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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/SENSITIVE

ACTION

January 16, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Letter to Ivan Head on Angola

In response to our memorandum of January 10 (Tab B), you have indicated that you wish to correspond with Ivan Head on the subject of Trudeau's forthcoming visit to Canada -- and the position we hope he will take on Cuba's Angolan intervention.

The letter for your signature to Head at Tab A would forward a report on Cuba's role in Angola -- prepared by CIA and coordinated with Steve Low.

I recommend that you sign this letter and arrange with Deputy Under Secretary of State Eagleburger for its direct delivery by special State courier (not by telegram) to Ivan Head in Ottawa.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A -- arrangements to be made with Eagleburger for its delivery.

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XGDS


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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State Dept. Review*  
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *1/21/03* *SW 9/23/02*



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
lc

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1976

Larry:

Attached is the letter to Ivan  
Head. I like your option of  
sending it to the Embassy in  
Ottawa as if it were from you.

  
Brent



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

January 17, 1976

Dear Ivan:

Knowing that your Prime Minister is planning to visit Cuba later this month, I want to share with you directly information that we have on the background and current status of Cuba's activities in Angola.

You are aware of the great depth of concern in the United States Government over Cuba's major intervention in Angola. There are now approximately 10,000 Cuban troops in that African country. Their Soviet-sponsored role is working against the interests not only of Angola but also of other African countries. It is a role that has introduced a dangerous, totally unwelcome and destabilizing element into international politics, jeopardizing broader interests which our two countries share with friends and allies. The accompanying paper provides a succinct review.

I hope the attached will be helpful. Please get in touch if the paper raises unanswered questions or if there is any other aspect of the issue that you wish to discuss.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

Mr. Ivan Head  
Assistant Principal Secretary  
to the Prime Minister  
Ottawa

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

*State Dept Review*  
SW 9/23/02

BY HR, NARA, DATE 4/21/03



THE BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF CUBA'S  
INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

Cuban support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) began in the early 1960s as an extension to Africa of the Castro regime's policy of supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America. Havana's connection with the MPLA was never broken. For more than a decade, the Cubans have been sending arms, supplies, and advisers to MPLA bases in Africa, training MPLA representatives in Cuba, and giving the MPLA strong propaganda support. Until September 1975, however, the level of Cuban support had been low. The number of Cubans serving with the MPLA probably never exceeded a few hundred during this entire period and for most of the time remained probably between 20 and 40 men.

In the spring or early summer of 1975, a decision was apparently made in Havana to increase this modest Cuban presence. Armando Acosta Cordero, a Cuban Communist Party Central Committee member heading Havana's delegation to Mozambique's independence celebrations, met in Lourenco Marques with MPLA President Agostinho Neto in late June, and a month later several dozen Cubans arrived in Congo (Brazzaville) to assist the MPLA in the reassembly of Soviet weapons arriving at Pointe Noire, Congo. In early or mid-August, a Cuban delegation arrived in Brazzaville, to talk with MPLA representatives. This meeting, like that in June, most likely concerned arrangements for an expansion of Cuba's support for the MPLA.

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MRO 10-169-#1

State Rev 9/23/02, CIA Rev 12/7/11

By dal NARA Date 2/13/13



The dramatic increase in Cuban support began in September when several Cuban ships began loading Cuban troops and supplies for the three week trip to Congo and Angola. At about the same time, several of Cuba's top military officers, including the number two man in the Cuban Armed Forces Ministry dropped from sight, with subordinates eventually being named to take up their responsibilities. We suspect that most if not all of these eight or ten officers have been sent to Angola to oversee the Cuban expeditionary force there. Also in late September, Cubana Airlines began an extended airlift of Cuban troops to Congo and Angola, using Bristol Britannia and IL-18 aircraft.

The Cubans at this time may have been planning to send only a few thousand troops and military advisers to back up the MPLA. Once the Cuban field commanders arrived on the scene -- and especially once they saw the MPLA under fire -- they probably decided that an even greater expansion than the one planned would be necessary to guarantee the safety of the Cubans already committed and to bring about the victory of the MPLA. There is evidence that in the early fighting, the Cubans took a beating largely because the MPLA forces broke and ran, leaving the Cubans to face the enemy alone. There is also evidence that the Cuban forces suffered supply problems, and this probably led them to send additional military personnel to provide their own administrative and logistical support.



