

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2011-0298-F

FOIA Number:
2011-0298-F

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30546
Folder ID Number: 30546-002

Folder Title:
July 1989 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

20901

July 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: JANIS WHITLEY

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Travel Request for Condoleezza Rice

Travel authorization is hereby requested for Condoleezza Rice to travel to Brussels, Belgium to attend meetings to coordinate support for reforms in Poland and Hungary. The meetings will be chaired by the European Community Commission.

Authorization is also requested for Dr. Rice to upgrade her outgoing reservations to business class. Dr. Rice will be arriving in Brussels on Monday, July 31, at 8:25 am and, almost immediately, attending meetings. She needs the space in business class to prepare for the upcoming meetings and also to have the opportunity to sleep since it is an all night flight. Dr. Rice will return government rate.

The fare breakdown is: \$1127.00 each way for business class and \$387.00 for government rate. NSC will cover all expenses which will total \$2032.00.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the travel authorization form at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Travel Authorization Form

Tab II Memorandum to State Department

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By 4 NARA, Date 6/14/11

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: Condoleezza Rice
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): attend meetings in Brussels, Belgium to coordinate support for reforms in Poland and Hungary chaired by the European Community Commission.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Washington DC to Brussels and return to Washington, DC
4. DEPARTURE DATE July 30 RETURN DATE Aug 2
DEPARTURE TIME 3:59pm RETURN TIME 3:54pm
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR _____ COMMERCIAL AIR X POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION 1514.00 PER DIEM 488.00 OTHER 30.00
TOTAL 2032.00
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC X OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO X
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ _____
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Condoleezza Rice
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director R. Blackburn
Director of Administration _____
National Security Adviser _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20901

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Foreign Travel

NSC Staff
Member: Condoleezza Rice

Purpose of Travel:

To attend meetings in Brussels, Belgium, to coordinate support for reforms in Poland and Hungary. The meetings will be chaired by the European Community Commission.

ITINERARY

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CITY</u>	<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>MAJOR EVENT/MEETING</u>
July 30-Aug 2	Brussels	Belgium	Meetings

G. PHILIP HUGHES
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By 11 NARA, Date 6/14/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5853

July 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

ROBERT BLACKWILL/ARNIE KANTER *CR for AK*

FROM:

CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT:

The President's Meeting with Marshal Akhromeyev

The memorandum at Tab I from you to the President provides background on Marshal Akhromeyev and suggests a number of topics that might be raised in the meeting. The President has met Marshal Akhromeyev several times, including last year when, as Vice-President, he received him formally. Akhromeyev remembers that meeting as one in which they shared experiences as veterans of World War II.

Akhromeyev is known for his grasp of detail and willingness to engage on technical matters of arms control and military policy. The President can use this opportunity to reiterate his determination to reach early agreement at CFE and on chemical weapons; and to explain the rationale for the START verification package. He might also press Akhromeyev on Soviet defense spending and the importance of transparency in the military relationship.

Marshal Akhromeyev's portfolio is believed to focus relatively narrowly on military policy and he may be uncomfortable discussing foreign policy issues. Yet he has made interesting statements during this trip on Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe saying that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the internal affairs of those states. The President might wish to draw him out on what "new thinking" means for Soviet security policy in terms of Soviet willingness to intervene in Eastern Europe and security assistance in the Third World.

The memorandum to the President provides some background on the current state of political-military relations in the Soviet Union. It is important to put Akhromeyev's role as a retired professional military man, turned adviser to Gorbachev, into perspective. The Soviet military is caught in the maelstrom accompanying perestroika. Professional officers are generally supportive of Gorbachev's economic modernization plan, though undoubtedly uncomfortable with its impact on Soviet security policy in the short-term.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-1582-MR
8/21/2013 JMM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Akhromeyev thus often finds himself defending specific security policies that he has, at earlier times, rejected. Such was the case with the unilateral troop reductions announced by Gorbachev in December 1987 to which all professional military men, including Akhromeyev, objected publicly prior to the announcement. But he is a good soldier and defends Gorbachev's security policies articulately and ardently. He provides a window on the professional military's view of how Soviet security policy will evolve as the Gorbachev revolution proceeds.

RD in left
Rich Davis concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	Presidential Talking Points
Tab B	List of Participants
Tab C	Akhromeyev Biography

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

5853

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH
MARSHAL SERGEY FEODOROVICH AKHROMEYEV OF THE SOVIET UNION

DATE: July 28, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:00 - 3:00 pm

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE:

To discuss issues of security and arms control with Marshal Akhromeyev.

II. BACKGROUND:

Your meeting with Akhromeyev provides an opportunity to discuss a number of security and arms control issues. He has been travelling throughout the United States and has testified before Les Aspin's committee.

Akhromeyev is known for his grasp of detail and his willingness to engage on technical matters. You may want to reiterate your determination to achieve early agreement at CFE and explain our rationale for the START verification package. Akhromeyev is likely to highlight Soviet concerns with our ceilings for U.S. and Soviet manpower and U.S. inclusion of air defense aircraft in CFE. He may repeat his public appeal for the inclusion of naval aircraft in the context of a CFE agreement. You could also ask him to elaborate on Moscow's view of outstanding issues at START.

You may also find it interesting to probe broader security issues with Akhromeyev. He has said during this trip that the Soviet Union intends to cut back on security assistance to the Third World and categorically ruled out Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe.

In raising these broader issues, you may be able to get a feel for how he views perestroika and its impact on Soviet military concerns. The Soviet Union has a long tradition of civilian control, maintained through a combination of

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-1582-MR
SCS 4/30/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

normative appeals and coercive means. Akhromeyev is, in keeping with that tradition, a good soldier and has been publicly supportive of Gorbachev's entire agenda. Yet questions remain about his decision to step down as Chief of the General Staff on the morning of Gorbachev's December announcement at the U.N. of the unilateral force reduction - a policy against which he had argued publicly prior to the decision.

Akhromeyev embodies the contradictory impulses that Soviet professional military men feel concerning perestroika. The Soviet military was an early supporter of economic reform, arguing well before Gorbachev rose to power that the weak economy threatened the Soviet Union's superpower status. Many in the General Staff, which Akhromeyev headed at the time, understood that the weak Soviet technological base could not support ever increasing demands for sophisticated military technology, particularly in the field of computers and information processing. They share Gorbachev's desire to build a modern economic and technological base.

But increasingly, the entire course of reform threatens core military interests that go well beyond the allocation of resources to defense. Glasnost' has produced unparalleled scrutiny of the defense budget, exposed corruption within the armed forces and unleashed criticism of their role in Afghanistan. The military has been pressured to produce civilian goods in defense plants and to convert several facilities permanently to civilian use. The top leadership, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze among them, consistently downgrades the role of military power in a way that must be offensive to the army which has, throughout Soviet history, been Moscow's strongest asset in foreign policy. Finally, the military recently has been forced to impose civil order in rebellious republics. Unaccustomed to a role usually reserved to internal security forces, the military has bristled at the criticism of their use of lethal force in Georgia.

Perhaps most disturbing from the military's point of view is the degree to which they have lost control of the security agenda. Until Gorbachev, "military-technical issues" as they were called, were the domain of the Soviet General Staff which prepared options for central political decisionmakers. While political leaders could and did reject military advice, the range of options was so narrow as to almost always serve professional military interests.

Gorbachev appears to rely less on the General Staff for the generation of options, and more on a group of trusted aides drawn from wide variety of backgrounds. It is not clear whether Akhromeyev is a part of this inner circle but as a former Chief of the General Staff, he speaks authoritatively

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

and can cushion Gorbachev against criticism within the military that he is recklessly threatening Soviet security interests.

The new national security decision structure accounts for the ability of the Soviet Union to propose sweeping military initiatives. But as Gorbachev and his closest advisers become more and more preoccupied with domestic difficulties, the danger of a reemergence of bureaucratic inertia in Soviet security policy increases. The recent back and forth in Moscow concerning your timetable for a CFE agreement is perhaps a case in point. The military planners do not think that they can reduce and demobilize their forces in three years and are pressing their case.

There is no evidence that the Soviet military threatens Gorbachev or perestroika. The mechanisms of civilian control, including KGB moles among the officer corps, are an effective deterrent to a politically active military. But this is a difficult and fluid time for political-military relations in the Soviet Union. The military is trying to find its bearings in a radically different international and domestic environment. Akhromeyev, a former Chief of the General Staff, provides a window on how professional military men see the evolution of Soviet security policy as the Gorbachev revolution proceeds.

III. PRESS PLAN

Open Photo and Writing Pool.

IV. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity followed by discussion with Marshal Akhromeyev.

Attachments

Tab A Presidential Talking Points
Tab B List of Participants
Tab C Akhromeyev Biography

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE IN THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MARSHAL

AKHROMEYEV

PERESTROIKA

- I want to take this opportunity to say what I have said publicly several times -- the United States supports perestroika in the Soviet Union and wishes President Gorbachev success in the pursuit of reform.

- As the reforms take place, I believe that there will be a firm basis for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. As I have said, we can now look to move beyond containment to enduring cooperation.

- I would be interested in your views of the challenges that lie ahead for perestroika. I am particularly interested in how you see the relationship of your security policies to the process of domestic economic reform.

- We are following economic reform with interest. How will the proposed changes impact on the future character of Soviet military forces?

-- Do you think that the military is adjusting well to the demands of perestroika?

-- You have said that there will be reductions in military procurement after 1990. Will you elaborate?

START

-- I want to emphasize the importance of the work our START negotiators are doing in Geneva. In these negotiations we seek an agreement that improves the security of both our countries and reduces the risk of war. Nothing has higher priority.

-- Much has already been accomplished in these negotiations, but significant problems remain. Among the outstanding issues, verification is the most complex.

-- It is for this reason that I proposed last month that we make a special effort to agree on and begin implementing as soon as possible a series of verification and stability measures.

-- I am heartened by evidence that the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate seriously toward a START agreement that promises to reduce the risk of war. I urge you to give our proposed verification and stability initiatives the most

serious consideration. Early agreement on them will speed resolution of outstanding issues and give added momentum to our joint efforts to conclude a fair and far reaching agreement in START.

CFE

- I want you to know that we are serious about rapid progress in the CFE negotiations. The President is committed to an ambitious timetable for concluding, and implementing, an agreement. We are communicating this priority to our officials and to our negotiators in Vienna. We hope you are doing the same.
- There are a number of areas of common ground between us on fundamental issues. We must do more to consolidate these areas of agreement and clear away trivial issues, so that we can concentrate on the big questions that divide us.
- One of these, I know, is aircraft. We do not believe a meaningful, or verifiable, distinction can be made between aircraft armed at a particular moment for some missions but not for others. All land-based aircraft designed for combat, and their look-alike variants, must be counted.

((If SNF talks are raised))

- The alliance has agreed publicly that there should be no negotiations on short-range nuclear forces until after conclusion of a CFE agreement. If you are anxious to begin SNF talks, I hope that will improve our chances for an early and successful outcome to our talks in Vienna.

((If carrier aircraft are raised))

- We cannot accept your argument for discussion of carrier-based aircraft. You agreed to exclude these forces, which can operate anywhere around the world, from the mandate for the CFE talks. Moreover, as a military man, you know that the numbers of carrier aircraft that could actually operate over Europe are marginal in comparison to the thousands of aircraft at issue in Vienna and the thousands which would remain after any agreement.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- I am sure you share my desire to eliminate the threat and capability of chemical weapons.
- This is a growing worldwide problem, but one where both our countries must set the example in moving to eliminate these weapons.
- We appreciate your experts' efforts with ours at the latest

bilateral discussions but there is still much to be done before these weapons are eliminated.

- We would welcome Soviet cooperation in preventing the spread of chemical weapons to additional states.

SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO CLIENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD

- I am interested in how you think security assistance fits into your new policy toward the Third World. For instance, we continue to be concerned about Soviet military assistance to the Sandinistas and the sale of advanced weaponry to Libya and to North Korea.
- It is important for regional stability that we work together to prevent proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01d. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	4/28/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: July 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 6/14/2011	OA/ID Number: 30546
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

Richard B. Cheney, Secretary of Defense

Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs

Condoleezza Rice, Director, European and Soviet Affairs

U.S.S.R.

Marshall Sergey Feodorovich Akhromeyev, Security Policy Advisor to President Gorbachev

Yuriy V. Dubinin, Ambassador

Col. Popov, Interpreter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chron
5879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 26, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on Berlin

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President attaching a letter to Gorbachev (Tab A) for signature. The letter follows up on the President's Mainz speech, in which he reaffirmed U.S. support for the 1987 Allied initiative on Berlin. So far, Soviet reactions have been unencouraging, and we believe that a personal letter from the President is needed to engage Soviet attention at the highest level.

The letter puts the Berlin initiative in the broader context of East-West relations and suggests that progress among the four powers in Berlin could show the way to progress beyond the city itself. In the letter, the President proposes that the Soviet Union join us, the U.K. and France for four-power discussions in early fall, as has already been communicated in a June 27 demarche delivered in Moscow.

We propose that the substance of the letter be shared with the U.K., France, and FRG, as well as with the Berlin Senat. At Tab II is a memorandum tasking State to prepare a crosshatch cable for release as soon as the letter is sent.

The State Department has cleared this initiative and the substance of the Presidential letter.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you sign the Tab I memorandum for the President.

That you authorize Philip Hughes to sign the Tab II memorandum for State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev
Tab II Hughes Memorandum for Roy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0727 NR
28 319109

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5879

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on Berlin

Purpose

To follow up on your Mainz initiative and engage Gorbachev personally on Berlin.

Background

Soviet reactions to your reaffirmation of the 1987 Allied initiative on Berlin have been unencouraging. This letter will underscore your personal commitment and put Berlin in a broader context, suggesting that progress among the four powers in Berlin could show the way to progress beyond the city itself. It expresses the hope that Berlin become a place of cooperation, rather than a point of confrontation, and proposes ways that Moscow might join us toward that end.

We would share the substance of your message with our Allies.

The State Department has cleared this initiative and the substance of the letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Gorbachev at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Letter to Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0727MR
ES 3/9/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Chairman Gorbachev:

In my speech in Mainz on May 31, I reaffirmed U.S. support for the 1987 Western initiative on Berlin. I expressed the hope that Berlin could become a place of cooperation rather than a point of confrontation.

It has now been forty years since the ending of the Berlin air lift and the first post-war Berlin crisis. On August 13, we mark the twenty-eighth anniversary of another Berlin crisis and the erection of the Wall that still divides the city. It is my deep conviction that we now have an opportunity to take important steps toward ensuring that Berlin never again become a flashpoint in East-West relations.

In that spirit, let me propose that your country join the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in discussing practical steps we might take together to improve the situation in and around Berlin. The French Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, accompanied by British and American diplomatic representatives, delivered that proposal to your Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 27, suggesting that preparatory talks be held in early fall.

At this time of hope for ending Europe's division, Berlin stands more than ever as the symbol of that division. By the same token, progress in Berlin would facilitate other steps toward European reconciliation. Our initiative offers proposals for making Berlin a more open city without undermining four-power responsibilities there. It is also a modest beginning to what could be a broader dialogue.

In a very real sense, Berlin's concerns are Europe's concerns, and our mutual responsibilities in Berlin are connected to our larger responsibilities in the center of Europe. Expanding air traffic between East and West, working together toward solving environmental problems, facilitating economic ties: these are areas in which Berlin can show the way to a broader process of cooperation and joint action. We hope the four powers can exercise their unique responsibilities in ways that let Berlin be a leader, not a barrier, toward European reconciliation.

I would welcome your views on how we might proceed together to address these issues.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5879

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

Attached is the text of a Presidential letter to Chairman Gorbachev concerning Berlin. It should be included in a cable to London, Paris, Bonn, and the U.S. Mission in Berlin, along with appropriate instructions for passing the substance to Allied governments, and should be handled in the Crosshatch system.

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Text of Presidential Letter to Gorbachev

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0727MR
ES 5/9/09

~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8904368
RECEIVED: 06 JUN 89 18

TO: ROY, J

FROM: HUGHES

DOC DATE: 25 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ITALY
NATO
SPAIN

BELGIUM
GREECE
GERMANY F R



PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR PRES TRIP TO EUROPE MAY 26 - JUN 2 1989

ACTION: HUGHES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 09 JUN 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
HILLIARD

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS

CLOSED BY: NSRSC

DOC 2 OF 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
H 6/14/11

~~TOP SECRET~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8904368

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 HUGHES
002

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED


Z 89061711 FOR DECISION
X 89072512 HUGHES SGD MEMO

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS
16 6/14/11

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of StateSUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations from the President's
Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989Attached for your information are the Memoranda of Conversations
of the President's Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989. ~~TS~~
G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachments

Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Meeting with
Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Expanded Meeting
with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Meeting with
Italian President Cossiga
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 27 Meeting with
Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy Craxi
Memorandum of Conversation for the Additional May 27 Meeting
with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 28 Meeting with
Belgian Prime Minister Martens
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 29 Meeting with NATO
Secretary General Woerner
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with Greek
Prime Minister Papandreu
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with
Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with EC
Commission President Delors
Memorandum of Conversation for the May 30 Meeting with FRG
Chancellor Kohl
Memorandum of Conversation for the June 1 Expanded Meeting
with UK Prime Minister Thatcher

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 4 NARA, Date 4/14/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(w/~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments)

4368

June 15, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations from the President's
Trip to Europe, May 26 - Jun 2, 1989

Attached at Tabs I - XIV are the subject memoranda. The only missing MEMCON is the President's meeting with Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, in Brussels on the morning of May 29. The notetaker for the meeting was Charles Thomas, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Jim Collins is aware that we need a final version of this MEMCON and has promised to forward it to the NSC.

We suggest, that consistent with your usual procedures, copies of these memoranda be made available to State and Defense, with the exceptions of the MEMCON for the President's May 30 meeting with Chancellor Kohl (Tab XII) and the MEMCON for the President's small June 1 meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher (Tab XIV).

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Conversations be filed for the record.

Approve *✓ RB*

Disapprove _____

That you approve release of all attached Memoranda to the Department of State with the exceptions of the MEMCON of the President's May 30 meeting with Chancellor Kohl (Tab XII) and the MEMCON of the President's small June 1 meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher (Tab XIII).

