

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2011-0298-F

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30541
Folder ID Number: 30541-002

Folder Title:
March 1989 [3]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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Redo

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2012-1563-JMR

MJM 11/3/2016

March 27, 1989

3/28/89
1830

Brent -- This seems especially timely given our conversation earlier this evening in connection with unfolding events in Europe and the Soviet Union and U.S. policies thereto. It was a good talk.
Bob Blackwill

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *PB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Background for April 4 Discussion of NSR 4: U.S.-
East European Relations by the NSC

This memorandum apprises you of the findings of NSR 4 and of the urgent need to develop a U.S. policy approach to the region given the rapidly unfolding events in Poland. The memorandum from you to the President at Tab I apprises him of the results of NSR 4 (U.S.-East European Relations) at Tab A, the deliberations of the March 17 DC on the subject and the upcoming issue of a response to Poland should the Roundtable succeed.

The Polish Roundtable is expected to conclude successfully in early April. If agreement is reached, the United States will be expected to respond, especially in light of then Vice President Bush's public promise in 1987 to show financial flexibility in support of political reform in Poland.

More importantly, a Roundtable agreement between Solidarity and the Polish government, supported by the Catholic Church, may be one small, but historic step toward an end to the division of Europe. There is no single issue that matters more, symbolically and practically, to our allies than the reintegration of Eastern Europe into the family of nations. That eventuality has been the goal of 40 years of Western postwar policy, beginning with Roosevelt at Yalta. If we appear to be indifferent to or ineffective in exploiting this opportunity, our role as leader of the Western alliance will be questioned widely, including in this country.

The end of our policy review on Eastern Europe dovetails nicely with the Polish accord but we cannot afford to delay in announcing our policy for this specific case. Our response should be made known within a few days of the announcement of a successful conclusion to the Roundtable. There are three risks if we wait longer: our allies may move out ahead of us; Gorbachev may seek to capitalize on the event, once again leaving us to play catch up; or we may appear to be reacting to pressure from the public and the Congress.

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In short, we think that NSR 4 sets the context for a Presidential initiative on Poland and Eastern Europe of precisely the forward looking kind for which we have been looking. An initiative of this type would require consultation with the Allies and with the Congress. The NSC should, therefore, both urgently review NSR 4 and examine a specific response to Poland as the first manifestation of our new policy toward Eastern Europe. We would be happy to discuss this with you if you wish.

Three issues have emerged from the interagency deliberations on NSR 4: how to respond to change in Eastern Europe; revision of the terms of differentiation as stated in NSDD 54; and whether to open dialogue with Moscow concerning Eastern Europe. The Summary of Conclusions of the DC is appended at Tab II.

Issue: Responding to Change in Eastern Europe

The DC urged revision of NSDD 54, which has guided U.S. policy in the region since 1982. There are essentially two policy options for the United States: go forward with our current supportive, but relatively low key approach to Eastern Europe; or adopt a more visible policy, perhaps including Presidential initiatives. If the second approach is taken, the NSC will need to determine at what level and how aggressively to pursue this course.

Discussion

Is this an "historic" opportunity?

We must first decide whether the events unfolding in Eastern Europe meet our criteria for fundamental political reform. Poland and Hungary are in more advanced stages of reform but the signals that we send will be read by the conservative elites in Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Bulgaria. Romania is a special case.

The confluence of political and economic crises and Soviet tolerance, indeed pressure for reform, has set the stage for potentially dramatic and rapid change in Poland and Hungary. There is some disagreement on how far reaching the reforms will be. Some, for instance, argue that the political reforms coming out of the Roundtable agreement in Poland will be less fundamental than they appear on the surface. While that is objectively possible, it is difficult to imagine the United

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States dismissing a compromise endorsed by the Church, Lech Walesa and Jaruzelski. But caution is warranted because the potential for instability in Eastern Europe leading to reversal and repression of the reform is high.

Obviously, as the region where the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces practice for war, the significance of Central Europe is clear. Moreover, instability and repression in Eastern Europe would have dire consequences for East-West relations and, arguably, for the course of reform in the Soviet Union itself. That the stakes in Eastern Europe are very high is not controversial; the policy implications of that conclusion are. Arguments about a consistent global debt policy, as noted below, expose a view that there are other regions of equal importance, for instance Latin America, and that Eastern Europe does not deserve special treatment.

