

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):  
2012-3130-S

FOIA Number:  
2012-3130-S

# FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an  
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential  
Library Staff.**

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**Record Group/Collection:** George H.W. Bush Presidential Records  
**Collection/Office of Origin:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files

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**OA/ID Number:** CF00182  
**Folder ID Number:** CF00182-002

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**Folder Title:**  
[Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

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| Stack: | Row: | Section: | Shelf: | Position: |
|--------|------|----------|--------|-----------|
| V      | 0    | 0        | 0      | 0         |

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                                                   | Date      | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-------------|----------------|
| 01. Memo        | Robert Blackwill to Robert M. Gates, Re: Miscellanie. (2 pp.)                                                   | 01/24/89  | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 02. Memo        | Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, Re: NSC Staffing of European Security Issues. (2 pp.)                      | 01/25/89  | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 03. Memo        | Robert D. Blackwill to Adrian Basora, et al., Re: Our Priorities. (1 pp.)                                       | 08/01/89  | (b)(1)      | S              |
| 04a. Memo       | Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft and Robert Gates, Re: Interviewing Candidates for the NSC Staff. (2 pp.) | 01/27/89  | (b)(6)      |                |
| 04b. Letter     | Handwritten letter from HansBinnendijk to Bob Blackwill, Re: Candidate for NSC staff. (1 pp.)                   | 01/17/89  | (b)(6)      |                |
| 04c. Resume     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.)                                                                   | n.d.      | (b)(6)      |                |
| 04d. Resume     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (6 pp.)                                                                   | Dec. 1988 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 04e. Letter     | Senator Richard Luger to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.)                         | 01/17/89  | (b)(6)      |                |
| 04f. Vitae      | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                                                                   | n.d.      | (b)(6)      |                |
| 04g. Resume     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (7 pp.)                                                                   | n.d.      | (b)(6)      |                |

Page 1 of 3

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files

### WHORM Cat.:

**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

**Pinksheet Number:** RML8151  
**OA/ID Number:** CF00182-002  
**Date Closed:** 1/18/2013  
**FOIA/Sys Case #:** 2012-3130-S  
**Re-review Case #:**  
**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Doc. No. / Type | Subject/Title                                                                               | Date     | Restriction | Classification |
|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| 04h. Letter     | To Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                           | 01/19/89 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 04i. Resume     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (3 pp.)                                               | n.d.     | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05a. Memo       | Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Interviewing Candidates for the NSC Staff. (2 pp.) | 02/11/89 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05b. Letter     | To Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                           | 11/25/88 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05c. Memo       | References, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                                   | n.d.     | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05d. Resume     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.)                                               | n.d.     | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05e. Letter     | To Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                           | 12/09/88 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05f. Resume     | Biography, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                                    | n.d.     | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05g. Vitae      | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                                               | n.d.     | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05h. Letter     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                                               | 01/06/89 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05i. Resume     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (4 pp.)                                               | n.d.     | (b)(6)      |                |

**Collection:**

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**Subseries:** Subject Files

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**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

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**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

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|-----------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| 05j. Memo       | Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Interviewing Candidates for the NSC Staff. (2 pp.) | 02/11/89 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 05k. Resume     | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (3 pp.)                                               | n.d.     | (b)(6)      |                |
| 06a. Letter     | From Robert D. Blackwill to candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.)                       | 02/22/89 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 06b. Letter     | From candidate for NSC staff position to Robert Blackwill. (3 pp.)                          | 02/14/89 | (b)(6)      |                |
| 06c. Letter     | Stuart E. Elzenstat to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.)       | 01/18/89 | (b)(6)      |                |

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**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



25 Jan 89

TO: Robert Blackwill

See attached comments.

Robert Gates

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| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Jan-1989 15:35 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

EDWARDS

FROM: VMS MAIL user NSRMP  
(NSRMP@CPUA.P@)

SUBJECT: FORWARDED MESSAGE

Received: From CPUA(NSRMP) by VAXC with Jnet id 2777  
for EDWARDS@VAXC; Tue, 24 Jan 89 15:35 EDT

Date: Tue, 24 Jan 89 15:33:19

From: Robert M. Perito <NSRMP@CPUA.PROFS>

Subject: FORWARDED MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

To: <GANTT@VAXC>,  
<EDWARDS@VAXC>,  
<HALL@VAXC>

FOR GATES; PLEASE PRINT

\*\*\* Forwarding note from SYSTEM --VAXC 01/24/89 15:30 \*\*\*

To: NSRMP --CPUA

From: ALL-IN-1 System Manager

Subject: FORWARDED MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Jan-1989 15:29 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Remote PROFS User

( \_PROFS%NSRMP@CPUA )

FROM: Robert M. Perito  
(PERITO)

SUBJECT: FORWARDED MESSAGE



BB

IN THE PROCESS OF  
CLEANING YOUR VAX FILES I  
FOUND THIS IN THE CREATED  
BUT NOT SENT FILE. I KNOW File  
IT'S OBE BUT I THOUGHT YOU'D  
LIKE TO KNOW YOU NEVER SENT IT. MK/1

Document Originally  
Attached to  
Following Page

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                  | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 02. Memo                 | Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, Re: NSC Staffing of European Security Issues. (2 pp.) | 01/25/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files

**Subseries:** Subject Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506


January 25, 1989

Professor Condoleezza Rice  
Department of Political Science  
Stanford University  
Building 160  
Stanford, California 94305

Dear Professor Rice:

I am delighted that you will be joining the National Security Council Staff in the Directorate of European and Soviet Affairs as of Feb. 1. I look forward to working with you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Robert D. Blackwill". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Robert" and last name "Blackwill" clearly legible.

Robert D. Blackwill  
Senior Director, European  
and Soviet Affairs

cc: Professor James Rosse  
Provost  
Stanford University  
Building 10  
Stanford, California 94305  
Attn: Jason Lewis

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 16, 1989


Mr. Chase Untermeyer  
Assistant to the President and Director  
of Presidential Personnel  
Second Floor, West Wing  
The White House

Dear Mr. Untermeyer:

I am writing to recommend Michael L. Moodie of the Center for Strategic and International Studies for a national security position in either the Departments of State or Defense. I am told that you already have his name under consideration, so the purpose of this note is simply to support his candidacy. He is both thoughtful and expert on defense and arms control matters, and especially with regard to NATO issues.

Please let me know if you need any further information from me.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Robert D. Blackwill". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, looping initial "R".

Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Senior Director, European  
and Soviet Affairs



EMBASSY  
OF THE  
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Washington, DC, March 21, 1989

Ambassador  
Robert D. Blackwill  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Senior Director European and  
Soviet Affairs  
National Security Council  
Old Executive Office Building  
Washington, DC 20506

*Dear Bob :*

Ambassador Dr. Jürgen Ruhfus who is on a short leave has asked me to convey to you his thanks for sending the text of President Bush's speech and the cable on Mr. Bahr's appearance in Brussels.

The forthcoming visit of the Chairman of the Social Democratic Party, Dr. Hans Jochen Vogel, and his delegation will, I think, offer a good opportunity to discuss the SPD's stance on questions of nuclear deterrence and strategy.

*Sincerely,  
Karl Th. Paschke*

Karl Th. Paschke  
Minister

*Pierre Lellouche*  
*Conseiller auprès de Jacques Chirac*


Paris, April 5, 1989

Dear Robert, *Bob,*

I wish to express my most sincere thanks for your help and support in organizing President G. Bush's audience with Jacques Chirac.

I know how helpful you have been and I highly appreciate the trouble you took especially as I know how busy you are. I am looking forward to seeing you in May and hope that we will be able to spend some time together.

With my warmest regards,



Pierre Lellouche

Ambassador R. BLACKWILL  
National Security Council  
Room 368 - Old Executive Office Building  
Washington DC 20 506  
ETATS UNIS

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                 | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 03. Memo                 | Robert D. Blackwill to Adrian Basora, et al., Re: Our Priorities. (1 pp.) | 08/01/89 | (b)(1)      | S      |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
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### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
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#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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| 04b. Letter              | Handwritten letter from HansBinnendijk to Bob Blackwill,<br>Re: Candidate for NSC staff. (1 pp.) | 01/17/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

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| 04c. Resume              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

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**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

FROM THE DESK OF **JAN 23**  
AMBASSADOR SEYMOUR WEISS

Bab -

A very knowledgeable young man who would be interested in a spot on the NSC staff:

- Knows Eur very well (speaks French and has good contacts in Europe. Andy Marshall knows him well.)
- Also has studied the Soviet area but not a Sovietologist.

Seg



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date      | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-----------|-------------|--------|
| 04d. Resume              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (6 pp.) | Dec. 1988 | (b)(6)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                               | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 04e. Letter              | Senator Richard Luger to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.) | 01/17/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 04f. Vitae               | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
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#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 04g. Resume              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (7 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- (b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                            | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 04h. Letter              | To Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position.<br>(1 pp.) | 01/19/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 04i. Resume              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (3 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

## Philip Zelikow

### Work Experience

#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE (1985-date)

##### Foreign Service Officer - Assignments have included:

- Negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments in Central Europe (MBFR), Vienna; political officer, drafted and negotiated statements used by NATO negotiators, analyzed Gorbachev's Atlantic to Urals initiative and assisted in developing Western responses
- Mandate Talks for Negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Vienna; political adviser to US delegation during talks' first year, drafted delegation reports and analyses, worked with Western allies and Warsaw Pact representatives in pursuing US objectives
- Operations Center, Washington; watch officer in Department's 24-hour duty office and crisis management center, drafted daily briefing materials for senior officials
- Secretariat Staff, Washington; tasked and screened papers for senior officials, served as liaison between Department principals and bureaus, provided staff support for Secretary on trips; current duties include assistance to Secretary-designate Baker's Transition Team

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (1984-85)

Adjunct Professor of National Security Affairs - Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. Taught courses to mid-level military officers from all services on "Problems of Gov't and Security in Contemporary Western Europe," "Int'l Relations and Security Problems of the North Atlantic Alliance," and "History of Europe and the USSR 1914-1945;," conducted seminars on Soviet-European Relations and on Political and Security Problems in Europe; did research (with Don Daniel) on US-Soviet ASW issues

#### HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1984)

Center for Science and International Affairs - Adjunct Research Fellow doing doctoral research

#### INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (1983)

Research Assistant, in London, on Soviet views of Western European military cooperation, British policy in low intensity conflict, and ASW issues

#### DAVID BERG & ASSOCIATES, P.C. (1980-82)

Trial Attorney, Houston, Texas - general civil and criminal litigation in state and federal courts, trial and appellate

#### TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (1979)

Briefing Attorney, Austin, Texas - research and preparation of judicial opinions for judge on state appellate court of last resort in criminal cases



## Education

### FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY,

TUFTS UNIVERSITY in cooperation with Harvard University

Awarded M.A. in Law and Diplomacy (1984) & Ph.D. candidacy (ABD) "with distinction" in fields of US and European diplomatic history, Soviet area studies, and defense policy, based on coursework at Fletcher, M.I.T., and Harvard. Recipient of Stewart Prize for ranking at top of first year class.

### UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON COLLEGE OF LAW

Received J.D. (1981). Associate Editor, Law Review; won 1st place in nation in American Bar Association National Moot Court Competition

### UNIVERSITY OF REDLANDS

Received B.A. with Distinction (1977), majored in History  
Also attended University of Houston (1972-75)

## Publications

"The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary," in George Osborn, Asa Clark, et al, eds., Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam: Implications for American Policymaking (Lexington: D.C. Heath & Co., 1987), pp. 31-81 (from 1985 West Point Senior Conference)

"Force Without War, 1975-82," Journal of Strategic Studies 7 (March 1984): 29-54

"Visions of the Future War in Europe," Fletcher Forum 7 (Winter 1983): 313

"The RICO Statute: The Business Client as Racketeer," Texas Bar Journal 45 (1982): 159 (co-author)

"The Constitutionality of Imposing the Death Penalty for Felony Murder," Houston Law Review 15 (1978): 356

"Texas Redefines the Intent to Kill," National Journal of Criminal Defense 3 (1977): 317

Member, International Institute for Strategic Studies

7918 Peyton Forest Trail  
Annandale, Virginia 22003  
(703) 560-2170



BLACKWILL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0736

February 11, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

PRIVATE

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

ROBERT BLACKWILL

SUBJECT:

Candidates for the NSC Staff

I am now ready to begin interviewing to fill the final two officer slots out of the total of seven officer and support positions you have allocated to my Directorate: an international economist to handle EC and East-West trade issues; and the best Germanist I can find who is also able to handle the job's operational requirements. A memo on candidates for the economic slot is at Tab I. At Tab II I have attached a memo on the German experts.

Attachments:

Tab I      Memo on Economists

Tab II     Memo on German Experts

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                   | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 05a. Memo                | Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Interviewing Candidates for the NSC Staff. (2 pp.) | 02/11/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                            | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 05b. Letter              | To Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position.<br>(1 pp.) | 11/25/88 | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                 | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 05c. Memo                | References, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 05d. Resume              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                            | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 05e. Letter              | To Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position.<br>(1 pp.) | 12/09/88 | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 05f. Resume              | Biography, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 05g. Vitae               | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 05h. Letter              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.) | 01/06/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 05i. Resume              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (4 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                                                   | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 05j. Memo                | Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Interviewing Candidates for the NSC Staff. (2 pp.) | 02/11/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                     | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 05k. Resume              | Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (3 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(6)      |        |

### Collection:

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]  
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document                                             | Date     | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 06a. Letter              | From Robert D. Blackwill to candidate for NSC staff position. (1 pp.) | 02/22/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                                     |                                  |
|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b> 1/18/2013       | <b>OA/ID Number:</b> CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b> 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>            |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>            | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>       |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b>       | <b>Disposition Date:</b>         |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>                   | <b>MR Case #:</b>                |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>              | <b>MR Disposition:</b>           |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>         | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b>      |

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| 06b. Letter              | From candidate for NSC staff position to Robert Blackwill.<br>(3 pp.) | 02/14/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
| <b>FOIA/SYS Case #:</b>       | 2012-3130-S | <b>Appeal Case #:</b>       |             |
| <b>Re-review Case #:</b>      |             | <b>Appeal Disposition:</b>  |             |
| <b>P-2/P-5 Review Case #:</b> |             | <b>Disposition Date:</b>    |             |
| <b>AR Case #:</b>             |             | <b>MR Case #:</b>           |             |
| <b>AR Disposition:</b>        |             | <b>MR Disposition:</b>      |             |
| <b>AR Disposition Date:</b>   |             | <b>MR Disposition Date:</b> |             |

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|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|-------------|--------|
| 06c. Letter              | Stuart E. Elzenstat to Brent Scowcroft, Re: Candidate for NSC staff position. (2 pp.) | 01/18/89 | (b)(6)      |        |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records  
**Office:** National Security Council  
**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files  
**Subseries:** Subject Files  
**WHORM Cat.:**  
**File Location:** [Resumes to Blackwill - NSC Staff Positions] [1]

|                               |             |                             |             |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| <b>Date Closed:</b>           | 1/18/2013   | <b>OA/ID Number:</b>        | CF00182-002 |
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# Continental Divide

## *Time to Disengage in Europe*

Christopher Layne

THE TIME HAS come to reap-praise fundamentally American policy towards Europe. The existing structure of the Western Alliance is based on a premise that, once clearly and explicitly stated, is both unconvincing to Europeans and unacceptable to Americans: that the United States will automatically use its nuclear weapons to defend Europe if the latter is attacked, even though such use would lead to the destruction of the U.S. itself. The recently-ratified INF treaty is important because it exposes starkly that the U.S. nuclear guarantee to NATO is incredible (in both senses of the word).

This article will argue that Washington should take the initiative in seeking mutual superpower disengagement in Europe. Given the policies now being pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev, and their implications for both Eastern Europe and East-West relations, such a disengagement may be achievable. Even if events prove that it is not, the advocacy of disengagement by the United States will still be sound policy, for it will put Moscow to the test and deprive it of unearned diplomatic advantage in Western Europe. Regardless of

whether the Kremlin accepts, such an approach would also signal to West Europeans that United States policy inevitably will change, placing the decision whether or not to defend Europe with nuclear weapons where it belongs: with the West Europeans.

The proposal to pursue mutual disengagement will be strongly opposed. Appealing to the old saw, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it," many will argue that Washington should remain loyal to the Alliance's familiar structure and policies and make only the minimal changes necessary to keep it in business. After all, in the past, a NATO Alliance based on an American nuclear guarantee served both the U.S. and Europe well, and much political, intellectual and emotional capital is invested in it. While this reaction is understandable, it is also mistaken. Today, the old transatlantic arrangement is "broke" beyond fixing: not only is the Alliance based on an untenable premise, but its untenability is increasingly evident to some of its key participants. Failing to acknowledge in good time the decay of NATO's foundations will lead only to the Alliance's disintegration in an atmosphere of acrimony and purposelessness.

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Christopher Layne, an attorney with the law firm Blecher & Collins in Los Angeles and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, has written widely on foreign policy. An earlier version of this article was published as a Cato Institute policy analysis.

