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Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30542
Folder ID Number: 30542-005

Folder Title:
April 1989 [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Chroni file

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 24, 1989

2845

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL NB
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RZK
SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Dr. Peter Wallenberg

Franklin Forsberg, former U.S. Ambassador to Sweden, has sent you a FAX message (Tab I) requesting that you agree to meet with Peter Wallenberg May 1-3. Wallenberg, a prominent Swedish banker and member of the Raoul Wallenberg family, is Chairman of the International Chamber of Commerce. Forsberg has sent an identical FAX message (Tab II) to Bob Gates.

Wallenberg has also written the President directly to request a meeting. In a separate action (copy attached at Tab III), we have suggested that you recommend to White House scheduling that the President regret.

We suggest that you and Bob Gates also decline, particularly since neither Forsberg nor Wallenberg has specified a purpose for meeting.

Tim Deal concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize us to inform Ambassador Forsberg that you will be unable to meet with Wallenberg.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Incoming from Forsberg
Tab II Incoming to Gates from Forsberg
Tab III Incoming to the President from Wallenberg

2845

FORSBERG ASSOCIATES

FRANKLIN S. FORSBERG
CHAIRMAN

FAX TRANSMISSION

Date: April 17, 1989 Time: 3:47 P.M.
To Telefax No.: 202-395-5221
Company: The White House
Washington, D.C. 20250
Attention: General Brent Scowcroft
From: Ambassador Franklin S. Forsberg
Total number of pages (including this one): 2


If you do not receive all of the pages, please telephone (212) 687-0100 immediately.

Message:

Dear General Scowcroft:

Dr. Peter Wallenberg, prominent Swedish Banker, Industrialist and present Chairman of the International Chamber of Commerce would very much like to spend a few minutes with you. He will be in Washington May 1st, 2nd and 3rd. My daughter Kristin Forsberg Williams of Washington will contact your office toward establishing a suitable time.

Dr. Wallenberg is a most authoritative and articulate friend of the United States. I can assure you that a meeting with him will be most productive.


Franklin S. Forsberg
Former United States Ambassador
To Sweden

FSF:aoh

8 APR 17 PM 02
WHITE HOUSE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

CURRICULUM VITAE

Dr. Peter Wallenberg, Econ. Dr. h.c. and Dr. of Letters h.c.

Born	May 29, 1926
1953	Bachelor of Laws at the University of Stockholm
1953	Employed at Atlas Copco AB
1956 - 1959	Employed at Atlas Copco Inc, USA
1959 - 1962	Managing Director Atlas Copco's subsidiary in Rhodesia
1960 - 1962	Managing Director of Atlas Copco's subsidiary in Congo
1962 - 1967	Executive Vice Chairman of Atlas Copco (Great Britain) Ltd and Atlas Copco (Manufacturing) Ltd, Hemel Hempstead, England, and Managing Director of the former company
1968 - 1970	Managing Director of Atlas Copco MCT AB, the product company for mining and construction technique within the Atlas Copco Group.
1970 - 1974	Deputy Managing Director of Atlas Copco AB
1974 -	Chairman of the Board of Atlas Copco AB
1974 - 1980	Industrial Adviser to the Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
1980 - 1984	Vice Chairman of the Board of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken
1984 -	First Vice Chairman of the Board of Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken

Dr. Wallenberg is also Chairman of STORA, Investor, Providentia, The Wallenberg Foundation, Enskilda Securities (U.K.), and Vice Chairman of ASEA AB, Electrolux, Telefon AB LM Ericsson and SKF.

As from January 1st, 1989 Dr. Wallenberg serves as President of the International Chamber of Commerce, ICC (Paris). He also serves on the Board of The Federation of Swedish Industries, The Nobel Foundation, Stockholm School of Economics, Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), ASEA Brown Boveri Ltd, ABB (Zürich), Per Jacobson Foundation (USA), and The Joseph H. Lauder Institute (USA). He is member of the International Advisory Council of Swiss Bank Corporation and Wharton Advisory Board, University of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Wallenberg was awarded an honorary doctor's degree from the Stockholm School of Economics (1984) and also an honorary doctor's degree from Augustana College, Illinois (1985).

Decorations:

The Order of Wasa (1974)
Orden de Isabel la Catolica (1979)
The King's Medal 12th Class (1983)
The Legion of Honour, Knight Commander (1987)
Commander, First Class, of the Order of the Lion of Finland (1988)

April, 1989

0063d

UNCLASSIFIED

2845

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX :

ADMIN FAX : 14

PAGES 2

DTG 171945Z

RELEASER

FROM/LOCATION

1. FORSBERG

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. (SCOWCROFT)

2. Hughes

TO: 171950Z APR 89

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDRES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SITUATION ROOM

80 APR 89 14:02

W. HOUSE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

FORSBERG ASSOCIATES

FRANKLIN S. FORSBERG
CHAIRMAN

FAX TRANSMISSION

Date: April 17, 1989 Time: 4:00 p.m.
~~5:45~~ p.m.

To Telefax No.: 1-202-395-5221

Company: The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Attention: Mr. Robert Gates, Dep. Assist. to the Pres. for Nat'l Sec. Affairs

From: Ambassador Franklin S. Forsberg

Total number of pages (including this one): 2


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Message:

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Franklin S. Forsberg
Former United States Ambassador
To Sweden

FSF:aoh

250 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10177
(212) 687-2832

WASHINGTON, D.C.
(202) 362-7171

465 LAKE AVENUE
GREENWICH CONNECTICUT 06830
(203) 869-0191

APR 17 '89 19:59

TOTAL P.02
PAGE 002

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX #

ADMIN FAX # 15

PAGES 2

DTG 171955ZAPC

RELEASES

FROM/LOCATION

1. FORSBERG

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. GATES

2. Hughes

3.

TOR: 172000ZAPL89

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDRES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SITUATION ROOM

80 APR 7 15:01

HOUSE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2843

RESPONSE DUE DATE: April 24, 1989

REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

☐ GOVERNOR SUNUNU	☐ JAMES CICCONI
☐ ANDREW CARD, JR.	☐ DAVID DEMAREST
☐ ROGER PORTER	☐ MARLIN FITZWATER
☐ STEPHEN STUDDERT	☐ FREDERICK MCCLURE
☐ RICHARD BREEDEN	☐ J. BONNIE NEWMAN
☐ DAVID BATES	☒ BRENT SCOWCROFT
☐ CHASE UNTERMEYER	☐ C. BOYDEN GRAY

FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

Please provide your recommendation on the following scheduling request:

EVENT: Request to Meet with the President from Peter Wallenberg- Swedish Citizen
DATE: April 30 through May 4
LOCATION: Washington, D.C.

Additional information concerning this event is attached.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept ☐

Regret ☒

Surrogate

Message

Priority

Video

Routine

Written

President has met Mr. Wallenberg in Sweden and the U.S.

If your recommendation is to accept, please cite reasons below.

PLEASE RETURN TO WINDY WHITE, ROOM 182, OEOB, BY THE RESPONSE DUE DATE ABOVE
SO THAT YOUR COMMENTS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS WE PROCEED WITH THIS REQUEST.
THANK YOU

PETER WALLEMBERG

To the President of the United States
Mr George Bush

Stockholm, April 11, 1989

Dear Mr President,

Am planning to be in Washington from p.m. April 30th until p.m. May 4th and would be much obliged if you would be kind enough to receive me for a moment during that time.

Warmest regards,

Peter Wallenberg
Peter Wallenberg

To office
office on the

dent: Former Ambassador Forsberg will be contacting your
st.

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The Legion of Honour, Knight Commander (1987)

Commander, First Class, of the Order of the Lion of Finland (1988)

April, 1989

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ADRIAN BASORA *AMB*

SUBJECT: Transmission to the Congress of the Extension of the Governing International Fishery Agreement with the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands

Attached at Tab I for signature by the President are letters to the Senate and the House of Representatives transmitting the subject Agreement effected by exchange of diplomatic notes which extends for two years, until July 1, 1991, and amends to bring into Technical Conformity with U.S. law, the Governing International Fishery Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands. The exchange of notes together with the present Agreement constitute a Governing International Fishery (GIFA) Agreement within the meaning of Section 201 (c) of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) (16 USC 1801 et seq.). The notes were exchanged at Washington, March 28, 1989.

Congressional and industry representatives favor the extension of the GIFA with the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands. This extension will further the objectives of the MFCMA by continuing economic benefits to the United States, and will permit the United States and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands to maintain their long-standing cooperative fishery arrangements.

Compliance with the requirements of Section 203(a) of the MFCMA (16 USC 1823) with respect to transmission to the Congress is necessary for the two-year extension to enter into force.

(a) IN GENERAL-- No governing international fishery agreement shall become effective with respect to the United States before the close of the first 60 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date on which

the President transmits to the House of Representatives and to the Senate a document setting forth the text of such governing international fishery agreement. A copy of the document shall be delivered to each House of Congress on the same day and shall be delivered to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, if the House is not in session, and the Secretary of the Senate, if the Senate is not in session. The present Agreement is scheduled to expire on July 1, 1989.

NR VL JL
N. Rostow, V. Lampley and J. Leach concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve____ Disapprove____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President
 Tab A Presidential Message to the Congress
 Tab B Agreement
 Tab II Incoming State Memorandum

THE WHITE HOUSE

2717

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Transmission to the Congress of the Extension of
the Governing International Fishery Agreement with
the Government of Denmark and the Home Government
of the Faroe Islands

Purpose

To transmit the extension of the Governing International Fishery Agreement with the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands to the Congress.

Background

The Department of State has forwarded the Agreement between the United States of America and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands for your transmission to the Congress.

Congressional and industry representatives favor the extension of the Governing International Fishery Agreement with the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands. This extension will further the objectives of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) by continuing economic benefits to the United States, and will permit the United States and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands to maintain their long-standing cooperative fishery arrangements.

Compliance with the requirements of the MFCMA with respect to transmission to the Congress is necessary for the two-year extension to enter into force.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the message of transmittal to the Congress at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A Message to the Congress
Tab B Agreement

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

In accordance with the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-265; 16 USC 1801 et seq.), I transmit herewith an Agreement effected by exchange of notes at Washington on March 28, 1989, extending for the period of two years from July 1, 1989 until July 1, 1991, and amending to conform with current United States law, the Governing International Fishery Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, signed at Washington on June 11, 1984. The exchange of notes together with the present Agreement constitute a Governing International Fishery Agreement within the meaning of Section 201(c) of the Act.

U.S. fishing industry interests have urged prompt consideration of this Agreement, and, similarly, I request that the Congress give favorable consideration to this Agreement at an early date, to avoid disruption of cooperative ventures.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

TO THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES:

In accordance with the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-265; 16 USC 1801 et seq.), I transmit herewith an Agreement effected by exchange of notes at Washington on March 28, 1989, extending for the period of two years from July 1, 1989 until July 1, 1991, and amending to conform with current United States law, the Governing International Fishery Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, signed at Washington on June 11, 1984. The exchange of notes together with the present Agreement constitute a Governing International Fishery Agreement within the meaning of Section 201(c) of the Act.

U.S. fishing industry interests have urged prompt consideration of this Agreement, and, similarly, I request that the Congress give favorable consideration to this Agreement at an early date, to avoid disruption of cooperative ventures.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OF THE ONE PART
AND THE HOME GOVERNMENT OF THE FAROE ISLANDS
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF DENMARK
OF THE OTHER PART
CONCERNING FAROESE FISHING IN FISHERIES
OFF THE COASTS OF THE UNITED STATES

AFTALE
MELLEM REGERINGEN FOR AMERIKAS FORENEDE STATER
PÅ DEN ENE SIDE
OG FÆRØERNES LANDSSTYRE OG DANMARKS REGERING
PÅ DEN ANDEN SIDE
OM FÆRØSK FISKERI I FISKERIET
UD FOR NORDAMERIKAS KYSTER

SÁTTMALI ÍMILLUM
STJÓRNINA FYRI SAMBANDSRÍKJUM NORDUR-AMERIKA
ØDRUMEGIN
OG FØROYA LANDSSTÝRI OG DONSKU STJÓRNINA
HINUMEGIN
UM FØROYSKA FISKIVEIDU Í FISKISKAPI ÚT FYRI STRONDUM
SAMBANDSRÍKJANNA

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA OF THE ONE PART AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
DENMARK AND THE HOME GOVERNMENT OF THE FAROE ISLANDS
OF THE OTHER PART CONCERNING FAROESE FISHING IN
FISHERIES OFF THE COASTS OF THE UNITED STATES

The Government of the United States of America of the
one part and the Government of Denmark and the Home Govern-
ment of the Faroe Islands of the other part,

Considering their common concern for the rational
management, conservation and achievement of optimum yield
of fish stocks off the coasts of the United States;

Recognizing that the United States has established by
Presidential Proclamation of March 10, 1983 an exclusive
economic zone within 200 nautical miles of its coasts within
which the United States has sovereign rights to explore,
exploit, conserve and manage all fish and that the United
States also has such rights over the living resources of the
continental shelf appertaining to the United States and to
anadromous species of fish of United States origin; and

Desirous of establishing reasonable terms and conditions
pertaining to fisheries of mutual concern over which the
United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage;

. Noting the status of the Faroe Islands as a self-govern-
ing community within the Kingdom of Denmark;

Recognizing that the Faroe Islands are heavily dependent
upon fishing;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The purpose of this Agreement is to promote effective conservation, rational management and the achievement of optimum yield in the fisheries of mutual interest off the coasts of the United States and to establish a common understanding of the principles and procedures under which fishing may be conducted by residents and vessels of the Faroe Islands for the living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage.

ARTICLE II

As used in this Agreement, the term

1. "living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage" means all fish within the exclusive economic zone of the United States (except highly migratory species of tuna), all anadromous species of fish that spawn in the fresh or estuarine waters of the United States and migrate to ocean waters while present in the United States exclusive economic zone and in areas beyond national fisheries jurisdictions recognized by the United States and all living resources of the continental shelf appertaining to the United States;

2. "fish" means all finfish, molluscs, crustaceans,

and other forms of marine animal and plant life, other than marine mammals, birds and highly migratory species;

3. "fishery" means

a. one or more stocks of fish that can be treated as a unit for purposes of conservation and management and that are identified on the basis of geographical, scientific, technical, recreational and economic characteristics; and

b. any fishing for such stocks;

4. "exclusive economic zone" means a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, the seaward boundary of which is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the United States is measured;.