The first Cuban ship arrived in Pointe Noire, Congo, in late September. At Pointe Noire, the Cubans established and operated a military trans-shipment facility at which they off-loaded incoming materiel from Cuban and Soviet ships, arranged for its shipment overland into Cabinda or by air and sea to Angola proper, and assisted in the reassembly of arms destined for the MPLA. Two more Cuban ships arrived in Pointe Noire and two in Porto Amboim, Angola, in October, all apparently carrying both men and arms. Some of the men aboard the latter two ships were sent to the Lobito-Benguela area and were there when FNLA/UNITA forces overran the cities. At about the same time, Cubans were placed in position to help defend Luanda, and became engaged with enemy forces driving on the Angolan capital from the north. Although the MPLA forces apparently panicked and fled, the Cubans held their ground and reportedly blunted the FNLA/UNITA drive, saving Luanda for the MPLA. Since then, the Cubans seem to have assumed the major share of the burden of combat.

Only two Cuban ships took men and arms to the civil war in November, a drop from the previous month, but the number of flights in the troop airlift picked up considerably. From one flight in September and four in October, the number jumped to 21 in November. Each carried an estimated average of 80 troops. In December, another seven Cuban ships and 17 Cubana Airlines flights took men and supplies to Congo and Angola, and by the end



of the year, some 7,500 to 8,000 Cuban military personnel were assisting the MPLA either in Angola or in neighboring Congo.

So far in January, four more Cubana Airlines flights have taken place and at least six ships have left Cuba for the war zone. In addition, beginning on January 7, Soviet Aeroflot IL-62 aircraft with a capacity of 200 troops have been ferrying Cuban troops to Luanda via Conakry, Guinea, at a rate of one flight per day. This has caused the estimates of Cuban troops in Angola to be revised sharply upward. The Aeroflot flights, which are in addition to the Cubana flights, are believed to have transported a total of 1,600 Cuban troops to Angola in eight days. Moreover, there is no indication that the sealift or either of the airlifts is coming to a halt. As of mid-January the level of Cuban troops in Angola or Congo supporting the MPLA probably topped 9,000 with another 1,000 still on the way.

The Cubans are serving in a variety of roles. Infantrymen, rocket-artillerymen, and armored personnel are involved directly in combat. Others are serving in an advisory capacity with MPLA units while still others are operating at least four training camps for MPLA recruits. The Cubans have probably undertaken the responsibility for operating the supply system and apparently are manning Luanda's anti-aircraft defenses. They reportedly have pilots ready to fly the Soviet MIGs which allegedly have been promised the MPLA, and most likely are piloting many of the other planes and



helicopters under MPLA control. Some security troops are reportedly policing Luanda and are establishing political and security police forces for the MPLA.

Although Havana's role in Angola is decidedly unpopular at home, there is no indication that Cuba plans to reduce its presence there in the near future. In fact, there is some suspicion that Havana may give in to the temptation to take the war beyond Angola's borders and into South West Africa or possibly even Zaire, depending on Moscow's reading of the situation.

The Castro regime's decision to become involved so deeply in Angola probably was made primarily as a result of pressures from the USSR which had no intention of committing its own forces. The Angolan civil war has underscored in the eyes of many world leaders the subservience of the Castro regime to Moscow, and has demonstrated to many that Havana has not lost its appetite for subversion and aggressive foreign adventurism. It has also sown the seed of doubt in the minds of many Cubans -- both civilian and military -- who want no part of the war and who find Cuba's participation in it hard to understand.



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WITHDRAWAL ID 014142

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Mr. Clift

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . General Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

TITLE . . . . . Trudeau's Visit to Cuba - Angolan  
Connection

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/10/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032500037

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BOX NUMBER . . . . . 2

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Canada (8)

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state visit  
BY gh, NARA, DATE 10/19/01

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVEACTION

January 10, 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift

SUBJECT: Trudeau's Visit to Cuba -- Angolan Connection

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau is planning to follow through with a long-scheduled visit to Cuba on January 26-29, 1976. Ivan Head has approached our Embassy (telegram at Tab B) to say that the trip will go ahead as planned, that he has recommended that Trudeau take a negative, "tut, tut" line with the Cubans on Angola, but that it would be helpful if the U.S. could provide him with more background on the Angolan situation. Our Embassy notes that Head, in keeping with normal practice, is not working through the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs or his Washington Embassy on this.

Steve Low, with Hal Horan's assistance, has prepared a paper containing the background information Head is seeking (Tab A). We believe it important you deal directly with Head on this matter, emphasizing:

- our interest in providing the Prime Minister with a detailed review of Cuban involvement in Angola,
- the fact that Castro will seek to take advantage of Trudeau's visit to demonstrate that he can carry out his Angolan policy without damage to other Cuban interests,
- the fact that the Cuban involvement has put a freeze on U.S. moves further to normalize US-Cuban relations,
- our preference that the Prime Minister find a reason to cancel or postpone the visit -- or at least to register privately and publicly Canada's disapproval of Cuba's Angolan involvement.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state visit 7/31/00  
BY Gh, NARA, DATE 10/12/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

- 2 -

If you are to do this effectively with Ivan, the open telephone line would not seem appropriate, [REDACTED]

I recommend that you call Ivan Head, say that you would like to provide him with detailed information on Angola and seek his views on how this might best be done, e. g.,

- Head fly down to Washington for a working lunch with you;
- you send a representative to Ottawa to brief him; or
- you agree on the best channel for a written communication.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you call Ivan Head as soon as possible along the lines recommended above.

