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AUGUST

How Not to Break China

ONCE AGAIN, THOSE WOULD-BE STATESMEN ON CAPITOL Hill are trying to micromanage American foreign policy and legislate morality in another country—something Congress does often and badly. Over the next several weeks, the Senate will almost certainly pass a bill that would punish China for its internal tyranny and irresponsible international behavior by restricting its trade with the U.S.

The leaders of the People's Republic richly deserve sanctions. The people themselves, however, don't. Ever since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, Congress has been looking for ways to beat up on Deng Xiaoping, 87, and his hard-line protégé, Premier Li Peng. In addition to repressing its citizens and persecuting its opponents, the Chinese regime has been selling lethal high technology to a number of potential troublemakers, particularly in the Middle East. As a result, Sino-American relations are the worst they have been in 20 years.

George Bush has contributed to the problem by coddling the Deng-Li gerontocracy, thereby provoking Congress to try to replace the Administration's Mr. Nice Guy policy with its own tougher one. It has been 17 years since Bush was U.S. envoy to China, yet he still seems to suffer from the clientitis that sometimes afflicts ambassadors who represent the views of their host governments too well. Three weeks after Tiananmen, the President dispatched National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to kowtow in secret to Deng, then sent them back several months later to toast him in public.

Largely in reaction to that craven and gratuitous behavior, Congress has generated a flurry of bills that would attach political conditions to China's most-favored-nation status. In fact, MFN is a misnomer: it implies special treatment but really means normal, equal treatment. All but a handful of the 187 countries on earth have MFN, including such pariahs and miscreants as Iraq, Syria, Iran, Libya and Burma.

Over the years, Congress has tried to use the denial of MFN—or what might more accurately be called the conferment of LFN (least-favored-nation)—status as a stick to make countries behave. It has never worked. Instead the use of trade as a political weapon has almost always backfired. The classic example is also the original one: in the mid-1970s, congressional conservatives passed the famous Jackson-Vanik amendment, which withheld MFN from the U.S.S.R. until the Kremlin agreed to let more Soviet Jews emigrate. Just to show who was boss, Leonid Brezhnev decreased the number of exit visas by two-thirds.

The effort to link MFN to a foreign government's respect for human rights is especially misguided in the case of China. Since sanctions are intended to keep Chinese-made products out of the American market, they will harm, first and foremost, those Chinese who are involved in export businesses. That means manufacturers, merchants and wheeler-dealers who benefited from the Good Deng's free-market economic reforms. These entrepreneurs are, in the main, liberals or at least apolitical. Granted, they are not as brave or noble as the prodemocracy activists who faced down the Bad Deng's tanks in Tiananmen, but they are essentially on the same side. Their commercial success is part of the larger process of coaxing China away from communism, and they are a key part of the generation that will take over from the old men any day.

In order to meet this obvious flaw in the logic of sanctions, Representative Don Pease, an Ohio Democrat, has come up with a twist that may be clever enough to overcome both experts' opposition and President Bush's certain veto. The Pease bill, which passed the House last week, would impose sanctions only on state-owned enterprises; it supposedly exempts the private sector.

Actually, the measure is too clever by half. It relies on a distinction that is hard to define and impossible to enforce. Take mohair. The textile mills that make the sweaters are largely state owned, but the suppliers are independents. Another example: silkworm cocoons are raised by private farmers and small cooperatives, while the threads are woven into silk scarves at state factories and sold by state trading organizations. In effect, the Pease bill penalizes everyone in the chain.

So curtailing MFN would hurt elements in China the outside world should be trying to help. It could also be disastrous for Hong Kong, which relies heavily on thriving commerce in the People's Republic, and unwelcome in Taiwan, which is quietly investing on the mainland.

Neither Hong Kong, Taiwan nor the booming Shenzhen Special Economic Zone inside China itself has any representatives in the U.S. Congress, or any votes in the Electoral College. That is why the Senate will pass some version of the Pease bill, and it is why Bill Clinton and the Democrats endorsed a pro-sanctions plank in their party platform at their convention in New York City two weeks ago. It is easier for a member of Congress to tell his constituents—or a candidate challenging Bush to tell the voters—"I'm against the butchers of Beijing!" than to explain how free trade with China strengthens the reformers and moderates for the power struggle to come.

The whole episode is a vivid reminder of the uneasy, often unhelpful interaction between U.S. politics and foreign policy, especially in an election year. Politicians are quick to embrace simple positions on complex issues that make them feel good and look good—but in fact make a bad situation worse.

The attempt to punish Beijing with sanctions on trade will backfire, just like other such efforts in the past



THE WHITE HOUSE

Emergency session: At Camp David, Quayle, Bush and Scowcroft discuss Iraq

An Ultimatum for Saddam

Will Baghdad back down—or will U.S. planes go in?

It was a long time to have to stand on tiptoe. For more than two weeks, the U.N. inspection team camped outside Baghdad's Agriculture Ministry. They were trying to seize documents believed to contain clues to Saddam Hussein's weapons plants—60 percent of which were left untouched during Operation Desert Storm—to force compliance with the Persian Gulf War cease-fire accord. The team expected the same kind of bullying defiance it had already met at least three times, before the Iraqis finally backed off. But this time Saddam didn't blink—perhaps calculating that George Bush's political weakness gave Baghdad a chance to get rid of the U.N. inspectors. Angry demonstrators threw stones and slashed tires. After a protester tried to stab an inspector with a skewer, as Iraqi police blithely looked on, the team withdrew. Exasperated, the United States, Britain and France dispensed with the usual vague talk of reprisal and threatened an ultimatum, warning that if Iraq failed to meet U.N. Security Council demands by a certain deadline, it faced military action.

Bush, says a senior administration official, "signed off, in principle" on some kind of airstrike or strikes several days earlier. But lining up support for the ultimatum proved nettlesome. The West's allies in the region—Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia—had to be courted by Secretary of State James Baker as he toured the Mideast last week. Most skeptical of all was the Saudi royal family, which was deeply divided about whether to support further U.S. mili-

tary action and feared reprisal from Saddam's Scud missiles. Still, the Arab states agreed not to oppose the ultimatum.

The allies still had to settle where and how they might attack. Within the Pentagon, officials debated what one source called "graduated pain or the big splat": a single strike followed by a pause, a warning and further bombing—or a massive series of strikes. Big splat won out. What about targets? Everyone agreed on facilities that developed nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. But national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft wanted to go further and hit Iraq's rebuilt conventional military assets—including its air-defense network—and its Republican Guard units. Bush's top aides warned him of the political risks of attacking Baghdad. Voters would likely support an effort that resulted in Saddam's ouster or demise—but wouldn't tolerate heavy U.S. casualties or a high death toll of Iraqi civilians.

Facing the threat of renewed allied attack, Baghdad at first refused to back down. But by the end of the week, as the ultimatum loomed, Iraq seemed to be groping for a way out. After negotiations with Rolf Ekeus, head of the U.N. commission overseeing inspection, Iraq's U.N. ambassador predicted a "very positive" response from Baghdad to a compromise giving inspectors access to the archives. Either way, no one was betting on Saddam's continuing cooperation.

