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PRESIDENT'S AFTERNOON INTERVENTION
ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

POINTS TO BE MADE

INTRODUCTION

- THIS MORNING I REVIEWED MY DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AT MALTA AND WE HEARD FROM PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI AND PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY ABOUT THEIR RECENT MEETINGS WITH HIM.
- I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY THIS AFTERNOON TO TALK ABOUT A SUBJECT OF EVEN BROADER SCOPE: THE FUTURE SHAPE OF THE NEW EUROPE AND THE NEW ATLANTICISM.

A TIME OF CHOICE

- WHEN WE LAST MET IN MAY, OUR SUMMIT DECLARATION DESCRIBED THE SETTING AS A "JUNCTURE OF UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITIES." IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, WE HAVE WITNESSED EVENTS THAT HAVE FINALLY BEGUN TO MATCH OUR HOPES THESE FORTY YEARS. OUR DREAMS FOR AN HISTORIC TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE FROM A DIVIDED CONTINENT INTO A CONTINENT WHOLE AND FREE ARE COMING TRUE.
- THE ALLIANCE WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1949 TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR PRECISELY THE EXTRAORDINARY EVOLUTION WHICH IS OCCURRING IN EASTERN EUROPE TODAY.
- THIS YEAR THE PEOPLE OF THE EAST MADE FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES ABOUT THEIR DESTINY, AND GOVERNMENTS THERE BEGAN TO HONOR THE CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE. WHAT THESE CHANGES AMOUNT TO IS NOTHING LESS THAN A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION.
- THE TASK BEFORE US IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE FRUITS OF THIS PEACEFUL REVOLUTION AND PROVIDE THE ARCHITECTURE FOR CONTINUED PEACEFUL CHANGE. GREAT CHOICES ARE BEING MADE, AND GREATER OPPORTUNITIES BECKON.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE: OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE THROUGH FREEDOM

- IN ANY TIME OF GREAT CHANGE, IT IS GOOD TO HAVE FIRM PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE OUR WAY. OUR GOVERNMENTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES AGAIN IN MAY TO SEEK AN END TO THE PAINFUL DIVISION OF EUROPE. WE HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED THIS DIVISION. THE PEOPLE OF EVERY NATION HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE IN FREEDOM.
- OF COURSE, WE HAVE ALL SUPPORTED GERMAN REUNIFICATION FOR FOUR DECADES. AND IN OUR VIEW, THIS GOAL OF GERMAN UNIFICATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES.

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- FIRST, SELF-DETERMINATION MUST BE PURSUED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS OUTCOME. WE SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME ENDORSE NOR EXCLUDE ANY PARTICULAR VISION OF UNITY.
- SECOND, UNIFICATION SHOULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMANY'S CONTINUED ALIGNMENT WITH NATO AND AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE LEGAL COMMITMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIED POWERS.
- THIRD, IN THE INTERESTS OF GENERAL EUROPEAN STABILITY, MOVES TOWARD UNIFICATION MUST BE PEACEFUL, GRADUAL, AND PART OF A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.
- LASTLY, ON THE QUESTION OF BORDERS WE SHOULD REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
- AN END TO THE UNNATURAL DIVISION OF EUROPE, AND OF GERMANY, MUST PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND BE BASED UPON THE VALUES THAT ARE BECOMING UNIVERSAL IDEALS, AS ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE BECOME PART OF A COMMONWEALTH OF FREE NATIONS. I KNOW MY FRIEND HELMUT KOHL COMPLETELY SHARES THIS CONVICTION.

THE ROLE OF NATO

- THE POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR NATO THAT WE AGREED UPON LAST MAY MAKES THE PROMOTION OF GREATER FREEDOM IN THE EAST A BASIC ELEMENT OF ALLIANCE POLICY. ACCORDINGLY, NATO SHOULD PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND REFORM WITHIN EASTERN COUNTRIES AS THE BEST MEANS OF ENCOURAGING RECONCILIATION AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE.
- THIS EFFORT RECALLS THE ORIGIN OF NATO AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE OF NATIONS SHARING THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL VALUES, A FOUNDATION ON WHICH I EXPECT NATO WILL INCREASINGLY BUILD IN THIS NEW AGE OF EUROPE.
- ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR REFORM AND POSITIVE CHANGE IN THE EAST NEEDS TO BE BROAD, MULTIFACETED, AND FLEXIBLE. IT SHOULD NOT ONLY BE A QUESTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE -- AS IMPORTANT AS THAT MIGHT BE -- BUT OF STEPS TO SUPPORT GREATER POLITICAL PLURALISM, OPEN UP FLOWS OF INFORMATION, DEVELOP NEEDED TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND PROVIDE THROUGH OUR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN STATES, BOTH EAST AND WEST.
- THIS FITS THE CONCEPT OF "NEW MISSIONS FOR NATO" WHICH I PROPOSED WHEN I WAS HERE LAST MAY FOR OUR SUMMIT.
- BUT WE ALSO MUST REMAIN CONSTANT WITH NATO'S TRADITIONAL SECURITY MISSION. THE POTENTIAL FOR STRIFE IS INHERENT IN ANY PERIOD OF FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL TRANSITION. IN SEEKING AND PREPARING PEACEFUL CHANGE, THIS ALLIANCE ALSO MUST REMAIN A RELIABLE GUARANTOR OF PEACE IN EUROPE, AS IT HAS

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BEEN FOR FORTY YEARS. IT UNITES THE FREE STATES OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN SHARING RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO NURTURE AND GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW EUROPE.

