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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30545
Folder ID Number: 30545-005

Folder Title:
June 1989 [5]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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4515

June 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers

The subject memorandum for the President's meeting with Dutch
Prime Minister Lubbers is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the
record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *28* NARA, Date *10/29/13*

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000 0429 F
DL 8/21/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister
of the Netherlands (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Governor John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of
State
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President
and Press Secretary
Robert D. Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
James Wilkinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek
Henry Wijnaendts, Director-General of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Richard Fein

DATE, TIME May 9, 1989, 10:00 - 10:15 am and 5:00 -
AND PLACE: 5:45 pm EST
The Oval Office and The President's Living
Quarters

Prime Minister Lubbers began by saying preparations for the NATO Summit were the most important items and proposed that they be the subject of the afternoon discussion. (C)

The President asked Prime Minister Lubbers for his latest thinking on the environment. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that the U.S. environmental proposals were very much like those of his government. The Dutch want to strengthen existing organizations under the framework of the U.N. His government also wants an environmental convention and in the coming months will have to achieve practical steps toward that end, including in the U.N. General Assembly. (C)

The President emphasized his personal commitment to sponsoring an environmental conference. The U.S. Administration is working to define its objectives, to fulfill this commitment to the American people. The President said he would be prepared to discuss this in July and to explain how best to use U.S. expertise, but he rejected Norwegian Prime Minister Brundtland's suggestion that 1% of GDP be put in an international fund. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers noted that his government also had doubts about the financial aspects of the Brundtland idea. It is important not to overexcite the expectations of developing countries. (C)

The President observed that the U.N. General Assembly gets very emotional and said he would not look for help in that forum at this time. (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers conveyed greetings from Queen Beatrix before the morning meeting concluded. (U)

The President expressed his thanks and conveyed his respects. He then invited Prime Minister Lubbers to come to the residence at the end of the day to discuss SNF. (C)

The President began the late afternoon session by saying the U.S. wants the NATO Summit to be a success. The Administration is not dragging its feet with the Soviet Union. The U.S. wants to have good relations, wants perestroika and glasnost to succeed, and wants to go forward on a wide array of issues. On Central America, the President expressed the hope that Europe will speak out on the outrage in Panama and noted that U.S.-Soviet relations will be tempered by Soviet behavior in Central America. The President added that the U.S. welcomes change in the Soviet Union and is willing to sell grain to the Soviets. This, he said, brings the discussion to the topic at hand. (C)

The President said that it is essential that the NATO meeting be successful. He expressed concern about the Germans, noting that Chancellor Kohl cannot be allowed to drive NATO, but said the U.S. Administration would be talking with them further. The President said he had to be concerned about domestic support for U.S. troops in Europe. He has a responsibility to guarantee the safety of U.S. forces, and that entails continuing nuclear deterrence. The answer to the SNF problem lies in the success of conventional force reductions, which must be our priority. If Gorbachev is serious about reducing forces, he can take unilateral steps, given his superiority in conventional forces and SNF. SNF negotiations, however, would lead to a third zero, which would undermine U.S. capacity to keep troops in Europe. This is an absolutely critical issue which goes to the heart of nuclear deterrence. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers noted that Foreign Minister van den Broek has been active on the SNF issue. Lubbers agreed with what the President said. The formal German position is risky and would endanger the NATO Summit. The first thing is to agree on what the Alliance has said in the past, and Lubbers said he thought Chancellor Kohl would take such a position. As to the follow-on to the Lance (FOTL) missile, the Prime Minister argued that if a decision on deployment is postponed until 1992, it would be unwise to make research and development only a U.S. decision. It would be better to have it a NATO decision. ~~(S)~~

The President agreed absolutely. The U.S. cannot be seen pushing such a decision on Europe. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Lubbers suggested a formulation providing for a decision on FOTL in 1991 or 1992, with research and development proceeding in the meantime. In the Comprehensive Concept, NATO should say that the Alliance will restructure and challenge the Warsaw Pact to reduce to NATO levels. Then, in a further phase, the Alliance would anticipate future SNF negotiations toward equal ceilings at lower levels above zero. This would also be considered in the context of the conventional balance in Europe. In sum, the Prime Minister proposed two preconditions: unilateral SNF reductions to our levels and progress in conventional talks. ~~(S)~~

Prime Minister Lubbers said his government had put this position to Chancellor Kohl in a paper delivered the preceding Wednesday. The Chancellor did not give a direct reply but said he would study the proposal. Prime Minister Lubbers said he promised to be back in touch with Chancellor Kohl after speaking with the President. Prime Minister Lubbers added that Chancellor Kohl, whose call for SNF negotiations is very important for him domestically, said he wants an agreement before the NATO Summit. As to nuclear artillery, Prime Minister Lubbers said there was something strange going on. A year ago, many Europeans thought of phasing out nuclear artillery and updating Lance. The Dutch thought the key to the problem was this shift from shorter to longer ranges. Prime Minister Lubbers felt the European populations would have accepted this, but then the idea got around that it would be dangerous to phase out nuclear artillery completely. Now the Alliance needs a "perspective" on modernization and a "perspective" on negotiations -- a very delicate formula that mentions negotiations but postpones them. ~~(S)~~

Foreign Minister van den Broek argued that the Alliance cannot phase out artillery until there is a firm FOTL decision. Europeans know that the U.S. fears that SNF negotiations would lead to a third zero. However, expectations of such negotiations were prompted by the 1987 Reykjavik communique, and the Germans use that language forcefully. Now the Alliance is saying that SNF negotiations do not make sense, that the Soviet side should

reduce to our levels. The Foreign Minister said that his government does not feel it is dangerous to give an SNF negotiating perspective so long as there are preconditions, though they will be hard for the Germans to accept. (S)

General Scowcroft asked about the timing of phasing out of nuclear artillery. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that the Alliance would reduce unilaterally the U.S. stockpile and challenge the Soviets to come down to our levels. Then the Alliance would say a phasing out of nuclear artillery could occur, if FOTL and tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASM) were modernized. Prime Minister Lubbers added that the U.S. is quite right to worry about a third zero, but the Alliance does not need nuclear artillery. (S)

General Scowcroft said it would be important, then, to have modernized SNF before eliminating nuclear artillery. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers agreed, adding that it would be better to phase out artillery unilaterally, rather than through negotiations. This would be a good NATO initiative. (S)

The President asked for Dutch views of required NATO troop levels, including U.S. (C)

Director-General Wijnaendts supported the current NATO proposal. (C)

Foreign Minister van den Broek added that the focus should be on tanks and artillery rather than troop reductions. (C)

The President asked what Mrs. Thatcher had said (during the April 29 visit of Prime Minister Lubbers and Foreign Minister van den Broek to London). (C)

Prime Minister Lubbers replied that Mrs. Thatcher knows the Dutch paper and does not like it. She favors telling Chancellor Kohl he is totally wrong and that there will be no negotiations. At the same time, she did find some elements of the paper useful. Mrs. Thatcher agrees on the need to find a formula other than negotiations, favoring equal ceilings at lower levels but omitting any reference to negotiations. (C)

The President summarized the Dutch view: that this language is acceptable to the Dutch, but would not accommodate Chancellor Kohl. (S)

Prime Minister Lubbers confirmed that summary. The language is "one bridge too far" for Chancellor Kohl. (S)

The President, concluding the meeting, asked how much of Chancellor Kohl's problem would be helped if there were forward

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movement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Would movement on START or CW help? (S)

Foreign Minister van den Broek replied that there is no linkage. Such moves would not help Chancellor Kohl. Foreign Minister Genscher wants SNF negotiations because he deeply feels a special German obligation to bring peace to Europe. Nothing else will satisfy him. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4624

June 14, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL MB

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RZ18

SUBJECT: Luncheon Invitation from the Austrian Ambassador

Austrian Ambassador Hoess has invited you to a small working lunch with the himself and his Swiss, Swedish, and Finnish counterparts. The date is open, but he would hope to arrange it in the next couple of weeks.

Although not a high priority, this would be a useful opportunity to exchange views with the European neutrals, who have naturally gotten less US attention than our Allies and the East Europeans. The ambassadors will be interested in your assessment of our European policy and will have views worth hearing on EC-1992, Eastern Europe, and the evolution of European security.

RECOMMENDATION

If your schedule permits, that you accept the luncheon invitation.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/4/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

FILE

June 7, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*FROM: PHILIP D. ZELIKOW *PZ*SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman John Bryant Concerning the
NATO Summit

The letter at Tab I responds to Congressman John Bryant's letter to you on May 25 (at Tab II) suggesting that the NATO Summit would be the time for the President to demonstrate U.S. leadership within the Alliance and offer an American alternative to Gorbachev's arms control agenda.

Concurrences by: Ginny ~~Hamley~~ *M* and Don MahleyRECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Congressman Bryant at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Response to Congressman Bryant

Tab II Incoming letter from Congressman Bryant, May 30, 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Bryant:

Thank you for your letter of May 25. In it, you suggested that the NATO Summit would be the time for the President to demonstrate U.S. Leadership within the Alliance and offer an American alternative to Gorbachev's arms control agenda. That was good advice, and I hope you agree that the Summit outcome filled the bill.

Your idea of pressing the Allies to take a greater responsibility for their own defense is an important part of our approach. In his May 21 speech at Boston University, the President welcomed a stronger Europe and specifically encouraged greater West European defense cooperation. At the Summit, we obtained the agreement of NATO heads of state and government to language in the Summit Declaration calling on all the Allies to assume their "fair share of the risks, roles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership," and endorsing "a reinforced European component of our common security efforts."

We will continue to pursue these policies, and I appreciate your support.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable John Bryant
United States House of Representatives
208 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

4179

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

May 25, 1989

JOHN BRYANT
5TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE

COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY

COMMITTEE ON
THE BUDGET

MAY 30 1989

Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

I am writing you today in regard to next week's NATO summit and the question of encouraging our allies to bear a larger portion of the defense burden.

Although I appreciate the difficulties in determining the exact cost of our commitments, I do not think it unreasonable nor controversial to say that it is clear the United States has continued to assume too large a burden for far too long in this regard. Moreover, given both the changed international environment, particularly in light of political developments within the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, and our grievous federal budget deficit, I believe that the upcoming NATO summit represents a rare opportunity to discuss these issues with our allies.

Recently, our European allies have expressed strong support for Soviet President Gorbachev's arms and troop reductions proposals. Now is the time to demonstrate our leadership within the alliance and offer an American alternative.

This juncture in NATO's history provides the U.S. the opportunity to encourage our allies to take a greater responsibility for their own defense. Our allies have long promised to meet levels of defense expenditures and output goals that have continually been unmet. It is imperative that we convince our allies that their increased financial commitment to their own defense, which has been subsidized by American taxpayers for almost a quarter of a century, will give the United States more flexibility in negotiating with the Soviet Union to minimize the threat of military confrontation in Europe.

I urge you to do all you can to convince the President of the necessity of this effort during his upcoming trip to Brussels. Please contact me if I can be of assistance in any way.

Sincerely,


JOHN BRYANT
Member of Congress

JB/eb

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4051

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FILE

June 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *m*

SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment Request for Hungarian
Minister of State, Imre Pozsgay

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Joseph Hagin, II,
recommending that the President agree to see Imre Pozsgay for
thirty minutes during the period of September 18-22. The State
Department request--which we endorse--is at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft memorandum to Hagin
Tab II State Incoming

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By ES NARA, Date 10/29/13

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with Hungarian Minister of State Imre
Pozsgay

PURPOSE: To review bilateral relations, and to discuss
the reform movement in Hungary, and the
changes throughout Eastern Europe

BACKGROUND: Pozsgay will be in Washington September 18-22
and requested a meeting with the President.
One of Hungary's most popular politicians,
and the leader of the reform movement,
Pozsgay is also a leading contender to become
Hungary's first President later this year.
President Bush will probably see Pozsgay in
Budapest this July.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None

DATE & TIME: September 18-22
DURATION: 30 minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Governor Sununu, Secretary
Baker, General Scowcroft, Robert Blackwill,
U.S. Interpreter; Minister of State Pozsgay,
Ambassador Hazi, one aide, Hungarian
Interpreter.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo-op, followed by thirty minute meeting
in Oval Office.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo, writing pool.

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC, State Department

OPPOSED BY: None



8911664

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 24, 1989

4051


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Appointment Request

Hungarian Minister of State Imre Pozsgay is planning a private visit to Washington September 18-22 and has requested a meeting with President Bush. If the President agrees to meet Mr. Pozsgay, an as yet to be determined State Department official will accompany him.