TOM POST with JOHN BARRY and ANN MCDANIEL in Washington and MARGARET GARRARD WARNER with Baker

DISPATCHES

Escobar's Jailhouse Rock

Colombia's most notorious drug lord and inmate, Pablo Escobar, escaped from his luxurious prison outside Medellín last week, proving that he wasn't really an inmate at all. Last June the cartel leader surren-



The fugitive

dered to police in exchange for guarantees of no extradition and a custom-built jail near his power base. But the government of President César Gaviria secretly planned to move Escobar to a more secure facility after learning the drug king still ran his *narcotraficante* business from inside the prison. Hours before the transfer was to take place, Escobar fled—probably with the help of top army commanders. Repeating history, he then offered to turn himself in and promised not to start another round of antigovernment terrorism—in exchange for some guarantees, of course.

The Mafia Strikes Again

For the second time in two months, Italy's hopes for a mob-free future have been shaken. Last week the nation mourned the car-bomb death of Palermo deputy chief prosecutor




Palermo casualty

Paolo Borsellino. The July 19 explosion came just eight weeks after the murder of Judge Giovanni Falcone who, like Borsellino, was to lead a new anti-Mafia unit.

The Definition of a Bad Trip

Fidel Castro was looking to gain friends last week. Instead, he lost a couple. At a Latin American summit in Madrid, Castro hoped



Looking for friends

to strengthen Cuba's ties to Spain and other Latin countries. But the security chief at Madrid's Cuban Embassy and the chief videotape editor covering Castro's visit both took the opportunity to defect.

WASH POST

04 AUG 92

Jim Hoagland

'We Won't Let You Down'

After 17 years, the American betrayal still burns in Massoud Barzani's heart and, at times, in his soft brown eyes. Mention the name Henry Kissinger and he stiffens. "Ask him what he gained that was worth sacrificing the opportunity to bring down Saddam," Barzani demands. "And then ask what the world lost."

Barzani returned to Washington last week for the first time since the 1979 death here of his father, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the legendary Kurdish tribal chieftan. He came with reluctance and suspicion. But the trip may help end, at long last, Saddam Hussein's murderous rule over Iraq.

The prospect of an end game against Saddam—and Massoud's playing a key role in it—will have Mullah Mustafa dancing a jig in Kurdish heaven. He was the first political leader to recognize and fight Saddam's bloodthirsty ambition. More than 150,000 Kurds died in the wars and the step-by-step campaign of genocide that followed.

When Saddam swaggered onto the world stage two years ago by invading and brutalizing Kuwait, he did no more to his Arab "brothers" than he had done to the Kurds for two decades. The Barzanis warned the world again and again that Hitler had been reborn in Baghdad. No oil was at stake. No one listened.

I had last seen Massoud with his father in the Zagros mountains as Saddam's army closed in on them in 1975. They fled to Tehran and later to Washington. I could never bring myself to go see Mullah Mustafa and his sons in their lonely CIA-tended exile—to go see one of the world's last great eagles confined in a squalid cage.

Massoud returned to Kurdistan in

dad and negotiate (unsuccessfully) with Saddam earlier this year, Massoud told me.

"There was a psychological barrier to my coming here," he said in a voice so soft that I had to lean forward to catch his answer. "We were let down, we were wounded in 1975"—when Kissinger, after encouraging the Kurds with covert arms and money to rebel against Baghdad, halted all support to the Kurds rather than fight an expanding and increasingly dangerous war.

Barzani still does not accept Kissinger's pained protestations that congressional opposition to U.S. involvement abroad after Vietnam and other pressures beyond his control dictated the 1975 cutoff. But Barzani adds, "We know the Bush administration was not responsible for this. The interests of the Iraqi people made it necessary for me to come here and try again."

Is America's word likely to be any better this time? Are the Bush administration's fumbling efforts to bring down Saddam likely to become more effective between now and Election Day? There are reasons for measured hope on both scores.

The nebulous, long-divided Iraqi opposition is beginning to coalesce into a political alternative to Saddam. The meetings that Barzani, his fellow-Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani and representatives from Iraq's Sunni and Shiite communities held with Secretary of State Jim Baker and other senior U.S. officials last week as a united delegation helped accelerate that process.

The meetings and the commitments Baker and Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, offered in those sessions represent an important, publicly undisclosed change for the Bush administration's Iraq strategy.

Until now, the White House has banked on a palace coup to topple Saddam. The people who could bring that about are bodyguards, military officers and family members close to Saddam. Seeing the United States join forces with the opposition could scare these people off, the White House reasoned.

But the opposition leaders came out of their meetings here believing that this reasoning is changing, although they cannot be sure why. They were encouraged to establish a national leadership office in the Kurdish area now under the protection of U.S. forces. The administration, Scowcroft said, will maintain a formal channel of communication with Iraq's opposition and will examine two other

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ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, August 9, 1992

TOPIC: SITUATION BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

GUESTS: BRENT SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

MARGARET THATCHER
Former British Prime Minister

MILAN PANIC
Yugoslav Prime Minister

INTERVIEWED BY: David Brinkley - ABC News

Sam Donaldson - ABC News

George Will - ABC News

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: David Glodt

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MR. BRINKLEY: In Sarajevo the leaders responded to the international outrage at reports of torture and murder and allowed the Red Cross to come in and inspect their camps. But it is reported hundreds of prisoners were hastily moved out before the inspectors came.

A short time ago we talked by satellite from Belgrade with Milan Panic, prime minister of Yugoslavia, or what's left of it, and asked him about the camps in Bosnia.

PRIME MINISTER PANIC: Let me first tell you that as a Yugoslav prime minister, and as a Yugoslav-born-as an American citizen here-I am equally disturbed if not more. And what can we do? We can work on peace. And that's what needs to be done. I am no prime minister of Bosnia. The prime minister of Bosnia is Mr. Izetbegovich. I am responsible for Yugoslavia. I can assure you that I will do my best, if these camps exist, that they are eliminated. But in Bosnia what can we do?

It is a very good question. One thing is to talk about the peace. The other thing is to send humanitarian help. The third to make sure that the Red Cross is there. Red Cross, believe it or not, is doing fantastic job. We just got some leaders to accept--to accept Red Cross as a control system. The people must be allowed to see the camps. And the camps, if they exist, it is my view that not only internationally, that we in Yugoslavia condemn camps of any kind. I would like to see an instant exchange of people in Bosnian camps of Serbians, Bosnian camps of Muslims, and Bosnian Croats.

MR. BRINKLEY: Have you talked to President Milosevic about this?

PRIME MINISTER PANIC: No, I have not spoke with President Milosevic. I haven't seen him lately. He's not around.

MR. BRINKLEY: He is pushing whatever is going on in the camps, is he not?

PRIME MINISTER PANIC: If Mr. Milosevic pushes the camps, he will end up in one of the jails.

MR. BRINKLEY: Who will put him there?

PRIME MINISTER PANIC: I will do it.

MR. BRINKLEY: When will we see this?

PRIME MINISTER PANIC: You're not going to see that because I don't know that he's pushing people in the concentration camp since he is somewhere on a vacation. He took vacation, he's not even around.

I think that it is imperative that we find ways to make peace, because the concentration camps will disappear when the peace comes. Therefore, work on peace is important, and I am doing exactly that.

MR. BRINKLEY: Prime Minister Panic, we thank you very much for coming in, talking with us today, giving us your view of this. Thank you again.

PRIME MINISTER PANIC: Thank you, Mr. Brinkley.

MR. BRINKLEY: A new Gallup poll in Newsweek says a slight majority of Americans--53 percent--favor air strikes against the Serbians if they continue blocking delivery of food and medicine. We'll be back with all the rest of today's program in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mrs. Thatcher, thank you very much for coming in to talk with us. I'm afraid we may have kept you up too late.

