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Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30544
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Folder Title:
May 1989 [10]

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SECRET

Blackwill

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5/9/89
0840 3436

SECRET

May 9, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *PB*

SUBJECT: Your May 9 Meeting with the President on Speeches
Related to His Trip to Europe

Brant --

We are incorporating your latest comments on the Texas A&M speech (TSI) into a new draft. However, you worked from a Demarest draft that describes "Open Skies" in one sentence and makes it a US-Soviet (not NATO/WP) initiative. That would be a problem with the Allies.

Rob Blackwill

Here is a summary of the major public pronouncements which the President will make associated with his upcoming trip to Europe. First, attached at Tab I, is the current draft of the speech on US-Soviet relations, to be delivered this Friday, May 12, at Texas A&M. Arnie Kanter says Secretary Baker is willing to proceed with the 'Open Skies' initiative but would want to raise it with Gorbachev in Moscow on ~~Wednesday~~ ^{Thursday}. General Herres says that he does not believe the Chiefs will object to going forward with this idea. If Secretary Cheney and Director Webster also agree, we would then have to coordinate our action urgently with other agencies, Congress, and our Allies. (At Tab II we have attached a memo from Lint Brooks outlining how to implement the Open Skies initiative if we decide to proceed.)

If we go ahead with the Jackson-Vanik waiver we would need to tell the Congress and interested domestic groups, also before Friday. In any event, the President should send a letter to his allied counterparts forecasting his approach to US-Soviet relations before he announces it in his speech.

The Rodman/Blackwill draft of the Boston University (May 21) speech on West-West relations is attached at Tab III. In addition to the new policy ideas contained therein, there are two other initiatives we could deploy. First, a proposal for US-West European cooperation in helping Eastern Europe and the USSR combat environmental pollution, which would include exchanges of needed experts, experience, and technology. This proposal has already been worked through the interagency process and has been cleared by EPA Administrator Reilly. It could be coordinated through the existing Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) in which we are a member. Second, the President could also announce our decision announcing an end to the 'no exceptions' policy at COCOM.

At Tab IV we have attached an outline for a speech on national security strategy to be delivered at the Coast Guard Academy on

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Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2003-0368-F12
ES 8/12/09

*Deane Hoffman
worries that
we could not
consult properly
on J-V by
Friday. Condi
says Baker wants to
go ahead, and
include the
Skinner
amendment.
PB*

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

May 24. If we are ready, we could include some sort of de-MIRVing initiative here.

A Rodman outline for the Mainz speech and an independently prepared State draft text are both attached at Tab V. This speech could include a renewal of Reagan's 1987 proposal on Berlin as well as a Presidential initiative to change NATO training practices to reduce the impact of large-scale exercises (the NSC has already supervised development of this idea through the interagency process).

The President's classified intervention at the NATO Summit should be handled separately with State and Defense.

Linton Brooks^{LB} concurs.

Attachments

Tab I	Current Draft of US-Soviet Speech for 5/12
Tab II	Brooks memo on Open Skies implementation
Tab III	Current Draft of West-West Speech for 5/21
Tab IV	Outline of National Security Strategy Speech for 5/24
Tab V	Rodman outline & State Draft of Mainz Speech for 5/31

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

89 MAY 8 P 6: 46

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3437

ACTION OFFICER: RICE

DUE: 9 May 12 p.m.

☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates

☐ Appropriate Action

☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi

☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

☐ Prepare Memo Scowcroft

to Winston w/ cc to Cicconi

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3912

FYI

☐ Basora
☐ Beers
☐ Blackwill
☐ Brooks
☐ Cabelly
☐ Charles
☐ Coulson
☐ Deal
☒ Donley
☐ Dyke
☐ Ebner
☐ Grant
☐ Haass
☐ Hoffmann
☐ Hutchings
☐ Jackson
☐ LaMagna
☐ Kanter

FYI

☐ Lampley
☐ Leach
☐ Lewis
☐ Lowenkron
☐ Mahley
☐ Mandel
☐ McCue
☐ Melby
☐ Menan
☐ Miller
☐ Miskel
☐ Needels
☐ Paal
☐ Pacelli
☐ Pastorino
☐ Popadiuk
☐ Porter
☐ Rademaker

FYI

☐ Reiss
☐ Rice
☒ Rodman
☐ Rostow
☐ Salvetti
☐ Snider
☐ Tahir-Kheli
☐ Tobey
☐ Welch
☐ Working
☐ Zelikow
☐ _____
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☐ _____
☐ _____
☐ _____
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☐ _____

INFORMATION

☒ Hughes
☒ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Gates (advance)
☒ Secretariat

☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
☐ _____

COMMENTS

Logged By JFC

Return to Secretariat

CLOSE HOLD

Document No.

034353SS

3437

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 5/8/89 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 5/9/89 2:00 PM

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: TEXAS A&M COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MCCLURE	☒	☐
SUNUNU	☒	☐	NEWMAN	☐	☐
SCOWCROFT	☒	☐	PORTER	☐	☐
DARMAN	☐	☐	STUDDERT	☐	☐
BATES	☐	☐	UNTERMAYER	☐	☐
BREEDEN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
CARD	☒	☐	_____	☐	☐
CICCONI	☐	☒	_____	☐	☐
DEMAREST	☐	☒	_____	☐	☐
FITZWATER	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
GRAY	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐
HAGIN	☐	☐	_____	☐	☐

REMARKS: Please forward any comments directly to Chriss Winston, Rm. 122, x2930, no later than 2:00 PM, Tuesday, May 9, 1989, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

CLOSE HOLD

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702

*Gen. Snowcraft's
Comments.*

Davis/Martin/Rice
Title: Aggie2
May 7, 1989
Version: Four

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: TEXAS A&M COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS
FRIDAY, MAY 12, 1989/2 p.m.

Thank you. I am delighted to be back in College Station, among my fellow Texans and friends. ((And for those of you who are Democrats, there is no truth to the rumor that Phil Gramm and I are ready to take our Elephant Walk.))

My sincerest congratulations go to every graduate, and to your parents. In this ceremony, we celebrate nothing less than the commencement of the rest, and the best, of your life . . .

I remember when I graduated, in 1948, thrilled to be striking out on my own, driving my red Studebaker across the prairie roads. I didn't know exactly what I was looking for in Texas. But I did know one thing -- whatever I would do, whatever I would become, destiny was in my hands. Your dreams, your destiny, are now in your hands.

But dreams are hard won, and no generation can escape history. I came of age in mid-century, when America helped to win a war and rebuild the world. I, along with your parents and grandparents, witnessed the drama of a world torn by war, then

divided by Soviet subversion and force, but sustained by an Allied response most vividly seen in the Berlin Airlift. Wise men . . . Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Rayburn . . . Marshall, Acheson and Kennan, crafted the strategy of containment. They believed that the Soviet Union, denied the easy course of external expansion, would ultimately have to face up to the contradictions of its inefficient, repressive and inhumane system. And they were right.

The strategy of containment arose out of the ruins of a shattered continent, as the possibility of postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union disappeared. It was validated by the stark recognition of the threat posed by a totalitarian and expansionist state with dominant military power.

Today, we are entering a new age because containment worked. It has been no mere propaganda victory. It worked because our democratic principles, values and institutions are sound. It worked because our alliances are united; and because the superiority of free peoples and free markets over stagnant socialism is a truth that can no longer be credibly denied.

We approach the conclusion of a historic postwar struggle between two visions -- one of conflict and ideological conquest, and one of an international order composed of free and prosperous states. The wise policies of the past enable us to stand at the

*international
order world
family of
nations*

threshold of winning this struggle. The review of U.S.-Soviet relations that we have just completed shows that we can now embark on an agenda more ambitious than any of my predecessors might have ever dreamed in the dark days of the Berlin Blockade, and the Soviet invasions of Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan. Forty years of perseverance has brought us a

precious opportunity. We can now ^(contemplate moving) move beyond containment to ^{a more hopeful goal of integrating the Soviet Union} [an era of critical reconciliation] ^{into the family of nations} as a productive rather than a destructive element.

^{is now saying} The Soviet Union ~~has said~~ it seeks rapprochement with the international order, and has criticized its own postwar policies. These are words we can only applaud. But a new relationship can not be simply declared by Moscow, or bestowed by others. It must be **earned** through the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy and reinforced by behavior consistent with the principles of the U.N. charter, ^{by the Soviets} to which the Soviets subscribed in 1945, and ~~have~~ repeatedly violated ^{in the decades since}.

^{On previous occasions} ~~Many times before~~, the Soviet Union has signaled a desire for a more cooperative relationship, only to reverse course and return to militarism ⁱⁿ the 1920s, the fifties and the seventies.

We hope perestroika is ^{pointing} leading the Soviet Union to a ^{definitive} break with the practices of the past -- an enduring break. Who would ^{previously} have thought we would see the ~~internal~~ deliberations of the Central Committee on the front page of Pravda, or ^{dissident} Andrei Sakharov

seated near the councils of power? These are hopeful signs, and let no one doubt our sincere desire to see perestroika succeed. But our national security is not predicated on hope. It must be based on deeds. Therefore, we seek nothing less than the ^{permanent} ~~fundamental~~ restructuring of Soviet behavior, institutions and military forces.

If we ^{seek to} ~~are moving~~ beyond containment, we are ^{now} ~~only~~ at the beginning of the path toward the reconciliation of the Soviet Union with the international system. Many dangers and uncertainties lie ahead. We must not forget that the Soviet Union has been acquiring awesome military capabilities which support a foreign policy hostile to the West. That was a fact of life for my predecessors. And that is a fact of life for me.

As we seek peace, we must remain strong. ~~in a perilous world.~~ We will not abandon ^{the practice} ~~a philosophy~~ of peace through strength. The purpose of our military might is not to ~~put~~ pressure ~~on~~ a weak Soviet economy, or to seek military superiority. It is to defend ourselves, ~~and to do something more~~ -- to convince the Soviet Union that there can be no reward in pursuing expansionism . . . and in fact, quite the contrary.

Western policies must be designed to encourage the evolution of the Soviet Union from a source of instability to a productive member of the family of nations. This task will require of us ^{strength}

patience, creativity and vision . . . vision to see what kind of world we could create, for you and your loved ones. I see a Europe, long divided and scarred by two world wars, at last healed -- where Eastern Europe, prosperous and free, is reconciled with its Western neighbors. I see a Soviet Union that abandons terrorist nations -- like Libya -- that threaten the legitimate security of their neighbors; a Soviet Union that joins with those ^{who} ~~that~~ seek to live in peace. I see the great nations of Asia living in harmony -- when the Soviet Union has returned the Northern Territories of Japan, to undo an historic wrong.

In short, I see a world in which the Soviet Union is finally integrated as a productive member of the international community of states. But to fulfill this vision, the Soviet Union must follow a clear path, including:

*** Reduction of Soviet forces to smaller and less threatening levels, until they are in proportion to their legitimate security needs.

*** Renunciation of the principle that class conflict is an inevitable source of international tension.

*** Adherence to the Soviet obligation -- promised in the final days of World War Two -- to permit self-determination for the nations of East-Central Europe.

*** An authoritative renunciation of the long-standing policy known as "The Brezhnev Doctrine," the excuse by which the Soviets have ~~enforced their system on states struggling to~~ *free themselves from its stifling embrace.* ~~toppled governments, and cast a chilling shadow over Eastern Europe.~~

*** Joining the West in sincerely and objectively ~~seeking~~ *efforts to* ~~settlements of~~ regional disputes around the world. The Soviet Union should cease to undermine regional stability and join us in positive steps toward diplomatic solutions. A good first step would be an end to the Soviet and Cuban arms transfers that have militarized Central America.

*** Institutionalization of political pluralism and respect for human rights. Ultimately, our hopes for a more cooperative and sustainable relationship rests *on* democratization of the Soviet Union itself.

*** Reducing threats to the security of every nation from the spread of ballistic-missile technology; nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; and terrorism.

*** Acceptance with the United States and the world community responsibility for addressing pressing global problems, including the international drug menace, and dangers to the environment.

As the Soviet Union creates the conditions for reconciliation, they will find willing partners in the West. ^{we} Let ~~me tell you how we will respond.~~ ^{are waiting to reach out a hand in response.}

^{we} ~~The United States~~ ^{and stabilizing} seeks verifiable arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union and its allies. ~~We seek agreements that increase stability while reducing numerical levels of weapons.~~ But arms control is not an end in itself. ^{we} ~~This government seeks~~ ^{measures which are} arms-control proposals that are consistent with our overall defense strategy.

To this end, I directed Secretary Baker to propose to the Soviets that we resume negotiations on strategic forces and nuclear testing in June. I am pleased to announce that the Soviets have agreed. Strategic arms negotiations will resume in Geneva the week of June, 19; nuclear testing negotiations the following week.

Our basic approach is clear. In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, ^{with} we ~~will seek~~ to reduce the risk of nuclear war. In the companion Defense and Space Talks, our objective will be to preserve our options to deploy advanced defenses should they prove feasible. In nuclear testing we will continue to seek the necessary verification improvements in existing treaties ^{to permit} ~~so that~~ ^{them to} ~~they can~~ be brought into force. We will continue to seek a ^{verifiable}

global ban on chemical weapons, ~~which must be effectively~~
~~verified.~~ We ~~must~~ support NATO efforts to reduce the Soviet
~~offensive~~ ~~armor~~ threat ~~to~~ in the negotiations on Conventional Forces in
 Europe.

~~Critical reconciliation . . . these words will provide the~~
~~tenor of our negotiations.~~ We will not seek agreements for the
 sake of agreements. We will not compromise our basic principles.
 But if the Soviets take a ~~similar~~ ^{constructive} approach, we can move together
 to a safer, more stable world.

((Simple openness must be an essential principle of this
 transforming relationship. It has always been the guiding
 principle of the democracies, and we are pleased that the Soviet
 Union now says it seeks a new era of openness.

^{Let us}
 ((~~We can~~ institutionalize our dedication to openness. ~~Why~~
~~ask for half-measures?~~ Let ~~all~~ the barriers come down. Open the
 skies, open the borders, open the airwaves . . . Let openness
 come to mean the publication and sale of Western books and
 newspapers in the Soviet Union. Let it come to mean nothing less
 than the free exchange of people, books and ideas between East
 and West. And let it come to mean one thing more . . .

