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Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files

OA/ID Number: 30540
Folder ID Number: 30540-002

Folder Title:
January-February 1989 [2]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

0178

January 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB/RS*

FROM: RUDOLF V. PERINA *RP*

SUBJECT: Letter from Ambassador Arthur Hartman Regarding
Armenian Relief Benefit at Carnegie Hall

Ambassador Arthur Hartman has asked the First Lady to be Honorary Co-Chairperson of an Armenian Relief Benefit to be held at Carnegie Hall on February 21 (Tab II). The First Lady's office has urgently asked for an NSC recommendation. At Tab I is a memorandum conveying our views.

NR/RS
Nicholas Rostow concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to Susan Porter at Tab I.

Approve_____ Disapprove_____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum for Susan Porter

Tab II Ambassador Hartman's Letter to Mrs. Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0178

January 27, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR SUSAN PORTER ROSE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter from Ambassador Arthur Hartman Regarding
Armenian Relief Benefit at Carnegie Hall

We have reviewed the information sent to the First Lady by Ambassador Arthur Hartman regarding the February 21st Carnegie Hall Benefit. The Armenian earthquake was a tragedy of exceptional magnitude, and the First Family has already been personally involved through the visit of the First Lady's son and grandson. We thus see no political objection to the First Lady serving as Honorary Co-Chairperson, providing that Mrs. Gorbachev does likewise. Attendance at the event would not be necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1989

TO: BOB PERITO
FROM: JULIE COOKE *JC*
Director of Projects for Mrs. Bush

Per our conversation, attached is the letter to Mrs. Bush from Ambassador Hartman, conveying an invitation on behalf of the Metropolitan Opera for Mrs. Bush to serve as Honorary Co-Chairman with Mrs. Gorbachev of a benefit for Armenian Relief (proceeds going to the American Red Cross) at Carnegie Hall on February 21, 1989.

We would appreciate comments/recommendation.

Thank you.

*P.S. - We would not expect that
Mrs. Bush would attend -
is it appropriate from your
viewpoint to lend her name?*

*Staff to Blackwell
Penna*

*Meed Scowcroft/Susan Porter
Rose with recommendation.
Mark it URGENT.*

APCO
ASSOCIATES
THE ARNOLD & PORTER CONSULTING GROUP

January 18, 1989

Mrs. Barbara Bush
c/o Ms. Lea Uhre
Room 268
Old Executive Office Building
17th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Barbara:

I have been asked by Jane Herman of the Metropolitan Opera and Vartan Gregorian, President of the New York Public Library, to find out if you would be prepared to lend your name as Honorary Co-Chairperson for an Armenian Relief Benefit to be held at Carnegie Hall in New York on February 21, 1989. Your doing so would be conditioned on Ambassador Dubinin obtaining Mrs. Gorbachev's approval to serve as Honorary Co-Chair with you.

This will be a stellar evening with leading Soviet and American performers. (There would be no commitment to attend.) To keep out of politics (both intra-Armenian and U.S.-Soviet) contributions and ticket sale proceeds would be made payable to the American Red Cross for Armenian relief.

I apologize for the haste of this note and to bother you in these busy days but we will have to get the publicity out quickly. Your staff can call Jane Herman at the Metropolitan Opera for details (212) 779-3100.

Donna sends love and all our best wishes to you both.

Sincerely,



Arthur A. Hartman

APCO
ASSOCIATES
THE ARNOLD & PORTER CONSULTING GROUP

January 18, 1989

His Excellency
Yuri Dubinin
Ambassador
Embassy of the USSR
1125 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005

Dear Yuri:

Your assistant David suggested that I put the following in writing so that you would have it for the record. Jane Herman of the Metropolitan Opera and Vartan Gregorian of the Opera Board and head of the New York Public Library have made the following arrangements for the Armenian Benefit:

1. It will take place on February 21 at Carnegie Hall in New York.
2. They are putting together the Honorary Committee of leading Americans. They want the Honorary Chairpersons to be Mme. Gorbachev and Mrs. Bush. (I am asking Mrs. Bush today.) Jane would like you to ask Mrs. Gorbachev. They would like agreement in time for an advertisement in the New York Times Sunday edition - January 22.
3. They also would appreciate it very much if you and your wife would agree to be on the inviting committee. (No work involved.)
4. To keep the evening out of politics (both intra-Armenian and U.S.-Soviet) they will ask that checks be made out to the American Red Cross to assure tax deductibility. They will arrange in any way you want for you to have publicity giving the check to the Red Cross so that it will be clear it is your initiative. (This is what is being done at Covent Garden in London.)

His Excellency
Yuri Dubinin
January 18, 1989
Page Two

5. Vladimir and Wanda Horowitz have agreed to be honorary artistic directors and to help recruit performers - both U.S. and Soviet. Jane has already lined up singers like Placido Domingo. She is trying to get Van Cliburn. She would like your help in getting Mme. Obrasova, MM. Richter, Buchaladze, young Kissen and a dancer who would have to be here at least four days in order to rehearse.

This is where the planning now stands. I suggest that you designate someone on your staff to deal with Jane Herman at the "Met." Her telephone number is (212) 799-3100.

With all best wishes.

Sincerely,



Arthur A. Hartman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

TIME STAMP

89 JAN 27 P 3: 47

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 0178

ACTION OFFICER: Blackwill DUE: ASAP

- ☐ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates ☐ Appropriate Action
- ☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- ☒ Prepare Memo Scowcroft to Susan Porter Rose

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5712

- FYI
- ☐ Addis
- ☐ Beers
- ☐ Blackwill
- ☐ Brintnall
- ☐ Brooks
- ☐ Burns
- ☐ Childress
- ☐ Cohen
- ☐ Curtin
- ☐ Donley
- ☐ Ebner
- ☐ Farrar
- ☐ Grant
- ☐ Grimes
- ☐ Heiser
- ☐ Henhoeffer

- FYI
- ☐ Kelly
- ☐ Kimberling
- ☐ Lampley
- ☐ Leach
- ☐ Lewis
- ☐ Lowenkron
- ☐ Mahley
- ☐ McCue
- ☐ Melby
- ☐ Menan
- ☐ Miller
- ☐ Miskel
- ☐ Onate
- ☐ Paal
- ☐ Pastorino
- ☒ Perina

- FYI
- ☐ Popadiuk
- ☐ Porter
- ☐ Rodman
- ☐ Rostow
- ☐ Saunders
- ☐ Snider
- ☐ Tahir-Kheli
- ☐ Tice
- ☐ Tobey
- ☐ Wiant
- ☐ Working
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____

URGENT

INFORMATION ☐ Staff Secretary
☐ Scowcroft (advance)

☒ Perito
☐ Gates (advance)

☒ Secretariat
☐ Exec. Sec. Desk

COMMENTS

Logged By JP

Return to Secretariat

THE WHITE HOUSE

0093

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH:

ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM:

RUDOLF V. PERINAR *RP*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Meeting with Armenian
Catholics Vazgen I, February 9, 1989

At Tab I is a schedule proposal requesting a 10 minute meeting between the President and Catholicos Vazgen I, the spiritual head of the Armenian Church. The Catholicos is visiting the United States to thank Americans for their assistance following the December earthquake. The Catholicos met with Jeb Bush and his son, George, when they visited Armenia after the earthquake. During the Catholicos' previous visit to the United States, in 1987, he was received by President Reagan. We believe a short meeting with the President would be appropriate in view of the President's personal involvement in the Armenian relief effort. The State Department also recommends a meeting (Tab II).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Schedule Proposal

Tab II State Recommendation

THE WHITE HOUSE

0093

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REQUEST: Brief meeting with Catholicos Vazgen I,
spiritual head of Soviet Armenian church.

PURPOSE: To show President's personal involvement in
Armenian earthquake relief effort and thank
the Catholicos for hospitality given to
President's son and grandson in Armenia.

BACKGROUND: The Catholicos is visiting the U.S. to thank
Americans for post-earthquake assistance. He
met with the President's son and grandson
during their visit to Armenia.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None, but the Catholicos was received by
President Reagan during his previous visit to
the U.S. in 1987.

DATE AND TIME: February 9, 1989, preferably before 3:00 p.m.

DURATION: 10 minutes.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, the Vice President, Chief of
Staff, National Security Advisor, Marlin
Fitzwater; NSC staff member (notetaker);
Catholicos Vazgen I, one or two accompanying
guests.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo Opportunity followed by brief meeting.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer; open press.

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC and State.

OPPOSED BY: None.



Washington, D.C. 20520

0093

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

January 24, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment Request: Catholicos Vazgen I

Attached is a copy of a memorandum to Donald P. Gregg sent on January 18. The New York Armenian Diocese is in the final stages of planning the Catholicos' schedule and is pressing for a reply.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As Stated

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 18, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD P. GREGG
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

NP

Subject: Appointment Request: Catholicos Vazgen I

The Armenian Catholicos, Vazgen I, spiritual head of the Armenian church, will come from the Soviet Union to the United States February 3-11. The purpose of his visit is to coordinate future U.S. relief efforts for earthquake victims in Soviet Armenia and to thank the American people for their generosity. This was the first time on record that the U.S. has aided the USSR in coping with a natural disaster and the only time since World War II that the Soviets have accepted an offer of U.S. assistance. The Catholicos last visited the U.S. in November, 1987, when he met with President Reagan. The Catholicos also met Jeb Bush and his son George during their recent visit to the disaster area on December 25.

The Catholicos will be in New York February 3-8 to meet with representatives of major Armenian-American organizations (there are approximately 1 million Armenian-Americans) as well as with representatives of Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups and representatives of private charitable organizations to discuss future relief efforts and to organize a national committee to coordinate U.S. relief work. The Catholicos also hopes to lead an ecumenical memorial service in New York, possibly at St. Patrick's Cathedral.

The Catholicos will be in Washington February 9 and has expressed his desire, through Archbishop Manogian of the New York Armenian Diocese and Appeal of Conscience Foundation, to meet with the President. He also hopes to meet with the Secretary of State.

Recommendation

Given the political significance of U.S. earthquake relief and Catholicos Vazgen's role, we recommend that the President-Elect agree to a brief call by Catholicos Vazgen I on February 9 at 3:00 p.m.

Melvyn Levitsky

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Biographic information.

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VAZGEN I
(Phonetic: VAEighen)

Catholicos of Echmiadzin,
Supreme Patriarch of All Armenia

Addressed as: Your Holiness

Catholicos Vazgen I, the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, has been a visible figure during the year-long unrest in Armenia and especially since the recent earthquake there. His 14 December meeting with Soviet Premier Ryzhkov and Armenian Party First Secretary Arutyunyan to discuss ethnic strife was highly publicized in the local and national press. In July Vazgen addressed the Armenian people on television to try to calm them in the wake of violent protests against the neighboring Azerbaijanis.

Vazgen was born Levon Karapet Palchyan on September 1908, in Bucharest, Romania. Vazgen graduated from the Philosophy and Literature Faculty of Bucharest University in 1936. He then taught in Armenian schools in Bucharest until 1943, when he took monastic vows and studied theology at Bucharest University. Vazgen was ordained and later elevated to archimandrite (one rank below a bishop), a position that he held until his consecration as bishop in 1951. He headed the Armenian eparchies in Romania and Bulgaria until 1954. He was then elected a member of the Supreme Theological Council of the Armenian Church in Echmiadzin. In September 1955 he was elected Catholicos of All Armenians.

The Armenian Apostolic Church -- which is sometimes known as the Gregorian Church from the name of its first Catholicos, Grigoriy Partev -- is one of the oldest Christian churches and has become a part of the cultural heritage of Armenia. In contrast to the Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches, the Armenian Apostolic Church is Monophysite because it acknowledges the divinity and humanity of Christ within a single nature.

While living in Romania, Vazgen visited Armenia five times between 1945 and 1954; he published his impressions from these trips in 1954 in a book entitled Under the Sun of the Fatherland. During the 1950s and 1960s, he visited all the major concentrations of Armenians throughout the world. Vazgen has received a number of awards, including the Romanian Star of the Republic for his work on the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the Order of the Badge of Honor, and the Order of Labor Red Banner.

