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[European Strategy Steering Group (ESSG) Meetings 3-6/89]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

March 14, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH  
RICHARD KERR  
ROBERT ZOELLYCK  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
DENNIS ROSS  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES

*φ* *Gates*  
*Group*

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on  
Friday, March 16, at 10:00 a.m.

I attach the following papers for consideration by the European  
Strategy Steering Group:

1. The Legal Basis for the Devolution of Allied Rights in  
Germany and Berlin (State)
2. Developing U.S.-EC Relations (State)
3. Adapting to Change: NATO Strategy and Force Posture (JCS)
4. Enhancing the Political Role of NATO (State)
5. Draft NAC Ministerial Declaration (State)
6. CSCE: Looking Ahead (State)

I will circulate other papers prepared for this meeting as they  
are received.

**DECLASSIFIED**

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 5/4/11

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Declassify on: OADR



March 19, 1990

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Note for Bob Blackwill

From: Robert B. Zoellick *RBZ*  
Re: Future Agenda of Informal Gates Group

*φ Gates Group*

It's my general impression that this group has produced a number of useful papers. It also seems that our discussions can be useful for: (1) sharing information; (2) developing a shared view of how to deal with the future; and (3) perhaps generating some new perspectives.

Nevertheless, I think we continue to have a difficult time getting our arms around a massive set of material-problems. Therefore, you may wish to discuss with Bob Gates the possibility of focusing our efforts on near term decisions that we need to make. (Also, from my parochial perspective, the USG needs to get moving in these areas so we can "direct" 2+4 questions in the direction of other fora.)

I'd suggest the following topics in the near term:

(1) SNF, including:

- what combination of alliance consultations/unilateral action?
- include artillery?
- timing?

(2) What Follow On to CFE?

- Timing?
- Possible alternative: Contingency for Bundeswehr in CFEI?
- Do we wish to consider CFE in the broader CSCE context? (If not, how do we address the sense of exclusion of the 35-23=12?)

(3) Do we want to propose a NATO Strategy Review?

- If so, what would our proposal look like?
- Timing (recognizing our initiative may need to reflect our sense of bottom lines)

There are certainly other questions to answer (e.g., U.S.-EC, CSCE plans). But this would be a useful start. What do you think? Please feel free to share this with Bob Gates.

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301  
23 March, 1990

*P Gates Group*

*cc: C/Z/Kanter,  
return PB*

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND  
DEPUTY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Attached is a copy of the overall NATO strategy paper Reg Bartholomew prepared with the work of the 'Thursday Group,' with a new Section consisting of the OSD/JCS paper on military strategy and force posture.

Since this paper represents a substantial consensus and a good deal of creative thought, we believe it would be useful for your group to review it for forwarding to principals as a framework paper that could help focus the thinking of the principals and provide a foundation for the work program that you are tasking.

Some modest changes to the paper are necessary to integrate the new Section IV better, to expand the arms control section and to revise the last section in line with the schedule of events that we now envision unfolding over the next several months.

We believe that those changes could be made without lengthy additional discussions. If we could endorse that general approach at today's meeting, we would recommend commissioning Reg or someone else to finish up the paper so that your group could endorse it and forward it to the principals.

*David Jeremiah*  
ADM David Jeremiah  
Vice Chairman, JCS

*Paul Wolfowitz*  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Under Secretary (Policy)

Attachment:  
As stated.

cc: Reginald Bartholomew  
Richard Kerr  
Robert Zoellick  
Raymond Seitz  
Dennis Ross  
Stephen Hadley  
LTG Howard Graves  
Robert Blackwill

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## NATO STRATEGY REVIEW

### I. Structural Change and Transition

- o The established strategy and force posture for NATO and the US in Europe is becoming less cogent and credible with the structural changes underway and in the offing:
  - The line between West and East that NATO has been designed to defend militarily and to overcome politically is rapidly disappearing with changes in the Soviet Union and its foreign policy, and German unification and Eastern European democracy and independence.
  - The "classic" threat of a short-warning Soviet attack capable of overrunning Western Europe is rapidly receding with Soviet force reductions in Eastern Europe and up to the Urals through CFE, Eastern European pressures, and Soviet economic needs.
  - It is already no longer credible to count the Eastern Europeans in a "Warsaw Pact" offensive against the West. They are becoming more a barrier than a springboard for any such Soviet threat. An attack against the West would begin from the borders of the USSR, not the GDR.
  - A CFE/CSBM structure of internationally-agreed force ceilings, monitoring and notification promises a fundamental correction in the balance and threat of attack and a major brake against reversal.
  - In the period ahead, the European system will focus at least as much on managing the real and potential effects of German unification and the reemergence of independent Eastern European states as on containing the Soviets.
- o In sum, the structural changes underway and in the offing over the next decade in Europe mark a transition:
  - from a Cold War structure of East-West political division and Soviet offensive capabilities that made major war with little warning a constant credible threat;
  - to a new structure in which major war could reemerge as a credible threat only after a long period of political reversal and military build-up, and maintaining a stable European-wide balance rather than containing the USSR becomes the "organizing principle."

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II. Consequences for NATO Strategy and Forces

- o This development -- this perspective -- is even now undercutting the military rationale and political sustainability of NATO's strategy and force posture and the role of US forces.
- o Big and ready standing forces deployed forward to counter the "classic" Soviet threat are losing their mission:
  - this powers heavy downward pressure on Allied national force levels apart from CFE cuts. The Belgians, Dutch and FRG already have specific plans and others are in the offing.
  - It will power similar pressures on stationed force levels in the FRG in the ministries and politics of stationing countries. And the waning strategic rationale for these forces will reduce German tolerance of them and their activities and add to whatever other pressures unification and Soviet withdrawals might stimulate for their reduction.
- o Extensive forward deployments of tactical nuclear weapons are losing their mission:
  - The flexible response doctrine for their role in deterrence and plans for their use are progressively less adapted to any plausible threat as the "classic" Soviet threat wanes.
  - This combines with existing anti-nuclear attitudes to increase pressures for nuclear withdrawals if not "denuclearization" of NATO defense, starting with the FRG, and unification may add to them.
  - Even now, just planning the use of tactical weapons against targets in a unified Germany and democratic and independent Eastern Europe is becoming politically unsustainable.
  - Deploying FOTL in the FRG is already dead and the only issue is how and when to bury it.
  - A decision this year to prepare/enter SNF negotiations is politically unavoidable, unless we choose to draw-down unilaterally.

- o Extensive plans for very rapid mobilization and reinforcement of massive forces are losing their purpose:
  - All of the planning factors predicated in the "classic" short-warning Soviet threat that drive reserves, stocks, air and sea lift, etc. are coming increasingly into question.
  - This has particular relevance for US plans for rapid large-scale reinforcement in Europe ("10 divisions in 10 days").
- o Events over the next few months will bring the structural changes and their implications for NATO and the US into even sharper focus in US and Allied opinion ("who is the enemy and what are NATO and US forces for").
  - A CFE agreement possibly by June, which will sharpen the immediate question of what comes next in national force decisions or arms control, conventional and S
  - The March 18 GDR vote and the 2+4 process which will sharpen attention on troop levels in Germany and NATO and Germany's place in it -- and in fact turn political opinion even more towards managing the potential impact of German unification on security and stability than countering the Soviet threat.
  - The wave of East European elections and agreements and Soviet withdrawals which will mark the de facto if not de jure end of the Warsaw Pact.
  - The June US-Soviet Summit which will be regarded as watershed in US-Soviet relations, beginning with the "political" completion of START.
  - A possible autumn CSCE Summit to sign CFE and "bless" arrangements for German unification, which will be widely regarded as the final step in ending the post-war order in Europe.

### III. Adapting to Change: Objectives and Criteria

- o In sum, we need to begin now -- in the Alliance and publicly -- to adapt NATO and the US role in Europe to the new circumstances in order to maintain their credibility in the new developments, and provide a framework for the specific issues we face.



- o The first principle must be that the pace and direction of this adaptation cannot run ahead of developments and must be keyed to the uncertainties in the transition underway.
- The Soviet Union is a massive power in the throes of high stress change in its internal system and external environment. Developments over which we have little control can drive Soviet policy and military and arms control posture in unpredictable directions. We are not doomed to relive history. But change on this scale in other empires and epochs typically brought a "time of troubles."
- A unified Germany is not fated to repeat its history yet again, and the odds are against this. But there are still substantial uncertainties about the terms of German unification and its place in Europe. And however confident we may be that an 80-million-strong Germany will not lapse into political and territorial "irredentism," neither we nor certainly Germany's neighbors can take this for granted given the costs of miscalculation.
- Eastern Europe is well on its way to democracy and independence. Yet we cannot dismiss the possibility of a return to the politics of the inter-war years marked by internal instability and minority and border struggles, with openings, if not invitations, for the involvement of outside powers.
- o That said, what objectives and criteria should govern in adapting NATO and the US role in Europe?
- o First, the basic mission of NATO remains valid: to preclude the use or threat of force as an option against any of its members by maintaining effective integrated defenses.
  - NATO nations have a basic interest in preventing military imbalances that would leave them vulnerable to coercion and dependent on the forbearance of the stronger when differences arise, even when the nature of the differences and the threat may not be precisely predictable.
  - NATO should remain an essential "all-hazards insurance policy" for its members vis-a-vis not only the USSR, but also the instability and unpredictability inherent in the change under way, including -- though it cannot be said -- a powerful Germany that does not act as we expect.

- o Second, counterbalancing Soviet military power must remain a central purpose of NATO.

- Even assuming CFE and total withdrawal from Eastern Europe, the USSR will remain by far the major military power in Europe.
- It will retain strategic and theater nuclear capabilities that equal those of the US and dwarf those of the UK and France, alone or in combination.
- It will retain the capability to generate and project massive conventional forces westward from its territory albeit not as quickly as now.
- No single European state or European compact can provide the counterweight to this power that NATO does.
- NATO cannot disarm and rely for its security on Soviet goodwill and forbearance in the use of this military power, even assuming the most positive developments in the USSR and its foreign policy.
- If developments continue as we wish and we expect, NATO will not require the forces it does today. But it will under any circumstances require the capability to maintain a balance against Soviet forces in being and mobilizable to keep the door closed on military options.
- The incorporation of the Soviet Union in any European structure that meets its security needs without threatening others will depend on this.

Third, the durable engagement of the US in Europe, including a significant military presence, will remain vital to our interests and the whole of Europe, and NATO is the essential framework for the US role.

- The success of containment does not end the rationale for US engagement in Europe. The US fought two world wars in Europe before containment and the vital purpose in all three efforts will remain valid after containment:
- That is, to assure a stable European balance and structure that is supportive of our own well-being and security and poses no overbearing threat to it.



