

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2011-0298-F

FOIA Number:
2011-0298-F

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Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30543
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL

3162

May 1, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RH*
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Norwegian Prime
Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, Wednesday, May 3,
1989, 10:00-10:20 p.m.

At Tab 1 is the President's briefing package for his meeting with Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.

As the Prime Minister's preoccupation will be with environmental issues, we have highlighted these in the President's package, along with specific markers we hope he can lay down. Our objective, however, is to turn the discussion toward the SNF issue, and to solicit Prime Minister Brundtland's support for a position that holds the line against early SNF negotiations with Moscow.

DM Donald Mahley, *SM* Eric Melby, and *DP* David Pacelli concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3162

MEETING WITH NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND

DATE: May 3, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To seek Norway's support on the SNF issue as we prepare for the NATO Summit, and to discuss international environmental issues.

II. BACKGROUND

Prime Minister Brundtland is in Washington on a private visit, during which she will make three speeches on the environment and will receive several awards from environmental and scientific groups.

Our objective is to engage Prime Minister Brundtland on SNF and enlist her support in resolving the issue before the NATO Summit. Although opposed to modernization and in favor of early negotiations, the Norwegians have been helpful by communicating their views privately -- until last week, when Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg responded to Genscher's request by taking a public stance in support of Bonn's position. Still, there may be give in the Norwegian position. Prime Minister Brundtland supports nuclear deterrence and flexible response, opposes a "third zero," and agrees that SNF reductions should be linked to redressing conventional imbalances. This position gives you an opportunity to drive home our opposition to early SNF negotiations and the urgent need for the Alliance to reach agreement before the NATO Summit.

On the broader themes concerning the NATO Summit, the Prime Minister will reflect Norway's public anti-nuclear sentiment and conviction that the West needs to respond to Gorbachev's "new" Soviet Union. She would welcome your assurance that we are developing new initiatives in U.S.-Soviet relations. You could also explain that your initiative toward Poland is part of a new and more active U.S. effort to engage Eastern Europe at a time of major change in the region.

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It would also be useful to engage the Prime Minister on Nicaragua. Her government opposes U.S. policy and recently added \$4.5 million in unconditioned aid for the Sandinistas. While we are not likely to change Norway's basic views, you could urge Brundtland to give our bipartisan initiative a chance by holding the line on additional funding for the Sandinistas.

The Prime Minister will want to raise environmental issues. She chaired the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), which issued its report on "Our Common Future" in April 1987. The report advocates some ideas we cannot accept, including compulsory arbitration of international economic disputes, but it has been an important catalyst in focusing world attention on the need for concerted action on the environment.

Along with Prime Ministers Rocard of France and Lubbers of the Netherlands, Brundtland organized the March 1989 Hague conference that called for a new international authority to respond to the challenge of global warming. Our position is that such a new authority would conflict with the work of existing bodies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

Prime Minister Brundtland is likely to raise these issues in the context of the July Economic Summit. This would be a good opportunity for you to assure her that the Summit will highlight environmental issues but that it should also give impetus to work underway in existing forums, particularly those dealing with global climate change. She may mention her proposal for a multilateral dialogue to help stabilize the oil market. We have told Norway we do not believe this would be helpful.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Photo opportunity and meeting in Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Brundtland Biography
Tab C	List of Participants

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND

- As we prepare for the NATO Summit, it will be imperative for the Alliance to resolve its differences over SNF, particularly the issue of SNF negotiations with Moscow.
- o I know that you share our commitment to extended nuclear deterrence and oppose a "third zero" on SNF.
 - o We have been exceedingly flexible on Lance modernization, but we believe that early SNF negotiations with Moscow would raise pressures for a third zero and ultimately for the denuclearization of Europe.
 - o There should be concrete results in the Vienna conventional force reduction talks and substantial unilateral reductions of Moscow's overwhelming advantage in SNF before NATO should consider further restructuring or reductions in its SNF forces.
 - o I ask your support as we try to reach an Alliance consensus that holds the line against early SNF negotiations.

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-- It is important that these differences be resolved, so that the NATO Summit can focus on the future. We propose not only to celebrate the Alliance's past achievements but also to project a broad vision of Europe's future and the Alliance's role in it.

- o Beginning with our initiative on Poland, we seek to engage Eastern Europe creatively at a time of major change in the region -- and to do so in concert with our Allies.

- o We are doing the same in building on the progress in relations with the Soviet Union.

-- On Central America, I know we have our differences. But I hope your Government can give our bipartisan initiative a chance.

- o We believe that any Western aid to the Sandinistas should be linked to meaningful reforms.

- o The Sandinistas have not met the first target under the El Salvador agreement. The new electoral law and media law are seriously defective and completely ignored opposition proposals.

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- 3 -

- o Providing new unconditional aid at this point will erode prospects for democracy and peace.

- You have worked tirelessly on behalf of efforts to protect the global environment. My Administration salutes your work and shares your commitment.

- o I welcome the meeting you are organizing in Bergen next year. As I mentioned in my letter, Secretary Baker will be taking the lead in organizing U.S. participation.

- o As we consider new forms of international cooperation, we should avoid creating new bodies that may conflict with the work of those already in existence, like the International Panel on Climate Control (IPCC).

- We hope the Paris Economic Summit can give new impetus to international cooperation on the environment, as well as on human rights, counterterrorism, and narcotics control.

- (if asked) I do not think a producer-consumer dialogue on energy is desirable. Price and production issues are best left to the market place.

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND

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- o I know that you share our commitment to extended nuclear deterrence and oppose a "third zero" on SNF.
 - o We have been exceedingly flexible on Lance modernization, but we believe that early SNF negotiations with Moscow would raise pressures for a third zero and ultimately for the denuclearization of Europe.

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 - o I ask your support as we try to reach an Alliance consensus that holds the line against early SNF negotiations.
- It is important that these differences be resolved, so that the NATO Summit can focus on the future. We propose not only to celebrate the Alliance's past achievements but also to project a broad vision of Europe's future and the Alliance's role in it.

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 - o We are doing the same in building on the progress in relations with the Soviet Union.
- On Central America, I know we have our differences. But I hope your Government can give our bipartisan initiative a chance.
- o We believe that any Western aid to the Sandinistas should be linked to meaningful reforms.

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- o The Sandinistas have not met the first target under the El Salvador agreement. The new electoral law and media law are seriously defective and completely ignored opposition proposals.
- o Providing new unconditional aid at this point will erode prospects for democracy and peace.
- You have worked tirelessly on behalf of efforts to protect the global environment. My Administration salutes your work and shares your commitment.
- o I welcome the meeting you are organizing in Bergen next year. As I mentioned in my letter, Secretary Baker will be taking

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 - We hope the Paris Economic Summit can give new impetus to international cooperation on the environment, as well as on human rights, counterterrorism, and narcotics control.
 - (if asked) I do not think a producer-consumer dialogue on energy is desirable. Price and production issues are best left to the market place.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
The Vice President
Governor Sununu
Secretary Baker
General Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates
Robert D. Blackwill (NSC)
M. James Wilkinson

NORWAY

Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland
Kjeld Vibe,
Ambassador to the U.S.
Arne Strand,
State Secretary
Morten Wetland,
Special Advisor to the Prime Minister

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 1, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Update on Planning for the President's Trips to Europe and Associated Public Appearances

As agreed in the meeting on Saturday, April 29, I chaired a Steering Group for the President's European Trips and Policy Statements this morning, May 1. Jim Cicconi, Steve Studdert, and Roman Popadiuk were there and made helpful contributions. The Steering Group recommends that you reconvene your Coordinating Group on Wednesday afternoon, May 3, in order urgently to consider policy options for decision by the President.

The President's Schedule and Public Appearances

Marlin Fitzwater has sent you a memo (copy attached at Tab I) recommending four key foreign policy speeches by the President between now and June 2, in addition to the major address in Mainz and various other public statements during the trip. This memo was discussed at the meeting, leading to the following recommendations:

Texas A&M Commencement, May 12 - The President would announce results of the policy reviews with a global statement of the Administration's foreign policy approach. We suggest that this speech should announce the results of NSR-12, on overall national security strategy.

Boston University Commencement, May 21 - This speech (which will have to be limited to 10-12 minutes) could take up West-West relations and the Alliance.

Coast Guard Academy Commencement, May 24 - This statement would concentrate on US-Soviet relations.

Address to the Nation from the Oval Office, June 2 - In this speech the President would report to the country on his trip to Europe, the NATO Summit, and what he had achieved.

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The Press Office recommended that the Boston University speech take up US-Soviet relations, with the Coast Guard address discussing Western Europe and NATO. The Coast Guard statement would be the last major speech before departure and it would be helpful if it dwelt on the West-West themes that will be the focus of the trip. We believe, however, that this good argument is counterbalanced by two others: (1) We should talk about the Alliance and Western Europe before we talk about the Soviet Union; and (2) with Mitterrand present, it would be inappropriate for the President to concentrate on the Soviet Union.

Work is proceeding on other scheduling issues. The latest schedule, which integrates themes for the President's appearances, is attached at Tab II. White House Advance has agreed to incorporate arrival and departure statements as needed. The President will be talking to the troops in Germany. Studdert has sent you a memo outlining his view of options for the afternoon in England - a lead contender emerging from today's meeting was a picturesque visit to George Washington's ancestral home at Sulgrave Manor, about 50 miles outside of London. Studdert is still wrestling with some logistical obstacles associated with this option, however.

Policy Initiatives

Don Mahley and Philip Zelikow will get together with agency representatives today, May 1, and commission preparation of an interagency-agreed paper which will specifically describe possible initiatives, analyze their respective pros and cons, and, if there is time to obtain high-level reaction, indicate agency recommendations. This paper is due by COB Tuesday, May 2. It would become a working document for use at your May 3 meeting. The paper will discuss the following ideas:

1. CW Arms Control.
2. Open Skies. This would include the Canadian idea for NATO-Warsaw Pact open skies in addition to the US-Soviet variant.
3. New Steps to Advance CFE Goals. This concept would encompass the post-CFE I force requirements study, new and lower subceilings in the current NATO proposal for equipment in active units, and permanent observers.
4. CSCE Summit in 1990 and a related proposal that the CSCE process expand its scope to set standards for free multi-party elections.

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5. NATO Arms Market.

6. COCOM Licensing-Free Zone. This idea would have the US call for harmonizing export control restrictions of all NATO states to a common standard, thus allowing licensing to be dropped for transfers of technology between COCOM countries.

7. Reducing Scale and Number of US or NATO Training Exercises.

The President's July Visit to Europe - There was also discussion of where the President should go after the Economic Summit in July, having visited Poland and Hungary before arriving in Paris. I agree with Roz Ridgway that the Netherlands is a good possibility and she also mentioned Switzerland today. State will come to the Wednesday meeting with more formal views.

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memo from Fitzwater on President's Appearances
- Tab II - Current Trip Schedule

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I

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 1, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNOR SUNUNU
GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM:

MARLIN FITZWATER

SUBJECT:

Public Appearances by the President on
Foreign Policy

The month of May promises to be a high visibility time for foreign policy. Expectations for the foreign policy review are extraordinarily high. We must be able to publicly demonstrate that a coherent "world view" has emerged from this process.

We propose three Presidential addresses as follows:

1) May 12 -- Commencement Address at Texas A&M. The President would deliver a "world view" address outlining the broad results of his policy review process. The speech could center on such concepts as the rise of democracy, the failures of Communism, and the growing rise of free enterprise in national economies. This speech should wrap up the entire "review."

2) May 21 -- Boston University Commencement Address. The President's address would focus on US-Soviet relations including such points as an assessment of those relations, where he expects that relationship to go and how he expects to guide that relationship.

3) May 24 -- Coast Guard Commencement Address. This event is scheduled two days prior to departure for the NATO Summit. As a result, the President would focus on NATO, our strong European ties, and the mutual US-European commitment to defense and international affairs.

In addition to the above three scheduled events, we propose that the President return directly to Washington, D.C. on June 2 in order to deliver an Oval Office address to the nation. The address would summarize his European trip and outline his successes. We understand this may necessitate a scheduling change for the President but we believe it is something that should be considered. This is an important trip and it would be wise to demonstrate Presidential leadership from the Oval Office. It would give the President an opportunity to report on the success of the policy review as demonstrated in the NATO meeting.

timing?

5/18
Pres. in
Rochester for
educ / priv sector
event. Earlier
sched for
4/17. If
not, do smthg
else that
day.

longer speech

10-12 mins

will

will

I would also like to call to your attention some of the logistical problems the Press Office encounters on our foreign trips. I understand that we will be scheduling a number of arrival and departure statements by the President. It is also necessary to schedule time for either on-the-record or background readouts of these statements and of various Presidential meetings by either Secretary Baker or General Scowcroft. It is incumbent, therefore, that any scheduling leave either of these individuals free time to address the traveling press corps in the filing center. Both Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft should be available for readouts on meetings towards the end of the President's working schedule. The availability of the Secretary or General is particularly crucial during the first day of the NATO Summit.

Attachment

cc: Andrew H. Card, Jr.
Stephen Studdert
David F. Demarest, Jr.

by DAVID R. GERGEN
Editor at Large

A GLOBAL COMPACT

A rare moment in history is at hand. The old order is breaking up, and a new one is emerging at breathtaking speed. Western Europe is moving rapidly toward economic and political integration. Japan, having achieved enormous economic muscle, is groping toward new global responsibilities. And as the massive student demonstrations in Beijing last week illustrated yet again, people in Communist nations are defiantly turning away from the failures of Marx and Lenin.

For the United States, this should be a moment of triumph as well as opportunity. After all, it was a generous America that helped Europe and Japan recover and a stout America that contained Communism's outward reach until it began crumbling from within. Fortunately, George Bush recognizes that if the U.S. and its allies work wisely and in concert, they have a chance in the 1990s to build a much more stable and democratic world.

While the West has only limited influence behind the iron curtain, it can be modestly helpful, as Bush showed recently with his economic proposal to assist Poland. Private citizens can also serve as a human bridge. Prof. Richard Gardner of Columbia University points out that no one has ever written a book on how to convert a Communist economy to a free market, but Moscow is now quietly turning to some American economists for advice. The West must not blow this possibility of ridding the world of Communism, the worst idea of the 20th century.

Ironically, at a time of enormous potential, the Western democracies have problems of their own that demand attention. A White House aide put it this way recently: "I would like to go in and tell him, 'Mr. President, we have the best chance in 40 years to undo Yalta. There's only one catch: We can't afford it.'" Precisely. The United States is now in the ludicrous position of proposing generous bailouts for debtor nations while it runs up the biggest debts in its own history. America and its partners have allowed trade and other imbalances to build up for so many years that the international economic system is badly out of kilter. Unless the imbalances are corrected, they could cause a

financial crisis in the early 1990s that could wreck the world economy.

A conference of Americans, Japanese and Europeans, sponsored in mid-April by the American Assembly in New York, concluded that the economic imbalances "are rooted in mistaken and often self-indulgent domestic policies of the industrialized democracies. Responsibility for ensuring a healthy international economy now rests primarily upon domestic policy changes in the United States, Japan and Western Europe." To break the current gridlock, the assembly said it was urgent that at the economic summit this summer, the key governments sign a "global compact." The U.S. would pledge to wipe out its budget deficit and become more export-oriented. The Japanese would take swifter steps to open their markets and triple economic assistance to poorer countries. And Europe would lower its current trade barriers and accelerate its economic growth.