12 January 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0145

January 26, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. PERITO

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Tasker to State Department on Presidential
Trip to Canada for February 10, 1989

Attached at Tab I is a tasker from you to Melvyn Levitsky requesting support materials for the President's February 10 trip to Ottawa.

ALL
Bob Blackwill concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the attached tasker to the State Department.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Perito Memo to Levitsky
Tab A Table of Contents

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By *SS* NARA, Date *9/3/25*

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Memo	Robert M. Perito to Melvyn Levitsky RE: [Presidential Trip to Canada, February 10] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: National Security Council
Series: Blackwill, Robert D., Files
Subseries: Chronological Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: January-February 1989 [2]

Date Closed: 5/3/2011	OA/ID Number: 30540
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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0145

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO OTTAWA

FEBRUARY 10, 1989

OVERALL BRIEFING BOOK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Overview Papers
 - 1. Brent Scowcroft Overview Paper (NSC will prepare)
 - 2. Secretary Baker Overview Paper
- II. Scenario
- III. Introductory Talking Points
- IV. Bilateral Agenda Papers, with Suggested Talking Points
 - (a) Acid Rain
 - (b) Free Trade Agreement: Pending Issues
 - (c) Outstanding Bilateral Trade Disputes
 - (d) Unresolved Boundary Disputes
 - (e) Cruise Missile Testing
 - (f) SSN Program
 - (g) Narcotics Cooperation
 - (h) Proposed Bi-National Education Commission
- V. Global Issues Papers, with Suggested Talking Points
 - (a) East-West Relations
 - (b) Arms Control
 - (c) Chemical Weapons
 - (d) Central America
 - (e) Southern Africa
 - (f) Middle East
 - (g) Afghanistan
 - (h) Cambodia
 - (i) Terrorism
- VI. Background Papers
- VII. Biographies

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PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/13/25

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 25, 1989

File

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1340
Brent --
The message has
been cleared by
all concerned
agencies.
BJS

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DON MAHLEY *DM*

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB* / LINTON BROOKS *LB*

SUBJECT: Communication with Chancellor Kohl

Attached at TAB I is a memorandum to the President requesting that he approve a message to be sent today to Chancellor Kohl of the FRG asking that the German government not take a decision tomorrow to demand negotiations on short-range nuclear forces (SNF) as a part of the "comprehensive concept of security and arms control" being developed in NATO.

This urgent action results principally from a demarche by the UK government yesterday, asking the President to contact Kohl directly providing US views on the issue of SNF negotiations. As brief background, Genscher (FRG foreign minister) is pressing hard for SNF negotiations and against SNF modernization (the follow-on to LANCE). He is using the argument that the new US administration may not support modernization or resist SNF negotiations, therefore the FRG should not take the political heat of supporting modernization.

Although the US is reconciled to the idea that there will be an arms control **component** of the "comprehensive concept," both the work on the comprehensive concept and the language of the NAC communique at Reykjavik (which is the current NATO "theology" on this issue) studiously avoided the word "**negotiations**." We envision **reductions** of SNF in the future, perhaps unilaterally as in Montebello, as warranted within the requirements for security and the NATO strategy of flexible response.

The memorandum to the President makes these points in very brief outline form, and requests his approval for a communication with Chancellor Kohl.

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The State Department urges that the communication be by telephone call. NSC Staff and the Department of Defense recommend a letter instead. NSC Staff strongly feels that a telephone call is the wrong medium because: the President already called Kohl this week; the meeting we are trying to influence is Thursday, which would either require the President to get up in the middle of the night to make the call or to get Kohl out of bed, and a telephone call does not give Kohl the same ammunition to display at a cabinet meeting.

Alternatively, we have provided as an option at TAB II a memorandum to the President recommending that he call Kohl on the phone. If you choose this option, note that we also included the letter text (almost identical to the talking points) for transmission following the phone call. NSC Staff repeat that we recommend TAB I and the letter alone. If there is a phone call, we certainly should follow up with a letter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and sign the memorandum to the President at TAB I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Alternatively, that you approve and sign the memorandum to the President at TAB II

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Communication with Chancellor Kohl

Issue

Whether you should approve the message at TAB A to be transmitted as a personal letter from yourself to FRG Chancellor Kohl.

Fact

The FRG government is meeting on January 26 to discuss whether to demand that the NATO "Comprehensive Concept of security and arms control" include either a mandate or a specific proposal for negotiations on short-range nuclear forces (SNF). The UK government presented a demarche yesterday asking that you communicate to Chancellor Kohl US objection to negotiations "in current circumstances" -- meaning for the foreseeable future.

Discussion

FRG foreign minister Genscher is trying very hard to push NATO and the US into further negotiations on nuclear forces in Europe. We believe this would be a mistake, with danger both to NATO strategy and our arms control policy. While the US has agreed to an arms control component in the "Comprehensive Concept," the idea has been to concentrate for now on chemical and conventional arms control. If the security situation improves, we have not ruled out the possibility of further unilateral reductions in the theater nuclear inventory, such as NATO agreed to in the Montebello decision in 1983. Given the short time before the FRG meeting and the fact that you already telephoned Kohl this week, we recommend that you communicate via letter rather than via another phone call. State recommends that you telephone Chancellor Kohl.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you approve the text at TAB A for immediate transmission as a letter from you to Chancellor Kohl.

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PROPOSED NODIS MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

Dear Helmut:

I enjoyed talking with you on Monday. I am writing you now because I understand there will be an important meeting in Bonn January 26 where you will continue to discuss the "comprehensive concept" of security and arms control under consideration in NATO. This is an important issue and I want to work with you on it.

I know that you and I agree that we must modernize NATO's nuclear forces. These forces must be effective to maintain deterrence and flexible response. As we have also agreed, NATO decisions will have to be taken in the framework of a comprehensive concept which will include both security and arms control components.

I believe, however, that negotiations on short-range nuclear forces would be a grave mistake in current circumstances.

We know how Gorbachev works. He could quickly offer a "third zero" which publics would find attractive, building irresistible pressure for a denuclearized Europe. There is, however, a good chance for substantial cuts in the number of our nuclear weapons in Europe in the context of keeping NATO's weapons up to date and moving to an emphasis on weapons of greater range.

We understand the inherent linkage between needed modernization decisions and NATO's comprehensive concept exercise, but we believe we should not undertake a new "dual track" decision like that of INF.

I hope you will not close any doors at your January 26 meeting. Your useful suggestion that a small group of senior officials meet to work this issue together is timely. My people will be in touch with Horst Teltschik.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Communication with Chancellor Kohl

Issue

Whether you should approve the talking points at Tab A for use in a telephone call to FRG Chancellor Kohl and the text at TAB B to be transmitted as a follow-up personal letter from yourself to Kohl.

Fact

The FRG government is meeting on January 26 to discuss whether to demand that the NATO "Comprehensive Concept of security and arms control" include either a mandate or a specific proposal for negotiations on short-range nuclear forces (SNF). The UK government presented a demarche yesterday asking that you communicate to Chancellor Kohl US objection to negotiations "in current circumstances" -- meaning for the foreseeable future.

Discussion

FRG foreign minister Genscher is trying very hard to push NATO and the US into further negotiations on nuclear forces in Europe. We believe this would be a mistake, with danger both to NATO strategy and our arms control policy. While the US has agreed to an arms control component in the "Comprehensive Concept," the idea has been to concentrate for now on chemical and conventional arms control. If the security situation improves, we have not ruled out the possibility of further unilateral reductions in the theater nuclear inventory, such as NATO agreed to in the Montebello decision in 1983. State recommends that you telephone Chancellor Kohl. You have already called Kohl once this week. If you approve making another phone call, we believe you should also send the message text at Tab B after the call is completed.

Recommendation

OK

No

That you approve the talking points at Tab A for use in a phone call to Chancellor Kohl and approve the message text at Tab B.

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**TALKING POINTS
FOR CONVERSATION WITH FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL**

- Enjoyed talking with you on Monday.
- Calling you now on eve of what I understnd will be an important meeting in Bonn January 26 where you will continue discussing the "comprehensive concept" of security and arms control under discussion in NATO.
- This is an important issue and I want to work with you on it.
- I know that you and I agree that we must modernize NATO's nuclear forces. These forces must be effective to maintain deterrence and flexible response.
- As we have also agreed, NATO decisions will have to be taken in the framework of a comprehensive concept which will include both security and arms control components.
- I believe, however, that in current circumstances any short-range nuclear forces (SNF) arms control negotiation would be a grave mistake.
- We know how Gorbachev works. He could quickly offer a "third zero" which publics would find attractive, building irresistible pressure for a denuclearized Europe.
- There is a good chance for substantial cuts in the number of our nuclear weapons in Europe in the context of keeping NATO's weapons up to date and moving to an emphasis on weapons of greater range.
- We understand the inherent linkage between needed modernization decisions and NATO's comprehensive concept exercise, but we should not undertake a new "dual track" decision like that of INF.
- Hope you will not close any doors at your January 26 meeting.
- I agree with your useful suggestion that a small group of senior officials meet to work this issue together. My people will be in touch with Horst Teltschik.

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PROPOSED NODIS MESSAGE FROM
PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHANCELLOR KOHL

Dear Helmut:

I enjoyed talking with you on Monday. I am writing you now because I understand there will be an important meeting in Bonn January 26 where you will continue to discuss the "comprehensive concept" of security and arms control under consideration in NATO. This is an important issue and I want to work with you on it.

I know that you and I agree that we must modernize NATO's nuclear forces. These forces must be effective to maintain deterrence and flexible response. As we have also agreed, NATO decisions will have to be taken in the framework of a comprehensive concept which will include both security and arms control components.

I believe, however, that negotiations on short-range nuclear forces would be a grave mistake in current circumstances.

We know how Gorbachev works. He could quickly offer a "third zero" which publics would find attractive, building irresistible pressure for a denuclearized Europe. There is, however, a good chance for substantial cuts in the number of our nuclear weapons in Europe in the context of keeping NATO's weapons up to date and moving to an emphasis on weapons of greater range.

We understand the inherent linkage between needed modernization decisions and NATO's comprehensive concept exercise, but we believe we should not undertake a new "dual track" decision like that of INF.

I hope you will not close any doors at your January 26 meeting. Your useful suggestion that a small group of senior officials meet to work this issue together is timely. My people will be in touch with Horst Teltschik.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

0105

January 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *AL*
SUBJECT: Appointment Request for Canadian
Ambassador Derek H. Burney

The Canadian Embassy has requested an appointment for Ambassador Derek Burney to meet with you to discuss the substantive agenda of the President's meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney. Ambassador Burney's schedule is open Thursday, February 2 until 4:00 p.m. and Friday, February 3 from 10:30 a.m. on. We understand that he has requested a meeting with Secretary Baker as well.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to meet with Ambassador Burney for 30 minutes, either February 2 or Feb 3.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Date _____

Time _____

File chron?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Jan-1989 14:45 EDT

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brent Scowcroft

(SCOWCROFT)

FROM:

Robert Blackwill
(BLACKWILL)

SUBJECT:

SNF Modernization

Brian Fall, Number Two at the British Embassy, saw Roz Ridgway at 2:30 p.m. to convey HMG's request that the President send a message to Chancellor Kohl on SNF modernization and arms control before the FRG Federal Security Council meets on the subject on January 26. Fall said that Mrs. Thatcher sent a strong message to Kohl on January 23 stressing that there should be no SNF arms control proposal in the Comprehensive Concept that NATO is now working on. Since Whitehall worries that Genscher may succeed in persuading Kohl to the contrary, the British would like the President to send a letter similar to Thatcher's.

COMMENT: This is awkward timing since we have not done our internal review of the SNF modernization issue. Nevertheless, the January 26 FRG meeting, if Genscher gets his way, could cause a major rumpus in NATO and constrain the President's future options on this matter. On its merits, Genscher's desire to go forward quickly with SNF arms control could lead to a rapid third zero and would put nuclear issues at the top of the European security agenda again, at a time when we are pushing hard on the need to reduce Soviet superiority in conventional and chemical weapons.

