

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Media Articles Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 85044
Folder ID Number: 85044-012

Folder Title:
September 1992

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

SEPTEMBER

NY Chapter Honors General Scowcroft

General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to President Bush, was presented the Theodore Roosevelt Award during a meeting of the Empire State Society's New York Chapter attended by over 200 Compatriots and guests.

Named after our 26th President — who was a founding member of the Chapter — the award is given to "outstanding Americans without regard to political affiliation; its objective is to acknowledge those who have served our country with the same dedication, integrity and love of country as Theodore Roosevelt and to encourage others to follow his example." Established in 1985 by Compatriot Gynn, the award has been given to such personages as Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney (in 1990), former Senator J. William Fullbright and astronaut Alan B. Shepard, Jr.

Among the guests were the Hon. Alistair J. Hunter, CMG, British Consul General in New York; Edward Luck, President of the United Nations Association of the U.S.; Capt. Donald J. Ferguson, Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Merchant Marine Acad-



Presenting the Theodore Roosevelt Award to General Brent Scowcroft (right) was New York Chapter President Edward J. Gynn.

emy and Vice Admiral Paul A. Welling, USCG, Commander Atlantic Area.



"JB" KB7YX (center) was proud to present the special heroism certificate to Andy UA3AB (left) and Romeo 3W3RR.

Russians Saluted

During August, 1991 — while the world watched in wonder at the events that changed history — two amateur radio operators placed their lives on the line to provide communications to the outside while the Russian "White House" was under siege. From inside, President Boris Yeltsin and others were able to get the only reliable word to reach many audiences throughout Russia and the world via radio through the combined efforts of Romeo Stephnenko 3W3RR and Andy Chesnokov UA3AB.

Northern Nevada was honored with a visit by the two Russians earlier this year according to a report by J. B. Coats, at the time serving as Vice-President General for the Western District. They recounted their experiences and adventures at a meeting in Minden attended by over 60 Compatriots, radio hams and guests. On behalf of the National Society, VPG Coats (KB7YX) presented a special "Certificate for Distinguished Heroism" to the pair in recognition of "Outstanding Bravery and Self-Sacrifice in the face of imminent danger during the attempted coup upon the Russian White House in August 1991 thus exemplifying the high ideals and principles which motivated and sustained our own patriot ancestors."

Nominations Due by December 31

Former President General George H. Brandau, M.D., Chairman of the Nominating Committee, has announced that nominations for 1993-94 General Officers must be received by him with supporting data, no later than December 31, 1992 at this address: 3703 Olympia Drive, Houston, TX 77019. Included must be a statement from each proposed candidate that he assents to the nomination and agrees to serve if elected. Endorsements by Districts, State Societies, Chapters or Compatriots may also be sent to the Committee; the deadline for these is

also December 31.

Other Committee members, in accordance with the Society's Bylaws, are: Former Presidents General James R. Calhoun, Nolan W. Carson, Charles F. Printz and James R. Westlake; State Society Presidents Larry D. Jester (AR), James A. McCafferty (MD) and Allen W. Moore (IN); and National Trustees William H. Lees (IA) and Thomas R. Topping (NC).

Each year the Council of State Presidents elects three of their members, while the President General names the Trustees.



TENDER LOVING CARE — Virginia Frost Jillson, a Maine DAR and wife of Maine Society Compatriot Ephraim Jillson, recently discovered that the tombstone of her Revolutionary War ancestor, Elkanah Dyer, had been knocked over and vandalized. To rectify the situation, the couple took the steps shown in these photos. **LEFT:** Compatriot Jillson dug a hole for the form preparatory to setting the stone in concrete. **CENTER:** Mrs. Jillson checked her work to see that the stone was standing properly. **RIGHT:** The couple and their daughter, Patricia, admired the handiwork! Patricia had located

remnants of the stone, thus facilitating the restoration and installation accomplished by her parents. According to information for this story supplied by Society Secretary Harry W. Kinsey, Jr., the stonecutter spelled the soldier's name differently from his records. He emphasizes that "this provides a reminder that spelling rules and concerns were developed in the mid-1800s and that, before then, people spelled phonetically; when the names were unusual, so frequently were the inscriptions."

Ban on F-16 Sales to Taiwan May End

Bush Move Would Save 3,000 Jobs in Texas, a Prize Election State

W. Post 9/2/92

By Daniel Southerland
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush, facing election-year pressure in Texas, plans to announce the lifting of a ban on the sale of F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan during a visit to a General Dynamics plant in Fort Worth today, Sen. Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) said yesterday.