The dangers of involvement stem largely from the uncertain prospects for successful reform in Eastern Europe. The impact of Western economic assistance could be minimal and the region could explode anyway. We need to brace for reversals and to avoid overselling our policies or overstating our influence. The DC noted that the national security implications of instability in Eastern Europe are underestimated in NSR 4. Our goal is to encourage measured and sustainable reform because we are mindful of the fact that Eastern Europe is the Soviet Union's most important security concern. Yet, if Moscow's grip on the region loosens, the Warsaw Pact could become a less cohesive and responsive military alliance, serving our objective of a diminished threat to the countries of NATO.

If we pursue a more passive policy and the region explodes, we will surely be criticized for inaction. It is worth noting, too, that there will be a Western response; the issue is whether the United States will take the lead. If we do not, our allies, who do not share our views on the priority of political reform, may grant aid unilaterally. This would temporarily remove reformist pressures and allow the regime to postpone, yet again, fundamental political reform.

What tools are available to the United States?

If we decide actively to promote reform in Eastern Europe, economic assistance is probably the West's most powerful weapon. The issue of assisting Eastern Europe economically will be politically contentious, with Treasury diametrically opposed to the European Bureau at State. Current U.S. policy assigns greater weight to economic criteria than political ones in questions of debt relief, in U.S. sponsorship of countries for membership in international economic organizations and in

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extensions of credits. NSDD 54 states, "The U.S. extends debt relief only when necessary as a financial measure to ensure repayment and when the debtor country embarks on a program of economic and financial stabilization." The President needs to decide if that will remain the policy of the Bush Administration.

The arguments against using economic levers to promote political change are good ones. First, Treasury would argue that economic assistance must be tied to fundamental economic reform because, absent that, Western assistance will be wasted. The economic agencies also argue that we must maintain a consistent global debt policy; what we do for Poland, they contend, we must be willing to do for Mexico. Second, there are those who cite limited American resources and point out that the Europeans, particularly the Germans, possess financial clout that we do not.

While sound, these arguments do not address certain political realities. First, in most countries of Eastern Europe, political reform is a precondition for economic reform. Austerity measures cannot be instituted by illegitimate governments and, in Poland for instance, the regime's desire to broaden the political base stems from recognition of that fact. Similarly, while it is true that our financial resources are limited, their monetary value may understate their political weight. In many cases the Europeans, East and West, are looking to the United States to give political signals to international economic institutions like the IMF. It is difficult to imagine that we could take the lead in developing a political strategy that links political reform and economic assistance, without the expenditure of American resources. The issue is how much and what kind of assistance we will need to grant in order to buy into the process.

The U.S. government does not have the capital to extend substantial new money to Eastern Europe. Given the region's dismal record in the 1970s, there would be resistance to such an approach from Congress and the financial agencies.

There are other types of incentives, such as investment guarantees through the Overseas Protection Investment Corporation (OPIC) or the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), that amount to duty free entry of imports for qualifying countries. Revision of the existing legislation governing these programs would be required in order to use them in Eastern Europe. While these incentives could probably be granted more easily than debt relief or credits, protectionist elements in Congress will be suspicious of GSP extension. These economic incentives would have minimal impact on U.S. budget outlays.

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Issue: Whether to redefine the terms of differentiation

Discussion

In consideration of the NSR, the DC supported revision of the terms of differentiation laid out in NSDD 54. Currently, the U.S. differentiates among East European countries on the basis of domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence from Moscow. There is interagency consensus that we should judge East European foreign policies on the basis of U.S. interests rather than solely in reference to Moscow. This would mean making Eastern European technology theft, support for terrorism, and/or intelligence activities factors in our differentiation decisions.

Issue: Whether to place Eastern Europe on the U.S.-Soviet Agenda

Discussion

The DC was united in the view that dialogue with the Soviet Union concerning Eastern Europe is wrought with political and symbolic difficulties. In general, the committee thought that the United States would be courting disaster in discussing the limits of East European reform with the Soviets. Moreover, such discussions would alarm the allies. The United States should continue to treat the countries of Eastern Europe as sovereign nations, particularly at a time when they are seeking and achieving distance from Moscow.

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RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum for the President.

