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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30543
Folder ID Number: 30543-002

Folder Title:
April 1989 [8]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

20321

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NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Short-Range Nuclear Forces and NATO's
"Comprehensive Concept"

The current dispute over modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear forces (SNF), and particularly the land-based missile portion of those forces, stems from the US-Soviet INF treaty. By eliminating land-based missiles in Europe with ranges over 500 kilometers, the treaty had three principal effects: (1) underscored the need to make sure that the US nuclear forces left in Europe, as the most credible element in extended deterrence, remained viable and survivable; (2) intensified German worries that the remaining short-range nuclear forces could only hit targets on German soil, implying that arms control was helping everyone but the Germans; and (3) set a powerful precedent for relying on the elimination of "whole classes" of nuclear weapons as the way to protect the continent from the danger of nuclear war. The 'double zero' solution in the INF treaty eliminated all US and Soviet land-based missile systems with ranges of 1000-5500 km. (the first zero) and all land-based missile systems with ranges of 500-1000 km. (the second zero).

NATO's response to these effects of the INF treaty was twofold. First, the Alliance reaffirmed that it would, as Defense Ministers had agreed at Montebello in 1983, modernize and improve its short-range nuclear forces while substantially reducing the overall numbers of nuclear weapons stocked in Europe. This NATO agreement specifically included deployment of a follow-on to the aging Lance land-based missile. Second, in order to reassure the Germans that total numbers of SNF weapons could be reduced, the Allies agreed to address these FRG concerns in a document called the "Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament." NATO will adopt this document at the May summit.

However, as Kohl's political situation has deteriorated, the FRG has increasingly advocated language at NATO for the "Comprehensive Concept" which both challenges the Montebello commitment to SNF modernization, specifically the need to commit

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again to a follow-on to Lance (FOTL), and urges the immediate initiation of negotiations with Moscow on SNF systems. The SNF negotiations that Bonn seeks would, in the current political climate, create almost irresistible pressures for a 'third zero', eliminating missile systems from 0-500 km. range. This would in turn hasten the denuclearization of Europe. We prefer to await further progress in conventional arms control and rely on unilateral restructuring of SNF forces by the two sides, rather than negotiations with Moscow, to achieve equal SNF missile ceilings for the U.S. and Soviet Union at lower levels.

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Proposed Language on Implementation of Reykjavik NAC
Communique's Approach to Reductions in Short-range
Nuclear Forces for Inclusion in Comprehensive
Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament

U.S. Objective: Agreement on inclusion of this language

As a step toward implementing the Alliance's approach to further reducing the level of nuclear forces in Europe, we call upon the Soviet Union to eliminate unilaterally its current, massive advantage over NATO in deployed ground-based nuclear missile systems in Europe. NATO is itself now engaged in an ongoing program of restructuring NATO's nuclear forces toward systems of longer range. While maintaining our nuclear stockpile at the lowest level necessary for deterrence, we recognize that nuclear weapons -- kept up to date with characteristics to perform their deterrent role credibly across the required spectrum of ranges, and taking into account the conventional and nuclear threat -- will continue for the foreseeable future to make a unique and essential contribution to that deterrence. The Alliance therefore cannot accept calls for a negotiated "third zero" elimination of such systems. Moreover, our negotiating priority remains to rectify the imbalance in conventional forces in Europe through asymmetric reductions. If concrete results toward symmetry and eliminating offensive capabilities are achieved in the conventional forces talks, NATO will be prepared to examine at that time further unilateral steps (including significant reductions in systems of the shortest range) -- as well as additional arms control possibilities -- for reducing the level of nuclear forces.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

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April 14, 1989

Good memo.
RB

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ARNOLD KANTER *RB* *AK*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW/DON MAHLEY *PZ* *DM*

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on SNF and the
Comprehensive Concept

This memorandum responds to your request for a memorandum to the President, attached at Tab I, providing essential background for the current dispute over the modernization of our short-range nuclear forces (SNF), possible SNF arms control, and the role of NATO's current efforts to agree on a "Comprehensive Concept for Arms Control and Disarmament."

Recommendation

That you send the Memorandum to the President on "Short-Range Nuclear Forces and NATO's Comprehensive Concept" attached at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I - Memorandum to the President

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1965

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from President Mitterrand

At Tab I is a letter to you from Ambassador de Margerie with an attached letter for the President from President Mitterrand concerning the President's attendance at ceremonies commemorating the Bicentennial of the French Revolution in Paris on July 13. Tab A is a memo to the President forwarding President Mitterrand's letter (with translation).

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the memo to the President at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Incoming Letter from Ambassador de Margerie

Tab A Memo to the President

*Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis*

L' Ambassadeur

Washington, April 4, 1989

Dear Brent,

Please find herewith the original of a letter addressed to President George Bush by President François Mitterrand.

A copy of this message has already been conveyed to you on March 21, 1989

With best regards, I am,

Yours sincerely

Bobby (Emmanuel)

Emmanuel de Margerie

General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington D.C.

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 20 mars 1989

Monsieur le Président,

Je vous remercie très sincèrement d'avoir accepté l'invitation que je vous avais faite d'assister aux cérémonies qui marqueront la célébration du Bicentenaire de la Révolution Française.

J'aurai donc la grande joie et l'honneur de vous accueillir à Paris à partir de midi, le 13 juillet prochain.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à l'assurance de ma haute considération *et de mes sentiments bien cordiaux*

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

Son Excellence George BUSH
Président des ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: A Letter to You from President Mitterrand

Attached is a letter (with translation) from President Mitterrand concerning your attendance in Paris on July 13 of ceremonies commemorating the celebration of the Bicentennial of the French Revolution.

Attachment

LE PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 20 mars 1989

Monsieur le Président,

Je vous remercie très sincèrement d'avoir accepté l'invitation que je vous avais faite d'assister aux cérémonies qui marqueront la célébration du Bicentenaire de la Révolution Française.

J'aurai donc la grande joie et l'honneur de vous accueillir à Paris à partir de midi, le 13 juillet prochain.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à l'assurance de ma haute considération *et de mes sentiments bien cordiaux*

François Mitterrand

François MITTERRAND

Son Excellence George BUSH
Président des ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

(TRANSLATION)

LS NO. 128664
RHC
French

Quote:

Mr. President:

I thank you very sincerely for accepting the invitation that I extended to you to attend the ceremonies commemorating the celebration of the Bicentennial of the French Revolution.

Thus I shall have the great joy and honor of welcoming you to Paris as of noon on July 13, 1989.

Accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my high consideration and cordial regards.

Unquote.

(Signed) François Mitterrand

*Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis*

1965

L' Ambassadeur

Washington, March 21, 1989

MAR 23 1989

Dear Brent,

Please find herewith the text of a message addressed to President George Bush by President François Mitterrand, which I was asked to forward to him. I would be grateful if you would be so kind as to convey this message to the President.

With best wishes, I am,

Yours sincerely,

Bobby

Emmanuel de Margerie

General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
For National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington D.C.

88 MAR 23 10:38

" Monsieur le Président,

Je vous remercie très sincèrement d'avoir accepté l'invitation que je vous avais faite d'assister aux cérémonies qui marqueront la célébration du Bicentenaire de la Révolution française.

J'aurai donc la grande joie et l'honneur de vous accueillir à Paris à partir de midi, le 13 juillet prochain.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, à l'assurance de ma haute considération et de mes sentiments bien cordiaux".

(signé): François Mitterrand

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8901965

REFERRAL

DATE: 23 MAR 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

DATE: 21 MAR 89

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES

8906203

89 MAR-23 5:41 PM

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR TRANSLATION

DUE DATE: 30 APR 89

COMMENT:

FOR



GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8906203

Date April 11, 1989

FOR: Mr. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

To: State Secretariat

From: NSC Secretariat - Mr. Van Eron

Date: March 21, 1989

Subject: Translation of Mitterand Letter

WH Referral Dated: March 23, 1989
NSCS ID# (if any): 8901965

_____ The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

ACTION TAKEN:

_____ A draft reply is attached.

_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.

 x A translation is attached.

_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.

_____ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.

_____ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.

_____ Other (see remarks).

REMARKS:

80 468 11 85-51
Via Smith for
Director
Secretariat Staff

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REFERRAL

DATE: 23 MAR 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

DATE: 21 MAR 89

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR TRANSLATION

DUE DATE: 30 APR 89

COMMENT:

FOR

G. Dahl
GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

*Urgent Staffing
Advance cy (translated)
to General*

D

Chen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 18, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from General Scowcroft's
Meeting with West German Social Democratic Party
(SPD) Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel

The subject memorandum from General Scowcroft's meeting with West German SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel of April 5 is attached at Tab I.

Bob *RLH* Blackwill concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That the memorandum at Tab I be reviewed and approved for record purposes.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify: OADR

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2012-1578-MR
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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5:40

April 18, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *R218*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from General Scowcroft's
Meeting with West German Social Democratic Party
(SPD) Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel

The subject memorandum from General Scowcroft's meeting with West German SPD Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel of April 5 is attached at Tab I.

BB
Bob Blackwill concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That the memorandum at Tab I be reviewed and approved for record purposes.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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Declassify: OADR

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2012-1578-MR
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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526

2012-1578-MR

MM 1/8/2016

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: General Scowcroft's Meeting with West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chairman Hans-Jochen Vogel (C)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs
Robert L. Hutchings, Director for European Political Affairs (Notetaker)

Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Jochen Vogel, Chairman, Social Democratic Party
Karsten Voigt, Member of the SPD Bundestag Caucus
Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus

DATE, TIME
AND PLACE: April 5, 1989, 10:30 a.m. - 11:00 a.m.
General Scowcroft's Office

Chairman Vogel began by noting there had been a number of changes since he had last been here a year before. He expressed satisfaction that the list of the positions on which the SPD and the US Administration agree is getting longer, while the list of disputed positions is getting shorter. He also noted that some 70 members of the SPD Bundestag caucus have visited Washington since January 1987. (U)

Referring to the longer list of agreed positions, Vogel said he welcomed the Administration's initiative on Central America and saw an opportunity for the Socialist International to cooperate. (U)

General Scowcroft said that he hoped for cooperation as we seek a democratic solution in Nicaragua that gives the Contras a voice in society. (U)

Chairman Vogel alluded briefly to positive changes in Moscow, which he was to visit the following week, and to the Roundtable agreement in Poland. He then turned to the shorter list of issues on which there is disagreement between the SPD and the US. On

land-based missiles and other short-range nuclear systems, Vogel expressed astonishment that the position of his government -- which holds there is no need for an early decision on SNF modernization -- had found so little response in Washington. Vogel said he was not surprised that his position (outright rejection of SNF modernization) found little resonance here, but he was surprised by the reaction to his government's line. (C)

General Scowcroft replied that he did not think the two governments are at odds. Our government feels strongly the need to maintain extended deterrence. This is a time of great flux, General Scowcroft continued, but not the time to throw away policies that have served us well. Nuclear systems were placed in Europe for good reasons, military and psychological. There was a perceived need by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic that conventional weapons were not sufficient, so we pursued a strategy of flexible response, with nuclear systems of different ranges and responsibilities. The US-Soviet INF agreement removed an entire range of these systems; now there is a need to look seriously at any further erosion of the numbers of capabilities. The disparity in conventional forces is the reason for our nuclear deterrent capacity. If we can eliminate the disparity, we could consider looking at nuclear deterrence in a different way than we can now. Meanwhile, what we maintain must be viable military systems. Within this framework, we are working already with the West German government as to how to manage the issue. (C)

Chairman Vogel said he appreciated those points but noted that he believes Lance will remain useful at least until 1995 or 1996. Even if these land-based systems disappeared, we would have air- and sea-launched systems. Ten to fifteen would be enough for deterrence. Moreover, Vogel said, Gorbachev needs arguments to satisfy his own military. The way to proceed is not to replace existing NATO systems with new, more dangerous ones. Finally, Vogel raised the special concerns Germans have that their country could be rendered uninhabitable for generations. (C)

General Scowcroft replied that he was not unaware of German concerns about "singularization." This was why he had reservations about the INF treaty, General Scowcroft noted, adding that the SPD was not arguing against the INF treaty at the time. (C)

General Scowcroft then addressed Vogel's other points. It is true, he said, that SNF are important political/psychological systems, but only if they have military utility. The number of systems does not have to be enormous, but it must be more than a token number if these systems are to have political force. We are interested not in fighting but in preventing war. We must ensure that the Soviet general staff can never calculate that an adventure in Western Europe makes any sense. If anything, we

should overensure. As to Lance, General Scowcroft continued, neither you nor I know when it will be obsolete. It is unfortunate that it has become such an emotional issue; but if we need weapons systems, we need them to work. (U)

Chairman Vogel asked about responding to a possible zero offer from Gorbachev. (U)

Our answer should be no, General Scowcroft replied. First we need to redress conventional disparities. (U)

Vogel then asked about the response to a possible Gorbachev offer of drawing down to ceilings below 50 percent of our existing systems. (U)

General Scowcroft observed that if Gorbachev drew down to our level, we would welcome it, but we would also remind him that he was modernizing SS-21s while we allowed Lance to age. (U)

Vogel noted that Gorbachev continues to take us by surprise, doing precisely what we have asked him to do. (U)

General Scowcroft applauded Gorbachev for that but noted that one reason he can make unilateral moves is that he has so much to give away. We are seeing progress because we have been firm for 40 years. We will encourage further progress but not try to get ahead of the USSR. We want to keep them on their present course; and one reason for that course is the past policy of NATO. (U)

Chairman Vogel added that a second reason for change in the USSR is economic; and a third, that democracy fits better with human nature. (U)

General Scowcroft concluded by suggesting that Vogel ask Gorbachev whether the recent elections were a victory or a defeat. The General speculated that Gorbachev would probably interpret votes against his opponents as votes for himself -- much as a Western politician might. (U)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 18, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AAB*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between President Bush and President Mitterrand of France, 4:35 p.m. to 4:55 p.m., April 17, 1989

President Mitterrand initiated a phone call to the President on April 17 to discuss the situation in Lebanon. Mitterrand sees no solution in view and said he foresees the danger of prolonged warfare and a real massacre. He saw no institution other than the U.N. which could play a role. He had contacted Secretary General de Cuellar who had agreed to take on a "mission of information" to Lebanon and Syria if he had the acquiescence of the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

The President responded that he would support such a mission although he was not confident it would lead to a ceasefire. He respected President Mitterrand's judgment and appreciated the call. He looked forward to President Mitterrand's visit in May.