A White House spokesman declined to confirm the report, but congressional sources said the president's decision to go ahead with the controversial sale would save at least 3,000 jobs in Texas and as many as 7,000 jobs elsewhere in the nation.

Taiwan has been barred from purchasing F-16 fighter jets from General Dynamics for the past decade because of a 1982 U.S.-China agreement under which the Reagan administration pledged to reduce and eventually phase out arms sales to Taiwan as tensions eased between mainland China and Taiwan. But the congressionally mandated Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 said that the United States reserved the right to sell arms to Taiwan to maintain the island's security.

China is expected to react strongly against the F-16 sale. Chinese Embassy officials here had

already quietly warned against the proposed sale in a meeting with State Department officials, one source said.

But some Chinese specialists say Beijing is likely to avoid a break with the administration because Chinese officials would much prefer to see Bush remain in the White House, given the moderated policy he has pursued toward their country. By contrast, Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton, during his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention in July, spoke of the "tyrants" in Beijing.

Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, in an appearance on the NBC program "Meet the Press" last Sunday, said the administration had decided to review its policy of not selling F-16s to Taiwan mainly because China had purchased advanced fighters from Russia.

Scowcroft also noted that France is negotiating over a possible sale of fighters to Taiwan. Taiwan has indicated it would buy the more expensive French Mirage 2000 fighter if the proposed F-16 sale does not go through.

Taiwan is also said by informed sources to have been negotiating over the possible acquisition of advanced fighter plane technology from Israel.

The sale of 120 to 180 F-16s could be worth as much as \$6 billion over a six-year period, according to analysts. One congressional specialist said the F-16 sale would open the door to other types of arms sales to Taiwan, including tanks and armored personnel carriers.

Bush is also expected soon to recommend a \$5 billion sale of 72 F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. But unlike the Taiwan deal, this sale would likely trigger a major political battle, given opposition to it from supporters of Israel in Congress and elsewhere in the United States.

In pursuing the Saudi sale, Bush is likely to be helped by a statement from Clinton, who said a week ago that the United States is now in a position to conclude the proposed F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia provided some curbs are placed on the type of technology in the aircraft sold so as not to violate security commitments to Israel.

Officials at McDonnell Douglas, the St. Louis-based aircraft company, have said that as many as 20,000 jobs could be lost if the United States fails to go ahead with the Saudi sale. The company has been hit hard by reduced commercial airplane purchases and cuts in defense spending resulting from the end of the Cold War.

W. Post 9/2/92

David S. Broder

The 'Possible Truth'

It was a mean thing to do to one of Washington's straight-shooters. But presumably when Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the White House national security adviser, accepted the invitation from NBC-TV's "Meet the Press," he knew that the questions would not be softballs.

In any event, Scowcroft came up with a very useful phrase as he was pressed at one point about fresh evidence challenging President Bush's account of his role, as vice president, in the Iran-contra affair.

A bit of background: Five years ago this month, Bush told me in an interview that in the critical period of 1985-86 when the ill-fated arms sale to Iran was being debated inside the Reagan administration, he never weighed in against it because he had never heard the objections being raised by Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Not once but three times, he said in the interview that he was unaware of their arguments. "If I'd have sat there and heard George Shultz and Cap [Weinberger] express it strongly," he said, "maybe I would have had a stronger view. But when you don't know something, it's hard to react. . . . We were not in the loop."

The story on the interview ran in The Post on Aug. 6, 1987, and last week, for the first time, I learned what the reaction had been. The special prosecutor who has filed charges against Weinberger introduced a pre-trial document quoting from a memo Shultz dictated to his assistant the day after the story ran.

It said: "VP [Bush] in papers yesterday said he not exposed to Cap or my arguments on Iran arms. Cap called me [and] said that's terrible. He [Bush] was on the other side,

It's on the Record. Why did he say that?

"On 'Meet the Press' I asked Scowcroft, who was one of the three members of the Tower Commission, which did the first investigation of the Iran-contra affair, what he made of it. He said the commission had not seen this memo, and 'we had no indication he [Bush] was an active player in this.'"

Since he knew Shultz and Weinberger well, I asked, did he think Bush's statement was truthful?

It was an uncomfortable moment. Scowcroft's answer: "I think it's quite possible it was a truthful statement."

Possibly true. What an artful phrase. Possibly true but, obviously, by implication, possibly not.