MRS. THATCHER: That's perfectly all right.

MR. BRINKLEY: We're happy to have you. Here in the studio with us are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC News.

MRS. THATCHER: I know both of them.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, they both know you. We are again happy to have you.

MRS. THATCHER: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, President Bush held a meeting with his military and diplomatic advisors and came out and told us that he's going to rely heavily on the United Nations, which sounds like a replay of the gulf war. What do you make of this? What would you recommend to him were he to ask you?

MRS. THATCHER: I thought it was something of a holding statement. I naturally watched it on television. Naturally he's waiting for the next United Nations resolution, and I hope that includes not only a means of getting humanitarian aid through; we need more than that. These people need steps which help to stop the fighting. After all, they're living in cellars in Sarajevo, they're being the target of sniping attacks, they're being driven from their homes. Humanitarian aid isn't enough.

So that resolution must contain the means of taking things further and using whatever force is necessary, or, if the United Nations doesn't like the word "force," whatever measures are necessary to bring the fighting to an end.

MR. BRINKLEY: Have you discussed this with Mr. Bush?

MRS. THATCHER: I have not discussed this occasion with Mr. Bush.

MR. BRINKLEY: George?

MR. WILL: Mrs. Thatcher, evidently some of the Bosnians are bewildered. They say that two years ago, when Mr. Bush, I guess bolstered by your company in Aspen, Colorado, declared that Iraqi aggression would not stand, the principle seemed to be that aggression would be resisted. They say they are the victims of aggression.

Can you tell us why you think there seems to be a different standard for Iraqi aggression and for Serbian aggression?

MRS. THATCHER: Well, one thing is very clear to me, that Serbia are the aggressors. They have not recognized Bosnia. The rest of us have recognized Bosnia. And the Serbs are trying to increase their hold on land in Bosnia and increase the extent of land which they hold. To do so some 50,000 people have been massacred and something like two million people have been terrorized into fleeing.

I can't understand why there is any further delay in taking much firmer action. It is both to stop an aggressor, and, after all, to back up the right of people to live in freedom in their own land in peace, something that appeals very deeply to all who love liberty.

MR. WILL: Many people, however, say that the difference, the obvious difference, is oil, and another difference is that there were massed armies crossing a fairly clear frontier between Kuwait and Iraq. And they say there is no clear strategic U.S. interest involved in the Balkans right now, nor does it threaten a general European war.

What do you say to those critics who justify inaction?

MRS. THATCHER: First, this is mainly a great moral question. And if there's one country in the world which came to life on a moral basis, it was America. Secondly, some of the terrible things that we have seen are things we thought never to see again in Europe--and we fought that that should not happen. We're seeing things which are just about the worst of Stalin and Hitler.

Thirdly, there is a strategic interest. There are various other minorities in Yugoslavia. Unless we stop the aggression in this case, there will be aggression against the Albanians in Kosovo--they've already been attacked; there will be problems with Macedonia; and there could also be other problems as other minorities are attacked.

Other countries will not let that rest. Turkey is interested, of course, in the Moslem population of Bosnia, and Greece will be interested in Macedonia. And other countries will be interested. Albania will be interested in Kosovo. You could in fact have a great extension of the conflict. And that would be very damaging to us all.

And the longer we take to act, the worse it will be.

MR. WILL: But what do you say to Americans who say we've spent quite enough time, we Americans have, liberating, resuscitating and defending Europe; this is clearly first and primarily a European problem. Why should we act when they are so reluctant to act?

MRS. THATCHER: If they are reluctant to act, I can only condemn that reluctance. I for a long time have been almost distraught at the inactivity as I've heard murder after murder, terrorism after terrorism, brutality after brutality. This is a moral question and as well a strategic question. And the third aspect is, are we in a position to do it?

I think ordinary people have the right instinct about this. They are horrified at the appalling scenes we've seen on television. They think, supposing this were my family crying out to be free, and those whom we expect to help us withheld that help and left us to our fate. That's the way most people will look at it.

MR. DONALDSON: Mrs. Thatcher, you've suggested that air strikes might be used against bridges and such. The president has said that he's not at all certain that air strikes would do any good. Why do you think they would?

MRS. THATCHER: Look, first, I think there are two things that have also to be done. First, the Bosnians haven't the weapons. It isn't really good enough to say there are a lot of weapons in the region. There are, and most of them belong to the aggressor. And it's not right to leave the unfair distribution like that. People have a right to defend themselves, and they really must be given the weaponry with which to defend them and their families.

Secondly, you must stop many, many of the supplies coming through from Serbia. Serbia, the old Yugoslav army, was a very big army. It has a lot of supplies. They are highly sophisticated. They are going straight through to the Serbs in Bosnia.

In order to stop that, you have to bomb the supply lines, mainly the bridges or the--also the munition dumps and the military targets in Serbia itself. The bombing now can be very accurate. That would shake the Serbs, who have made, I believe, a calculated assessment in the high command in Belgrade that the West would not use force. You never say you will not use force. That only encourages the aggressor in his dastardly work.

So yes, I would say the two things which I have indicated.

MR. DONALDSON: And if there is bombing, who should do it--the United States Air Force, the British Air Force, the Germans? Just who?

MRS. THATCHER: The forces of NATO. Whoever has the best aircraft and the best technology in order to do it accurately. And I think perhaps that would be the United States has the best technology. Whether it would be available to us, I don't know, but I think it would be need to be used in conjunction with the very successful things which you did during the Iraq war.

But each of us should be prepared to take our own share. America must not stand alone in this. That wouldn't be fair, and it wouldn't be right if the Europeans held back. We, I'm sure, if it came to it, would not hold back.

MR. DONALDSON: Let me turn now to Iraq. As you know, there is a new U.N. inspection team there now, and Iraqi authorities are already saying that they will not be permitted to go into ministries in other buildings. What should be the response from the West, the United Nations, the United States? And how quickly should it come?

MRS. THATCHER: Saddam Hussein must be made to comply with United Nations resolutions. If not, he must be made to understand that force might again have to be used. These people only understand the language of force, and the more you hold off, the worse the battle will be when it came.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mrs. Thatcher, President Bush in discussing this makes the following point. The guerrillas are highly skilled, the terrain is difficult. In World War II, not even the Germans could wipe them out. He foresees himself having to take responsibility for an endless fight in a difficult place with young Americans coming home in coffins.

What would you say to him?

MRS. THATCHER: In wartime, naturally the Bosnians reacted to the Nazi invader. Of course they did, and they were helped to react by arms supplied by the superpowers. So they had the means to fight the German invader.

The fighters--the Bosnians, the Croatians--are on the side of liberty. Give them the means and they will fight the aggressor. That argument is on our side this time. The Bosnians are wanting to fight the aggressor. They need the means to do so, and they need to do it effectively.

I'm not suggesting that we put in ground forces. Indeed, I heard more from the president's statement about ground forces than I'd heard anyone else suggest. Of course I expect the United Nations to have ground forces to protect them, but that's where the ground forces would be. Ours would be the arms to the Bosnians and the air strikes on the supply lines and the military targets in Serbia. I think that would soon make the Serbians sit up.

MR. BRINKLEY: George, we have a little time left.