RB RH
Robert Blackwill and Richard Haass concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the attached memorandum of conversation for record purpose.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I MEMCON

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation between President Bush and President Mitterrand of France (S)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Mitterrand of France

DATE, TIME April 17, 1989, 4:35 p.m to 4:55 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

President Mitterrand said that he hoped that he was not interrupting at an inconvenient time. (S)

The President said not at all; he was sorry he had not been able to talk in the morning, since he was in Michigan giving a speech. (S)

President Mitterrand said that he would be talking at greater length next month, since President Bush was kind enough to be receiving him in his home. (S)

The President said that he and Mrs. Bush were looking forward to the visit. (S)

President Mitterrand said that he saw no solution in view for Lebanon. Instead, he foresaw the danger of prolonged warfare and a real massacre. He saw no institution other than the U.N. which could play a role, although he was aware of how difficult it was to do anything through the Security Council. However, he had contacted Secretary General de Cuellar, who had agreed to take on a "mission of information" to Lebanon and Syria if he were given such a mandate by the Security Council. This could be done without a vote. (S)

President Mitterrand said that if de Cuellar took on this mission it would lead to a ceasefire on the part of the belligerents, which could be longer than the usual ceasefires. This would provide time for the powers to reflect on a course of action. This solution was not humiliating for anyone. It would not offend Syria, provided that Assad does not view Lebanon as his

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"private hunting preserve" where no one else has a right to step in. But he should not feel that way if it is the U.N. French Foreign Minister Dumas had discussed this with de Cuellar when he was recently in Paris and he had agreed with the proviso that the Permanent Members would have to approve. (C)

President Mitterrand repeated that the proposed course of action would not require a vote but, instead, it would be a mission of information and conciliation. He had wanted to discuss this with President Bush before pursuing it further with de Cuellar, who would be in Luxembourg the next day. He repeated that if this mission were to be known, the result would be a ceasefire. Otherwise, he could only foresee continued warfare and continued occupation of the entire country by Syria, except in the Israeli-controlled zone of Lebanon. Lebanon would thus become the first state to be wiped off the face of the map. (C)

President Mitterrand said that he had lunch with King Hussein earlier in the day and the King shared his feelings. President Mitterrand wanted to inform President Bush of his initiative in order to avoid a surprise, and because he was conscious of the weight that the U.S. could provide in helping to seek a truce in a country being torn apart by war, with 40-50 people dying per day. He added that this approach does not lend itself to the impression of taking sides as between the Christians and the Moslems. France has been involved in Lebanon for 50 years, knows the country well and can vouch for the urgency of finding a solution. (C)

The President replied by thanking President Mitterrand for bringing this proposal to his attention and by asking for confirmation that this approach required acquiescence, but no action, by the 5 Permanent Members. (C)

President Mitterrand said that this was correct, but there was a requirement not to vote against it. On this basis, we could secure de Cuellar's consent. (C)

The President responded that it would be a pleasant surprise if the announcement of such a mission led to a ceasefire. He respected President Mitterrand's judgment. Although he was not optimistic, we had no better plan. (C)

President Mitterrand said that he was no more certain than was President Bush of the success of this approach, but he saw no alternative. (C)

President Bush agreed. He said he would talk with Secretary Baker and General Scowcroft, but the U.S. would support this approach. (C)

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President Mitterrand said that he had talked with the Kuwaiti chairman of the Arab League's Action Committee and asked whether the Arab League opposed this approach. The Kuwaiti had said absolutely not, to the contrary, he approved of it. (C)

The President said that this was good. The situation was very complex and heartbreaking. He respected the French position, and wished the Secretary General well. (C)

President Mitterrand said that King Hussein would also be discussing the issue with the President directly when he visited Washington, however, Hussein had told him that there are many Arab countries which do not want to see Lebanon disappear. (C)

President Mitterrand ended by saying that he was not an enemy of Syria. He did not want to fight Syria -- but this was a question of the disappearance of a country recognized by the international community. These were his feelings and thoughts, and he had wanted to share them directly with the President. (C)

President Bush ended by expressing his appreciation for the call and saying that he looked forward to President Mitterrand's visit in May. (C)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1430 add-on

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April 18, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Conversations - Meetings on April 17
with UK Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe

Attached at Tabs I and II are the Memoranda of Conversations for the President's and General Scowcroft's meetings with Foreign Secretary Howe.

Recommendation

That you file the memorandum of conversation attached at Tab I for the record and that you file the memorandum of conversation attached at Tab II for the record.

Attachments:

- Tab I - Memorandum of Conversation for President's Meeting with Howe
- Tab II - Memorandum of Conversation for General Scowcroft's Meeting with Howe

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 26 NARA, Date 9/17/13

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1430 add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1578-MR

MM 1/8/2016

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Geoffrey Howe of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
The President
Secretary of State James A. Baker, III
John Sununu, Chief of Staff to the President
Henry Catto, Ambassador of the U.S. to the United Kingdom
Marlin Fitzwater, Assistant to the President for Public Affairs
Robert Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway
United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe
Ambassador to the U.S. Sir Antony Acland
Permanent Under Secretary Sir Patrick Wright
Andrew Burns, FCO Press Spokesman
Steven Wall, Private Secretary

DATE, TIME April 17, 1989, 3:30 p.m. - 3:50 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President began by expressing his pleasure at the opportunity to obtain Sir Geoffrey's comments on the U.S. approach to the issue of modernizing short-range nuclear forces (SNF). The President noted that he had spoken to Chancellor Kohl on the phone the week before. We need, the President said, to get the Chancellor or his emissary to Washington as soon as possible in order to arrive at an acceptable position on the SNF issue before the NATO Summit. (C)

The Foreign Secretary agreed that an early settlement of the SNF question was enormously important. On the substance, putting off a commitment to modernization until after the German elections in 1990 would not, he felt, improve the prospects for this modernization. Prime Minister Thatcher would see Chancellor Kohl on April 30. The Foreign Secretary wanted the U.S. to keep open the possibility that she could persuade the Chancellor to agree to SNF modernization. The Foreign Secretary added that he had

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been discussing tactics for handling SNF with Secretary Baker. The UK did not want arms control negotiations on SNF, preferring instead, if necessary, to offer unilateral reductions. London felt the commitment to modernize SNF must be credible and therefore had to embody a public commitment at least as substantial as those we had made in the past. The Foreign Secretary hoped that the U.S. would not pass proposed language to the FRG until the Prime Minister had seen Chancellor Kohl. (X)

The President replied that it was absolutely essential for us to talk to the Germans. Such a discussion was long overdue. Kohl owed the President a phone call this week. We have to get going. We must do everything we can as soon as we can. Sand was running through the hourglass. (X)

The Foreign Secretary said that the critical date was the NATO Summit. While there would be no 'amour propre' on the UK side, the Prime Minister wanted to retain an opportunity to bring Kohl around on SNF, although the Foreign Secretary did not know if that would be possible. (X)

The President said he thought there was room for everyone to work with the Chancellor on this matter. (X)

Secretary Baker added that every day that goes by puts Foreign Minister Genscher in a stronger bargaining position because he knows we are drawing closer to the Summit. The problem was not Kohl; it was Genscher. (X)

The President noted that Genscher and the FDP could jump to the SPD, which would not be good. (X)

The President then asked if London was happy with the results of Gorbachev's visit. (X)

Yes, the Foreign Secretary replied. The Prime Minister and General Secretary Gorbachev argued about this very question of SNF modernization. There had been some hopeful Soviet moves on Southern Africa. Moscow had been helpful in seeing that the Angola agreement is being successfully implemented. Perhaps Soviet encouragement to SWAPO had not been constructive but, more recently, Moscow had become more helpful. HMG would appreciate anything the U.S. could do to influence South Africa. (X)

The President said that we have less and less influence with South Africa because of our sanctions against them. (X)

The Foreign Secretary said that the UK's influence in South Africa was based on respect for Prime Minister Thatcher and respect for London's firm policy against sanctions, including among the black population. You know, he added, that the UK is trying to get Mandela released. He said he would pass the latest

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polling data on South African opinion that the UK had on to the U.S. (S)

The President said he had always thought that sanctions would not be effective as long as the front-line states would be so badly damaged by adherence to them. He asked if the Fraser Committee was going forward with its work. (S)

It was not, the Foreign Secretary said, but the Commonwealth remained intensely interested in South Africa. (S)

The President said the Foreign Secretary's remarks were the first encouraging word he had heard about South Africa in a long time. The first. Constructive engagement, though offensive to liberals, actually worked, especially with the tremendously helpful British role. He would love to think that the Angola deal could be followed by reconciliation talks, peace between Dos Santos and Savimbi. (S)

Secretary Baker said there was some evidence that the MPLA wanted reconciliation talks, if Savimbi could be kept out of the government. (S)

The President then asked if the Foreign Secretary had any magic wand for the latest problems in Lebanon. (S)

No, replied the Foreign Secretary, the situation was awful. We need to keep behind the Arab League. (S)

The President agreed. He did not see a need for a new initiative. What did the Foreign Secretary think Asad wanted? Was it the complete domination of Lebanon? (S)

The Foreign Secretary thought Asad was content to be the spoiler. He added that he was delighted that Washington was actively engaged in Middle East talks, though it would of course be a long haul. (S)

The President said he hoped we could move things along. He had talked to King Hussein on the phone and the King seemed a little more upbeat. The King was wedded to an international conference, not least because he wanted to stay alive. The President hoped the King could show more flexibility on elections in the occupied territories. Mubarak had been helpful on that score. (S)

The Foreign Secretary thought that the President's statement, during Mubarak's visit, calling for an end to the Israeli occupation gave a helpful impulse to the peace process. (S)

The mood in the U.S. was changing, the President said. Public opinion was shifting against Israel. Shamir was much more pleasant than the President had expected. Shamir had wanted the

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visit to be seen as a success. It was very positive to have Secretary Baker's statement, that someday Israel might talk to the PLO, out in public. There is a fighting chance to make real progress on Middle Eastern problems. (S)

Secretary Baker observed that Shamir did not complain about U.S. talks with the PLO, though Benjamin Netanyahu did. (S)

Turning to sales of U.S. arms to Argentina, the Foreign Secretary thanked the President for the continuing consultations on this subject. (S)

The President commented that he was worried about Argentina, Brazil, and the problem of Third World debt. Those debt problems needed to be solved one country at a time. Mexico and Argentina were prime targets. (S)

The Foreign Secretary said the UK was telling the Latins not to have false expectations. There was no magic solution to the debt problem. (S)

To some extent, Secretary Baker pointed out, expectations are out of control, so it is important to have a success with one country, perhaps Mexico or Brazil. (S)

In closing, the President said it had been good to see the Foreign Secretary and said he looked forward to seeing Prime Minister Thatcher soon. (U)

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1430 add-on

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1578-WR
mm 1/8/2016

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Geoffrey Howe of the United Kingdom (U)

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Gates, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Robert Blackwill, Special Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Philip Zelikow, NSC Staff (notetaker)

United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe
Ambassador to the U.S. Sir Antony Acland
Permanent Under Secretary Sir Patrick
Wright
Andrew Burns, FCO Press Spokesman
Steven Wall, Private Secretary

DATE, TIME April 17, 1989, 6:00 p.m. - 6:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: General Scowcroft's Office

General Scowcroft said he had heard that the Foreign Secretary had a good meeting with the President. He asked whether the Foreign Secretary was satisfied with the US position on the SNF issue. (X)

The Foreign Secretary said he was not sure he was. Although a solution was needed before the NATO Summit, Secretary Baker had said the matter did not need to be settled before the Secretary's Moscow meeting with Shevardnadze in May. There was clearly a split on this question within the FRG. Further work was needed, and so the Prime Minister's April 30 meeting with Chancellor Kohl would be important in this regard. (X)

On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary acknowledged that the Kohl government was supposed to be holding a coalition meeting on the SNF issue on April 18 and Kohl was expected to make a formal statement on the subject to the Bundestag on April 27; the scene may be moving on. The UK was, he said, not entirely happy with the draft language for the Comprehensive Concept that the US intended to forward to the Germans. (X)

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The Foreign Secretary observed that Genscher had the bit between his teeth. Both the US and the UK wanted to stay clear of SNF arms control negotiations. If an outside observer looked at the discussion of modernization in the US draft paragraphs for the Comprehensive Concept, he would see the prospect of indefinite postponement. If this language was then opened to further bargaining down by Genscher, modernization would disappear. The modernization language should be strengthened while giving Genscher tough language on the SNF arms control aspect. His experience in dealing with Genscher led him to expect hard bargaining on whatever language we passed to Bonn. (X)

General Scowcroft asked if the Foreign Secretary had any specific suggestions. (X)

The Foreign Secretary said that the US and UK wanted to end up with a text that will signal a real commitment to the outside world. He asked if he could look at the U.S. language overnight. (X)

General Scowcroft said that would be excellent. (X)

Ambassador Acland asked when the U.S. planned to give its language to the FRG. (X)

General Scowcroft said it would be tomorrow, April 18. The US needed to get Bonn thinking about possible solutions; the Germans have already postponed a discussion of the problem for too long. (X)

Ambassador Acland, noting that language usually gets weaker after it is negotiated, asked if the UK could comment on the text before the U.S. gave it to Bonn. (X)

General Scowcroft said he understood, then, that we would be getting some comments by the next morning (April 18), Washington time. (X)

Ambassador Blackwill cautioned that we should not give the Germans language that was so tough that they would dismiss it out of hand and view it as not reflecting a serious attempt to initiate a dialogue. (X)

The Foreign Secretary agreed, but added that the Germans could not decline to discuss this issue for the indefinite future. (X)

General Scowcroft said his greatest worries were over the arms control portion of the language. If trapped in early SNF arms control negotiations with Moscow, we would head straight towards a 'third zero.' He would rather accept softer language on the commitment to SNF modernization than compromise on the arms control aspect. (X)

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The Foreign Secretary said he did not like the choice. He feared that if the Alliance allowed SNF modernization to slide away now, it would be almost impossible to get a commitment to it later. Chancellor Kohl had said himself, last year, that it would be best to make an early commitment. (X)

General Scowcroft agreed, observing that the Chancellor had clearly changed his view. (X)

The Foreign Secretary speculated on the significance of Stoltenberg's appointment as Defense Minister and said he feared the worst, insofar as SNF was concerned. Why was Stoltenberg brought in? (X)

General Scowcroft said Stoltenberg certainly could not be better on SNF than Scholz had been. (X)

He would, however, have more clout, the Foreign Secretary commented. (X)

General Scowcroft said he would ask Secretary Baker to hold off with an approach to Bonn on SNF until we had seen the British comments. (X)

The Foreign Secretary promised to provide the comments as soon as possible. (X)

Turning to the issue of chemical weapons, the Foreign Secretary emphasized the need to keep picking away with Moscow on making progress on CW arms control. The Soviets said they wanted a ban but maintained tremendous stockpiles of their own. At the worst, we could expose the USSR's bad faith on this question. (X)

Continuing, the Foreign Secretary said that, in London, Shevardnadze had knowingly been untruthful in describing Soviet CW stocks and that this compared poorly with Moscow's more forthright behavior on other issues. In Namibia, for instance, the Soviets may have winked initially at SWAPO's violation of the agreement but they are now being more helpful in backing the accord. There were, however, a rising number of examples of 'old thinking' that one could cite. (X)

General Scowcroft agreed, and mentioned Soviet mischief-making in dealings with the African National Congress. (X)

Mr. Gates added that the list of examples of 'old thinking' was longer than the list for 'new thinking.' (X)

General Scowcroft said he wanted to be sure that HMG understood that the U.S. government was not relaxed about sanctions against South Africa. The Administration was dead against the imposition

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of additional sanctions. (X)

The Foreign Secretary said he was glad to hear it, and felt that our very good effort in cooperating with Congress on Central America should not be reproduced on South Africa. The UK was influential with South Africa in part because of Prime Minister Thatcher's credibility as a foe of sanctions. (X)

General Scowcroft agreed that sanctions were not the way to go, but said that ingenuity was needed in order to find the best way to proceed. (X)

Mr. Gates pointed out that the only value of sanctions was in the threat to impose them, since they were seldom effective. (X)

Ambassador Acland asked about the possibility of adjusting sanctions based on particular government actions. (X)

General Scowcroft said this idea, which had support in the Senate, was fine in theory - if Congress was prepared to give the President the executive authority to be more flexible. (X)

The Foreign Secretary stressed the importance of Soviet attitudes toward the Angola/Namibia agreement, saying that the fragility of the accord could not be overestimated; it was held together by a thread. (X)

Ambassador Acland asked if the U.S. was sending someone out to Namibia. (X)

General Scowcroft said we would be sending people there momentarily. (X)

The Foreign Secretary said that, if SWAPO would not interfere with the process, Namibian self-government might have a chance. (X)

General Scowcroft commented that recent events had at least exposed SWAPO's true character. (X)

Mr. Gates said that Soviet behavior did not encourage optimism about SWAPO's future role. (X)

The Foreign Secretary concluded by complimenting recent U.S. efforts in the Middle East as part of a painstaking process to solve some very difficult problems. (X)

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1902

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 19, 1989

prepared in Haass' office

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS/ROBERT *RB* BLACKWILL
FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *W*
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from FRG Chancellor Kohl

Chancellor Kohl wrote the President (Tab B) before the Mubarak visit to urge us to be helpful to Egypt's pressing economic needs. We held up responding to this letter until after the Mubarak visit, so we could have something forthcoming to say on economic assistance. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President with a proposed response.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memorandum to the President providing a response to Chancellor Kohl.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter to Chancellor Kohl
Tab B Incoming Letter from Chancellor Kohl

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1572-MR
M-M 4/19/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter to Chancellor Kohl

Purpose

To respond to a letter from Chancellor Kohl on Egypt's economic needs.