5. "fishing" means

a. the catching, taking or harvesting of fish;

b. the attempted catching, taking or harvesting of fish;

c. any other activity that can reasonably be expected to result in the catching, taking or harvesting of fish;

d. any operations at sea, including processing, directly in support of, or in preparation for, any activity described in subparagraphs a.

through c. above, provided that such term does not include other legitimate uses of the high seas, including any scientific research activity;

6. "fishing vessel" means any vessel, boat, ship, or other craft that is used for, equipped to be used for, or of a type that is normally used for

- a. fishing; or
- b. aiding or assisting one or more vessels at sea in the performance of any activity relating to fishing, including preparation, supply, storage, refrigeration, transportation or processing;

7. "highly migratory species" means species of tuna which in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over great distances in waters of the ocean; and

8. "marine mammal" means any mammal that is morphologically adapted to the marine environment, including sea otters and members of the orders Sirenia, Pinnipedia, and Cetacea, or primarily inhabits the marine environment such as polar bears.

ARTICLE III

1. The Government of the United States is willing to allow access for foreign fishing vessels to harvest, in accordance with terms and conditions to be established in permits issued under Article VII, that portion of the

total allowable catch for a specific fishery that will not be harvested by United States fishing vessels and is determined to be available to foreign fishing vessels in accordance with United States law.

2. The Government of the United States shall determine each year, subject to such adjustments as may be appropriate and in accordance with United States law;

- a. the total allowable catch for each fishery based on optimum yield, taking into account the best available scientific evidence, and social, economic and other relevant factors;
- b. the harvesting capacity of United States fishing vessels in respect of each fishery;
- c. the portion of the total allowable catch for a specific fishery to which access will be provided, on a periodic basis each year, to foreign fishing vessels; and
- d. the allocation of such portion that may be made available to qualifying fishing vessels of the Faroe Islands.

3. The United States shall determine each year the measures necessary to prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery in

accordance with United States law. Such measures may include:
inter alia:

- a. designated areas where, and periods when, fishing shall be permitted, limited, or conducted only by specified types of fishing vessels or with specified types and quantities of fishing gear;
- b. limitations on the catch of fish based on area, species, size, number, weight, sex, incidental catch, total biomass or other factors;
- c. limitations on the number and types of fishing vessels that may engage in fishing and/or on the number of days each vessel of the total fleet may engage in a designated area for a specified fishery;
- d. requirements as to the types of gear that may, or may not, be employed; and
- e. requirements designed to facilitate enforcement of such conditions and restrictions, including the maintenance of appropriate position-fixing and identification equipment.

4. The Government of the United States shall notify the Home Government of the Faroe Islands of the determinations provided for by this Article on a timely basis.

ARTICLE IV

In determining the portion of the surplus that may be made available to vessels of each country, including the Faroe Islands, the Government of the United States will decide on the basis of the factors identified in United States law including:

1. whether, and to what extent, such nations impose tariff barriers or nontariff barriers on the importation, or otherwise restrict the market access, of United States fish or fishery products;
2. whether, and to what extent such nations are cooperating with the United States in the advancement of existing and new opportunities for fisheries trade, particularly through the purchase of fish or fishery products from United States processors or from United States fishermen;
3. whether, and to what extent, such nations and the fishing fleets of such nations have cooperated with the United States in the enforcement of United States fishing regulations;
4. whether, and to what extent, such nations require the fish harvested from the exclusive economic zone for their domestic consumption;
5. whether, and to what extent, such nations otherwise contribute to, or foster the growth of, a sound and economic United States fishing industry, including minimizing gear

conflicts with fishing operations of United States fishermen, and transferring harvesting or processing technology which will benefit the United States fishing industry;

6. whether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of such nations have traditionally engaged in fishing in such fishery;

7. whether, and to what extent, such nations are cooperating with the United States in, and making substantial contributions to, fishery research and the identification of fishery resources; and

8. such other matters as the United States deems appropriate.

ARTICLE V

The Government of Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall cooperate with and assist the United States in the development of the United States fishing industry and the increase of United States fishery exports by taking such measures as reducing or removing impediments, if any, to the importation and sale of United States fishery products, providing information concerning technical and administrative requirements for access of United States fishery products into the Faroe Islands, providing economic data, sharing expertise, facilitating the transfer of harvesting or processing technology to the United States fishing industry,

facilitating appropriate joint venture and other arrangements, informing its industry of trade and joint venture opportunities with the United States, and taking other actions as may be appropriate.

ARTICLE VI

The Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall take all necessary measures to ensure:

1. that residents and vessels of the Faroe Islands refrain from fishing for living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage except as authorized pursuant to this Agreement;

2. that all such vessels so authorized comply with the provisions of permits issued pursuant to this Agreement and applicable laws of the United States; and

3. that the total allocation referred to in Article III, paragraph 2.d. of this Agreement is not exceeded for any fishery.

ARTICLE VII

The Home Government of the Faroe Islands may submit an application to the Government of the United States for a permit for each fishing vessel of the Faroe Islands that wishes to engage in fishing in the exclusive economic zone

pursuant to this Agreement. Such application shall be prepared and processed in accordance with the Annex, which constitutes an integral part of this Agreement. The Government of the United States may require the payment of fees for such permits and for fishing in the United States exclusive economic zone. The Home Government of the Faroe Islands undertakes to keep the number of applications to the minimum required, in order to aid in the efficient administration of the permit program.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall ensure that residents and vessels of the Faroe Islands refrain from harassing, hunting, capturing or killing, or attempting to harass, hunt, capture or kill, any marine mammal within the United States exclusive economic zone, except as may be otherwise provided by an international agreement respecting marine mammals to which the United States is a party, or in accordance with specific authorization for and controls on incidental taking of marine mammals established by the Government of the United States.

ARTICLE IX

The Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall ensure that in the conduct of the fisheries under this Agreement:

1. the authorizing permit for each vessel of the Faroe Islands is prominently displayed in the wheelhouse of such vessel;

2. appropriate position-fixing and identification equipment, as determined by the Government of the United States, is installed and maintained in working order on each vessel;

3. designated United States observers are permitted to board, upon request, any such fishing vessel, and shall be accorded the courtesies and accommodations provided to ship's officers while aboard such vessel, and owners, operators and crews of such vessel shall cooperate with observers in the conduct of their official duties, and, further, the Government of the United States shall be reimbursed for the costs incurred in the utilization of observers;

4. agents are appointed and maintained within the United States possessing the authority to receive and respond to any legal process issued in the United States with respect to an owner or operator of a vessel of the Faroe Islands for any cause arising out of the conduct of fishing activities for the living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage; and

5. all necessary measures are taken to minimize fishing gear conflicts and to ensure the prompt and adequate compensation of United States citizens for any loss, or damage to, their fishing vessels, fishing gear or catch, and resultant

economic loss, that is caused by any fishing vessel of the Faroe Islands as determined by applicable United States procedures.

ARTICLE X

The Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall take all appropriate measures to assist the United States in the enforcement of its laws pertaining to fishing in the exclusive economic zone and to ensure that each vessel of the Faroe Islands that engages in fishing for living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage shall allow and assist the boarding and inspection of such vessel by any duly authorized enforcement officer of the United States and shall cooperate in such enforcement action as may be undertaken pursuant to the laws of the United States.

ARTICLE XI

1. The Government of the United States will impose appropriate penalties, in accordance with the laws of the United States, on vessels of the Faroe Islands or their owners, operators, or crews that violate the requirements of this Agreement or of any permit issued hereunder.

2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released, subject to such reasonable bond or other security as may be determined by the court.

3. The penalty of imprisonment may be imposed only in the case of enforcement related offenses, such as assault on an enforcement officer or refusal to permit boarding and inspection.

4. In cases of seizure and arrest of a vessel of the Faroe Islands by the authorities of the Government of the United States, notification shall be given promptly through diplomatic channels informing the Government of Denmark of the action taken and of any penalties subsequently imposed.

ARTICLE XII

1. The Government of the United States and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall cooperate in the conduct of scientific research required for the purpose of managing and conserving living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage, including the compilation of the best available scientific information for management and conservation of stocks of mutual interest.

2. The competent agencies of the two Governments shall cooperate in the development of a periodic research plan on stocks of mutual concern through correspondence or meetings as appropriate, and may modify it from time to time by agreement. The agreed research plans may include, but are not limited to, the exchange of information and scientists, regularly scheduled meetings between scientists to prepare research plans and review progress, and jointly conducted research projects.

3. The conduct of agreed research during regular commercial fishing operations on board a fishing vessel of the Faroe Islands in the United States exclusive economic zone shall not be deemed to change the character of the vessel's activities from fishing to scientific research. Therefore, it will still be necessary to obtain a permit for the vessel in accordance with Article VII.

4. The Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall cooperate with the Government of the United States in the implementation of procedures for collecting and reporting biostatistical information and fisheries data, including catch and effort statistics, in accordance with procedures which will be stipulated by the United States. The Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall similarly provide such economic data as may be requested by the United States.

ARTICLE XIII

The Government of the United States and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall carry out periodic bilateral consultations regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of fisheries of mutual concern, including cooperation within the framework of appropriate multilateral organizations for the collection and analysis of scientific data respecting such fisheries.

ARTICLE XIV

Should the Government of the United States indicate to the Home Government of the Faroe Islands that nationals and vessels of the United States wish to engage in fishing in the fishery conservation zone of the Faroe Islands, or its equivalent, the Home Government of the Faroe Islands will allow such fishing on the basis of reciprocity and on terms not more restrictive than those established in accordance with this Agreement.

ARTICLE XV

Nothing contained in the present Agreement shall prejudice the views of either Party with respect to the existing territorial or other jurisdiction of the coastal State for all purposes other than the conservation and management of fisheries.

ARTICLE XVI

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes, following the completion of internal procedures of both Parties, and remain in force until July 1, 1989, unless extended by exchange of notes between the Parties. Notwithstanding the foregoing, either Party may terminate this Agreement after giving written notice of such termination to the other Party six months in advance.

2. At the request of either Party, this Agreement shall be subject to review by the two Parties two years after its entry into force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized for this purpose, have signed this Agreement.

TIL ÁSANNAN AV HESUM hava undirritaðu, sum hava neyðuga fulltrú til tess, undirritað hendan sáttmála.

TIL BEKRÆFTELSE HERAF har undertegnede, der er behørigt befuldmægtiget hertil, undertegnet denne aftale.

DONE at Washington, on June 11, 1984, in triplicate, in the Faroese, Danish and English language, all texts being equally authentic.

GJØRDUR í Washington, tann 11 juni 1984, í trimum eintøkum í færoyskum, donskum og enskum. Hver av hesum tekstum skal hava sama gildi.

UDFÆRDIGET i Washington, den 11 juni 1984, i tre eksemplarer på færøsk, dansk og engelsk, idet disse tekster har samme gyldighed.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
FYRI STJÓRNINA FYRI SAM-
BANDSRÍKJUM NORÐUR-
AMÉRIKA
FOR REGERINGEN FOR AMERIKAS
FORENEDE STATER:

Edward J. Wolf

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
DENMARK:
FYRI DONSKU STJÓRNINA:
FOR DANMARKS REGERING:

Niels Fingrum

FOR THE HOME GOVERNMENT
OF THE FAROE ISLANDS:
FYRI FØROYA LANDSSTÝRI:
FOR FÆRØERNES LANDSSTYRE:

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ANNEX

Application and Permit Procedures

The following procedures shall govern the application for and issuance of annual permits authorizing vessels of the Faroe Islands to engage in fishing for living resources over which the United States has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage:

1. The Home Government of the Faroe Islands may submit an application to the competent authorities of the United States for each fishing vessel of the Faroe Islands that wishes to engage in fishing pursuant to this Agreement. Such application shall be made on forms provided by the Government of the United States for that purpose.

2. Any such application shall specify

- a. the name and official number or other identification of each fishing vessel for which a permit is sought, together with the name and address of the owner and operator thereof;
- b. the tonnage, capacity, speed, processing equipment, type and quantity of fishing gear, and such other information relating to the fishing characteristics of the vessel as may be requested;

- c. a specification of each fishery in which each vessel wishes to fish;
- d. the amount of fish or tonnage of catch by species contemplated for each vessel during the time such permit is in force;
- e. the ocean area in which, and the season or period during which, such fishing would be conducted; and
- f. such other relevant information as may be requested, including desired transshipping areas.

3. The Government of the United States shall review each application, shall determine what conditions and restrictions may be needed, and what fee will be required, and shall inform the Home Government of the Faroe Islands of such determinations. The Government of the United States reserves the right not to approve applications.

4. The Home Government of the Faroe Islands shall thereupon notify the Government of the United States of its acceptance or rejection of such conditions and restrictions and, in the case of a rejection, of its objections thereto.

5. Upon acceptance of the conditions and restrictions by the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the payment of any fees, the Government of the United States shall approve the

application and issue a permit for each Faroese fishing vessel, which fishing vessel shall thereupon be authorized to fish in accordance with this Agreement and the terms and conditions set forth in the permit. Such permits shall be issued for a specific vessel and shall not be transferred.

6. In the event the Home Government of the Faroe Islands notifies the Government of the United States of its objections to specific conditions and restrictions, the two sides may consult with respect thereto and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands may thereupon submit a revised application.

7. The procedures in this Annex may be amended by agreement through an exchange of notes between the two Parties.

AGREED MINUTE

With respect to Article IV, paragraph 4, the representatives of the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands stated that the people and economy of the Faroe Islands are heavily dependent on exports of fishery products to cover their essential needs, and with respect to Article V, stated that the Faroe Islands are not a significant market for U.S. fishery products, but that the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Denmark in respect of the Faroe Islands would endeavor to promote free trade in fishery products, including products of U.S. origin.

