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PAGE 01 OTTAWA 00524 01 OF 02 091804Z AUTHORITY State dept. 4w 8/1/00

42 ACTION NODS-00 BY dal NARA, DATE 6/14/10

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 OTTAWA 0524

NODIS

FOR ARA ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CU, CA  
SUBJ: BRIEFING ON TRUDEAU'S VISIT TO CUBA, MEXICO  
AND VENEZUELA

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW  
1-  Retain Class'n  Change to \_\_\_\_\_  
 Declassify in part and excise as shown  
EO 12958, 25X(6)( ) ( ) \_\_\_\_\_  
2-  Declassify  After 1/1/2007  
 With concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ (not)(obtained)  
IPS by gach sulan Date 8/1/00

- ON FEBRUARY 7, IVAN HEAD, SPECIAL ADVISER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU, GAVE TWO-AND-A-HALF HOUR BRIEFING TO ARA ASST SECRETARY WILLIAM D. ROGERS ON TRUDEAU'S LATE JANUARY VISIT TO MEXICO, CUBA, AND VENEZUELA, IN WHICH HEAD PARTICIPATED. BRIEFING STRUCTURED BY COMMENTS ON DISCUSSIONS IN EACH COUNTRY IN FOLLOWING ORDER.
- MEXICO. TRUDEAU VISIT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN TREATED ON HEAD OF STATE BASIS. IN USUAL LONG-WINDED FASHION, ECHEVERRIA ELABORATED HIS VIEWS ON STATE OF MEXICAN SOCIETY THROUGHOUT PAST CENTURY, SUGGESTING US HAD NOT DEALT KINDLY WITH MEXICO IN DISTANT PAST. ECHEVERRIA DID NOT EXPRESS ANY CURRENT ANTI-US ANIMUS AND SAID MEXICO WAS IN FACT STILL DEPENDENT ON US. TRUDEAU, IN RESPONSE TO PROPOSAL OF TRIANGULATION OF TRADE, SAID NOT MUCH COULD BE DONE SHORT OF TUNNELLING BENEATH U.S.
- MINISTERS WERE WELL BRIEFED AND THEIR PRESENTATIONS GOOD, WITH EXCEPTION OF ROBLES, WHO GAVE TIRESOME ONE-HOUR DISCOURSE ON DISARMAMENT. HIS SPECIAL INTEREST WAS IN

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NPT AND RECENT REVIEW CONFERENCE (HE USED WORD "REVISION"), AT WHICH HE FOUND CANADIAN ATTITUDES DESERVING HIS CRITICISM.

4. IN MEXICO, TRUDEAU PARTY RAISED FOLLOWING THREE SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION - NIEO-CERDS, NPT, AND LOS. (1) ON NIEO-CERDS, MEXICANS ASKED WHY CANADA HAD BEEN UNABLE SUPPORT CHARTER. TRUDEAU COUNTERED WITH QUESTION OF WHY SUBJECT COULD NOT BE APPROACHED ON NON-CONFRONTATIONAL BASIS. ECHEVERRIA REPLIED THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY. TRUDEAU THEN MENTIONED COMMONWEALTH PRACTICE OF CONCILIATORY APPROACH. CONCLUSION WAS THAT PERHAPS IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR CANADA AND MEXICO TO FIND COMMON GROUND. (2) ON NPT, CANADIANS EXPRESSED HOPE ALL COULD AGREE THAT PNE'S WERE NEITHER SAFE NOR COST-EFFECTIVE. MEXICANS RESPONDED THAT EXPLOSION WAS NECESSARY EN ROUTE TO CREATION OF POWER. AFTER CANADIANS ESSAYED EXPLANATION EXPLOSION UNNECESSARY, THEY THOUGHT PERHAPS ECHEVERRIA GOT THE MESSAGE. (3) ON LOS, CANADIANS MADE STRONG PITCH FOR MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION OF NEW MARITIME REGIME. ECHEVERRIA SAID PRESSURE WAS GREAT FOR EARLY ACTION. CANADIANS SAID THEY SHARED MEXICO'S OBJECTIVES, BUT DISAGREED WITH TACTICS. MEXICANS DID NOT RAISE SUBJECT OF TWELVE-NATION, CARIBBEAN "MATRIMONIAL" FISHERIES PACT. ROGERS COMMENTED THAT MEXICO COULD PLAY A KEY ROLE IN MATTER.

5. ON CAS AND POSSIBLE CANADIAN MEMBERSHIP, ECHEVERRIA TOOK NEUTRAL STANCE, SAYING CANADIANS SHOULD MAKE UP THEIR OWN MINDS. ECHEVERRIA MADE NO SUGGESTIONS (CAS PEREZ DID LATER) THAT CANADA ESTABLISH CONNECTION WITH SELA.

6. TRUDEAU AND PARTY HAD MEETING WITH LOPEZ PORTILLO AND WERE IMPRESSED WITH HIS WARMTH AND COMPETENCE, WHICH HE DEMONSTRATED IN DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS OF LONG-DISTANCE POWER TRANSMISSION.

7. TRUDEAU RAISED ANGOLA WITH ECHEVERRIA, WHO SAID MEXICO WAS OPPOSED TO CUBAN INTERVENTION. HIS FIRST PUBLIC MENTION OF SUBJECT (ACCORDING TO HEAD) WAS IN PRESS CONFERENCE DURING VISIT (TEXT BY SEPTTEL).



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8. DISCUSSIONS ON TOURISM AND COMMERCE WERE HARMONIOUS, BUT VAGUE. CANADIANS GOT LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE FROM MEXICANS ON SUBJECTS OF OIL AND PHOSPHATE EXPORTS. ROGERS COMMENTED THAT EVIDENCE WAS ACCUMULATING THAT THEIR OIL RESERVES WERE CONSIDERABLE. HEAD SAID CULTURAL AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, BUT IT WAS OF NO SPECIAL NOTE. FOOTING ON OTHER BILATERAL MATTERS WAS GOOD. TRUDEAU MENTIONED TO PRIVATE GROUP THAT CANADA HAD LOANED ONE BILLION DOLLARS TO MEXICAN INTERESTS.

9. ON BELIZE, MEXICANS SAID THAT HAD "BLOCKED" GUATEMALA'S CLAIM.

10. ECHEVERRIA DID NOT VOICE TO CANADIANS ASPIRATIONS TO BE SYG. THEIR IMPRESSION FROM OTHER SOURCES WAS THAT HE WOULD PREFER TO RUN THIRD WORLD UNIVERSITY.

11. VENEZUELA. ON BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, TRUDEAU RAISED MATTER OF CANADA'S TRADE DEFICIT WITH VENEZUELA, AND PEREZ AGREED SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE, THOUGH HE WANTED CANADA TO INCREASE ITS OIL IMPORTS FROM ESTIMATED 270,000 B/D. CURRENTLY. CANADA WAS INTERESTED IN MAKING RAILWAY AND SUBWAY SALES, THOUGH IT APPRECIATED NO EARLY RESULTS LIKELY. CANADIANS PROPOSED UMBRELLA-TYPE AGREEMENT COVERING TRADE, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND SO ON. VENEZUELAN AGREE, THOUGH PEREZ SAID STUDY WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN FIRST, FOLLOWED IN TWO MONTHS BY VISIT OF VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS TO CANADA.

12. ON SELA, VENEZUELAN SUGGESTED CANADA BECOME INVOLVED, AND CANADIANS AGREED TO PURSUE THOUGHT OF CONNECTION.

13. ON OAS, PEREZ SAID CANADA SHOULD CONSIDER FULL MEMBERSHIP. OAS WAS NOT DEAD, THOUGH NOT MUCH THOUGHT WAS BEING GIVEN TO RESTRUCTURING IT AND REFORM WAS HARDLY A LIVELY ISSUE.