- AS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND PARTNERSHIP OF DEMOCRACIES, NATO SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THREATENING BY THE EAST. RATHER, IT CAN HELP MANAGE PEACEFUL CHANGE IN EUROPE IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES SECURITY AND STABILITY FOR ALL STATES. A HEALTHY NATO WILL SUPPORT BOTH MOVES TOWARD GREATER UNITY WITHIN WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS THE DISSOLUTION OF BARRIERS WITH THE EAST.
- ALTHOUGH THIS IS A TIME OF GREAT HOPE, WE MUST NOT BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROMISING EXPECTATIONS AND PRESENT REALITIES.
- MY GOVERNMENT THEREFORE REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR, BASED ON A MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.
- I PLEDGE TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES DESIRE OUR PRESENCE AS PART OF A COMMON SECURITY EFFORT.
- AS I SAID AT NATO EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE U.S. WILL REMAIN A EUROPEAN POWER. THAT MEANS THE U.S. WILL STAY ENGAGED IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, AND IN OUR COMMON DEFENSE.
- THIS IS NOT OLD THINKING. IT IS GOOD THINKING. OF COURSE I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LESS MILITARIZED EUROPE. EVERYONE HERE KNOWS HOW STRONGLY I SUPPORT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TOWARD AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE EAST-WEST DIVIDE.
- THIS CFE AGREEMENT WOULD DRAMATICALLY CUT BACK WARSAW PACT, PARTICULARLY SOVIET, FORCE STRENGTH. THIS HAS GREAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS FOR THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE. AND IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED AND RESPONSIBLE SET OF ALLIED REDUCTIONS AS WELL.
- AS WE SEEK TO ADJUST OUR MILITARY POSTURE TO THE CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE, I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER MODEL THAN THE CFE PROCESS AS A WAY TO COORDINATE OUR RESPONSES TO THE NEW REQUIREMENTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. WE MUST STAND TOGETHER FOR NEGOTIATED, COORDINATED, STABILIZING REDUCTIONS AGAINST A RUSH TO THROW OFF DEFENSE BURDENS, AGAINST A RETURN TO THE NARROW PROTECTION OF SELF-INTEREST THAT COULD BE SO DANGEROUS AT A TIME WHEN EUROPEAN POLITICS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX RIVALED IN MY ADULT LIFE ONLY BY THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

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- YET, THE CFE PROCESS HAS NOT REALIZED ITS FULL POTENTIAL. LAST MAY WE AGREED TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR. WE HAVE MADE GOOD PROGRESS SINCE THEN, BUT TOO LITTLE AND TOO SLOWLY TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US: THE CHANCE TO EASE THE SOVIET ARMY OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE AND SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND AGGRESSION.
- WE AS POLITICAL LEADERS NEED TO REMAIN FIXED ON THIS GOAL AND TO RE-ENERGIZE OUR BUREAUCRACIES AND NEGOTIATORS TO SEIZE THIS URGENT OPPORTUNITY. I HOPE YOU AGREE WITH ME ON THE NEED FOR ACTION NOW. IF WE IN THIS ALLIANCE ARE NOT EQUAL TO THE CHANGES THAT ARE GOING ON IN EUROPE AROUND US, THE CFE PROCESS COULD BE OVERRUN BY EVENTS. THAT COULD BE DANGEROUS AND WE MUST AVOID IT.
- SIMILARLY, WE NEED TO GIVE THOUGHT TO HOW THE ALLIANCE CAN BEST MAINTAIN, IN THE MIDST OF CHANGE, DETERRENCE AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES.
- FOR THAT REASON, I AM PREPARED TO LOOK WITH AN OPEN MIND AT WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN TOGETHER ACHIEVE EVEN LOWER LEVELS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE AS PART OF A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.

THE ROLE OF CSCE

- MANY OF THE VALUES THAT SHOULD GUIDE EUROPE'S FUTURE ARE DESCRIBED IN THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. THESE VALUES ENCOMPASS THE FREEDOM OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR DESTINY UNDER A RULE OF LAW WITH RULERS WHO ARE DEMOCRATICALLY ACCOUNTABLE.
- I THINK WE CAN LOOK TO THE CSCE TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE.
- EARLIER THIS YEAR, I SUGGESTED WE EXPAND THE CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS BASKET TO INCLUDE FREE ELECTIONS. GIVEN THE CALLS AND COMMITMENTS TO ELECTIONS IN MANY NATIONS TO THE EAST, THIS COULD BE AN EXCELLENT TIME FOR THE CSCE TO ASSUME THIS ADDITIONAL MANDATE.
- IN ADDITION, THE "ECONOMIC BASKET" OF THE CSCE HAS BEEN UNDERDEVELOPED. I SUGGESTED TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV THIS WEEKEND THAT WE COULD BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THIS ASPECT OF CSCE BY FOCUSING ON THE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSITION FROM STAGNANT PLANNED ECONOMIES TO FREE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS.
- IN SUM, THE THIRTY-FIVE NATIONS OF THE CSCE BRIDGE BOTH THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. IT IS A STRUCTURE THAT SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE.

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THE ROLE OF THE EC

- I ALSO APPRECIATE THE VITAL ROLE THE EC MUST PLAY IN THE NEW EUROPE.
- BEFORE MY TRIP TO MALTA, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND CALLED TO SHARE WITH ME THE VIEWS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS EXPRESSED AT THE EC MEETING HE HAD CALLED. AND I KNOW THE COMMUNITY WILL BE RETURNING TO THESE TOPICS IN STRASBOURG LATER THIS WEEK.
- IT'S MY BELIEF THAT THE EVENTS OF OUR TIMES CALL BOTH FOR A CONTINUED, PERHAPS EVEN INTENSIFIED, EFFORT OF THE TWELVE TO INTEGRATE, AND A ROLE FOR THE EC AS A MAGNET THAT DRAWS THE FORCES OF REFORM FORWARD IN EASTERN EUROPE.
- THAT'S WHY I WAS EXCEPTIONALLY PLEASED THAT WE AGREED AT THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT ON A SPECIFIC ROLE FOR THE EC IN THE GROUP OF 24 EFFORT TO ASSIST POLAND AND HUNGARY. NOW THE G-24, CATALYZED BY EC EFFORTS, MUST DELIVER. ONE KEY STEP IS TO HELP POLAND ASSEMBLE THE \$1 BILLION STABILIZATION FUND IT HAS REQUESTED TO SUPPORT THE MAJOR MACROECONOMIC OVERHAUL PLAN IT INTENDS TO PUT IN PLACE WITHIN WEEKS.
- I RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THE EC CANNOT BEAR THIS BURDEN ALONE. THE UNITED STATES WILL BE AT THE COMMUNITY'S SIDE IN THIS NOBLE ENDEAVOR.
- I ALSO AM COMMITTED TO A CLOSE U.S. PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EC. WE ARE BOUND TOGETHER BY COMMON VALUES AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AS WELL AS BY SHARED INTERESTS. SO WE SHOULD LOOK FOR WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR TIES SO A NEW ATLANTICISM WILL PULL IN HARNESS WITH A NEW EUROPE.