Bush himself last week brushed aside a news conference question about the Shultz memo, saying he had not bothered to read the news stories about it and adding, "I see no reason to contradict myself at all." But the contradictions to his accounts of his non-involvement in the biggest scandal of the Reagan years are many. He has denied any direct role in the decision to sell arms, even though others say he was an advocate and was present when the issue was debated. And he has denied knowing anything about the diversion of funds to the contras, even though some of the principals in that diversion were in regular contact with Bush's own national security adviser, Donald Gregg, and, on occasion, with Bush himself.

Iran-contra is history, even though Weinberger, who honorably opposed the folly, is being hauled into the dock by the special prosecutor. What gives this episode its relevance is Bush's effort to make "trust" a theme of his reelection campaign.

The Bush organization's prime argument that challenger Bill Clinton is not to be trusted goes back to Clinton's avoidance of the Vietnam War draft. Clinton sought to preempt the attack in a speech to the American Legion last week. This time he began with his getting a draft induction notice while studying at Oxford. Earlier in the year, before the press learned of it, Clinton omitted that event from his narrative and even claimed that this event—a memorable moment for millions of others—had no special significance to him. When he spoke to the Legion, it was front and center.

What he didn't tell the Legion was that he later thanked the colonel who had accepted his promise to join a University of Arkansas R.O.T.C. unit "for saving me from the draft." Nor did he acknowledge that in the letter to Col. Eugene Holmes, he had said that he had finally "decided to accept the draft in spite of my beliefs for one reason: to maintain my political viability within the system."

And he certainly did not admit in his Legion address that in the same letter he wrote of "loathing the military, to which you and other good men have devoted years." Quite the contrary. "I was never against the heroic men who served in that war," Clinton told the Legion. "I honored your service then, and I honor it still."

Clinton's speech to the American Legion fits perfectly into Scowcroft's category of the "possibly true."

The voters could better focus on the alternatives the two candidates are offering if Bush and Clinton could find it in themselves to remove the demeaning adverb from their accounts about these episodes in their pasts.

1982 Arms Policy With China Victim Of Bush Campaign, Texas Lobbying

W. Post 9/4/92

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

On July 14, Rep. Joe Barton (R-Tex.) received an urgent plea from General Dynamics Corp. executives in Fort Worth to help reverse a 10-year-old U.S. policy limiting U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

Close to 3,000 Texas jobs were at stake, the officials said, in the potential sale of F-16 warplanes to the anticommunist bastion off the Chinese coast.

Standing in the way of the \$6 billion deal was the 1982 Joint Communiqué between the United States and China, which ended a tense and lengthy standoff between the two nations over arming Taiwan. Negotiated by the Reagan administration, it committed the United States not to exceed previous arms sales levels to Taiwan "either in qualitative or quantitative terms" and to "reduce gradually" the sales over years to come.

After a two-hour briefing from the company, Barton telephoned W. Henson Moore, then deputy White House chief of staff, to plead the case for approving the controversial sale, Barton said in an interview yesterday.

Almost immediately, the National Security Council staff and other elements of the White House conducted a "quick-and-dirty" review of the sale and of China-Taiwan arms policy, tentatively concluding that the sale "had a lot of merit," Barton was informed.

Shortly thereafter, according to Barton, more extensive studies were ordered in the State and Defense departments leading to a final interagency review that was completed late last week—in time for President Bush to make a formal announcement before cheering workers at the General Dynamics plant in Fort Worth Wednesday that the plane sale had been approved.

Since mid-July, Barton said, he and other Texas lawmakers had lobbied strenuously for the F-16 sale in conversations with Bush, White House Chief of Staff James A. Baker III, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger

last year. The F-16 sale, which will be by far the largest and most important since the decade-old agreement, would sharply reverse the downward trend.

Several experts on U.S.-China relations said Bush's decision is dramatic evidence of the reduced importance of ties with China in U.S. eyes since Beijing's 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators and the end of the Cold War. Noting that arms sales to Taiwan have been a major issue with Beijing since the 1970s, Harry Harding of Brookings Institution said that in today's Washington climate the an-

swer among officials to China's objections can be summed up as, "Who cares?"

State Department officials as well as outside experts said they are uncertain how strong China's reaction to the sale will be, beyond the official protests received yesterday. An official said it is still unclear whether China's senior leader, Deng Xiaoping, has decided to risk further serious deterioration in Sino-American relations by symbolic and substantive actions, or to swallow hard and hope that a re-elected Bush will rescue the flagging ties between the two nations.

and other senior officials. At the same time, Texas Democrats, while joining appeals to approve the sale, began attacking Bush for caring more about the communist regime in Beijing than about jobs of workers in the Lone Star State.