### *The Suicide Pact*

AS THE LATE Robert E. Osgood noted, the American nuclear guarantee to Europe faces a problem: "The

United States must reassure the allies that it will use nuclear weapons in their behalf but also that it will not precipitate their destruction if deterrence fails." The recently ratified Soviet-American treaty eliminating intermediate range nuclear forces (INFs) underscores that it is increasingly difficult for Washington to persuade West Europeans that either half of this extended deterrence equation is true.

Nuclear weapons are the "glue" holding NATO together, and the role of American nuclear weapons in Alliance strategy is the most politically sensitive issue in U.S.-West European relations. The INF treaty, though of limited military significance, is crucially important because it has forced into the open the debate about the future of NATO's strategies of extended deterrence and flexible response. In the process, the divergent political and strategic interests of the United States and West Germany—the Alliance's two key members—have been highlighted and the intractability of NATO's risk-sharing dilemma has been underlined. A re-examination of the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO is thus long overdue.

In West Germany, the traditional Atlanticist security elite has always feared that, in a crunch, Washington would not use its strategic nuclear weapons in Europe's defense, precisely because it would be suicidal for the United States to do so. On the other hand, the West German public and successor generation security elites fear that, in the event of war, America *would* use nuclear weapons but seek to confine the conflict to German soil. The INF deployments stirred fears that the United States could involve West Germany against its will in a nuclear war and fueled the emergence of a politically and intellectually potent anti-nuclear peace movement. The INF episode has had a pronounced effect on Bonn's foreign and security policies.

On this side of the Atlantic, extended deterrence is being rethought as part of a wider debate about the future of the U.S. commitment to Western Europe. Over the years, the most frequently voiced American objection to the transatlantic status quo has been that the

United States spends too much on Europe's defense and the Europeans too little. Propelled by America's fiscal and trade woes, and the timely publication of books by David Calleo and Paul Kennedy, "burden-sharing" has emerged as an important issue during the 1988 U.S. presidential campaign.<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, a second, more basic objection to America's involvement in NATO: Rational states do not base their strategy on a pledge to commit suicide to protect other states' security. But in fact, what West German analysts refer to as "deterrence identity," means exactly that: for the purposes of nuclear strategy West German territory and American soil are identical. The United States is obligated to respond to a Soviet attack on West Germany precisely as it would to an attack on the American homeland itself. Remarkably, the American public is largely unaware of the nature of the United States' nuclear undertakings to Western Europe. For example, a 1984 Public Agenda Foundation survey found that 81 percent of Americans believe—wrongly—that Washington's policy is to use nuclear weapons *only* in response to a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States.<sup>2</sup> The Strategic Defense Initiative and President Reagan's negotiating position at the October 1986 Reykjavik superpower summit implicitly reflected official American concerns about the dangers to America of extended deterrence.

The INF treaty has focused attention on two intimately connected issues: First, the role of American nuclear weapons in Western Europe's defense and second, the nature of future European security arrangements—that is, the relation of the United States to Western Europe and of both to the Soviet Union. In the treaty's wake, modernization of NATO's remaining in-theater nuclear forces and the East-West conventional balance have surfaced as the leading items on the transatlantic agenda. American Atlanticists believe the Soviet threat to Western Europe has not abated and they want to bolster NATO by modernizing the Alliance's battlefield nuclear weapons, deploying longer-range "gray area" systems not prohibited by the INF treaty, and building up



the Alliance's conventional capabilities. This militarized approach to European security is certain to prove counterproductive. Invariably, American attempts to strengthen the Alliance militarily backfire and weaken it politically—thus pushing America and Western Europe further apart.

The majority of West Germans do not share the American Atlanticists' stark view of the Soviet threat. On the contrary, they believe that Mikhail Gorbachev's emphasis on internal restructuring and diplomatic "new thinking" offers an unparalleled opportunity to ease significantly East-West tensions and mitigate the effects of Europe's partition. Given this prevailing political climate, U.S. pleas for a new NATO build-up are bound to receive a chilly reception, especially since fiscal constraints practically ensure that America's own NATO contribution will not increase. Moreover, U.S. calls for modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and new nuclear deployments will have an especially harmful impact on U.S.-West German relations. Such calls will alienate Bonn from its security partners, set the West German government against its public, and further undermine America's political standing in West Germany.

Some American Atlanticists are candid enough to admit that their post-INF program of nuclear modernization and conventional build-up is a non-starter; yet, they offer no alternative. The U.S. cannot afford this kind of sterile thinking, or the policy immobility it produces. Much has changed in Europe and the world during the past four decades, yet America's European policy has remained static. American Atlanticists are responding to yesterday's dangers instead of today's, and they have failed to identify the salient issues in post-INF Europe. This single-minded focus on the military aspects of European security is misplaced. It is virtually impossible to construct a plausible scenario for a deliberate Soviet "bolt-out-of-the-blue" war of conquest against Western Europe. No Soviet geopolitical interest could justify the risks in such a step. This does not mean war in Europe is impossible, only that the real military threat

to European security lies elsewhere: in Eastern Europe where an outbreak of popular unrest could spark an uncontrollable chain reaction precipitating a wider conflict.<sup>1</sup>

By the same token, today the most serious Soviet threat to transatlantic cohesion is political, not military. Gorbachev is well positioned to exploit the widening gap between the United States and West Germany. The Soviet Union has overhauled its diplomatic image and successfully projected itself as the leading force for "peace" and constructive change in Europe while depicting Washington as the chief obstacle to the stabilization of East-West relations.

### *A New European Policy*

AS THE POSTWAR ERA draws to a close, it is obvious that the United States needs a new European security policy. Washington's objectives should be the reduction of the nuclear exposure extended deterrence imposes on the United States; enhancement of West Germany's security; diffusing of tensions in Eastern Europe; and the blunting of Gorbachev's West European "peace offensive." While these goals may appear contradictory, there is a policy that can reconcile them: the United States should shift from extended deterrence to residual deterrence while simultaneously pressing for the superpowers' mutual political and military disengagement from Central and Eastern Europe. As part of this broader disengagement package, Washington should push for the third "zero"—elimination of Soviet and American short range nuclear weapons in Europe because U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe are a danger for this country and a source of poison in American-West German relations. To regain the diplomatic upper hand in Europe, the next U.S. administration on taking office should challenge the Soviets by unilaterally withdrawing from Europe (and demobilizing) one American division and one thousand of the shortest range U.S. tactical nuclear weapons.

It was not foreordained that Western Eu-



rope's defense should depend on American nuclear weapons. On the contrary, as conceived between 1947 and 1949, America's containment strategy envisioned that the Soviet Union would be checked by powerful local forces of resistance on its periphery. Despite West European attempts to entangle the United States more deeply in European security, the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty was seen by Washington as primarily a symbolic gesture of reassurance. It did not obligate the United States to go to war if Western Europe was attacked, did not establish an integrated military command for the Alliance, and did not commit America to deploy combat troops in Western Europe permanently.

It was only after the North Korean attack on South Korea in June 1950 that the structure of the Alliance and the nature of American strategy changed radically. A unified NATO military command with an American as supreme commander (SACEUR) was established and U.S. combat troops were dispatched to Western Europe on a permanent basis. But it was evident that neither Washington nor the Europeans were prepared to build up their conventional forces to the levels thought necessary to defeat the Soviet army. Instead, a decision was made to Americanize and nuclearize Western Europe's defense. America, superior in long-range nuclear delivery systems and virtually immune from Soviet retaliation, could credibly threaten to strike the Soviet homeland if the Kremlin marched against Europe. In essence, the protective "umbrella" of American nuclear power was extended to protect Western Europe as well as the United States.

As early as the mid-1950s, however, strategic analysts understood that the advent of U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity would compromise fatally the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Western Europe. Once Moscow acquired the capability to respond in kind to a U.S. nuclear strike on the Soviet Union, America could not be relied upon to come to Western Europe's defense if it meant exposing its own cities to nuclear destruction.

Nuclear parity should logically have caused NATO to shift from nuclear deterrence to conventional defense, or led to the Europeanization of NATO's nuclear deterrent. Indeed, for a quarter of a century, American defense planners have acknowledged the need to reduce extended deterrence's risks by "raising the nuclear threshold"—that is, by decreasing NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons. Doctrines and concepts such as Flexible Response, No First Use, Air Land Battle 2000, and Follow On Forces Attack were all efforts to raise the nuclear threshold, as was Samuel Huntington's proposal that NATO adopt an offensive strategy of responding to a Soviet attack by thrusting deep into East Germany and Czechoslovakia. However, while a high nuclear threshold would advance America's strategic interests, West European traditional security elites do not believe it would serve theirs. Any policy that lowers NATO's strategic risks to the United States raises—or at least is perceived to raise—the strategic risks to Western Europe, particularly to West Germany. Consequently, the major Western European governments remain committed to the Alliance's current nuclear posture.

Western Europe recognizes the diminishing credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, and in response Britain and France are expanding the capabilities of their respective independent nuclear forces. West Germany, on the other hand, though committed to nuclear deterrence, is a non-nuclear power; Bonn looks to the United States to provide the nuclear deterrent it lacks. Extended deterrence is thus the underlying foundation of the U.S.-West German relationship. Much of NATO's recent history has consisted of American attempts to reassure Bonn that the U.S. will risk nuclear war in West Germany's defense.

### *Inflexible Response*

**B**ECAUSE OF its geographic position, *any* European war—conven-



tional or nuclear—would be disastrous for West Germany. Bonn's overriding objective is war avoidance, through a NATO deterrent strategy that makes U.S. use of nuclear weapons in a conflict as nearly automatic as possible. An Alliance strategic posture that makes less certain NATO's prompt resort to nuclear weapons weakens their deterrent effect and makes conventional war more attractive to the Soviets. As Josef Joffe puts it, "Raising the 'nuclear threshold' . . . would surely lower the price of conventional aggression for the Soviets and increase it for the Europeans."<sup>4</sup> While American strategists have responded to strategic parity by urging NATO to become less dependent on nuclear weapons, West German defense planners have responded by seeking new ways of bolstering extended deterrence. Although the Americans have had the upper hand in the battle to shape the Alliance's declaratory policy, NATO's actual posture still reflects the strategic preferences of West Germany's traditional security elites.

The dilemma of NATO strategy is often posed in the following terms: Would an American president trade New York for Hamburg? Traditional security elites in West Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe, however, do not want an American president even to have the option of deciding whether to make this trade. West German strategists want to *ensure* that if the Soviets attack Europe, New York *will* be traded for Hamburg. In other words, their goal is to deny United States freedom of choice—to commit America in advance to using nuclear weapons in Europe's defense. In a crisis America is not to be permitted to decide between honoring its commitment to Europe—regardless of the cost—or abandoning it. As Egon Bahr, one of the SPD's foremost foreign policy experts, says:

Europe does not want to allow America the freedom to decide when to put its own existence on the line, but rather wants to link the United States indissolubly, in an almost automatic manner with Europe's own destiny.<sup>5</sup>

Joffe succinctly defines "coupling" as consist-

ing of tying "America's hands by rendering it just as vulnerable to Soviet aggression as Western Europe is by dint of its weakness and geography." From the West German viewpoint, coupling is the *sine qua non* of an effective NATO deterrent strategy.<sup>6</sup>

It is of course one thing to state the theory of deterrence through coupling; it is quite another thing to implement it. After all, no matter how logical extended deterrence may seem from the West European viewpoint, it still rests on the questionable assumption that the United States would court its own destruction by using nuclear weapons in Western Europe's defense. Accordingly, because Washington almost certainly would not cold-bloodedly initiate nuclear warfare, NATO's military structure is designed to ensure that America will do reflexively what it would not do deliberately. This is the Alliance's dirty little secret.

### *The Battalion Commander's Decision?*

AMERICAN strategists conceive of a flexible response as a strategy that allows for carefully controlled escalation through three levels of conflict: conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic. From the American viewpoint, the use of tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons deployed in Europe is an intervening step between a conventional conflict and a strategic nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. In the American view, flexible response is essentially a war-fighting strategy. The West Germans, however, are interested in deterrence, not war fighting. For them, there is nothing flexible about flexible response: tactical and intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe are there to ensure that any European war would automatically become an all-out nuclear conflict. West German planners regard these weapons not as a means of gaining battlefield advantage but rather as a trip wire device linking U.S. strategic nuclear forces to Western Europe's defense. As Yale professor Paul Bracken explains, tactical (and inter-



mediate range) nuclear weapons are the key to NATO's real strategy, one of suicidal deterrence not of flexible response:

In the face of the suicidal consequences of a war in Europe, it is easy to see why a rational political leader would never take steps leading to devastation. What is needed instead of a rational procedure for going to war is a posture that is so complex that war could be triggered in any one of a number of different ways without rational control.<sup>7</sup>

NATO's tactical nuclear weapons serve this objective perfectly and in effect, Bracken notes, they constitute a regional doomsday machine. In wartime, eight NATO nations in addition to France would control nuclear weapons. Unlike strategic forces, NATO's tactical nuclear weapons are imbedded in the structure of conventional military units where they likely will be regarded as "just another weapon" once the shooting starts.

In peacetime, NATO's tactical nuclear weapons are kept at a small number of storage facilities. Because of their vulnerability to attack, these weapons would have to be dispersed to their assigned units in a prewar crisis. Because of the short reaction times imposed by the nature of the European battlefield and the confusion and disruption of communications that would occur during combat, authority to use nuclear weapons would have to be pre-delegated to battlefield commanders (if these weapons are to be dispersed with the intention of using them). Notwithstanding official statements from top Alliance leaders that the decision to use tactical nuclear weapons resides solely with civilian authorities at the highest level, the reality is that if NATO actually intends to implement its flexible response strategy, battalion commanders in the field would make the momentous decision to initiate nuclear warfare in Europe.<sup>8</sup>

With the coming of strategic nuclear parity in the 1970s, West German strategists and politicians began to re-examine the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. Although firmly wedded to nuclear deterrence, they be-

gan feeling queasy about battlefield nuclear weapons stationed in Germany. What the Germans wanted was the coupling of American *strategic* nuclear forces to their defense; they preferred to shift the risk of nuclear war back to the United States. If the worst happened and deterrence failed, the Germans wanted the superpowers to fight the nuclear conflict over their heads, not on their soil. In a February 1988 speech, SPD party chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel, noting American second thoughts about extended deterrence, pointedly observed that West Germans had their own doubts about NATO's nuclear strategy. "We too," he stated, "cannot rely on threats with short-range nuclear missiles and theater weapons expected to destroy what they are intended to defend."

### *The INF Decision*

FORMER WEST German chancellor Helmut Schmidt was one of the first European leaders to grasp the implications of strategic parity between the superpowers. In his 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, he took the initiative to restore the credibility of America's extended deterrent, and thereby set in motion the events that culminated in the INF deployments.<sup>9</sup> Even before this seminal address, Schmidt had made clear his views that the Alliance's strategic risks were not fairly shared; West Germany was bearing too much of this risk because under the prevailing conditions of superpower parity, America could not be counted upon to honor its nuclear commitment to NATO. These concerns were intensified by the controversy surrounding the proposed deployment of U.S. neutron warheads in West Germany. Many West Germans concluded that this weapon's limited range and the likelihood it would be used during Soviet attack would quickly transform a conventional war in Europe into a nuclear war limited to European soil. It was a weapon that would permit the United States to confront the Soviet Union on German territory without putting the American homeland at risk. Thus, Schmidt



viewed the INFs as both a means of equalizing NATO's nuclear risks and as an answer to the Alliance's strategic conundrum in an age of superpower nuclear parity: the problem of restoring credibility to a threat that rational American policy-makers would never carry out.

Throughout the entire INF episode—from NATO's December 1979 decision to deploy intermediate range cruise and Pershing II missiles until the treaty's ratification—a variety of rationales was advanced to explain why the INFs were deployed in the first place. The most popular of these was that NATO's deployments were needed to counter the Soviet build-up of mobile, highly accurate, triple warhead SS-20s. This argument was never convincing. The bulk of INF warheads (464 of a total of 572) were on slow-flying cruise missiles and posed no counterforce threat to the SS-20s. Moreover, the 572 NATO INFs were not sufficient to regain escalation dominance over the Soviet SS-20 force of 1200-plus warheads. And the suggestion that the INFs gave NATO limited nuclear options (for selective, low yield strikes) rested—like the escalation dominance argument—on the hotly debated contention that nuclear weapons are militarily-usable.

Another frequently invoked rationale for the INF deployment was that it represented nothing more than a "modernization" that improved the survivability and penetrability of NATO's in-theatre nuclear weapons systems. Had survivability been the main concern, however, the INFs ought to have been deployed at sea; on land they were vulnerable and a magnet for a Soviet preemptive strike. Finally, although the SS-20s may have had a significant political and psychological impact in certain NATO circles, their effect on the actual military balance in Europe was much less certain. All of the SS-20s' targets in Western Europe could have been covered by Soviet strategic nuclear forces without significantly depleting the strategic warheads available for targeting the United States. Indeed, it has long been known that a significant portion of

the Soviet strategic arsenal is dedicated to West European targets.