Approve *✓ RB*

Disapprove _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(w/~~TOP SECRET~~ attachments)

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0762-MR
MM 4/18/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Meeting with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Tab II	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Expanded Meeting with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Tab III	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Meeting with Italian President Cossiga
Tab IV	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 27 Meeting with Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy Craxi
Tab V	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's Additional May 27 Meeting with Italian Prime Minister De Mita
Tab VI	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 28 Meeting with Belgian Prime Minister Martens
Tab VII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 29 Meeting with NATO Secretary General Woerner
Tab VIII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with Greek Prime Minister Papandreou
Tab IX	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez
Tab X	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with EC Commission President Delors
Tab XI	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 30 Meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl
Tab XII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's May 31 Small Meeting with FRG Chancellor Kohl
Tab XIII	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's June 1 Meeting with UK Prime Minister Thatcher
Tab XIV	Memorandum of Conversation for the President's June 1 Expanded Meeting with UK Prime Minister Thatcher

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4368

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)
Interpreter

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 10:10 a.m. - 11:45 a.m.
AND PLACE: Villa Madama, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita renewed his welcome and said he was sure Rome would get the President off to a good start for his European visit. Italy and the U.S., he said, now face an exceptional international situation. Today, we are building on peace and no one is prepared for that. We must be ready for the future. Therefore, the Atlantic Community, which has been the equilibrium for keeping the peace, should be the center of future efforts to build peace. Solidarity within the Alliance should grow, should take advantage of this new era. In previous decades, there were arguments about whether the Alliance was the correct choice for civilization. But now the Western Alliance has won, because its military position of strength deterred the Soviet Union. Now that the Alliance was winning, it would be a shame if it was troubled by self-doubt. (S)

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his welcome. He said it was no accident that Italy was chosen as the first stop

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
②1 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

on his trip. This decision signaled the importance of this bilateral visit and the closeness of the U.S.-Italian relationship. Americans felt very special about Italy in their hearts, and the President wanted all Italians to understand that. There were few bilateral problems, so it was possible to concentrate on broader questions. (U)

The President agreed that the Alliance was winning -- Western values, and the resulting peace and economic prosperity were capturing public attention. As a result of this success, there were pressures on the Alliance. So the President felt the Allies must have a united and successful Summit in Brussels. NATO would be judged on whether it could settle one contentious issue: SNF (short-range nuclear forces). (S)

The President believed the Germans, torn asunder by their domestic politics, had been reluctant to move toward the kind of compromise that the President thought must come out of the Summit. Recognizing that the conventional force imbalance was a major problem, and recognizing that Soviet forces were the biggest threat, the U.S. had come up with a conventional arms control proposal on which the Prime Minister had been briefed. That proposal should be an enormous help with the German problem. The President had made an appeal to Helmut Kohl to compromise, to accept a text which would be sustainable politically because of this U.S. conventional arms control initiative. The President felt Chancellor Kohl should accept the U.S. compromise text on the SNF issue. If the Prime Minister agreed with that assessment, the President would love to have the Prime Minister's support in Brussels if the matter was not resolved before the Summit. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said he had talked about the SNF issue with the German Chancellor. He thought he understood the German position. There was, the Prime Minister thought, no real objective conflict in views. The Prime Minister and Chancellor Kohl had discussed the unacceptability of a "third zero" and an eventual negotiation on SNF missiles after a significant agreement reducing conventional weapons. The problem was in the timing of the relationship between SNF negotiations and a conventional forces agreement. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita then turned to the general problem of Germany, which was not always discussed between the U.S. and Italy. The problem stemmed from the fact that East-West relations were no longer characterized by conflict. In the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

"space" that was opening up, many things can happen. So the U.S. and Italy should endeavor to be sure that the elements that fill up this new space should not be a source of conflict in Europe. Washington and Rome must help those conservative Germans, including Chancellor Kohl, who want to remain within "Europe," within the Alliance. Others in Germany have different ideas. (S)

The President asked if the Prime Minister was concerned about reunification and a neutral Germany. (S)

No, replied Prime Minister De Mita. The problem of reunification was not immediate; if it was immediate, the U.S. and Italy would not be able to handle it. But the problem does exist in the long run. Italy was worried about those forces in Germany who would like the FRG to be equidistant between the USSR and the West. Next year in Germany there would be difficult elections. The Prime Minister put the problem in this way: Do we wish to help the Kohl Government or will we remain indifferent to the outcome of the next German election? If the Allies keep Kohl's situation in mind, and their strategic objectives in mind, a compromise could be found. But the result must not be a mess. If the Prime Minister understood the U.S. position correctly, the U.S. did not exclude SNF negotiations, if the CFE negotiation "makes good progress." This is a reasonable position. So the SNF negotiations could begin when there was a good result in the CFE talks. Prime Minister De Mita knew it was difficult to define when a good outcome has been achieved. But the U.S. and Italy had to be mindful of the timing of the West German elections. When Prime Minister De Mita spoke to Chancellor Kohl, Kohl said that he was not for the "third zero." (S)

Secretary Baker asked if the Germans were willing to say explicitly that a third zero has been excluded. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that, in his press conference a month ago, Chancellor Kohl had said it must be clear that we Germans do not want a denuclearized Europe, a zero option. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti observed that the Allies had always been able to find agreements. Germany has always done its duty, while some countries, like Holland, seem to be more clever and did not accept INF missiles when Italy and the Germans did. In addition to the concerns described by the Prime Minister, Germany was also dealing with the 50th anniversary of Germany's invasion of Poland. So this psychological element must be taken into

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

account when thinking of German and East European reaction to the whole SNF issue. (S)

Continuing, Foreign Minister Andreotti said that too much emphasis was being given to the SNF problem. President Reagan's nuclear-free world was a wonderful vision and Reagan's idea was that such a vision should be implemented step by step. The question was to explain how the West intended to get to a nuclear-free world and how conventional arms negotiations would push the world closer to this noble goal. Foreign Minister Andreotti thought inclusion of aircraft in the West's CFE approach was a good idea. Too much emphasis should not be given to SNF missiles because the Alliance might lose prospects for a successful NATO Summit. (S)

The President said the world press was focused on the SNF issue, so it would be difficult to push it off to another meeting. The Alliance must find a compromise solution on SNF at the Summit. The President thought it could be done. Otherwise, the Summit would be overridden, soured by that one contentious issue. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita understood that, because SNF had been discussed so intensively, the Allies could not pretend at the NATO Summit that the problem did not exist. Yet he agreed with Minister Andreotti that, in celebrating the fortieth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance, the Allies should stress NATO's political accomplishments. It would be a mistake not to emphasize the triumphs of Western values throughout the world. The Allies should stress the strong justifications for the Alliance's continued existence. At the same time, NATO should describe how it wished to proceed in the future, to stay together, and avoid concentrating on one divisive item. The Eastern Bloc was changing strategy and causing problems. NATO's challenge was to assess East-West relations. This was the real subject for discussion in Brussels, rather than this or that specific problem. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita added that the Alliance also needed to talk about disarmament. Prime Minister De Mita knew President Bush was about to put forward a conventional arms control proposal in Brussels. Prime Minister De Mita thought President Bush had to stress the importance and the meaning of this proposal. The Alliance would be looking at the future by trying to bring about a conventional military equilibrium at the lowest possible level. Within the context of the U.S. proposal, the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

Allies could say that, if "concrete results" were reached in CFE, there could also be an eventual SNF negotiation. This vaguer formula would get past the SNF problem at the NATO Summit and avoid a serious problem with the German friends. Thinking aloud, Prime Minister De Mita suggested that the Alliance could say SNF negotiations would begin when the CFE talks reached a "positive result." "For a given time," the Alliance would say it could not do without nuclear weapons, and thus could not denuclearize Europe. On SNF modernization, the Allies could say that if short-range nuclear forces are kept in Europe ("if in the SNF negotiation, we keep something...") then those forces would be modernized if necessary. (S)

The President asked Secretary Baker to review the three central points for the U.S. on SNF. But, first, he wanted to reply to what Prime Minister De Mita and Foreign Minister Andreotti had said. The Summit's emphasis must be on the future of NATO. The Alliance should address the tremendous changes in the USSR, in Eastern Europe, and around the world. This was a time of great optimism, of bringing the Soviet Union into the community of nations. The West's success was so great, and the future was so exciting, that the President did not want the SNF issue to destroy the climate of celebration. (S)

Secretary Baker commented that, because the President wanted to stress larger issues at the Summit and because the U.S. recognized the problems of its German friends, Washington had been trying to work out the SNF problem with Bonn for several months. The President had taken three actions that were very forthcoming: first, indicating a willingness to delay production of a follow-on system to the Lance missile until the end of 1991 or early '92; second, embracing the principle of SNF negotiations dependent upon "tangible implementation" of a CFE agreement; and third, deciding to propose, at the NATO Summit, speeding up the CFE negotiations through a major new NATO conventional arms control initiative. All this would, it was hoped, meet Chancellor Kohl's problems in Bonn. Secretary Baker also noted that the U.S. was anxious that the text of the President's arms control initiative not become public until the President presented it at the Summit in Brussels. (S)

Secretary Baker added that with these three actions, there remained two important principles that mattered to the U.S. and to other members of NATO: first, explicit rejection of a third zero and, second, an understanding that any agreement on SNF forces cannot be implemented before there is full implementation

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

6

of a CFE agreement that would redress the significant imbalance of conventional forces in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Secretary Baker believed this last point was acceptable to the Federal Republic. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti asked why, if the Alliance spoke of reducing nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, it was necessary to say that the West needed nuclear weapons for all time. This changed the policy of the Reagan Administration, which wished to get rid of all nuclear weapons, and it gave the other side a propaganda advantage. Foreign Minister Andreotti recalled that NATO had a difficult moment in the 1960s when it moved from massive retaliation to flexible response; the Foreign Minister was Defense Minister at the time. The Alliance found a good strong formula that took into account the psychological situation in Bonn. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. had taken into account changing circumstances in Germany and the psychological factors there. That was why Washington had substantially changed its position on modernization and agreed to the principle of SNF negotiations in certain circumstances. The U.S. was not suggesting that the provision ruling out a third zero say that there can never be a third zero. That was not the U.S. formulation. But the U.S. was suggesting that the text be silent on the duration of the period when there would be no third zero. This approach should therefore, in the U.S. view, be acceptable. The SNF negotiation should seek lower and equal levels, but not go to zero. The German language saying that under the present circumstances there should not be a third zero created major problems because the present circumstances end tomorrow. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti said the Alliance should not express a view one way or the other. (S)

Secretary Baker recalled that General Scowcroft had made a good point that, in the 1960s, it took five years to develop Alliance consensus on the flexible response doctrine and the Allies did not have five years to solve the SNF problem. (S)

The President asked if West German Foreign Minister Genscher could accept Foreign Minister Andreotti's formulation. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti said it was important not expressly to rule out the zero option, since Genscher could not accept that. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7

Secretary Baker said there should be some statement in the text of NATO's Comprehensive Concept document that an SNF negotiation would not produce a zero outcome for SNF missiles. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that lower and equal levels did not mean zero. (S)

Secretary Baker answered that it could mean just that. (S)

Foreign Minister Andreotti asked why the Allies should today exclude the possibility that, in thirty years, there would be no SNF missiles. (S)

Secretary Baker replied that the U.S. was not saying that forever and always there would be no zero. But, in connection with an SNF negotiation, the Alliance must say it was not going for zero now. The text of the U.S. language did not say NATO needed SNF missiles forever. But it must say that the Allies were not aiming for the third zero in this SNF negotiation. There were strong views in the United States, including in the Congress, that America needed those SNF weapons to help defend the 324,000 U.S. troops in Europe. The Alliance was faced not only with substantial Warsaw Pact conventional advantages, but also with a tremendous Warsaw Pact SNF advantage. Public opinion in U.S. and some other Allied countries would not support any position that does not make clear that the Alliance was not intending to go to zero. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that the SNF problem had to be solved without making a statement of principle, without saying yes to the zero option or no to the zero option. This was not only a German problem; it was a problem for other members of the Alliance. If this problem was not solved, there will be problems with other countries. Mrs. Thatcher was inflexible on everything, pretty close to a Cold War approach. At the same time, she has the closest sentimental attachment to Gorbachev. (S)

The President said the U.S. was working with the Germans, getting close to a common position. The U.S. now understand Italy's views better. A discussion of SNF could go on all day. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita, concluding, said that the Allies needed to work the SNF problem out. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
EDL 8/20/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister
of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
William Reilly, Administrator of the EPA
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of
State
Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of
State
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Interpreter

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Luigi Cavalchini, Foreign Ministry Chief of
Staff
Andrea Manzella, Secretary General of
Presidency of the Council of Ministers
Umberto Vattani, Prime Minister's Office
General Franco Angioni, Prime Minister's
Office
Ugo de Mohr, NATO Adviser
Mr. Perlot, Foreign Ministry Director General
Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 11:48 a.m. - 12:02 p.m.
AND PLACE: Villa Madama, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita opened the expanded discussion by asking
the President for his views on the evolution of East-West
relations.

762

The President said he saw tremendous change in Eastern Europe,
with Poland and Hungary obviously in the forefront. The
President recounted his offer of assistance in Poland's economic
recovery, provided the Poles could persist in making needed

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

economic reforms. His overall goal was not to stir up trouble but to make it clear that, as the East moved toward greater freedom and human rights, the U.S. would respond. (S).

The President continued, saying that his policy would not involve a "post-Yalta" arrangement, sitting with the Soviets to divide up spheres of influence. The goal was differentiation based on movement toward democracy and economic liberty. While this called for a certain amount of delicacy, to avoid seeming to exhort people to the barricades as occurred with Hungary in 1956, Western values had intrinsic appeal. The U.S. would reach out, selectively, in every way it could. Actions would not be so "flamboyant" that the Soviets would feel the need to take action to reverse movement toward freedom. The next few years would be exciting. Eastern Europe would be a high priority for the Administration. (S).

Prime Minister De Mita asked for an overall assessment of East-West relations. (S).

The President said they were pretty good. Despite what some had said, the President wanted Gorbachev to succeed and had told him so personally in New York. Caution was still needed, since foreign policies could not be based on one individual. However, the U.S. wanted good relations with the Soviet Union and was conducting its policies so that the Soviets knew that. A summit meeting with Gorbachev was still up in the air. The President's proposals would show he was prepared to be forthcoming, but the President was not interested in a public relations or charm school battle with Gorbachev. The U.S. had asked for help on arms sales to Central America and there had been frank discussions on this issue. The Soviets had shown interest in changing their policies. Angola was one example. There were possibilities for a more constructive Soviet role in restraining their Middle Eastern clients. So the President thought the Soviets might be able to be more helpful on Central America as well. (S).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Francesco Cossiga, President of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Interpreter

Francesco Cossiga, President
Giulio Andreotti, Foreign Minister
Rinaldo Petrignani, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sergio Berlinguer, Secretary General of Quirinale Palace
Giovanni Dominedo, President's Diplomatic Adviser
Ludovico Ortona, President's Spokesman
Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 12:32 p.m. - 1:09 p.m.
AND PLACE: Quirinale Palace, Rome

President Cossiga welcomed the President on behalf of his government and people. He was touched that the President chose to begin his first visit to Europe as President in Rome. He praised, as well, the exemplary performance of Ambassador Rabb.
(U)

The President thanked President Cossiga and joined in his praise for Ambassador Rabb. He said the choice of Rome as the first stop on his trip was no accident. Relations between America and Italy had never been better. In his briefings for this trip, the President had noticed that hardly any issues seemed to divide the two countries, an indicator of the excellent state of the relationship. (C)

The President asked if, incidentally, President Cossiga could fit an official visit to the United States into his schedule during

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
@ 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

the fall, perhaps in October. Such a visit could keep attention focused on the fine relationship between the United States and Italy. (S)

President Cossiga expressed his gratitude for the invitation and said he would certainly come. The Foreign Ministry and the State Department would agree on the date and work out the details. (S)

The President noted that many Americans were already preparing for the 500th Anniversary celebration of Columbus' voyage of 1492. There was great interest in this celebration in the United States as well as in Latin America and the Caribbean. (U)

The President, continuing, said he had already discussed the NATO Summit with Prime Minister De Mita and Foreign Minister Andreotti and there was no need to review the subject again. The President did, however, want President Cossiga to hear directly that he, the President, welcomed the changes in the Soviet Union. The policy reviews, which were proper and prudent for a new Administration, were mostly finalized. The United States was prepared to move forward in a realistic way with Moscow. (S)

The President did think a word of caution was still in order. A foreign policy must be based on reality, not on the charisma of a new leader. As Commander-in-Chief, the President felt a profound responsibility for the lives of soldiers and sailors, so when he put forward arms control proposals he wanted to be sure that they would enhance peace and not threaten it. The President observed that the Alliance was on the winning side and its values were prevailing. There was less of a threat to peace. There was, therefore, no reason not to move prudently. Those were the views the President would take to the NATO Summit. (S)

The President added that euphoria about Gorbachev caused some people to feel there were no problems anymore. The President was sorry to say that there were still problems. Yet, as the President had himself told Gorbachev, no one in America wanted perestroika to fail. Secretary Baker had met Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and the Soviets knew that the US supported reform in the Soviet Union. The US and Italy were entering an exciting new era. (S)

The President thanked the Government of Italy for its helpful decisions on Alliance issues, such as the transfer of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing. Italy had shown real leadership. The President could still remember how Italy's war against domestic terrorism and the freeing of Colonel Dozier had shown strength and earned the respect of all Americans. (S)

President Cossiga thanked the President for his comments. He understood why the President had carefully examined his policies

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

before taking action. President Cossiga believed that, in ordinary life, prudence and care are major virtues. (C)

President Cossiga remarked that the NATO Summit would be an important celebration of the Alliance's great success. The Allies had demonstrated that, without firmness, there might not be any glasnost and perestroika in the Soviet Union today. There were certainly important changes occurring in the USSR. It was too early to foresee the outcome. (C)

President Cossiga recalled that he had recently travelled with Foreign Minister Andreotti to Poland. They were able to meet freely with people from the whole range of political and social life. At an Italian Embassy reception, which Jaruzelski attended, were guests who, during the period of Stalinization, had been sentenced to death. This symbolized the important changes now underway. Poland needed Western support. (C)

The President asked President Cossiga for his opinion of General Jaruzelski. The President commented that, when he had met the General, Jaruzelski had made an unexpectedly favorable impression. (C)

President Cossiga replied that, during his recent visit to Poland, he spoke to General Jaruzelski for hours. President Cossiga believed that General Jaruzelski had qualities that were not immediately apparent. He also thought General Jaruzelski was determined to pursue a new course and that, without General Jaruzelski, Poland could not have proceeded as far as it had. President Cossiga thought that General Jaruzelski was responsible for getting the Communist Party to sit at the Roundtable with Solidarity and accept the outcome of the negotiations. General Jaruzelski, President Cossiga thought, was a man who had suffered for measures he had had to implement in the past. History would be more generous to the General than recent critics. It was very likely that General Jaruzelski's role had prevented a repetition of Soviet intervention as in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. President Cossiga thought the winds of freedom were blowing in Poland. The just-passed laws on religious freedom were of great importance. The officials of the Church in Poland had also displayed great insight and prudence. President Cossiga left Poland convinced that, if economic and political reforms did not progress, all the recent achievements would be jeopardized. (C)

The President said he had talked with General Jaruzelski long before the Roundtable negotiations and had urged him to be more forthcoming with labor. General Jaruzelski had cited some extreme demands from the union leaders, such as a call for five years paid maternity leave. The answer was obvious: the President advised General Jaruzelski to recognize free unions and then negotiate with them, but the President had not realized that labor was making such tough demands. (C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

President Cossiga said that it was difficult to predict how the Opposition would ultimately express its views. Solidarity was just the peak of the iceberg. Yet Poland could not turn back now. (S)

Secretary Baker asked if Poland would be in a political position to sustain the economic changes that must be adopted in order to move forward. In the 1970's, credit had been made available and that did not work. The US could not repeat that example unless Poland made the free market reforms needed for real growth. (S)

President Cossiga said he was convinced that the political leadership and the new Opposition could support the needed changes that would allow them to receive aid from the West. Poland was no longer asking for more money. They were asking for Western businesses to invest in Poland and teach the Poles how a market economy works. (S)

Secretary Baker asked how companies would be assured of being able to keep their profits. (S)

President Cossiga responded that laws were the guarantee. Still, the opportunities for investment were not there yet, though Fiat chairman Agnelli's interest in Poland was a promising sign. (S)

The President said he was looking forward to his visit to Poland.
(U)

President Cossiga said the Poles were looking forward to the President's visit as well. He said his Polish police escorts had all still been wearing the tie pins received during the President's trip to Poland as Vice President. It was a small point, but a revealing one. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4368

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0762-MR

MM 4/18/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist Party of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Italy
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
John Holmes, U.S. Embassy, Rome (notetaker)

Bettino Craxi, Secretary of the Socialist
Party of Italy
Gennaro Acquaviva, Senator

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 3:10 p.m. - 3:30 p.m.
AND PLACE: Villa Taverna, Rome

Mr. Craxi explained that Italy was in the midst of a government crisis which would be resolved after the European Parliament elections in June. (S)

The President asked whether a new government would officially take office by the beginning of July. (S)

Mr. Craxi said yes, perhaps in July, if everything went well -- which he thought would be the case. (S)

The President said it would be nice to have an Italian government in place by the time of the Economic Summit on July 14. (S)

Mr. Craxi said "we will try." He then expressed his concerns about the lack of progress in the Middle East. (S)

The President said he and the American people shared these concerns. In Lebanon, the Syrians would not withdraw and there was no ceasefire. (S)

Mr. Craxi asked the President to keep an open mind on the idea of elections on the West Bank. The Palestinians could accept such elections, he said, but not if the Israelis remained as military occupiers. The Israelis could be on the borders of the West Bank, but not in the villages. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