14. CANADIANS INVITED PEREZ TO VISIT CANADA, HOPEFULLY THIS FALL. THEY EXPRESSED PREFERENCE TO ROGERS THAT IF PEREZ WERE TO VISIT US ON SAME JOURNEY THAT CANADIAN VISIT TAKE

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PLACE FIRST. THEY REITERATED OLD SENSITIVITY ABOUT CANADIAN CALLS SO FREQUENTLY BEING TACKLED ON TO PRIOR US VISITS.

15. ON ANGOLA, VENEZUELAN MADE FIRST PUBLIC MENTIONED (ACCORDING TO HEAD) OF THEIR OPPOSITION TO CUBAN INTERVENTION DURING CANADIAN VISIT (TEXT BY SEPTTEL). PEREZ WAS NOT CRITICAL OF CUBAN POLICIES IN LOCAL AREA. HE MADE NO CRITICISM OF CANADIAN VISIT TO CUBA.



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16. PEREZ SUGGESTED THAT TRUDEAU ATTEND CONFERENCE OF NATIONS OF HEMISPHERE IN PANAMA IN JUNE.

17. ON GUYANAN BORDER ISSUE, PEREZ SAID MORATORIUM WOULD NOT BE BREECHED.

18. VENEZUELAN (HERNANDEZ) OFFERED VIEW THAT KIDNAPPING OF OPEC MINISTERS IN VIENNA HAD BEEN LED BY CARLOS. BUT THEY DID NOT STRONGLY PUSH ANY PROPOSALS FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM, THOUGH ONE OFFICIAL MENTIONED THE DESIRABILITY OF REFUSING HIJACKERS ASYLUM.

19. TRUDEAU GARNERED IMPRESSION THAT VENEZUELAN WERE SATISFIED THAT PANAMA'S "JUST CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGNTY" WERE BEING MET IN NEGOTIATIONS ON FUTURE OF CANAL. ROGERS SKETCHED PROGRESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND EMPHASIZED HOPE ALL COUNTRIES SHARED INTEREST IN FACILITY OPEN TO WORLD COMMERCE AND TENDERED BELIEF US THERE AS ITS SURROGATE.

20. ON NPT, VENEZUELAN WERE RECEPTIVE TO EXPRESSION BY CANADIANS OF THEIR CONCERN OVER BRAZILIAN PROGRAM (HEAD ASKED SPECIAL PROTECTION IN THIS PARA). PEREZ WANTED TRUDEAU TO KNOW HE HAD BEEN FEARFUL OF WHAT MIGHT BE ARRANGED BETWEEN FRG AND BRAZIL AND, IF BRAZIL WENT NUCLEAR, OF ARGENTINA'S DOING THE SAME. PEREZ SAID HE HAD LEARNED FROM FRG OFFICIAL OR NATIONAL THAT FRG WAS NOT ITSELF INTERESTED IN GOING NUCLEAR, AND WAS NOT

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INTERESTED IN BRAZIL'S GOING NUCLEAR. HE HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCE FROM THIS INDIVIDUAL THAT PRG WOULD NOT PASS TO BRAZIL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF WEAPONS-PRODUCING NATURE. (HEAD WOULD APPRECIATE LEARNING IDENTITY OF THIS INDIVIDUAL IF ASCERTAINABLE.)

21. CUBA. CASTRO HIMSELF RAISED SUBJECT OF DISCRETION INVOLVED FOR CANADIANS IN VISITING CUBA. HE EXPRESSED GRATITUDE TO CANADA (AND MEXICO) FOR ITS POSITION DURING ALL CUBA'S HARD YEARS, ESPECIALLY ITS FRIENDSHIP DURING BLOCKADE.

22. CASTRO INVOKED NO SPECIAL TIRADE AGAINST US. HE MADE USUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN USG AND AMERICAN PEOPLE. ON SUBJECT OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH US, HE SAID USG WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO RECOGNIZE REALITY OF CUBA.

23. CASTRO WAS FRANK ABOUT RECEIPT SOVIET ASSISTANCE. HE VOLUNTEERED THAT OPEC'S HIGH OIL PRICES HURT LDC'S MORE THAN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN MAKING THIS POINT TO LDC'S. CANADIANS ENCOURAGED HIM TO CONTINUE DOING SO.

24. ON MIDDLE EAST, CASTRO WAS VAGUE. HE SAID IT WAS WRONG TO CAST OUT ISRAEL, BUT WRONG AT SAME TIME TO DENY PALESTINIANS. SECURE AND RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES WERE NEEDED.

25. CASTRO RAISED CHILE, BLAMING ROLE OF US. THERE WAS NO DISCUSSION OF PANAMA.

26. CASTRO WAS INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING BILATERAL TRADE, NOTING NEED FOR MECHANIZATION OF PORT FACILITIES. CANADIANS EXPRESSED INTEREST AS SUPPLIERS. CASTRO DID NOT MENTION US RESTRICTIONS ON CANADIAN-CUBAN TRADE.

27. ON ANGOLA, HEAD COMMENTED TO ROGERS THAT NEITHER CASTRO NOR TRUDEAU MENTIONED MATTERS OF CUBAN LANDINGS AT GANDER AND FUTURE USE OF DC-8'S.

28. PRINCIPAL DISCUSSION OF ANGOLA TOOK PLACE EVENING SPENT AT SMALL LIGHTHOUSE ISLAND. CASTRO COMMENCED WITH HISTORICAL REVIEW, CITING LONG INTEREST IN AFRICA AND FRIENDSHIP WITH TOURE AND OTHERS. CUBA HAD EARLY ON OFFERED SUPPORT TO MPLA (FURNISHING MILITARY TRAINING AS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REVEALED IN

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CASTRO'S ACCOUNT), BUT HAD HAD NO INTENTION OF INTERVENING FURTHER. BUT ON OCTOBER 23, SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES CAME UPON CUBAN MILITARY TRAINING SCHOOL NEAR BENGUELA, KILLING ALL CUBANS THERE. THEN, ZAIREAN FORCES ENTERED THE CONFLICT. MPLA INVITED CUBAN TO SEND TROOPS, AND HE CHOSE TO RESPOND BECAUSE SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAIRE WERE THERE - AND CLANDESTINELY. OTHERWISE, HE FELT ANGOLA WOULD LOSE. HE MADE DECISION WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH SOVIETS. IT WAS HIS MEN, HIS TRANSPORT, HIS MONEY.

29. TRUDEAU ASKED AT THIS POINT WHY CASTRO DID NOT FAVOR NON-INTERVENTION. TRUDEAU SAID CASTRO'S ACTION HAD DRIVEN WEDGES BETWEEN HIS (TRUDEAU'S) FRIENDS KUADDA, NYERERE, AND KHAMA. CASTRO AGREED THERE WAS AN APPROPRIATENESS IN NON-INTERVENTION, BUT HE HAD BEEN INVITED. IT WAS NOT INTERVENTION ON HIS PART, MOREOVER, SINCE CUBANS HAD AN AFRICAN INHERITANCE. FURTHER, THE FORCES OF LIBERTY AND PROGRESS HAD TO STAND TOGETHER.