DClift:nw:1/10/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 7, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DENIS CLIFT  
FROM: STEPHEN LOW *SL*  
SUBJECT: Trudeau's Planned Visit to Cuba

Attached is a summary of Cuban involvement in Angola done by the Department of State which you might include in a Talker to Brent for his conversation with Ivan Head. I have slightly modified it on the basis of comments by Hal Horan. The following is for inclusion in the Background section and Talking Points. You can handle the Talker either from the two of us jointly or with my (and Horan's) concurrence.

Background

State is unaware of any change in Trudeau's plans to visit Cuba January 23-25. We believe that Castro will use the visit, together with visits from Senator Abourezk, Torrijos and possibly Tito, to demonstrate both to the Cubans and the rest of the world that he can carry out an intervention of the kind he is engaged in in Angola without damage to his international position. On the contrary, that his international prestige has even increased as a result.

As a consequence, we suggest that you may want to brief Ivan Head on the admittedly sketchy information we have relating to Cuban involvement in Angola.

Talking Points

- Cuban assistance to the MPLA goes back to 1961.
- From that date until the middle of last year, it was confined to military training in Cuba, a small training cadre in the Congo (Brazzaville), and technicians running an airbase.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES; state visit 7/31/00  
BY *lab*, NARA, DATE 10/15/01



-- Assistance increased rapidly beginning last September, with a massive sea and airlift which has reached the level of 6,000-7,500 military personnel.

-- We believe the Cuban contingent is commanded by the Deputy Armed Forces Minister, Major General Julio Casas Regueiro (Ray-gair-o).

-- The Cubans have maintained separate combat units and are manning tanks, armed personnel carriers and heavy aircraft defenses.

-- In a number of cases we believe that the presence of Cuban forces and particularly their ability to man sophisticated Soviet weaponry has been a decisive factor in some combat situations.

-- AFP reports that there may have been as many as 100 Cubans killed since Angolan independence November 11.

-- The Cubans have not publicly admitted the full extent of their military intervention but only that they are supporting the MPLA and are prepared to shed blood in the cause. There seems to be some unhappiness over the adventure within Cuba.

-- We think their reasons are:

- 1) To accommodate the Soviets;
- 2) To refurbish their ideological image as supporters of liberation movements;
- 3) To win support in Africa and the Third World;
- 4) To test their military apparatus under combat conditions.

-- We suppose they must have decided that these advantages were more important to them than continuing the progress we had been making toward improving our relations.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cuban moral and material assistance to the Soviet-supported MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) dates from 1961. From this period until mid-year 1975, several hundred MPLA cadre received military training and indoctrination in Cuba, in bases in the Congo and more recently in Angola. In mid-summer 1975, Cuba had about 50 personnel training cadre in the Congo; had doctors and medical technicians serving with MPLA units; had a small number of advisers attached to combat units; and had technicians running one airbase.

Cuban assistance escalated sharply in late September. A massive sea and airlift of Cuban military personnel and war materiel began at that time and still continues. Currently about 6,000 to 7,500 Cuban military personnel are believed to be in Angola. Additional personnel are stationed in the Congo where the logistical and support center for Cuban troops is maintained.

Cuban troops are believed to be commanded by Brigade Commander (Major General) Julio Casas Regueiro, Deputy Armed Forces Minister for Services. Cuban units apparently are not integrated with MPLA units, but are assigned separate combat operations in cooperation with MPLA troops. Cuban personnel have manned tanks, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft defenses. Their presence and ability to man sophisticated equipment provided by the Soviets is reported to have been the decisive factor in some combat operations. Additionally they have provided training, medical assistance, communications and transport services.

Precise figures on Cuban casualties are not known; however, AFP has reported, using South African sources, that about 100 Cubans have been killed since independence November 11. We are not in a position to verify this report.

Cuba has stopped just short of admitting to military intervention in Angola. Castro has indicated that Cuba will continue to support fully MPLA efforts and stated that Cuba is prepared to shed blood in such support. There have been some reports of dissatisfaction within Cuba over Castro's Angola adventure.