The President said the U.S. was working to persuade the Israelis to be more open-minded and adopt better election procedures. It was not clear that the Israelis would talk to whoever would win the elections. (S)

Mr. Craxi said that (Shimon) Peres had warned him that the PLO would control anyone who was elected. (S)

Secretary Baker commented that the Israelis had promised to accept the election results. (S)

Mr. Craxi thought the Israelis were ambiguous. They promised to talk to the winners, but if the talks do not work out there would be a period of controlled autonomy. The result would be a return to the present state of confusion. (S)

The President noted that, in fact, the Israeli theory was that the next stage should be one of controlled autonomy. (S)

Mr. Craxi thought this would be acceptable if the period of controlled autonomy was limited. (S)

Secretary Baker said this was possible; the Israelis talk of five years, the Palestinians of two. (S)

Mr. Craxi said that another issue before the U.S. and Italy was the prospect of a more united Europe while, at the same time, the Soviet Union was "creaking." (S)

The President was optimistic. The U.S. wanted Gorbachev to succeed. Although the Administration had been accused of dragging its feet, of taking too much time, the U.S. would engage the Soviets. First, the President wanted to achieve a unified outcome to the NATO Summit. The German problem was difficult; Kohl was torn by his political difficulties. In terms of broader developments it was too bad that one negotiating point, SNF, was hanging over the Allies as if it were the key to the Alliance. (S)

Mr. Craxi said that, of course, the West had never been stronger, because of the weakness of the other side. (S)

The President agreed. The Eastern economies were not working; time favored the West. There was no need to panic, no need to think the Allies were in a day-to-day public relations war. (S)

Mr. Craxi commented that he did not overestimate difficulties within the Alliance. The Allies had always managed to reach agreement. (S)

The President asked when Mr. Craxi would be coming to the United States. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Craxi thought it might be this year. (U)

Secretary Baker commended Mr. Craxi for helping make the G-5 into the G-7. (U)

Mr. Craxi offered Secretary Baker credit for this development and then acknowledged his own contribution. Mitterrand and Kohl had been against Italy, he said. (U)

Secretary Baker noted that the United Kingdom had not been enthusiastic. (U)

Mr. Craxi recalled that the French had called a meeting and proposed a "directoire." Prime Minister Thatcher had objected strongly. (U)

Secretary Baker thought it was good for the membership in the financial group to be identical to that of the Summit Seven. (U)

Mr. Craxi felt the Reagan Administration had done well with international monetary issues. (U)

The President commented that exchange rate fluctuations had not been eliminated. (U)

Secretary Baker said this was a problem to work on. (U)

Mr. Craxi observed that the U.S. and Italy were dealing with two great economic powers -- the FRG and Japan -- who did not always assume their proper responsibility. (U)

The President said that the U.S. had some major trade difficulties with Japan. U.S. firms still did not have adequate access to the Japanese market. Under U.S. law, the President had taken certain steps a couple of days earlier to say that, in this period of negotiations, something had to be done. Certain steps are necessary to show that the U.S. was serious. (U)

Mr. Craxi recalled an old Latin saying, "Woe to the victors." In conclusion, he said that it had been a great pleasure to see the President. He now had to travel to northern Italy because of some local elections in that region. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister of Italy

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Ciriaco De Mita, Prime Minister

DATE, TIME May 27, 1989, 5:20 - 5:25pm
AND PLACE: Villa Taverna, Rome

Prime Minister De Mita told the President that, as a citizen of the free world, he was very happy with the President's conventional arms control initiative. It would have a great effect on the world and in Europe. (S)

The President said that the spirit this morning had been very good. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita turning to the SNF issue, noted the tension between Great Britain and Germany. He hoped that Prime Minister Thatcher could eventually agree to the "communique." (S)

The President observed that there were still difficulties on the issue of a "third zero." President Mitterrand had been very diplomatic and generous. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that, when he had heard the President's proposals, he thought they would help with Germany. The German situation was very difficult. There had been many criticisms of Germany in recent weeks. Chancellor Kohl was in a difficult situation. It was impossible to say exactly why this was so, because the German economy was so strong. Perhaps it was a product of the emotions of the German people, "searching," as they had so many times before. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
01 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

The President asked the Prime Minister whether Gorbachev had awakened Germany's aspirations for unity. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita thought that Gorbachev had done this, but what was most important was for Germany to have a chance to express itself. The Germans did not feel that they were treated like the French or the British, despite their great strength. (S)

The President asked whether the June elections for the European Parliament were likely to have an impact. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita thought they would, especially in Germany. He noted that detente and East-West relations were a major problem. (S)

The President said that, in his Boston University speech, he had reiterated his intention to remain fully involved with Europe, not to turn isolationist. He wanted the Prime Minister to know how he felt on this subject. Most Americans, though not all, felt the same way. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said that there was a consensus in Europe that the speech was very important. (S)

Continuing, Prime Minister De Mita said it was difficult to know how to proceed with Eastern Europe on economic matters. Some wanted to go too far too quickly. The U.S. and Italy should cooperate closely on such issues. (S)

The President said he would like to help Poland and Hungary bilaterally, but there must be economic reform or the U.S. would just be wasting money. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita agreed. The East Europeans had told him that they welcomed Western economic help but did not want Western advice. (S)

The President returned to the idea of a united Germany and said he would like to say the Germans should do what they wish, but he must be responsible. (S)

Prime Minister De Mita said one could think about the problem on two levels. On the level of ordinary people, a desire for reunification was strong. At the political level, the entities wanted to remain distinct. (S)

The President referred to the unrest in China and said he had been very circumspect recently about the student riots there. It was tough to know what line to take. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister of Belgium

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Maynard Glitman, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Spokesman
Philip Zelikow, Director for European Security Affairs, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Wilfried Martens, Prime Minister
Leo Tindemans, Foreign Minister
Guy Coeme, Defense Minister
Frans Roelants, Foreign Ministry Secretary General
Alexis Reyn, Chef de Cabinet
Jan Grauls, Diplomatic Adviser, Prime Minister's Office
Philippe Nieuwenhuys, Adviser to the Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME May 28, 1989, 6:45 - 7:32pm
AND PLACE: Chateau Stuyvenberg, Brussels

Prime Minister Martens welcomed the President and commented that this was a difficult time for the Belgian government because of the SNF issue. The Prime Minister hoped for a solution at the Summit. (C)

The President thanked the Prime Minister for his hospitality and noted that bilateral relations were very strong. He admired the Prime Minister's economic success in lowering the government deficit without serious inflation or major tax increases. The U.S. was also trying to get its fiscal house in order. The President thought tax increases would slow economic growth and cause a net loss in revenue. He was working with Congress. (C)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
01 8121109

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

The President said he was not pessimistic about NATO or East-West relations. His policies were realistic. Their development had taken some time, and criticism for this had been expected. The President said it should be clearly understood that his Administration wanted Gorbachev and perestroika to succeed. The West had won the battle of ideologies and the Communist model was dead. Western values were prevailing. The Allies should try to capitalize on that success and reduce arms, but not be naive or case their foreign policies on one person. (C)

Turning to security issues, the President said the differing viewpoints on SNF were well understood. The President said he planned to make an important conventional arms control proposal, challenging the Soviets to reduce to equal levels of manpower stationed on foreign territory in Europe. The world would see the fairness in having the two largest powers deploy the same number of soldiers in Europe. This dramatic arms control proposal should strengthen Kohl in fighting his political battles. Yet, whatever the outcome of the SNF issue, it should not be allowed to affect the basic principles underpinning NATO strategy. (C)

The President was optimistic about the opportunities for change. The Soviets were moving toward the West on arms control, and Western values. The U.S. was prepared to help with the Soviet economy but would do so with eyes wide open. All these developments were good for the security of Europe. (C)

Prime Minister Martens commented that he and Foreign Minister Tindemans had recently been in Poland. It had been interesting to hear the Polish government talk of its willingness to accept an opposition role. The Prime Minister thought the key was in Polish statements that they wanted a free market economic system. South Korea had been cited as an example. The same trend was seen in African countries, such as Dakar, which the Prime Minister had just visited. Although it was dangerous when so much depended on one person, the real reason for change in the East was economic. (C)

The President urged the Prime Minister not to underestimate the unquenchable thirst for freedom. In Chile, for example, a totally repressive regime allowed a free market economy to operate. However, the Chilean people still agitated for political change. Once Gorbachev had unleashed perestroika and glasnost, he could not put the genie back in the bottle. Ortega, in Nicaragua, now announced he was a socialist in the "Swedish model." If true, this would be a conversion without precedent since Christ had walked the earth. Ortega was being convinced by the failure of his economy and the increasing trend toward democracy among his neighbors. These were exciting times. The Allies just needed to be prudent in proposing and making significant reductions in armed forces. (C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

The President appreciated that the Prime Minister took a tough decision in accepting deployment of INF missiles and got "bloodied" for it. This showed courage, and firmness. No one would ever convince the President that these deployment decisions did not compel the Soviets to be forthcoming at the negotiating table. Changes were encouraging, but the Alliance should not disperse out of euphoria. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Martens asked for an elaboration of the President's conventional arms control proposal. ~~(C)~~

The President asked Secretary Baker or General Scowcroft to provide one. (U)

Secretary Baker said the proposal would pick up on Warsaw Pact acceptance of Western figures for tanks and armored troop carriers, with reduced equipment to be destroyed. It would urge agreement on reducing land-based combat aircraft and helicopters on each side to a level fifteen percent below the current NATO total. These Alliance-to-Alliance ideas would be complemented by a U.S.-Soviet manpower ceiling of 275,000 for troops stationed in Europe. The U.S. would cut 20% of its combat manpower, with withdrawn forces to be demobilized and deactivated. The U.S. would cut about 30,000 troops (29,200 being 20% of the combat manpower), and the Soviets would have to cut 325,000. ~~(C)~~

The President added that the Soviets could decide where they wanted to take their troop cuts, but the U.S. cuts would be in combat forces. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker said that, in the U.S. view, these moves should allow the timetable for an agreement to be accelerated to six months to a year. This timetable would be important in resolving the SNF issue. On that point the U.S. felt that negotiations, though accepted in principle, should await the beginning of implementation of a CFE agreement. This should take about a year. In any case, however, the U.S. was reluctant to proceed with SNF negotiations until a CFE agreement had been concluded and its implementation had begun. ~~(C)~~

Secretary Baker asked that information about the President's CFE proposal not be made public in advance of the Summit meeting. ~~(C)~~

Returning to SNF, Secretary Baker said the President had recognized the FRG's particular problems and the significance of the changes in the East. The U.S. had been forthcoming, beginning with the Secretary's meetings with NATO leaders in February. The U.S. had delayed decisions on production and deployment of a modernized system until late 1991 or 1992 and had agreed in principle to SNF negotiations, all to accommodate the concerns of the Federal Republic. These moves should now be considered along with the President's conventional arms control

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

~~SECRET~~

proposal. It would be good to have an agreement on SNF and not dampen the Summit by kicking the problem over to a later date.

~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Tindemans said that, of course, the President's proposal was extremely interesting. It would be the event of the Summit meeting. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Martens, after cautioning that he was negotiating on the SNF issue on the basis of a political agreement within his government, asked the President for a commitment to early SNF negotiations, running parallel to the CFE talks. However, he said his priority was the conventional talks and that he was against the "zero option." Forces should be updated where necessary, without any production or deployment decision before 1991 or 1992. NATO did not need to decide on development. The President's conventional arms control proposal had overcome some of the problem, reducing the issue to one of immediate negotiations versus a link to an accelerated CFE timetable. ~~(S)~~

The President hoped his conventional arms control proposal would take precedence over SNF negotiations. His fast track approach should change political calculations. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker emphasized the accelerated timetable for implementation of CFE reductions as well, with 1992 or 1993 as the target date. He hoped this would give the Belgian government latitude as an alternative to parallel SNF talks. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Martens asked if he had correctly understood that an agreement would be sought in six months to one year. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker said that was what the U.S. thought was reasonable, in light of the convergence in the positions of the two sides. ~~(S)~~

Defense Minister Coeme thought the linkage between the outcome of the Vienna CFE talks and the beginning of SNF negotiations was potentially dangerous. ~~(S)~~

The President said he would prefer no linkage, just a concentration on the conventional forces. The conventional force imbalance was destabilizing and should be addressed. This may be tough for those who, like some elements in the FRG, put SNF reductions over everything else, but the accelerated timetable could accomplish what everyone wants -- conventional reductions and SNF negotiations. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker said the conventional imbalance was a primary requirement for the SNF deterrent. It was therefore prudent to link the two problems. This would also give the East an incentive to move more quickly toward a CFE accord. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5

~~SECRET~~

The President said this was true despite the Eastern advantage in SNF. He asked Ambassador Glitman to elaborate on the disparities. (S)

Ambassador Glitman noted that, according to our count, the disparity was 14 to 1 and was 11 to 1 according to Eastern figures. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said these disparities were a justification for SNF negotiations designed to correct the imbalance. (S)

Secretary Baker replied that the Western SNF forces were counterforce weapons designed against Eastern conventional forces. He asked if General Scowcroft agreed. (S)

General Scowcroft said the principal function was to counter the conventional imbalance. (S)

The President said the short-range nuclear forces were there to deter attack. He said the Allied views were different from those of the Soviet Union on this point but he agreed that linkage to the CFE outcome might help speed an agreement on conventional force reductions. (S)

Secretary Baker said that the President understood political problems in Europe, but the President had political problems too. One was the military's very strong belief that ground-based nuclear missiles were needed to defend the 325,000 U.S. soldiers in Europe. The Secretary understood the appeal of a third zero. That was why a conventional agreement was needed before embarking on that slippery slope. (S)

The President said he hoped not to refer to U.S. politics at the NATO meeting. There were some in America who did not support the commitment to NATO, but the President would not rely on this argument. However, when it came to protection of "our kids," the President had to listen to his military commanders. In his role as Commander-in-Chief the President felt SNF was vital as long as there was a massive conventional imbalance. (S)

Prime Minister Martens wondered whether this argument against early SNF negotiations would still be valid if it was clearly accepted that a third zero outcome was ruled out by the Alliance. (S)

The President said the argument would be less valid, but valid. The levels of SNF were affected by the conventional imbalance. He looked forward to a lively discussion of this subject at the Summit. He hoped a solution to the problem could be negotiated with the Germans. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Martens said his government had reviewed the positions of many countries, including the Germans. His government would propose some ideas. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister Tindemans thought that, rather than each government putting forward a position, it would be better to have experts draft a document and then have a political discussion of it. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Martens said this practice worked well in the EC, with the EC Commission proposing papers to the Council of Ministers. ~~(S)~~

The President promised to consider the procedural question. He asked the Prime Minister for all possible consideration of what he, the President, had suggested during the meeting. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Martens referred to an earlier discussion on Zaire during the drive from the airport. (U)

The President asked the Prime Minister when he would decide upon a course of action. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said he would inform the government the next morning (May 29). If the government accepted the results from Dakar then King Hassan would mediate and the Moroccans would organize a meeting to confirm the conclusions. He thanked the President for his help and noted that (President) Mobutu (of Zaire) had said the Belgians were clumsy and the Americans have lost their sangfroid. ~~(S)~~

The President commented that Mobutu was a flamboyant person who was useful in some ways. He had some human rights problems. Perhaps the Belgian government had sobered him down. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Martens said Belgium had an enormous effort in Zaire, five billion francs worth. ~~(S)~~

Secretary Baker asked if this was commercial debt. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said it was a 25 year debt rescheduled with a grace delay of 14 years, but intervention was needed for payment of interest charges. ~~(S)~~

The President said the problems were with the system and the need for reform. Without reform, money was being poured down a rathole. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Martens said Mobutu had accepted adjustment from the IMF. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

General Scowcroft said the question was whether he would perform or not. ~~(S)~~

The President asked about (Senegalese President) Diouf. (U)

Prime Minister Martens said Diouf was a good man, having difficulty with reintegrating 90,000 citizens from Mauritania but maintaining a political system with opposition parties. He was a serious man at the Francophone summits. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Manfred Woerner, Secretary General of NATO

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Alton Keel, Permanent U.S. Representative to the North Atlantic Council
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Manfred Woerner, Secretary General
Marcello Guidi, Deputy Secretary General
James Cunningham, Director of the Secretary General's Private Office

DATE, TIME May 29, 1989, 9:00 a.m. - 9:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President said that the SNF issue was still unresolved. He asked the Secretary General, as the host for the Summit meetings, for his advice. ~~(S)~~

Secretary General Woerner said that one clear priority was to keep the Summit from being dominated by the missile issue, although the press would focus on it. He wished to avoid spending the morning discussing SNF instead of the main purpose of the Summit, which was to look forward to the great opportunities lying ahead. The Allies should create a group chaired by Deputy Secretary General Guidi to see if there was anything that could be done. ~~(S)~~

The President thought this was a good idea. ~~(S)~~

Secretary General Woerner asked for the President's support. ~~(S)~~

The President asked how much time the prepared interventions should take. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-079-F
EU 8121109

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

Secretary General Woerner expected they would average about ten minutes each for the sixteen heads of state and government. (U)

General Scowcroft commented that the President's intervention was slightly longer than ten minutes. (U)

Secretary General Woerner asked that the intervention not last more than twelve minutes. (S)

The President said he wished to be forward looking and mention his decision on COCOM no exceptions policy and Jackson-Vanik, but he did not wish to take advantage. He recalled sitting through speeches at the United Nations. (S)

Secretary Baker observed that those in the room would be interested in the President's major conventional arms control proposal. (S)

The President said the U.S. would not move any further on SNF. It would be unwise, he said, to be driven by the lowest common denominator. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said he did not wish to contradict the President. (S)

Secretary Baker said he had detected a little more flexibility on when the SNF negotiations might commence and the conditions thereto, but none on the question of the third zero. The UK, French, and Dutch may support the U.S., so Genscher might worry that he will be isolated. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said he was more pessimistic. The Alliance needed to emphasize its political objectives. (S)

The President said his CFE proposal alters the previous Western approach to the talks in an unprecedented way. The West would be moving forward in CFE. This would bring SNF negotiations closer. Things were different now and, naturally, time would be needed to study the situation. The President hoped Genscher would take this suggestion. (S)

Secretary General Woerner advised the President not to set a new deadline for arriving at a decision on SNF. This would put all the public expectations and pressure on the Alliance. German domestic pressure would continue. Those who blocked agreement should not be allowed to claim victory on the issue of SNF negotiations with only "details" to be worked out. Genscher was popular because he said the weapons are no good and negotiations will solve everything. The Allies needed to explain to its publics the rationale for nuclear weapons. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

Continuing, Secretary General Woerner urged the President to point out that the U.S. had come a long way to gain an agreement. People asked why SNF would be needed if there was conventional stability. This view was dangerous because, even if there was a conventional balance, SNF weapons would still be necessary. This point was not easy to explain. The Secretary General also remarked that the President had given a good speech on Eastern Europe; he should repeat that message. (S)

Governor Sununu asked whether there was any Allied support for the Secretary General's language on the SNF issue. (S)

Secretary General Woerner said this text could be a basis for compromise except for Genscher. Genscher might accept tying SNF negotiations to a CFE agreement. But Genscher could not accept exclusion of the possibility of a third zero. There had been bitter arguments between Genscher and Kohl which threatened the coalition. Kohl could accept the Secretary General's formulation but Genscher could not. (S)

Secretary Baker said the Alliance could not let itself be driven by a representative of five percent of the German electorate. It was clear from the (Quad) breakfast that no compromise was possible on the issue of the third zero. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister of Greece

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)

Andreas Papandreou, Prime Minister
Karloos Papoulias, Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 11:10 - 11:19am
AND PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President said he just wished to say hello. He knew the Prime Minister was preparing for elections. (U)

Prime Minister Papandreou said he was pleased to meet the President. He met with Secretary Baker for constructive discussions in Athens in February. He congratulated the President for his conventional arms control initiative. The Summit was a real triumph, with "no asterisks." The Prime Minister said he had not expected it. ~~(S)~~