- This will continue to require preventing any concentration of power over the huge resources of the continent that might isolate us and impel us to become a fortress/garrison state to balance it. It will continue to require promoting pluralism, peace, and prosperity in Europe as the first line of defense against this and the conditions most supportive of our own well-being and security.
- The US plays a unique and irreplaceable role in Europe to these ends.
  - Only the US can insure against nuclear intimidation and its weight is essential in offsetting Soviet power in any form on the continent.
  - Its weight is an essential guard against the reemergence of dangerous divisions in Europe and --though again it cannot be said -- a resurgence of German power and nationalism.
  - US power is unique in Europe, not only because of its scale, but also because it is directed at a vital interest that coincides with Europe's own --and especially the smaller states, East as well as West -- and because it does not threaten hegemony bounded as it is by our own values and by geography itself.
- The US role will not be effective and credible in Europe nor politically sustainable here without the direct and significant participation of the US in the defenses and in the decisions of the continent.
- NATO with a substantial US military presence embedded in its integrated defense system is the essential vehicle for this participation. NATO's historic achievement has been to cement American engagement at a European power against our tradition of isolationism.
- If US forces were reduced to token levels (i.e., were no longer a significant element of the balance of forces in being in Europe to the Urals), then neither NATO and its integrated defense system nor the US role in Europe could be sustained.

- If NATO's importance as a central mechanism for the security of its members and Europe as a whole declined, so would political support in this country for the continuing engagement of the US in Europe, starting with its troop presence.
  - No pan-European structure can replace NATO as an effective vehicle and rationale for this. If the US is in Europe only as one of 34, that fact will diffuse its weight and diminish the sense of American responsibility and commitment to European security.
  - Without the rationale of participation in a vital and viable NATO, pressures will build for a reduced US role that is tantamount to a modern form of traditional American isolationism.
- o Fourth, NATO will remain an essential guard against a return to an unstable system of individual defense and shifting alliances, and an essential component of any broader European security structure.
- Throughout the history of the European state system, nations looked to their own strength and ad hoc alliances for their security. Twice in this century the nationalism and isolation, uncertainty and tensions, miscalculation and imbalances this system can foster made Europe the seedground of world war.
  - NATO broke with history to create a durable system of national security through collective defense that both built on and promoted common values and political purposes among its members.
  - The unparalleled 40 years of cooperation without conflict among the states of Western Europe -- including a stable German state and the EC itself -- ranks with the engagement of the US in Europe and the containment of Soviet power as a great NATO success from which the whole of Europe has benefitted.
  - No alternative structure -- be it pan-European or Western European -- can replace NATO's 40-year role in assuring these achievements.
  - The decline of the "classic" Soviet threat and the Warsaw Pact is now generating notions of pan-European security structures into which NATO might also be dissolved with its mission accomplished.



- Yet no such collection of 34 individual nations can provide the assured counterweight to Soviet power, or to any other threat to the continent's security, that NATO does.
- Without the cohesive weight of NATO any such structure of 34 individual nations operating by "consensus" with their different situations and outlooks, will be prone, as similar structures always have been, to relapse into individual defense and ad hoc alliances and foster a resurgence of nationalism. German unification and the reemergence of independent Eastern European states are ready-made motors for just such a relapse and resurgence.
- Nor for that matter can any foreseeable form of Western European defense arrangement play NATO's role. None of its potential members have seen enough in any such arrangement to move very far toward it. It will be even less attractive now when the problem of managing German power in any such European-compact is compounded by German unification.
- In sum, NATO may not be the sole answer to the problem of European security in the new circumstances. But there can be no real and durable European security architecture for use or for Europe as a whole without NATO for as far ahead as we can see.
- o Fifth, NATO has a clear interest and role in the security and stability of Eastern Europe and in the development of broader European arrangements that would enhance it.
  - The shape of things in Eastern Europe can materially affect the security of NATO and the continent as a whole. We have seen that twice in this century. It takes on renewed relevance now with the stresses inherent in the transition underway there and the risk of resurgence of past unstabilities and conflicts.
  - Moreover, NATO with its democratic values cannot be insensitive to the security needs of the newly democratic and independent states of the region.
  - Nor can the way be opened for the USSR to metamorphose into the champions and protectors of the region, playing particularly on the German question, without creating a new basis for Soviet hegemonic power there.

- The Eastern Europeans want and need protection and insurance against a resurgent Germany, a recidivist Soviet Union; and divisions among themselves.
  - NATO was a critical factor in the rollback of Soviet power from Eastern Europe and will remain an important part of an environment that supports the evolution of the Eastern Europeans into fully independent international actors. NATO with full US engagement is the only sure framework for the management and moderation of German power.
  - That said, NATO cannot in any overt sense extend its security umbrella over Eastern Europe -- let alone have Eastern European states join it -- without frontally challenging the Soviets. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact does not end all Soviet security interests in a region on their borders which has been the path way and launch-pad for threats East as well as West. It is one thing to lose the glacis -- it is another to see it allied to or under the direct protection of others.
  - NATO can do more to meet its interests and Eastern European security concerns only through broader European arrangements such as CSCE and CFE and CSBMs.
  - The CFE/CSBM system of ceilings and constraints in fact provides Eastern Europe with security assurances rooted in international treaties. The fact that the NATO powers are party to these agreements with a direct interest in their observance gives the Eastern Europeans assurance against their violation they would not otherwise have.
  - The design of CSCE and post-CFE arms control will be major mechanisms for establishing a structure in Eastern Europe that meets NATO's interests and the Eastern Europeans security needs.
- o Sixth, NATO will remain essential to any prospects of integrating the Soviet Union into a broader European structure that meets its legitimate security interests without threatening others.
- This is the direction of any longer-term solution to the problem of managing and moderating the Soviet "threat" in any form.
  - That said, the Soviet Union's continental position and size give it the potential for overbearing weight in any such structure unless balanced by NATO.



IV. Adapting to Change: NATO Strategy and Force Posture

- What are the guidelines for change and continuity in reshaping NATO strategy and force posture to achieve NATO's purposes in the new circumstances?
- The key assumptions which apply most directly to NATO strategy and force posture in the new security environment include the following:
  - Soviet forces will withdraw in stages from Eastern Europe, and Soviet ground and tactical air forces west of the Urals will be limited by a CFE agreement.
  - The Warsaw Pact is ended.
  - An attack against Central Europe would begin from the borders of the USSR, not the GDR. Strategic warning will increase, but the potential for operational surprise remains.
  - Europe's theater nuclear posture will be different.
  - Germany will be reunited.
  - The CFE/CSBM structure of ceilings, monitoring, and notification promises to provide a fundamental correction in the balance and threat of attack and a major brake against reversal.
- The elements of continuity in the security environment include:
  - Soviet armed forces -- restructured and modernized -- still constitute the largest military force on the European continent (and the principal nuclear threat).
  - Soviet leadership will insist on playing a key role in future European security arrangements. The Kremlin does not want military retrenchment to lead to political disengagement from Europe.
  - Threats on NATO's flanks may change but will not diminish.
  - Sea lines of communication will remain vital linking the U.S. and Canada to Europe and European trade to the world.

- If U.S. policy succeeds, a reunited Germany will remain (in some form) in NATO's military command, and will support stationing of allied troops (in some form) on its territory.
- The Soviet threat to NATO prior to the changes initiated over the past year and a half consisted of:
  - A nuclear threat posed by a large, diversified nuclear force capable of operations across a wide range of missions, contingencies, and targets.
  - A conventional threat posed by a large, armor-heavy force with supporting tacair, forward-deployed on NATO's borders, backed by a substantial mobilization posture, and premised upon integrated Warsaw Pact operations in case of war.
    - In the Western Theater of Military Operations (TVD) opposite the NATO Central Region, the Soviet threat was focused on early initiation of a deep, strategic offensive operation featuring surprise, preemption, and seizing the initiative through rapid, offensive action.
    - Soviet planners preferred to prepare for an attack involving five to six fronts with four fronts in the first strategic echelon, but also planned for a three-front attack in the first strategic echelon if necessary.
- In the late 1980s, the Soviet threat to NATO began a transition which still is underway.
  - The nuclear threat to NATO during this transition remains much the same as before.
    - At the strategic nuclear level, the Soviets are modernizing their forces across the board. Even in a post-START environment, the Soviets are expected to have sufficient nuclear weapons to meet essentially the same targeting requirements as they would have had without START, and to continue to compensate for nuclear weapons given up in INF. Strategic nuclear forces have not been adjusted to a posture of defensive sufficiency.
    - Soviet assessments of their capability to defend their western borders against attack by aircraft and cruise missiles will have to adjust to the loss of the the air defense network they traditionally maintained in Eastern Europe, as Soviet forces withdraw from Eastern Europe.
    - Also, Soviet short range nuclear forces will withdraw from Eastern Europe. Unless the Soviets achieve their goal of negotiating reductions in SNF, the pace of their SNF withdrawal will likely be linked to the pace of conventional withdrawals.



- - The conventional threat to NATO during the transition is characterized by reductions and restructuring of Soviet forces toward a more balanced armor-mechanized posture, by monitored destruction of large numbers of tanks and other treaty-limited equipment in accordance with CFE, by modernization of Soviet forces (within budget constraints), by withdrawal from Eastern Europe to within the Soviet borders (which themselves may be redrafted on the map if constituent republics are allowed to secede or alter their relationship with Moscow), and possibly by movement away from a conscript army.
- - - Despite the positive signs of change in the East, a great deal of uncertainty and unpredictability accompany the transition. Today the Soviets remain a formidable force in the European balance. Over 110 Soviet divisions still are earmarked for operations in Europe. These can be reinforced by moving divisions from East Asia. In the Transcaucasus (not far from Turkey's eastern border) the Soviets have introduced additional forces in response to civil disorder. In the Northwestern TVD, the Soviets have continued to build up combat power so that they vastly outnumber any NATO forces currently deployed in or earmarked for Norway. While warning time for NATO has improved in the Central Region, it remains possible for the Soviets to move rapidly against either flank.
- - - However, the Soviets cannot count on integrated Warsaw Pact operations, and as the 30 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe withdraw in stages to the Soviet borders, the nature of the Soviet threat to Central Europe will assume a fundamentally different character.
- Once the Soviets have withdrawn to within their own borders the outlines of the Soviet threat are less clear, but may have the following characteristics:
  - - At a nuclear level, the Soviet Union will retain the capacity to destroy Eurasian and North American societies within a matter of minutes, if they choose to initiate large-scale nuclear war.
  - - - Reductions of strategic nuclear forces deeper than called for in START will not remove this capacity.
  - - - However, the Soviets may find that nuclear weapons are less capable of intimidating nations which have adjusted to a new vision of superpower stability and limitations.

- - - And the Soviets will find their task of planning for the air defense of their western borders more difficult, without the defensive depth formerly provided by the Warsaw Pact.
- At a conventional level, the eventual posture and employment plans of Soviet conventional forces are unclear.
  - - - The size of the ground forces and supporting air will be smaller. Reductions by 50%, a real possibility, would result in a ground force of slightly less than 100 divisions within Soviet borders, some 50 of which are west of the Urals. The major concentration of Soviet conventional forces may be opposite the Polish border, with the posture of those forces determined by the outcome of debates already underway within the Soviet Union on such questions as short war/long war, offense/defense, levels of readiness, pace of modernization, and so forth.
  - - - The future role of the Soviet ground forces in maintaining internal order also is unclear, as is the extent to which the Soviet mobilization base will be sustained.
- NATO's purposes during the transition to the new European security environment include:
  - Countering Soviet power.
    - - - Deterring conventional or nuclear attack or intimidation.
    - - - Sustaining a military balance on the continent.
    - - - Insuring that the Soviets complete their withdrawal from Eastern Europe.
    - - - If the Soviets initiate hostilities against NATO, providing the initial stabilizing force that can hold in the FRG against conventional attack and then drive Soviet forces from the former GDR.
    - - - Defense on the flanks.
    - - - Assuring that NATO will not, at any stage, be at a disadvantage in a mobilization race.