((Let us allow unarmed aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to conduct frequent reconnaissance flights over the territory of the other country.))

If the Soviet Union joins us in a more cooperative relationship, then our economic ties will surely broaden. American investment and commerce will grow if the Soviets create a domestic environment more congenial to free enterprise.

Until now, economic relations have been ^{stifled} ~~hindered~~ by Soviet internal policies. They have also been injured by Moscow's practice of using the cloak of commerce to steal technology from the West. Ending discriminatory treatment of U.S. firms would be a helpful step. Trade and financial transactions ^{should} ~~must~~ take place on a normal commercial basis, without subsidies. ^{should} ((And ~~if~~ the Soviet Union codifies ^{its} ~~ies~~ emigration laws in accord with international standards, implements ^{its} new laws faithfully, and increases ^{the} ~~levels~~ of emigration, I am prepared to work with Congress ~~and the American people~~ on a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, ^{this giving} ~~which would give~~ the Soviet Union access to Most Favored Nation status.))

We are at the beginning of ^{a new} ~~our~~ ^{-- a journey} journey toward a better world. The day must come when Europe is united, when Europeans can drive from Moscow to the Normandy coast without seeing a single guard tower, or a single strand of barbed wire. The day

must come when the voices of all Europeans can be heard in free elections. The day must come throughout the world when the first instinct is to settle regional disputes by ^{discussion}~~mediation~~, not by violence.

Many quote Winston Churchill, ~~on the Soviet Union~~, who called ~~the Soviet Union~~ ^{it} "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." As perestroika and glasnost progress, we hope that these words will come to describe ^{only the} ~~a~~ Soviet Union ^{the} ~~of a distant~~ past. But much depends on the Soviet Union and its willingness to engage our challenge. This is ^{the} ~~a good~~ time to remember the rest of what Churchill said. "The key" to the Soviet Union, said Churchill, is its "national interest." We hope to convince the leadership of the Soviet Union that it is in their national interest to reconcile their system to the international community.

I recognize the extraordinarily ambitious character of ^{our} ~~the~~ ^{new objective} ~~critical reconciliation~~. ^{Our} ~~Today's~~ challenge is unique. We must retain the strength ^{and determination} that has kept the world at peace for a near half-century. But we must also be bold and imaginative. We must balance risk and opportunity, discretion and valor. To succeed, we only need the unity of the American people, a renewed bipartisan spirit and close cooperation between allies -- in short, the courage and goodwill of free peoples.

Forty-three years ago, a young Lieutenant by the name of Albert Kotzebue, a Texas A&M graduate, was the first American soldier to shake hands with the Soviets at the banks of the Elbe River. Once again, it is a time for peace. Once again, we extend our hand across the Elbe. We do this for you.

I am a man of this century. But the next century is yours, another American century in which you and your children can know a better world. Thank you for inviting me to Texas A&M, and I wish you the very best in the years to come.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 8, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB

FROM: LINTON BROOKS

SUBJECT: Open Skies

I understand from Bob Blackwill that, if Baker concurs, you are disposed to have the President announce an Open Skies initiative at his Friday Texas A&M speech. Bob asked me to outline for you a summary of the minimum actions which should be completed before such a speech. **Although Bob Blackwill is confident that we can get everything done by Friday, I have some reservations, which I believe Arnie Kanter shares, that we can be ready for an announcement this week.** In any event, to make this work we need a tentative Presidential decision by mid-day Tuesday. This memorandum is based on the assumption you have decided to go ahead and sets forth suggestions on how to do it.

Get the senior leadership on board.

We understand Bob Gates is discussing the issue with Secretary Baker. In addition, you should discuss it personally with:

- Secretary Cheney. Cheney (per his EA) assumes that we are engaged in a several week study effort and has not focused on this as a subject for near term decision.
- Admiral Crowe. Per his EA, Crowe's endorsement may be based on the assumption that the initiative would apply in the Atlantic to the Urals region only. Bob Herres, however, subsequently told Blackwill that he thought JCS would have no problem with applying the policy to the United States.
- Judge Webster. The Judge wants to be helpful and probably has no problem, but he needs to be consulted.
- Director Sessions (FBI)/Admiral Studeman (NSA). Thus far we have not dealt with the counter-intelligence aspects. That can't be done before Friday; it depends on decisions not yet made (e.g. will inspection aircraft be based in the opposite country or simply refueled). But you need to ask if these two see any insurmountable obstacles before the speech.

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I recommend you make these calls as soon as possible. The Department of Transportation (FAA) will also be involved, but they can be told after the fact.

Get the Congress on board.

We should call not later than the night before the speech and inform:

- House and Senate Leadership
- Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of House and Senate Armed Services, Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs, House and Senate Intelligence Committees

An alternative would be to use Thursday's bipartisan leadership meeting to float the idea, if the President has made a tentative decision by then. You still will need to call those Chairmen/Ranking Members not involved.

Get the Allies on board.

This seems to us to be the hardest. State is working on cables but may not realize the time frame. Since we are speaking of overflights of allied territory, we must consult in advance. We suggest you direct State to send a cable from Eagleburger to all NATO posts Tuesday afternoon, directing immediate consultations Wednesday and a reaction back Thursday. To do this you need (a) a tentative decision from the President by COB Tuesday and (b) a willingness to reverse that decision if we run into major allied objections.

In addition, you should ask Eagleburger to personally call the British and Canadian Foreign Ministers. (British because they are likely to have strong views; Canada as a courtesy since they have been pushing the idea.)

You will also need to ensure you are comfortable with the talking points for Secretary Baker to use at NATO. Since he is briefing the allies on Friday, he will have to describe the initiative. We suggest a back channel to Baker with the points he should make as soon as possible.

Finally, you should direct State to prepare cables to all posts (especially the Soviet bloc) outlining the initiative in greater detail than is in the President's speech. (For example, the cables should make clear that we will call for negotiations on this in which others may join, rather than seeking formal NATO endorsement of alliance to alliance discussions.) These cables should go before the speech so posts will be able to react once the speech is given. Necessarily so of the details will have to be left for later, but we should present the maximum detail we can.

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Telling the Soviets.

I spoke to Arnie tonight (Monday) in Helsinki. He informs me that if the President is going to make the announcement on Friday, Baker wishes to give the Soviets a heads up, probably in his Thursday meeting with Gorbachev. This increases the need to get a tentative agreement from the President on Tuesday so we can have allied feedback before Baker leaves the Soviet Union.

Getting the public story right.

We understand you will be backgrounding the story with the President's party. In addition, we will need a package of background materials, including a fact sheet and Qs and As for all cabinet agencies and NATO posts so the word from Washington, Texas and our embassies is consistent. NSC staff should work this, but the package needs to be distributed before the speech. It should also be sent out by State to all posts for background.

To get the maximum benefit from this, we'll need to follow up the speech with some additional backgrounding, beyond what you do in Texas, in order to lay out our thoughts for the press. Thus we need the greatest possible detail in the background material and a designated Washington spokesman to do additional backgrounding here.

Getting the internal story right.

I understand you do not plan to issue an NSD to document the initiative, but will rely on the speech and the press kit to make certain the bureaucracy knows what we are doing. I think that's a mistake. We are running into problems in Congressional testimony on ICBM modernization and SDI due to lack of any authoritative guidance on what the President decided; this will be far worse. I recommend you reconsider and direct the preparation of a formal record of the President's decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That, assuming you wish to announce the initiative, you proceed as above, giving priority to Cabinet-level and allied consultations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Don Mahley, Phil Zelikow, Judy Mandel and Ginny Lampley concur.

PREVIOUS DRAFT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 11, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN ~~mm~~ RB
ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Presidential Speech on Western Europe

Attached is a draft of a possible Presidential speech on Western Europe. We look forward to a chance to talk to you about its ideas and about the best time for its delivery.

While most speeches about NATO are yawners, this one may grab attention, particularly in Europe:

- It marks various steps away from recent U.S. policy, e.g., a ringing endorsement of nuclear deterrence and a pledge, in effect, to avoid repetitions of Reykjavik.
- It speaks positively of EC-1992 and a European "pillar," as a great boon to the West in a period of fluidity in the international system. (One purpose of this is to make the strategic case for not letting our economic agencies declare war on the EC at this point in history.)

There are some new wrinkles here and there, which are underlined, and which you should look over carefully.

~~mm~~  Arnie Kanter, Deane Hoffmann, and Nick Rostow concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached, and meet with us to discuss content and timing.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Proposed Western Europe speech

Western Europe Speech

When Harry Truman spoke at the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949, he explained its goal in his typical down-to-earth way:

"In this pact, we hope to create a shield against aggression and the fear of aggression -- a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all our citizens."

And what a success it's been! Behind the shield of our collective defense, Europe revived and the free nations prospered. Aggression was deterred; the world was made safer. Our adversaries now talk seriously of peace. Has any alliance in history ensured the freedom and prosperity of so many nations with such success, and for so long?

The Challenge

Throughout those four decades, there were those who warned of problems in the Alliance. The prophecies of doom were wrong. Yet, problems there have been -- and problems there are today. We do ourselves no favor by ignoring them. In the coming years, the Atlantic Alliance will be tested as never before:

- Many perceive the threat from our adversaries as diminishing, which diminishes the political will in our countries to maintain or modernize our defenses.
- America's pursuit of nuclear arms reduction with the Soviet Union has sometimes unnerved our allies, who -- while they are eager for arms reduction -- also fear the erosion of our nuclear guarantee and chafe at the dependency that leaves their destiny so much in the hands of others.
- As all our governments wrestle with economic challenges, there are tough disputes over trade and the equitable sharing of the common defense.

These challenges must be mastered. But if we master them, history offers us a unique chance to shape the future. For a new era of change is also testing our adversaries, and finding them wanting. Their system is in profound crisis:

- In Eastern Europe, a powerful yearning for self-determination is asserting itself, which will not be satisfied by mere easing of the grip of illegitimate regimes.

-- In the Soviet Union, we see an extraordinary experiment in reform, bringing many welcome changes. Whatever the future extent -- or durability -- of this experiment, it already amounts to a dramatic confession of failure.

Perhaps we will see, down the road, a real end to the cruel division of Europe imposed by Soviet power. Perhaps we will see, down the road, a real end to the Soviet military threat to the West. That is our vision -- a Europe of security and freedom for all, East and West.

Today, it's the democracies that are vibrant, as we advance full-steam-ahead into the Information Revolution of supercomputers and telecommunications, transforming the technological base of world prosperity. It's no accident that this new burst of innovation came from the creativity of the free nations. And democracy is spreading around the world. The cause of human rights can't be suppressed. Our principles of economic freedom are being vindicated everywhere -- even in Communist countries. And the connection between political freedom and economic progress -- that lesson, too, is finally appreciated as never before.

About nine years from now, the Communist Manifesto will be 150 years old. That document preached a new social and economic system, and promised that capitalism would end up on the trash

heap of history. Yet today, it is Marxism that is everywhere discredited...despised...discarded.

My Commitment

As the democracies enter a new era of testing and of hope, let me declare America's commitment to its allies:

- First, our major alliances in the Atlantic and the Pacific remain the cornerstones of our foreign policy. What was a bold innovation in 1949 is now a permanent fact, sustained by both moral principle and vital interest. This is a pledge backed by both American political parties, by the President and Congress united, and by our people.
- Second, America remains committed to the defense of Europe by whatever means may be necessary, in accordance with the agreed Alliance strategy. Our nuclear forces remain the ultimate deterrent of aggression -- and there is no substitute. That's why modernization is so important. The most basic asymmetry in the European balance is geography -- the inescapable preponderance of Soviet power. The American nuclear guarantee is the equally inescapable counterweight.
- Third, we remain equally committed to contribute to the conventional defense of Europe -- subject to our very real

hope to reach a more secure balance, at lower levels, through negotiations. I will strongly oppose legislative attempts to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe unilaterally. Moscow will still command a standing army of four and a half million men -- after the cutbacks announced by Mr. Gorbachev in December. We are prepared to maintain U.S. ground and air forces in Europe so long as a Soviet military threat to the continent exists.

-- Fourth, we will pursue better relations with our adversaries in every area, and on a broad agenda of arms reductions -- strategic nuclear, conventional, chemical. NATO's success over 40 years has brought us to an extraordinary moment of opportunity in East-West relations. We will seize that opportunity -- in constant consultation with our allies, sensitive to their vital interests and concerns. There will be no surprises for our allies on such important matters.

-- Fifth, the United States continues, as it has for the entire postwar period, to endorse and support European integration as one of the historic developments of our time. We welcome a larger European role in the world. We welcome the political role of the European Community, and we are eager, if the EC agrees, to develop and intensify the mechanisms of our consultation and cooperation on world issues.

The Threshold of the Next Century

I make these pledges because there is no doubt in my mind that America's goals for a new century of peace cannot be achieved except in partnership with our fellow democracies. If we have the wisdom to maintain the strength and unity that have brought us to this hopeful point, the future holds tremendous promise.

Look at Europe. Look at the breathtaking advance in European integration scheduled for 1992 -- a single European market.

European unity and NATO partnership are not in conflict; they reinforce each other. The founders of the Alliance in 1949 saw it as one of their principal aims to ensure a climate of security so that European integration -- which had already begun -- could proceed. European unification has meant the ending of hatreds, the fostering of democracy, the economic and social regeneration of a continent, and the strengthening of the West.

Nineteen-ninety-two will mean a new resurgence of the vast genius and potential of Europe. In today's new era of technology, it means Europe's opportunity to remain in the first rank. In an era of new hope for an end to Europe's divisions, resurgent Western Europe will be a magnet, drawing the economically and politically impoverished countries of Eastern Europe westward, toward our way of life. In today's new era of political change

sweeping across the continent, the strategic importance of what is happening on the Western side of the line cannot be overestimated.

There will be problems in Atlantic relations, but these problems are soluble. The United States and other nations will fight hard against protectionism and unfair barriers that deny access -- you can be sure of that. We want to see what President Kennedy used to call an "outward-looking" Europe, a European Community that uses its new strength to contribute to a global expansion of trade, not to constrict it. We need to create with our European friends specific new mechanisms to manage the transition to 1992 cooperatively. ✓

In the security dimension, the dividend can be just as great. European defense coordination can mark a new stage of Atlantic relations. In the coming new era, the West needs a stronger "European pillar," in the framework of the Alliance. We support the historic endeavors of defense cooperation between France and Germany. We support the British and French independent nuclear deterrents and their modernization, cooperation between those two countries, and their special role in European security; we will make no agreements with the Soviet Union that compromise those forces. We value the contribution of the Eurogroup in NATO's councils. We applaud the revitalized Western European Union and its landmark "Platform" of October 1987, which expressed Europe's

own identity and interests but in partnership with the United States. We welcomed the WEU's coordination of European efforts to help protect the Persian Gulf.