While most American officials relied on these arguments to justify the deployments, West Europeans were more forthcoming in explaining the real reason they wanted the INFs. Simply put, the weapons were viewed as a means of recoupling American strategic nuclear forces to Western Europe's defense. For coupling to work, both superpowers had to be disabused of the belief that the clash between them could be contained to Central Europe; both had to realize that their respective homelands would not remain untouched sanctuaries. Thus NATO's strategic posture needed to make clear to Moscow that even a *conventional* attack on Western Europe would inevitably unleash an all-out nuclear war between the superpowers. The INFs thus were a rung inserted between tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear levels on the escalation ladder to recouple the United States to West Germany's defense. They shared all the characteristics of tactical nuclear weapons that make the latter ideal triggers for suicidal deterrence. Like tactical nuclear weapons, the INF forward deployment in West Germany meant that, in a conflict, NATO would have been pressured to "use 'em or lose 'em." However, the INFs had two unique characteristics that set them apart from tactical nuclear weapons: they were wholly under American control and they were capable of hitting targets in the Soviet Union itself. These two factors meant that the INFs would have shifted much of the risk of nuclear suicide from West Germany to the United States.

From the West European perspective the INFs were preeminently *political*—not military—weapons. The INFs promised to restore the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent while simultaneously relieving West German fears that a NATO posture based on tactical nuclear weapons or conventional defense would enable the superpowers to fight a war confined to Europe (read: Germany). A Soviet conventional attack on Western Europe would provoke American INF strikes against



the Soviet Union; this in turn would trigger Soviet retaliation against the United States thus touching off a full-scale nuclear conflict between the superpowers. This almost certain sequence of events would deter the Soviets from ever attacking Western Europe in the first place.

ON THIS SIDE of the Atlantic, most analysts either do not understand or do not wish to admit the true rationale for the INF deployments. Instead, like former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, they assert that the INFs were intended to give Washington a "less cataclysmic" alternative to using strategic weapons in response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Such arguments rest on the fallacious assumption that Moscow would react differently to an attack on the Soviet Union by West German-based Pershing IIs than it would to an attack by North Dakota-based Minuteman missiles. In fact, as then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt admitted in a moment of ill-advised candor, for America the INFs would have *increased* the risk of a nuclear apocalypse, not lowered it. "The Soviet Union," he said, "would most likely respond to an attack on its homeland by U.S. systems in Europe with an attack on the United States. Thus, the emplacement of long-range U.S. cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe makes escalation of any nuclear war to involve an intercontinental exchange more likely, not less." In the perverse view of American Atlanticists, this was a good thing.

The most important question raised by the INF affair is the one American policy-makers are afraid to ask: Should the United States allow itself to be irrevocably committed to fight a nuclear war on Europe's behalf? The answer clearly is "No." Western Europe is important to America but its security is not identical to that of the United States. Whether based on INFs or tactical nuclear weapons, extended deterrence is not a strategy that serves American interests. In a nuclear world, alliances are high-risk entanglements, not a source of national strength. America should

retain its autonomy and not allow itself to be automatically bound to risk nuclear war on another nation's behalf. Defenders of NATO's strategic status quo say extended deterrence/flexible response works and has kept the peace for forty years. But the critical question is what happens if deterrence fails? Many on both sides of the Atlantic will argue that a retraction of the American nuclear umbrella will "make Western Europe safe for conventional war." But American leaders need to remember that NATO's present strategy keeps Europe safe from conventional war by exposing the United States to almost certain nuclear destruction if NATO is attacked.

Even if U.S. nuclear weapons and troops were not deployed on the continent, Europe's security would be protected by the residual deterrent effect of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Because deterrence is inherently existential, the mere fact that the United States possesses nuclear weapons and *might* use them in response to a Soviet attack on Western Europe is sufficient to dissuade Moscow. Deterrence can be effective even without the explicit understandings and visible symbols of a formal alliance. This was demonstrated in the late 1960s when Washington used its deterrent threat to prevent Moscow from launching a preemptive war against China—a nation with which the United States at that time did not even have official diplomatic relations.

For America, there would be a critical difference between residual deterrence and NATO's present strategy of "suicidal" extended deterrence. Today, the United States does not control its own destiny; as long as American nuclear weapons are deployed in Europe, the United States' survival is hostage to Western Europe's fate. Residual deterrence, however, would enable America to regain its freedom to choose whether to use nuclear weapons.<sup>10</sup>

### *The Singularized Germans*

AS BONN'S reaction to the INF accord shows, any change in



NATO's extended deterrent/flexible response strategy has important implications for West Germany's overall diplomatic and security policies. The post-INF dilemma in U.S.-West German relations already is taking shape. In the wake of the INF accord, Washington is pressing NATO to modernize its short range battlefield nuclear weapons (especially the Lance missile). But battlefield nuclear weapons make the Germans feel nervous and "singularized." Singularization is simply a clumsy term that restates long-standing West German fears that, if a conflict occurs, a NATO deterrent strategy based on tactical nuclear weapons will tempt the superpowers to fight a limited nuclear war at Germany's expense. As CDU foreign policy spokesman Volker Ruhe puts it in a catchy and widely quoted phrase, "the shorter the range, the deader the Germans." (Of course, German extended deterrence advocates never explain to audiences on this side of the Atlantic the corollary of their position: the longer the range, the deader the *Americans*.)

Bonn's security partners say West German fears of singularization are misplaced, but these reassurances ring hollow. For example, France and Britain say that because their long-range nuclear weapons are capable of reaching the Soviet Union, they are more likely to be hit by Soviet nuclear strikes than is West Germany. This argument misses two obvious points: West Germany is in the front line if the Soviets attack Western Europe but Britain and France are not, and precisely because they *are* nuclear powers, Britain and France control their own fate in a way that Germany does not. Another approach, adopted by Richard Burt, now America's ambassador to Bonn, is to tell the West Germans that the INF treaty really has not changed anything—all it does is return NATO to the 1979 status quo ante. But, as Burt of all people should know, Bonn insisted on the INF deployments because the status quo ante was unacceptable; and as today's controversy demonstrates, nothing has transpired during the past nine years to make singularization more

palatable to the West Germans than it was in 1979.

Finally, many U.S. officials tell Bonn that the INF treaty leaves the American nuclear umbrella unaffected because there still are some 4,000 United States nuclear warheads in Europe. But because almost all of these are on short-range delivery systems, such comments jangle rather than soothe German nerves. They simply demonstrate that West Germany indeed *is* singularized in a very special sense: In a war, it is the only NATO member certain to be destroyed by its *allies'* nuclear weapons.

Recent developments have aggravated German fears rather than assuaged them. Intentionally or otherwise, the Iklé-Wohlstetter Commission's report seems to validate German concerns that extended deterrence has been vitiated and that Germany has been singled out as the conventional and/or nuclear battlefield if the Soviets march west. The report implicitly repudiates the deterrence through coupling strategy advocated by West Germany's traditional security elites. Western strategy, it states, should be structured to ensure that a conflict "does not rapidly deteriorate into an apocalypse." "To help defend our allies," the report maintains, America "cannot rely on threats expected to provoke our own annihilation if carried out." For those West Germans who missed the point, the report further observes that "[t]he Alliance should threaten to use nuclear weapons not as a link to a wider and more devastating war—although the risk of further escalation would still be there—but mainly as an instrument for denying success to invading Soviet forces." Finally, the report states that a NATO capability of defeating a Soviet attack with conventional forces—and, if necessary, the discriminating use of nuclear weapons—is a more effective stance than a policy that attempts to deter the Soviets by raising the specter of escalation to all-out nuclear war.<sup>11</sup> German apprehensions that America is seeking to shift back to them the main part of NATO's strategic risks were also fanned by defense



secretary Frank Carlucci's February 1988 threat to withdraw U.S. troops unless Bonn proceeds with modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons.

Such approaches suggest that American policy-makers learned nothing from the INF episode. Those who seem to have forgotten recent history should remember that although West Germany's traditional security elites are addicted to American nuclear weapons, the West German public is allergic to them. If the United States persists in trying to force Bonn to accept modernization of battlefield nuclear weapons, it will trigger a repetition of the domestic crisis that gripped West Germany during the early 1980s.

### *The Pyrrhic Deployment*

ALTHOUGH PROCLAIMED by some Atlanticists as a "victory" for the Alliance, the INF episode has been a pyrrhic one at best. The INF deployments—which were supposed to recouple America and West Germany—have dramatized the politico-military differences that separate Bonn and Washington. The postwar security consensus in Germany has been shattered by the INF episode. Within the SPD, Helmut Schmidt's Atlanticist followers have been driven to cover. The SPD's emerging leaders—like Saarland premier Oskar Lafontaine and Andreas von Bulow—talk about taking West Germany out of NATO's integrated military command, demanding withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany and shifting to an avowedly neutralist foreign policy. The SPD already is on record as favoring a "security partnership" between Western Europe and the Warsaw Pact and a central European nuclear-free zone. On the Right, conservative members of the Christian Democratic party reacted with bitterness to the October 1986 Reykjavik summit meeting and the double zero INF treaty. Alfred Dregger, the CDU's Bundestag floor leader, has accused the U.S. of "betraying" German interests and "abandoning" the Federal Republic. In a position

paper, Dregger's colleague, Bernhard Friedmann, argued that because America inevitably is going to withdraw from Europe, Bonn should seek Soviet support for a united, neutral German state. On both the political Right and Left, German nationalism—and the question of German reunification—has been revived by the INF affair.<sup>12</sup>

The German Question lies at the heart of NATO's nuclear dilemma and the broader issues of European security. The interplay of strategic factors with its own national aspirations makes Bonn's relations with the West inescapably ambivalent. Committed to the long term goal of reunification, Bonn's top foreign policy priority is *Deutschlandpolitik*—its political, economic, and cultural outreach to East Germany. To allow this policy to flourish, West Germany seeks to relax political tensions in Europe and to avoid any moves that could heighten East-West tensions. Bonn's policies cause friction within NATO but in recent years both former SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and CDU Chancellor Helmut Kohl have made it plain that West Germany's national policy will not be subordinated to Washington's definition of Alliance solidarity.

NATO's nuclear dilemma is a second factor undergirding Bonn's delicate balancing between East and West. West Germans understand better than many U.S. policy-makers that America's interests require Washington to lower the nuclear risks of U.S. alliance commitments. Nothing the United States says or does is likely to convince West Germans that America would really put its national existence on the line for their sake. The Alliance's strategic anomaly has always been that its most vulnerable and vital European member is a non-nuclear power that must rely upon others for its security. As long as this remains true, Bonn has powerful incentives to seek a political accommodation with Moscow that will resolve its security dilemma as well as preserving its interests in more intimate relations with the other Germany. Thus a new consensus is emerging in West Germany that



seeks security in a "second phase of detente," involving comprehensive arms control and closer economic relations with Moscow.

The Kremlin is well positioned to take advantage of West Germany's nuclear angst, rising neutralism, and the growing friction in U.S.-West German relations. The Soviets have leverage because they can link progress in intra-German relations to Bonn's willingness to make political, security, and economic concessions to Moscow. Merely by flashing the German card, the Kremlin pulls Bonn eastward, thereby sharpening the strains between America and West Germany. If the Soviets ever did decide to play the reunification gambit, they would bring about NATO's sudden collapse. Though the conventional wisdom has it that the Soviets will never allow German reunification on any terms, it would not be wise to base American strategy on the assumption that the Soviets aren't smart enough to make an obvious, winning move. Moreover, the Soviets can use the "German card" even without offering outright reunification. In fact there are signs that Gorbachev may offer to tear down the Berlin Wall in exchange for a central European nuclear-free zone and/or withdrawal of all foreign troops from East and West Germany. If such an offer is made, it is hard to see how a West German government that refused it could survive politically. The rumored unilateral Soviet troop withdrawal from Hungary demonstrates that such dramatic Soviet gestures should not be discounted.

### *Going Beyond Yalta*

TODAY, THE post-World War II settlement of Yalta is crumbling. There is growing disarray in NATO; there is a resurfacing of the German Question; and there is simmering discontent in Eastern Europe. Evolutionary forces are at work on the continent which will determine the future relationships between the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union. Change cannot be prevented but

it can be directed. Washington's challenge in the post-INF environment is to formulate policies that will smooth the transition from the present European security system to a post-Alliance world.

American Atlanticists are pursuing a policy that lacks vision and has no objective other than preserving the ossified postwar security structure for its own sake. Yet, more than two decades ago, then-Professor Kissinger warned that it is an illusion to regard NATO as the "natural" structure of Atlantic relations and to think that sound policy consists only of attempts to improve the Alliance. The objective of America's European policy should not be to preserve NATO intact but to maintain peace and stability in Europe and to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining political ascendancy over the continent. American policy-makers must ask whether the postwar arrangements still serve their intended purposes, or whether those purposes would be better met through new structures.

They should start by recognizing the obvious: because the credibility of extended deterrence cannot be restored at an acceptable cost to the United States, NATO's long-term cohesion is seriously compromised. At the same time, an American policy of reducing the nuclear danger to itself by increasing it for Germany risks triggering a bitter divorce between Washington and Bonn—something from which only Moscow would benefit. Thus it is necessary to seek a diplomatic solution to West Germany's security dilemma. And because West Germany's strategic difficulties are intertwined with the geopolitical effects of Germany's partition, American policy must confront the German Question head-on.

The United States should adopt a European policy based on: (1) an *interim* solution to the German Question short of reunification that guarantees unhampered travel between the two Germanys; (2) removal of both superpowers' military forces and nuclear weapons from Central Europe (the two Germanys, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary); (3) asymmetrical de-



mobilization of the Soviet and U.S. forces withdrawn from Europe; and (4) a pledge that neither superpower will be the first to reintroduce its forces into Central Europe.

In coming years, America's European interests would be served by mutual U.S.-Soviet disengagement from Central Europe or by a gradual U.S. policy of devolution/Europeanization. However, a determined American effort to secure mutual disengagement is a prerequisite for any long-range policy of Europeanizing the Alliance. Europeanization will remain a chimera as long as West Europeans view the Soviet Union as a relatively benign power and as long as West Germany believes something substantive might lurk behind Soviet hints of flexibility on the German Question. On the other hand, if the Soviets were to prove unrelenting on the German Question and cling stubbornly to their positions in Eastern Europe while America was seeking an interim solution to Germany's partition and showing a willingness to leave Western Europe, reasonable people could have no doubt as to which superpower had embraced Europe's aspirations and which was blocking them. At that point the United States would be in a strong position to negotiate a new transatlantic compact that ultimately would lead to the Alliance's Europeanization. Only if Gorbachev's overtures stood revealed as a propaganda ploy would Western Europe have reason to confront the difficult problems of West Germany's nuclear and political roles in a Europeanized Alliance and only then would Bonn be persuaded to anchor itself firmly in the Alliance.

### *The Promise of Disengagement*

A MORE IMAGINATIVE American policy would also force the Soviet Union to confront the dilemmas posed by its own European strategy. Do the Soviets really want to take on the German Question? Do they really want to push the U.S. off the

continent and thus risk the emergence of a powerful Western Europe which would not only be a magnet for Eastern Europe, but which could well include a nuclear West Germany?

Washington should not use mutual disengagement merely as a public relations gimmick. Mutual superpower disengagement is a vehicle both for shifting the political momentum in Europe and for promoting America's interests. By championing new European security arrangements the United States could put the Soviet Union on the defensive. Washington could neutralize the Soviets' German card because the advocacy of mutual superpower disengagement would cast America—not the Soviet Union—as the champion of Germany's national aspirations. Unlike current U.S. policies—which have resonance only among a narrow and shrinking spectrum of politically conservative West Germans—such an American initiative would have widespread popular appeal in West Germany. The inexorable loosening of U.S.-West German bonds would be offset by tangible improvement in Western Europe's security position that would accrue from mutual disengagement.

Far more than any attainable nuclear or conventional arms control agreement, mutual disengagement would radically reduce the chances of war in Europe by lowering the political tensions that could lead to conflict. A Soviet pullback from Eastern Europe would help ensure that that region does not become the Sarajevo of the 1990s. Both superpowers have a common interest in achieving Eastern Europe's Finlandization by reconciling legitimate Soviet security concerns with Eastern Europe's desire for greater autonomy, political pluralism, and economic reform.

Mutual disengagement would bolster Western Europe's military security by neutralizing Moscow's conventional superiority. The Soviet army's size would be reduced and it would be put back where it belongs — in the Soviet Union. Western Europe's strategic depth (currently a serious weakness) would



be greatly enhanced by moving Soviet forces hundreds of miles to the east of their present positions, and Eastern Europe would be transformed into a protective buffer between Western Europe and the Soviet Union.

Finally, unlike current proposals for conventional arms control, mutual disengagement would not be bogged down in endless discussions about proper units of account, definitions of "offensive" versus "defensive" weapons, and the problem of reducing forces that are asymmetrical quantitatively and qualitatively. In contrast to the technical minutiae of arms control, the pristine simplicity of mutual disengagement could easily be grasped by the West German public (and other Europeans) in a way that would politically and morally strengthen the U.S. position in Europe.