On the question of U.S. bases, Prime Minister Papandreou said the U.S. and Greece were having very professional meetings. The process was being interrupted until after the elections. The next Greek government would resolve the issues. There were difficulties, but Prime Minister Papandreou thought they could be overcome. One such difficulty was the amount of time needed to absorb the costs of new developments. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Papandreou said he sought to strengthen the relationship between Greece and the U.S. These relations were far better today than eight years ago, when Cyprus played such a negative role in public opinion. (Turkish Prime Minister) Ozal was close and friendly with the Prime Minister, but the Prime

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
DL 8/21/09

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Minister felt Ozal had not put enough pressure on Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. Prime Minister Papandreou had said so to Ozal but Ozal did not reply. Greece and the U.S. needed to work hard on the Cyprus issue. Perhaps not today or tomorrow, but some day the problem there could explode. The UN Secretary General was working on the problem too, but the Turkish side had not been willing to give an inch, even though Greek Cypriots have agreed to bizonality and political equality. Both of these were big concessions. ~~(S)~~

The President said he had been impressed by Cypriot President Vassiliou. The President knew President Vassiliou was trying for a fresh approach, but the parties involved had never been able to develop a compromise acceptable to all. At some point, the U.S. might be in a position to be helpful. ~~(S)~~

The President said he would like to see the problem solved. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Papandreou concluded the meeting by promising to be in touch with Secretary Baker. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Memcon	Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, 11:20 a.m. - 11:27 a.m. [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: July 1989 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 3/24/2023

Date Closed:	6/14/2011	OA/ID Number:	30546
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(66)	MR Case #:	2012-1596-MR(513.02)
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	8/21/2009	MR Disposition Date:	2/2/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4368

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1596-MR
MM 2/2/2016



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
(notetaker)

Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister
Francisco Fernandez-Ordonez, Foreign Minister

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 11:20 a.m. - 11:27 a.m.
AND PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Brussels

The President thanked Prime Minister Gonzalez for his help on Panama. He wondered if the Prime Minister had any ideas about how best to resolve the issue. The President was afraid that the OAS was backing off a bit. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that pressure from Latin American countries on Noriega was growing. He was not sure when this pressure would get stronger. (S)

The President said the pressure must stay on. He recalled that he had raised the question of the Panamanian Defense Forces with Prime Minister Gonzalez. The President thought that Noriega had been lying to the PDF, telling them that they would be persona non grata if Noriega left. That was not true. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said it is quite obvious that the PDF realizes that it has a continuing role in Panama. Spain had passed that message along. Noriega had tried to involve the PDF in his problems, but Noriega may be a prisoner of the National Strategic Council. (S)

The President said he had been reading about that. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez commented that Noriega had created and corrupted this body. Now that he wants to get out, this body is

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

resisting because they worry about what will happen to them. Perhaps the leadership will come to understand they can play a role without Noriega. (S)

The President said the U.S. had sent word to key figures in the PDF that the U.S. had no problem with them, only with Noriega. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez did not want to be optimistic, but he thought there would be results with Noriega. (S)

Governor Sununu asked if Spain had special contacts with the PDF. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said the Spanish ambassador had normal contacts ^{3.3(b)(1)} [REDACTED]

(S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez, turning to the Summit, remarked that the atmosphere of the Alliance was superb, the cohesion impressive. (U)

The President said one could feel the cohesion in the air. (U)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
200-0429-F
81 812109

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jacques Delors, President of the
European Commission

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce
Alfred Kingon, U.S. Ambassador to the
European Community
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of
State
Margaret Tutwiler, Assistant Secretary of
State for Public Affairs and Spokesman
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)

Jacques Delors, President of the European
Commission
Frans Andriessen, Vice President
Sir Roy Denman, Head of Delegation, Mission
of the E.C. to the U.S.
David Williamson, Secretary General
Pascal Lamy, Chef de Cabinet
Johannes Wijnmaalen, Chef de Cabinet for the
Vice President
Horst Krenzler, Director General
Claus Ehlermann, Spokesman
Gianluigi Giola, Deputy Director

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 1:55 p.m. - 2:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: European Commission Headquarters, Berlaymont,
Brussels

President Delors said he was pleased with the results of the
just-concluded NATO Summit and asked the President for his
assessment. (U)

The President said he was very pleased with the outcome of the
Summit. The Alliance had shown itself at its best. The German
question related to short-range nuclear forces (SNF) had
dominated early discussions, and Secretary Baker had taken a
strong leadership role in finding a solution. The resolution of
the SNF issue and the new proposal for reducing conventional

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

forces were historic accomplishments. The conventional arms control proposal had won broad acceptance within the Alliance. U.S. generals had also certified that the proposal was militarily sound. The first tentative Soviet reaction was fairly good and upbeat. The U.S. would push forward now, challenging the Alliance to move faster. Although there was skepticism in the press and among some military people on "our side," things could be changed if the Alliance could keep the momentum going. All the Allies had agreed that the Summit was a success. (C)

President Delors then asked Secretary Baker for his comments. (U)

Secretary Baker said the Summit meeting had resulted in a double victory for the Alliance. There had been questions, before the Summit, about Allied unity. The Alliance was now very unified, with broad and deep acceptance of the President's conventional arms control initiative and gratitude for it, welcoming leadership by the new American President. The SNF issue had been resolved in a way that adapted to changing circumstances in Europe, while putting priority on solving asymmetries in the balance of conventional forces. The Comprehensive Concept document provides for no reduction of SNF forces to zero. Although it did not say so in those words, due to certain sensitivities, this message was quite clear in the document. (Dutch Foreign Minister) Van den Broek had done a good job in chairing the final Foreign Ministers' meeting. (C)

President Delors asked Secretary Mosbacher to comment on his meetings in Brussels. (U)

Secretary Mosbacher said his meetings had gone well. Progress had been made in several areas. With respect to financial institutions, the issue of national treatment was on the way to a good settlement. Standards would be more transparent and open. The Secretary knew the EC would be discussing these questions further. (C)

Vice President Andriessen said the most important result was an improvement in public perception. The goals and objectives of the U.S. and the EC were better known. The creation of economic opportunities in a more integrated European market would be beneficial for other operators. The EC wanted an open market. The Vice President was determined to let the single European market function in a multilateral world trading framework and shared the position of the United States in this respect. He looked forward to intensifying contacts between the U.S. and the Community. (C)

The President commented that his Boston speech had spoken of a united Europe and of shared values, such as a commitment to democracy, human rights, and free markets. He had made clear

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

that integration of Europe meant a stronger Alliance and more prosperous trading partners. (U)

Continuing, the President said he hoped to continue the political dialogue between the U.S. and the EC. In addition, he noted the recent meetings at the EC of U.S. Trade Representative Hills and Senator Roth and observed that a good exchange of views was going on. The President hoped that a single market would result in a more open, vigorous Europe. There had been lingering doubts about this prospect in the U.S., but there was more understanding now. The big thing was how the single market would be implemented, the details. The most important of these details, the President said, would be in agriculture. The success of the Uruguay round follow-on would be critical. (S)

Overall, the President concluded, problems might come up but the EC should know the U.S. was encouraged by and supportive of what the EC was trying to do. There had been problems in the past, but the Administration was not in a "posture of doubt;" it wanted more interaction with the EC. (U)

President Delors replied that only a stronger EC could strengthen the multilateral trading system. That was why integration was so important. (U)

The President then asked President Delors whether the arrangements were set for his visit to the United States. (S)

President Delors said he hoped they were. (S)

The President asked President Delors when he would be coming. (S)

President Delors said the U.S. had to decide this. (S)

The President, after briefly conferring with Ambassador Kingon, said he understood that the matter now rested with President Delors. (S)

President Delors said there were details to be worked out. (S)

The President then said that, in any case, President Delors was welcome to come to the United States. He urged President Delors to firm up the arrangements and said he did want to meet with him in Washington. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03d. Memcon	Meeting with Helmut Kohl, 5:30 p.m. - 6:20 p.m. (3 pp.)	5/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: July 1989 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By SS on 6/18/12

Date Closed: 6/14/2011	OA/ID Number: 30546
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2009-0630-MR
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 8/17/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

4366

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Vernon Walters, Ambassador to the FRG

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Foreign Minister
Hans Klein, Minister for Economic Cooperation
Juergen Ruhfus, Ambassador to the U.S.
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on Security Policy
Dieter Kastrup, Foreign Ministry Political Director
Walter Neuer, Head of Chancellor's Private Office
Uwe Kastner, Chancellery Director for USA and Europe

DATE, TIME May 30, 1989, 5:30 p.m. - 6:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl said the day was a good one for the FRG after the joint labors of Brussels. The Summit outcome was a cornerstone in the U.S.-German relationship. As the Federal Republic celebrated its 40th anniversary, it was clear that the FRG's success would be inconceivable without the United States. Beyond the material help in the Marshall Plan, America's spiritual help was immeasurable. Without going into the details of the Summit, the Chancellor wanted the President to be sure that Germans understood that there could be no secure future for the FRG without NATO and without German friendship with the United States. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0630-MR
SS 8/17/15

~~SECRET~~

2

Chancellor Kohl wanted to raise U.S.-German relations and his hopes for improved cooperation in exchanging young people between the two countries. He also hoped the U.S. and Germany could tap the resource of the millions of Americans who had served as soldiers in the FRG. (U)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted to discuss burdensharing. Nine hundred thousand soldiers moved about in a small country, as wide as the length of Long Island. Chancellor Kohl and the President also needed to discuss low-level flights. In the months ahead, Chancellor Kohl hoped for an intensified discussion of burdensharing and, with a view to U.S. domestic politics, it might be good to come to reasonable agreements on this issue. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl, referring to an earlier discussion of the EC, said that, without any overestimation, the FRG was the real engine of the EC. The Federal Republic paid in the most money and drew the most benefits. In 1989, 55% of the FRG's exports would go to the EC. In heading to 1992, Bonn's policy was to avoid a 'fortress Europe' at all costs, and the FRG was not alone. There would not be a U.S.-EC trade war. An agreement was needed on goods and services. In 1948, West Germany had opted for a free market. From this lesson, it was clear that the FRG would never revert to protectionism. These were the points the Chancellor Kohl wanted to make. Later, perhaps the Chancellor and the President could talk about the Warsaw Pact, Poland and Hungary. (Z)

The President said he was pleased with the Brussels result. Reaction at home had been positive. With regard to NATO, the President would be misleading the Chancellor if he did not say that some in the U.S. wanted someone else to take on the NATO burden. But a majority of Americans, as the President made clear in Brussels, realized how important the U.S. relationship to NATO really was. This Summit meeting would help. (Z)

The President was thinking about how to push forward now quickly after the euphoria in Brussels. The HLTF needs to have the new proposal ready by September 7; then the Allies must move CFE forward. This would be an interesting test for Gorbachev. The President's general feeling was that Gorbachev would find positive elements in the NATO initiative, partly because of the cost of conventional forces to the Soviet economy. So the President was somewhat hopeful, and determined to try to make the CFE process work. (Z)

The President felt that German-American relations probably had never been better. There was a feeling of goodwill toward Germany in the U.S. There would be differences, but the relationship would endure and only get better and better. (John) McCloy's funeral was a symbol of this. As for exchanges, the U.S. and the FRG should intensify efforts to exchange more young

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

people, see what could be done about that. There would be budgetary constraints because of the U.S. budget deficit, but the U.S. would work on the problem. On burdensharing, exercises were needed to maintain readiness, but the U.S. and the FRG needed to explain their purpose better. On trade, both the U.S. and Europe needed to keep markets open, especially on agriculture, where all were guilty. The President hoped to talk about this issue at the Economic Summit. The U.S. would work with the EC as best it could. Consultation had gotten much better and the U.S. never wanted to "blindsides" the FRG. There would be no surprises. Consultation was crucial. (Ø)

Foreign Minister Genscher said that, on the subject of the European Community, he had followed the President's Boston speech with great attention. There was a great opportunity on both sides of the Atlantic because of 1992. The EC had a 340 million person market. The President saw in Brussels yesterday how members of the EC could talk -- and some men and women fight, especially as the night gets longer. In ten to fifteen years, there would be three major economic areas: Japan, the EC, and the U.S. and Canada. The Foreign Minister was not afraid of Japan. He had told Nakasone that, as MacArthur said, we in Europe shall return. On terrorism and drugs, the U.S. and the FRG must work even more closely together. (Ø)

The President asked about the UK role in the EC. What were Prime Minister Thatcher's concerns? Were they manageable? How would the EC accommodate neutrals like Austria or Switzerland? (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said he held Prime Minister Thatcher in very high esteem. He had known her for 18 years. He respected her very much. She is intelligent. ^{1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)} For a long time, the English Channel was a border for the UK. Half the population of the UK has never crossed the Channel. That would change over time, but now the British were behind the views of the rest of Europe. ^{1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)}

^{1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)} Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand were very close, as were their countries. When Chancellor Kohl was younger, France was Germany's sworn enemy. That had changed. ^{1.4(b), 1.4(d), 3.3(b)(6)} (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl said that as time passed European national "competencies" would gradually shift to the EC. This was inevitable. Norway would vote for membership in the EC in three or four years. Sweden and Finland would also have to be accommodated. Chancellor Kohl wished the Germans would have pursued the thoughtful economic policies of Finland for the last forty years; Chancellor Kohl had great admiration for the Finns. As for Switzerland, Chancellor Kohl was not sure the Swiss would agree to join the EC. As for Austria, it had applied for membership but it was unclear what would happen when EC defense cooperation intensified, if there were neutrals within the EC. (Ø)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4368

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of the
Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor
Horst Teltschik, Chancellery Adviser on
Security Policy
Interpreter

DATE, TIME May 31, 1989, 9:10 a.m. - 10:05 a.m.
AND PLACE: Federal Chancellery, Bonn

Chancellor Kohl opened with a discussion of exchange programs. He emphasized the value of student exchanges and mentioned possibilities for a congressional exchange program, starting with the leadership in the U.S. Senate. They could spend four or five days in the FRG, including meetings with military units so they can see how a conscript army works. It would be good for the Senators to meet with these young people. A similar program could be followed for the U.S. House of Representatives during a second phase. Also, the Soviets were mounting a massive offensive in this area, with more and more visitors all the time. (P)

Chancellor Kohl also wanted the President to understand that, for him, there were two pillars in his foreign policy: the EC and NATO. (P)

The President suggested that the Chancellor not forget the importance of state officials as well. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said that Mr. Weidenfeld would do more about this problem, and suggested that General Scowcroft could talk to him. The Chancellor also wanted to establish a scholarship for ten American students. Could the Chancellor and the President be joint patrons? (P)

The President said he would like that very much if there was no Congressional prohibition. (P)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
8000-0429-F
28 4/11/13

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

Chancellor Kohl admitted that it sounded crazy but said the U.S. and the FRG must get back to the year 1910. That was when the largest exchanges were taking place. The Chancellor joked that he was a nut on this issue. (Z)

The President said he did not worry about American young people going to Moscow if they had something to compare it with. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl noted he had spoken to (Egyptian) President Mubarak about this. Mubarak had studied in Moscow and told the Chancellor not to worry. (Z)

The President commented that Mubarak was a good man. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl said he wished that (Israeli Prime Minister) Shamir would reach out more. He should know that any other leader in Egypt would be worse for him to deal with. (Z)

The President said he was under pressure from the American Jewish community but would persist in his approach. The U.S. had a problem on the settlements issue and the President would do something publicly about it. (Z)

The President said he was especially disturbed about the problems in Lebanon. It was hard to know what to do. The President would not send the Marines back in, but he was frustrated. He loved the Lebanese people. The crisis in Lebanon was a pressing concern in the U.S., especially in the Catholic community. The President had discussed Lebanon with the Holy Father. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl said that, if he could be of help, the President should let him know. This was a critical area -- one where Christians, Jews, and Moslems come together. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl then asked the President for his views on the situation in Japan, noting his regret about Nakasone's problems. (Z)

The President said it was a tough period for Japan. The U.S. knew that Uno, and Takeshita, were good men. The President said he had reluctantly taken a 301 decision. There is an anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States and the President was worried about it. The U.S. needed a close relationship with Japan and the Japanese were buying U.S. bonds. The President described the FSX problem. There was an ugly undercurrent in U.S.-Japanese relations and it worried the President. (Z)

Chancellor Kohl said he had encountered the same situation three or four years earlier. When the Chancellor came into office there was a depressing attitude toward Japan all over Europe. The Chancellor was in Japan and the Japanese said the Germans had lost out, could not keep up. The Chancellor promised the Germans

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

would be back later. The Japanese told the Chancellor last year that he was right; the Germans were back. Now, for example, BMW sells motorcycles in Japan. The U.S. and Germans could do it. The Japanese did not have more brain cells than the Americans or Germans did. Nor did the Chancellor think the Japanese could continue as they had in the past. The Chancellor said the Japanese will have a cultural crisis, and recounted a story about Japanese children identifying their home as being their kindergarten school. The absence of any home life was the reverse of the traditional Japanese lifestyle. The Japanese had gone from one extreme to the other. They were not better people; they were just organized better, and work harder. The SPD now had a program for a 30-hour work week. In 1988 the Germans were investing more in research and development and were up to the per capita level of investment of the U.S. and Japan. The U.S. and the FRG should do more joint research and development. The Chancellor wanted thousands of ties between the U.S. and Germany in every conceivable field. (S)

Chancellor Kohl cited another problem. The Germans had an inferiority complex. By the year 2000 there would be three main economic areas -- Japan, the U.S. and Canada, and Western Europe. Within this room, the Chancellor said he felt the FRG should stay within the second rank, not stick its neck out. That was why the Germans pushed France out in front. That was the problem with Prime Minister Thatcher. She got irritated with the FRG even though the Chancellor spoke last at the EC meetings. The Chancellor did not want to push her into a corner, but wanted to bring her in. That was also why he wanted to bring the U.S. in. (TS)

The President said he wanted to be sure the U.S. did not appear to have exclusive friends in Europe. That was why he had taken Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. The U.S. would have problems with Mitterrand, but these were also because the French felt there was a U.S.-Great Britain special relationship. That was also a problem with Germany. (TS)

Chancellor Kohl characterized France as a capricious lady that can always be wooed. The only Cardinal in France does not receive his hat from the Pope, but from the head of state -- ever since Louis XIV. One must accept these French idiosyncrasies and deal with them. (S)

The President said all countries had their special concerns. The U.S. would cater to them, but not grovel. (S)

Chancellor Kohl said it was fantastic that the President took Mitterrand to Kennebunkport. With President Reagan, the relationship just did not work. The President had dealt with him exactly right. Mitterrand used to say he did not take instructions from U.S. Presidents. He could not talk with

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

4

~~TOP SECRET~~

President Reagan. He talked with the President and he loved it. The Chancellor urged the President to please continue this approach with Mitterrand. There was no jealousy on the part of the Chancellor. (TS)

The President recounted a story about former Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki. (Ø)

Chancellor Kohl asked the President when he would be going to Poland. (U)

The President said it would be just before the Economic Summit. (U)

Chancellor Kohl said the U.S. and the FRG should help Jaruzelski. The Poles were a bit too arrogant, but it was important to help them. (Ø)

The President said he would like to consult with the Chancellor about this subject before his trip. (Ø)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03f. Memcon	Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, 10:35 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. (6 pp.)	6/1/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: July 1989 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By AL (NLGB) on 6/31/11

Date Closed:	6/14/2011	OA/ID Number:	30546
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	2000-0429-F(70)	MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:	7/10/2009	MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~TOP SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET

2/17/06

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



4368
4368

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME June 1, 1989, 10:35 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.
AND PLACE: Number 10 Downing Street, London

Prime Minister Thatcher, after a brief discussion of the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential government, commented that the President must be thrilled with the way the Summit had turned out. (U)

The President said that if it had not been for the Prime Minister's "anchor to windward," the Summit would not have been a success. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1) (S)

(b) (1)

The President said he now wanted to keep the pressure on for progress in arms control. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President acknowledged that verification of a chemical weapons ban would be tough. He said that perhaps the U.S. proposal in 1984 was wanting in this respect, but the international community must try to achieve a ban. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

2000-0429-F
7/10/09 10

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

The Prime Minister

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(S)~~

The Prime Minister

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(S)~~

The President

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(TS)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(S)~~

The President

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(C)~~

The President agreed, citing the example of China. The U.S. had to move carefully. The President supported democracy but did not want to jeopardize a great relationship. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(C)~~

The President described his meeting with Wan Li in the White House. The U.S. would conduct itself properly and work closely with the regime while supporting democracy. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) (1)

The President agreed. He had made modest proposals to address this problem but the Prime Minister was right; the West must deal properly with the debt issue. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(h) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President asked if the Prime Minister was worried about Germany's future and the possibility of reunification. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(TS)~~

The President |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher said East Germany was economically better
(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) (1)

The President asked what the Prime Minister thought of Austria's desire for membership in the EC. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(C)

The President asked the Prime Minister for her views on the Middle East. He said the visits of Middle Eastern leaders to Washington had gone well. The Shamir visit went better than the President had expected, but |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President was not too optimistic. On Lebanon, the President was really depressed. It was an awful situation and the President felt emotionally involved. Things used to work there.