The idea of a global compact is sound, but it would not be easy to engineer. The resignation announcement of Japan's Prime Minister and the panic that swept over the West German government last week starkly revealed



that the industrial democracies are entering the 1990s with major weaknesses at the top. Charges of corruption and cover-up in Japan are toppling not only Noboru Takeshita but at least a generation of other men in the line of succession; it will take a long while for that government to recover. In West Germany, centrist politics of the past are giving way to a polarization that threatens the government of Helmut Kohl. To ward off potential ouster, Kohl last week was pushing nuclear ideas that reeked of capitulation to the left and could splinter NATO. ~~Even that magnificent leader Margaret Thatcher is in trouble from spiraling interest rates.~~

As he enters his second hundred days, here then is a mission for President Bush: To recognize not only the opportunities but the dangers of the 1990s and to rally the industrial democracies to meet them. The United States may no longer tower over other nations, but it remains *primus inter pares*. President Bush, more than anyone else, must lead the West into the next decade. ■

At the NATO summit four weeks from now, Bush will have some explaining to do. As his drawn-out review of foreign-policy options nears its conclusion, his advisers

are trying to pull together an overall strategy to match Gorbachev's bold maneuver in Europe. One idea under consideration is to counter the Soviet call for a "common European home" by celebrating "common Western values" and daring the Soviet leader to adopt them. Administration officials still have not settled, however, on specific initiatives that might put some meat on the thematic bones. So far, officials say they have no clear signals from the presi-

dent, and no sign that his
have altered much. But what he
has done is to make it clear that
the change is coming.

RUSSELL WATSON with JOHN BARR and
MARGARET GARRARD WARREN in Washington,
MICHAEL MEYER in Bonn and bureau reports

On the face of it, it seems that
none of these NATO squab-
bles spring up from time to
time, but from time to time
spring out in guise of op-
erations and habits of proce-
dure. But this one is differ-
ent. When the Germans are
telling us, and it's a mistake
to think that it all stems
from Helmut Kohl's political
problems back home, is that
the days of military buildup
in Europe are over? And there
is a larger implication: the
NATO alliance, although the

[illegible]

of great importance in the agency to take on greater and long-term commitments than the economic commission could handle. The real problem for the United States in the next decade may well turn out to be not economic but political: It may be able to afford a huge military establishment, but that military council will not come out as much. In a world less worried about war, the owners of the arsenal cannot expect the old difference.

German Influence: Western Europe is now excited about the economic unification due at the end of 1992. If by then the importance of NATO is thought to have diminished, what will be the United States' point of influence over a revitalized continent? West Germany is pushing forward with commercial projects in Poland and Hungary; the

[illegible]

Ameyan cannot expect the old deferment. He is a draftsman, 1940

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II

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO THE NATO SUMMIT
AND ROME, BONN AND LONDON
May 26 - June 1, 1989

Substitute Marlin's
3 paras et mp

INTEGRATED SCHEDULE

SUNDAY, MAY 21

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Key Themes: a city looking toward Europe; shared
Western heritage and values

WEDNESDAY, MAY 24

PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH AT COAST GUARD ACADEMY

Key Themes: Challenges of future (drug interdiction,
terrorism); Western partnership in meeting those
challenges

FRIDAY, MAY 26

7:00 AM Depart Andrews Air Force Base en route Rome, Italy

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

Key Themes: Shared Western heritage, common values;
challenges and opportunities.

=====
ROME
=====

10:00 PM Arrive Ciampino Airport, Rome, Italy
(4:00 PM
EDT)

Possible Greeting by Prime Minister

ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Key Themes: Transatlantic cooperation; constancy and
commitment to Alliance tasks; cooperation on modern
challenges (drugs, terrorism, environment)

10:40 PM Arrive Villa Taverna for RON

5/1/89 8:00

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DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
PER E.O. 12958, SEC 3.3 (C)
2011-0298-F
5/19/11 14

SATURDAY, MAY 27

~~9:05~~ ^{9:30} AM Depart Villa Taverna en route Villa Madama
~~9:30~~ ^{9:55} AM Meeting with Prime Minister De Mita
 Participants: 3 on 3
~~10:00~~ ^{10:30} AM Conclude Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting
 Participants: 6-8 on 6-8
 11:40 AM Depart Villa Madama en route Quirinale Palace
 12:00 PM Meeting with President Cossiga
 Participants: 3 on 3
~~1:15~~ ^{12:30} PM Begin Lunch Hosted by President Cossiga
 Mrs. Bush to Join

TOAST

Key Themes: Shared cultural heritage, value of
 growing economic ties; strong open economies vital to
 Western security

~~2:15~~ ^{1:30} PM Depart Quirinale Palace en route Villa Taverna
~~3:00~~ ^{2:15} PM Private Time
 4:45 PM Reception hosted by the President at Villa Taverna
 5:35 PM Depart Villa Taverna en route Vatican
 5:50 PM Arrive Vatican, Cortile San Damaso for Brief Ceremony
 6:00 PM Private Audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II

STATEMENT

Key Themes: common Western values; overcoming division
 of Europe

7:00 PM Mrs. Bush joins Audience
 7:15 PM Other U.S. party members join Audience
 7:40 PM Arrive Sala Clementina for American Seminary Greeting

STATEMENT (Brief remarks)

Key Themes: To be provided

7:55 PM Arrive Holding Room

Said:
 Reception?
 Meet ~~back~~
 Italians?
 Some Mrs in
 company.

Q: what
 kind of
 statements are
 given?

RR: Mix + mingle
 for IT society
 bad.
 Said: Emb wants
 to build
 friendship,
 meet NGO
 ITALIANS
 RR, let's see
 list.
 proposed

SC - give
 time for
 statements

pool coverage

8:15 PM Depart Vatican en route Villa Madama
 8:30 PM Arrive for Dinner hosted by PM De Mita

TOAST

Key Themes: Italy's contribution to Alliance; value of transatlantic partnership

10:30 PM Arrive Villa Taverna for RON

SUNDAY, MAY 28

8:00 AM Depart Villa Taverna en route Nettuno via helicopter and motorcade

9:00 AM Arrive San Francesco Church for Church Service (small (2000 yr old))

10:00 AM Arrive Nettuno Sicily-Rome American Cemetery (30-40,000 people there, 12-13 min range)

STATEMENT

Key Themes: American commitment to security of Europe; defense in the preservation of peace

11:00 AM Depart Cemetery en route Villa Taverna via helicopter and motorcade

12:00 PM Host Lunch with PM De Mita

1:15 PM Conclude Lunch and begin Private Time

2:30 PM Begin American Community Greeting

REMARKS

3:00 PM Depart Villa Taverna en route Airport

3:30 PM Depart Rome, Italy en route Brussels, Belgium

=====

BRUSSELS

=====

6:00 PM Arrive Brussels Intl Airport, Belgium

(12:00 PM EDT) Met by Prime Minister Martens
 Honor Guard

msg for Eur for
 15,
 msg for US and

and
 Q: DeM wanted
 a more
 formal greeting,
 function of
 lunch, is
 form? DeM
 has accepted
 lunch.

Q - coverage - possibly pool.
 casual pep talk. Will amount
 to dep statement. Very informal.

5/1/89 08:00

AP, Pres will interview correspondents from country, concludes w/ the

ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Key Themes: transatlantic partnership, value of Belgian contributions; home of NATO and EC

*JC: How much shld this do?
A: Not that much.
Q - time - most of these are 5 mins.*

- 6:10 PM Depart Airport, accompanied by PM Martens, en route Chateau Stuyvenberg
- 6:40 PM Meeting with PM Martens
Participants: 6-8 on 6-8
- 7:10 PM Conclude Meeting and proceed to Suite
- 7:15 PM Arrive Suite for RON

BILATERAL AUS?

MONDAY, MAY 29

- 8:40 AM Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO Hqs
- 8:55 AM Arrive NATO Hqs and proceed to SYG Woerner's office
Met by SYG Woerner
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

*Part 1: Pres Amb USNATO
JAB
BS
NSC NTaker
Col S*

- 9:00 AM Arrive SYG Woerner's office for Meeting
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY
- 9:30 AM Depart Secretary General's office for Conference Room 16 for Coffee in Foyer
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

Can do Pres interview in advance

- 9:45 AM Opening Ceremony in Conference Room 16
OPEN PRESS
- 10:00 AM Depart Conference Room 16 for Conference Room One.
PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

- 10:15 AM Arrive Conference Room One for First Working Session

INTERVENTION

Key Themes:

- o Strength and success of Alliance based on unity of purpose, shared values, common interests
- o Shared roles, risks, responsibilities; transatlantic partnership; political and defense cooperation

*2 at table
Pres/JAB
+*

6

- o relevance of Harmel in pursuing political/economic agenda with East
- o East-West relations: Shared vision of a Europe undivided by political or physical barriers; Western values basis for "Community of Free Nations" which East is invited to join.
- o arms control goals (bilateral, CFE, CSBMs)

*Possible*Initiatives:

- o Describe goals for CFE Phase II, NATO position on CW [redacted] [subject to interagency clearance]
- o Proposals to emphasize political and economic decentralization, e.g. exchange programs with Eastern Europe

12:40 PM Depart NATO en route King Baudouin's Palace

1:00 PM Arrive Palace for Lunch

2:35 PM Depart Palace for NATO Hqs

3:00 PM Arrive Conference Room One for Second Working Session

*what say:
type up
remarks -
based on
what's
transpired*

INTERVENTION

6:00 PM Depart Conference Room One en route Chateau Stuyvenberg

6:20 PM Arrive Chateau for Private Time

7:45 PM Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg for Val Duchesse

8:00 PM Arrive Val Duchesse for Working Dinner

10:30 PM Depart Val Duchesse for Chateau Stuyvenberg

10:45 PM Arrive Chateau for RON

*RR: 1st day ends w/
CC
2nd day ends w/
Summit Dec*

TUESDAY, MAY 30

8:40 AM Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO Hqs

9:00 AM Arrive Conference Room One for Third Working Session

*structure
take previous
night*

INTERVENTION

11:30 AM Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Holding Room

12:30 PM Press Conference in Luns Press Theatre

*Shd: Do we want to go
first?
A: Yes.*

*12:00,
Woerner
press
conf*

STATEMENT

Key Themes: Durability of alliance based on shared heritage, community of values; commitment to transatlantic partnership; moves to end the division of Europe

1:05 PM Depart NATO Hqs en route to Berlaymont
 1:15 PM Meeting with EC Commission President Delors
 1:55 PM Conclude Meeting

PRESS STATEMENT

Key Themes: support for economic European economic integration/political cooperation; partnership with Europe of the future.

RR: spk to home and on push by views w/ EUR

2:00 PM Depart Berlaymont en route Brussels American School
 2:15 PM Arrive Brussels American School for Tri-Mission Community Greeting

STATEMENT (brief remarks) pool probable, TBD

2:50 PM Depart Brussels American School en route Airport
 3:10 PM Depart Brussels en route Bonn, FRG

No departure statement

=====

BONN

=====

4:15 PM Arrive Bonn/Koln Airport
 4:45 PM Arrive Villa Hammerschmidt for Ceremony

ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Key Themes: cohesiveness and strength of bilateral relations, NATO foundation on which we stand; strong defense to accompany political dialogue with East.

5:00 PM Meeting with President von Weizsaecker
 Participants: 5 on 5
 5:25 PM Depart Villa Hammerschmidt en route Chancellory

5:35 PM Small Meeting with Chancellor Kohl
 Participants ~~1 on 1~~ 1 on 1 or not? send w/ Pres.

Sheet
 copy for
 [unclear]
 [unclear]
 [unclear]

6:40 PM Depart Chancellory en route Ambassador's Residence
 6:45 PM Arrive Ambassador's Residence for Private Time
 8:05 PM Depart Residence en route Redoute Castle
 8:15 PM Dinner Hosted by Chancellor Kohl

TOAST AND REMARKS (Kohl goes for 15 mins, Pres shorter)
Key Themes: congratulations on 40th anniversary of
 founding of FRG; German-American cooperation, ties;

→ McCloy

Invite any
 of elder
 statesmen
 (US parts
 in
 founding)
 use
 allusion at
 beg of
 remarks

10:30 PM Depart Redoute Castle en route Ambassador's Residence

10:40 PM Arrive Residence for RON

WEDNESDAY, MAY 31

7:45 AM Depart Residence en route Villa Hammerschmidt

7:55 AM Breakfast with President von Weizsaecker (vW insists on 2 weeks,
 small bkfst)

9:00 AM Depart Villa Hammerschmidt for Chancellory

9:10 AM Meeting with Chancellor Kohl (incl Genscher)

10:10 AM Depart Chancellory for Sussmuth Residence

10:20 AM Arrive Sussmuth Residence for Youth Program

REMARKS (2-3 minutes)

POOL

Initiative
 here

Key Themes: U.S.-FRG ties; youth as the future (scrub youth as
 much as poss
 w/out big uprisings)
 w/USIA - investing in youth

10:45 AM Depart Sussmuth Residence en route American Club

10:50 AM Arrive American Club for AmEmb Community Greeting

REMARKS

11:35 AM Depart American Club en route Mainz, FRG, via
 helicopter and motorcade (lunches on helos)

12:40 PM Arrive Mainz Rheingoldhalle

SPEECH

(include ref to youth remarks/init)

Key Themes:

- o Vision of West-West relations, transatlantic partnership
- o Support for European unity

network
 for
 more
 private
 time

- o Change: dynamic in West, static in East
- o Goal of ending division of Europe (including Germany and Berlin) on basis of CSCE, values.
- o Commitment to arms control

Initiatives:

- o Reduce size and frequency of exercises
- o Endorse "European Pillar"
- o COCOM Licensing-Free zone
- o Free movement of free people
- o Announce post-Paris trip to Eastern Europe

1:35 PM Depart Rheingoldhalle en route Rhein-Main Air Base via
 helicopter, motorcade, and river boat (reception) Kohl present
 (25 mins on helo) Boer - 1415-1630 to Koblenz throughout

5:10 PM Arrive Rhein-Main AB

REMARKS to 10,000 troops

5:20 PM Depart Rhein-Main AB en route London, U.K.

=====

LONDON

6:00 PM Arrive Heathrow Airport

Met by Prime Minister Thatcher
 Honor Guard

ARRIVAL STATEMENT

Key Themes: shared heritage; moving forward together
 toward next century

6:30 PM Arrive Winfield House for RON

— PM Thatcher + Denis
 accompany

— restaurant? Emphasis on staying there
 to gain time

THURSDAY, JUNE 1

10:15 AM Depart Winfield en route Number 10 Downing Street

10:30 AM Arrive No. 10 Downing Street for Meeting with Prime
 Minister Thatcher
 Participants: 1 on 1

11:30 AM Conclude Small Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting
 Participants: 4-5 on 4-5

12:40 PM Depart No. 10 Downing en route Buckingham Palace
 (Pres say something? A: Informal, have Mike there)

12:50 PM Arrive Buckingham Palace for Lunch with Queen Elizabeth
 2:30 PM Depart Buckingham Palace en route American Embassy
 2:35 PM Arrive American Embassy for Greeting

REMARKS

3:00 PM Depart American Embassy en route Winfield House

SCHEDULE TO BE DETERMINED

1) genealogy
 - Pres not int
 2) others? Stay
 in Lond, pressure
 to give speech w/ Reagan
 comparisons

~~Chunnel~~ Channel, Am business theme,
Sulgrave Manor

(Send sent
 memo to
 RG/BS on
 5/1/89)

5:10 PM Arrive Winfield House for Private Time
 7:10 PM Depart Winfield House en route No. 10 Downing Street
 7:25 PM Arrive No. 10 Downing for Dinner

- 16-20 family-style
 - Pres wing it - few ideas

TOAST/REMARKS

Key Themes: focus on free societies, free markets;
 vision toward future: hi-tech cooperation, business
 ties

9:30 PM Depart No. 10 Downing Street en route Heathrow Airport
 10:30 PM Depart London en route Kennebunkport, Maine

Friday night
 6/2
 TIMING OF
 PRES RETURN
 STATEMENT

* * * * *

JULY 14-16 PARIS ECONOMIC SUMMITPotential Initiatives:

- o Enterprise Fellowship/White House Conference
- o Environment
- o Environmental Disaster Cooperation

Two other pts: Announce Pres trips to PL + HV
 2 stops after: Netherlands

WH speakers: sched for getting bastis/students for us to police

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20417

May 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CAROL A. PAQUETTE

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Travel Orders for Condoleezza Rice

Request travel orders as an NSC representative to the Secretary of State's party to attend the Moscow Ministerials during the period May 8-12, 1989.