- - Maintaining stability.
  - - - Demonstrating that nations are pursuing defense requirements collectively rather than individually.
  - - - Providing consultative crisis management mechanisms and a collective military presence to help resolve regional tensions and crises and dampen ethnic or territorial instabilities in Europe.
  - - - Facilitating participation by NATO allies in larger peace-keeping operations in the European theater, if future European security arrangements would accommodate such contributions.
  - - - Underwriting an environment in which Germany's legitimate aspirations for sovereignty are reconciled with Europe's legitimate aspirations for security.
  - - - Serving as a guarantor of CSCE and of arms control limitations in Europe.
- NATO's purposes after the Soviets leave Eastern Europe are similar to those during the transition period. The two fundamental purposes (countering Soviet power and maintaining stability) remain constant. The differences between the two periods, however, adds the following purpose.
  - - Raise the risks inherent in a Soviet decision to attempt armed reentry into former Warsaw Pact states.
- The general requirements for NATO which derive from the above are:
  - - Appropriately sized, organized, equipped, and deployed military forces, with plans and infrastructure for mobilization and reinforcement.
    - - - Although not a requirement, it is worth noting at this point that a reduction in NATO forces by 50% (an assumption chosen to match the level of anticipated Soviet reductions) would result in a standing NATO ground force of 30-40 divisions, half of which would be Greek and Turk. Central Zone forces, using this calculation, would be 15-20 divisions. Force sizing decisions within NATO would be driven by the politics of defense budgets as well as a maturing understanding of requirements.
  - - A functioning, integrated military structure. If NATO allows this structure to erode through neglect -- or if the structure is disbanded -- the benefits of increased warning time will not be realized. NATO cannot wait until a crisis to rebuild the processes of military cooperation.

- A rough military balance within the Alliance itself, reflecting shared responsibilities, underwriting collective defense, and enhancing stability.
- A theater nuclear force posture with nuclear weapons (likely on dual-capable aircraft) deployed in as many countries as possible, and linked to strategic nuclear forces.
- Institutional arrangements adjusted to support planning for and executing NATO's stability role in the new security environment.
- Within this framework, the rationale for U.S. forces in Europe includes:
  - The European alliance cannot be confident that it can defend against Soviet threats alone, without a U.S. military commitment to and presence in Europe.
  - Europeans want a U.S. military presence for stability.
  - U.S. ground forces provide a link to extended deterrence.
  - The U.S. military presence in Europe contributes to:
    - An American voice in the shaping of European political, security, and economic policies.
    - Continued European commitment to multilateral defense structures
- The general requirements for U.S. forces in Europe are:
  - Forward deployed forces for presence and for day-to-day military contingencies.
  - Surge capabilities for responding to the reemergence of a major Soviet ground threat to Central Europe.
  - Theater nuclear forces less dependent upon ground systems.
  - Maritime forces to protect the sea lines of communication and to augment theater nuclear assets.
  - Forces for specialized missions, such as guarding and maintaining U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons which remain on European soil, for intelligence, for communications, for monitoring arms control agreements, and so forth.
  - U.S. membership in integrated military staffs, which has been -- and should continue to be -- the glue holding the alliance together for military planning and other essential staff activities.



- The U.S. contribution to NATO's force posture emerges from these patterns of requirements. Any changes to strategy and force posture should be accomplished as the level and nature of the threat draws down which will happen by phases.
  - The first phase is the one currently underway -- the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, concluding and implementing CFE, restructuring the theater nuclear balance, reunifying Germany, and reshaping European security arrangements -- with all the uncertain changes which accompany these processes.
    - - - The size of NATO and U.S. forces required during this phase obviously bears a relationship to the size of Soviet forces, discussed earlier.
    - - - During this phase, an American force presence in Europe should be on the order of a robust corps with the necessary tacair, logistical, C3I, headquarters, and other military support necessary to contribute to effective execution of the strategy of forward defense and flexible response.
    - - - Also during this phase, a large and robust reception base for reinforcing Europe quickly must be sustained.
    - - - The size of U.S. forces in Central Europe during this phase should hold at a ceiling of 195,000 (the CFE entitlement), although evolving circumstances may arise which permit actual U.S. presence to go below that number.
  - The second phase is reached when the Soviets have withdrawn within their borders and when circumstances have stabilized -- when the Alliance is able to view clearly the nature of the threat posed by the new Soviet force posture, when Germany's legitimate desire to regain its sovereignty has been reconciled with the legitimate security concerns of others, and when arms control arrangements are in-place and working.
    - - - Under these circumstances, the generic concepts of forward defense and flexible response are likely to remain viable concepts, but the war plans and force posture to execute NATO's strategy could be modified.
    - - - As in the first phase, the size of U.S. forces required bears a relationship to the threat. As discussed earlier in the paper, Soviet ground forces will be withdrawn within the Soviet borders, and are assumed to be sized at slightly less than 100 divisions, some 50 of which are west of the Urals.

- - - NATO and U.S. forces will be smaller. U.S. forces in Europe may be on the order of a corps and supporting tacair, with 100,000 - 150,000 personnel.
  - - - A supported corps appears to be the minimum U.S. force presence that is militarily significant.
  - - - There is some U.S. force level below which U.S. influence in NATO planning will be seriously degraded. This force level will, of course, be relative to that of the NATO allies. If the NATO allies reduce their force levels by 50%, a U.S. force no lower than 100,000 appears to be reasonable for retaining desired U.S. influence.
  - - In both phases, certain additional guidelines apply. The Alliance must plan to exercise its forces; they cannot merely sit in barracks, in casernes, or on airfields. Alliance members must strive for collective support, for enhancing interoperability, and for maintaining mechanisms to do such things as share intelligence, plan for military contingencies, and reconcile national armaments programs to the common tasks.
  - Two areas require further study before incorporating them into guidelines for change and continuity in NATO's future
    - - Multinational Units: Should multinational units (possibly up to corps level) become a central element of NATO in a new European security structure?
    - - Security Operations Outside the ATTU: Should cooperation in security operations outside the ATTU be pursued by NATO in a new European security structure?
- V. Adapting to Change: NATO Arms Control Policy
- o NATO's arms control policies on conventional forces and SNF must be integrated with Alliance force planning in moving toward a new posture.
  - o What are the guidelines for continuity and change in shaping NATO's arms control policies post-CFE?



VI. The Vehicle

- o The vehicle for beginning the process of adaptation should be a NATO policy declaration issued at the June NAC Ministerial.
  - The declaration would be developed with the NAC by special representatives from capitals.
  - We would initiate this process with a Presidential letter attaching an American draft vetted privately beforehand in the Quad.
- o The declaration need not and should not be long or detailed. It should be basic policy guidance with specifics to be developed by the relevant Alliance groups in the months after the Ministerial. Its main purposes are to:
  - show the Alliance responding to change and alive and well as a central mechanism;
  - create a policy framework and process to hold the Allies together and impede unilateral decisions.
- o The main elements of the declaration would include:
  - Acknowledgement/assessment of the changes since the June 1989 NATO Summit and in the offing.
  - Statement that the fundamental role of NATO and the US in European security and stability will remain valid.
  - Recognition that the Alliance's political mission and strategy and force posture must be adapted to change, with an outline of the basic concepts to be developed within the Alliance.
  - Common commitment to maintain defense efforts and coordinate any changes within the Alliance process.
  - Alliance general approach on post-CFE conventional arms control objectives and processes.
  - Alliance general approach on SNF including national decisions and arms control objectives and processes.

- o The main German unification questions of direct concern to the Alliance -- Germany's place in NATO, NATO forces in Germany, the Alliance treatment of Eastern German territory -- will need to be referred to in the NATO declaration, but not worked in that document or process.
- o A separate, faster consultative track in the Alliance on these questions will be required, keyed to the timing of the 2+4 process.
  - That track could be focussed on development of an Alliance consensus statement (with prior coordination in the Quad) that would serve as a platform for Allied participants in the 2+4 before any meeting at Ministerial level.



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 21, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW  
PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ROBERT ZOELICK  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

*φ*  
*Gates group*

As agreed, I attach for your comment a suggested compilation of issues for discussion and decision by the Gates group and/or our Principals.

Please call me by COB March 21 with your comments. I will then circulate the final version of this document to the Gates group.

As Bob Gates stressed at the last meeting, this extremely sensitive material should not be passed to anyone outside of the Gates group.

1986

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White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By cap NARA, Date 5/4/11

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March 21, 1990

Future Agenda of European Strategy Steering Group

ISSUES FOR DECISION

(1) SNF

- What should we do about FOTL (cancel it outright ourselves; let Congress kill it; put it on life support; fight to keep it in the budget)?
- Should we announce a decision on FOTL in the context of a larger SNF initiative or deal with it separately?
- What should be the timing of the FOTL/SNF moves? Timing of action in the Congress on FOTL? Relationship to Secretary Cheney's activities at the NPG (May 9-11)
  - what should Secretary Cheney say about the future of US nuclear forces in Europe? Relationship to possible Soviet denuclearization initiative in Two Plus Four? Relationship to US-Soviet Summit? To 1990 FRG elections?
- Substance of SNF initiative: what will be reduced to what level, area of application, etc.
- What commitments, if any, should we try to get from the Allies about continued stationing of US air-delivered nuclear forces in Europe?
- Should the President use his meetings with Thatcher (April 13) and Mitterrand (April 19) to discuss a possible US move on FOTL and/or on an SNF initiative?
- What consultation with Allies or SACEUR will be needed prior to announcement of US decision on FOTL or SNF initiative?

(2) Conventional Defense and Arms Control

- What should be said at the DPC (May 22-23) regarding the US view of the conventional defense of Europe in the post-CFE environment, including implications for NATO strategy and force requirements?
- How can the DPC best promote the maintenance of substantial US forces in Europe and back continued full membership of a united Germany in NATO?
- Specific ideas for DPC: Reduction of NATO exercises in Europe? (With what justification? To what end?) Drop goal of 3% increase in defense spending (and replace it with...)? How should CFE reductions be taken (relationship to post-CFE NATO defense of Europe)? Change NATO spare parts requirements? (How much? To what end?) Multinational forces in Germany and/or



elsewhere in NATO? What overall geopolitical rationale should be used by US/NATO to explain these moves at the DPC?