MR. WILL: Yes, but the question is, what if it didn't? Napoleon had an axiom: if you start to take Vienna, take Vienna. If you start to protect the Bosnians and you've drawn your sword, and the sword of air power and giving arms to the Bosnians does not suffice, how far are you prepared to go?

MRS. THATCHER: But you are not going to stop at giving arms to the Bosnians. You are going to try to stop the supply of arms to the Serbians who are fighting.

Mr. Will, I've been in government for 11-1/2 years, longer than anyone in the United States since Roosevelt. I've known much advice come to me. If you ask people what you should do, they'll give you 101 reasons why you shouldn't do anything. If you say the situation is urgent, people are being murdered, they're being invaded, now how can we deal with it, they'll give you a lot of options which are pretty effective. You really must not be as faint-hearted as to say what if, what if? It's a moral case, and we must help.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mrs. Thatcher, our thanks and our respects. Thanks for being with us today. We wish you the best.

MRS. THATCHER: Thank you. I am grateful for the opportunity.

MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, General Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the president for national security affairs. In a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: General Scowcroft, you're in Kennebunkport. Hope you're enjoying it. Thanks for coming in today.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Good morning, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: How are you?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm just fine, sir.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, President Bush is under great pressure to do something. What do you think he will do or should do?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, what we are trying to do right now is to mobilize the United Nations with a resolution that would primarily authorize the use of all necessary means to ensure that humanitarian relief can get into Bosnia.

In addition, we're proposing strengthening the sanctions around Serbia in order to apply pressure to the Serbians to see reason.

And lastly, under the co-chair of the secretary general and the British prime minister, a conference will be held later this month to try to deal diplomatically with the sources of this frustrating and intractable conflict.

MR. BRINKLEY: In these negotiations with the United Nations, what sort of reaction are you getting--favorable, dubious, doubtful--what?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't want to talk in too much detail--

MR. BRINKLEY: Go ahead and do it, go ahead and do it.

MR. SCOWCROFT: --but I think it's fair to say the United States is out in front. We are now discussing with the British and the French the formulation of a resolution, and there are some differences of perspective, but we all have--we have common objectives. And I'm confident that by Monday, we will have a resolution that both the three can support with the Perm Five and ultimately the rest of the Security Council, and that will also receive support of the secretary general.

MR. WILL: General Scowcroft, I'd like you to respond to Mrs. Thatcher's response to the president. She heard the president yesterday when he was asked about arming the Bosnians and he said he thought the problem was there are too many arms in the area, not too few. She says, that's all very well, but they're on the side of the aggressor.

Are we not somewhat in the position that we were in during the Spanish civil war, when we said we're not going to fuel the fire, but the other side did, the Germans and the Italian fascists?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, one can make that argument, George. But I think the problem is, you know, these--as were the Spanish, of course--these are people who are going to have to live together; they're neighbors fated to live together. There are plenty of arms in the region. It is true that the monopoly on heavy arms belongs to the Serbs, which they've gotten from the Yugoslav army. But we are trying to resolve the conflict, not simply make it more equitable, continued fighting at a more technologically sophisticated level.

MR. WILL: But the crux of Mrs. Thatcher's position was that aggression has occurred and is occurring. Now, two Augusts ago, the president, responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, said, this aggression will not stand.

Why is there, Bosnians are asking, a marked difference between the president's response to this aggression?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think the circumstances are fundamentally different. This is, after all, the break-up of a multi-religion, multi-language society. It is in every sense a civil war. Even though there has been international recognition which transforms it legally into an international conflict, it is a civil war.

And I would point out that in the Iraqi case, we dealt with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and against the ability of Iraq to threaten its neighbors by destroying its offensive capability. We did not go into Baghdad to restructure Iraqi society. And we've been criticized for that indeed, but I think that is the crux of the difference between the two.

MR. WILL: Well, correct me if I'm wrong. Can you say both that this is aggression and that it is, as you said, in every sense a civil war? Doesn't it have to be one or the other here, and are you not therefore exonerating Serbia of aggression?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think so. And I think one of the difficulties is, George, that it is in fact both. And I think Mrs. Thatcher, who I greatly admire, and others are expressing their frustration at getting what is a useful handle on the horrors of this conflict without at the same time getting bogged down, as you and others have pointed out, in a war in a country where Hitler, with 37 divisions, couldn't--and had part of the Yugoslavs on his side--could not do it. That--it is a terribly frustrating conflict.

MR. DONALDSON: General Scowcroft, I take it when you talk about a resolution that you expect from the U.N. that will contain a sentence saying that all necessary means is now authorized, that you do not expect a sort of stair-step situation, where only one course is authorized, and if that doesn't work, then the U.N. has to authorize another stronger course of action; that one resolution will give everyone the power to do anything needed.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the resolution would not be quite that sweeping, Sam, although, yes, I think we should not have to go back to the United Nations with every incremental move. The use of all necessary means would still be focused at the provision of humanitarian relief, but you know, that could be writ fairly broadly.

And as the president said yesterday, nothing is ruled in or out.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, in order to get humanitarian relief through, you might have to suppress gunners, you might have to suppress forces that are now in the field.

And my question is, do you use air power? And is it correct that the president has really all but ruled out the use of U.S. ground forces?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think you're absolutely right. And what I say is the provision of humanitarian relief could require different kinds of force.

I think that, as Mrs. Thatcher pointed out, the United States' role in the application of force can, I think, best be applied with the high technology equipment, and that would be primarily air power.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, that brings up an interesting question that has to do with domestic

politics. A couple of weeks ago, Governor Clinton talked about the possible use of air power and was immediately challenged by a White House spokesman as having said something that was ridiculous.

Now the president seems to be favoring it, you've just stated it, and is this a case of Governor Clinton proposing a policy and George Bush agreeing to it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not at all, Sam. The president first raised it and got general agreement at the G-7 summit on July 7th or 8th, that it was imperative to ensure humanitarian relief supplies get through, including the use of force.

We have marched on that through the Helsinki conference, and trying in informal discussions to get agreement on a resolution. And finally the president said, if we can't get agreement, we have to propose it unilaterally. So this is not a case of following anybody.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, all right. First, at least you'd agree, then, that Governor Clinton was not saying something that was preposterous or ridiculous or in any other way something he shouldn't have said.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't disagree with your comment.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, one final question on the use of air power. Does this air power include the bombing in Serbia itself?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't want to define any particular limits for it. It would be designed to ensure the relief of humanitarian supplies, whatever that might take.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, as I understand it, the U.N. resolution when it comes about, will allow the use of some sort of force to make it possible to deliver food and medicine to the Bosnians. If that is the case, we will be taking in food and medicine while the Serbians continue to kill them.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I wouldn't deny that, David. I think again that points up the terrible nature of this conflict. On the one hand, we want to do what we can. We want to help, we want to resolve it. On the other hand, there are the perils of getting involved in an endless, difficult, bloody, cruel conflict without being able to calculate how we can in fact resolve it.

And I think the president put it very well yesterday. And it's dealing with these two, the humanitarian imperative to do something and the political and military dangers of this conflict, that are the dilemma which faces us.

MR. WILL: General, nations very rarely, if ever, use military force for purely humanitarian reasons, and therefore would you address, tell the American people what are the political and strategic interests the United States has in this region of the world?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I will. First of all, there is the general example of this kind of conflict, which if it cannot be controlled by the United Nations, could be replicated in many other areas around the globe.