NO DOUBT, danger is inherent in the process of moving toward a new political dispensation in Europe. But danger is abundantly present in the status quo, too. America's traditional Atlanticist policy seems destined to produce a bitter rupture between the United States and West Germany—NATO's keystone relationship. With its present European policy, Washington is suffering a diplomatic equivalent of the death of a thousand cuts, allowing Moscow to orchestrate the process of NATO's gradual but steadily creeping paralysis. By failing to grasp that the critical dimension of European security is political, U.S. policy-makers have left the geopolitical initiative entirely in Moscow's hands.

Moscow has developed a subtle and appealing *Westpolitik* that plays both to Western Europe's insecurities and to its pan-European aspirations. The Kremlin is able to manipulate West European perceptions of both the Soviet threat (undercutting support for new NATO defense initiatives or steps to Europeanize the Alliance) and extended deterrence's contradictions (thereby sowing discord between Bonn and Washington). Gorbachev's domestic program of openness and revitalization reinforces West European perceptions of a vastly reduced Soviet threat.

Finally, by dangling the German card, the Soviets keep West Germany uneasily suspended between East and West and encourage Bonn to slide toward a de facto neutrality, notwithstanding its NATO membership.

Today, the United States stands by, helplessly bewildered by Gorbachev's dazzling diplomatic virtuosity. Lacking its own overarching European blueprint, Washington must belatedly react on an ad hoc basis to a succession of Soviet *démarches*. The lack of a creative U.S. policy allows the Soviets to score a lot of uncontested diplomatic points and has caused America's political standing in Western Europe to slip badly.

Recently, the Soviets have suggested that both superpowers "weigh anchor" and leave Central Europe, claimed that the Brezhnev Doctrine has been repealed, and said that they are prepared to accept political pluralism in Eastern Europe. To determine Moscow's sincerity, the U.S. must put forward its own constructive proposals. Regardless of whether Moscow accepts or refuses an American mutual disengagement proposal, the U.S. would gain diplomatically. Washington, however, should not assume that the Soviet response would be negative. The Soviets have important interests that might dispose them to agree to mutual disengagement. Whether the Soviets are merely seeking a "breathing space" to regroup for renewed conflict is much less important than asking whether—regardless of Moscow's intentions—opportunities exist to reach *mutually* beneficial political agreements that the Soviets would have difficulty in subsequently breaking. Because America's interests would be served by mutual disengagement, Washington should engage the Soviets on this issue. Although the Soviet Union and the United States are rivals, they have congruent as well as antagonistic interests. As Walter Lippmann once observed, statesmen who believe unfriendly powers cannot reach useful agreements forget what diplomacy is all about.

The next administration will take office at a delicate moment. If it stumbles, Gorbachev could capitalize on the resulting trans-



atlantic discord. To meet Gorbachev's challenge at a time when U.S.-West European relations are evolving into a new phase, Washington must out-think the Kremlin. Unlike the current stagnation in U.S. European policy, change in Europe contains the seeds of

opportunity—if American statesmen are wise enough to nurture them. Washington holds the high cards in the political struggle for Europe and needs only the boldness and imagination to play them.

## Notes

1. David Calleo, *Beyond American Hegemony* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987). On the role of burden-sharing in the 1988 campaign, see "The High Cost of NATO," *Newsweek*, March 7, 1988.
2. Daniel Yankelovich and John Doble, "The Public Mood," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1984).
3. A European war could also plausibly result from two other scenarios. First, a Soviet-American clash in the Third World could escalate horizontally to Europe. Second, if Gorbachev's reforms fail, a deteriorating internal situation could prompt a post-Gorbachev Soviet leadership to resort to war in a desperate attempt to halt the Soviet Union's decline.
4. Josef Joffe, *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States, and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1987), p. 483.
5. Egon Bahr, "Peace: A State of Emergency," in Rudolph Steinke and Michael Vale, eds., *Germany Debates Defense: The NATO Alliance at the Crossroads* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 1983), p. 146.
6. As four prominent West German analysts wrote in 1982, it is the "tight and indissoluble coupling" of American strategic nuclear forces with NATO's conventional forces and European-based non-strategic nuclear weapons that "confronts the Soviet Union with the incalculable risk" that a superpower clash in Europe "could escalate to a nuclear war." Karl Kaiser, Georg Leber, Alois Mertes and Franz Joseph Schulze, "A German Response to No First Use," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1982), p. 1162. Absent this nuclear coupling of America and West Germany, it is claimed, the Soviets could stage

a conventional offensive against West Germany with the certain knowledge that as long as they refrained from using nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union homeland would be immune from retaliation. Thus, West German strategists say, if the American nuclear umbrella covering West Germany is lifted, Germany "would have to bear the destruction and devastation of war alone [because] conventional conflicts in Europe would no longer involve any existential risk for the territory of the Soviet Union and . . . would be without such risk for the territory of the United States as well."

7. This paragraph and the following two paragraphs are based on Paul Bracken, *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), chapter 5.
8. Bracken points out that the very uncontrollability of events once battlefield nuclear weapons are deployed in the field could prompt the West German government to block their dispersal. The use of these weapons probably would result in Germany's devastation and at least one extremely high level former West German official has suggested that Bonn would order its forces to actively resist any American attempt to remove tactical nuclear weapons from their storage sites (many of which are guarded jointly by U.S. and German troops). Dispersal might also be inhibited by the fact that such a step could prompt Soviet nuclear preemption. See, *ibid.*, pp. 174–175. Bracken's conclusions with respect to predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons to battlefield commanders are supported by Robert S. McNamara in *Blundering into Disaster* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), and

- McNamara's "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1983).
9. Schmidt's lecture is reprinted in *Survival* (January-February 1978).
  10. The need to preserve nuclear autonomy illustrates why it would be inconsistent for the United States to promote creation of an independent West European nuclear deterrent force while simultaneously leaving its own nuclear weapons and troops in Europe. Under such conditions, America could be drawn into a nuclear conflict by West European decisions over which it exercised no control.
  11. Commission on Integrated Long Term Strategy, *Discriminate Deterrence* [the Iklé-Wohlstetter report], Washington, D.C. (1988), p. 2.
  12. For an extended analysis of the link between the INF deployments and the revival of German nationalism, see Christopher Layne, "Toward German Reunification?" *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (Fall 1984). The article analyzes the implications of the German Question for U.S.-Soviet relations. See also Christopher Layne, "Deutschland Über Alles," *The New Republic*, September 28, 1987, and "Atlanticism without NATO," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1987).

### *The Democratic Party and the World*

A PLATFORM IS NOT a contract, thank God. But its careful rhetoric is still a revealing Rorschach. The issues it broaches, the few it fixates on, the ones it shrugs off, tell you much about the inner mind of the party.

The international arena conjured up in that mind is the stuff of fantasy. The platform rehearses the discredited clichés of North-South wealth transfer, as if all that is needed, especially in "the poorest continent, Africa, which deserves special attention," is some American compassion and lots of American cash. There's no hint that it might be well to encourage free markets in those tens of poor countries where socialist planning has further immiserated their people. The platform subtly and falsely suggests that progress in arms control has been made largely because of the Soviet initiatives, which the United States is enjoined to "match." The platform specifies only the United States as undermining the peace process in Central America—not a mention of Nicaragua!—and asserts that U.S. bad faith is all that stands between that region and a future of national reconciliation and human rights.

NONETHELESS, THE PARTY seems to believe that the United States, despite its previous sins, can be decisive in righting wrongs almost everywhere. The question is: Where are the wrongs? In Ireland and Cyprus, Central America and Asia, but not in the Arab Middle East, and not in Africa either save for apartheid South Africa. So what about Marxist Ethiopia? There is another caveat: in Eastern Europe, we should encourage the forces of pluralism and democracy only "wherever possible." Such squeamish deference to circumstance would be refreshing if it weren't reserved for the Soviet bloc. Indeed, Democrats have no sense that the multiple crises of communism provide us with opportunities to probe in behalf of the national interest and of democratic values generally. The idea of pursuing American diplomatic advantage seems wholly alien to the party soul. There is no cohesive strategic world view in this platform, which only magnifies the question of whether the candidate also is without one.

Martin Peretz in *The New Republic*, August 29, 1988



# Bush Can Turn the Tables on Gorbachev

By CHRISTOPHER LAYNE

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's United Nations speech—and his decision to reduce Soviet military forces by 500,000 men—was another of his diplomatic masterstrokes that always seem to catch Washington off guard. The Bush administration can be certain that Mr. Gorbachev's U.N. gesture will be followed by other, equally dramatic, acts. Unless the U.S. moves quickly to formulate its own strategy it will continue playing catch-up in the game of East-West diplomacy.

A handful of American foreign-policy analysts—including this writer—have warned repeatedly that it is risky for the U.S. to yield the initiative on European security issues to the Soviet Union. However, Washington, long accustomed to viewing European security issues only in terms of regional strategic balance, has been slow to grasp that today the real threat to NATO's cohesion is political not military.

Having successfully overhauled its diplomatic image, the Soviet Union has projected itself as the leading force for the constructive stabilization of East-West relations. As long as they are allowed to define the European security agenda, the Soviets will be able to orchestrate NATO's creeping paralysis and benefit from improved relations with Western Europe without having to make meaningful counter-concessions.

It is a good bet that Mr. Gorbachev will strike next at NATO's heart—the crucial U.S.-West German relationship. Because Bonn's overriding foreign-policy concern is to deepen the political, economic and cultural ties between the two Germans, it wants to refrain from doing anything that could heighten East-West tensions in Europe. Moreover, while few West Germans these days believe the Soviets are a threat, most feel very much endangered by the presence of short-range nuclear weapons on their soil.

## Risks of Bitter Rupture

Whatever its military merits, the U.S. emphasis on modernizing battlefield nuclear weapons and building up NATO's conventional forces is badly out of sync with West German public opinion. In the present political climate, Washington risks a bitter rupture with Bonn by pressing these issues. Obviously, the serious frictions in U.S.-West German relations are especially tempting diplomatic targets of opportunity for the Soviets.

As Soviet foreign-policy expert Valentin Fallin suggested last year, Mr. Gorbachev may offer to tear down the Berlin Wall in exchange for West German agreement to a Central European nuclear free zone and/or withdrawal of all foreign troops from both Germanys. Even before Mr. Gorbachev came to New York, alarm bells should have been ringing in Washington.

Mr. Fallin was recently promoted to head the Soviet Communist Party's international affairs department. He, like Alexander Yakovlev, perhaps Mr. Gorbachev's closest political confidante, is a proponent of a "multipolar" Soviet diplomatic strategy. This approach aims to capitalize on tensions among the Western allies by deemphasizing the bilateral superpower relationship in favor of closer Soviet ties with Western Europe and Japan. The West European stampede to extend financial help to Moscow is a sign that multipolarism already is bearing fruit for the Soviets.

The Bush administration will face a tough twofold problem: It must counter Mr. Gorbachev's diplomacy while simultaneously ensuring that Western Europe is secure. The latter is difficult because even as U.S. strategic realists are warning that

the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe is unacceptably risky (see the recent report of the Ikke-Wohlstetter Commission), the Soviet Union retains its perceived edge in conventional forces in Central Europe.

One obvious solution is for an accelerated "Europeanization" of NATO—the buildup of both an independent West European nuclear deterrent and West European conventional forces. But here the political and military dimensions of European security are interwoven. As long as Moscow is able to project a non-threatening image to Western Europe, the latter has no incentive to confront the difficult problems of West Germany's nuclear and political roles in a Europeanized alliance.

To wrest the diplomatic initiative from Moscow and ensure Europe's security, the Bush administration should press for: (1) removal of both superpowers' conventional and nuclear forces from Central Europe;

*Mutual disengagement would reduce the chances of war in Europe by lowering political tensions, helping ensure that Eastern Europe does not become the Sarajevo of the 1990s.*

(2) asymmetrical demobilization of U.S. and Soviet conventional forces; and (3) a pledge that neither superpower will be the first to reintroduce its forces into Central Europe. The U.S. should insist that any discussion about European conventional disarmament also include full consideration of Europe's future political, as well as military, arrangements.

Because U.S. strategic nuclear force requirements historically have been dictated by the need to offset Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, the U.S. should link the strategic nuclear force reduction talks to the outcome of the mutual disengagement negotiations. The key question about America's strategic nuclear forces is not whether they can destroy the Soviet Union five, 10 or 15 times over, but whether they have sufficient first-strike/counterforce capability to carry out their mission of deterring a Soviet attack on Western Europe. Deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces could actually make it more difficult for the U.S. to prevent a European war. Therefore, unless the Soviets are willing to eliminate the threat to which extended deterrence responds, the requirements of strategic credibility should not yield to the political imperatives of arms control.

Mutual disengagement — an old idea whose time has come — has much to recommend it. Unlike traditional arms-control agreements, mutual disengagement would radically reduce the chances of war in Europe by lowering political tensions, helping ensure that Eastern Europe does not become the Sarajevo of the 1990s. Both superpowers have an interest in "Finlandizing" Eastern Europe by reconciling legitimate Soviet security concerns with Eastern Europe's desire for greater autonomy, and political and economic reform.

Mutual disengagement would bolster Western Europe's military security by reducing the Soviet army's size and moving it hundreds of miles to the east of its present positions (thus transforming Eastern Europe into a protective buffer between Western Europe and the Soviet Union). The role of nuclear weapons in Western Europe's defense would then be a far less

salient issue than it is at present.

Moreover, unlike the current proposals for conventional arms control, the simple concept of mutual superpower disengagement would not get bogged down in squabbling about proper units of account, definitions of "offensive" and "defensive" weapons and the problem of reducing forces that are asymmetrical qualitatively and quantitatively. Mutual disengagement would turn the tables on Moscow and cast America as the champion of pan-European aspirations for an end to the continent's artificial division.

If America is willing to leave Western Europe but the Soviets are unwilling to budge from Eastern Europe, reasonable people would have no doubt which superpower was embracing Europe's desires and which was frustrating them. Once a disengagement proposal was on the table, the Soviets would find it even more difficult to justify and maintain their East European presence.

Mutual disengagement would put the Soviet Union on the defensive in other ways, as well. Today, the lack of an effective U.S. diplomatic strategy allows Moscow to score a lot of uncontested points by hinting that both superpowers should "weigh anchor" and leave Europe, that the Brezhnev doctrine has been repealed, and that it is prepared to tolerate pluralism in Eastern Europe. By advocating mutual disengagement, Washington would not only call the Soviets' bluff but also would force them to confront the contradictions of their own Westpolitik.

## A Strong Position

Do the Soviets really want to take on the German Question? Do they really want to push the U.S. off the continent and risk the emergence of a powerful Western Europe that not only would be a magnet for Eastern Europe but that could well include a nuclear West Germany? Certainly, if the Soviets rebuffed mutual disengagement the U.S. would be in a strong position to negotiate a new transatlantic compact that would lead to NATO's Europeanization.

However, a negative Soviet response to mutual disengagement should not be assumed. The Soviets have important interests that might dispose them to agree to mutual disengagement. Mr. Gorbachev clearly wants to focus on domestic restructuring and avoid a resource-draining, high-tech arms race with the U.S. Using the configuration of U.S. strategic nuclear forces as a lever to induce Soviet agreement to mutual disengagement would be a sound linkage policy.

The efforts of the Reagan administration, and the Soviet Union's own internal difficulties, have combined to put the U.S. in an unprecedentedly favorable diplomatic position vis-a-vis Moscow. Mutual disengagement is the diplomatic analogue of the new military doctrine of competitive strategies. It is also the logical culmination of U.S. postwar policy. As George Kennan wrote in 1958, the purpose of building up the Western alliance's strength was to put the West in a position to negotiate an end to Europe's division. In truth it is Washington, not Moscow, that holds the high cards in the diplomatic struggle for mastery in Europe. If the Bush administration has the boldness to play a potentially winning hand, it is likely to find that a historic breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet relations is within reach.

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**Toward German Reunification?**

*Christopher Layne*



# TOWARD GERMAN REUNIFICATION?

Christopher Layne

**O**n September 6, 1946, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes pledged that American troops would stay in Germany as long as Soviet forces remained there.<sup>1</sup> The United States has honored Byrnes' commitment: nearly forty years later, the American Army maintains its "Watch on the Elbe."

Byrnes' Stuttgart speech was a historic turning point in American foreign policy. In autumn 1946 it was not apparent that U.S. troops would remain in Europe for any length of time; indeed, in 1945 President Roosevelt envisioned that all U.S. forces would be rapidly withdrawn from Europe upon the war's conclusion. The shift in American policy signaled by Byrnes' speech was occasioned by what Hajo Holborn termed the "political collapse of Europe"—in reality, the collapse of the European balance of power. During the war U.S. policymakers had focused narrowly on achieving military victory and thought little about the geopolitical consequences that would attend the conflict's termination. The destruction of German power, combined with Britain's exhaustion and the war's political and economic effects on the rest of Western Europe, created a power vacuum on the continent. To fill this vacuum, American power was added to the

European scale to replace the weight of the German power that had been destroyed by the war; to contain Moscow, the United States, in a geopolitical sense, *became* Germany.