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(C)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(C)

The President raised the issue of American and British hostages in Lebanon. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(TS)~~

Mr. Powell |

(b) (1)

~~(TS)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President praised the role of the Prime Minister. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President |

(b) (1)

~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~(S)~~

The President |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President |

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The Prime Minister commented that Ambassador Acland would stay in Washington for another year, until 1991. ~~(C)~~

The Prime Minister said she would be going to the next meeting of the International Democratic Union and asked if it was true that Vice President Quayle might be the next chairman of the IDU. ~~(C)~~

The President was embarrassed to say he had not heard that. The U.S. had an internal problem with the IDU, since the Democrats wanted to be part of it rather than be in the Socialist International. But the President would look into the question and would be pleased about the Vice President assuming the chairmanship. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President said he had thought of asking President Reagan to go to the Tokyo meeting. ~~(C)~~

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

The President, after a brief discussion of the environment, commented on the Strategic Defense Initiative, saying he could not take SDI away. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

Prime Minister Thatcher asked if the U.S. was contemplating holding an international conference on global warming. ~~(C)~~

The President said he was worried that there were too many conferences. ~~(C)~~

Prime Minister Thatcher

(b) (1)

(b) (1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, III, Secretary of State
Henry Catto, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President and Press Secretary
Robert Zoellick, Counselor, Department of State
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)

Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary
Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to the U.S.
Sir Percy Cradock, Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister
Sir Robin Butler, Cabinet Secretary
Mr. Charles Powell, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
Bernard Ingham, Press Secretary for the Prime Minister

DATE, TIME June 1, 1989, 11:35 a.m. - 12:35 p.m..
AND PLACE: Number 10 Downing Street, London

Prime Minister Thatcher said there was much to discuss: NATO Summit follow-up, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, China, South Africa, Namibia, and Argentina. The Prime Minister said she was bewildered in knowing what to say about Lebanon. (P)

The President said this was a good summary, and yielded the floor to the Prime Minister. (U)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135268000-0429-F
28 6/6/13

~~SECRET~~

2

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Thatcher asked Foreign Secretary Howe whether, in his meeting, there had been a discussion of the refugee problem in Hong Kong. (C)

Foreign Secretary Howe reported on his meeting with Secretary Baker. (U)

Prime Minister Thatcher remarked that there had been no discussion of Cambodia and that she would be asked in the House of Commons about Lockerbie. She also expected to be asked whether there had been a discussion of nuclear non-proliferation or the dangers of missile proliferation. (C)

The President replied that, on the topic of Cambodia, the United States would continue to support Prince Sihanouk. He was a bit of a weak reed, but he was the only reed in town. The U.S. was strongly opposed to Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge, and was listening to its Asian friends on Hun Sen. In the Sino-Soviet summit meeting, Gorbachev and Deng did not make any real progress on Cambodia as far as the U.S. could see. The President was afraid that it would be tough to keep the Khmer Rouge out. (C)

Secretary Baker said it was important to support the non-Communist resistance and those in Hanoi who might be reasonable. It was a difficult problem because of the large number of players. (C)

The President said he was amazed to hear about the problems in Hong Kong. (C)

Prime Minister Thatcher said the problems in Hong Kong had been aggravated by recent events in China which had weakened those Chinese officials who had worked with the UK to negotiate the Hong Kong agreement. The people of Hong Kong were very anxious at the moment and this has been made worse by the flood -- 700 a day -- of boat people. The British authorities had been trying to repatriate these people, but there was no more space for them. The British government might have to stop allowing them to come. (C)

The President said this revealed something about conditions in Vietnam. There were some in America who wanted to give Vietnam a chance, but the problem of the boat people was just another indicator of the repressive nature of the Vietnamese government. (C)

Foreign Secretary Howe said these refugees were economic migrants and Hong Kong was the only place where they were accepted. The British had to send 35,000 Chinese a year back to the mainland but are accepting Vietnamese boat people -- a nasty political problem. (C)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Thatcher repeated that the UK might have to stop the boat people from landing in Hong Kong. (S)

Secretary Baker noted that there would be a conference on June 13-14 to seek a comprehensive solution to the Indochinese refugee problem. The U.S. had encountered similar problems with Soviet Jews, and migrants from Central America and Mexico. The U.S. was looking at whether to change the definition of asylum. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said that must be done or "we" would be swamped. It was a new problem, harming the whole notion of asylum. The world should put pressure on Vietnam to stop this outrage. The Prime Minister observed that the press would want to know if the Vietnamese problem had been discussed. (S)

Secretary Baker said that he and Foreign Secretary Howe had talked about it at some length. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. was extremely grateful for the Prime Minister's treatment of (Nicaraguan President) Ortega. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said Ortega was awful, talking drivel. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. was also grateful for the Prime Minister's help with the Namibia accords. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said that it was lucky she was there when the crisis arose. (S)

The Prime Minister commented that the NATO Summit had gone extremely well. It would help stop the euphoria about the Soviet Union. The Prime Minister said she was very grateful to the President for the speeches he had been making. (S)

On Lebanon, the Prime Minister talked to Perez de Cuellar and had tried to do what she could with the Arab League. She wondered how one could pressure Syria. (S)

The President said that Aoun was not very sympathetic either. (S)

Secretary Baker said the U.S. had sent word to Iraq asking that Baghdad stop sending weapons to Aoun. (S)

Prime Minister Thatcher said the situation would be more difficult if General Aoun "went under." (S)

Secretary Baker said this was absolutely true. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chron

5733 Add-on

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 25, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *PB*
ARNIE KANTER *AK*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Canadian Minister of National
Defense William McKnight, Wednesday, July 26,
1989, 2:30-3:00 p.m.

McKnight is coming to Washington to discuss Canadian defense cooperation with Secretary Cheney and to solicit our views on the President's timetable for agreement at the CFE talks.

Defense Policy. Mulroney appointed McKnight Minister of National Defense this February primarily to avoid embarrassing then-Defense Minister Perrin Beatty (a rising star in the Conservative party) over Mulroney's April budget cuts which gutted the 1987 Canadian White Paper on Defense. McKnight's task is to maintain morale at the Department of National Defense in light of the cuts, and to demonstrate to the U.S. and NATO that Canada will honor its defense commitments. This will not be easy.

- With its budget cuts, Canada's defense contribution will fall to 1.9% of per capita GNP, putting it ahead only of Luxembourg within NATO; this in spite of having a per capita GNP in NATO second only to that of the U.S.
- The rate of growth in Canadian defense expenditures under Mulroney is lower than that of the last Trudeau government (1980-1984).
- Canadian forces in Europe face a serious obsolescence problem. The White Paper had called for modernization of Canada's main battle tanks (through purchase of either the Leopard II or the M-1). The Government has put these plans on hold. McKnight asked Secretary Cheney in May whether it would be possible to obtain surplus M-60 tanks in lieu of modernization, an issue that is being explored in the Pentagon.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1598-JR
MM 11/4/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- Even with a tank upgrade, military transport is so antiquated that there are serious questions as to whether Canada can meet its obligation to send up to 5,000 reinforcements to Europe in the event of a crisis.
- The cancellation of the nuclear submarine program will not free any funds for other military requirements, since the \$8 billion cost for the submarines was never allocated in the first place.

McKnight has announced that a new defense policy statement will be issued, tentatively in September, outlining Canadian defense policy in light of the April cuts. In addition, he is likely to stress the cooperative U.S.-Canadian defense efforts (e.g., approval of advanced cruise missile testing) as a signal of Canada pulling its own weight on defense matters.

We have repeatedly stressed to Canadian officials the need to avoid unilateral reductions so as not to undermine NATO's position in Vienna. We need to reinforce this message with a second theme, that of Canada's role in relation to a more assertive Europe. The Canadians believe that, even with a more united Europe, the U.S. will always have a seat at the table because of its nuclear power and its military presence in Europe. Canada, however, is fearful of being left out. We should turn this concern to our advantage, emphasizing the value that a strong military commitment carries in a west-west context as well.

Open Skies. The Canadians have been the most supportive of our NATO Allies on Open Skies. At the same time, Ambassador Burney has already raised concerns that we are not pursuing our initiative. In addition to getting a sense of our own planning, McKnight may float the idea of Canada hosting an international conference on Open Skies -- an idea which may be attractive.

You could take the opportunity to stress that we are completing our interagency development of Open Skies, and intend to work closely with Canada to make it succeed.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD). Next year marks the 50th anniversary of the Ogdensburg Declaration signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister MacKenzie King that established the PJBD and the close military cooperation between both countries. The Canadian government plans to commemorate the event in August 1990. (The railway car where the declaration was signed is being refurbished.) McKnight may ask whether the President would consider participating in the event. Given our commitment to yearly summits and the close relationship between the President and Prime Minister Mulroney, we suggest you inform him that we would give it favorable consideration in next year's planning.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Minister McKnight will be accompanied by Acting Deputy Minister of Defense, Louis Delvoie, and Ambassador Burney.

Attachment

Tab A Biographic Data

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Report	Re: William Hunter McKnight [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	5/15/89	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: July 1989 [2]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 9/4/2018

Date Closed: 6/14/2011	OA/ID Number: 30546
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2012-1598-MR(502.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 2/12/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

William Hunter MCKNIGHT**CANADA***Minister of National Defense
(since January 1989)*

William McKnight is holding his third and most important post in Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government. He had no experience in defense matters before 1989 but has a reputation as a good organizer. His appointment indicated the government's intention to back off from its ambitious modernization program for the armed forces. Although after taking office he stated often that he did not intend to abandon the proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, the federal budget announced in April 1989 did not provide funds for the project. Most observers agree that the suspension of the nuclear submarine program was not a major political setback for McKnight but rather a recognition of fiscal realities and a need to restrain federal spending. Shortly after the budget's unveiling he announced that the Navy would seek six diesel submarines instead and that Canada would have to depend on her allies to defend the Arctic.



©

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

One of his first acts as Defense Minister was to announce Ottawa's approval for US testing in Canadian airspace of the Advanced Cruise Missile. He has worked well with US counterparts thus far.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

McKnight was born on 12 July 1940 in Saskatchewan. He attended high school there and then became a wheat and cattle farmer and a businessman. Before his election to the House of Commons in 1979, his only political experience was as president of the provincial Progressive Conservative Party (1974-77) and as a member of a local school board. In Ottawa he has served as Minister of Labor (1984-86) and of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (1986-89). He has also served on parliamentary committees dealing with trade and agricultural issues.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

McKnight is married to the former Beverly Ogden and has two children.

1.4(c); 1.4(d); (b)(3)

LDA M 89-12536
15 May 1989



**DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526**

2012-1598-MR

2/12/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5230 *Chmn*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *R218*
SUBJECT: Appointment Request from Shirley Temple Black,
Ambassador-Designate to Czechoslovakia

Ambassador-Designate Black expects to be confirmed August 5 and sworn in August 7. She has requested a meeting with you August 7 or 8. Given your personal association and the likelihood that Czechoslovakia will undergo substantial changes during her tenure, we recommend that you agree to a meeting.

Within the next year or two, the Chernenko-like transitional leadership in Prague is likely to give way to a more pragmatic lot, or at least begin some long overdue reforms. Czechoslovak society has already reawakened from its post-1968 slumber and is poised for real change. When change comes, it will move quickly and in directions we will want to encourage.

Our dialogue with Czechoslovak officialdom is all but nonexistent, and our small Embassy staff rarely gets outside of Prague to acquire a real sense of public moods around the country. This meeting would be a good opportunity for you to stress the need for preparing our mission in Prague for a task totally unlike that of the past two decades.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to meet with Black for thirty minutes on August 7 or 8.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1599-MR
MM 1/13/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 30, 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

5230

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request: Shirley Temple Black,
Ambassador-Designate to Czechoslovakia

Shirley Temple Black, Ambassador-Designate to Czechoslovakia, is in Washington for consultations prior to her Senate confirmation hearing. The hearing has not yet been scheduled, but Ambassador Black hopes to leave for Czechoslovakia in mid-July. She would welcome the opportunity to meet with you and Robert Gates as soon as possible.

Czechoslovakia under the leadership of General Secretary Milos Jakes has resisted the reforms sweeping the Soviet Union, Poland and Hungary. The Jakes regime has implemented some minor economic reforms, but avoided political liberalization or change in the "leading role of the Party." Although Czechoslovak playwright Vaclav Havel was recently released from prison, the overall climate of repression has not improved nor has Czechoslovakia's poor human rights record. There are signs, however, that pressure on the regime to adopt more substantial reforms is building.

Ambassador Black would like to discuss with you her upcoming assignment to Czechoslovakia and U.S. relations with that country.

J. Stapleton Roy
Stapleton Roy
Deputy Secretary

*— State incoming in partly
OSE and should not be
forwarded with the memo
to B.S.*

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0397MR
E8 11/23/15

— R218

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

5673

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Crown Prince Felipe of Spain

Crown Prince Felipe is scheduled to visit New Mexico and Texas, September 25-30, at the invitation of Governor Clements. The Spanish Ambassador has inquired whether a brief photo opportunity with the President could be arranged. Mindful that the visit coincides with the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, the Ambassador said that a New York meeting would also be possible.

State recommends that the President agree to a brief meeting and photo op. We concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I Schedule Proposal.

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal

Tab A List of Participants

Tab II State Recommendation w/Bio

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0397MR
E8 11123115

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

5673

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Photo opportunity and brief meeting with
Crown Prince Felipe of Spain

PURPOSE: To generate favorable publicity in Spain
after our difficult base negotiations

BACKGROUND: Crown Prince Felipe will visit New Mexico and
Texas in late September at the invitation of
Governor Clements of Texas

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Crown Prince Felipe met with President Reagan
in the Oval Office in May 1987

DATE & TIME: September 25, 28, or 29, 1989
DURATION: 10 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, James Baker, Governor Sununu,
Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, Robert
Blackwill, Crown Prince Felipe, Ambassador
Santamaria

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity and brief meeting

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo, writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC and State

OPPOSED BY: None

Attachment

Tab A List of Participants

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

James A. Baker, Secretary of State

John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff

Brent Scowcroft,

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert M. Gates,

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for

National Security Affairs

Spain

Crown Prince Felipe

Julian Santamaria, Ambassador



July 19, 1989

CONFIDENTIAL/
(With ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Private Visit by the Crown Prince of Spain:
Request for Photo Opportunity with the
President

Spanish Crown Prince Felipe plans a private visit to the U.S. September 25-30 as the guest of Texas Governor Clements. The Spanish Ambassador has approached the Department to explore the possibility of a brief photo opportunity for Prince Felipe with President Bush. If that should not be possible, the prince would limit his stay to Texas. During his last U.S. trip in 1987, Prince Felipe was received at the White House by President Reagan and Vice President Bush jointly.

The Department recommends a 5-minute meeting/photo opportunity if the President's schedule permits. Given the high esteem in which the royal family is held by the Spanish public, a photo opportunity would attract exceptional media play in Spain, especially just before Prime Minister Gonzalez's October 19 visit to the U.S. The President's willingness to receive the 21-year-old future monarch would be seen as an important gesture of friendship to the Spanish people, and contribute to the upward trend in bilateral relations evident since conclusion of our new base agreement.

The Spanish Crown Prince could meet with the President on September 25, 28 or 29.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0397MR
ES 11123115


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic Information 11123115

CONFIDENTIAL/ (With ~~SECRET~~/NOFORN Attachment)
(DECL:OADR)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06c. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: July 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 6/14/2011	OA/ID Number: 30546
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chron

CONFIDENTIAL

572A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Danish Ambassador

Ambassador Dyvig has requested a brief meeting with you between now and the second week in August. Dyvig has been here just over a month and has been making courtesy calls, including separate meetings with Bob Blackwill and Bob Gates earlier this month. We see no reason for you to meet with him as well.

The one specific item on his agenda is to seek a meeting between the President and Danish Prime Minister Poul Schluter. We have forwarded a Schedule Proposal under separate cover.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to decline the appointment request.

Agree _____ Disagree _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0397-MR
E8 11/23/15

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

5733

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON FILE

July 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNIE KANTER
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON
SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Canadian Defense Minister William McKnight

Canadian Defense Minister William McKnight will be travelling to Washington July 26 for his initial call on Secretary Cheney. McKnight also requested a meeting with you. We recommend that you agree to meet with McKnight so that you can register our concerns about the anemic Canadian defense contribution to the NATO alliance. We could also use such a meeting to update the Canadians on Open Skies, an initiative they have strongly endorsed.

We will forward a briefing paper along with McKnight's biographic data should you agree to meet with him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to meet Defense Minister McKnight on Wednesday, July 26, at 2:30 p.m. for thirty minutes.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0397MR
E8 11/23/15

CONFIDENTIAL

Chron

5645
Redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*
SUBJECT: Letter to American Turkish Association

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Shirley Green of White House Correspondence forwarding a proposed Presidential letter (Tab A) to Dr. Demir Karsan, President of the American Turkish Association, Inc. Karsan had written the President to seek his support for the plight of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. The reply expresses sympathy and refers to the June 26 White House Press Statement on the topic, as well as to U.S. support for a NATO statement along the same lines.

Concurrence by: Robert D. Blackwill *RB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Green at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Green
Tab A Letter to Karsan
Tab B Incoming from Karsan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Letter to American Turkish Association

Attached is a proposed Presidential letter responding to a letter from Dr. Demir Karsan, who wrote to the President seeking his support on behalf of the plight of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. The draft reply expresses sympathy and refers to the June 26 White House Press Statement on the subject, as well as to U.S. support for a NATO statement along the same lines.

RECOMMENDATION

That the President sign the letter to Karsan at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Letter to Karsan

Tab B Incoming from Karsan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Dr. Karsan:

Thank you for your letter of June 22 concerning the plight of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. I share your concern and want to assure you that the United States will continue to use every opportunity to condemn the Bulgarian Government's systematic denial of the basic human rights of its Turkish population.

On June 26, the White House issued a strongly worded Press Statement on the subject. The United States is also supporting a NATO statement calling on the Government of Bulgaria to cease its violations of the human rights of its Turkish minority and to allow the orderly emigration of those who desire to leave. I hope that international pressure of this kind will bring some relief to Turks in Bulgaria and those, now numbering over 160,000, who have sought refuge in Turkey.

Sincerely,

Dr. Demir I. Karsan, President
American Turkish Association
P.O. Box 61002
Houston, Texas 77208

5645

ID# 051138

HH

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JULY 06, 1989

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: DR. DEMIR I. KARSAN

SUBJECT: REQUESTS SUPPORT TO STOP THE INHUMAN
TREATMENT OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA
BY THE GOVERNMENT

		ACTION		DISPOSITION	
ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
CHARLES BACARISSE		ORG	89/07/06		C 89/07/07 TH
<i>Phil Hughes, NSC</i>	REFERRAL NOTE:	A	89/07/11		
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				
	REFERRAL NOTE:				

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

PL MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

```

*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION          *OUTGOING          *
*                        *                        *CORRESPONDENCE:   *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED          *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL *      OF SIGNER    *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED         *      CODE = A      *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED         *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                        *      OUTGOING     *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                        *                        *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                        *                        *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                        *                        *
*****

```

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

A.T.A.