Mr. Pozsgay is generally regarded as the most popular politician in Hungary and is the leader of the democratic reform movement. He is the leading contender to become Hungary's first President, when that office is created by legislation later this year. President Bush will probably see Pozsgay in Budapest this July.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Biographic information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(DECL:OADR)

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-1594-MR

MM 12/18/2015

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	4/7/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed:	6/7/2011	OA/ID Number:	30545
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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4573

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 14, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. CICCONI

FROM:

G. PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*

SUBJECT:

President's Meeting with Jacques Delors

Attached at Tab A is a proposed press release covering the President's working luncheon on June 14 with Jacques Delors, President of the Commission of the European Communities.

cc: Marlin Fitzwater
B. Jay Cooper

Attachment
Tab A

Proposed Press Release

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President held a working lunch today with Jacques Delors, President of the Commission of the European Communities (EC). The President had invited President Delors for the luncheon when they met in Brussels on May 30. The two, who were accompanied by senior advisers, discussed ongoing cooperation between the U.S. and the EC Commission on issues of mutual interest including the implications of the EC's 1992 integration program, international trade and the Uruguay Round, the efforts toward political and economic reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and transnational problems such as the urgent need to protect the environment.

The President reiterated his support for European integration and the EC's single market program. He reaffirmed that a stronger Europe means a stronger America. He also noted that there will be new challenges as the EC carries out its single-market program. He stressed the importance of open markets in a more closely integrated Europe and said that the U.S. would work with the EC Commission and the member-states to ensure that U.S. interests are taken fully into account in the 1992 process. The President underlined the need for both the U.S. and the EC to continue to combat protectionism and to conclude the current round of trade negotiations successfully by the end of 1990.

The President reiterated a key point in his Boston University speech: that the U.S. and the European Community must strengthen their dialogue and cooperation. He stressed the importance of the annual U.S.-EC Ministerial meeting in December as an opportunity for a high-level review of all aspects of the relationship. He also said that other channels, such as the sub-Cabinet consultations held in November 1988, can help to broaden U.S.-EC understanding.

The President said that he looked forward to seeing President Delors again next month at the Paris Economic Summit.

#

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
June 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES
THROUGH: DEANE E. HOFFMANN/ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
FROM: TIMOTHY E. DEAL/ADRIAN A. BASORA
SUBJECT: Proposed Press Release: Delors Luncheon

Attached at Tab I is a proposed press release covering the President's working lunch on June 14 with Jacques Delors.

Roman Popadiuk concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Philip Hughes to sign the memo to James W. Cicconi at Tab I.

Approve BO

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Cicconi
Tab A Proposed Press Release

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Blackwill

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4512

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 9, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Budimir Loncar

Foreign Minister Loncar will be in Washington at Secretary Baker's invitation en route to Caracas, where he will represent Yugoslavia at the 25th anniversary meeting of the Group of 77 developing nations. (In August Yugoslavia will host the Non-Aligned Summit and assume chairmanship of the NAM.)

The nearly completed PCC review of US-Yugoslav relations is recommending that we intensify our political dialogue with the Yugoslavs -- both to exert pressure for economic and political liberalization and to reaffirm our commitment to Yugoslav unity and independence. (Our commitment needs reaffirming, given the sharp decline in US attention to Yugoslavia over the past year.)

The Yugoslavs are giving another push toward economic reform, but they face inflation running at over 1000 percent a year. Foreign Minister Loncar, a strong advocate of political and economic liberalization, needs US support and has views worth hearing.

Loncar will be meeting with Secretary Baker at 10:30 am on June 15. Ambassador Zimmermann specifically mentioned that he hopes you will also receive Loncar. We concur and recommend that you see him for half an hour.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to see Loncar for 30 minutes on June 15.

Approve *RB*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I State Recommendation w/Bio

1:00 thru 6/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526
800-0439-MR
US 9/6/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Budimir Loncar

Secretary Baker will meet with Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Budimir Loncar on Thursday, June 15, at 10:30 a.m. Loncar is stopping in Washington briefly en route to an anniversary meeting of the Group of 77 in Caracas and has asked to meet with you.

Yugoslavia is in political and economic crisis. Ethnic strife has intensified recently, particularly between Serbs and ethnic Albanians over control of Kosovo province. Serbian pressure has deprived the majority Albanian population there of its political autonomy, precipitating violence, mass arrests and military occupation. The resurgence of Serbian nationalism has also aroused the fears of other ethnic groups. We have avoided taking sides publicly in response, but we have expressed strong concerns in private conversations with Yugoslav authorities.

We are equally concerned about the sharp deterioration in the Yugoslav economy. As the Yugoslavs have struggled unsuccessfully with reform, living standards have fallen sharply with an inflation rate currently running at over 1000 percent. Premier Ante Markovic is putting together a program to address these problems, and an IMF team is now in Belgrade discussing the first step of international efforts to assist and prod the Yugoslavs to move forward speedily with systemic reform.

Loncar's visit will give us a chance to express our concerns and lend support to those in Yugoslavia who favor both political and economic reform.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

DECL:OADR

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~PER E.O. 13526~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	12/14/88	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Chron

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4384

June 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Letter for Edward Blumenthal

At Tab I is a memorandum for you to the President recommending that he sign a congratulatory note (Tab A) on the one hundredth birthday of Edward Blumenthal, father of former Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal. (Michael Blumenthal's letter to you is at Tab B.) At Tab C is a letter from you to Michael Blumenthal, to be used in forwarding the President's letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

That you sign the letter at Tab C.

Attachments

Tab I	Scowcroft memo to the President
Tab A	President's letter to Blumenthal
Tab B	Blumenthal incoming
Tab C	Scowcroft letter to Blumenthal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4384

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Letter to Edward Blumenthal

Issue

Whether to sign the attached letter to Edward Blumenthal.

Background

Michael Blumenthal, former Secretary of the Treasury, has written me to request a Presidential letter for his father on the occasion of his one hundredth birthday. Blumenthal's letter (Tab II) includes a touching description of his father's struggles in Germany, escape to Shanghai, and new life in the United States.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A President's letter to Blumenthal
Tab B Blumenthal request

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Blumenthal:

I want to join the members of the Blumenthal family in wishing you a happy one hundredth birthday.

Your story is a living testament to the human determination to triumph over horrors we cannot imagine even to this day. It is also a reaffirmation of our own national drama: the renewal of life when freedom is unfettered.

Birthdays are a time for celebration and giving of gifts. On your birthday, it is you who have given us a remarkable gift: an example of the unyielding courage, unwavering determination and unshakable faith that you, like so many others, have brought to our shores. God bless you.

Sincerely,

Mr. Edward Blumenthal
c/o W. Michael Blumenthal
Unisys Corporation
P.O. Box 418
Detroit, Michigan 48232

W Michael Blumenthal
Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer

Unisys Corporation
PO Box 418
Detroit MI 48232

Telephone
313 972 7334

Unisys Corporation
PO Box 500
Blue Bell PA 19424 0001

Telephone
215 542 6570

UNISYS

May 31, 1989

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

My apologies for bothering you with a small request in the midst of your preoccupation with much more important matters. You are, however, the one person I know in the White House -- hence, this letter to you.

I have a very special favor to ask of President Bush. In July, the extended Blumenthal family will be gathering in California to celebrate my father's one hundredth birthday. It would mean a great deal to him, the family and, of course, to me if we could present him with a short, personal note of congratulations from the President. Let me tell you a bit about him.

My father is a survivor of the Nazi terror. He was born Ewald (now Edward) Blumenthal on July 10, 1889 in Oranienburg, Germany. He served in the Kaiser's Guard regiment in World War I and after our family was impoverished by the great German inflation, he and my mother ran a modest clothing store in the 30's, until dispossessed by Hitler. He became a victim of the Holocaust and barely survived Buchenwald Concentration Camp in 1938, because my mother managed to arrange our escape to Shanghai just before the outbreak of World War II.

Interned again by the Japanese during the war, he emigrated to the U.S. in 1947 and became a U.S. citizen in 1953.

In many ways, my father's story in the U.S. is a story of the American dream fulfilled. He started again at the bottom as a janitor and building maintenance supervisor, but he lived a happy life here and his greatest pride, of course, was to see his son get a good education, become a college professor and successful businessman, and eventually to serve as the 64th U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.

STAFF -
JUN 5 1989

Also - prepare
etc of transmission
for BS signature

UNISYS

May 31, 1989


Page 2

As an immigrant who has seen that kind of fulfillment of his dreams in our great country, a brief note of congratulations from the President, sent to me, which I would present to him on his birthday would be an unforgettable gift.

Many thanks for anything you can do to help on this.

With best regards.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Mike".

WMB/sch

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mike:

The President read your letter describing your father's life story, and was delighted to send birthday greetings on his one hundredth birthday. I, too, would like to add my name to the list of well-wishers. Your father can take pride in all of his accomplishments, not least of which is the contribution that his son has made, in academia, business, and government.

All the best to you and to the entire Blumenthal family.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. W. Michael Blumenthal
Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer
Unisys Corporation
P.O. Box 418
Detroit, Michigan 48232

Chen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4579

June 13, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *MB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *R2H*
SUBJECT: Chancellor's Scholarship Fund

At Tab I is a draft joint statement by the President and Chancellor Kohl announcing creation of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship for future American leaders, to commence in the autumn. The draft statement incorporates small changes we have made to the proposed German text at Tab II.

The program is an outgrowth of a July 1988 proposal by Chancellor Kohl for strengthening U.S.-FRG academic cooperation. The President responded positively when Kohl suggested the Scholarship program in Bonn, but wanted to ensure there was no Congressional problem with issuing such a statement. Ginny Lampley has checked. There is no problem.

Financing would come entirely from the FRG. Once the announcement is made, USIA will prepare a paper on implementing the program.

Concurrence by: Ginny *GL* Lampley

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve issuance of the joint statement at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Joint Statement
Tab II German Draft Statement

Joint Statement by President George Bush of the United States of America and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany on the Creation of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship

President George Bush of the United States of America and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany share the conviction that the future development of German-American partnership depends on mutual understanding and cooperation between the young generations in both countries.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl have therefore agreed today to assume joint patronage of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship for future American leaders, to commence in the fall.

This scholarship program is the result of a proposal made by the Chancellor while hosting American university representatives in July 1988, with a view to intensifying German-American academic cooperation.

The Chancellor's purpose in launching this initiative was to make people of both countries, especially the younger generations, more acutely aware of the fundamental importance of the strong ties and close friendship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl are agreed that this year, which marks the fortieth anniversary of the Federal Republic, is a particularly important time for launching such a program. They share the view that it is in the vital interest of both countries to broaden the foundations of their common future in the academic sphere as well.

Joint Statement by the President of the United States of America, Mr. George Bush, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Helmut Kohl, on the Creation of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship

- draft -

The President of the United States of America, Mr. George Bush, and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Helmut Kohl, share the conviction that the future development of German-American partnership vitally depends on mutual understanding and co-operation between the young generations in both countries.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl have therefore agreed today to assume joint patronage of a Federal Chancellor Scholarship for future American leaders to be commenced in the autumn.

This scholarship programme is the result of a proposal made by the Chancellor while hosting American university representatives in July 1988 with a view to intensifying German-American co-operation in the academic sphere.

The Chancellor's purpose in launching this initiative was to make the people of both countries, and especially the young generation on the other side of the Atlantic, again more acutely aware of the fundamental importance of the close friendship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

President Bush and Chancellor Kohl are agreed that this year is a particularly suitable time for the launching of such a programme. They share the view that it is in the vital interest of both countries to broaden the foundations of their common future in the academic sphere as well.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4404

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 9, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *su*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Helmut Schmidt

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Joseph W. Hagin, II, recommending that the President meet with former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt for 15 minutes on June 21 or, as a fall-back, June 26. Schmidt's request for the meeting, which is supported by the State Department, is at Tab II. Schmidt wants to present the President with a report published by a distinguished group of former government officials on financial flows to the developing world. (Paul Volker will be transmitting a similar report to Chancellor Kohl, and Pierre Trudeau will do the same in a meeting with President Gorbachev.) Schmidt recently repeated his call for a more assertive European voice on East-West affairs. The President could use his meeting with the former Chancellor to echo the themes he stressed in his Boston University address and during his recent trip to Europe.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to Hagin

Tab II State Incoming

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0699-UR
ES 5/20/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Brief meeting with former German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt

PURPOSE: To exchange views on international political
and economic issues.

BACKGROUND: Schmidt requested the meeting to deliver a
report from a group of distinguished former
leaders on world financial flows to the
developing world. Although out of office
since October 1982, Schmidt remains a well-
known figure in Germany and throughout
Europe. The meeting would afford the
President the opportunity to convey his
support for a more unified, stronger
Europe -- a vision long advocated by Schmidt.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: No record available of previous meetings.

DATE & TIME: June 21 (or, if not possible, June 26) for 15
minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Gov. Sununu, General
Scowcroft, Robert Blackwill; Former
Chancellor Schmidt, one aide from German
Embassy

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo-op followed by 15 minute meeting

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo/writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC and State Dept.