I do not fear European defense cooperation. Granted, part of its motivation is to be a little more independent of us. But Europeans should see defense as an enterprise they engage in for their own future, not as a favor to the United States. And our security interests are parallel, indeed indivisible; no advocate of this European coordination conceives of a plausible defense of Europe without the continuing partnership with the United States.

Such efforts, which can increase the effectiveness of Europe's role in Western defense, should also be taken account of in any measurement of how burdens are being shared.

Conclusion

Nineteen-ninety-two, of course, will be a notable date for another reason -- commemorating the discovery of the New World. We have five centuries to celebrate, not just four decades.

We all know Canning's words about the New World called into existence to redress the balance of the Old. Twice in this century, the New World came to the rescue of the civilization

that gave birth to us. And we Americans, with our great and growing cultural diversity, like to think that we have enriched that common heritage.

How fitting it is that Europe's own resurgence will mark the next advance of that civilization! The North Atlantic Treaty expressed the will of its members, and I quote: "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Those are values that Europe gave to all of us, and nurtured over its long history. The modern vitality of Europe -- its prosperity, its freedom, and its unity -- is the vindication and culmination of everything we cherish.

They are universal values -- whether expressed in the American Bill of Rights, or the French Rights of Man, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or in the power of the idea of democracy as we see today on every continent. America -- and the world -- owe a moral debt to Europe that is beyond measure.

Today's challenges to the West are without precedent. There are dangers -- most of all if we fail to stand together. But our success for 40 years points the way to the future.

Harry Truman, on that memorable occasion, put it this way:

"We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or another. In our own time we have seen brave men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmountable and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom -- war or peace. ... If there is anything certain today, if there is anything inevitable in the future, it is the will of the people of the world for freedom and for peace."

How right he was!

COAST GUARD ACADEMY SPEECH: MAY 24

Theme: Global change and global continuity

- Want to report to you today on the preliminary conclusions from the review of our global defense strategy.
- Reviewed all three elements of national power -- diplomatic, economic, and military.
- Reaffirmed the basic soundness of our strategy.
- That strategy seeks to promote freedom and encourage stability. It is based on voluntary alliances with sovereign nations, on freed trade, and on a shared commitment to democratic values.
- While all elements of national power are important, this aspect of global review focused on the military component of national security. First we considered the national security environment. We see three major changes.
 - The Soviet Union and its relationship with other European nations.
 - The changed position of the Soviet Union with respect to the Third World.
 - The growing rise of regional powers.
- Considering these changes, we focused our review on four areas:
 - How to deal with the Soviet Union in Europe
 - Burdensharing with our allies
 - **Forward** deployments and base rights
 - **Threats** in the Third World.
- Provide our initial conclusions in each area.
 - With respect to resource investment in the near term
 - With respect to technology opportunities in the mid term

- We have also completed our initial review of arms control and how it fits into our overall broad national security strategy.
- Our approach will be based on several principles:
 - First, our objective is to reduce the incentives, even in crisis, for either side to launch a first strike. Thus we seek not reductions per se, but agreements which will promote a more stable balance.
 - Second, to enhance stability, we will favor agreements which lead to greater predictability in the size, nature and evolution of Soviet forces.
 - Third, agreements can add to our security only if they are scrupulously complied with and if we can effectively verify that compliance.
 - Fourth, the security of the United States is indivisible from that of its friends and Allies; we will insist that any arms control agreements not compromise Allied security.
 - Finally, we will insist that equal rights and limits are essential in any agreement.
- This review has given us confidence that our basic approach is sound. But we must look beyond the past and look ahead to the year 2000. When we do, we see great opportunities.
- I see a world where political and economic liberty flourish; where pluralism is celebrated; where human rights are respected; and where the inexorable march to freedom and democracy is encouraged and sustained.
 - To encourage this world American diplomacy will always be on the side of liberty and human rights.
 - We will recognize the fundamental moral, political and security interests which bind us to those who share our values.
 - And we will seek to expand the family of nations which dwell in freedom.
- I see a world where the growing economic strength of other democracies is seen as a boon for America, not a threat. What enriches mankind enriches America.
 - Reference to free trade, U.S. strengthening global economy.
 - Initiative if appropriate.

- Finally, I see a world in which the risk of war is reduced, in which eras will be known to history by their accomplishments, not their conflicts.
- To secure this world, we must, of course, maintain the basic elements of our national security strategy: deterrence, arms control, strong alliances, forward deployments, the ability to project power, and effective command and control.
- But these aren't enough. Must also look to creative ways to enhance stability and reduce the risk of war.
- (Initiative if we have one ready)

MAINZ SPEECH

- Introductory section on U.S.-FRG bilateral partnership:
 - 40th anniversary of end of Berlin airlift; also of FRG Basic Law (Constitution).
 - U.S. was there with you, at rebirth of German democracy, creation of modern miracle (economic, political) of the German success story.
 - We're proud of this association.
 - FRG is a trustworthy ally, deserves credit for its contribution to freedom, etc.
 - We're sensitive to your concerns, will modify our exercises.
- U.S. will be with you, and with Alliance partners, as we enter era of change and pursue our vision of a new Europe:
 - Resurgent Western Europe (EC-1992): U.S. supports it as vindication of common values, strategic boon to West.
 - Transatlantic partnership has always been key to common success, will continue to be crucial even as balance adjusts between us.
- Atlantic partners can now pursue, as a long-cherished goal, an end to the division of Europe -- an end to the Cold War in the place where it began:
 - Historic opportunity now; U.S. ready and eager to engage.

- Marxism discredited; our system vindicated.
 - Ferment in Eastern Europe; signs of change in Soviet policy.
 - "Common European Home"? Not if you aren't free to move from room to room. Soviets say it must be grounded in "existing realities" -- but we say there can be no peace without self-determination. Helsinki accords as guideline.
 - West will engage politically and economically with USSR and Eastern Europe.
 - Tear down Berlin Wall; demolish the guardposts and tear down the barbed wire all across center of Europe.
 - Reagan Berlin initiative for lowering barriers between halves of the city: Allies made proposal; Soviets treated it with contempt, should now give us a serious response.
- Solidarity of the democracies has helped bring us to this hopeful point, is all the more needed as we move forward toward success.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH

Rheingoldhalle; Mainz, Germany
May 31, 1989

It is fitting that, on my first trip to Europe and to the Federal Republic of Germany as President, I visit Mainz, for this city in many ways represents the values which unite our countries.

In 1455, Johannes Gutenberg, a son of this city, revolutionized the world with the invention of moveable type. Gutenberg's achievement is a symbol of so much that lies at the heart of our Western community: the free expression of ideas; the right of the people to hear and to read those ideas; and the power of the printed word.

Five centuries later, another Rhinelander -- Konrad Adenauer -- shaped his homeland into one of the world's great democracies and one of its most successful free market economies. Through membership in NATO and the European Community, and German commitment to Western values, the state he helped found four decades ago has become a pillar of the Western community of democracies. And as the Federal Republic has grown

stronger, so too has the richness and maturity of the friendship between our countries, fostered by such statesmen as the late John J. McCloy.

As the Federal Republic celebrates its fortieth anniversary, I am reminded that we are friends and allies because we share a common heritage, a common culture, a set of common values. I want to talk about those values, and about the vision of the future they inspire. For the strength of our relationship rests not only on the past we share, but on the knowledge that ours is a common future, and that we share a common vision of what that future should be.

A Continent of Change

My journey to this continent comes at a time of change and expectation. The power of Western values is transforming Europe, both East and West. And the challenges and opportunities that lie before us are rooted in the success of Western policies that we as Allies have pursued.

Here in the Federal Republic as in the U.S., our societies draw strength from their capacity to grow, evolve and change. The West is not afraid of change; to the contrary, we

benefit from it. Nor is the West afraid of vigorous public debate. Our capacity to change is born of openness and willingness to engage in public debate. It is this capacity which distinguishes the dynamism of the West from the failed Marxist-Leninist creed of the East. The changes we see across the continent today underscore this fundamental distinction between the two halves of a divided European spirit.

Take a look at Western Europe. The creation of an integrated market by 1992 will open a new chapter in the history of the European Community. We support this goal, as we do efforts at greater European political cooperation. These are signs of an emerging European identity, one which will allow Europe to add its full weight to the defense of the West and to political and moral issues of global significance. Economic and political cooperation on this scale was only dreamed of at the time the Treaty of Rome was signed, and we welcome their cultivation.

The European Community has been a vital framework of cooperation in which Europe's greatest strength -- its cultural and national diversity -- can flourish without giving rise to the bitter nationalisms of the past. Over the years, the EC has become both symbol and catalyst of Europe's growth and

prosperity. Together with the OECD, it has nurtured a strong, global economic partnership without which our common security would be in jeopardy.

Europe's capacity to draw on its own resources to strengthen its foundations is also clear in the security field. Since that time when Europe, with our help, pulled itself from the ruins of war, the Franco-German relationship has been indispensable to Europe's political and economic development. Adenauer and de Gaulle recognized that enmities of the past had to be overcome if Europe's hard-won peace were to endure. These two far-seeing giants of the post-war era laid the foundations for what has become a strong, cooperative relationship. Adding a security dimension to this bilateral relationship has been a natural and positive evolution.

Likewise, we welcome the resurgence of the Western European Union as a useful multilateral forum for our European allies to discuss defense issues among themselves. The WEU does not conflict with the Alliance; on the contrary. Its platform sets forth principles with which we fully agree. It complements NATO's task of examining roles, risks and responsibilities in carrying out the defense commitments to which we as Allies are pledged. If this is a platform for a "European pillar" to NATO, we endorse it enthusiastically.

Efforts such as these to reinforce our common strength will continue to grow. They give evidence to the variety of forms which cooperation among like-minded democracies can take; their pursuit can only enrich further our partnership across the sea.

This broadened framework of cooperation has room for a close and mature partnership between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Indeed, a healthy transatlantic relationship cannot exist without such ties. There should be no doubt of our continued friendship. And there should be no doubt of America's continued commitment to work with our British and French Allies in and for Berlin.

No doubt the future will bring its share of disagreements among members of our Alliance. Nonetheless, as we approach 1992, the United States hopes that, as Europe eliminates internal barriers to growth, it also will open its gates to free economic competition from without. Failing to do so would decrease the global market's capacity for beneficial growth, and would require us to take measures to defend our own interests. In the same manner, our discussion within NATO of the sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities will not be friction-free. But an increasingly unified Europe offers a creative basis for resolving these issues.

Is Europe ready for broader responsibilities? We believe so. The process of give-and-take, of arriving at mutually acceptable solutions through open debate, is a hallmark of our relationship as Allies. I am confident that, working together, the countries of the West will be able to seize opportunities for greater cooperation to enrich our collective community.

Transatlantic Partnership, Transatlantic Values

Only yesterday in Brussels, leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization joined in celebrating forty years of peace. Created from the ruins of war, NATO has provided the shield behind which Western Europe has grown strong and prospered. Its success is evident around us here today, for the Federal Republic of Germany is a secure, prosperous and confident state -- a country of free enterprise, whose standard of living, social responsibility and political freedoms are among the highest in the world.

Today, as forty years ago, NATO is the cornerstone of our transatlantic partnership. Our commitment to that partnership is clear. It is symbolized by the presence of U.S. troops in Europe, supported by a force of nuclear and

conventional weapons. This presence, along with that of other Allies, is necessary to ensure that our defenses are knitted closely together. Together with all fourteen other members of NATO, your government and mine are pledged to each other's security. None of us -- on either side of the Atlantic -- can fall down on that pledge without damaging our collective defense.

But institutions such as NATO, the EC and the OECD are only a nexus through which Atlantic community values are linked. Our Western partnership is broader than any single institution. It is based on the common heritage and values of which I spoke earlier -- human rights and individual freedoms, the rule of law, democratic institutions, the right of the individual to make political and economic choices, the right of diversity. These are the values which bind us together across the waters of the Atlantic. These are the values which define for the West an agenda of freedom and democracy. These are the values we are pledged to promote and defend.

Our Common Security

In making this pledge, we as NATO Allies have been guided by the principles outlined in the Harmel Report. We seek dialogue with the East -- and that dialogue is important -- but

it must be based on a strong defense. We must, and we shall, keep our defenses up to date. Today, having held to these principles, we see within our grasp the promise of European security at lower levels of armament.

Good beginnings have been made toward this promise. Only a few weeks ago, the Soviet Union took the first steps toward reducing its overwhelming superiority in conventional forces. Negotiations on Confidence and Security Building Measures have resumed in Vienna. New talks on Conventional Forces in Europe also have begun. And, following the call of the Alliance in 1986 for conventional stability at lower levels of forces, and for removal of the asymmetries favoring the Warsaw Pact, the East has responded at last.

Still, these promising promises cannot cloud our vision. We see positive change in the East. But the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact still hold more than a two-to-one advantage in tanks and artillery. We must base present policies on present realities, not on future hopes. At the same time, we must work diligently to explore new opportunities.

The Soviets say they are prepared to agree to the NATO objective of reductions to parity in a first phase. We intend

to put them to the test. But our objective is not just cuts in numbers. To achieve a real improvement in security, we also must change the pattern of Eastern deployments. A situation in which over three-fourths of all the stationed forces in the area and over a third of all tanks and artillery belong to one country is not compatible with real security. This must change.

Our reductions need not end with Phase I of the Vienna talks. We are prepared for stability at still lower levels of troops and armaments. We are prepared for further reductions. We ask the Warsaw Pact to join us in such an outcome.

There will be tough bargaining ahead. But the Soviet Union must recognize that it cannot be accepted as a partner in European cooperation while, at the same time, maintaining high levels of troops and armaments that threaten Europe, and force structures and maneuvers that are incompatible with self-defense. I call on General Secretary Gorbachev to make real the promised troop withdrawals, to speed them up, and to work with us in reducing this threat to stability in Europe. Let me repeat: we want security at lower levels of armaments. We challenge the East to join us in such an outcome.