Approve____ Disapprove____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President
 Tab A Response to NSR 4
Tab II Summary of Conclusions

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THE WHITE HOUSE

20246 ao

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: NSR 4/U.S.-East European Relations

The interagency review of U.S.-East European relations that you directed has been completed and is attached at Tab A. The review has identified three issues for your consideration: how to respond to change in Eastern Europe; whether to revise the terms of differentiation; and whether to open dialogue with Moscow concerning Eastern Europe.

This is a fluid period in Eastern Europe. The confluence of political and economic crises in the countries of the region and Soviet tolerance, indeed pressure for reform, has set the stage for potentially dramatic change. Poland and Hungary are in a more advanced stage of reform while Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Bulgaria are resistant to reform, though pressures both from their populations and from Moscow persist.

Political reform seems destined to come first in Poland, where Solidarity and the government may reach an accord in early April. The agreement would, at a minimum, relegalize Solidarity and allow publication of an opposition newspaper and create a second legislative body which the opposition is expected to control through free elections. The regime would maintain a strong hand through a powerful Presidency with responsibility for public order, foreign and defense policy. These noteworthy political reforms would not, however, be matched by fundamental economic restructuring.

If agreement is reached, the U.S. would be asked to respond. This is especially so in light of your pledge in Warsaw in September, 1987, to show financial flexibility if the Poles undertook fundamental political reform. We are developing a set of options for response to the Polish situation for your consideration.

There are difficult choices for the U.S. to make in responding to these rapidly unfolding events in Eastern Europe. If we take a more active course we will need the support of Congress, the American public and our allies. Yet the opportunity before us may be historic. A speech that Dwight Eisenhower delivered in 1953, a month or so after the death of Stalin, is relevant nearly 40 years later. In it he said, "The idea of a just and peaceful

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world is not new or strange to us. It inspired the people of the United States to initiate the European Recovery Program in 1947. That program was prepared to treat, with like and equal concern, the needs of Eastern and Western Europe. We are prepared to reaffirm, with the most concrete evidence, our readiness to help build a world in which all peoples can be productive and prosperous."

The times are different and our resources more limited than in 1947, but our commitment to Roosevelt's objective at Yalta, stated so well by Eisenhower, has never waned. Eisenhower's words reveal an understanding of a crucial fact: Eastern Europe cannot be viewed in isolation, for the peaceful evolution of postwar Europe is inextricably linked to its fate. The division of Europe is at the root of our conflict with the Soviet Union and without its resolution there can be no lasting U.S. rapprochement with Moscow. For our allies, there is no single issue that matters more, symbolically and practically, than the reintegration of Eastern Europe into the family of nations.

Issue One: Responding to change in Eastern Europe

Economic assistance may be the West's most powerful lever to try and affect change in Eastern Europe. American financial resources are limited, but our political influence may be useful in encouraging our allies to tie Western economic assistance to the region to political and economic institutional reform. Major aid packages or the granting of new credits should, in any case, await structural economic reform in Eastern Europe or the money is likely to be wasted.

There are other ways of assisting the East European economies, including investment guarantees by the Overseas Protection Investment Corporation (OPIC) or favorable terms of trade for selected Eastern European products through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), rather than debt relief or new money for credits. All require Congressional action, however, to amend or rescind the legislation governing these programs. Finally, the United States might, within budgetary limitations, expand cultural activities in the region.

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Issue Two: The Terms of Differentiation

Currently, the U.S. differentiates among East European countries on the basis of domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence from Moscow. There is interagency consensus that we should judge East European foreign policies on the basis of U.S. interests rather than primarily in reference to Moscow. This would mean making Eastern European technology theft, support for terrorism, and/or intelligence activities against us factors in our differentiation decisions.

Issue Three: Dialogue with the Soviet Union on Eastern Europe

The Deputies Committee agreed that dialogue with the Soviet Union concerning Eastern Europe is wrought with political and symbolic difficulties. In general, the committee thought that the United States would be courting disaster in discussing the limits of East European reform with the Soviets, though we are, of course, cognizant of the region's vital importance to Moscow. The United States should continue to treat the East European countries as sovereign nations, particularly at a time when they are seeking and achieving distance from Moscow.

Conclusion

We must not overstate our ability to affect change in Eastern Europe and it is important to realize that the path to reform will not be smooth. Moscow's tolerance of continued change is still the key variable. But the glimmer of pluralism that we see in Poland and in Hungary raises our hopes that your Administration can, together with our allies, pursue more actively today than at any other time in the postwar world, steps toward an end to the division of Europe.