NSC is requested to cover the expenses of the trip; per diem estimated to be approximately \$864; lodging approximately \$700.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached travel request.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Travel Authorization Form
Tab II Memo from Hughes to Roy re NSC Staff
 Foreign Travel

DATE May 3, 1989

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: CONDOLEEZZA RICE
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): To attend the Moscow Ministerials
in support of the Secretary of State during the period
May 8-12, 1989
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary): Attached at TAB II.
4. DEPARTURE DATE May 8 RETURN DATE May 12
DEPARTURE TIME _____ RETURN TIME _____
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR X COMMERCIAL AIR _____ POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM \$864 OTHER lodging \$700
TOTAL \$ 1564
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC X OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO X
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By
Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ 500.00
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You
Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders): _____
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Condoleezza Rice
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director _____
Director of Administration _____
National Security Adviser _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20417

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff
Member: Condoleezza Rice
Director
Soviet and Eastern European Affairs

Purpose of
Travel: To represent NSC in support of the Secretary of
State at the Moscow Ministerials May 8-12, 1989

ITINERARY:

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
May 9	Helsinki	Finland	Pre-Ministerials
May 10-11	Moscow	USSR	Ministerials
May 11	Brussels	Belgium	Brief Allies

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary



THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

May 1, 1989

Dear Mr. Bassow:

Thank you for your letter outlining the Moscow Correspondents Association's views on the current CSCE Information Forum meeting. I certainly think the positions are worth exploring. I understand that you met with our delegation head Leonard Marks prior to the opening of the Forum to discuss the Association's ideas. We are following the discussions in London carefully and hope that they will result in significantly reducing the constraints to the free flow of information.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Whitman Bassow
Moscow Correspondents Association
P.O. Box 18394
Washington, D.C. 20036

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

April 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *AM*
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Moscow Conference
Association Chairman Whitman Bassow

At Tab I is a letter from you to Whitman Bassow thanking him for his letter and accompanying position paper outlining proposals for use by our delegation to the CSCE Information Forum currently meeting in London. (Mr. Bassow's letter is at Tab II; the Association's position paper is at Tab III.) We understand that Mr. Bassow met with State Department officials and with our delegation head, Leonard Marks, to discuss the Association's proposals.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Mr. Bassow
Tab II Letter from Mr. Bassow
Tab III Position Paper

Moscow Correspondents Association
P.O. Box 18394
Washington, D.C. 20036

4. 13. 1989

2821

2821

for
Bassow

Steering Committee
(information)

Chairman
Whitman Bassow
UPI, Newsweek

Robert Cullen
Newsweek

B.J. Cutler
N.Y. Herald Tribune

Joe Galloway
UPI

Marvin Kalb
CBS News

Stuart Loory
N.Y. Herald Tribune
Cable News Network

Peter Osnos
Washington Post

Hedrick Smith
New York Times

Robert Toth
Los Angeles Times

Howard Tyner
UPI, Chicago Tribune

Mr. Brent Scowcroft
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Scowcroft:

I write on behalf of a new association of past and present members of the American press corps covering the Soviet Union. We wish to acquaint you with the enclosed position paper, which we presented yesterday to Mr. Leonard Marks. He, as you know, will head the United States delegation to the C.S.C.E.'s London conference on information policy and working conditions for journalists.

We believe the nine points in our paper could readily be implemented by both the United States and the Soviet Union, to the benefit of journalists from both countries. We hope you will agree and that you will take the initiative in proposing them to the Soviets.

If we may be of further assistance, please don't hesitate to call on us.

Sincerely,



Whitman Bassow

PS. I can be reached at my office: 212 683-4700

Moscow Correspondents Association
P.O. Box 18394
Washington, D.C. 20036

Steering Committee
(in formation)

Chairman
Whitman Bassow
UPI, Newsweek

Robert Cullen
Newsweek

B.J. Cutler
N.Y. Herald Tribune

Joe Galloway
UPI

Marvin Kalb
CBS News

Stuart Loory
N.Y. Herald Tribune
Cable News Network

Peter Osnos
Washington Post

Hedrick Smith
New York Times

Robert Toth
Los Angeles Times

Howard Tyner
UPI, Chicago Tribune

EXPANDING GLASNOST

Statement by the Moscow Correspondents' Association

April, 1989

The Moscow Correspondents' Association is a group of American journalists who have covered or are covering the Soviet Union. Its only political goal is the improvement of working conditions for foreign journalists in that country.

We begin from the premise that conditions have slowly, sometimes erratically, improved in the years since Stalin's death. Some of our members remember when dispatches had to be cleared by Soviet censors. Others remember when each trip into and out of the country required a separate visa application. Most of us can remember the days, before the era of glasnost, when briefings, press conferences and other opportunities to talk with Soviet officials were all but nonexistent. All of us can remember cases of harassment, most recently the arrest of Nicholas Daniloff in 1986. We hail the progress represented by the end of censorship, the advent of multiple-entry-and-exit visas, and the many improvements in Soviet information policy in the past four years.

We also understand that progress must be reciprocal, and that unjustifiable restraints on working journalists must be eliminated wherever they occur. We regret that the United States government has found it necessary in recent years to try to duplicate for Soviet journalists in the United States some of the petty problems that Americans encounter in Moscow. Such a policy can only be justified, in our view, if it is accompanied by a vigorous American effort to negotiate the elimination of such restraints. To date, we have seen no such effort. We call on our government to launch one.

We have surveyed the current American press corps in Moscow. Based largely on their responses, here is a list of steps that would continue the progress the Soviets have been making and bring the country closer to full compliance with the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act:

1. Abolish "closed zones."

Under Stalin, the Soviet Union placed as much as 30 percent of its territory off limits to foreign journalists. The U.S. reciprocated by banning Soviet journalists from 30 per

cent of its territory. It was a misguided policy then; it is an archaic stupidity now, when satellites can photograph all of both countries and arms control inspectors visit the most sensitive weapons production facilities. Closed zones deserve immediate interment in the ash heap of history.

2. Keep troubled regions open.

Throughout most of 1988, the Soviets forbade American correspondents to travel to Yerevan, which normally is an open city, to report on the disturbances there. This could not have been to secure the correspondents' own safety; tourists were still permitted to go to Armenia. Some correspondents encountered problems when they sought to go to the Baltic region. There can be no justification for such obstacles, which clearly are intended to suppress the reporting of unpleasant news.

3. Abolish the 48-hour travel notification requirement.

We see no justification for the present requirement that correspondents give the Foreign Ministry Press Department 48 hours' notice before traveling to points outside Moscow. We understand that the Press Department has begun to waive this requirement in some circumstances. It should be abolished.

4. Improve travel services.

Sometimes it can take days, even weeks, to buy tickets and make hotel reservations for travel inside the Soviet Union. Intourist needs more staff to handle correspondents' requests.

5. Improve visa response.

Particularly at times of urgent news, journalists need to be able to enter the Soviet Union fast. They should be able to get a visa good for at least a few days simply by presenting their credentials at Sheremetyevo Airport. If the Soviet government cannot permit that, it should at least assure that a journalist can get a visa within 24 hours from any Soviet consulate.

6. Equal access for journalists without bureaus.

At present, free-lancers and reporters for publications without Moscow bureaus must get sponsorship from a Soviet organization, generally Novosti, for their requests to come to the Soviet Union and report a particular story. Such sponsorship can be, and sometimes is, arbitrarily denied. Journalists without Moscow bureaus should be able to come to the Soviet Union and get temporary accreditation without such problems.

7. Open housing.

We understand that Moscow has a housing shortage, and that some 1200 foreigners are waiting for apartments provided by the Administration for Service of the Diplomatic Corps (known by its Russian initials, U.P.D.K.), which has a monopoly on foreigners' housing. This impedes the opening of new bureaus and the expansion of existing bureaus. This situation could be im-

proved somewhat if journalists had the option of subletting flats from Soviet citizens while they waited for U.P.D.K. flats.

8. Freedom to hire.

Journalists in Moscow should be free to hire whomever they want to work for them as secretaries, maids, drivers and translators. Until now, they have had to choose from candidates offered by U.P.D.K. We understand that an U.P.D.K. official recently told Michael Putzel of the Associated Press that correspondents could hire whomever they wished. That policy should be put in writing.

9. End harassment, surveillance and wiretapping.

One of the most welcome aspects of the glasnost era has been the evident reduction in cases of harassment and surveillance reported by the present Moscow press corps, particularly since the Danilooff affair. But there are still occasional incidents, particularly outside Moscow. Such practices should be abolished completely and permanently.

The 14 years since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act have proven that progress is possible and that no policy, no matter how well entrenched, is immutable. We hope that the London forum will spur the Soviet Union, the United States, and the other signatory countries to expand on the progress that has occurred and to move ever closer to the Helsinki ideal: a free flow of information.

###

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

20417

BLACKWILL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8910128

Date May 8, 1989

For: Mr. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: Mr. J. Stapleton Roy From: G. Phillip Hughes

Date: May 5, 1989 Subject: Travel of
Condoleezza Rice to Soviet Union.

Referral Dated: May 5, 1989 ID# 20417
(if any)

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State

Action Taken:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
- _____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- _____ A translation is attached.
- _____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- _____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- XX _____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- _____ Other (see remarks).

Remarks:

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Deborah J. Padgug
Director
Secretariat Staff

ORIGINAL AND 1 COPY TO:
- S/S - S:
ADVANCE COPIES TO:
- 5 1989
S/S - 2
S/S - I SUPV.
PENDING

S
D
P
C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20417

May 5, 1989

8910128

'89 MAY-05 12:11 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff
Member: Condoleezza Rice
Director
Soviet and Eastern European Affairs

Purpose of
Travel: To represent NSC in support of the Secretary of
State at the Moscow Ministerials May 8-12, 1989

ITINERARY:

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
May 9	Helsinki	Finland	Pre-Ministerials
May 10-11	Moscow	USSR	Ministerials
May 11	Brussels	Belgium	Brief Allies


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

89 MAY -5 PM 2:04

BLACKWILL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADD-ON
3140

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE
IN SEEN

MEETING WITH KING OLAV V OF NORWAY

DATE: May 8, 1989

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 10:40 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED

PER NSC WAIVER, 150020A1-02

By SS NARA, Date 9/3/95

I. PURPOSE

To strengthen our ties with Norway through King Olav, a good friend of the U.S. and a respected figure at home.

II. BACKGROUND

King Olav is returning to Norway from a private visit to Texas and had requested a brief meeting with you. He is expected to arrive in Washington on May 7 and be entertained at a private dinner hosted by Secretary Mosbacher that evening.

The King last visited Washington in November 1987, at the end of a private visit to the American Midwest. He met with President Reagan at the White House, and with you and then-Secretary of State Shultz at the Norwegian Ambassador's residence.

Although the meeting will be a brief courtesy call, you may want to seek King Olav's views on a changing Europe. He has been witness to most of the twentieth century and has occupied a unique vantage point.

The Norwegian Embassy, which has heard rumors that Norway is under consideration as one stop on your July trip to Europe, has told us that King Olav may reiterate Prime Minister Brundtland's invitation. A politely noncommittal reply would suffice.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Photo opportunity and brief meeting in Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Biography
Tab C	Participants List

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH KING OLAV V OF NORWAY

- Welcome back to Washington, and to the White House, Your Majesty. I admire your energy and appreciate your close contacts with the Norwegian-American community here in the United States.
- I had a lively discussion with your Prime Minister last week. particularly on the SNF issue. We both agree that the Alliance must find common ground. As we prepare for the NATO Summit, we need to focus on what unites the Alliance so that we can look ahead with confidence and creativity.
- You have observed Europe from a unique perspective and know Europe as few men do. So much is changing, yet so much is unsettled -- in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the European Community. Where do you see it all leading? How do we in the Western democracies keep our balance and sense of proportion as these changes unfold?
- When you return to Norway, please convey my best wishes to the Norwegian people.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/3/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03c. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

PARTICIPANTSU.S.

The President
Vice President
Governor Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Barry Lowenkron (NSC)
M. James Wilkinson

Norway

King Olav V
Ambassador Kjeld Vibe
Jan Braathen, Aide-de-Camp to the King

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADD-ON
3140

May 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with King Olav V of Norway,
Monday, May 8, 1989, 10:30-10:40 a.m.

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with King Olav of Norway.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 52 NARA, Date 9/3/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB
SUBJECT: Beeper for Mary Kay Stults

As my Administrative Assistant, Mary Kay is required to be available to me on a 24 hour basis. I have been, and will continue to be, required to provide urgent advice and assistance after hours and on weekends to the President, the National Security Advisor, and the Deputy National Security Advisor. I need access to Mary Kay at these times. Please provide her with a beeper. Thank you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3397

May 6, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Gorbachev

FILE

The memorandum at Tab I from you to the President asks him to sign a letter to Gorbachev which Secretary Baker will deliver when he is in Moscow. The letter, drafted at the State Department, is unobjectionable and is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I asking him to sign the letter.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President

Tab A Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 26 NARA, Date 9/24/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3397

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: President's Letter to Gorbachev

Purpose

To sign a letter to Gorbachev that Secretary Baker will deliver when he is in Moscow.

Background

The letter lays out our approach to the Ministerial and reaffirms our wish to see perestroika succeed.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Mikhail Gorbachev attached at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 26 NARA, Date 9/24/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04c. Letter	President Bush to Mikhail Gorbachev (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04d. Washfax receipt	J. Carragher to distro list RE: Gorbachev letter (1 pp.)	5/6/89	(b)(2)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
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AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

WHITE HOUSE
80 MAY 6 P7:37
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 037555 CLASSIFICATION S (b)(2)
FROM: J Carragher SS-O [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Gorbachev Letter

TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

(b)(2)

Extension

Room No.

WH Sit Room

Senior Duty Officer

SCOWCROFT

RICE

ROOMAN

GATES

HAASS

POPADZIK

HUGHES

PACELLI

OWP

DONLEY

JACKSON

BLACKWILL

MILLER

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS:

S/S Officer: [Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), July 21, 1997
By # NARA, Date 5/19/10

Blackwill

20432

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Robert L. Hutchings
Director for Europe, Political Affairs

Purpose of Travel: To accompany the Presidential Pre-Advance Team for the Economic Summit to Paris, France; Budapest, Hungary; and Warsaw, Poland.

ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
May 7-11	Paris	France	Pre-Advance for
	Budapest	Hungary	Presidential
	Warsaw	Poland	Economic


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 4, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

for CAROL A. PAQUETTE *Bill Van Horn*

FROM:

ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT:

Travel Orders for Robert Hutchings

Request travel orders for Robert Hutchings to accompany the Presidential Pre-Advance Team for the Economic Summit (July), May 7-11, 1989. Participants include Presidential Advance team, US Secret Service, WHCA, and State Department. Travel is via military aircraft; NSC is requested to pay expenses. This is not a projected trip.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached travel request.

Approve

8

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Travel Authorization Form
Tab II Memo, Hughes to Roy re
NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: ROBERT HUTCHINGS
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): To travel with Presidential Pre-Advance for the Economic Summit in July; travel to Paris, Warsaw and Budapest, May 7-11, 1989.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Itinerary is being prepared by State - not available at this time.
4. DEPARTURE DATE Sun, May 7 RETURN DATE Thurs, May 11
DEPARTURE TIME _____ RETURN TIME _____
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR ☒ COMMERCIAL AIR _____ POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____
TOTAL _____
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC ☒ OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO ☒
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ Yes
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
POC at State: Jeanie Bull: 647-7531
POC/Presidential Advance: Patty Conrad: 7565
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Robert Z Hutchings
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
Director of Administration CAROL A. PAQUETTE
National Security Adviser BRENT SCOWCROFT

*Pow, Wain -
- R. S. 5-25*

May 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR PRE-ADVANCE PARTICIPANTS

FROM: JOHN G. KELLER, JR.