Background

Attached is a suggested reply to Chancellor Kohl's March 16 letter (Tab B) concerning Egypt's economic situation and discussions with the IMF.

We held up responding to this letter until after the Mubarak visit, so we could have something more forthcoming to say on economic assistance, as well as broader remarks on your talks with Mubarak, Shamir, and Hussein.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Chancellor Kohl
Tab B Incoming Letter from Chancellor Kohl

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1572-MR
mm 4/19/2016

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Helmut:

Thank you for your letter of March 16 concerning your recent discussions with Egypt. Your insights were most valuable to us as we prepared for President Mubarak's visit to Washington.

We had solid and productive discussions on how to advance the Middle East peace process with President Mubarak and with Prime Minister Shamir, who arrived in Washington immediately after Mubarak, followed by good meetings with King Hussein. Our discussions with all three leaders underscored the strong agreement among us on the basic goal for the peace process: a comprehensive peace on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We firmly believe that the key to progress in the region lies in developing a political process of dialogue and negotiations involving both Israel and the Palestinians. Given the gaps that separate the parties and the suspicions that divide them, getting to negotiations will require flexibility, goodwill, and a considerable amount of preparation.

Prime Minister Shamir proposed during his visit the idea of elections in the Occupied Territories to launch a "political negotiating process." We expect to discuss this idea further with the Government of Israel and with Arab leaders to determine whether a mutually acceptable formula for properly designed elections can be developed.

Our discussions with President Mubarak, of course, also dealt significantly with Egypt's economic prospects. Our massive and sustained bilateral assistance program must play a major role in supporting economic reform and has been tailored to this objective.

Shortly before arriving in Washington, President Mubarak and his ministers developed a new reform package that restrains demand and liberalizes both the industrial and agricultural sectors to stimulate production. We are prepared to use U.S. bilateral assistance, including our cash transfer, in support of the implementation of this program. As a first step, we are moving forward with a large energy project. We have also increased Egypt's access to agricultural credit to finance wheat purchases. At the same time, we urged the Egyptians to continue their negotiations with the IMF and IBRD. Some progress was made, although much work remains to be done.

It will be essential that the lines of communication between Egypt and the IMF be kept open. We will be following this situation closely in the coming weeks, and would like to maintain close contact to ensure that our positions are coordinated.

Sincerely,

His Excellency Dr. Helmut Kohl
Chancellor of the Federal Republic
of Germany
Bonn

Translation

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR

Bonn, 16 March 1989

Dear Mr President, *dear George,*

On 15 March I had an extensive discussion with Mr Mohammad Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, who is at present on a State visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.

President Mubarak gave me a full account of the difficulties confronting Egypt in the negotiations with the International Monetary Fund. Those negotiations are intended to establish the basis for a new loan agreement between Egypt and the IMF which will be essential for further international assistance. In view of the economic and social conditions prevailing in Egypt, President Mubarak considers it impossible for his country to carry the burden of the adjustment programmes demanded by the International Monetary Fund. He also pointed out that in the past three years his government has already pushed through substantial price increases for important commodities. He says that more cannot be done without jeopardizing his country's social and political stability.

My government has followed the negotiations between Egypt and the IMF and appreciates the problems. It has particularly borne in mind that Egypt is crucial to the maintenance of political stability in the unsettled Middle East region. I again emphasized this point in the talks I have just had with President Mubarak.

His Excellency
Mr George H.W. Bush,
President of the United States of America,
The White House

The Federal Government realizes, of course, that the International Monetary Fund is an institution which has to uphold principles and insist on minimum requirements. On the other hand we feel that in determining the pace of the reform programme allowance should be made for Egypt's economic and social circumstances.

Mr President, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany play an important role in the IMF's decision-making bodies. I would therefore greatly appreciate it if our two countries were to give special attention to the problems that arise in the negotiations between Egypt and the IMF. I for my part have instructed the German representative at the IMF to follow the negotiations closely and to avail himself of every opportunity to help the IMF achieve with Egypt an early and mutually acceptable solution.

President Mubarak, as you know, has played a key role in recent efforts to resolve the Middle East problem. It is due not least to his efforts that the PLO has taken the road of moderation and helped to bring about the decisions of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers in which it expressed its recognition of Israel's right to exist and of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. For this reason, too, I deem it important to strengthen Egypt's moderating role.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) Helmut Kohl

EMBASSY
OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

In the absence of Ambassador Ruhfus I have the honor to transmit to you the enclosed letter from Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Respectfully yours,

Karl Th. Paschke

Karl-Th. Paschke
Minister

Washington, D.C., March 21, 1989

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.

BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND
DER BUNDESKANZLER

Bonn, den 16. März 1989

An den
Präsidenten der Vereinigten
Staaten von Amerika
Herrn George H.W. Bush

The White House

Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident,

Lieber George,

am 15. März 1989 habe ich ein ausführliches Gespräch mit dem Präsidenten der Arabischen Republik Ägypten, Mohammad Hosni Mubarak, geführt, der sich zur Zeit zu einem Staatsbesuch in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland aufhält.

Präsident Mubarak hat mir bei dieser Gelegenheit eingehend die Schwierigkeiten geschildert, denen sich Ägypten in den Verhandlungen mit dem Internationalen Währungsfonds gegenüber sieht. In diesen Verhandlungen soll die Grundlage für eine neue Kreditvereinbarung zwischen Ägypten und dem Internationalen Währungsfonds geschaffen werden. Ein IWF-Kredit ist wiederum wichtige Voraussetzung für zusätzliche internationale Hilfszusagen.

Aus der Sicht Präsident Mubaraks sind die vom Internationalen Währungsfonds geforderten Anpassungsprogramme unter den wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen seines Landes nicht zu verkraften. Er verweist zudem darauf, daß seine Regierung in den letzten drei Jahren bereits erhebliche Preiserhöhungen für wichtige Güter durchgesetzt habe. Für ihn sei im Augenblick die Grenze des Durchsetzbaren erreicht, wenn er nicht die soziale und politische Stabilität seines Landes aufs Spiel setzen wolle.

Die Bundesregierung hat die bisherigen Verhandlungen zwischen Ägypten und dem IWF mit Verständnis verfolgt. Sie hat sich hierbei vor allem von dem Bewußtsein leiten lassen, daß Ägypten ein entscheidender Faktor der politischen Stabilität in der unruhigen Nahost-Region ist. Dies habe ich auch erneut in dem jetzt stattgefundenen Gespräch mit Präsident Mubarak unterstrichen.

Die Bundesregierung ist sich selbstverständlich der Tatsache bewußt, daß der Internationale Währungsfonds als Währungsinstitution die mit seiner Aufgabenstellung verbundenen Grundsätze und Mindestanforderungen einhalten muß. Gleichzeitig sind wir allerdings auch der Auffassung, daß die Bestimmung des Reformtempos für Ägypten den wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Bedingungen des Landes Rechnung tragen sollte.

Die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, sehr geehrter Herr Präsident, spielen in den zuständigen Entscheidungsgremien des Internationalen Währungsfonds eine wichtige Rolle. Ich würde es daher sehr begrüßen, wenn unsere beiden Länder den Problemen, die sich bei den derzeitigen Verhandlungen zwischen Ägypten und dem IWF stellen, ihre besondere Aufmerksamkeit schenken würden. Ich habe meinerseits den deutschen Vertreter im IWF anweisen lassen, den Fortgang der Verhandlungen aufmerksam zu verfolgen und alle Möglichkeiten wahrzunehmen, damit es dem IWF bald gelingt, mit Ägypten zu einem für beide Seiten vertretbaren Abschluß zu kommen.

Präsident Mubarak hat, wie Sie wissen, bei den jüngsten Bemühungen um eine Lösung des Nahost-Problems eine Schlüsselrolle gespielt. Es ist nicht zuletzt ihm zu verdanken, daß die PLO sich auf den Weg der Mäßigung begeben und die Beschlüsse des Palästinensischen Nationalrats von Algier, in denen das Existenzrecht Israels und die Sicherheitsratsresolutionen 242 und 383 anerkannt wurden, mitgetragen hat. Auch aus dieser Sicht halte ich es für wichtig, die auf Ausgleich bedachte Rolle Ägyptens zu stärken.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'H. Schmidt', written in a cursive style.



8906076

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

1902

April 14, 1989

~~SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response to Letter from FRG Chancellor Kohl

FRG Chancellor Helmut Kohl wrote President Bush on March 16 about his discussions with Egypt. Because of last-minute developments in Egypt's economic policy, we deferred answering the letter until after the Mubarak visit. Attached is a draft response which takes into account Egypt's most recent economic policy decisions and our own talks with Mubarak and Shamir.

J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

12 15

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1572-MR

mm 4/19/2016

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8901902

REFERRAL

DATE: 22 MAR 89

MEMORANDUM FOR: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DEPT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: KOHL, HELMUT

DATE: 16 MAR 89

SUBJ: LTR TO PRES FM CHANCELLOR RE MAR 15 DISCUSSIONS W/ MUBARAK & HIS
DIFFICULTIES W/ IMF

REQUIRED ACTION: PREPARE DRAFT REPLY

DUE DATE: 25 MAR 89

COMMENT: PLS EXPEDITE - PRES NEEDS TO SIGN LTR BEFORE MUBARAK VISIT 3 APR

FOR


GEORGE VAN ERON

DIRECTOR NSC SECRETARIAT

*Received in S/S-TRM/RAET
3/22 at 3:34 pm (AS)*

Chron file

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2845

April 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RH*
SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Dr. Peter Wallenberg

Franklin Forsberg, former U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, has sent you a FAX message (Tab I) requesting that you agree to meet with Peter Wallenberg May 1-3. Wallenberg, a prominent Swedish banker and member of the Raoul Wallenberg family, is Chairman of the International Chamber of Commerce. Forsberg has sent an identical FAX message (Tab II) to Bob Gates.

Wallenberg has also written the President directly to request a meeting. In a separate action (copy attached at Tab III), we have suggested that you recommend to White House scheduling that the President regret.

We suggest that you and Bob Gates also decline, particularly since neither Forsberg nor Wallenberg has specified a purpose for meeting.

JD
Tim Deal concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to inform Ambassador Forsberg that you will be unable to meet with Wallenberg.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Incoming from Forsberg
Tab II Incoming to Gates from Forsberg
Tab III Incoming to the President from Wallenberg

2845

FORSBERG ASSOCIATES

FRANKLIN S. FORSBERG
CHAIRMAN

FAX TRANSMISSION

Date: April 17, 1989 Time: 3:47 P.M.To Telefax No.: 202-395-5221Company: The White House
Washington, D.C. 20250Attention: General Brent ScowcroftFrom: Ambassador Franklin S. ForsbergTotal number of pages (including this one): 2


If you do not receive all of the pages, please telephone (212) 687-0100 immediately.

Message:

Dear General Scowcroft:

Dr. Peter Wallenberg, prominent Swedish Banker, Industrialist and present Chairman of the International Chamber of Commerce would very much like to spend a few minutes with you. He will be in Washington May 1st, 2nd and 3rd. My daughter Kristin Forsberg Williams of Washington will contact your office toward establishing a suitable time.

Dr. Wallenberg is a most authoritative and articulate friend of the United States. I can assure you that a meeting with him will be most productive.


Franklin S. Forsberg
Former United States Ambassador
To Sweden

FSF:ach

Dr. Peter Wallenberg, Econ. Dr. h.c. and Dr. of Letters h.c.

Born	May 29, 1926
1953	Bachelor of Laws at the University of Stockholm
1953	Employed at Atlas Copco AB
1956 - 1959	Employed at Atlas Copco Inc, USA
1959 - 1962	Managing Director Atlas Copco's subsidiary in Rhodesia
1960 - 1962	Managing Director of Atlas Copco's subsidiary in Congo
1962 - 1967	Executive Vice Chairman of Atlas Copco (Great Britain) Ltd and Atlas Copco (Manufacturing) Ltd, Hemel Hempstead, England, and Managing Director of the former company
1968 - 1970	Managing Director of Atlas Copco MCT AB, the product company for mining and construction technique within the Atlas Copco Group.
1970 - 1974	Deputy Managing Director of Atlas Copco AB
1974 -	Chairman of the Board of Atlas Copco AB
1974 - 1980	Industrial Adviser to the Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
1980 - 1984	Vice Chairman of the Board of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
1984 -	First Vice Chairman of the Board of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken

Dr. Wallenberg is also Chairman of STORA, Investor, Providentia, The Wallenberg Foundation, Enskilda Securities (U.K.), and Vice Chairman of ASEA AB, Electrolux, Telefon AB LM Ericsson and SKF.

As from January 1st, 1989 Dr. Wallenberg serves as President of the International Chamber of Commerce, ICC (Paris). He also serves on the Board of The Federation of Swedish Industries, The Nobel Foundation, Stockholm School of Economics, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), ASEA Brown Boveri Ltd, ABB (Zürich), Per Jacobson Foundation (USA), and The Joseph H. Lauder Institute (USA). He is member of the International Advisory Council of Swiss Bank Corporation and Wharton Advisory Board, University of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Wallenberg was awarded an honorary doctor's degree from the Stockholm School of Economics (1984) and also an honorary doctor's degree from Augustana College, Illinois (1985).