Cuban military intervention probably stems in the first instance from a desire to accommodate to the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union. Secondarily, such intervention fits neatly into

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Cuba's ideology of actively supporting liberation movements, in this case represented by a regime enjoying some international recognition. Thirdly, Cuba probably hopes its support to the MPLA will win friends for Cuba in Africa and the Third World in general. And finally, Angola provides for the Cuban military apparatus an opportunity to test for the first time under combat conditions Cuba's armed forces.

Cuba probably recognized that its intervention in Angola would further jeopardize prospects for an early normalization of relations with the U.S. and may have discounted the possibility of such normalization before 1977. Cuba has all along indicated that it was in no hurry for this process to begin and likely calculated that the setback to U.S.-Cuba bilateral relations was more than outweighed by advantages accruing to Cuba in Africa and the Third World.







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RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Assistant to the President for National  
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TITLE . . . . . Trudeau's Visit to Cuba - Angolan  
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VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State visit 27/31/00  
BY lsh, NARA, DATE 10/14/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~ACTION

January 10, 1976

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FROM: Mr. Clift

SUBJECT: Trudeau's Visit to Cuba -- Angolan Connection

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State visit 7/31/00

BY lch, NARA, DATE 10/18/01

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RECOMMENDATION

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DClift:nw:1/10/76



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

JK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 7, 1976

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
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BY *bb*, NARA, DATE *10/15/01*



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
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
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 00080 090056Z

HAS ALREADY BRIEFED HEAD AND EXTAFF AFRICAN DIVISION  
(ON REFTEL).

3. ACTION REQUESTED: WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER TRUDEAU IS PERSONALLY INCLINED TO FOLLOW HEAD'S SUGGESTION THAT HE TAKE SUCH AN ACTIVIST ATTITUDE WITH CASTRO CONCERNING ANGOLA. GIVEN HEAD'S ONE-MAN-SHOW STYLE OF OPERATION, IT UNLIKELY HE WILL BOTHER INFORM EXTAFF OF HIS INITIATIVE WITH US (IN EMBASSY CONTACT YESTERDAY WITH EXTAFF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR AFRICAN AREA INCLUDING ANGOLA, THEY SURMISED THAT TRUDEAU COULD NOT FAIL TO MENTION ANGOLA IN HAVANA BUT WERE UNAWARE OF HIS INTENTIONS AND HAD NOT BEEN CALLED UPON FOR BRIEFING PAPERS).

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT INADVISABLE TO TAKE INITIATIVE WITH WARREN UNLESS (1) DEPT WISHES ON ITS OWN TO REQUEST TRUDEAU TO INTERCEDE WITH CASTRO ON MATTER AND (2) DEPT DOES SO WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HEAD'S APPROACH. EXTAFF'S NOSE WOULD BE FAR OUT OF JOINT IF IT APPEARED WE WERE ACTING IN MATTER ON SUGGESTION OF HEAD, WITH WHOM IT HAS QUITE UNPLEASANT RIVALRY.

5. IN EVENT DEPT HAS SUCH INTEREST, HEAD WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY TAKE CREDIT, ASSUMING TRUDEAU BOUGHT THE PROJECT. BUT SUCH BACK-PATting COULD NOT BE AVOIDED AND WOULD BE WORTH THE PAIN IN THE LARGER INTEREST. FOR EMBASSY TO SUGGEST TO HEAD THAT HE FUNNEL HIS REQUEST TO EXTAFF WOULD ACCOMPLISH NOTHING BUT INVITE HIS ANNOYANCE.

6. MOST DIFFICULT ASSESSMENT TO MAKE IS WHAT TRUDEAU'S INCLINATION MIGHT BE. ON ONE HAND, HE WOULD NOT WISH GIVE OFFENCE TO CASTRO DURING HIS FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT. ON OTHER HAND, HIS INSTINCT IS PROBABLY AGAINST INTERVENTION OF CUBAN AND OTHER FOREIGN TROOPS AND IN FAVOR USG POLICY. IN ANY EVENT, EMBASSY SEES NO HARM IN DEPT'S BROACHING SUBJECT TO WARREN IF IT REALLY THINKS CASTRO MIGHT BE PERSUADED OR AT LEAST IMPRESSED WITH TRUDEAU INTERCESSION. AT LEAST HE HAS SHOWN NO WISH SO FAR TO PUT KINK IN GROWING CUBAN-CANADIAN ENTENTE.

JOHNSON

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CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

ACTION  
January 16, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift  
SUBJECT: Letter to Ivan Head on Angola

In response to our memorandum of January 10 (Tab B), you have indicated that you wish to correspond with Ivan Head on the subject of Trudeau's forthcoming visit to Canada -- and the position we hope he will take on Cuba's Angolan intervention.

The letter for your signature to Head at Tab A would forward a report on Cuba's role in Angola -- prepared by CIA and coordinated with Steve Low.