RE: EASTERN EUROPE PRE-ADVANCE

PARTICIPANTS

Stephen M. Studdert, Assistant to the President for
Special Activities and Initiatives

ADVANCE

John G. Keller, Director of Advance
Gary Fendler, Deputy Director for Press
Patricia Conrad, Trip Coordinator

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

Tim McCarthy, Assistant Special Agent in Charge

WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

Chris Adams, Trip Officer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bob Hutchings, Director for Europe, Political Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Jeannie Bull, Chief of Presidential and Vice Presidential Support

Hutchings

20432

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 6, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Robert L. Hutchings
Director for Europe, Political Affairs

Purpose of Travel: To accompany the Presidential Pre-Advance Team for the Economic Summit to Paris, France; Budapest, Hungary; and Warsaw, Poland.

ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
May 7-11	Paris	France	Pre-Advance for
	Budapest	Hungary	Presidential
	Warsaw	Poland	Economic


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 4, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

for CAROL A. PAQUETTE *Bill Van Horn*

FROM:

ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT:

Travel Orders for Robert Hutchings

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RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached travel request.

Approve *8*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

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Tab II Memo, Hughes to Roy re
 NSC Staff Foreign Travel

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GOVT. AIR X COMMERCIAL AIR _____ POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____
TOTAL _____
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC X OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO X
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ Yes
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
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11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Robert Z Hutchings
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
Director of Administration CAROL A. PAQUETTE
National Security Adviser BRENT SCOWCROFT

Pove, W. -
H. E. S. -

May 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR PRE-ADVANCE PARTICIPANTS

FROM: JOHN G. KELLER, JR.

RE: EASTERN EUROPE PRE-ADVANCE

PARTICIPANTS

Stephen M. Studdert, Assistant to the President for
Special Activities and Initiatives

ADVANCE

John G. Keller, Director of Advance
Gary Fendler, Deputy Director for Press
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UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

Tim McCarthy, Assistant Special Agent in Charge

WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

Chris Adams, Trip Officer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bob Hutchings, Director for Europe, Political Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Jeannie Bull, Chief of Presidential and Vice Presidential Support

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5/5/89

1600

Bob - -

As promised,
including the telegram.

Bob Blackwell

Stahl continues:

(President Bush: "The word of the President of the United States, George Bush, is there was no quid pro quo. The records of the meeting demonstrate that there was no quid pro quo, where there has been much needless, mindless speculation about my word of honor. And I've answered it now, definitively.")

But members of Congress investigating President Bush's role are not satisfied with his quid pro quo denial.

(Rep. Obey: "I'm happy to hear him say that, but the fact is the documents indicate that there was, and I want to see what documentation they have demonstrating that there was not.")

The chairman of the House Iran-contra committee made clear that the North trial opened up a wide range of questions for George Bush to answer.

(Rep. Hamilton: "President Reagan and then-Vice President Bush still have some explaining to do with regard to their activities.")

Spokesmen for Ronald Reagan in California said he had no comment. President Bush said he may or may not answer any more questions about the case. That, he said, will depend on what the questions are. (CBS-2)

NATO

Jennings reports that today, after meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, President Bush agreed to accept a Canadian offer to mediate. Mulroney proposed a compromise that would lead to missile talks with Moscow as West Germany is demanding. However, before any talks are held, the President wants the Soviets to reduce their conventional forces to equality with NATO's forces. (ABC-9)

SOVIET STRATEGY

Jennings: After a four-month review, the Bush Administration has unveiled its new strategy towards the Soviet Union. Today, it appears the new strategy is not much different from the old. The one major change in it seems to be the tone. Secretary Baker said there is now a rare opportunity to transform our attitudes towards each other for the better. (ABC-11)

ATLANTIS

Jennings reports that the weather at Cape Canaveral held up the countdown of the space shuttle Atlantis for almost an hour, but finally Atlantis took off. The shuttle's next job is to send its payload, the Magellan Planetary Explorer, on a mapping mission to Venus. (ABC-3, NBC-3, CBS-4)

KOOP

Jennings reports that C. Everett Koop, the Surgeon General of the United States, has announced that he's resigning. Koop has left his mark on America's public health service and on our attitudes towards health. He is 72, and he is not finished talking.

(Gen. Koop: "I want to be heard from again, because I still have some things to say.") (ABC-7, NBC-5, CBS-5)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05a. Washfax receipt	Joe Lake to distro list RE: Cable on U.S.-Soviet Relations (1 pp.)	5/5/89	(b)(2)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

WHITE HOUSE

89 MAY 5 AIO :

SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 037499 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 7

FROM: JOE LAKE S/S (b)(2)
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION IMMEDIATE EXDIS CABLE TO ANATO "LETTER TO ALLIED
FOREIGN MINISTERS ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS"

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	G. PHILIP HUGHES		
NSC	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		
	DONLEY		
	ZELIKOW BLACKWILL		
	RICE		
	SNIDER		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 5/5 Urgent

S/S Officer: JOE LAKE

CROSSHATCH

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), July 21, 1997
By 11 NARA, Date 5/11/00

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVER SHEET

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1581-MR
mm 1/27/2016

EUR/SOV:KPUSCHEL
4/25/89 647-6859 WANG 9453M
THE SECRETARY

EUR:RLRIDGWAY EUR:TMSIMONS JR
P:EEDELMAN
MSC:
S/S:
T:JHAWES

| EUR/SOV:AVERSHOBW
| S/P:DROSS
| EAP:DWESTMORE
| EUR/RPM:ABOHLER

IMMEDIATE ANATO, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, CANBERRA IMMEDIATE,
SEOUL IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, US

SUBJECT: LETTER TO ALLIED FOREIGN MINISTERS ON
- U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

JB 20
KP 15
RR 15
EEL 15
MSC 15
SS 15
AW
DND
AB

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. POSTS SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE
SECRETARY TO HOST GOVERNMENT FOREIGN MINISTERS. (USNATO
SHOULD DELIVER COPY TO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER.) THERE
WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR :

AS YOU ARE AWARE, PRESIDENT BUSH HAS BEEN CONDUCTING
A REVIEW OF POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE LAST
SEVERAL MONTHS. I WILL BE IN MOSCOW SHORTLY FOR MEETINGS
WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AND CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
AND THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO SHARE
WITH YOU SOME OF OUR THOUGHTS ON THE CONCLUSIONS OF THAT
REVIEW.

WE HAVE TAKEN A HARD LOOK AT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 2

INCLUDING AN ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR EFFECT ON U.S. AND WESTERN INTERESTS. WE THOUGHT PARTICULARLY HARD ABOUT OUR OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS THE USSR, BOTH IN THE SHORT AND LONG TERM, AND A STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THOSE GOALS.

LET ME BEGIN BY SUMMARIZING OUR VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR. WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET LEADERS SEE THEIR OVERRIDING GOALS FOR THE NEXT DECADE AS ARRESTING INTERNAL DECLINE AND MODERNIZING THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THEY SEEK TO LAY THE BASIS FOR THE SOVIET UNION'S BECOMING A STRONGER, MORE COMPETITIVE SUPERPOWER -- POLITICALLY, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY -- IN THE NEXT CENTURY. BUT THEY FACE FORMIDABLE PROBLEMS: SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH; AN INCREASINGLY DISSATISFIED PUBLIC; LAGGING TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT; RESISTANCE TO CHANGE; AND LOOMING NATIONALITY STRIFE. THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS NOW SET IN MOTION WILL TAKE YEARS, IF NOT DECADES, TO TAKE ROOT. BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE WIDESPREAD CONSENSUS IN MOSCOW THAT A RETURN TO THE POLICIES OF THE PAST IS OUT OF THE QUESTION.

WE SEE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AS FLOWING FROM THESE INTERNAL IMPERATIVES. GORBACHEV IS CLEARLY IMPATIENT FOR PROGRESS AND SEES INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AS A SINE QUA NON FOR DOMESTIC REFORM. THUS WE HAVE SEEN CHANGED SOVIET ATTITUDES ON ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, AS EVIDENCED BY THE INF TREATY, THE WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN AND GREATER DOMESTIC FREEDOM INSIDE THE USSR. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE NEW SOVIET ATTITUDE IS GENUINE, AND LASTING, IS UNKNOWN. BUT SINCE THE IMPETUS FOR REFORM IS LIKELY TO LAST INTO THE NEXT DECADE, WHAT IS TACTICAL NOW COULD BECOME MORE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE AS EVENTS UNFOLD.

OUR BASIC CONCLUSION AS TO WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE WEST SHOULD NOT SURPRISE YOU: WE SEE MANY NEW OPPORTUNITIES THAT WERE UNIMAGINABLE ONLY A DECADE AGO FOR ACHIEVING LONGSTANDING WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN THE SECURITY, POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC FIELDS. IT IS THUS IN OUR INTEREST TO TRY TO ENCOURAGE THE TYPE OF SYSTEMIC CHANGES THAT WILL HELP TO ENSURE THE DURABILITY OF REFORM. BUT GIVEN THE STRETCH OF ROAD STILL TO BE TRAVERSED BY THE SOVIETS, WE MUST ALSO BE PRUDENT. BASICALLY, THE SOVIET UNION IS OPENING, BUT NOT OPEN. SOME GOOD THINGS ARE HAPPENING, BUT WE DO NOT KNOW HOW IT WILL ALL TURN OUT. MEANWHILE, SOVIET MILITARY FORCES REMAIN FORMIDABLE AND CONTINUE TO MODERNIZE; INDEED, NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESSURE OF SCARCE RESOURCES AND THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

NEED TO CUT DEFENSE SPENDING, SOVIET TANK PRODUCTION IS AT AN ALL-TIME HIGH, AND THE SOVIETS ARE MOVING AHEAD WITH EXTENSIVE NEW DEPLOYMENTS OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. THUS, SOVIET MILITARY FORCES WILL BE A THREAT TO WESTERN SECURITY FOR YEARS TO COME.

AS A RESULT, AS WE NAVIGATE THIS PERIOD OF POSSIBLE TRANSITION TO A MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP, ONE OF OUR HARDEST TASKS WILL BE TO BALANCE REALISM, ON THE ONE HAND, WITH FORWARD-LOOKING POLICIES THAT SEEK TO EXPLOIT REAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHANGE ON THE OTHER. WE MUST ARTICULATE OUR OBJECTIVES AND VISION OF FUTURE RELATIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRATIC PUBLICS, EVEN AS WE STRESS A CURRENT AGENDA OF OUR CREATION THAT FOCUSES ON THE REAL ISSUES AND THE HARD WORK NECESSARY TO TURN THAT VISION INTO REALITY. THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN MATCHING INITIATIVES ONE FOR ONE, WHICH EVENTUALLY TAKES THE RELATIONSHIP DOWN A ROAD OF COMPETING HEADLINES; IT MEANS ESTABLISHING AN AGENDA ROOTED IN SOLID OBJECTIVES WHICH WE PURSUE IN A CONSISTENT MANNER.

THESE OBJECTIVES SHOULD CENTER UPON THE COMMON WESTERN VALUES THAT WE AS ALLIES SHARE. AS A COMMUNITY OF NATIONS, WE RESPECT AND PROMOTE FREEDOM OF THE INDIVIDUAL. OUR CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, FOR THE RULE OF LAW, AND FOR ECONOMIC FREEDOMS REFLECTS THE FUNDAMENTAL FABRIC OF OUR SOCIETIES. IT IS THIS CONCERN AND THESE FREEDOMS WHICH MUST GUIDE US AS WE PURSUE A BROADER DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST.

WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE BROAD SETS OF OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS. THEY GO BEYOND THE OBJECTIVES WE HAVE ARTICULATED IN THE PAST, REFLECTING THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES WE SEE. ESSENTIALLY, THE BASIC THRUST OF THESE OBJECTIVES IS TO ENCOURAGE THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FAVORABLE MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE SO AS TO BUILD A MORE LASTING, AND PREDICTABLE RELATIONSHIP IN THE FUTURE.

OUR BASIC STRATEGIC-MILITARY OBJECTIVE IS TO MAINTAIN STRONG MODERN DEFENSES, STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE AND ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE U.S., OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS. PROCEEDING FROM THIS POINT OF DEPARTURE, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK WAYS, INCLUDING THROUGH ARMS CONTROL, TO ENCOURAGE THE TRANSFORMATION INTO REALITY OF NEW SOVIET DEFENSE RHETORIC REGARDING THE RESTRUCTURING OF ITS MILITARY TOWARD LOWER FORCE LEVELS AND A TRULY DEFENSIVE POSTURE.

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. IN THE POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC AREA, WE SHALL SEEK TO ENCOURAGE FURTHER SOVIET RETRENCHMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD AND GREATER AUTONOMY IN EASTERN EUROPE. WE SHALL CHALLENGE MOSCOW TO SUBORDINATE CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS TO THE OBJECTIVE OF FINDING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND, OVER THE LONGER TERM, SEEK TO REMOVE THE COMPETITIVE EAST-WEST DYNAMIC FROM SUCH CONFLICTS. WE ALSO WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES THAT ARISE TO EXPAND COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH GLOBAL ISSUES LIKE TERRORISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

. AND FINALLY WE SHALL SEEK TO ENCOURAGE DEMOCRATIZATION, THAT IS, GENUINE REFORM -- INCLUDING GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC LIBERALIZATION INSTITUTIONALIZED BY LAW -- WITHIN THE USSR. WE UNDERSTAND THAT OUR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SOVIET INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS RESTS LARGELY IN OUR IDEAS AND IN MECHANISMS LIKE THE CSCE PROCESS. BUT WE BELIEVE IT IS IN THE WEST'S INTEREST TO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO BUILD A SOCIETY THAT INCREASINGLY CASTS ITS VALUES AND PRIORITIES IN TERMS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE OF ITS PEOPLE, RATHER THAN EXPANSION ABROAD, AND WHERE THERE ARE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE POWER OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND PARTY. IN THE LONG TERM, WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET PEOPLE FLOW PRIMARILY THROUGH PRIVATE CHANNELS, SIMILAR TO THOSE THAT WE HAVE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

. THE KEY TO MOVING TOWARD THESE GOALS WILL BE THE WEST'S ABILITY TO CHALLENGE THE SOVIETS IN CONCRETE TERMS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF ISSUES. THE EXPANDED FIVE-PART AGENDA FOR OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE (HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL DIALOGUE, BILATERAL AND GLOBAL ISSUES) SERVES THIS END. IT GIVES CONTENT TO THE BROAD PRINCIPLES OUTLINED ABOVE AND PROVIDES AN OVERALL FRAMEWORK FOR PURSUING OUR GOALS OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. IT ALSO PROVIDES A YARDSTICK BY WHICH TO JUDGE THE SUCCESS OF OUR POLICIES AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO OUR CHALLENGES: BY THE SPECIFICS OF THE ACCORDS WE NEGOTIATE; BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE COMPETITIVE EAST-WEST DYNAMIC IS REMOVED FROM REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND REPLACED BY COOPERATION; BY THE STEPS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS WILLING TO TAKE TO MEET OUR CONCERNS ON HUMAN RIGHTS; AND BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH MEASURES ARE IMPLEMENTED THAT INCREASE TRANSPARENCY IN THE USSR AND CONTRIBUTE TO THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DOMESTIC REFORM.

. THIS AGENDA IS NOT STATIC BUT CAN ENCOMPASS THE EMERGENCE OF ANY NEW ISSUES REQUIRING CONSIDERATION.

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THUS, WHILE OUR APPROACH WILL REFLECT CONSIDERABLE CONTINUITY WITH THAT OF THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION, WE WILL ALSO HAVE SOME DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASIS, REFLECTING THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE NEW OPPORTUNITIES WE SEE TO SET MORE FAR-REACHING GOALS IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

I WILL MAKE CLEAR THESE NEW AREAS OF EMPHASIS IN MY MEETINGS NEXT WEEK WITH SHEVARDNADZE AND GORBACHEV:

-- WE HAVE ALREADY SINGLED OUT GLOBAL ISSUES -- SUCH AS THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL HAZARD REDUCTION, NARCOTICS AND TERRORISM -- AS DESERVING INCREASED ATTENTION ON THE EAST-WEST AGENDA, AND I WILL SEEK TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED COOPERATION IN MY MOSCOW TALKS.