Attachment

Tab A Response to NSR 4

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8905175

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

20155

March 10, 1989

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS ATTACHMENT

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MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: National Security Review Number 4:
U.S.-East European Relations

Attached is the final version of National Security Review Number 4 on U.S.-East European relations. We request that the NSC distribute the paper for discussion at the upcoming NSC/DC.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

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2012-1563-MR
MM 8/1/2016

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DECL: OADR

2012-1563-MR 08:33



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

MAR 10 1989

~~SECRET~~/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Executive Secretary
PCC on (Eastern) Europe

FROM: *[Signature]*
Kozanne L. Ridgway, Chairman
PCC on Europe

SUBJECT: National Security Review Number 4
U.S.-East European Relations

Attached is the final version of National Security Review Number 4 on U.S.-East European relations for distribution by the NSC.

Attachment:

As stated

DECLASSIFIED
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2012-1563-MR

MM 8/1/2016

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DECL: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01e. Paper	Executive Summary (32 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: March 1989 [3]

Date Closed: 5/6/2011	OA/ID Number: 30541
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Summary of Conclusions

Deputies Committee Meeting, March 17, 1989

The Deputies Committee met to consider the response to National Security Review (NSR) 4: U.S.-East European Relations. The DC deliberations centered on three issues raised by NSR 4: how to respond to change in Eastern Europe; revision of the terms of differentiation as stated in NSDD 54; and whether to open dialogue with Moscow concerning Eastern Europe.

The participants agreed that this is a period of profound change in Eastern Europe and that NSDD 54, which has guided U.S. policy in the region since 1982, needs to be updated. If the Roundtable negotiations in Poland conclude successfully in early April (as they are expected to do), the U.S. will be asked to respond. This is especially so in light of the pledge, made in 1987 by then Vice-President Bush, to show financial flexibility when and if the Poles undertook fundamental political reform.

The group discussed the implications of the changes in the region for U.S. policy. There are essentially two policy options; go forward with our current supportive, but relatively low key approach to the region; adopt a more visible policy, perhaps including Presidential initiatives. If the second approach is taken, the NSC will need to determine at what level and how aggressively to pursue this course. The goal of our policy must be to encourage peaceful transition and we must keep in mind the national security implications of instability in Eastern Europe.

The DC discussed the tools available to the United States to affect change in the region. American financial resources are limited but most agreed that our political influence may be useful in helping to shape the response of our allies, ensuring, for instance, that economic assistance to Eastern Europe be tied to political reform. There was general consensus that we should be careful in encouraging the IMF and the World Bank to make exceptions for Eastern Europe unless the countries entered into programs of economic restructuring. It was noted that some of the austerity measures required by international financial institutions could lead to political instability in Eastern Europe, however.

The participants believe that the East Europeans will seek debt relief and it was noted that a high percentage (\$27 of \$39 billion) of the Polish debt is owed to governments. Though this gives the Paris Club considerable control, the participants were generally wary of major initiatives on the Polish debt. Some asked whether Eastern Europe warranted more sympathetic economic treatment than Latin America.

Other ways of assisting the East European economies were also considered, including investment guarantees by the Overseas Protection Investment Corporation (OPIC) or favorable terms of trade for selected Polish products through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) rather than debt relief or new money for credits. If the Polish Roundtable succeeds there may be domestic support for change in the extant legislation that governs OPIC and GSP. The participants agreed that the United States should, within budgetary limitations, expand its cultural activities in Eastern Europe.

The DC considered revision of the terms of differentiation as laid out in NSDD 54. Currently, the U.S. differentiates among East European countries on the basis of domestic liberalization and foreign policy independence from Moscow. The latter criterion may no longer be appropriate, however, since the East Europeans may undertake policies that, while different from Moscow's, are not supportive of U.S. interests. The DC agreed that we should judge East European foreign policies on the basis of U.S. interests rather than in reference to Moscow. This would mean making Eastern European technology theft, support for terrorism, and/or intelligence activities factors in our differentiation decisions.

