

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2011-0298-F

FOIA Number:
2011-0298-F

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30547
Folder ID Number: 30547-007

Folder Title:
October 1989

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0


~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 3, 1989



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Meeting with Gorbachev

In response to your comments yesterday, we have revised this memorandum.

The most difficult problem will be managing public and allied expectations surrounding this meeting. We will want to make clear that this meeting is not a negotiating session and work to avoid raising the ghosts of Reykjavik. But whatever our protestations to the contrary, the interest in this meeting will be very high.

Once the date is public, expectations and rumors will grow daily. Early disclosure of the meeting would bring pressure from the Soviets and perhaps from the State Department to hold a preparatory Ministerial with the attendant pressures for concrete U.S. proposals. On the other hand, a late announcement increases the risk that the fact of the meeting will leak before the Administration can provide its own interpretation of the meeting's rationale. There is also a risk that an event or Soviet proposal between now and the announcement could give the impression that the meeting is event driven. Finally, if as noted below, we operate out of Italy, advance preparation with the Italians will increase the chances of a leak from Rome.

Nevertheless, we continue to believe that an announcement in early November is preferable so that anticipation does not build over a prolonged period. In our view, the necessary logistical and substantive preparation could be accomplished between November 1 and the time of the meeting. Thus, we could decide to try not to enlarge the circle of those in the know for another month to minimize the likelihood of a leak. We could fail. Thus, if you wish to proceed with an earlier announcement, we should be able to handle that too.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

Mechanics of the Meeting

If the staging area is in Italy, we would want to minimize the time spent in country and the President's proximity to Andreotti. The President could fly into a U.S. airbase in the south of Italy. (We have not explored the various possibilities pending your authorization.) But this might not deflect Andreotti's desire to be involved with such a signal political event; a bilateral meeting could be held at a U.S. airbase if necessary. Staging from Italy presents us with one further problem. We would want to try to avoid upstaging the Gorbachev-Andreotti Summit. This would be difficult since most of the world's attention will focus naturally on the upcoming Bush-Gorbachev meeting.

Specific logistics will be challenging, especially given what we think is limited Soviet ability to move by air from shore to ship and ship to ship. (We assume that Gorbachev and the President would go separately from shore by helicopter to their respective ships.) The first day's meeting could be held on one of the ships with the visiting head of state aboard for most of the day. That head of state would host the second day. The following is a notional schedule.

Friday, December 1

President flies to Europe and boards U.S. ship

Saturday, December 2

0945	Gorbachev arrives on U.S. carrier
1000-1100	One on One
1100-1230	Meeting Time
1230-1400	Official Lunch
1400-1600	Private Time
1600-1900	Meeting Time
1900-2100	Official Dinner
2105	Gorbachev departs

Sunday, December 3

0845	The President arrives on Soviet ship
0900-1100	Meeting time
1100-1200	Private time
1200-1300	Official Lunch
1300-1330	One on One
1335	The President departs Soviet ship, returns to U.S.

-3-

The Press

Ferrying the Soviet leader onto an American cruiser or carrier and vice versa will be dramatic and the press will want to be there to capture the moment. We need to decide whether there will be pool coverage. In any case, the meeting will spark enough interest to warrant a Presidential press conference at the very least upon his return and perhaps a major speech on U.S.-Soviet relations.

Managing the Allies

The allies may be somewhat nervous about an informal meeting of this kind which will remind them of Reykjavik. Secretary Baker or his representative could go to NATO immediately before and after the meeting to take care of allied consultations. (A possible complicating factor for Baker is the pending Canadian proposal to begin the three week Open Skies Conference in Ottawa at the Ministerial level November 29- December 1.) In addition, the President's key allied counterparts will want to be kept informed. Mrs. Thatcher may be in Washington the Friday after Thanksgiving -- just prior to the meeting. Chancellor Kohl, who wants to see the President right before or after any such meeting for his own domestic political reasons, could be invited to Washington closely thereafter. Mitterrand also has requested a meeting with the President in his role as President of the EC in October or November. Hard as it will be, we should try to accommodate all three of these leaders who are crucial to the success of our European policies.

Will other agencies be represented Arms control will be a main topic so Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell or their representatives could well want to be invited. Space constraints are obvious, and a good reason for keeping the meetings small, but this will not limit demand for inclusion.

Holding the number to five in the meetings as you mentioned may be tough but here is a possible U.S. lineup of six: The President, Sununu, Scowcroft, Baker, Matlock, Blackwill (notetaker). This does not include Fitzwater. Baker may want Dennis Ross present and perhaps Bartholomew, Cheney may wish to have Wolfowitz attend, and Blackwill would like Condi to be there. Of course, not everyone ferried to the U.S. ship needs to be in every meeting with Gorbachev.

How will communications be handled? Communications will be difficult for both WHCA and the Soviets.

Contingency planning for bad weather. Weather could constrain helicopter operations so we would need backup plans to get the Principals back and forth by ship.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 25, 1989

NOTE TO: Robert Blackwill

FROM: Robert Gates 

Attached is a copy of the final draft
of my speech as not delivered.

*CC: all,
MS.*

The Seventeenth National Collegiate Security Conference
Sponsored by the Georgetown International Relations Association
October 26, 1989

Robert M. Gates
Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
The White House

Recent Developments in the USSR:
Prospects and Implications for the US

The attention of the world remains riveted on the Soviet Union, where, for the first time since 1917, the tectonic plate of the Soviet system is shifting, loosing a political dynamic as well as societal tensions and pressures that hold the potential, on the one hand, to move the USSR toward pluralism and economic rationality or, on the other, to create significant instability, repression and even greater hardship.

President Bush explained US attitudes and set forth U.S. policy toward Soviet reform at Texas A&M in May, where he said, "Now it is time to move beyond containment, to a new policy for the 1990s-- one that recognizes the full scope of change taking place around

the world, and in the Soviet Union itself." He observed that "a new breeze is blowing across the steppes and cities of the Soviet Union," and declared, "Let no one doubt our sincere desire to see perestroika continue and succeed."