- Should the US accept the Soviet position on manpower limits in the Central Region in the current CFE negotiations, including indirect limits on the Bundeswehr?
- If not, what kind of US/NATO position -- and at what level of detail -- will be needed to address Soviet and Polish concerns about the size of the Bundeswehr in the Two Plus Four forum?
- Should there be follow-on conventional arms control negotiations immediately after signature of a CFE treaty among the 23, using the current CFE mandate? If not, then when? Relationship to the 1990 FRG election?
- Are we prepared to support negotiation of a new mandate for conventional arms control talks, including as an alternative to immediate follow-on conventional arms control talks under the current CFE mandate? If so, what should be the substance of this new mandate? When should those mandate talks begin?
- Should the current CSBM negotiation be brought to an end when the CFE treaty is signed? If so, when and how? If not, what should be the future purpose of these talks?
- What should be the substance of our approach to post-CFE conventional arms control and what should be its relationship to post-CFE NATO strategy and force requirements?
- How should we integrate our planning for the future of conventional arms control into the agenda for the US-Soviet Ministerial in May, the possible meeting of NATO and Warsaw Pact Ministers in Budapest in mid-May, the NAC Ministerial (June 8-10), or the US-Soviet Summit? NATO Summit?
- When should we be prepared to make public the substance of a post-CFE NATO conventional arms control proposal?

(3) NATO Strategy Review

- Is a high-visibility NATO Strategy Review necessary or desirable?
- If so, when would such a Review be commissioned, and what would be the occasion for endorsement of its conclusions by the Alliance? What would be the relationship to the DPC and the NAC? A NATO Summit?
- Who would conduct the Review? Can we effectively control the conclusions? How would such a process affect the 1990 FRG election?
- What should be the Review's conclusions?
- What new US initiatives in this Review would infuse

NATO with a larger political role?

(4) Future of CSCE

- When should the US, or NATO, be prepared to publicize its goals for a CSCE Summit?
- How can we minimize the involvement of the CSCE Summit in the process of German unification? Should the Two Plus Four have concluded their work by the time of the CSCE Summit? How would various CSCE Summit results affect the outcome of the 1990 FRG election?
- Should the CSCE Summit issue a concluding document that calls for new activities or institutionalization by the CSCE? If so, which new activities or steps toward institutionalization would be acceptable to the US?
- Can we go on strengthening the CSCE without eventually undermining our attempts to increase the political role of NATO or even endangering NATO itself? Are there tradeoffs?
- Should the US itself develop a new CSCE institutionalization initiative(s), beyond the free elections ~~and economic principles ideas~~, for the CSCE Summit to parry (a) other institutionalization ideas, and (b) collective security proposals? If so, when would such an initiative(s) be deployed -- Copenhagen (early June), at the NAC, or later?
- How, where, and when should the US engage in preparatory meetings among the 35 for the CSCE Summit? What is the relationship between such preparatory meetings and US leverage to maintain the requirement that a CFE treaty be signed at the CSCE Summit?



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 22, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW  
PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH  
RICHARD KERR  
ROBERT ZOELICK  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
DENNIS ROSS  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL

*RB*

*d. Galt*  
*Long*

I attach for discussion at 4:00 p.m. on March 23 a revised compilation of issues for discussion and decision by the Gates group and/or our Principals.

Bob Gates will circulate at his meeting for comment a suggested work program and timeline which would allow our Principals to make the required decisions on these issues, in sequence, by the first week of May.

As Bob stressed at the last meeting, this extremely sensitive material should not be passed to anyone outside of the Gates group.

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 5/4/11

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March 22, 1990

Future Agenda of European Strategy Steering Group

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(1) SNF

- What are the future roles and missions of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe?
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1/16/2014 MM



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3

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**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY**

*Bob Blackwill*

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY BARTHOLOMEW  
LTG GRAVES  
COUNSELOR ZOELICK  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLARKE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY SEITZ  
MR. KANTER

*1:30*

*MAN 23*

FROM: STEVE HADLEY  
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-ON CFE NEGOTIATIONS

Paul Wolfowitz asked us to distribute the attached draft on CFE-II options. It is very much a work still in progress but would benefit greatly from your comments. We understand that it will be the subject for Monday's meeting.

*Gates Comp*

*cc: Z/E,  
return RB*

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

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| 05. Paper                | Re: Options for CFE-II (15 pp.) | 3/23/90 | (b)(1)      | S      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files

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**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** [European Strategy Steering Group] (ESSG) Meetings 3-6/89

**Date Closed:** 5/5/2011 **OA/ID Number:** CF00182-001

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**Re-review Case #:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

**Appeal Case #:**

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]  
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]  
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]  
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 22, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW  
PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH  
RICHARD KERR  
ROBERT ZOELICK  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
DENNIS ROSS  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL

*RB*

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 5/4/11

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7/19/2013 JAM

March 22, 1990

Future Agenda of European Strategy Steering Group

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 28, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW  
PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ROBERT ZOELICK  
DENNIS ROSS  
RICHARD CLARKE  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES  
JAMES DOBBINS

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Meeting of the NATO Strategy Review subgroup of  
the European Strategy Steering Group on Thursday,  
March 29, at 10:00 a.m.

I attach a paper for discussion at the above-mentioned meeting.  
The meeting will be at the White House Situation Room. Under  
Secretary Bartholomew will be in the chair.

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 5/4/11

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Declassify on: OADR

NATO Strategy Review

Purpose

NATO's strategy has stood the test of time. For forty years it has safeguarded the liberty of the West and ensured peace and stability in Europe. The changes underway in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, particularly German unification and the de facto demise of the Warsaw Pact, are in important respects the direct result of NATO's success. At the same time, they clearly represent such a major change in the European security environment that they require a substantial revision of some of NATO's established doctrine. Some of our Allies, and NATO Secretary General Woerner himself, argue for a review of the Alliance's political-military strategy as a way of demonstrating NATO's adaptability to new European realities.

If we accept that premise, the U.S. should approach an Alliance review as a positive opportunity, allowing us to integrate our arms control and military objectives into a broader political framework. In that way we can ensure NATO will be (and will be seen to be) relevant to the security concerns of the 1990s and beyond. This paper looks at some of the key questions associated with such a review.

Timing

From one perspective, it might appear best to delay a strategy review as long as possible so as not to interfere with the rapid conclusion of a CFE agreement, the unification process, or the December 1990 FRG elections. However, if we do not take the initiative to get such a review underway soon, we risk losing control over its pace and perhaps its substance. This is particularly true if we find it necessary to reopen the Comprehensive Concept's compromise on SNF modernization and arms control. In that event, it would be important to have the overall approach to Alliance strategy under active consideration to guide formation of the negotiating mandate.

One possibility would be for the President to issue a statement toward the end of April putting forward our basic approach to SNF arms control and proposing a review of NATO strategy to be completed by the Spring of 1991. The conclusions reached could then be endorsed at the 1991 Spring NAC or, alternatively, at a 1991 NATO summit. The latter would strengthen the impact of the review on NATO publics and provide an occasion for reaffirming the role of the Alliance in managing issues of critical importance to European security.



This timeframe would straddle the December German elections, enhancing the German public's perception of NATO and strengthening Kohl's chances for reelection.

An alternative approach would be to try to get a "new strategy" agreed by the spring, and announced at the June NAC (or a June Summit) in a relatively brief statement.

We would have to precede either approach with quiet bilateral -- and perhaps quadrilateral -- consultations with the FRG, UK and France. It would also make sense, and make the process go more smoothly, if we discussed the idea in advance with SYG Woerner.

#### Scope and Modalities

A review of Alliance strategy could be either narrowly or broadly conceived. It could restrict itself to purely military strategy, or consider the Alliance's security posture as a whole. Given our recent emphasis on the fundamentally political nature of NATO, it would seem best to embed a review of military strategy in a reexamination of the overall political purposes of the Alliance.

We could engage in such a strategy review in basically two ways:

- through existing NATO structures (the NAC, the Military Committee reporting to the DPC, etc.);
- or, through a "Wise Men's Group" or "Harmel II" approach.

In the latter, governments would appoint officials or prestigious former officials to conduct the review (as with the 1967 Harmel report on the future of the Alliance).

Both approaches have advantages and drawbacks. Working through existing structures would maximize our control over the process and reinforce the status and relevance of the structures themselves. We would probably pay a price, however, of less creativity, credibility and impact than would emanate from a special higher-level group. The "Wise Men" approach would enhance the prospect of innovative thinking and public impact but would risk a more unpredictable outcome.

One possible compromise would be to conduct the review through a series of reinforced NAC meetings (perhaps also reinforced DPC and MC meetings) that would allow for direct, high-level input from capitals while preserving the advantages of working through established Alliance structures.

Substance

From our perspective a review of NATO strategy must:

- reaffirm the importance of maintaining a collective defense structure for Europe and the U.S.;
- draw the connection between a U.S. presence in Europe and stability, reaffirming the need for U.S. forces on the ground in Europe;
- emphasize NATO's role in preserving and promoting freedom in Europe, and in providing the stability that allows integration in the West, German unification, and democratization in the East to go forward peacefully; and
- point out the flexibility and dynamism of NATO in meeting the new political and security challenges posed by a Europe in transition.

In both the political and military dimensions, we should differentiate between those elements of NATO strategy we want to reaffirm and the new elements we want to add to the Alliance repertoire.

In our input to the review of the political framework surrounding Alliance strategy we should reaffirm NATO's mission to:

- offset Soviet political and military power;
- provide for a broad equilibrium in Europe -- among the Western allies as well as between East and West;
- maintain and reinforce Western solidarity on the basis of common security, allowing further progress along the path to European integration;
- serve as the vehicle for continued American engagement in Europe;



- be a forum for the West to manage change in Europe; and
- deal with the security challenges posed by the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

We could also suggest major new political tasks for NATO:

- help to provide the impetus and intellectual content for a broader European security structure -- including the East European states -- in which NATO would remain a major constituent element;
- take the lead in developing more institutionalized and effective cooperation with other European institutions, including the EC and the WEU.

Both of these tasks could enhance European security cooperation and thus move toward a more genuine two-pillar foundation for transatlantic security.

On the military side, we should stress the continuity of NATO's fundamental mission to balance Soviet military power, actual and potential, with credible defensive force. This would mean that:

- NATO's strategy of deterring war will continue to rest on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces;
- the commitment of U.S. nuclear and conventional forces will be necessary for a credible deterrent, and to establish a clear linkage between American power and European security (extended deterrence).

We should also preserve military essentials of the Alliance such as the maintenance of the multinational defense structure and military commands.

At the same time, we will have to reinterpret and probably find new terms for the concepts of flexible response and forward defense. In the context of CFE reductions and a likely complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and the much greater warning time we would have of a major Soviet aggression, we should consider moving toward a doctrine of "insurance." Rather than striving for the capability of mounting a large-scale, short-warning defense, such a doctrine would rely on strategies that stress:

- a mobile force-in-being capable of responding swiftly to any limited Soviet aggression; and
- a viable collective security structure able to provide adequate intelligence and warning time for reconstitution of NATO forces in response to a renewal of a more substantial Soviet threat.

These new strategies would imply:

- a reduced reliance on ground-launched nuclear weapons but a continuing requirement for some U.S. nuclear forces in Europe;
- a reaffirmed emphasis on shared risks and responsibilities in maintaining nuclear deterrence;
- the possibility of some expanded role for UK and French nuclear forces.