Bush, in announcing his decision, said it "does not change the commitment of this administration and its predecessors to the agreements previously negotiated with China. Ignoring the U.S. promise to cap and reduce arms sales to Taiwan, Bush said that to him "the importance of the '82 communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan lies in its promotion of common political goals—peace and stability in the area through mutual restraint."

The State Department, making the case yesterday for the sale, said that "the aging of Taiwan's air force and China's purchase of Russian SU-27 aircraft were among the factors considered in the president's decision." Department spokesman Joseph Snyder argued that it is now impossible for the United States to provide spare parts for Taiwan's obsolescent U.S. warplanes and thus "we're maintaining the quality of that air force in the only way we have available."

In answer to questions about the level of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since the 1982 agreement, the State Department provided figures showing sales rising from \$525 million in 1982 to \$707 million in 1984 and then gradually declining on a nearly steady path to \$479 million

Baker's Fix-It Campaign Becoming More Visible

W. Post 9/14/92

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

When James A. Baker III and his team took over the White House operation two weeks ago, the president had been committed for weeks to address a convention of followers of Pat Robertson and his Christian Coalition.

Within days, the Baker team—convinced by results from their focus groups and their own political instincts that further public focus on Bush's courtship of the Christian right would be a mistake—moved to situate the speech among Friday's presidential events in a way that would restrict, if not eliminate, massive media coverage.

The speech was timed for 7:40 p.m., 10 minutes after the last network news program and well past the early weekend deadlines of

many newspapers. To deflect attention from the speech, Baker cranked up the national security process to approve the sale of F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia in time for Bush to make the announcement early Friday to a cheering crowd of defense workers in Missouri.

The attention the new Bush team devoted to "fixing" the Robertson event is in microcosm the story of the changes underway in the White House since Samuel K. Skinner's departure as White House chief of staff and his replacement by Baker.

White House and campaign aides said that last week and this week will offer the full flavor of the Baker operation designed to fix a presidency many felt was going down the drain.

It already is clear that the president, long disdainful of handlers,

See BAKER, A10, Col. 3

Baker's Fix-It Operation Begins to Show

BAKER, From A1

has turned himself over to Baker and his team, who determine where he goes, what he says, how it looks and how it all is executed.

Said one of the pre-Baker occupants of the White House: "It was a bloodless coup. Most of us don't know what's going on anymore, aren't asked for our opinions, and don't much care. When there's blood in the streets, a dictator can look pretty good."

The signs of the Baker takeover are everywhere. Over the past three weeks, the team has seized control of the speechwriting, scheduling and advance operations, bringing longtime Bush confidant and former Cabinet secretary David Bates back from his law practice to head a small team on Bush's plane assigned to execute the decisions made by the policymakers back in Washington.

The Baker team has ordered revisions in how the campaign budget will be spent and has begun revamping the campaign advertising operation. Baker also has taken control of strategic political issues such as when to debate, under what conditions and what message Bush will deliver each day, as well as ensuring that the White House and campaign work in unison to keep anyone else from overshadowing or interfering with the message. He has established "quick-turnaround" systems to move Bush swiftly—both physically and rhetorically—from one direction to another, an essential capability in a fast-moving campaign.

The Baker team is embarked on a two-sided effort to draw voters back to the president. It hopes to win support for Bush by convincing voters that he has a "coherent" plan to mend the economy and a commitment to carry the plan forward, and to pull voters away from Bill Clinton by raising questions about Clinton's credibility on character and substance.

White House and campaign officials called Bush's speech to the Detroit Economic Club last week an effort to assemble a "coherent" economic plan.

The same aides acknowledge it will be more difficult to convince voters that he actually will follow the plan and that the changes he brings will be better for them than Clinton's. "You may not like what he said, but you cannot say he has no plan," said one official at the end of the week. "We needed to get the campaign off the theme that Bush was for status quo and Clinton for change. The point of the exercise was to say change will occur under both men, but our kind of change is better for you than his."

This week will offer a flavor of both sides of the Bush campaign coin—economics and character.

The president, who left for the West Coast yesterday, will offer himself as an example of reasonable balance on one element of economic renewal, environmental issues. Bush, his aides said, will make his case for a "balanced" approach on environmental issues that takes into account job

as an extremist, willing to sacrifice jobs for owls and tree toads.

On Tuesday Bush will fly to Utah to address a convention of National Guardsmen. Vice President Quayle had been scheduled to address the group, but Baker decided on Friday to have Bush directly enter the debate over Clinton's military service record.