OPPOSED BY: None

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-09-14
ES 5/20/10



8912971
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520 4189


June 8, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request: Former FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt

Former Chancellor Schmidt has asked for a short meeting with President Bush in order to deliver a message and a report on financial flows to developing countries prepared by a prestigious group of international financial experts. According to the former Chancellor, identical messages are being delivered to the heads of government of Japan (by Robert McNamara), the Soviet Union (by Pierre Trudeau) and West Germany (by Paul Volcker). All messages are being presented during the second half of June.

Former Chancellor Schmidt has proposed June 21 for the appointment, although June 26 would also be possible.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary



S/S 8912715

4404

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council Staff
The White House

SUBJECT: Alerting NSCS on Presidential
Correspondence

Enclosed is the original of a request to President Bush from Helmut Schmidt of Germany which is transmitted for your information.

This correspondence was received in the Information Resources Management Section of the Executive Secretariat on
A copy has been assigned to the appropriate bureau for action.

Director, S/S-IRM
Information Resources Management Section
Executive Secretariat
647-2991

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Department of State

S/S-0
INCOMING

PAGE 01 BONN 17068 030339Z 9212 001489 SS09736

PAGE 01 BONN 17068 030339Z

9212 001489 SS09736

INFO TRIP-01 SWO-01 SSI-02 SSO-01 IN-01 P-02 D-01 C-01
SP-02 /012 A1 LCM

TAKE LONGER I WOULD BE DELIGHTED.

INFO TRIP-01 SS-01 EUR-01 /003 A4 DNB

IT WAS GOOD TO SEE YOU IN NEW YORK AT HENRY'S DINNER
PARTY EARLIER THIS YEAR.

ACTION EUR-00

HOPING TO MEET FROM YOU SOON WITH ALL MY GOOD
WISHES FOR YOUR MISSION IN MY COUNTRY.

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SS-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 /000 W
-----333375 030505Z /10

YOURS, '89 JUN-05 11:44 AM

O 021359Z JUN 89

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2767

INFO AMCONSUL HAMBURG

HELMUT SCHMIDT

END QUOTE.

DOBBINS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE BONN 17068

EUR/CE PASS TO AMBASSADOR WALTERS

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, GE

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM HELMUT SCHMIDT ADDRESSED TO
AMBASSADOR VERNON WALTERS CONTAINING REQUEST FOR AN
APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH

1. ACTION MESSAGE - SEE PARA 2.

2. DEPARTMENT IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT WHITE HOUSE
REGARDING APPOINTMENT REQUEST CONTAINED IN PARA 3.
EUR/CE IS REQUESTED TO PASS TEXT OF LETTER TO
AMBASSADOR WALTERS.

3. BEGIN QUOTE:

JUNE 1, 1989

DEAR AMBASSADOR WALTERS:

UPON COMING BACK FROM A WEEK IN WASHINGTON, D. C. I
HEAR ABOUT YOUR WISH TO SEE ME. ONCE I GET BACK TO MY
HAMBURG OFFICE I WILL IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCT MY HAMBURG
SECRETARY TO GET IN TOUCH WITH YOUR SECRETARY IN ORDER
TO ARRANGE A DATE, EITHER IN BONN OR IN HAMBURG.

IN THE MEANTIME, PLEASE PERMIT ME TO ASK YOU A
FAVOUR. AN INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF FINANCIAL EXPERTS,
WHICH IN APRIL AND MAY HAS MET TWICE IN TOKYO AND IN
WASHINGTON, HAS JUST FINISHED AN EXPOSE AND A MESSAGE
TO THE MOST IMPORTANT HEADS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
WORLD. THE MESSAGE WILL BE PERSONALLY TRANSMITTED TO
CHANCELLOR KOHL IN BONN BY PAUL VOLCKER (I ASSUME,
THAT PAUL MIGHT GET IN TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT THIS
HIMSELF), BY PIERRE TRUDEAU TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV IN
MOSCOW, BY BOB MCNAMARA TO THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT IN
TOKYO. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO AS WELL TRANSMIT THE
MESSAGE BY HAND TO PRESIDENT BUSH IN WASHINGTON, AND
SO ON, ALL IN THE LATER COURSE OF JUNE.

I WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES ANYWAY
BECAUSE OF A MEETING IN VAIL, COLORADO, DUE TO A
LONGSTANDING INVITATION BY FORMER PRESIDENT FORD,
WHICH I HAVE ACCEPTED ALSO LONG AGO. I WOULD EITHER
MAKE A STOP-OVER IN WASHINGTON ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21,
WHICH I WOULD PREFER, OR ON MY WAY BACK ON MONDAY,
JUNE 26. THE LATER DATE THOUGH WOULD BE VERY
DIFFICULT FOR ME TO ARRANGE. MY HOPE IS, THAT YOU
COULD ARRANGE FOR A SHORT VISIT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH IN
THE COURSE OF JUNE 21. THE MEETING NEED NOT TAKE MORE
THAN 20 MINUTES; OF COURSE IF THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO

Lo8
adv. to nsc
Rx
RB
SK
G/K

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4567

FILE

June 12, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss the President's Trip to Europe

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to your agency counterparts convening a meeting on June 12 at 4:00 p.m. to discuss the President's July trip to Europe.

Robert *RB* Blackwill concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum for Executive Secretaries

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By *26* NARA, Date *10/29/13*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4567

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. EMILY L. WALKER
Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

MR. SCOTT HAJOST
Acting Associate Administrator
of International Activities
Environmental Protection Agency

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Acting Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Meeting to Discuss the President's Trip to
Europe (U)

There will be a meeting on Wednesday, June 14, at 4:00 p.m. in the Cordell Hull Conference Room (Room 208), OEOB. The purpose will be to discuss the President's July trip to Europe. Please telephone attendance plans to Condoleezza Rice, Director for Soviet and East European Affairs, or Mary Kay Stults at 395-5112.

(/)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 26 NARA, Date 10/29/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3989

CHRON FILE

June 9, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL 
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON 
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from James Billington

At Tab I is a letter from you to James Billington informing him that the President will be unable to attend the September 7 dinner at the Library of Congress opening a major exhibit on Alexis de Tocqueville. (Billington's request is at Tab II). President Mitterand, who was also invited, will not be travelling to Washington in September.


Adrian Basora concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft letter to Billington
Tab II Billington incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your letter inviting the President to attend the formal dinner opening the de Tocqueville exhibit at the Library of Congress. The exhibition sounds fascinating and worthy of being the premier Washington event in honor of the French bicentennial. Unfortunately, the President will be unable to attend the dinner. Again, many thanks, and best of luck with the event.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. James H. Billington
The Librarian of Congress
James Madison Memorial Building
101 Independence Avenue, S.E.
Washington, D. C. 20540



THE LIBRARIAN OF CONGRESS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

May 19, 1989

Dear Brent:

I can imagine how hectic your life is, and I hesitate to intrude on your busy schedule.

I am writing to ask a favor concerning a formal dinner we are having at the Library which we would like President Bush to attend on Thursday, September 7, 1989, beginning at 8:00 p.m. He could make the opening remarks (as brief and informal as desired) at the dinner which will mark the opening of a major exhibition, A PASSION FOR LIBERTY: ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE ON DEMOCRACY AND REVOLUTION. This will be the premier Washington event in observance of the bicentennial of the French revolution honoring one of the most quoted Frenchmen in the history of the United States.

President Francois Mitterand is being invited to attend along with members of the Tocqueville family, senior French officials, members of the diplomatic community, Congressional leaders, and French historians and intellectuals. We would be delighted if the President would serve as Honorary Chairman.

This exhibition will be an extraordinary French-American cultural event which will bring together the rich historic collections of the Library with rare and never before displayed treasures from the Tocqueville family chateau in Normandy, France, including the illustrations to Democracy in America. This exhibition will, we hope, contribute to French-American relations.

Please call if you need additional information. I hope you will put this evening on your calendar as well. I look forward to hearing from you and to our getting together before too long, perhaps for lunch.

With best regards,

James H. Billington
The Librarian of Congress

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

*Tocqueville may be the
most frequently quoted
author by folk here
on the Hill - so it also
could be good for exec - legislative relations!*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4562

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

June 12, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Thatcher, June 11, 1989

Attached at Tab I is the subject Memorandum of Conversation.

Robert *BB* Blackwill concurs.

Recommendation

That you file the Memorandum of Conversation for the President's telephone call to Prime Minister Thatcher on June 11, 1989, attached at Tab I, for the record, and, consistent with appropriate procedures, make a copy available to the Department of State.

Attachment

Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 26 NARA, Date 01/29/13

~~SECRET~~

4562

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2000-0429-F
25 6/6/13

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom (✓)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister
Notetaker: Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff

DATE, TIME June 11, 1989, 8:07 a.m. - 8:24 a.m.
AND PLACE: Camp David

The Prime Minister, after thanking the President for his kind letter, said she had called to discuss three subjects: China, including Hong Kong; Vietnamese boat people; and Poland. (✓)

First, on China. The Prime Minister was following the President's lead on curtailing visits and arms sales to China. The shock to Hong Kong from the recent repression was absolutely massive. The confidence of people in Hong Kong had been completely shattered. They obviously wondered what would happen to them in 1997. The Hong Kong government had been in London and had told the Prime Minister that citizens of the Crown Colony wanted guarantees that they could come into Britain. There were, however, 3 to 5 million people in Hong Kong. The British government would enlarge the numbers who were allowed to come to include police, critical government employees, and some business entrepreneurs. This was a change in policy. In the past the UK had urged Hong Kong businessmen to stay and try to work with the PRC. Then, if it did not work out, they could apply to immigrate to Britain. Now, the businessmen were only likely to stay in Hong Kong if they knew they had an insurance policy -- the right to come to Britain. This was still, unfortunately, not much help to the rest of the people in Hong Kong. (✓)

There was no point, the Prime Minister said, in going to the Chinese about this now. Anything to steady the nerves was welcome for the time being; the UK would see how to work on this problem with China later. Democratic institutions must now be put in place in Hong Kong as quickly as possible. The people there were feeling no differently than the Prime Minister or the President would if they were living there. (✓)

The Prime Minister knew the UK could not defend Hong Kong. But it was a real human problem, about which the Prime Minister felt deeply. The main points were to be calm, be more flexible about

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

the numbers of people who could come to Britain, and reapproach China or get international guarantees for Hong Kong's status later. It was not possible to normalize relations with China or otherwise show that the recent outrages were forgotten. (C)

The President said that he was watching the situation in Hong Kong. He liked what the Prime Minister had said about steadiness. It was now clear that the Chinese authorities were making a wider crackdown against dissent. The country was in a real state of flux. The President was trying to preserve the relationship with China while speaking out against abuses. There was also a problem with dissidents being sheltered in the American Embassy. Relations could not be normal, but all involved had a stake in continued U.S. involvement, which could encourage reform and progress toward democracy. (C)

The Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. and UK had a big stake in keeping lines of contact open to China. The UK would keep its good ambassador in Beijing in place and do what was possible to influence the Chinese government. (C)

The second subject the Prime Minister wished to address was the problem of boat people. They were still flooding into Hong Kong. Britain had sent tents and other supplies to try to accommodate the influx. The boat people were coming from north Vietnam. They were not refugees, but people seeking a better economic future. This was a very tough problem, since the UK was already sending Chinese migrants to Hong Kong back to China, 35,000 in the previous year even before the current unrest. The situation could not go on this way with the Vietnamese. The Prime Minister had therefore sent the President a message on this subject explaining that if the UK could not win assurances of the potential for full repatriation of the boat people, the UK would abandon the principle of first asylum. Forty-four thousand boat people had arrived already in Hong Kong and more were pouring in. (C)

The President asked if it was possible to separate the economic migrants from the political refugees. (C)

The Prime Minister said that they were interviewed now, but the only option was voluntary repatriation. Vietnam was overcrowded and did not mind pushing out a million of its people a year. China allowed them to go to Hong Kong. They were not, she repeated, genuine refugees, and only Hong Kong would take them. (C)

The President said he would try to help. Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger was going to the conference on this subject in Geneva. (C)

The Prime Minister repeated that she had sent a message to the

President on this issue and that she had only acted because she was driven to it. (Ø)

The President said he would talk to Secretary Baker and be on the alert for the Prime Minister's message. The Prime Minister could be sure that the President understood her position. Like the UK, the U.S. had historically received refugees, as an important humanitarian commitment. Yet the U.S. had a similar problem on its borders in differentiating between economic and politically-motivated migrants. It was difficult to move away from the historic position. (Ø)

The Prime Minister said that the historic position for asylum was being exploited by people who were not refugees at all. It was appalling to have to send people back to Vietnam, but the UK might have to do it. It was already being done with Chinese coming from the mainland. It was awful to tell the Chinese in Hong Kong that Chinese from the PRC could not be allowed in but the Vietnamese would be accepted. (Ø)