Decorations:

The Order of Wasa (1974)
Orden de Isabel la Catolica (1979)
The King's Medal 12th Class (1983)
The Legion of Honour, Knight Commander (1987)
Commander, First Class, of the Order of the Lion of Finland (1988)

April, 1989

0063d

UNCLASSIFIED

2845

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX #

ADMIN FAX # 14

PAGES 2

DTG 171945Z APR 89

RELEASER

FROM/LOCATION

1. FORSBERG

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. (SCOWCROFT)

2. HUGHES

TOP: 171950Z APR 89

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SITUATION ROOM

80 APR 89 17:04:02

WHITE HOUSE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

FORSBERG ASSOCIATES

FRANKLIN S. FORSBERG
CHAIRMAN

FAX TRANSMISSION

Date: April 17, 1989 Time: 4.00 p.m.
~~5.47 p.m.~~

To Telefax No.: 1-202-395-5221

Company: The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Attention: Mr. Robert Gates, Dep. Assist. to the Pres. for Nat'l Sec. Affairs

From: Ambassador Franklin S. Forsberg

Total number of pages (including this one): 2


If you do not receive all of the pages, please telephone (212) 687-0100 immediately.

Message:

Dear Mr. Gates:

Dr. Peter Wallenberg, prominent Swedish Banker, Industrialist and present Chairman of the International Chamber of Commerce would very much like to spend a few minutes with you. He will be in Washington May 1st, 2nd and 3rd. My daughter Kristin Forsberg Williams of Washington will contact your office toward establishing a suitable time.

Dr. Wallenberg is a most authoritative and articulate friend of the United States. I can assure you that a meeting with him will be most productive.


Franklin S. Forsberg
Former United States Ambassador
To Sweden

FSF:aoh

250 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10177
(212) 687-2832

WASHINGTON, D.C.
(202) 362-7171

465 LAKE AVENUE
GREENWICH CONNECTICUT 06830
(203) 869-0191

APR 17 '89 19:59

TOTAL P.02
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Dr. Peter Wallenberg, Econ. Dr. h.c. and Dr. of Letters h.c.

Born	May 29, 1926
1953	Bachelor of Laws at the University of Stockholm
1953	Employed at Atlas Copco AB
1956 - 1959	Employed at Atlas Copco Inc, USA
1959 - 1962	Managing Director Atlas Copco's subsidiary in Rhodesia
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Dr. Wallenberg was awarded an honorary doctor's degree from the Stockholm School of Economics (1984) and also an honorary doctor's degree from Augustana College, Illinois (1985).

Decorations:

The Order of Wasa (1974)
 Orden de Isabel la Catolica (1979)
 The King's Medal 12th Class (1983)
 The Legion of Honour, Knight Commander (1987)
 Commander, First Class, of the Order of the Lion of Finland (1988)

April, 1989

0063d

CURRICULUM VITAE

Dr. Peter Wallenberg, Econ. Dr. h.c. and Dr. of Letters h.c.

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April, 1989

0063d

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CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

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ROUTINE

MODE

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ADMIN FAX # 15

PAGES 2

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RELEASER

FROM/LOCATION

1. FORSBERG

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GACTES

2. Hughes

3.

TOP: 172000ZAPR89

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7.

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1.

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SITUATION ROOM

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HOUSE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

2843

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RESPONSE DUE DATE: April 24, 1989

REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

_____ GOVERNOR SUNUNU	_____ JAMES CICCONI
_____ ANDREW CARD, JR.	_____ DAVID DEMAREST
_____ ROGER PORTER	_____ MARLIN FITZWATER
_____ STEPHEN STUDDERT	_____ FREDERICK MCCLURE
_____ RICHARD BREEDEN	_____ J. BONNIE NEWMAN
_____ DAVID BATES	XX _____ BRENT SCOWCROFT
_____ CHASE UNTERMEYER	_____ C. BOYDEN GRAY
_____	_____

FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

Please provide your recommendation on the following scheduling request:

EVENT: Request to Meet with the President from Peter Wallenberg- Swedish
Citizen
DATE: April 30 through May 4
LOCATION: Washington, D.C.

Additional information concerning this event is attached.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____

Regret ☒ _____

Surrogate _____

Message _____

Priority _____

Video _____

Routine _____

Written _____

President has met Mr. Wallenberg in Sweden and the U.S.

If your recommendation is to accept, please cite reasons below:

7-2-18 15:13

PLEASE RETURN TO WINDY WHITE, ROOM 182, OEOB, BY THE RESPONSE DUE DATE ABOVE
SO THAT YOUR COMMENTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS WE PROCEED WITH THIS REQUEST.
THANK YOU

PETER WALLEMBERG

To the President of the United States
Mr George Bush

Stockholm, April 11, 1989

Dear Mr President,

Am planning to be in Washington from p.m. April 30th until p.m. May 4th and would be much obliged if you would be kind enough to receive me for a moment during that time.

Warmest regards,

Peter Wallenberg
Peter Wallenberg

To office dent: Former Ambassador Forsberg will be contacting your
office on t. st.

Dr. Peter Wallenberg, Econ. Dr. h.c. and Dr. of Letters h.c.

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April, 1989

Chen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1610

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: "Together for Peace" Association Invitation to
Mrs. Bush

Attached at Tab I is a memo to Susan Porter Rose forwarding NSC concurrence with State's recommendation that Mrs. Bush decline Mrs. Fanfani's invitation to participate in a "Together for Peace" seminar to be held in Rome from May 21 to 24.

Bob Blackwill *BB* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Susan Porter Rose

Tab A Incoming from State

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1610

MEMORANDUM FOR SUSAN PORTER ROSE

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: "Together for Peace" Association Invitation to
Mrs. Bush

The NSC concurs with State's recommendation (Tab A) that Mrs. Bush decline Mrs. Fanfani's invitation to participate in a "Together in Peace" seminar in Rome from May 21 to 24. Also at Tab A is a draft response to Mrs. Fanfani for your use.

Attachment

Tab A Incoming from State



8905208

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

1610

March 11, 1989

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: "Together for Peace" Association Invitation
to Mrs. Bush

Mrs. Mariapia Fanfani, wife of former Prime Minister of Italy and current Italian Budget Minister Amintore Fanfani, has invited Mrs. Bush to participate in a seminar in Rome from May 21 to 24, 1989, entitled "Women and Solidarity." Mrs. Fanfani is president of the Italian "Together for Peace" Association and is Vice President of the International League of the Red Cross.

Mrs. Fanfani's original invitation to Mrs. Bush was sent to the White House on January 10, along with a similar invitation to Mrs. Quayle. The signed original of Mrs. Fanfani's invitation, along with the proposed agenda and descriptive materials on the "Women and Solidarity" seminar in Rome, are attached to this memorandum.

The Department of State recommends that Mrs. Bush decline this invitation. A suggested response to Mrs. Fanfani is attached.

Melvyn Levitsky

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Draft Response
- Tab 2 - Seminar Agenda and Descriptive Materials
- Tab 3 - Letter of Invitation

68 MAR 13 4 20: 20

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

SUGGESTED RESPONSE FROM MRS. BUSH TO MRS. FANFANI

Dear Mrs. Fanfani:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful invitation to me to participate in the "Women and Solidarity" seminar which you are organizing in Rome this May.

I have read with great interest and admiration the attractive and informative descriptions of the "Insieme per la Pace" Association, and would like to extend my best wishes for your organization's continued success and good work.

I regret that other commitments this spring preclude me from accepting your invitation. However, I look forward to seeing you again in the near future and to discussing the challenging and important causes you have embraced.

I wish you continued success, and send my warm regards.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. Mariapia Fanfani,
Associazione Culturale E Benefica,
Rome.

International Study Seminar organized by the Association "Insieme Per la Pace" (Together for Peace) with the collaboration of the Non-Governmental Organization "Noi per Loro" (Us for Them).

AGENDA

FIRST SESSION

May 23 (morning)

"The role of women in international and supranational organizations"

Addresses and presentation of study papers

SECOND SESSION

May 23 (afternoon)

"Women in Government and other Institutions"

Addresses and presentation of study papers

THIRD SESSION

May 24 (morning)

"Women in Non-Governmental Organizations and in the Voluntary Service"

Addresses and presentation of study papers

FOURTH SESSION

May 24 (afternoon)

"Women and research for humanitarian purposes"

Addresses and presentation of study papers

Closing remarks

The agenda for the second and third sessions will be coordinated by "Noi per Loro" (Us for Them).

WOMEN AND SOLIDARITY

Preliminary Program

Sunday May 21

Participants arrive in Rome

Monday May 22

09.30 Visit to the Mayor of Rome
11.00 Audience with the Holy Father
13.30 Luncheon
18.00 Audience with the President of the Republic at
the Quirinal Palace.
20.00 Vernissage of paintings by Mrs. Charbonneau and
Mrs. Corrias

Tuesday May 23

10.00 Official opening of seminar with address by the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honorable
Giulio Andreotti
13.30 Luncheon
15.30 Seminar resumes
18.00 Conclusion of first day of seminar
21.00 Dinner at Villa Madama

Wednesday May 24

10.00 Opening of second day of Seminar
13.30 Luncheon
15.30 Seminar resumes
18.00 Conclusion
21.30 Gala Dinner and Award ceremony

Thursday May 25

Free day for city sightseeing and shopping

Friday May 26

Departure of participants.


The leaflets you will find enclosed in this folder represent an illustrative summary of the activities we have taken up over the past few months our "INSIEME PER LA PACE" (TOGETHER FOR PEACE) ASSOCIATION.

The Association, founded of humanitarian and cultural objectives, proposes for itself - since the time of its foundation - to intensify the relations among peoples of the North and the South of the world, between industrialized nations and developing countries in a concrete vision of peace that is not a mere affirmation of political will, but a fruit of understanding, friendship and dialogue among peoples and nations.

In this spirit, the Big Event of Solferino and Castiglione delle Stiviere was organized in September of 1986 culminating with the Verona Conference in which representatives from 65 countries all over the world launched a common and joint appeal towards constructing peace. In this spirit, during that occasion and the more recent event last May 1987, numerous Awards for Peace were conferred on personalities and luminaries who offered not formal but substantial contributions (sometimes even at the point of sacrificing one's own life) to promote understanding among men. Again, in this same spirit, we have organized the International Study Seminar on the New African Literature which has brought together in Rome, from September 28 to October 2 1987, intellectuals coming from the African continent to confront with Italian scholars and writers towards a perspective of collaboration which has, naturally, surpassed the limits of the literary academy.

In this spirit, finally, other big events for peace will take place in the near future.

Mariapia Fanfani

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Mariapia Fanfani", written in a cursive style.

THE "TOGETHER FOR PEACE" COMMITTEE 1986 IS BORN

Alongside the "Noi per Loro" (WE FOR THEM) Association, the "TOGETHER FOR PEACE" Committee, also under the presidency of mme. Mariapia Fanfani, was born with the objective of diffusing the ideals of brotherhood and solidarity among peoples and nations.

Thus, on September 2-3, in Solferino and Castiglione delle Stiviere - 2 places sacred in memory of Henry Dunant, where the idea of the Red Cross was conceived during the Italian Risorgimento - a series of big events were celebrated in which official delegations from 65 countries worldwide participated. The foreign representatives paraded on a stage erected on the plaza of Solferino to launch, in their respective languages, an appeal for peace.

Two photo exhibits were inaugurated at the Museum of Castiglione, dedicated to the history of the Red Cross and the mission of the Peace Ship. During the ceremonies in Solferino, the "Together for Peace" Awards were conferred.

"AWARD FOR PEACE" 1988

The Association **"Insieme per la pace"** has conferred upon:

HER ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCESS IRENE OF GREECE

The 1988 Award for Peace for her extraordinary effort and dedication to the poor and needy populations through the World In Harmony Organization, which she promotes and presides over which proposes through institutional means to redistribute the surplus of the wealthy nations, thereby offering tangible proof of brotherhood and solidarity to those who suffer and are in need.

MATILDA RAFFA CUOMO

The 1988 Award for Peace for her zealous defense of those weaker and helpless sectors of society against every form of violence, in a constant and meritorious effort which has earned her the unanimous respect and gratitude of the entire community in which she lives and works.

AMALIA LACROZE DE FORTABAT

The 1988 Award for Peace for her continual generosity over the years in contributing concretely and efficiently to the various programs of social assistance for the poor and the outcast, and for her love for the most unfortunate children, showing us that only selfishness and stupidity are the obstacles to the building of a better and more just world for all.

MARCELA PEREZ DE CUELLAR

The 1988 Award for Peace in recognition of the work she has carried out on many missions in every corner of the world encouraging the affirmation of the ideals of solidarity, friendship and peace among people and nations.

ANNA MERETE PETRIGNANI

The 1988 Award for Peace for her devoted commitment with which she has dedicated herself for many years to social assistance bringing esteem and prestige to the image of Italy abroad and demonstrating by her actions the participation of our people in those undertakings which attempt to strengthen the bonds of international solidarity.

RUTH RABB

The 1988 Award for Peace for her work during her seven year stay in our Country, strengthening the ties of friendship between Italy and the United States, assisting the outcast and the most needy citizens both through her public activities and through her own personal commitment, always with great humility and efficiency.

FATHER CELESTINO CIRICILLO

The 1988 Award for Peace for his indefatigable humanitarian efforts in Bebedjia Mission in Ciad, where he has created a social-sanitary center which the Chad government has recognized as «indispensable for the progress and sanitary education of the Country», saving a great number of human lives and furnishing a shining example of devotion to duty and to the ideals of universal brotherhood.

“INSIEME PER LA PACE” ASSOCIATION

Committee of honour:

President: MARIAPIA FANFANI
SUSANNA AGNELLI
MARISA BELLISARIO
GIOIA BRAGA MARCONI
TULLIA CARETTONI
PAOLO CARLINI
VITTORINO CARRA
MARIA LUISA CASSANMAGNAGO
GABRIELLA CECCATELLI
ALICE COLOMBO
SILVIA COSTA
GIOVANNI D'ERCOLE
MICHEL DOO KINGUÉ
MARCELLA GLISENTI
GIOVANNA MARONE CINZANO
EDOUARD MAUNICK
RITA LEVI MONTALCINI
GABRIELE MORETTI
REMO PAOLINI
MARCELA PEREZ DE CUELLAR
RENATO PONZ
BEATRICE RANGONI MACHIAVELLI
MARIDA RECCHI
LUIGI ROSSI BERNARDI

“INSIEME PER LA PACE” ASSOCIATION

Executive Committee:

MARIAPIA FANFANI
MARINA BELLENGHI
NICOLETTA BONCOMPAGNI
LILIANA DI LAZZARO
DOMENICO FERRARO
GIUSEPPE GALLO
ANTONIETTA GUAZZARONI
ALESSANDRA LASSOTOVICH
MAURIZIO MARIANI
GABRIELLA MOLINI
MARIA TERESA MONTANARELLA
MARINA PAVONCELLI
CARLA PULCINELLI
GIUSTO PURI PURINI
MARGHERITA PURI PURINI
ORESTE RADÌ
ROSANNA PIZZIRANI
GIUSEPPINA SCIASCIA
CECILIA SFLIGIOTTI
MARISA SOAVI
PIER GIORGIO SPAGGIARI
FRANCESCA TODESCHINI
MASSIMO TOSTI
MARCO VENTURA
MARIA VICARI

"CULTURE FOR PEACE" AWARD 1988

The Association **"Insieme per la pace"** has conferred upon:

JACK LANG

The 1988 «**Culture for Peace**» Award for his exceptional contribution towards the spreading of culture as an instrument of exchange and friendship among peoples in a vision of his role in government which has continually attempted to go beyond all boundaries and develop a dialogue among peoples.