30. HEAD SAID HE THEN ASKED CASTRO HOW HE (CASTRO) COULD JUSTIFY INTERVENTION WHEN EVEN AFRICANS WERE NOT INVOLVED. HE ASKED IF CASTRO HAD CONSIDERED WHETHER HE WAS BEING USED TO DO NIGERIA'S BUSINESS AGAINST ZAIRE. DID HE WANT A HOSTILE ZAIRE? DID HE WANT TO EARN HATRED BEING THE WHITE MAN ENEMY IN AFRICA?

31. CASTRO REPLIED THAT CUBA WOULD LEAVE WHEN THE MPLA ASKED IT TO GO. HEAD SAID HE RISKED BEING CAUGHT AND TIED DOWN. AFRICANS WANT TO SETTLE THEIR OWN AFFAIRS. THE OAU IS ANTAGONIZED OVER THE ISSUE AND SPLIT DOWN THE MIDDLE. WHEN CASTRO SAID THAT THE GOOD GUYS (NYERERE, BOUNEDIENE, QADHAFI) WERE ON HIS SIDE, HEAD RESPONDED THAT NYERERE HAD TOLD HIM AT THE TIME OF BIAFRA THAT THE WHITE MAN (INCLUDING CANADIANS) SHOULD STAY OUT OF AFRICA.

32. CASTRO SAID THAT KAUNDA WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN THE ECONOMICS OF THE SITUATION, NOTABLY THE RAILWAY TO THE COAST. HEAD REPLIED THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, KAUNDA COULD NOT BE WRITTEN OFF IN THOSE TERMS, THAT KAUNDA HAD TOLD HIM HE WAS WILLING TO MAKE ECONOMIC SACRIFICES.

33. CASTRO THEN SAID IT WAS A MISTAKE TO EMPHASIZE COMMONWEALTH TIES AND THEIR IMPORTANCE. LOOK AT SOUTH AFRICA. HEAD RESPONDED THAT SOUTH AFRICA WAS NOT IN THE COMMONWEALTH, NOR IN THE OAU.

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34. CASTRO CONJECTURED THE MPLA WOULD WIN AN ELECTION, TO WHICH HEAD SAID IT WOULD NOT BECAUSE IT HAD ONLY ITS TRIBAL CONSTITUENCY. CASTRO SAID IT WOULD WIN ON THE BASIS OF IDEOLOGY. HEAD SAID HE HAD AN INSUFFICIENT APPRECIATION OF AFRICAN SCENE. NYERERE AND KAUNDA WERE TOGETHER ON RHODESIA, BUT WERE BEING DIVIDED BY CUBA ON THIS ISSUE. NAMIBIA WAS NOT HIGH ON THEIR LIST AND WAS IN FACT JUST AHEAD OF SOUTH AFRICA AS A TARGET.

35. CASTRO THEN SAID THAT IF AND ASSUMING THE SOUTH AFRICANS PULLED BACK, THE CUBANS WOULD BEGIN TO PULL OUT, CONSISTENT WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THE MPLA, IN PERHAPS THREE WEEKS. (HEAD SAID THAT RODRIGUEZ TOLD HIM THE NEXT DAY THAT THE CUBANS HAD BEEN SPLIT OVER WHETHER TO SEND TROOPS AND THEN WERE DIVIDED OVER HOW LONG TO KEEP THEM THERE, CASTRO FAVORING THE SHORTER PERIOD OF THREE WEEKS. HEAD ESTIMATED THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO REEVALUATE THE SITUATION.)

36. HEAD GIVE HIS ANALYSIS TO ROGERS THAT CASTRO HAD MADE A VERY CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT BEFORE TAKING HIS ACTION. HE THOUGHT HE WAS NOT A SOVIET PAWN AND WAS PERHAPS AN UNCONTROLLABLE EMBASSASSMENT TO THE SOVIETS. AT NO POINT HAD CASTRO INDICATED THE NUMBER OF CUBAN TROOPS IN ANGOLA. HE HAD SAID NO FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WERE IN USE ON EITHER SIDE. CASTRO SEEMED INDIFFERENT ABOUT HIS IMAGE ELSEWHERE IN THIS REGARD.

37. WHEN ASKED WHAT SUGGESTIONS HE MIGHT HAVE HIMSELF, HEAD SAID THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS COULD BE PERSUADED TO PULL BACK, MAYBE CUBA WOULD WITHDRAW.

38. ALSO PRESENT AT ABOVE BRIEFING WERE JIM NUTT, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS BUREAU, EXTAFF, PIERRE CHARPENTIER, DIRECTOR OF LATIN AMERICAN DIVISION, EXTAFF, AND CHARGE. JOHNSON



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FOR ARA SECRETARY ROGERS ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, AD, CA  
SUBJ: TRUDEAU PRESS STATEMENTS ON ANGOLA IN CARACAS AND  
MEXICO CITY

REF: OTTAWA 0524

1. CHARPENTIER OF EXSTAFF RECONFIRMED TO ME TODAY THAT BOTH PEREZ (IN CARACAS) AND ECHEVERRIA (IN MEXICO CITY) MADE PUBLIC MENTION OF SUBJECT OF ANGOLA IN RESPECTIVE PRESS CONFERENCES (JOINT IN CARACAS, SEPARATE IN MEXICO CITY), HELD WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU DURING HIS VISITS THERE. CHARPENTIER WAS PRESENT AND RECALLS EACH SAYING HE OPPOSED ANY FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA. UNFORTUNATELY, CHARPENTIER REPORTS HE MISINFORMED US; HE DOES NOT HAVE TEXTS. HE HAS TEXTS ONLY OF TRUDEAU'S REMARKS, WHICH CONTAIN FOLLOWING REFERENCES TO ANGOLA QUESTION:

A. PRESS CONFERENCE IN CARACAS FEBRUARY 2: SETIN QUOTE BUT IN AREAS WHERE WE (AND THE CUBANS) HAVE POLITICAL DIFFERENCES THEY WERE MADE QUITE CLEAR AND ALMOST BRUTALLY FRANK ON THE ANGOLAN QUESTION, FOR INSTANCE. THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THE CUBANS' MINDS AS TO WHAT OUR POSITION IS. I DON'T KNOW WHAT PARTICULAR CRITICISM HAS BEEN RAISED BACK HOME OR HERE AS YOU SAY IN VENEZUELAN JOURNALS, YOU HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND THAT THESE PEOPLE KNOW EACH OTHER, THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE INFLUENCED BY MY

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PARTICULAR WAY OF REACTING TO HOSPITALITY. PRESIDENT PEREZ AND PREMIER CASTRO HAVE KNOWN EACH OTHER A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF YEARS AND I BELIEVE THEY WERE BOTH IN EXILE TOGETHER FIGHTING DICTATORSHIPS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. I AM NOT SURE ABOUT PRESIDENT ECHEVERRIA, BUT OBVIOUSLY MEXICO AND CUBA HAVE MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH CUBA BEING THE ONLY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE HEMISPHERE TO DO SO WITH CANADA. I DON'T, QUITE FRANKLY, AT HOME THERE MAY BE SOME MISUNDERSTANDING, I'LL CLEAR THAT UP IF NEEDS BE WHEN I GET BACK BY REMINDING CANADIANS ONCE AGAIN THAT THE CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT IS THE GOVERNMENT THAT KEPT RELATIONS AND MAINTAINED RELATIONS WITH CUBA AND THEREFORE IN A SENSE WE ARE FOLLOWING A BILATERAL POLICY, BY-PARTISAN POLICY. BUT INSOFAR AS PEOPLE IN THE REGION ARE CONCERNED, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE LEADERS THAT I MET HAVE THEIR OWN IDEAS AND HAVE MADE UP THEIR OWN MIND ABOUT CASTRO AND ABOUT HIS ROLE IN ANGOLA AND THEY DON'T NEED MY LEAD TO KNOW WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. I THINK THEIR FEARS ARE PERHAPS EVEN GREATER THAN OURS BECAUSE THEY ARE IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN AND THEY ARE PROBABLY MORE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN AS A RESULT OF THE ANGOLAN INTERVENTION THAN CANADA FROM A MORE REMOVED POSITION IS.