Turning to the subject of Poland, the Prime Minister said General Jaruzelski had arrived in Britain the day before and would be there today as well. Jaruzelski, she said, was quite a personality and a great Polish patriot. He had been very wounded by the extent of the electoral defeat but had accepted the results magnanimously. Solidarity had been good in allowing those senior party officials who had been defeated while running unopposed to stand again for election during the next round of balloting. Jaruzelski felt that he had Gorbachev's support for his policies and was very hopeful. (Ø)

Poland was anxious for economic help. The Prime Minister had said that the key was an IMF agreement which would be exacting but not intolerable. The IMF should not require the impossible or the Polish economy would never get off the ground. It should push the Poles toward a free market but not be intolerable, because one should realize that Poland was suffering. Then, after an agreement was concluded with the IMF, there could be credits and World Bank help. (Ø)

Continuing, the Prime Minister said the Poles had an immediate rescheduling problem with their 1989 debt payments. The Prime Minister was ready to negotiate a rescheduling of the 1989 debt payments and not wait for conclusion of an IMF agreement, if the IMF said the Poles were seriously negotiating a standby agreement. The Prime Minister was ready to consider rescheduling the 1989 debt payments over the next ten years, with no payments required during the first five years. (Ø)

Poland was also having trouble with quantitative restrictions on Polish exports to the EC. The UK would try to see these restrictions removed, as had been done for Hungary. (Ø)

The UK would also spend five million pounds a year for the next five years to set up a school for management in Poland. A mission would also be sent to Poland to explore opportunities for investment. Jaruzelski would be given something to carry on with. (Ø)

The Prime Minister said Jaruzelski and the Polish people were really looking forward to seeing the President. Jaruzelski had made some very warm comments about the President as well. (Ø)

The President said he was fascinated by these developments. He was so pleased that the Prime Minister felt this way about Jaruzelski and Poland. Jaruzelski had a terrible image in America. Perhaps a way could be found to give him some exposure in the United States to help his image, which was that of a symbol of repression. Jaruzelski's visit to the UK would be helpful in America. (Ø)

The Prime Minister again praised Jaruzelski's response to the Polish elections and his cooperation with Solidarity. She said Jaruzelski feared Solidarity might not be constructive in solving Poland's problems, demanding more than the government could give. The Prime Minister hoped Polish emigres in Britain and America realized that Jaruzelski was a real Polish patriot, who prevented the Russians from intervening in 1980 or 1981. (Ø)

The President said that, though it was a cosmetic matter, Jaruzelski should change his glasses. (Ø)

The Prime Minister agreed, and commented on the medical condition that forced him to wear those glasses. The U.S. and UK should mobilize support for his efforts. The Prime Minister briefly described Jaruzelski's remaining schedule in England and noted his request for a transfer of the remains of Sikorski back to Warsaw. She was prepared to grant this request if the Polish Church, Solidarity, and Polish emigre groups agreed. (Ø)

The President observed that the world had certainly been in turmoil during the past week. (Ø)

The Prime Minister agreed and said, "Didn't we get it right at NATO!" (Ø)

The President agreed. He said there would be no surprises on China. There was no clear four-point program, but the U.S. would try to keep the doors open while being sure that the Chinese government knew of U.S. disapproval for its actions. (Ø)

The Prime Minister thought this point was particularly true for such actions by a permanent member of the Security Council. She complimented the U.S. for its role in getting a statement from

Perez de Cuellar. (C)

The Prime Minister thanked the President for not opposing a conferral of honors upon President Reagan. (U)

The President asked if the Prime Minister had told President Reagan about this yet. (U)

The Prime Minister said she had not. It would be a marvelous occasion, she said, and President Reagan would see the Queen. (U)

The President said the American people would rejoice in such an honor being given to President Reagan. (U)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 7, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: PHILIP D. ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman John Bryant Concerning the
NATO Summit

CHRON FILE

The letter at Tab I responds to Congressman John Bryant's letter to you on May 25 (at Tab II) suggesting that the NATO Summit would be the time for the President to demonstrate U.S. leadership within the Alliance and offer an American alternative to Gorbachev's arms control agenda.

Concurrences by: Ginny *Sampley* and Don *Mahley*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Congressman Bryant at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Response to Congressman Bryant

Tab II Incoming letter from Congressman Bryant, May 30, 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Bryant:

Thank you for your letter of May 25. In it, you suggested that the NATO Summit would be the time for the President to demonstrate U.S. Leadership within the Alliance and offer an American alternative to Gorbachev's arms control agenda. That was good advice, and I hope you agree that the Summit outcome filled the bill.

Your idea of pressing the Allies to take a greater responsibility for their own defense is an important part of our approach. In his May 21 speech at Boston University, the President welcomed a stronger Europe and specifically encouraged greater West European defense cooperation. At the Summit, we obtained the agreement of NATO heads of state and government to language in the Summit Declaration calling on all the Allies to assume their "fair share of the risks, roles and responsibilities of the Atlantic partnership," and endorsing "a reinforced European component of our common security efforts."

We will continue to pursue these policies, and I appreciate your support.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable John Bryant
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

4179

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

May 25, 1989

JOHN BRYANT
5TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE
COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE ON
THE BUDGET

MAY 30 1989

Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

I am writing you today in regard to next week's NATO summit and the question of encouraging our allies to bear a larger portion of the defense burden.


Although I appreciate the difficulties in determining the exact cost of our commitments, I do not think it unreasonable nor controversial to say that it is clear the United States has continued to assume too large a burden for far too long in this regard. Moreover, given both the changed international environment, particularly in light of political developments within the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, and our grievous federal budget deficit, I believe that the upcoming NATO summit represents a rare opportunity to discuss these issues with our allies.

Recently, our European allies have expressed strong support for Soviet President Gorbachev's arms and troop reductions proposals. Now is the time to demonstrate our leadership within the alliance and offer an American alternative.

This juncture in NATO's history provides the U.S. the opportunity to encourage our allies to take a greater responsibility for their own defense. Our allies have long promised to meet levels of defense expenditures and output goals that have continually been unmet. It is imperative that we convince our allies that their increased financial commitment to their own defense, which has been subsidized by American taxpayers for almost a quarter of a century, will give the United States more flexibility in negotiating with the Soviet Union to minimize the threat of military confrontation in Europe.

I urge you to do all you can to convince the President of the necessity of this effort during his upcoming trip to Brussels. Please contact me if I can be of assistance in any way.

Sincerely,


JOHN BRYANT
Member of Congress

JB/eb

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 7, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *PB*

FROM: PHILIP D. ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman John Bryant Concerning the
NATO Summit

The letter at Tab I responds to Congressman John Bryant's letter to you on May 25 (at Tab II) suggesting that the NATO Summit would be the time for the President to demonstrate U.S. leadership within the Alliance and offer an American alternative to Gorbachev's arms control agenda.

Concurrences by: Ginny *Sampley* and Don *Mahley*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Congressman Bryant at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Response to Congressman Bryant

Tab II Incoming letter from Congressman Bryant, May 30, 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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We will continue to pursue these policies, and I appreciate your support.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable John Bryant
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

4179

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

May 25, 1989

JOHN BRYANT
5TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE

COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY

COMMITTEE ON
THE BUDGET

MAY 30 1989

Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

I am writing you today in regard to next week's NATO summit and the question of encouraging our allies to bear a larger portion of the defense burden.

Although I appreciate the difficulties in determining the exact cost of our commitments, I do not think it unreasonable nor controversial to say that it is clear the United States has continued to assume too large a burden for far too long in this regard. Moreover, given both the changed international environment, particularly in light of political developments within the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, and our grievous federal budget deficit, I believe that the upcoming NATO summit represents a rare opportunity to discuss these issues with our allies.

Recently, our European allies have expressed strong support for Soviet President Gorbachev's arms and troop reductions proposals. Now is the time to demonstrate our leadership within the alliance and offer an American alternative.

This juncture in NATO's history provides the U.S. the opportunity to encourage our allies to take a greater responsibility for their own defense. Our allies have long promised to meet levels of defense expenditures and output goals that have continually been unmet. It is imperative that we convince our allies that their increased financial commitment to their own defense, which has been subsidized by American taxpayers for almost a quarter of a century, will give the United States more flexibility in negotiating with the Soviet Union to minimize the threat of military confrontation in Europe.

I urge you to do all you can to convince the President of the necessity of this effort during his upcoming trip to Brussels. Please contact me if I can be of assistance in any way.

Sincerely,


JOHN BRYANT
Member of Congress

JB/eb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4548

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany

During his June 7 telephone call to the President, Chancellor Kohl said he would call again on Thursday, June 15, to give the President a readout on Chairman Gorbachev's visit, which will just have concluded. Our embassy in Bonn informed us this morning that Chancellor Kohl wishes to make the call between 8:00 and 8:30 a.m., June 15, 1989.

Concurrence by: Arnold *enter*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Telephone Call Proposal to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Telephone Call Proposal
Tab A Points to be Made

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *95* NARA, Date *10/29/13*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4548

FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Telephone Call from Chancellor Kohl, Federal
Republic of Germany

DATE: June 15, 1989

PURPOSE: To get Chancellor Kohl's readout of Chairman
Gorbachev's visit to West Germany

SECURE OR OPEN: Secure Line if available

INTERPRETER: To be supplied by State Department

PHONE NUMBER: WHCA Head of State circuit -- Bonn

CONTACT: Robert Hutchings

TIME DIFFERENCE: +6

SUGGESTED TIME: 8:00 - 8:30 a.m. EDT June 15, 1989

TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION: Chairman Gorbachev's June 12-15 Visit to West
Germany

Date of Submission:

Action:

Attachment

Tab A Points to be made

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 25 NARA, Date 10/29/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4548

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR KOHL

- I appreciate your quick readout on Gorbachev's visit.
- What private reactions did you get from Gorbachev to the NATO Summit and our conventional force reduction proposal? Did you get a sense that the Soviets are ready to move quickly to meet our timetable?
- How did you and Hans-Dietrich handle the SNF issue with Gorbachev? Will Moscow leave the SNF issue alone for now, or can we expect further Soviet pressure for early SNF negotiations?
- We appreciated the balanced handling of the joint statement, though we continue to believe that Gorbachev tries to use the "common European home" to divide the West.
- Did Gorbachev have anything of special interest to say about his internal problems? What was his reaction to the crackdown in China?
- How is he reacting to the dramatic events in Poland and Hungary? Did you draw any new conclusions about how to handle your forthcoming trip to Poland, or mine to Poland and Hungary?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-06-11 MR
ES 5100110

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

-- As we prepare for the Economic Summit and my trip to Eastern Europe, we should continue our pattern of close consultation. Do you now have any specific ideas concerning what, if anything, the West should do in the near term about the Polish debt?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Blackwill

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4163 Add-on

June 8, 1989

INFORMATION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL ^{RB}

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA ^{AAB}

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador-designate Zappala,
June 9, Friday, 4:30 p.m.

Joseph Zappala had his confirmation hearings today and anticipates no problems for his confirmation. However, he did undergo some difficult questioning from Senator Sarbanes on his very limited Spanish and on how he got the job. In the process, Zappala let slip the fact that he had originally asked for Italy, which will hurt him if it gets into the Spanish press.

Zappala is a self-made businessman (mainly real estate development in Florida) who has also been active in civic affairs. Active in Florida Republican politics, he has been a Bush supporter since 1979. He has a good personal relationship with the President, and he and Mrs. Zappala have been at the White House for informal social events over the past few months.

As you know, the President strongly endorsed Zappala to Spanish Foreign Minister Ordonez when he was here in mid-March.

The President's relationship with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has warmed considerably over the past two months. With the U.S.-Spanish Base Agreement also finally behind us, we are thus in a clear upswing in our bilateral relations with Spain. Zappala's mission will be to help consolidate this trend. He will have to be vigilant that the Spanish side implements the Base Agreement fairly. We had to undertake numerous gentlemen's understandings in order to close the negotiations last fall, and the Spanish Defense Ministry has been less than honorable in respecting prior understandings. Other than this, the main area of friction has been on Latin America policy, and the President's telephone conversations with Gonzalez on Panama may have set the stage for a more cooperative approach on Nicaragua and on other Latin American problems.

Attachment:

Tab I Biography

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/14/25

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 17, 1989

The President today announced his intention to nominate Joseph Zappala to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Spain. He would succeed Reginald Bartholomew.

Mr. Zappala is currently the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Joseph Zappala and Associates. He served as co-chairman for the state of Florida on the George Bush for President National Steering Committee and National Finance Committee. He recently served as the National co-chairman of Finance for the American Bicentennial Presidential Inaugural. Mr. Zappala is the Chairman of Home Town Investors Inc. and Owner and Chairman of Tucson Greyhound Park in Tucson, Arizona. He founded and was Chairman of the Board of the First National Bank of Seminole in Pinellas County, Florida. In addition, he was co-founder and serves as President of STRAIGHT, Inc., a drug treatment and rehabilitation program for adolescents. Mr. Zappala serves on the Board of the College of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Florida and on the Board of the Police Athletic League. He is also the past Chairman of the Pinellas Association for Retarded Children.