Only last week, Vice President Quayle at the Town Hall of California referred to the "amazing changes" occurring in the Soviet Union and the Soviets' "remarkable effort at internal reform." And, Secretary of State Baker, speaking to the Foreign Policy Association, also last week, observed that we want perestroika to succeed "not because it is our business to reform society or to keep a particular leader in power -- we can really do neither -- but because perestroika promises Soviet actions more advantageous to our interests."

I speak about the Soviet Union this evening with some trepidation that journalists and others will continue the search for divisions within the Administration with respect to the Soviet Union. Let us be clear. The President establishes American foreign policy and the Secretary of State is his principal spokesman. While the President's principal advisers speak of the Soviet Union with

different points of emphasis, the different perspectives are complementary, not contradictory. There are no noteworthy differences of view among these advisers with regard to American support for reform, to the difficulties confronting the reform process, to the mixed picture we see in Soviet foreign and military activities, nor with respect to the policies this country should pursue in response to Soviet reform.

Because we seek far-reaching change in the USSR, because we regard the process of reform -- of perestroika -- as in our national interest, it is important that we have a realistic understanding of how it is faring. How then goes reform in the Soviet Union?

Amid the welter of information streaming out of the Soviet Union, it is difficult to distinguish between pronouncement and policy on the one hand, and implementation and reality on the other, between what is ephemeral and what may be lasting. Tonight, I would like to review what is going on in the Soviet Union and the implications for the US and the West.

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he and his colleagues knew that the Soviet system was failing. The Soviet economy -- burdened by huge military spending and Stalinist centralized planning -- was rapidly falling further behind the West, and the traditional levers of control were unable to impede this downward spiral. Gorbachev recognized that if the Soviet Union was to retain its status even as a military superpower, fundamental change was required.

Political Reform: Glasnost, Democracy, and Nationalism

In no area of Soviet life has Gorbachev wrought such dramatic change as in politics. Political reform, initiated as a means to advance the ends of economic reform, has taken on a life and momentum of its own. Gorbachev plainly viewed the ossified party structure and hierarchy as a major obstacle to systemic revitalization and saw the oppressive, stultifying propaganda machinery as breeding cynicism, disbelief and alienation.

Glasnost, or the relaxation of controls over the flow of ideas and information, came first as a means to promote both economic

and political reform. Despite twists and turns in other aspects of reform, glasnost has endured and spread, allowing ethnic groups, striking workers and others to use the media to promote their causes, to establish contact and share ideas with one another -- all in ways that have magnified challenges to the government. Yet, the limits to and fragility of this more open environment was illustrated last week by Gorbachev's outburst at Soviet editors and the fearful reaction to his words.

Political reform and democratization have taken two forms-- changes within the Party, and changes in the relationship between the Party and other political institutions. Gorbachev clearly believes that without mobilizing public participation and autonomous activity in other political institutions, progress in dealing with the problems of the Soviet Union will not occur. Thus, in reforming the Party, Gorbachev is insisting that the Party must abandon its longstanding executive, management and legislative roles and remove itself from day-to-day involvement in government. It should instead serve as a brain trust to generate broad strategic policies for the country and exercise political leadership.

To accomplish this change in the Party's role, Gorbachev first resorted to removing the old guard. He subsequently has removed every member of the Politburo appointed under Brezhnev, dramatically reduced the collegial role of the once powerful Party Secretariat, replaced nearly 80% of the Central Committee, and changed 15 of 16 Republic Party heads. He has reduced the size of the Party apparatus, especially that part concerned with economic matters. He has encouraged multicandidate elections and the wholesale turnover of officials.

These sweeping changes have strengthened Gorbachev's position in the Kremlin. He appears -- for the time being at least -- to have no challengers in the Soviet leadership, and there may be recognition among his colleagues that a change of command could be highly destabilizing.

Yet, the Party apparatus's vested interest in the status quo and responsibility for coping with intractable problems on the ground still block acceptance of Gorbachev's vision of the future. Many of the Party personnel changes have moved new people into place who may be nearly as conservative or as skeptical as their

predecessors. This is a major reason why he has advanced the date of the Party Congress by six months, to October, 1990 -- thus affording him a chance to make even more dramatic changes in the Central Committee.

While engaged in this stubborn battle to reform the Party, Gorbachev is proceeding simultaneously to attempt to breathe new life into the soviets, trade unions, and other organizations through measured but significant democratization and empowerment. At the national level, the Supreme Soviet provides a vehicle for promoting change that is not easily controlled by the Party apparatus or perhaps even by Gorbachev. And, indeed, the legislature no longer seems to be a rubber stamp, as we have seen in televised debates, harsh questioning and even rejection of some of nominees for office, and in the rejection or revision of important new laws.

Yet, there is another perspective in looking at these changes. First, there are very real limits to the democratization intended by Gorbachev. While he is prepared to tolerate more diversity within the Party, multiple candidates for Party offices and the Soviets, and political activity by informal groups, he is a true Leninist and he

continues to make clear that the Communist Party's political monopoly will remain intact. No opposition party will be tolerated. Leadership moves at the top remain as enshrouded in secrecy as at any time in the past. When the regime deems it necessary, the rules can be manipulated, and democratic procedures in many places are deeply flawed. Indeed, up to two-thirds of the recent elections to the Congress of Peoples' Deputies were rigged.

Second, Gorbachev is inviting chaos by weakening the existing organs of government before the new institutions are strong enough to assume their administrative role. The odds are high against the realization of Gorbachev's vision of what the Party should become. In the meantime, his strategy is weakening the Party's ability to bring order to a still centralized state-run economy, increasing uncertainty as to the Party's role, demoralizing its members at all levels, and intensifying the already great hostility of the apparatus to Gorbachev personally. At the same time, the frustration of political and economic expectations of the population, the radicalization of demands by many informal groups, bitter conflicts over ethnic issues, and increasingly insistent workers' demands all are imposing severe strains on the new institutions -- such as the Supreme Soviet

-- and at a time when tolerance and compromise are not yet part of the political culture.