Secondly, there is the danger of the widening of this conflict. There are Albanian minorities within Serbia, within Macedonia, there is concern by the Greeks, and there is also the Muslim

population being assaulted, and statements by Muslim countries that something has to be done there.

MR. WILL: Are you afraid that some of the Muslim countries might intervene on behalf of the-- as they see it--the oppressed Muslim population? And if so, which countries?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I wouldn't want to go that far at this point, but there are increasing comments, indications of disquiet among Muslim countries, and that's a possibility that can't be ruled out. And therefore, I'd say this conflict does have broader implications.

MR. DONALDSON: General, bring us up to the minute on what you hear from Baghdad. Are the U.N. inspectors being allowed access today to what they want to see?

MR. SCOWCROFT: It's my understanding that they are being allowed access. I think that the comment of the Iraqi government was that no longer would the inspectors⁹ +^{^^} ^] ^^*(owed into ministry buildings as opposed to those buildings that supposedly would harbor weapons or other buildings of mass destruction.

But whatever the limitation, it is unacceptable. Resolution 687 says "anytime, anyplace."

MR. DONALDSON: Well, do you have any information that the U.N. inspectors are in fact going to want to see what's inside one of those ministry buildings this trip?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I certainly wouldn't--well, this trip--you know, there are a number of inspections planned. Whether it's on this trip, I'm not sure. But I would certainly not rule out that one or more ministries may need to be examined.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, General, last time there was three weeks of negotiation between the time that Iraq said no and when it finally backed down with some modifications. What timeframe would you allow this time if it comes up again?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I would say rather shorter.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, days?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Rather shorter.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's all you're going to get, Sam. And General, thanks very much for being with us. Pleasure to have you.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: We'll keep an eye on you, and we wish you luck.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, sir.



THE NEXT BATTLE WITH SADDAM



Bush now fears another armed conflict with Iraq looms. The reasons: new atrocities and suspicions Hussein has more arms to hide

Americans are suckers for sequels, but as Hollywood has learned to its sorrow, some are better than the original while others are downright embarrassments. Despite last week's half step back from the brink of hostilities against Saddam Hussein, President George Bush's team now suspects conflict with Hussein is inevitable and that perhaps within a matter of days or weeks something like Desert Storm II will be launched. True to form, more Americans than not say they would support such action—and the Iraqi dictator's outlaw behavior would amply justify it. But the president can't count on a winner. Though he could bring considerable firepower to bear on Iraq in just a matter of hours, the risks would be considerable, the rewards uncertain.

When things go bad, they often do so all at once, and that is what has befallen Bush. To the economy's continued anemia and Bill Clinton's remarkable post-

convention bounce add a Saddam Hussein thumbing his nose gleefully at America, then taking a few hours off to go for a boat ride. It was a performance designed to provoke, and it did. Asked his gut feeling about whether Bush and his allies will have to issue an ultimatum and then use force to get Hussein's abuses to end, one top White House aide said: "It'll probably come to that."

"Obnoxious across the board." What is most surprising is not the fervor of the Bush administration's current anger but the absence of it during the many weeks Hussein was egregiously violating the cease-fire agreement Iraq signed at the conclusion of its drubbing by the U.S.-led coalition 18 months ago. Bush has spoken feelingly about the importance of a rejuvenated United Nations and its role in a post-cold-war world. The U.N. had blessed the cease-fire agreement with Iraq. But as Hussein proceeded to flout nearly every one of the agree-

ment's meaningful provisions—becoming "obnoxious across the board," in the words of one U.S. official—the Bush administration said little, did less.

When the U.N. finally called Hussein's bluff and insisted that weapons inspectors be allowed inside Iraq's Agriculture Ministry, the administration was not only hopelessly late, some U.S. military and intelligence officials say, it had picked the wrong fight. The ministry had been designated as an end user on numerous shipping documents pertaining to Iraqi military purchases, so there was plenty of reason for the U.N. team to search the place. But Iraq's use of fixed-wing aircraft to drop tons of bombs on rebellious Iraqi Shiites in southern Iraq was a far more blatant violation of the cease-fire terms, and that was never challenged at all. Bush and his national-security adviser, **Brent Scowcroft**, were reportedly appalled by intelligence reports of Iraqi atrocities, including one





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The range of options

The United States can use many military assets against Iraq. **1.** Cruise missiles can be launched from battleships in the Mediterranean or Persian Gulf. **2.** In Operation Desert Storm, the United States dropped only two 5,000-pound deep-penetrating GBU-28s in an unsuccessful attempt to target Saddam Hussein. The Air Force now could deploy 30 more of these concrete-piercing bombs. **3.** The F-15E Strike Eagle, equipped with terrain-following radar and laser-guided bombs, could be used against airfields, helicopter bases and Scud missile launchers. **4.** Twenty F-117A Stealth aircraft could also be used against anti-aircraft defenses.



instance where Iraqi troops lined up all the inhabitants suspected of collaborating with the rebels in one village and shot them. But the administration's tepid response to all the atrocities probably emboldened Hussein, who also probably figured he could become more aggressive while the West was preoccupied with Yugoslavia's civil war.

The timing of all this, of course, is also politically embarrassing for Bush. As he heads to Houston this month to address an increasingly jittery and dispirited Republican Party, his foreign-policy credentials have never seemed more tarnished. His aides have begun sniping at Bill Clinton's meager foreign-policy experience, but any new engagement with Iraq raises uncomfortable questions about the president's own leadership. Why did his administration push so long and hard for such favorable treatment for Iraq right up until its invasion of Kuwait? Once hostilities

were engaged, why did the president approve their cessation when so much of Hussein's military power remained?

Pressure points. However belatedly, the president and his senior advisers may now be seeing the problem of Iraq clearly. Hussein is a despot who thrives on crisis, and he seems particularly to relish his long-distance feud with Bush. For that reason, many of the president's senior advisers believe, he will continue to look for pressure points and to exploit them. Indeed, even as Hussein shuffled his cabinet last week to put a Shiite Muslim in the top foreign-policy job, he undercut that bit of window dressing by escalating his attacks on Shiite rebels in the marshes of southern Iraq. Intelligence officials say that as many as five divisions, about 50,000 men, have established a perimeter around the marshes and stepped up attacks—all in violation of the U.N.-sanctioned cease-fire.

At the same time, U.S. officials say, a

guerrilla-type campaign against U.N. peacekeepers in northern Iraq is escalating. One soldier was murdered in his bed by an assailant; others have been wounded in vehicles and residences by rocket-propelled grenades and plastic explosives. No one doubts the campaign has the blessing of the Iraqi leader.


Hussein may also be hiding some of his more dangerous weapons. Even though the inspection mission of the U.N. teams is nearly complete—the Agriculture Ministry was the 41st site investigated, and knowledgeable officials say there are fewer than a half dozen left—some inspectors believe Hussein is still playing keep away with dangerous military hardware. Some of the specialists assigned to the U.N. inspection teams believe that Iraq continues to hide an underground plutonium reactor and a highly sophisticated network of perhaps several hundred centrifuges that could be used to enrich uranium to weapons-

U.S. NEWS

grade level. Additionally, the sources say, perhaps as many as 200 Scud missiles may still be concealed somewhere in Iraq, as well as a production plant for high-speed capacitors of the type used in nuclear explosive devices.