Mr. Zappala was graduated from the New York Institute of Finance. He is married and has four daughters.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to President Bush RE: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	6/12/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10b. Talking points	Phone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011 **OA/ID Number:** 30545

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F

Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

AR Case #:

AR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

Appeal Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

Disposition Date:

MR Case #:

MR Disposition:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10c. Action memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft RE: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	6/11/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4330

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 6, 1989

CHRON FILE

FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *MB*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Natan Sharansky

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President recommending that he sign a letter to Natan Sharansky (Tab A). Sharansky wrote the President welcoming his policy statement on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (Tab B).

Concurrence by: Condi Rice *CR*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft memorandum to the President
Tab A President's letter to Sharansky
Tab B Incoming from Sharansky, May 15, 1989

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By *SS* NARA, Date *9/4/25*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4330

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Natan Sharansky

Purpose

To respond to letter from Natan Sharansky.

Background

Natan Sharansky wrote you (Tab B) to commend your stance on the Jackson-Vanik Amendment as outlined in your Texas A&M speech. Sharansky also met with me to discuss Jewish emigration and whether the Amendment should be waived. His input was both timely and helpful in forging a consensus within your administration on how to deal with the issue. In your letter, you thank him for his support and pledge that you will work to achieve greater progress on Soviet human rights performance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Natan Sharansky.

Attachments

Tab A President's letter to Sharansky
Tab B Incoming from Sharansky, May 15, 1989

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/4/25

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Sharansky:

Thank you for your kind words of support. Free emigration is one of the fundamental rights that should be made available to citizens of all countries. It enjoys the strong support of the American people.

The struggle you have led for freedom and human rights in the Soviet Union has been an inspiration to us all. The changes in the Soviet Union are dramatic, and due in no small measure to the part you and others played in insisting that human rights are universal rights. I have committed my administration to press for continued progress in Soviet Union human rights performance, and to ensure that such progress will not be reversed.

I hope I can count on your continued support, as well as your unceasing efforts to translate our shared ideals into reality, in the Soviet Union and throughout the globe.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Natan Sharansky
President
Soviet Jewish Zionist Forum
Jerusalem, Israel

NSC
Soviet Jewry
Zionist Forum

SJZF



פצ"ב

הפורום הציוני
של יהודי בריה"מ

38160

May 15, 1989
Jerusalem

Mr. George Bush
President of the United States

Dear Mr. President,

I welcome your latest policy statement regarding the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The current positive developments in the Soviet Union's performance in the area of human rights and particularly emigration come as a result of a continuous struggle in which the noble and steadfast position of the American people, Congress and Administration has played a critical role. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment is one of the highest expressions of this position. Let's hope that the Soviet Union will introduce emigration laws in accordance with international standards and implement them, thus making possible further improvements in East-West relations, including trade exchange.

Sincerely yours,

Natan Sharansky,
President, Soviet Jewry Zionist Forum

RECEIVED
1989 MAY 15 PM 3:40
WHITE HOUSE MAIL ROOM J5 0503

4536

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

FILE

June 12, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE CR

SUBJECT: Announcement of OPIC and GSP for Hungary

It is our understanding that the President has agreed to seek legislation to accord OPIC and GSP to Hungary. State Department officials are testifying today on the Hill in support of a House bill that would accord GSP and OPIC to both Hungary and Poland. We recommend that an announcement of the Presidential decision be made today aboard Air Force One.

Tim Deal ⁹ concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the Hughes to Fitzwater memorandum at Tab I releasing the press statement at Tab II which announces the President's decision to seek GSP and OPIC legislation for Hungary.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memo to Fitzwater
Tab A Statement

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES
TO: MARLIN FITZWATER
SUBJECT: President's decision to seek legislation OPIC and
GSP legislation for Hungary.

Please issue the attached press statement announcing the
President's decision to seek legislation to accord OPIC and GSP
to Hungary.

Attachment
Tab A Statement

The United States welcomes the announcement of the Hungarian government's intention to begin discussions with the opposition as a first step to multiparty elections. In view of Hungary's progress on the path to fundamental political reform, the President will seek legislation to accord Hungary GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) and to permit OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) to operate in Hungary.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 7, 1989

FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Draft "Democracy in Eastern Europe Act of 1989"

The attached memorandum gives NSC Staff concurrence on the language of the "Democracy in Eastern Europe Act of 1989" as it applies to Poland.

The Administration is reviewing policy on Hungary.

Robert D. *Blackwill* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Peterson at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Peterson

Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Draft "Democracy in Eastern Europe Act of 1989"

The NSC staff concurs with the language of the Bill as it applies to Poland.

The Administration is reviewing policy toward Hungary and is not in a position to support GSP and OPIC for Hungary at this time.

The NSC Staff recommends that the Bill's drafters add a preamble drawn from the President's Hamtramck Speech in order to lay out the goals of the Democracy in Eastern Europe Act.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
June 6, 1989

4371
URGENT

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

National Security Council (Hughes 456-2224)	49
Department of State (Bachrach 647-4463)	25
Department of Commerce (Levitt 377-3151)	04
United States Trade Representative (Bolton x3150)	23
U.S. Information Agency (Isacco 485-8828)	55
Overseas Private Investment Corp. (Hatton 457-7012)	21
Department of Justice (Parkins 633-2113)	17

SUBJECT: Draft "Democracy in Eastern Europe Act of 1989."

NOTE: We understand from State that HFAC has tentatively scheduled a markup of the attached bill for June 8th and House Ways+Means for June 12th. State supports this bill and would like Administration concurrence in this position.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than 4:00 P.M., WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1989.

Questions should be referred to Annette Rooney/Sue Thau (395-7300), the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosure

cc: B. Sasser
J. Doherty

URGENT

SENT BY: Xerox Telecopier 7020 : 8-2-89 : 5:10PM :

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June 1, 1989

101ST CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. _____

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. _____ introduced the following bill; which was
referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To provide for certain forms of assistance to Poland and Hungary
to encourage the process of democratic reforms in those
countries.

- 1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
- 2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SL5009

2

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the "Democracy in Eastern
3 Europe Act of 1989".

4 SEC. 2. ELIGIBILITY OF POLAND FOR GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF
5 PREFERENCES.

6 Subsection (b) of section 502 of the Trade Act of 1974
7 (19 U.S.C. 2462(b)) is amended by striking out "Poland" in
8 the table within such subsection.

9 SEC. 3. OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION.

10 (a) ELIGIBILITY OF POLAND AND HUNGARY FOR OPIC
11 PROGRAMS.--Section 239(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
12 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2199(f)) is amended by inserting ", Poland,
13 Hungary," after "Yugoslavia".

14 (b) PARTICIPATION BY NONGOVERNMENTAL SECTOR.--

15 (1) IN GENERAL.--In accordance with its mandate to
16 foster private initiative and competition and enhance the
17 ability of private enterprise to make its full
18 contribution to the development process, the Overseas
19 Private Investment Corporation shall support projects in
20 Poland and Hungary which will result in enhancement of
21 the nongovernmental sector and reduction of state
22 involvement in the economy.

23 (2) DEFINITION.--For purposes of this subsection, the
24 term "nongovernmental sector" in Poland or Hungary
25 includes private enterprises, cooperatives (insofar as

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1 they are not administered by the Government of Poland or
2 Hungary), joint ventures (including partners which are
3 not the Government of Poland or Hungary or
4 instrumentalities thereof), businesses in Poland or
5 Hungary that are wholly or partly owned by United States
6 citizens, including those of Polish or Hungarian descent,
7 religious and ethnic groups (including the Catholic
8 Church), and other independent social organizations.

9 **SEC. 4. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY EXCHANGE.**

10 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**--There are
11 authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for
12 purposes of continuing to implement the 1987 United States-
13 Polish science and technology agreement--

14 (1) \$1,500,000 for fiscal year 1990, and

15 (2) \$1,560,000 for fiscal year 1991.

16 (b) **DEFINITION.**--For purposes of this section, the term
17 "1987 United States-Polish science and technology
18 agreement" refers to the draft agreement concluded in 1987
19 by the United States and Poland, entitled "Agreement Between
20 the Government of the United States of America and the Polish
21 People's Republic on Cooperation in Science and Technology
22 and Its Funding", together with annexes relating thereto.

23 **SEC. 5. PROVISION OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND HOSPITAL EQUIPMENT**
24 **TO POLAND.**

25 In addition to amounts authorized to be appropriated to

SL8009

4

1 carry out chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act
2 of 1961 (relating to the economic support fund) for fiscal
3 years 1990 and 1991, there are authorized to be appropriated
4 to carry out that chapter for each such fiscal year
5 \$2,000,000, which shall be available, only--

Notwithstanding any other provision of law,

6 (1) for providing medical supplies and hospital
7 equipment to Poland through private and voluntary
8 organizations, including for the expenses of purchasing,
9 transporting, and distributing such supplies and
10 equipment, and

11 (2) for training of medical personnel

12 SEC. 6. ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORT OF DEMOCRACY IN POLAND AND
13 HUNGARY.

14 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in addition
15 to amounts authorized to be appropriated to carry out chapter
16 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating
17 to the economic support fund) for fiscal years 1990 and 1991,
18 there are authorized to be appropriated to carry out that
19 chapter for each such fiscal year \$2,000,000, of which--

for assistance in support of democracy in Poland and Hungary

20 (1) \$1,000,000 shall be available in each such fiscal
21 year only for the unconditional support of democratic
22 institutions and activities in Poland; and

23 (2) \$1,000,000 shall be available in each such fiscal
24 year only for the unconditional support of democratic
25 institutions and activities in Hungary.

SLS009

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1 SEC. 7. EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE.

2 It is the sense of the Congress that the President
3 should--

4 (1) encourage privately administered educational and
5 cultural exchanges between the United States and Poland
6 and between the United States and Hungary, through the
7 International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), the
8 National Academy of Sciences, the Fulbright Educational
9 Exchange Program, and the United States Information
10 Agency; and

11 (2) consider the establishment of reciprocal cultural
12 centers in Poland and the United States and in Hungary
13 and the United States to facilitate government and
14 privately funded educational exchanges.

~~of ~~institutions~~ institutions and activities in Hungary.~~

SEC. 7. EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE.

- a) There are authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency \$2,500,000 for each of the fiscal years 1990 and 1991 for support of expanded professional and educational exchanges with Eastern Europe, emphasizing particularly the private and independent groups in that region.
- b) There are authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency \$1,500,000 for fiscal year 1990, which shall be available for the establishment of an American Cultural Center and a Polish-American Academic Exchange Office in Warsaw.
- c) There are authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency \$500,000 for each of the fiscal years 1990 and 1991 to enable the distribution of American magazines, books, newspapers, and videocassettes which support economic and political reform objectives in Eastern Europe.

Democratic Development: In addition to funds otherwise available for such purposes, there are authorized to be appropriated to the USIA \$2.0 million for FY 1990 and \$2.5 million for FY 1991, which shall be available for grants to the NED for civic education and democratic institution building in East Europe. Of this sum \$1.0 million for FY 1990 and \$1.5 million for FY 1991 should be identified for activities in Poland including assistance to independent publishing, communication media, and other independent political and civic organizations. In addition, \$1.5 million for each of the fiscal years 1990 and FY 1991 should be made available to the USIA for a grant to the Independent Polish Trade Union Solidarity by the NED.

Private Sector Assistance: To support the creation of a private sector in East Europe, ~~there is authorized~~ \$1 million for each of FY 1990 and 1991 to support the emergence and strengthening of such a sector in Poland and Hungary by means of training, exchanges, and related programs. **UP TO ONE HALF OF THIS SUM SHALL BE AVAILABLE TO THE NED.**

Amounts appropriated in this legislation authorized to remain available until expended.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12a. Action memo	Adrian Basora to Brent Scowcroft RE: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	6/11/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to President Bush RE: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12c. Talking points	Phone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

4414

June 10, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with West
German Chancellor Kohl, June 7, 1989

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum.

Robert *Blackwill* concurs.