We believe OSD will strongly support the British request. State believes we should defer action for the time being. In any event, we recommend that you, Bob Gates or I chair a meeting first thing tomorrow morning to discuss the British demarche and examine how best to present this issue to you and the President.

Don Mahley concurs.

WILMA: Please print for General Scowcroft and Bob Gates.

CC: Robert M. Gates
CC: Wilma G. Hall

(GATES)
(HALL)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 24, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. PERITO

FROM: BOB BLACKWILL *BB*

SUBJECT: Meeting on SNF Policy

Attached is a memorandum to Executive Secretaries of the various agencies announcing a meeting tomorrow morning (January 25, 1989) on SNF Policy.

Request that you telephone the various Executive Secretaries tonight to alert them to the meeting, and then sign and dispatch the memorandum. This meeting has been approved by the Deputy National Security Adviser, Robert Gates.

I will chair the meeting. Room 208 has been reserved for the time of the meeting.

AM
Don Mahley concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve and dispatch the memorandum attached.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

CAPT ANTHONY MANESS
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

MS. ROBERTA RIFKIN
Executive Secretary
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

MR. H. LAWRENCE SANDALL
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: January 25, 1989 Meeting on SNF
Policy (U)

Each agency is invited to send representatives at Assistant Secretary level (principal plus one) to a meeting at 10:00 a.m. on January 25, 1989, at the Old Executive Office Building, Room 208. Names of participants should be submitted to COL Donald Mahley, NSC Staff (395-5010) prior to the meeting. The meeting will discuss the U.S. response to the January 24, 1989, UK demarche on SNF modernization and the Comprehensive Concept being developed in NATO. (7)

Acting Executive Secretary

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SP NARA, Date 9/13/25

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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January 23, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT PERITO

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *ML*

SUBJECT: Background Material for President Bush

At Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum from you to Melvyn Levitsky requesting background material for President Bush by close of business, Wednesday, January 25, 1989.

Bob *Blackwill* concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Melvyn Levitsky.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Perito Memo to Levitsky

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0016

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Background Material for President Bush (Ø)

We would appreciate receiving from the Department of State a two-to-three page background paper on the implications for the United States of the Single European Act. We would appreciate receiving this paper by close of business Wednesday, January 25, 1989. (Ø)

Robert Perito
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0014

January 23, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT PERITO

FROM: RUDOLF V. PERINA *RP*
SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Moscow
Conference on Cuban Missile Crisis

At Tab I is a self-explanatory memorandum from you to Melvyn Levitsky.

RB
CM
Bob Blackwill and Pete Brintnall concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Melvyn Levitsky.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Perito Memo to Levitsky
Tab A Presidential Message

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0014

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to Moscow
Conference on Cuban Missile Crisis

Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who will be participating in the January 27-29 Moscow conference on the Cuban missile crisis, has asked for a Presidential message of greeting to the conference. The text of this message is at Tab A. We would appreciate if the State Department would cable this text to our Embassy in Moscow and authorize the Embassy to coordinate with Professor Nye on how the message should most appropriately be delivered.

Robert Perito
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Message

Presidential Statement

The security of the world is well-served by reaching a better, more detailed understanding of the Cuban missile crisis, such as is sought by the participants in this path-breaking conference. I applaud this latest example of the new openness of the Soviet Union under President Gorbachev, whose representatives have brought together in Moscow important figures in the crisis from all major perspectives. This can only improve our mutual understanding of just the sort of episode we must avoid in the nuclear age. I extend my personal greeting to all participants in the conference, and wish you all success in your important endeavors.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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20025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of US-Soviet Relations (S)

Our post-World War II policies toward the Soviet Union have been extraordinarily successful. Containment is being vindicated, as the peoples of the world reject the outmoded dogma of Marxism-Leninism in a search for prosperity and freedom. The trends in US-Soviet relations are, in large part, favorable to us. It would be unwise thoughtlessly to abandon policies that have brought us this far. (S)

Even so, remarkable changes are taking place in the Soviet Union and in Soviet foreign policy. It is therefore necessary to undertake a comprehensive forward-looking review of the US-Soviet relationship, and clearly articulate our long term objectives and strategy. What kind of relationship do we wish to see in the year 2000? We may be standing at the door of a new era in our relationship with the USSR, with potential for significantly reducing military forces and resolving longstanding international disputes. Yet the USSR remains an adversary with awesome military power whose interests conflict in important ways with our own. The Soviet Union already presents a new and complicated political challenge to us in Europe and elsewhere. My own sense is that the Soviet challenge may be even greater than before because it is more varied. (S)

At the same time, the Soviet Union is passing through a period of internal change, the outcome of which cannot be known even to the

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leadership. The pressures of a failing system at home and frustrated policies abroad have caused the Soviet leadership, at least for now, to experiment with new political and economic approaches domestically, to make important concessions and withdrawals abroad, and to present a more benign, but in some ways more challenging, face to the world. (S)

These circumstances, and their likely continuation during my Administration, offer the opportunity to make progress toward resolution of other international problems, to enhance international and strategic stability, and to promote the cause of democracy. There may be opportunities to encourage further positive change in the Soviet Union itself, including the institutionalization of greater pluralism, observance of human rights and constructive cooperation on international problems. (S)

Accordingly, I direct the National Security Council to prepare a comprehensive review of US-Soviet relations. The review should formulate long term US objectives in this relationship (through the end of the century) and offer a strategy for the achievement of these objectives. The review should be ready for NSC consideration by 15 March 1989. Differences of view or recommendation among agencies should be clearly noted in the paper. Work on this review should take account of, and be closely coordinated with, similar reviews dealing with U.S. national strategy and force structure. (S)

The review should address the following issues:

- (1) Policy Objectives of Soviet Internal and External Policy: This section should examine the evolution of Soviet domestic and foreign policy objectives since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev. This section should address current and anticipated Soviet objectives in military policy, arms control negotiations, and public diplomacy. Gorbachev and others say they seek to change the decades-old premises of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Should we take this seriously? If so, what are the odds of their success? Would such an effort survive Gorbachev? What are the broad internal and external goals of Soviet leadership in the short term (3-5 years)? Do they have longer term (10 years) objectives? What relationship does the Soviet leadership perceive between internal and external policy objectives?
- (2) Assessment of Soviet Internal Situation: This section should evaluate the present domestic situation in the Soviet Union. How far has domestic reform, both politically and economically, progressed? What are the prospects for


further economic reform and how successful are such reforms likely to be? What are the implications of failure -- of a lack of success in improving economic performance? Likewise, what are the prospects for further political reforms? What are the implications of the rollback of selected economic reforms and of new restrictions on Glasnost? What would constitute "success" for Gorbachev in both economic and political terms? In examining the major domestic problems and challenges that reform is likely to encounter in the short and long term, this section should consider the possibility of the failure of economic and political reform and its impact on Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Separately, this section should consider the impact on both Soviet domestic and foreign policy if Gorbachev were to be removed from office.

This section should be intentionally broad in scope, paying particular attention to the following issues: the Soviet economy, especially its ability to produce high-technology goods for both civilian and military use; the nationalities problem in all its possible variants, including the possibility of serious disturbances in ethnic regions; the indigenous human rights movement; and the degree of resistance to change and potential focus of active opposition within the Party, the bureaucracy, the military and security sectors and the society as a whole. This section should include with an evaluation of the objectives outlined in Section 1. Finally, how will the US-Soviet relationship be affected by developments in Eastern Europe?

- (3) Assessment of Soviet Foreign and Military Policy: This section should evaluate the degree of change in Soviet foreign and military policy since the accession of Gorbachev in relation to the United States, Western countries, and the Third World. Soviet intelligence activity and policy in the arms control and public diplomacy spheres should be included. To what degree has the Soviet leadership been successful and unsuccessful in pursuit of its external objectives? Other conditions being equal, what are the prospects for Soviet attainment of the external objectives outlined in Section 1? For example, at what point might the Soviets feel compelled to intervene in Eastern Europe to suppress uncontrolled reformist movements and how might this impact on East-West relations more generally? How will the US-Soviet relationship be affected by developments in Eastern Europe?
- (4) U.S. Policy Objectives in Relation to the Soviet Union: Within the context of Soviet objectives and behavior, what

should be the long range goals of U.S. foreign and security policy toward the Soviet Union? Is it in the U.S. interest to "help" the Soviet leadership in the attainment of some of its internal or external objectives? What are the potential dangers and benefits to U.S. national security interests in a negative or affirmative response? The section should examine public, congressional and Allied perceptions of this issue.

- (5) Sources of U.S. Leverage over Soviet Policy: This section should examine the sources of U.S. leverage to attain the objectives noted in Section 4 and analyze the pros and cons as well as relative importance of each. What conditions, criteria, or demands should the US attach to any assistance? Would such "help" be of sufficient value as to induce the USSR to pay a political price? With Soviet ideology, political thinking, and military doctrine in a state of flux, this section should examine opportunities for the U.S. to influence developments in these areas and the strengths and weaknesses of any approach designed to affect Soviet concepts, debates and actions. (For example, how much opportunity exists to affect Soviet debates and condition Soviet attitudes on concepts like "balance of interests," "defensive defense" and "reasonable sufficiency?") Attention should in particular be directed toward unilateral and multilateral military-security and economic policy, negotiating initiatives, public diplomacy and scientific and cultural relations. An evaluation should be given of the overall likely impact of U.S. policy in influencing Soviet domestic and international behavior.
- (6) Recommended Policies for Short and Long Term: The concluding section should outline recommended objectives for the United States in the next 3-5 and 10 years, focusing in particular on a strategy (and new or modified policies) aimed at the achievement of our long range objectives. The recommendations may in some cases be contingent upon specific Soviet actions or developments which would warrant shifts in U.S. policy. The section should examine the compatibility of policy recommendations with the policies of other major Western countries and recommend what, if any, actions are required to enhance the coordination of Western policy toward the Soviet Union. Finally, how can the U.S. get out in front of the USSR in making proposals to affect the relationship? Should such efforts constitute a major policy initiative? (S)



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of US-East European
Relations (S)

The potential for real and sustained change in Eastern Europe is greater now than at any time in the post-war period. Our objectives in that region, to see popular aspirations for liberty, prosperity and self-determination met, are still valid. And we are sure that those aspirations cannot be realized as long as the Soviet occupation of East-Central Europe continues. (S)

The time may have come when creative American policies can make a more significant difference. As Western neighbors prosper, grow and aim for economic integration, and their Eastern neighbor tries to shake off the legacies of its history and its failures, the states of Eastern Europe face unprecedented economic and political pressures from within and without. Economic problems have become so severe that some of the leaders now seek to revise the outmoded socialist principles on which they have relied for forty years. And the peoples of Eastern Europe are sending a message to their rulers; political freedom is a precondition for economic improvement. That desire for liberty is reinforced by the growing identification of the East Europeans with their cultural ties to the West. Most importantly, these trends coincide with changes in the Soviet Union itself. Gorbachev will have difficulty denying to his clients that which he

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sanctions at home. He says that he respects the right of self-determination for the East Europeans. The peoples of Eastern Europe should have the opportunity to test that proposition. How can we help them to do this without bringing a strong and counterproductive reaction either from the USSR or the governments involved? (S)

We often speak of Eastern Europe as a whole but, of course, we must treat the countries individually. The policies that we design must take discriminating account of the pace and direction of reform in each of these nations. The road to peaceful change in Eastern Europe is narrow, but the region is alive with possibilities and we must take advantage of the opportunities before us. (S)

I direct the NSC to prepare a review of US-East European relations and recommend new policy initiatives that the U.S. might undertake in relation to Eastern Europe. The review should be completed by March 15, 1989, for consideration by the National Security Council. Any differences of view or recommendation among agencies should be noted in the paper. (S)

The review should address the following issues:

- (1) Assessment of Current Situation in Eastern Europe: An assessment of how the situation in Eastern Europe has changed since the last comprehensive U.S. policy review in 1982, and particularly since the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU. Emphasis should be put on identifying new trends which the United States should encourage or discourage. The assessment should include developments in the region as a whole, as well as internal and external developments in the individual countries: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Special attention should be focused on the implications of current Soviet policy toward the region, the economic difficulties facing East European countries, the growing split between party leaderships and rank and file, as well as the perceived popular bankruptcy of the regimes, and -- in the case of the GDR -- developments regarding inner-German relations and Berlin. The assessment should address the likelihood and implications of present trends toward autonomy and reform in Eastern Europe continuing. Describe the effect on West European attitudes of continuation of these trends; assess the implications for US-West European relations. The assessment also should specifically examine the likelihood of serious instability or open political conflict in each of the states of Eastern Europe -- and the effect of such developments on Western Europe and on US-European relations. (S)

(2) U.S. Policy Objectives in Eastern Europe: This section should review U.S. policy toward Eastern European countries since 1982 and determine if it requires revision or updating in present circumstances. Emphasis should be put on influencing any new trends identified in Section 1. Has the concept of differentiation worked, and does the U.S. have adequate means of leverage to implement it effectively in the future? What adjustments are needed as a result of recent developments? The section should include consideration of the effect on Eastern Europe of Soviet troop withdrawals. What opportunities does continuation of current trends toward autonomy and reform in Eastern Europe present to the U.S.? What, if any, different policies are called for? (S)

(3) Sources of U.S. Leverage: This section should examine the sources of U.S. leverage in Eastern Europe and determine if they should be revised and expanded in view of the objectives described in Section 2. Categories of leverage to consider include: (S)

Economic relations -- MFN, credits, IMF membership or support, OPIC guarantees, technology transfer, loan rescheduling, concessional sales of foodstuffs, etc.; (S)

Political relations -- public diplomacy, high level visits, consular and diplomatic restrictions, overall bilateral cooperation, etc.; (S)

Cultural relations -- scientific exchanges, nature of radio broadcasts beamed to a country, USIA activities, etc.; (S)


Regional relations -- should the U.S. initiate a dialogue with the Soviet Union regarding Eastern Europe bilaterally or in negotiating fora such as CSCE, CFE, etc.; (S)

Arms control aspects -- how our arms control policies in the CFE talks and elsewhere might impact on the region. (S)

(4) Challenges to U.S. Interests: This section should examine the role of East European states in acting as a source of high technology leakage to the USSR. It should also address the extensive clandestine operations of the GDR, the Czechs and Bulgarians, among others, conducted against U.S. interests. The role of certain of the East European states acting as a haven for terrorists or a weapons source for radical states also

needs to be addressed. Sources of leverage assessed in Section 3 should be considered not only in terms of forwarding U.S. interests, but also in limiting threats to them. (S)

- (5) Policy Recommendations: This section should suggest U.S. strategy toward the countries of Eastern Europe in the short (3-5 years) and long term (10 years), contingent upon developments in a given country and focusing in particular on new or modified policy initiatives that the U.S. might undertake to implement our strategy. The strategy should take into account variables such as whether Gorbachev's Soviet reform efforts succeed or not, and what effect this has upon Eastern Europe. Other variables include likely succession contingencies (e.g., Romania) and social instability (Poland, Hungary, etc.). Recommended changes in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union which would enhance our policy objectives in Eastern Europe should be included. This strategy also should address how to balance encouraging pluralism and greater popular participation on the one hand and the potential for dangerous unrest and instability on the other. How should the U.S. respond to serious instability, a political explosion and/or repression in Eastern Europe? This section should also examine the compatibility of U.S. policy with the policies of other major Western countries and determine what, if any, actions are required to enhance the coordination of Western policy toward Eastern Europe. (S)



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THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Comprehensive Review of US-West European
Relations (8)

Our approach toward Western Europe in the post-war period was based on shared confidence in a common cultural and ethnic inheritance. There was mutual concern about the external threat posed by the dominant military power on the Eurasian landmass, its totalitarian direction and expansionist inclinations. We shared fears about the renewal of intra-European conflicts that had already ignited two global conflagrations in a generation. We cherished hopes for rebuilding the wealth and resources of once-mighty economies strained or ruined by war. (8)

The structures erected on these foundations now provide much of the political and economic architecture for our modern world. The close bonds of Atlantic friendship, along with the NATO alliance and its commitment of large standing armies to the defense of the West, have provided an unprecedented period of stability and security for Europe. The European Community and the networks of other European bilateral and regional groupings, as well as an economic system predicated on free trade as a source of common affluence, have broken historical patterns of strife and created new incentives for cooperation. All of these institutions are products of lasting postwar concerns. (8)

All are now being challenged for contemporary relevance. Questions are posed about the continued commonality of American and European world views, potential shifts in the priorities and goals of the Soviet leadership, the growing integration of a Europe moving toward the 1992 goals of the Single European Act,

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the related competitive pressures being applied to the free trading system, and whether any voluntary alliance can endure in the absence of a popular consensus that there is a common and dangerous adversary. The coherence of the Alliance is challenged as never before by two developments: internally by European integration plans centered on 1992; and externally by the political success of Gorbachev and the USSR in weakening the perception of European publics of a threat to their security. (S)

The central importance of American leadership remains. This leadership must set a positive course for the future that is not wedded unalterably only to the familiar assumptions. It should instead play its part in setting the agenda for a reinvigorated Atlantic community, adapting enduring requirements to a changing international context. In examining how the United States should meet this challenge, I ask participants in this review to produce a political concept of the future of Europe, incorporating judgments about the likely evolution of its division between East and West and a sense of new opportunities for the United States in continuing to assure that our relations with Western Europe develop in an environment of stability, prosperity and community. (S)

The NSC should prepare a comprehensive review of US-West European relations and recommend new policy initiatives that the U.S. might undertake in relation to Western Europe. The review should be completed by March 15, 1989 for consideration by the National Security Council. Any differences of view or recommendation among agencies should be noted in the paper. (S)

This review should be closely integrated with, but not duplicate, on-going reviews of national security strategy, force structure and arms control.

The review should address the following issues:

1. U.S.-European Relations: An overview should indicate the current state of U.S.-European political, military and economic relations and of East-West and intra-European developments that have the potential to affect relations between the United States and Western Europe. (S)
2. NATO Alliance: An assessment should be made of major challenges to the Alliance and of ways to maintain and increase Allied coordination on key foreign policy issues. This section should also assess NATO's current military posture, structure and tactics, and also factor in possible changes in the composition, structure and size of Warsaw Pact forces. The section should also examine the difficult issue of burden-sharing. The assessment should address the impact of differing attitudes in the Alliance toward the evolving threat represented by the USSR. (S)

3. European Defense and Arms Control Issues: Taking into account the above assessment of the impact of differing attitudes toward the Soviet threat, an analysis should be made of the following arms control and defense modernization issues as they relate to the US-European relationship. (S)
- (a) Prospects for negotiations on Conventional Forces in Europe. This section should also examine the political implications of conventional reductions in Central Europe, with particular emphasis on their effects on the Federal Republic of Germany. (S)
 - (b) The CSCE negotiations on confidence and security building measures. (S)
 - (c) SNF Modernization. This section should outline the military and political requirements for SNF modernization. (S)
4. Intra-European Political-Military Cooperation: This section should address the following issues, including their implications for U.S. defense policies in Europe: trends in the West European Union; greater European Community cooperation on political issues; Franco-German defense cooperation; state of UK and French nuclear modernization programs, including nuclear cooperation between the two countries; and the theory of the "European Pillar" and its implications over the longer term. (S)
5. West European Assessment of the Soviet Union: This section should examine the West European assessment of the Soviet Union. It should outline the policies -- both bilateral and in multilateral fora such as the CSCE -- that Western European countries are likely to pursue regarding the Soviet Union. (S)
6. East-West Trade: This section should include the following issues, outlining potential conflicts between the U.S. and Western Europe: trends in European economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; evolution of EC-CEMA relations; European policies toward COCOM; European views on Soviet or East European participation/membership in international financial institutions. (S)
7. European Economic Integration: An assessment should be made of the effects of European economic integration and current EC economic policies on the U.S. This section should include evaluation of implementing the Single European Act of 1992; the continued efforts to reform the European Community's Common Agricultural Policy; and the EC's position in the GATT Uruguay round of negotiations. Assess our chances to influence the process of integration. Do we

have the ability to influence European deliberations with respect to 1992? If not, the review should suggest how to deal with this. (S)

8. European Relations with Japan: This section should assess trends in European political and economic links with Japan and with other countries in East Asia. The section should examine ways in which the U.S. can foster greater coordination between our European and Asian allies on issues of common interest. How does the US-Japanese relationship affect Europe and what are the pros and cons of consulting with the Japanese on European integration? Can the U.S. and Japan develop jointly a more effective means of dealing with Europe? Similarly, would consultations on Europe improve our relationship with Japan? (S)
9. Role for Europe in Out-of-Area Activities: This section should assess the prospects of our West European Allies playing a more active role in out-of-area activities. (S)
10. Recommended Objectives and Policies for Short and Long Term: The concluding section should propose recommended objectives and policies that the United States should pursue over the next 3-5 years and 10 years, focusing in particular on new initiatives that the U.S. might undertake to deal with popular perceptions in the Alliance of a significantly diminished Soviet military threat. The strategy toward Western Europe for achieving these objectives should be broad enough to encompass further dramatic changes in the USSR or in the orientation of key West European governments. (S)



THE WHITE HOUSE
OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY

For Immediate Release

The President today announced the appointment of Robert D. Blackwill as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate. He will succeed Nelson C. Ledsky.

A career Foreign Service Officer, Mr. Blackwill served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs in 1981-1982 and for European Affairs in 1982-1983.

From 1983 until 1985, Mr. Blackwill was Associate Dean and faculty member at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and from 1985-1987 he was U.S. Ambassador and Chief Negotiator at the Negotiations with the Warsaw Pact on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. He rejoined the faculty of the Kennedy School 1987-1989. Mr. Blackwill's overseas assignments have included Kenya, the United Kingdom and Israel.

The author of many scholarly articles on European security and the co-editor of the forthcoming book, Conventional Arms Control and East-West Relations, Mr. Blackwill is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Blackwill is a graduate of Wichita State University. He is married to the former Anne Heiberg and has three children.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 8, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT D. BLACKWILL
FROM: CAROL A. PAQUETTE *CP*
Director of Administration
SUBJECT: In-Processing for a Special Assistant
to the President

In preparation for your appointment as a Special Assistant to the President, there are a number of things which need to be taken care of:

- We need to have a press release prepared.
(A sample copy is attached for your use.)
- How do you want your name to appear on the Commission Certificate, which is signed by the President?
Robert D. Blackwill
- What State do you want noted on your Commission Book?
(Normally the Special Assistants list the State they vote in.)
Maryland

Please return this memorandum with your answers and press release. We will forward the information to the Clerk's Office; they will take care of the press release and prepare the Commission Certificate and frame it for you. They will also prepare your Commission Book.

0328
Blackwell

C

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 13, 1989

Dear Harold:

Thank you for forwarding the report, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: An Agenda for the Future." As you know, we are in the process of reviewing policy toward the Soviet Union. I have made the report available to the NSC staff for consideration and use in that process.

I look forward to seeing you soon. Again, thank you for the input.

*Some fascinating
ideas. Thanks
a lot.*

Sincerely,

Brent

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Harold Brown
Chairman
The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute
School of Advanced International Studies
1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20036-2297

The Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute
School of Advanced International Studies

January 17, 1989

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
Kissinger Associates
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Brent:

As we discussed over the phone, I am pleased to provide you with a few copies of our "Report to the Forty-First President of the United States" on The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations.


This Report includes two main sections. First, you will find a consensus statement on the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations. What I find especially significant about that statement is the very broad range of qualified experts who agreed to endorse it.

Next, the Report presents an Agenda for the Future that is based on the brief summaries of twenty proposals for cooperation between the two countries in a wide variety of areas. Some of these proposals are quite innovative, and may deserve the attention of some members of your staff. In any event they may serve as a sample menu. The twenty were selected out of about 250 proposals that we received on the basis of a nationwide appeal for new ideas. Each proposal was published in full and separately, and we will be pleased to provide any related publication your staff might require.