The DC was united in the view that dialogue with the Soviet Union concerning Eastern Europe is wrought with political and symbolic difficulties. In general, the committee thought that the United States would be courting disaster in discussing the limits of East European reform with the Soviets. Moreover, such discussions would alarm the allies. The United States should continue to treat the East Europeans as sovereign nations, particularly at a time when they are seeking and achieving distance from Moscow.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Robert Gates RE: NSR 3: U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations (8 pp.)	3/27/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: March 1989 [3]

Date Closed: 5/6/2011	OA/ID Number: 30541
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2011-0298-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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S/S 8905176
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

20158

March 10, 1989

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: National Security Review No. 3: U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached is the final version of National Security Review no. 3 on U.S.-Soviet relations. We request that the NSCS distribute the paper for discussion at the upcoming NSC/DC.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

88:33
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2012-1562-MR
7/12/2013 MM



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

MAR 10 1989

MEMORANDUM

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Executive Secretary
Soviet Union PCC

FROM: *[Signature]*
Rozanne L. Ridgway, Chairman
Soviet Union PCC

SUBJECT: National Security Review No. 3:
U.S.-Soviet Relations

Attached is the final version of National Security Review
no. 3 on U.S.-Soviet relations for distribution by the NSCS.

Attachment:

As stated

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2012-1562-MR
7/12/2013 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Paper	U.S.-Soviet Relations National Security Review 3 (31 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: March 1989 [3]

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20242 a/o

DEPUTIES COMMITTEE MEETING
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
Tuesday, March 28, 1989
White House Situation Room
11:00 a.m.

NSR-3 (POLITICAL AND SECURITY ASPECTS)

Agenda

- I. Intelligence AssessmentRichard J. Kerr
- II. Review of Policy Recommendations.....Robert M. Kimmitt
- III. Policy Issues for NSC Consideration.....Robert M. Gates

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12/2/2014 MM

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

24 MAR 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE PCC MEMBERS

SUBJECT: NSR-12 PART I

Attached is the final draft of Part I of NSR-12. Please notify my office (695-6607) by COB Friday, March 24, if you have any significant reservations or objections to this draft. Otherwise, we will consider this document ready for submission to the NSC Deputies Committee.


Paul Wolfowitz

Attachment

Classified by: NSC
Declassify on: OADR

Upon removal of attachment this
document becomes ~~Confidential~~

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2012-1562-MR

4/28/2014 MM

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02g. Report	Response to National Security Review #12 Fourth Draft (38 pp.)	3/23/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: March 1989 [3]

Date Closed: 5/6/2011	OA/ID Number: 30541
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2004

ACTION

March 27, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: ROBERT L. HUTCHINGS *RKH*

SUBJECT: Letter from Congressman Thomas Coleman

Attached at Tab I is a letter for your signature expressing appreciation for Congressman Coleman's Congressional Study Group on Germany and thanking him for sending a copy of the Group's first newsletter.

Ginny Lamprey *GL* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Congressman Coleman.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Congressman Coleman
Tab II Incoming Letter from Coleman

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Congressman Coleman:

Thank you for your letter of March 16 and the copy of the first newsletter issued by your Congressional Study Group on Germany.

I share your view that U.S.-West German relations are of the highest importance to our common security and common values. The advent of a new generation of political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic makes a group like the one you chair both timely and crucial. Publication of a newsletter will also assist in the critically important task of informing the American and German publics on the values that bind our two countries.

I commend you for your effort and look forward to working with you toward the further strengthening of the U.S.-West German partnership.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable E. Thomas Coleman
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

2004 *Letter for 195 reply*

E. THOMAS COLEMAN

8TH DISTRICT, MISSOURI

COMMITTEES:
AGRICULTURE

SUBCOMMITTEES:
CONSERVATION, CREDIT, AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT, VICE CHAIRMAN
DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS, RESEARCH
AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURE

EDUCATION AND LABOR

SUBCOMMITTEES:
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION, RANKING
HUMAN RESOURCES

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515

March 16, 1989

WASHINGTON OFFICE:

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KANSAS CITY, MO 64116
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POST OFFICE AND FEDERAL BUILDING
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(816) 364-3900

MAR 23 1989

General Brent Scowcroft
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear General Scowcroft:

As Chairman of the Congressional Study Group on Germany, I am pleased to send you a copy of our first newsletter which we will publish quarterly.


The basic purpose of the Study Group is to foster understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. We do this primarily through programs that bring together Members of Congress and their counterparts in the Bundestag.