-- SIMILARLY, I WILL PRESS FOR SOVIET EFFORTS TO RESOLVE OTHER REGIONAL CONFLICTS -- NOT JUST AFGHANISTAN, BUT CONFLICTS WHERE MOSCOW MAY HAVE LESS OBVIOUS INCENTIVES TO DISENGAGE, SUCH AS CENTRAL AMERICA. THIS WILL BE A TRUE TEST OF "NEW THINKING."

-- I LIKEWISE WILL REITERATE TO SHEVARDNADZE THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT I WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS WILL DEPEND ON MOSCOW'S TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS THAT MAKE A FEASIBLE PROCESS POSSIBLE AND THAT INDICATE SOVIET UNDERSTANDING THAT INCLUSION IN THE PROCESS CARRIES RESPONSIBILITIES.

-- I ALSO WILL PLACE SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR THE SOVIETS TO FOLLOW THE WEST'S LEAD IN TAKING CONCRETE, NOT MERELY RHETORICAL, STEPS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.

AS WE HIGHLIGHT THE ABOVE ISSUES, WE DO NOT INTEND TO SHORTCHANGE OTHER PARTS OF OUR AGENDA. AS IN THE PAST, WE WILL KEEP HUMAN RIGHTS HIGH ON OUR LIST OF PRIORITIES, STRESSING THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF BASIC HUMAN FREEDOMS THROUGH CHANGES IN SOVIET LAW AND REGULATION. AND WE WILL DISCUSS THE RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL QUESTIONS, INCLUDING SETTING RESUMPTION DATES FOR THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS AND NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS.

WE CONSIDERED THE ISSUE OF "LINKAGE" IN OUR REVIEW. WHILE WE CONCLUDED THAT IT MAKES LITTLE SENSE TO PUNISH

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THE SOVIETS FOR MISBEHAVIOR IN ONE AREA BY DENYING OURSELVES AGREEMENTS OF INTEREST TO US IN OTHER AREAS. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET ACTIONS WILL AFFECT THE OVERALL U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN THE U.S. UNDERPINNING OUR APPROACH. WE HAVE ALREADY MADE THIS POINT TO THE SOVIETS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR MILITARY ON NICARAGUA.

A FINAL BASIC CONCLUSION THAT EMERGED FROM OUR STUDY IS THE NEED FOR ALLIANCE COHESION AS WE PURSUE OUR POLICIES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. OUR SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS IN LARGE PART DUE TO THE SOLID SUPPORT THAT THE WESTERN AGENDA ENJOYS -- BOTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN EUROPE. WE IN THE WEST HAVE HELPED SHAPE THE CONDITIONS THAT FORCED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO MAKE THE HARD CHOICES LEADING TO PERESTROYKA.

-- AFTER YEARS OF REFUSING TO DISCUSS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SOVIETS FINALLY CHANGED THEIR TUNE. THIS STEMS FROM THE FACT THAT A BROAD CONSENSUS EXISTED WITHIN THE WEST THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ANY IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

-- AND AFTER YEARS OF STALEMATE ON ARMS CONTROL, THE SOVIETS FINALLY AGREED TO HIGHLY ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS IN THE INF TREATY AND INTRUSIVE ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES. AGAIN, ALLIANCE AGREEMENT ON CORE INTERESTS WAS ESSENTIAL.

-- AFTER YEARS OF FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN, THE SOVIETS FINALLY RETREATED IN THE FACE OF WORLDWIDE CRITICISM AND STEADFAST MATERIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT FROM THE WEST FOR THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE.

THESE ARE IMPORTANT LESSONS. THEY TELL US BOTH WHAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH IF WE BAND TOGETHER AND HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO PURSUE POLICIES THAT ENJOY SUPPORT. CRAFTING A POLICY BASED ON "HELPING" GORBACHEV OR DEPENDENT ON THE SUCCESS OF PERESTROYKA MISSES THE POINT: OUR POLICIES MUST BE DRIVEN FIRST AND FOREMOST BY OUR OWN OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS. ONLY IN THIS WAY WILL WE BE PREPARED TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS IN THE FACE OF "BAD" SOVIET BEHAVIOR WHILE RESPONDING CONSTRUCTIVELY TO "GOOD" BEHAVIOR.

IN CONCLUSION, LET ME SAY THAT THE STRATEGY AND POLICIES THAT WE, IN CONCERT WITH THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, HAVE BROADLY PURSUED VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION IN THE POST-WAR YEARS HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL. WHILE AT SOME POINT IN THE FUTURE WE MAY BE ABLE TO PROCLAIM THAT A NEW ERA

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OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION HAS ARRIVED. FOR NOW THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IS FLUID AND THE OUTCOME OF GORBACHEV'S REFORMS TOO UNCERTAIN. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE MUST REMAIN TRUE TO OUR ENDURING INTERESTS WHILE AT THE SAME TIME TAKING ADVANTAGE OF WHAT I BELIEVE ARE UNIQUE OPPORTUNITIES TO ENCOURAGE THE TYPE OF CHANGE THAT WILL MAKE US MORE SECURE IN THE FUTURE.

(FOR NATO POSTS ONLY:

AMBASSADORS RIDGWAY AND BARTHOLOMEW WILL BRIEF AT NATO ON MAY 8 ON OUR PLANS FOR THE MOSCOW MINISTERIAL. THEY WILL ALSO BE PREPARED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON OUR POLICY REVIEW. I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU (POSTS CORRECT FOR ATTENDEE AS APPROPRIATE) AT NATO ON MAY 12 WHERE I WILL SHARE THE RESULTS OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW AND MY IMPRESSIONS OF WHERE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE HEADING.)

(FOR NON-NATO POSTS ONLY:

I WILL BE RETURNING TO WASHINGTON ON MAY 12, AND WILL ENSURE THAT YOU RECEIVE AN EARLY READ-OUT ON THE RESULTS OF MY DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW AND MY IMPRESSIONS OF WHERE OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ARE HEADING.)

SINCERELY,

JAMES A. BAKER, III

END TEXT.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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FILE

May 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting With Dutch Prime Minister
Ruud Lubbers, Tuesday, May 9, 1989, 10:00 - 10:30
a.m.

Attached at Tab I is the briefing package for the President's
meeting with Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers.

ML Don Mahley, *Em* Eric Melby, *RH* Richard Haass and *DAP* Dave Pacelli concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Lubbers Biography

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By *26* NARA, Date *9/24/13*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON

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MEETING WITH DUTCH PRIME MINISTER RUUD LUBBERS

DATE: May 9, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 10:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To reaffirm our close relations with the Netherlands and exchange views on NATO policies prior to the NATO Summit.

II. BACKGROUND

Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers is in Washington despite the May 2 fall of his Christian Democratic Appeal-Liberal Party coalition over funding for environmental programs. Although a lame duck, Lubbers will remain as Prime Minister, at least through the September elections. His party has led all five coalition governments since 1977, and Lubbers may yet retain the Prime Ministership -- which he first won in 1982.

Even though the Netherlands has been one of the best and most reliable of U.S. allies, no American President has ever visited The Hague. We now believe that a visit to this country would be an excellent idea following the Paris Economic Summit. With your approval, we hope to have informed the Dutch of these plans shortly before Lubbers' arrival. Your meeting with Lubbers could be a good opportunity for a public announcement of the Dutch invitation and your acceptance.

Although Lubbers views his meeting with you as an opportunity to discuss a broad range of foreign policy and environmental issues, he knows that SNF will dominate the agenda. The Dutch have tried to hammer out an SNF compromise that would pave the way for modernization, challenge the Soviets to make unilateral cuts in their SNF forces, and leave the door open for negotiations pending Soviet SNF reductions and progress in the Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations. The Dutch were taken aback both by the Kohl Government's current public SNF position, and by the manner it was announced within the Alliance. Lubbers and Foreign Minister Van Den Broek -- who has

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CC: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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Constitutional responsibility for foreign affairs -- visited London April 29 and Bonn May 3. In response to Kohl's backsliding and apparent refusal to rule out the complete elimination of SNF, Van Den Broek publicly insisted that even "speculation" about a third zero would undermine NATO's credibility. Lubbers will be interested in hearing your views on SNF, including whether you support the Dutch efforts to find a compromise.

On East-West relations, Lubbers has shared our approach of testing Gorbachev while maintaining our defense posture. While commending Gorbachev's unilateral cuts, Lubbers has publicly warned that the Warsaw Pact still poses a threat to NATO because of continued conventional disparities and past Soviet practices of military intervention. The Dutch government has been among the most vocal in highlighting human rights abuses in the Soviet Union and East Europe. On Soviet emigration, the Dutch -- who process Soviet applicants claiming a desire to emigrate to Israel -- are concerned about Israeli attempts to force Soviet Jews to go directly to Israel, rather than maintain their refugee status with freedom to enter the United States.

On the trans-Atlantic relationship, Lubbers is a staunch supporter of the Western European Union, but has reaffirmed that European efforts should be a complement to and not a substitute for NATO. In 1987 the Dutch played a key role in crafting the WEU's Security Platform that reaffirmed long-standing NATO policy -- including the need to maintain nuclear weapons in Europe. The Dutch view the 1992 Single European Act in a similar fashion as WEU: fostering European unity but not at the expense of the United States.

On regional issues, the Dutch may raise the Middle East, where they have cooled to the idea of an international conference, and now believe that our step by step approach is the only realistic option. Lubbers may ask for a read-out of your meetings with President Mubarak, Prime Minister Shamir and King Hussein, as well as for a sense of how we plan to follow up. On Central America, Lubbers has succeeded in ratcheting down Dutch public opposition to U.S. policies, has cut back aid programs to the Sandinistas, and has praised your emphasis on a diplomatic solution.

On environmental issues, the Dutch hosted an Environmental Summit March 11. Defensive about the last-minute invitation to the United States, Lubbers wrote to you March 6 and 20, forwarding the Hague Declaration on Global Warming. You responded, sharing Lubbers' concerns but expressing reservations about the creation of any new international

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monitoring authorities.

In addition to his meeting with you, Prime Minister Lubbers will meet with EPA Administrator Reilly, accept an honorary degree from Georgetown University and meet with prominent members of the Dutch-American community.

III. Participants

U.S.

The President
Vice President
Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft
Deputy Secretary Eagleburger
Robert Blackwill, NSC
Deputy Assistant Secretary Wilkinson

The Netherlands

Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers
Foreign Minister Hans Van Den Broek
Henry Wijnaendts, Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Richard Fein

IV. PRESS PLAN

Oval Office - Open Photo, Writing Pool

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Photo Op in Oval Office followed by meeting.

Attachments

Tab A Points to Be Made
Tab B Lubbers Biography

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POINTS TO BE MADE

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER RUUD LUBBERS

- Welcome to Washington. It is always a pleasure to meet with the head of a country which helped finance our own revolution, and with which we have had the longest period of uninterrupted diplomatic relations.
- (Pending your approval) I am delighted to accept the invitation to visit your country in July. I will be honored to be the first American President to visit the Hague.

NATO SUMMIT AND SNF

- I know that you share our concerns about the SNF problem. We agree that the Summit should not focus on SNF or the Comprehensive Concept. It should be a forward looking event. We want to resolve intra-alliance differences over SNF beforehand.
- I've followed your efforts to help resolve the SNF issue. I want to express my gratitude to your government. I also want to thank you for your statements reaffirming the need to maintain an up-to-date SNF force in Europe to maintain the credibility of our defenses.
- We believe that SNF negotiations with Moscow under current circumstances would be a grave mistake.
- We need to eliminate the Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional forces through the CFE negotiations. Only if there are concrete results in Vienna should we consider

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further reductions in our nuclear forces in Europe.

- As I said, the Summit is not just about SNF. It is about the future of Europe and of the Alliance. We must convey the sense that NATO is not simply a security arrangement, but a dynamic community based on shared values.
- The Summit declaration should be an appropriate vehicle to highlight the importance of these values as the means ultimately to overcome the division of Europe.

Eastern Europe

- We see hope in overcoming this division. The changes in Poland and Hungary are remarkable.
- We are committed to an active policy in Eastern Europe. This July, I will be travelling to Poland and Hungary to demonstrate that the United States has a fundamental interest in encouraging the reform efforts underway in these two countries.
- I know from your own concerns that there is much that needs to be done throughout the region -- particularly in Czechoslovakia and Romania.
- I want to work with you and with the other members of the European Community in actively engaging in Eastern Europe. We have to make it clear to the other governments in Eastern Europe what the Poles, the Hungarians, and the Soviets are learning: economic reform can only succeed with political reform.

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Environmental Issues

- Thank you for your letters outlining your concerns on the state of the environment. I share them.
- As I wrote to you, the environment and in particular the issue of climate change is a global concern. I expect it will be a key topic at the Paris Economic Summit.
- The need for greater international cooperation will not be served by duplicative mechanisms that divert resources from work already underway under such organizations as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
- I'm please to hear that you will find time during your brief stay in Washington to meet with our Environmental Protection Agency Head William Reilly. We're exploring ideas on how to advance environmental issues across a broad international front, and I know he will benefit immensely from his meeting with you.

Middle East Peace Process (If Raised)

- We have had good talks with President Mubarak, Prime Minister Shamir and King Hussein. They have been pleased with our public statements and have offered support for our overall approach.
- I know that the European Community advocates an international conference. At some point, an international conference that promotes direct negotiations might be appropriate, but we are not yet there.
- Prime Minister Shamir's proposal to offer elections as a way

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to "launch a political negotiating process" is a good idea that could provide a basis for forward movement. It should be explored.

- We have made it clear to Israel that elections must be part of a political process leading to negotiations on interim arrangements and final status of the occupied territories.

Central America (If Raised)

- We have taken a fresh look at our Central American policies and have decided to give diplomacy a chance.
- The Sandinistas have pledged to make electoral reforms, but they have loaded the elections council to ensure their control and they have passed a new media law which fails to enlarge press freedoms.
- We must not let the Sandinistas make a mockery of attempts by the other countries in the region to advance basic political reforms.

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Biography to be provided

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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May 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with the President for Jozef Czyrek

Party Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy and a proponent of reforms, will be in Washington May 15-17. He was an important actor in the Polish regime's compromise with Solidarity. Czyrek's visit was rescheduled from the week of March 20 and from the week of April 25. As you know, we have had numerous scheduling conflicts and would like to make certain that this meeting takes place. Since the President met recently with Jacek Kuron of the opposition, it is especially important that this meeting with a high-ranking government official take place in order to provide balance.

The State Department recommends, and we agree strongly, that Czyrek meet with the President. Czyrek's visit would be a useful opportunity to set the stage for the President's visit to Poland. A meeting with Czyrek is also a natural follow-on to the President's speech supporting the reforms. A Schedule Proposal for such a meeting is at Tab I. Czyrek should then meet with you and Bob Gates.

Czyrek may press for further economic assistance. The meetings with Czyrek can be used to impress upon him the fact that Poland must follow its political reforms with economic restructuring in order to create a climate for more forthcoming Western assistance.

The memorandum at Tab II from Philip Hughes to the Department of State informs them that a Presidential meeting with Czyrek has been approved.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab II Incoming from State Department

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2012-1581-MR
MM 1/27/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with the President for Polish Party Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek. This is a useful opportunity to set the stage for the President's visit to Poland.

PURPOSE: To give a strong push for decisive GOP action on democratizing political and economic reforms which would have an impact at a fluid and potentially historic period.

BACKGROUND: Party Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy, will be in Washington May 15-17. This meeting is being rescheduled from March 20 (Czyrek was unable to come to the United States at that time) and from April 25-27 when the President was traveling and unable to see him.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President met with Czyrek in March 1987, at a time when the Polish situation was far less auspicious.

DATE & TIME: May 15-17
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President, Governor Sununu, Jozef Czyrek, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, Robert Blackwill

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo and discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None



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May 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE


Subject: Meeting with Polish Party Secretary Jozef Czyrek

Party Secretary and Politburo member Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy, wants to visit Washington during the period May 15-17, if an appointment with the President can be arranged on one of those days. With NSC staff clearance, we had offered the GOP these dates for a possible Czyrek call on the President, without making a commitment. Two earlier visits by Czyrek were postponed due to scheduling difficulties on both sides.