Third, with its other purposes, every element of political reform seems to have been designed to increase Gorbachev's personal power. Indeed, there is a great difference between political support for Gorbachev and support for his brand of reform. He has consolidated power far faster than his predecessors, using a unique blend of all of their techniques, including especially a deep and continuing purge, the discrediting of institutional centers of power that are potential obstacles or that could use their power against him, and making structural changes in political institutions to break up centers of resistance. Further, his occupancy of the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet gives him a power base substantially independent of the heretofore most powerful organs of the regime -- the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Secretariat.

There is a final aspect of political reform that warrants comment. Glasnost and partial democratization have contributed greatly to the two most volatile dangers Gorbachev faces--ethnic

turmoil at home and serious centrifugal forces in Eastern Europe. In the USSR, new opportunities to speak, write and organize freely have opened the way to the assertion of ancient nationalist and ethnic rights and even sovereignty, as well as to the inflammation of old, long-suppressed inter-ethnic hatreds and struggles.

Gorbachev's dilemma is how to constrain these forces and maintain the integrity of the Soviet state while avoiding a crackdown that would discredit if not destroy the heart of his reforms. At the same time, he confronts the growing fear and anger of 30 million Russians who live in these ethnic areas and who see themselves at risk politically and physically amid the turmoil.

Gorbachev seems to believe that the ethnic crises are basically due to past policy mistakes and mismanagement. Thus, the unrest can be moderated if errors are corrected and legitimate grievances addressed. He also seems to be counting on the new political institutions to provide a mechanism through which ethnic interests and demands can be accommodated.

These assumptions are likely unwarranted. Allowing the nationalities freedom to protest without being able to redress their

basic grievances is a recipe for escalating crises. The radicalization of ethnic demands and the expansion of the mass popular base for ethnic assertiveness we see occurring, as well as the entrenchment of communal violence, make the prospects for Gorbachev's ethnic strategy poor indeed. In fact, with the escalation of ethnic assertiveness generally, the radicalization of Baltic demands, and the growth of Russian nationalist sentiment, the stage is being set for major conflict between Russians and non-Russians.

In Eastern Europe, also confronted with economic crisis, reform spurred by Moscow has generated tremendous tension between regimes lacking legitimacy and their populations, as well as within Communist parties. Gorbachev's reforms in the USSR also have offered the East Europeans the opportunity to act boldly, as in Poland and Hungary -- where the former has installed a largely democratic, non-Communist government and the latter may soon follow. But elsewhere, the tensions multiply, producing great political and social pressures -- illustrated dramatically by the flight to West Germany of thousands of East Germans.

Gorbachev has urged reform on the East European laggards, as yet to no avail. He has shown he will tolerate non-Communist governments in Poland and Hungary as long as they remain in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, and avoid anti-Sovietism. But will he, can he, accept this in East Germany?

The Economy

Secretary Baker has observed that "the exponents of perestroika see their country as rich in natural resources and human talent, but stifled by the legacy of stagnation -- a system incapable of producing the economic progress which Soviet citizens have a right to expect". Unfortunately, if the future of reform is cloudy in the political arena, the picture is starkly clear in the economy: since Gorbachev came to power the situation has steadily worsened and the country is now in deep crisis. Reform leaders themselves use the most apocalyptic terms. Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin said on October 2nd, "The economy is sinking further each month. If we do not stop this process, there will be no Soviet power. It will be the end of perestroika." Reform economist N.P. Shmelev in June told the Congress of People's Deputies, "If we do not stop our

snowballing inflation, the decline in the consumer market, and our monstrous budget deficit . . . we may within 2-3 years suffer economic collapse."

The performance of the economy continues to worsen. Industrial output in the first six months of 1989 was less than one percent above the same period last year. Industrial growth this year will probably be the lowest in forty years. Coal and oil output have declined in absolute terms. The machine building industries still are not producing the quantity or quality of equipment needed for the modernization program. The only bright spot this year is in agriculture, where the grain harvest is somewhat improved.

Current poor economic performance is, in no small way, the result of deep flaws in the reform program itself. Gorbachev, soon after assuming power, asserted that he would develop his reforms "on the march, as we go." And so he has. Announced policies for economic reform are impressive: privatization of the service sector, long-term leasing of land to farmers, modernization of industry, decentralization of economic decisionmaking, independence and self-

financing of enterprises, wholesale and retail price reform, and more.

The reality is far different. Implementation has been highly uneven, rapid changes of policy have led to managerial chaos and confusion, resources for investment have been inadequate, price reform has been delayed indefinitely, curbs have been placed on enterprise authority, centrally mandated production targets have been prolonged or reimposed, and performance has been poor. The industrial modernization program -- the engine of revitalization -- has fallen further and further behind. Commissionings of new factory capacity and production of modern machinery have fallen far short of targets and needs. And, the expansion of some reform measures has disrupted the economy as problems in their design and execution have undermined implementation.

The effort to improve consumer welfare and increase popular support for perestroika has been unsuccessful. Per capita consumption increased by only about 1.5% in the first half of 1989 - much of that increase accounted for by a 30% rise in alcohol consumption (as consumers return from homebrew to expanded

availability of state-produced alcohol). Daily life has become harder with food shortages, growing inflation, and the unavailability of many retail goods. In response to this emergency, Politburo candidate member Alexandra Biryukova recently went on an extraordinary shopping spree in London, ordering \$165 million worth of shoes, toothpaste, razor blades and stockings. Even this will make barely a dent in the problem and certainly will not change the growing perception in the USSR that ordinary people are the victims of perestroika rather than its beneficiaries.

Looming over the shortcomings of the reform program itself is a growing financial crisis as the regime tries to cope with increasing inflation and a projected budget deficit that would amount to 12% of GNP -- or more than 120 billion rubles. (The combined US federal and state deficits, at their worst in 1986, were 3.5% of GNP.) Deficit reduction seems certain to fall far short of planned goals. It will be hard to impose investment cuts on ministries and republics, or to delay social programs. The coal strike settlements and raises for transport workers and others to keep them from striking also will make reductions in expenditures difficult.