Although the Study Group is relatively new, it has already been recognized by leaders on both sides of the Atlantic as providing an important new dimension to the relationship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Underlying our purpose is the belief that U.S.-West German relations are critical to the Western alliance. We believe that this relationship must be built on sound political and economic ties and anchored to the common values held by the peoples of both nations. Although we recognize the signal importance of our mutual security, the Study Group's activities reflect the broader interests of our more than 80 Members of Congress.

I look forward to working with you and the White House as we attempt to strengthen the bond between the United States and West Germany.

Sincerely,



E. THOMAS COLEMAN
Member of Congress

100-24:44



The Newsletter Of

The U.S. Congressional Study Group On Germany



March, 1989

Volume 1, Number 1

Study Group Fosters Understanding

The United States Congressional Study Group on Germany (CSGG), after completing a variety of programs in 1988, enters its second year with a full agenda of 1989 activities to generate a better understanding between our two nations.

"The Study Group got off to an excellent beginning last year," said Congressman Tom Coleman of Missouri, chairman of the group. "This year, we want to institutionalize it further as an important element in U.S.-German relations. We want to encourage full participation by current Study Group members, and urge other Members of the House of Representatives to consider joining the study group."

Originally organized in 1987, the group's activities are underwritten by a grant from the German Marshall Fund. The CSGG is a bipartisan group dedicated to facilitating better understanding and greater cooperation between the Congress of the United States and the German Bundestag.

Congressman Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana served as the group's first Chairman. Other founding members were Congressmen Coleman; David Price,



Special Guests

Study Group Chairman Tom Coleman (at left), meets Dr. Rita Süßmuth, President of the German Bundestag, and Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus. President Süßmuth visited Congress as a part of Study Group activities.

North Carolina; Doug Bereuter, Nebraska; Bob Livingston, Louisiana; Thomas Petri, Wisconsin; Bill Richardson, New Mexico; and Doug Walgren, Pennsylvania.

As 1989 chairman, Congressman Coleman oversees an organization which has 81 members.

"Several members of the Bundestag and diplomatic corps tell me the West German leadership sees the CSGG as a very significant, positive development in relations between our two nations," Coleman observed.

The group provides a forum

for contacts between Members of Congress and the Bundestag. It encourages the exchange of ideas and information on economic, security, trade, agriculture and other policies.

"The CSGG expands mutual understanding through visits to members' constituencies in Germany and in the United States; through seminars in Europe and the United States, and through other nonpartisan meetings for its membership," said Congressman Coleman.

U.S. Elections Observed

In 1988, the CSGG played a

See VISITS, Page 4

From the Chairman

Study Group Links Bundestag, Congress

By Tom Coleman
Chairman
Congressional German Study Group

As the Study Group enters its second year, I want to thank Congressman Lee Hamilton who as our first chairman provided the leadership so essential during the initial year of any organization. To Lee, the other founding Members and to Jed Johnson, who as Executive Director of the Association of Former Members of Congress administers our German Marshall Fund grant, I express my deep appreciation and look forward to their continued support and wise counsel.

In 1989 we will be working to institutionalize our efforts. This first edition of our quarterly newsletter is an important step toward putting down those roots. Its purpose will be to highlight the Study Group's activities and to chronicle its central objective: to promote effective communications between fellow parliamentarians of our two nations.

Indeed, maintaining and promoting open and frank dialogue between the Federal Republic of Germany and ourselves is now more important than ever. Recent events have raised difficult issues between us that require careful discussion and comprehensive understanding on both sides. Burden sharing, sales to Libya, joint military exercises, Europe 1992, nuclear modernization and the rapidly changing climate of East-West relations in the Gorbachev era are but a few of the critical issues that face us.

We recognize that international relationships are fluid rather than static, and that the U.S.-German relationship cannot be an exception. Our ability to maintain our friendship and mutual respect during this period of rapid change may be determined to a great extent by our nations' elected

legislative bodies. The Congressional Study Group and our counterpart in the Bundestag can play a significant role as we meet challenges and seize the opportunities presented by these changes.

I believe the Study Group is uniquely positioned to strengthen the bonds between our two great nations and to foster the personal relationships from which our national policies will flow.



Missouri Congressmen Harold L. Volkmer and Tom Coleman meet West German Economics Minister Dr. Helmut Haussmann at a reception hosted by the Congressional Study Group on Germany.