END QUOTE.

B. PRESS CONFERENCE IN MEXICO CITY JANUARY 25 CONTAINED NO REFERENCE TO ANGOLA.

C. PRESS CONFERENCE IN HAVANA JANUARY 26: BEGIN QUOTE

WELL, THE CANADIAN VIEW ON ANGOLA HAS BEEN STATED PUBLICLY BY MACEACHEN AND BY MYSELF TO THOSE WHO ASKED: THAT WE ARE AGAINST MILITARY INTERVENTION BY OUTSIDERS IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD. WE WERE AGAINST IT PREVIOUSLY, WE REMAIN AGAINST IT NOW, AND WE WILL REMAIN AGAINST IT IN THE FUTURE. WE DON'T THINK THAT INTERVENTION BY... (BREAK IN TAPE)... LEAD TO AN ENLARGING OF THE HOSTILITIES RATHER THAN A REDUCTION OF THEM. BUT I DON'T EXPECT PREMIER CASTRO TO SHARE MY OPINION, AND I THINK THAT ON MANY AREAS WE WILL HAVE TO AGREE TO DISAGREE.  
END QUOTE

D. PRESS CONFERENCE IN HAVANA JANUARY 29: BEGIN QUOTE

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WELL, THE WAY IN WHICH I WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE TALKS (WITH CASTRO) IS TO USE THE USUAL CLICHE, THEY WERE VERY FRANK AND FULL. BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, I THINK THE CLICHE IS MORE THAN THAT, IT IS A REALITY. THERE WAS VERY EXTENSIVE EXPLORATION NOT ONLY OF ANGOLA BUT OF THE WHOLE BALANCE OF POWER IN AFRICA, THE APPRECIATION OF DIFFERENT THRENDNS, OF DIFFERENT COUNTIRES AND LEADERS. I FOUND PREMIER CASTRO EXTREMELY WELL INFORMED ON AFRICA. I HAVE SOME SLIGHT KNOWLEDGE OF IT BECAUSE OF MY SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH WELL-KNOWN COMMONWEALTH LEADERS THERE, AND I CERTAINLY WAS IN A POSITION TO APPRECIATE THE QUALITY OF HIS ASSESSMENT OF THESE PEOPLE AND I COULD ADD TO THAT SEVERAL OTHER WORLD LEADERS THAT I KNOW THROUGH THE COMMONWEALTH, FOR INSTANCE PRIME MINISTER MANLEY, OF JAMAICA. IT WAS OBVIOUS TO ME THAT PREMIER CASTRO HAD MADE THIS DECISION WITH A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT AND OF FEELING FOR THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN AFRICA. YOU KNOW, THIS WASN'T JUST A SHORT, QUICK ANSWER TO A SHORT, QUICK QUESTION; THERE WAS A VERY LENGTHY ATTEMPT ON BOTH SIDES TO INFLUENCE THE OTHER, I SUPPOSE. I CAN'T SAY THAT I HAVE CHANGED MY MIND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF NON-INTERVENTION, AND I THINK I WOULD BE FOOLHARDY TO ASSUME THAT I CHANGED PREMIER CASTRO'S MIND. BUT I CERTAINLY CAME OUT OF THE TALK WITH A MUCH GREATER KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE AFRICAN SITUATION VIEWED FROM THE PARTICULAR SOCIALIST POINT OF VIEW OF PREMIER CASTRO, AND I HOPE THAT HE ALSO BENEFITED FROM SOME OF THE IDEAS AND ARGUMENTS THAT I PUT FORTH. END QUOTE

2. FULL TEXTS ABOVE FOUR PRESS CONFERENCES POUCHED TO YOU TODAY.

3. COMMENT: WILLIAM MADER, TIME MAGAZINE OTTAWA BUREAU CHIEF WHO ACCOMPANIED OFFICIAL PARTY, TOLD ME THAT ANGOLA COME UP AT ECHEVERRIA PRESS CONFERENCE IN QUESTION. IN REPLYING, ECHEVERRIA NEVER USED WORK "ANGOLA", BUT SAID HE HAD BEEN AGAINST FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM AND WAS OPPOSED TO IT IN PRINCIPLE IN OTHER PLACES.  
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# TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

*MR07-62 #6; State ltr 11/14/07*

N0018

DISTRIBUTE TO STATE AND NSC ONLY

**BY del NARA DATE 9/9/08**

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIF (TRUDEAU, P. E.), CN  
SBJ: TRUDEAU ON RELATIONS WITH U.S.

1. SUMMARY. IN MY FIRST HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION ALONE WITH HIM ON MARCH 23, TRUDEAU AGREED THAT OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WILL PROBABLY IMPROVE WITH THE BUSINESS CYCLE, MAINTAINED THAT CANADIAN CULTURAL NATIONALISM WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE A PROBLEM BETWEEN US IN THE FUTURE, BUT SAID HE COULD SEE US CLASHING ON SUCH IDEOLOGICAL ISSUES AS THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMY, INCLUDING PUBLIC OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE. HE SAID WE SHOULD TRY TRY TO CONCEPTUALIZE OUR RELATINSHIP MORE; SUGGESTED WE MEET OCCASIONALLY AT LUNCH TO DO SO. END SUMMARY.

2. TRUDEAU KEPT COMING BACK TO THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF HOW IN THE FACE OF THE PULL OF U.S. CONSUMPTION STANDARDS THE CANADIAN ECONOMY COULD BE REORGANIZED TOWARD MORE PUBLIC AND LESS PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, WITH CURBS ON ADVERTISING AND MORE PUBLIC OWNERSHIP. IF HE WANTED TO DETER CANADIAN ADVERTISING BY TAXATION, TRUDEAU SAID, THAT WOULD ONLY INCREASE CANADIAN DEMAND FOR AMERICAN PRODUCTS. IF HE WANTED TO DETER PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN CANADA, CANADIANS WOULD CONSTANTLY HAVE THEIR EYES ON THE HIGHER AMERICAN STANDARD, AND WOULD RESIST. IF HE WANTED TO NATIONALIZE INDUSTRY,

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INCLUDING HIS FIRMS, US PUBLIC OPINION WOULD REVOLT. TRUDEAU SAID THAT IT WAS THIS SORT OF ISSUE, NOT CANADIAN CULTURE OR THE CLASSIC ENERGY AND ECONOMIC DISPUTES WE NOW HAVE, THAT WOULD CAUSE CONFLICT BETWEEN US IN THE FUTURE. CANADIAN CULTURE HAS JUST ABOUT REACHED THE POINT WHERE RESTRICTIVE ACTION SUCH AS AGAINST BEGIN UNDERLINE TIME END UNDERLINE WILL NO LONGER BE NECESSARY.