RITA LEVI MONTALCINI

The 1988 **"Culture for Peace"** Award to honor that pact, never written, yet eternally valid which unites intelligence and the wise use of creativity in the perpetual hope for peace entrusted to the positive challenges which only courage and intelligence may offer an overcome.

EDOUARD MAUNICK

The 1988 **"Culture for Peace"** Award, as a pure example of cosmopolitanism and of the universality of poetry, a cross of languages and races, honoring his civic commitment which holds dear the highest Human values and strives to affirm those Principles which have no boundaries or nations and which express feelings and meanings understood the world over.

EDILIO RUSCONI

The 1988 **"Culture for Peace"** Award in recognition of his unswerving faith and dedication, in over forty years of his career, first as a journalist and then as an editor, to the ideals of solidarity, honesty and peace.

HARUO SHIKANAI

The 1988 "**Culture for Peace**" Award, in recognition of his limpid expression of the strivings of the new generation of the Japanese people, born from the ashes of war and shaped by the memory of the atomic holocaust, dedicating his own energies towards the realization of the high ideals of peace solemnly consecrated in the post war constitution which he faithfully interpreted in a new key, utilizing the media of mass communication, television, radio, and the press, in an attempt to promote transcultural values which are the tools of understanding among peoples, and thus are also the implements of peace.

INSIEME PER LA PACE

Presidente Mariapia Fanfani
Vicepresidente della Lega
Internazionale di Croce Rossa
e Presidente del Comitato
Nazionale Femminile della
Croce Rossa Italiana

Rome, December 30 1988

Dear Mr. Bush,

I have the pleasure to inform you that the Association "Insieme per la Pace", of which I am President, is organizing a Seminar entitled "Women and Solidarity", whose purpose is to test out the problems that involve women in the large and difficult field of Solidarity.

The Seminar will take place in Rome from the 21st to the 24th of May 1989, under the High Patronage of the President of the Italian Republic, in the beautiful Palais of the San Michele Institute.

The feminine apport to Solidarity results from a natural attitude of us women towards humanitarian works and is therefore deeper for it is less affected by political prejudices and personal interests. The idea of organizing this meeting has come from the need of setting the basis for a joint effort and action in the field of humanitarian assistance. It is by pointing out, all together, the fundamental aims to pursue and the common strategies to undertake, that our action will be more incisive.

./.

ASSOCIAZIONE
CULTURALE E BENEFICA
Via di Monte Giordano, 36
cap. 00186 Roma
Tel. 06/654.58.35-654.09.66
38.61.63-31.74.47
Telefax 06/68.78.341
Telex 623119 NOILOR-I
Codice Fiscale - Partita IVA
07955580589
N° c/c 43565.77
Monte dei Paschi di Siena



INSIEME PER LA PACE

- 2 -

The invitation to attend the meeting is addressed to those most interested and engaged women in this field and this is the reason why indeed I hope that you will be with us.

The stay in Rome includes a private audience to the Holy Father, a visit to the President of the Italian Republic and another one to the Mayor of Rome.

While looking forward to having you as a guest of the Association "Insieme per la Pace" to our seminar, I send you all my warmest and best regards.

*Con molti cari saluti
mi ricordo molto al Presidente
e alle due
Amiatrici*

Maria Fanfani
(Mariapia Fanfani)

Mme Barbara Bush



SEMINARIO INTERNAZIONALE DI STUDIO



Chan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2130

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *AL*
SUBJECT: Request from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies to Meet with Members of the
European Working Group

At Tab I is a response from you to Robert Hunter at CSIS declining his request that you meet with fifteen members of the CSIS European Working Group in Washington in June. Dr. Hunter's letter is at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Dr. Hunter.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Dr. Hunter
Tab II Incoming Letter

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob:

Thank you for your kind invitation to meet with members of the European Working Group. The list of participants is impressive, and I am sure the people they will meet in Washington will benefit from their perspectives on the key foreign policy issues dominating the Transatlantic agenda. Unfortunately, due to the constraints on my schedule, I will be unable to meet with the group. I hope they will find their stay in Washington a rewarding one.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Robert E. Hunter
Vice President for
Regional Programs
Center for Strategic &
International Studies
Washington, D. C. 20006



Center for Strategic & International Studies
Washington, DC

2130

*Staff for
recommendation
by Florence*
MAR 28 1989

26 March 1989

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Brent:

Each year in June selected members of the London-based CSIS European Working Group (EWG) come to Washington to present a paper to the foreign policy community, meet with journalists, and share views with sitting government officials. The EWG, led by former Labour M.P. Alan Lee Williams, consists of a number of leading European observers and commentators on transatlantic affairs. Their presentations here have always proved to be extremely useful for Americans, in and out of government.

About fifteen members of the Group (list attached) will be in Washington on June 7, 8 and 9 (Wednesday through Friday) to discuss current European views on the economic and trade situation, arms control, and defense responsibilities.

I am writing to ask whether you can meet with the EWG in your office either later afternoon on June 7, any time on June 8, or during the morning of June 9. The Group would greatly benefit from hearing your views on key subjects, and I believe that their insights will also be valuable to you.

In the near future, Curtis Farmer of CSIS -- the action officer -- will be in touch with your office to see about the possibility of scheduling an appointment. I very much hope it will be possible for you to meet with the Group if only briefly.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Robert E. Hunter
Vice President for
Regional Programs

EUROPEAN WORKING GROUP

Those tentatively scheduled to participate in the June visit are:

BRIAN BEEDHAM CBE: Foreign Editor, the Economist, UK
(author of the annual EWG paper)

FRITS BOLKESTEIN MP: Member of Parliament, The Netherlands

M. EMILE BOURSIER: President, Union des Industries
Metallurgiques and Minieres, France

DR. PETER CORTERIER: Former Member of Parliament in Germany and
now General Secretary of the North Atlantic Assembly

SENATOR MAURICE FAURE: Member of Parliament in France and
Minister of Housing

RODRIGO DE RATO FIGAREDO: Conservative (Partido Popular) Member
of Parliament in Spain and a businessman

JOHN FLOOD: Deputy General Secretary of the Shop, Distributive &
Allied Workers Union (USDAW), UK

JAMIE GAMA: Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Portuguese
Parliament and the Deputy Secretary General of the Portuguese
Socialist Party

M. EVALD von KLEIST: Chairman, Europäische Wehrkunde, Germany

PETER ROBINSON: Director, Stoke Rochford Management Ltd.

GENERAL GERD SCHMUCKLE: Former Deputy Supreme Commander of NATO,
and now a journalist

THE RT HON PETER SHORE MP: Labour Member of Parliament and
former Cabinet Minister, UK

RAY WHITNEY OBE, MP: Conservative Member of Parliament and
former Foreign Office Minister

ALAN LEE WILLIAMS OBE: Former Labour Member of Parliament,
presently Chairman of the SDP Defence & Disarmament Committee.
Founder member of European Working Group & currently Chief
Executive of the University Settlement Toynbee Hall

ch

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET~~

w/~~TOP SECRET~~ Attachment

20272 add-on

April 17, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Minutes for NSC Meeting on US Relations with the
Soviet Union, April 5, 1989.

Enclosed at Tab I are the minutes for the above-referenced meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you file the minutes for the NSC meeting on US Relations with the Soviet Union, attached at Tab I, for the record.

Attachment: Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Tab I Minutes

~~TOP SECRET~~

w/~~TOP SECRET~~ Attachment
Declassify: on OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *bic* NARA, Date *3/13/08*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. List	National Security Council Meeting participants (1 pp.)	4/5/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [8]

Date Closed: 5/18/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Minutes	NSC Meeting on US Relations with the Soviet Union, April 5, 1989 [missing page 2] (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [8]

Date Closed: 5/18/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Chen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2543

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Toby Gati

At Tab I is a letter from you to Toby Gati responding to her note of April 4 in which she describes the work of the United Nations Association of the USA and the Asia-Pacific Association of Japan in assessing Gorbachev's "new thinking" toward East Asia. (The Gati letter is at Tab II.) In your response you thank Gati for forwarding to you a copy of the joint report of the UNA-USA and Asia-Pacific Association of Japan (Tab III).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Toby Gati at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments:

Tab I	Letter to Toby Gati
Tab II	Incoming Letter
Tab III	Executive Summary of "Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Refashioning American and Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union"

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Toby:

Thank you for your recent letter outlining the work of the United Nations Association of the United States of America and the Asia-Pacific Association of Japan. Certainly, the impact of Gorbachev's new thinking is not confined to Europe. I am also heartened to hear that the Japanese are addressing Soviet policies toward Asia as more than merely derivative of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

I am sorry we could not arrange a meeting in Washington. I do hope that your trip to Moscow was rewarding and stimulating. Let's stay in touch.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Ms. Toby Trister Gati
Vice President
Policy Studies
U.N. Association of the
United States of America
485 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10017-6104



UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

485 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017-6104 PHONE: (212) 697-3232 FAX: (212) 682-9185 CABLE: UNASMER
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McGeorge Bundy

Chairman, Advisory Group
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* * *

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Arthur J. Goldberg

254J

April 4, 1989

*Mr. Gati is a
friend of the
House.*

APR 7 1989

Cy Florence

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Brent,

While you've been busy running the country, UNA-USA and the Asia Pacific Association of Japan have been studying Soviet "new thinking" in the East Asia-Pacific region. That three-year study has resulted in the publication of a joint report, "Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Refashioning American and Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union," which is enclosed. This is the first time the Japanese have systematically addressed Soviet policy in Asia as more than just a derivative of Soviet-American relations.

Some of the recommendations you may find encouraging. The support for COCOM on both sides is especially significant in light of past events, as is the call to have the Asian NICs join some sort of COCOM framework. You may not be as happy, however, with the part about meeting the Soviets halfway for a discussion of arms control in East Asia.

Speaking of the Soviets, I'm off to Moscow again to meet with a group from the Soviet UNA on UN issues. This meeting is the second in a series devoted to the future of the UN system, and it has proven remarkably interesting. Some members of the US group plan to be in Washington on the 18th for a debriefing with John Bolton and others, and I was hoping we could come in and see you for a few minutes. My assistant will call your office while I am away to set it up.

Wishing you a crisis-free world,

With warm regards,

Toby

Toby Trister Gati
Vice President
Policy Studies



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* * *

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CONTACT: Jennifer Metzger
Katy Wille

American and Japanese Policy Experts Call for New Coordinated Approach to Gorbachev's Initiatives in Asia

UNA-USA and the APAJ Release Policy Recommendations in Response to Soviet "New Thinking" in the Asia-Pacific Region

New York, NY....The United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA) and its Asian counterpart, The Asia Pacific Association of Japan (APAJ), has released a groundbreaking joint report on U.S.-Japanese relations and the Soviet Union. The report, which recommends a set of constructive policy responses to Gorbachev's initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, was presented today to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

A new emphasis on Asia--from reducing involvement in regional military conflicts to initiating greater Soviet integration in the regional economy--marks Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy. At the same time, however, the picture is mixed--Gorbachev has recommended multilateral discussions on air and naval force reductions in Northeast Asia while increasing and upgrading Soviet deployments there, for example. The UNA-APAJ study represents the first sustained effort by Americans and Japanese working together to assess these intentions and develop a coordinated U.S.-Japanese policy.

"The new Soviet interest in the Pacific will present difficulties to the U.S. and Japan only if we fail to manage our bilateral relations and relations with other states in the Asia-Pacific region," says McGeorge Bundy, U.S. Chairman of the UNA-APAJ panel and U.S. National Security Advisor to President John F. Kennedy. This reevaluation of U.S. and Japanese foreign policy in the region by UNA-USA and the APAJ was undertaken by UNA's Parallel Studies Program with Japan with the support of the U.S.-Japan Foundation. The three-year study involved joint meetings of policy experts and prominent scholars, and consultations with representatives of both governments.

Among the key recommendations of the bilateral report are:

1. establishment of a high-level group to analyze arms control options in Northeast Asia;
2. development of greater Japanese support for U.N. activities, including its participation in future U.N. peacekeeping forces;
3. establishment of an economic policy toward the Soviet Union that plays down the role of state financial guarantees and subsidies, and encourages project loans based strictly on business criteria, all within an upgraded COCOM structure;

In the effort to promote political stability and economic development in the region, the report also calls upon the U.S. to share decision-making power with Japan in various international economic organizations such as the IMF and World Bank, and to be more receptive to Japanese initiatives for dealing with the Third World debt crisis.

Yoshio Okawara, Counselor of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Special Advisor to the Federation of Economic Organizations, and former Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., chaired the Japanese panel and McGeorge Bundy headed the U.S. panel.

The United Nations Association of the United States of America, a nonpartisan, nationwide membership and research organization, is considered the foremost international authority on the U.N. For over 20 years, UNA's Parallel Studies Programs with Japan, the Soviet Union, and China have brought together high-level experts and former policy-makers for bilateral discussions of foreign policy.

Contacts in Japan for overseas press: Yutaka Nakayama and Tomomi Shimada at the APAJ, World Trade Center Building, 23rd Floor, 2-4-1 Hamamatsu-cho Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan. Tel: (03) 578-0949

Press Conference, 12-2 pm: The Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan, 7-1 Yurakucho 1-chome, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, Japan

Please notify the APAJ by phone in advance if you plan to attend the press conference.
Tel: (03)578-0949

To receive a copy of the joint report, *Gorbachev's Asian Policy: Refashioning American and Japanese Policy Toward the Soviet Union*, contact Jennifer Metzger, UNA Public Affairs Coordinator, in New York. To receive a Japanese translation of the report contact Tomomi Shimada at the APAJ in Tokyo.

GORBACHEV'S ASIAN POLICY: REFASHIONING AMERICAN AND JAPANESE POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

*A Report of the
United Nations Association of the USA
and the
Asia Pacific Association of Japan*

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In speeches, visits, and diplomatic initiatives; through the cultivation of economic relations; and by efforts to resolve regional conflicts, the Soviet Union has signaled its intention to improve relations with nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Soviet tactics in Asia and the Pacific have changed, but it remains unclear if basic Soviet regional objectives and strategy have shifted.