I recommend that you sign this letter and arrange with Deputy Under Secretary of State Eagleburger for its direct delivery by special State courier (not by telegram) to Ivan Head in Ottawa.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A -- arrangements to be made with Eagleburger for its delivery.

DClift:nw:1/16/76

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE  
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DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 1/21/03 *State Dept. Review SW 9/23/02*



~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

Dear Ivan:

You are aware of the great depth of concern in the United States Government over Cuba's major intervention in Angola. There are now approximately 10,000 Cuban troops in that African country. Their Soviet-sponsored role is working against the interests not only of Angola but also of other African countries. It is a role that has introduced a dangerous, totally unwelcome and destabilizing element into international politics, jeopardizing broader interests which our two countries share with friends and allies.

Knowing that your Prime Minister is planning to visit Cuba later this month, I want to share with you directly information that we have on the background and current status of Cuba's activities in Angola. The accompanying paper provides a succinct review.

For our part, Cuba's military adventure in Angola has put a freeze on any further moves to normalize US-Cuban relations. In our view, there is little doubt that Castro will seek to take advantage of Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to demonstrate that he can carry out his Angolan policy without damage to other Cuban interests. We do not believe that he should be afforded this latitude. While we clearly would be pleased were the Prime Minister to find a reason to cancel or postpone his visit, I would hope that in any event it will be possible for him publicly to register disapproval of Cuba's Angola intervention.

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~  
XGDS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/90, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HRC, NARA, DATE 4/21/03

*State Dept Review*  
*SW 9/23/02*



~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE~~

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I trust the attached will be helpful. Please get in touch if the paper raises unanswered questions or if there is any other aspect of the issue that you wish to discuss.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Ivan Head  
Assistant Principal Secretary  
to the Prime Minister  
Ottawa

DClift:nw:1/16/76

~~CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE/XGDS~~



THE BACKGROUND AND STATUS OF CUBA'S  
INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA

Cuban support for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) began in the early 1960s as an extension to Africa of the Castro regime's policy of supporting revolutionary movements in Latin America. Havana's connection with the MPLA was never broken. For more than a decade, the Cubans have been sending arms, supplies, and advisers to MPLA bases in Africa, training MPLA representatives in Cuba, and giving the MPLA strong propaganda support. Until September 1975, however, the level of Cuban support had been low. The number of Cubans serving with the MPLA probably never exceeded a few hundred during this entire period and for most of the time remained probably between 20 and 40 men.

In the spring or early summer of 1975, a decision was apparently made in Havana to increase this modest Cuban presence. Armando Acosta Cordero, a Cuban Communist Party Central Committee member heading Havana's delegation to Mozambique's independence celebrations, met in Lourenco Marques with MPLA President Agostinho Neto in late June, and a month later several dozen Cubans arrived in Congo (Brazzaville) to assist the MPLA in the reassembly of Soviet weapons arriving at Pointe Noire, Congo. In early or mid-August, a Cuban delegation arrived in Brazzaville, to talk with MPLA representatives. This meeting, like that in June, most likely concerned arrangements for an expansion of Cuba's support for the MPLA.

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MRG 10-169-#1

State rev 9/23/02; CIA rev 12/7/11

By dal NARA Date 2/13/12



The dramatic increase in Cuban support began in September when several Cuban ships began loading Cuban troops and supplies for the three week trip to Congo and Angola. At about the same time, several of Cuba's top military officers, including the number two man in the Cuban Armed Forces Ministry dropped from sight, with subordinates eventually being named to take up their responsibilities. We suspect that most if not all of these eight or ten officers have been sent to Angola to oversee the Cuban expeditionary force there. Also in late September, Cubana Airlines began an extended airlift of Cuban troops to Congo and Angola, using Bristol Britannia and IL-18 aircraft.

The Cubans at this time may have been planning to send only a few thousand troops and military advisers to back up the MPLA. Once the Cuban field commanders arrived on the scene -- and especially once they saw the MPLA under fire -- they probably decided that an even greater expansion than the one planned would be necessary to guarantee the safety of the Cubans already committed and to bring about the victory of the MPLA. There is evidence that in the early fighting, the Cubans took a beating largely because the MPLA forces broke and ran, leaving the Cubans to face the enemy alone. There is also evidence that the Cuban forces suffered supply problems, and this probably led them to send additional military personnel to provide their own administrative and logistical support.