3. I REPLIED THAT THERE IS PROBABLY A LOT MORE SCOPE FOR SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT IN OUR ECONOMIES THAN WE THINK. MOST OF TRUDEAU'S EXAMPLES COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY AN IMAGINATIVE USE OF EXCHANGE RATE, TAX AND TARIFF CHANGES, AND I DESCRIBED TO HIM HOW HE WOULD DO IT. THE IMPORTANT THING, I ARGUED, WAS TO AVOID TRYING TO ENGINEER SEPARATE DEVELOPMENT BY RESTRICTING EXCHANGES. HE COULD SEE THE SORT OF PUBLIC RESENTMENT SUCH ACTION HAS GENERATED THESE LAST YEARS. IF THOSE RESENTMENTS WERE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP, THEY COULD CAST OUR RELATIONSHIP IN ADVERSARY MODE IN SPIITE OF THE EFFORT OF GOVERNMENT TO AVOID IT. ON PUBLIC OWNERSHIP, I TOLD HIM THAT HE WAS QUITE RIGHT ABOUT US OPINION, BUT THAT AS A GOVERNMENT WE DON'T CONTEST EXPROPRIATION FOR AUTHENTIC PUBLIC PURPOSES, PROVIDED THERE IS FULL PAYMENT. WHEN CANADA WANTS TO CHANGE A SECTOR OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, I SAID, MAIN THING IS FOR US TO COOPERATE ON THE WHOLE SCENARIO RATHER THAN HAVE INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS POP UP WITHOUT CONTROL.

4. TRUDEAU AGREED WITH THESE POINTS BUT REPEATED HIS CONCERN THAT DIFFERING PHILOSOPHIES ON HOW TO ORGANIZE OUR DOMESTIC ECONOMIES MAY LEAD US INTO CONFLICT.

5. ON INDIVIDUAL ISSUES, TRUDEAU EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE TIME DISPUTE CAME OUT AS IT DID (HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT A CANADIANIZED TIME REMAIN); PROFESSED IGNORANCE OF THE TV COMMERCIAL DELETION ISSUE, BUT SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO IT, GIVEN THE POLITICAL TOPSIN ON OUR SIDE; AND PROBED OUR ATTITUDES ON SASKATCHEWAN POTASH, CUBA AND OTHER FOREIGN ISSUES WERE NOT DISCUSSED.

6. TRUDEAU CONCLUDED THAT WE SHOULD TRY TO CONCEPTUALIZE

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OUR RELATIONSHIP MORE, PARTICULARLY IN ITS LONG-TERM ASPECTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE INVITE EACH OTHER TO LUNCH OCCASIONALLY TO DO SO, PROVIDED "YOU DON'T TELL MY CABINET." (HE HAS BEEN IN TROUBLE WITH UNIONS AND BUSINESS SINCE NEW YEAR'S FOR CONCEPTUALIZING BY PUBLICLY ESPOUSING KEN GALBRAITH'S THEORY THAT THE MARKET ECONOMY NEEDS TO BE REPLACED BY A LOWER GROWTH, CONTROLLED ECONOMY.) VERBATIM NOTES POUCHED.

7. COMMENT: TRUDEAU WAS AS ADVERTISED: ELEGANT, CONTRARY, BRITTLE, UNABLE TO RESIST INTELLECTUALIZING, PREOCCUPIED WITH GALBRAITHIAN THOUGHTS THAT FEW IN CANADA SHARE WITH HIM. HE WAS ALSO VERY FRIENDLY.

8. CHANCES ARE THAT HE WILL NOT HAVE THE POWER TO MOVE VERY FAR TOWARDS IMPLEMENTING THOSE THOUGHTS (HE HAS MADE NO MOVE TO DO SO SINCE NEW YEAR'S) AND HIS PARTICULAR SCENARIO FOR US/CANADIAN CLASHES IS UNLIKELY TO BE A BIG HEADACHE FOR A WHILE. MORE INTERESTING IS HIS ASSESSMENT THAT FURTHER ACTION PROTECTIVE OF CANADIAN CULTURE MAY NOT BE NEEDED. IF TRUE, THAT COULD AVOID SOME OF THE MOST PRICKLY AND UNMANAGEABLE DISPUTES.

9. I WILL FOLLOW UP HIS OFFER TO LUNCH OCCASIONALLY, WHICH TRUDEAU'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR IVAN HEAD TELLS HE HAS NOT BEEN MADE BEFORE. ENDERS

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DEPARTMENT PASS TO COUNSELOR SONNENFELDT FROM ENDERS

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E.O. 11652: XGDS  
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) CA  
SUBJ: INCREASE IN CANADIAN EXPORT PRICES FOR GAS

REF: (A) OTTAWA 2004; (B) OSLO SECTO 13011

1. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO CEASE DISCUSSION OF THE GAS PRICE ISSUE PER YOUR TELEGRAM (REFTEL B), UNLESS WE ARE PREPARED TO BACK OFF THE SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS THAT WE HAVE NOW AND INDEED HAVE FOR THE LAST TWO YEARS TAKEN WITH THE CANADIANS ON EXPORT GAS PRICES (THAT WE ACCEPT PRICE INCREASES BUT DO NOT WANT OUR CONSUMERS TO BE TREATED WORSE THAN THEIRS; THAT WE ACCEPT PRICING AT THE COMMODITY VALUE, BUT NEED TO HAVE A CLEARLY IDENTIFIED STANDARD TO DEFINE THAT).

2. CANADA'S PROPOSAL TO RAISE GAS PRICES POSED TWO PROBLEMS FOR US. (A) IF ANNOUNCED MAY 18 AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, IT COULD BECOME AN ISSUE IN WEST COAST PRIMARIES; AND (B) IT WOULD INCREASE RATHER THAN DECREASE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST AMERICAN CONSUMERS AND WAS SO LOOSELY JUSTIFIED THAT IT COULD LEAD TO FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES.

3. AS I REPORTED IN REFTEL (A), CANADIAN CABINET AGREED AT MY URGING ON MAY 17 TO TAKE CARE OF THE FIRST PROBLEM

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES  
BY 661, NARA, DATE 10/15/01



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AND DELAY ANNOUNCEMENT OF EXPORT GAS PRICE INCREASES. PUBLICLY OTTAWA HAS SAID THAT IT IS DISCUSSING THE GAS PRICE INCREASES WITH THE U.S. AND THEY WILL BE ANNOUNCED LATER. PRIVATELY CANADIAN OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN TELLING THE PRESS THAT LATER MEANS MID-JUNE.


4. AT THE SAME TIME THE CANADIANS AGREED THAT WE COULD HAVE SOME SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF THE GAS PRICE ISSUE, AND ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ TO HEAD A TEAM UP HERE IN THE MIDDLE OF NEXT WEEK. THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO UNDERTAKING BY THE CANADIANS TO ALTER THEIR POSITION, BUT THEY HAVE INSISTED THAT THEY WANTED TO CONSULT WITH US FULLY BEFORE TAKING A FINAL DECISION.

5. YOUR INSTRUCTION TO STOP TALKING ABOUT THE ISSUE WOULD PREEMPT THAT CONSULTATION PROCESS, AND DEPRIVE US OF AN OPPORTUNITY WE MAY HAVE TO GET SOME ADJUSTMENT IN THE CANADIAN NUMBERS.

6. I HOPE YOU AND THE SECRETARY WILL RECONSIDER. WE SHOULD NOT BACK OFF OUR SUBSTANTIVE POSITION AND THE OPPORTUNITY THE CANADIANS ARE GIVING US TO PUT IT FORWARD, WHATEVER THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS.