### America-as-Germany

During the post-World War II era, America-as-Germany confined Soviet power to the region east of the Elbe and provided a shield for Western Europe's political and economic recovery. Moreover, America-as-Germany seemingly provided a permanent solution to the "German Question"—that of defining Germany's borders as a unified state—that had bedeviled Europe at least since 1871, when Prussian-led Germany defeated France in war. The benefits of America-as-Germany, however, have not been cost-free. Soviet and American forces continue to confront each other in the heart of divided Germany. Despite the obvious dangers of this superpower confrontation, many on both sides of the Elbe regard Germany's division as a source of political stability in Europe. However, as Moscow's reaction to the detente between East and West Germany reminds us, history did not end in 1945 and Europe cannot be regarded as stable when its second most powerful nation not only remains divided but also is increasingly restless about its partition.

Today, the durability of the post-1945 settlement is in doubt and the European political situation is characterized by fluidity and potential volatility. The gathering storm clouds over Eastern Europe have especially portentous implications for the West because, as Helmut Sonnenfeldt warned in 1975, the greatest risk of war in Europe lies in the potential spillover effects of an explosion of anti-Soviet unrest in Eastern Europe.<sup>2</sup> As long as Europe—and Germany—remain divided, Central Europe will remain the focal point of the competition between the superpowers and a source of danger.

Germany is the key to Europe's political future and thus to the future of Soviet-American relations. Perceptive observers long have recognized Germany's centrality to the East-West struggle. In the 1950s, George Kennan proposed that German reunification be accompanied by the superpowers' military disengagement in Central Europe.<sup>3</sup> In the mid-1960s Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski stressed that any viable long-range U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union and towards Europe must encompass resolution of the German Question.<sup>4</sup> As Brzezinski wrote:

The present internal trends in Germany, as well as general change in the European relationship to America point clearly to the reemergence of the German issue as the key for U.S. policy, and the nature of the American response will have to be based on a broader evaluation of the European scene, particularly with regard to changes in the eastern bloc. The prob-



lem of the German partition has become critically linked to the problem of the European partition, and neither can be resolved without the resolution of the other.<sup>5</sup>

Brzezinski's analysis was prescient but premature. The German Question was not the crucial issue in U.S. foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s, but it may well predominate between now and the end of the century because it is inescapably intertwined with the most vital issues that Washington faces: (1) the nuclear dilemma that stems from the superpower rivalry, and (2) the future of the Western Alliance. Given the dangers of extended deterrence in an era of strategic nuclear "parity" between the superpowers, we now must ask whether or not the U.S. strategic guarantee to West Germany—and to NATO—poses an unacceptably high risk of involving this country in a nuclear war.

Just as the nuclear dilemma places our commitment to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and to NATO in doubt, Bonn's interest in resolving the German Question places West Germany's commitment to the Atlantic Alliance in doubt. The FRG is the European key to NATO, but Bonn's relations with the Western Alliance have always been ambivalent; there is a profound tension between the FRG's allegiance to the West and its interests in the East. The diminishing credibility of the U.S. strategic nuclear commitment to West Germany and the collapse of superpower detente in 1979–80 have caused Bonn to practice "differential detente" in its relations with Moscow and with East Germany.

The recrudescence of the German Question is both a reflection and a cause of severe tension within the Western Alliance. This article does not address the issue of whether NATO will survive; instead, it assumes the gradual process of decay will *continue* and that the Alliance will *dissolve* during the next twenty-five years.<sup>6</sup> Because Western analysts are concerned, rightly, to prevent NATO's precipitous collapse, the current debate on U.S.–Western European relations heretofore has focused exclusively on the issue of how to save the Alliance. However, given the significant possibility that the Alliance will not survive the next quarter-century, it is important to focus on the neglected but perhaps ultimately more critical issue: can the United States *manage* the process of NATO's dissolution to ensure its termination does not impair America's strategic interests?

Both Washington and Moscow have a vital interest in the future of post-Alliance Europe. Each superpower harbors an unspoken fear that "its" Germany will defect from its respective alliance in quest of reunification. Reunification resulting from the defection of either Germany would be profoundly destabilizing. Both superpowers also share a common desire to alleviate the costs of maintaining their res-

tive European security systems. Soviet interests in Eastern Europe will be greatly affected by what happens in post-Alliance Western Europe and both superpowers have an interest in reconciling Moscow's security interests in Eastern Europe with that region's desire for greater political autonomy. Both Soviet and U.S. interests may be served by an orderly transition from a "postwar" to a "post-Alliance" European system, based on German reunification and withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Although the German Question has been mostly dormant during the past thirty years, it was bound to reemerge eventually as a vital political issue. That it has emerged now is essentially due to the 1979 NATO decision to deploy U.S. intermediate range nuclear forces (INFs) in Western Europe. The American Pershing II and cruise missiles deployed in the FRG have yielded a rich harvest of irony and paradox. The INF deployments were supposed to restore the credibility of the American strategic nuclear guarantee to West Germany; instead, the deployments have underscored the nuclear peril of America-as-Germany. Bonn pressed for the INFs expecting that the American missiles would insulate West Germany from Soviet attempts to split the FRG from the Western Alliance; instead, the deployment decision has generated strong internal pressures that compel Bonn to follow an increasingly nationalist/neutralist foreign policy. The INF deployment decision was intended to reaffirm the

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really are.*

basic identity of West German and American interests; instead, it has revealed just how different those interests really are. If the INFs were meant to keep the U.S. strategically coupled to the FRG, they equally were intended to keep West Germany politically coupled to the Atlantic Alliance. Instead, the furor over the INF deployments has been the catalyst that forced the German Question back to the top of the international political agenda.

Since 1950 American strategic doctrine has been embodied in several linguistic formulations (e.g., massive retaliation, graduated deterrence, and flexible response), but its central premise has remained constant: the United States will respond to a Soviet attack (conventional and/or nuclear) on West Germany by using tactical, intermediate and, if necessary, strategic nuclear weapons. Amazingly—although U.S. strategy has been fundamentally constant for over three decades—the American public largely is ignorant of the implications and dangers of the U.S. guarantee to West Germany. According to a recent Public Agenda Foundation survey, "[v]irtually all Americans—81 percent—mistakenly believe it is our policy to use nuclear weapons if, and only if, the Soviets attack the United States first with nuclear weapons."<sup>7</sup> In fact, America-as-Germany means



that for the purposes of nuclear strategy, West German territory and American soil are identical: Washington will respond to a Soviet attack on the FRG precisely as it would to an attack on the U.S. itself.

From its inception, NATO has eschewed a concrete—as opposed to a rhetorical—policy that would give the Alliance a convincing conventional defense capability. In event of war, the U.S. almost certainly would be compelled to resort to the early and first use of nuclear weapons, thereby initiating a process that probably (though not inevitably) would lead from the use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to a central nuclear exchange between the superpowers. The probability of this sequence of events *may* deter the outbreak of war in Europe but *if* deterrence fails the U.S. homeland will be exposed to Soviet nuclear attack because of the American commitment to West Germany. Although the American public does not yet comprehend the implications of our commitment to West Germany, the INF debate has concentrated analysts' minds on the salient possibility that the basic strategic interests of the United States and the FRG may in fact be widely divergent.<sup>8</sup>

The inner contradictions of extended deterrence long have been recognized.<sup>9</sup> From the early 1950s through the mid-1970s, strategic analysts perceived that the advent of U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear parity would compromise the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee to West Germany. At the time, however, this was only a possibility. Extended deterrence is a subject of discussion today because superpower strategic nuclear parity now is a reality too important to ignore. Extended deterrence requires the U.S. to have a credible first-strike capability and leaves to Washington the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Such a strategy was sensible in the age of American strategic nuclear superiority. As French president Charles de Gaulle realized early on, however, the advent of strategic nuclear parity between the superpowers undermines the basis of the Alliance's nuclear strategy because Moscow now possesses the ability to respond in kind to an American strategic nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in retaliation for a Soviet conventional assault on West Germany. As de Gaulle prophesied, Americans find the prospect of risking their cities in Europe's defense most unattractive and it is doubtful that any U.S. president would deliberately run this risk. Today, the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Europe is incredible in both senses of the term. This, of course, was precisely the point of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's now celebrated remarks made in Brussels in September 1979. As Kissinger said, "Don't you Europeans keep asking us to multiply assurances we cannot possibly mean and that if we do mean, we should not want to execute, and which if we execute, would destroy our civilization?"<sup>10</sup>

There is, of course, another alternative: NATO could shift from a nuclear deterrence strategy to a conventional defense strategy. The U.S. recognizes its interest in raising the nuclear threshold and advocates new weapons systems and new doctrine that would achieve this result. However, while these approaches advance America's strategic interests, the West Germans do not believe they are well-served by them; consequently, they refuse to abandon the Alliance's nuclear strategy.

Western Europe appreciates the diminishing credibility of the American nuclear guarantee, and in response Britain and France are enhancing their own independent strategic nuclear deterrent forces. West Germany, on the other hand, though committed to nuclear deterrence, is a non-nuclear power; Bonn looks to America-as-Germany to provide the nuclear deterrent the FRG itself lacks. The objective of West German strategy is war avoidance. For the FRG, any conflict in Europe, whether conventional or nuclear, would be disastrous. Quite apart from economic or domestic political concerns, Bonn categorically rejects conventional defense as an alternative to the Alliance's nuclear strategy because it believes a conventional defense strategy will raise the nuclear threshold and thereby increase the likelihood that a war will occur.<sup>11</sup> For Bonn, war avoidance depends on keeping the nuclear threshold low and keeping the American nuclear guarantee intact. The premises that have informed official West German strategic thinking are set forth with remarkable candor in a *Foreign Affairs* article written by four prominent West German foreign policy analysts in response to the "No First Use" concept.<sup>12</sup> For the FRG, the essence of Alliance strategy is extended deterrence:

The tight and indissoluble coupling of conventional forces and nuclear weapons on the European continent with the strategic potential of the United States confronts the Soviet Union with the incalculable risk that any military conflict between the two Alliances could escalate to a nuclear war.

Absent the U.S. nuclear guarantee to West Germany, "[e]ven in the case of a large-scale conventional attack against the entire European NATO territory, the Soviet Union could be certain that its own land would remain a sanctuary as long as it did not itself resort to nuclear weapons." Consequently "those attacked [i.e., West Germany] would have to bear the destruction and devastation of war alone . . . conventional conflicts in Europe would no longer involve any existential risk for the territory of the Soviet Union and . . . would be without such risk for the territory of the United States as well."

By the late 1970s the key strategic problem facing Bonn was to find a means of *restoring the credibility of America's extended deterrent* and thereby to reattach U.S. strategic forces to West Germany's defense.



## Restoring credibility

Helmut Schmidt was one of the first European leaders to appreciate the geopolitical consequences of the strategic nuclear balance between the superpowers codified by SALT I, and in his 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture he took the initiative to restore the credibility of America's extended deterrent.<sup>13</sup> As Schmidt realized, when combined with Soviet superiority in both conventional and theater nuclear forces, superpower strategic nuclear parity indeed could decouple the U.S. from West Germany's defense. If "decoupling" occurred, the Soviets would use their resulting superiority to apply political pressure against Bonn. As Schmidt stated in an early 1983 interview:

It has become apparent that fears were justified that beneath the inter-continental nuclear-strategic balance between the superpowers, the Soviet intermediate range nuclear potential could produce a crucial weakening of the European regional deterrence effect, meaning the danger of political pressure on the non-nuclear states [i.e., West Germany] with the help of Soviet Eurostrategic superiority.<sup>14</sup>

The task is to restore the credibility of a threat that never can be *deliberately* carried out by rational American decision-makers. Schmidt believed the INFs offered an escape from this conundrum. The INFs seemed the ideal solution because (1) they are American-controlled; (2) they are based on West German soil; (3) because of their forward deployment they must be used early in a conflict; and (4) unlike NATO's tactical nuclear weapons, the INFs can reach targets in the western Soviet Union. Presumably many of the INFs in fact are assigned to strike these targets. Moscow repeatedly has stated it will regard an attack on the Soviet Union by West German-based U.S. INFs as the precise equivalent of an attack by American land-based ICBMs launched from the continental United States. As the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Richard Burt, has admitted: "The Soviet Union would most likely respond to an attack on its homeland by U.S. systems in Europe with an attack on the United States. Thus the emplacement of long-range U.S. cruise and ballistic missiles in Europe makes escalation of any nuclear war to involve an intercontinental exchange more likely, not less."<sup>15</sup> The INF controversy should be a timely reminder that, in a nuclear world, the United States in fact is *not* Germany. The Alliance's fundamental problem is risk sharing, not burden sharing, because the risks of nuclear deterrence fall disproportionately on the United States and the risks of conventional defense fall disproportionately on West Germany.

The dilemmas embedded in NATO strategy inevitably will cause the United States to reassess its relations with Western Europe. Across

the Atlantic, European doubts about the reliability of the U.S. commitment to Europe's defense and European anxiety over the prolonged chill in superpower relations already have stimulated a reexamination of Europe's ties to the U.S. As a consequence of this reexamination, there is a renewed interest in Western European political unification, the emergence of incipient "Euro-nationalism," and serious discussion about "Europeanizing" NATO's defense.<sup>16</sup> These developments are a response to the Alliance's nuclear dilemma and to Western Europe's perception that its interests increasingly diverge from American interests, and are mirrored in revived German nationalism.

The INF deployments and the contemporaneous intra-Alliance crises over Afghanistan, Poland, and the Soviet natural gas pipeline have underscored differing West German and American approaches to relations with the Soviet Union and Bonn hence has turned to a policy of "divisible detente." Divisible detente reflects two West German concerns. There is growing doubt that a military-strategic solution to the FRG's security dilemma exists. Consequently, Bonn is attempting to insulate its regional security interests from the context of the global superpower rivalry in hope that accommodation with Moscow will provide a political solution to West Germany's security dilemma. Divisible detente also reflects Bonn's determination to protect the tangible benefits of detente—increased contacts with East Germany and trade with Moscow and Eastern Europe—from the breakdown in Soviet-American relations.<sup>17</sup>

Perhaps the most important consequence of the INF deployments has been the revival of German nationalism. Opposition to the INFs was linked to a renewal of German national consciousness and the "peace" movement's relative success was attributable to its ability to present itself to the West German public as a nationalist, rather than a pacifist, movement. It is easy to understand why many West Germans believe that the nuclear and national issues are inextricably bound together. Many believe the INFs have increased superpower tensions to the detriment of Germany's national interests. Professor Alfred Mechtersheimer, a peace researcher and former CSU (Christian Socialist) Bundestag member observes: "People feel that something is happening which is alien to them, that has nothing to do with their own interest. They feel that the two superpowers are carrying out a conflict at the expense of Germans east and west."<sup>18</sup> Germany's division, therefore, is viewed as both a cause and a consequence of Europe's division: if political tensions in Europe could be lowered, the blocs would dissolve, and the impediments to Germany's reunification would disappear. As an essay in the book *German Unity is Sure to Come*—one of the peace movement's leading tracts—states, "[I]f the German peace movement wants success, it



must take as its starting point the golden rule that the division of Germany plays a significant role in the growing military confrontation in Europe."<sup>19</sup>

As Rudolf Zundel recently wrote in *Die Zeit*, West Germans bridle at being "an alliance partner bristling with weapons in stern alliance discipline (but possessing no guaranteed right of opinion about the employment of the most dangerous weapons)."<sup>20</sup> There is an acute realization among important West Germans that the interests of the U.S. and the FRG often are sharply at odds. Karsten Voigt, a leading Social Democratic (SPD) foreign policy spokesman says, "No American senator is elected to defend German interests and I'm not elected to represent U.S. interests."<sup>21</sup> These attitudes are now expressed through overt nationalism—and these sentiments are especially pronounced in the SPD (though by no means confined to it). The SPD slogan in the March 1983 national elections was "In German Interests" and the party's candidate for chancellor lashed out at Helmut Kohl's "vassal-like fealty" to Washington. On the eve of the actual INF deployments, Willy Brandt accused Kohl of abandoning Germany's interests "in the cloakroom of the White House." The most visceral expression of the fusion of nationalism and anti-Americanism is the statement of *Der Spiegel* publisher Rudolf Augstein that although West German politicians are like so many "Fridays" to the American Robinson Crusoe, this relationship cannot be Germany's fate forever.<sup>22</sup>

While it is true that public opinion polls continue to show both a majority of West Germans favoring NATO membership and a large reservoir of goodwill toward the U.S., it also is true that, on the eve of the INF deployments, polls indicated 60 to 70 percent of West Germans opposed the missiles, and that West Germans sympathizing with the peace movement's objectives had risen to 61 percent (from 46 percent in 1981).<sup>23</sup> Ambivalence about the Federal Republic's future role in Europe was reflected in the prevailing mood at the SPD's November 1983 special meeting on the INF deployments. As the *Manchester Guardian* observed, despite the party's ritual obeisance to NATO, the dominant feeling was that the SPD was shifting from a pro-Alliance policy to one based on creating a nuclear-free zone in central Europe as the prelude to the reunification and neutralization of Germany.<sup>24</sup> While the anti-American and anti-Alliance tone of the SPD's May 1984 meeting was more muted than it had been the previous November, it was clear that the SPD's underlying outlook remained unchanged.<sup>25</sup>

Although some argue otherwise, West German nationalist neutralism is not a reaction to the Reagan administration's policies; the trend preceded Reagan. In March 1980, Chancellor Schmidt's office com-

missioned a poll of West German attitudes towards the United States; the poll's results were ordered suppressed for fear they would offend Washington. A separate Allensbach Institute survey taken at roughly the same time indicated that only 8 percent of those questioned expressed confidence in America's world leadership role. Changes in attitude among West German elites were even more pronounced, and the view that the Soviet Union and the U.S. equally threatened German interests already was widespread. Interestingly, at this time (the summer of 1980) American analysts at the Bonn embassy reported to Washington that West German hostility toward the U.S. was the product of something much deeper than the well-known tension between the Schmidt and Carter governments; West German views portended a major change in U.S.-FRG relations. As a Carter administration advisor said, "There is a change in the quality of feeling about America. The question is, how permanent is it?"<sup>26</sup>

Permanent or transitory, the views expressed in 1980 are held today by a growing number of West Germans. The change in attitudes is especially pronounced in West Germans under forty years of age—those who make up "the successor generation." In a detailed survey of West German public opinion, Stephen F. Szabo observes that the West German successor generation is "more distant from America and more skeptical of American intentions and policies" and that it "will remain independent in its foreign policy orientations and distant from both superpowers."<sup>27</sup> In 1982 David Kramer and Glenn Yago found that although 43 percent of the total West German population believed the INFs would enhance the FRG's security, only 31 percent of those under forty believed this.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, although 50.2 percent of all West Germans surveyed perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to German security, only 39.6 percent of those born after 1945 held this view. Kramer and Yago found that there is a direct correlation between age and support for the postwar Atlantic system: "The younger the people, the less support for the Atlantic alliance, the more popular are proposals for an independent European political bloc and for West Germany's becoming a world power that does not subordinate its interests to America's." Finally, there is powerful public sentiment for reunification. An April 1982 Allensbach survey showed West Germans favoring a neutral, reunified Germany by 53 to 20 percent.