Possible U.S. Initiatives

We could enhance the impact and effectiveness of a NATO strategy review with initiatives in the arms control and security area. Some possible examples, based on a reevaluation of U.S. policies complementary to a NATO review, follow:

- o Arms control and confidence-building measures designed to eliminate U.S. and Soviet ground-launched nuclear missiles and nuclear artillery from Europe.
- o CSCE-style proposals to increase openness and exchange of information on military activities.
- o Initiatives to more closely coordinate the political and security dialogue within the NATO/WEU/EC context.
- o Initiatives on training and exercises, e.g., low-level flying, Wintex-Cimex, showing our willingness to adjust our readiness standards in light of the new political-military situation in Europe.
- o Support European development of multinational forces at battalion or lower levels. In some limited areas the U.S. might also move toward greater multilateralization, as we already have in manning NATO's AWACs fleet.



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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 5, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW

PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH  
RICHARD KERR  
RON LEHMAN  
ROBERT ZOELICK  
DENNIS ROSS  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES  
JOHN McLAUGHLIN

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on  
Friday, April 6, at 5:30 p.m.

As promised, I attach for review by the European Strategy Steering Group a draft outline for a late April Presidential speech on NATO and European security. As you will see, this draft draws heavily on Reg Bartholomew's "substantive framework" and takes into account the conversation on this subject among Principals on April 4.

As in the past, I ask that you only discuss this paper with other participants in the Steering Group.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 5/4/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Declassify on: OADR

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April 5, 1990

Outline for Presidential Speech on  
the Future of NATO Strategy and  
European Security

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2000-0233-F/4  
7/19/2013 MM

Introduction

- Wish to speak to you about the revolutionary changes which are transforming Europe, renewing the Old World, and about what these changes mean for the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance of which we are a part.
- Having consulted with my NATO colleagues, I will describe my views about the opportunity the Alliance now has to build upon its historic success over the last forty years. I propose a NATO Summit meeting in June, in Brussels, the purpose of which should be to provide direction for a broad review of the Alliance's political and military strategies for the future. I also will discuss today what the significance of these changes for the future of our military forces, including my decision concerning new nuclear missiles for deployment in Europe.

**I. Changes Transforming Europe**

A. The Age of Freedom

- Revolutions of 1989: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany - Berlin Wall; emerging realization of 'a Europe whole and free'
- welcome the prospect of Germany finally unified in peace and freedom
- an age of uncertainty and hope, turbulent adjustments to massive social, political, and economic change -- fears and anxieties mixed with, above all, a liberating sense of opportunity and new possibilities for the future

B. The Threat of Aggression Recedes

- a Soviet Union undergoing fundamental change; new leaders who have accepted revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, more interest in internal reform
- transition in Soviet military potential. Pleased Moscow accepted State of the Union proposal to withdraw significant numbers of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe



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as part of a CFE agreement. Anticipate all Soviet stationed forces in Eastern Europe will eventually return home, following pattern already established in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

- significance of current CFE talks: would redress dangerous imbalances in conventional forces, give Allies more warning of possible aggression and better opportunities to prepare to meet the threat

C. Adapting to the New Europe

- now in a time of transition, transformation of Soviet politics and society still incomplete. Periods of historic transition often unsettled and unpredictable. Crucial to see if Moscow chooses military coercion or peaceful dialogue in responding to the aspirations of the Lithuanian people.
- CFE not yet signed, Soviet troops not yet out of Eastern Europe, and Soviet armed forces still well over 4 million strong. Our policies now must follow a measured pace appropriate to a period of transition.
- But our approach must be guided by new concepts that prepare us for the prospect of a new era in Europe's history, and a new Western strategy for Europe's defense. Concepts to show what is possible if the promise of fundamental change in Soviet military power is fulfilled.

II. An Atlantic Community -- The Enduring Political Compact

A. NATO Never Just a Military Alliance

- Treaty written to make a basic political statement: that the fate of the United States could not be separated from the fate of Europe. Miscalculation by Americans and Europeans about this fact contributed to devastation of two world wars. Peace since then is, in part, a result of our full engagement in Europe.
- Military arrangements to guarantee collective security flowed from the underlying political compact -- "after many heartbreaks" America had "reversed its policy and was seeking to deter aggression by proof of determination. The only question was how its determination should be implemented." (Lovett to British, French, Canadian, Belgian, and Dutch reps, 1948)
- The historic solidarity NATO has fostered among its

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members and the collective/multinational defenses it has built provide a proven structure to resist any relapse into the pursuit of individual security and nationalism.

- Pleased that the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany has indicated its unequivocal wish to remain a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance, including participation in its integrated military structure.
- US will remain a European power in the broadest sense, joining with Europe in common effort to promote shared goals for growth of prosperity and freedom

B. Alliance Should Consider Its Strategy for the Future

- Build on achievements of past forty years, to sustain the triumph of democratic values and define the objectives and agenda for the US and NATO for the rest of this century and beyond.
- Therefore, after consulting with our Allies and NATO Secretary General Woerner, I am calling for a NATO Summit in June of this year to consider the Alliance's approach to the future.
- Believe that this NATO Summit will define the objectives and agenda for the Atlantic Community and direct a reexamination of NATO political and military strategy to enable the Alliance to meet its new objectives.

C. Issues for the Alliance to Consider

- NATO must continue to insure against instability and protect its members from military intimidation or coercion.
- NATO must decide how its force plans and arms control efforts can contribute to this goal.
- Broad patterns of cooperation in Europe -- political, military, and economic -- must be linked in ways that also address the security concerns of the new democracies of Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union.

III. **Adapting to Change -- Looking Forward**

- A. As NATO Strategy Changes, Military Requirements Will Change With It
- Alliance conventional and nuclear forces must be



substantially different from those we deploy today in order to meet the changed conditions and objectives for the mid-90s and beyond.

- Political events have created a new situation that will change how we maintain a stable balance of military power in Europe.

B. The Future of Allied Conventional Forces

- Have already taken first steps in CFE. US will reduce one-fourth of its troop presence in Europe by the mid-1990s. There will be reductions and new ceilings on the numbers of tanks, other armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and other systems. CFE Treaty would be most ambitious multilateral arms control agreement in history.
- But need to go further. Need to look beyond CFE to see what size and structure of conventional forces we will need in the 1990s and beyond, and the role arms control can play in stabilizing the size of these forces.
- These future steps depend on evolution of Soviet capabilities. Soviet Union will remain, even after forces are reduced, by far the strongest military power on the Eurasian landmass.
- US forces will need to remain in Europe as a continued counterweight to inherent Soviet power, and to demonstrate the link between our security and the security of our European Allies.

C. The Future of US Nuclear Forces in Europe

- Soviet Union remains a nuclear superpower. The US nuclear forces offset this potential threat against not only the US, but also our Allies -- most of whom do not have nuclear weapons of their own.
- US will keep nuclear forces in Europe, with the support of our friends, to assure our Allies that we stand with them in deterring any form of war, any military intimidation.
- Yet, with political changes in Europe, the nature of this US nuclear commitment can also change.
- One of the things that has changed is our need to produce and deploy newer, more modern, short-range nuclear

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missiles to replace the systems we now have in place in Europe. I have therefore decided to terminate our program to produce a Follow-On system to replace the Lance missiles now deployed in Europe, and withdraw the funding request I have submitted to Congress.

- I have also decided to cancel any further modernization of US nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe.
- As for the current short-range nuclear missile systems, both US and Soviet, we will be ready to enter into arms control negotiations to decide upon the reduction of those systems as well.

#### Conclusion

- Developing the Alliance's basic political objectives and new concepts for our strategy and forces will require important decisions within the Alliance. We began this process at the May 1989 NATO Summit. We must now intensify and accelerate it, starting with Secretary Cheney's meetings with his Allied counterparts in Canada and Belgium next month.
- Look forward to a NATO Summit in June to set our new course for the future. United States has always been a leader within the Atlantic Community from the time the North Atlantic Treaty was signed here in Washington, in 1949. We will continue to work with our Allies to show together how free peoples, pursuing a common purpose, can continue to shape the future of our world.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 12, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW  
PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH  
RICHARD KERR  
RON LEHMAN  
ROBERT ZOELLICK  
DENNIS ROSS  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES  
JOHN McLAUGHLIN

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FROM:

ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT:

Follow-Up to Meeting of the European Strategy  
Steering Group on Monday, April 9

As agreed, I attach a revised outline for a possible Presidential  
speech on European security and NATO.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines  
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006  
By CAP NARA, Date 5/4/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

Declassify on: OADR

April 12, 1990

Outline for Presidential Speech on  
the Future of NATO Strategy and  
European Security

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1887-MR

MM 4/11/2016

Introduction

- Wish to speak to you about the revolutionary changes which are transforming Europe, renewing the Old World, and about what these changes mean for the United States and the North Atlantic Alliance of which we are a part.
- Having consulted with my NATO colleagues, I will describe my views about the opportunity the Alliance now has to build upon its historic success over the last forty years.

**I. Changes Transforming Europe**

A. The Age of Freedom

- Revolutions of 1989: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany - Berlin Wall; emerging realization of 'a Europe whole and free'
- welcome the prospect of Germany finally unified in peace and freedom
- an age of uncertainty and hope, turbulent adjustments to massive social, political, and economic change -- fears and anxieties mixed with, above all, a liberating sense of opportunity and new possibilities for the future

B. The Threat of Aggression Recedes

- a Soviet Union undergoing fundamental change; new leaders who have accepted revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe, more interest in internal reform
- transition in Soviet military potential. Pleased Moscow accepted State of the Union proposal to withdraw significant numbers of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe as part of a CFE agreement. Anticipate all Soviet stationed forces in Eastern Europe will eventually return home, following pattern already established in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
- significance of current CFE talks: would redress dangerous imbalances in conventional forces, give Allies



more warning of possible aggression and better opportunities to prepare to meet the threat

C. Adapting to the New Europe

- now in a time of transition, transformation of Soviet politics and society still incomplete. Periods of historic transition often turbulent and unpredictable. Crucial to see if Moscow chooses military coercion or peaceful dialogue in responding to the aspirations of the Lithuanian people, and other nationalities within the Soviet Union.
- CFE not yet signed, Soviet troops not yet out of Eastern Europe, and Soviet armed forces still well over 4 million strong. Our policies now must follow a measured pace appropriate to a period of transition.
- But our approach must be guided by new concepts that prepare us for the prospect of a new era in Europe's history, and a new Western strategy for Europe's defense. Concepts to show what is possible if the promise of fundamental change in Soviet military power is fulfilled.

II. An Atlantic Community -- The Enduring Political Compact

A. NATO Never Just a Military Alliance

- Treaty written to make a basic political statement: that the fate of the United States could not be separated from the fate of Europe. Miscalculation by Americans and Europeans about this fact contributed to devastation of two world wars. Peace since then is, in part, a result of our full engagement in Europe.
- Military arrangements to guarantee collective defense flowed from the underlying political compact -- "after many heartbreaks" America had "reversed its policy and was seeking to deter aggression by proof of determination. The only question was how its determination should be implemented." (Lovett to British, French, Canadian, Belgian, and Dutch reps, 1948)
- Cannot give in to new calls for isolationism; cannot assume that peace and stability in Europe can now taken for granted. Must view this 'long peace' with the perspective of history: Europe has not experienced a war in 45 years -- the longest period of international peace in the history of the continent, measured not in decades -- but in centuries. We must reflect on the causes for

this extraordinary 'long peace,' and retain the American commitment that has contributed so vitally to it. Americans understand this commitment, and it will remain strong, only in the context of NATO.