This joint report suggests a coordinated U.S.-Japanese approach to the new Soviet policy in Asia aimed not only at seizing the opportunities posed by current changes in the Soviet Union, but also at preventing Moscow from taking initiatives that might weaken the U.S.-Japanese alliance. *It is the conclusion of the UNA-USA and APAJ panels that Japan and the United States should wherever possible engage the Soviet Union in constructive dialogue on all aspects of Asian security--political, military, and economic--and work energetically to establish a U.S.-Japanese bilateral agenda for promoting peace and prosperity in the region.*

The policy recommendations are presented against the background of a new Soviet strategy in the Asia-Pacific region and an analysis of American and Japanese perspectives on the Soviet Union.

Recommendations

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Security Issues

A. Regional Conflicts

To encourage the Soviet Union to play a constructive role in resolving regional conflicts, the United States and Japan should:

1. support Soviet efforts to get Vietnam to reduce its military forces in Cambodia and seek a negotiated settlement of the Cambodian conflict.
2. encourage the Soviet Union to press the Chinese to strengthen those factions that can provide the foundations for political stability and democratization in Cambodia and prevent the resurgence of the Khmer Rouge.
3. endorse closer Soviet and Chinese relations with the Republic of Korea and encourage both Moscow and Beijing to support a policy of cross-recognition.
4. seek greater Soviet support for policies aimed at discouraging North Korean terrorism and other acts of provocation and encouraging economic liberalization in North Korea.
5. commence U.S.-Soviet discussions about restraints on arms transfers to the two Koreas.
6. work closely with the Soviet Union in resolving regional conflicts through the U.N. As concerns Japan's own policies at the U.N., increased support for the U.N. specialized agencies and international peacekeeping efforts--including the participation of Japanese nationals in future U.N. peacekeeping forces--would provide a suitable means for enhancing Japan's contribution to international security. The United States, for its part, should meet all of its financial obligations to the U.N. as soon as possible.

B. Defense and Arms Control

The Soviet Union's many arms control proposals hold out the promise of a reduction of military confrontation, while continued Soviet upgrading of regional ground, air, and naval forces pose a threat to the United States and Japan. Given the present balance of forces in Northeast Asia:

1. Japan should continue to modernize and upgrade its military capabilities, especially in early warning, surveillance, and sea lane defense and in the defense of northern Japan.
2. the United States should maintain its forward defense posture to enhance both regional and global deterrence.

3. Japan and the United States should improve command and control between their forces in the event of a crisis, deepen their consultations on military matters, and promote joint planning and combined training exercises. The two countries should also consider negotiating a "wartime host nation support agreement" and the prepositioning of military material in Japan.

4. Japan should bear more of the yen-based costs for American forces stationed in Japan to promote a more equitable sharing of the defense burden.

The U.S. and Japan should also seize the opportunity posed by recent Soviet flexibility on military issues. In response, Japan and the United States should:

1. establish a high-level study group to analyze the possibility of arms control in Northeast Asia and to develop a bilateral understanding about the measures that would be in our mutual interest.

2. encourage Moscow to follow through on Gorbachev's promise to make public Soviet defense capabilities in the Far East.

3. engage the Soviet Union in a serious dialogue about ways to reduce tensions and reduce the possibility of military crises and accidents in the region, and about the negotiation of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) involving air, ground, and naval forces. At the same time, Washington and Tokyo must resist one-sided Soviet proposals for limitations on naval deployments designed to weaken America's forward defense posture.

4. be sensitive to concerns in the Pacific region about the disposal of nuclear waste and the production and storage of nuclear weapons, thus preventing the exploitation of anti-nuclear sentiments by the Soviet Union.

C. Economic Development and Political Stability

The Soviet Union is still only a marginal political and economic player in East Asia, yet it can play a spoiler role in the region. The U.S. and Japan, working together, can take several steps to enhance regional stability:

1. at home, the United States must contain domestic pressures for protectionism, while Japan must continue to expand its absorption of imports.

2. in the region, the U.S. and Japan should cooperate to increase the amount of multilateral economic assistance available and promote the transfer of needed technology.

3. the United States must share decision-making power with Japan in various international economic organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, and be more receptive to Japanese initiatives for dealing with the Third World debt crisis.

4. both the United States and Japan should actively support and participate in the multilateral aid consortium now being proposed to assist the Philippines.

Economic Relations with the Soviet Union

Soviet interest in participating in the dynamic Pacific economic system is growing, as is an interest in joining various regional and global economic organizations. Given the importance of these institutions for managing the world economy, many questions arise as to procedure and intentions. Looking ahead, the United States and Japan should:

1. discuss the requirements for Soviet participation in the various global and regional economic organizations, including those Soviet domestic reforms that would prevent dumping and achieve convertibility of the ruble. Washington and Tokyo should also insist that Moscow develop a clear tariff policy and disclose relevant financial and trade information.
2. encourage the Soviet Union to take the necessary steps to create free economic zones in Asia and to grant them basic autonomy from central economic planners.

The United States and Japan should also develop basic guidelines for managing economic relations with the Soviet Union. In terms of lending and investment policy, the U.S. and Japanese governments should:

1. discourage untied commercial bank lending and encourage loans on a project basis. Both the American and Japanese governments should allow direct foreign investment to be driven primarily by the business evaluations of individual firms.
2. refrain in principle from providing state financial guarantees for such investments and from granting subsidies for trade with the Soviet Union.
3. determine the proper political conditions for the relaxation of certain existing export controls and the allocation of credit and credit guarantees from government financial institutions.
4. actively enforce the COCOM restrictions on transferring technology with possible military applications. Effective enforcement requires that the list of restricted goods be streamlined to contain only the critical technologies and updated regularly to keep abreast of technological change.
5. develop a policy to integrate the Asian newly industrializing economies into formal or informal adherence to COCOM restrictions.

Relations with China

The United States and Japan should maintain good relations with China to ensure that Soviet initiatives in Asia, as well as the improvement of Soviet-Chinese relations, will enhance regional stability. Washington and Tokyo should closely follow the process of Sino-Soviet normalization and be aware that we can no longer assume automatic Chinese opposition to Soviet foreign policy initiatives or automatic support for our own. The U.S. and Japan should:

1. signal to the Soviets that there are no objections to "normal" relations with the Chinese but indicate, at the same time, that there is no "China card" that can be played against the United States and Japan.

2. continue to assure the Chinese that Japanese military modernization does not pose a security threat. Likewise, American support of Chinese military modernization should be so tailored as to avoid provoking fear in Japan or other Asian countries.

3. not attempt to steer China away from the Soviet Union by upgrading the level of military assistance to the PRC.

The Northern Territories Issue

A resolution of the Northern Territories issue is in the interest of Japan, the Soviet Union, the United States, and all countries that support regional stability. Indeed, there is no way that the Soviet leadership can avoid dealing with this problem if it desires to play a more active role in the Asia-Pacific region. In this regard:

1. the United States should continue to support Japanese efforts to resolve the Northern Territories issue.

2. the Soviet Union, as a step toward serious governmental negotiations, should recognize Japan's potential sovereignty over the Northern Territories.

Background

EMERGENCE OF A NEW SOVIET STRATEGY TOWARD THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

The need for internal reform derives from an awareness that the Soviet Union can improve its global position only if it modernizes. The implementation of such reform requires a more peaceful international environment and a lower cost, lower risk foreign policy.

Although traditionally Asia had been only of secondary importance in Soviet foreign policy, interest in the Far East has grown since the 1970s. However, past Soviet actions, particularly the effort to contain China, have had the effect of promoting a broad anti-Soviet security coalition in Asia and of isolating the Soviet economy from the dynamism of the East Asia-Pacific region.

Gorbachev's rise to power brought a new determination to reduce the disabilities of past policies and to engage and integrate the Soviet Union into the region. Gorbachev has moved rapidly to improve ties with other socialist states in the area and to give his country a larger political and diplomatic presence throughout the Asia-Pacific region.

The Political-Military Dimension

The Soviet government has begun to reduce the burdens of its involvement in regional conflicts--the military withdrawal from Afghanistan being the most dramatic example--and has also encouraged the Vietnamese to announce their own military pullout from Cambodia. Gorbachev has put forth a series of regional arms control proposals, suggesting a nuclear weapons freeze in the Asia-Pacific region, lending support for the creation of nuclear-free zones, urging the adoption of confidence and security-building measures, and recommending multilateral discussions to freeze and reduce air and naval forces in Northeast Asia and restrict their activity.

Moscow has now agreed to cut Soviet armed forces in Asia by 200,000 men, to pull out an armored division from Mongolia, make unilateral ground force reductions along the Sino-Soviet border, liquidate Soviet aviation forces in Mongolia, and publish data about Soviet military capabilities in the Far East. At the same time, the Soviet Union is also continuing to make qualitative improvements in terms of naval and air power in the Far East, increasing naval deployments and movements and upgrading its air force capabilities in Northeast Asia. These deployments confirm the growing importance of the Northwest Pacific for Soviet military strategy and the Soviet-American strategic nuclear balance. Furthermore, Moscow has not reduced its military assistance to its Asian allies, such as North Korea and Vietnam.

All of this presents a mixed picture of Gorbachev's peace offensive in the region. By all indications the Soviet government has not yet reconciled its military posture with the doctrine it says it wants to adopt for the region.

The Economic Dimension

Gorbachev has underscored the importance of economic development in the Soviet Far East and has acknowledged this to be one of the preconditions for Soviet integration into the Pacific economic system. The Soviet Union is expanding its horizons in Asia to include more trade and greater economic cooperation not only with Japan, for obvious financial and technological reasons, but also with the newly industrializing economies (NIEs) such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.

Translating this new economic vision into policy will not be easy. Autarkic tendencies persist, and Soviet bureaucrats continue to resist efforts to reduce control over the allocation of national resources and the price system. Thus a significant turnaround in economic performance cannot be expected in the next few years.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union has recently taken several modest steps toward greater regional and global integration of its economy. The Kremlin has decentralized the foreign trade mechanism and liberalized its policies regarding joint ventures to make them more appealing to foreigners. Gorbachev has called for an opening up of Vladivostok and even suggested the creation of special economic zones in the Soviet Far East.

Relations with China

Under Gorbachev, the improvement of relations with China has been the top priority of Soviet bilateral diplomacy in Asia. Soviet and Chinese officials are preparing for a Sino-Soviet summit in 1989 against the background of expanded bilateral trade, ongoing talks on the border disputes, and the emergence of a common identity between reforming socialist states. After the summit, arms control negotiations will likely be put on a more regular basis and bilateral contacts will expand. The USSR and the PRC are also likely to identify a number of parallel interests in foreign policy, including opposition to America's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and concern about Japanese rearmament.

Relations with Japan and the United States

Moscow is now giving greater attention to improving its relations with Tokyo and acknowledging the resilience of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. It entertains fewer thoughts about getting the Japanese to abrogate the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty or pushing the Americans to weaken their security commitment to Japan. Soviet leaders are coming to recognize that the dispute over the Northern Territories is a major obstacle to Soviet-Japanese normalization, and some nongovernmental representatives have even floated informal proposals addressing this issue. From the Kremlin's perspective, the recent improvement in Soviet-American relations has created an environment favorable to the improvement of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Relations with the Koreas

Moscow is beginning to see South Korea as a rising economic star of the Asia-Pacific region and a possible economic partner for the Soviet Union. Although the Soviets seem unwilling to forgo their military relationship with the North Koreans, they would like to play a role in reducing tensions on the peninsula. The Soviet Union is giving less vocal support to North Korea's demand for direct talks with the United States about withdrawing the American military from the South.

Relations with Southeast Asia and the South Pacific

Gorbachev has openly recognized the positive integrative functions of ASEAN and the Soviet Union's status among ASEAN countries is improving. Although the Soviets would gain from better economic relations with the ASEAN countries, it is still unclear what the benefits to ASEAN would be. As long as Moscow provides military aid to Vietnam and is unwilling to relinquish its military bases there, its arms control initiatives are unlikely to win many supporters.

The Soviet Union has also been attempting to increase its influence in the South Pacific--this primarily via fishing agreements with the island nations. The Kremlin is likely to use its newfound influence to mobilize interest in nuclear-free zones in this strategically critical region.

THE SOVIET FACTOR IN U.S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS

There is a diversity of perspectives in both the United States and Japan about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's reform efforts. As is the case among the community of experts in the United States, some Japanese experts are pessimistic about Gorbachev's capacity to change the Soviet system, while others are more optimistic. On both sides of the Pacific, scholars and policy analysts draw different conclusions about the future of Soviet foreign policy and the appropriate response by the West. Both Japan and the United States: 1. share a fundamental commitment to democratic values; 2. see the Soviet Union as the primary military threat; 3. welcome Gorbachev's flexibility on arms control, while recognizing that his initiatives for the Asia-Pacific region thus far would have the effect of weakening America's forward defense posture; 4. understand the importance of maintaining good relations with China to ensure that Soviet-Chinese normalization will be a force for stability in the region; 5. are open-minded about the prospects of greater Soviet integration in both the global and Pacific Basin economies; and, 6. support greater liberalization of the Soviet domestic economy.

At the same time, significant cross-national differences exist between the United States and Japan about the Soviet factor in Asian policy: 1. Americans see the rivalry with the Soviet Union in global terms, while Japanese tend to emphasize the regional dimension of the Soviet challenge; 2. the American agenda for Soviet policy--which includes the military

balance and arms control, regional conflicts, technology transfers, and human rights--is much broader than is Japan's agenda--where the problem of the Northern Territories and the absence of a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty tends to dominate; 3. most Japanese leaders assume a sober geopolitical perspective, while American views of the Soviet Union have shifted in response to emotional and ideological concerns; 4. although both American and Japanese analysts see China as a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, Americans are more likely to support further military cooperation with the Chinese, while the Japanese are more sensitive about the growth of Chinese military capabilities; and, 5. the American process for formulating and implementing Soviet policy is more pluralistic than that of Japan, and Soviet policy often becomes an issue of significant national debate. By contrast, the formulation of Japan's Soviet policy is dominated by the Foreign Ministry.

Weighing these various factors, it does not appear that differences over Soviet policy are likely to be a source of serious conflict in the overall bilateral relationship. From the point of view of both countries, a strong U.S.-Japanese relationship strengthens their respective positions *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. The possibility of tensions on specific issues, such as technology transfer and human rights, will remain, but these problems are manageable and should not cause major strains in the trans-Pacific alliance. The most immediate challenge posed by Gorbachev is not so much managing Japanese-American disagreements over policy toward the Soviet Union as creating a more positive environment for U.S.-Japanese relations so that both can respond to new circumstances.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *DB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for West German President
Richard von Weizsaecker

West German President Richard von Weizsaecker plans to make an unofficial visit to the U.S. May 31 through June 6. He would like to meet with the President on June 6.

Although the President will just have seen von Weizsaecker in Bonn, it would be useful symbolically to have a brief meeting in the Oval Office. This would reciprocate von Weizsaecker's hospitality and affirm our strong ties to one of West Germany's most respected public figures. We concur with State's recommendation that the President see him on June 6 for 15-20 minutes.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab II State Recommendation w/Bio

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with West German President
von Weizsaecker

PURPOSE: To affirm our strong ties with one of West
Germany's most respected public figures.