It would be shortsighted and unwise to believe that West German neutralism and the desire for reunification are desired only by the young and the left. These attitudes are not simply a transitory phase of public opinion. Throughout the Federal Republic's history support for reunification has been strong. There has been substantial support for a neutralist foreign policy, as well. Current West German attitudes



on the national question are firmly rooted both in German history and in the logic of Germany's geopolitical situation, reflecting continuity as well as change.

### **Weltpolitik and Mitteleuropa**

German options have been remarkably consistent since 1945. Since the end of World War II, West German policy has balanced delicately between the lineal successors of the *weltpolitik* and *Mitteleuropa* policies that informed Germany's grand strategy from 1871 to 1939.<sup>29</sup> Post-1945 *weltpolitik* is embodied in the bilateral U.S.-FRG relationship and, like its pre-1945 predecessor, it rests on an export-oriented economic policy. Unlike pre-1945 *weltpolitik*, however, West Germany's post-1945 drive to secure world markets has not threatened the leading imperial power of the day; for the FRG, one of the key benefits of America-as-Germany is guaranteed access to the markets and raw materials of America's free trade empire. The *Mitteleuropa* aspect of Bonn's postwar policy is symbolized by its ties with France and the EEC. Built around the Bonn-Paris axis, the EEC gives West Germany (and the rest of Western Europe) a secure, continent-sized market; West Germany/Western Europe thus is able to compete economically against the U.S. In many respects, Bonn's dual-track Atlantic (*weltpolitik*) and European (*Mitteleuropa*) policies have been quite successful. However, success has not been without its price; West Germany has had to accept both Germany's continuing division and a loss of national autonomy in political and security matters. From 1949 until he left office in 1963, Christian Democratic Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was willing to pay this price because he deeply valued Western European unity and, like foreign minister Gustav Stresemann in the 1920s, he believed Germany only could recover its sovereignty through integration into the Western European system. Until such time as the FRG regained both its sovereignty and its strength, the best it could do on the reunification issue was to keep the question formally alive. West Germans accepted Adenauer's policy because they believed the FRG had an understanding with America and Western Europe: the Federal Republic would rearm within the NATO framework and link its economy to Western Europe's; in return, the allies would assist West Germany to achieve its long-term goals. However, it is apparent that the allies have never been seriously interested in promoting the cause of German reunification. By the mid-1960s, West Germans began to realize this and Bonn, responding to changes in the international strategic and diplomatic environment, began to move in a new direction.

Bonn's new course was charted by Willy Brandt when he became foreign minister in the 1966 Grand Coalition between the Social Dem-

ocratic and Christian Democratic Parties.<sup>30</sup> Brandt's policy—West Germany's third option—was an overtly nationalist policy that sought improved relations with the East and, ultimately, German reunification. Brandt felt it imperative for West Germany to develop close human and economic relations with the East German Democratic Republic (GDR) if the possibility of eventual reunification was to be kept alive (he realized, too, that reunification was a very long-range objective). Brandt knew that rapprochement with Moscow was the key to improving the FRG's relations with East Germany and with the other Eastern European states. The prevailing conditions in the international system were propitious for Brandt. The Soviet Union, increasingly preoccupied with China and desirous of access to Western technology, credits, and markets, was favorably disposed toward detente and the United States was distracted by Vietnam, thus allowing Bonn unusual freedom of maneuver.

Brandt's grand strategy consisted of four components: (1) political settlement with the Soviet Union and the East Bloc states other than the GDR; (2) recognition of the GDR; (3) a mutual reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe; and (4) creation of a central European security system.<sup>31</sup> The first two objectives were short term, the third was medium range, and the fourth was long range. Brandt's successful negotiations with Moscow and Warsaw were the key to *Ostpolitik*. By recognizing the post-1945 boundaries and by renouncing the use of force to change them, Bonn was able to establish diplomatic and economic ties with the East Bloc states. This process left the GDR somewhat isolated within the East Bloc and made East Berlin more receptive to Bonn's overtures. West Germany's recognition of East Germany opened the way for close economic relations and increased human contacts between the two German states, thus ensuring West German cultural penetration of the GDR. The next stage in Brandt's policy was a mutual reduction of superpower forces in both Germanys. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, begun in 1972, were supposed to accomplish this result; however, these negotiations have been stalemated virtually since their inception. In Brandt's conception, the reduction of superpower forces in both Germanys would be followed by creation of an autonomous central European security system comprised of the FRG, Denmark, Benelux, the GDR, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. All superpower forces would withdraw from these states, which, in turn, would withdraw from their respective Alliance systems. Once NATO and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, the evolutionary forces of history presumably would lead to German reunification.

Implicitly, there is a deep and irreconcilable tension between a national policy and between the Atlantic and European policies. To



achieve reunification, Germany must free itself of the grip of *both* superpowers. This is the central premise of *Ostpolitik* and the *leitmotiv* of the current domestic political debate in the FRG. The preconditions of reunification were divined by the individual responsible for Germany's defeat and division: during his final days in the Berlin bunker, Adolf Hitler incisively analyzed the consequences of the war he had wrought. Only Russia and America would emerge from the war as superpowers. Yet, because of their rivalry, both the Soviet Union and the United States would be compelled to seek German and European support. Germany's—and Europe's—hope lay in asserting independence from both Washington and Moscow and in reemerging as a world power. Hitler wrote:

*To achieve reunification, Germany must free itself of the grip of both superpowers.*

The laws of both history and geography will compel these two powers to a trial of strength. . . . These same laws make it inevitable that both powers should become enemies of Europe. And it is equally certain that both these powers will sooner or later find it desirable to seek the support of the sole surviving great nation in Europe, the German people. I say with all the emphasis at my command that the Germans must at all costs avoid playing the role of pawn in either camp.<sup>32</sup>

Contempt for its source does not compromise the validity of the analysis; there is more historical continuity than today's German national neutralists might wish to admit.

Despite its increasingly independent national strategy, West Germany is not yet ready to choose between *Ostpolitik*, on the one hand, and the dual-tracked Atlantic and European policies, on the other hand. Bonn has refrained from making a decision partly because the Atlantic and European policies give the FRG added leverage in pursuing *Ostpolitik* and partly because there is not yet a need to make an irrevocable choice. The time for decision, however, may be closer than commonly has been thought. America-as-Germany has granted to West Germany the luxury of simultaneously pursuing her Atlantic, European, and *Ostpolitik* options. But NATO's gradual unravelling is leading to the end of America-as-Germany and the logic of *Ostpolitik* itself is an important cause of NATO's dissolution: to achieve its goals in the East, West Germany must follow an independent policy towards Moscow that exposes the underlying tension between the FRG's Alliance obligations and its national interests.

When Washington ceases to play America-as-Germany, West Germany's Atlantic option will be foreclosed. Bonn then will be forced to choose between a European policy and *Ostpolitik*, and Western Europe may have to choose between accepting a peaceful West German hegemony or accepting German reunification. The process of decision likely will prove more difficult for Western Europe than it

will for Bonn. The smaller West European states inevitably would oppose West Germany's hegemony over them and France certainly would find such a prospect distinctly unpalatable.<sup>33</sup> Yet, Western Europe does not welcome the prospect of German reunification either. As long as America is Germany, Western Europe is relieved of the necessity of confronting the German Question. Indeed, this is a major—perhaps *the* major—reason that Western Europe wants to keep the United States committed to NATO. The FRG could achieve peaceful hegemony over Western Europe only by forfeiting the possibility of reunification but, given a choice between reunification or peaceful hegemony over Western Europe, West Germany will opt for the former.

For Western Europe the German Question is a difficult dilemma—but it is one that must be faced. In considering their options, the Western Europeans should remember that a policy of obstructing Germany's national aspirations is bound to have consequences that are antithetical to their interests.<sup>34</sup> Regardless of Western Europe's decisions, however, Americans must recognize that the U.S. has a vital interest in resolving the German Question. The deepening desire for reunification and the hostility toward America felt by growing numbers of West Germans suggest that Washington's paramount challenge in coming years will be to manage U.S.–West German relations in a way that will establish America as the *champion* of Germany's national aspirations rather than as the cause of their frustration.

The suggestion that the German Question be resolved through reunification will be severely criticized and the criticism is likely to fall into three broad categories: (1) Germany should be kept divided because it is a "bad" state; (2) the Soviets will never agree to reunification; and (3) reunification is not in America's interest.

There are many outside Germany who insist the German Question not be reopened. "The peace of Europe," the *New York Times* editorialized last year, "depends on keeping it smothered."<sup>35</sup> Yet history did not end in 1945 and it is historical myopia of the worst sort to believe the postwar division of Germany represented a permanent solution to the German Question. The wish to avoid confronting the German Question is rooted in memories of Germany's past. Though the appalling nature of Hitler's Reich left an indelible scar on the world's psyche, antipathy towards Germany goes beyond Hitler. There is a widespread view that Germany is a bad nation, a nation that has been an uncommonly aggressive and destabilizing force in world politics. The prevailing (and historically incorrect) view is that Germany caused *two* world wars in this century. Those with a passing acquaintance with history also remember Germany's unification



resulted from Prussia's military victories in 1866 and 1871 and not from realization of the Liberal principles of the 1848 Frankfurt Assembly. Because Germany is seen as a disturber of the peace, its post-1945 division is a source of satisfaction to those who fear a unified Germany as a destabilizing factor in world politics.

A serious historical analysis discloses scant support for the idea that Europe has been more stable during the periods when Germany has been divided. Before 1871, Germany's *disunity* was a primary cause of Europe's *instability*. From the Thirty Years' War through the Wars of Louis XIV to the Napoleonic Wars, the central European power vacuum caused by Germany's political fragmentation was an irresistible lure to the great powers on Germany's peripheries. Germany's division still fuels instability because the U.S. is forced to assume Germany's role in the balance of power.

### **Division and instability**

Understanding the course of German history from 1871 to 1945 is a prerequisite for understanding the implications of reunification. Because of the geopolitical constraints on Germany during this period, its attempt to emerge as a world power inevitably made it a source of instability in international politics. Germany's contribution to international political instability, however, resulted from the objective circumstances in which it found itself and not because it was a "bad" state. The key to Germany's post-1871 history was its misfortune of being the last great power to emerge into the European system. The other great powers already had established their places in the European order and they regarded the balance of power as a device to legitimize their privileged position in the international system. Merely by coming into being, Bismarck's Reich challenged the existing distribution of power and privilege in world politics and thus was viewed as a threat to the system's stability. It also was Germany's misfortune to arrive on the stage when the system of European great powers was giving way to a system of world powers (i.e., superpowers). To survive, Germany, too, needed to become a superpower; however, if Germany attained superpower status, the European balance of power would be shattered. As David Calleo observes:

Whereas the growth of superpowers on the Eastern or Western edges only indirectly undermined the European status quo, German ambitions assaulted it directly. Hence, while Britain came to preside over half the globe, and Russia and the United States relentlessly filled out their continental hinterlands, Germany was expected to remain locked within the tight frame of Europe's traditional balance of power. From a German view, preserving the European balance, while extra-European giants formed all around, meant condemning Germany to mediocrity and,

ultimately, all of Europe to external domination. That was the German problem as the Germans saw it.<sup>36</sup>

The close of the war in 1945 did not definitely resolve the German Question; it did, however determine that Germany would not dominate Europe. Germany's bids for superpower status in 1914 and 1939 were a mortal threat to the European balance because, on both occasions, the greatest powers of Europe acting together were unable to defeat it. Germany was too strong to be balanced within the European framework and only American intervention secured its defeat. Today, however, even a reunified Germany will not be able to upset the European power balance. In contrast to 1914 and 1939, Soviet Russia today is an actual, not an incipient, superpower possessed of awesome military strength, and it would be more than able to balance the power of a reunified Germany.

Will the Soviets agree to the reunification of a strong and independent Germany? The eminent British diplomatic historian, Sir Herbert Butterfield, once cautioned against discounting "the remarkable operation of fear" in international politics. For the Soviet Union since 1945, "fear" and "Germany" have been synonymous.<sup>37</sup> In view of

*The Soviets might be flexible on the German Question.* Soviet losses during the "Great Patriotic War," as the Russians call World War II, this is understandable. Nevertheless, analysis of Moscow's strategic interests suggests the Soviets might be more flexible on the German Question than generally has been thought.

Between 1946 and 1949 Moscow's German policy was ambivalent. The Soviets wished reparations from the Ruhr and Saar in addition to reparations from their own occupation zone; consequently, they insisted the defeated Reich be treated as a single economic unit. The Soviets also were inclined to favor political unification because they believed they could achieve predominant political influence throughout Germany. Since the FRG's creation in 1949, the constant objectives of Moscow's German policy have been to prevent or retard West German rearmament and to split Bonn from the Western Alliance. Moscow's 1952 and 1953 reunification overtures may well have been sincere because reunification would have achieved these objectives and also would have left open the possibility of eventual Soviet control over a neutral and disarmed Germany. By the mid-1950s it was apparent that the FRG was firmly integrated into the Western Alliance; Moscow abandoned hope of reunification on Soviet terms and turned instead to the tasks of stabilizing the GDR and weakening the bonds between West Germany and NATO.

The Soviets probably have not seriously examined the reunification issue for over thirty years; events may now be forcing them to do so. Moscow's European and German policies are marked by ambivalence



and by latent contradictions among key policy objectives. The Soviets wish to maintain their position in Eastern Europe, reinforce divisible detente with Bonn and Western Europe, increase tension within the Western Alliance, and prevent emergence of a united Western Europe. These objectives, however, are internally inconsistent. Curiously, German reunification is the one policy likely to achieve the greatest number of Soviet objectives.

Preserving the Eastern European empire is the key challenge facing Moscow in coming years.<sup>38</sup> The satellites are vital to the Soviets for strategic, political, economic, and ideological reasons. Eastern Europe serves the Soviets both as a security buffer and as a platform for westward projection of Soviet power. The East Bloc countries are a vital conduit through which the Soviet Union imports Western technology and credits and they also serve as laboratories to determine which—if any—economic reforms are suitable for transplant to the Soviet Union. Through the “socialist division of labor,” Eastern Europe contributes importantly to Moscow’s global interests and to maintenance of the Soviet Union’s overseas empire. The networks of political, economic, and human relations that have formed between Eastern and Western Europe solidify divisible detente and thus serve the Kremlin’s objective of heightening intra-Alliance tensions. Finally, the “socialist” regimes of Eastern Europe legitimize the Soviet system itself by validating the universality of Soviet communism.