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The Department of State has the honor to refer to the agreement between the Government of the United States of America of the one part and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands of the other part concerning Faroese fishing in fisheries off the coasts of the United States, signed at Washington on June 11, 1984, and due to expire on July 1, 1989. The Department of State proposes that the agreement be extended until July 1, 1991, and that it be amended as follows:

1. In Article IV, paragraph 1, replace the phrase "of United States fish or fishery products" with "of both United States fish and fishery products, particularly fish and fishery products for which the foreign nation has requested an allocation;"
 2. In Article IV, paragraph 2 replace the present text with the following: "whether, and to what extent, such nation is cooperating with the United States in both the advancement of existing and new opportunities for fisheries exports from the United States through the purchase of fishery products from United States
-

processors and the advancement of fisheries trade through the purchase of fish and fishery products from United States fishermen, particularly fish and fishery products for which the foreign nation has requested an allocation;"

3. In Article VII, before the final sentence, insert the following: "While such fees shall be applied without discrimination, the fee level may vary depending upon, INTER ALIA, whether, in the judgment of the United States, vessels or nationals of the Faroe Islands are harvesting United States origin anadromous species at unacceptable levels, or whether the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Denmark are failing to take sufficient action to benefit the conservation and development of United States fisheries.
4. In Article VIII, insert after the words "exclusive economic zone," the phrase "and any marine mammal of U.S. origin, such as North Pacific fur seal, on the high seas,".
5. In Article XVI, replace the date "July 1, 1989" with the date "July 1, 1991."

The United States proposes that if the extension and the amendments set out in this note are acceptable to the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Denmark, this note and the reply of the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Denmark to that effect shall constitute an agreement between the Parties amending the agreement between the Parties and extending that agreement until July 1, 1991. This agreement shall enter into force on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes following the completion of internal procedures of both parties.

Department of State,

Washington, March 28, 1989

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ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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The Royal Danish Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to acknowledge receipt of the Department's note of March 28, 1989, which reads as follows:

"The Department of State has the honor to refer to the agreement between the Government of the United States of America of the one part and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands of the other part concerning Faroese fishing in fisheries off the coasts of the United States, signed at Washington on June 11, 1984, and due to expire on July 1, 1989. The Department of State proposes that the agreement be extended until July 1, 1991, and that it be amended as follows:

1. In Article IV, paragraph 1, replace the phrase "of United States fish or fishery products" with "of both United States fish and fishery products, particularly fish and fishery products for which the foreign nation has requested an allocation;"
2. In Article IV, paragraph 2 replace the present text with the following: "whether, and to what extent, such nation is cooperating with the United States in both the advancement of existing and new opportunities for fisheries exports from the United States through the purchase of fishery products from United States processors and the advancement of fisheries trade through the purchase of fish and fishery products from United States fishermen, particularly fish and fishery products for which the foreign nation has requested an allocation;"

Department of State
Washington.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

3. In Article VII, before the final sentence, insert the following: "While such fees shall be applied without discrimination, the fee level may vary depending upon, INTER ALIA, whether, in the judgement of the United States, vessels or nationals of the Faroe Islands are harvesting United States origin anadromous species at unacceptable levels, or whether the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Denmark are failing to take sufficient action to benefit the conservation and development of United States fisheries."
4. In Article VIII, insert after the words "exclusive economic zone," the phrase "and any marine mammal of U.S. origin, such as North Pacific fur seal, on the high seas,".
5. In Article XVI, replace the date "July 1, 1989" with the date "July 1, 1991."

The United States proposes that if the extension and the amendments set out in this note are acceptable to the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Denmark, this note and the reply of the Home Government of the Faroe Islands and the Government of Denmark to that effect shall constitute an agreement between the Parties amending the agreement between the Parties and extending that agreement until July 1, 1991. This agreement shall enter into force on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes following the completion of internal procedures of both parties."

The Royal Danish Embassy has the honor to inform the Department of State that the extension of the agreement between the Government of the United States of America of the one part and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands of the other part concerning Faroese fishing in fisheries off the coasts of the United States and the amendments set out in the Department of State's note of today's date are acceptable to the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands, and that the Department of State's note and this reply note shall constitute an agreement between the Government of the United States of America of the one part and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands of the other part amending the agreement between the Parties and extending that agreement until July 1, 1991. This agreement shall enter into force on a date to be agreed upon by exchange of notes following the completion of internal procedures of both Parties.

The Royal Danish Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

Washington D.C.
March 28, 1989.





8908015

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 15, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Transmission to the Congress of the Extension of the Governing International Fishery Agreement with the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands

Attached for signature by the President are letters to the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, transmitting the Agreement effected by exchange of diplomatic notes which extends for two years, until July 1, 1991, and amends to bring into Technical Conformity with U.S. law, the Governing International Fishery Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands. The exchange of notes together with the present Agreement constitute a Governing International Fishery Agreement within the meaning of Section 201 (c) of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MFCMA) (16 USC 1801 et seq.). The notes were exchanged at Washington, March 28, 1989.

Congressional and industry representatives favor the extension of the GIFA with the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands. This extension will further the objectives of the MFCMA by continuing economic benefits to the United States, and will permit the United States and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of the Faroe Islands to maintain their long-standing cooperative fishery arrangements.

Compliance with the requirements of Section 203(a) of the MFCMA (16 USC 1823) with respect to transmission to the Congress is necessary for the two-year extension to enter into force.

(a) **IN GENERAL**-- No governing international fishery agreement shall become effective with respect to the United States before the close of the first 60 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date on which the President transmits to the House of Representatives and to the Senate a document setting forth the text of such governing international fishery agreement. A copy of the document shall be delivered to each House of Congress on the same day and shall

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be delivered to the Clerk of the House of Representatives, if the House is not in session, and to the Secretary of the Senate, if the Senate is not in session.

The present Agreement is scheduled to expire on July 1, 1989. Therefore, we request prompt transmittal of the exchange of notes to the House of Representatives and to the Senate.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Draft letter to the Senate with attachments.
2. Draft letter to the House of Representatives with attachments.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Minutes and Summary of Conclusions from the
Deputies Committee Meeting on NSR 3 - US-Soviet
Relations (Political-Military Relations)

Attached at Tab I are the Minutes of the Deputies Committee Meeting held on March 28. The Summary of Conclusions at Tab II has been coordinated with State, Defense and JCS.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve for record retention the Minutes and the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tabs I and II, respectively.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Minutes
Tab II Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *CS* NARA, Date *9/10/13*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Minutes	Deputies Committee Meeting NSR 3 (3 pp.)	3/28/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 5/13/2011	OA/ID Number: 30542
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Summary of Conclusions	Deputies Committee Meeting NSR 3 (2 pp.)	3/28/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Date Closed:	5/13/2011	OA/ID Number:	30542
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Minutes and Summary of Conclusions from the
Deputies Committee Meeting on NSR 3 - US-Soviet
Relations (Economic Matters)

Attached at Tab I are the Minutes of the Deputies Committee Meeting held on March 29. The Summary of Conclusions is at Tab II and has been coordinated with State, Defense and JCS.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve for record retention the Minutes and the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tabs I and II, respectively.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Minutes
Tab II Summary of Conclusions

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *26* NARA, Date *9/10/13*

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Declassify on: OADR

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Minutes	Deputies Committee Meeting NSR 3 (3 pp.)	3/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Date Closed:	5/13/2011	OA/ID Number:	30542
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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20297

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Deputies Committee Meeting

March 29, 1989, 11:00 a.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet Relations (Economic Matters)

Summary of Conclusions

Summary of the Deputies Committee Meeting to Review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet Relations (Economic Relations)

The meeting began with a brief summary of problems in the Soviet economy. The Soviet leadership is beginning to realize the depth of its problems and that reform of the economy is a long term proposition. The Soviets have been unable to stimulate growth or cope with shortages. And they now face inflationary pressures and an enormous budget deficit as well. The effort at restructuring suffers both from failures of implementation and from the regime's refusal to address many key but painful elements of reform, including price reform. The economic picture is bleak and the leadership is showing signs of frustration with the lack of progress. Gorbachev and his closest advisers seem to be convinced that there is no turning back, however, although they have retreated from time to time on some elements of reform. The severe economic problems have led the Gorbachev leadership finally to accept the need for real cuts in defense spending, thus the announcement of troop cuts and of cuts in the defense budget.

The Soviets do need help from the West, but the leadership is ambivalent and cautious about reliance on external aid. They are concerned both about the absorption capacity of their economy for imports and about engendering long term dependence on Western capital and credits. They would like to expand joint ventures, which the Soviets see as a vehicle for investment and as a source of management training and expertise.

The DC then turned to a discussion of U.S.-Soviet economic relations in the current environment. It was suggested that it might be time to think of economic relations as a sixth area of interaction with the Soviet Union. Others thought it was appropriately placed as it is. Currently, economic relations are subsumed under bilateral issues. The participants confirmed that, in principle, U.S.-Soviet economic relations should be thought of as an element of our overall relationship. Linking the state of economic relations to specific instances of Soviet behavior was thought to be problematic. But, in reality, the

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overall state of political relations does have an effect on the climate for trade and financial activity with the Soviet Union. Concerning our approach to U.S.-Soviet economic relations, the DC discussed the three schools of thought that NSR 3 outlined: maintain the present level and structure of economic relations; liberalize selectively and cautiously; or liberalize almost immediately. The participants felt that these "pure" types were not the basis for the formulation of policy. First, the present course does have within it some elements of gradual liberalization. We are, for instance, encouraging non-strategic trade. Further, commercial relations with the Soviet Union have a logic of their own and the commercial community is, for the most part, out in front of the USG. Nevertheless, the participants did take note of the business community's desire for signals from the Administration on U.S. economic activity in the new environment provided by perestroika.

Several specific policy choices were then addressed and it was agreed that it would be necessary to return to them for thorough review. While there was no disagreement in principle on the wisdom of streamlining the COCOM list, the DC believed that the extent of streamlining needs to be examined. It was noted that pressures were building to do so, both from the commercial community and from our allies, and that it would be better to be in front on the issue with strong recommendations rather than carried along by events. The DC also recommended that our position on COCOM "no-exceptions" be reviewed.

All of the members of the DC agreed that it is probably too early to waive Jackson-Vanik but, again, since there is sentiment on the Hill for such a waiver, the Administration should look at the issue. The Administration does not want to be out in front of the American public or the Congress, but many of them are looking to the USG for leadership on this issue.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RLH*
SUBJECT: Minutes and Summary of Conclusions from the
Deputies Committee Meeting on NSR 5: U.S.-West
European Relations (Economic Aspects)

Attached at Tab I are the Minutes of the Deputies Committee Meeting held on March. The Summary of Conclusions at Tab II has been coordinated with State, Defense and JCS.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve for record retention the Minutes and the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tabs I and II, respectively.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Minutes
Tab II Summary of Conclusions

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *25* NARA, Date *9/10/13*

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03b. Minutes	Deputies Committee Meeting, Re: NSR 5 [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (7 pp.)	3/22/89	(b)(1) , (b)(3)	8

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Document Declassified
Copy of **(Document Follows)**
 By MM on 5/2/2022

Date Closed:	5/13/2011	OA/ID Number:	30542
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1765-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	1/27/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


- (b)(1) National security classified information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

20252

Deputies Committee Meeting

March 22, 1989, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: NSR 5: U.S.-West European Relations
(Economic Aspects)

PARTICIPANTS:

White House

Robert Gates (Chairman)

OMB

William Diefenderfer

State

Robert Kimmitt
Charles Thomas

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3)

Treasury

Peter McPherson
Robert Fauver

USTR

Joshua Bolten
Andrew Stoler

DOD

William Taft
John Woodworth

JCS

Jonathan Howe
Wharton Rivers

Agriculture

Peter Myers

NSC

Robert Hutchings

Commerce

Allen Moore
Ken Nichols

Minutes

Robert Gates opened the meeting and turned immediately to Mr. Kerr for an intelligence assessment.

Richard Kerr (CIA) focused chiefly on the European Community's drive to create a unified single market by 1992. There is debate over how far and how fast the process will go, he explained, but it clearly will have a major impact on Europe and on US interests. Over half of the directives have been adopted; and while the toughest issues are still ahead, the process has momentum and political commitment. Rises in private investment and employment growth also reflect a general optimism in European

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business circles. Additionally, the decision-making arena has shifted from traditional financial institutions to international bodies, whose Eurocrats have an interest in progress toward 1992 as a goal in itself. On the other hand, progress is easier in a period of economic growth. An economic slowdown could sharpen national differences and fuel protectionist sentiments.

The process, Kerr continued, offers both benefits and challenges for the US. On the positive side are prospects for stable growth, reduction of barriers, and creation of new markets; on the negative, the possibility of new barriers and sharper competition. Increasingly, the Europeans will be speaking with greater unity and coherence. Will the same be true on this side?

Robert Kimmitt (State) reviewed the policy recommendations contained in the PCC paper responding to NSR 5. Stressing that our economic, political, and security interests cannot be treated in isolation, he outlined four general economic areas calling for policy consideration. First, European integration goes beyond the measures in the 1992 plan; it involves a much broader process to which US policy must respond. Second, there are important macroeconomic choices, going beyond the 1992 process per se, that the US must seek to influence. Third, the paper raises major East-West trade and technology transfer issues. Finally, the paper identifies the issue of how to manage our approach to the European Community as it moves toward 1992. We also need to consider our substantive approach to "1992." The paper touches on these issues, but it needs work.

Robert Gates agreed that the paper needs more work. The treatment of 1992 and the US approach to it is inadequate. He proposed that the DC spend its time on these issues, adding that we need a further PCC paper, to be prepared before the NSC meeting on NSR 5, outlining options for a US strategy toward 1992. Mr. Gates said there is a need for a political/security umbrella to articulate our attitude toward European economic and political integration. The NSC staff has suggested three possible elements of such an approach:

-- The US welcomes 1992 and its role in moving Western Europe toward greater economic and political integration.

-- We believe a united Europe will be a stronger economic partner and hope the 1992 process will bring our European allies to be stronger contributors to the defense of Europe.

-- At the same time, we recognize this to be a complex process involving US commercial and financial interests. The US will oppose strongly any effect of 1992 that would close EC markets to US goods and services.