These are the opportunities that lie before us. The challenge will be to maintain our strength in a period of transition. If we fail to maintain that strength, the

opportunities will disappear, and our security will decrease. But, as tough as the challenge is, the prize is equal to the calling: a durable peace, a real and lasting improvement in European security, and the hope that genuine change will allow us to overcome the divisions that have torn the map of Europe for these forty years.

A Changing Eastern Europe

Just as we, as Allies, recognize that our security and freedoms are bound indivisibly together, so do we realize that a divided Europe is not of our choosing. Ours are not the barriers which divide East from West -- barriers of ideology, and barriers of concrete, barbed wire and land mines. These are walls of the East, built on fear of free competition of ideas. We never have accepted these barriers as a permanent condition. We never will.

I know how painfully aware Germany is of these barriers. The wall that divides a people -- and, more dramatically, cuts across the face of Berlin -- is an enduring scar, and one which must be removed. But that wall symbolizes a greater psychological wall, one separating the dynamic changes of the West from the failed ideology of the East.

As Westerners, we applaud the process of change taking place in the Soviet Union and in some countries of Eastern Europe. This process has only begun; years may pass before we know how much openness these countries are prepared to tolerate, how many freedoms they will grant their citizens, or how much they will open up their economies to change. One thing is clear, however: Marxism-Leninism -- rigid and discredited as it is -- has failed, and Western political and economic models are on the march. It is Western concepts which are being adopted in the East, and it is the policies of the West that increasingly have framed the East-West agenda.

The changes we see in the Soviet Union, in Poland, and in Hungary today can move those countries in a positive direction. This offers hope for the future of East-West relations. It is for that reason that I have decided to go to Poland and Hungary this summer. But these changes must be written into law and honored in practice. They must extend deeper and further throughout the East if East-West tensions are to disappear and our hard-won peace is to remain secure.

I have spoken already of the link between security and the preservation of our common freedoms. A more secure Europe cannot be created simply by reducing levels of armaments, for

those armaments reflect the underlying tension between Western freedoms and Eastern autocratic rule. If Europe is to be truly secure, political and economic changes in the East must deepen. To the degree this happens, our task of seeking security at lower levels of armaments will be made simpler.

Thus, while we welcome Eastern calls for increased cooperation within Europe, our call is not limited by geography. Rather, ours is a call for greater freedom for the common man. It is rooted in values found from Japan to Portugal, from Switzerland to Australia. These values once were found in Eastern Europe as well. They remain open to the East, as they do to any country which will respect the rights God has given the community of mankind.

Within the CSCE framework, the West has put forward its vision of a future Europe. That vision stresses the fundamental values that should unite rather than divide Europe. These include respect for the individual and for his or her natural freedoms; the preservation of national identities; a lifting of limits on the free flow of information; and the creation of a firm legal basis of rights in which governments are responsible to their people.

When the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975, the countries of the Warsaw Pact put forward a competing vision. But their vision was territorial, even static. It spoke only of borders; it offered nothing to the individuals within those borders. Today, we see clearly that it is the West's vision which has withstood the passage of time, with its emphasis on human values and on peaceful change. Our vision continues to gain ground, even in some countries of the East.

The time to implement this vision is now. Why not, as a first step, tear down the dark symbols of the past, the guard posts and the concrete walls dividing family from family? Instead of governments, why not let individuals decide which television programs they watch and to what radio broadcasts they listen? Why not let people read what they wish, without political censorship?

Less than three months ago, foreign ministers from all 35 CSCE member states agreed to a comprehensive review of East-West cooperation in a number of areas. As I speak, one of these meetings -- this one to review implementation of human rights commitments -- is taking place in Paris. I already have instructed the United States delegation there to put forward a proposal to end exit restrictions wherever they exist. We also

will propose to eliminate other, more subtle tools that nations use to keep people from leaving, such as limits on their right to take their life's savings and personal belongings with them.

As for freedom of information, many commitments exist, but often only on paper. Those countries which blatantly ignore their commitments must change. In Vienna the countries of the East pledged to end the jamming of radio broadcasts. The next step is to end political censorship in any guise, and of any medium. These are the freedoms of free people; this is the hand we hold out to the people of Eastern Europe.

Confidence and Hope

And so, we look to the future with hope and confidence, sure of the continued relevance of what we have stood for these many years, and confident of successes to come.

For our transatlantic partnership will continue to provide the framework not only for our common defense, but for exploring the challenges and opportunities of East-West change. In NATO and with the EC, we and our transatlantic partners will work hand-in-hand to tackle a growing transnational agenda. This agenda, from environmental preservation to cooperation

against terrorism and drug trafficking, is vital if we are to protect our collective well-being in the modern age.

As we in the West work to resolve these problems, so, too, will we push for the changes which will support an enlarged dialogue with the East. As political, economic and civic institutions in the East become less centralized and more independent, greater opportunities will emerge for useful contacts between those institutions and private, voluntary associations of the West -- whether in the religious, trade union, media, business, education or other fields. Greater opportunities, too, will emerge for new paths of cooperation as we head toward the next century.

In carrying out these tasks and this dialogue, we in the West will remain true to the enduring human values and freedoms from which we derive our common strength. It is these values, and these freedoms -- nurtured and spread over the centuries in part by Herr Gutenberg's invention -- which brought us together as partners forty years ago. It is these values and freedoms which guide us as we pursue our vision of an integrated West and a freer and more humane East. Ours is the cause of peace; ours is the cause of freedom. Let us walk forward together in pursuit of these noble goals and this vision.

Thank you.

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Blackwill

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 8, 1989

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL RB
FROM: LINTON BROOKS
SUBJECT: Open Skies

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

I understand from Bob Blackwill that, if Baker concurs, you are disposed to have the President announce an Open Skies initiative at his Friday Texas A&M speech. Bob asked me to outline for you a summary of the minimum actions which should be completed before such a speech. **Although Bob Blackwill is confident that we can get everything done by Friday, I have some reservations, which I believe Arnie Kanter shares, that we can be ready for an announcement this week.** In any event, to make this work we need a tentative Presidential decision by mid-day Tuesday. This memorandum is based on the assumption you have decided to go ahead and sets forth suggestions on how to do it.

Get the senior leadership on board.

We understand Bob Gates is discussing the issue with Secretary Baker. In addition, you should discuss it personally with:

- Secretary Cheney. Cheney (per his EA) assumes that we are engaged in a several week study effort and has not focused on this as a subject for near term decision.
- Admiral Crowe. Per his EA, Crowe's endorsement may be based on the assumption that the initiative would apply in the Atlantic to the Urals region only. Bob Herres, however, subsequently told Blackwill that he thought JCS would have no problem with applying the policy to the United States.
- Judge Webster. The Judge wants to be helpful and probably has no problem, but he needs to be consulted.
- Director Sessions (FBI)/Admiral Studeman (NSA). Thus far we have not dealt with the counter-intelligence aspects. That can't be done before Friday; it depends on decisions not yet made (e.g. will inspection aircraft be based in the opposite country or simply refueled). But you need to ask if these two see any insurmountable obstacles before the speech.

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I recommend you make these calls as soon as possible. The Department of Transportation (FAA) will also be involved, but they can be told after the fact.

Get the Congress on board.

We should call not later than the night before the speech and inform:

- House and Senate Leadership
- Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of House and Senate Armed Services, Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs, House and Senate Intelligence Committees

An alternative would be to use Thursday's bipartisan leadership meeting to float the idea, if the President has made a tentative decision by then. You still will need to call those Chairmen/Ranking Members not involved.

Get the Allies on board.

This seems to us to be the hardest. State is working on cables but may not realize the time frame. Since we are speaking of overflights of allied territory, we must consult in advance. We suggest you direct State to send a cable from Eagleburger to all NATO posts Tuesday afternoon, directing immediate consultations Wednesday and a reaction back Thursday. To do this you need (a) a tentative decision from the President by COB Tuesday and (b) a willingness to reverse that decision if we run into major allied objections.

In addition, you should ask Eagleburger to personally call the British and Canadian Foreign Ministers. (British because they are likely to have strong views; Canada as a courtesy since they have been pushing the idea.)

You will also need to ensure you are comfortable with the talking points for Secretary Baker to use at NATO. Since he is briefing the allies on Friday, he will have to describe the initiative. We suggest a back channel to Baker with the points he should make as soon as possible.

Finally, you should direct State to prepare cables to all posts (especially the Soviet bloc) outlining the initiative in greater detail than is in the President's speech. (For example, the cables should make clear that we will call for negotiations on this in which others may join, rather than seeking formal NATO endorsement of alliance to alliance discussions.) These cables should go before the speech so posts will be able to react once the speech is given. Necessarily so of the details will have to be left for later, but we should present the maximum detail we can.

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Telling the Soviets.

I spoke to Arnie tonight (Monday) in Helsinki. He informs me that if the President is going to make the announcement on Friday, Baker wishes to give the Soviets a heads up, probably in his Thursday meeting with Gorbachev. This increases the need to get a tentative agreement from the President on Tuesday so we can have allied feedback before Baker leaves the Soviet Union.

Getting the public story right.

We understand you will be backgrounding the story with the President's party. In addition, we will need a package of background materials, including a fact sheet and Qs and As for all cabinet agencies and NATO posts so the word from Washington, Texas and our embassies is consistent. NSC staff should work this, but the package needs to be distributed before the speech. It should also be sent out by State to all posts for background.

To get the maximum benefit from this, we'll need to follow up the speech with some additional backgrounding, beyond what you do in Texas, in order to lay out our thoughts for the press. Thus we need the greatest possible detail in the background material and a designated Washington spokesman to do additional backgrounding here.

Getting the internal story right.

I understand you do not plan to issue an NSD to document the initiative, but will rely on the speech and the press kit to make certain the bureaucracy knows what we are doing. I think that's a mistake. We are running into problems in Congressional testimony on ICBM modernization and SDI due to lack of any authoritative guidance on what the President decided; this will be far worse. I recommend you reconsider and direct the preparation of a formal record of the President's decision.

RECOMMENDATION

That, assuming you wish to announce the initiative, you proceed as above, giving priority to Cabinet-level and allied consultations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Don Mahley, Phil Zelikow, Judy Mandel and Ginny Lampley concur.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1989

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: NATO CFE Initiatives

The undated proposal for a CFE approach from SecDef contains some excellent material - material that the President should be able to use to good advantage at the NATO Summit. We believe, for instance, that the President should, in his NAC intervention at the Summit, welcome Gorbachev's acceptance of NATO numerical levels on Tanks and Armored Troop Carriers. We also believe there is a good prospect, if Allies can be sounded out in time to ensure agreement, for accepting some kind of limit on helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, even though not Gorbachev's limits. This would be seen -- and welcomed in many quarters -- as a major Western concession. We would then be in a position to say that NATO and the WP have agreed in principle to the types of weapons and equipment to be limited in a Phase I agreement. At the same time, we see serious costs to proposing bilateral US-Soviet reductions.

Area One: Agreeing to Reductions of Tanks, Artillery, and ATCs

The virtue of doing this dramatically at the Summit is that it seizes the initiative and gives us the opportunity to "assume" Western counting rules for these categories of equipment and force the Soviets into reductions that correspond to our analysis.

Area Two: Accepting some limit - not Gorbachev's - on other categories such as helicopters and aircraft

There may be a problem with the Allies on this part, especially the French. If we are going to try to expand the negotiation to these new categories - which would certainly be a substantive initiative for the Summit - we can't do it without French agreement to include French aircraft. The President might want to raise this point with Mitterrand in Kennebunkport, which would be an opportunity to sound him out on French attitudes toward the principle of such reductions.

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PER E.O. 13526

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Area Three: Bilateral US and Soviet Reductions

You have already heard our views about the serious risks and potential damage of bilateral US-Soviet reductions, both in terms of the substantive security risks and the undermining of Allied solidarity and consensus.

Nevertheless, if we propose to wrap bilateral reductions somehow into the CFE, we absolutely would need to ensure a priori Allied agreement to our proposal before we put it forward to Moscow or in a multilateral forum.

Final Observations

We like the emphasis on CFE in this proposal. If we do it right, it may seize the initiative from Gorbachev, will appeal to the moderate and left-wing elements in Europe as showing that we are not afraid to make concessions to the Soviets in order to create progress, and could relieve some of the pressure on SNF between the US and the FRG. All of these benefits could be managed without getting into the bilateral reductions category.

We have not been able to scrub the numbers in the paper, which will have to be done before we go much further (for instance, the manpower numbers in the non-paper are a million higher for Soviets than the interagency agreed estimates). This will need to be done soon if we are going to proceed in this way.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

May 17, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/~~ROBERT BLACKWILL~~
FROM: LINTON BROOKS
SUBJECT: NATO Wives Tour of the White House

Attached (Tab II) is a letter from Admiral Frank Kelso, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, to Mrs. Bush. Admiral Kelso asks for a White House tour for about 60 wives of NATO officials, including the wife of NATO Secretary General Woerner, in conjunction with the biannual NATO Sea Link conference. He further requests that, if possible, Mrs. Bush join the group for coffee. The request was forwarded to General Scowcroft for a recommendation.

A suggested response is at Tab I. We propose you act on behalf of Scowcroft. For the reasons set forth in Tab I, we think it is useful to recommend approval, perhaps with Mrs. Quayle in lieu of Mrs. Bush, since the latter will have recently participated in NATO activities associated with the summit. Our bottom line: the people are of appropriate stature to grant the request, the timing is right, and it would be useful to display the routine harmonious nature of NATO inter-relationships in the aftermath of what may be a somewhat tense summit.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Don Mahley and Phil Zelikow concur.

Attachments

Tab I Hughes Memorandum to Brock
Tab II Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR ANN BROCK

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Request for White House Tour and Coffee with
Mrs. Bush for NATO Wives Group

The NSC staff recommends favorable consideration of Admiral Kelso's request that Mrs. Bush sponsor a White House tour for 60 wives of NATO dignitaries attending the biannual Sea Link conference in Annapolis. We also believe it would appropriate to offer this group, which will include the wife of the NATO Secretary General, a brief opportunity to meet with either Mrs. Bush or Mrs. Quayle over coffee. Although the President and First Lady will have participated in activities associated with the NATO summit shortly before the Sea Link conference, we believe that the gesture suggested by Admiral Kelso is appropriate, particularly since this will be the first Sea Link conference of the Bush Administration. Mrs. Bush's participation will serve to underscore the important theme that NATO is a family and that we welcome our NATO colleagues to the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3594
MAY 12 1989

May 11, 1989

NOTE FOR: General Brent Scowcroft
USAF (Retired)

FROM: Ann Brock

Please comment on the attached.