BACKGROUND: President von Weizsaecker plans to make an
unofficial visit to the U.S. May 31 - June 6
and would like to meet with the President on
June 6. This would reciprocate
von Weizsaecker's hospitality during the
President's planned visit to Bonn the week
before.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Von Weizsaecker met with the President in
Tokyo in February 1989.

DATE & TIME: June 6.
DURATION: 15-20 minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, The Vice President, Governor
Sununu, Secretary Baker, Brent Scowcroft,
Robert Gates, Robert Blackwill, President
von Weizsaecker, and Ambassador Ruhfus

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity followed by discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo/writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC, State

OPPOSED BY: None

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 13, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request -- West German President von Weizsaecker with the President on June 6

West German President Richard von Weizsaecker plans to make an unofficial visit to the U.S. May 31-June 6. He would like to meet with the President on June 6, if the President's schedule permits.

President von Weizsaecker is arriving in Washington immediately after having hosted President Bush during the latter's May 30-31 visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. The West German President will attend a May 31 gala concert at the Kennedy Center commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany. After a program of private meetings and discussions in Washington on June 1 and 2, President von Weizsaecker travels to Philadelphia and then to New York City. He will receive both the Appeal of Conscience Award and the Union Seminary Medal for his strong support of human rights and religious freedoms (a tentative schedule for his visit to the United States is attached).

Since President Bush will be in Europe during von Weizsaecker's May 31-June 2 stay in Washington, the West German President now proposes to return on the morning of June 6 from New York solely for the purpose of meeting with the President.

The Department recommends that President von Weizsaecker's request for a June 6 meeting be considered favorably, reciprocating the hospitality extended to the President the week before in Bonn. While the office of the FRG president is largely ceremonial, von Weizsaecker exercises great moral and political influence and is extremely popular -- especially among German youth. The proposed meeting offers another opportunity to underscore the importance we attach to U.S.-FRG relations and, in particular, to highlight our shared political ideals and vision to a new generation of Germans and Americans. The President last met with von Weizsaecker in February in Tokyo.

J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Bio Information on President von Weizsaecker
2. Draft Schedule of President von Weizsaecker's visit to the U.S.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07c. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	8/18/87	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [8]

Date Closed: 5/18/2011	OA/ID Number: 30543
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Botschaft
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Embassy
of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and, with reference to its note dated February 22, 1989, has the honor to communicate the following amended suggestions for the envisaged unofficial visit to the U.S.A. by the Federal President of the Federal Republic of Germany:

May 31, 1989

- 4:00 p.m. arrival with special airplane in Washington
- 7:30 p.m. concert by the Berlin Opera Orchestra (together
with U.S. Choir, Beethoven's 9th Symphony) at the
Kennedy Center
- 9:30 p.m. reception by the Federal President at the Kennedy
Center

June 1, 1989

- 8:00 a.m. breakfast with Dr. Henry Kissinger, Hotel Watergate
- early
afternoon meeting with U.S. journalists
- 5:00 p.m. round table-discussion at the Institute for
Contemporary German Studies, Washington, D.C.

Office of Central European Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Room 4232
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

June 2, 1989

12:30 p.m. lunch hosted by the Ambassador for the Members of the Congressional Study Group on Germany

8:00 p.m. dinner hosted by the Federal President for the Members of the German-American Advisory Board for the 40th Anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany

June 3, 1989

morning departure to Philadelphia (by plane)

4:00 p.m. participation in the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church

5:30 p.m. dinner hosted by the Presbyterian Church

7:15 p.m. departure for New York (by car)

June 4, 1989

12:00 noon lunch hosted by Appeal of Conscience Foundation (Hotel Pierre)

7:00 p.m. dinner hosted by the American Jewish Committee

June 5, 1989

8:30 a.m. meeting with German U.N. Ambassador

10:00 a.m. meeting with U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar

10:45 a.m. meeting with journalists

5:30 p.m. reception hosted by Union Seminary and presentation of the Union Medal to the Federal President

8:00 p.m. dinner hosted by Union Seminary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

4/19/89

Chen



MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL ^{RB}
SUBJECT: Proposed Visit by Italian President Cossiga

Ambassador Petrignani has been lobbying here and at the State Department for a visit by President Cossiga in the second half of 1989. I have told him that there is very little chance that this would be possible, but that we could try for a commitment in principle for the first half of 1990. The invitation would be extended personally by the President when he sees Cossiga in Rome on May 27.

Although Petrignani continues to push for 1989, 1990 is soon enough for a Cossiga visit, given that the President is making Rome his first stop in Europe.

I recommend that you seek a commitment in principle from the President for a Cossiga visit in the first half of 1990, unless you are already in a position to make a commitment on his behalf. This should be done within the next week or ten days if at all possible in order to avoid the wasted time and energy that will result from Petrignani's continued efforts to push for a 1989 visit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you seek a commitment in principle from the President for a Cossiga visit in the first half of 1990.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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FILE

Brent,

I understand that Deane Hoffman believes that US-Soviet economic issues

April 28, 1989 should be handled by combining the State chaired Soviet Union PCC and the Treasury chaired International Economics PCC. As Executive Secretary of the Soviet PCC, I believe that it is the only body that can provide the national security/foreign policy focus which must determine our economic policy toward Moscow. The Soviet Union is not just another potential US trade partner. I would like to talk to you about this — perhaps tomorrow.

Condi

6:50 PM

4/28

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: PCC on U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations

In our memorandum of April 21, we discussed the need to have a follow-on study to NSR 3 concerning U.S.-Soviet economic relations. We believe that it is important to begin that process promptly. The State Department will convene a meeting of the Soviet PCC on the issue immediately after we return from the Ministerial. The need for the review has become urgent for several reasons:

(1) The Administration must decide within just a few weeks whether it intends to grant a waiver of Jackson-Vanik to the Soviet Union. The President will certify China and Hungary for a waiver on June 3, which raises the question of whether to include the Soviet Union in the package. This issue turns primarily on our evaluation of trends in Soviet emigration. The Jewish community is planning a trip to the Soviet Union in mid-May and will make an announcement of their position on Jackson-Vanik on June 13 (the date of the annual meeting of the National Conference). While we should not be too far out ahead of the Jewish community, we should make our decision before their announcement opens us up to criticism of bowing to interest group pressure. A decision is thus needed by the latter part of May.

(2) Domestic and allied pressures are building to liberalize our economic policies. Whatever we do in the economic field will send a political signal. As the EEP episode shows, we no longer have the luxury of postponing a decision on our overall approach to economic policy toward the Soviet Union. As NSR 3 stated, our economic policy toward the Soviet Union must derive from a coherent political strategy toward Moscow. If these decisions are to be made within a political framework, rather than piecemeal, we need to address economic policy immediately.

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(3) There are reasonable arguments for developing several economic initiatives in a larger package of proposals which would launch the Administration's overall U.S.-Soviet policy, perhaps in a Presidential speech in June. We cannot do this until we have answered several basic questions:

Are we prepared to waive Jackson-Vanik?

Do we wish actively to encourage joint ventures through government assistance in training, etc.?

What is our attitude toward expansion of non-strategic trade?

What is our policy on lending to the Soviet Union?

What is our position on Soviet accession to GATT and IMF?

Should the United States launch an "Enterprise Initiative" to help the development of cooperatives and private enterprise in the Soviet Union?

Do we wish to grant private investment insurance to stimulate American economic activity in the Soviet Union?

We believe that the COCOM "no exceptions" policy and the review of the COCOM list should be handled separately.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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April 10, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
SUBJECT: Conclusion of the Polish Roundtable

The Polish Roundtable concluded successfully April 5. We will want to respond promptly. You will remember that we sought allied reaction to a set of measures that we would like to announce in support of the agreement. The five on which the agencies agree are:

Multilateral Steps:

- 1. Paris Club. The U.S. would indicate to its Allies willingness to consider substantial rescheduling of official debt within the Paris Club once an IMF standby is negotiated for Poland.
- 2. IFC. The U.S. would publicly indicate willingness to support viable private sector loans by the International Finance Corporation, a World Bank affiliate.

Unilateral Steps:

- 3. GSP. We would announce intention to seek legislation to accord Poland Generalized System of Preferences. GSP treatment eliminates tariffs on a variety of products.
- 4. OPIC. We would announce our intention to seek legislation making Poland eligible for OPIC (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) insurance. OPIC provides political risk insurance for private investment.

Steps 3 and 4 would require legislation and we have begun informal discussions with key Congressional leaders.

- 5. Private sector involvement.

We would announce our intention to negotiate a government-to-government Small/Private Business Agreement to facilitate direct contacts with Poland's private business sector.

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Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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We would announce support for expanded training and exchange programs, targeted at the emerging private sector.

We would signal our support for voluntary private sector swaps of existing Polish debts for equity in Polish enterprises, or environmental, educational or other humanitarian programs.

Our allies reacted favorably to our approach and to these specific measures. The EC-member countries made clear that they are not individually considering GSP-like treatment for Poland because such a decision would fall within the competence of the EC.

There remain interagency differences on two significant elements of a possible response.

1. Timing of IMF-Polish negotiations for a Polish standby loan arrangement. There is agreement that the USG should no longer block Poland's negotiations with the Fund on political grounds and that any outcome should be subject to the usual IMF standards.

State and Treasury disagree on the conditions under which the U.S. should support formal negotiations between Poland and the IMF toward a stand-by program for Poland. Treasury believes Poland must first establish a track record of economic reform. State believes the U.S. should allow Poland and the IMF to negotiate immediately for a standby. In preliminary reaction, allies support the State position, with the exception of Japan which was non-committal.

2. World Bank. The World Bank has negotiated project loans for Poland but is withholding final approval of the loans subject to conclusion of an IMF standby program. State believes the loans should be approved on a case-by-case basis on their merits. Treasury believes that to allow the Bank to go forward without the assurances that an IMF standby would provide would be a mistake and would signal a major shift in U.S. efforts to encourage close coordination between the World Bank and the IMF on their activities in debtor countries. In preliminary reaction, allies, with the exception of the FRG and Norway, support the Treasury position.

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3

The Treasury-State debate stretches back months now with no change in either position. Jim Baker is ready to move ahead with both of the disputed measures. The political grounds for moving ahead are clear. In the final analysis, Poland must negotiate an agreement with the IMF and must prove to the latter's satisfaction that it can meet the conditions of an IMF program. By the same token, the World Bank will only approve project loans that make economic sense. An IMF standby has nothing to do with the economic viability of the loans.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve the five agreed measures.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

2. That you resolve the State-Treasury dispute over measures six and seven.

Measure 6 (Timing of Polish-IMF standby negotiations)

State Option: U.S. should allow negotiations immediately.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

or, alternatively

Treasury Option: Poland must first establish track record on economic reform.

Approve ✓ Disapprove ✓ *CB*

Measure 7 (World Bank loans in the absence of an IMF standby loan agreement for Poland)

State Option: Loans should be approved on their merits on a case by case basis without reference to IMF standby.

Approve Disapprove ✓ *CB*

or, alternatively

Treasury Option: IMF standby should be in place prior to final approval of loans.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Treasury Concerns Regarding IMF and World Bank
Lending to Poland

As you are aware, the interagency deliberations on how to respond to the agreement between the Government of Poland and Solidarity did not reach agreement on the following two elements:

- the conditions under which the U.S. should support formal negotiations between Poland and the IMF toward a standby for Poland, and;
- whether the U.S. should pressure the IBRD to bring forward project loans that are on hold because Poland is considered uncreditworthy and does not have an IMF standby.

Before mention is made of these issues in any possible public statement, we would like an opportunity to discuss our views with you. My concerns on these two issues are outlined below.

IMF STANDBY

We believe it is critical that Poland demonstrate a track record of sound economic policies before consideration of an IMF program.

1. There is little evidence at this time that they can successfully implement a reform program.
 - Economic liberalization has been minimal because the Party refuses to cede control over the large state-owned sector of the economy.
 - The Polish government's failure to propose specific price and wage policies, and to adequately control the money supply and impose market mechanisms, has contributed to, in large measure, Poland's accelerating inflation, which reached 70 percent in 1988 and is increasing further in 1989.
 - Without such measures reform programs will not work.

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2. From what I have read there is no evidence the agreement with Solidarity will do much for the economics of Poland and is unfortunately likely to hinder further economic reform efforts.
 - Solidarity's insistence on wage indexation and resistance to rapid reduction of food subsidies are exacerbating economic problems in Poland.
 - The official union's refusal to join the government and Solidarity in signing their agreement will further disrupt economic reform efforts.
3. A U.S. signal to support the negotiation of a standby in the absence of Polish ability to implement meaningful reforms would run the risk of pushing the IMF in a direction that it cannot sustain.
 - The Europeans would pressure the Fund to accept a weak program, comments to the contrary notwithstanding.
 - Poland is already \$6 billion in arrears to the Paris Club. A standby under these circumstances would lead to further arrears to the IMF. This would be particularly unfortunate.
 - As you know, a strong IMF is crucial to this effort, at a time when we are trying to make real progress on the Bush debt strategy.
 - The IMF is not a foreign aid organization. Efforts to convert it to such will only reduce its effectiveness to serve our broader international financial and economic interests.

IBRD LOANS

We oppose project loans to Poland in the absence of an IMF standby.

1. Concerns about Polish creditworthiness.
 - Project loans have been under negotiation for Poland. They have not been sent to the Executive Board because in Bank Management's judgment Poland is not creditworthy.
2. Pronouncements of a USG position in advance of loan evaluation would set a bad precedent.
 - Pronouncements by the USG in support of World Bank lending to Poland prior to Treasury's analysis would be embarrassing if the loans in question turn out to be financially unsound.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

3. Supporting IBRD loans to Poland in the absence of an IMF standby would have an adverse effect on U.S. and G-7 efforts to get the two institutions to collaborate more closely.
 - One institution would be going ahead while the other was holding back.
 - We have only last week resolved a six month dispute over Fund/Bank collaboration. It would be very unwise to run the risk of reopening it.

We understand the desire to be supportive and to look constructively at ways we can be helpful. But supporting loans that Poland is ~~incapable of repaying does not do the Poles any favors~~. We will be building a debt problem for Poland in the future as we have in Latin America today.

What Poland really needs now is substantial technical assistance to better understand how markets work. We should explore possibilities in this area with the Fund and Bank, as well as with our Allies.

Nicholas F. Brady

Nicholas F. Brady

cc: Secretary Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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2387 a/o

April 10, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Press Packet for Presidential Statement on Poland

Marlin Fitzwater has requested the following information should the President decide to make a statement tomorrow morning on Poland:

- Fact Sheet on the Roundtable Accords and on the measures that the United States is taking in response. (Tab I)
- Background information on recent sanctions against Poland and the current status of those sanctions. (Tab II)

The draft Presidential statement is at Tab III. Commerce and State have cleared the draft. Treasury has agreed to the statement but not to the language on the two measures that they still oppose.