The first Cuban ship arrived in Pointe Noire, Congo, in late September. At Pointe Noire, the Cubans established and operated a military trans-shipment facility at which they off-loaded incoming materiel from Cuban and Soviet ships, arranged for its shipment overland into Cabinda or by air and sea to Angola proper, and assisted in the reassembly of arms destined for the MPLA. Two more Cuban ships arrived in Pointe Noire and two in Porto Amboim, Angola, in October, all apparently carrying both men and arms. Some of the men aboard the latter two ships were sent to the Lobito-Benguela area and were there when FNLA/UNITA forces overran the cities. At about the same time, Cubans were placed in position to help defend Luanda, and became engaged with enemy forces driving on the Angolan capital from the north. Although the MPLA forces apparently panicked and fled, the Cubans held their ground and reportedly blunted the FNLA/UNITA drive, saving Luanda for the MPLA. Since then, the Cubans seem to have assumed the major share of the burden of combat.

Only two Cuban ships took men and arms to the civil war in November, a drop from the previous month, but the number of flights in the troop airlift picked up considerably. From one flight in September and four in October, the number jumped to 21 in November. Each carried an estimated average of 80 troops. In December, another seven Cuban ships and 17 Cubana Airlines flights took men and supplies to Congo and Angola, and by the end



of the year, some 7,500 to 8,000 Cuban military personnel were assisting the MPLA either in Angola or in neighboring Congo.

So far in January, four more Cubana Airlines flights have taken place and at least six ships have left Cuba for the war zone. In addition, beginning on January 7, Soviet Aeroflot IL-62 aircraft with a capacity of 200 troops have been ferrying Cuban troops to Luanda via Conakry, Guinea, at a rate of one flight per day. This has caused the estimates of Cuban troops in Angola to be revised sharply upward. The Aeroflot flights, which are in addition to the Cubana flights, are believed to have transported a total of 1,600 Cuban troops to Angola in eight days. Moreover, there is no indication that the sealift or either of the airlifts is coming to a halt. As of mid-January the level of Cuban troops in Angola or Congo supporting the MPLA probably topped 9,000 with another 1,000 still on the way.

The Cubans are serving in a variety of roles. Infantrymen, rocket-artillerymen, and armored personnel are involved directly in combat. Others are serving in an advisory capacity with MPLA units while still others are operating at least four training camps for MPLA recruits. The Cubans have probably undertaken the responsibility for operating the supply system and apparently are manning Luanda's anti-aircraft defenses. They reportedly have pilots ready to fly the Soviet MIGs which allegedly have been promised the MPLA, and most likely are piloting many of the other planes and



helicopters under MPLA control. Some security troops are reportedly policing Luanda and are establishing political and security police forces for the MPLA.

Although Havana's role in Angola is decidedly unpopular at home, there is no indication that Cuba plans to reduce its presence there in the near future. In fact, there is some suspicion that Havana may give in to the temptation to take the war beyond Angola's borders and into South West Africa or possibly even Zaire, depending on Moscow's reading of the situation.

The Castro regime's decision to become involved so deeply in Angola probably was made primarily as a result of pressures from the USSR which had no intention of committing its own forces. The Angolan civil war has underscored in the eyes of many world leaders the subservience of the Castro regime to Moscow, and has demonstrated to many that Havana has not lost its appetite for subversion and aggressive foreign adventurism. It has also sown the seed of doubt in the minds of many Cubans -- both civilian and military -- who want no part of the war and who find Cuba's participation in it hard to understand.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 014147

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Mr. Clift

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . General Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs

TITLE . . . . . Trudeau's Visit to Cuba - Angolan  
Connection

CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/10/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032500037

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EUROPE AND CANADA

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 2

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Canada (8)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 10/16/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempted  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state visit 7/31/00  
BY gb, NARA, DATE 10/18/01

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVEACTION

January 10, 1976

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: Mr. Clift

SUBJECT: Trudeau's Visit to Cuba -- Angolan Connection

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau is planning to follow through with a long-scheduled visit to Cuba on January 26-29, 1976. Ivan Head has approached our Embassy (telegram at Tab B) to say that the trip will go ahead as planned, that he has recommended that Trudeau take a negative, "tut, tut" line with the Cubans on Angola, but that it would be helpful if the U.S. could provide him with more background on the Angolan situation. Our Embassy notes that Head, in keeping with normal practice, is not working through the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs or his Washington Embassy on this.

Steve Low, with Hal Horan's assistance, has prepared a paper containing the background information Head is seeking (Tab A). We believe it important you deal directly with Head on this matter, emphasizing:

- our interest in providing the Prime Minister with a detailed review of Cuban involvement in Angola,
- the fact that Castro will seek to take advantage of Trudeau's visit to demonstrate that he can carry out his Angolan policy without damage to other Cuban interests,
- the fact that the Cuban involvement has put a freeze on U.S. moves further to normalize US-Cuban relations,
- our preference that the Prime Minister find a reason to cancel or postpone the visit -- or at least to register privately and publicly Canada's disapproval of Cuba's Angolan involvement.