"With fewer than 50 days left to the election, the time for surrogates on an issue like this before an audience like that is past," one official said. Senior campaign and administration officials said the president's point will not be to call Clinton a draft dodger but to suggest he is not offering the full story of his history.

Since Labor Day, the president has been "seeding," as one aide put it, his speeches with questions about Clinton's credibility, accusing him of "waffling and wavering" on issues ranging from the North America Free Trade Agreement to the Persian Gulf War.

On a broader front, Baker has used all the advantages of incumbency. "There is going to be one Santa Claus this election season," said one GOP official, "and Baker is determined it will be Bush." The effort is visible in the announcement of government contracts in states where jobs are affected and in the decision to commit massive federal resources to hurricane-stricken Florida. The exercise of incumbency also involved last Thursday's use of one of the powerful symbols of the White House, the Oval Office, for a five-minute Bush commercial on his economic plan.

Part of Baker's influence can be seen in his pulling back to the White House the advance apparatus, which selects sites for Bush events. Several weeks before Baker came on board, the White House had given away to the campaign much of that advance operation, which is vital because it controls how events look on television. Now Gary Foster, a skilled advance man, has returned to the White House staff. Karen Groom, who led Baker's advance operation, came with him to the White House. John Keller, another skilled advance man who was undersecretary of commerce, also was pulled into the White House operation.

The White House under Baker bears little resemblance to the operation under Skinner or his predecessor, John H. Sununu. It also does not look much like the one Baker ran in Ronald Reagan's White House when he had to share power with Michael K. Deaver and Edwin Meese III, the two other members of the ruling triumvirate in Reagan's first term.

Instead, it resembles the Baker State Department in its tight structure, closely held information, love of strategic surprise, and attention to controlling news media coverage. Baker meets daily at 7:30 a.m. with his four top aides, all of whom came with him from the State Department and had worked in Bush's 1988 campaign—Robert B. Zoellick and Dennis Ross, the senior policy advisers, and Margaret Tutwiler and Janet G. Mullins, the implement-

Added to this group are Office of Management and Budget Director Richard G. Darman, a longtime Baker aide; press secretary Marlin Fitzwater; and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. The two top campaign officials, Robert M. Teeter and Frederic V. Malek, are included in the early morning meeting that Baker is said to run from a strict agenda that leaves little room for argument or wide discussion.

Zoellick, who is deputy chief of staff, runs the daily senior White House staff meeting and hands out assignments. Much of the senior staff, not part of the Baker circle, rarely meets with him. A brainy policymaker, who loves five-part plans and six-point programs and the interconnectedness of the global economy, Zoellick supervises the speechwriting apparatus and is one of three "conceptualizers," in the words of one White House aide. Darman and Ross are the others.

They join with Baker in the "big-picture" efforts to conceive major addresses, such as the one Bush gave on the economy Thursday, repackaging a variety of his proposals under a new "agenda for economic renewal" rubric.

Tutwiler is the new communications director, but her real job appears to be an insider fix-it role, arranging systems that keep the trains running, forcing the decision-making process, holding hands with key Republicans outside the White House to get their problems handled, and advising Baker and the rest of the team on Bush's message. The closest of Baker's political aides, Tutwiler, as one assistant puts it, "had the mandate to add her two cents' worth" in virtually everything. She has, however, deliberately stepped out of the picture in direct press relations. "That is Marlin Fitzwater's job," she said. "He does not work for me, and I hope I don't interfere."

Mullins, the other politician in the group, is political director, supervising the directly political operation and keeping constant contact with the campaign.

Tutwiler and Mullins both bring to the White House what one outside friend of theirs—a woman—called the "chick check," a female sensibility. Both were said by others to have staunchly objected to the convention attacks on Hillary Clinton, saying they would likely turn off women voters. Both have stressed that it is important for Bush to take actions that show concern for average people rather than simply saying he is concerned. For example, Bush went to Florida after the hurricane and is "following through. . . . That is a real message of caring," said one official, describing the difference between what Bush might have said two months ago and the way he is responding now.

Ultimately, outside Republicans and Baker aides themselves say a smoother White House operation will not determine the election. "Everyone says we would have lost without it," said one administration official, but he adds, "if it were not for Baker's operation, we would have lost."

Among White House Staffers, Salaries Range From \$12,385 to \$125,100

By Kenneth J. Cooper
Washington Post Staff Writer

A House subcommittee has fired another shot in the "perk wars" between Congress and the White House by releasing a list of salaries for White House employees, ranging from high-powered advisers to telephone operators and maids.