Given the upcoming Presidential trip to Poland, the President's meeting on May 3 with Solidarity advisor Kuron and the need for balance in our high-level contacts with the Polish regime and opposition, we strongly recommend the President agree to a meeting during this period.

Czyrek was a major player in the Roundtable negotiations and may replace Jaruzelski as party First Secretary when Jaruzelski, as expected, becomes the new President. Czyrek's visit comes as implementation of the Roundtable's political accords begins. Putting these into practice will be difficult and overhanging the process is considerable economic stress. Both the Polish government and Solidarity expect increased Western support.

Czyrek's visit would be a very useful opportunity to set the stage for the President's visit. We can signal U.S. support for Polish political democratization and economic reform, put the GOP on notice that we expect it to fulfill its commitments, and present both the details and the conditions of the U.S. economic response to the Roundtable.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
Biographic information

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

National Security Council
The White House

JC

LOG # 1471
SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
DOCLOG JC A/O

89 MAR 10 P 5: 28

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>RP</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>	<u>PH</u>	
Bob Gates	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	
Brent Scowcroft	<u>4</u>		
Philip Hughes			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other

COMMENTS Should be seen by: (Date/Time)

fix
Trip cancelled per
Condi Rice's office

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1471

March 10, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President for Jozef Czyrek

Party Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy and a proponent of reforms, will be in Washington the week of March 20. He is a key actor in the Polish government's unfolding compromise with the opposition. The State Department memorandum at Tab II recommends, and I agree strongly, that Czyrek meet with the President. If the President chooses not to meet with Czyrek it would send a message of indifference to the process of reform in Poland and would be read negatively throughout Eastern Europe. Czyrek should then meet with you and Bob Gates.

Czyrek will undoubtedly press very hard for economic assistance upon completion of the political compromise with Solidarity. (Most analysts believe that the Roundtable will reach agreement in early April). The only drawback to a Presidential meeting at this point is that we may send a premature signal that we are ready to deliver on the President's September 1987 promise to "show financial flexibility" in support of fundamental political reforms. In order to avoid this, the President should reaffirm our support for fundamental political reform, state that we are reviewing policy generally, and avoid direct discussions of what we may or may not be willing to do economically.

The memorandum at Tab I from Philip Hughes to the Department of State informs them that you have approved a Presidential meeting with Czyrek.

RECOMMENDATION:

- (1) That the memorandum to Melvyn Levitsky at Tab I be signed and forwarded.

Approve____ Disapprove____

- (2) That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab II.

Approve____ Disapprove____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum for Melvyn Levitsky
Tab II Schedule Proposal
Tab III Incoming

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-1581-UR

mm 1/27/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1471

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Appointment Request for Jozef
Czyrek (7)

We have recommended that the President meet with Jozef Czyrek, Poland's Party Secretary, when he is in Washington during the week of March 20. A scheduling request has been submitted and hopefully the President's schedule will allow such a meeting during that time. (7)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By ES NARA, Date 9/24/13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with the President for Polish Party
Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek

PURPOSE: To give a strong push for decisive GOP action
on democratizing political and economic
reforms which would have an impact at a fluid
and potentially historic period

BACKGROUND: Czyrek's visit comes as the "Roundtable"
negotiations between the GOP and Solidarity
enter a decisive stage. The Roundtable's
tentative agreements include Solidarity's
legalization and democratizing political
reform; the GOP has recently introduced key
pro-market economic reforms. We have a major
opportunity for progress toward objectives we
have sought in Poland and Eastern Europe
since 1945. However, the sides remain far
apart on some key issues and success is not
assured.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President met with Czyrek in March, 1987,
at a time when the Polish situation was far
less auspicious.

DATE & TIME: Any day during week of March 20.
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Jozef Czyrek, Brent Scowcroft,
Robert Gates, Robert Blackwill, and
Condoleezza Rice

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open Photo, Writing Pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1471

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with the President for Polish Party
Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek

PURPOSE: To give a strong push for decisive GOP action
on democratizing political and economic
reforms which would have an impact at a fluid
and potentially historic period

BACKGROUND: Czyrek's visit comes as the "Roundtable"
negotiations between the GOP and Solidarity
enter a decisive stage. The Roundtable's
tentative agreements include Solidarity's
legalization and democratizing political
reform; the GOP has recently introduced key
pro-market economic reforms. We have a major
opportunity for progress toward objectives we
have sought in Poland and Eastern Europe
since 1945. However, the sides remain far
apart on some key issues and success is not
assured.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President met with Czyrek in March, 1987,
at a time when the Polish situation was far
less auspicious.

DATE & TIME: Any day during week of March 20.
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President and Jozef Czyrek, *Brent Scowcroft,*
Robert Gates and Condoleezza Rice.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open Photo, Writing Pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None



8904624

United States Department of State

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Washington, D.C. 20520

1471

March 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with Polish Party Secretary Jozef Czyrek

Party Secretary and Politburo member Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy and a proponent of reforms, will be in Washington the week of March 20, following a trip to New York at the invitation of the Council on Foreign Relations.

We recommend the President receive Czyrek. A strong push for decisive GOP action on democratizing political and economic reforms would have impact at a fluid and potentially historic period. The President met with Czyrek in March 1987, at a time when the Polish situation was far less auspicious.

Czyrek's visit may come as the "Roundtable" negotiations between the GOP and Solidarity enter a decisive stage. The Roundtable's tentative agreements include Solidarity's legalization and democratizing political reform; the GOP has recently introduced key pro-market economic reforms. We have a major opportunity for progress toward objectives we have sought in Poland and Eastern Europe since 1945. However, the sides remain far apart on some key issues and success is not assured.

Czyrek will press for a signal that the U.S. would respond positively should the Roundtable succeed; he is aware of the President's September 1987 challenge to Jaruzelski which offered an economic response if the GOP took steps toward democracy and human rights. If the Roundtable succeeds, Solidarity and the Church also are very likely to press for U.S. support for Poland.

As the GOP considers its end-game negotiating position, we should reaffirm U.S. support for democracy and economic reform in Poland, and stress the validity of the President's framework. The policy study currently underway addresses the possibilities and constraints of concrete U.S. action; there is no need to discuss specifics with Czyrek.

The President's interest in Poland is known and appreciated by the regime, Solidarity, Church and the Polish public. His involvement at this stage would be welcomed by Lech Walesa, the Church and, we believe, the Polish community here.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262012-1581-MK
MM 1/27/2016*Melvin Levitsky*88 MAR 1 5 37 PM
Melvin Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

1. Biographic data on Czyrek

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07g. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	9/15/87	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: ✓

LOG # 2715

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

DOCLOG PRC A/D _____

Robert
~~Robert~~

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

1

MD

A

Philip Hughes

2

✓

Bob Gates

Brent Scowcroft

Philip Hughes

Situation Room

3

Visit Cancelled

West Wing Desk

NSC Secretariat

A = Action

I = Information

D = Dispatch

R = Retain

N = No further Action

cc:

VP

Sununu

Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Gen. & the President are
traveling Apr 24-25.

Mtg w/ RMG could be an option.

Diane - Condi will work
w/you in Mtg 4/24

89 APR 19 AM 11:37

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2715

April 18, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *NB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with the President for Jozef Czyrek

Party Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy and a proponent of reform, will be in Washington April 24-25. He was an important actor in the Polish regime's compromise with Solidarity. Czyrek's visit was rescheduled from the week of March 20.

The State Department memorandum at Tab I recommends, and we agree strongly, that Czyrek meet with the President. Czyrek's visit comes as implementation of the Roundtable accords begins. A meeting with Czyrek is a natural follow-on to the President's speech supporting the reforms. Czyrek should then meet with you and Bob Gates.

Czyrek may press for further economic assistance. The meetings can be used to impress upon him the fact that Poland must follow political reform with economic restructuring in order to create a climate for more forthcoming Western assistance.

A schedule proposal for the President's meeting is at Tab I. The memorandum at Tab II from Philip Hughes to the Department of State informs them that a Presidential meeting with Czyrek has been requested.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the schedule proposal for the meeting with the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove ☒ *Pres. + GEN* *OOT*

That you approve the memorandum from G. Philip Hughes be signed and forwarded to the Department of State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab II Memorandum for J. Stapleton Roy
Tab III Incoming

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1576-MR
M.M. 1/5/2016

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Condit to
try to
schedule
something
w/ Gates
4/24*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with the President for Polish Party
Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek

PURPOSE: To give a strong push for decisive GOP action
on democratizing political and economic
reforms which would have an impact at a fluid
and potentially historic period.

BACKGROUND: Czyrek's visit comes at the beginning of the
implementation of the "Roundtable" accords
between the GOP and Solidarity. His visit is
a natural follow-on to the President's April
17 speech supporting the reforms and can give
the President an opportunity to impress upon
Czyrek the need for further reform,
particularly of the economy.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President met with Czyrek in March, 1987,
at a time when the Polish situation was far
less auspicious.

DATE & TIME: April 24-25
DURATION: 30 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President and Jozef Czyrek

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo and discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2715

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President for Jozef Czyrek (C)

We have recommended that the President meet with Jozef Czyrek, Poland's Party Secretary during his trip to Washington April 24-25. A scheduling request has been submitted and we are hopeful that the President's schedule will permit a meeting. (C)

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By SS NARA, Date 9/24/13

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 15, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with Polish Party Secretary Jozef Czyrek

Party Secretary and Politburo member Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy, has rescheduled his trip previously planned for March. He will be in Washington April 25-26, following a trip to New York at the invitation of the Council on Foreign Relations. Czyrek has been a major player in the Roundtable process. We have recommended that the President and Secretary Baker meet with him. The Polish Embassy has requested a meeting with you as well.

Czyrek's visit comes as implementation of the Roundtable accords begins. The accords provide for Solidarity's legalization, free elections to a new Senate, a free opposition press, a liberalized law on independent political and other associations, and other political steps. Putting the agreements into practice will be difficult, and overhanging the process is an economic crisis of enormous magnitude. The Polish government, as well as Solidarity and probably the Church, expects forthcoming Western support.

Czyrek's visit is a major opportunity to signal U.S. support for Polish political democratization and economic reform, to put the GOP on notice that we expect it to fulfill its commitments, and to present both the details and the conditions of the U.S. economic response. The Polish Government is looking hard for signals of our attitudes and will take our views very seriously at this fluid time. The Vice President and Secretary Baker had agreed to meet with Czyrek last month, but Czyrek postponed his visit in order to remain in Warsaw for the conclusion of the Roundtable negotiations.

J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Biographic information

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DECL: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-1576-MR

mm 1/5/2016



Washington, D.C. 20520

2614

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 12, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Meeting with Polish Party Secretary Jozef Czyrek

Party Secretary and Politburo member Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy, has rescheduled his trip previously planned for March. He will be in Washington on April 25-27, following a trip to New York at the invitation of the Council on Foreign Relations. Czyrek has been a major player in the Roundtable process. We recommend that the President meet with him.

Czyrek's visit comes as implementation of the Roundtable accords begins. The accords provide for Solidarity's legalization, free elections to a new Senate, a free opposition press, a liberalized law on independent political and other associations, and other political steps. Putting the agreements into practice will be difficult, and overhanging the process is an economic crisis of enormous magnitude. The Polish government, as well as Solidarity and probably the Church, expect forthcoming Western support.

Czyrek's visit is a major opportunity to signal U.S. support for Polish political democratization and economic reform, to put the GOP on notice that we expect it to fulfill its commitments, and to present both the details and the conditions of the U.S. economic response. Because of the President's involvement in Polish issues, his views have considerable impact on Polish Government thinking. While Vice President, the President met with Czyrek in March 1987; a request for the President to meet with Czyrek last month was pending when Czyrek postponed his visit in order to remain in Warsaw for the conclusion of the Roundtable negotiations.

J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Biographic information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1581-MR
MUM 1/27/2016

Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
071. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	3/13/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	5/19/2011	OA/ID Number:	30543
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with the President for Polish Party Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek. This is a useful opportunity to set the stage for the President's visit to Poland.

PURPOSE: To give a strong push for decisive GOP action on democratizing political and economic reforms which would have an impact at a fluid and potentially historic period.

BACKGROUND: Party Secretary and Politburo member Jozef Czyrek, Jaruzelski's deputy for foreign policy, will be in Washington May 15-17. This meeting is being rescheduled from March 20 (Czyrek was unable to come to the United States at that time) and from April 25-27 when the President was traveling and unable to see him.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President met with Czyrek in March 1987, at a time when the Polish situation was far less auspicious.

DATE & TIME: May 15-17
DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President, Governor Sununu, Jozef Czyrek, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, Robert Blackwill

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo and discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADD-ON
3140

FILE

May 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *MB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RZH*
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with King Olav V of Norway,
Monday, May 6, 1989, 10:30-10:40 a.m.

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with King Olav of Norway.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Points to be Made
Tab B Biography
Tab C Participants List

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY: OADR

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *CS* NARA, Date *9/18/13*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADD-ON
3140

MEETING WITH KING OLAV V OF NORWAY

DATE: May 6, 1989

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 10:30 a.m. - 10:50 a.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

To strengthen our ties with Norway through King Olav, a good friend of the U.S. and a respected figure at home.

II. BACKGROUND

King Olav is returning to Norway from a private visit to Texas and had requested a brief meeting with you. He is expected to arrive in Washington on May 7 and be entertained at a private dinner hosted by Secretary Mosbacher that evening.

The King last visited the Washington in November 1987, at the end of a private visit to the American Midwest. He met with President Reagan at the White House, and with you and then-Secretary of State Shultz at the Norwegian Ambassador's residence.

Although the meeting will be a brief courtesy call, you may want to seek King Olav's views on a changing Europe. He has been witness to most of the twentieth century and has occupied a unique vantage point.

The Norwegian Embassy, which has heard rumors that Norway is under consideration as one stop on your July trip to Europe, has told us that King Olav may reiterate Prime Minister Brundtland's invitation. A politely noncommittal reply would suffice.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool

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PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/3/25

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Photo opportunity and brief meeting in Oval Office.

Attachments

Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Biography
Tab C	Participants List

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


OLAV V
(Phonetic: OOlahv)

NORWAY

King (since 1957)

King Olav V, one of the world's oldest and longest reigning monarchs, marked his 30th anniversary on the throne in September 1987. A constitutional monarch, he has little direct political power, but he does designate a new prime minister after a government crisis and, under certain circumstances, may assume command of the armed forces. The King participates in the weekly meetings of the Council of State, and he regularly attends meetings of the Oslo Military Association, an organization that sponsors major speeches on defense-related issues. Admired and trusted by his subjects, the monarch is the undisputed rallying point for Norway's tradition of democratic

freedom. The King, who is widely traveled, last visited the United States in 1982, when he met with President Ronald Reagan and Vice President George Bush.



The son of a Danish prince and an English princess, Olav was born on 2 July 1903 in England. He arrived in Norway at the age of 2, when his father became King. He is a graduate of the Norwegian Naval Academy and has studied economics and political science at Balliol College, Oxford. Almost killed in a bombing attack during World War II, Olav was eventually exiled to London when the Germans occupied Norway in 1940. As Crown Prince, he headed the buildup of Norwegian forces for the liberation. In 1945 he received a triumphal welcome as the first of the royal family to return to Norway.

Despite his age, Olav is an avid skier and an accomplished sailor—an Olympic yachting champion in 1928, he bought a yacht as his own birthday present this year. He speaks fluent English and some French. A widower since 1954, the King has two daughters, Ragnhild and Astrid, and a son, Crown Prince Harald.

24 November 1987

PARTICIPANTSU.S.