CONCLUSION

- WE STAND ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA. WE KNOW THAT WE ARE CONTRIBUTING TO A PROCESS OF HISTORY DRIVEN BY PEOPLES DETERMINED TO BE FREE. THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE, ESPECIALLY THE BRAVE CITIZENS OF THE EAST, ARE ILLUMINATING THE FUTURE.
- YET THE OUTCOME IS NOT PREDESTINED. IT DEPENDS ON OUR CONTINUED STRENGTH AND SOLIDARITY AS AN ALLIANCE. IT DEPENDS VITALLY ON THE ACTIONS WE TAKE, AS GOVERNMENTS AND INDIVIDUALS, TO OFFER LEADERSHIP, PROTECTION, AND ENCOURAGEMENT FOR THIS PROCESS OF PEACEFUL TRANSFORMATION.
- EUROPE IS CHANGING, AND WE WILL BE EQUAL TO THE CHANGE. OUR TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP CAN CREATE THE ARCHITECTURE OF A NEW EUROPE, AND A NEW ATLANTICISM, WHERE SELF-DETERMINATION, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM EVERYWHERE REPLACE COERCION AND TYRANNY, WHERE ECONOMIC LIBERTY EVERYWHERE REPLACES ECONOMIC CONTROLS AND STAGNATION, AND WHERE LASTING PEACE IS REINFORCED EVERYWHERE BY COMMON RESPECT FOR THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

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At the just concluded session of the North Atlantic Council, I had an opportunity to report on my meetings with Chairman Gorbachev at Malta and to discuss with our allies the remarkable changes unfolding on the European continent.

I went to Malta to discuss how Chairman Gorbachev and I could prepare the way for greater economic interaction; give new impetus to our arms control agenda; and to address the differences that we face in a number of regional conflicts. We still disagree on a number of issues, especially on regional affairs, but we did lay a solid foundation for further progress across a broad range of problems. Chairman Gorbachev and I also had an extensive discussion of events in Europe in which he too welcomed the changes taking place and stated that every nation must find its own way.

Prime Minister Mulroney and Prime Minister Andreotti -- both of whom have also met with Chairman Gorbachev recently -- shared the results of their discussions as well. The three of us and the other NATO leaders agree that we are in a period of far reaching and historic change. As NATO celebrates safeguarding forty years of peace, reform in the Soviet Union and the sheer will of the peoples of Eastern Europe, present us with our best chance yet to transform fundamentally the East-West relationship.

When the members of NATO met in May, we dedicated ourselves to

overcoming Europe's painful division so that the people of every nation would have the right to determine their way of life in freedom. We could not have known that the still accelerating pace of change in Eastern Europe would put the realization of that goal within our grasp so soon. There is now a whole new challenge before NATO -- to consolidate the fruits of the peaceful revolution and to provide a stable basis for continued democratic change.

Today's meeting looked to that future, understanding the importance of appropriate and timely responses to the requirements of building a new Europe -- whole and free. We recalled the origin of NATO as a political alliance of nations sharing the same fundamental values. Today, those democratic values are the powerful magnet that is drawing the East toward us. And it is only on the basis of those values that the unnatural division of Europe and of Germany can proceed.

But NATO is first and foremost a security alliance -- one that can and must provide stability as change takes place. This is a time of great hope, but the promise of the future will never be realized if we do not take account of present day realities. Thus, the Alliance must remain a defensive alliance, committed to a strategy for the prevention of war based on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces. The Allies emphasized their commitment to early conclusion of a CFE treaty which has the potential to transform the military landscape and contribute to the political

evolution as well. Finally, I pledged today that the United States will maintain significant military forces in Europe as long as our allies desire our presence. The United States is a part of Europe and committed, for the long-term, to Europe's defense and its political evolution.

The United States also recognizes, too, that there are important changes taking place within Western Europe as well as in the East. A strong and united Europe means a stronger NATO and a stronger America. The United States supports the European Community's effort to form a single integrated market and appreciates its willingness to reach out to Eastern Europe -- along with the United States -- to help the people of the region find prosperity.

Europe is changing and NATO must be equal to the change. The transatlantic partnership that Canada, the U.S., and our West European allies forged forty years ago. A new Atlanticism is emerging, one where self-determination and individual freedom everywhere replace coercion and tyranny, where economic liberty abounds and where lasting peace is reinforced by common respect for the rights of man.

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CONCLUSION

- WE STAND ON THE THRESHOLD OF A NEW ERA. WE KNOW THAT WE ARE CONTRIBUTING TO A PROCESS OF HISTORY DRIVEN BY PEOPLES DETERMINED TO BE FREE. THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE, ESPECIALLY THE BRAVE CITIZENS OF THE EAST, ARE ILLUMINATING THE FUTURE.
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03a. List	Malta Meeting Briefers. (3 pp.)	1989	(b)(1), (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Non-Summit - December 2-3, 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	11/7/2007	OA/ID Number:	CF01952-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2001-1853-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. List	List of Participants in the President's Pre-Malta Briefings. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1), (b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: Blackwill, Robert D.

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Non-Summit - December 2-3, 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	11/7/2007	OA/ID Number:	CF01952-004
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	Re: Secure Voice Circuit Between the White House and the Kremlin. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: Blackwill, Robert D.