AMERICAN TURKISH ASSOCIATION, INC.

P.O. BOX 61002 HOUSTON, TX 77208, TEL: (713) 497-7559

June 22, 1989

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, D.C

Subject: Inhuman Treatment of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria by the
Bulgarian Government.


Dear Mr President,

This is to ask for your support to stop inhuman treatment, murder and mass deportation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria by the Bulgarian government. Bulgarian government has been systematically trying to force the Turks to "Bulgarize " their names, close their schools and stop practicing their religion. Turkish names in cemeteries are being wiped off and Bulgarian Turks by the thousands are beaten, relocated, imprisoned and even killed. As of last week, an astounding 16,297 Bulgarian Turks had been kidnapped, picked up on the streets, taken from their homes and deposited in trucks and busses in the Turkish boarder cities of Istanbul and Bursa.

It is hard to believe that a terror of this magnitude can exist on the eve of the 21st Century by a country claiming to be a member of the United Nations. Bulgaria refuses to allow journalists to cover the serious incidents taking place, instructs its state controlled press not to mention the incidents and maintains its silence in the face of the demand of the international community for information about these grave developments.

We invite you to take firm action against the treatment of the 1.5 Million Turkish minority in Bulgaria and put an end to this state supported terrorism.

Your Very Truly,



Dr. Demir I. Karsan
President

American Turkish Association Inc. Houston

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 21, 1989

CHRON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *ALL*SUBJECT: Response to Letter from R. D. Praaning, Director,
Netherlands Atlantic Commission

At Tab I is a letter from you to R. D. Praaning, Director of the Netherlands Atlantic Committee thanking him on behalf of General Scowcroft, for a copy of the Atlantisch Perspektief publication. In his incoming letter, Mr. Praaning also asks whether it would be possible to present "NATO Roses" for planting in the White House Rose Garden. (The Dutch Government is planning to provide "NATO Roses" to all NATO members.) We have drafted a memorandum from you to Irv Williams, the Superintendent of the White House Grounds, recommending a positive response to this request. We have checked informally with Mr. Williams and understand that there is no problem in accepting the roses.

Mr. Praaning's letter, along with the Atlantisch Perspektief, are at Tab III.

Concurrence by: Robert D. Blackwill *RB*RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Praaning at Tab I and the memo to Irv Williams at Tab II.

Attachments

Tab I	Letter to Praaning
Tab II	Memo to Irv Williams
Tab A	Copy of Letter to Praaning
Tab B	Incoming letter

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Praaning:

General Scowcroft asked me to convey his appreciation for sending along the Atlantisch Perspektief, as well as an outline of events your organization has planned to commemorate NATO's fortieth anniversary.

We find the "NATO Rose" project a wonderful, refreshing idea, which we support. I would ask that you contact Mr. Irving Williams, the Superintendent of the White House Grounds, to discuss the necessary arrangements for planting the "NATO Roses" in the Rose Garden. He can be reached by telephone at 202-456-2188.

Sincerely,

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Mr. R. D. Praaning
Atlantische Commissie
Laan van Meerdervoort 96
2517 AR Den Haag

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR IRV WILLIAMS

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: "NATO Roses" From The Netherlands

R. D. Praaning, Director of the Netherlands Atlantic Committee, has written General Scowcroft to inquire whether or not it would be possible to have "NATO Roses" planted in the Rose Garden. The Dutch Government is offering these roses on the occasion of NATO's fortieth anniversary to each member of the alliance. The NSC endorses the project and has asked Mr. Praaning to contact you directly to work out the necessary arrangements.

Attachments

Tab A Copy of Letter to Praaning
Tab B Incoming letter

(After Philip signs the letter
to Mr. Praaning, please xerox
a copy and put it at Tab A.)

4288

Atlantische Commissie



Laan van Meerdervoort 96, 2517 AR Den Haag

Telefoon 070 - 639495 / 645711

Telefax 070 - 646309

JUN 1 1989

Betreft: NATO-Rose
No.: 8161/RP/IM
Datum: May 24, 1989

General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
17th Street and Pennsylvania
Av., NW
Washington, DC, 20506
United States of America

Dear General,

On behalf of the Board of The Netherlands Atlantic Commission I have the honour to present three copies of our bi-monthly "Atlantisch Perspektief", in which a photo is published of His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands, as he congratulates you on your present appointment.

The Netherlands Atlantic Commission has organized a wide-ranging programme on the occasion of NATO's fortieth anniversary. Please find a review of the various projects enclosed.

One of these projects is the "NATO Rose". Her Majesty Queen Beatrix of The Netherlands received the first of these roses during our fifth Roundtable Conference in The Hague. A photo of this event is enclosed.

During the NATO summit at the end of this month in Brussels, the Netherlands Government will provide NATO Headquarters and all Heads of State and of Government with "NATO Roses".

May we ask you to inform us, whether we can offer a (any desired) number of NATO Rose plants to the President, for cultivation in the White House rose garden?

Thanking you most sincerely for your attention, and looking forward to your answer, I remain,

Yours Faithfully,
ATLANTIC COMMISSION

R.D. Praaning
Director

Enclosures: * Atlantisch Perspektief 1988/6 - 3 copies
* Photo with HM Queen Beatrix and the NATO Roses
* Memorandum on NATO anniversary activities in The Netherlands.



Memorandum on Netherlands Atlantic Commission activities on the
occasion of NATO's fortieth anniversary

1. The Netherlands Atlantic Commission is executing its largest and most far reaching information programme ever, within the framework of NATO's fortieth anniversary.
2. Preparations started in 1986. Basic to the effort were: maximum media coverage, simple approaches for the largest possible audiences, controversial and open debates to attract maximum academic and political attention, and the broadest possible co-operation in order to use all available and existing channels of communication for the distribution of information on Atlantic security issues.
3. Projects were selected in such a way, that entirely new target groups could be added to the traditional ones.
4. On this basis, the Netherlands Atlantic Commission set up twelve projects of its own and twelve projects with third parties.

The following 12 projects have, by now, been executed by the Commission:

a. **Stamp**

At the 14th of March, 1989, the first PTT-stamp commemorating NATO's fortieth anniversary was presented by PTT-President Dr Dik to Foreign Minister Van den Broek. Subsequently, fifteen million stamps were sold. Each post-office disseminated special leaflets explaining the background of the stamp, mentioning the Atlantic Commission with its address as initiator of the stamp. 300.000 subscribers to first-day emissions received an explanatory article on NATO and the Atlantic Commission. Several philatelic publications ran articles on NATO and the Commission. A special philatelic exhibition on NATO's history in stamps was started and is now touring the country.

The stamp-project was well covered by the Dutch press, if only, because the Commission's initiative was explicitly and in writing supported by the leaders of all major political parties and by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

b. **Teachers Conference**

The Federal Republic of Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty are of the same year. The Education Committee of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission held, at the 14th of March, 1989, a national teachers conference on this theme. The conference was of particular importance because of Germany's somewhat differing positions on present Allied policies. The conference was attended by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the most well-known authorities on Germany in Dutch academic and journalistic circles. There were over 350 participating teachers of history, civics and geography. A video tape with the major presentations and discussion rounds during this conference will be made available to schools and universities.

c. **International teachers and publishers Conference**

In November, 1989, an international Education Conference, co-sponsored by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and the Atlantic Council of the United States, will analyse NATO's role in textbooks for history and civics used at secondary schools. In The Netherlands, a special study team is researching all textbooks of importance; its concluding report will be presented to the Dutch Government. During the conference, casus will be reviewed of the US, the UK, the FRG and Belgium. The conference will host textbook authors, publishers and teachers.

d. **NATO Rose**

In co-operation with a West-German rose breeders firm and after explicit approval by NATO, the Commission gave the name "NATO Rose" to the bluest rose it could find. This rose is now for sale in every garden-center and flower shop. The first NATO roses were presented to Her Majesty Queen Beatrix during our fifth international Roundtable Conference in The Hague. The NATO Rose drew attention in both the national media and the specialist press on horticultural affairs. This fall, eight million leaflets will be mailed throughout Europe, presenting the NATO Rose to possible consumers.

e. **Posters, stickers**

The styled image of the NATO Rose has been printed on one thousand huge full-colour posters, 10.000 medium-size full-colour posters, 10.000 normal sized full-colour stickers and 20.000 small sized full-colour stickers. The huge posters were shown on all railway stations in The Netherlands, through the support of the Nederlandse Spoorwegen. The medium sized posters were spread throughout the country. A special system is developed to keep the posters on strategic points in all major cities. By now all stickers have found their way to users.

The text on the posters and stickers was kept simple; in translation: 16 leafs together form a rose - 16 nations together form NATO. Smaller print explains what NATO is all about in very simple language. All posters and stickers give the address and telephone numbers of the Commission's office.

The posters and stickers, because of the symbolism and apparent impact drew unexpected press and television coverage. A press release of the Commission, explaining further that the thorns of the NATO Rose were non-aggressive and for deterrence and defence purposes only, must have contributed to this coverage, which even made it to the front page of one leftist weekly.

f. **Puzzle Marathon**

The NATO Rose also featured on a puzzle marathon, but now in combination with the Red Cross. This puzzle marathon still runs, now in its fifth week out of eight, and is carried by door-to-door papers reaching over 1.3 million house holds every week. The normal percentage of 0.2 participates in the marathon; so each week the Commission receives anywhere between 2.300 and 3.000 solutions on post-cards. According to statistics this implies, that at least 8.000 persons participate in the puzzle marathon without, however, sending in the solutions. Obviously the NATO puzzle as such is at least seen by a much larger number of people, as the lay-out of each puzzle covers at least one quarter of a page. On top of that, the puzzle features the American Statue of Liberty, the words 40 years NATO and the first prize after eight weeks: a trip to the USA for two persons. All prizes, including eight video-recorders, are donated by large Dutch companies.

The puzzle consists of eight very short stories, each dealing with an issue concerning NATO. The language, of course, is kept simple. Participants have to read these stories and use a number of words in italics in those stories, by filling in those words in a puzzle; with a number of letters from that puzzle they have to form, each week, a slogan. Some of the slogans are: "Most succesfull Alliance in history"; "Longest period of peace"; "Allies in freedom".

The puzzle drew unexpected press coverage in the national media and there was even a television special on the puzzle marathon. Contributing to these phenomena were probably the fact that the surplus of the marathon action will be donated to the Red Cross and that the Red Cross will spent this donation on the victims of the earthquakes in Armenia.

The Councillor of the Embassy of the USSR in The Hague, a man of Armenian birth, accepted the Commission's invitation to hand out the first prize of the first week of the puzzle marathon. A photo of this gesture, against the background of the huge NATO Rose poster, was published in two dailies, one of them the largest in this country. The headline read: "Soviet diplomat hands out NATO prize".

This latter approach served to project the image of absolute openness as a general idea behind the puzzle marathon. Despite the fact that some criticized the puzzle marathon as being overly propagandistic, no criticism has been aired since the marathon's start. In fact, many of the thousands of participants in the marathon wrote not only the puzzle solutions on their postcard, but also encouraging messages of support for our purposes.

g. **Educational Television**

In co-operation with the Dutch National Education Television a documentary series of two parts was produced on forty years of Allied Co-operation. The Netherlands Atlantic Commission wrote the first draft of the scenario and was represented in the editorial board. The starting point of the scenario is a Czech, who flew to the West and is now a Professor of history at the University of Groningen. He tells his audience, a target group of pupils between 14 and 18 years old, how he and his family, in Prague, experienced the last days of the Second World War and the first days of the Cold War.

The series has been broadcast nationally on Monday April 3 and Tuesday April 4. The series has been repeated on April 10 and 11. Video tapes of the series can be obtained by individual schools.

The National Education Television published a special paper in a circulation of 40.000 copies for dissemination amongst the 4.000 Dutch secondary schools for higher education. The text of the paper was written by Drs F.R. Kat, a member of the Dutch Atlantic Education Committee.

Simultaneously the National Education Television published 4.000 copies of a teacher's manual with background information and references.

This approach ensured that no school was uninformed of the video, the paper and the teacher's manual. Up to now, over 20.000 copies of the paper have been ordered for use at the schools.

h. Opinion Poll

The annual public opinion poll commissioned by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission focussed, of course, at NATO's fortieth anniversary. The National Gallup Organization NIPO obtained the following polling results:

- * over 70 % wants The Netherlands to remain a member of NATO; 9 % wants to get out
- * 58 % thinks that Mr Gorbachev will succeed in his efforts to modernize the Soviet Union without abolishing Communism; 20 % says he won't
- * 49.5 % expects more unrest in Eastern Europe as a result of Mr Gorbachev's activities; 26.5 % expects less turmoil
- * 31 % is of the opinion that another Soviet leader would increase the danger for Western Europe; 8 % thinks the danger would decrease; 27 % thinks it wouldn't matter
- * 45 % thinks that the Soviet armies will always remain in Eastern Europe; 30 % thinks that they will be withdrawn
- * 56 % thinks that the American troupes will remain in Western Europe; 22 % thinks they will be withdrawn
- * 57 % is for re-unification of East and West Germany; 14 % is against; 8 % couldn't care less; and 21 % has no opinion. (This was a so-called "zero question"; this question, or any other question on this subject, has never been asked in a public opinion poll before. This implies that we have only measured a "gut feeling".)
- * 5 % wants each country to react individually to Mr Gorbachev's arms control initiatives; 16 % wants the European Community, without the US and Canada, to react; 22.5 % has no opinion; 56.5 % point at NATO as the body which should react.
- * 62 % thinks that all proposals by Mr Gorbachev's should be carefully studied and that all 16 nations should agree on a common reaction, even if this takes time; 8 % does not agree with this procedure and wants a quicker response; 4 % does not agree for any other reason; 2 % does not agree without a reason; 24 % has no opinion.
- * 57 % agrees that NATO should keep its nuclear weapons in Western Europe up to date, as long as the Soviet Union maintains a large nuclear weapons arsenal; 24 % does not agree; 20 % has no opinion.

The public opinion poll made headlines in a number of national and regional papers; the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs used the information of the poll in at least one speech and so did the Minister of Defense.

i. **Study Letter**

Underlining the position of NATO and of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission in the Dutch political environment, a special "Study Letter" was produced and presented to all schools of secondary education and to all authorities involved with international security affairs. *Party leaders of all political parties in the Dutch Parliament, including the Pacifist Socialist Party and the Radical Political Party, joined in this effort to clarify Dutch thinking on the Atlantic Alliance.* As it turned out, only one party, the PSP (Pacifists, one seat in Parliament out of 150), proclaimed that it wanted The Netherlands to get out of the Alliance. But even the PSP acknowledged that there was no solution for the "German Problem", once "both military blocks were dissolved".

The Study Letter, no 18 in a series, is a powerful means of signaling the broadest possible political support for the Atlantic Alliance. Obviously, ideas may differ on the sort of political course the Alliance should take in the near future. But each party leader emphasized the necessity of continuing the political consultation and co-ordination within NATO and ~~the impossibility to execute effective national foreign policy outside NATO's military and political framework.~~

Even though this Study Letter was "only" intended for secondary education, it led to reporting in the national press. The only critical remarks were found in De Waarheid (The Truth), the daily of the one party which, at this time, is not represented in the Dutch Parliament.

j. **Fourth international Roundtable Conference**

The fourth international Roundtable Conference of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (US), took place in Washington D.C. on November 28 and 29, 1988. His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands was the Honorary Guest during the Conference. During all sessions, the Prince was seated amongst the "Direct Participants" taking part in the debates. The general theme, "The Atlantic Alliance and Western Security as NATO turns forty; Setting the Agenda", was discussed by the then US Secretary of Defense Mr Frank Carlucci, the Ministers of Defense of Turkey, Norway and The Netherlands, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom and outstanding politicians, academics and journalists from both sides of the Atlantic, such as Senator Albert Gore, Congressman and House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, National Security Advisor to President Reagan, General Colin Powell, National Security Advisor to President-elect Bush, Brent Scowcroft, Dr Joseph Nye, Dr Uwe Nerlich, Dr Thierry de Montbrial, Dr Robert Murray, Mr Benoit d'Aboville, Mr Dominique Moisi, Dr Hans Rühle, Dr Marshall Goldman, Dr Stephano Silvestri, Dr David Greenwood and many others.

The timing of the Conference was such, that the debates were of supreme interest for the media and political Washington, all of whom were getting ready for the incoming Bush Administration. The Conference was broadcast nation-wide and all major and regional papers wrote about it.

In order to stimulate the best possible media coverage, the Netherlands Atlantic Commission took the initiative to hold a "media contest". In June 1989, eight journalists of papers who covered the RTC-IV, will be awarded a trip to Europe. During this trip they will be received at the highest possible political and academic level in London, Rome, Ankara, Bonn, The Hague and Brussels.

The RTC-IV was co-sponsored by the EUROGROUP, the North Atlantic Assembly and the Western European Union. Each of these organizations brought its top functionaries and outstanding Assembly representatives to the Conference to take part in the debates. The media contest will be co-sponsored by the NATO Information Service and the EUROGROUP.

k. Fifth international Roundtable Conference

~~On April 7 and 8, 1989, the fifth international Roundtable Conference of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (US) was held in De Ridderzaal, The Hague, The Netherlands. What once seemed to be superb timing turned out to be a lot less; the US Administration appeared to be still in the process of its planning for the Bush-approach of defense and foreign policies, and NATO was not even in sight of its Comprehensive Concept, defining minimum requirements for NATO's defense in the 1990s.~~

Nevertheless, the RTC-V served to be an excellent sounding board for Mr Gorbachev's visit to London, immediately preceeding the Conference. In the Dutch national news, and particularly on TV, both events were closely linked.

As usual, a wide variety of prominent politicians, academics and journalists took part in the Conference. It was a great honour for the sponsoring organizations to have Her Majesty Queen Beatrix as the Honorary Guest during the first part of the Conference. Queen Beatrix was seated amongst the "Direct Participants" at the Round Table. His Royal Highness Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands was the Honorary Guest during the Conference dinner and a most interested listener to the dinner address of Mr Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee of the US Congress.

Amongst the speakers and Direct Participants were the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Hans van den Broek, the Minister of Defense, Mr Frits Bolkestein, Director-designate of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ambassador Ronald Lehman, the US negotiator on Conventional Forces in

Europe, Ambassador Steven Ledogar, Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs of NATO, Ambassador Henning Wegener, US Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Alton Keel, Senator Malcolm Wallop, SPD Defense Spokesman in the Bundestag, Mr Erwin Horn, Congressman Don Ritter, Mr Michel Tatu, Dr Christoph Bertram, Mr François Heisbourg, Mr Simon Lunn and Major General (ret.) Evgeni Noshin, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

The RTC-V was extremely well covered by all national media, including national TV-news, a television special, headlines and photo's for a number of days in all major national and regional dailies, and many analysing articles in virtually all publications concerned with defense issues. As such, the RTC-V served to focus national attention on NATO's fortieth anniversary. Its general theme, "The Atlantic Alliance in a Changing World: Maintaining Public Support", gave way to very open-minded debates. All topical issues, including modernizing SNF, "the German Question", conventional arms negotiations, East-West relations in the political, financial and economic realms and the implications of "1992" for the Western European role in the Atlantic Alliance were ~~thoroughly discussed.~~

The planning of all national activities was such, that the RTC-V was the culminating point of the Netherlands Atlantic Commission's efforts to bring home in the most literal sense to all Dutchmen, that NATO's fortieth anniversary was and is of importance to them. The fact that Her Majesty Queen Beatrix accepted the first "NATO Roses" at the beginning of the Conference was perhaps the most meaningful contribution to that intention.