The President
Vice President
Governor Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Robert Gates
Barry Lowenkron (NSC)
M. James Wilkinson

Norway

King Olav V
Ambassador Kjeld Vibe
Jan Braathen, Aide-de-Camp to the King

~~SECRET~~
NSC/S PROFILE

C FILE
RECORD ID: 8903251
RECEIVED: 02 MAY 89 20

TO: HUGHES

FROM: STARR, B

DOC DATE: 02 MAY 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
FOREIGN TRAVEL

CW

PERSONS: HANSEN, L

SUBJECT: FORN TRAVEL TRIP RPT FM ASSISTANT DIRECTOR / ACDA

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

DUE DATE: 05 MAY 89

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
ZELIKOW

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
RODMAN
WORKING

COMMENTS:

OK. P2 5/3

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSREB

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b). September 11, 2006
By it NARA, Date 5/11/06

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8903204
RECEIVED: 02 MAY 89 10

FILE

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROY, J

DOC DATE: 01 MAY 89
SOURCE REF: 8909284

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN

PERSONS: THATCHER, MARGARET

SUBJECT: LTR TO THATCHER RE 10TH ANNIV AS PM

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES

DUE DATE: 05 MAY 89

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ZELIKOW

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
DONLEY
HUGHES
RODMAN
WORKING

COMMENTS: *To be handled by message through White House privacy
channel - no memo to President. P2 5/3*

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMDC

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

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Blackwill

3246

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
5/5/89

May 4, 1989

MEETING WITH AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR FRANZ VRANITZKY

DATE: May 5, 1989
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 9:30 a.m. - 9:50 a.m.
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

NOTED

I. PURPOSE

To continue our efforts to establish better relations with Austria after the Waldheim affair and to seek Vranitzky's views on Eastern Europe and Austria's policies toward the European Community.

II. BACKGROUND

Chancellor Vranitzky is in Washington May 4-6 to make initial contact with senior Administration officials, as well as to meet leaders on the Hill.

Vranitzky comes at a time of turmoil in the conservative Austrian People's Party, the junior partner in the coalition headed by Vranitzky's Socialist Party. These changes have not affected Vranitzky, who remains Austria's most popular and respected politician. Vranitzky is not of Waldheim's party and almost certainly will not raise any bilateral concerns arising from the Waldheim affair.

The Chancellor will want to discuss broad trends in East-West relations. Although he will want to hear your views on arms control and the SNF issue, you may want to turn the discussion toward Eastern Europe, about which Vranitzky will have views worth hearing. Austrian leaders have urged more Western assistance to Eastern Europe, not least because they fear a new influx of refugees in the event of instability in Poland, Hungary, or Yugoslavia. You could sound him out on his view of changes in Poland, in the context of your Polish initiative, and especially Hungary, with which Austria has developed much closer relations in the last year or two.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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2012-1579-MR
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The refugee problem in Austria is one bilateral concern that Vranitzky may raise. The Austrians refuse visas to the great majority of would-be East Europeans immigrants to their country, on the grounds that the many Poles and Hungarians leave on economic rather than political grounds. Yet Austria is burdened with a buildup of refugees awaiting resettlement in third countries, including the U.S.. Although our own policy is still under review, you can tell Vranitzky that we will send a delegation to the conference on refugees that the Austrian government is hosting in June. As to Soviet refugees, we are introducing legislation and appropriating new funds to deal with increases in Soviet emigration.

A former Finance Minister with a doctorate in economics, Vranitzky will also have views worth hearing on the European Community's effort to create a single market by 1992. Austria is moving toward an EC membership application this summer, despite Vranitzky's concerns about the implications for Austrian neutrality. We have told the Austrians that we see no incompatibility between EC membership and Austrian neutrality and that the matter is one for the EC and Austria to decide.

If time permits a discussion of Arab-Israeli issues, Vranitzky is likely to urge an acceleration of the peace process and may suggest that an international conference be convened. Although a marginal player in the Middle East, particularly after the Waldheim affair, Austria does take an interest and last year upgraded relations with the PLO. This would be an opportunity to seek Vranitzky's support for elections in the West Bank and Gaza as the first step towards negotiations.

III. PARTICIPANTS

A list of participants is attached at Tab C.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open photo, writing pool.

V. SEQUENCE

Photo opportunity and meeting in Oval Office.

TAB A -- Talking Points

TAB B -- Biography

TAB C -- Participants

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR FRANZ VRANITZKY

- We appreciate Austria's latest good service to the cause of international peace, through your hosting of the two sets of Vienna talks -- on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).
- Both those talks have gotten off to good starts, and we are hopeful that they can achieve significant results. As we complete our comprehensive policy reviews, we will be introducing new initiatives to advance the prospects for concrete results.
- Our comprehensive reviews of U.S. policy have already yielded a new initiative on Poland, which we intend as a model for Hungary and potentially for other East European countries as well. We believe it vitally important to engage Eastern Europe creatively at a time of major change in the region.
 - o We also believe it important for Western countries to coordinate their policies. As you know, we consulted with your Government before going forward with our Polish initiative.
 - o I would be interested in hearing your views on prospects for change in Eastern Europe and how your Government is responding. Yugoslavia poses

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2

special problems, and we are encouraging market reforms and further democratization as the best hope for stability.

-- (IF RAISED) We understand your concerns on East European refugees seeking resettlement through Austria. We are working to reduce the backlog of applicants for resettlement in the U.S., but we do not expect to be able to increase the total number we approve.

- o We will send a delegation to the conference your Government will be hosting in June to address the refugee problem, and we hope the meeting will point the way toward improving the situation.
- o We are taking steps, through new legislation and increased funding, to deal with the recent and welcome increase in Soviet emigration.

-- I would be interested to hear your assessment of the European Community's "1992" program and particularly on the consideration your Government is giving to applying for EC membership.

- o We support closer European economic and political integration, but we also share your concerns that some in the EC may want to raise barriers to outsiders.
- o My Government sees no incompatibility between Austrian neutrality and membership in the EC. We

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3

believe this is a matter for you and the EC to
work out.

-- (IF RAISED) In the Middle East, we remain committed to a
comprehensive peace (based on U.N. resolutions 242 and 338),
and are encouraging confidence-building measures by both
sides in the West Bank and Gaza. You could be helpful in
encouraging the PLO to support elections as the first step
in a process leading to negotiations.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09c. Report	Government report (2 pp.)	5/2/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: May 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/19/2011 **OA/ID Number:** 30543

FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F

Appeal Case #:

Re-review Case #:

Appeal Disposition:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

AR Case #:

MR Case #:

AR Disposition:

MR Disposition:

AR Disposition Date:

MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

LIST OF PARTICIPANTSU.S.

The President
Secretary James Baker
Governor Sununu
Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Assistant Secretary William Bodde
Ambassador Henry Grunwald
Robert Hutchings (NSC)

Austria

Chancellor Franz Vranitzky
Eva Novotny, Foreign Policy Advisor to the Chancellor
Ambassador Friedrich Hoess

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3246

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RH*
SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Austrian Chancellor
Franz Vranitzky, Friday, May 5, 1989,
9:30-9:50 a.m.

At Tab I is the President's briefing package for his meeting with Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky.

Aside from the issue of East European refugees in Austria, there are no bilateral issues of major concern that need to be raised in the meeting. This will be a good opportunity for the President to engage Vranitzky on areas where the Chancellor will have views worth hearing, particularly Eastern Europe and the European Community's 1992 program for a single integrated market.

Tim Deal and David Welch concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum for the President
Tab A	Points to be Made
Tab B	Vranitzky Biography
Tab C	Participants List

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3195 add-on

FILE

May 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Kohl, May
5, 1989

Attached at Tab I is the subject Memorandum of Conversation.

Robert *RB* Blackwill concurs.

Recommendation

That you file the Memorandum of Conversation for the President's
telephone call to Chancellor Thatcher on May 5, 1989, attached at
Tab I, for the record.

Attachment

Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *ES* NARA, Date *9/24/13*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Helmut Kohl of
the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)
Jackie Murphy, NSC Staff (stenographer)
Gisela Marcuse, State (interpreter)

FRG
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Mrs. Weber (interpreter)

DATE, TIME May 5, 1989, 9:16 a.m. - 9:34 a.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Chancellor Kohl began by commenting on his talk on May 3 with Ambassador Walters, expressing pleasure with the President's choice and noting his appreciation both for the Ambassador's personal qualities and for his closeness to the President. He hoped that the Ambassador enjoyed his service in Bonn, despite attacks from the left-wing media.

His points today, the Chancellor said, were: first, that he will do his very best to achieve a reasonable compromise on the issue of the future of NATO's short-range nuclear forces before the Brussels Summit; and, second, that he will do his part in bringing such a successful conclusion about. The Chancellor thought the chances for success were good.

Continuing, the Chancellor commented that he was aware of Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney's compromise proposal on the SNF issue, though he had not had time to study it. He expected that the President would soon be seeing Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers, who has also given thought to a possible compromise. The kind of ideas that were being discussed seemed very good to the Chancellor, but he felt these efforts proved the truth of an old German saying -- that too many cooks spoil the soup.

So, the Chancellor wondered if the President could send one of his competent collaborators to Bonn for direct talks. The person need not be a Minister, but it should be someone with direct access to the President.

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2000-0429-F
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The President replied that he was confident he could send an emissary. As the Chancellor knew, the President had long supported the idea of such a dialogue between Washington and Bonn. He would send someone in whom he had full confidence. He would prefer that this not be a high visibility mission. He agreed that too many cooks can spoil the broth.

The Chancellor agreed that the visit could be done discreetly. If someone just came to Bonn to visit with the U.S. Ambassador, the Chancellor would seize the opportunity and arrange a meeting with "two or three of us." That would be no problem. It would be important, however, for the Chancellor and the President to maintain direct contact. Then one could go a step further and put the matter into official channels. The Chancellor thought this approach would be helpful.

The President agreed it would be helpful. The U.S. was being attacked as irresolute as it was trying to work out a solution to the SNF problem. The President was annoyed, because differences had become public differences and now he was being criticized by Congress. He had told critics that the U.S. position was clear but that the Administration was trying to work with the Chancellor to have a harmonious Summit. But the Chancellor knew that the President was coming under considerable fire from the American and European press.

The President said the Chancellor's proposal suited him very well. He would let the Chancellor know soon who his representative would be.

The Chancellor gave two reasons for his effort. First, he wanted the Summit to be successful. Second, he wanted the President to have a success. It would be the President's first trip to Europe as President. The President was a proven friend of Europeans and, in particular, of the Germans. The Chancellor had never forgotten this fact and never would forget it.

The Chancellor added that he had told Ambassador Walters of his belief that in the summer, when the Summit was over, the U.S. and the FRG should engage in talks about the burdensharing issue. The Chancellor was ready on this subject to take a step in the President's direction, so that the U.S. Congress would be able to see that Bonn was working jointly with Washington, and that the Germans appreciated the sacrifices made by the United States.

We are in a historic position, the Chancellor said. He understood that the President was going to Poland and Hungary. The President would observe an enormous evolution there. It was far from the Chancellor's mind to see Gorbachev as the new hero and he did not mistake words for deeds. Deeds must be considered. However, the Chancellor and the President were

witnessing events beyond their wildest dreams, the ideological breakdown of a political and economic system. This was the hour of our triumph.

This triumph, the Chancellor added, was due not least to the efforts of the United States. That is why the Chancellor thought the President's role should be brought to the fore. This was linked to the cohesion of NATO, and with the success of the NATO Summit.

Perhaps, the Chancellor remarked, it was best now to say that on Monday the President would pass a message to one of the Chancellor's collaborators; the best choice would be Horst Teltschik. Then the President and the Chancellor would call each other next week "when we know where we stand." The Chancellor wanted the President to know that he, the Chancellor, would be following this issue.

The President asked what day would be best for his person to be in Bonn.

The Chancellor said he would prefer to agree on that on Monday. Some of his people were "not here now." Maybe the President's and the Chancellor's collaborators could arrange this on Monday, through direct contact, especially if the President could tell the Chancellor then who the representative would be.

The President said he would do that. Turning to Poland and Hungary, the President said his trips to those countries were not definitely settled, but the plans had been leaked -- something the Chancellor could understand. The governments involved had not yet signed off on the visits. However, as Gorbachev cruised around Western Europe, the President felt it was appropriate for him to show his support for the changes in Eastern Europe.

Secretary Baker would be leaving soon for Moscow, the President noted. He would talk there with Shevardnadze about a number of subjects of interest to the Chancellor.

The Chancellor said it was important, even necessary, for the President to go to Eastern Europe. It was important that the voice of America be heard in those countries. The Chancellor planned to go to Warsaw in the second half of July, after the President's visit. There were great expectations in those countries about these visits; we should make the best possible use of the opportunity. The Chancellor could not accept letting Gorbachev set himself up as the imitator of the voice of Europe. The Chancellor approved of progress, but not that.

The President thought Secretary Baker's trip would display further engagement of the United States with the Soviet Union and would help with European public opinion. It would show that the

U.S. was not afraid to talk to Gorbachev, and the Secretary had a useful agenda for his meetings with Shevardnadze.

The Chancellor said that on Monday the President and the Chancellor would hear from one another. Things would be done very discreetly.

The President asked what the Chancellor planned to say about this call.

Nothing, the Chancellor replied.

The President asked what would be said about the fact of the call. He said he would release that a call had occurred but make no comment on the substance of the discussion or on the possibility of an emissary to Bonn.

The Chancellor agreed that he would disclose that the President and the Chancellor had talked to each other, as they do regularly. There would not be one word about the call's contents.

The President thought that would be good. He said he appreciated the spirit of the Chancellor's call. The Alliance needed to come out strong and it was essential for the Summit to succeed. He thanked his friend, the Chancellor, for his call.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

FILE

May 4, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*
SUBJECT: Request that You Meet with Jacques Chaban-Delmas

In the note attached at Tab A, Charles Mathias informs you that Chaban-Delmas will be in Washington May 10-13. He says that the President would find it interesting to speak with him and by implication suggests that you see him as well.

Although Chaban-Delmas is one of the grand old men of politics and genuinely pro-American, he is a declining political figure in France. He is currently Major of Bordeaux, but no longer a realistic candidate for Prime Minister. Given the other pressures on the President, I would not recommend a Presidential appointment. A few minutes of your time would be a very elegant gesture. It is not essential, however, and one important criterion is whether you already have a personal relationship with him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to a brief courtesy call from Jacques Chaban-Delmas during the period May 10-13.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Note to you from Charles McC. Mathias

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

21 April 89 2993


Dear Brent,

Jacques Chaban-Delmas' plans to visit Washington are now firm. He will be here May 10, 11, 12, 13. The President would find him interesting and I hope will have a few minutes for him.

As ever,

McC

General Scowcroft



Charles McC. Mathias
JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE

METROPOLITAN SQUARE

1450 G STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-2088

TO: General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

FILE
ACTION

May 4, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: CAROL A. PAQUETTE
FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
SUBJECT: Travel Orders for Robert Hutchings

Request travel orders for Robert Hutchings to accompany the Presidential Pre-Advance Team for the Economic Summit (July), May 7-11, 1989. Participants include Presidential Advance team, US Secret Service, WHCA, and State Department. Travel is via military aircraft; NSC is requested to pay expenses. This is not a projected trip.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached travel request.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Travel Authorization Form
Tab II Memo, Hughes to Roy re
NSC Staff Foreign Travel

DATE May 4, 1989**NSC STAFF TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION**

1. TRAVELER'S NAME: ROBERT HUTCHINGS
2. PURPOSE/EVENT (Include Dates): To travel with Presidential Pre-Advance for the Economic Summit in July; travel to Paris, Warsaw and Budapest, May 7-11, 1989.
3. ITINERARY (Please Attach Copy of Proposed Itinerary):
Itinerary is being prepared by State - not available at this time.
4. DEPARTURE DATE Sun, May 7 RETURN DATE Thurs, May 11
DEPARTURE TIME _____ RETURN TIME _____
5. MODE OF TRANSPORTATION:
GOVT. AIR ☒ COMMERCIAL AIR _____ POV _____ RAIL _____
OTHER _____
6. ESTIMATED EXPENSES:
TRANSPORTATION _____ PER DIEM _____ OTHER _____
TOTAL _____
7. WHO PAYS EXPENSES: NSC ☒ OTHER _____
IF NOT NSC, DESCRIBE SOURCE AND ARRANGEMENTS: _____
8. WILL FAMILY MEMBER ACCOMPANY YOU: YES _____ NO ☒
IF SO, WHO PAYS FOR FAMILY MEMBER (If Travel Not Paid By Traveler, Describe Source & Arrangements): _____
9. TRAVEL ADVANCE REQUESTED: \$ Yes
10. REMARKS (Use This Space to Indicate Any Additional Items You Would Like to Appear on Your Travel Orders):
POC at State: Jeanie Bull: 647-7531
POC/Presidential Advance: Patty Conrad: 7565
11. TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE: Robert Z Hutchings
12. APPROVALS: Senior Director ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
Director of Administration CAROL A. PAQUETTE
National Security Adviser BRENT SCOWCROFT

Pove, W. -
H. B. - 5-25

May 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR PRE-ADVANCE PARTICIPANTS

FROM: JOHN G. KELLER, JR.