I hope some of this material proves to be of some use. Please let us know if there is anything else we can do concerning any of the suggestions made in this Report.

With warm personal wishes,

Sincerely,


Harold Brown
Chairman

Enclosures

FPI POLICY BRIEFS

FPI

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0324

February 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE

SUBJECT: Report to the Forty-First President of the United States on the Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

The report attached at Tab II was sent to you by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.

The report, prepared by the Foreign Policy Institute at Johns Hopkins, contains twenty proposals for the future agenda in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The proposals fall into five categories and most are already on the public agenda. Novel proposals include a Soviet-American Peace Corps and a Bilateral Endowment for the Arts and Humanities. The report also suggests significant rethinking of economic relations with the Soviet Union.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the thank you letter attached at Tab I to Mr. Brown.

Approve____ Disapprove____

Attachments:

Tab I Thank You Letter

Tab II Incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 28, 1989

#0339

Rice

Dear Mr. Pavlovskis:

Thank you for your letter of January 30 inviting me to be the keynote speaker at the annual meeting of the Baltic American Freedom League. Due to the press of responsibilities here, I will be unable to accept your kind invitation.

The Bush Administration continues to be deeply concerned with the issues that you raise and will work, as have our predecessors, to promote human rights for the populations of the Baltic States.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

Mr. Agris Pavlovskis
Vice President
Baltic American Freedom League
P.O. Box 29657
Los Angeles, California 90029

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0339

February 14, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Address the Baltic American Freedom
League

The Baltic American Freedom League has invited you to be the keynote speaker at ~~their~~^{its} annual conference on March 11 (Tab II). The Baltic American Freedom League is a national organization comprised of Americans of Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian heritage. This is a reputable organization that has had very good speakers from former administrations in the past. The meeting does not, however, warrant your attendance.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter of regret appended at Tab I.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachments:

Tab I Letter of Regret

Tab II Incoming Correspondence



BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE

(818) 765-2587

0339

P.O. Box 29657, Los Angeles, California 90029

January 30, 1989

Executive Board:

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President
(818) 765-2587

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Treasurer
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Yanis Braukis
Secretary
(213) 662-6917

Honorable Brent Scowcraft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington D.C. 20025

Dear General Scowcraft;

The Baltic American Freedom League would like to invite you to be the keynote speaker at our Eight Annual Human Rights Conference. This year it will be held in Cleveland, Ohio on March 11. You would be speaking at the evening banquet following a day session of panel discussions.

Directors:

Saulius Anuzis
Lansing, MI

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Los Angeles, CA

Tadas Dabsys
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Kariis Kalejs
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Rita M. Lalsons
Washington, DC

Heikki Leesment
Washington, DC

Dr. Hendrik Leesment
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Anthony Mazeika
Mission Viejo, CA

Danute Mazeika
Mission Viejo, CA

Bernard Nurmisen
Studio City, CA

Dr. Ants Pallo
Bernardsville, NJ

Valdis Pavlovskis
Los Angeles, CA

Antonija Petrulis
Phoenix, AZ

Vilvi Pūrlisid
North Hollywood, CA

Valdek Roosna
Tacoma, WA

Hon. Jaak Treiman
Canoga Park, CA

Daiyte Trotman
San Diego, CA

The Baltic American Freeom League is a national organization whose membership is comprised of Americans of Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian heritage. The League's goals are to promote the development of human rights and self-determination for the Baltic States. Attendees to the conference will be from throughout the country. Approximately 200 Baltic-American community leaders will be present for your speech.

Past keynote speakers have been: Elliot Abrams (Asst. Sec. State for Human Rights); Melvin Levitsky (Special Asst. to the Sec. State); James Montgamery (Sr. Dep. Asst. Secretary for Human Rights); Eugene Pell (Director, Voice of America).


Other speakers have been: Paul D. Kamenar (Executive Legal Director, Washington Legal Foundation); Carl S. Gershman (U.S. Representative to the Third Committee at the U.N.); Ambassador John D. Scanlan (Chairman U.S. Delegation to the Budapest Cultural Forum).

We hope that you will accept our invitation as Baltic-Americans anxiously await a statement from the Bush Administration concerning the Baltic situation. We would like to hear about the Administration's position in regard to the U.S. non-recognition policy toward the occupation of the Baltic States in light of current developments in the Soviet Union; the impact of the INF treaty and SS-20 installations in the Baltic; and conventional troop reductions in Europe proposed by the Soviets and how it relates to the Baltic States.

You will find the Baltic American Freedom League a receptive audience. Our organization has always been supportive of a strong and realistic defence program. We will also pay your expenses.

If you are unable to attend, would you please consider designating someone from your staff. Please notify me of your decision as soon as possible. My day phone is (517) 482-1083. Thankyou very much.

Yours truly,



Agris Pavlovskis

Vice President, Baltic American Freedom League

RICE

Completed
action

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 11, 1989

C



Dear Ms. Jukofsky:

Thank you for your letter of December 29, 1988 requesting my participation in your "Cutting Edge" conference, March 10-12. Due to the press of my responsibilities at the start of a new Administration, I will unfortunately be unable to attend. Please convey my regrets to Roald Sagdeyev and my hope that he would participate in the conference despite my inability to be present.

All the best for a successful event.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

Ms. Diane Jukofsky
Vice President, Programs
Scientists' Institute for
Public Information
355 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

0351

February 3, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Regret for Scientists' Institute Meeting

The Scientists' Institute for Public Information invited you to speak during their two-day conference. Before your appointment, you had agreed to participate in their briefing for news directors. Apparently, Roald Sagdeyev will participate if you are willing to do so and they are seeking an early commitment. They are a very good organization and deserve a courteous letter of regret. Your letter of regret to Diane Jukofsky of the Scientists' Institute for Public Information is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the aforementioned letter to Ms. Jukofsky.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachments:

Tab I Letter of Regret

Tab II Incoming

Video Tape in outer office

*1. Harry for regular
2. City Florence*
**Scientists' Institute for
Public Information**

355 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
(212) 661-9110
CABLE: SIPCODE

December 29, 1988

0351

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Fred Jerome
Executive Vice President
Diane Jukofsky
Vice President, Programs

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Gerard Piel
Robert Sinsheimer, Ph.D.
Richard Smyser
George Strait
James D. Watson, Ph.D.

Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Kissinger & Associates
1800 K Street, NW, Suite 1021
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Gen. Scowcroft:

I have been in touch with your staff regarding your attendance at our March 10-12 "Cutting Edge" conference, and they kindly have promised to raise this with you again, although I realize how tentative your schedule must be. As I explained to them, Roald Sagdeyev has agreed to participate on a luncheon debate on U.S.-Soviet arms control, provided that you are his partner.

You may recall that you agreed to participate in our briefing for local TV news directors back in October, at our dinner with you, Joe Nye, and network television correspondents and bureau chiefs. Since this was before your appointment to National Security Advisor (for which we offer hearty congratulations), we realize that you may no longer be able to honor that commitment. If, however, you still agree in principle to participate in this discussion, we could pass this on to Mr. Sagdeyev and confirm his participation. Naturally, in both your cases, events may preclude your attendance at the last moment.

I've enclosed the videotaped invitation to the conference, narrated by Walter Cronkite, that was mailed to selected news directors across the country, with the enclosed printed invitation. Early returns are excellent -- we expect a terrific audience of both news directors and scientists. Participating scientists include David Baltimore, Paul Berg, Condoleezza Rice, and Maxine Singer, so you can see we are expecting a stellar event.

If you still are willing to pencil in on your calendar a Saturday, March 12 luncheon discussion on arms control, to take place at the Mayfair Hotel in Coconut Grove, Fla., please let me know so we can make your travel arrangements. (Naturally, we'd be delighted if you could attend the entire weekend conference.) Better yet would be a letter of intent from you that we could send to Sagdeyev.

I appreciate your understanding and help with this, and most important, sincerely hope you'll be able to be a part of our "Cutting Edge" conference. I know you would enjoy it!

Sincerely,

Diane Jukofsky
Diane Jukofsky
Vice President, Programs

**Media
Resource
Service**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0881

February 16, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from the Soviet National Congress of Gerontologists and Geriatrists

The letter at Tab II from Ambassador Dubinin transmits a message to President Bush from the President of the Soviet Gerontological and Geriatrics Society, Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov.

The organization's transmittal letter with the message (Tab A) calls upon President Bush to reallocate funding now designated for military programs to research activities on the process of aging. A memorandum forwarding the communication to the President is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve____Disapprove____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter and Message from
 Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov
Tab II Dubinin Letter

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization)

8881

☐ PLEASE PHONE ► ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

AP

last time text
research on aging
the process of

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018
★ U.S. GPO: 1988 — 201-759

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0881

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Message from the Soviet Gerontological and
Geriatrics Society

Ambassador Dubinin of the Soviet Union has asked that I forward the letter and message at Tab A from Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov, President of the Gerontological and Geriatrics Society and Director of the Institute of Gerontology, USSR. The letter urges you to reallocate resources devoted to military programs to research of the aging.

Attachment:

Tab A Dubinin Letter with Enclosure

ВСЕСОЮЗНОЕ НАУЧНОЕ МЕДИЦИНСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ГЕРОНТОЛОГОВ И ГЕРИАТРОВ

252114, г. Киев-114, ул. Вышгородская, 67
Для телеграмм: Киев-114 Геронтология

Телефоны: 4304068
~~850100~~
~~850100~~

№ 01/27

« — » January 20, 1988 г.


George Bush
President,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
White House,
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President:

The specialists in the field of gerontology and geriatrics who had met last November for their 5th National Congress, have unanimously accepted a Message to public of all nations of the world, and decided to send its copies to you as U.S. President, and Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Message calls for the reallocation of resources to be spent for military purposes and arms race to finance research into the mechanisms of aging and ways to expand active human lifespan. This would not only save mankind from selfdestruction, but open perspectives for the control over aging, for lifespan prolongation.

Yours sincerely,



Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov
President, USSR Gerontological and
Geriatrics Society
Director, Institute of Gerontology
AMS USSR,
Vyshgorodskaya St. 67,
252655 Kiev-114, USSR

VVB:aw
Encl.

A MESSAGE

of the participants of the 5th USSR's All-Union
Congress of gerontologists and geriatrists
(Tbilisi, November 1988)

We, gerontologists-delegates of the Congress and its foreign guests can state that research data presented at the Congress allow to hope that the elucidation of mechanisms of aging and the development of means prolonging an active life span is now a real project realisation of which has long been waited for by whole humanity. The urgency of this problem is obvious if a consideration is taken of the significant population aging, especially in more developed countries, and of the aspiration of every human being to live a long and meaningful life.

The participants think it necessary to inform broad public around the world that the development of approaches prolonging an active life must be a leading trend of research at the present stage. In this context, it is vital that the level of subsidies for research in this area will at long last correspond to the magnitude of the task outlined.

The delegates point out that resources being currently put in the whole world to military build-ups and arms race may prove sufficient to achieve an opposite goal, i.e. extending human life, and then it will well be that the present generation shall benefit from advances in the field of aging.

The delegates also feel it expedient to support the slogan "Means for prolonging human life rather than means for destruction," which was put forward by the participants of International Symposium on the "Mechanisms of Aging and Longevity" (Soukhumi, 1986), and call on wide public of all nations to give every support to this initiative.

This will allow not only to save humanity from the danger of self-destruction, but also to open an exciting perspective for a control over aging and for increasing life-span.

О Б Р А Щ Е Н И Е

УЧАСТНИКОВ У ВСЕСОЮЗНОГО СЪЕЗДА ГЕРОНТОЛОГОВ И ГЕРИАТРОВ

(Тбилиси, ноябрь, 1988 г.)

Мы, геронтологи - участники съезда и его зарубежные гости, отмечаем, что материалы научных исследований, представленные на съезде позволяют надеяться, что выяснение механизмов старения и разработка средств увеличения продолжительности активной жизни является сейчас реально выполнимым проектом, в осуществлении которого заинтересовано все человечество. Актуальность этой проблемы очевидна, если учесть значительное постарение населения, которое наблюдается во всех развитых странах мира, и заинтересованность каждого человека в долгой и полноценной жизни.