Despite Eastern Europe’s critical importance, the Soviets will be increasingly hard-pressed to maintain their position there. Eastern Europe (with the possible exception of Bulgaria) never has accepted completely either the Soviet presence or the legitimacy of its socialist governments. The events of 1953, 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1980 to the present, especially in Poland, prove there is a persistent threshold level of instability in Moscow’s Eastern European empire. During the 1960s and early 1970s significant increases in real living standards and internal liberalization associated with detente substantially ameliorated the political tensions in the East Bloc states. However, there is near-universal agreement that the coming decade will be one of economic stringency for Eastern Europe; living standards are expected to decline sharply and economic hardship almost certainly will be reflected in heightened political unrest. As John C. Campbell recently has pointed out, the Kremlin faces a complex predicament in Eastern Europe:

They want the East European states to be viable and productive, with the necessary minimum of cooperation and tolerance on the part of the people. They also want to be sure of maintaining control. Yet these two aims may be in conflict. Reforms that relax economic or political restrictions in the interest of viability can fuel popular currents that could threaten the structure of control. Conversely, the rigid maintenance of

control can lead to economic stagnation, passive resistance and violence. One can describe the course of Soviet policy as a quest for the right balance between viability and control.<sup>39</sup>

When Soviet leaders think about Eastern Europe they cannot feel optimistic. Unless they can devise alternative policies, Moscow increasingly will have to rely on sheer force alone to maintain its position in the region. But such a policy likely will lead to an action-reaction cycle of coercion and resistance that could lead to open rebellion against Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. Such an explosion of unrest well could be the Sarajevo of the 1980s or 1990s; it is the most plausible cause of a future superpower war in central Europe and the Soviets almost certainly know this. We should not doubt that the Kremlin will do whatever is necessary to maintain its Eastern European empire. Nevertheless, the Soviets might gladly embrace an alternative that would enable them to achieve their Eastern European objectives at a lower cost and with less risk. German reunification could be such an alternative.

To stabilize their position in Eastern Europe, the Soviets must find a means of legitimating (at least partially) their presence in the region. Clearly, they cannot do this through positive incentives—they cannot “sell” Eastern Europe political liberty or economic prosperity; Moscow, however, can offer Eastern Europe security from external threat. Today West Germany—the primary exponent of divisible détente—is not perceived by Eastern Europe as a threat to its security; a reunified Germany, however, undoubtedly would be perceived as a security threat by nations such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the 1950s Moscow successfully used the specter of a revanchist Germany to legitimize its presence in Eastern Europe and, confronted with a renewed German menace, Poland and the other exposed East Bloc states most likely would turn to the Soviets for protection, as they did in the 1950s.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, reunification could deepen the historically complementary pattern of Soviet (Russian)-German trade relations. By availing itself of these economic opportunities, the Kremlin could partially relieve the Soviet Union’s own economic stagnation and also offset at least part of the cost of maintaining its position in Eastern Europe.

The Kremlin assiduously has cultivated the seeds of divisible détente in Western Europe and it has harvested important political and economic benefits as a result. Western Europe is the major source of credits and advanced technology vital to the Soviet Union’s own economic modernization. But even more importantly, by providing credits and technology markets, Western Europe is underwriting a significant portion of the cost of Moscow’s Eastern European empire. Without the deepening economic ties between Eastern and Western



Europe — especially between the two Germanys—the East Bloc's economic plight would be even worse than it now is and the risks of political upheaval would be correspondingly greater. Divisible detente also serves Moscow's broader geopolitical interests by highlighting the latent tensions in the Atlantic Alliance that result from the growing divergence of American and Western European interests. By exploiting Western Europe's stake in detente, the Kremlin also is able to use our European allies as a conduit to pressure Washington to modify its Soviet policy—especially on arms control and on East-West trade.

### **Stability and security**

Despite Moscow's ability to gain major advantages, divisible detente is very much a two-edge sword because, fundamentally, the Kremlin's Eastern and Western European policies are exquisitely inconsonant. By fostering closer economic relations between Eastern and Western Europe, detente makes the East Bloc governments dependent on Western European assistance to maintain at least the minimum level of economic well-being needed to prevent the eruption of political unrest. Consequently, the Eastern European nations have their own stake in detente and—like their Western European counterparts—they wish to protect their interests from the vicissitudes of the superpower competition. Because it drives the Eastern Europeans to assert their own independent interests and to follow policies that diverge from the Kremlin's, divisible detente poses a latent threat to the East Bloc's cohesiveness. The fissiparous tendencies inherent in detente were illustrated by the summer of 1984 dialectical exchange between the Soviet Union and the GDR and Hungary.<sup>41</sup> Moscow's problem of maintaining control over Eastern Europe is further accentuated by the relaxation in Soviet-Western European relations that is detente's vital precondition. An atmosphere of detente undercuts the very rationale for tight East Bloc cohesiveness and the relaxed political climate that flows from divisible detente is further encouragement for the Eastern European states to expand their diplomatic freedom of maneuver to the limits of Moscow's tolerance. Similarly, the relaxation of international tensions occasioned by detente—combined with the increased contacts between Europe's two halves that accompany it—stimulate the peoples of Eastern Europe to press their regimes for mitigation of internal political restrictions and controls. Yet reform itself could jeopardize Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. At the same time, the Soviets know that a too-repressive policy in Eastern Europe might cause Western Europe to reconsider its own commitment to divisible detente.

These dilemmas would be magnified many times if Western Europe

were politically united and strategically independent of the United States. A federated Western Europe would be—as American analysts repeatedly have pointed out—an irresistible political and economic magnet for Eastern Europe and also probably would be a more credible security instrument than NATO is today. Herein, for Moscow, lies the major contradiction between its Eastern and Western European policies. By sharpening U.S.–Western European tensions, divisible detente furthers Soviet interests—up to a point. Beyond that point, however, Soviet policy helps to accelerate (but does not *cause*) the Alliance's demise while simultaneously pushing Eastern and Western Europe closer together. Ironically, The Kremlin's deliberate exploitation of the Atlantic Alliance's fissures contributes to bringing about a geopolitical change that almost certainly cannot redound to its benefit: the emergence of a united Western Europe. As Adam Ulam has observed, the prospect of a united Western Europe may be the Soviets' greatest "nightmare" and an overriding objective of their policy must be to prevent its emergence.<sup>42</sup> Unfortunately for Moscow, Western Europe's future likely will be determined more by America's actions than by the Kremlin's.

The United States' relationship with Western Europe—and the consequent triangular relationship between the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union—means that American actions also affect the stability of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Since the end of World War II, the Soviets have been profoundly ambivalent about whether they are benefitted or harmed by America's presence in Europe.<sup>43</sup> The gains to Moscow from the U.S. presence in Western Europe are clear: (1) America-as-Germany means the Soviets do not have to act decisively on the German Question; (2) American troops in Europe—and NATO's existence—lend some credibility to Soviet arguments that Warsaw Pact cohesion is a necessary response to a Western threat to the socialist states' security; and (3) the United States commitment to Western Europe's defense allays pressures for Western Europe's political unification. Despite these benefits to the Kremlin from America's European commitment, some Soviet analysts believe Moscow would gain even more from a U.S. pullout from Western Europe. U.S. withdrawal from Europe would lower tensions on the continent and thus would allow the Soviets to devote more of their resources to the Chinese threat and to economic reforms. American disengagement from Europe also would formally mark the end of Washington's postwar hegemony and thus would be construed by Moscow as a prestige victory for the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, Moscow would also perceive a major opportunity to further its geostrategic interests if Western Europe remains politically fragmented in the wake of a U.S. pullback. Nevertheless, for Moscow



the theoretical advantages of American withdrawal from Europe are outweighed by its likely practical disadvantage. By ending Western Europe's "free ride" regarding security, America's departure from Europe probably would be the catalyst for the formation of a united Western Europe.

If the United States decides to terminate its NATO commitment, the Kremlin may face a choice between accepting German reunification as part of a negotiated settlement with the United States or risking Western European unity. German reunification might offer Moscow a way out of the seamless web of contradictions that comprise Soviet policy. Moscow can exploit Soviet-German economic relations both for its own and for Eastern Europe's benefit. Moreover, unlike divisible detente—which pushes Eastern and Western Europe closer together—there would be little risk of Eastern Europe being drawn into the political orbit of its German economic benefactor. Unlike Western Europe, reunified Germany would repel—not attract—Eastern Europe and push it back into Soviet arms for protection from the subjective threat posed by a reunified Germany. At the same time, a reunified Germany might pose a much smaller objective threat to vital Soviet interests than would a united Western Europe.

### **German Question and American Problem**

The United States, too, has strong reasons to prefer Germany's reunification to Western Europe's union. In 1917–18 and 1940–45, the U.S. fought to preclude the continent's unification because it feared the emergence of a European superpower capable of threatening its vital interests. After the war, however, America labored indefatigably to bring about peacefully the very geopolitical result it had gone to war to prevent. U.S. Atlanticists envisioned an Alliance of equal American and Western European pillars and they supported Western Europe's political and economic integration as a means to this end. Few American statesmen appreciated the geopolitical incongruity of this policy. An Alliance of twin pillars is not likely to remain an alliance; as Western Europe approached equality with the U.S. it was bound to assert its political independence from Washington and act more as a rival and a competitor than as an ally. Whether it is the result of peaceful integration or the result of conquest by a hegemonic power, a united or integrated Western Europe inevitably would challenge American interests.

For nearly a century European statesmen and geopoliticians have recognized that America's preeminence in the international system is an economic and political threat to Europe. Since the 1870s, Europe's geopolitical course has been shaped by the German Question *and* by the American Problem. Europe's American Problem is simple: a polit-

ically fragmented Europe is overwhelmed by American power and only a united Europe can compete on equal terms with the United States. In this century statesmen as diverse as Joseph Chamberlain, Hitler, and de Gaulle all recognized the need for Europe to become sufficiently powerful to counterbalance the United States. In 1914 and 1939, Germany bade to resolve simultaneously the German Question and the American Problem by forging a European superpower through German hegemony on the continent. In the postwar years, the impetus for Western European union has come primarily from the Old World's drive to reclaim its independence from the New World.

In historical perspective, it is apparent that the postwar Atlantic system is neither the final stage of Europe's political evolution nor the ultimate chapter in U.S.-European relations. Once Western Europe recovered fully from the war, U.S.-European relations were bound to return to a more normal pattern. Henry Kissinger perceived that Western European unity would have had a decidedly ambiguous effect on American interests. "A united Europe," Kissinger wrote in 1965, "is likely to insist on a specifically European view of world affairs—which is another way of saying that it will challenge American hegemony in Atlantic policy. This may well be a price worth paying for European unity; but American policy has suffered from an unwillingness to recognize that there is a price to be paid."<sup>44</sup> Though Europe has yet to achieve political union, it already is challenging America's Atlantic hegemony and both Euro-nationalism and West German national neutralism are manifestations of Europe's desire to recover fully its political sovereignty and to shift U.S.-European relations into a more traditional balance of power pattern.

In a post-Alliance world, the costs to the U.S. of Western European unity would be acceptable to escape from the nuclear peril of America-as-Germany and to reduce America's strategic over-extension. And while the U.S. cannot simply will a united Western Europe into being, it can influence significantly the emergence of such a Europe. The United States can establish a firm timetable for its gradual withdrawal from NATO and simultaneously offer Western Europe full assistance—technological and economic—in building up a credible defense system that will enable it to defend itself from the Soviet Union. This is America's "Western Europe card." Washington can communicate its intentions to Moscow and make the Soviets understand that they have two alternatives: (1) America's unilateral pullout from Europe coupled with American initiatives to promote Western European unity; or, (2) American disengagement from Europe as part of a negotiated superpower settlement providing for German reunification. Although Washington should be prepared to



play the Western European card, German reunification would be preferable to Western European unity because the former would accomplish the same American purposes as the latter but at a much lower cost to the United States. A reunified Germany could effectively balance Soviet power in Europe but would not threaten U.S. interests as would a united Western Europe, and unlike a united Western Europe, reunified Germany will serve the interests of both superpowers in enhancing Eastern Europe's political stability.

The underlying asymmetry of superpower bargaining advantage on the German question is another powerful reason why Washington should press for German reunification. The U.S. can play its Western European card in an attempt to bring Moscow to the negotiating table on the German Question; however, Moscow can play its German card and thereby break up the Western Alliance. If West Germany ever concludes that its allies are blocking reunification, Bonn might act on the logic of its geopolitical circumstances and turn eastward in pursuit of its national aspirations. At the worst, this could mean West Germany's defection from the Alliance in exchange for reunification on Soviet terms. This is *not* an immediate prospect but without progress on the German Question, it becomes increasingly possible. The current Soviet leadership probably is too rigid to play the German card, but their successors may be more flexible. If Moscow *does* embark on the reunification gambit, it could bring about NATO's sudden collapse and change the balance of power to Soviet advantage.

In absence of an outright Soviet reunification offer, Bonn will not formally leave the Alliance because its NATO membership is the key bargaining chip it can trade to Moscow in exchange for reunification. However, while remaining formally part of NATO, the FRG is likely to adopt a policy of *de facto* neutrality in order to strengthen its ties with the GDR and thus keep the national question open. There are signs that this is already occurring. The leaders of both Germanies now speak of their "community of responsibility" to act together to prevent the outbreak of war on German soil. Earlier this year, during military discussions with France, West Germany insisted on having a voice in any French decision to use nuclear weapons on German territory—East or West. The West German position was reported "to reflect a strong desire to insulate the improving relationship between East and West Germany from further controversy over nuclear weapons."<sup>45</sup>

Already the dialectic of U.S.—West German relations is locked into the ritual exchange of hollow assurances. Washington assures Bonn it will risk nuclear war in West Germany's defence and Bonn assures the U.S. that West Germany is not a "wanderer between the superpowers." Neither government can mean what it says to the other and

simultaneously remain constant to its own most vital national interests. Awareness that America will not risk nuclear war over West Germany only accelerates Bonn's natural eastward drift. For West Germany, the road to Berlin leads through Moscow, and America ignores this geopolitical fact at its peril.

For Washington, German reunification resulting from an orderly transition from an Atlantic to a post-Alliance European security system is the optimal goal for America-as-Germany. If the U.S. does not take the initiative to resolve the German Question, reunification could result from Bonn's defection from the Western camp because the very existence of the Kremlin's German card is a latent source of European instability. Indeed, during the climax of the INF deployment crisis, Moscow dangled the German card tantalizingly before Bonn—and with some effect.<sup>46</sup>

America-as-Germany is both the substance and the symbol of the most serious foreign policy issues confronting Washington today; the German Question is deeply enmeshed in growing anxiety about the future course of American foreign policy. By moving to resolve the German Question, the U.S. can relieve much of this disquietude because a German settlement will: (1) break the stalemate in U.S.-Soviet political relations; (2) minimize the risk that America will be drawn into a nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union; (3) provide a viable alternative to the decaying postwar Atlantic system; and (4) enable the United States to redress the imbalance between its strategic commitments and the resources available to support those commitments.

German reunification offers the United States and the Soviet Union opportunities to reduce the danger of war between them and to break the impasse in their relations. Since the Austrian State Treaty (1955), the superpowers have not made a serious attempt to grapple with the underlying political problems that cause the tension between them. Instead, Soviet-American relations focus on the symptoms of the superpower competition, and arms control has become the "center-piece" of their relations. Armaments, however, are neither the source of tensions between great powers nor the cause of war. Political, strategic, and ideological conflicts are the causes of great power rivalries. The Soviet-American rivalry is intractable and will not go away; however, the risks of that rivalry can be ameliorated. Disengagement in Europe through German reunification offers the prospect of reducing the political tensions that make Soviet-American relations dangerous. Such an agreement would radically reduce the chance of nuclear war and divert the Soviet-American contest to arenas where the likelihood of a direct clash is less and the consequences of confrontation would not be lethal.



German reunification also offers Washington the opportunity to relieve America's strategic over-extension. It is now generally accepted that there is a widening gap between America's strategic objectives and the resources available to pursue them. It is apparent that domestic political considerations and economic constraints preclude correcting this imbalance by expanding U.S. forces; the gap probably can be closed only by reducing existing U.S. commitments. America-as-Germany, in NATO's guise, accounts for over one-half of the U.S. defense budget and U.S. disengagement from Europe would significantly reduce the imbalance between means and ends that now undermines Washington's strategic policies.<sup>47</sup>

The desire to reduce the chances of nuclear war and the strategic overcommitment inherent in America-as-Germany will compel U.S. decision makers to think not only about the future of U.S. foreign policy but also about the more transcendent issue of how an alteration in American grand strategy will affect, and will be affected by, changes in the structure of the international political system. Percolating beneath the surface of the foreign policy debate is the unspoken assumption that America's postwar hegemony is waning and that the end of U.S. preeminence presages important changes in the international system. Like "nuclear parity" and economic "interdependence," America's strategic overextension is a sign of the relative decline in American power from its postwar apogee.

As President Nixon and Henry Kissinger realized in the early 1970s, the American retrenchment that will be needed to redress our strategic overextension will accelerate the gradual trend away from bipolarity and toward a more traditional multipolar balance-of-power system. Their reaction to the prospect of multipolarity was distinctly equivocal. In theory they welcomed the prospect of a multipolar system because they perceived the advantages that would accrue to the U.S. from such a development: diplomatic flexibility and maneuver would be restored and America's strategic overextension would be alleviated by devolving some U.S. security responsibilities to the new powers in the system and by relying on the natural dynamics of the balance of power to protect America's interests in those regions from which it withdrew. In practice, however, Nixon and Kissinger were not so sanguine about the effects of multipolarity. Because the rise of new power centers in the international system is a necessary corollary of American strategic retrenchment, the inexorable consequence of multipolarity is enhanced political and economic rivalry between the U.S. and these new powers and a corresponding diminution of America's ability to influence international outcomes.