7. I WOULD AGREE ENTIRELY THAT NO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE TIMING OF THE CANADIAN DECISION IS NECESSARY INASMUCH AS THE CANADIAN CABINET HAS ALREADY GRANTED THE DELAY WE SOUGHT.  
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
E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: OVIP (TRUDEAU, PIERRE E.), CA  
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH TRUDEAU

MR 02-76; #4 pt. 12/4/02  
By duc NARA, Date 1/28/03

1. SUMMARY. IN LONG TALK AUGUST 6 GIVEN OVER TO PHILOSOPHY, TRUDEAU EXPRESSED THREE FUNDAMENTAL PREOCCUPATIONS:

(A) THAT THE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE NO LONGER WORKING WELL, AND MUST BE REFORMED FUNDAMENTALLY, (B) THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE LOSING THE STRUGGLE FOR THE DEVELOPING WORLD, AND (C) THAT CANADA HAS MADE NO HEADWAY DURING HIS ADMINISTRATION IN SOVLING THE FRENCH/ENGLISH SPLIT. ALL OF THESE VIEWS HE HAS STATED VARIOUSLY AND OFTEN BEFORE, BUT I WAS STRUCK BY HIS CONVICTION AND BY HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE POLITICAL COSTS OF ASSERTING THEM. REFERRING FREQUENTLY TO CLUB OF ROME THINKING ON THE NEED FOR NEW POLITICAL AND MORAL APPROACHES TO ECONOMIES (ALTHOUGH EXPLICITLY DISAVOWING LIMITS TO GROWTH), TRUDEAU BRUSHED ASIDE ANY SUGGESTION OF ALTERING HIS TACTICS IN ORDER TO POSITION HIMSELF BETTER FOR THE COMING ELECTION STRUGGLE. HE EXPRESSED AMAZEMENT FOR THE GOOD ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE US THIS YEAR, AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HIS OWN POLICIES HAD ALIENATED BOTH LABOR AND MANAGEMENT, BUT SAID HE WILL PERSIST. I SEE NO REASON

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TO DOUBT IT. END SUMMARY.

2. HAD THE TRUDEAUS OVER TO DINNER ALONE AUGUST 6. IT WAS PRIMARILY A SOCIAL OCCASION BUT TRUDEAU HAD JUST COME FROM DISAPPOINTING EFFORT TO ASSOCIATE LABOR IN A TRIPARTITE POST-CONTROLS POLICY BODY (OTTAWA 3185), AND KNEW HE WOULD FACE A ONE-DAY NATIONWIDE WORK STOPPAGE THIS FALL. HE WANTED TO TALK ECONOMIC PHILOSOPHY.

3. THE GREAT INFLATION AND THE "GREAT WASTEFULNESS" OF THE SEVENTIES SHOWS THAT SOMETHING IS FUNDAMENTALLY WRONG, TRUDEAU ARGUED. THE MARKET SYSTEM, INTENDED TO MEDIATE GREED FOR SOCIAL BENEFIT, IS INSTEAD BEING DOMINATED BY IT, WITH EACH GROUP VYING TO OUTGRAB THE OTHERS. A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT IS NEEDED. CANADA'S WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS ARE THE FIRST STEP OF AN INTEGRATIVE PROCESS INTENDED TO ESTABLISH IT. THE SECOND STOP WOULD BE THE POST-CONTROLS BUSINESS/LABOR/GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE TRUDEAU IS PROMOTING. THE STRUCTURE WILL KEEP EVOLVING IN THE FUTURE.

4. I OBSERVED THAT WHAT APPEARS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE ALL-OUT OPPOSITION OF LABOR AND INCREASINGLY OF BUSINESS TO TRUDEAU'S PROGRAM IS THE CONCEPT OF PERMANENTLY PREEMPTING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE MARKET SYSTEM. A TEMPORARY SYSTEM WOULD BE MUCH EASIER TO SELL. TRUDEAU AGREED BUT SAID THAT THERE'S NO POINT IN TRYING TO BE PRIME MINISTER IF YOU DON'T PUT TO SOCIETY REALISTICALLY WHAT IT NEEDS TO DO TO SUCCEED.

5. TRUDEAU ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY OF HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE PUERTO RICO SUMMIT THOUGHT THE 1973-74 INFLATION EXCEPTIONAL, DUE TO SIMULTANEOUS PEAKING OF ALL THE INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES AND THE OIL PRICE HIKE. HE ADMITTED ALSO THAT "AMAZING" US ECONOMIC RESULTS THIS YEAR DON'T FIT HIS THEORY; US AND CANADIAN BUDGET DEFICITS ARE THE SAME SIZE RELATIVE TO THE ECONOMY, BUT AMERICAN PRICE/WAGE AND GROWTH PERFORMANCE IS BETTER THAN CANADA'S, AND GROWTH OF MONEY SUPPLY IN THE US SUBSTANTIALLY LESS. "YOU AMERICANS HAVE LEARNED SOMETHING, SOME RESTRAINT AND MUTUAL TOLERANCE, THAT WE CANADIANS HAVE YET TO

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Department of State

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GRASP," TRUDEAU SAID. HE SPECULATED IT MAY HAVE BEEN DUE TO OUR EARLIER EXPERIENCE WITH CONTROLS, AND THE SHARPER IMPACT OF THE RECESSION.

6. TRUDEAU ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FIRST YEAR WAGE SETTLEMENTS IN CANADA HAVE BEEN COMING DOWN, FROM OVER 16 PERCENT IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1975 TO LESS THAN 12 PERCENT IN THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1976.

7. BUT NEITHER THE SLOWDOWN IN CANADA NOR THE GOOD US PERFORMANCE COMFORTED HIM. "CANADA WILL GET FIRST YEAR WAGE SETTLEMENTS DOWN TO EIGHT PERCENT IN 1977, AND THEN THEY'LL START GOING UP AGAIN." THE US, HE PREDICTED, WILL ALSO RUN INTO TROUBLE, WITH SETTLEMENT MOVING INTO DOUBLE-DIGIT FIGURES BY END 1976. AND YET, TRUDEAU CONCLUDED, EVEN THEN THE UNITED STATES MAY NOT FOLLOW HIM INTO CONTROLS: "THE UNITED STATES IS AN AMAZING COUNTRY, RESILIENT AND ADAPTABLE FAR BEYOND CANADA. THERE IS A DYNAMIC TO YOUR COUNTRY I DO NOT UNDERSTAND."

8. IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, TRUDEAU SAID, THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ARE STEADILY LOSING GROUND. "SOON WE WILL BE UNDER SIEGE IN A WORLD THAT ONLY A GENERATION AGO WE HOPED TO CONVERT TO OUR SYSTEM." BUT TRUDEAU WAS NOT SURE OF HOW TO REMEDY IT. WE SHOULD, HE SAID, BE FAR MORE RESPONSIVE, GENEROUS TO LDC DEMANDS. BUT HE AGREED WITH MY ARGUMENTS THAT MANY OF THE DEMANDS (COMMODITY PRICE INDEXING, INDISCRIMINATE DEBT RELIEF, FOR EXAMPLE) COULD IF MET DAMAGE THE LDC'S AS A WHILE FAR MORE THAN THEY HELPED THEM. COMING TO CLUB OF ROME ARGUMENTS, TRUDEAU SAID THAT THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THE SECULAR DECLINE IN LDC TERMS OF TRADE IS FOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES TO SHARE MARKETS WITH THEM, CURBING OUR OWN PRODUCTION IN AGRICULTURE FOR EXAMPLE TO ALLOW LDC'S TO INCREASE THEIR EXPORTS.

9. I REMARKED THAT REPEATED STUDIES RUN IN WASHINGTON FAILED TO TURN UP EVIDENCE OF A SECULAR DECLINE IN LDC TERMS OF TRADE, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MARKED FLUCTUATIONS DURING THE BUSINESS CYCLE. TRUDEAU SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE EVIDENCE (WHICH I PROMISED TO

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PROVIDE). IF IT HOLDS UP, HE WILL USE IT WITH NYERERE, MANLEY, BURNHAM AND OTHER THIRD WORLD LEADERS HE SEES OFTEN.