Участники съезда считают своим долгом довести до сведения широкой общественности всех стран мира, что разработка путей увеличения продолжительности активной жизни должна стать ведущим направлением современной науки. Для этого необходимо, чтобы уровень финансирования научных исследований в данной области стал, наконец, соответствовать масштабу поставленной задачи.

Участники съезда отмечают, что тех средств, которые в настоящее время идут на военные расходы и гонку вооружений во всем мире, вполне достаточно для достижения прямо противоположной цели - продления жизни человека, причем в этом случае плодами достижения геронтологии сможет воспользоваться уже нынешнее поколение.

Участники съезда считают целесообразным поддержать лозунг "СРЕДСТВА ПРОДЛЕНИЯ ЖИЗНИ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ВМЕСТО СРЕДСТВ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЯ", выдвинутый участниками международного симпозиума "Механизмы старения и долголетия" (Сухуми, 1986г.), и обращаются к широкой общественности всех стран мира с призывом поддержать выдвинутую инициативу всеми возможными и доступными способами. Это позволит не только спасти человечество от угрозы самоуничтожения, но и открыть перед человечеством захватывающую перспективу контроля над старением, увеличения продолжительности жизни.

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

Staff 0831
with address by
to Gen Scowcroft
by Fri 1/19 - the
Secretary of State
Secretary
FEB 13 1989

The Honorable
Brent SCOWCROFT
Advisor to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

February 13, 1989

Dear General:

The 5th USSR's National Congress of gerontologists and geriatrists at its session last November adopted a Message to the peoples of all Nations and decided to send copies of it to President Gorbachev and President Bush.

Enclosed is a copy of this message to President Bush with a covering letter from the President of the USSR Gerontological and Geriatrics Society.

I would appreciate your assistance in seeing that this communication reaches the President.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Yuri V. DUBININ

file

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

RICE

0881

February 16, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from the Soviet National
Congress of Gerontologists and Geriatrists

The letter at Tab II from Ambassador Dubinin transmits a message to President Bush from the President of the Soviet Gerontological and Geriatrics Society, Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov.

The organization's transmittal letter with the message (Tab A) calls upon President Bush to reallocate funding now designated for military programs to research activities on the process of aging. A memorandum forwarding the communication to the President is attached at Tab I.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove ☒

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Letter and Message from
Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov
Tab II Dubinin Letter

*Brent - does staff like
to this really need
to go to the President?
No, B*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

0881

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Message from the Soviet Gerontological and
Geriatrics Society

Ambassador Dubinin of the Soviet Union has asked that I forward the letter and message at Tab A from Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov, President of the Gerontological and Geriatrics Society and Director of the Institute of Gerontology, USSR. The letter urges you to reallocate resources devoted to military programs to research the process of aging.

Attachment:

Tab A Dubinin Letter with Enclosure

ВСЕСОЮЗНОЕ НАУЧНОЕ МЕДИЦИНСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВО ГЕРОНТОЛОГОВ И ГЕРИАТРОВ

252114, г. Киев-114, ул. Вышгородская, 67
Для телеграмм: Киев-114 Геронтология

4 304 068
Телефоны: ~~85-1011~~
~~85-1109~~

№ 01/87

« — » January 20, 1989 г.


George Bush
President,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
White House,
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President:

The specialists in the field of gerontology and geriatrics who had met last November for their 5th National Congress, have unanimously accepted a Message to public of all nations of the world, and decided to send its copies to you as U.S. President, and Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Message calls for the reallocation of resources to be spent for military purposes and arms race to finance research into the mechanisms of aging and ways to expand active human lifespan. This would not only save mankind from selfdestruction, but open perspectives for the control over aging, for lifespan prolongation.

Yours sincerely,



Dr. Vladislav V. Bezrukov
President, USSR Gerontological and
Geriatrics Society
Director, Institute of Gerontology
AMS USSR,
Vyshgorodskaya St. 67,
252655 Kiev-114, USSR

VVB:aw
Encl.

A MESSAGE

of the participants of the 5th USSR's All-Union
Congress of gerontologists and geriatrists
(Tbilisi, November 1988)

We, gerontologists-delegates of the Congress and its foreign guests can state that research data presented at the Congress allow to hope that the elucidation of mechanisms of aging and the development of means prolonging an active life span is now a real project realisation of which has long been waited for by whole humanity. The urgency of this problem is obvious if a consideration is taken of the significant population aging, especially in more developed countries, and of the aspiration of every human being to live a long and meaningful life.

The participants think it necessary to inform broad public around the world that the development of approaches prolonging an active life must be a leading trend of research at the present stage. In this context, it is vital that the level of subsidies for research in this area will at long last correspond to the magnitude of the task outlined.

The delegates point out that resources being currently put in the whole world to military build-ups and arms race may prove sufficient to achieve an opposite goal, i.e. extending human life, and then it will well be that the present generation shall benefit from advances in the field of aging.

The delegates also feel it expedient to support the slogan "Means for prolonging human life rather than means for destruction," which was put forward by the participants of International Symposium on the "Mechanisms of Aging and Longevity" (Soukhumi, 1986), and call on wide public of all nations to give every support to this initiative.

This will allow not only to save humanity from the danger of self-destruction, but also to open an exciting perspective for a control over aging and for increasing life-span.

О Б Р А Щ Е Н И Е
УЧАСТНИКОВ У ВСЕСОЮЗНОГО СЪЕЗДА
ГЕРОНТОЛОГОВ И ГЕРИАТРОВ
(Тбилиси, ноябрь, 1988 г.)

Мы, геронтологи - участники съезда и его зарубежные гости, отмечаем, что материалы научных исследований, представленные на съезде позволяют надеяться, что выяснение механизмов старения и разработка средств увеличения продолжительности активной жизни является сейчас реально выполнимым проектом, в осуществлении которого заинтересовано все человечество. Актуальность этой проблемы очевидна, если учесть значительное постарение населения, которое наблюдается во всех развитых странах мира, и заинтересованность каждого человека в долгой и полноценной жизни.

Участники съезда считают своим долгом довести до сведения широкой общественности всех стран мира, что разработка путей увеличения продолжительности активной жизни должна стать ведущим направлением современной науки. Для этого необходимо, чтобы уровень финансирования научных исследований в данной области стал, наконец, соответствовать масштабу поставленной задачи.

Участники съезда отмечают, что тех средств, которые в настоящее время идут на военные расходы и гонку вооружений во всем мире, вполне достаточно для достижения прямо противоположной цели - продления жизни человека, причем в этом случае плодами достижения геронтологии сможет воспользоваться уже нынешнее поколение.

Участники съезда считают целесообразным поддержать лозунг "СРЕДСТВА ПРОДЛЕНИЯ ЖИЗНИ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ВМЕСТО СРЕДСТВ УНИЧТОЖЕНИЯ", выдвинутый участниками международного симпозиума "Механизмы старения и долголетия" (Сухуми, 1986г.), и обращаются к широкой общественности всех стран мира с призывом поддержать выдвинутую инициативу всеми возможными и доступными способами. Это позволит не только спасти человечество от угрозы самоуничтожения, но и открыть перед человечеством захватывающую перспективу контроля над старением, увеличения продолжительности жизни.

AMBASSADOR OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

0881
with enclosure by
to the Secretary
by the 1/14/89
the 1/14/89
1/14/89

The Honorable
Brent SCOWCROFT
Advisor to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

February 13, 1989

Dear General:

The 5th USSR's National Congress of gerontologists and geriatrists at its session last November adopted a Message to the peoples of all Nations and decided to send copies of it to President Gorbachev and President Bush.

Enclosed is a copy of this message to President Bush with a covering letter from the President of the USSR Gerontological and Geriatrics Society.

I would appreciate your assistance in seeing that this communication reaches the President.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Yuri V. DUBININ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

RICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0914

February 16, 1989

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *NB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Dubinin on Friday,
February 17, 1989, at 11:00 a.m. (in your office)

According to Sergei Kislyak, Counselor in the Soviet Embassy, Ambassador Dubinin's agenda for Friday is general in nature. Kislyak told me that the Ambassador will raise two specific matters. He would like to hear your views on where the U.S.-Soviet "dialogue" is going and is, in turn, ready to offer his thoughts on the direction of Soviet foreign policy. A brief set of talking points is appended at Tab I.

The Ambassador will also deliver a message from Mrs. Gorbachev to Mrs. Bush concerning their joint sponsorship of a concert in New York for Armenian relief. (Susan Porter Rose has copied you on all correspondence concerning the concert.)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the talking points provided at Tab I for your meeting with Ambassador Dubinin.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Thanks.
[Signature]

Attachment:

Tab I Talking Points for Dubinin Meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on : OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0932 - MR

SCS 5/20/13

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0914

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR DUBININ
FEBRUARY 17, 1989

U.S.-Soviet Dialogue

- At the direction of the President, we are undertaking a comprehensive review of U.S.-Soviet relations as well as other aspects of our foreign policy. It is natural for a new administration to want to take a fresh look at key foreign policy issues. Though the review will be comprehensive it will not be protracted. We expect to complete it within two months.
- We want to build on the achievements of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. We intend to be creative, taking into account the changes that are taking place in your country and in others. But we want to make certain at the outset that we set a course for sustainable progress.
- We took note of the timely withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and urge you to continue to work in the spirit of the Geneva Accords for a stable, non-aligned Afghanistan.
- Progress must be made on all fronts in our relationship; human rights, arms control, settlement of regional conflicts, economic relations and, a new area of emphasis, transnational issues like the environment and problems of terrorism.

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PER E.O. 13526

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SCS 5/20/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- We are watching the process of reform in your country with interest. Political, cultural and economic liberalization in the Soviet Union will make the path toward a more cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship easier.
- The comprehensive review includes an examination of our arms control policies. We cannot yet set a date for resumption of the START talks but strategic arms control will be a very high priority of our administration. Our goal is to enhance stability both through the treaty and through prudent military planning. The number of weapons cut is not the primary issue.
- General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral reduction in Soviet forces was a welcomed and important step. We are particularly encouraged by the emphasis on cuts in heavy armor, as well as other forces that support offensive operations (bridgelaying equipment and paratroopers.) The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations give us an excellent chance to build on that initiative and to lessen dramatically the threat of surprise attack in Europe.

Armenian Relief

- The tragedy of the Armenian earthquake allowed us to see how compassionate our peoples can be toward one another. The concert that Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev are sponsoring will be a symbol of the goodwill that is growing between our citizens.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0914

February 16, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Dubinin on Friday,
February 17, 1989, at 11:00 a.m. (in your office)

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The Ambassador will also deliver a message from Mrs. Gorbachev to Mrs. Bush concerning their joint sponsorship of a concert in New York for Armenian relief. (Susan Porter Rose has copied you on all correspondence concerning the concert.)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the talking points provided at Tab I for your meeting with Ambassador Dubinin.

Approve____Disapprove____

Attachment:

Tab I Talking Points for Dubinin Meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on : OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0932-MR
SCS 5/20/13

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0914

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR DUBININ
FEBRUARY 17, 1989

U.S.-Soviet Dialogue

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- We want to build on the achievements of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. We intend to be creative, taking into account the changes that are taking place in your country and in others. But we want to make certain at the outset that we set a course for sustainable progress.
- We took note of the timely withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and urge you to continue to work in the spirit of the Geneva Accords for a stable, non-aligned Afghanistan.
- Progress must be made on all fronts in our relationship; human rights, arms control, settlement of regional conflicts, economic relations and, a new area of emphasis, transnational issues like the environment and problems of terrorism.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2009-0932-MR
SCS 5/20/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

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Armenian Relief

- The tragedy of the Armenian earthquake allowed us to see how compassionate our peoples can be toward one another. The concert that Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev are sponsoring will be a symbol of the goodwill that is growing between our citizens.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8745

February 14, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Reply to Mrs. Raisa Atlasman's Letter to President Reagan

The subject letter regarding exit permission for the mother, sister, and nephew of Mrs. Atlasman from the Soviet Union is attached at Tab B. She is a former USSR emigre who is now a U.S. citizen. The U.S. Embassy Consular Section has told her that only her elderly mother may depart for the U.S., but that her sister and nephew are to be held on a waiting list. The Department of State has drafted a reply to Mrs. Atlasman attached at Tab A that explains the options available to her.