The 60-page list shows that the top employees were paid \$125,100, more than 10 times as much as the lowest paid "student assistants," who received \$12,385. Full- and part-time employees are not clearly distinguished on the list, which includes political appointees and civil servants.

More men than women receive top salaries, and some female su-

pervisors earned significantly less than men with apparently similar responsibilities.

Over White House objections, the House Post Office and Civil Service human resources subcommittee, which earlier questioned President Bush's travel expenses, decided Thursday to make public the salaries of more than 1,000 White House employees during fiscal year 1991. The pay figures were first disclosed by States News Service.

The human resources subcommittee also endorsed legislation that would mandate the White House disclose salary and operating expenditures twice a year.

Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski (D-Pa.), the subcommittee's chairman, and Rep. James P. Moran (D-Va.) argued that

expenditures for the White House ought to be public, just as House and Senate expenses are. Agreeing with the Democrats was the panel's ranking Republican, Rep. Dan Burton (Ind.), who at other hearings has denounced inquiries about executive travel expenses as partisan, election-year attacks.

"His salary and our salaries are public record, and people can look that up. So why not the White House?" Mark A. Walker, a spokesman for Burton, asked.

One Democratic subcommittee aide described the release as "full disclosure," the same slogan that Republican members used to press the House to divulge the names of members who had at least one overdraft at the now-closed House Bank.

The White House submitted the salary list with each page stamped "not for publication" in two places and asked the subcommittee not to release the information.

A White House spokeswoman accused the subcommittee of playing politics in releasing the kind of information it has kept confidential since 1978. "Why did they choose to disregard their 14-year practice of not publishing names?" asked Judy A. Smith, White House spokeswoman.

"President Bush has been campaigning on the basis that Congress is full of perks and privilege," Moran said. "If there's more perks up in Congress than in the White House, he should be willing to disclose [the list] . . . I don't see who gets hurt by public disclosure un-

less there's something they don't want the public to know."

Just like power in the Bush White House, compensation in 1991 was more heavily distributed to men than women.

A total of 15 men received the top pay, compared to two women—Cabinet Secretary Edith E. Holiday and then-personnel director Constance J. Horner.

The top-paid men included then-chief of staff John H. Sununu, press secretary Marlin Fitzwater, then-deputy chief of staff Andrew H. Card Jr. (now transportation secretary), counsel C. Boyden Gray, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Sigmund Rogich, who was then "assistant to the president for public events."

A gender disparity is also evident in salaries of people who look after the First Family's living quarters. The chief usher was paid \$83,141 and the executive chef, \$67,806. Female supervisors in fiscal 1991 earned less: the curator, \$57,646; the executive housekeeper, \$55,185; and the chief florist, \$54,037.

Besides student assistants, workers who earned the least included a "labor foreman" at \$13,350, telephone operator trainees at \$15,677 and "correspondence review analyst" at \$16,973.

The names of about 90 employees detailed to the White House from other agencies are included in the list, but their salaries and home agencies are not specified.

THE U.S. CAMPAIGN

No Miracles Yet

The organization is tighter, the decisions come quicker, but Baker is still struggling to inject a much needed jolt into Bush's re-election campaign

By MICHAEL DUFFY WASHINGTON

MOST REPUBLICANS BREATHED A sigh of relief when former Secretary of State James Baker took over the White House in August. Baker and his team, it was said, could make quick decisions. They could stop the leaks. Baker could talk straight to the stubborn President. As the engineer of Bush's 1988 win, Baker seemed just the political wizard that the President's often incoherent re-election campaign needed.

With seven weeks left before the election, it is clear that neither Baker nor his boss is working miracles—yet. Baker does deserve credit for making Bush focus on his biggest weakness and the voters' overriding concern: the Administration's handling of the economy. In an appearance before the Economic Club of Detroit, Bush offered his clearest prescriptions so far. True, the Baker plan provided little new substance. But viewed as a campaign document rather than as a bold new policy manifesto, Baker's speech at least re-



positioned Bush as a man with a plan. The first task Baker and his aides faced when they arrived at the White House was to impose order on a chaotic political operation. Decision making had ceased. Top-level meetings took hours and accomplished nothing. Second guessing and finger pointing were rampant. Advance men were refusing to journey to sites of future Bush events out of fear that they would be canceled en route. Bush had little confidence in his top advisers, and the strain was evident to anyone who watched him on television. Baker has told friends that before returning to the White House, he had discounted complaints about how sclerotic the operation had become. Once he got there, he confessed that he'd "had no idea how goddam bad it was."