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One element not addressed, Mr. Gates continued, is EC strategy toward the US, which seems aimed at keeping us focused on micro-issues via a dialogue between economic agencies. They can beat us at this game, unless we elevate the whole problem to the political level. Therefore, one issue we should address is what our strategy should be. Should it be economic only, or should we elevate it to the political, military, and strategic level? Another aspect raised by my staff, Mr. Gates said, was that the dialogue is not just US-EC but the ins v. the outs -- i.e., those firms, including US firms, that operate within the EC as against those which only export to Europe. He then invited comments.

Peter McPherson (Treasury) expressed concern that the economic relationship is more central to our relations with Europe than the paper suggests. Trade issues, which affect the economic health of our country, should not be subordinated to a desire to maintain cordial relations with our European allies. We must have a Europe that is open to us. Mr. McPherson concluded that the paper should be rewritten to strengthen considerably the economic side.

Robert Gates agreed. We need a new, not very long paper on 1992, and we need to consider ways of bringing to bear all aspects of our relations with Europe -- political, security, foreign policy -- to strengthen the hand of our economic agencies in dealing with 1992.

Joshua Bolten (USTR) expressed complete agreement with all that had been said, particularly with Treasury's position. When we try to "rise above" economic issues, there is a danger that we set aside those issues. We need to push hard for our economic interests.

Robert Gates alluded to the methodological problem of dividing economic from other issues and noted that the handling of the FSX issue as a national security matter was not inappropriate here. One deficiency in this paper, he said, was its failure to integrate economic issues with the political and security dimensions of our relations with Europe.

William Taft (Defense) observed that experience has shown that we should not allow our security relationship with Europe to be harmed by trade disputes. He agreed that we need a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to Europe, but mixing trade disputes with security matters is the wrong approach. It will not help trade, but it will harm security.

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Robert Gates agreed. We are not talking about our security relationships but rather with developing a political strategy to deal with economic issues.

Robert Gates then turned to three sets of economic policy issues arising from NSR 5:

- how to deal with the European Community as it moves toward a single market in 1992;
- how to improve US-European cooperation in managing global economic problems; and
- how to deal with Western Europe regarding aid, trade, and investment in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

The DC already has addressed the third of these in the NSR on Eastern Europe, though there are some COCOM issues still to be discussed. Mr. Gates proposed focusing on US approaches to 1992 and to global economic management generally. Are we properly organized to deal with these? He suggested two possibilities for coordinating US policies via an overview body: a PCC for international economics, chaired by Treasury, or a PCC for Europe, chaired by State.

Joshua Bolten (USTR) observed that we already have an interagency task force in which 15 agencies coordinate their responses to 1992. This does a good job at the staff level. The Economic Policy Committee may also take up the issue in the next month or so. What we need is not more players but the right level of involvement. We need to focus cabinet-level attention on 1992 in order to do a better public relations job and for strategic planning.

Allen Moore (Commerce) made the point that the current system is not so bad. EC 1992 is above all about Europe, not EC-US relations per se. The drive toward closer economic integration reflects Europe's concern about internal barriers retarding growth; it is spurred by instincts of economic self-preservation. At Commerce, twenty people are working full-time in monitoring 1992. Most of their work is pretty pedestrian, but they perform a vital service in keeping US business apprised of new EC agreements and their impact.

The battleground, Mr. Moore continued, is in Europe; we are trying to keep the barriers down directive by directive. It would be useful to have a general statement of principle on US attitudes toward 1992 -- via a Presidential statement, for example; but the existing mechanisms are sufficient for monitoring daily developments and informing the Trade Policy Review Group. There is no need to reorganize.

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Robert Kimmitt (State) agreed that the TPRG does a good job, but it fails to address the major issues. We should remember the broader implications of political integration -- on counterterrorism, for example. The PCC on Europe is the place to coordinate; 1992 is ultimately a matter of national security, not of economics.

Peter McPherson (Treasury) also noted that the existing monitoring system works well but that it is a good idea to focus attention at a higher level -- not to pick over detail but to develop a broader strategy. The DC could probably agree on a set of principles guiding US approaches to 1992. We should also aim toward a set of principles agreed between the US and the EC -- such as a statement that harmonization would not devolve to a lowest common denominator but rather would lead to liberalization.

Robert Gates added that if we elevate 1992 to the NSC we would have two major assets -- the President and the Secretary of State -- in establishing and projecting our principles.

Peter McPherson (Treasury) suggested that the DC might agree on three points:

- The current monitoring system should remain in place.
- Our approach to 1992 should be elevated to higher levels for strategic thinking.
- We should define certain key principles that the USG would pursue in its relations with the EC regarding 1992.

Joshua Bolton (USTR) said he largely agreed.

Robert Gates said the follow-on paper to NSR 5 should lay out these points. He then turned to the second major policy issue: how to improve US-West European cooperation in managing global economic issues.

Peter McPherson (Treasury) noted that on structural adjustment the EC now has no jurisdiction, because Bonn and London do not want it to have such jurisdiction. We have been working through G-7, which is probably the best place, since structural issues are largely in the hands of finance ministers.

Robert Kimmitt (State) said that if we are coordinated in our approach, this should not be much of a problem.

Robert Gates turned to the third major policy issue -- coordinating Western economic policies toward Eastern Europe and the USSR -- and suggested that the discussion be confined to technology transfer and COCOM. Mr. Gates noted there was a fair

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degree of agreement that we need a considerable streamlining of the list in return for tougher enforcement, but there has been little progress on either. How can we bring this issue to the principals so as to galvanize the process?

Richard Kerr (CIA) noted that CIA has been analyzing major categories on the COCOM list, trying to identify several technologies that are truly strategic. This technique should help to narrow down the list.

William Taft (Defense) said he had no problem with the study but would give a better grade to what has been done already to narrow the list. He also gave a better grade to the enforcement efforts of our Allies and even of such countries as Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria. We need to do a better in both areas, he said, but these are tough issues. Therefore we should keep on with our efforts on a case-by-case basis.

Robert Kimmitt (State) disagreed. The perception in Europe, he said, is that we are losing our consensus in COCOM -- at the same time that threat perceptions are declining. We should not sacrifice our interests, but these perceptions in Europe weaken compliance. We may be the last "true believers."

Richard Kerr (CIA) added that European governments are loosening up their enforcement efforts. We need to keep a realistic list that we can defend aggressively.

William Taft (Defense) agreed that some narrowing is needed but warned that it should not be done hastily.

Admiral Howe (JCS) added that as we move toward 1992, toward a more united Europe, the pressure will increase for us to fall off a restrictive list.

Joshua Bolten (USTR), returning to the earlier discussion on 1992, argued that this is primarily an economic, rather than a national security, issue.

Robert Kimmitt (State) replied that he was not denigrating the economic side. He had argued for years that international economic policy is a matter of national security.

Robert Gates concluded the meeting with a summation. We should ask the PCC to reconvene and prepare by early next week a separate, relatively brief paper on US strategy toward 1992. The paper should present overarching principles and attitudes, as well as specific principles that we might get the European Community to agree to. The paper should also describe the EC's

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strategy toward us and divisions among the Europeans, driving toward what our strategy toward 1992 should be.

Allen Moore (Commerce) added that the paper should identify differences within the EC to find points of leverage that we may have. Knowing that a minority of EC members can block action, we need to be more coordinated and smarter in getting done what we want done.

Robert Gates called for a draft by COB Tuesday, March 28. This would not be the subject of another DC but simply an additional paper for submission to principals.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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20252

Deputies Committee Meeting

March 22, 1989, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: NSR 5: U.S.-West European Relations
(Economic Aspects)

Summary of Conclusions

The Deputies Committee met to consider National Security Review (NSR) 5: U.S.-Western Europe Relations. This meeting focused on the economic aspects of NSR 5, the political and security aspects having been discussed at a DC meeting on March 20.

The DC deliberations focused chiefly on the substantive and organizational questions raised by the European Community's drive to create a unified single market by 1992. The group agreed that the 1992 program will have a major impact on Europe and on U.S. interests. On the positive side are prospects for stable growth, reduction of barriers, and creation of new markets; on the negative, the possibility of new barriers and sharper competition.

The DC discussed whether the U.S. is adequately organized to deal with the broader implications of European economic and political integration, a process going well beyond the 1992 program. The group agreed that existing mechanisms do a good job of tracking the trade and investment aspects of 1992, but there was consensus that we need to focus greater high-level attention on "1992" and better integrate our economic, political, and security interests.

The DC further agreed that efforts toward a more coordinated U.S. approach should not have the affect of subordinating our vital economic interests, nor should it permit trade disputes to jeopardize our security relationship with Europe.

The DC decided that we should have a set of basic principles to guide U.S. policy toward the EC regarding 1992. A Presidential statement embracing these principles, the group suggested, could also serve to address criticism in Congress and business that the Administration is not doing enough to defend U.S. interests.

The DC concluded that the PCC paper responding to NSR 5 did not adequately address the challenges posed by the 1992 program. The DC tasked the PCC to prepare a separate, relatively brief paper on U.S. strategy toward the European Community as it approaches

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1992. The paper should delineate principles governing U.S. attitudes, describe EC strategies toward us, and propose substantive and organizational measures that could facilitate our approaches toward the EC as it pursues the 1992 program. The paper would not be the subject of another DC meeting but rather would be appended to NSR 5 for review by principals.

The DC turned briefly to two other issues raised in the PCC paper. First, the DC agreed that, so long as the U.S. is coordinated in its own approaches, the G-7 framework remains a satisfactory mechanism for coordinating Western macroeconomic policies. Second, noting that NSRs 3 and 4 address the broad issues of Western economic relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the DC discussed the technology transfer dimensions of those relations. The DC agreed that we need to narrow down the COCOM list if we are to succeed in pushing aggressively for better enforcement. DOD noted, however, that such narrowing should be done carefully and case by case.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. GATES

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: PHILIP ZELIKOW *PZ*

SUBJECT: Minutes and Summary of Conclusions from the
Deputies Committee Meeting on NSR 5 - U.S.-West
European Relations (Political and Security
Aspects)

Attached at Tab I are the Minutes of the Deputies Committee Meeting on NSR 5 - U.S.-West European Relations (Political and Security Aspects) held on March 20. The Summary of Conclusions at Tab II has been coordinated with State, Defense and JCS.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve for record retention the Minutes and the Summary of Conclusions attached at Tabs I and II respectively.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Minutes
Tab II Summary of Conclusions

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *26* NARA, Date *1/10/13*

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Minutes	Deputies Committee Meeting RE: NSR 5 (6 pp.)	3/20/89	(b)(3)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
By 28 on 11/9/14

Date Closed: 5/13/2011	OA/ID Number: 30542
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #: 2010-1764-MR (500)	MR Case #:
AR Disposition: Released in Full	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date: 6/20/2013	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508



Deputies Committee Meeting

March 20, 1989, 3:00 - 4:00 p.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: NSR 5: U.S.-West European Relations
(Political and Security Aspects)

PARTICIPANTS:

White House

Robert Gates (Chairman)

OMB

William Diefenderfer

State

Robert Kimmitt

Don McConnell

CIA

Richard Kerr

(b)(3)

DOD

William Taft

John Woodworth

JCS

Jonathan Howe

Wharton Rivers

ACDA

George F. Murphy, Jr.

NSC

Philip Zelikow

Office of the Vice President

Carnes Lord

Minutes

Robert Gates opened the meeting and explained that the NSC staff would soon be laying out an overall schedule of NSC meetings on European issues. A decision was needed on whether to have a general overview meeting on East-West relations, which could lead to specific meetings on particular topics raised by the NSRs on European issues (NSRs 3, 4, and 5). He thought General Scowcroft might raise the idea of such an overview meeting with State and Defense at the Wednesday (March 22) breakfast.

Richard Kerr began his assessment of current political developments in Western Europe by commenting that, although the paper prepared by the Europe PCC on NSR 5 emphasizes continuity in European trends, the intelligence community was more struck by breaks with the past. These changes could challenge the orientation of Germany toward NATO, US ability to maintain its

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military presence in several European countries, and Washington's capacity to persuade a more unified and confident Europe to accept US policies. The West Europeans, in particular, enthusiastically believed that more trade and financial support for the East would promote reform. A Western Europe with more central direction could, however, also be helpful since, on those issues where the US had support, it might be easier to put together a united West European front to back our policies.

Kerr felt the paper did not give enough attention either to the policy implications of challenges to the US force posture in Europe or to the future of Germany and the question of reunification.

Robert Kimmitt reviewed the PCC paper's policy recommendations, noting a substantial degree of consensus on central points such as the importance of Europe to the US. The paper raised general issues, such as whether a stronger Europe was in the US interest, and specific problems such as the relationship of the CFE talks to the CSCE process. He was also struck by the lack of attention to key force structure issues and felt that this study, NSR 5, needed to address the political issue of the future of our forces. The upcoming NATO summit would provide an opportunity, he hoped, for Western leaders to answer basic questions about where the Alliance should go.

Robert Gates recalled that, at an NSC meeting on Poland in December 1980, Harold Brown and General Jones had urged the group not to get out in front of allies. A congressman present at the meeting, John Rhodes, replied that he thought 'getting out in front' was called "leadership." Gates said the NSR was dealing with two phenomena: (1) the impact of Gorbachev's initiatives on Western perceptions of a Soviet military threat, raising the question of whether an alliance could remain viable in the absence of a military enemy; and (2) the role of the US as Europe moved toward 1992. In this context, there were six issues he thought the group should consider.

The first issue was the content of our vision for Europe's future. He asked the group whether they agreed that the DC, or NSC, should direct the crafting of a document outlining such a vision, starting with the overlay of common values, along with cultural and historical ties, that bound the US to Western Europe and included Eastern Europe, i.e., a "Western experience," which encompassed all of Europe but not the Soviet Union. He also solicited the group's views on growing European unity. Should we throw ourselves in front of the train, or ask the NSC to consider welcoming closer political consultation with the West Europeans, despite the heartburn this might cause.

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Kimmitt agreed we needed a statement of the US vision for Europe's future. He also agreed that the US should accept a more positive attitude toward European unity, making it clear that we would not approach these European developments with suspicion.

William Taft stressed the need to keep reemphasizing Western values. He agreed that we should be more positive about European integration.