10. TRUDEAU AGREED THAT FAR MORE THAN TRADE THE CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN LOC GROWTH WAS WHAT WAS DONE IN THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY IN AGRICULTURE.

11. COMING BACK TO THE U.S. AND CANADA, TRUDEAU AGREED WITH MY REMARK THAT THE U.S. IS ENTERING A PERIOD OF NEW STRENGTH, WITH FAR FEWER INTERNAL DIVISIONS THAN AT ANY POINT IN A GENERATION. "THE STATES HAS DONE A REMARKABLE JOB WITH ITS BLACK PROBLEM," HE SAID. "EVERY TIME I TURN ON TELEVISION I SEE NEW EVIDENCE OF THE REVOLUTION IN THE STATUS OF BLACKS."

12. IN CONTRAST, TRUDEAU SAID, NOTHING HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN THE FRENCH/BRITISH SPLIT IN CANADA UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. THIS FAILURE IS NOT DUE ONLY OR MAINLY TO THE FACT THAT THE PROBLEM IS TERRITORIAL AS WELL AS LINGUISTIC AND "RACIAL." THE CAUSE, TRUDEAU SAID, WAS THAT IN CONTRAST TO AMERICAN CANADIANS BOTH FRENCH AND ENGLISH DO NOT ACCEPT THAT THEY ARE CONDEMNED TO LIVE TOGETHER. "IN THEIR HEARTS, EACH BELIEVES THERE IS ANOTHER OPTION. I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO BREAK THAT."

13. COMMENT: THE CONVERSATION IS CHARACTERISTIC OF TRUDEAU'S CURRENT MOOD: IDEALISTIC, SOMEWHAT SPENGLERIAN, RATHER TESTILY MORALISTIC, CONVINCED OF HIS VISION BUT TRYING TO GOVERN BY FIAT RATHER THAN WITH HIS VERY CONSIDERABLE POWERS AS A PRACTICAL POLITICIAN.

14. SUBSEQUENT TO OUR TALK I SPENT THE WEEKEND IN QUEBEC WITH TREASURY BOARD CHAIRMAN AND TRUDEAU CONFIDENT JEAN CHRETIEN, WHO CONFIRMED THE PICTURE BY SAYING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S CURRENT THINKING IS TO MAKE ONLY SMALL CHANGES IN CABINET PERSONNEL AND POLICY THIS FALL, NO MATTER HOW FAR DOWN THE LIBERALS APPEAR IN THE POLLS. OBVIOUSLY, CHRETIEN ADDED, AT

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SOME POINT TRUDEAU WILL HAVE TO GET IN FIGHTING FORM FOR THE NEXT ELECTION; BUT NOT NOW.

15. MARGRARET TRUDEAU PROVIDED AN INTERESTING COUNTER-POINT AT DINNER. DESCRIBING HERSELF AS A "ROMANTIC, OPPOSED TO ALL MANIPULATION," SHE URGED HER HUSBAND TO GET OUT OF POLITICS. HIS RESPONSE WAS: "WHAT, AND LEAVE MACKENZIE'S RECORD STANDING?" (MACKENZIE KING WAS PM FOR 22 YEARS). MARGARET MADE RATHER A POINT ABOUT HER DISTASTE FOR FRENCH, WHICH SHE HAS STUDIED FOR FIVE YEARS BUT WHOSE USE "WOULD HAVE RUINED THE EVENING."  
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E.O. 11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, CA  
SUBJ: ANTICIPATED PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT

REF: STATE 243174, STATE 246006


1. IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR FROM OTTAWA, DCM CALLED ON PETER TOWE (ACTING UNDER SECRETARY IN ABSENCE OF ROBINSON AT UN) TO DELIVER SECRETARY'S LETTER TO JAMIESON, PER INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED REFTELS. DCM MADE POINTS CONTAINED REFTELS STRESSING ABSOLUTE CONFIDENTIALITY PRIOR TO PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT.

2. AFTER SCANNING LETTER AND ENCLOSURE, TOWE COMMENTED THAT COMMUNICATION WAS MOST TIMELY FROM GOC POINT OF VIEW SINCE IT IS IN PROCESS OF INTENSIFIED STUDY OF OWN NUCLEAR POLICIES, AND PLANS TO ADOPT MORE RESTRICTIVE POSITION ON PROLIFERATION AFTER THRONE SPEECH AND ENSUING DEBATE IN MID-OCTOBER. TOWE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ADVANCE NOTICE, SAW NO IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS WITH SUBSTANCE OF COMMUNICATION, AND PROMISED TO KEEP USG INFORMED OF GOC DELIBERATION ON SAME SUBJECT.  
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 With concurrence \_\_\_\_\_ (not)(obtained)  
IPS by John Hulsen Date 8/1/00

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, *state visit 8/1/00*  
BY 66, NARA, DATE 10/15/01



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STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

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IPS by Jack Suber Date 8/1/00

C O N F I D E N T I A L OTTAWA 4187

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, CA

SUBJ: ANTICIPATED PRESIDENTIAL NUCLEAR POLICY STATEMENT

REF: (A) STATE 243174; (B) KRATZER-LEARY TELCON, OCT 18

1. LABERGE (DIRECTOR, TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION, EXTAFF) INQUIRED ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 18 WHETHER PRESIDENT HAD MADE PUBLIC STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR POLICY OVER THE WEEKEND. EXTAFF HAD RECEIVED INDICATIONS (SOURCE UNSPECIFIED) THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED. AFTER CHECKING WITH KRATZER (REF B), EMBASSY ADVISED LABERGE THAT STATEMENT NOT YET MADE BUT EXPECTED "SOON."

2. DURING COURSE OF CONVERSATION, LABERGE SAID GOC IS PREPARED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY. EXTAFF MINISTER JAMIESON HAS BEEN GIVEN BRIEFING NOTES WHICH "ESSENTIALLY" INCLUDE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. GOC WELCOMES PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT WHICH REPRESENTS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

B. GOC NOTES FAVORABLY EMPHASIS ON PRACTICAL APPROACH FOCUSING ON BACK-END OF NUCLEAR CYCLE INSTEAD OF ON "PAPER AGREEMENTS", GUARANTEE OF FUEL SUPPLY AGAINST WILLINGNESS TO FOREGO OR POSTPONE DEVELOPMENT OF

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NATIONAL REPROCESSING FACILITIES, AND WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS COMMERCIAL IMPACT WHICH IS OF KEY IMPORTANT IN GETTING EUROPEANS ON BOARD;

C. GOC NOTES THAT U.S. PROPOSALS ARE CONSISTENT WITH EXISTING GOC POLICY APPROACH TO NUCLEAR ISSUES. (LABERGE POINTED OUT THAT GOC POLICY IS CURRENTLY UNDER REVIEW; WE ARE NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT JAMIESON MIGHT REFER TO THIS REVIEW IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT.)

3. LABERGE SAID THERE IS NO DECISION ON HOW JAMIESON WILL GO PUBLIC; HE COULD, DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES, USE HIS BRIEFING MATERIAL TO VOLUNTEER A STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA OR TO RESPOND TO A QUESTION IN COMMONS.