B. Renewing Our Dedication to the Alliance

- The historic solidarity NATO has fostered among its members and the collective/multinational defenses it has built provide a proven structure to resist any relapse into the pursuit of individual security and nationalism.
- Pleased that the leadership of the Federal Republic of Germany has indicated its unequivocal wish to remain a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance, including participation in its integrated military structure.
- As part of its global responsibilities, US will remain a European power in the broadest sense, joining with Europe in common effort to promote shared goals for growth of prosperity and freedom

C. The Alliance Should Consider Its Strategy for the Future

- Build on achievements of past forty years, to sustain the triumph of democratic values and define the objectives and agenda for the US and NATO for the rest of this century and beyond.
- Therefore, after consulting with our Allies and NATO Secretary General Woerner, I am calling for a NATO Summit in June of this year to consider the Alliance's approach to the future.
- Believe that this NATO Summit will define the objectives and agenda for the Atlantic Community and direct a reexamination of NATO political and military strategy to enable the Alliance to meet its new objectives. Developing these new ideas will require fundamental review within the Alliance, and fresh policies and programs.

D. Issues for the Alliance to Consider

- **First**, NATO must continue to insure against instability and protect its members from military intimidation or coercion.
- **Second**, NATO must decide how its force plans and arms control efforts can contribute to this goal.



- **Third,** Broad patterns of cooperation in Europe -- political, military, and economic -- must be linked in ways that also address the security concerns of the new democracies of Eastern Europe and of the Soviet Union.

### III. Objectives for a New Western Strategy

#### A. Securing the Revolution

- Need to strengthen victorious forces of democracy in Eastern Europe, build institutions for free societies
- Effort will require political and economic assistance to the new governments
- Must reassure these governments that, as they join the commonwealth of free nations, they will be partners in the building of a new, stable, Europe

#### B. Insuring Peace in the New Europe

- NATO can help deter the outbreak of any war in Europe, presenting the united resolve to meet any aggression against its members with whatever forces are needed -- nuclear or conventional.
- NATO's deterrence of war has worked, and must continue to work, through the Alliance's manifest readiness to defend the territory of its members. It should continue to display this preparedness, maintaining a functioning collective military structure supported by forces in the field and backed by much larger forces that can be called upon in a crisis.

### IV. Adapting to Change -- Looking Forward

#### A. As NATO Strategy Changes, Military Requirements Will Change With It

- Alliance conventional and nuclear forces must be substantially different from those we deploy today in order to meet the changed conditions and objectives for the mid-90s and beyond.
- Our forces have been designed to deter and defend against constant danger of an attack launched with little warning, capable of overwhelming Western Europe, spearheaded by powerful offensive Soviet forces deployed forward in Eastern Europe.

- Political events and our arms control efforts are creating a new situation that will change how we maintain a stable balance of military power in Europe. Our plans can focus less on the danger of an immediate outbreak of war and more on safeguarding stability over the long-term, ruling out military solutions to political problems at the expense of our Allies.

B. The Future of Allied Conventional Forces

- Have already taken the first steps in CFE. US will reduce one-fourth of its troop presence in Europe by the mid-1990s. There will be reductions and new ceilings on the numbers of tanks, other armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and other systems. CFE Treaty would be most ambitious multilateral arms control agreement in history.
- Must finish work on a CFE treaty soon. Last May, Allied leaders called for us to complete negotiation of a treaty within the next twelve months. We have made great progress since then, and I believe, if all the participants in these talks make the effort, that the major issues in the CFE negotiations can and should be resolved by the time NATO leaders meet again in Brussels in June.
- But we need to go further. Need to look beyond CFE to see what size and structure of conventional forces we will need in the 1990s and beyond, and prepare for new negotiations, after conclusion of a CFE treaty, to continue our conventional arms control efforts.
- These future steps depend on evolution of Soviet capabilities. The changes made so far by Gorbachev been profound -- for Moscow the clock cannot be turned back. But we also cannot turn it ahead, cannot see what kind of country the Soviet Union will be in years to come. Amid this uncertainty, here is what we know: the Soviet Union will remain, even after all planned reductions in forces are complete, the strongest military power on the Eurasian landmass, armed with thousands of nuclear weapons, dwarfing other European states in size, population, and armed strength.
- US forces will need to remain in Europe as a continued counterweight to inherent Soviet power, and to demonstrate the link between our security and the security of our European Allies.



C. The Future of US Nuclear Forces in Europe

- Soviet Union remains a nuclear superpower. The US nuclear forces offset this potential threat against not only the US, but also our Allies -- most of whom do not have nuclear weapons of their own.
- US will keep nuclear forces in Europe, with the support of our friends, to assure our Allies that we stand with them in deterring any form of war, any military intimidation. Historical experience reminds us that reliance on conventional forces alone to prevent war has not worked. Reliance on a mix of nuclear and conventional forces has. This is no coincidence: the unique and terrible destructive potential of nuclear weapons has made general war unthinkable in Europe, and these forces should help to prevent war in the future.
- Yet, with political changes in Europe, the nature of this US nuclear commitment can also change. As the threat of immediate and overwhelming aggression recedes, the nuclear forces, based in Europe, which we will need to deter war in the future may well be different from the forces we needed in the past.
- One of the things that has changed is our need to produce and deploy newer, more modern, short-range nuclear missiles to replace the systems we now have in place in Europe. I have therefore decided to terminate our program to produce a Follow-On system to replace the Lance missiles now deployed in Europe, and withdraw the funding request I have submitted to Congress.
- I have also decided to cancel any further modernization of US nuclear artillery shells deployed in Europe.
- As for the current short-range nuclear missile systems, both US and Soviet, I would like to announce that, after consulting with our Allies, the U.S. is prepared to advance the date for beginning new arms control negotiations to decide upon the reduction of those systems as well. We hope these talks between the United States and the Soviet Union can begin shortly after a CFE treaty is signed.
- [-- The goal of these negotiations should be drastic reductions in the number of U.S. and Soviet short-range nuclear missile forces in Europe, even including their possible elimination.]

- [-- We should also consider sharp cuts, perhaps even the elimination, of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear artillery shells stockpiled in Europe as well.]

Conclusion

- Developing the Alliance's basic political objectives and new concepts for our strategy and forces will require important decisions within the Alliance. We began this process at the May 1989 NATO Summit. We must now intensify and accelerate it, starting with Secretary Cheney's meetings with his Allied counterparts in Canada and Belgium next month.
- Look forward to a NATO Summit in June to set our new course for the future. United States has always been a leader within the Atlantic Community from the time the North Atlantic Treaty was signed here in Washington, in 1949. We will continue to work with our Allies to show together how free peoples, pursuing a common purpose, can continue to shape the future of our world.



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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW

PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH  
RICHARD KERR  
RON LEHMAN  
ROBERT ZOELICK  
DENNIS ROSS  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES  
JOHN McLAUGHLIN

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on  
Monday, June 11, at 10:00 a.m.

I attach two papers prepared by State's European Bureau for  
review at the above-mentioned meeting:

- NATO Summit: Fostering a New Relationship with the Warsaw Pact
- CSCE

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By 64P NARA, Date 5/4/11

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Declassify on: OADR

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NATO Summit:  
Fostering a New Relationship with the Warsaw Pact

OVERVIEW

In recent discussions with the Soviets, including at last week's Summit, they have shown keen sensitivity to NATO as an adversary of the Warsaw Pact and a desire to explore new relationships. There are arguments against going down such a path at a time when at least some WTO members seem intent on quitting the organization. By doing so we would be legitimizing the Pact and helping the Soviets perpetuate it. There is also the objection of some Allies, notably the French, to using NATO as a primary instrument for political engagement with the East, as opposed to CSCE and the EC.

We should nevertheless consider ideas for more clearly engaging NATO in more cooperative projects vis-a-vis the East. First, this would serve our broad objective of enhancing the Alliance's political content and thus ensuring its long-term viability, though we must be careful not to obscure the integrity of NATO's central purpose of collective defense. Second, it could be an important component of our larger strategy to ensure Soviet acquiescence in a united Germany in NATO. Here, however, we should be clear about our own strategy vis-a-vis the Soviets. We should not make a habit out of promptly responding to each expression of Soviet anxiety or discontent, at least not without getting something precise in return. Any new steps must not take on the appearance of a search by the Alliance for new members, or a NATO effort to recruit Moscow's erstwhile allies. Above all, it must be clear that we are not looking to extend our defensive perimeter.

Given the political transformation that has taken place in Eastern Europe, the Warsaw Pact already is incapable of being used as an instrument of Soviet aggression. It is not conceivable that the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs or East Germans would cooperate with the Soviets in launching an attack against the West. We certainly should not actively promote continued Eastern adherence to the Pact. We must avoid any suggestion that the two alliances are equivalent institutions and we must be mindful of what kind of Alliance affiliations the freely elected governments of Eastern Europe want. But to the extent that the current members of the Pact are willing to accept the role, a continued security relationship between the Soviet Union and its neighbors that is essentially political and non-aggressive is not necessarily inconsistent with Western interests and arguably could contribute to stability. The Warsaw Pact's most recent Summit communique is an example of the moderating influence the Pact's East European members can have on the Soviet Union, for instance as regards the central issue of a united Germany in NATO.

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DECL: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526  
2012-1985-MR  
8/15/2014 JM



The ideas we should examine include more exchanges between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, modest declarations of peaceful, friendly intent, and further expansion of confidence-building under the aegis of the CSCE process. We should consider pressing one or more such initiatives in the context of the NATO Summit.

## DISCUSSION

### Where We Stand

The North Atlantic Treaty affirms NATO's peaceful purposes. It pledges members of the Alliance to "settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means ... and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force." The Treaty additionally requires NATO member states to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being."

The Alliance has recently taken steps to make its founding principles better known in the East. Perhaps the most visible of these was Shevardnadze's visit to NATO headquarters this Spring, possibly to be reciprocated by SYG Woerner's trip to Moscow. The Alliance also has put forward a "democratic fellowship" program to extend the benefits of study in the West to East Europeans, and has agreed on East European participation in the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), which focuses on environmental issues.

Ongoing arms control negotiations are another demonstration of NATO's pursuit of greater East-West cooperation. CFE will create structures supporting the foundation of a new, more cooperative security environment in Europe. In CSBMs NATO promoted the very successful military doctrine seminar, which for the first time brought military chiefs of staff together to discuss the different theories and doctrines behind their respective military postures.

The strategy review to be launched at the Summit is an additional sign that the Alliance is adapting itself to the changing European scene and finding ways to maintain its fundamental collective defense mission without threatening the East. Gorbachev indicated at the Summit that a key factor in

the Soviets' attitude toward NATO would be the evolving nature of the Alliance itself. In addition to influencing the Soviet position, it is also important that we be seen as trying to respond to expressed Soviet concerns. This is especially true in Germany, including the GDR, where the idea of a more political, less threatening NATO has appeal.