Ambassador Supports Study Group's Mission

Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus says the Congressional Study Group on Germany "demonstrates the great interest" Americans share with West Germans in enhancing relations between the two nations.

He praised the Study Group for its diversified membership, and offered it his support.

"The group, though founded little more than a year ago, has already grown to include more than 80 members of the House of Representatives and draws its membership from nearly every House committee," said Ruhfus in a recent statement. He noted that this growth "demonstrates the great interest German-American relations find in Congress."

Germans appreciate the role the Study Group plays as a forum for discussion between Members of Congress and their counterparts in the Bundestag, he said.

"At a time of very close cooperation between the administrations of our two nations, the Study Group adds a useful and important political dimension," added the Ambassador.

Close contact between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany "on all levels" is an "indispensable prerequisite for a deep understanding between our peoples," said Ruhfus.

"Remarkable to me is the fact the Study Group's membership is not limited to foreign policy experts. The Study Group's membership represents nearly all the House committees. Thus a wide variety of far-reaching questions and issues can be raised between parliamentarians of our two countries," he said.

Besides the frequent discussions on foreign policy and secu-

rity matters, the group last year "had a productive meeting with Bundestag members on agricultural questions.

"And as a result of those meetings, environmental and scientific problems will figure on the 1989 agenda," said Ruhfus.

"Our friendship is built on a

mutual understanding of each other's interests. This understanding will help us overcome any strains in our relations," said Ruhfus, who also promised that the West German Embassy "will do anything it can" to help the Study Group continue its mission.



Egon Bahr (right), Social Democratic Party member of the German Bundestag, visits with Matthew F. McHugh of New York. Bahr addressed members of the Study Group on Germany at a luncheon in the Capitol. Bahr chairs the Bundestag Subcommittee on Disarmament and Arms Control.



Dr. Wolfgang Pordzik, Director, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, makes a point with Congressman Robert J. Lagomarsino of California during a recent reception for Economics Minister Dr. Helmut Haussmann hosted in the Capitol by the Congressional Study Group on Germany.

Visits

Continued From Page One

key role in improving understanding of the electoral process of the United States; showed members of the Bundestag the strengths of American agriculture, and hosted Bundestag members during a celebration of German-American Day in October.

A Bundestag delegation visited Iowa during the presidential caucuses and another delegation went to Illinois to view the Illinois primary as a part of their efforts to understand the American political system.

The goal of these visits was to broaden understanding in Western Germany of the process the United States uses in selecting its candidates for President.

Agriculture, Environment Exchange

Members of the Bundestag who oversee agricultural policies and programs recently met with members of the House Agriculture Committee and later toured American agricultural facilities.

The goal was to show West German agriculture experts the

variety and resilient strength of the American agricultural system.

As a result of these meetings, members of the German Bundestag with expertise in environmental issues have planned a meeting with American Congressmen to discuss the environment and related issues.

German-American Day

On October 6, the Study Group hosted a Bundestag delegation that came to Washington as a part of German-American Day. Also, Bundestag members who are experts on defense and national security issues met with their counterparts on the Armed Services Committee. As a result, another meeting has been scheduled to discuss mutual defense and security issues.

CSGG Meet Bundestag President, Economics Minister

Thus far in 1989, the Study Group hosted the President of the Bundestag, Dr. Rita Süßmuth, and the German Economics Minister, Dr. Helmut Haussmann. While in Washington, Frau President Süßmuth and

Minister Haussman discussed issues raised by the apparent involvement of a West German company in providing Libya with resources and technology needed to build a plant capable of producing chemical weapons.

They also discussed defense and economic issues important to both countries.

Joining The CSGG

Any Member of Congress with an interest in broadening and fostering positive relations between the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Congress of the United States may join the Congressional Study Group on Germany. Membership in the Congressional Study Group is free.

Plans are now being made to commemorate the 40th anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany with ceremonies in Washington at the end of May.

For membership information, contact the office of Tom Coleman, Chairman of the U.S. Congressional Study Group on Germany, 2468 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. The telephone number is (202) 225-7041.

**U.S. Congressional Study Group on Germany
2468 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 24, 1989

Dear Christine:

Many thanks for your excellent paper on the outlook for the Greek elections. This kind of quick, to-the-point analysis helps immensely.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'RDB', written over a horizontal line.