4. LABERGE ASKED TO BE INFORMED PROMPTLY, AND PREFERABLY IN ADVANCE, WHEN PRESIDENT ACTUALLY MAKES HIS STATEMENT. EMBASSY WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THIS REQUEST.  
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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PGEN, CA

SUBJ: TRUDEAU ON TACTICS VIS-A-VIS THE SEPARATISTS

1. SUMMARY. IN 40-MINUTE TALK TODAY NOVEMBER 17 TRUDEAU TOLD ME HE WILL LET LEVESQUE MAKE THE FIRST MOVE, EXPECTS IT BY MID-DECEMBER. TRUDEAU INSISTS THAT HE HAS NO CONCESSION TO OFFER, AND THUS SEES LEVESQUE GRADUALLY MAKING THE CASE THAT QUEBEC CAN EXPECT NOTHING FROM ENGLISH CANADA. ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH SEPARATISTS HE DESCRIBED IS TO TRY TO MOVE FOCUS FROM OTTAWA-QUEBEC DUEL TO DECISIONS ON QUEBEC ECONOMY, ON WHICH PQ (PARTI QUEBECOIS) BADLY AT ODDS WITH ITSELF. BUT HE EXPRESSED NO OPTIMISM, AND IS CONCERN THAT EVENTUAL ACCEPTANCE OF IDEA OF SEPARATISM BY AMERICANS COULD HASTEN ITS ACHIEVEMENT.

2. TRUDEAU CEDES THE FIRST MOVE TO LEVESQUE IN THE COMING ENGAGEMENT. LEVESQUE IS NOW RIDING THE TOP OF HIS WAVE, TRUDEAU SAID BENEFITTING FROM A RANGE OF WELL WISHES IN QUEBEC EXTENDING FAR BEYOND HIS SOLID SEPARATIST SUPPORT. TRUDEAU'S OWN SUPPORT, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS SEVERELY ERODED IN QUEBEC AS ELSEWHERE IN CANADA, AND AT THIS STAGE OF PLAY HE CANNOT COUNT ON SPONTANEOUS SYMPATHY FOR AN AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TO THE NEW QUEBEC GOVERNMENT.

3. TRUDEAU EXPECTS LEVESQUE'S FIRST MOVE TO COME SOON. IT WILL BE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR LEVESQUE NOT TO MAKE A STATEMENT AT THE FIRST MINISTERS' CONFERENCE ON PATRIATION

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

4. TRUDEAU SAID HE DOES NOT SEE HOW HE CAN AVOID THERE BEING A SUCCESSION OF SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS, EACH CAREFULLY CALIBRATED TO AVOID A BREACH, BUT EACH ADDING TO THE GENERAL IMPRESSION OF NON-RESPONSIVENESS BY ENGLISH CANADA. HE HOPES, HOWEVER, TO GIVE AS FEW OPPORTUNITIES AS POSSIBLE FOR SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS, AS FAR BETWEEN AS POSSIBLE, SO THAT THE QUEBEC PUBLIC CAN BE FOCUSED ON THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE -- THE ECONOMY -- ON WHICH THE PQ CAN BE MOST VULNERABLE. AS LONG AS THE PQ CAN FOCUS PLAY ON OTTAWA IT WILL BE RELATIVELY EASY TO KEEP PARTY DISCIPLINE, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PQ SPANS "FROM BOURGEOIS TO MAOIST." BUT IF EVER THE QUEBEC GOVERNMENT COULD BE SET UP TO MAKE DECISIONS ON OWNERSHIP OF INDUSTRY AND RESOURCES, SOCIAL BENEFITS, EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER RIGHTS, IT WILL COME UNDER SEVERE INTERNAL TENSION. TRUDEAU NOTED THAT THESE EFFECTS OF TENSION WOULD BE MAGNIFIED BY THE NEED TO COME TO TERMS WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS. HE AGREED THAT INVESTORS SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY PRECIPITATE ACTION EITHER TO PULL OUT OF OR INVEST IN QUEBEC, BUT RATHER SHOULD ADOPT A WAITING STANCE WHILE MAKING CLEAR TO THE NEW GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WISH ASSURANCES ABOUT THEIR FUTURE IN THE PROVINCE.

5. TRUDEAU EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT HOW THE SEPARATIST ISSUE MAY ULTIMATELY PLAY OUT AND THE POSSIBLE ROLE AMERICANS MAY HAVE IN IT. IF THE SEPARATISTS CONTINUE TO GAIN, SOME

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AMERICANS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY COULD DEAL WITH QUEBEC AND THE SINGLE OR SEVERAL REMAINING PIECES OF CANADA. BUT, TRUDEAU SAID, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE IN THAT FOR THE US. GIVEN EUROPEAN (READ FRENCH) AND POTENTIALLY SOVIET AND CHINESE INTEREST IN QUEBEC, AN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN THE PROVINCE COULD OCCUR. A SIMILAR STRUGGLE WOULD GO ON BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENT, AND IT COULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT A RADICAL STATE MIGHT APPEAR ON THE ST. LAWRENCE WITH OUTSIDE, HOSTILE SUPPORT. TRUDEAU ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT TO WAVE A BOGEYMAN BUT THOUGHT THIS POSSIBLE. I POINTED OUT THAT I HAD OFTEN HEARD CANADIANS SPECULATE ON THE REMAINING PIECES ASSOCIATING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN THE EVENT OF SEPARATION, BUT HAD NEVER HEARD AMERICANS SPECULATE UPON IT. TRUDEAU REPLIED THAT MANY CANADIANS DO, AND IF SPECULATING GETS GOING VERY MUCH IT COULD SPREAD TO THE U.S. AND HASTEN THE WHOLE HISTORICAL PROCESS.

6. ONE OF THE GREAT DANGERS FOR CANADA IN THE PRESENT SITUATION, TRUDEAU SAID, IS TO BECOME SO OBSESSED WITH SEPARATISM AS TO FAIL TO DO WHAT HAS TO BE DONE TO GET THE ECONOMY MOVING. TRUDEAU IS VERY INTERESTED IN MEETING WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION EARLY ON IN ORDER TO SEE HOW HIS OWN ACTION TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE CAN BE COORDINATED WITH THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

7. COMMENT: IN MY JUDGMENT TRUDEAU'S COMMENTS ABOVE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE TAKEN AS FINAL TACTICAL DECISIONS, TAKEN BY SURPRISE, HIS GOVERNMENT IS STILL DEBATING HOW TO DEAL WITH THE SEPARATIST VICTORY; IT CANNOT BE RULED OUT THAT IT WILL TAKE SOME INITIATIVE. MORE IMPORTANT, IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR THAT TRUDEAU HAS THE STRENGTH TO STONEWALL LEVESQUE THE WAY HE STONEWALLED BOURASSA. THE OPPOSITION PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATIVES AND RIVAL JOH TURNER WITHIN THE LIBERAL PARTY MAY BOTH ADVOCATE SUCH CONCESSIONS, AS WILL SOME OF THE WESTERN PROVINCES TO KEEP QUEBEC IN FEDERATION. WE CAN EXPECT A DEBATE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ON CENTRALISM VS A LOOSER CONFEDERATION. IF TRUDEAU DOES STICK TO HIS PRESENT COURSE OF NO CONCESSIONS, THE OTTAWA/

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QUEBEC CLASH MAY ESCALATE QUITE QUICKLY.

8. TRUDEAU DISPLAYED NO OPTIMISM: HE MADE NO EFFORT (AS HAVE OTHERS) TO DESCRIBE FOR ME A SCENARIO IN WHICH EVERYTHING COMES OUT ALL RIGHT. WHILE THERE ARE "SOME FOOLS ON THEIR SIDE TOO," HE DESCRIBED LEVESQUE AS A "FORMIDABLE, TOTALLY COMMITTED ADVERSARY."  
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