Kerr commended the idea of including Eastern Europe in Gates' notion of the 'Western experience' that would underlie our vision for Europe.

Jonathan Howe asked whether the vision would have a US label, being articulated in a Presidential speech, or come out of NATO, like another Harmel report.

Gates replied that a statement embodying a more welcoming approach to European integration should come from the US. On the overall vision of Europe, the NSC should decide whether to make this a US initiative or have the US take the lead in NATO. He felt the latter was more appealing but he was open to argument. He was sure, however, that in either case the US should take the lead.

Howe thought a reemphasis of common values was excellent. He commented, though, that some papers assumed that greater security cooperation in the WEU was good. JCS was ambivalent and felt there had not been enough analysis of the disadvantages of such cooperation.

Gates contended, citing the WEU coordination of Persian Gulf assistance, that Western Europe could assume more global responsibilities in reality, not just rhetorically.

Howe said that real West European assumption of global responsibilities was a long way away.

Kerr responded that West European support for the US in addressing global issues would be important in satisfying domestic concerns about burdensharing. Gates added that the PCC paper was realistic, pointing out the downsides of increased consultation on global issues. But if we could not block a larger European role we should encourage movement in a positive direction. Taft agreed. Taft also stressed the criticism on burdensharing that would ensue if the US public perceived that Europe was unwilling to help with global burdens.

Returning to the general vision of Europe, Howe said the PCC product had papered over some issues. He agreed with Kerr on the

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need to address more directly the issue of German reunification. He also was concerned about the prospect of a Western Europe integrated under French leadership.

Gates then turned discussion to a second issue: NATO security policy. He asked three questions: (1) Should the USG move now, in the context of NSR-12, to study preferred outcomes in NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels beyond the cuts envisioned in NATO's current CFE proposal? The pressure on us to cut our forces was great and increasing, including from the Hill, and we had no analysis to support future policy. (2) Should we make a major effort to develop new initiatives in CSBMs beyond NATO's current proposal? He knew a lot of ideas had been vetoed in the previous administration but he thought we should think harder. (3) Were there better ways to address the burdensharing problem, with more imagination? New concepts, perhaps reviving the old idea of MBT standardization, should be explored.

Kimmitt referred to Gates' earlier comment on the disappearing military enemy and noted that the recent NIE made it clear that we were seeing action, not just rhetoric, from the East. He agreed we needed to do more to examine how arms control could eventually influence future NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels.

Gates asked whether the analysis of future directions for conventional arms control should be done as part of NSR-12 or in a parallel exercise run by the Defense PCC? Although it was often assumed that lower conventional numbers were better, this remained unproven and more analysis was needed.

Taft agreed the issue of future force levels must be addressed. He thought it should be handled in the defense strategy review by the Defense PCC. Budget constraints were already driving the US toward force reductions. He urged that the analysis first be done in the defense budget context, then in NSR-12. George Murphy said the issue was not size, but the composition of forces.

Howe agreed the budget and our strategy were critical to an examination of future force posture. If NATO went beyond the 5-10% cuts described in its current CFE proposal, NATO might be unable to maintain its current forward defense strategy, due to the irreducible minimum forces needed to cover a given area. Larger cuts would require a consideration of different strategies. We should concentrate, for the moment, on the current Soviet offer. Aside from the aircraft problem, an agreement close to those terms could be a fantastic achievement and get truly deep cuts in Pact forces. The alliance needed to look harder and more creatively at arms control possibilities since we were now in a new situation no one had anticipated. We

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should keep in mind, though, that changes in force structure would be a sensitive and difficult subject within NATO.

Kimmitt contended that the study of future conventional arms control possibilities should be done in the Europe PCC or, if in the Defense PCC, done with strong State representation. Policy on this subject should be decided separately from internal DOD budget deliberations.

Gates summarized that the study should be done in the Defense PCC to insure interagency input. Taft suggested that the group first look at the Army budget, to be decided by April, which would probably require troop strength to be cut from 740,000 to 710,000.

Taft also observed that, on burdensharing, more did need to be done. One idea was to find a better way to sensitize our European allies to US political realities. Murphy agreed.

Gates then raised a third issue: Europe's role in the world. Should we encourage more West European assertiveness and engage the EC on regional issues? It was anomalous to talk to the Soviets about these problems but not to the EC.

Kimmitt said Allied interest on these matters was intense. He thought we should engage the Europeans more on regional subjects, stressing our common values and putting down markers, as part of a more mature relationship. He proposed, however, that such consultations occur more in NATO than in the EC. The EC context pulled in too many uninvolved countries. Howe said NATO had committees that already discussed such things. Kimmitt replied that those discussions were "Brussels-generated," not based on real direction from capitals.

A fourth issue, Gates said, was our program for the NATO summit. Did the group agree that NATO should try to formulate a broad vision for Europe's future that would be embodied in a summit declaration? Also, there was a question of coming up with new initiatives for the President to table. He thought we should look harder for initiatives the President could use.

There was no comment on this point, so Gates turned to his fifth issue: an integrated Europe. Gates noted that some of the political implications of 1992 had not been addressed in the paper, including counter-terrorism, technology transfer, the increasing role of the French, and possibilities for expanded dialogue. Kimmitt agreed completely, adding that, as in the FSX case, the economic dimension was only part of the story. There was also a question of whether Europe 1992 issues were matters for the EPC process or, as he preferred, the NSC structure.

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Gates thought the President's decision to put LDC debt issues under the purview of the NSC was a good sign.

Gates then raised a sixth and final issue: the future of Germany. The two principal questions, in his view, were: (1) Can we do more to keep Germany closely aligned to the West, and should we put a higher priority on trouble-free relations, even if we pay a price on issues like SNF modernization or the status of our forces? (2) How best can we influence Germany's 'Eastern policies?' On this latter point, he asked the group to consider whether we should encourage Bonn to be a Central European magnet to draw Eastern Europe closer to the West. This raised long-range historical issues.

Kimmitt recommended sensitivity to Kohl's political situation, while helping Kohl understand the limits to our flexibility. We should also be mindful of the Alliance context and of the need to avoid undercutting Prime Minister Thatcher. The role of Germany in Eastern Europe was a large question that could justify a separate study. We should concentrate on Germany's relationship to the Alliance.

Gates suggested that we could try to tie our political framework in Eastern Europe to the FRG's economic activity in that region. Kimmitt agreed.

Howe returned to the issue of how much to help Kohl and argued that more analysis was needed on the likelihood of an SPD takeover and the implications of such a change for US policy. Kimmitt felt the choice was increasingly narrowing to one of Genscher's foreign policy versus that of the SPD. John Woodworth said the problems were tough and more quiet consultations were needed to determine how to support Kohl as best we can. Howe said we must first watch our own interests.

Gates then asked if there were any issues that he had missed.

Kimmitt asked if ACDA had a problem with State's view on CFE autonomy from the CSCE. Murphy said no.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Deputies Committee Meeting

March 20, 1989, 3:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m., Situation Room

SUBJECT: NSR 5: U.S. Relations with Western Europe
(Political and Security Aspects)

Summary of Conclusions

The Deputies Committee met to consider the response to National Security Review (NSR) 5: U.S.-West European Relations. This meeting focused on political and security aspects of NSR 5. Another DC meeting on NSR 5, on March 22, was to address US economic relations with Western Europe.

The DC deliberations centered on six principal issues. The first of these was the content of America's vision for the future of Europe. The group agreed that a document should be prepared outlining such a vision. This document should start with the common values, culture, and heritage, amounting to a "Western experience," that was shared by the United States and Europe, including Eastern Europe, but not by the Soviet Union.

The participants also agreed that the vision for Europe's future should include a positive statement welcoming greater West European integration. [JCS expressed ambivalence about prospects for more West European security cooperation outside of NATO or assumption of global European responsibilities under the WEU, and felt more analysis on this point was needed.] All participants felt increased WEU activity, as in the Persian Gulf, had been helpful to US interests and alleviated some US burdensharing concerns. [The participants agreed that a statement welcoming West European moves toward more unification should come from the US, rather than from NATO.]

On a second issue, NATO security policy, the group agreed that the USG should move now, in the context of the review of US national security strategy (NSR-12), to study preferred outcomes in NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels beyond the cuts envisioned in NATO's current CFE proposal. The participants agreed that this study should have full interagency review and be conducted by the Defense PCC.

The DC also agreed that the USG should make a major effort to develop new initiatives in CSBMs beyond those included in NATO's

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current proposal. The group also agreed that the USG should examine more creative approaches to the burdensharing issue. The group further agreed that the US should maintain current policy on the autonomy of the CFE negotiations from the CSCE.

The third issue the DC considered was the US view of Europe's role in the world. All present agreed that the US should encourage more West European assertiveness on global problems, and initiate direct consultations between the US and Western Europe on selected regional issues. There was disagreement, however, on whether these consultations should occur in the EC framework or in NATO.

Fourth, the DC discussed the US agenda for the NATO summit in May. The participants agreed that NATO should try to formulate a broad vision for Europe's future to be embodied in a summit declaration. They also agreed that the USG should try to develop new policy initiatives for the President to use in connection with the summit.

On the fifth issue, the increasing integration of Europe, the DC agreed that the PCC paper responding to NSR 5 had not adequately considered the political implications of the move toward a single EC market in 1992.

Sixth and finally, the DC considered the future of Germany. The group felt that the US should be as sensitive as possible, to Chancellor Kohl's political situation. The participants also agreed that, as the FRG played a more active role in Eastern Europe, the US should encourage this process but seek to tie German economic activity more to US political goals, which included the need for Eastern countries to adopt institutional political and economic reforms. [Some participants urged that more attention be given to US policy on German reunification.]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 3, 1989

4/4/89
0930

Brent --

Following our conversation
last night, we have ~~tried~~
tried to frame these issues
in a way that produces clear
policy alternatives for the NSC
to discuss.

Bob Blackwill

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: April 5 Meeting to Review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet
Relations

This memorandum lays out our suggestions for conducting the NSC meeting to review NSR 3: U.S.-Soviet relations. The memorandum from you to the President at Tab I prepares him for the meeting and apprises him of the results of NSR 3. The awful recommendations paper that was commissioned by the DC is at Tab II. The response to NSR 3 is at Tab C of the President's package.

The meeting should begin with an assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union by Judge Webster. You may then want to guide the participants through the 6 issues that emerged from NSR 3. It may be possible to move briskly through issues 1-4, reserving time to discuss the more specific policy choices raised by the last two issues.

Issue One: What strategy should we pursue during this period of Soviet military retrenchment? Should the U.S. cooperate, concentrating on joint problem solving? Or should we pressure the Soviet Union, seeking to extend American advantages relative to the Soviet Union?

Discussion

The key intelligence judgment in NSR 3 is that Soviet internal problems are so severe that the leadership will concentrate in the next 3-5 years and perhaps longer on trying to "arrest the internal decline of the Soviet Union." As a result of their preoccupation with internal problems, the Soviet leadership will seek a non-confrontational relationship with the United States and the Western alliance for at least that period of time. This does not preclude an active Soviet foreign policy but does imply that Soviet military power will be less in evidence and that Moscow will be more cooperative on the international front. The West will have a period of time, three-five years, maybe longer, to pursue significant reductions in Soviet military power and to reduce the Soviet Union's presence in the Third World. We must decide how best to use this period.

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NSR 3 takes a cooperative approach to the Soviet Union, concentrating on joint problem solving to ameliorate regional conflicts and to address global problems (narcotics, terrorism, etc.). Though not explicitly stated, an underlying assumption of NSR 3 is that the Gorbachev reforms have the potential to transform Soviet foreign policy for the long term. Though the "new foreign policy" is not irreversible, it will become harder for the Soviet Union to return to its aggressive course if democratization proceeds, giving, for instance, real powers in foreign and defense policy to a revamped legislature. In this scenario, the Soviet Union would emerge from perestroika as a competitor but one that relies more on diplomacy and less on military power.

The defense agencies believed that NSR 3 was too optimistic about future Soviet behavior. They emphasized that the real motivation of economic perestroika ultimately is to make the Soviet Union more competitive. Thus, whatever the opportunities for U.S. policy in this period, they argue that it is important not to lose sight of the long term picture and the possibility that the Soviet Union will reemerge as a more competitive and efficient military power. This is the tone taken in the analytic section (Part I) of NSR 12: Defense Strategy Review. It is a view with which we agree.

The bottom line for policy is not fundamentally different in the two reviews; both recommend a cautious approach that seeks changes in Soviet capabilities that are reversible only at high cost. But as you know, Bill Odom and others argue that now is precisely the time to squeeze the Soviets. These differing approaches might be worth discussing at the NSC.

Issue Two: What leverage do we have over Soviet external behavior and what role should explicit linkage play in our policy?

Discussion

NSR 3 argues that Gorbachev's new approach gives us sources of leverage that we have not had in the past because of Moscow's desire for international legitimacy and positive relations. The agencies are agreed that implicit linkage, making clear to Moscow that actions in one area can affect the overall relationship, is useful. The disagreements arise over the value of explicit cross-issue linkages (like the grain embargo as a sanction for Afghanistan). It might be useful for the principals to discuss the utility of linkage, particularly since we have gone pretty far down this road in linking Soviet behavior in Central America to the general state of our relations. In particular, one wonders exactly what we will do if Moscow does not meet our desiderata in Central America.

Issue Three: In what regions and on what global issues does cooperation with the Soviet Union make sense?

Discussion

The paper notes that the Soviet desire for a non-confrontational relationship with us and Moscow's retrenchment in the Third World will produce opportunities for amelioration of a number of regional conflicts and then presents a fairly standard list of regional problems:

- There may be opportunities to promote greater autonomy in Eastern Europe as Moscow's grip loosens.
- We should press the Soviets on Bloc arms supplies to Nicaragua.
- In Asia, any significant lessening of the Soviet military threat poses challenges to our relationship with Japan which remains the pillar of our Asian policy.
- We should resist Soviet pressure for a Helsinki-like process in Asia.
- The Soviet call for an international conference in the Middle East is a ploy to gain entrance into the peace process. We should press the Soviets to demand that their clients adopt more benign policies that can lead to fruitful and direct talks among the parties.
- We will want to challenge Moscow to translate its rhetorical support for efforts to address global problems (terrorism, narcotics control, the environment and disaster relief) into concrete action.