The NATO Summit itself will be the culmination of an intensely political process and by its results will reaffirm the salience of the Alliance's political nature. We need to make this point clear to our publics as well as to the Soviet Union. The political character of the NATO Alliance goes hand in hand with its strictly defensive security mission, and holds out the possibility of increased cooperation with the East at all levels.

NATO's role in coordinating the Western position in CSCE is perhaps its currently most important political role, and is of direct relevance to the East. Internal Alliance consultations on the Baltics also exemplify NATO's efforts to come to grips with major issues in a purely political sense, without the threat of military force.

There are other new areas already agreed on at NATO, such as the NATO Verification Support Staff (NVSS), which links the Alliance's new role in arms control implementation with its political dimension. The NVSS could also furnish a model for further cooperative arms control efforts.

We should not renew old debates within the Alliance on, for example, "out of area" questions, or make a special effort to gain ground in Europe at anyone's expense. In pursuing new ideas, we must be certain to maintain NATO's fundamental mission as the locus for Western defense cooperation while sustaining and strengthening its traditional political roles. We should make every effort to reinforce NATO's political dimension in the North Atlantic Treaty area in ways that enhance security for the entire continent.

#### Proposals Now on the Table

The concept of risk reduction centers, proposed in CSBMs and elsewhere, might serve to increase confidence in each side's intentions. In CSCE, Soviet and Allied proposals to create conflict resolution mechanisms, as well as a small secretariat and more frequent political-level meetings, could reduce Soviet insecurities about being left out of a Europe whose security and prosperity will increasingly depend upon a strong NATO and a vital EC.



Some New Ideas

Declaratory Measures: The NATO Summit might consider discussing a NATO/Warsaw Pact declaration in the context of successful CFE and SNF negotiations, and linked to the outcome of the 1992 CSCE review conference. (This idea would require further analysis, including by the lawyers.) We could offer in the nearer term to reaffirm the language in the 1986 CDE Agreement on the non-use of force, and rededicate the Alliance in the Summit declaration to the pursuit of peace and to refrain from the use of force unless required for self-defense.

Greater NATO-Warsaw Pact Interchange:

Shevardnadze has already visited NATO Headquarters and has spoken informally to the members of the North Atlantic Council. This precedent could now be expanded and eventually institutionalized, with invitations to other Eastern leaders to address the NAC. Indeed, the President might propose, at the NATO Summit, that Gorbachev be invited to address the next such Alliance meeting.

NATO could also invite one or more Warsaw Pact governments to participate in specific, non-military aspects of NATO, such as NATO's Economic or Science Committees. These would, of course, be low-level activities in what are essentially peripheral NATO institutions, and there would be some resistance in NATO to taking them on, particularly in view of the existence of competing organizations (like the OECD) with similar missions. We are probably best advised to think in terms of initiatives which have a more concrete security element, rather than engaging the East on non-security issues.

Similar projects could be conceived to focus more directly on security issues, such as conducting ad-hoc seminars on security topics for NATO and WTO representatives at a facility attached to NATO headquarters.

Assistance with Reconversion: A statement at the NATO Summit that individual Allies are prepared, on a national basis, to consider ways to help the Soviet Union absorb returning troops and convert their economy to a more civilian footing could be useful in gaining Soviet acquiescence to their total withdrawal from Central and eastern Europe. To strengthen this initiative, the NATO Summit could task the

Economic Committee to do a study of these problems and, after reporting to the NAC, make its results available to the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members.

A related initiative, which could serve either as a further alternative or a complementary measure, would be a NATO-Warsaw Pact Seminar on the problems of reconversion and demobilization -- problems which are to some extent shared between East and West as military confrontation is wound down. Commitments to assist the Soviets would not be a prerequisite for participation in such a seminar, but individual, national efforts to help Moscow could grow out of such a seminar.

This kind of effort might even be expanded to include the creation of a NATO "Democracy Corps" that would assist in civic programs in East Europe and the Soviet Union going beyond infrastructure and related projects.

Changing the Role of the NATO Defense College: The Defense College in Rome, modelled on the National War Colleges, offers mid-rank officers and civilians from NATO member countries a one-year course of study. It builds long-term relationships among Allied officers. The College could be converted into an East-West institute for security studies where most of the course content could remain essentially the same, but Soviet and East European students (and lecturers) would be admitted. A scaled-down alternative would be to keep the College essentially as is, but to introduce a three-month course each year (perhaps in the summer) which would be East-West in nature and which could include officers/lecturers from Warsaw Pact countries. In addition to the symbolic value of such a shift in focus, this could help over time to build greater trust between NATO and Warsaw Pact military officers and civilian officials.



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## CSCE

### OVERVIEW

The Copenhagen human rights conference, the NAC Ministerial and the NATO Summit all provide opportunities to advance our views on how to strengthen and extend CSCE in a manner which advances our interests while also responding to Soviet and Eastern concerns. Our work in CSCE's Baskets II and III is well-advanced: at the Bonn Conference on Economic Cooperation in Europe, we achieved consensus on a set of principles of market economies. At the Copenhagen human rights meeting now in progress, we hope to build the basis for greater democratization and rule of law in the East. It is now time also to put forward an overall concept in CSCE's security basket which draws a clear distinction between the collective defense arrangements which only NATO can provide and the broader, complementary structure for "security and cooperation" which can be developed through CSCE.

The "institutionalization" of CSCE, properly conceived and carefully implemented, can help advance the process in all of these areas. Doing so can also channel impulses driving vague and overly ambitious institutionalization ideas and allow for structure without pushing the process of broadening and deepening CSCE too far, too fast. Finally, and perhaps most immediately, elaborating the CSCE process is also necessary to win Soviet agreement to a timely, successful conclusion of the Two-plus-Four process on German unification.

Our approach to institutionalization should include consideration of initiatives such as: increased political consultations within CSCE; elaboration of a CSCE dispute management mechanism; establishment of a CSCE center for military information exchange; creation of a small CSCE secretariat; and the development of links between CSCE and other international organizations.

### WHERE WE STAND

In Secretary Baker's recent letters to CSCE foreign ministers, he endorsed:

- (1) instituting regular political consultations among the 35, at ministerial and sub-ministerial level;
- (2) regularizing the scheduling of review conferences on a more frequent basis and with fixed duration;

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- (3) securing agreement on the principle and content of free and fair elections;
- (4) invigorating the mandate of the 1991 Valletta experts' meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes to encourage examination of possible mechanisms for dispute management;
- (5) establishing a CSBMs mechanism to request clarification of unusual military activities; and
- (6) considering ways existing organizations might be used to follow up on CSCE accomplishments, to help avoid creating costly or duplicative bureaucratic structures.

These proposals, which bridge the three "baskets" (political/security, economic/environmental, human rights), demonstrate our commitment to CSCE, our goal of balanced progress in all areas of the process, our desire for CSCE to emphasize Western political and economic values, and our intention to remain involved in Europe's future development.

We must continue to insist that CSCE cannot replace NATO in providing firm security guarantees for a changing Europe. But CSCE ultimately could evolve a security role analogous to that of other regional institutions -- the OAS or the OAU, for instance -- while NATO would retain its unique collective defense role.

We want to sidestep overly ambitious "institutionalization" schemes for CSCE. But measured progress can: (1) solidify America's role in the new Europe; (2) help to weave the newly democratizing states of the East into the fabric of European political life; and (3) provide the Soviets a dignified way of defining a new Soviet role in Europe and accepting a unified Germany's place in NATO. We believe that, taken together, the following five suggestions can help to accomplish these goals.

#### 1. INCREASED POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS

The general notion of establishing a procedure for more frequent political-level consultations among the 35 enjoys wide support among CSCE governments. Shevardnadze's letter called for CSCE Summits (under the rubric "Council of Greater Europe") to be held every two years and rotate among CSCE capitals. The Council would be backed up by a Foreign Ministers' Committee which would meet twice a year. In line with the Polish proposal for a "Council of European Cooperation," Shevardnadze also called for creation of an ongoing consultative mechanism through meetings between the CSCE ambassadors resident in the capital of whatever country is chosen to host a permanent CSCE secretariat.

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Our own approach, though similar in many respects, places less emphasis on creating institutions or "councils" and more on enhancing the process of substantive consultation.

- (a) Biennial review conferences, each lasting no longer than perhaps three months, would assess results of intersessional activities and channel future CSCE work. These conferences could be opened or, perhaps better, closed at Summit level, meeting Moscow's interest in holding biennial CSCE Summits.
- (b) Meetings of Foreign Ministers could be held annually to review specific issues as agreed at sub-ministerial level and to prepare and follow up Summit meetings, as necessary. This corresponds to the Soviet call for a Foreign Ministers' Committee.
- (c) In addition, periodic one/two-day meetings of political directors or "special representatives" could be useful in reviewing the general European situation and to prepare and follow-up on Ministerial meetings. These sessions might be held twice per year, perhaps on the margins of existing intersessional activities.
- (d) Specialized CSCE intersessional activities ("experts" meetings) set out in the Vienna Concluding Document will continue to be held. Their results will be reviewed at this year's Summit and at the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference. Helsinki, and future full review conferences, will continue to mandate additional experts meetings on specific subjects.

## 2. DISPUTE/CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

Secretary Baker has also proposed that the CSCE Summit consider reinforcing Valletta's mandate to develop mechanisms for managing disputes between CSCE member states. Such mechanisms can provide greater stability as age-old cross-border animosities reassert themselves upon Soviet troop withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Creating such mechanisms can be billed to Gorbachev as meeting the Soviet concern that CSCE provide greater pan-European cooperative security, without detracting from NATO's unique collective defense mission.

At the Vienna Review Conference, CSCE members accepted the principle of binding arbitration among the 35, though the U.S. explicitly interpreted that commitment to exclude the areas of national security, territorial integrity, internal domestic disputes and self-defense. In conjunction with preparations

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for the CSCE Meeting of Experts on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Valletta, January 1991), we are exploring at NATO what mechanisms might be created to allow this agreement in principle to be put into operation.

Proposals addressing this general problem area range from establishing a procedure for calling a snap meeting of the 35 (at ministerial or lower level) in the event of a crisis to creating a CSCE arbitration mechanism. Foreign Secretary Hurd has asked us to endorse his proposal for establishment of a voluntary conciliation mechanism. The Swiss, the Canadians and perhaps others are also looking at initiatives in this area. Well before the CSCE Summit we should decide on specific variants we can accept, for subsequent elaboration at Valletta. In doing so, we will want to ensure that construction of some such mechanism does not actually invite or encourage ethnic disputes as a way of gaining international attention.

### 3. CSCE CENTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION AND MUTUAL SECURITY

In the specific area of military disputes, the recent Shevardnadze letter called for setting up a risk reduction or crisis management center in Berlin to clarify unusual military situations, prevent the emergence of conflicts and, if necessary, help settle them through mediation or provision of good offices. The Soviets have also called for establishing a second body, an information exchange and notification center, also in Berlin, to exchange military information and notification of troops movements and exercises, register and coordinate military inspections and take on other "verification activities."

Shevardnadze's ideas reflect longstanding Soviet interest in crisis avoidance as a means to enhance stability. In the past, the West has dismissed this concept as an instrument to facilitate Soviet meddling in NATO defense policy and acquisition debates. In the current political context, however, such "meddling" could become a two-way street. Moreover, it would be a concrete manifestation of a more cooperative security relationship, in which Soviet interests are addressed.