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempted

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state v. visit 7/21/00

BY GB, NARA, DATE 10/18/01

If you are to do this effectively with Ivan, the open telephone line would not seem appropriate, [REDACTED]

I recommend that you call Ivan Head, say that you would like to provide him with detailed information on Angola and seek his views on how this might best be done, e. g.,

- Head fly down to Washington for a working lunch with you;
- you send a representative to Ottawa to brief him; or
- you agree on the best channel for a written communication.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call Ivan Head as soon as possible along the lines recommended above.

DClift:nw:1/10/76



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 7, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: DENIS CLIFT  
FROM: STEPHEN LOW *SL*  
SUBJECT: Trudeau's Planned Visit to Cuba

Attached is a summary of Cuban involvement in Angola done by the Department of State which you might include in a Talker to Brent for his conversation with Ivan Head. I have slightly modified it on the basis of comments by Hal Horan. The following is for inclusion in the Background section and Talking Points. You can handle the Talker either from the two of us jointly or with my (and Horan's) concurrence.

Background

State is unaware of any change in Trudeau's plans to visit Cuba January 23-25. We believe that Castro will use the visit, together with visits from Senator Abourezk, Torrijos and possibly Tito, to demonstrate both to the Cubans and the rest of the world that he can carry out an intervention of the kind he is engaged in in Angola without damage to his international position. On the contrary, that his international prestige has even increased as a result.

As a consequence, we suggest that you may want to brief Ivan Head on the admittedly sketchy information we have relating to Cuban involvement in Angola.


Talking Points

- Cuban assistance to the MPLA goes back to 1961.
- From that date until the middle of last year, it was confined to military training in Cuba, a small training cadre in the Congo (Brazzaville), and technicians running an airbase.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *state visit 7/31/00*  
BY *CSJ*, NARM, DATE *10/15/01*



-- Assistance increased rapidly beginning last September, with a massive sea and airlift which has reached the level of 6,000-7,500 military personnel.

-- We believe the Cuban contingent is commanded by the Deputy Armed Forces Minister, Major General Julio Casas Regueiro (Ray-gair-o).

-- The Cubans have maintained separate combat units and are manning tanks, armed personnel carriers and heavy aircraft defenses.

-- In a number of cases we believe that the presence of Cuban forces and particularly their ability to man sophisticated Soviet weaponry has been a decisive factor in some combat situations.

-- AFP reports that there may have been as many as 100 Cubans killed since Angolan independence November 11.

-- The Cubans have not publicly admitted the full extent of their military intervention but only that they are supporting the MPLA and are prepared to shed blood in the cause. There seems to be some unhappiness over the adventure within Cuba.

-- We think their reasons are:

- 1) To accommodate the Soviets;
- 2) To refurbish their ideological image as supporters of liberation movements;
- 3) To win support in Africa and the Third World;
- 4) To test their military apparatus under combat conditions.

-- We suppose they must have decided that these advantages were more important to them than continuing the progress we had been making toward improving our relations.



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Cuban moral and material assistance to the Soviet-supported MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) dates from 1961. From this period until mid-year 1975, several hundred MPLA cadre received military training and indoctrination in Cuba, in bases in the Congo and more recently in Angola. In mid-summer 1975, Cuba had about 50 personnel training cadre in the Congo; had doctors and medical technicians serving with MPLA units; had a small number of advisers attached to combat units; and had technicians running one airbase.

Cuban assistance escalated sharply in late September. A massive sea and airlift of Cuban military personnel and war materiel began at that time and still continues. Currently about 6,000 to 7,500 Cuban military personnel are believed to be in Angola. Additional personnel are stationed in the Congo where the logistical and support center for Cuban troops is maintained.

Cuban troops are believed to be commanded by Brigade Commander (Major General) Julio Casas Regueiro, Deputy Armed Forces Minister for Services. Cuban units apparently are not integrated with MPLA units, but are assigned separate combat operations in cooperation with MPLA troops. Cuban personnel have manned tanks, armored personnel carriers, anti-aircraft defenses. Their presence and ability to man sophisticated equipment provided by the Soviets is reported to have been the decisive factor in some combat operations. Additionally they have provided training, medical assistance, communications and transport services.

Precise figures on Cuban casualties are not known; however, AFP has reported, using South African sources, that about 100 Cubans have been killed since independence November 11. We are not in a position to verify this report.

Cuba has stopped just short of admitting to military intervention in Angola. Castro has indicated that Cuba will continue to support fully MPLA efforts and stated that Cuba is prepared to shed blood in such support. There have been some reports of dissatisfaction within Cuba over Castro's Angola adventure.