We recommend that the participants discuss the judgment that Moscow's retrenchment will allow for greater cooperation and examine some of the generic problems of a more cooperative Soviet Union in these regions. There are some areas where cooperation with the Soviet Union makes sense and is relatively cost free (i.e. narcotics control) and others where Soviet help might come at a price that we are unwilling to pay (e.g. in the Middle East). The State Department is anxious to have bilateral expert talks on counter-terrorism. The intelligence agencies are worried that talks on operational issues will compromise U.S. and allied sources, methods and procedures. The NSC should start to distinguish between those areas that are ripe for cooperation and those that are problematic. The DC commissioned a paper to disaggregate "global issues," and discuss the costs and benefits of engaging the Soviet Union on different problems. We have not yet received that paper but will forward it to you when it arrives.

Issue Four: Can we influence the course of democratization in the Soviet Union? How large a role should democratization, including human rights, play in our policy?

Discussion

NSR 3 endorses continued pressure on the Soviet Union to improve human rights, using our participation in the Moscow Human Rights Conference as leverage. It also recommends the promotion of Western values and ideas through expanding people-to-people, cultural and scientific exchanges.

Though not discussed in this paper, the U.S. embassy Moscow has recently sent a cable suggesting that we expand bilateral discussions, presumably beginning with Baker's May visit, with the Soviet Union to include domestic developments. We think that this is a terrible idea because it gives the impression of moral equivalence in the two systems. We do not need to give the Soviets a forum in which to raise American Indian rights every time we bring up their nationalities problem.

The concept of "democratization" of the Soviet Union as an American objective is not cost free and should be discussed before we go further down this road. It is easy to overstate the degree to which Moscow's interest in and tolerance for Western ideas will last. There are many countervailing pressures, including a prideful great Russian segment of the intelligentsia that may react against too overt an American "democratization" effort. Most importantly, should this Administration continue to say publicly, as did the last, that human rights are our number one priority in relations with the Soviet Union?

Issue Five: What should be our approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union?

Discussion

The key question is whether the USG needs to liberalize its approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union. Though NSR 3 notes that the volume of U.S.-Soviet trade is not likely to increase dramatically in the next 3-5 years, the Western allies and business communities are looking for signals from the Administration on several issues. No agency is willing to argue for broad and rapid liberalization of our approach; a view held by some in Congress and in the U.S. business community. But Commerce and State believe that the time is approaching when we should take specific decisions in that direction. Defense hopes to hold the line and is even suspicious of expanding non-strategic trade. There is, however, surface consensus on this issue that is hard to crack. We recommend that the NSC discuss the following:

- Should the U.S. do more to encourage non-strategic trade with the U.S.S.R. (e.g., endorsing joint ventures in principle)?

- What should be our approach on: (a) Western export credits to the USSR, and (b) Soviet membership in international bodies such as the GATT and IMF?
- When and under what conditions should the Administration seek waivers for the USSR under Jackson-Vanik and repeal of the Stevenson amendment? Though the agencies argue that the Administration should wait for signals from the American Jewish Community and the Congress on a Jackson-Vanik waiver, many there are waiting for leadership from the Executive Branch. We are in something of a tangle on this issue which should be addressed at the NSC level.
- Should the U.S. ease existing constraints on high technology trade with the USSR (e.g. faster streamlining of COCOM control lists, no exceptions)?

Issue Six: What steps should we take in the near term to regain the initiative and challenge Gorbachev? Is there a role for unilateral U.S. initiatives?

Discussion

The DC felt that NSR 3 failed adequately to address this question and commissioned a PCC paper on near term policy recommendations. The product is very disappointing. So as Bob Gates asked, we have come up with in a very preliminary way the following sets of initiatives that you might raise for discussion with the NSC:

Arms Control

Though military issues will not be discussed at this meeting you may want to mention that NSR 12's tasks examination of the following initiatives:

- Modifying the existing negotiating organizational structure and the existing U.S. position on the linkage between conclusion of a START treaty and resolution of existing Defense and Space Treaty issues.
- Opening negotiations on restricting anti-satellite weapons.
- Offering a ban on MIRVd mobile ICBMs in START, while allowing single-RV mobile ICBMs.
- Offering specific limits on nuclear SLCMs.

- Examining options for reductions in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe which exceed those in the initial Western proposal in the CFE negotiations.
- Preparing options for additional confidence building measures which might be proposed in the East-West context.

Additional initiatives examined beyond these could include:

- An interim agreement among the 23 members of the two alliances to reduce their chemical weapons stocks to residual, lower, declared and equal ceilings, with strict verification both of destruction of the declared stocks and inspection of residual stockpiles.
- Open skies. The United States and the Soviet Union could permit reconnaissance aircraft to fly routine aerial overflights over their respective territories. Opening the U.S. to such inspections would be a big step and would have to be carefully considered by all agencies, especially CIA and JCS. But as Andy Goodpaster put it to Eisenhower, on balance, a closed society always has more to lose from openness than we do. The President may have reservations on this one.
- Regular meetings of the Secretary of Defense-Minister of Defense to discuss long term defense plans. The Ministers could discuss the scope, pace and direction of their defense policies and programs. This would diminish some of the pressure for worst case analysis and, perhaps, give us insight into the impact of perestroika on the Soviet defense effort.

Cooperation in Space

Now that the U.S. space program is back on track, the President could announce a broad "cooperation in space" initiative. He could direct the Space Council to oversee an effort by a blue ribbon team to design a sensible program for cooperation with the Soviets.

We are told that the Soviets are now advanced enough in some limited areas that we could benefit from joint efforts in space. Three potentially useful areas are:

- Life Sciences. Exploring the impact of zero gravity on physiological processes. Exploring the impact of extended space travel on the human body. We have superior medical technology to ensure design of useful experiments and they have valuable data gathered through the extended stays of astronauts above the Mir space station.

- Research on ecological and environmental problems on earth using space as the laboratory. Because the Soviets have so many cheap, small satellites (low-earth orbit) and are able to launch them quickly, a marriage between that capability and our applied earth sciences knowledge would be a good one.
- Robotic research toward an expedition to Mars. The United States is scheduled to launch an unmanned probe toward Mars next year. The Soviets have recently lost both their Phobos experiments but might have useful information to share.

Work has been going on at NASA and there are already low-level bilateral efforts in space cooperation. The problem is that NASA doesn't have the right people to design the experiments to take account of national security/technology transfer concerns. The Space Council, backed by a Presidential initiative, could bring Defense and NASA together to resolve some of these issues.

Economic Relations

The U.S. could propose an expanded program of management training for Soviet executives, a sort of Peace Corps/free enterprise initiative. As the Soviets loosen centralized controls on their economy, they will need more competent managers who understand market principles.

Media Initiative

The United States and the Soviet Union could agree to give the other side one or two hours of programming per month for direct television broadcast. This could be for cultural programming or public affairs/public interest documentaries. Obviously, this would take considerable negotiation on our side with either PBS or the networks but it would extend the concept of the exchange of Presidential messages on New Year's Day begun in the Reagan Administration.

Baker's Trip to Moscow

At some point, we will have to settle how preparation for Baker's 10-11 May Ministerials in Moscow will be managed within the Administration but this is not the meeting in which to do so.

A. Kanter and T. Deal concur.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President
 Tab A Suggested Talking Points
 Tab B Agenda
 Tab C Response to NSR 3
 Tab D List of Participants
Tab II Recommendations Paper

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DATE: April 5, 1989

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

TIME: 3:15 p.m. - 4:15 p.m.

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I. PURPOSE

The NSC will meet to consider the issues raised in National Security Review 3: U.S.-Soviet Relations.

II. BACKGROUND

The review of U.S.-Soviet relations affirms the validity of the approach of the Western alliance since the end of World War II. The pressures of a failing system at home and frustrated policies abroad have caused the Soviet leadership, at least for now, to experiment with new political and economic approaches domestically, and to make important concessions abroad. These circumstances are likely to continue during your Administration and offer the opportunity to make progress toward the resolution of a number of international problems.

NSR 3 concludes that Soviet internal problems are so severe that the leadership will concentrate in the next 3-5 years and perhaps longer on trying to "arrest the internal decline of the Soviet Union." As a result, Moscow is likely to seek a non-confrontational relationship with the United States and the Western alliance.

We have identified five major issues for discussion by the NSC. The agenda of the meeting is at Tab B.

Issue One: Should our strategy be to cooperate with or to pressure the Soviet Union in this period?

The first issue is how to pursue our objectives during this period of Soviet military retrenchment. There is agreement that we should take a cautious approach that seeks changes in Soviet behavior and in Soviet capabilities that Moscow can reverse only at high cost. This consensus disguises two quite different approaches. One would emphasize cooperation and joint efforts to solve international problems during the next 3-5 years. Alternatively, the United States could use this period of Soviet weakness to press its advantages, technologically and economically, seeking to emerge in an even stronger position relative to the Soviet Union at the end of the century.

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Issue Two: How much leverage do we have to influence Soviet external behavior?

The review states that Gorbachev's new approach gives us sources of leverage that we have not had in the past because of Moscow's desire for international legitimacy and positive relations. While all agree that we should make clear to Moscow that actions in one area can affect the overall relationship, there may be disagreement over the value of explicit linkage between various elements of our relationship with the Soviets. This is worth discussing because we have already gone pretty far down this road in linking Soviet behavior in Central America to the general state of relations with Moscow.

Issue Three: Regional Disputes: What regions and on what issues does cooperation with the Soviet Union make sense?

The probable Soviet desire for a less confrontational international environment may produce opportunities to settle a number of regional conflicts. But the Soviets will need to make significant changes in their policies in the Middle East and Central America before cooperative efforts are likely to bear fruit.

As you know, the U.S.-Soviet agenda has been expanded to include global or transnational issues and we will challenge the Soviet Union to join us in fighting the narcotics trade and environmental problems. Some issues, like discussions on terrorism require careful planning so that we do not inadvertently reveal the intelligence sources, methods and operational procedures of the United States or our allies.

Issue Four: How large a dimension should democratization, including human rights, of the Soviet internal system be in our policy?

NSR 3 endorses continued pressure on the Soviet Union to improve human rights. It also recommends the promotion of Western values and ideas through expanding people-to-people, cultural and scientific exchanges. Our ability to affect the course of Soviet internal reform is limited. But to the degree that the Soviet people and even elements of the leadership are ready to look to the West for ideas about free enterprise or democracy we should stand ready to make our experience available to them.

Issue Five: What should be our approach to U.S.-Soviet economic relations?

Though the volume of U.S.-Soviet trade is not expected to expand dramatically in the next 3-5 years, there are public and commercial pressures to liberalize our approach toward

economic relations with the Soviet Union. We need to address the following issues:

- Should the U.S. further encourage non-strategic trade with the U.S.S.R. (e.g. endorsing joint ventures in principle).
- What should be our approach on: (a) Western export credits to the U.S.S.R., and (b) Soviet membership in international bodies such as the GATT and IMF?
- When and under what conditions should the Administration seek waivers for the U.S.S.R. under Jackson-Vanik and repeal of the Stevenson amendment?
- Should the U.S. ease existing constraints on high technology trade with the U.S.S.R. (e.g. faster streamlining of COCOM control lists, revocation of the no exceptions sanction)?

III. PARTICIPANTS

List of participants is at Tab D.

IV. PRESS PLAN

No press plan.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You will open the meeting, perhaps using the suggested talking points at Tab A, and will then turn to me to review the agenda.

Attachments

Tab A	Talking Points
Tab B	Agenda
Tab C	Response to NSR 3
Tab D	List of Participants

Prepared by:
Condoleezza Rice

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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20272 AO

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

- The purpose of this NSC meeting is to consider our policy toward the Soviet Union. Our agenda is to examine five issues raised by National Security Review 3.
- We might also spend a few minutes discussing how to seize and keep the initiative in U.S.-Soviet relations.
- The issues before us are:
- How can we best use the next four years to advance our objectives and those of our allies?
- What leverage do we have over Moscow's external behavior?
- In what regions and on what issues does it make sense to cooperate with Moscow?
- Do we have new opportunities to promote Western values and ideas as the Soviet Union undergoes reform?
- What should be our approach to economic relations with the Soviet Union?
- We cannot compete with Gorbachev headline for headline but now that our review is complete we need to seize the initiative. How can we do that?
- This is an exciting time when carefully crafted policies may allow us to achieve goals that we have pursued since

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the end of World War II. Our postwar policies have been vindicated by the changes taking place in the Soviet Union and in Europe and are in large measure responsible for the historic juncture at which we find ourselves.

-- But it is time to go forward. As we move from the principles established in this review to specific policy decisions over the next few months, we should keep the key judgements of this review in mind.

-- With that background, let me turn to Brent.

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20272

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Wednesday, April 5, 1989

Cabinet Room

3:15 p.m.

SOVIET UNION

Agenda

- I. Introduction.....The President
- II. Assessment of the SituationJudge Webster
in the Soviet Union
- III. Issues for NSC Consideration.....Brent Scowcroft
- IV. Discussion.....All participants
- V. Summary.....General Scowcroft

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 25 NARA, Date 9/10/13

Participants

The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
Chief of Staff to the President
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Plus representatives from the following departments and agencies:

Department of Commerce
Department of Energy
Office of Management and Budget
Central Intelligence Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
U.S. Information Agency
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05f. Paper	U.S.-Soviet Relations National Security Review 3 [missing pages 10 and 11] (29 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Date Closed:	5/13/2011	OA/ID Number:	30542
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NSR 3: Recommended Policies

NSR 3 affirms the strategy and policies the United States has broadly pursued vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the post-war years, both for ourselves and our Allies. Implementation of this affirmed long-term policy approach involves several facets: our long- and short-term objectives, our strategy for achieving them, and the immediate task of implementing our approach. All are critical if we are to build a policy that is comprehensive, stable and sustainable with our Allies and at home.