1. 40 years NATO in cartoons (exhibition)

Famous international political cartoonist Fritz Behrendt (The New York Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Berlingshe Tidende, Aftenposten, De Nieuwe Gazet, De Telegraaf) donated sixty of his best cartoons on NATO to an exhibition on "40 years NATO in cartoons". This most effective and attractive tool for drawing attention to NATO's problems and successes throughout its history was first exhibited during the Fifth International Roundtable Conference in The Hague on April 7 and 8, 1989. The exhibition is now touring the country. *It is available to all interested institutions in and outside The Netherlands.*

5. The following projects of third parties were selected for financial and other support by the Netherlands Atlantic Commission:

- a. a conference on NATO for editors of secondary school magazines, organized by JASON
- b. a national project involving teachers of history and pupils, gathering popular views on NATO and its history held by

- pupils between 14 and 18 years, organized by the National Association for Teachers of History
- c. an international high level academic conference on "Western Co-operation since the Second World War" by the University of Groningen
 - d. an international high level academic conference on "East-West Economic and Trade Relations" by the University of Leyden
 - e. an international high level academic conference on "Ten Years after NATO's Dual Track Decision" by the University of Amsterdam
 - f. a publication by D66 (political party, Center Left) for its own membership, on NATO's fortieth anniversary and Western Europe's future role in the Alliance
 - g. a national conference on NATO policies by the Women's Organization within the Christian Democratic Party (CDA)
 - h. an international conference on NATO policies by the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), organized in conjunction with the International Secretary of the Labour Party and the Scientific Bureau of that Party
 - i. a national conference on NATO policies by the VVD (Center Right)
 - j. an international meeting for junior Members and staff aides ~~of the US Congress and the Netherlands Parliament on Atlantic Co-operation~~, organized by "Mandaat", a combination of Members of Parliament under 40 years of all political parties
 - k. a national conference by the Youth Organization of the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) on "Alternatives to NATO's Present Strategy?"
 - l. a national conference by VOKS, an alternative body to the anti nuclear Interchurch Peace Council (IKV), on "Present NATO Policies"
6. It is too early to tell in a conclusive way, whether the underlying assumptions of the programme outlined above were right, and whether this or another approach should have been contemplated. However, each individual project seems to have attracted more media, academic and popular attention than was hoped for to start with. After a year, we may be able to decide whether or not the programme did make a difference. For now, suffice it to say, that the many personalities of all social and political strata involved in the programme have testified of their joy in supporting or taking part in the various projects.

RDP

May 17, 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5568

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Danish Prime Minister
Schluter

*Brent -- If
Schluter gets a
meeting at Kennebunkport
every other week
European leader
will want to go
there as well.
RB Blackwill*

Prime Minister Schluter will be traveling via New York to Mexico for an official visit, August 25-31, and would like to meet briefly with the President either August 24-25 or September 1-2. This informal request was relayed by Ambassador Dyvig in separate meetings with Bob Blackwill and Bob Gates.

I explained to Dyvig that the President would be out of the city from August 18 through the Labor Day weekend. Dyvig, predictably, said the Prime Minister would be glad to meet with the President in Kennebunkport.

We believe that while such a meeting would be useful, there is no urgent reason to push for it. We suggest that you raise the matter with the President in terms of his personal relationship with Schluter as well as the kind of the schedule he wishes to follow in Kennebunkport.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss with the President a possible meeting with Schluter in Kennebunkport and then decide whether to forward the Tab I Schedule Proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Schedule Proposal

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0897 NR
Eg 11/23/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with Danish Prime Minister
Poul Schluter

PURPOSE: To renew personal contact with Schluter.

BACKGROUND: Prime Minister Schluter will be travelling
via New York to Mexico for an official visit,
August 25-31, and has expressed an interest
in a brief meeting with you.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Schluter met with President Reagan in the
Oval Office in September 1985. You last saw
Schluter in May at the NATO Summit.

DATE & TIME: August 24-25 or September 1-2
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Kennebunkport, Maine

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Governor Sununu, Brent
Scowcroft, Robert Blackwill, Prime Minister
Schluter, and Ambassador Dyvig

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity and brief discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo/writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5568

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

July 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RH*
SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Danish Prime Minister
Schluter

Chron
7/21/89
1805
Brent -- If Schluter gets a meeting at Kennebunkport every other week European leaders will want to go there as well.
BB Blackwill

Prime Minister Schluter will be traveling via New York to Mexico for an official visit, August 25-31, and would like to meet briefly with the President either August 24-25 or September 1-2. This informal request was relayed by Ambassador Dyvig in separate meetings with Bob Blackwill and Bob Gates.

I explained to Dyvig that the President would be out of the city from August 18 through the Labor Day weekend. Dyvig, predictably, said the Prime Minister would be glad to meet with the President in Kennebunkport.

We believe that while such a meeting would be useful, there is no urgent reason to push for it. We suggest that you raise the matter with the President in terms of his personal relationship with Schluter as well as the kind of the schedule he wishes to follow in Kennebunkport.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss with the President a possible meeting with Schluter in Kennebunkport and then decide whether to forward the Tab I Schedule Proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Schedule Proposal

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0397-MR
SS 11/23/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with Danish Prime Minister
Poul Schluter

PURPOSE: To renew personal contact with Schluter.

BACKGROUND: Prime Minister Schluter will be travelling
via New York to Mexico for an official visit,
August 25-31, and has expressed an interest
in a brief meeting with you.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Schluter met with President Reagan in the
Oval Office in September 1985. You last saw
Schluter in May at the NATO Summit.

DATE & TIME: August 24-25 or September 1-2
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Kennebunkport, Maine

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Governor Sununu, Brent
Scowcroft, Robert Blackwill, Prime Minister
Schluter, and Ambassador Dyvig

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity and brief discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo/writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

BLACK Will
3407

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 20, 1989

Diib ✓
Dear Professor Gardner,

Thank you for your letter of April 25, and for sending the papers by the students in your Defense Policy and Arms Control Seminar.

I have shared the papers with my staff, who agree that they are indeed of exceptionally high quality. Clearly, your students have acquired a solid grounding in the subject, and have produced thoughtful and thought-provoking works on very topical issues.

I hope you will pass on to your students my compliments on their excellent work.

Sincerely,

Brent
Brent Scowcroft

Richard N. Gardner
Professor of Law and International
Organization
Columbia University
435 West 116th Street
New York, New York 10027

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3407

June 29, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER *AK*

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL *JM*

SUBJECT: Reply to Professor Gardner

Attached for your signature is a suggested reply to Professor Richard Gardner, who sent you five papers by the graduate students in his Defense Policy and Arms Control Seminar.

The papers are well-researched, thoughtful and thought-provoking. Your reply commends the high quality of their effort.

RB Robert Blackwill, *JK* John Gordon, *CR* Condi Rice, *PD* Rich Davis and *DM* Don Mahley concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached reply to Professor Gardner.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Reply to Professor Gardner
Tab A Incoming

*General Scowcroft -
You just signed a letter
to Prof Gardner for sending
two separate papers.
If you prefer, to not send
two letters, I will be glad
to phone and thank
him on your behalf -
✓/r John Gordon*

3467

1.4.89

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N.Y. 10027

SCHOOL OF LAW

435 West 116th Street

April 25, 1989

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
National Security Advisor
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

MAY 4 1989

Dear Brent:

I received five exceptionally good papers from students in my Defense Policy and Arms Control Seminar this year -- so good, indeed, that I thought they might be useful to you and Arnold Kantor as you complete your strategic review and focus on specific arms control issues.

The authors and the subjects of these papers, which are enclosed, are as follows:

Christina Rufenacht, "Recommendations for the Emerging Soviet-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty."

Steven Messinger, "START Verification and Compliance."

Alan Levesque, "NATO Nuclear Forces: At the Crossroads."

Ian Johnstone, "Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy: Multilateral Measures."

Mary Holland, "Report to President Bush: Proposal to Restrict Nuclear Testing."

Also enclosed is the text of an agreed statement on strengthening the United Nations which we negotiated between the two U.N. Associations earlier this month in Moscow.

I'm off on a month-long tour of the Pacific rim tomorrow which will take me to Sydney, Hong Kong, Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul. I'll be visiting Washington in June and will give you a call to see if we can get together.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely,

RG

Richard N. Gardner
Professor of Law and
International Organization

440

BLACKWILL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


July 26, 1989

Jim
Dear Lord Callaghan:

Henry Catto forwarded your letter to me and I wanted to thank you for your kind words.

The success of the Summit and my visits to London, Bonn, and Rome were the high points in my first six months as President. As you so rightly point out, although we have laid a solid foundation for the future, there is "still some way ahead." We are eager to continue down that road and welcome your seasoned judgment and understanding along the way.

Sincerely,



The Rt. Hon. Lord Callaghan of Cardiff, K.G.
5 Temple West Mews
West Square
London SE11 4TJ

*We should
have thought
of that.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5335

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
July 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BJS*
SUBJECT: Letter to Lord Callaghan

Purpose

To thank former Prime Minister Lord Callaghan for a letter he sent to Ambassador Catto which Ambassador Catto then forwarded to you.

Background

Lord Callaghan was the Labour Prime Minister, succeeded by Margaret Thatcher in 1979. He is now in the House of Lords and is a voice within his Party for more moderation on defense issues.

Attached for your signature at Tab A is a letter to Callaghan

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Callaghan at Tab A

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Callaghan

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 96 NARA, Date 07/24/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



5 TEMPLE WEST MEWS
WEST SQUARE
LONDON S.E.11 4TJ
01-735-9959

3 June 88

Dear Henry,

When we met at Margaret's I said (rather pompously) that the President must not permit the NATO Summit to get bogged down on Lance but he should respond to Europe's mood & offer a constructive approach on a much broader canvas.

Well he's done it! What he said was exactly right: the visit to each country was a resounding success: he has recaptured American leadership. Never mind the squawks about the "Special Relationship" - that will look after itself as long as it has value to both of us. It needs no public reassurance from the President, while affirmations of devoted loyalty from the Prime Minister are not only embarrassing to many of us & counterproductive to some, but also misunderstand what it is about!

As to Germany, the President was right to say what he did. I cannot claim that I shall be overjoyed

if & when Germany is reunited. But if it is coming (I believe it to be inevitable), then it must be channelled into a wide European settlement that will render harmless that Teutonic tendency to give way to ANGER at regular intervals.

However that is still some way ahead: & there will be some formidable negotiations on arms control before we reach that point.

Meanwhile the real purpose of this letter is to say how much I applaud the President's Ford & send my congratulations to him & those who helped - I fancy I detected Brent Scowcroft's hand & Henry Eagleburger's in what he said.

Yours

Jim Callaghan

The Rt. Hon. Lord Callaghan of Cardiff K.G.

3 June '89

Dear Henry:

When we met at Margaret's I said (rather pompously) that the President must not permit the NATO Summit to get bogged down on Lance but he should respond to Europe's mood and offer a constructive approach on a much broader canvas.

Well he's done it! What he said was exactly right: the visit to each country was a resounding success: he has recaptured American leadership.

Never mind the squawks about the "Special Relationship"-- that will look after itself as long as it has value to both of us. It needs no public reassurance from the President, while affirmations of devoted loyalty from the Prime Minister are not only embarrassing to many of us and counterproductive to some, but also misunderstand what it is about!

As to Germany, the President was right to say what he did. I cannot claim that I shall be overjoyed if and when Germany is reunited. But if it is coming (and I believe it to be inevitable), then it must be channelled into a wide European settlement that will render harmless that Teutonic tendency to give way to angst at regular intervals.

However that is still some way ahead: and there will be some formidable negotiations on arms control before we reach that point.

Meantime the real purpose of this letter is to say how much I applauded the President's tour and send my congratulations to him and those who helped--I fancy I detected Brent Scowcroft's hand and Larry Eagleburger's in what he said.

/s/ Jim Callaghan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8905335

REFERRAL

DATE: 26 JUL 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: CALLAGHAN

SOURCE: PRESIDENT

DATE: 26 JUL 89

SUBJ: PRES LTR TO FORMER PM RE NATO SUMMIT

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENT:

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECORD

LOG 8905335
DATE 26 JUL 89

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO FORMER PM RE NATO SUMMIT
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

ROY, J
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20590

COPY: ORIGINAL

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC/S RM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 1

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES SA
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO LORD CALLAGHAN

LOG # 5335

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
STATE	MR. J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS *** FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING *** SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW ***

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

14 5/27/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5251

July 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ^{RB} ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA ^{AMB}

SUBJECT: Response to President Mitterrand's Letter on
Environmental Issues at the Summit

The State Department's suggested response to Mitterrand's letter of May 6 just arrived July 3. A slightly edited version for the President's signature is at Tab I.

Given the imminence of the Summit, the letter should go out within the next day or two. We would thus suggest that you give it to the President for signature at your next opportunity to see him privately.

^{JL} Jerry Leach and ^{EM} Eric Melby concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you hand the attached letter to the President for signature at the next available opportunity.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter from the President to Mitterrand
Tab II Mitterrand's letter of May 6

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By EL NARA, Date 10/21/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Francois,

Thank you for your letter of May 6 in which you stressed the need for special emphasis at the upcoming Paris Economic Summit on global environmental matters, including the risk of global "greenhouse" warming. I share your personal concern with this problem and agree that we should have a full discussion of its implications in Paris.

As you know, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has undertaken an ambitious program to understand the science, to assess the impacts, and to build consensus on responses to this global concern. I expect these efforts to lead to formal negotiations on the establishment of a framework convention on global climate. Such a convention could serve as a basis for specific protocols and commitments as international approaches to the problems are devised and agreed. I believe the Economic Summit should give strong support to the work of the IPCC and point to the need for a framework convention. It also would be an appropriate opportunity to stress the need for long-term monitoring of these effects and a vigorous international program of research in global environmental change.

I understand that an in-depth discussion on the science of global environmental change was held at your recent "Planet Earth" symposium in Paris. I look forward to hearing the results of those discussions, and to our dialogue on this issue at the Economic Summit in just a few days.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Francois Mitterrand
President of the French Republic
Paris

The President of the Republic

Paris, May 6, 1989

Mr. President:

The problems of environmental protection are becoming of increasing concern to our Governments and to public opinion.

Recent efforts have rightly been concerned primarily with the atmosphere, and specific measures have been planned to protect the ozone layer.

Notwithstanding, the major problem with which we could very rapidly be confronted is a risk of global warming because of the "greenhouse effect," which could cause an increase in the content of methane and particularly carbon gases in the atmosphere. If this phenomenon is not controlled, it could entail disastrous consequences for our planet, particularly rising sea levels.

That is why, in view of the Summit of the Seven Industrialized Countries next July 14, I should like to have special emphasis placed on concrete measures that would make it possible to combat this phenomenon. Among these

His Excellency
George Bush,
President of the United States of America.

measures, I suggest that consideration be given to:

- Establishing a global network of observatories for emissions of carbon gases;

- Protecting equatorial forests that absorb these carbon gases, combatting desertification and acid rains;

- Developing incentive measures intended to reduce excessive consumption of fossil fuels, particularly for automobiles;

- Launching programs that make it possible to develop research in this field.

I propose that these various measures be studied by our personal representatives during the preparatory meetings for the forthcoming Ark Summit.

These subjects will also be discussed at a "planet earth" symposium organized at Paris on June 12 and 13, 1989.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high consideration [Handwritten] Yours truly,

[s] François Mitterrand

François Mitterrand

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 129173
RHC
French

Office of the President of the Republic
The Technical Advisor

Paris, May 9, 1989

Chargé d'Affaires Lissfelt
Embassy of the United States of America
2, avenue Gabriel
75382 - Paris CEDEX 08

Sir:

I enclose the original of a letter from the President of the Republic to President Bush for transmittal to its distinguished addressee.

The text of this letter will be transmitted concurrently by diplomatic telegram through the Quai d'Orsay.

Very truly yours,

[Signature]

Marc Boudier

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 6 mai 1989

Monsieur le Président,

Les problèmes de protection de l'environnement deviennent pour nos Gouvernements comme pour l'opinion publique de plus en plus préoccupants.

Les efforts récents ont surtout concerné, à juste titre, l'atmosphère, et des mesures spécifiques ont été prévues pour la protection de la couche d'ozone.

Mais le problème majeur auquel nous pourrions nous trouver très rapidement confrontés est un risque de réchauffement de la planète, en raison de "l'effet de serre" que pourrait provoquer une augmentation de la teneur en méthane et surtout de gaz carbonique dans l'atmosphère. Si ce phénomène n'est pas maîtrisé, il pourrait en résulter des conséquences désastreuses pour notre planète, notamment une élévation du niveau des mers.

C'est pourquoi, dans la perspective du Sommet des Sept Pays Industrialisés, le 14 juillet prochain, je souhaiterais que l'accent soit particulièrement mis sur les mesures concrètes qui permettraient de lutter contre ce dernier phénomène. Parmi ces mesures, je vous suggère que soient étudiés :

- la mise en place d'un réseau mondial d'observatoires des émissions de gaz carbonique,
- la protection des forêts équatoriales qui absorbent ce même gaz carbonique, la lutte contre la désertification et les pluies acides,
- des mesures d'incitation visant à réduire la trop forte consommation de combustibles fossiles, notamment pour les automobiles,
- le lancement de programmes permettant de développer les recherches dans ce domaine.

.../...

Son Excellence Monsieur Georges BUSH
Président des ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE

Je propose que ces différentes mesures puissent être étudiées par nos représentants personnels, dans le cadre des réunions de préparation du prochain Sommet de l'Arche.

Ces thèmes seront également discutés à l'occasion d'un colloque "la planète terre" organisé à Paris les 12 et 13 juin prochains.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à l'assurance de ma haute considération. *et de mon fidèle service*

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chron
5655

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

July 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*
SUBJECT: Conference on Finnish-U.S. Relations

At Tab I is an invitation from the Finnish Ambassador for you to attend a September 22 conference commemorating the 70th anniversary of U.S.-Finnish diplomatic relations. This looks like an event you can safely skip. A reply card is attached.

Note that the Finnish Foreign Minister is scheduled to give closing remarks. If he does indeed come to Washington for the event, we can expect appointment requests.

RECOMMENDATION

That you decline the Tab I invitation on the attached reply card.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Invitation from Ambassador Valtasaari

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0397-MR
28 11/23/15

AMBASSADOR OF FINLAND
WASHINGTON, D.C.

JUL 12 1989

July 11, 1989

Stamp

Mr. Robert M. GATES
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Old Executive Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. Gates,

This year marks the 70th anniversary of the Finnish-US diplomatic relations. To commemorate this historic event the Embassy of Finland is organizing a conference on the development of the relations between our two countries.

The conference will be held at the Four Seasons Hotel, 2800 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C., on Friday, September 22, 1989.

The aim of the conference is to deepen our understanding on three important eras in the relations: 1) the establishment of relations, 2) the period of crisis during World War II and 3) recent developments. We also try to take a quick look at future prospects.

It is my greatest pleasure to invite you to attend the conference. I do hope that you could take time from your busy schedule to participate in the gathering, which I am personally looking forward to with greatest interest.


Due to a relatively short preparation time I and my staff would appreciate it very much if you could inform us about your participation by returning the enclosed reply card by July 28th, 1989.

Please also find enclosed the programme of the conference.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact either Mr. Jaakko Laajava, Minister Counselor, or Mrs. Pirkko-Liisa O'Rourke, Cultural Counselor, tel.: (202) 363 2430.