The steps Gorbachev is taking to deal with these problems will not alleviate them significantly and, in fact, probably will delay if not cripple reform and modernization:

- Delays in price reform, which result from the fear that meaningful price reform will spark massive popular unrest, undermine the entirety of perestroika and economic progress. In fact, postponement of this indispensable -- though certainly very painful -- prerequisite for rational economic decisionmaking effectively puts workable decentralization, the introduction of genuine wholesale trade, and marketization itself on hold. In the meantime, talk of price reform has led to hoarding. Further delay is only making the ultimate problem more difficult.
- Diverting resources from investment in industrial modernization to alleviating consumer shortages will have only a temporary palliative effect but it will certainly further delay improvement in the economic foundations of the country.

- High taxation of cooperative income and gradual reimposition of central administrative controls on enterprises will discourage individual initiative and risktaking as well as innovative, reform minded factory managers. Indeed, the Soviet leadership continues to reject large-scale private ownership on ideological grounds. By yielding to the pressures against privatization, accommodating the dominant collectivist preferences of both the Soviet elite and the population, Moscow is reinforcing already strong impulses that exist to reassert "administrative" or Stalinist controls over the economy.

- The Soviets' emergency program to reduce inflation and the monumental deficit is likely to fall far short. This, added to diminishing prospects for marketization of the economy, sets the stage for continued corruption, protracted economic crises, and retreat to the old "command-edict" methods.

The growing assertiveness of workers, such as the miners, and broader popular participation in the political process are making needed austerity measures and painful reform initiatives all the more difficult to implement. Indeed, a gradualist, ad hoc approach to economic reform, compromises and delays in implementation, half measures, and inability to introduce simultaneously basic changes in the economic system have produced confusion, contradictions and economic stagnation. Dashed expectations likely will generate greater discontent and more strikes, further undermine work incentives, and probably lead to widespread worker unrest. Dealing with these circumstances is intrinsically difficult. That said, the problems the current Soviet leadership has created or fostered are likely to lead in the foreseeable future to major instability in the USSR.

Military and Foreign Policy

Secretary Baker accurately has observed that "the systemic, organic nature of perestroika takes it beyond the category of an exclusively domestic reform." Indeed, the economic crisis has had a profound effect on Soviet foreign policy. The USSR undoubtedly

seeks a breathing space on the international front to focus on its internal problems. It seeks Western economic help, technology and trade. It needs to avoid a new round in the arms race that would direct additional scarce resources to the military, and reducing military expenditures would free investment money for the civilian economy. The Soviets want to convert some defense industrial capacity to the production of civilian goods. And, the Kremlin would like to reduce the flow of money at least to some foreign clients, especially in the Third World.

All of these considerations underpin the so-called "new thinking" in foreign policy. And we welcome significant changes in policy on the part of the USSR, including withdrawal of their army from Afghanistan; a constructive role in the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and a similar role in the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia; concessions which made possible the Treaty eliminating intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe; the announced unilateral Soviet reduction of 500,000 soldiers, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 airplanes; a more constructive role in the UN; and an announced 14% cut in defense spending with a 19% reduction in military procurement.

These actions and the change in Soviet tone and approach, suggesting a willingness to negotiate solutions to a number of problems, have contributed to a remarkable easing of tensions in international affairs. They have stimulated, in turn, a desire in the West to reduce arms and expenditures on arms, and to assist Gorbachev and the reform process politically and financially.

Yet, while all of the actions I have just recited are real, they do not convey the full picture. For example:

- What does it say about Soviet priorities that, at a time of economic crisis at home, they are providing about \$6 billion a year in economic and military aid to Castro, a quarter billion dollars a month in weapons to the puppet government in Afghanistan (or \$4 billion this year), two-three billion dollars a year to Vietnam; and almost a billion dollars a year to Nicaragua, and twice last year's level of assistance to the Communist government of Cambodia.

- How is "new thinking" reflected in the continued sale of weapons to Libya, despite Qadhafi's persistent support

for terrorism and construction of a huge chemical weapons plant?

- What about the fact that Soviet military spending -- by our reckoning -- increased about 3% every year after Gorbachev became General Secretary, a growth rate higher than in the preceding several years; that Soviet military spending as we define it is at least twice the level announced publicly; and that only this year, when internal economic pressure became irresistible, did the Soviets apparently begin to scale back this spending somewhat?

- What are we to make of the extraordinary scope of modernization of their strategic forces, including deployment of two new mobile ICBMs; a new and more accurate model of the SS-18, the largest Soviet ICBM and its primary weapon against hard targets such as US ICBM silos; deployment of the first new intercontinental bomber in a generation -- the world's largest and heaviest bomber; continuing deployment of Delta IV and Typhoon-class ballistic-missile submarines; the development of

long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles;
upgrading of the world's only operational ABM system;
and substantial research in advanced technologies for
ballistic missile defense?

In sum, there is a very mixed picture in foreign affairs and military policy. There is much that is encouraging, but there remain significant elements of "old thinking". Some of what is touted as peaceful gestures and unilateral actions makes sense in strictly military terms, results in limited diminution in military capability, would be done as part of a modernization process, or is fairly easily reversible. It does not disparage what the Soviets have done to signal a less threatening posture to point out the capabilities that remain (and offsetting improvements underway). It does not call into question constructive Soviet moves in several regional trouble spots to observe their actions of contrary nature in the same places and elsewhere.

Implications for the US

In sum, we see a reform process in the Soviet Union that, if successful in bringing profound structural change, would move the USSR dramatically toward greater pluralism and a market economy and away from its previous internal repression and international aggressiveness and subversion. As the President has said, "we hope perestroika is pointing the Soviet Union to a break with the cycles of the past -- a definitive break."