RE: EASTERN EUROPE PRE-ADVANCE

PARTICIPANTS

Stephen M. Studdert, Assistant to the President for
Special Activities and Initiatives

ADVANCE

John G. Keller, Director of Advance
Gary Fendler, Deputy Director for Press
Patricia Conrad, Trip Coordinator

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE

Tim McCarthy, Assistant Special Agent in Charge

WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

Chris Adams, Trip Officer

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bob Hutchings, Director for Europe, Political Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Jeannie Bull, Chief of Presidential and Vice Presidential Support

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NSC Staff Foreign Travel

NSC Staff Member: Robert L. Hutchings
Director for Europe, Political Affairs

Purpose of Travel: To accompany the Presidential Pre-Advance Team for the Economic Summit to Paris, France; Budapest, Hungary; and Warsaw, Poland.

ITINERARY

<u>Date</u>	<u>City</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Major Event/Meeting</u>
May 7-11	Paris	France	Pre-Advance for
	Budapest	Hungary	Presidential
	Warsaw	Poland	Economic

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

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3317

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 4, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ARNOLD KANTER/ROBERT BLACKWILL ^{AK} ^{RB}

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL ^{Jm}

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement for Opening of CFE/CSBMs
Talks

Attached for your approval (Tab A) is a draft White House press statement for the opening of the second round of negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs). The sessions begin on May 5, in Vienna and we propose that the statement be issued in Washington on that day, and provided to the delegations for their use in press briefings and public affairs activities.

We issued a Presidential statement for the formal opening of these talks in March. We see no reason to do another Presidential statement at this time, but believe it would be useful to have a White House statement on these negotiations to demonstrate their importance to us.

The suggested statement was drafted by State and cleared with other agencies. The Arms Control and SDI Public Diplomacy Group has also prepared a pamphlet (Tab II) on CSBMs (to parallel the one on CFE) for release on May 5, and themes for Administration spokesmen.

^{Jm} Don Mahley, ^{Hulow for} Roman Popadiuk and ^{PN} Philip Zelikow concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached text as a White House Press statement.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Marlin Fitzwater

Attachments:

TAB I Memo to Cicconi
TAB A Draft Statement
TAB II Pamphlet

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3317

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES CICCONI

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement for Opening of CFE/CSBMs
Talks

Attached for your approval (Tab A) is a draft White House Press statement on the opening of the second round of the negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). The sessions begin on May 5 in Vienna, and we propose that the statement be issued in Washington on that day, and provided to the delegations for their use in press briefings and public affairs activities.

Attachment:

Tab A Draft White House statement

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Declassify: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-1581-MR
MM 1/27/2016

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Draft White House Press Statement

Resumption of CFE and CSBM Talks in Vienna, Austria

May 5, 1989

We are pleased to mark the resumption today in Vienna, Austria, of the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which involves all 23 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the talks on Confidence and Security Building Measures, which include the 35 nations that participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

In the CFE negotiations, we and our NATO allies are seeking a stable and secure balance of conventional forces in Europe at reduced levels; the elimination of destabilizing disparities of forces; and the elimination of capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. NATO's approach reflects a continuing commitment to realizing these goals through a meaningful, realistic and verifiable agreement.

The work ahead is complex. However, we are encouraged by the fact that the Soviet Union and its allies have come to accept in principle some long-held NATO requirements. We hope they will join us in serious exchanges on enhancing security for all of Europe.

In the CSBMs talks, NATO has tabled a set of proposals which build and expand upon those already agreed in the 1987 Stockholm Document on Confidence and Security Building Measures. The centerpiece of the NATO proposal is an annual exchange of information on military organization, manpower and equipment in Europe and a corresponding system to evaluate the information that is exchanged. In contrast to the Eastern proposals that clearly seek to constrain NATO's ability to train and reinforce its troops, these and other NATO proposals apply equally to all participating states.

During this second round, NATO will be elaborating the practical details of these proposals in order to demonstrate their effectiveness, feasibility and the contribution they can make to furthering openness, transparency and predictability about military organization and activities in Europe.

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2012-1581-MR

mm 1/27/2016

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BACK 21:11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 3, 1989

Dear Toby:

Thank you for your recent letter outlining the work of the United Nations Association of the United States of America and the Asia-Pacific Association of Japan. Certainly, the impact of Gorbachev's new thinking is not confined to Europe. I am also heartened to hear that the Japanese are addressing Soviet policies toward Asia as more than merely derivative of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

I am sorry we could not arrange a meeting in Washington. I do hope that your trip to Moscow was rewarding and stimulating. Let's stay in touch.

*Please
come see
me. SK?*

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

Ms. Toby Trister Gati
Vice President
Policy Studies
U.N. Association of the
United States of America
485 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10017-6104

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

2543

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Toby Gati

At Tab I is a letter from you to Toby Gati responding to her note of April 4 in which she describes the work of the United Nations Association of the USA and the Asia-Pacific Association of Japan in assessing Gorbachev's "new thinking" toward East Asia. (The Gati letter is at Tab II.) In your response you thank Gati for forwarding to you a copy of the joint report of the UNA-USA and Asia-Pacific Association of Japan (Tab III).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Toby Gati at Tab I.

Approve____ Disapprove____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Toby Gati
Tab II Incoming Letter
Tab III Executive Summary of "Gorbachev's Asian Policy:
Refashioning American and Japanese Policy Toward the
Soviet Union"

cc: Nancy Dyke



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254J April 4, 1989

Mr. Gati is a friend of the Association.

APR 7 1989

Cy Flanigan

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Brent,

While you've been busy running the country, UNA-USA and the Asia Pacific Association of Japan have been studying Soviet "new thinking" in the East Asia-Pacific region. That three-year study has resulted in the publication of a joint report, "Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Refashioning American and Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union," which is enclosed. This is the first time the Japanese have systematically addressed Soviet policy in Asia as more than just a derivative of Soviet-American relations.

Some of the recommendations you may find encouraging. The support for COCOM on both sides is especially significant in light of past events, as is the call to have the Asian NICs join some sort of COCOM framework. You may not be as happy, however, with the part about meeting the Soviets halfway for a discussion of arms control in East Asia.

Speaking of the Soviets, I'm off to Moscow again to meet with a group from the Soviet UNA on UN issues. This meeting is the second in a series devoted to the future of the UN system, and it has proven remarkably interesting. Some members of the US group plan to be in Washington on the 18th for a debriefing with John Bolton and others, and I was hoping we could come in and see you for a few minutes. My assistant will call your office while I am away to set it up.

Wishing you a crisis-free world,

With warm regards,

Toby

Toby Trister Gati
Vice President
Policy Studies

GORBACHEV'S ASIAN POLICY: REFASHIONING AMERICAN AND JAPANESE POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

*A Report of the
United Nations Association of the USA
and the
Asia Pacific Association of Japan*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In speeches, visits, and diplomatic initiatives; through the cultivation of economic relations; and by efforts to resolve regional conflicts, the Soviet Union has signaled its intention to improve relations with nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Soviet tactics in Asia and the Pacific have changed, but it remains unclear if basic Soviet regional objectives and strategy have shifted.

This joint report suggests a coordinated U.S.-Japanese approach to the new Soviet policy in Asia aimed not only at seizing the opportunities posed by current changes in the Soviet Union, but also at preventing Moscow from taking initiatives that might weaken the U.S.-Japanese alliance. *It is the conclusion of the UNA-USA and APAJ panels that Japan and the United States should wherever possible engage the Soviet Union in constructive dialogue on all aspects of Asian security--political, military, and economic--and work energetically to establish a U.S.-Japanese bilateral agenda for promoting peace and prosperity in the region.*

The policy recommendations are presented against the background of a new Soviet strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and an analysis of American and Japanese perspectives on the Soviet Union.

3. Japan and the United States should improve command and control between their forces in the event of a crisis, deepen their consultations on military matters, and promote joint planning and combined training exercises. The two countries should also consider negotiating a "wartime host nation support agreement" and the prepositioning of military material in Japan.

4. Japan should bear more of the yen-based costs for American forces stationed in Japan to promote a more equitable sharing of the defense burden.

The U.S. and Japan should also seize the opportunity posed by recent Soviet flexibility on military issues. In response, Japan and the United States should:

1. establish a high-level study group to analyze the possibility of arms control in Northeast Asia and to develop a bilateral understanding about the measures that would be in our mutual interest.

2. encourage Moscow to follow through on Gorbachev's promise to make public Soviet defense capabilities in the Far East.

3. engage the Soviet Union in a serious dialogue about ways to reduce tensions and reduce the possibility of military crises and accidents in the region, and about the negotiation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) involving air, ground, and naval forces. At the same time, Washington and Tokyo must resist one-sided Soviet proposals for limitations on naval deployments designed to weaken America's forward defense posture.

4. be sensitive to concerns in the Pacific region about the disposal of nuclear waste and the production and storage of nuclear weapons, thus preventing the exploitation of anti-nuclear sentiments by the Soviet Union.

C. Economic Development and Political Stability

The Soviet Union is still only a marginal political and economic player in East Asia, yet it can play a spoiler role in the region. The U.S. and Japan, working together, can take several steps to enhance regional stability:

1. at home, the United States must contain domestic pressures for protectionism, while Japan must continue to expand its absorption of imports.

2. in the region, the U.S. and Japan should cooperate to increase the amount of multilateral economic assistance available and promote the transfer of needed technology.

3. the United States must share decision-making power with Japan in various international economic organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and be more receptive to Japanese initiatives for dealing with the Third World debt crisis.

4. both the United States and Japan should actively support and participate in the multilateral aid consortium now being proposed to assist the Philippines.

1. signal to the Soviets that there are no objections to "normal" relations with the Chinese but indicate, at the same time, that there is no "China card" that can be played against the United States and Japan.

2. continue to assure the Chinese that Japanese military modernization does not pose a security threat. Likewise, American support of Chinese military modernization should be so tailored as to avoid provoking fear in Japan or other Asian countries.

3. not attempt to steer China away from the Soviet Union by upgrading the level of military assistance to the PRC.

The Northern Territories Issue

A resolution of the Northern Territories issue is in the interest of Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and all countries that support regional stability. Indeed, there is no way that the Soviet leadership can avoid dealing with this problem if it desires to play a more active role in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard:

1. the United States should continue to support Japanese efforts to resolve the Northern Territories issue.

2. the Soviet Union, as a step toward serious governmental negotiations, should recognize Japan's potential sovereignty over the Northern Territories.

The Economic Dimension

Gorbachev has underscored the importance of economic development in the Soviet Far East and has acknowledged this to be one of the preconditions for Soviet integration into the Pacific economic system. The Soviet Union is expanding its horizons in Asia to include more trade and greater economic cooperation not only with Japan, for obvious financial and technological reasons, but also with the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.

Translating this new economic vision into policy will not be easy. Autarkic tendencies persist, and Soviet bureaucrats continue to resist efforts to reduce control over the allocation of national resources and the price system. Thus a significant turnaround in economic performance cannot be expected in the next few years.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has recently taken several modest steps toward greater regional and global integration of its economy. The Kremlin has decentralized the foreign trade mechanism and liberalized its policies regarding joint ventures to make them more appealing to foreigners. Gorbachev has called for an opening up of Vladivostok and even suggested the creation of special economic zones in the Soviet Far East.

Relations with China


Under Gorbachev, the improvement of relations with China has been the top priority of Soviet bilateral diplomacy in Asia. Soviet and Chinese officials are preparing for a Sino-Soviet summit in 1989 against the background of expanded bilateral trade, ongoing talks on the border disputes, and the emergence of a common identity between reforming socialist states. After the summit, arms control negotiations will likely be put on a more regular basis and bilateral contacts will expand. The USSR and the PRC are also likely to identify a number of parallel interests in foreign policy, including opposition to America's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and concern about Japanese rearmament.

Relations with Japan and the United States

Moscow is now giving greater attention to improving its relations with Tokyo and acknowledging the resilience of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. It entertains fewer thoughts about getting the Japanese to abrogate the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or pushing the Americans to weaken their security commitment to Japan. Soviet leaders are coming to recognize that the dispute over the Northern Territories is a major obstacle to Soviet-Japanese normalization, and some nongovernmental representatives have even floated informal proposals addressing this issue. From the Kremlin's perspective, the recent improvement in Soviet-American relations has created an environment favorable to the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

balance and arms control, regional conflicts, technology transfers, and human rights--is much broader than is Japan's agenda--where the problem of the Northern Territories and the absence of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty tends to dominate; 3. most Japanese leaders assume a sober geopolitical perspective, while American views of the Soviet Union have shifted in response to emotional and ideological concerns; 4. although both American and Japanese analysts see China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, Americans are more likely to support further military cooperation with the Chinese, while the Japanese are more sensitive about the growth of Chinese military capabilities; and, 5. the American process for formulating and implementing Soviet policy is more pluralistic than that of Japan, and Soviet policy often becomes an issue of significant national debate. By contrast, the formulation of Japan's Soviet policy is dominated by the Foreign Ministry.

Weighing these various factors, it does not appear that differences over Soviet policy are likely to be a source of serious conflict in the overall bilateral relationship. From the point of view of both countries, a strong U.S.-Japanese relationship strengthens their respective positions *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. The possibility of tensions on specific issues, such as technology transfer and human rights, will remain, but these problems are manageable and should not cause major strains in the trans-Pacific alliance. The most immediate challenge posed by Gorbachev is not so much managing Japanese-American disagreements over policy toward the Soviet Union as creating a more positive environment for U.S.-Japanese relations so that both can respond to new circumstances.



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CONTACT: Jennifer Metzger

Katy Wille

American and Japanese Policy Experts Call for New Coordinated Approach to Gorbachev's Initiatives in Asia


UNA-USA and the APAJ Release Policy Recommendations in Response to Soviet "New Thinking" in the Asia-Pacific Region

New York, NY....The United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA) and its Asian counterpart, The Asia Pacific Association of Japan (APAJ), has released a groundbreaking joint report on U.S.-Japanese relations and the Soviet Union. The report, which recommends a set of constructive policy responses to Gorbachev's initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, was presented today to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

A new emphasis on Asia--from reducing involvement in regional military conflicts to initiating greater Soviet integration in the regional economy--marks Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy. At the same time, however, the picture is mixed--Gorbachev has recommended multilateral discussions on air and naval force reductions in Northeast Asia while increasing and upgrading Soviet deployments there, for example. The UNA-APAJ study represents the first sustained effort by Americans and Japanese working together to assess these intentions and develop a coordinated U.S.-Japanese policy.

"The new Soviet interest in the Pacific will present difficulties to the U.S. and Japan only if we fail to manage our bilateral relations and relations with other states in the Asia-Pacific region," says McGeorge Bundy, U.S. Chairman of the UNA-APAJ panel and U.S. National Security Advisor to President John F. Kennedy. This reevaluation of U.S. and Japanese foreign policy in the region by UNA-USA and the APAJ was undertaken by UNA's Parallel Studies Program with Japan with the support of the U.S.-Japan Foundation. The three-year study involved joint meetings of policy experts and prominent scholars, and consultations with representatives of both governments.

Gorbachev's Asian Policy:



Refashioning American and Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union

A Joint Report by the United Nations Association of the USA
and the Asia-Pacific Association of Japan