Nixon and Kissinger were incisive in their analysis of the advan-

*American retrenchment  
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our strategic  
overextension.*

tages and dangers of multipolarity for the U.S. but their analysis also was premature. The pentagonal balance of power they envisioned will not materialize for many years to come, if it materializes at all. Nevertheless, they correctly discerned an important trend. The international system is moving toward a modified multipolar system. In this system, bipolarity will be superimposed on multipolar regional power balances. A promising debate about the impact of multipolarity on America's future foreign policy was aborted by Vietnam and Watergate. A resumption of this debate is in order.

German reunification raises some of the practical issues involved in a transition from bipolarity to modified multipolarity. To be an effective factor in a post-Alliance European security system, reunified Germany might need nuclear weapons. Such a prospect will raise atavistic fears and, more concretely, a nuclear Germany has serious implications for Washington's nonproliferation policy. Yet it seems apparent that the trend to a more multipolar system inevitably will lead to an increase in the number of nuclear great powers. At the same time, the end of America-as-Germany also carries with it the risk that Western Europe's historic animosities will generate a renewal of ancient national rivalries. In a post-Alliance world, the states of Western Europe might quarrel among themselves rather than combine against the Soviets.

These are serious issues. In answering them, American policy makers must reexamine the objectives of Washington's post-1945 policy and they also must confront the issue of whether, in a post-hegemonic era, the United States should give primacy to managing the international system or to advancing its more narrow national interests.

When Secretary Byrnes committed this country to be America-as-Germany in 1946 it is doubtful that he, or any other senior national security official in the Truman administration, had the faintest conception that nearly forty years later over 300,000 American troops still would be mounting the "Watch on the Elbe." America-as-Germany and its offspring, the Marshall Plan and NATO, were conceived as *temporary* palliatives to fill the void in the balance of power caused by the defeat of the Axis powers and by Western Europe's exhaustion. As originally conceived, the purpose of Washington's postwar policy was to assist Germany and Western Europe to recover from the war (and for Germany, to undergo political rehabilitation) so they could resume their accustomed places in the balance of power. When that task was accomplished, it was envisioned that America itself would return to a more traditional policy. The risks and the burdens inherent in America-as-Germany suggest Washington should return to the original design of postwar U.S. policy; certainly, that



policy has attained its objective of restoring Western Europe's *ability* to participate in the balance of power. In an age of strategic nuclear parity, it is unrealistic to expect that the United States will continue to court the risk of nuclear war through its strategic guarantee to Europe simply because others harbor an inordinate fear of Germany. For the United States, in a nuclear world, it is better that Germany be itself than that America should be Germany. Similarly, it also is unrealistic to expect that the United States will continue to incur the enormous economic and strategic costs of America-as-Germany simply because some Europeans and Americans believe that Western Europe is not capable of managing its affairs without an American presence.

If America ceases to be Germany, perhaps Western Europe will fragment and its states will concentrate on defending themselves from each other rather than from the Soviets. Perhaps—but it is not likely. Faced with a threat to the balance of power from the Soviet Union, post-Alliance Europe probably will react as Europe historically has reacted to such situations: the European states will set aside their differences and combine against the common threat. In the final analysis, if they react otherwise it would be a European problem, not an American one. America's most pressing national interests are to minimize the possibility of U.S. entanglement in a nuclear war and to redress the imbalance between our commitments and our resources. These concrete interests far outweigh the ephemeral gratification derived from the privilege of protecting Western Europe from itself.

The tide of history is ebbing and the foundations of America's Atlanticist policy are being left in its wake. The forces of evolution and change are at work in Europe and the results can be seen in the erosion of Western Alliance, the revival of the German Question, and in the growing political unrest in the East Bloc. When combined, these trends form a highly combustible mixture. These forces will largely determine the future course of U.S.-Europe-Soviet relations. Change cannot be prevented; it can, however, be directed. The challenge for Washington (and for Moscow, too) is to formulate policies that will smooth the transition from the present European security system to a post-Alliance world. German reunification is one option for coping with the forces of change.

It is impossible to know whether Moscow will be receptive to negotiating a new European settlement based on German reunification and American withdrawal from Europe. Objectively, the Kremlin has strong incentives to deal along these lines because doing so would: (1) reduce Soviet-American tensions; (2) prevent the emergence of a united Western Europe; and (3) reduce the Soviet Union's imperial burdens in Eastern Europe and provide a non-coercive method of stabilizing its hegemony in that region. Neverthe-

less—regardless of Moscow's reaction—the United States has strong reasons of its own to raise the issue of German reunification and Washington should not allow the Soviets to define the international political agenda.

Clearly, there are risks in raising the issues of German reunification and American withdrawal from Europe. But these risks pale in comparison to those of attempting to preserve the post-1945 European political order that visibly is collapsing. Even if it somehow were possible to maintain the present European status quo, it would not be in our interest to do so. Those who simply reject the possibility of a post-Alliance European security system condemn the United States to bear indefinitely the nuclear risks and economic burdens imposed by our NATO commitment and they also condemn Europe to remain partitioned indefinitely.

The United States may choose not to make German reunification the centerpiece of its post-Alliance policy but, whatever course Washington ultimately adopts, no American policy will succeed unless it takes account of the German Question. As it always has been, Germany is the key to Europe's security and America will jeopardize its own safety if we ignore this lesson of the past. As the late Luigi Barzini wrote in *The Europeans*: "The future is in the laps of the gods. It will probably be decided, once again, by Germany's decisions. And Germany is, as it always was, a mutable, Proteuslike, unpredictable country, particularly dangerous when it is unhappy."<sup>48</sup>

1. *Department of State Bulletin* XV, September 15, 1946, pp. 496–501.
2. Sonnenfeldt's remarks subsequently became known as the "Sonnenfeldt Doctrine." From "State Department Summary Remarks by Sonnenfeldt," *New York Times*, April 6, 1976, p. 4.
3. George F. Kennan, "Disengagement Revisited," *Foreign Affairs* (January 1959): Kennan first set out his views on German reunification and disengagement in the BBC's Reith lectures. His remarks were reprinted as "A Chance to Withdraw our Troops in Europe," *Harper's*, February 1958.
4. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Alternative to Partition* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), and Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
5. Brzezinski, p. viii.
6. My reasons for believing the Alliance's collapse is inevitable are set forth in Layne, "Ending the Alliance," *Journal of Contemporary Studies* (Summer 1983): 5–31. For an analysis of the recent short-term improvement in relations between America and Western Europe, see Simon Serfaty, "America and Europe in 1984: A Renewed Partnership?," *SAIS Review* (Winter 1984/85) (forthcoming).
7. Kathy Sawyer, "Americans Show Attitude Shift on Nuclear Arms," *Washington Post*, September 7, 1984, p. 49.
8. Henry Kissinger has adeptly summarized the roots of the divergence in American and Western European strategic interests in *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979). Egon Bahr, in "Peace: A State of Emergency," *Germany Debates Defense: The Nato Alliance at the Crossroads*, eds. Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1983), has exhibited rather plainly the strategic views that Kissinger ascribes to Western Europeans. According to Bahr, "The threat of escalation to the ultimate extreme is safe because the fear of the abyss has the effect that no one will throw the first stone."
9. See Lawrence Freedman, "NATO Myths," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1981–82).



10. Paul Lewis, "U.S. Pledge to NATO to Use Nuclear Arms Criticized by Kissinger," *New York Times*, September 2, 1979, p. A7.
11. On a rhetorical level at least, all leading West German defense officials acknowledge the need to improve NATO's conventional defense capabilities and thus raise the nuclear threshold. For an example, see the 1982 remarks of the soon-to-be West German Defense Minister, Manfred Woerner, in "NATO's New 'Conventional Option,'" *Wall Street Journal*, November 19, 1982, p. 32. As Minister, however, Woerner spoke of only modest improvement in FRG defense capabilities because, he said, "Finances will play a considerable role." John Tagliabue, "Bonn Balks at Weinberger's Arms Plans," *New York Times*, June 1, 1983, p. 3.
12. Karl Kaiser, George Leber, Alois Mertes, and Franz Joseph Schulze, "A German Response to No First Use," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1982): 1159, 1162. This article was a response to McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara and Gerard Smith, "Nuclear Weapons and the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1982).
13. Helmut Schmidt, "1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture," *Survival* (January-February 1978).
14. "Helmut Schmidt on Those Missiles," *Washington Post*, February 13, 1983, p. 7.
15. Michael R. Gordon, "Pushing the Pershing," *National Journal*, August 20, 1983, p. 1745.
16. See, for example, Klaus Bloemer, "Freedom for Europe, East and West," *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1983); Heldly Bull, "European Self-Reliance," *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1983); and Pieter Dankert, "Europe Together, America Apart," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1983-84). See also Helmut Schmidt's call for close Franco-German defense cooperation, "Schmidt Bundestag Statement on Economy, Defense," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report (Western Europe)*, July 6, 1984, p. J1.
17. A 1981 paper by the FRG Foreign Ministry's policy planning staff outlined Bonn's rationale for divisible detente. Referring to Washington's Soviet policy, the policy planning staff stated: "We fear that such an American policy leads to an arms race and to endangering peace. We want to protect what we have achieved in our relations with East Germany, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states." John Vinocur, "West Germany Reviewing Policy toward Soviet Bloc," *New York Times*, January 31, 1982, p. 10.
18. Anna Tomforde, "Timebomb over the Rhineland," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, October 9, 1983, p. 7.
19. John Vinocur, "Rally in Bonn During Reagan's Visit Focal Point of Antinuclear Campaign," *New York Times*, June 3, 1982, p. 8.
20. Quoted in Gordon A. Craig, "Germans: A New Search for Identity," *Los Angeles Times*, April 10, 1984, V, p. 7.
21. Quoted in Frederick Kempe, "Two Strains of German Nationalism," *Wall Street Journal*, October 21, 1983, p. 22.
22. Rudolf Augstein, "First, German Survival," *New York Times*, December 9, 1983, p. 27.
23. Tyler Marshall, "Key German Party Shuns Missile Plan," *Los Angeles Times*, November 20, 1983, I, p. 1; and James A. Markham, "German Missile Protests: Mixed Signals for Kohl," *New York Times*, October 24, 1983, p. 3.
24. "A Fateful German Decision on Missiles," *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, November 27, 1983, p. 1.
25. "Exit Schmidt, Enter Fudge," *The Economist*, May 26, 1984, p. 48.
26. John Vinocur, "Lack of Confidence in U.S. Growing among West Germans," *International Herald Tribune*, June 11, 1980, p. 1.
27. Stephen F. Szabo, ed., *The Successor Generation: International Perspectives of Postwar Europeans* (London: Butterworth's, 1983), p. 71.
28. David Kramer and Glenn Yago, "Germans' Hostility to the U.S.," *New York Times*, June 7, 1982, p. 23.
29. My views of the historical continuity of Germany's geopolitical possibilities are strongly influenced by David Calleo's brilliant study, *The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present* (Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1978).
30. On Ostpolitik in general, see William Griffiths, *The Ostpolitik of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 1978). See also Lawrence L. Whetten, *Germany's Ostpolitik: Relations Between the Federal Republic and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
31. The full scope of Brandt's strategy was outlined by Ostpolitik's chief architect,



- Egon Bahr. See Walter F. Hann, "West Germany's Ostpolitik: The Grand Design of Egon Bahr," *Orbis* Winter 1973).
32. Quoted in Calleo, p. 110.
  33. For France, propinquity ensures that the German Question never will go away. The FRG is a vital security buffer and the French know that the neutralist impulses in West German politics—should they come to fruition—could gravely impair their security. President Mitterand's dramatic speech of January 20, 1983 to the Bundestag was an attempt to squelch the West German "peace" movement and defuse incipient nationalist-neutralist sentiment in the FRG. See James M. Markham, "Mitterand, on Bonn Visit, Warns Against Efforts to Divide the West," *New York Times*, January 21, 1983, p. 1.  
Shifts in French military strategy have been shaped with a view to enhancing France's ability to intervene on the central front with both conventional and nuclear forces. However, French extended deterrence may be no more credible than the American variety—something some French strategists (like their American counterparts) stress. See Michael Dobbs, "General Proposes New Plan for Military Defense," *Washington Post*, March 19, 1984, p. 20.
  34. The recent remarks by Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti illustrate Western Europe's underlying view of the German Question. On September 12, 1984, Andreotti said: "There are two German states and two German states must remain," see James B. Markham, "For Both East and West, Two Germanys is Better," *New York Times*, September 23, 1984, p. E5.
  35. "Let Germany Vote on Wurst," *New York Times*, February 4, 1983, p. 24.
  36. Calleo, p. 5.
  37. Fear of Germany—particularly of a revanchist Germany—is an essential element of Moscow's strategy to mobilize the Soviet population against external threat and to convince the population that the economic burdens imposed by Soviet defense spending are necessary. Russian views of Germany always have been a mixture of envy, admiration, and fear. It also is true that despite Russian-German, Teutonic-Slav, animosity, the two nations historically have often been allies, as well as adversaries. However, at this time Soviet internal propaganda is based on "anti-Fascist" and "anti-Hitlerite"—not anti-German—themes. Recently, the trend of Soviet propaganda has been to equate the U.S. and President Reagan with fascism and Hitlerism. See Alvin Rosenblum, "Soviets Paint Reagan as the New Hitler," *Wall Street Journal*, September 12, 1984, p. 32; Robert Kaiser, "Russia's Bogeyman is Alive, Real and American," *Washington Post-National Weekly Edition*, September 10, 1984, p. 25.
  38. Andrzej Korbonski, "Eastern Europe," in *After Brezhnev*, ed. Robert F. Byrnes (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1983).
  39. Campbell, "Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe: An Overview," in *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, ed. Sarah Meiklejohn Terry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 1–2.
  40. Poland's fears of German reunification were expressed clearly by General Jaruzelski in a July 22 speech: "One of the essential conditions for peace in Europe is the prevention of the return of powerful German expansionism, which is being revived under the pretext of unification." According to the *New York Times*, the basis of Polish fears is the realization that "ultimately any German reunification could come only with Soviet approval and that at some point it might be worthwhile for Moscow to have a united but neutral and missile-free Germany." Michael T. Kaufman, "Pressures on Poland," *New York Times*, August 27, 1983, p. 3.
  41. The Soviet Union vigorously criticized the inter-German detente that took place during the spring and summer of 1984. Perhaps the key article in the Soviet salvoes opposing inter-German detente was L. Bezymenskiy's article in the July 27 edition of *Pravda*, denouncing West German "revanchism." Noting the GDR's 35th anniversary, Bezymenskiy pointed to statements by East German leaders that the GDR's success is guaranteed by "indissoluble friendship and alliance with the U.S.S.R. and the other fraternal countries." "Bezymenskiy Condemns FRG Revanchist Trends," *FBIS Daily Report* (U.S.S.R.), July 27, 1982, p. G2. Soviet pressure forced East German leader Erich Honecker to cancel a scheduled visit to West Germany. The East German and Hungarian presses strongly supported the detente between the two Germanies and, by implication, the right of the East Bloc states to pursue their own divisible detente policies independently from Moscow. An article in the Budapest publication *Magyarország* praised the GDR's policy of seeking improved relations with the West despite the chill in superpower relations. See



- "Development of FRG-GDR Ties Can Strengthen Peace," *FBIS Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), August 5, 1984.
42. Adam Ulam, "The World Outside," Robert F. Byrnes, pp. 410-411, 420.
  43. In 1971, only four days before the Senate vote on the Mansfield Amendment to unilaterally withdraw 150,000 U.S. troops from NATO, Brezhnev delivered a major speech calling for Soviet-American negotiations on mutual troop reductions in Europe. Many analysts believe Moscow was deeply concerned about the possibly destabilizing effects of American withdrawal from Europe. See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, "America's European Policy Viewed in Global Perspective," in *The United States and Western Europe*, ed. Wolfram F. Hanrieder (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1974).
  - On the other hand, recent Soviet commentaries also have criticized the U.S. role in Europe. At the least, the Soviets realize the benefit of fomenting dissension within the Alliance and, at most, parts of the Soviet foreign policy establishment believe that Moscow's interests would be served best if the U.S. is forced out of Western Europe.
  44. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, p. 40. The risks to the United States that would be posed by a united Western Europe are analyzed incisively by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 199-204, and "The Stability of a Bi-Polar World," *Daedalus*, Summer 1964.
  45. William Drozdiak, "Bonn Seeks More Influence on French Nuclear Targeting," *Washington Post*, April 20, 1984, p. 1.
  46. According to a Washington Post report, on one occasion before the actual INF deployments, "word was passed through Bonn's Foreign Ministry that Soviet President Yuri Andropov was prepared to devote himself to achieving a solution to the 'German problem' through some form of reunification within seven years if Kohl would renounce the missiles." William Drozdiak, "Caribbean Shock Waves Reach Bonn," *Washington Post-National Weekly Edition*, November 14, 1983.
  47. Richard Halloran, "Two Studies Say Defense of Western Europe is Biggest U.S. Military Cost," *New York Times*, July 20, 1984, p. 4. A Pentagon study said that the U.S. commitment to NATO accounts for 58 percent of our FY1985 military budget and a GAO report concluded that in FY1982, 56 percent of the U.S. defense budget was attributable to the NATO commitment.
  48. Luigi Barzini, *The Europeans* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), p. 267.