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Non-Summit - December 2-3, 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	11/7/2007	OA/ID Number:	CF01952-004
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PRESIDENT'S AFTERNOON INTERVENTION
ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

- THIS MORNING I REVIEWED MY DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AT MALTA AND WE HEARD FROM PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI AND PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY ABOUT THEIR RECENT MEETINGS WITH HIM.
- I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY THIS AFTERNOON TO TALK ABOUT A SUBJECT OF EVEN BROADER SCOPE: THE FUTURE SHAPE OF THE NEW EUROPE AND THE NEW ATLANTICISM.

A TIME OF CHOICE

- WHEN WE LAST MET IN MAY, OUR SUMMIT DECLARATION DESCRIBED THE SETTING AS A "JUNCTURE OF UNPRECEDENTED CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITIES." IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, WE HAVE WITNESSED EVENTS THAT HAVE FINALLY BEGUN TO MATCH OUR HOPES THESE FORTY YEARS. OUR DREAMS FOR AN HISTORIC TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPE FROM A DIVIDED CONTINENT INTO A CONTINENT WHOLE AND FREE ARE COMING TRUE.
- THE ALLIANCE WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1949 TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR PRECISELY THE EXTRAORDINARY EVOLUTION WHICH IS OCCURRING IN EASTERN EUROPE TODAY.
- THIS YEAR THE PEOPLE OF THE EAST MADE FUNDAMENTAL CHOICES ABOUT THEIR DESTINY, AND GOVERNMENTS THERE BEGAN TO HONOR THE CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE. WHAT THESE CHANGES AMOUNT TO IS NOTHING LESS THAN A PEACEFUL REVOLUTION.
- THE TASK BEFORE US IS TO CONSOLIDATE THE FRUITS OF THIS PEACEFUL REVOLUTION AND PROVIDE THE ARCHITECTURE FOR CONTINUED PEACEFUL CHANGE. GREAT CHOICES ARE BEING MADE, AND GREATER OPPORTUNITIES BECKON.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLE FOR EUROPE'S FUTURE: OVERCOMING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE THROUGH FREEDOM

- IN ANY TIME OF GREAT CHANGE, IT IS GOOD TO HAVE FIRM PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE OUR WAY. OUR GOVERNMENTS COMMITTED THEMSELVES AGAIN IN MAY TO SEEK AN END TO THE PAINFUL DIVISION OF EUROPE. WE HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED THIS DIVISION. THE PEOPLE OF EVERY NATION HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE IN FREEDOM.
- OF COURSE, WE HAVE ALL SUPPORTED GERMAN REUNIFICATION FOR FOUR DECADES. AND IN OUR VIEW, THIS GOAL OF GERMAN UNIFICATION SHOULD BE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES.
- FIRST, SELF-DETERMINATION MUST BE PURSUED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS OUTCOME. WE SHOULD NOT AT THIS TIME ENDORSE NOR EXCLUDE ANY PARTICULAR VISION OF UNITY.

- SECOND, UNIFICATION SHOULD OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF GERMANY'S CONTINUED COMMITMENT TO NATO AND AN INCREASINGLY INTEGRATED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE LEGAL ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ALLIED POWERS.
- THIRD, IN THE INTERESTS OF GENERAL EUROPEAN STABILITY, MOVES TOWARD UNIFICATION MUST BE PEACEFUL, GRADUAL, AND PART OF A STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS.
- LASTLY, ON THE QUESTION OF BORDERS WE SHOULD REITERATE OUR SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT.
- AN END TO THE UNNATURAL DIVISION OF EUROPE, AND OF GERMANY, MUST PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND BE BASED UPON THE VALUES THAT ARE BECOMING UNIVERSAL IDEALS, AS ALL THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE BECOME PART OF A COMMONWEALTH OF FREE NATIONS. I KNOW MY FRIEND HELMUT KOHL COMPLETELY SHARES THIS CONVICTION.

THE ROLE OF NATO

- THE POLITICAL STRATEGY FOR NATO THAT WE AGREED UPON LAST MAY MAKES THE PROMOTION OF GREATER FREEDOM IN THE EAST A BASIC ELEMENT OF ALLIANCE POLICY. ACCORDINGLY, NATO SHOULD PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND REFORM WITHIN EASTERN COUNTRIES AS THE BEST MEANS OF ENCOURAGING RECONCILIATION AMONG THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE.
- THIS EFFORT RECALLS THE ORIGIN OF NATO AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE OF NATIONS SHARING THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL VALUES, A FOUNDATION ON WHICH I EXPECT NATO WILL INCREASINGLY BUILD IN THIS NEW AGE OF EUROPE.
- ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR REFORM AND POSITIVE CHANGE IN THE EAST NEEDS TO BE BROAD, MULTIFACETED, AND FLEXIBLE. IT SHOULD NOT ONLY BE A QUESTION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE -- AS IMPORTANT AS THAT MIGHT BE -- BUT OF STEPS TO SUPPORT GREATER POLITICAL PLURALISM, OPEN UP FLOWS OF INFORMATION, DEVELOP NEEDED TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND PROVIDE THROUGH OUR DEFENSE AND ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FOR INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN STATES, BOTH EAST AND WEST.
- THIS FITS THE CONCEPT OF "NEW MISSIONS FOR NATO" WHICH I PROPOSED WHEN I WAS HERE LAST MAY FOR OUR SUMMIT.
- BUT WE ALSO MUST REMAIN CONSTANT WITH NATO'S TRADITIONAL SECURITY MISSION. THE POTENTIAL FOR STRIFE IS INHERENT IN ANY PERIOD OF FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL TRANSITION. IN SEEKING AND PREPARING PEACEFUL CHANGE, THIS ALLIANCE ALSO MUST REMAIN A RELIABLE GUARANTOR OF PEACE IN EUROPE, AS IT HAS BEEN FOR FORTY YEARS. IT UNITES THE FREE STATES OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY IN SHARING RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AS WE WORK TOGETHER TO NURTURE AND GUIDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW EUROPE.