As luck would have it, Baker's arrival coincided with Hurricane Andrew's. He initially won high marks for persuading the ever cautious Bush to fly to both Florida and Louisiana within hours of the storm. But at a time when Bush was trying to pose as a giant in domestic affairs, he goofed by allowing three days to pass before he took control of one of the worst natural disasters in the nation's history. As one Baker aide put it, "It was a tough first week."

Baker quickly redistributed power in the hands of a core group of advisers: longtime aide Margaret Tutwiler, communications chief Robert Zoellick, domestic policy chief Dennis Ross and political aide Janet Mullins. All four had worked closely under Baker at the State Department and on the 1988 campaign; they trust one another implicitly and, as they are quick to point out, often "finish one another's sentences." Like Baker, they work 16-hour days, are in constant communication and carry little pocket cards listing the things to do before they go home that night.

Each morning and night, Baker and his team meet with five other officials: Budget Director Richard Darman, campaign chairman Robert Teeter and manager Fred Malek, **National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft** and press secretary Marlin Fitzwater. Baker makes most of the decisions on scheduling, speeches and lines of attack; he demands same-day execution from his nine aides. "Once decisions get made," says Malek, "they stay made."

The most dramatic effect Baker has had so far is on the mood and performance of the President. Just knowing that his old friend is at his side, thinking through his every move, has put some badly needed spring back into Bush's step. All of Bush's speeches are now clearer, better written, more substantive and, most important,

consistent. "For the first time in months," said a senior campaign official, "we are able to stay on our message for more than 12 hours."

Baker's team has already taken credit for toning down the party's overheated family-values rhetoric following the Republican Convention. After watching conservative speakers bash gays and Hillary Clinton in Houston, the Bakerites immediately sensed that the theme was, as an aide put it, "exclusionary, rather than inclusionary." Within hours of taking over at the White House, Baker team members requested poll data to back up their hunch. When they got them, they moved to more closely tie Bush's talk of family values to his policies. "There was just a consensus," said an official, "that we were eventually going to hurt ourselves if we weren't careful about how we handle it."

Baker, who ordered the campaign to buy five minutes of television time on four

networks last week to recap the main points of the Detroit speech, knows that the key to tough campaigning is, as he once put it, "repetition, repetition and repetition." Instead of 12 separate lines of attack on Clinton, says Jim Pinkerton, a counselor to the campaign, "we've boiled it down to 'You can't afford Bill Clinton, and you can't trust him.'"

It was the attorney in Baker that told Teeter two weeks ago to take another look—"the way a trial lawyer would"—at Clinton's

contradictory descriptions of his draft record. Baker felt that the real value of the draft issue was not so much Clinton's behavior as a 23-year-old but his waffling and incomplete accounts of his actions and motives, and the questions they raised about his trustworthiness.

In the past the Bush team had undercut its attacks on Clinton's draft record by couching them in ridicule and bombast. Under Baker's orders, Teeter asked campaign counsel Bobby Burchfield to pull together the record in a clear, undramatic fashion and let the public judge. Burchfield turned out a lengthy, side-by-side comparison of Clinton's comments over the past year that fueled numerous news reports. "Basically," says Burchfield, "this is a situation where the histrionics could very easily get in the way of the message we're trying to put out, which is look at what the guy has said over the years. We're not going to dress it up in any sort of politicized way. We're just going to put it out there."

The draft was not the only cudgel the Baker forces were wielding against Clinton's integrity. Bush has begun to assert with increasing intensity that Clinton's

So far,
Baker has
not brought
much new
substance
to the
campaign

record on the Gulf War, the North American Free Trade Agreement and even fuel economy standards for new automobiles is riddled with inconsistencies.

None of those are new lines of attack. But Baker has rearranged them under a simple and potentially devastating strategic framework: Whom do you trust? If Bush can reframe the campaign about trust rather than change, his aides believe, he will win. Conservatives in the Republican Party criticize the approach as uninspired and unconventional but as a member of the White House inner circle retorted, "we don't have time to reinvent the wheel, and we're not trying to."

That attitude was certainly evident in the Detroit speech. Though Baker's plan consists of the same warmed-over ideas Bush has been peddling for years, they are repackaged in a fashion that turns every Bush position into a less-or-more proposition: Do Americans want less government or more, less bureaucracy or more, less taxation or more? Of course, the numbers

don't add up, and the choices are in most cases false. But to a struggling Bush campaign, what matters is whether voters buy it. As an Administration official put it bleakly, but candidly, "It doesn't make much difference what's in the economic plan because he's not going to follow through on it anyway."