Cuban military intervention probably stems in the first instance from a desire to accommodate to the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union. Secondarily, such intervention fits neatly into

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Cuba's ideology of actively supporting liberation movements, in this case represented by a regime enjoying some international recognition. Thirdly, Cuba probably hopes its support to the MPLA will win friends for Cuba in Africa and the Third World in general. And finally, Angola provides for the Cuban military apparatus an opportunity to test for the first time under combat conditions Cuba's armed forces.

Cuba probably recognized that its intervention in Angola would further jeopardize prospects for an early normalization of relations with the U.S. and may have discounted the possibility of such normalization before 1977. Cuba has all along indicated that it was in no hurry for this process to begin and likely calculated that the setback to U.S.-Cuba bilateral relations was more than outweighed by advantages accruing to Cuba in Africa and the Third World.







Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 OTTAWA 00080 090056Z

HAS ALREADY BRIEFED HEAD AND EXTAFF AFRICAN DIVISION (ON REFTEL).

3. ACTION REQUESTED: WE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING WHETHER TRUDEAU IS PERSONALLY INCLINED TO FOLLOW HEAD'S SUGGESTION THAT HE TAKE SUCH AN ACTIVIST ATTITUDE WITH CASTRO CONCERNING ANGOLA. GIVEN HEAD'S ONE-MAN-SHOW STYLE OF OPERATION, IT UNLIKELY HE WILL BOTHER INFORM EXTAFF OF HIS INITIATIVE WITH US (IN EMBASSY CONTACT YESTERDAY WITH EXTAFF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR AFRICAN AREA INCLUDING ANGOLA, THEY SURMISED THAT TRUDEAU COULD NOT FAIL TO MENTION ANGOLA IN HAVANA BUT WERE UNAWARE OF HIS INTENTIONS AND HAD NOT BEEN CALLED UPON FOR BRIEFING PAPERS).

4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, EMBASSY BELIEVES IT INADVISABLE TO TAKE INITIATIVE WITH WARREN UNLESS (1) DEPT WISHES ON ITS OWN TO REQUEST TRUDEAU TO INTERCEDE WITH CASTRO ON MATTER AND (2) DEPT DOES SO WITHOUT REFERENCE TO HEAD'S APPROACH. EXTAFF'S NOSE WOULD BE FAR OUT OF JOINT IF IT APPEARED WE WERE ACTING IN MATTER ON SUGGESTION OF HEAD, WITH WHOM IT HAS QUITE UNPLEASANT RIVALRY.

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JOHNSON



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13

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 014148

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Letter  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Brent Scowcroft  
CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Ivan Head  
RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Assistant Principal Secretary to the  
Prime Minister  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Angola  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/1976?  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032500037  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR EUROPE AND CANADA  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 2  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Canada (8)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 10/16/2001  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG

188 X add-on  
Rewrite 1/19/76

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

Dear Ivan:

Knowing that your Prime Minister is planning to visit Cuba later this month, I want to share with you directly information that we have on the background and current status of Cuba's activities in Angola.

You are aware of the great depth of concern in the United States Government over Cuba's major intervention in Angola. There are now approximately 10,000 Cuban troops in that African country. Their Soviet-sponsored role is working against the interests not only of Angola but also of other African countries. It is a role that has introduced a dangerous, totally unwelcome and destabilizing element into international politics, jeopardizing broader interests which our two countries share with friends and allies. The accompanying paper provides a succinct review.

I hope the attached will be helpful. Please get in touch if the paper raises unanswered questions or if there is any other aspect of the issue that you wish to discuss.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Attachment

Mr. Ivan Head  
Assistant Principal Secretary  
to the Prime Minister  
Ottawa

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY state dept. review 9/23/02

BY dal NARA, DATE 6/16/10

CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE XGDS



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			JG NBR			INITIAL ACTION O		
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7600188X					

*Clift*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: KISSINGER *Clift* \_\_\_\_\_ S/S \_\_\_\_\_ REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE

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SUBJECT: *Judean's Visit to Cuba, re the Angolan Connection - LA*

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	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK . . . . . (_____)
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES . . . . . (_____)
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____ (_____)
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION . . . . . (_____)
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____ (_____)
EUROPE / CANADA			<i>X</i>	RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . (_____)
LATIN AMERICA			<i>X</i>	JOINT MEMO . . . . . (_____)
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ (_____)
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? . . . . . (_____)
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE . . . . . (_____)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: _____
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

*Index: Judean, Lucie - Elliott*

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
<i>1/12</i>		<i>Clift</i>	<i>+</i>	<i>Decision (1-19)</i>	
<i>1/21</i>		<i>SC/CS</i>		<i>scowcroft spd via LA to Head via Eagleburg</i>	



DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

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