CR for Robert Blackwill and *CR for* Richard Childress concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum attached at Tab I to Shirley Green forwarding the approved letters for signature.

Approve____Disapprove____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum for Shirley Green
Tab A Draft Letter from the Department
 of State
Tab B Incoming Correspondence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8745

MEMORANDUM FOR SHIRLEY GREEN

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Reply to Mrs. Raisa Atlasman's Letter to President
Reagan

Mrs. Atlasman wrote to President Reagan stating that the U.S. Embassy Consular Section told her that her elderly mother may leave the USSR, but that her sister and nephew are to be held on a waiting list. The Department of State has drafted a response to Mrs. Atlasman explaining the different immigration options available to her. The response has been approved by the NSC for the President's signature.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft Reply from the
Department of State

Tab B Incoming Correspondence

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Ms. Atlasman:

I am responding to your December 6 letter in which you expressed concern over delays in the processing of your family for entry into the United States.

As you are a U.S. citizen, you may petition for your mother to come to the U.S. as an immigrant. This category of immigrant may come to the U.S. as soon as the visa procedures are completed. You should contact the nearest office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for further information. Unfortunately, this option is not available for your sister, who must apply for refugee status.

The dramatic rise in emigration from the Soviet Union in recent months is a human rights and foreign policy accomplishment of the Reagan Administration in which all Americans can take great pride. The resultant increase in the number of Soviets seeking admission to the U.S. has, however, created delays in processing for some applicants. Our Embassy in Moscow has been accepting applications from an average of over 2,000 persons per month since the fall of 1988. By the end of December about 13,000 people were waiting for an interview with INS. The Administration is taking several measures to address this situation.

Raisa Atlasman,
10201 Mason Avenue #18,
Chatsworth, CA 91311.

First, let me say that we remain firm in our open-door policy and are taking extraordinary measures to ensure that Soviet emigrants who fail to qualify for refugee status will still be offered the opportunity to come to the United States. Second, we maintain a policy of granting refugee admission to all Soviet emigrants who qualify as refugees under uniform legal standards; no Soviet emigrant has been denied refugee status because of budgetary limitations. We are not closing our door to Soviet refugees who have no ties to the United States, as we have had to do for refugees from other regions of the world. We also do not require Soviet refugees to accept resettlement elsewhere as we normally do under our policy of "international burdensharing."

The total annual allocation of admissions for fiscal year 1989, however, amounted to only 4,000 refugee numbers. One thousand five hundred refugee numbers were allocated for the first quarter and had been used by the end of October. We ceased interviewing applicants at that point while waiting for new numbers and, more importantly, a longer term plan to deal with the increase in applications.

After consultation with the Judiciary Committees of Congress, we have reallocated 3000 fully-funded refugee numbers from other areas of the world for use by Soviet refugees. We are also working with the private sector in order to use the 6000 admissions numbers for which State Department funding is not available. This group of 6000 is in addition to the 2500 remaining admissions numbers authorized by the President for refugees whose entire support is guaranteed by private sector sponsors.

We have now resumed processing in Moscow. The backlog, which is now six to eight months, will be with us for some time. To be as fair as possible, we do not intend to make exceptions to allow some persons to be processed more rapidly than others. Unfortunately, this means that some applicants will have to wait until their applications can be processed, probably some time in the spring.

I hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further assistance.

Sincerely,



0220

S/S 8836440
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 26, 1989

UNCLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Reply to Mrs. Raisa Atlasman's letter to President
Reagan

Mrs. Raisa Atlasman wrote to President Reagan to request help in expediting the immigration processing of her family in the Soviet Union. Attached is a suggested reply. The reply discusses the different immigration options available to the various members of Mrs. Atlasman's family. It goes on to explain the recent delays in refugee processing at our Embassy in Moscow.

Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

88 JAN 31 11:11

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508


December 20, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State880440
88 DEC 20 3:38 PM

SUBJECT: Letter from Emigre re Family

The attached letter to the President was received from Raisa Atlasman, a former Soviet Jewish emigre who is now a U.S. citizen. The writer's mother, sister, and nephew, who are still in the USSR, have received exit permission from the Soviet Government to join her in the United States. Mrs. Atlasman complains, however, that the U.S. Embassy Consular Section has told only the elderly mother that she may leave, but that the sister and nephew are to be held on a waiting list.

We request that the Department ascertain the details of this case and draft an appropriate response for the signature of a White House official.


Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Original Incoming from Ms. Atlasman

88
DEC 21 A9:32*Received in 5/5-7PM
12/20 at 3:40 PM (CJ)*

8745

December 6, 1988

President Ronald Reagan
Attn: Nelson Ledsky
The White House
Washington, D.C.

I, Raisa Atlasman, a jewish immigrant from USSR and now a citizen of USA wish to express my concern and ask you to help me with my problem.

I have sent out a direct invitation for my mom (Basya Manyak), my sister (Olga Svetlitsa) and her 3-year-old son (Dmitri Svetlitsa) to come to America and live with me in USA under my support. In order to receive permission my sister had to resign her job and whole family had to evacuate their home. Finally, they received the permission from the Soviet Government to leave USSR, but now they are faced with a dilemma with the American Consulate in Moscow. The American Consulate says that my mom can leave any time, but my sister and her son must be put on a waiting list. My mom is 72-year-old woman, who recently had experienced a myocardial infarction and was in a hospital for over a month. My mom is extremely worried what will happen to them without a job, home & money, if they do not receive permission to enter America soon. Because my mom is worried so much, I am afraid that she may have another myocardial infarction and I will never see her again. I don't understand why the American Consulate will not let them go if I am willing to provide all financial support.

Please see what you can do, I will be very grateful to you. Thank you for your time. God bless you! God bless America!

Sincerely,

Raisa Atlasman

Raisa Atlasman
10201 Mason Ave., # 18
Chatsworth, CA 91311
(818) 709-7304

U.S. Denies Refugee Status to 200 Soviet Jews, Armenians

WASHINGTON (AP)—U.S. authorities have denied refugee status to 200 Soviet Jews and Armenians unqualified for admission to the United States as refugees because they were unable to demonstrate "a well-founded fear of persecution," a State Department official said Friday night.

But they could be eligible to enter the country, however, through a process known as parole, said Charles Redman, spokesman for the State Department.

One way or another, the official said, "we intend to admit all Soviet Jewish applicants who choose to come to the United States."

The issue was raised by the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews. The private group released two petitions from Soviet Jews awaiting entrance visas to the United States.

Redman said of more than 4,000 applications for refugee status in 1987 and November, less than 200 were found not to qualify for refugee status. But, he said, "if this occurs, the applicants are given an exception, given the opportunity to apply for parole."

However, Redman said, entering as a refugee provides certain benefits that are not available under parole.

To be granted parole, the U.S. official said, applicants must show they would be supported by a relative or a sponsor in the event they were not found.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

0741

ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Credential Ceremony for Swiss Ambassador
Edouard Brunner, February 7, Residence

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes the attached memorandum of conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

2011-0298.F
5/2/11 14

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0741

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Credential Ceremony for
Ambassador Edouard Brunner of Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
William Bodde, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, European/Canadian Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill (Notetaker)

SWITZERLAND
Ambassador Edouard Brunner

DATE, TIME February 7, 1989, 4:20 p.m. - 4:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: Residence

The President expressed his welcome to the Ambassador and said the United States had much to be grateful for to Switzerland.

The Ambassador replied that he was privileged to be arriving in Washington at the beginning of the Bush Administration, and that in Bern he had been number two in the Foreign Ministry. Noting that he had met the President in 1984 in Geneva, the Ambassador recalled the President's important speech at that time on banning chemical weapons.

With respect to banning chemical weapons, the President expressed the view that verification was a terrible problem. Nevertheless, we had to keep trying and to build world opinion against CW use. The President said the key is to hold the line on CW proliferation, to try to keep the problem from getting worse while we attempt to discover ways to verify a global CW ban.

The Ambassador responded that with regard to chemical weapon exports from Switzerland, if the US Government had reason to believe that Swiss businesses were contributing to the CW proliferation problem, Washington should immediately inform Bern. The Swiss government would be appreciative, not offended.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/3/25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

0739

ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Credential Ceremony for Canadian Ambassador
Derek H. Burney, February 7, Residence

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes the attached memorandum of conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON
REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENTS

2011-0298-F
5/2/11 H

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0739

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Credential Ceremony
for Ambassador Derek H. Burney of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Homme (State/Canadian Affairs)
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill (Notetaker)

CANADA
Ambassador Derek H. Burney

DATE, TIME February 7, 1989, 4:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Residence

The President said how very pleased he was to welcome the Ambassador to Washington and added that he hoped he was not descending on Prime Minister Mulroney too quickly. However, the President had wanted to send a clear signal on the importance he personally attached to the US-Canadian relationship and thought an early visit to Ottawa was the best way to accomplish that goal.

The Ambassador responded that the Prime Minister was delighted that the President's first foreign visit was to Canada. The US-Canadian relationship would only be special if the two governments treated it so.

The President asked how the brief Canadian press conference, called a scrum, would be conducted by the two leaders.

The Ambassador said that the President and the Prime Minister would be expected to make a few brief remarks and then answer a few questions from the press until "you get fed up." Continuing, the Ambassador said he would be shot by his colleagues in Ottawa, if he did not raise the issue of acid rain.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 9/31/15

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The President replied that the Canadians would be pleased with what he would have to say on acid rain in his speech to the Congress and that, after working out an approach with the Hill, the Administration would get to work on the problem with our Canadian friends.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0743

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with FRG
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Chief of Staff John Sununu
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, NSC Staff
(Notetaker)

FRG
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble
Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus
Dr. Christian Ueberschaer (Notetaker)
Heinz Weber (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 9, 1989, 2:50 p.m. - 2:55 p.m.,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President began by noting that Minister Schaeuble would have a good talk with General Scowcroft after the meeting in the Oval Office. He knew Schaeuble had seen Secretary Baker and wanted to stress to the Chancellor that he, the President, was outraged over some of the press stories here concerning West Germany, Libya and CW. The President thought that we could have handled our side a bit better, but we could not control our newspaper columnists. While some laws in the FRG will have to be changed, the Chancellor should know that we are sure that he is determined to stamp out chemical terror. The President wanted the Chancellor to be completely at ease about the US-German relationship which has not been affected in the least by this controversy.

Minister Schaeuble said it was a great honor to be received by the President. Bonn had made it clear that it would do everything possible to stop CW proliferation. Within a short time, there would be legislation in the FRG which would make it much more difficult for companies to export chemical technology.

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The President responded that he appreciated personally the spirit of this visit. Although verifying a CW ban was extraordinarily difficult, we had to go on working on the problem.

Turning to SNF, Minister Schaeuble said that the FRG was completely against a third zero. The Baker trip to Europe would help coordinate US-German views on this subject. Bonn was very grateful for the trip. The Minister commented that it was important not to isolate SNF modernization, but instead to fit it into a comprehensive concept of dealing with Gorbachev.

Replying to the President's question concerning German public opinion and the third zero, Minister Schaeuble said that Bonn could run into difficulties on the matter but was determined to prevail.

The President said that each time Gorbachev makes a forthcoming, interesting speech, it was all the more important for the Alliance to stay together. He asked Schaeuble to convey to the Chancellor that our policy reviews were not born of fear but instead rested on our judgment that there were new opportunities in East-West relations. At an appropriate time, the President went on, he would meet with Gorbachev. But this would only be done on the basis of complete consensus within the Alliance. In this context, it was important to think creatively on arms control, Eastern Europe, regional tensions, and so forth. So we are in a thoughtful mood here in Washington. The President said that he was sure Gorbachev understood this and was willing to wait until the United States was ready to proceed.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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0743

ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Meeting with FRG Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble,
February 9, Oval Office

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes the attached memorandum of conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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WITH ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

0740

ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Credential Ceremony for Norwegian Ambassador
Kjeld Vibe, February 7, Residence

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes the attached memorandum of conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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ATTACHMENTS

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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0740

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Credential Ceremony for
Ambassador Kjeld Vibe of Norway

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
William Bodde, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, European/Canadian Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill (Notetaker)

NORWAY
Ambassador Kjeld Vibe

DATE, TIME February 7, 1989, 3:50 p.m. - 3:55 p.m.,
AND PLACE: Residence

The President welcomed the Ambassador and said the Ambassador had his best wishes in his new assignment. In terms of substance, the President stressed how much importance we put on NATO and how much we valued the Norwegian contribution to the Alliance. The President asked the Ambassador to convey his respects to the Prime Minister, whom he had seen in both Oslo and Washington in recent years, and to His Majesty.