Recommendation

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed
for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *ED* NARA, Date *10/29/13*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4414

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Robert Hutchings, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
Rachelle Dionne, NSC Staff (Stenographer)

Chancellor Helmut Kohl

DATE, TIME June 7, 1989, 9:46 - 9:52 am EST
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl, who initiated the call from New York, said he was paying a courtesy call and had no specific problems to discuss. He said he had praised the President during a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations and was also scheduled to give an interview to the New York Times before going on to Harvard and MIT. The Chancellor added that his wife, Hannelore, joined him in extending best wishes to the President and Mrs. Bush. (U)

The President said he very much appreciated the call and the Chancellor's kind words before the Council on Foreign Relations. The President said he was still aglow with the hospitality the Chancellor provided during his visit to Germany. (U)

The President noted that he had a good visit with Pakistani President Bhutto, who will be speaking at Harvard. He noted that she is holding her own despite major problems at home, and that she came across very well in her many meetings in Washington. The President also mentioned his very good visit with President von Weizsaecker. (S)

The President then asked what the Chancellor was saying about developments in China. (S)

Chancellor Kohl replied that the situation was very hard to gauge. The military assault on the Chinese protesters was a dreadful thing, but the Chancellor was warning against forming a

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definitive judgment at this point. For example, he said, there is no way of knowing what Deng Xiao Ping is going to do or who may have usurped power. The Chancellor said that he and the President should stay in close touch until things become clearer in China. (C)

Chancellor Kohl said that he would call the President next week after Chairman Gorbachev had completed his visit to Bonn on Thursday. The Chancellor wanted to continue the tradition of calling one another on key issues. (C)

The President said he would appreciate the call and would be anxious to hear about Gorbachev's visit. The President said he had received a reasonably positive response [to the conventional force reductions initiative] the previous day from the Soviet Ambassador, who said he had come at the request of Chairman Gorbachev. The response did not constitute an acceptance of anything, the President noted, but it was not negative. The President and the Chancellor then concluded the call with the usual courtesies. (C)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4512

June 9, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*

SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Budimir Loncar

Foreign Minister Loncar will be in Washington at Secretary Baker's invitation en route to Caracas, where he will represent Yugoslavia at the 25th anniversary meeting of the Group of 77 developing nations. (In August Yugoslavia will host the Non-Aligned Summit and assume chairmanship of the NAM.)

The nearly completed PCC review of US-Yugoslav relations is recommending that we intensify our political dialogue with the Yugoslavs -- both to exert pressure for economic and political liberalization and to reaffirm our commitment to Yugoslav unity and independence. (Our commitment needs reaffirming, given the sharp decline in US attention to Yugoslavia over the past year.)

The Yugoslavs are giving another push toward economic reform, but they face inflation running at over 1000 percent a year. Foreign Minister Loncar, a strong advocate of political and economic liberalization, needs US support and has views worth hearing.

Loncar will be meeting with Secretary Baker at 10:30 am on June 15. Ambassador Zimmermann specifically mentioned that he hopes you will also receive Loncar. We concur and recommend that you see him for half an hour.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to see Loncar for 30 minutes on June 15.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I State Recommendation w/Bio

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PER E.O. 13526

8011-0439-NR
ES 9/6/11

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Meeting with Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Budimir Loncar

Secretary Baker will meet with Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Budimir Loncar on Thursday, June 15, at 10:30 a.m. Loncar is stopping in Washington briefly en route to an anniversary meeting of the Group of 77 in Caracas and has asked to meet with you.

Yugoslavia is in political and economic crisis. Ethnic strife has intensified recently, particularly between Serbs and ethnic Albanians over control of Kosovo province. Serbian pressure has deprived the majority Albanian population there of its political autonomy, precipitating violence, mass arrests and military occupation. The resurgence of Serbian nationalism has also aroused the fears of other ethnic groups. We have avoided taking sides publicly in response, but we have expressed strong concerns in private conversations with Yugoslav authorities.

We are equally concerned about the sharp deterioration in the Yugoslav economy. As the Yugoslavs have struggled unsuccessfully with reform, living standards have fallen sharply with an inflation rate currently running at over 1000 percent. Premier Ante Markovic is putting together a program to address these problems, and an IMF team is now in Belgrade discussing the first step of international efforts to assist and prod the Yugoslavs to move forward speedily with systemic reform.

Loncar's visit will give us a chance to express our concerns and lend support to those in Yugoslavia who favor both political and economic reform.

J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

DECL:OADR

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
~~PER E.O. 13526~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14c. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	12/14/88	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

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AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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4163 Add-on

June 8, 1989

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA

SUBJECT: Your meeting with Ambassador-designate Zappala,
June 9, Friday, 4:30 p.m.

Joseph Zappala had his confirmation hearings today and anticipates no problems for his confirmation. However, he did undergo some difficult questioning from Senator Sarbanes on his very limited Spanish and on how he got the job. In the process, Zappala let slip the fact that he had originally asked for Italy, which will hurt him if it gets into the Spanish press.

Zappala is a self-made businessman (mainly real estate development in Florida) who has also been active in civic affairs. Active in Florida Republican politics, he has been a Bush supporter since 1979. He has a good personal relationship with the President, and he and Mrs. Zappala have been at the White House for informal social events over the past few months.

As you know, the President strongly endorsed Zappala to Spanish Foreign Minister Ordenez when he was here in mid-March.

The President's relationship with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez has warmed considerably over the past two months. With the U.S.-Spanish Base Agreement also finally behind us, we are thus in a clear upswing in our bilateral relations with Spain. Zappala's mission will be to help consolidate this trend. He will have to be vigilant that the Spanish side implements the Base Agreement fairly. We had to undertake numerous gentlemen's understandings in order to close the negotiations last fall, and the Spanish Defense Ministry has been less than honorable in respecting prior understandings. Other than this, the main area of friction has been on Latin America policy, and the President's telephone conversations with Gonzalez on Panama may have set the stage for a more cooperative approach on Nicaragua and on other Latin American problems.

Attachment:
Tab I Biography

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/4/25

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 17, 1989

The President today announced his intention to nominate Joseph Zappala to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Spain. He would succeed Reginald Bartholomew.

Mr. Zappala is currently the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Joseph Zappala and Associates. He served as co-chairman for the state of Florida on the George Bush for President National Steering Committee and National Finance Committee. He recently served as the National co-chairman of Finance for the American Bicentennial Presidential Inaugural. Mr. Zappala is the Chairman of Home Town Investors Inc. and Owner and Chairman of Tucson Greyhound Park in Tucson, Arizona. He founded and was Chairman of the Board of the First National Bank of Seminole in Pinellas County, Florida. In addition, he was co-founder and serves as President of STRAIGHT, Inc., a drug treatment and rehabilitation program for adolescents. Mr. Zappala serves on the Board of the College of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Florida and on the Board of the Police Athletic League. He is also the past Chairman of the Pinellas Association for Retarded Children.

Mr. Zappala was graduated from the New York Institute of Finance. He is married and has four daughters.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

June 8, 1989

Dear Mr. Colucci:

I am responding to your letter to General Scowcroft inquiring about the possibility of obtaining a position on the National Security Council. Your academic background and interests correspond well to the work carried out in our European and Soviet Directorate. Unfortunately, I regret that we have no openings available at present.

Thank you for your interest in working on the National Security Council. I wish you the best of success in your future endeavors.

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Mr. Lamont Colucci
6333 Piping Rock Road
Madison, Wisconsin 53711

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4221

June 7, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM; BARRY LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT; Response to Letter from Lamont Colucci

At Tab I is a letter from you to Lamont Colucci informing him that there are no positions available at the NSC. Colucci's request -- written to General Scowcroft -- is at Tab II.

Robert *Blackwill* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Hughes letter to Colucci
Tab II Colucci letter to Scowcroft

4221

Staff to Blackwell
for response

The White House
National Security Council
Mr. Brent Scowcroft
Washington, D.C. 20500

22/May/89

MAY 30 1989

Dear Mr. Scowcroft,

As early as December of 1988 I received a form from Mr. Untermeyer's office in regards to an appointed position on the President's staff. Since then I have confirmed review (class C) of my portfolio with the office of special placements and have been given political clearance. I am now applying directly to your office for a position. Enclosed is my resume, the rest of my file is in the office of special placements.

As the letter from Congressman Gunderson relates my formal academic training is in the area of foreign policy. My areas of concentration are primarily within the rubric of U.S foreign policy especially concerning Western/Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Mainly I have been concerned with political and security concerns within these areas. I think I would be useful in a setting such as the National Security Council. My language training is in German. Special areas of research for me are the Eastern European uprisings of the 1950's and U.S-German relations in the post 1945 period.

On the domestic front I have a large amount of campaign and work experience as indicated in my resume, as well as academic training centered on American national government. If you would like a writing sample I would be happy to send one to you. In support of my case my file contains letters from Mr. John MacIver

& Mr. Tim Byrne the Wisconsin Co-Chairs for the Bush for President campaign, as well as from Senator Robert Kasten and Congressman Steve Gunderson. Further references from top campaign workers such as Mr. Mark Bloc and Mr. Jeff Wiswell are available as well. I would be happy to provide further information and travel to Washington for an interview as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Lamont Colucci

Mr. Lamont Colucci
6333 Piping Rock Rd.
Madison, WI 53711
(608) 271-2925

Lamont C. Colucci
6333 Piping Rock Road
Madison, Wisconsin 53711
(608) 271-2925

Objective: Research, analysis and/or public educational position dealing with public policy issues, foreign affairs, security issues or defense policy.

Education: B.A. University of Wisconsin- Madison, May 1988; completed undergraduate studies in three majors (International Relations (U.S. Foreign Policy), History, Political Science) in three years, in upper 20% of graduating class.

Currently working towards M.A., U.S. History-U.S. Foreign Policy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1989.

Relevant Experience: Independent Contracted Lobbyist (Executive Director Seat Belt Freedom of Choice)

Assistant to State Co-Chairman, George Bush for President campaign, 1988.

Political work for Steve King U.S. Senate campaign.

Regional director for Rick Berg Madison Mayoral campaign.

Member: Republican National Committee, Dane County Republican Party and College Republicans.

Student Conference on U.S. Affairs, West Point, 1987. U.W. Representative.

Won/held numerous student government posts, awards, writing and journalism awards, public speaking awards, scholarships, etc.

Delegate, Badger Boys State, 1984.

Washington Workshop Congressional Seminar, 1983, finalist.

Tutored students in History and Government.

Wisconsin De Molay, Officer Corps.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16a. Action memo	Adrian A. Basora to Brent Scowcroft RE: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	6/8/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to President Bush RE: Telephone Call to Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16c. Talking points	Meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Chron

4339

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1989

FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

RB

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

CR

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Proclamation/Baltic Freedom Day

The draft proclamation at Tab I would in accordance with Senate Resolution 63, designate June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day.

The proclamation has been revised to reflect reforms in the Soviet Union.

Upon your approval, the revised text will be given to Presidential Messages for dispatch.

State concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the revised text for the Draft Presidential.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Draft Proclamation

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR:

C. BOYDEN GRAY
DAVID Q. BATES, JR.
FREDERICK D. McCLURE
ROGER B. PORTER
DAVID DEMAREST
STEPHEN S. J. D. ET
GREGG PETERSMEYER
JOSEPH W. HAGIN II (YI)
~~BRENT SCHEWCHOFF (YI)~~

FROM:

Amy Miller for
SHIRLEY GREEN
93 OEOB

SUBJECT:

(Draft Proclamation
Baltic Freedom Day, 1989)

Attached for your review is the above mentioned proclamation designating June 14, 1989 as Baltic Freedom Day.

It was submitted by the Department of State and edited/revised by this office.

(IMMEDIATE ATTENTION REQUIRED.) Written response required by no later than 5:00 p.m. TODAY, ~~FRIDAY, JUNE 9~~. For routine clearance, questions, or discussion, call Amy Miller, extension 2276. Thank you.

cc: Ron Geisler



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

MAY 23 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James C. Murr 
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

SUBJECT: Baltic Freedom Day, 1989

Attached is a proclamation which, in accordance with Senate Joint Resolution 63, would designate June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day. Senate Joint Resolution 63 passed the Senate on February 28, 1989, and House passage is anticipated in the near future.

The proposed proclamation was submitted by the Department of State, and editorial and format changes were made in this Office.

Attachment

BALTIC FREEDOM DAY, 1939

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
A PROCLAMATION

Fifty years ago on August 23, 1939, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The secret protocols to this treaty condemned the independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the foreign domination they still endure today.

Less than 1 year after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union invaded the three Baltic Republics and imposed upon them a regime antithetical to the ideas of national sovereignty and individual liberty. The suffering of the Baltic people was exacerbated when Nazi forces drove through these states during the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet War and established a Gestapo-run ~~and a brutal~~ administration. ~~When the Red Army recaptured the Baltic States during World War II, it reinstituted a reign of terror under the Soviet secret police that fully matched the brutality of the Gestapo.~~ Hundreds of thousands of innocent men, ~~women~~, and children were deported to Siberia, thousands of others perished in armed resistance to the attack upon their national independence and individual rights. By the end of World War II, the Baltic States had lost a significant portion of their population.

Since their forcible annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have suffered political oppression, religious persecution, and repression of their national consciousness. Their culture and heritage has been denigrated and suppressed, and russification has threatened their survival as distinct ethnic groups. An aggressive program of industrialization has posed hazards to their health as well as the environment. Members of the clergy and lay religious leaders have been systematically harassed and imprisoned for activities deemed unacceptable by the authorities.

spirit of the Baltic people. Today, the ~~fight~~ and ~~struggle~~ for liberty remain strong. Hundreds of thousands of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian men and women have publicly demonstrated their desire for freedom and democracy, calling for national autonomy and control over their own ~~social~~, ~~political~~, and ~~economic~~ affairs.