Looking forward to hearing from you soon,

Sincerely,


Jukka Vartiainen
Ambassador

FINNISH - U.S. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1919 - 1989

Invitational Conference

September 22, 1989 at Four Seasons Hotel,
2800 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington D.C. 20007

PROGRAMME AND SCHEDULE

Afternoon session

1.00 - 1.10 Opening remarks by Ambassador Jukka Valtasaari

1.10 - 1.40 "Founding on Experience"
Finnish-US diplomatic relations in perspective
Mr. Pertti Paasio, Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Finland

1.40 - 3.15 Panel: "Finland in the U.S. Foreign Policy from 1919 to
early 1960's"

Moderator Dr. Robert Rinehart, Foreign Service Institute
-Years 1919 - 1939

Dr. William Z. Slany, The Historian of the State
Department

-Ideological Preferences and Wartime Realities
Finland in US Policy in 1939 - 1944

Dr. Michael Berry, Docent of Political History
University of Turku, Finland

-Through the "Years of Danger" to the Acceptance of
Finnish Neutrality

Dr. Jukka Nevakivi, Professor of Political History
University of Helsinki, Finland

3.15 - 3.30 Coffee Break

3.30 - 5.00 Comments by discussants:

Professor Hans-Peter Krosby, State University of New York
Dr. Kendall Myers, Foreign Service Institute
Professor Keith Olson, University of Maryland
Ambassador Klaus Tornudd, Permanent Representative of
Finland to the United Nations

Discussion of panelists and discussants

Comments and questions from the audience as allowed by
the Moderator

5.00 Closure of the Afternoon Session

EVENING SESSION

6.30 - 7.30 Cocktail Hour

7.30 Conference Dinner

Keynote Speaker: Ambassador Max Jakobson
"Global Change and the Finnish-US Relations"
Comments by Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Former
Assistant Secretary of State

Closing Remarks by Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Pertti Paasio

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8904579
RECEIVED: 13 JUN 89 09

TO: CICCONI, J

FROM: HUGHES

DOC DATE: 06 JUL 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR SCHOLARSHIP FUND

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE DATE: 16 JUN 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: HUTCHINGS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKWILL
HUTCHINGS

COMMENTS: *** ADD TO FILE ***

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEN

CLOSED BY: NSTAS

DOC 3 OF 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 6/14/11

2000
1000

1000

1000
1000
1000

1000

1000
1000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8904579

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 SCOWCROFT
002 SCOWCROFT
003
003
003

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 89061410 FOR DECISION
Z 89070608 FOR DECISION
X 89070620 SCOWCROFT APPROVED RECOM
X 89070620 HUGHES SGD MEMO
X 89071015 NOTED BY PRES

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 4 NARA, Date 6/14/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 10, 1989

NOTE FOR ROMAN POPADIUK

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES SUBJECT: Joint Press Statement on
"Chancellor's Scholarship
Fund"

Roman,

The President has approved the attached text of a joint press release with the FRG announcing the Chancellor's Scholarship Fund for student exchanges with the FRG. We would like to release this statement on July 20, in coordination with a simultaneous announcement in the FRG. We have taken the necessary steps with Bonn to synchronize their announcement with ours.

Attachment
As Stated

Joint Statement by President George Bush of the United States of America and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Creation of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship


President George Bush of the United States of America and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany share the conviction that the future development of German-American partnership depends on mutual understanding and cooperation between the young generations in both countries.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl have therefore agreed today to assume joint patronage of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship for future American leaders, to commence in the fall.

This scholarship program is the result of a proposal made by the Chancellor while hosting American university representatives in July 1988, with a view to intensifying German-American academic cooperation.

The Chancellor's purpose in launching this initiative was to make people of both countries, especially the younger generations, more acutely aware of the fundamental importance of the strong ties and close friendship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl are agreed that this year, which marks the fortieth anniversary of the Federal Republic, is a particularly important time for launching such a program. They share the view that it is in the vital interest of both countries to broaden the foundations of their common future in the academic sphere as well.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first letter "G" being large and stylized, and "Bush" written in a more standard cursive script.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4579

July 6, 1989

OK

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. CICCONE

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Chancellor's Scholarship Fund

G

At Tab A is a joint statement by the President and Chancellor Kohl announcing creation of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship for future American leaders. We recommend that the statement be issued and that you alert us five working days beforehand so that we can arrange simultaneous release in Bonn.

Attachment
Tab II German Draft Statement

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

7/1/89

RH

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CHRON

July 21, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Congressman Solarz on
Administration Policy Toward Poland

At Tab I is a letter from you to Congressman Solarz stressing the President's commitment to a more active policy toward Poland and throughout Eastern Europe. Your letter also highlights the specific policies which the President intends to pursue in dealing with Poland. (Solarz's letter and recent speech on Poland are at Tab A.)

Concurrences by: *su f*
Virginia Lampley and Condi Rice

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Letter to Solarz
Tab A Solarz Incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Solarz:

Thank you for sharing with me your thoughts on the future of U.S. policy toward Poland. The changes that are taking place in that country are indeed remarkable. I agree with your assessment that we have an historic opportunity to help bring about greater freedom and political pluralism in Poland.

Let me assure you that the President is committed to an active policy toward Poland and throughout Eastern Europe. The proposals the President outlined in Hamtramck in April and in Poland in July are first steps. The President intends to push ahead in such areas as debt rescheduling, foreign investment, the environment, and educational and cultural exchanges in order to encourage the continued political evolution in Poland. At the Paris Economic Summit, the President urged concerted allied action toward Eastern Europe. We look forward to working closely with the European Community to better address the Polish economic situation in a coordinated and effective manner.

The President believes that the active involvement and support of the Congress will be vital if we are to succeed in seizing the opportunities that are unfolding in Eastern Europe. In that regard, I would appreciate it if you would continue to allow us to benefit from your ideas and your interest.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
13TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
EDUCATION AND LABOR
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE

4811

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC
June 14, 1989

*Atty Gen
for*

JUN 15 1989
WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1536 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-2361

DISTRICT OFFICES:
532 NEPTUNE AVENUE
BROOKLYN, NY 11224
(718) 372-8600
619 LORIMER STREET
BROOKLYN, NY 11211
(718) 706-6603

356 COURT STREET
BROOKLYN, NY 11231
(718) 802-1400

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcraft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
NSC The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

I thought you might be interested in seeing the text of a speech I recently delivered in Chicago before the Polish National Alliance on the subject of the developments in Poland and how the United States and its allies can best respond to them.

The April signing of the round table accords could well represent a historic turning point for the Polish people in their quest to reestablish democracy after almost half a century of dictatorship.

The emergence of political freedom and genuine sovereignty in Poland would have enormous significance not only for the Polish people but for all the nations of the Western alliance. I believe that democracy in Poland would be a necessary condition for the end of the cold war.


In view of the fundamental importance to the West of developments in Poland, the United States and its allies should be looking for ways to support the process of democratization and to address the threats to that process posed by the deteriorating Polish economy.

The enclosed speech which I gave represents an initial effort to elaborate the outlines about what such an initiative might entail.

The Western countries need to elaborate a comprehensive plan to help Poland's economy to recover. Such a program could prove invaluable in providing the Polish authorities with sufficient incentive to complete the journey to genuine democracy.

I would, of course, be most interested in your reaction to the speech, or more generally on the overall situation in Poland and what the United States should do to respond.

Sincerely,





United States
of America

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 101ST CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Vol. 135

WASHINGTON, TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1989

No. 62

House of Representatives

"HOW TO TRANSFORM CRISIS INTO TRIUMPH"—AN ADDRESS ON POLAND BY CONGRESSMAN STEPHEN J. SOLARZ

HON. DAN ROSTENKOWSKI

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, May 16, 1989

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, a few days ago our colleague, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ], delivered an address on the significance of recent developments in Poland at the annual Polish National Alliance banquet in Chicago, IL, in honor of the 1791 Polish Constitution.

In his speech, Mr. SOLARZ discussed the April signing of the roundtable agreement as representing a historic opportunity for the Polish people to make a peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy. He also pointed out that the developments could have lasting significance for East-West relations by helping to end the cold war. Noting the threats to successful implementation of the agreement, including the potential for social unrest caused by the deteriorating Polish economy, Mr. SOLARZ described the measures that the United States can take to encourage the momentum for reform. These steps include cooperating with our Western allies to produce a comprehensive economic assistance program which would act as an incentive for the Polish Government to continue on the road toward democracy.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that the ideas put forward by Mr. SOLARZ about the how, in his words, "to transform the Polish crisis into a Polish triumph," ought to be seriously considered by the American people and by our colleagues as we begin to weigh how best to respond to the new realities in Poland. I commend Mr. SOLARZ' insights and recommendations, and I ask leave now to place them in the RECORD.

POLISH CONSTITUTION DAY

(Address by Congressman Stephen J. Solarz)

Witam Panstwa!

I am proud to be here tonight in the company of so many distinguished Americans and Poles.

I am especially grateful to the Polish-American Congress and the Polish National Alliance for giving me the opportunity to speak to you about the significance of the round table accords for Poland and the United States.

After more than four decades of darkness and despair, of decline and dictatorship, of foreign domination and domestic degradation, a ray of light can now be seen at the end of the long tunnel of totalitarianism.

Whether it will be possible for the Polish people to emerge from the darkness of dictatorship into the sunlight of democracy will depend in no small measure on their

For more than 120 years of foreign domination it kept hope alive.

For the past 50 years, a period in Polish history which began with the brutal attack by her Nazi neighbor to the West and her communist neighbor to the East, the memory of the May 3rd constitution has sustained the desire for democracy among a people who during this time experienced nothing but dictatorship.

And today, its message of human rights and human dignity is being heard loudly and clearly again.

From the shipyards on the Baltic to the coal mines in Silesia, from large cities like Warsaw and Wroclaw to small towns like Sanok and Suwalki, the Polish people are once again crying out for freedom.

They know that human rights are given by God and not by man, and that no theory of history, no theory of economics, no theory of class struggle has the power to take them away.

One month ago, the Polish government and the Polish people concluded a far reaching accord intended to rejuvenate the political, social and economic life of the nation.

For the government, the agreement represents an admission that the policies of the past eight years—indeed of the past forty years—have been a failure.

It constitutes a belated recognition by the regime of the truth of Stalin's observation that trying to impose socialism in Poland is like trying to put a saddle on a cow.

Yet in signing the agreement, the authorities are making a gamble that by relinquishing some power, they can preserve the rest.

For the opposition, while the agreement creates a momentum for change, it provides no guarantee for the establishment of democracy.

It also commits the opposition to sharing responsibility for implementing what could be painful economic reforms.

Yet for all of its limitations, the round table agreement offers the best opportunity Poland has had in half a century to make a peaceful transition from dictatorship to democracy.

It is important, therefore, for us to understand exactly what the agreement does—and does not—provide.

In political terms, the round table agreement:

Restores the legal rights of Solidarity as well as those of Rural Solidarity and the Independent Student Association.

It sets elections in June for the Sejm in which 35 percent of the seats will be freely contested by anyone who chooses to run.

It restores via free and open elections in June a 100 member upper chamber of parliament—the Senate—with the power to veto legislation enacted by the lower house.

It establishes the post of president of the republic, elected to a six year term by the two houses of parliament.

It allows Solidarity a half hour of television time weekly and one hour of radio time on the state controlled media.

It permits Solidarity to publish its own daily national newspaper and eases press censorship in general.

It requires the government to strengthen the independence of judges and to

the basis of ability rather than political connections.

As sweeping as these provisions are, it is important to note that the agreement does not:

Legalize opposition political parties.

Provide for a freely elected parliament.

Abolish all press censorship or break the state control of the media.

Furthermore, the agreement fails to:

Address in any comprehensive way the problem of low productivity in the economy.

Restore consumer goods to the marketplace.

Or abolish the detestable and demoralizing nomenklatura system in which almost 1 million key jobs in the economy are set aside as a special reserve for the 1.3 million members of the communist party.

But although the round table agreement falls short of providing what Abraham Lincoln characterized as a government of the people, by the people and for the people, it does represent an enormous opportunity for democracy in Poland.

Yet it is also true that, like Rome, political pluralism and economic prosperity in Poland cannot be built in a day.

The real choice that confronts Poland is not between purgatory and paradise, but between stagnation and rejuvenation.

The Polish people, exhausted by the seemingly endless talks and by the daily grind of economic hardship, have greeted the agreement with a certain degree of skepticism.

Their cautious reaction underscores the political realities of a country where dashed hopes and unkept promises have become part and parcel of a long history of betrayal and repression.

The bitter disappointments—the failure of Gomulka's political reforms in the late 1950's, the collapse of Gierek's economic policies in the mid 1970's, and the betrayal of the Gdansk accords in the early 1980's—have taught the Polish people the lesson that promises by the authorities are more often broken than fulfilled.

It will take the continuing courage and commitment of the Polish people to counter the inevitable efforts on the part of Stalinist elements within the communist party to subvert not only the spirit but also the letter of the agreement.

But difficult as this will be, Poles can take heart from the fact that they are blessed with extraordinary leadership, inspired by the charismatic eloquence of Lech Walesa, the sage advice of activists like Jacek Kuron and Adam Michnik, and by the spiritual wisdom of Pope John Paul II.

For Poland, the difference between the success and failure of the round table agreement will be the difference between the establishment of democracy and the continuation of dictatorship.

For the United States, the success of the accords would mean the fulfillment of our humanitarian hopes for the Polish people, but the emergence of genuine democracy in Poland also represents a necessary condition for the end of the cold war and the transformation of our relationship with the Soviet Union from one of aggressive confrontation to one of peaceful cooperation.

threats to the roundtable agreement and what we can do to help the forces of freedom in Poland deal with them.

There is, first of all, the possibility of Soviet intervention.

While the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy would seem to militate against any direct military intervention by the Red Army in Poland, the history of Eastern Europe, not to mention the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the threatening military maneuvers around Poland in 1981, suggest that it would be dangerously naive to preclude the possibility of another Soviet intervention in the region.

Yet even if a Soviet invasion is only a remote possibility, the United States needs to make it clear to the Soviet Union that not only would such an intervention jeopardize—perhaps fatally—the prospects for meaningful arms control, it would also eliminate the possibility of significant and sustained economic cooperation between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

By putting Moscow on notice that we simply will not tolerate the use of force to suppress the aspirations of the Polish people, we can diminish the possibility that in a crisis the Soviet Union will resort to military means in order to put the genie of democracy back into the bottle of repression.

The process of democratization which the round table agreement has set in motion could also be cut short by a decision on the part of the Polish communist party to halt or reverse the process of reform. The Polish government declared martial law once. It could conceivably do so again.

Here, too, the United States can create disincentives for the use of force by making it very clear to the Polish authorities that such a misguided move would doom their hopes for better relations with the West.

The final threat to the effective implementation of the accords lies in the possibility of a massive social upheaval caused by the continuing deterioration of the economy.

Such a scenario would clearly bring political progress to a halt and could very easily lead to a crackdown by the communist authorities which would bring the whole process of reform and rejuvenation to a crashing and categorical end.

Such a dismal and depressing scenario is by no means a purely hypothetical possibility. At a time when real national income is still below what it was a decade ago; at a time when prices are almost doubling every year and when a zloty buys virtually nothing; at a time when the wait for a new car is 10 years and an apartment 35 years, a single spark resulting from a wholly unexpected incident could easily set off a confrontation between the authorities and the population that would once again plunge Poland into the abyss of violence and repression.

But here too there are steps which the U.S. could take in concert with its Western allies to maximize the prospects for social stability by providing Poland with the kind of financial assistance that can minimize the painful consequences of necessary economic reform.

In June 1947, fearing the collapse of democracy in a Europe ravaged by a brutal war and paralyzed by a frigid winter, the American Secretary of State George Marshall spoke about the need to rebuild Europe.

If democracy was going to be saved, he said, we would need a cure rather than just a palliative.

Poland today, like Western Europe 40 years ago, needs a cure rather than a palliative.

This is a time not just for the United States but the West in general to think boldly rather than incrementally, creatively

rather than conventionally, in determining how to transform the Polish crisis into a Polish triumph.

President Bush's speech on Poland a few weeks ago constituted a measured and appropriate initial response to the signing of the round table agreement.

The offer to support debt reschedulings, to reduce our tariffs for a range of Polish goods, and to encourage U.S. investments in Poland are all positive and needed initiatives.

But just as the Polish government needs to go further in the elaboration and implementation of its programs for political and economic reform, so too does the U.S. need to go further in indicating comprehensively what additional steps we would be willing to take, in concert with our western allies, if the Polish authorities agreed to the establishment of genuine democracy and a free economy.

We cannot expect that vague promises of future action on our part will provide the Polish government with a sufficient incentive to continue—let alone complete—its journey on the path to democracy.

Such promises have the same value as the zloty, for like the zloty they are likely to buy us very little.

Whether the round table agreement finally evolves into a charter for freedom like the May 3rd constitution rather than becoming another in a long list of broken commitments will depend largely on events in Poland itself.

But it will also depend on the willingness of the United States to take the kinds of steps that will help to transform the dream of democracy into the reality of freedom.

Yet the truth of the matter is that the Bush Administration has no clear idea of what we and our western allies should be willing to do for Poland, if the Polish authorities are willing to abolish the nomenklatura, end all censorship, introduce a market economy, implement totally free elections, and establish a real democracy.

I call upon the President to establish a high level Administration taskforce to determine what resources would be needed to put the Polish economy back on its feet.

For only if we know the true dimensions of what needs to be done can we assess what we are prepared to do.

It might be useful to suggest what such a proposal should include.

It would need to involve **generous debt rescheduling, including outright forgiveness of some loans and the reduction of interest rates on others.**

It would need to include **new credits**, perhaps through the capitalization of a bank to help in providing capital to small and medium sized private enterprises.

It would need to explore ways to **stimulate foreign investment in Poland.**

It would need to help private firms tap **western capital markets through such means as mutual funds.**

And it would need to **train the management of small and medium size industries**, which is where Polish entrepreneurial talent is most heavily concentrated.

Such a program would not be cheap. It could easily cost \$10 billion over the next five years.

But before we dismiss such a sum as being widely unrealistic we should consider the fact that the countries of the western alliance spend \$350 billion a year in maintaining the defense of Europe.

If democracy in Poland can help to bring about the end of the cold war, thereby saving us tens of billion of dollars that we are obligated to spend on defense, then **\$10 billion dollars as an inducement to the Polish authorities to agree to the kind of reforms that would bring real democracy to Poland would be one of the best investments the NATO nations have ever made.**

It is important to emphasize that this is truly a western and not just American responsibility.

The United States clearly has a significant stake in the emergence of democracy in Poland, but so too do our western allies.

A comprehensive program of assistance designed to facilitate the transition from dictatorship to democracy must, therefore, be a collective initiative.

There are those who say that we should begin immediately the task of rebuilding the Polish economy, and that we should not wait for the establishment of real democracy and a market economy before providing this kind of financial support.

But those who would argue for such a policy ignore the experiences of the early 1970's when western creditors pumped over \$20 billion in credits into Poland only to find that the regime used the loans to avoid rather than to support reform.

A repeat performance would be the height of economic folly and political naivete.

There are also those who argue that Poland is not our responsibility and that at this time of substantial budget deficits we should not consider taking on any additional financial burdens.

But given the enormous stake we have in progress toward real political pluralism in Poland, such a do-nothing policy would be morally unacceptable and strategically unwise.

History is filled with the stories of Poles who have come to the aid of others.

Sobieski's lifting of the siege of Vienna in 1683, Kosciuszko's contribution to our own revolution in 1776, and the brave Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen who fought alongside the Allies to liberate Europe from the Nazis in the 1940's, all made a critical contribution to the cause of freedom in other lands.

In view of what Poland has done for America and Europe, it is time for America and Europe to start doing something for Poland.

Finally, I wish to address a few words to Poles in Poland who may be listening via their radios to this celebration in Chicago.

We are watching with awe and admiration your heroic struggle to achieve the rights and freedoms for which we struggled over two centuries ago and which without your help we might never have achieved.

The events which are now taking place in Poland constitute one of the greatest and most important political dramas in the history of our time.

On the outcome depends your aspirations for freedom and our hopes for a more stable world. As you engage in this historic struggle you should know that you have our moral and political support.

It is my hope—and I shall work tirelessly to see that it comes to pass—that you will also have our material assistance as well.

Permit me to close on a very personal note which concerns an experience I had during a visit I made to Gdansk a few years ago.

When I left St. Brygida's after a lengthy meeting with Lech Walesa and Father Jankowski, who I am pleased to see here this evening, I saw a wedding ceremony in progress. A short time later, on my way to the airport, I stopped to lay a wreath at the monument to the shipyard workers killed in the uprising of 1970.

There to my amazement I saw the same couple—their marriage vows still fresh on their lips—in their first act as man and wife paying their respects to those fallen heroes who gave their lives in the struggle to make Poland free.

It is that unique pride in country and commitment to freedom which leads me to believe that, however long the journey may take, the Polish people will eventually reach the promised land of democracy and freedom.

Niech Zyje Polska.