- AS A DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE AND PARTNERSHIP OF DEMOCRACIES, NATO SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THREATENING BY THE EAST. RATHER, IT CAN HELP MANAGE PEACEFUL CHANGE IN EUROPE IN A WAY THAT PRESERVES SECURITY AND STABILITY FOR ALL STATES. A HEALTHY NATO WILL SUPPORT BOTH MOVES TOWARD GREATER UNITY WITHIN WESTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS THE DISSOLUTION OF BARRIERS WITH THE EAST.
- ALTHOUGH THIS IS A TIME OF GREAT HOPE, WE MUST NOT BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PROMISING EXPECTATIONS AND PRESENT REALITIES.
- MY GOVERNMENT THEREFORE REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE ALLIANCE STRATEGY FOR THE PREVENTION OF WAR, BASED ON A MIX OF NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES.
- I PLEDGE TODAY THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN SIGNIFICANT MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE AS LONG AS OUR ALLIES DESIRE OUR PRESENCE AS PART OF A COMMON SECURITY EFFORT.
- AS I SAID AT NATO EARLIER THIS YEAR, THE U.S. WILL REMAIN A EUROPEAN POWER. THAT MEANS THE U.S. WILL STAY ENGAGED IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE, AND IN OUR COMMON DEFENSE.
- THIS IS NOT OLD THINKING. IT IS GOOD THINKING. OF COURSE I WOULD LIKE TO SEE A LESS MILITARIZED EUROPE. EVERYONE HERE KNOWS HOW STRONGLY I SUPPORT THE PROGRESS BEING MADE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TOWARD AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE EAST-WEST DIVIDE.
- THIS CFE AGREEMENT WOULD DRAMATICALLY CUT BACK WARSAW PACT, PARTICULARLY SOVIET, FORCE STRENGTH. THIS HAS GREAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PROCESS OF REFORM IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WELL AS FOR THE SECURITY OF WESTERN EUROPE. AND IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED AND RESPONSIBLE SET OF ALLIED REDUCTIONS AS WELL.
- AS WE SEEK TO ADJUST OUR MILITARY POSTURE TO THE CHANGING POLITICAL CLIMATE, I CAN THINK OF NO BETTER MODEL THAN THE CFE PROCESS AS A WAY TO COORDINATE OUR RESPONSES TO THE NEW REQUIREMENTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. WE MUST STAND TOGETHER FOR NEGOTIATED, COORDINATED, STABILIZING REDUCTIONS AGAINST A RUSH TO THROW OFF DEFENSE BURDENS, AGAINST A RETURN TO THE NARROW PROTECTION OF SELF-INTEREST THAT COULD BE SO DANGEROUS AT A TIME WHEN EUROPEAN POLITICS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX RIVALED IN MY ADULT LIFE ONLY BY THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
- YET, THE CFE PROCESS HAS NOT REALIZED ITS FULL POTENTIAL. LAST MAY WE AGREED TO SEEK AN AGREEMENT WITHIN ONE YEAR. WE HAVE MADE GOOD PROGRESS SINCE THEN, BUT TOO LITTLE AND TOO SLOWLY TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY BEFORE US: THE CHANCE TO EASE THE SOVIET ARMY OUT OF EASTERN EUROPE AND SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THE RISK OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND AGGRESSION.

- WE AS POLITICAL LEADERS NEED TO REMAIN FIXED ON THIS GOAL AND TO RE-ENERGIZE OUR BUREAUCRACIES AND NEGOTIATORS TO SEIZE THIS URGENT OPPORTUNITY. I HOPE YOU AGREE WITH ME ON THE NEED FOR ACTION NOW. IF WE IN THIS ALLIANCE ARE NOT EQUAL TO THE CHANGES THAT ARE GOING ON IN EUROPE AROUND US, THE CFE PROCESS COULD BE OVERRUN BY EVENTS. THAT COULD BE DANGEROUS AND WE MUST AVOID IT.
- SIMILARLY, WE NEED TO GIVE THOUGHT TO HOW THE ALLIANCE CAN BEST MAINTAIN, IN THE MIDST OF CHANGE, DETERRENCE AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL OF FORCES.
- FOR THAT REASON, I AM PREPARED TO LOOK WITH AN OPEN MIND AT WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN TOGETHER ACHIEVE EVEN LOWER LEVELS OF CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE AS PART OF A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT.

THE ROLE OF CSCE

- MANY OF THE VALUES THAT SHOULD GUIDE EUROPE'S FUTURE ARE DESCRIBED IN THE FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE OF SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE. THESE VALUES ENCOMPASS THE FREEDOM OF PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR DESTINY UNDER A RULE OF LAW WITH RULERS WHO ARE DEMOCRATICALLY ACCOUNTABLE.
- I THINK WE CAN LOOK TO THE CSCE TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN THE FUTURE OF EUROPE.
- EARLIER THIS YEAR, I SUGGESTED WE EXPAND THE CSCE HUMAN RIGHTS BASKET TO INCLUDE FREE ELECTIONS. GIVEN THE CALLS AND COMMITMENTS TO ELECTIONS IN MANY NATIONS TO THE EAST, THIS COULD BE AN EXCELLENT TIME FOR THE CSCE TO ASSUME THIS ADDITIONAL MANDATE.
- IN ADDITION, THE "ECONOMIC BASKET" OF THE CSCE HAS BEEN UNDERDEVELOPED. I SUGGESTED TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV THIS WEEKEND THAT WE COULD BREATHE NEW LIFE INTO THIS ASPECT OF CSCE BY FOCUSING ON THE PRACTICAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE TRANSITION FROM STAGNANT PLANNED ECONOMIES TO FREE AND COMPETITIVE MARKETS.
- IN SUM, THE THIRTY-FIVE NATIONS OF THE CSCE BRIDGE BOTH THE DIVISION OF EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC OCEAN. IT IS A STRUCTURE THAT SHOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPE.