Provided ideas like Shevardnadze's can be made to avoid a heavy German-specific focus, it is worthwhile looking creatively at how they might be refashioned to provide a greater sense of all-European security, as distinct from NATO's concrete collective defense tasks, which we must guard scrupulously. We would not want to institutionalize any kind of roving observer teams with broad authority like that

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currently embodied in MLMs, nor would we want, as Genscher has suggested, to assign to CSCE the arms control verification functions, which we have put forward as a future political task for NATO (which has just agreed on a NATO Verification Support Staff). We could, however, consider a CSCE forum where compliance complaints with regard to CSCE security obligations (e.g., CSBMs) could be aired -- similar in effect to the compliance review we have traditionally coordinated on human rights obligations.

With these qualifications in mind, we should consider establishing a CSCE center, perhaps to be called the "CSCE Center for Communications, Information and Mutual Security." The tasks of such a center could be:

- to house and disseminate CDE observation inspection reports;
- to house the hub of the communications network which the Alliance has proposed in the CSBMs talks (the link -- whether secure phone, secure fax, or computer -- will be used for crisis or more routine CSBMs-related communication, and probably for CFE and Open Skies communication as well);
- to house periodic meetings of the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG), which, while remaining an independent organ of the 23, would share the above-mentioned communications network and likely would have common representatives with the broader, 35-nation grouping;
- to host any meeting of the 35 which may arise under the unusual military activities mechanism you have proposed, and to receive and disseminate information regarding accidents or other unusual occurrences (e.g., MIG-23 incident, efforts to locate a sunken submarine) which might otherwise be misinterpreted (a "risk reductions" function); and
- to promote contacts, both among military officials and security experts, including by hosting seminars, such as the annual CDE implementation meeting proposed by the Alliance in the CSBMs talks.

Such a center could be housed in the Allied Control Authority building in Berlin (for symbolic reasons, as a nod to Shevardnadze, and to anchor Germany further in Western-oriented CSCE structures). Since our proposal is similar in some important respects to the FRG's proposal for a CSCE Conflict Prevention and Verification Mechanism, the Germans would likely be eager to serve as hosts. Alternatively, we could propose Prague as host city, in deference to clear Czechoslovak desires



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to play a role in this area, as evidenced by Foreign Minister Dienstbier's own proposal for a "European Security Commission."

#### 4. SECRETARIAT

The U.S. has long opposed creating a CSCE Secretariat for a number of reasons: uncertainty about its precise role and impact on the current flexibility and open-endedness of the CSCE process and on the direct involvement of member states; concerns (now diminishing) about espionage; reservations about the cost. CSCE has never had a permanent home and review conferences and other meetings have traditionally rotated among CSCE capitals. As CSCE activities and functions multiply, however, we should reexamine whether a small Secretariat could play a useful administrative and symbolic role, if structured carefully.

The primary purposes of such a secretariat would be to facilitate transmission of notes and reports; keep necessary records; make administrative and technical arrangements for the enhanced political consultations we envisage; provide expertise for the administration of other CSCE meetings; and serve as the administrative channel for triggering some of the various CSCE "mechanisms" likely to be under consideration in the coming months. It can also help make more concrete what until now has been an only intermittently visible CSCE process. For obvious reasons this is of major importance to the Soviets, who have themselves proposed establishment of a modest secretariat or document center.

Various options for operating a secretariat are currently under discussion: permanently designating individual CSCE states to cover different, specific aspects of the CSCE process; rotating secretariat functions among the 35 foreign ministries; or creating a small staff, the membership of which could either be permanent, rotate in a fixed formula among CSCE states, or be a combination of the two.

We believe a small secretariat (perhaps no more than ten persons, including secretarial help) permanently sited in one CSCE capital would best serve our needs, minimize costs and increase CSCE's visibility. To take advantage of its central CSCE location and developed infrastructure, to help integrate a reunited Germany permanently into the larger European community and to symbolize the end to European division and the Cold War, Berlin might be a good choice. Some, however, might balk at giving so much influence to the Germans, since the secretariat host would also have a hand in organizing many future CSCE meetings. An alternative would be to choose the capital of one of CSCE's traditional neutrals. The Finns consider themselves

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the keepers of the CSCE flame, while the Austrians have notified the CSCE community of their interest in hosting future CSCE activities. The Swedes have just put forward Stockholm as a possible CSCE secretariat location.

With the announcement of U.S. backing for a permanent CSCE secretariat, an intense bidding war among potential hosts is almost certain to commence. We can exercise maximum influence over the ensuing debate if we have already indicated our own preference right from the start.

##### 5. CSCE COOPERATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In keeping with our desire to avoid creating costly and duplicative bureaucratic structures, we also should press CSCE to establish relationships with those existing institutions available to carry out tasks desired by the CSCE community. Given that no existing organization duplicates exactly the membership of CSCE, this would require that those outside institutions devise forms of association needed to allow the voices of non-members to be heard and taken into account in the performance of CSCE-related tasks. CSCE might, for example, ask the OECD to take on some Basket II task, while the same might be done with regard to the Council of Europe on a Basket III matter. Both organizations would then need to find appropriate forms of association to allow CSCE states which are not members of those organization to participate in their CSCE activities without being subjected to the separate and, in some cases, more rigorous requirements of full membership in those organizations. By the same token, CSCE itself would need to include those organizations as guest participants in appropriate CSCE meetings or develop some form of special observer status.

##### CONCLUSION

We will thus need to achieve at the Summit as full and detailed an Alliance position as possible on CSCE, in order to provide full, clear and comprehensive guidance for Summit preparatory work, which will begin in earnest on July 10 in Vienna. In the absence of such a full mandate, others (including the EC) will feel unconstrained to pursue their own individual agendas, thus greatly complicating our ability to manage Summit preparations in light of our own objectives for the meeting.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW

PAUL WOLFOWITZ  
ADM DAVID JEREMIAH  
RICHARD KERR  
RON LEHMAN  
ROBERT ZOELICK  
DENNIS ROSS  
RAYMOND SEITZ  
STEPHEN HADLEY  
LTG HOWARD GRAVES  
JOHN McLAUGHLIN

FROM: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Meeting of the European Strategy Steering Group on  
Monday, June 11, at 10:00 a.m.

I attach a third paper prepared by State's European Bureau for  
review at the above-mentioned meeting. You should already have:

- NATO Summit: Fostering a New Relationship with the Warsaw Pact
- CSCE

Enclosed is a paper on: Preparing for the NATO Summit.

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 5/1/10

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Declassify on: OADR



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## PREPARING FOR THE NATO SUMMIT

### Overview

The July NATO Summit will be the pivot point for this year's construction of the security and political architecture for a post-Cold-War Europe. Building on NATO's spring series of ministerials and the U.S./Soviet Summit, it will be the platform from which we launch the initiatives which will shape the agenda for the second half of the year, culminating in the Paris CSCE Summit.

Thus it is essential that the Summit produce a full and compelling declaration of Western goals and objectives. Given the range of questions at play, the Summit must make a comprehensive statement covering many issues. Achieving this goal will take a balancing act. The allies want and expect U.S. leadership. At the same time, they must be directly engaged in a meaningful process of Summit preparation, both to ensure their support for our ideas whenever they are presented and to keep some of their own ideas in check. SYG Woerner will be one of the staunchest supporters of our overall approach, but will also expect his own International Staff to play a role.

### Making the Machinery Work for Us

One of the most important balances we must seek is between, on the one hand, ensuring that the allies can express their views early and that the necessary "mechanical" work is done at NATO to keep Summit preparations on track, and, on the other hand, keeping key initiatives for introduction at or shortly before the Summit. In particular, we must ensure that the process does not lead to documents which it would be politically costly to junk but which it would be unprofitable to pursue.

NATO has already begun to prepare for the Summit. Woerner has set out his own ideas (see attached outline) and asked for contributions. There is no real way to turn this off, and any effort to do so would create a great deal of friction which would in turn make our own task more difficult.

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There should thus be a three-stage approach between now and the Summit:

- Bilateral consultations in the next week or so;
- Instructions to our representatives in the NAC (and, as indicated in the next section, other NATO bodies where appropriate) to channel the continuing work there in productive directions; and
- Shortly before the Summit, introduction of additional ideas, including U.S. initiatives, perhaps via a presidential letter, to be followed by the President's own presentation at the Summit itself.

#### Managing a Multi-Track Process

In order to guide this process effectively, and ensure that we get the substantive outcomes we want, preparations should proceed for specific issues on their respective tracks. Aside from German unification, which should be worked through quadripartite discussions, the following issues have discrete fora which we should use:

CFE -- The product of our bilateral consultations should be channeled first into the HLTF "Logistics Group" (FRG, UK, France, and Italy), then into the full HLTF.

SNF - Initial contacts should be with those allies most directly affected -- i.e., those that own/operate SNF systems: FRG, UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. As we develop our views, we should then channel them into the NAC with a view to high-level treatment at the Summit itself.

CSCE - NATO's special CSCE Summit working group should be used to ensure that we get agreement in London on a position that is comprehensive, forward-looking, and consistent with the USG approach to strengthening and extending the CSCE process.

Strategy Review - Initial work will be done on the defense side of NATO, with sufficient NAC involvement to ensure French involvement and an appropriate political context for Summit consideration of this issue.

Heads of state and government at the Summit will draw these threads together, and mandate appropriate follow-up action.

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### Tying It All Together

The Summit should provide a comprehensive road map for the next six months' work, but this need not be in a single, lengthy document. Separate documents on the key issues (probably those outlined on page 1) would allow the Summit declaration itself to be shorter and punchier. It would also allow for a public affairs approach in which the specific issue documents are released on the first day, with the declaration itself being issued the second day, thereby gaining maximum press and political attention.

Depending on the state of the work and the nature and timing of our initiatives, it may well be advisable at the Summit to move the drafting of the declaration and some or all of the associated documents to a higher level. This approach proved very productive in handling the 1989 Summit statement and its associated "Comprehensive Concept."

Attached is SYG Woerner's draft Summit Declaration Outline, which he has already distributed to the delegations of all 16 NATO members.

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## (George Bush Library)

| Document No.<br>and Type | Subject/Title of Document      | Date | Restriction | Class. |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------|-------------|--------|
| 11b. Declaration         | Re: Summit Declaration (4 pp.) | n.d. | (b)(1)      | C      |

**Collection:**

**Record Group:** Bush Presidential Records

**Office:** National Security Council

**Series:** Blackwill, Robert D., Files

**Subseries:** Subject Files

**WHORM Cat.:**

**File Location:** [European Strategy Steering Group] (ESSG) Meetings 3-6/89

**Date Closed:** 5/5/2011

**OA/ID Number:** CF00182-001

**FOIA/SYS Case #:** 2010-2612-F

**Appeal Case #:**

**Re-review Case #:**

**Appeal Disposition:**

**P-2/P-5 Review Case #:**

**Disposition Date:**

**AR Case #:**

**MR Case #:**

**AR Disposition:**

**MR Disposition:**

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### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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