For the moment, Bush and his advisers have decided to fight fire with fire. Instead of waiting for him to provoke them, their plan is to take the fight to Hussein. For starters, they are already pushing for accelerated inspections of the sites left on the U.N. teams' list. Other options on which the president has already been briefed could increase the pressure on the Iraqi leader. Under prodding from the United States, Britain and France, the U.N. could as early as this week call for a cessation of all hostilities against the Shiites. The ultimatum could easily be enforced with the military strength already in the region.

Another proposal under study: creating a second U.N. protective zone for the Shiites in the south of Iraq to complement the Kurdish zone in the north. Both could also be exempted from the economic sanctions now imposed on all of Iraq, and a new U.N. resolution could



Sportin' life. Brushing off his troubles, Hussein takes a ride.

unfreeze billions of Iraqi assets to pay for U.N. operations in the security zones, isolating Hussein's strength, the Sunni Muslim central zone around Baghdad. Any one of these moves could create the kind of "acute crisis" Bush and his advisers say they need to galvanize opinion to move once again against Iraq. Says a senior Pentagon official: "We want to pick things that are measurable and doable."

Any move would not be quick. **Scowcroft**, the national-security adviser who was the president's most influential adviser during the earlier gulf conflict, is said to support a "sustained" air campaign against Iraq. Gen. Colin Powell,

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agrees with many Pentagon leaders who are reluctant to get involved in a massive military operation. But if one is launched, he wants as much force as possible brought to bear. According to several officials, any military action would involve an air campaign of at least several days. Targets would include air bases for both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters and some of the same command-and-control bunkers Hussein hid in during Desert Storm.

More worrisome is the reaction of Hussein himself.

The despot who needs crises might easily survive renewed military action, emerging more megalomaniacal than ever. Such a conclusion would not make Bush happy, but it is a risk inherent in any new action he might order. "The more you pressure him and humiliate his people," says Egyptian Gen. Talaat Mosallam, who has studied Hussein closely, "the stronger he becomes. It is difficult to hunt any man in his position, and Saddam is no ordinary man." ■

BY BRIAN DUFFY WITH BRUCE B. AUSTER, KENNETH T. WALSH, PETER CARY AND STEPHEN J. HEDGES

VIEW FROM THE SOUK

Let's you and Saddam fight

For the Arab world, it is a midsummer's nightmare relived: Saddam Hussein on the loose; the renewed prospect of conflict; Arab fighting Arab. Yet some of the United States' allies in the Persian Gulf region, who once urged President Bush to put on the military brakes after Kuwait was liberated, are now singing a different song. "Dialogue does not bear fruit with dictators and fascists like Saddam," editorialized the Saudi daily *Okaz* last week. "Those carbuncles that spring up from time to time on the face of humanity deserve only one treatment: to be cut and cauterized."

Of course, most gulf leaders do not want to perform the surgery themselves. Arab leaders want it done by Hussein's own Army, by Iraqi rebels or by the United States, France and Britain—quickly, from



Partisans. While Arab leaders loathe Hussein, Iraqis show their support.

the air and with no damage done to their own political standing at home. There is little Arab enthusiasm—nor any immediate need seen—for renewing the grand military coalition that performed in Desert Storm.

Syria's Hafez Assad, who was

lured into sending troops to the gulf by visions of billions in Saudi aid, is reportedly disinclined to do the same today. "Sentiment in the souk," says a European diplomat in Damascus, "was never in favor of allying with the West against Arab Iraq. Assad may not be able to ignore it again." Even Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, one of Desert Storm's staunchest partners, is in an uneasy position because of new challenges to his regime from Islamic fundamentalists that could worsen if tensions mount. Still others worry that conflict in the gulf may upset the delicate balance of the Arab-Israeli peace talks.

One move that could ease the way psychologically: a more forceful American-led attempt to stop the slaughter in Bosnia. That, says one Saudi official, would go a long way in showing the Arab street that the West is "interested in saving Muslim lives, not just Muslim oil."

BY RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF IN CAIRO

U.N. Accord
On Bosnia
Aid Near

Use of Force Would
Be Authorized,
Bush Adviser Says

By Gary Lee and Edward Walsh
Washington Post Staff Writers

U.N. Security Council members are close to agreement on a resolution that would authorize the use of force to deliver humanitarian aid to war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said yesterday.

The United States, France and Britain are ironing out the details of a resolution that could go to the Security Council as early as today, Scowcroft said in an interview on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley." The resolution would authorize "the use of all necessary means to ensure that humanitarian relief gets to the former Yugoslav republic, he added.

The resolution is not expected to specify what type of force could be used, and administration officials said they are reluctant to send ground forces into the area. Scowcroft indicated that if force were used, air power was the likeliest choice.

Television images of emaciated, half-naked prisoners detained behind fences in Serb-run camps in Bosnia were beamed around the world last week, heightening international awareness of the ongoing crisis in Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, which is under siege by Serb forces.

Meanwhile, Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton reiterated

See BOSNIA, A12, Col. 3

U.N. Agreement Near on Getting Aid to Bosnia

BOSNIA, From A1

that he would not rule out the use of force in the Balkan crisis but at a New York news conference refused to be drawn into a discussion of what military steps might be taken.

Clinton said the Bush administration deserved time to explore its options in trying to lift the Serb siege of Sarajevo and to deliver humanitarian aid to the Bosnian people.


"We have to maintain the possibility of use of force in order to show that we are serious," he said. "But I don't think it's my place to make detailed tactical decisions here."

But former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who appeared on the Brinkley show, urged military action and exhorted the United States and Europeans to take the lead in assisting the Bosnian government, which is controlled by Slayic Muslims.

"This is mainly a moral question," Thatcher said. "We are seeing things that are just about the worst of Stalin and Hitler." She said that shipping humanitarian aid would be an insufficient response and proposed that NATO bomb supply lines to Serb forces and military targets in neighboring Serbia, which is helping Serb forces in Bosnia. "I can't understand why there is any further delay in taking much firmer action," Thatcher said.

But Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who in the 1970s was U.S. ambassador to the now dissolved Yugoslavia, stressed yesterday that the Bush administration's overriding concern is providing humanitarian aid to Bosnia.

Asked in an interview on CBS's "Face the Nation" about the possible use of ground troops in the region, Eagleburger said, "I suppose I



AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

An unidentified prisoner of war is given beans while others await their turn at the Manjaca detention camp near Banja Luka, Bosnia-Hercegovina.

distinction between providing humanitarian assistance and getting in there and trying to end the civil war," Eagleburger added.

The Bush administration now

is necessary, but is undecided about how far it should go.

"On the one hand, we want to do what we can," Scowcroft said on "This Week." "On the other hand

involved in an endless, difficult, bloody, cruel conflict without being able to calculate how we can, in fact, resolve it."

Clinton, at his New York news conference, said it was a "legitimate concern" for U.S. leaders to worry about becoming involved in a protracted conflict similar to Vietnam, adding that "the military options are not easy and not clear."

Clinton said it appeared the administration believed that a "show of resolve" by the United States and its European allies would lead to the delivery of the humanitarian aid and put an end to the Serb-run detention camps in Bosnia. "We need to give them a chance to do that," he said, adding it was "inappropriate for him to discuss the use of ground forces at this point."

The Arkansas governor also said the administration should not rule out lifting its arms embargo against Bosnia and neighboring Croatia, which lost a six-month war last year against powerful Serb insurgents, to give those people "a greater capacity to defend themselves."