THE ROLE OF THE EC

- I ALSO APPRECIATE THE VITAL ROLE THE EC MUST PLAY IN THE NEW EUROPE.
- BEFORE MY TRIP TO MALTA, PRESIDENT MITTERRAND CALLED TO SHARE WITH ME THE VIEWS ABOUT RECENT EVENTS EXPRESSED AT THE EC MEETING HE HAD CALLED. AND I KNOW THE COMMUNITY WILL BE RETURNING TO THESE TOPICS IN STRASBOURG LATER THIS WEEK.

- IT'S MY BELIEF THAT THE EVENTS OF OUR TIMES CALL BOTH FOR A CONTINUED, PERHAPS EVEN INTENSIFIED, EFFORT OF THE TWELVE TO INTEGRATE, AND A ROLE FOR THE EC AS A MAGNET THAT DRAWS THE FORCES OF REFORM FORWARD IN EASTERN EUROPE.
- THAT'S WHY I WAS EXCEPTIONALLY PLEASED THAT WE AGREED AT THE PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMIT ON A SPECIFIC ROLE FOR THE EC IN THE GROUP OF 24 EFFORT TO ASSIST POLAND AND HUNGARY. NOW THE G-24, CATALYZED BY EC EFFORTS, MUST DELIVER. ONE KEY STEP IS TO HELP POLAND ASSEMBLE THE \$1 BILLION STABILIZATION FUND IT HAS REQUESTED TO SUPPORT THE MAJOR MACROECONOMIC OVERHAUL PLAN IT INTENDS TO PUT IN PLACE WITHIN WEEKS.
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CONCLUSION

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE: November 30, 1989
LOCATION: The Cabinet Room
TIME: 9:30 am - 10:30 am

PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO MALTA

Agenda

- I. Introduction President
- II. Discussion All participants
- III. Summary Brent Scowcroft

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Declassify on: OADR

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By Ruc NARA, Date 11/07/07

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS, re: National Security Council Meeting [on upcoming Malta Summit]. (2 pp.)	11/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: Blackwill, Robert D.

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Non-Summit - December 2-3, 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	11/7/2007	OA/ID Number:	CF01952-004
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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Talking Points	Points to Be Made in NSC Meeting on Your Discussion with Gorbachev. (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Non-Summit - December 2-3, 1989 [2]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Talking Points	Points to Be Made in NSC Meeting on Your Discussion with Gorbachev. (6 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records

Office: National Security Council

Series: Blackwill, Robert D.

Subseries:

WHORM Cat.:

File Location: Non-Summit - December 2-3, 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	11/7/2007	OA/ID Number:	CF01952-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2001-1853-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

Nicholas Brady, Secretary of Treasury

Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Judge William Webster, Director of Central Intelligence

General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Robert Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National
Security Affairs

Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for European
and Soviet Affairs

Condoleezza Rice, Director for Soviet and East European Affairs
NSC Staff

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06d. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft, re: NSC Meeting on the President's Trip to Malta. (1 pp.)	11/29/89	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 27, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH DAVID BATES
FROM COOPER EVANS 
SUBJECT Dobrynin's Views on Codifying Soviet Emigration
 Laws

The purpose of this memorandum is to convey to you recent observations of Mr. Dobrynin, Assistant to President Gorbachev for US-USSR Relations, related to Jackson-Vanik and your December meeting with President Gorbachev.

At a social gathering shortly after the recent meeting of the Joint US-USSR Economic Commission, Soviet Ambassador Dubinin commented on Soviet codification of emigration laws. He made the following points:

- * The Soviet Union recognizes how important codification is to the US.
- * The Supreme Soviet has begun the process of codification.
- * President Gorbachev attaches a very high priority to adoption of the necessary legislation.
- * The legislative process should be completed in December 1989.

On hearing these remarks, Mr. Dobrynin took Dwayne Andreas aside and privately made the following points, asking that they be relayed to me:

- * He, Dobrynin, was worried about the codification prospects. He commented approximately as follows:

"We in the Soviet Union also have 'hard-liners' just as you have in the US. They resist President Gorbachev's urging that the emigration rules be codified at once. They take the position that the US is pushing too hard, that there is much other important business before the Supreme Soviet, some of critical priority. I am afraid we may not be able to complete codification in December in spite of President Gorbachev's best efforts."

* Dobrynin suggested that perhaps the best way for both sides to proceed would be for you to be prepared to announce something along the following lines at the December meeting:

- That you have received the strongest assurances from President Gorbachev that emigration policies are being codified and that the process will soon be completed.
- That you believe and trust President Gorbachev on this point and are now prepared to waive Jackson-Vanik.

* Finally, Dobrynin stated that following such a statement by President Bush the Soviet hard-liners will have lost their principal argument and codification would follow promptly.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3:30 p.m., Nov 29

Florence:

Steve Farrar gave original of attached to Condi Rice (here in ofc) because she is putting briefing books together.

Attached is a copy for General Scowcroft's info.

Wilma

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 29, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROGER B. PORTER *RBP*
SUBJECT: Economic Issues at Malta

At yesterday morning's discussion, there was a consensus that economic issues are likely to be on President Gorbachev's mind at Malta. There was less agreement, however, over what might be an appropriate United States response to a request for support.

One key question is how to handle a request for greater Soviet participation in the major international economic institutions, the GATT and the IMF. Rapid assimilation of the Soviet Union would be difficult and problematic for at least two reasons.

1. The institutions themselves are at delicate stages.

The GATT is at the start of the final year of negotiating the Uruguay Round. It needs to concentrate on the difficult political and economic decisions that will be demanded over the coming year, such as on future trade rules for agriculture, services, intellectual property, and textiles.

The IMF is struggling with the international debt problem, which is creating a need for increased IMF resources. Adding a large new potential claimant for resources would be controversial, especially in the U.S. Congress.

2. Soviet membership could be disruptive because of the size of its economy and its lack of market rules.

While several countries with non-market economies (such as Poland and Hungary) are members of the GATT and the IMF, they have always been small, marginal players. The sheer size of its economy would make the Soviet Union a key player in both institutions. If and when the Soviets adopt market-based arrangements for guiding their economic activity, then their participation can be constructive.

These reservations do not suggest giving the Soviets a cold shoulder on this set of issues. They do, however, suggest the following possible scenario.