CR for TD
Tim Deal and Virginia Lampley concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward this background information to Marlin Fitzwater.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Fact Sheet on Roundtable Accords and U.S.
Support Measures
Tab II Background Information/Recent Sanctions
Against Poland
Tab III Draft Presidential Statement

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER #2021-02
By *MM* NARA, Date *7/16/2021*

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Roundtable Agreements

- o The Roundtable Accords consist of overall agreements on political, trade union and economic reform, and several specialized agreements.
- o Solidarity, Rural Solidarity and the independent students' union will be legalized.
- o Political reforms include:
 - free elections (this June) to a new Senate with legislative and veto powers;
 - a division of seats (60% regime; 35% opposition; 5% official Catholic groups) in the lower chamber of Parliament;
 - establishment of a new office of the President, with broad but limited powers (the Roundtable includes explicit limits on the President's ability to declare martial law);
 - establishment of a free opposition press, which we understand will include a daily and weekly newspapers and some agreed access to the electronic media;
 - a liberalized law on independent associations, including political associations.
- o Agreement on economic reform has been much tougher. Both sides agree on the need for market reforms, but are concerned about popular resistance to austerity.
- o While the Accords are unprecedented for a communist country, the relationship between Solidarity and the Polish authorities remains adversarial. Implementation of the Accords will likely be contested, with vigorous differences emerging over interpretation.
 - We should not be surprised by inconsistencies and even backsliding, due in part to resistance by local authorities and hard-liners.
- o Solidarity and the Polish government, both concerned about Poland's economic situation, have repeatedly stated their intention to appeal for Western economic support.

Support for Polish Reforms

Overall

- o The U.S. initiative encourages five (seven) specific new steps to support Polish political and economic reforms, as these take root over time.
 - Each step is designed to encourage sound economic policies and political reforms.
 - Each economic step contains its own conditionality; there is no untied aid or unconditional credits.
- o We have been consulting with the Congress, the Polish-American community and our Allies and friends about the elements of the initiative.

Specific Elements

1. Support for the Private, Independent Sector

- o Exchanges
 - The U.S. will explore new exchanges, training and educational programs to support the private sector.
 - The Roundtable agreements provide for establishment of independent political, economic and professional associations. These are already springing up.
 - Creative programs would be modest in cost but could have a major impact.
 - USIA would have a major role.
- o Debt swaps
 - The USG will encourage voluntary private sector swaps of Polish debts for equity in Polish enterprises, or for environmental, educational or other humanitarian projects.
 - Debt-nature or debt-charity swaps involve three parties: a private group would purchase Polish debt from a commercial bank, probably at a discount; with the cooperation of the Polish government and appropriate non-governmental Polish agencies, the group would direct the funds to an in-country project.

- Some environmental groups and commercial banks have been exploring debt swaps with Poland.

o Private Business Agreement

- Poland's private business sector is relatively small (6% of non-agricultural GNP) but growing rapidly. Some leading entrepreneurs have ties to Solidarity.
- A government-to-government private business agreement could serve as a vehicle for direct links between Polish and U.S. business.
- We do not anticipate a private business agreement providing direct funds.
- The Commerce Department, Small Business Administration and U.S. small business and entrepreneurial associations will have roles in this initiative.

2. GSP for Poland

- As Solidarity is legally registered, the U.S. will begin the legislative process to accord Generalized Systems of Preferences benefits to Poland.
- GSP provides duty free entry for a number of goods from beneficiary countries. Poland's per capita income is under the qualifying ceiling.
- GSP would facilitate Poland's ability to service and repay its debt.
- GSP would require a Presidential finding that Poland was making progress on worker rights and is not denominated by "international communism."
(G\Yugoslavia enjoys GSP and Romania once did, so precedents exist for community countries, including a Warsaw Pact member).
- We will work closely with Solidarity as we proceed.

3. OPIC for Poland

- As Solidarity is legally registered, the U.S. will seek legislation to authorize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to operate in Poland.
- OPIC provides political risk insurance for U.S. overseas direct investment, and has limited lending authority as well.

- OPIC programs would encourage commercially-viable arrangements that take advantage of Poland's liberalized foreign investment law. It could support cooperation with Poland's private sector.
- Once authorized, OPIC and the Polish Government will negotiate an investment incentives agreement detailing OPIC's rights and the GOP's responsibilities for OPIC-assisted investment.
- In the absence of GSP, OPIC would make an independent determination that Poland is taking steps to adopt and implement worker rights. We will work closely with solidarity.

4. IFC

- The U.S. will consider, on their merits, viable private sector loans by the International Finance Corporation, a World Bank affiliate.
- The IFC is another source of support for Poland's private sector.
- Once IFC loan was approved for Poland last fall (about \$14 million).

5. Paris Club

- As the Roundtable accords are implemented, we will work with our friends and Allies to develop a substantial rescheduling of Poland's official debt.
- This process will assist Poland to regularize its external finances.
- The mechanism for this process is the Paris Club, an informal group of creditor nations.
- Most of Poland's \$39 billion debt is to official creditors (\$2.4 billion to the U.S. -- mostly CCC and ExIm Bank).
- The terms and timing of a rescheduling will depend on several factors, including Poland's progress in working with the IMF and in introducing sound economic policies.
- Poland has had several reschedulings, but is currently not meeting its payments. We would want an agreement on a repayment schedule that Poland would meet.

6. [IMF]

- The U.S. hopes that the Roundtable Accords will clear the way for Poland to negotiate a stand-by arrangement with the IMF which supports sound, market-oriented economic policies.
- Poland has been a member of the Fund since 1986. Since that time, Poland has had regular consultations with the Fund staff.
- A stand-by agreement would provide discipline, direction and conditional resources to Polish economic reform and adjustment efforts.]

7. [World Bank]

- As the Roundtable accords are implemented, we will support Poland's effort with the World Bank to conclude economically-viable project loans.}

UNCLASSIFIED

U.S. SANCTIONS ON POLAND 1981-87

4/10/89

Morlin - - 1455

We have no
standing sanctions
against Poland.

Bob Blackwell

<u>Date</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Status</u>
12/81	Science & Technology:	
	o New agreement not signed	o New agreement signed September 1987
	o Suspension of travel for Polish scientist	o Lifted August 1984
12/81	Fishing:	
	o Suspended privileges in U.S. waters	o Lifted January 1984
12/81	Civil Aviation:	
	o Suspended Lot's landing rights	o Lifted August 1984
12/81	Credits:	
	o Suspended Poland's eligibility for official credits	o Lifted February 1987
12/81	Technology Transfer:	o Lifted September 1986
	o No exceptions policy on COCOM licensing of less sophisticated exports to Poland	
1/82	Debt Rescheduling:	
	o Suspended renegotiation of Poland's official debt	o Lifted March 1984
10/82	MFN Suspension:	o Lifted February 1987
1982/83	IMF/IBRD Entry:	
	o Delayed Action	o Lifted December 1984
		o Poland joined both June 1986
1985	High-level contacts:	
	o Restricted GOP contacts to office director level	o Lifted September 1986

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OVERVIEW OF POLISH SANCTIONS SINCE DECEMBER 1981

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SANCTION</u>	<u>WHY IMPOSED</u>	<u>WHAT WE SAID</u>
12/81	<u>Credits:</u> Suspension of eligibility for official credits	Martial Law declared	President's 12/23/81 speech: "I've urged him (Gen. Jaruzelski) to free those in arbitrary detention to lift martial law, and to restore the internationally recognized rights of the Polish people to free speech and association.
10/82	<u>MFN Suspension</u>	GOP outlaws Solidarity	Press guidance of 10/9/82: "Suspension still in effect of MFN is, like our other economic sactions against Poland, designed to be reversible. We anticipate that the U.S. would be ready to restore MFN status to Poland when the Polish Government has moved to reverse the repressive steps it has taken." Repressive steps identified in President's radio address of 10/9/82: GOP has "no intention of restoring...the right to belong to a free trade union."
12/81	<u>Technology Transfer:</u> "No exceptions" policy on COCOM licensing of less sophisticated technology exports to Poland.	Martial law declared	President's speech of 12/23/81: "We are proposing to our allies the further restriction of high technology exports to Poland.
12/81	<u>Science Exchanges:</u> No renewal of S&T agreement, which expired on 12/31/81.	Martial law imposed.	No public announcement. A new S&T agreement initialled in 10/81 was not signed.
12/81	<u>Fishing:</u> Suspension of privileges in U.S. waters.	Martial law imposed.	President's 12/31/81 speech.
12/81	<u>Civil Aviation:</u> Suspension of Lot's landing rights.	Martial law imposed.	President's 12/31/81 speech.

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OVERVIEW OF POLISH SANCTIONS SINCE DECEMBER 1981

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SANCTION</u>	<u>WHY IMPOSED</u>	<u>WHAT WE SAID</u>
1982/83	<u>IMF Entry:</u> We delay action on Poland's IMF membership.	Martial law	Never publicly announced.
1985	<u>High Level Contacts:</u> We restrict GOP officials' contact to office director level.	GOP failure to respond to Scanlan agreement request.	Never publicly announced.

(0491A)

UNCLASSIFIED

SUPPORTING DEMOCRACY IN POLAND

Draft Presidential Statement

Seven years ago, Americans lit candles in support of Poland's freedom, in the hope that the darkness of repression would some day be lifted and that Solidarity would resume its rightful place in Polish life.

This week, Poland took a great stride forward. In Warsaw, Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and Interior Minister Kiszczak signed agreements that, if implemented, will be a watershed in the postwar history of Eastern Europe.

According to the Roundtable agreements, among the many steps to be taken, the free trade union Solidarity will be formally restored, a free opposition press will be legalized, independent political and other free associations will be permitted, and free national elections for a new Polish senate will be held.

These agreements do not bring full democracy. But the degree of pluralism and of freedom that they institutionalize will take Poland far from totalitarianism.

The Roundtable agreements are inspiring testimony to the indomitable spirit of the Polish people; to the strength and wisdom of Lech Walesa and Solidarity; to the spiritual guidance of the Catholic Church; and to the realism of the Polish authorities.

Poland has started on an uphill road of peaceful change. It represents a historic opportunity, but major challenges remain.

The legacy of mistrust and bad faith cannot be erased overnight. Many are skeptical about whether the Polish authorities will keep their word as people begin to test their new freedoms to the full extent. So, steps toward democracy must be taken and not reversed. Agreements must be implemented. Disputes must be worked out fairly.

Second, Poland faces, and will continue to face for some time, severe economic problems. Structural reforms are needed to undo the institutionalized waste and mismanagement that are the product of the Communist system, and to give free rein to the enterprising and creative spirit of the Polish people. Patience and indeed sacrifice will be necessary in the short run if the benefits of freedom are to be fully realized. That is why the political reforms -- making the Polish people partners -- are so important. But there are no guarantees and there will be no easy successes.

The Polish people understand the magnitude of the challenge. Poland's democratic forces have asked for the West's help. While they pursue democratization and economic reform, their friends should stand with them, not just in words, but in actions.

The United States Government has just completed a thorough review, in the National Security Council, of our policy toward Eastern Europe, and Poland in particular. I have considered ways we could help, and pitfalls to be avoided. We will not take

unconditional steps, offer untied aid, or extend unsound credits. And even as Poland takes steps of political reform, it is still a member of the Warsaw Pact, and we will take no steps that compromise our security.

But we can and should respond now. The Congress, the Polish-American community, U.S. labor leaders, the American people, and our allies and international financial institutions should work together to support the cause of democracy in Poland as political and economic reforms take root over time.

Specifically:

- As Poland opens up, the United States will pursue imaginative exchange, educational, cultural, and training programs to reach out and support the emerging private sector.
- My administration will encourage business and private non-profit groups to put together creative programs to swap Polish debt for investment equity and for charitable, humanitarian, and environmental projects.
- We will offer to begin negotiations for a private business agreement with Poland, to facilitate cooperation between U.S. firms and Poland's private businesses.
- With the legalization of Solidarity, I will ask Congress for legislation to provide Poland access to our Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which provides selective tariff relief for beneficiary countries.

- I will seek legislation to authorize the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to operate in Poland. OPIC can benefit both Poland and U.S. investors.
- The United States will continue to consider, on their merits, viable loans to the private sector by the International Finance Corporation, a World Bank affiliate.
- We will work with our allies and friends to develop sustainable new schedules for Poland to repay its debts.
- [-- The U.S. hopes that the Roundtable Accords will clear the way for Poland to work with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on programs that support sound, market-oriented economic policies.]

For me, this development brings special gratification. When I visited Poland in September 1987, I told Chairman Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa that the American people and government would respond quickly and imaginatively to a significant internal reform of the kind we see now. Both sides valued that assurance. And I will keep my word.

We recall the words of the Polish fighters for independence: "For your freedom and ours." We know that Poland's struggle for democracy is our struggle too. If Poland's experiment succeeds, other countries may follow. A cornerstone for true, sustainable, and democratic stability in Europe will have been laid.

America today renews its historic commitment to see the division of Europe ended. The winds of change are sweeping across Europe -- a resurgence of Western Europe and its

institutions of unity; a reawakening of yearnings in Eastern Europe for freedom, democracy, independence, and prosperity. Soviet policy, too, shows signs of change, though it has not yet been finally tested. As East and West seek to reduce arms and the danger of war, they cannot forget that the true source of tension and instability in Europe is not the arms race but the continuing and unacceptable division of the continent imposed by Soviet power.

The Cold War began in Eastern Europe; if it is to end, it must end there as well. The American people hope that that day is approaching and will engage constructively, creatively, and generously toward that end.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Presidential Message of Congratulations to
Assembly of Turkish Americans

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to Shirley Green of White House Correspondence with a draft Presidential message (Tab A) for delivery at the annual convention of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, May 5-7. The draft, prepared by the State Department, seems to strike the right tone and conveys an important message of support.

RB
Robert Blackwill concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to Shirley Green at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Green
 Tab A State Draft
Tab II Incoming from State

cc: Roman Popadiuk

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Presidential Message of Congratulations to
Assembly of Turkish American Associations

The State Department has provided a draft Presidential Message (Tab A) for delivery at the annual convention of the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, May 5-7. We recommend that the draft be signed by the President.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Message

PROPOSED MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS

As you gather for your Tenth Anniversary Convention, I congratulate the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, and I congratulate each of you for carrying the message of Turkish-American friendship to every part of our Nation.

The seeds of understanding the Assembly has planted over this last decade are bearing fruit. You are a constant reminder to Americans everywhere, not only of the rich diversity of our national life, but also of the essential role Turkey fulfills as an Ally in a troubled part of our world. We share many important values, and U.S.-Turkish economic and commercial ties continue to grow.

Over the past decade, the Assembly has broadened cooperation and understanding between two great peoples. As you set your goals still higher for the coming decade, I wish you a most successful convention and pledge my support for an ever-strengthened partnership between Turkey and the United States.



Washington, D.C. 20520

2445

April 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Message of Congratulations to
Assembly of Turkish American Associations

The Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) is celebrating its tenth anniversary this year at the group's annual convention to be held May 5 - 7. The Assembly traditionally prepares a brochure for those attending the convention which contains a message from the Presidents of the United States and Turkey. ATAA would like to include a message this year from President Bush. If possible, the organization would like to have the message by April 15, so that it can be formally published in the brochure. A proposed message is attached for your consideration.

J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Proposed message

68 163 10 48: 70

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