Yet,

- We see a Soviet Union in deep internal crisis, where economic reform is foundering as fundamental measures are repeatedly postponed and where there is no strategy for making critical and near-simultaneous structural changes. The shortage of necessary consumer goods has given rise to popular discontent, strikes and growing social tension. Unrealistic hopes and deep dissatisfaction are producing an explosive combination. Persistent and growing ethnic conflicts are affecting economic performance, diverting the leadership and threatening the integrity of the country. Political power below Gorbachev

is fragmented and often too weak to maintain order, much less implement reform measures. There is, in fact, a growing likelihood of the broad use of force at home, beyond that already employed by the internal troops. In short, under any scenario, economic tension, labor unrest, and ethnic strife guarantee that the US will have to deal with a Soviet leadership that faces endemic popular instability. Indeed, the odds are great that either consumer dissatisfaction, labor unrest, or ethnic strife will create -- perhaps soon -- strong pressures for a crackdown.

- We see that Soviet preoccupation with instability and economic problems at home has not substantially affected Soviet objectives, behavior or expenditures in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, North Korea, or even Angola, where new thinking and new approaches seem to well serve old goals. Interest in arms reductions and solutions to international problems are well-balanced by continued modernization of Soviet strategic and conventional forces.

- We see a Soviet focus on internal problems that will permit continued decay of Communist systems and growth of regional instability in Eastern Europe, confronting the United States and Western Europe with new foreign policy and strategic challenges.

Where does this leave us as 1989 comes to a close? In a single sentence, we want reform to succeed, but we see a Soviet Union with still formidable military forces and military modernization programs; a mixed record abroad; multiple internal crises that could produce a change in leadership and/or direction; an inability to confront critical decisions addressing these crises; and growing odds of a crackdown and/or internal paralysis. Not knowing whether far reaching structural reform will succeed or when -- reform that would alter the very essence of Communist rule in Russia, we must pursue policies reflecting reality as well as our hopes, policies that promote genuine reform rather than discourage it, policies that are conciliatory while protecting our interests and security in the event their -- and our -- hopes are not realized. A

step by step approach is the only one consistent with Soviet realities.

We can help. We can vigorously pursue sensible arms control with the Soviets along the lines described by Secretary Baker this week in San Francisco -- in ways that enhance our security and reduce the dangers of war even while allowing both sides to reduce expenditures. We can expand trade with the Soviet Union on a commercial basis, as long as we protect strategically valuable technologies. As Secretary Baker has suggested, we can provide expertise and advice on needed economic changes, on building democratic institutions, on the rule of law, and on the basics of market economics -- price reform, a real banking system, stock markets, and so on. And, we can cooperate in resolving some regional disputes, work together on environmental problems, and collaborate in combatting narcotics.

By the steadfastness of our policies and our strength, we have brought the USSR to understand that its hope of overtaking and overcoming the West is unrealistic and that internal decay is its real problem. By holding open the prospect of a structurally changed

USSR becoming a full partner in the world order, we hope to encourage positive change. But we cannot make that change happen. Hard as it is for many to accept, in that respect we are bystanders. At the end of the day, we cannot want reform for the Soviet Union more than they themselves want it. As Secretary Baker said, "We can have but small direct impact on how the Soviets resolve their dilemmas."

Whether the Soviet Union can, in fact, peacefully evolve into a politically pluralistic, market oriented, internationally responsible society is very much an open question. Herein lies our caution and our prudence. It is far from assured that our vision of the Soviet future is Gorbachev's vision. This is an historic time of decision for the Soviet Union. Will it succeed in advancing into a different, better future or will it retreat to a more familiar but unhappy past? For now, and likely for years to come, we must be prepared for either eventuality.

As Charles Fairbanks has written, Gorbachev "is one of those historic figures driven by ambition into the grain of the familiar, splitting it apart, and triggering an avalanche of changes that we

cannot foresee." That the odds seem against his success adds to his appeal to Americans, who generally wish him well. Much is riding on him, and therefore the preoccupation among many observers with his survival in office -- and he is, in my view, above all, a survivor. But, in truth, it is the survival and ultimate success of reform itself that is critical.

We well know that the failure of perestroika (and the policies that flow from it) would pose costs and dangers not just for us, but for the whole world. The status quo in the Soviet Union, or worse -- regression -- holds no attraction for the West. We do not seek a revived traditional Soviet Union, but a fundamentally changed one. We will do all we should to help, but the greatest obstacles to the success of reform are 70 years of Communist rule and 1000 years of Russian history. Gorbachev is, in fact, challenging history itself. The odds are formidable.

The President said of our relationship with the Soviet Union at Texas A&M that, "the national security of America and our allies is not predicated on hope. It must be based on deeds. We look for enduring, ingrained economic and political change." It is, indeed,

our interest in far-reaching change in the Soviet Union that gives rise to our concern over the great obstacles, missteps and setbacks to reform; to our worry about a crackdown; and to the caution that accompanies our hopes for and wonder at this extraordinary process underway in the Soviet Union. For, as Secretary Baker has said, "it is this process, combined with our own achievements, that offers promise for the future."

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

R Blackwill

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2050610/30/89
1953

October 30, 1989

Brent --

package redone
with your edits.
messages for allies
will be punched
tonight by the Sit Room
but held until you
give the
OK tomorrowACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL NB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Package for Announcement of the Mediterranean Meeting

We attach talking points for the President's meeting with the Congressional Leadership tomorrow morning; questions and answers for the press conference; and messages informing the Summit Six and Manfred Woerner of the impending meeting. State has cleared all this material. BS Blackwill

We suggest that the messages be dispatched via privacy channels 30 minutes before the public statement which the President will make in the press room at 10:00 A.M.

We assume that you will wish to hand-carry the talking points, q's and a's, and messages to the Allies to the President in order to minimize the paper flow.