Long-Term Objectives

Over the next ten years, we should pursue three broad sets of objectives in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Our basic strategic-military objective is to maintain strong modern defenses, strengthen deterrence and enhance the security of the U.S., our Allies and friends. To this end, we should seek ways to transform new Soviet defense concepts, such as a restructuring of the military toward lower force levels and a truly defensive posture, into reality.

In the political-diplomatic area, we should seek to preserve strong ties with our Allies and friends in Europe and Asia, while encouraging Soviet retrenchment in the Third World and greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. We should challenge Moscow to subordinate client relationships to the objective of finding peaceful solutions to regional conflicts and, over the longer term, seek to remove the competitive East-West dynamic from such conflicts. We also want to take advantage of opportunities that arise to expand cooperation in dealing with global issues like terrorism and the environment.

And finally we should seek democratization, that is, genuine reform -- including greater respect for human rights and domestic liberalization institutionalized by law -- within the USSR. We want a Soviet Union that increasingly casts its values and priorities in terms of the quality of life of its peoples rather than expansion abroad, and where there are internal political constraints on the power of the Soviet leadership and party. In the long term, we seek to make cultural, economic and social contacts with the Soviet people flow through private channels, similar to those we have with other countries.

The Overall Strategy

The strategy to achieve these objectives must be multi-faceted: it must be fully consistent with broader U.S. national security objectives; it must be sustainable with our Allies and at home; and it must effectively challenge the

Soviets to move in the directions we seek. Given these requirements, our strategy specifically should:

- Be comprehensive, taking advantage of opportunities to push forward on all elements of the relationship. We should not permit the Soviets to dictate a selective approach, e.g. one limited to arms control and regional conflicts of interest to Moscow. Indeed, the primary weakness of the détente process in the 1970s was that it held out a promise of improved relations without addressing many of the sources of real tension between the U.S. and USSR. Today, with the plurality of views and interests in America concerning the Soviet Union, it is even more important to take a comprehensive approach to relations with Moscow.
- Be grounded in the consistent pursuit of our fundamental interests. The opportunities now facing us are largely the result of U.S. policies of the last forty years and particularly the last eight (e.g. our efforts to modernize our military, restore our economy's vitality, strengthen alliances, and foster democracy and economic growth in the Third World). They will continue to be key components of a successful strategy for dealing with Moscow.
- Be sensitive to Alliance concerns. A coordinated Western approach significantly increases the chances of reaching our goals — and Allied disunity significantly increases the risk of failure. Pursuing a forward-looking policy toward the Soviet Union with well-defined goals is an essential element of U.S. international leadership.
- Be steady and consistent with a long-term perspective. Soviet reform will take many years to play out; progress in our relationship will be gradual and uneven, as the relationship remains largely adversarial and susceptible to crisis. We must be able to handle "bad" as well as "good" Soviet behavior, avoiding overreaction to either that could undermine our long-term aims.
- Inspire confidence in our leadership. We must articulate our objectives and vision of future relations, even as we strengthen our current agenda of our creation that focuses on the real issues and hard work necessary to turn that vision into reality. This means establishing an agenda rooted in solid objectives which we pursue in a consistent manner. This will be essential if we are to keep public expectations realistic.

The five-part agenda (human rights, arms control, regional dialogue and bilateral issues supplemented by global issues) is designed to give specific content to these broad principles and to provide an overall framework for pursuing our strategic-military, political-diplomatic and democratization goals over an extended length of time. Much of Soviet "new thinking" is

still only words. We should continually challenge Gorbachev to back those words with concrete and specific actions that meet U.S. interests. Clear challenges will not only signal to Moscow what actions we want them to undertake, but will also lay down clear milestones by which our publics can judge Soviet behavior. Such challenges are also meant to ensure that we continue to define the agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Short-Term Objectives

In the next 3-4 years, we seek to make significant strides toward the long-term objectives outlined above. Specifically, we should challenge the Soviets on all key elements of our relationship and press ahead in those areas where opportunities to further U.S. interests present themselves. Only in this manner will we be able to "get out front" of Soviet policies. The particular fascination that the world has for Gorbachev because of his perceived bold gambles is an arena in which we should not attempt to compete.

The five-part agenda should guide our policies: it is concrete, it is of our creation, and experience shows that it is an approach that works. It also provides a yardstick by which to judge the success of our policies and the Soviet response to our challenges: by the specifics of the accords that we negotiate; the degree to which the competitive East-West dynamic is removed from regional conflicts and replaced by cooperation; the steps that the Soviet leadership are willing to take to meet our concerns on human rights; and the extent to which measures are implemented that increase transparency in the USSR and contribute to the irreversibility of domestic reform.

The key to asserting U.S. leadership in this area will be the demonstration in both word and deed that we have a sound and realistic policy: one that is forward-looking and does not shrink from the future, but one that also focuses on the concrete steps needed to get us there. Two immediate steps can be taken to this end: U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union should be presented in its totality; and we should reengage with the Soviets on the basis of our agenda as quickly as is appropriate.

Therefore, we would recommend the following in the near-term:

- Complete the review and, in consultation with our Allies, build a consensus in support of our objectives.
- Project its findings, specifically our objectives and overall agenda. A Presidential speech could get the ball rolling.
- Reengage the Soviets and challenge them across the spectrum of issues with specific initiatives that fit our overall agenda and serve U.S. interests.

NSR 3 Near-Term Initiatives

The paper identifies specific possible initiatives that might serve U.S. policy objectives. Agencies disagree on the utility of certain candidates; all would require further work before they could be fleshed out into concrete initiatives. The following simply lists the possibilities; the more detailed discussion is contained in NSR 3.

Strategic-Military (pages 16-19)

- Reengage as soon as appropriate on the full range of issues on the arms control agenda.
- Consider possible new strategic confidence-building measures (CBMs).
- A new chemical weapons (CW) initiative.
- Supplement existing military-to-military contacts by having new "national security" discussions.

Political-Diplomatic (pages 19-24)

- Reengage on the regional conflict dialogue, including a regular cycle of regional experts meetings on such issues as Central America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
- Build Allied agreement to a revamped and forward-looking new stress on NATO as a political alliance devoted to ending the division of Europe through systemic changes in the East.
- Work with our Asian allies to challenge the Soviets by opening the Soviet Far East to international trade and communication.
- Challenge the Soviets to work in practical ways to curb terrorist activities.
- Establish a working relationship with narcotics authorities and implement our bilateral Memorandum of Understanding.
- Challenge the Soviets on such global issues as the environment.

Democratization (pages 24-31)

- Active use of bilateral and high-level dialogue to press the Soviets on human rights, including individual cases.

- Press the Soviets at the Paris human rights conference for follow-through on commitments made regarding Soviet human rights performance.
- Increase the role of inter-parliamentary bodies and non-governmental organizations on human rights; inter-parliamentary contacts; Congressional/CSCE Commission channel; "Rule of Law symposia.
- Promote Western ideas within the USSR: an "Enterprise Initiative" to encourage the development of market institutions in the USSR; promote labor contacts between the two countries; press for reciprocal cultural centers.
- Foster expansion of non-strategic trade, including joint ventures, on strictly commercial terms.
- Work with Allies to seek greater transparency in lending to the East.
- Consider "no exceptions" COCOM policy; work with Allies on streamlining and strengthening export controls.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2381

April 5, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL/ROBERT S. PASTORINO *DRP for*
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RH*
SUBJECT: Privacy Channel Message to Sir Robin Butler

As you requested, we have prepared the attached message from you to Sir Robin Butler concerning the April 4 Arias visit here. At Bob Gates's request, we have added a paragraph on Namibia.

DM
David Miller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the message to Sir Robin Butler at Tab I and authorize its dispatch via White House privacy channels.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab I Message to Sir Robin Butler

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/3/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06b. Message	Brent Scowcroft to Sir Robin Butler RE: [Central America] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Date Closed:	5/13/2011	OA/ID Number:	30542
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8901894
RECEIVED: 21 MAR 89 15

TO: EBERLE, JAMES

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 03 APR 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN
SPEECHES

ANSA

PERSONS: EBERLE, JAMES

SUBJECT: REQUEST SCOWCROFT ADDRESS ROYAL INSTITUTE OF INTL AFFAIRS
DATE OPEN

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR / ACCEPT DUE DATE: 24 MAR 89 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLACKWILL

GANTT

LOWENKRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

DOC 3 OF 3

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8901894

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ZELIKOW
002 SCOWCROFT
003

Z 89032115 PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT
Z 89032320 FOR SIGNATURE
X 89040310 SCOWCROFT SGD LTR / ACCEPT

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 3, 1989

Dear Jim:


Thank you for your letter of December 1 inviting me to address the Royal Institute for International Affairs. I am glad the offer is open ended, given the months that have passed since you extended the invitation.

I am interested in addressing the Institute, if my travel schedule and work load allow me to escape from my in-box. I suggest that we stay in touch, and I will try to give you as much advance notice as possible should the opportunity present itself.

I am glad to hear about the work of the Institute and the solid progress on the European Strategy Group. I hope to see you soon in London so that we can catch up.

Again, many thanks for the invitation and the kind words of support.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

Admiral Sir James Eberle GCB
Director, The Royal Institute of
International Affairs
Chatham House
10 Saint James's Square
London SW1Y 4LE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

1894

March 23, 1989

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Speak at Royal Institute for
International Affairs

Attached at Tab II is a letter from James Eberle, Director of the Royal Institute for International Affairs, inviting you to speak to the institute. The invitation, dated December 1, 1988, is open-ended. You had indicated on the letter that you would consider accepting the invitation. We have drafted a reply to Mr. Eberle conveying your interest in addressing the group at some point in the future, subject to your schedule and travel plans.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Mr. Eberle
TabbII Incoming

cc: Roman Popadiuk

The Royal Institute of International Affairs

Chatham House 10 St James's Square London SW1Y 4LE

Telephone 01 930 2233 Fax 01 839 3593

1894

Patron Her Majesty the Queen

Chairman Christopher Tugendhat

Director Admiral Sir James Eberle GCB

1 December 1988

Dear Brent,

*Reply to BS reply
see his comment
above
by Florence*

My congratulations on your appointment as National Security Adviser. At a time of such rapid developments in the international scene, it is important for the confidence of America's allies and friends in Europe that we have someone of your experience, knowledge, style and background appointed to this vital post in the new Administration.

The work of this Institute is expanding rapidly; and we continue to maintain our position as the leading centre in London for research and discussion on questions of international relations and this includes a very active programme on international security issues. United States policies are, of course, one of our major concerns. We were fortunate enough to have President Reagan as one of our speakers, when he made his valedictory address in London last summer, and we look forward to welcoming senior members of the new Administration.

I would like to extend a ~~very warm invitation to you to come to Chatham House and speak to our members on a subject of your choice should you be visiting London in the coming year.~~ Our meetings are ~~usually held at mid-day, preceded by an informal lunch, or in the evening with a reception beforehand.~~ We ask our speakers to ~~talk for half an hour and take questions and discussion for a further half hour.~~ We can, however, be entirely flexible in our arrangements to fit in with your programme and preferences.

Relating to your former role as a chairman of the Aspen Strategy Group, I hope that you will be pleased to hear that the fledgling European Strategy Group is now gathering strength and should increasingly be able to add a more coherent European contribution to the transatlantic security debate.

Continued.../

9. Royal Institute of International Affairs (Adm Sir
Address members of Royal Inst OPEN
at Chatham House in London
when you are next in London. Yes ___ No ___


Leave for OPEN

- 2 -

Please accept my personal good wishes in the great task that lies ahead of you. I know, of course, that your immediate priorities will lie in getting the new Administration off to a good start. But if and when your 'impossible' diary does allow you to get away from Washington, I do hope you will bear in mind this warm invitation to speak here in London.

With Sincere Regards

Yours,

 Jim Elser.

Director

General Brent Scowcroft
1875 I Street North West
Washington DC 20006
USA

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

2141

ACTION

April 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Berlin Governing Mayor
Walter Momper

Newly elected Berlin Governing Mayor Walter Momper would like to visit Washington in the near future to meet with the President. Momper's office has suggested April 16-19 as preferred dates, or alternatively May 1-3 or May 16-17. Momper also plans initial visits to Paris and London in April or May.

Berlin's importance to U.S. interests needs no elaboration. Momper presides over a "Red/Green" (Social Democrat/Alternative List) coalition that can be expected to challenge Allied rights and prerogatives in and around Berlin. He has nonetheless emphasized his desire to develop close cooperation with the U.S., British, and French Allies in Berlin. It is vitally important that we reinforce these inclinations.

The State Department strongly recommends that the President agree to meet with Momper. We concur, believing this is a "must" for U.S. interests.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab II State Recommendation w/Bio

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
5008-01d7-MR
ES 12/14/09

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2141

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Meeting with Berlin Governing Mayor Walter Momper.

PURPOSE: To establish early and close cooperation with the new Governing Mayor, who presides over a Social Democratic/Alternative List ("Red/Green") coalition that may challenge US and Allied rights in Berlin.

BACKGROUND: Momper seeks an early visit to Washington for a meeting with the President. He also plans initial visits to London and Paris in April or May.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Former Berlin Governing Mayor Diepgen met with President Reagan at the White House in April of 1988.

DATE & TIME: April 16-19;
DURATION: 15-20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Blackwill, Governing Mayor Momper, FRG Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity followed by discussion.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo/writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
A008-0067-112
28 12/14/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



8906314

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2141

CONFIDENTIAL(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

March 27, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request for Berlin Governing Mayor to
Call on the President

Newly elected Berlin Governing Mayor Walter Momper would like to visit Washington in the near future. He wishes to make a brief call on the President to affirm his support for the special role of the United States in Berlin. Momper's office has suggested April 16-19 as preferred dates, or alternatively May 1-3 or May 16-17.

The Department believes that Momper's current and potential political role as well as our broader responsibilities for Berlin make it appropriate and important for him to be received by the President.

As Governing Mayor, Momper is Berlin's most prominent political figure and key to management of our common interests there. He has taken office at a time of dynamic political reorientation in the city and will wield great influence over its direction. At age 44, Momper may seek to parley his role as Berlin Governing Mayor into a national political career, as did Federal President von Weizsaecker and Willy Brandt.