Thank you!



SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA

*Let's stuff out to
Gen. Seawright*

27 April 1989

Dear Mrs. Bush,


About every two years an international maritime symposium entitled SEA LINK is held at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. This year's event will be held from 13 to 15 June. The symposium is sponsored by The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and I host it as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. SEA LINK's purpose is to provide in-depth thought and discussions on maritime matters of interest and concern to the free world.

I have extended invitations to distinguished civilian and military leaders from all the NATO nations and from a number of other countries outside the Alliance. It is anticipated that each national delegation will be led by the Defense Minister or Service Chief. Speakers will include His Excellency Doctor Manfred Woerner, the Secretary General of NATO; General Wolfgang Altenburg, Chairman, North Atlantic Military Committee; Doctor Henry Kissinger; His Excellency Knud Enggaard, the Minister of Defense of Denmark; and, Doctor Francois Heisbourg, the Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

My invitation to delegates also encourages their spouses' participation, and I would like to arrange as interesting and enjoyable a program for them as possible. The ladies' program includes a visit to Washington, D.C., on Wednesday, 14 June. Since this is a NATO-sponsored conference and the ladies are guests of our country, I would very much wish for their Washington, D.C., visit to become the most memorable highlight of their stay. Should your schedule permit, I would be very appreciative if you would consider providing them an informal tour of the White House on Wednesday, 14 June, and, if possible, personally greet them either before or after the tour, perhaps for coffee. An ideal time for the visit would be between 10:30 and 11:30 A.M., but I will arrange the visit for any time that suits your schedule.

Responses are still being received from invited delegates thus I cannot as yet give you the exact number or names, but I expect that about 60 ladies will attend. Mrs. Woerner and Mrs. Altenburg, however, will definitely accompany their husbands. Understanding that your White House responsibilities and obligations naturally dictate your priorities, I would, however, appreciate any time you could allot from your busy schedule on 14 June to support my request.

Sincerely and
very respectfully,



FRANK B. KELSO, II
Admiral, U.S. Navy

(804) 445. 3245

Mrs. George Bush
c/o Mrs. Susan Porter Rose
The White House Chief of Staff
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Capt Ed Moninger

5-2-89

ID #

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WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

89105101

Name of Correspondent:

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) (B) (C)

Subject:

June 14, 1989, international maritime symposium (NATO sponsored)
held at the Naval Academy - winner will be in D.C. - He
would like Mrs Bush to arrange informal tour of White House
+ perhaps personally greet them ... maybe for coffee.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)

Action
CodeTracking
Date
YY/MM/DDType
of
Response

Code

Completion
Date
YY/MM/DD

ORIGINATOR

8910501

C 89105101

Referral Note:

A

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Referral Note:

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D - Draft Response
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to be used as Enclosure

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032280



SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC
NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
26 April 1989

Dear Mrs. Bush,


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I have extended invitations to distinguished civilian and military leaders from all the NATO nations and from a number of other countries outside the Alliance. It is anticipated that each national delegation will be led by the Defense Minister or Service Chief. Speakers will include His Excellency Doctor Manfred Woerner, the Secretary General of NATO; General Wolfgang Altenburg, Chairman, North Atlantic Military Committee; Doctor Henry Kissinger; His Excellency Knud Enggaard, the Minister of Defense of Denmark; and, Doctor Francois Heisbourg, the Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

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Responses are still being received from invited delegates thus I cannot as yet give you the exact number or names, but I expect that about 60 ladies will attend. Mrs. Woerner and Mrs. Altenburg, however, will definitely accompany their husbands. Understanding that your White House responsibilities and obligations naturally dictate your priorities, I would, however, appreciate any time you could allot from your busy schedule on 14 June to support my request.

Sincerely and
very respectfully,



FRANK B. KELSO, II
Admiral, U.S. Navy

Mrs. George Bush
c/o Mrs. Susan Porter Rose
The White House Chief of Staff
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

3594
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MAY 12 1989

May 11, 1989

NOTE FOR: General Brent Scowcroft
USAF (Retired)

FROM: Ann Brock

Please comment on the attached.

Thank you!

BLACKWELL

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1989 MAY 25 AM 7:3891

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PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/3/25

May 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Nonimmigrant Visas Waiver Pilot Program

Purpose

To decide whether to allow the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program to go forward in six European countries, with or without pre-inspection of individuals and documents at airport of departure.

Background

The Congress mandated and continues to press for a pilot program under which the United States would waive visa requirements for the citizens of eight countries to visit the United States. The pilot program was begun in the UK and Japan in 1988. Six European countries (Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden) have been selected based on largest nonimmigrant visa volume and low rates of visa refusals to enter the program.

Both Justice and State favor going ahead with the program but with differences on whether to link implementation with pre-inspection, a pre-screening measure. Commerce favors the program to facilitate air travel for tourists and prefers no linkage to pre-screening.

Justice (Tab B) has argued that individuals should go through a pre-inspection process at the airport before boarding a US-bound aircraft in lieu of receiving a visa. The visa process provides Justice with information, including photographs and whereabouts of individuals, that is useful in criminal investigations. Also, the visa process uncovers and turns away those who would try to enter the US but should not because of prior Nazi affiliation, terrorist activities, drug trafficking or other disqualifying characteristics. Justice is concerned about the loss of information we would experience if the visa process is not replaced with another information-gathering process. Justice

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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proposes that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) perform pre-inspections at the airports, which would have a deterrent effect.

State (Tab A) argues that the waiver program should go forward without linkage to pre-inspection, citing sovereignty problems with trying to negotiate US pre-inspection. The concern is sovereignty infringement by having US law enforcement officials at the airports overseas. Where we do have this presence, it has been negotiated with some difficulty. State believes that the lookout process in place for the UK and Japan, whereby individuals' names are checked in a computer when they arrive at a US airport, is the best answer.

State advances the argument that our foreign policy interests are served by waiving the visa requirement, as it is a very positive indication of US confidence if a country has this special arrangement with the US. Failure to go ahead with the program now will bring negative publicity in those countries during your trip. We cannot base a decision entirely on the public reaction, but it is a consideration, since there are other matters of discord. In the current climate, a negative decision on this would be exaggerated in the press and probably in the minds of the public.

Another extremely strong consideration is counterterrorism. We must lower the odds of a terrorist incident. To the extent that lack of visas or pre-inspection leave a gap -- or raise the risk -- we must try to close that gap and lower the risk.

One downside to the program concerns certain former Nazis who are prohibited (by the Holtzman amendment) from entering the US. These German citizens are currently screened during the visa application process via a "watch list" of tens of thousands of former Nazis. Under the visa waiver program, they would be screened only at point of entry into the US. While there are steps that can be taken to minimize the problem, there inevitably will be cases in which West German citizens are turned back from the US because their names appeared on the list, leading to damaging publicity here and in the FRG.

Following is my proposal, worked out today. It has general agreement from State, Transportation, FAA, Commerce, and NSC. Justice still would prefer linking pre-inspection to the visa waiver program. The proposal is:

-- That we proceed with extension of the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program to the remaining six countries. This would allow you to make announcements during your forthcoming visits in Italy and the FRG.

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-- That we seek to achieve de facto pre-inspection by a series of steps designed to enhance international air travel safety for all. This would include enhanced exchange of information in narcotics, counterterrorism, and other undesirable personal characteristics. We propose high-level bilateral meetings in June to seek ways in which we can promote cooperation in these areas.

Nonetheless, formal pre-inspection should not be dropped as a goal. It is agreed by State (at least for the time being) that Justice should go forward in trying to reach agreement for pre-inspection. Pre-inspection should be included in the high-level discussions you authorize. It will be important to Justice that you give some emphasis to seeking pre-inspection.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the plan outlined above to go ahead with 1) extending the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program to the FRG, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland without linkage to pre-inspection, and 2) authorizing a US initiative of high-level bilateral talks with each of the eight countries to enhance cooperation on air travel safety, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics.

Approve ✓

Disapprove

OP

G. Bush

Attachments

Tab A Acting Secretary of State Position Letter

Tab B Attorney General Position Letter

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1988

Mr. President:

Note that Justice does not support this recommendation. I do not believe the Attorney General is obdurate, but he does prefer pre-inspection.


Brent Scowcroft

3891

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lawrence S. Eagleburger
The Acting Secretary

SUBJECT: Nonimmigrant Visas Waiver Pilot Program

I. Summary

- o Several governments may raise the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) during your European trip. It could become an irritant in our relations with the FRG, France and Italy. Since the Attorney General and I hold different views of the program, we have decided to refer the matter to you for your decision. The Attorney General will give you his views in a separate memorandum.

II. Background

- o In the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Congress authorized a three-year pilot program to waive temporary visitor visas for up to eight countries under certain conditions. The program has already been implemented successfully in the United Kingdom and Japan.
- o In October 1988, Secretary Shultz, as obliged under the terms of IRCA, sought concurrence from the Attorney General to include six more countries in the program. Acting Secretary Armacost and Secretary Baker later reiterated his request (Tab 1). The six countries, chosen because they have the largest nonimmigrant visa volume and low rates of visa refusals, are the FRG, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden.
- o Unless a decision about the visa waiver is made soon, the Department will have to commit additional resources to accommodate the annual 20% increase in nonimmigrant visa workload anticipated in the proposed countries.

- o The Attorney General on May 5 replied to Secretary Baker's letter of March 31 (Tab 2). He stated that for security reasons, he would not endorse an expansion of VWPP unless it were linked with preinspection. (Preinspection is the inspection abroad of U.S.-bound passengers by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.)

III. Discussion

- o I believe that for you to announce the extension of the VWPP to six more countries -- including the FRG, Italy and France -- would have a very positive impact on the atmosphere for your forthcoming European trips. The countries proposed for inclusion in the VWPP support it.
- o Delay or termination of the program would cause negative and emotional reactions in Italy, West Germany and France. These reactions could mar the prospects for your visits to these countries.
- o Preinspection, as advocated by Justice, is a complex issue with resource, security and political implications. State's position is that preinspection should not be linked to the nonimmigrant visa waiver pilot program. At the moment, it is uncertain if any of the six countries would agree to have INS operate in its airports. INS itself estimates its preinspection plans would call for an additional 105 full-time and 69 part-time positions, a significant expansion of our official presence in Europe.
- o Even the limited, experimental program in Shannon required a year's negotiation with the Irish. It is thus doubtful that preinspection facilities, even if agreed to by the six proposed countries, could be in place in time to give the pilot program a fair trial before its Congressionally mandated expiration in the fall of 1991. A further complication would be demands by other countries for reciprocal privileges.
- o Expansion of VWPP raises security and law enforcement questions, some of which can be addressed with arrangements similar to those now in effect with the United Kingdom and Japan. We are now transferring information from the visa lookout system to the INS lookout system, so that screening now performed during the visa issuance process can be done during the

admittance process at the ports of entry. We can also handle problems peculiar to the FRG and Italy (i.e., the number of former Nazis ineligible for visas for having participated in WWII persecutions, the ease with which residents of the GDR get FRG passports, and interdiction of organized crime and drug figures). Our views on handling these problems are at Tab 1.

- o Congress asked that this program be tested. If the Administration does not there will likely be Congressional criticism. Indeed, by letter of April 25, 1989, Senator Kennedy, speaking for the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, already inquired about continuing delays in full implementation. On May 3, Congressman Morrison, speaking for the House Subcommittee, sent a similar letter to the Attorney General.

Recommendation

- o That, before leaving for Europe later this month, you resolve differences between the Departments of State and Justice on full implementation of the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program by authorizing extension of the program to the six proposed countries without preinspection being a condition.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Secretary Baker's letter of March 31, 1989
- Tab 2 Attorney General Thornburgh's letter of May 5, 1989

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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'89 APR -3 AR:29

March 31, 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Dick:

I am writing to follow up on letters of October 17, 1988, and January 24, 1989, nominating the six countries to be added to Japan and the United Kingdom as participants in the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program. Based on volume, low fraud and reciprocity, the six are the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden. We urgently need your concurrence.

To obtain maximum benefits from this program, it should be fully operational before the 1989 summer tourist season begins. Moreover, under the provisions of section 405 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, you and I must report on the program to Congress by July 1, 1990, giving our evaluation and our recommendation on its extension and expansion. If that report is to be useful, it should include the experience of at least one full summer season; otherwise, we may be subject to Congressional criticism.

As noted in the October 17 letter, concern has been voiced about certain aspects of expanding the program. As is more fully discussed in the appendix, Department of State and INS officers have discussed potential problems and have agreed that they are manageable.

In view of the time needed to institute a program before summer, I would appreciate your early reply.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,


James A. Baker, III

Enclosure:
Appendix

The Honorable
Richard L. Thornburgh,
Attorney General.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1589-MR

MM 1/13/2015

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APPENDIX

Three concerns have been raised with respect to expansion of the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP).

I. The Holtzman Amendment

The Holtzman amendment (section 212(a)(33) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) prohibits admission to the United States of former Nazis who participated in persecutions. The current method of administering this provision uses lists of names furnished to the visa lookout system by the Department of Justice's Office of Special Investigations (OSI). When a named person applies for a visa, the consular officer investigates to see whether the applicant is within the provisions of the Holtzman amendment.

About a hundred such cases arise each year, of which about 20% result in visa denial. In order to afford the same protection under VWPP, OSI will furnish its lists to the INS lookout system for identification at the ports of entry. Further investigation can be carried out using the Service's system of deferred inspection. This permits the traveler to proceed to his destination in the U.S. without legally "entering" the country, while the information is being gathered and evaluated. Final determination of admissibility can be made when the investigation is completed. A similar system is already in use with respect to excludable aliens from the United Kingdom. It has worked very well.

Widespread publicity within revelant countries about the various grounds of excludability should produce enough self selection among potential travelers to avoid embarrassing situations or compromise of the law.