RECOMMENDATION

That you give the talking points, q's and a's, and messages to Allies to the President for his approval.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Points
Tab II Q's and A's
Tab III Messages

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING
PRIOR TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN MEETING

- I WANT TO INFORM YOU, IN ADVANCE OF THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET ABOARD U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS ON ALTERNATE DAYS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON DECEMBER 2 AND 3. THE PRECISE LOCATION IS YET TO BE DETERMINED.
- WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS MEETING FOR SOME TIME, INCLUDING DURING FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER.
- WHILE THERE WILL BE A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT MEETING DURING THE LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER OF NEXT YEAR, GORBACHEV AND I AGREED THAT AN INFORMAL MEETING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AT THIS TIME OF RAPID AND HISTORIC CHANGE WOULD BE USEFUL.
- I DO NOT INTEND THAT THIS WILL BE A DETAILED NEGOTIATING SESSION. I HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH GORBACHEV SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT, AND THOUGH WE HAVE WRITTEN TO EACH OTHER SEVERAL TIMES, I WANT TO AGAIN ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT WITH HIM. WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DISCUSS U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE BROADEST SENSE.
- I ALSO HOPE TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING WITH A BETTER SENSE OF HOW GORBACHEV VIEWS THE DEMANDS OF PERESTROIKA AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.
- I, OF COURSE, LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING MY IMPRESSIONS WITH YOU UPON MY RETURN.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MEDITERRANEAN MEETING

Q1: HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN PLANNING THIS MEETING?

A1: WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A MEETING WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR SOME TIME, INCLUDING DURING FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER.

Q2: WHY DID IT TAKE SO LONG TO ARRANGE SUCH A MEETING?

A2: OUR DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE NEED TO FIND A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME AND APPROPRIATE VENUE FOR AN INFORMAL MEETING OF THIS KIND, AND TIME WAS NEEDED TO CONSIDER VARIOUS OPTIONS.

Q3: IS THIS MEETING BEING ARRANGED SO SUDDENLY TO ANSWER CRITICISM ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATION'S TIMIDITY IN RESPONDING TO CHANGES UNDERWAY IN EUROPE?

A3: AS I'VE SAID, WE'VE BEEN DISCUSSING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS MEETING FOR SOME TIME. WE HAVE ALREADY SCHEDULED A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT MEETING NEXT YEAR, BUT BOTH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO MEET MORE INFORMALLY AND RENEW OUR ACQUAINTANCE.

Q4: WHOSE IDEA WAS THIS MEETING?

A4: THIS WAS ACTUALLY A REAL MEETING OF THE MINDS; BOTH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I WANTED SUCH A MEETING.

Q5: YOU SAY THIS MEETING WILL BE INFORMAL. WILL THIS BE ANOTHER MEETING LIKE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "INFORMAL" MEETING WITH GORBACHEV IN REYKJAVIK IN 1986?

A5: AS I SAID, WE ARE NOT GETTING TOGETHER IN DECEMBER IN ORDER TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS. THIS IS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO RENEW OUR ACQUAINTANCE AND EXCHANGE GENERAL VIEWS AT A TIME OF RAPID AND HOPEFUL CHANGE AROUND THE WORLD.

Q6: DIDN'T YOU SAY DURING THE CAMPAIGN THAT YOU ONLY WANTED TO MEET GORBACHEV ON A FORMAL BASIS, WITH CAREFUL PREPARATION, WHEN THERE ARE AGREEMENTS TO BE SIGNED?

A6: AS I'VE INDICATED, NEITHER PRESIDENT GORBACHEV NOR I INTEND TO USE THIS MEETING AS A FORUM FOR ACHIEVING AGREEMENTS. THAT WILL BE THE OBJECTIVE OF A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT MEETING NEXT YEAR IN THE LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER. THIS INFORMAL DISCUSSION IN DECEMBER WILL, HOWEVER, BE SUBSTANTIVE, AND I ASSUME PRESIDENT

GORBACHEV, LIKE MYSELF, WILL BE FULLY READY TO ENGAGE. I BELIEVE SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AT THIS POINT IN TIME, WILL BE HELPFUL FOR BOTH OF US.

Q7: WHY ARE YOU SETTING SUCH MODEST GOALS FOR THIS MEETING? SHOULDN'T WE TRY TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE FORWARD CONCRETELY IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS?

A7: WE ARE PURSUING A BROAD AGENDA IN OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, FROM ARMS CONTROL TO HUMAN RIGHTS, TO WORK IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS. I HOPE THAT SUBSTANTIAL ACHIEVEMENTS ON THESE SUBJECTS CAN BE MADE BY THE TIME PRESIDENT GORBACHEV COMES TO THE UNITED STATES NEXT YEAR. THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING, HOWEVER, IS INFORMATIONAL AND TO GET BETTER ACQUAINTED.

Q8: HAVE YOU INFORMED THE ALLIES?

A8: YES, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

Q9: HAVE YOU INFORMED THE CHINESE?

A9: OUR EMBASSIES ARE INFORMING ALL CAPITALS.

Q10: HAVE YOU INFORMED THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP?

A10: YES, I TOLD THEM MYSELF.

Q11: WHERE EXACTLY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WILL THIS MEETING TAKE PLACE?

A11: THE PRECISE LOCATION IS STILL BEING DETERMINED.

Q12: WHY ARE YOU DOING THIS MEETING OUT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, ON SHIPS?

A12: PRESIDENT GORBACHEV HAD ALREADY PLANNED TO BE IN ITALY AT ABOUT THIS TIME, AND THIS SEEMED LIKE AN APPROPRIATE WAY TO HANDLE THE SORT OF INFORMAL MEETING WE HAD IN MIND.

Q13: ARE YOU GOING TO DISCUSS WAYS FOR THE U.S. TO HELP GORBACHEV WITH HIS PROGRAM OF REFORMS?

A13: OF COURSE, I AM VERY INTERESTED IN THE EVENTS NOW GOING ON IN THE SOVIET UNION, AND I WILL NATURALLY BE EAGER TO HEAR FROM PRESIDENT GORBACHEV ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY THERE. AS I HAVE SAID MANY TIMES, WE WANT PERESTROIKA TO SUCCEED.

Q14: ARE YOU GOING TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV?