1. The first step would concentrate on extending MFN status to the Soviets. We might start now, even before the emigration issue is completely cleared away, to negotiate the commercial agreement that is a precondition to granting MFN. This process could be completed by early next year.
2. A second step would involve negotiating a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) to assure Soviet compliance with recognized standards for treatment of foreign investment. These negotiations might span the first half of 1990.
3. A third step would be U.S. support for observer status in the GATT. This step would occur after completion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, which are scheduled to end in December, 1990. Full Soviet membership in the GATT would be achieved after the Soviets demonstrate their ability to be constructive participants in the international trading system.

The question of Soviet membership in the IMF is probably best deferred for now. IMF rules do not allow observers. Also, the economic tests for IMF membership will be harder for the Soviets to meet than for GATT membership.

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

'89 NOV 28 10:45

B

S/S #

9:02

89 NOV 28

STATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. **044275** CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages **1**
FROM: **ROBERT KIMMITT** **P** **647-1598** **7208 NS**
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION **CENTRAL AMERICAN LETTER - DUBININ TO BAKER ON 11/28**

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	BOB GATES VIA WHISITRM		
	<i>Pryce</i>		
	<i>Pacelli</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

Per 11/09/07

S/S Officer: *[Signature]*

Dubinina to Baker
Letter re
Central America

Blackwell
has copy

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08b. Letter	Dubin [sic] to Baker, re: Soviet policies in Central America [Unofficial Translation]. (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Martin -

Please give me
your views on
previous summits -
the ones you attended.

How is Gorb likely
to act -

How will press play
go -

Give to me with
cc J.S. Brent JAB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 20, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

1500 2017-03
SCS 7/12/17

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

MARLIN FITZWATER *Marlin*

SUBJECT:

REFLECTIONS ON GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL SUMMIT STYLE

In three summit meetings with President Reagan (Washington, Moscow, and New York), President Gorbachev tried three distinctly different personal tactics for dominating the meetings. But the common thread in all three was that he did try to dominate. In addition, while each meeting showed a progression in his sophistication and mastery of diplomatic skills, there always came a point where the basic, feisty, streetfighter, Georgian emerged.

Washington. In the Washington summit, Gorbachev quickly established his objective of stopping SDI, in return for a START agreement. With his Ministers negotiating the issue in side meetings with Shultz, Nitze, Ridgway, and others, Gorbachev set out to intimidate President Reagan through his mastery of arms control issues and his knowledge of the history of previous agreements. Speaking rapidly and excitedly through two two-hour sessions the first day, Gorbachev read from handwritten notes in a small spiral notebook. His gestures were fast and flamboyant, moving his arms in wide circles, slicing the air with an open palm, and pointing his finger at the U.S. delegation. It was an impressive performance, as he recalled the substance of a 1925 treaty and tried to tell the President exactly how many ships were in the U.S. Fleet, and their locations.

President Reagan raised all of our concerns about the various arms control issues, and Gorbachev would respond to each one of them in great detail, challenging the validity of every U.S. argument. At the end of the day, President Reagan was drained. He told Howard Baker that he needed to go home and brush up on his facts if he wanted to compete with Gorbachev. Wisely, Senator Baker told him not to do that, but instead to simply remember who he was and the ideas he represented.

The next day, Gorbachev began the opening session with the same techniques. President Reagan did not try to engage the arguments. He simply held firm to the U.S. positions, repeating our commitment to SDI. On this second day, the situation reversed, with Gorbachev growing ever more frustrated that his

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- 2 -

arguments were not making any headway. Indeed, they were not even being engaged. In the end, we were able to negotiate an agreement in the side groups that the START process would continue, with an understanding that SDI would be set aside.

Moscow. On Gorbachev's home turf, and at the prime of his rise in power, Gorbachev undertook to challenge the President in the most personal way. Again, the issue for discussion was progress on the START treaty and compliance with the ABM treaty in terms of SDI testing. But clearly, Gorbachev's primary goal was to get a final communique that committed the U.S. to "detente." He wanted to be able to tell the Soviet people that the problems with the U.S. were solved.

As at the Washington summit, the language of this debate was being negotiated in side meetings at the ministerial level. Shevardnadze was obviously reporting to Gorbachev that those talks were not going well. Shultz and Ridgway were not willing to budge on language the Soviets wanted, which amounted to a detente situation.

As we entered the final session, Gorbachev focused on the specific language of the communique and demanded answers from the President as to why the Soviet language was unacceptable. President Reagan knew it was unacceptable and would not budge.

The Gorbachev tactic in his situation was to accuse President Reagan of taking orders from his subordinates. At several points he said, "Don't listen to George on this," or "You aren't going to let Frank tell you how to do this, are you?" The President remained passive and calm. He simply overlooked the challenge and said he believed strongly that the language of the U.S. side was the only language he could accept.

Gorbachev asked for a caucus. The two sides stepped back from the table and huddled. Shultz and Powell emphasized again that the United States relationship was based on our continuing ability to raise issues such as regional conflicts, human rights, and military posture. They explained that the Soviet language would gloss these issues over, indicating that we no longer had major disagreements in these areas.

The President and Gorbachev walked around to the end of the table for a final discussion. They stood toe-to-toe, with Gorbachev, a much shorter man, gesturing wildly, demanding that President Reagan explain why he would not accept their proposal. President Reagan said calmly that he could not accept it and only the U.S. language would do. Gorbachev's shoulders sank. He started to turn away, but abruptly the old smile and laugh came back. He shook hands with President Reagan and accepted the U.S. language.

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- 3 -

New York. In this meeting, which you attended, the highlight of the session was his impassioned plea for understanding and support in America of perestroika. But you will recall that he started the conversation with the challenge, "I know there are many in America who don't want perestroika to succeed." Even though this exchange was more gentle than at the other two summits, it demonstrated once again that he is combative by nature, and he likes to make his points from a challenging position -- by putting the other fellow on the defensive.