The undeniable energy of the Baltic peoples is stirring again.
~~But the future looks brighter today than at any other time in the Baltic States' post-war experience.~~
~~The undeniable voice of Baltic people has begun to stir the occupying regime.~~ Some religious shrines -- desecrated by the Communist government and used to house concerts, ~~arts,~~ ^{artwork} and even a museum of atheism -- have been returned to the churches. Members of the clergy have been allowed to take up their pastoral duties. The unique languages, national flags, and patriotic songs of the three countries have been restored. Some political prisoners have been released.

These are important steps, but justice demands that more be made. ~~Recent human rights advances must be institutionalized.~~ ~~Recent improvements in human rights must be institutionalized.~~ ~~But for the peoples of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia there is a more fundamental right -- the right to self-determination.~~ ~~The people of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have a God-given right to shape their own future free from foreign domination.~~

The Government of the United States does not and will not recognize the unilateral incorporation by force of arms of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. ~~The Baltic people have a God-given right to shape their own future free from foreign domination.~~ On this observance of Baltic Freedom Day, we express our solidarity with them and call upon the Soviet Union to heed their calls for freedom and self-determination.

By S.J. Res 63, the Congress of the United States has designated June 14, 1989, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate remembrances and ceremonies and to reaffirm their commitment to principles of liberty and freedom, ~~for all oppressed people.~~

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this
day of _____, in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred and eighty-nine, and of the Independence of
the United States of America the two hundred and thirteenth.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

ELIOT FIELDER DAY, 1989

- - - - -

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

Fifty years ago on August 23, 1939, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The secret protocols to this treaty condemned the independent Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to the foreign domination they still endure today.

Less than 1 year after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union invaded the three Baltic Republics and imposed upon them a regime antithetical to the ideas of national sovereignty and individual liberty. The suffering of the Baltic people was exacerbated when Nazi forces drove through these states during the beginning of the Nazi-Soviet War and established a Gestapo-run civil administration. When the Red Army recaptured the Baltic States during World War II, it reinstituted a reign of terror under the Soviet secret police that fully matched the brutality of the Gestapo. Hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children were deported to Siberia; thousands of others perished in armed resistance to the attack upon their national independence and individual rights. By the end of World War II, the Baltic States had lost 20 percent of their population.

Since their forcible annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940, the people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have suffered political oppression, religious persecution, and repression of their national consciousness. Their cultural heritage has been denigrated and suppressed, and Russification has threatened their survival as distinct ethnic groups. An aggressive program of industrialization has posed hazards to their health as well as the environment. Members of the clergy and lay religious leaders have been systematically harassed and imprisoned for activities deemed unacceptable by the authorities.

However, half a century of repression has not broken the spirit of the Baltic people. Today, their longing and hopes for liberty remain strong. Hundreds of thousands of Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian men and women have publicly demonstrated their desire for freedom and democracy, calling for national autonomy and control over their own social, political, and economic affairs.

more

(OVER)

The undeniable voice of Baltic people has begun to stir the occupying regimes. Some religious shrines -- desecrated by the Communist government and used to house concerts, arts, and even a museum of atheism -- have been returned to the churches. Members of the clergy have been allowed to take up their pastoral duties. The unique languages, national flags, and patriotic songs of the three countries have been restored. Some political prisoners have been released.

These are important steps, but justice demands that more be made. Recent improvements in human rights practices by the ruling Communist officials are not complete, nor have they been institutionalized. The people of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia both demand and deserve lasting guarantees of their fundamental rights.

The Government of the United States does not and will not recognize the unilateral incorporation by force of arms of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. The Baltic people have a God-given right to shape their own future, free from foreign domination. On this observance of Baltic Freedom Day, we express our solidarity with them and call upon the Soviet Union to heed their calls for freedom and self-determination.

By S.J. Res 63, the Congress of the United States has designated June 14, 1989, as "Baltic Freedom Day" and has requested the President to issue a proclamation in observance of this event.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim June 14, 1989, as Baltic Freedom Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate remembrances and ceremonies and to reaffirm their commitment to principles of liberty and freedom for all oppressed people.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this day of , in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-nine, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and thirteenth.

GEORGE BUSH

#

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4388

June 8, 1989

FILE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment for German Foreign
Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Joseph W. Hagin, II, recommending that the President agree to meet with German Foreign Minister Genscher. Genscher will be in Washington June 21-22 at the invitation of Secretary Baker for follow-up discussions on the President's initiatives and the NATO Summit.

In addition to meeting with Secretary Baker and a possible meeting with the President, Genscher has requested separate meetings with Secretary Cheney and yourself.

The State Department request is at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you agree to meet with Foreign Minister Genscher for thirty minutes on June 21 or, if not possible, on June 22.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Scowcroft Memorandum to Hagin
Tab II State Incoming

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *ES* NARA, Date *10/29/13*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4388

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Deputy Assistant to the President for Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher

PURPOSE: To have follow-up discussions on the NATO Summit

BACKGROUND: Foreign Minister Genscher will be in Washington at the invitation of Secretary Baker to review the results of the NATO Summit and exchange views on how best to implement the President's proposals unveiled at NATO and in the FRG. A meeting with the President would solidify the close consultations between our two countries that are vital in ensuring the success of the President's initiatives.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Genscher accompanied Chancellor Kohl to his meetings in Washington with President Reagan and then-President-elect Bush on November 15, 1988.

DATE AND TIME: June 21, or if not possible, June 22.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Secretary Baker, Gov. Sununu, General Scowcroft, Bob Blackwill; Foreign Minister Genscher, Ambassador Ruhfus, one aide.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo op, followed by twenty minute meeting

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo/writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC and State Department

OPPOSED BY: None

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/4/85

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~




June 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request: West German Foreign Minister
Genscher

At the invitation of Secretary Baker, Foreign Minister Genscher plans to visit Washington June 22 (or June 21) for follow-up discussions on the NATO Summit and President Bush's visit to Bonn.

The Foreign Minister has requested separate appointments with the President and you. His preferred date is June 22 (he will spend only one day in the U.S.), but June 21 would also be possible. Genscher will meet separately with Secretary Baker and hopes to meet with Secretary Cheney.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Non-Log

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 22, 1989

FILE

Thanks.
B

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: NATO CFE Initiative - Redux

This memorandum proposes an initiative that would produce fifteen per cent cuts in equipment of five categories (all the categories mentioned by Gorbachev, but with Western definitions) on an Alliance-to-Alliance basis. It also contains a bilateral US-Soviet reduction in the manpower of combat forces stationed in Europe of about twenty-five per cent.

We believe that proceeding on an Alliance-to-Alliance basis will:

- Provide greater military benefit and pursue directly the Alliance goal of reducing the threat of surprise attack.
- Be consistent with NATO's present CFE approach, an approach forged painfully over three years of negotiations.
- Be likely to be accepted by NATO Allies, with the possible exception of the French on aircraft. Even then, if there is disagreement, we shift the onus to the French for not agreeing to an Alliance-wide approach.

We strongly believe that proceeding bilaterally on equipment, especially to expand the number of categories subject to limitation, would forfeit all the above advantages. Indeed, a purely bilateral initiative could topple the NATO consensus on CFE and could add serious strains to the very cohesion of the Alliance.

The bilateral manpower element imbedded in this proposal will:

- Have a dramatic political impact, both in the US and in Europe.
- Sharply reduce forward-positioned Soviet troop presence in Eastern Europe (and thus the threat of short-notice attack).
- Help with burdensharing arguments on the Hill.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1588-MR

MM 8/4/2016

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

We would point out that verification of an explicit manpower ceiling would be very difficult. In fact, it would resurrect the ghosts of the interminable arguments about manpower definition (and the impact of definition on verification) that paralyzed the MBFR negotiations for years -- arguments we have been avoiding in CFE by focusing on equipment limitations.

An Outline of a Proposal

- We could "pocket" the Gorbachev announcement in Moscow and trump his play.
- We could propose the following:
 - NATO and the Warsaw Pact would reduce their combat aircraft (Western definition) and helicopters to parity at levels 15% below the current NATO level.
 - The existing Western proposal (Tanks, ATC, Artillery) would be adopted for implementation sooner than Gorbachev's proposal. This would achieve parity in Tanks, ATC, and Artillery before the 1997 date proposed by Gorbachev, and at the same levels of forces.
 - All equipment reduced in CFE would be destroyed. (A complicating factor for us, since we would like to do some shuffle to preserve more modern equipment - but one we could swallow if the Soviets had to do even more destruction of the most modern equipment.)
 - **Manpower associated with all NATO/Pact equipment reductions would be taken out of the force structure of the two sides.**
 - As part of the CFE reductions, the US and the Soviet Union would agree to a common ceiling of residual stationed forces in Europe at about 275,000 men. We could describe this as a 25 per cent reduction below the current US stationed combat force total. This would be a means of the two major partners in the respective Alliances demonstrating their own seriousness about the negotiations.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Non-Log

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1989

FILE

Handwritten initials and a circled 'D'

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER^{He}/ROBERT BLACKWILL^{RB}

SUBJECT: NATO CFE Initiatives

The undated proposal for a CFE approach from SecDef contains some excellent material - material that the President should be able to use to good advantage at the NATO Summit. We believe, for instance, that the President should, in his NAC intervention at the Summit, welcome Gorbachev's acceptance of NATO numerical levels on Tanks and Armored Troop Carriers. We also believe there is a good prospect, if Allies can be sounded out in time to ensure agreement, for accepting some kind of limit on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, even though not Gorbachev's limits. This would be seen -- and welcomed in many quarters -- as a major Western concession. We would then be in a position to say that NATO and the WP have agreed in principle to the types of weapons and equipment to be limited in a Phase I agreement. At the same time, we see serious costs to proposing bilateral US-Soviet reductions.

Area One: Agreeing to Reductions of Tanks, Artillery, and ATCs

The virtue of doing this dramatically at the Summit is that it seizes the initiative and gives us the opportunity to "assume" Western counting rules for these categories of equipment and force the Soviets into reductions that correspond to our analysis.

Area Two: Accepting some limit - not Gorbachev's - on other categories such as helicopters and aircraft

There may be a problem with the Allies on this part, especially the French. If we are going to try to expand the negotiation to these new categories - which would certainly be a substantive initiative for the Summit - we can't do it without French agreement to include French aircraft. The President might want to raise this point with Mitterrand in Kennebunkport, which would be an opportunity to sound him out on French attitudes toward the principle of such reductions.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1589-MR
12/29/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

Area Three: Bilateral US and Soviet Reductions

You have already heard our views about the serious risks and potential damage of bilateral US-Soviet reductions, both in terms of the substantive security risks and the undermining of Allied solidarity and consensus.

Nevertheless, if we propose to wrap bilateral reductions somehow into the CFE, we absolutely would need to ensure a priori Allied agreement to our proposal before we put it forward to Moscow or in a multilateral forum.

Final Observations

We like the emphasis on CFE in this proposal. If we do it right, it may seize the initiative from Gorbachev, will appeal to the moderate and left-wing elements in Europe as showing that we are not afraid to make concessions to the Soviets in order to create progress, and could relieve some of the pressure on SNF between the US and the FRG. All of these benefits could be managed without getting into the bilateral reductions category.

We have not been able to scrub the numbers in the paper, which will have to be done before we go much further (for instance, the manpower numbers in the non-paper are a million higher for Soviets than the interagency agreed estimates). This will need to be done soon if we are going to proceed in this way.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Chiron

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 8, 1989

4048

4372

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: State Draft Testimony on Removal of Chemical
Weapons from West Germany

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Ronald Peterson concurring,
with comments, on the draft testimony (Tab A).

Concurrences by: Robert Blackwill, Bret Coulson, *BC*
Donald Manley, *DM* Nicholas Rostow

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Peterson at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Peterson

Tab A Draft Testimony

Tab II Incoming from Peterson

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4048

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: State Draft Testimony on Removal of Chemical
Weapons from West Germany

The NSC staff concurs with the draft testimony, with one proposed change on page five of the State draft. The NSC staff also suggests that State double-check the summary (page 4, top paragraph) of Secretary Baker's March 6 challenge to the Soviet Union to insure the wording comports with what was actually said.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Testimony

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and its Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence:

These hearings come at a time of dramatic movement in the field of arms control. We have witnessed, and we have been the catalyst for momentous events, which will affect world peace and the security of this country for years and decades to come. A key element in that unfolding situation is President Bush's initiative at the NATO Summit on conventional arms control in Europe.

We have all been gratified, I believe, by the response to the President's initiative. It is important in charting new ground for conventional arms control -- but important as well because it dramatized a fact which had become obscured. I mean the leadership role the West has played in establishing the political and philosophical framework for security relations in Europe. The facts are incontestable. The present negotiations on conventional force reductions, and the negotiations on confidence building measures, are based on our proposals, and our agenda. Our insistence on asymmetrical reductions to eliminate Soviet superiority in key weapons systems, for example, has been accepted by the East and is now the keystone to those talks. Our insistence that the negotiations cover all of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals is another illustration of how the West has set the groundrules -- as is our long support for greater transparency in the negotiations on confidence and security building measures.