Indicating that he had seen the King just before departing Oslo, the Ambassador said His Majesty had asked him to convey congratulations to the President on his inauguration. The King will visit Texas privately in the spring to oversee a regatta in Galveston and would like to make a courtesy call on the President.

The President responded that, if he is in the country, he would very much like to see the King.

Continuing, the Ambassador said that Prime Minister Brundtland would be in Washington in May and would also like to have a talk with the President.

The President replied that he was sure something could be worked out and asked the Ambassador to pass his best wishes to the Prime Minister.

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By SS NARA, Date 9/3/25

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Responding to the Ambassador's comment that all Western Europeans appreciated Secretary Baker's impending visit, the President noted that the Baker trip demonstrated our keen interest in the real meaning of consultation. We wanted to signal to our friends in NATO that we are determined to have a solid front before dealing with Gorbachev. Although we are now involved in internal policy reviews, these in no way indicate that we are dragging our feet. When we go forward with Gorbachev, the President emphasized, we will do so after a careful policy re-evaluation, and completely in step with our European friends.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL

RB

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Meeting with FRG Federal Democratic Party
Chairman, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, February 8,
Oval Office

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes the attached
memorandum of conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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0742

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with FRG
Free Democratic Party Chairman,
Otto Graf Lambsdorff

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill (Notetaker)

FRG
FDP Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff
Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus
Hagen Graf Lambsdorff (Economic Counselor)
Klaus-Peter Gottwald (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 8, 1989, 4:15 p.m. - 4:20 p.m.,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President asked Count Lambsdorff how his visit was going.

The Count responded that he had just had a good conversation with General Scowcroft on SNF and had seen many friends in the Congress during the last few days.

The President said he wanted to stress that there were no lasting differences between Bonn and Washington on the problem of German companies furnishing Libya with CW technology. There had been some outrageous newspaper columns in the United States on the subject, and the President wanted to stress that he knew the Chancellor was completely committed to doing the right thing. The Administration had nothing but the highest possible respect for West Germany.

Continuing, the President noted that he was very interested in how public opinion was developing in the FRG on nuclear issues. He said he was troubled by some of the stories he read concerning some views on this subject in West Germany.

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Count Lambsdorff stressed that our two countries have the same target, to keep Western Europe strong. At the same time, the present coalition did not want to commit political suicide by pushing SNF modernization forward too quickly.

Turning to our internal policy reviews, the President stressed that there would be no procrastination. We would complete the studies as soon as prudently possible and would then move forward in our dealings with the Soviet Union on the basis of agreement with our Allies.

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8900739
RECEIVED: 13 FEB 89 09

TO: HUGHES

FROM: BLACKWILL

DOC DATE: 16 FEB 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA

AP

φ

PERSONS: BURNEY, DEREK H

SUBJECT: MEMCON RE PRES CREDENTIAL CEREMONY FOR CANADIAN AMB 7 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY HUGHES

DUE DATE: 16 FEB 89

STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLACKWILL

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSREB

CLOSED BY: NSMDC

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By 15 NARA, Date 5/2/11

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8900739

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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X 89022710 NOTED BY HUGHES

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White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By H NARA, Date 5/3/11

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ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Credential Ceremony for Canadian Ambassador
Derek H. Burney, February 7, Residence

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and retain for record purposes the attached memorandum of conversation.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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0739

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Credential Ceremony
for Ambassador Derek H. Burney of Canada

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Homme (State/Canadian Affairs)
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill (Notetaker)

CANADA
Ambassador Derek H. Burney

DATE, TIME February 7, 1989, 4:10 p.m.
AND PLACE: Residence

The President said how very pleased he was to welcome the Ambassador to Washington and added that he hoped he was not descending on Prime Minister Mulroney too quickly. However, the President had wanted to send a clear signal on the importance he personally attached to the US-Canadian relationship and thought an early visit to Ottawa was the best way to accomplish that goal.

The Ambassador responded that the Prime Minister was delighted that the President's first foreign visit was to Canada. The US-Canadian relationship would only be special if the two governments treated it so.

The President asked how the brief Canadian press conference, called a scrum, would be conducted by the two leaders.

The Ambassador said that the President and the Prime Minister would be expected to make a few brief remarks and then answer a few questions from the press until "you get fed up." Continuing, the Ambassador said he would be shot by his colleagues in Ottawa, if he did not raise the issue of acid rain.

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The President replied that the Canadians would be pleased with what he would have to say on acid rain in his speech to the Congress and that, after working out an approach with the Hill, the Administration would get to work on the problem with our Canadian friends.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Meeting with FRG Federal Democratic Party
Chairman, Otto Graf Lambsdorff, February 8,
Oval Office

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

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Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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0742

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with FRG
Free Democratic Party Chairman,
Otto Graf Lambsdorff

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill (Notetaker)

FRG
FDP Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff
Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus
Hagen Graf Lambsdorff (Economic Counselor)
Klaus-Peter Gottwald (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 8, 1989, 4:15 p.m. - 4:20 p.m.,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President asked Count Lambsdorff how his visit was going.

The Count responded that he had just had a good conversation with General Scowcroft on SNF and had seen many friends in the Congress during the last few days.

The President said he wanted to stress that there were no lasting differences between Bonn and Washington on the problem of German companies furnishing Libya with CW technology. There had been some outrageous newspaper columns in the United States on the subject, and the President wanted to stress that he knew the Chancellor was completely committed to doing the right thing. The Administration had nothing but the highest possible respect for West Germany.

Continuing, the President noted that he was very interested in how public opinion was developing in the FRG on nuclear issues. He said he was troubled by some of the stories he read concerning some views on this subject in West Germany.

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Count Lambsdorff stressed that our two countries have the same target, to keep Western Europe strong. At the same time, the present coalition did not want to commit political suicide by pushing SNF modernization forward too quickly.

Turning to our internal policy reviews, the President stressed that there would be no procrastination. We would complete the studies as soon as prudently possible and would then move forward in our dealings with the Soviet Union on the basis of agreement with our Allies.

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ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL RB

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Credential Ceremony for Swiss Ambassador
Edouard Brunner, February 7, Residence

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

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Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Credential Ceremony for
Ambassador Edouard Brunner of Switzerland

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
William Bodde, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, European/Canadian Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill (Notetaker)

SWITZERLAND
Ambassador Edouard Brunner

DATE, TIME February 7, 1989, 4:20 p.m. - 4:25 p.m.
AND PLACE: Residence

The President expressed his welcome to the Ambassador and said the United States had much to be grateful for to Switzerland.

The Ambassador replied that he was privileged to be arriving in Washington at the beginning of the Bush Administration, and that in Bern he had been number two in the Foreign Ministry. Noting that he had met the President in 1984 in Geneva, the Ambassador recalled the President's important speech at that time on banning chemical weapons.

With respect to banning chemical weapons, the President expressed the view that verification was a terrible problem. Nevertheless, we had to keep trying and to build world opinion against CW use. The President said the key is to hold the line on CW proliferation, to try to keep the problem from getting worse while we attempt to discover ways to verify a global CW ban.

The Ambassador responded that with regard to chemical weapon exports from Switzerland, if the US Government had reason to believe that Swiss businesses were contributing to the CW proliferation problem, Washington should immediately inform Bern. The Swiss government would be appreciative, not offended.

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By SS NARA, Date 9/3/25

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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ACTION

February 16, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR G. PHILIP HUGHES

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: President's
Meeting with FRG Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble,
February 9, Oval Office

Attached at Tab I is the subject memorandum of conversation.

RECOMMENDATION

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Attachment

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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0743

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with FRG
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble

PARTICIPANTS: US
The President
Chief of Staff John Sununu
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Robert D. Blackwill, NSC Staff
(Notetaker)

FRG
Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble
Ambassador Juergen Ruhfus
Dr. Christian Ueberschaer (Notetaker)
Heinz Weber (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME February 9, 1989, 2:50 p.m. - 2:55 p.m.,
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President began by noting that Minister Schaeuble would have a good talk with General Scowcroft after the meeting in the Oval Office. He knew Schaeuble had seen Secretary Baker and wanted to stress to the Chancellor that he, the President, was outraged over some of the press stories here concerning West Germany, Libya and CW. The President thought that we could have handled our side a bit better, but we could not control our newspaper columnists. While some laws in the FRG will have to be changed, the Chancellor should know that we are sure that he is determined to stamp out chemical terror. The President wanted the Chancellor to be completely at ease about the US-German relationship which has not been affected in the least by this controversy.

Minister Schaeuble said it was a great honor to be received by the President. Bonn had made it clear that it would do everything possible to stop CW proliferation. Within a short time, there would be legislation in the FRG which would make it much more difficult for companies to export chemical technology.

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2

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

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February 16, 1989

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has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *NB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Ambassador Dubinin on Friday,
February 17, 1989, at 11:00 a.m. (in your office)

According to Sergei Kislyak, Counselor in the Soviet Embassy, Ambassador Dubinin's agenda for Friday is general in nature. Kislyak told me that the Ambassador will raise two specific matters. He would like to hear your views on where the U.S.-Soviet "dialogue" is going and is, in turn, ready to offer his thoughts on the direction of Soviet foreign policy. A brief set of talking points is appended at Tab I.

The Ambassador will also deliver a message from Mrs. Gorbachev to Mrs. Bush concerning their joint sponsorship of a concert in New York for Armenian relief. (Susan Porter Rose has copied you on all correspondence concerning the concert.)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you review the talking points provided at Tab I for your meeting with Ambassador Dubinin.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Thanks.
[Signature]

Attachment:

Tab I Talking Points for Dubinin Meeting

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR DUBININ
FEBRUARY 17, 1989

U.S.-Soviet Dialogue

- At the direction of the President, we are undertaking a comprehensive review of U.S.-Soviet relations as well as other aspects of our foreign policy. It is natural for a new administration to want to take a fresh look at key foreign policy issues. Though the review will be comprehensive it will not be protracted. We expect to complete it within two months.
- We want to build on the achievements of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. We intend to be creative, taking into account the changes that are taking place in your country and in others. But we want to make certain at the outset that we set a course for sustainable progress.
- We took note of the timely withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and urge you to continue to work in the spirit of the Geneva Accords for a stable, non-aligned Afghanistan.
- Progress must be made on all fronts in our relationship; human rights, arms control, settlement of regional conflicts, economic relations and, a new area of emphasis, transnational issues like the environment and problems of terrorism.

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- We are watching the process of reform in your country with interest. Political, cultural and economic liberalization in the Soviet Union will make the path toward a more cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship easier.
- The comprehensive review includes an examination of our arms control policies. We cannot yet set a date for resumption of the START talks but strategic arms control will be a very high priority of our administration. Our goal is to enhance stability both through the treaty and through prudent military planning. The number of weapons cut is not the primary issue.
- General Secretary Gorbachev's announcement of a unilateral reduction in Soviet forces was a welcomed and important step. We are particularly encouraged by the emphasis on cuts in heavy armor, as well as other forces that support offensive operations (bridgelaying equipment and paratroopers.) The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations give us an excellent chance to build on that initiative and to lessen dramatically the threat of surprise attack in Europe.

Armenian Relief

- The tragedy of the Armenian earthquake allowed us to see how compassionate our peoples can be toward one another. The concert that Mrs. Bush and Mrs. Gorbachev are sponsoring will be a symbol of the goodwill that is growing between our citizens.

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