A15: THERE IS NO FORMAL AGENDA FOR OUR DISCUSSIONS. THERE ARE VERY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS OCCURRING IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THIS WERE NOT AMONG THE SUBJECTS ON WHICH WE WOULD EXCHANGE VIEWS. BUT, OF COURSE, THE U.S. POSITION ON THE FUTURE OF EASTERN EUROPE HAS BEEN FULLY COORDINATED WITH OUR WESTERN ALLIES AND WILL REMAIN SO.

Q15: ARE YOU GOING TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITIES FOR GERMAN REUNIFICATION WITH PRESIDENT GORBACHEV?

A15: WE HOPE THAT THE NEW REGIME IN EAST GERMANY WILL IMPLEMENT REFORMS OF THE SORT ALREADY UNDERWAY ELSEWHERE IN EASTERN EUROPE. ON THE LONGER-TERM QUESTION, OUR POSITION RESPECTING SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE GERMAN PEOPLE IS CLEAR. AS I SAID RECENTLY, I DO NOT SHARE THE CONCERN OF SOME ABOUT THIS ISSUE BECAUSE I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY'S COMMITMENT TO THE WESTERN ALLIANCE IS UNSHAKABLE. IT IS NOT FOR US TO PUSH THE CONCEPT OF REUNIFICATION -- OR SET TIMETABLES.

Q16: IS THE ARRANGEMENT OF THIS MEETING PART OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION'S NEW APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, FOLLOWING UP ON SECRETARY BAKER'S SAN FRANCISCO SPEECH?

A16: AS I'VE SAID WE HAVE BEEN ARRANGING THIS MEETING FOR SOME TIME, AND MY APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION, MOVING BEYOND CONTAINMENT, HAS ALSO BEEN IN PLACE FOR A WHILE. THIS MEETING IS PART OF MY CONTINUING EFFORT TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR HISTORIC PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Thatcher
via White House privacy channels

Dear Margaret,

I wanted you to know before it is publicly announced that President Gorbachev and I will meet aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3 to review the current international environment and to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. As you are aware, there will be a full-scale Summit in the United States during the late spring or early summer of next year. That is some time distant and President Gorbachev and I have agreed that an earlier informal meeting to exchange views at this time of rapid and historic change would be useful.

I do not intend a detailed negotiating session during these December talks nor do I expect that President Gorbachev and I will conclude agreements in the course of this meeting on any issues of significance. With regard to CFE, I will naturally explain the West's current position and hear out any new ideas President Gorbachev may have.

As you know, I have not had an opportunity to meet with President Gorbachev since becoming President, and although we have written to each other often, I want again to establish personal contact with him. I hope to get a better sense of how he views the demand of perestroika and the future course of East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations. I, of course, look forward to sharing my impressions with you upon my return.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand
via White House privacy channels

Dear Francois,

I wanted you to know before it is publicly announced that President Gorbachev and I will meet aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3 to review the current international environment and to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. As you are aware, there will be a full-scale Summit in the United States during the late spring or early summer of next year. That is some time distant and President Gorbachev and I have agreed that an earlier informal meeting to exchange views at this time of rapid and historic change would be useful.

I do not intend a detailed negotiating session during these December talks nor do I expect that President Gorbachev and I will conclude agreements in the course of this meeting on any issues of significance. With regard to CFE, I will naturally explain the West's current position and hear out any new ideas President Gorbachev may have.

As you know, I have not had an opportunity to meet with President Gorbachev since becoming President, and although we have written to each other often, I want again to establish personal contact with him. I hope to get a better sense of how he views the demand of perestroika and the future course of East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations. I, of course, look forward to sharing my impressions with you upon my return.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

Message from President Bush to Chancellor Kohl
via White House privacy channels

Dear Helmut,

I wanted you to know before it is publicly announced that President Gorbachev and I will meet aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3 to review the current international environment and to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. As you are aware, there will be a full-scale Summit in the United States during the late spring or early summer of next year. That is some time distant and President Gorbachev and I have agreed that an earlier informal meeting to exchange views at this time of rapid and historic change would be useful.

I do not intend a detailed negotiating session during these December talks nor do I expect that President Gorbachev and I will conclude agreements in the course of this meeting on any issues of significance. With regard to CFE, I will naturally explain the West's current position and hear out any new ideas President Gorbachev may have.

As you know, I have not had an opportunity to meet with President Gorbachev since becoming President, and although we have written to each other often, I want again to establish personal contact with him. I hope to get a better sense of how he views the demand of perestroika and the future course of East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations. I, of course, look forward to sharing my impressions with you upon my return.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 JMM

~~SECRET~~

Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Andreotti
via White House privacy channels

Dear Giulio,

I wanted you to know before it is publicly announced that President Gorbachev and I will meet aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3 to review the current international environment and to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. As you are aware, there will be a full-scale Summit in the United States during the late spring or early summer of next year. That is some time distant and President Gorbachev and I have agreed that an earlier informal meeting to exchange views at this time of rapid and historic change would be useful.

I do not intend a detailed negotiating session during these December talks nor do I expect that President Gorbachev and I will conclude agreements in the course of this meeting on any issues of significance. With regard to CFE, I will naturally explain the West's current position and hear out any new ideas President Gorbachev may have.

As you know, I have not had an opportunity to meet with President Gorbachev since becoming President, and although we have written to each other often, I want again to establish personal contact with him. I hope to get a better sense of how he views the demand of perestroika and the future course of East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations. I, of course, look forward to sharing my impressions with you upon my return.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

Message from President Bush to Prime Minister Mulroney
via White House privacy channels

Dear Brian,

I wanted you to know before it is publicly announced that President Gorbachev and I will meet aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3 to review the current international environment and to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. As you are aware, there will be a full-scale Summit in the United States during the late spring or early summer of next year. That is some time distant and President Gorbachev and I have agreed that an earlier informal meeting to exchange views at this time of rapid and historic change would be useful.

I do not intend a detailed negotiating session during these December talks nor do I expect that President Gorbachev and I will conclude agreements in the course of this meeting on any issues of significance. With regard to CFE, I will naturally explain the West's current position and hear out any new ideas President Gorbachev may have.