Baker is also relying on old-fashioned presidential pork to buy votes. But several campaign officials note that it is incongruous for the President to rail against a government that "is too big and spends too much" while he is running around the country doling out billions. Bush announced \$8.6 billion in hurricane aid to Florida and Louisiana and export subsidies to farmers two weeks ago. When he cannot tap the U.S. Treasury, he is prepared to tap the reserves of foreign governments. Last week Bush made a special trip to St. Louis, home of McDonnell Douglas, where he backed a \$9 billion sale of 72 F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia.

Will Baker's magic work? Many cam-

paign insiders believe his biggest challenge remains giving lasting substance to a presidency that never stood for much in the first place. "Yes, things are organized much better, and the work seems more channeled," says a White House official. "But it's hard to point to tangible progress on what we need, which is something to run on, a banner to charge forward under, or a reason to vote for George Bush."

There is growing talk in Republican circles that Bush should announce that Baker will stay on as chief of staff for a year after re-election. On that proposal, both Bush and Baker are mum. Bush resented having to ask Baker to bail him out one more time, and Baker was not keen to return to a job he had for four years under Ronald Reagan. "In the next two months," said a longtime Baker watcher at the campaign, "we're going to find out whether this is just another case for Jim Baker to win a verdict on or whether it's a mission."

—With reporting by Dan Goodgame/Washington

What Did Bush Know?

WHENEVER GEORGE Bush is asked about his role in the Iran-*contra* affair, his standard reply is that he has said all there is to say. In fact, Bush has said little on the subject—and much of what he has said is not true. A newly released memo by former Secretary of State George Shultz directly disputes a key Bush claim: that he had no idea Shultz and former Secretary of De-

fense Caspar Weinberger had bitterly opposed arms deals with Iran. "It's on the record," says the 1987 memo, which recaps an angry telephone call Weinberger made to Shultz after Bush told the *Washington Post* he had been in the dark about this. "Why did he say that?" the Shultz memo asked. Last week Bill Clinton challenged reporters to examine Bush's truthfulness about Iran-*contra* as carefully as they had probed Clinton's statements about the draft.

Bush's fullest public account of his role appears in his 1987 autobiography, *Looking Forward*, in which he claims to have been "excluded from key meetings" on the Iran operation. He later told a TV interviewer that he would have opposed the deal if he had known "what was going on." But the fact is that Bush attended key meetings at which the Iran arms deal was discussed and authorized. He was briefed by National Security Adviser John Poindexter on the finding that authorized covert aid to Iran. There was even discussion in the White House about sending Bush to meet the Iranians personally.

Bush also claims in *Looking Forward* that he didn't know that Shultz and Weinberger "had serious doubts" about the Iran deal; otherwise, he says, he might have opposed it. But here is what Shultz told the Tower commission about the crucial January 1986 meeting at which he and Weinberger made their last stand against the operation: "I expressed myself as forcefully as I could . . . Everybody was well aware



Reagan and Bush sift national security options in 1985

TERY ARTHUR—THE WHITE HOUSE

of my views." Bush, Reagan, William Casey and Poindexter "all had one opinion, and I had a different one," Shultz said.

Bush has said he thought arms were being sold to Iranian "moderates." But Amiram Nir, Israel's point man for the arms sales, told him in July 1986 that the U.S. and Israel were dealing with "the most radical elements" in Iran. Bush told the

Tower commission that he had discussed counterterrorism in general terms with Nir but that there had been no talk about arms sales to Iran. The commission later published a memo on the Bush-Nir conversation, written by a Bush aide who was present, showing that the Israeli had indeed given Bush a detailed briefing on the Tehran arms deal.

Though there is no evidence that Bush knew that proceeds from the arms sales were being funneled to the *contras*, his claim that he didn't know other U.S. funds and personnel were being illegally used to support the *contras* is not plausible. A key operative in this supply network, Felix Rodriguez, was sent to Central America with the backing of Bush's office. Documents released in the trial of Lieut. Colonel Oliver North, moreover, show that the U.S. government offered Honduras increased economic, military and covert support in exchange for Honduran military aid to the *contras*. This quid-pro-quo arrangement, whose existence Bush explicitly denied in 1989, violated the congressional ban on indirect U.S. military assistance to the rebels. Documents obtained by *TIME* show that Reagan approved the deal and that a copy of the memo authorizing it went to Bush. Bush "concurred" in the stepped-up CIA funding that was part of the deal. And he personally gave the President of Honduras the good news about U.S. aid.

—Reported by Jay Peterzell/Washington