II. Admission of Residents of the GDR

Based on its fundamental concept of German nationality, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) issues passports to any German, regardless of residence in the FRG or the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The issue of German nationality in a divided Germany remains extremely sensitive for the FRG government, and it has declared emphatically that it will not participate in a visa waiver program that treats FRG passport holders differently on the basis of residence in the FRG or GDR.

Instituting the nonimmigrant waiver program vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Germany will not materially affect processing of FRG passport holders. At present, Foreign

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 9/14/25

Service posts apply the same standards to all FRG passport holders, taking account of residence only so far as it may bear on the applicant's qualifications as a nonimmigrant. Indeed, in the great majority of cases it is impossible to tell whether a German applicant holding an FRG passport is a resident of the FRG or GDR.

On the other hand, both FRG and GDR identity documents are accurate and difficult to alter. GDR residents obtain FRG passports on the basis of GDR documents, so identity remains the same. Since the FBI has access to both the State and Justice lookout systems, it can enter the names of suspected GDR operatives or other undesirables into either. Such action should provide considerable protection against the surreptitious entry of GDR agents on FRG passports (unless, of course, they have such well-concocted fictitious identities that we would not uncover them in the visa application process in any event).

Residents of the GDR present no other special problems.

III. Mafia

Implementation of the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program will result in no less protection against Mafiosi than now available in the visa process. There is concern that the visa waiver program could diminish our ability to intercept Mafiosi and narcotics traffickers traveling from Italy to the United States. In the main, however, these people do not now appear in either the State or Justice lookout systems and are not detectable during the visa or admissions process. If they do appear in the lookouts they do so as being ineligible under one of the usual grounds of ineligibility and can be just as easily barred from admission at the port of entry.

DOC 2109V

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04f. Letter	Dick Thornburgh to James A. Baker, III RE: Visa Waiver Pilot Program (2 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [10]

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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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3891

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID G. MILLER, Jr./ROBERT D. BLACKWILL ^{RB}

FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE ^{NBD}

SUBJECT: Nonimmigrant Visas Waiver Pilot Program

The memorandum at Tab I provides information and a recommended decision to the President on the subject of the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program.

As you know, State and Justice has been unable to agree on this, with Justice arguing that pre-inspection at overseas airports must be a prerequisite if we are to allow the nonimmigrant visa to be waived for six European countries. The program is in place with the UK and Japan.

I have worked to effect a compromise, including drawing in the FAA because of its air safety role. The recommendation in the memo to the President is:

- to go ahead with enlarging the visa waiver program, without linking it to pre-inspection,
- seek a commitment from Italy, the FRG, and the UK during his trip to high-level meetings aimed at enhanced cooperation on air safety, antinarcotics, and antiterrorism, and write the leaders of the other countries for the same purpose.

Concurrence by: Bob Hutchings ^{RKH}

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I. ✓

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Acting Secretary of State Position Letter

Tab B Attorney General Position Letter

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/14/25

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. MILLER, Jr./ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
FROM: NANCY BEARG DYKE ^{NBD}
SUBJECT: Nonimmigrant Visas Waiver Pilot Program

The memorandum at Tab I provides information and a recommended decision to the President on the subject of the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program.

As you know, State and Justice has been unable to agree on this, with Justice arguing that pre-inspection at overseas airports must be a prerequisite if we are to allow the nonimmigrant visa to be waived for six European countries. The program is in place with the UK and Japan.

I have worked to effect a compromise, including drawing in the FAA because of its air safety role. The recommendation in the memo to the President is:

- to go ahead with enlarging the visa waiver program, without linking it to pre-inspection,
- seek a commitment from Italy, the FRG, and the UK during his trip to high-level meetings aimed at enhanced cooperation on air safety, antinarcotics, and antiterrorism, and write the leaders of the other countries for the same purpose.

Concurrence by: Bob Hutchings

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Acting Secretary of State Position Letter
Tab B Attorney General Position Letter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/4/25

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3891

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/4/25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Nonimmigrant Visas Waiver Pilot Program

Purpose

To decide whether to allow the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program to go forward in six European countries, with or without pre-inspection of individuals and documents at airport of departure.

Background

The Congress mandated and continues to press for a pilot program under which the United States would waive visa requirements for the citizens of eight countries to visit the United States. The pilot program was begun in the UK and Japan in 1988. Six European countries (Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Sweden) have been selected based on largest nonimmigrant visa volume and low rates of visa refusals to enter the program.

Both Justice and State favor going ahead with the program but with differences on whether to link implementation with pre-inspection, a pre-screening measure. Commerce favors the program to facilitate air travel for tourists and prefers no linkage to pre-screening.

Justice (Tab B) has argued that individuals should go through a pre-inspection process at the airport before boarding a US-bound aircraft in lieu of receiving a visa. The visa process provides Justice with information, including photographs and whereabouts of individuals, that is useful in criminal investigations. Also, the visa process uncovers and turns away those who would try to enter the US but should not because of prior Nazi affiliation, terrorist activities, drug trafficking or other disqualifying characteristics. Justice is concerned about the loss of information we would experience if the visa process is not replaced with another information-gathering process. Justice

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proposes that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) perform pre-inspections at the airports, which would have a deterrent effect.

State (Tab A) argues that the waiver program should go forward without linkage to pre-inspection, citing sovereignty problems with trying to negotiate US pre-inspection. The concern is sovereignty infringement by having US law enforcement officials at the airports overseas. Where we do have this presence, it has been negotiated with some difficulty. State believes that the lookout process in place for the UK and Japan, whereby individuals' names are checked in a computer when they arrive at a US airport, is the best answer.

State advances the argument that our foreign policy interests are served by waiving the visa requirement, as it is a very positive indication of US confidence if a country has this special arrangement with the US. Failure to go ahead with the program now will bring negative publicity in those countries during your trip. We cannot base a decision entirely on the public reaction, but it is a consideration, since there are other matters of discord. In the current climate, a negative decision on this would be exaggerated in the press and probably in the minds of the public.

Another extremely strong consideration is counterterrorism. We must lower the odds of a terrorist incident. To the extent that lack of visas or pre-inspection leave a gap -- or raise the risk -- we must try to close that gap and lower the risk.

One downside to the program concerns certain former Nazis who are prohibited (by the Holtzman amendment) from entering the US. These German citizens are currently screened during the visa application process via a "watch list" of tens of thousands of former Nazis. Under the visa waiver program, they would be screened only at point of entry into the US. While there are steps that can be taken to minimize the problem, there inevitably will be cases in which West German citizens are turned back from the US because their names appeared on the list, leading to damaging publicity here and in the FRG.

Following is my proposal, worked out today. It has general agreement from State, Transportation, FAA, Commerce, and NSC. Justice still would prefer linking pre-inspection to the visa waiver program. The proposal is:

-- That we proceed with extension of the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program to the remaining six countries. This would allow you to make announcements during your forthcoming visits in Italy and the FRG.

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-- That we seek to achieve de facto pre-inspection by a series of steps designed to enhance international air travel safety for all. This would include enhanced exchange of information in narcotics, counterterrorism, and other undesirable personal characteristics. We propose high-level bilateral meetings in June to seek ways in which we can promote cooperation in these areas.

Nonetheless, formal pre-inspection should not be dropped as a goal. It is agreed by State (at least for the time being) that Justice should go forward in trying to reach agreement for pre-inspection. Pre-inspection should be included in the high-level discussions you authorize. It will be important to Justice that you give some emphasis to seeking pre-inspection.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the plan outlined above to go ahead with 1) extending the nonimmigrant visas waiver pilot program to the FRG, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland without linkage to pre-inspection, and 2) authorizing a US initiative of high-level bilateral talks with each of the eight countries to enhance cooperation on air travel safety, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Acting Secretary of State Position Letter
Tab B Attorney General Position Letter

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3891

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lawrence S. Eagleburger
The Acting Secretary

SUBJECT: Nonimmigrant Visas Waiver Pilot Program

I. Summary

- o Several governments may raise the Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP) during your European trip. It could become an irritant in our relations with the FRG, France and Italy. Since the Attorney General and I hold different views of the program, we have decided to refer the matter to you for your decision. The Attorney General will give you his views in a separate memorandum.

II. Background

- o In the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Congress authorized a three-year pilot program to waive temporary visitor visas for up to eight countries under certain conditions. The program has already been implemented successfully in the United Kingdom and Japan.
- o In October 1988, Secretary Shultz, as obliged under the terms of IRCA, sought concurrence from the Attorney General to include six more countries in the program. Acting Secretary Armacost and Secretary Baker later reiterated his request (Tab 1). The six countries, chosen because they have the largest nonimmigrant visa volume and low rates of visa refusals, are the FRG, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden.
- o Unless a decision about the visa waiver is made soon, the Department will have to commit additional resources to accommodate the annual 20% increase in nonimmigrant visa workload anticipated in the proposed countries.

- o The Attorney General on May 5 replied to Secretary Baker's letter of March 31 (Tab 2). He stated that for security reasons, he would not endorse an expansion of VWPP unless it were linked with preinspection. (Preinspection is the inspection abroad of U.S.-bound passengers by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.)

III. Discussion

- o I believe that for you to announce the extension of the VWPP to six more countries -- including the FRG, Italy and France -- would have a very positive impact on the atmosphere for your forthcoming European trips. The countries proposed for inclusion in the VWPP support it.
- o Delay or termination of the program would cause negative and emotional reactions in Italy, West Germany and France. These reactions could mar the prospects for your visits to these countries.
- o Preinspection, as advocated by Justice, is a complex issue with resource, security and political implications. State's position is that preinspection should not be linked to the nonimmigrant visa waiver pilot program. At the moment, it is uncertain if any of the six countries would agree to have INS operate in its airports. INS itself estimates its preinspection plans would call for an additional 105 full-time and 69 part-time positions, a significant expansion of our official presence in Europe.
- o Even the limited, experimental program in Shannon required a year's negotiation with the Irish. It is thus doubtful that preinspection facilities, even if agreed to by the six proposed countries, could be in place in time to give the pilot program a fair trial before its Congressionally mandated expiration in the fall of 1991. A further complication would be demands by other countries for reciprocal privileges.
- o Expansion of VWPP raises security and law enforcement questions, some of which can be addressed with arrangements similar to those now in effect with the United Kingdom and Japan. We are now transferring information from the visa lookout system to the INS lookout system, so that screening now performed during the visa issuance process can be done during the

admittance process at the ports of entry. We can also handle problems peculiar to the FRG and Italy (i.e., the number of former Nazis ineligible for visas for having participated in WWII persecutions, the ease with which residents of the GDR get FRG passports, and interdiction of organized crime and drug figures). Our views on handling these problems are at Tab 1.

- o Congress asked that this program be tested. If the Administration does not there will likely be Congressional criticism. Indeed, by letter of April 25, 1989, Senator Kennedy, speaking for the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration, already inquired about continuing delays in full implementation. On May 3, Congressman Morrison, speaking for the House Subcommittee, sent a similar letter to the Attorney General.

Recommendation

- o That, before leaving for Europe later this month, you resolve differences between the Departments of State and Justice on full implementation of the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program by authorizing extension of the program to the six proposed countries without preinspection being a condition.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Secretary Baker's letter of March 31, 1989
- Tab 2 Attorney General Thornburgh's letter of May 5, 1989

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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'89 APR -3 AR:29

March 31, 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Dick:

I am writing to follow up on letters of October 17, 1988, and January 24, 1989, nominating the six countries to be added to Japan and the United Kingdom as participants in the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program. Based on volume, low fraud and reciprocity, the six are the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland and Sweden. We urgently need your concurrence.

To obtain maximum benefits from this program, it should be fully operational before the 1989 summer tourist season begins. Moreover, under the provisions of section 405 of the Immigration Reform and Control Act, you and I must report on the program to Congress by July 1, 1990, giving our evaluation and our recommendation on its extension and expansion. If that report is to be useful, it should include the experience of at least one full summer season; otherwise, we may be subject to Congressional criticism.

As noted in the October 17 letter, concern has been voiced about certain aspects of expanding the program. As is more fully discussed in the appendix, Department of State and INS officers have discussed potential problems and have agreed that they are manageable.

In view of the time needed to institute a program before summer, I would appreciate your early reply.

With warm personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

James A. Baker, III

Enclosure:

Appendix

The Honorable

Richard L. Thornburgh,
Attorney General.

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 9/4/25~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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APPENDIX

Three concerns have been raised with respect to expansion of the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program (VWPP).

I. The Holtzman Amendment

The Holtzman amendment (section 212(a)(33) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) prohibits admission to the United States of former Nazis who participated in persecutions. The current method of administering this provision uses lists of names furnished to the visa lookout system by the Department of Justice's Office of Special Investigations (OSI). When a named person applies for a visa, the consular officer investigates to see whether the applicant is within the provisions of the Holtzman amendment.

About a hundred such cases arise each year, of which about 20% result in visa denial. In order to afford the same protection under VWPP, OSI will furnish its lists to the INS lookout system for identification at the ports of entry. Further investigation can be carried out using the Service's system of deferred inspection. This permits the traveler to proceed to his destination in the U.S. without legally "entering" the country, while the information is being gathered and evaluated. Final determination of admissibility can be made when the investigation is completed. A similar system is already in use with respect to excludable aliens from the United Kingdom. It has worked very well.

Widespread publicity within relevant countries about the various grounds of excludability should produce enough self selection among potential travelers to avoid embarrassing situations or compromise of the law.

II. Admission of Residents of the GDR

Based on its fundamental concept of German nationality, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) issues passports to any German, regardless of residence in the FRG or the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The issue of German nationality in a divided Germany remains extremely sensitive for the FRG government, and it has declared emphatically that it will not participate in a visa waiver program that treats FRG passport holders differently on the basis of residence in the FRG or GDR.

Instituting the nonimmigrant waiver program vis-a-vis the Federal Republic of Germany will not materially affect processing of FRG passport holders. At present, Foreign

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PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 9/14/25

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Service posts apply the same standards to all FRG passport holders, taking account of residence only so far as it may bear on the applicant's qualifications as a nonimmigrant. Indeed, in the great majority of cases it is impossible to tell whether a German applicant holding an FRG passport is a resident of the FRG or GDR.