In summary, you may want to consider how you will respond to this kind of testing. Do you want to engage him point-by-point, or lay back and hear him out? You may want to consider an opening set of remarks that establishes not only what you want out of the meeting, but remarks which demonstrate the kind of man he is dealing with.

Gorbachev reads the popular press and will no doubt drop references to articles or quotations he has read about you. This also means that he has heard the criticism about caution and timidity, etc. My guess is that he will test your style and personality early in the meetings.

Two pre-Malta meeting statements seem to be right out of the Gorbachev mold for past summits. The first is his warning that Western nations should not try to export capitalism. This puts us on the defensive right away. It also sets a benchmark by which the public will judge whether or not we are being differential to Gorbachev, and he knows that our natural proclivity is to not challenge him in public anyway.

The second maneuver is Gennady Gerasimov's statement that the Malta Meeting will dump the Cold War to the bottom of the Mediterranean. This is their typical "raise expectations" maneuver.

In each of the other summits, the Soviets spoke publicly of great achievements, and then tried to hold the U.S. responsible for not reaching those levels. In Moscow, when Gerasimov and I were briefing after one of the sessions, Gerasimov claimed that we had reached agreement on bomber accounting rules and at least an understanding on sea-launched cruise missiles. Neither of these was true. I challenged him immediately. And later in the evening, we had to hold a special briefing to knock down the false euphoria of these statements.

In Malta, the nature of the meeting is much different than past summits, but the techniques may be the same. I remember the lesson I learned as President Reagan walked through Red Square. Gorbachev and Reagan walked around the Square moving from one set of "private citizens" to another. I began to recognize that many of the citizens were actually our drivers from the hotel motorpool, no doubt KGB.

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- 4 -

It also became apparent that each cluster of people was coached to ask a set of questions on a specific issue that had been discussed in the meetings only moments before. One group asked about the joint space mission to Mars, which we had declined; another protested SDI; etc. The lesson here is that every move the Soviets make at these affairs, no matter how pleasurable or informal, are pre-planned and staged. Already, the Soviets are moving a group of "celebrity briefers," no doubt such people as Georgi Arbatov and Vladimir Posner, to hold further briefings in the International Press Center in Malta.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



November 29, 1989

TO: Brent Scowcroft

FROM: John D. Macomber

Brent

Here is the memo the President asked I send to him. He asked specifically that it be sent via you so he would be sure to have it for his trip.

Thank you for your help.

Brent.
JDM.

Enclosure



JOHN D. MACOMBER

Mr President -

Here's the note we
talked about yesterday -

The gist of it is that
there is a great deal the Bank
can do (and quickly) to
finance trade with the USSR,
assuming some legal issues
are cleared up, particularly
the Stevenson Amendment.

My own experience is
that there is a long list of
U.S. products that the Soviets
want to buy so opening
trade with them would be
a pretty big deal for U.S.
business -

all the best.

JM.

11/29/89

JOHN D. MACOMBER



EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20571

PRESIDENT
AND
CHAIRMAN

November 29, 1989

CABLE ADDRESS "EXIMBANK"
TELEX 89-461

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: John D. Macomber *JDM*

SUBJ: Eximbank Support for U.S. Exports to the Soviet Union

Thank you for your telephone call about possible use of Eximbank programs to further trade with the Soviet Union. I believe that there are enormous opportunities for American manufacturers in Soviet markets, and Eximbank can play a vital role in helping them make sales there.

1. While it is hard to estimate how much business we could expect to do, the level of financing activity of other export credit agencies is instructive. For example, Japan has outstanding \$4.1 billion in commitments to the Soviet Union; West Germany, \$3.2 billion; France, \$2.8 billion; and the UK, \$2.2 billion (of which \$800 million was incurred during the two-year period following Secretary Gorbachev's 1987 visit to the UK).
2. At the present time, Eximbank is the only major export credit agency which is not open for business with the Soviet Union. Eximbank's exposure from loans made in the early 1970's to the Soviet Union has now been reduced to about \$45 million and is rapidly being paid down.
3. There is no question in my mind that, as a result of much improved quality, better pricing and a keener awareness of the importance of global trade, U.S. manufacturers can compete successfully for much of the business in the Soviet Union which is currently being won by other countries. And while there may be some temptation to sell controversial high tech products, most of the business will be in traditional manufactured goods -- e.g., engines, pumps, machinery, power equipment, food processing and consumer goods manufacturing equipment, etc.
4. If Eximbank opens in the Soviet Union, we will be able to make available export support under our regular insurance programs (where we insure payment to the exporter) and guarantee programs (where we guarantee loans provided by private commercial banks). Guarantees could be extended to cover loans of up to 8 1/2 years. Our insurance and guarantee programs run on an essentially break even basis so that the cost is de minimis to the U.S. taxpayer.

5. However, several legal constraints prevent us from doing business in the Soviet Union at the present time. The most important is the Stevenson amendment, which unrealistically limits all new Eximbank exposure in the Soviet Union to a total of \$300 million.

6. In addition, if Eximbank is to deal successfully with the Soviet Union, it is important that the Soviets do all they can to streamline their own financial bureaucracy. This has always been their Achilles' heel. Assuming we open for business, I would like to initiate discussions immediately with the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the USSR. We believe that this entity is likely to guarantee our transactions as well as handle the administrative aspects of Eximbank-supported transactions.

I firmly believe that everybody's interests will best be served by the development of successful trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the countries of Eastern Europe. And there's no question that the Bank can help make this happen.



November 29, 1989

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JD.

11/29/88

JOHN D. MACOMBER



EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20571

PRESIDENT
AND
CHAIRMAN

November 29, 1989

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Scowcroft

9528

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RS*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Specialists on Soviet
Baltic States

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his meeting on Tuesday, November 28, with specialists on Soviet Baltic States.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Participants List

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By *Puc* NARA, Date *11/07/07*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS, re: Meeting with Specialists on the Baltic States. (1 pp.)	11/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. List	Re: Participants in Meeting with Specialists on the Baltic States. (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D.
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Non-Summit - December 2-3, 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	11/7/2007	OA/ID Number:	CF01952-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2001-1853-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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