As you know, I have not had an opportunity to meet with President Gorbachev since becoming President, and although we have written to each other often, I want again to establish personal contact with him. I hope to get a better sense of how he views the demand of perestroika and the future course of East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations. I, of course, look forward to sharing my impressions with you upon my return.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

Message from President Bush to Secretary General Woerner
via White House privacy channels

Dear Manfred,

I wanted you to know before it is publicly announced that President Gorbachev and I will meet aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3 to review the current international environment and to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. As you are aware, there will be a full-scale Summit in the United States during the late spring or early summer of next year. That is some time distant and President Gorbachev and I have agreed that an earlier informal meeting to exchange views at this time of rapid and historic change would be useful.

I do not intend a detailed negotiating session during these December talks nor do I expect that President Gorbachev and I will conclude agreements in the course of this meeting on any issues of significance. With regard to CFE, I will naturally explain the West's current position and hear out any new ideas President Gorbachev may have.

As you know, I have not had an opportunity to meet with President Gorbachev since becoming President, and although we have written to each other often, I want again to establish personal contact with him. I hope to get a better sense of how he views the demand of perestroika and the future course of East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations. I, of course, look forward to sharing my impressions with you upon my return.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-442
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP MEETING
PRIOR TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN MEETING

-- I WANT TO INFORM YOU, IN ADVANCE OF THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT, THAT PRESIDENT GORBACHEV AND I HAVE AGREED TO MEET ABOARD U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS ON ALTERNATE DAYS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON DECEMBER 2 AND 3. THE PRECISE LOCATION IS YET TO BE DETERMINED.

-- WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS MEETING FOR SOME TIME, INCLUDING DURING FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER.

-- WHILE THERE WILL BE A FULL-SCALE SUMMIT MEETING DURING THE LATE SPRING OR EARLY SUMMER OF NEXT YEAR, GORBACHEV AND I AGREED THAT AN INFORMAL MEETING TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AT THIS TIME OF RAPID AND HISTORIC CHANGE WOULD BE USEFUL.

I do not intend that there will be
-- ~~NEITHER PRESIDENT GORBACHEV NOR I HAVE IN MIND A DETAILED NEGOTIATING SESSION. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT WE ARE LIKELY TO CONCLUDE ANY OF THE VARIOUS BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS NOW UNDERWAY IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING.~~

th/ I HAVE NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH GORBACHEV SINCE BECOMING PRESIDENT, AND THOUGH WE HAVE WRITTEN TO EACH OTHER SEVERAL TIMES, I WANT TO AGAIN ESTABLISH PERSONAL CONTACT WITH HIM. WE WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE STATE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DISCUSS U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS *in the broadest sense*

-- I ALSO HOPE TO EMERGE FROM THE MEETING WITH A BETTER SENSE OF HOW GORBACHEV VIEWS THE DEMANDS OF PERESTROIKA AND THE FUTURE COURSE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

-- I, OF COURSE, LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING MY IMPRESSIONS WITH YOU UPON MY RETURN.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

Message from President Bush to President Mitterrand
via White House privacy channels

Dear Francois,

That is some time ^{distant} ~~ago~~ and
I wanted you to know before it is publicly announced that President Gorbachev and I will meet aboard U.S. and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3 to review the current international environment and to discuss U.S.-Soviet relations. As you are aware, there will be a full-scale Summit in the United States during the late spring or early summer of next year. ~~Yet~~ President Gorbachev and I have agreed that ~~this an~~ earlier informal meeting to exchange views at this time of rapid and historic change would be useful.

will I do not ~~have in mind~~ ^{intend} a detailed ^{expect} negotiating session during these December talks nor do I believe that President Gorbachev and I ~~are likely to conclude~~ ^{agreements} in the course of this meeting ~~any of the~~ ^{on} various bilateral arms control efforts now underway. With regard to CFE, I will naturally ~~argue~~ the West's current position and hear out any new ideas President Gorbachev may have.

As you know, I have not had an opportunity to meet with President Gorbachev since becoming President, and although we have written to each other often, I want again to establish personal contact with him. I hope to get a better sense of how he views the demand of perestroika and the future course of East-West and U.S.-Soviet relations. I, of course, look forward to sharing my impressions with you upon my return.

Sincerely,

explain

*issues of
significance*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Brent --

10/30/89
1217

Here is our best effort,
working with State, to make
the suggested Soviet ^{text} ~~statement~~
grammatical and in the first
person. You will know whether
to go back to the Soviets with
this text. Q&A's/Pres. talkers for
Congressional leadership to come.
BB Blackwell

① ~~Handwritten signature~~
~~Summit~~

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Pursuant to an agreement reached between the sides, President Gorbachev and I will meet on December 2-3. The meeting will be held on alternate days on board American and Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean at a place to be determined.

In view of the full-scale U.S.-Soviet Summit to be held in late spring - early summer of 1990 in the United States, we agreed that an interim informal meeting at this time would be useful.

The forthcoming talks will be informational, designed to allow us to become better acquainted and to deepen our respective understanding of each other's views.

The two sides do not anticipate that agreements on specific issues will be reached during this informal meeting.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 MM

SECRET

Pursuant to the agreement reached between the sides, M.G. and Pres. Bush will meet on Dec 2-3. The meeting will be held on alternate days on board an American and a Soviet naval vessels in the Mediterranean (place).

In view of the full-scale meeting Soviet-US summit to be held ⁱⁿ late spring - early summer of 1990 in the United States, both sides decided that an interim informal meeting at this time will be ~~appropriate~~ useful.

The forthcoming talks between the Soviet and American leaders will be informal in nature, designed to enable them to ~~better~~ ^{make better} acquaintance with of each other and to deepen ^{their respective} understanding of ~~the~~ each other's views.

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1612-MR
6/13/2016 M.A.

~~SECRET~~

~~In accordance with~~

The two sides do not set the task of reaching agreements on specific issues during this informal meeting.

SENSITIVE