On the other hand, both FRG and GDR identity documents are accurate and difficult to alter. GDR residents obtain FRG passports on the basis of GDR documents, so identity remains the same. Since the FBI has access to both the State and Justice lookout systems, it can enter the names of suspected GDR operatives or other undesirables into either. Such action should provide considerable protection against the surreptitious entry of GDR agents on FRG passports (unless, of course, they have such well-concocted fictitious identities that we would not uncover them in the visa application process in any event).

Residents of the GDR present no other special problems.

III. Mafia

Implementation of the Nonimmigrant Visa Waiver Pilot Program will result in no less protection against Mafiosi than now available in the visa process. There is concern that the visa waiver program could diminish our ability to intercept Mafiosi and narcotics traffickers traveling from Italy to the United States. In the main, however, these people do not now appear in either the State or Justice lookout systems and are not detectable during the visa or admissions process. If they do appear in the lookouts they do so as being ineligible under one of the usual grounds of ineligibility and can be just as easily barred from admission at the port of entry.

DOC 2109V

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05f. Letter	Dick Thornburgh to James A. Baker, III RE: Visa Waiver Pilot Program (2 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [10]

Date Closed: 5/31/2011	OA/ID Number: 30544
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Blackwill

May 24, 1989

ACTION

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ARNOLD KAUFER/ROBERT BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: NATO Summit CFE Proposal - Presidential Letters

Attached at TAB I is a proposed memorandum to the President, recommending that he sign the letters at TAB A to Allied leaders. The letters outline the US proposal. In addition, we have prepared copies of the cables at TAB B to those Allied leaders from the President indicating the imminent arrival of his letter by special courier. We recommend that the President authorize the cable text to be transmitted to the appropriate heads of government.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Done by RMB

5/23.

Cables transmitted
through WHSR.

Letters delivered
by Gater.

NFA req'd.

MP
5/25

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SS NARA, Date 10/22/13

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20535

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: NATO Summit Initiative - Letters to Allied Leaders

Purpose

For you to approve formally the text of the letters to key Allied leaders on your CFE proposal at the NATO Summit, to sign the letters at TAB A, and approve the text of a cable to those leaders requesting they receive Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and my deputy, Robert Gates.

Background

You directed that Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and Bob Gates personally carry letters to key Allied heads of government outlining the proposal you will make at the NATO Summit on conventional arms control. The letters at TAB A convey the details of this proposal and your rationale for taking this step.

In addition, you directed that a message be prepared and dispatched to those Allied capitals, asking the host head of government to receive Eagleburger and Gates. I have included for your approval copies of those cables at TAB B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters at TAB A and approve the text of the cables at TAB B.

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2003-08-28-F/1
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Ruud:

The last few years have witnessed historic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Obligated to confront the failure of their social systems, the members of the Warsaw Pact have been engaged in a fundamental reassessment of their national priorities. This reassessment has produced initial signs in Moscow and some Eastern European capitals of a serious intention to reallocate resources from their swollen military establishments to their impoverished civil economies. We may finally have before us an unprecedented opportunity to begin lifting the West out of the shadows cast by the overwhelming conventional forces which the Soviet Union and its allies have amassed against us since 1945.

I have been considering ways we can capitalize on this opportunity now, thereby encouraging fundamental changes in Soviet force posture that, once accomplished, will be difficult to reverse by any future Soviet leader or set of leaders. The most promising avenue toward this goal leads through the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now underway in Vienna.

The Eastern states have already adopted major elements of the Western approach in these talks. They have recognized that substantial disparities exist between the conventional forces deployed by members of the two alliances and have agreed that these disparities should be

removed. Further progress remains blocked, however, by disputes over the categories of equipment to be reduced. Meanwhile, President Gorbachev claims that his vision for easing the military confrontation in Europe is more ambitious than our own. I believe the Atlantic Alliance should respond decisively to this challenge.

To this end, I am going to propose at the NATO Summit for consideration by our colleagues a new move in the East-West talks on conventional arms. It would amplify or expand our current position in CFE in three areas by:

- First, locking in Eastern acceptance of the proposed Western ceilings on tanks (20,000 for each side) and armored troop carriers (28,000 for each side). Additionally, we would seek early agreement on a ceiling for artillery in the range between NATO's number (16,500) and the Pact number (24,000), provided definitional problems can be resolved. All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Second, expanding our current proposal to include cuts of 15 percent below the combined total for members of the Alliance in two additional categories: helicopters (attack and assault/transport) and aircraft (all land-based combat aircraft regardless of role or configuration). All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Third, proposing a manpower ceiling on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at approximately 275,000 each. The resulting reduction in U.S. manpower would represent approximately 20 percent of U.S. ground and air combat manpower in the theater. This manpower ceiling will require the Soviets to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe by 325,000.

Finally, I am going to propose an accelerated timetable for reaching and implementing an agreement along these lines. I believe that it should be possible to reach such an agreement in perhaps six months to a year, and to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

I have asked Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy National Security Adviser Gates to discuss these ideas with you.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Ruud Lubbers
Prime Minister of the Netherlands
The Hague

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

The last few years have witnessed historic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Obligated to confront the failure of their social systems, the members of the Warsaw Pact have been engaged in a fundamental reassessment of their national priorities. This reassessment has produced initial signs in Moscow and some Eastern European capitals of a serious intention to reallocate resources from their swollen military establishments to their impoverished civil economies. We may finally have before us an unprecedented opportunity to begin lifting the West out of the shadows cast by the overwhelming conventional forces which the Soviet Union and its allies have amassed against us since 1945.

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I have asked Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy National Security Adviser Gates to discuss these ideas with you.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Ciriaco De Mita
President of the Council of Ministers
of the Italian Republic
Rome

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

The last few years have witnessed historic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Obligated to confront the failure of their social systems, the members of the Warsaw Pact have been engaged in a fundamental reassessment of their national priorities. This reassessment has produced initial signs in Moscow and some Eastern European capitals of a serious intention to reallocate resources from their swollen military establishments to their impoverished civil economies. We may finally have before us an unprecedented opportunity to begin lifting the West out of the shadows cast by the overwhelming conventional forces which the Soviet Union and its allies have amassed against us since 1945.

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The Eastern states have already adopted major elements of the Western approach in these talks. They have recognized that substantial disparities exist between the conventional forces deployed by members of the two alliances and have agreed that these disparities should be

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I have asked Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy National Security Adviser Gates to discuss these ideas with you.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Francois Mitterrand
President of the French Republic
Paris

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Helmut:

The last few years have witnessed historic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Obligated to confront the failure of their social systems, the members of the Warsaw Pact have been engaged in a fundamental reassessment of their national priorities. This reassessment has produced initial signs in Moscow and some Eastern European capitals of a serious intention to reallocate resources from their swollen military establishments to their impoverished civil economies. We may finally have before us an unprecedented opportunity to begin lifting the West out of the shadows cast by the overwhelming conventional forces which the Soviet Union and its allies have amassed against us since 1945.

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removed. Further progress remains blocked, however, by disputes over the categories of equipment to be reduced. Meanwhile, President Gorbachev claims that his vision for easing the military confrontation in Europe is more ambitious than our own. I believe the Atlantic Alliance should respond decisively to this challenge.

To this end, I am going to propose at the NATO Summit for consideration by our colleagues a new move in the East-West talks on conventional arms. It would amplify or expand our current position in CFE in three areas by:

- First, locking in Eastern acceptance of the proposed Western ceilings on tanks (20,000 for each side) and armored troop carriers (28,000 for each side). Additionally, we would seek early agreement on a ceiling for artillery in the range between NATO's number (16,500) and the Pact number (24,000), provided definitional problems can be resolved. All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Second, expanding our current proposal to include cuts of 15 percent below the combined total for members of the Alliance in two additional categories: helicopters (attack and assault/transport) and aircraft (all land-based combat aircraft regardless of role or configuration). All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Third, proposing a manpower ceiling on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at approximately 275,000 each. The resulting reduction in U.S. manpower would represent approximately 20 percent of U.S. ground and air combat manpower in the theater. This manpower ceiling will require the Soviets to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe by 325,000.

Finally, I am going to propose an accelerated timetable for reaching and implementing an agreement along these lines. I believe that it should be possible to reach such an agreement in perhaps six months to a year, and to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

I have asked Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy National Security Adviser Gates to discuss these ideas with you.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany
Bonn

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Margaret:

The last few years have witnessed historic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Obligated to confront the failure of their social systems, the members of the Warsaw Pact have been engaged in a fundamental reassessment of their national priorities. This reassessment has produced initial signs in Moscow and some Eastern European capitals of a serious intention to reallocate resources from their swollen military establishments to their impoverished civil economies. We may finally have before us an unprecedented opportunity to begin lifting the West out of the shadows cast by the overwhelming conventional forces which the Soviet Union and its allies have amassed against us since 1945.

I have been considering ways we can capitalize on this opportunity now, thereby encouraging fundamental changes in Soviet force posture that, once accomplished, will be difficult to reverse by any future Soviet leader or set of leaders. The most promising avenue toward this goal leads through the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now underway in Vienna.

The Eastern states have already adopted major elements of the Western approach in these talks. They have recognized that substantial disparities exist between the conventional forces deployed by members of the two alliances and have agreed that these disparities should be

removed. Further progress remains blocked, however, by disputes over the categories of equipment to be reduced. Meanwhile, President Gorbachev claims that his vision for easing the military confrontation in Europe is more ambitious than our own. I believe the Atlantic Alliance should respond decisively to this challenge.

To this end, I am going to propose at the NATO Summit for consideration by our colleagues a new move in the East-West talks on conventional arms. It would amplify or expand our current position in CFE in three areas by:

- First, locking in Eastern acceptance of the proposed Western ceilings on tanks (20,000 for each side) and armored troop carriers (28,000 for each side). Additionally, we would seek early agreement on a ceiling for artillery in the range between NATO's number (16,500) and the Pact number (24,000), provided definitional problems can be resolved. All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Second, expanding our current proposal to include cuts of 15 percent below the combined total for members of the Alliance in two additional categories: helicopters (attack and assault/transport) and aircraft (all land-based combat aircraft regardless of role or configuration). All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Third, proposing a manpower ceiling on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at approximately 275,000 each. The resulting reduction in U.S. manpower would represent approximately 20 percent of U.S. ground and air combat manpower in the theater. This manpower ceiling will require the Soviets to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe by 325,000.

Finally, I am going to propose an accelerated timetable for reaching and implementing an agreement along these lines. I believe that it should be possible to reach such an agreement in perhaps six months to a year, and to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

I have asked Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy National Security Adviser Gates to discuss these ideas with you.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Manfred:

The last few years have witnessed historic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Obligated to confront the failure of their social systems, the members of the Warsaw Pact have been engaged in a fundamental reassessment of their national priorities. This reassessment has produced initial signs in Moscow and some Eastern European capitals of a serious intention to reallocate resources from their swollen military establishments to their impoverished civil economies. We may finally have before us an unprecedented opportunity to begin lifting the West out of the shadows cast by the overwhelming conventional forces which the Soviet Union and its allies have amassed against us since 1945.

I have been considering ways we can capitalize on this opportunity now, thereby encouraging fundamental changes in Soviet force posture that, once accomplished, will be difficult to reverse by any future Soviet leader or set of leaders. The most promising avenue toward this goal leads through the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe (CFE), now underway in Vienna.

The Eastern states have already adopted major elements of the Western approach in these talks. They have recognized that substantial disparities exist between the conventional forces deployed by members of the two alliances and have agreed that these disparities should be

removed. Further progress remains blocked, however, by disputes over the categories of equipment to be reduced. Meanwhile, President Gorbachev claims that his vision for easing the military confrontation in Europe is more ambitious than our own. I believe the Atlantic Alliance should respond decisively to this challenge.

To this end, I am going to propose at the NATO Summit for consideration by our colleagues a new move in the East-West talks on conventional arms. It would amplify or expand our current position in CFE in three areas by:

- First, locking in Eastern acceptance of the proposed Western ceilings on tanks (20,000 for each side) and armored troop carriers (28,000 for each side). Additionally, we would seek early agreement on a ceiling for artillery in the range between NATO's number (16,500) and the Pact number (24,000), provided definitional problems can be resolved. All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Second, expanding our current proposal to include cuts of 15 percent below the combined total for members of the Alliance in two additional categories: helicopters (attack and assault/transport) and aircraft (all land-based combat aircraft regardless of role or configuration). All of the equipment reduced would be destroyed.
- Third, proposing a manpower ceiling on U.S. and Soviet ground and air forces stationed outside of national territory in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone at approximately 275,000 each. The resulting reduction in U.S. manpower would represent approximately 20 percent of U.S. ground and air combat manpower in the theater. This manpower ceiling will require the Soviets to reduce their forces in Eastern Europe by 325,000.

Finally, I am going to propose an accelerated timetable for reaching and implementing an agreement along these lines. I believe that it should be possible to reach such an agreement in perhaps six months to a year, and to accomplish the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

I have asked Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger and Deputy National Security Adviser Gates to discuss these ideas with you.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Dr. Manfred Woerner
Secretary General of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Brussels

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY VIA CABINET OFFICE

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRIME MINISTER MINISTER THATCHER

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MARGARET,

I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. I WOULD LIKE,
THEREFORE, TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER AND
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GATES TO LONDON TO BRIEF YOU IN
ADVANCE ON THAT PROPOSAL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEE
THEM ON WEDNESDAY MORNING TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM ME EXPLAINING
THE PROPOSAL. I AM SENDING THEM TO LONDON FIRST, AFTER WHICH
THEY WILL GO TO PARIS, ROME, BONN AND BRUSSELS (TO SEE SECRETARY
GENERAL WOERNER). I REALIZE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT HOPE THAT
YOU WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST.

EAGLEBURGER AND GATES ARE COMING CONFIDENTIALLY AND THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH YOU WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. I WOULD ASK THAT
YOUR GOVERNMENT MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR PRESENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0368-F11
ES 8/12/09

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY VIA BLUE CHANNEL

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR FRANCOIS,

I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. I WOULD LIKE,
THEREFORE, TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER AND
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GATES TO PARIS TO BRIEF YOU IN
ADVANCE ON THAT PROPOSAL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEE
THEM ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM ME
EXPLAINING THE PROPOSAL. I REALIZE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT
HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST.