Clinton, who expects to be attacked for his lack of foreign policy and national security policy experience, flew to New York to meet with his vice presidential running mate, Sen. Albert Gore Jr. (Tenn.) and two of their party's leading congressional experts on national security issues, Sen. Sam Nunn (Ga.) and Rep. Les Aspin (Wis.).

Both Nunn and Aspin said the Bush administration has now essentially adopted the "Clinton policy" toward the Balkan crisis even though Clinton's assertion that military force should not be ruled out was initially described as "reckless" by White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater.

Lee reported from Washington,

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**ALLIES INCH CLOSER
TO BOSNIA AID PACT**

**Agree on Strong Words, but
Differ on Strong Actions**

By **ANDREW ROSENTHAL**
Special to The New York Times

KENNEBUNKPORT, Me., Aug. 9 — After consultations among the United States, France and Britain, two senior Administration officials said today that they were nearing agreement on a new Security Council resolution that Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, said would authorize "all necessary means" to insure delivery of food and medicine to Bosnia and Herzegovina, a formulation that could include military force.

Negotiations on Friday and Saturday proved inconclusive. But Mr. Scowcroft and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State, said in separate television appearances that final agreement on a text could come as early as Monday, with the resolution then going before the Security Council early in the week.

But the Bush Administration and its European allies were still clearly undecided over how quickly and how extensively to use their military to back up the relief effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially on the question of sending ground troops into the war zone. They were even more hard pressed to find ways to end the fighting.

While Mr. Bush struggled with a crisis that threatened to undermine the most potent electoral weapon at his disposal, his foreign policy record, his aides sought to ward off mounting pressure for the broader action that he seems to be considering.

Where Clinton Stands

Speaking in Little Rock, Ark., Gov. Bill Clinton, who has criticized Mr. Bush's response on the Balkans, said today that he thought the United States should consider military action not only for the relief effort but also to force the opening of Serbian detention camps where there have been allegations of torture and killings.



Reuters

A Serbian soldier trying to reach comrades wounded during fighting in the town of Bosanska Gradiska.

Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger pressed the argument that there was no easy military solution in the Balkans and that Europe should lead a military response. They said the fighting in the remnants of Yugoslavia was really a civil war, even though Mr. Bush announced last week that he would open diplomatic relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia.

But the Administration's efforts, including three Presidential news conferences in four days to demonstrate that Mr. Bush is hard at work on the situation, seemed to do little to quiet the growing chorus of complaints that Washington has acted too slowly and demands that it lead the world's response.

"I can't understand why there is any further delay in taking much firmer action," Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of Britain, said on the ABC News program "This Week."

In remarks that clearly stung the Bush Administration, Mrs. Thatcher

brushed aside Washington's finely calibrated analysis of the tactical military situation. "This is mainly a great moral question," she said. "And if there's one country in the world which came to life on a moral basis, it was America."

Airlift Called Insufficient

A new Security Council resolution would provide backing for the use of force to open a land corridor to take supplies to Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia. American officials say the current airlift to Sarajevo, which is regularly interrupted by shelling, will be insufficient in the long term.

But on Saturday, Administration officials said the countries of the Security Council could not agree on the scope of the proposed resolution and on whether it would commit the Council to use military force and not just authorize such action.

The officials said that while there was a consensus that a land route would require the deployment of ground troops in large numbers, no country was stepping forward to offer

its own forces. Mr. Bush has frequently expressed great reluctance to send American troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina and would prefer to use American air power to support a ground operation.

Today, Mr. Scowcroft told reporters, "We're working hard with the British and French."

He said the three countries had "some differences in perspective" but predicted they would agree on a resolution by Monday. Then, officials said, the three countries must obtain the backing of Russia and China, the two other permanent members of the Council, and move on to agreement with the temporary members.

Caution Called Justified

Mrs. Thatcher said the world's response to the Balkan warfare must go beyond simple humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, whose secession from Yugoslavia set off attacks by the Serbian Government in Belgrade.

W. Post 10 AUG 92

U.N. Begins Inspections For Weapons in Baghdad

Confrontation Over Ministries Is Avoided

By Nora Boustany

Washington Post Foreign Service

AMMAN, Jordan, Aug. 9—A heavily guarded United Nations team completed its first day of probing Iraqi weapons programs today but refrained from disclosing what sites were inspected.

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has banned search of government ministries and U.N. as well as U.S. officials have said those installations will be inspected. But no confrontation was reported today.

The 22 arms inspectors, clearly avoiding comment that could spark Iraqi reaction, returned to their hotel saying only that their mission of the day had been accomplished.

"It was an inspection day, the first one. That is all it was," Russian Nikita Smidovich, the group leader, told reporters in Baghdad. "We went where we planned to go." He refused to specify whether his men had entered government ministries, but when asked whether the team saw what it wanted to see, Smidovich said, "Yes."

["It's my understanding that they are being allowed access," National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said on ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley." "There are a number of inspections planned. Whether it's on this trip, I'm not sure, but I would certainly not rule out that

one or more ministries may need to be examined."]'


The team, including Americans, arrived Friday in the first such visit since U.N. inspectors searched the Ministry of Agriculture on July 28 and 29. That entry followed a three-week standoff that prompted the United States to raise the possibility of military action.

Under the aegis of the U.N. Security Council, the team is assigned to investigate Iraq's efforts to produce nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles to deliver them. Inspectors said they would resume their task Monday.

This morning, the inspectors left their hotel in seven four-wheel-drive vehicles, escorted by eight others plus a police car carrying Iraqi security men. Smidovich told reporters his team would split up at the site. Asked whether he had received new instructions from the head of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq to exercise caution in entering certain critical sites, Smidovich replied: "We have our standard operational procedures under which we will operate."

The commission's chairman, Rolf Ekeus, has said Iraq promised to start "a new chapter" in relations. The U.N. team arrived Friday and planned to begin its search on Saturday. But the Iraqi government said that was a holiday, marking the

See IRAQ, A20, Col. 1



REUTERS

Israeli soldier dismantles wall built illegally by Jewish settlers in the West Bank.

U.N. Begins Weapon Probe in Baghdad; Shiite Ayatollah Dies in Southern Iraq

IRAQ, From A11

fourth anniversary of the end of Iraq's eight-year war against Iran. A 24-hour delay resulted.

Today's official Iraqi media ignored the U.N. inspectors but played up a holiday speech by Saddam in which he vowed that Iraq would triumph over its enemies. On Saturday, the newspapers attacked the U.N. task force as being part of a Western conspiracy against Iraq spanning its war against Iran, the U.N. sanctions imposed after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resulting Persian Gulf War.

Saddam's tensions with the country's majority Shiite Muslim community came to the fore this week-end with the death Saturday in southern Iraq of Grand Ayatollah Abdel Qassem Khui, 92, Shiism's ranking scholar of theology. He was buried today.

Khui was placed under house arrest last year following a Shiite uprising in southern Iraq against troops loyal to Saddam at the end of the gulf war. His family said he had remained under virtual house arrest since then and that more than 100 aides and family members were jailed.

Khui was considered senior to the late ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran. He died in Kufa, where he moved in 1990 after spending most of his life in the Shiite holy city of Najaf and writing

more than 90 books on religious studies.

Iraqi opposition sources in London said Iraqi troops had surrounded Najaf to prevent massive concentrations of mourners. The sources said Khui was denied religious rites befitting someone of his stature.