Robert D. Blackwill
Assistant to the President
and Senior Director, European
and Soviet Affairs

Ms. Christine Williams
Chief, West European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
Room 6G-28
Central Intelligence Agency

cc: George Kolt, D/EURA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

1090

March 23, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT B. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: RUDOLF V. PERINA *RP*
SUBJECT: Request for Article in Mediterranean Quarterly

Robert Pranger of Howard University has written you two letters requesting an article by you for a new journal, Mediterranean Quarterly, due to start publication in September (Tab II).

We think that any articles by you merit more established journals, and that you should send Pranger a polite regret.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter of regret at Tab I.

_____ Approve _____ Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Pranger
Tab II Incoming from Pranger

cc: Roman Popadiuk

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bob,

Many thanks for your letters suggesting that I contribute an article to your new journal, Mediterranean Quarterly. I appreciate the invitation to be included in the inaugural issue.

Unfortunately, I think I am not ready to engage in publishing at this time, and my work will keep me more than occupied for the foreseeable future. I know your journal will be a first-rate one, however, and I look forward to seeing the first issue.

With best wishes to you and the Mediterranean Quarterly,

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Robert Pranger
Visiting Professor
Department of Political Science
Howard University
Washington, D.C. 20059

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20059

COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

March 1, 1989

1090

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

On February 17 I wrote you a letter raising the possibility that you might wish to contribute something to our first issue of Mediterranean Quarterly scheduled for publication in late September. This might be a written essay or an interview, as I noted. You have been in the Far East with the President and so I've been reluctant, even after your return, to get back to your office about this. In any event, I now have another suggestion.

My letter of February 17 suggested certain key issues on the future of NATO, but I am now thinking that perhaps the President, yourself and others in the administration would be interested in publishing a more comprehensive strategic/foreign policy statement, if not a "doctrine," by the Fall of this year, and that a new journal such as ours, with strong southern Europe connections, might be an ideal vehicle for this. The first presidential doctrine of the post-war, the Truman Doctrine, was specifically related to the Mediterranean/Southern Europe region, but had much wider ramifications. Now there are some who argue that the Cold War has ended. What has happened and what has changed between the Truman and Bush presidencies, and where are we headed?

For September publication it would be good to have any manuscript by late June, but we would, of course, hold everything just to get something like this from you. I have some ideas that might be useful about how to approach this myself. Would it be possible for you or someone on your staff to get back to me about this idea? If I don't hear from your office in the next two weeks, I'll call your secretary. I can be reached at Howard University, 636-6720, or at home, 966-0850.

I hope you'll be interested in this idea. Please accept my best wishes for your demanding tasks.

Sincerely yours,

Bob Pranger

Robert J. Pranger
Visiting Professor

HOWARD UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20059

COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 636-6720/6847

Handwritten: Done for
recomm. letter
& reply by BS
FEB 21 1989
1090

February 17, 1989

Handwritten: by F. Lorenz

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

In a letter I sent you on December 15 congratulating you on your appointment as Assistant to the President for National Security, I raised the possibility that you might do something for our new journal, Mediterranean Quarterly, which will have its first issue in September of this year. As was suggested in the earlier letter, we would love to have a 15- or 20-page essay by yourself on the "Future of Alliances" that would deal not only with NATO but the Warsaw Pact. I also noted, however, that with your demanding duties in the White House, you might wish to simply sit down with David Binder and myself to discuss some key issues sometime before August 1.

Some examples of key issues in alliance future are the following: (1) NATO's own review of "comprehensive" concepts or strategy, supposedly to be finished by mid-year; (2) the effect of Gorbachev's initiatives on the Western alliance; (3) trends in the Warsaw Pact in both military policy and alliance cohesion; and (4) NATO's southern flank and broader Mediterranean outlook.

Perhaps you would find it easier if only you and I discussed these questions informally and on-the-record before August 1, and we simply carried the results (which you would edit/amend of course) in the September/Fall issue as an interview by the journal's executive editor.

I realize you are terribly busy, but I think many would find it highly interesting to read your own strategic world view in a new journal. Of course, the topics that might be covered could go well beyond the four listed above, as you wish.

Please accept my congratulations again.

Sincerely yours,

Handwritten signature: Bob Pranger
Robert J. Pranger
Visiting Professor; and
Executive Editor,
Mediterranean Quarterly