EAGLEBURGER AND GATES ARE COMING CONFIDENTIALLY AND THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH YOU WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. I WOULD ASK THAT
YOUR GOVERNMENT MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR PRESENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2008-0368-F11
26 8/12/09

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY VIA MERCURY CHANNELS

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
PRIME MINISTER DE MITA

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER,

I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. I WOULD LIKE,
THEREFORE, TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER AND
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GATES TO ROME TO BRIEF YOU IN
ADVANCE ON THAT PROPOSAL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEE
THEM ON THURSDAY MORNING TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM ME EXPLAINING
THE PROPOSAL. I REALIZE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT HOPE THAT YOU
WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST.

EAGLEBURGER AND GATES ARE COMING CONFIDENTIALLY AND THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH YOU WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. I WOULD ASK THAT
YOUR GOVERNMENT MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR PRESENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
0003-0348-F11
EL 8/12/09

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY VIA SKIPPER CHANNELS

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
CHANCELLOR KOHL

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR HELMUT,

I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. I WOULD LIKE,
THEREFORE, TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER AND
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GATES TO BONN TO BRIEF YOU IN
ADVANCE ON THAT PROPOSAL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD SEE
THEM ON THURSDAY AFTERNOON TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM ME EXPLAINING
THE PROPOSAL. I REALIZE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT HOPE THAT YOU
WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST.

EAGLEBURGER AND GATES ARE COMING CONFIDENTIALLY AND THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH YOU WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. I WOULD ASK THAT
YOUR GOVERNMENT MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR PRESENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE

END TEXT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2003-0368 F11
ES 01/21/09

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06m. Message	From President Bush to Ambassador Alton Keel, Re: Conventional Force Reductions [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [10]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
By MM on 8/31/2018

Date Closed: 5/31/2011	OA/ID Number: 30544
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2012-1589-MR(504.12)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 6/17/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 1.4(c)

1.4(c) BRUSSELS: PLEASE IMMEDIATELY DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
TO AMBASSADOR ALTON KEEL

BEGIN TEXT:

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR KEEL

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL:

I HAVE DECIDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PROPOSAL ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCE REDUCTIONS AT THE UPCOMING NATO SUMMIT. I WOULD LIKE,
THEREFORE, TO SEND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE EAGLEBURGER AND
DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER GATES TO BRUSSELS TO BRIEF YOU
IN ADVANCE ON THAT PROPOSAL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD
SEE THEM EARLY THURSDAY EVENING TO RECEIVE A LETTER FROM ME
EXPLAINING THE PROPOSAL. I REALIZE THIS IS SHORT NOTICE, BUT
HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE MY REQUEST.

EAGLEBURGER AND GATES ARE COMING CONFIDENTIALLY AND THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH YOU WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL. I WOULD ASK THAT
YOU MAKE NO REFERENCE TO THEIR PRESENCE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN BRUSSELS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1589-MR
6/17/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

Chron

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

3443

May 26, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe
Gonzalez of Spain, May 8, 1989

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of the telephone call placed
to Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain on May 8, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached MEMCON be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By *96* NARA, Date *10/22/13*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3443

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
JL 7/10/09

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Interpreter/Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC

DATE: May 8, 1989,
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:16 - 2:30 p.m.

The President said he was calling on a specific subject near and dear to his heart, and one in which he knew that Prime Minister Gonzalez has great interest: the elections in Panama. Former President Jimmy Carter was down in Panama, although he was there on his own. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez told the President that he already knew this, as he had been following President Carter's statements in Panama. (S)

The President went on to say that Jimmy Carter had told General Scowcroft that the opposition forces had in fact won a victory. There was some fear on his part that at this very minute Noriega was deliberating on whether or not to allow the election results to stand, or whether to manipulate them into a victory for himself. As a result of these events, he wanted to run the following idea by the Prime Minister. In view of the respect everybody in Central America has for the Prime Minister, would he be willing to talk to General Noriega on the following basis? Recalling that he had offered asylum to General Noriega in March of 1988, he might call and tell him that the U.S. would not seek to extradite Noriega in Panama, or in Spain or in any other country. The U.S. would make the same stipulation now as it had before, if Noriega respects the results of the elections. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez asked the President directly if his proposal was that whether Noriega stays in Panama or goes to

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Declassify on: OADR

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2

~~SECRET~~

Spain or a third country, the United States would not seek to extradite him as long as he abandons power? (S)

The President confirmed this. In addition, the U.S. would be willing quickly to restore normal relations with the new government of Panama. If Noriega agrees to step down, the U.S. would not seek extradition and the U.S. would move immediately to restore relations, which would benefit Panama very much. This last point would also be conveyed by Jimmy Carter. Noriega should know that, if he insists on manipulating the results, the U.S. simply could not have business as usual with Panama. The U.S. could not even continue the relationship it had recently had with Panama. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez asked if he had understood correctly that the message consists of three points: the first point is that if Noriega recognizes the election results and gives up power, the U.S. would not seek to extradite him. Secondly, if Noriega leaves power there would be immediate normalization of relations with Panama. Thirdly, if he stays in power, even the precarious relations which now exist with Panama would not continue. (S)

The President stated that this was a correct understanding of his message. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that in that case he would do it. He would call Noriega and transmit this message, in addition to what Carter would do. (S)

The President went on to say that the reason he had asked the Prime Minister to do this is because of the universal respect he enjoys in that area. The President could not think of anyone better to convey this message with authority, and he personally appreciated the Prime Minister's willingness to do so. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he would immediately make this demarche to Noriega, and that he would monitor the situation closely over the next two or three hours. He would be back in touch in a day or two. (S)

The President told the Prime Minister that he was looking forward to hearing from him and thanked him very much. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that he did this with great pleasure. (S)

The President then asked the Prime Minister if he had plans for any private visit to the U.S. over the next few months. If so, he would love to see him on a private basis. Perhaps he could also talk Gonzalez into coming in the fall on an official basis as well. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

Prime Minister Gonzalez thanked the President very much. He told the President that, if he has occasion to come, he will let him know. In any case, he would see the President in Brussels at the end of this month. (S)

The President said he would see him for sure, although it would be a little hectic. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez ended saying that time would be short, but that at least they would have an occasion to see each other. (S)

The President ended the conversation by saying that he was looking forward to that too. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Chun

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4115

May 26, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA (Acting)

AMB

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe
Gonzalez of Spain, May 23, 1989

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of the telephone call placed
to Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain on May 23, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached MEMCON be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2008
By ES NARA, Date 10/22/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WASHINGTON

4115

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg
Notetake: Adrian Basora, NSC

DATE: May 23, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 12:31-12:41 p.m.

Prime Minister Gonzalez initiated the call, saying that he wanted to share his impressions from his visit the previous day to the Federal Republic of Germany and to Chancellor Kohl. President Gonzalez said that with the NATO Summit so close he wanted to convey the great concern and great tension he saw in Chancellor Kohl. He wanted to ask the President to make a special effort so there might be agreement on the SNF matter. Disagreement at the Summit would be terribly negative.

The President said he wouldn't want to exaggerate the negative impact. There were still some German differences not just with the United States but with the British and perhaps the French. But, the President would be interested in hearing Prime Minister Gonzalez' impressions from seeing Chancellor Kohl.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he really thought that when you looked at the current German situation closely the limit of any positive action within NATO was really defined by Chancellor Kohl himself. If NATO positions that have been stipulated up to now are maintained, a good road to solution could be found.

The President said he appreciated Prime Minister Gonzalez' views and that the U.S. and Kohl were not too far apart. In fact, when Stoltenberg was here and met with Secretary Baker and Brent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
36 7/10/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Scowcroft and others, we were very close. Then the Germans went home and pulled back a little from what was discussed. The President said we would keep working on this matter and he appreciated Prime Minister Gonzalez's advice and sound counsel.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said that the next day he would see Mr. Shamir, and also the King of Morocco dealing with the problem of the Arab Summit.

The President said that would be very interesting. He asked Prime Minister Gonzalez to take a look at a statement by Secretary of State Baker the previous day on the Middle East situation. It was a very balanced statement and one that he strongly supports. The U.S. is trying to encourage dialogue and to stop the violence, and encouraging the Israelis not to move forward with settlements. Secretary Baker's speech might be helpful to review so as to know the U.S. position before Shamir arrives.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he would be certain to look at the speech. He added that he was continuing contacts with certain persons on the Panamanian scene to see if they could provide some impetus toward a solution.

The President added that the U.S. had no intention of escalating military action. But, anything Prime Minister Gonzalez could do to use his prestige to get others to follow through on the OAS resolution would be helpful. We would be extremely grateful and the people who want peace in Panama would be too. The President appreciated Prime Minister Gonzalez' continued interest in that tough situation.

Prime Minister Gonzalez thanked the President and said that he wanted him to know that he would continue his work in this direction. If there was any news worth reporting he would be in touch.

The President said that if he had any thoughts, he would like to feel that he could call Prime Minister Gonzalez.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he would be delighted and also thanked the President.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRON

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3776

May 26, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*
SUBJECT: State Draft Report on H.R. 398

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Ronald Peterson at OMB relaying NSC concurrence on the draft report (Tab A.)

Concurrences by: *AAB* Adrian Basora (Acting), Virginia Lampley, Nicholas Rostow

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I memorandum to Peterson.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Peterson
Tab A State Draft
Tab II Incoming from Peterson

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

3776

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: State Draft Report on H.R. 398

The NSC concurs with the State Department draft report at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A State Department Draft



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

With reference to your letter of February 21 to Secretary Baker, following is the Department of State's Report on H.R. 398 -- Application of Helsinki Final Act Criteria to Determination of Eligibility for Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Status:

The basic intent of H.R. 398, to improve the human rights performance of countries not in compliance with the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), is a worthy objective. It has been our constant goal for four decades to obtain greater respect for basic human rights, including freedom of assembly, association, religion, press, speech and emigration and travel, by the regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. However, we do not believe that passage of H.R. 398 is the best way to achieve our common goal.

For fifteen years, since the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has provided a clear framework linking the extension of MFN trade benefits to Jewish and other emigration from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. For over a decade, Jackson-Vanik played a major role in the continuation of emigration from Romania. If enacted, H.R. 398 would undercut our leverage on the emigration of Jewish and other groups from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

H.R. 398 puts more weight on MFN than it can bear. It adds many new conditions and makes attaining MFN impossible for many of the countries in the region. By adding so many unreachable conditions, H.R. 398 would result in loss of our leverage on emigration. Since its passage, Jackson-Vanik has provided four Administrations with the flexibility to encourage a wide range of human rights improvements. The addition of the rigid and much broader conditionality required in H.R. 398 would reduce

The Honorable
Dante B. Fascell,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

our ability to press for the maximum feasible human rights improvements, which we have done with some success by tailoring our approaches to each country.

Thus, while we agree with the goals H.R. 398 advances, we believe our interpretation and implementation of Jackson-Vanik provides adequate means to achieve our objectives in improving the human rights performance of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, without endangering U.S. leverage on Jewish and other emigration from these countries.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Janet G. Mullins
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

SPECIAL

MAY 12, 1989

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer -

National Security Council (Hughes 456-2224)	49
Department of Justice (Perkins 633-2113)	17
Department of Commerce (Levitt 377-3151)	04
United States Trade Representative (Bolton x3150)	23
Department of Labor (Zinman 523-8201)	18
Department of the Treasury (Carro 566-8523)	28
Department of Agriculture (Shapiro 382-1516)	01

SUBJECT: State draft report on H.R. 398, to enforce the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by denying most favored nation status to countries which are not in complete or substantially complete compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than FRIDAY, MAY 26, 1989.

Questions should be referred to **Annette Rooney/Sue Thau (395-7300)**, the legislative analysts in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson

RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosure

cc: T. Davis
T. Dorsey
T. Thiele

SPECIAL

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

May 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL ^{RB}

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA ^{AAB}

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe
Gonzalez of Spain, May 11, 1989

Attached at Tab A is the memorandum of the telephone call placed
to Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain on May 11, 1989.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached TELCON be filed for the record.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 26 NARA, Date 8/12/09

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Interpreter: Stephanie van Reigersberg, State
Notetaker: Adrian Basora, NSC

DATE: May 11, 1989,
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:20 - 1:30 p.m.

The President recalled that the 24-hour period was about over and wondered if there was anything new. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez replied that not only was there nothing new but the situation had gotten worse. He had been in touch the previous day with the Papal Nuncio and with the Spanish Ambassador and they had confirmed that there was no flexibility on the part of Noriega and even less on the part of the National Strategic Council. Prime Minister Gonzalez continued that, according to his information, the National Strategic Council had an even tougher stand than Noriega himself. In view of this, Gonzalez was giving up his attempt to find a reasonable solution. (S)

The President said this was very discouraging. He had talked with Carlos Andres Perez and was still hoping for statements in this hemisphere about the fraud and the fact that Endara had been elected. At one point Perez was willing to declare that Endara was President, but other Latin Americans had pulled back from that approach. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he had talked to Carlos Andres Perez that morning and learned that, because of difficulties posed by some countries, it would not be possible to go as far as he had desired. Instead, there will be a convocation of the OAS without going so far as to recognize the victory of Endara. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
2000-0429-F
3L 8/21/09

The President said he thought he knew the two countries that had been recalcitrant and unwilling to participate. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez replied that he knew who they were too. (S)

The President then spoke of the 40,000 Americans in Panama, and of U.S. obligations under the Canal Treaty. There was an Embassy and U.S. dependents about whose safety he was concerned. He would have to take some action very soon aimed at protecting the lives of Americans in Panama. He was not interested in abrogating the Canal Treaty, but he would insist that Panama live up to its obligations and he fully intended to exercise U.S. rights under the Treaty. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez said he understood perfectly and that this position was eminently correct. It was not an annulment of the Treaty but an insistence that the Treaty be complied with. That was a very good approach. (S)

The President confirmed that this was what he would be doing. He did not want to risk the brutality and unpredictability of Noriega. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez agreed and said he was working to ensure a very strong statement by the EC -- stronger than was made right after the electoral fraud. He hoped for a firm response from the EC. (S)

The President said this would be magnificent. It would focus world opinion on this travesty. He hoped Gonzalez would be able to bring it off. He then asked when the EC decision might be forthcoming. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez replied that it should be ready by the next day. (S)

The President said that was good news and he appreciated this effort. He expressed his respect for Gonzalez and looked forward to hearing from him again. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez agreed that they should maintain contact. (S)