Momper has stressed his desire to develop close cooperation with the U.S., British and French Allies responsible for Berlin's security and viability. The Allies wish to encourage that inclination as Momper's new government defines its agenda. His Social Democrat/Alternative List ("Green Party") coalition can be expected to present challenges to the Allies, some of which may impact on our basic interests in the city.

While central to U.S. interests in Europe in its own right, Berlin also is a fundamental element in our relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany. Momper also will be paying initial calls soon in London and Paris to establish the political foundation and working relationships essential for joint Allied/Berliner cooperation.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)
DECL: OADRDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
8008-0007-MR
ES 3/24/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

- 2 -

The Department strongly endorses an appointment request for Momper during the dates indicated above, if possible, or at a later date convenient to the President's calendar.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Biographic Data on Governing Mayor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(with ~~SECRET~~ attachment)

DECL: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07d. Report	Government report (2 pp.)	3/24/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 5/13/2011	OA/ID Number: 30542
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

20267

April 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: National Security Review 3

The attached paper (Tab A) was tasked at the Deputies Committee meeting on March 28 and is forwarded to you for dispatch to the principals on the Soviet Union Policy Coordinating Committee.

Robert Blackwill *RB* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I which forwards the aforementioned paper to the appropriate addressees.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachment:

Tab I Memorandum to the Agencies
Tab A Paper

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 28 NARA, Date 9/10/13

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

20267

April 3, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CARNES LORD
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MS. EMILY WALKER
Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

MR. FRANK HODSOLL
Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

CAPTAIN ANTHONY MANESS
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Acting Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

MS. ROBERTA RIFKIN
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

Subject: National Security Review 3

Attached at Tab A is a short paper entitled "Recommended Policies" that was tasked at the Deputies Committee meeting on March 28.

G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Tab A Paper

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 28 NARA, Date 9/12/13

NSR 3: Recommended Policies

NSR 3 affirms the strategy and policies the United States has broadly pursued vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the post-war years, both for ourselves and our Allies. Implementation of this affirmed long-term policy approach involves several facets: our long- and short-term objectives, our strategy for achieving them, and the immediate task of implementing our approach. All are critical if we are to build a policy that is comprehensive, stable and sustainable with our Allies and at home.

Long-Term Objectives

Over the next ten years, we should pursue three broad sets of objectives in our relations with the Soviet Union.

Our basic strategic-military objective is to maintain strong modern defenses, strengthen deterrence and enhance the security of the U.S., our Allies and friends. To this end, we should seek ways to transform new Soviet defense concepts, such as a restructuring of the military toward lower force levels and a truly defensive posture, into reality.

In the political-diplomatic area, we should seek to preserve strong ties with our Allies and friends in Europe and Asia, while encouraging Soviet retrenchment in the Third World and greater autonomy in Eastern Europe. We should challenge Moscow to subordinate client relationships to the objective of finding peaceful solutions to regional conflicts and, over the longer term, seek to remove the competitive East-West dynamic from such conflicts. We also want to take advantage of opportunities that arise to expand cooperation in dealing with global issues like terrorism and the environment.

And finally we should seek democratization, that is, genuine reform -- including greater respect for human rights and domestic liberalization institutionalized by law -- within the USSR. We want a Soviet Union that increasingly casts its values and priorities in terms of the quality of life of its people, rather than expansion abroad, and where there are internal political constraints on the power of the Soviet leadership and party. In the long term, we seek to make cultural, economic and social contacts with the Soviet people flow through private channels, similar to those we have with other countries.

The Overall Strategy

The strategy to achieve these objectives must be multi-faceted: it must be fully consistent with broader U.S. national security objectives; it must be sustainable with our Allies and at home; and it must effectively challenge the

Soviets to move in the directions we seek. Given these requirements, our strategy specifically should:

- Be comprehensive, taking advantage of opportunities to push forward on all elements of the relationship. We should not permit the Soviets to dictate a selective approach, e.g. one limited to arms control and regional conflicts of interest to Moscow. Indeed, the primary weakness of the détente process in the 1970s was that it held out a promise of improved relations without addressing many of the sources of real tension between the U.S. and USSR. Today, with the plurality of views and interests in America concerning the Soviet Union, it is even more important to take a comprehensive approach to relations with Moscow.
- Be grounded in the consistent pursuit of our fundamental interests. The opportunities now facing us are largely the result of U.S. policies of the last forty years and particularly the last eight (e.g. our efforts to modernize our military, restore our economy's vitality, strengthen alliances, and foster democracy and economic growth in the Third World). They will continue to be key components of a successful strategy for dealing with Moscow.
- Be sensitive to Alliance concerns. A coordinated Western approach significantly increases the chances of reaching our goals -- and Allied disunity significantly increases the risk of failure. Pursuing a forward-looking policy toward the Soviet Union with well-defined goals is an essential element of U.S. international leadership.
- Be steady and consistent with a long-term perspective. Soviet reform will take many years to play out; progress in our relationship will be gradual and uneven, as the relationship remains largely adversarial and susceptible to crisis. We must be able to handle "bad" as well as "good" Soviet behavior, avoiding overreaction to either that could undermine our long-term aims.
- Instill confidence in our leadership. We must articulate our objectives and vision of future relations, even as we stress a current agenda of our creation that focuses on the real issues and hard work necessary to turn that vision into reality. This means establishing an agenda rooted in solid objectives which we pursue in a consistent manner. This will be essential if we are to keep public expectations realistic.

The five-part agenda (human rights, arms control, regional dialogue and bilateral issues supplemented by global issues) is designed to give specific content to these broad principles and to provide an overall framework for pursuing our strategic-military, political-diplomatic and democratization goals over an extended length of time. Much of Soviet "new thinking" is

still only words. We should continually challenge Gorbachev to back those words with concrete and specific actions that meet U.S. interests. Clear challenges will not only signal to Moscow what actions we want them to undertake, but will also lay down clear milestones by which our publics can judge Soviet behavior. Such challenges are also meant to ensure that we continue to define the agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations.

Short-Term Objectives

In the next 3-4 years, we seek to make significant strides toward the long-term objectives outlined above. Specifically, we should challenge the Soviets on all key elements of our relationship and press ahead in those areas where opportunities to further U.S. interests present themselves. Only in this manner will we be able to "get out front" of Soviet policies. The particular fascination that the world has for Gorbachev because of his perceived bold gambles is an arena in which we should not attempt to compete.

The five-part agenda should guide our policies: it is concrete, it is of our creation, and experience shows that it is an approach that works. It also provides a yardstick by which to judge the success of our policies and the Soviet response to our challenges: by the specifics of the accords that we negotiate; the degree to which the competitive East-West dynamic is removed from regional conflicts and replaced by cooperation; the steps that the Soviet leadership are willing to take to meet our concerns on human rights; and the extent to which measures are implemented that increase transparency in the USSR and contribute to the irreversibility of domestic reform.

The key to asserting U.S. leadership in this area will be the demonstration in both word and deed that we have a sound and realistic policy: one that is forward-looking and does not shrink from the future, but one that also focuses on the concrete steps needed to get us there. Two immediate steps can be taken to this end: U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union should be presented in its totality; and we should reengage with the Soviets on the basis of our agenda as quickly as is appropriate.

Thus, we would recommend the following in the near-term:

- Complete the review and, in consultation with our Allies, build a consensus in support of our objectives.
- Project its findings, specifically our objectives and overall agenda. A Presidential speech could get the ball rolling.
- Reengage the Soviets and challenge them across the spectrum of issues with specific initiatives that fit our overall agenda and serve U.S. interests.

NSR 3 Near-Term Initiatives

The paper identifies specific possible initiatives that might serve U.S. policy objectives. Agencies disagree on the utility of certain candidates; all would require further work before they could be fleshed out into concrete initiatives. The following simply lists the possibilities; the more detailed discussion is contained in NSR 3.

Strategic-Military (pages 16-19)

- Reengage as soon as appropriate on the full range of issues on the arms control agenda.
- Consider possible new strategic confidence-building measures (CBMs).
- A new chemical weapons (CW) initiative.
- Supplement existing military-to-military contacts by having new "national security" discussions.

Political-Diplomatic (pages 19-24)

- Reengage on the regional conflict dialogue, including a regular cycle of regional experts meetings on such issues as Central America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
- Build Allied agreement to a revamped and forward-looking new stress on NATO as a political alliance devoted to ending the division of Europe through systemic changes in the East.
- Work with our Asian allies to challenge the Soviets by opening the Soviet Far East to international trade and communication.
- Challenge the Soviets to work in practical ways to curb terrorist activities.
- Establish a working relationship with narcotics authorities and implement our bilateral Memorandum of Understanding.
- Challenge the Soviets on such global issues as the environment.

Democratization (pages 24-31)

- Active use of bilateral and high-level dialogue to press the Soviets on human rights, including individual cases.

- Press the Soviets at the Paris human rights conference for follow-through on commitments made regarding Soviet human rights performance.
- Increase the role of inter-parliamentary bodies and non-governmental organizations on human rights: inter-parliamentary contacts; Congressional/CSCE Commission channel; "Rule of Law symposia.
- Promote Western ideas within the USSR: an "Enterprise Initiative" to encourage the development of market institutions in the USSR; promote labor contacts between the two countries; press for reciprocal cultural centers.
- Foster expansion of non-strategic trade, including joint ventures, on strictly commercial terms.
- Work with Allies to seek greater transparency in lending to the East.
- Consider "no exceptions" COCOM policy; work with Allies on streamlining and strengthening export controls.



March 30, 1989

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Affairs Advisor
The White House

MS. EMILY L. WALKER
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of the Treasury

COLONEL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MS. SHARON MARSHALL
Assistant to the
Secretary
Department of Agriculture

MR. CRAIG R. HELSING
Chief of Staff
Department of Commerce

MR. DAVID HAUN
Executive Assistant to
the Director
Office of Management and Budget

SUBJECT: National Security Review 3

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. GARY EDSON
Chief of Staff
U.S. Trade Representative

CAPTAIN ANTHONY MANESS
Executive Assistant to
the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. ROBERTA RIFKIN
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency

MR. ARTHUR E. GREEN
Acting Executive Secretary
U.S. Information Agency

Please transmit the attached NSR 3 "Recommendations" paper to principals on the Soviet Union Policy Coordinating Committee by OOB Friday, March 31.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 25 NARA, Date 9/12/13

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS
DECL:OADR

WHITE HOUSE

89 MAR 30 PM : 06

SITUATION ROOM



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 30, 1989

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

TO: NSC: Mr. Robert Blackwill
Treasury/IM: Mr. Thomas Berger
Defense/OSD/ISP: Mr. John Woodworth
USDA/O/SEC: Mr. William Bailey
Commerce/ITA/IEP: Mr. Richard Johnston
CIA/NIO/USSR: Mr. Robert Blackwell
CJCS: Adm. Jon Howe
ACDA/D/EX: Ms. Roberta Rifkin
USIA/EU: Mr. Michael Eisenstadt
USTR: Mr. Andrew Stoler
OMB/IAD: Mr. Rodney Bennet

FROM: Rozanne L. Ridgway, Chairman *RR*
Soviet Union PCC

Attached is a short paper entitled "Recommended Policies" that was tasked at the Deputies' Committee meeting on March 28. It is drawn from NSR 3 and contains little new material; it is due at the NSC at OOB on Monday, April 3.

Please pass any comments to EUR/SOV - Steve Pifer or Karen Puschel (647-9806) by noon Friday, March 31. If you feel that a PCC meeting is required, please let EUR/SOV know and we will schedule a meeting for 4:00 pm on Friday.

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2012-1573-MR
2/25/2014 MM

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with ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
attachment

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2403
Re-do

Chase

April 19, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL NB
FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS RLT
SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Icelandic President
Vigdís Finnbogadóttir

Icelandic President Vigdís Finnbogadóttir will visit the United States May 18-25 to receive an honorary doctorate from Luther College and to tour Icelandic firms in Pennsylvania.

State recommends that the President agree to a photo opportunity with President Finnbogadóttir (Tab II). Although she occupies a largely ceremonial position and does not support U.S. military activity in NATO and at our base in Keflavik, we understand from Philip Hughes that the President has maintained contact with her since his 1983 visit to Iceland and likes her personally.

Arnold Kanter ^{AK} concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal
Tab II Incoming from State

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with ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

2011-0298-F
5/13/11 14

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Photo opportunity, brief meeting with
Icelandic President Vigdis Finnbogadottir

PURPOSE: To generate favorable publicity in Iceland as
we continue negotiations regarding the U.S.
base at Keflavik.

BACKGROUND: President Finnbogadottir will visit the U.S.
May 18-25 to receive an honorary degree from
Luther College and to tour Icelandic firms in
Pennsylvania.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Finnbogadottir met with President Reagan in
the Oval Office in January 1988.

DATE & TIME: The week of May 18-25, preferably May 23-25.
DURATION: 10 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, The Vice President, Governor
Sununu, Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates, Robert
Blackwill, President Finnbogadottir, and
Ambassador Ingvarsson

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity and brief discussion

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open photo/writing pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC

OPPOSED BY: None



8906982

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2403

April 5, 1989

UNCLASSIFIED
(with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Request for a "Photo Opportunity" for Icelandic President Finnbogadottir with President Bush

Icelandic President Vigdis Finnbogadottir will visit the U.S. May 18 - 25 to receive an honorary degree from Luther College and to tour Icelandic firms in Pennsylvania. We believe that a photo opportunity for Finnbogadottir with President Bush would underscore the new Administration's appreciation for our vital defense ties with this strategically located country and help counter vigorous Soviet efforts to weaken Iceland's ties with the U.S. Also, Icelandic governments are very responsive to public opinion which is unusually well informed. A photo op for Finnbogadottir with President Bush would generate extensive favorable publicity and contribute to a positive environment for upcoming discussions on two contentious issues: Iceland's lethal research whaling program and negotiations on how to respond to the contamination of local water supplies by the U.S.-manned NATO base at Keflavik.

J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Biographic information on Finnbogadottir

UNCLASSIFIED
(with CONFIDENTIAL Attachment)

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Report	Government report (1 pp.)	1/15/88	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: April 1989 [5]

Date Closed: 5/13/2011	OA/ID Number: 30542
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information