I raise these examples now to make a point. Although we have clearly set the pace for arms control negotiations with the Soviets, this fact has not always been clear to our publics. Indeed, we have repeatedly seen examples of Soviet acquiescence to a Western position being portrayed as a new Soviet initiative. There are many examples, but perhaps the most glaring is the credit the Soviets derived from General Secretary Gorbachev's acceptance of President Reagan's double global zero position in the INF negotiations.

The same has been true in the area of chemical weapons. As members of the Committee are aware, it was the United States, in the person of then-Vice President Bush, that tabled at the Conference on Disarmament in 1984 a proposal for the total elimination of chemical weapons world-wide. It was the United States which established the requirement for on-site, on-demand verification as a key -- and now universally accepted -- element in achieving such a treaty. Moreover, it was the United States which unilaterally suspended production of chemical weapons in 1969 -- only to see Soviet production continue, creating a huge arsenal facing our forces and our allies in Western Europe. It was the United States which instigated the Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons use which has done so much to focus world attention on this pressing issue -- and, we believe, to reinforce the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva protocol.

Still, in spite of our leadership on the chemical weapons issue, it was clearly the case earlier this year that our policy was either unknown or discounted by publics in Europe and in the United States. Therefore, we have taken and will continue to take steps which we hope will accomplish a number of objectives. The most important of these is to push on in Geneva for the achievement of a global, effectively verifiable ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. Another is to continue our efforts to halt proliferation of chemical weapons. As the Committee is aware, we are currently working with Congressional staffs to develop legislation giving the President appropriate sanctions authority for use to help stem such proliferation. Since publicity and credibility are so crucial to these efforts, we have also taken steps to dramatize our efforts, so that publics will understand both the opportunities and difficulties of chemical weapons arms control. And, finally, we have sought to bring pressure to bear wherever we can on the Soviets to begin dismantling the huge CW arsenal which they now possess.

The President's pledge to seek ways to accelerate the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the Federal Republic of Germany should be seen in this context. As the Committee is aware, there was an existing political commitment to withdraw those weapons by the end of 1992. This was in response to the concerns of our German ally. It was a commitment which underscored our desire to find a way out of the CW morass. But it was not widely known, and certainly it had resulted in no public pressure on the Soviets to make a corresponding move.

Accordingly, the President determined -- after consultation with allies, and in particular with the German Government -- to announce our intention to explore ways and means of accelerating CW withdrawal. In announcing this decision in his speech at Vienna Meeting of Foreign Ministers on March 6, Secretary Baker did not specify a date because, frankly, we were uncertain how soon the problems of transportation and storage of these weapons could be resolved. My colleagues can explain those problems in greater detail. But the Secretary did implement the other element of the Presidential decision by challenging the Soviet Union to respond to our announcement by beginning the removal of their vast CW stockpile facing Western Europe.

We intend to keep up the pressure on the Soviets to destroy their CW stocks, and to continue our efforts to achieve a global CW ban. President Bush has repeatedly emphasized his personal commitment, and that of his Administration, to the elimination of chemical warfare and chemical weapons. Most recently, at the NATO Summit in May, he stated that "the Alliance should support efforts to move ahead toward an effectively-verifiable global chemical weapons ban. We must achieve a global chemical weapons ban as quickly as possible." These are not idle statements. The Administration has undertaken to demonstrate in a tangible way our commitment to the President's goal. The removal of the chemical weapons stocks from the Federal Republic, together with the ultimate destruction of our unitary stocks, as mandated by the Congress, are a clear demonstration and dramatization of the sincerity of our intentions and our dedication to the President's objectives.

- 3 -

I noted earlier the movement for greater progress in conventional arms control in Europe. President Bush led the way; we've taken the high ground. Our pursuit of chemical weapons reductions in Europe is a part of this movement. It shows not only our leadership in this area, but our commitment to retaining -- some would say, regaining -- the moral highground on chemical weapons as well. The point is that we are leading the way and we are calling on the Soviets to match us with positive actions. We are already politically committed to the elimination of our chemical stocks in Germany; we have everything to gain in accelerating the process now. In fact, the positive effect of such serves our foreign policy and national security interests in other areas of arms control policy as well. Progress in one area promotes progress across the board. In this period of lessening tensions, the ~~retrograde operation~~ will foster a more stable East-West relationship in Europe in general, and contribute towards progress on our ultimate goal, the negotiation of a total ban on chemical weapons.

And now I would be happy to answer your questions.

elimination of these stocks



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

June 6, 1989

124192
4372
URGENT

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

National Security Council (Hughes 456-2224)	49
Department of Commerce (Levitt 377-3151)	04
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Starr 647-8478)	34
Department of Defense (Brick 697-1305)	06


SUBJECT: State draft testimony on removal of chemical weapons
from West Germany.

NOTE: If we have not heard from you by the deadline, we will
presume your agency has no comment.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship
to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular
A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
4:00 P.M., WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1989.

Questions should be referred to Annette Rooney/Sue Thau
(395-7300), the legislative analyst in this office.


RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosure

cc: J. Ashford
S Dotson

URGENT

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20a. Action memo	Robert L. Hutchings to Robert M. Gates RE: Message to Diplomatic Posts on Beyond Containment (1 pp.)	6/8/89	(b)(2)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Chron

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

June 8, 1989

4363

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Message to Diplomatic Posts on Beyond Containment

At Tab I is a memorandum from Philip Hughes to State Executive Secretariat attaching a talking points (Tab A) for U.S. diplomatic posts on "beyond containment." They will facilitate our ability to project and explain the concept, and will help maintain the momentum of the President's initiatives.

We propose that the talking points be included in a State cable for all diplomatic posts.

Concurrence by: Arnold *AK* Kanter

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Philip Hughes to forward the talking points to State for handling [REDACTED]. (b)(2)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum from Philip Hughes
Tab A Talking Points on "Beyond Containment"

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
20b. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy RE: Talking Points on "Beyond Containment" (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(2)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: June 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 6/7/2011	OA/ID Number: 30545
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4363

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Talking Points on "Beyond Containment"

Attached are talking points explaining and elaborating on the President's vision of "beyond containment," a theme he has developed in numerous public statements beginning with his commencement address at Texas A&M University. They should be incorporated in a message for dissemination to all diplomatic posts for handling [REDACTED] (b)(2)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points on "Beyond Containment"

D R A F T M E S S A G E

1. Following are talking points for mission use in explaining the President's vision of "beyond containment," a theme he has developed in numerous public statements beginning with the May 12 address at Texas A&M. They should be used to project and elaborate on the concept, as a key element of the U.S. global agenda.

2. Talking Points on Beyond Containment

What does this mean?

--Our policy of seeking to move beyond containment to the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations is a positive reaction to reform in the Soviet Union and to signs of new international behavior by Moscow.

--The elements of the policy are: recognition that containment has worked and that change is coming to the Soviet Union; a vision of a fundamentally different relationship with Moscow that supports enduring not cyclical

cooperation; a clear-eyed understanding that such a relationship must be built step by step and from a position of Western strength.

--We want to integrate the Soviet Union into the international system, and hope that the USSR will use its power and potential to solve international problems instead of to exploit them.

--Our policy of moving beyond containment includes the goal of overcoming the division of Europe, working for a Europe that is whole and free, united as part of the commonwealth of free nations.

--In this new, more cooperative framework, we anticipate greater common efforts to address global political issues, such as the environment, terrorism, and the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons.

How does it differ from other U.S. policies? Has not the United States always wanted to move beyond containment?

--The most important difference is that we live in a time of historic change.

--The Soviet leadership has admitted that it must end the isolation of the Soviet Union, politically and economically, from the international system. We think that they see that the "communist alternative" has failed.

--There have been two grand strategies in our postwar policy toward the Soviet Union-- containment and detente.

--Containment focused on holding the military and ideological threat of Soviet communism in check long enough to permit the world's long-standing and new democracies to be rebuilt after two destructive world wars.

--Detente was premised on perpetual conflict between two competing world systems.

--The goal was to manage the competition with elaborate rules of the game. It was implicitly accepted that nothing could be done about the root causes of the conflict.

--In analyzing why cooperation did not endure, a central obstacle was Soviet inability or unwillingness to make fundamental changes in the size and composition of their military forces, in their alliance and client relationships or in their domestic institutions.

--Reversals of behavior back to patterns of confrontation and hostility were relatively easy.

--This time we need to build the new relationship on a firm foundation.

--This is not a utopian vision. We would still have differences with Moscow, but the Soviet Union would be committed to solving international problems, not creating them.

What are you asking Moscow to do?

--We should start by discussing the spirit of the "conditions" that the President set out in the Texas A&M speech. They are not "tests" that a school teacher lays out for a student.

--The Soviet Union is a great power that we treat with respect.

--These conditions are the foundation on which the Soviet Union's relationship to us and to the international system would rest.

--We do not expect the conditions to be met tomorrow; nor do we need to wait until they are met to begin progress toward that new relationship.

--But we need to see the process of reform continue and see a track record of Soviet international behavior consistent with the principles of constructive cooperation.

--The Soviet Union does not have to become a Western democracy for us to build this new relationship.

--But respect for the rule of law and human rights, greater openness and a more market-oriented economy are critical to our calculations of the kind of partner Moscow can be.

--The Soviets must respect the rights of East Europeans to pursue fundamental political and economic reform.

--The Soviet Union has to behave as a responsible force for international stability--not as an outsider trying to undermine the system.

--For instance, the new relationship in regional affairs would require Moscow to concentrate on contributing to the solution of regional conflicts and global problems and to insist that its friends do the same.

--The Soviets have continually chosen friends that were explicitly anti-Western and forces for international instability: Look at Libya, Vietnam, Nicaragua.

--This is why we consider the cut-off of arms to countries like Nicaragua and pressure on the Sandinistas to respect Esquipulas so important.

--In the military arena, the Soviets would have to be willing to reduce their military forces and make them less threatening to the West.

--Soviet military power is far in excess of that needed to defend the Soviet Union.

--This is why we attach importance to President Gorbachev's acceptance of the principle of asymmetric reductions by the Warsaw Pact.

How will economic relations develop?

--The Soviets need to create domestic conditions that will attract private investment and commerce.

--Over time, as we build a more cooperative relationship, we would expect economic relations to grow as well.

--We will protect our security by strict adherence to COCOM restrictions.

--It is far too early to talk about Soviet membership in the GATT or the IMF. Soviet internal practices are incompatible with the goals of those institutions.

Why are you cautious?

--A new relationship takes time to build and has to be earned, not declared, by Moscow or by anyone else.

--Soviet cooperation with the West has been cyclical. The Soviets cooperated when it served them well only to turn back, when they were stronger, to a policy based on confrontation.

--We are in a period of transition.

--We need to remain strong, and preserve a credible and effective nuclear deterrent force, including in Europe, to defend ourselves and our allies, and serve as a hedge against the uncertainties of this period.

--Our strength will also impress upon Soviet leaders the futility of turning back to their former, militaristic course.

What is the United States willing to do?

--We have said that Moscow will find a willing partner in the United States and we mean that.

--Much of the work has to be done by Moscow. This new relationship must be built on Western values of openness and respect for political and economic freedom.

--The Soviet leadership is beginning to espouse these values because it can see the benefits that we have enjoyed.

--But we are willing to do our part.

--Some progress can be achieved in tough negotiations--for instance in arms control.

--Constructive Soviet actions will be matched, step by step, with actions of our own.

--For example, after concluding that the Warsaw Pact had moved significantly toward the West's concept and framework in the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), the President responded with a comprehensive, far-reaching conventional arms control proposal designed to bring the Vienna negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion. If accepted, the President's proposal would transform the post-war military map of Europe.

--We can also make progress by lifting U.S. restrictions on our economic relationship with the Soviet Union when the Soviets meet certain conditions.

--Jackson-Vanik can be waived when emigration laws in the Soviet Union are codified and implemented faithfully.

--We are lifting the "no exceptions policy" that was a sanction for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

--Sometimes progress can be made by initiatives that challenge Moscow to cooperate and to show that we have the same vision of the relationship we want to build.

-- Thus, "Open Skies" is intended to demonstrate our commitment to openness. The Soviets should also agree to publish accurate military budgets.

Conclusion

--Our policy of seeking to move beyond containment is part of our broader determination to help shape the dramatic changes that are transforming East-West relations.

--We have welcomed a stronger and more united Europe, which we believe means a stronger America, and have called for closer cooperation with the European Community on global issues.

--We have put forward concrete initiatives for encouraging peaceful reform in Eastern Europe and for helping end the division of Europe.

--As the President said in his speech in Mainz, West Germany, on May 31, the Cold War began with the division of Europe and it must end with a reconciliation based on shared values where East joins West in a commonwealth of free nations.