The official Iraqi news agency said the "funeral was attended by Najaf Gov. Karim Hassan Reda, officials from the Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs and a large crowd of clerics and followers." Iraq declared three days of mourning.

Khomeini's successor as religious leader in Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, told the Iranian news agency that Khui's death was a "great catastrophe" and Iran said it planned to send a delegation to Najaf with Khamenei's condolences as soon as

Iraq responded to its request, conveyed through the Iraqi embassy in Tehran.

2 Marines in War Games Killed by Copter Crash

Reuter

KUWAIT, Aug. 9—Two U.S. Marines taking part in joint exercises with Kuwaiti forces were killed early today when their helicopter crashed near the emirate's northern border with Iraq, the U.S. military said.

The cause of the games' first fatal accident was under investigation, the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said. The unarmed AH-1W Cobra helicopter was on a routine night training flight when it crashed about eight miles from Kuwait's border with Iraq, it said.

By Jonathan Alter

The Limits of Schmooze

George Bush now lives in fear of the dreaded "L word"—not "liberal" but "landslide." So he's fighting back by flashing his national-security credentials. Surrogates are fanning out to claim that "children sleep easier" because of Bush's efforts to lift the threat of nuclear war. The GOP will devote the first night of its Houston convention to explaining how the president "changed the world."

That's a reach, to put it mildly. Bush was lucky to have communism collapse on his watch; he did no more to hasten its demise than any other postwar American president, Democrat or Republican. The more relevant question is whether he is as myopic and reactive abroad as he is at home. Yes, the president is knowledgeable about foreign affairs. But to what end? What have all of those frenetic "late-night calls" he brags about actually accomplished?

The answer to the Vision Gap was supposed to be "the New World Order," an idea cooked up by Brent Scowcroft during a Kennebunkport fishing trip. The phrase was defined at the time as meaning collective security against aggression. You have only to look at Bush's hands-off response to the aggression against Bosnia to realize that it was an empty slogan—a way to gussie up the gulf war. In practice, such ideas will always be subordinated to the national interest.

So how has the Bush foreign policy done on that score—advancing American interests? The primary national-security interests now are economic; the gulf war was at bottom economic. But if the real goal of that war was protecting America's energy supply, one might expect some follow-up. Even when he was enormously popular, Bush didn't try to develop an energy policy that would lessen our dependence on foreign oil and dictators. Worse, the administration has repeatedly blocked congressional efforts to tighten export controls on nuclear technology. That means the United States has no credibility in asking other nations to stop shipping nukes, which is good news for Saddam wanna-bes and bad news for the rest of us.

Without clear goals, you get mush. Norman Podhoretz, the neoconservative icon, sums up the Bush foreign policy as "coitus interruptus." In the case of Iraq, Bush did not, in the words of his memorable 1988 acceptance speech, "complete the mission." Last week he allowed Saddam to dictate terms to the U.N. inspection team, and it looks as if the Iraqi leader will continue yanking



his chain. Eventually, Bush may go to war again.

But without any framework for his foreign policy, it's hard to know why. Bush sometimes seems to believe that no presidency is complete without a war. Early in his term, he wistfully told Diane Sawyer that he hadn't been "tested by fire"; according to a new book, "What It Takes," by Richard Ben Cramer, he didn't even feel as if he were really president until December 1989, when he invaded Panama.

That intervention established a peculiar pattern that was followed almost exactly in Iraq. First a head of state is identified as a major threat (Noriega, Saddam). The war is a

military success, but it becomes clear that Bush has himself fearlier encouraged and armed the man he is now trying to oust. The aftermath shows little improvement (unabated drug trafficking in Panama; slaughter of Kurds and Shiites in Iraq). The war turns out to be a clumsy way of trying to salvage a failed approach. After Bush blows it, he just blows it up.

Without a framework, the president consistently confuses activity with purpose. His schmoozing with foreign leaders, for instance, has become an end in itself—a reason offered to re-elect him. The problem with clubbiness is that while it's fine for diplomacy, it's no substitute for a real foreign policy. When members of the club

change, as they do often, you have to start all over again. In the meantime there's a tendency to stick with old friends, even when history has passed them by. Bush made this mistake with the two largest countries in the world: he sided with Mikhail Gorbachev too long (even going so far last year as to demean the idea of Ukrainian independence), and he continues to coddle those wheezing Chinese communists. He also badly underestimated Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic. In fact, the whole idea of "experience" with foreign leaders as a selling point is dubious. Neither Jimmy Carter nor Ronald Reagan had any experience whatsoever, and they accomplished more abroad than Bush.

A Camp David-style Middle East peace treaty is about the best that Bush can hope for, and it would be no small accomplishment. He deserves credit for showing the guts necessary to push the Israelis to the bargaining table. But that is far from a done deal. While a second term would give him a chance to complete what he started, nothing about his first suggests he has the vision or follow-through to do so. Before he changes the world, George Bush will have to change himself. Not likely.



Mission Incomplete: Saddam celebrating last week

AP

-Taking on Bullies ...

Last Saturday afternoon President Bush in Maine held a televised press conference concerning Bosnia. Margaret Thatcher, watching in Switzerland and about to tape an interview for an American Sunday morning program, seethed.

When Bush was asked about helping to arm Bosnia's elected government, which is resisting Serbian aggression, his response was almost flippant. He said there were too many, not too few, arms in that region. Moments later Thatcher said, "It isn't really good enough to say there are a lot of weapons in the region. There are, and most of them belong to the aggressor."

The word "aggressor" fits Serbia, but that word's implications are inconvenient. So Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, appearing on the program immediately after

Why it's prudent to pretend that's a civil war in the Balkans.

Thatcher, insisted that Serbia's aggression today and Iraq's aggression against Kuwait of two Augusts ago "are fundamentally different."

Indeed, Serbian aggression does not threaten the supply of a vital resource, and Serbia is not developing weapons of mass destruction that might make it a more than a local menace. However, Scowcroft stressed another difference: "This [Balkan turmoil] is, after all, the breakup of a multi-religion, multi-language society. It is in every sense a civil war."

But in his next sentence Scowcroft said why it is not "in every sense" a civil war: "... there has been international recognition [of Bosnia's sovereignty] which transforms it legally into an international conflict. ..."

So, is Serbia's seizure and "cleansing" of territory aggression or civil war? "Both," says Scowcroft, eager to emancipate U.S. policy from the logic that led the United States to war in the Persian Gulf. Then, the catechism of the New World Order proclaimed that aggression "will not stand." But acting on that catechism in the Balkans would be intolerably costly. So Serbia's aggression will be called part of something "in every sense" a civil war.

There are several reasons why the administration is blurring the clarity of Serbian aggression. One is that Mrs. Thatcher is not in power or, so to speak, in Aspen, Colo. Another is that drawing a line in desert sand is a lot easier than drawing a line in the ethnic stew now bubbling in the mountain valleys of the Balkans.

The day Iraq invaded Kuwait, Bush met with

his advisers and said, "We're not discussing intervention. I'm not contemplating any such action." But that same day he flew to Aspen, where Thatcher was. It may be unfair to say, as a Thatcher aide did, that she "performed a successful backbone transplant." But it is reasonable to say, as Jean Edward Smith does in his book "George Bush's War," that "those few hours with Thatcher" turned Bush sharply and irrevocably toward a policy that Iraqi aggression "will not stand."

Again, it is understandable why, regarding Serbia, Scowcroft sacrifices logic on the altar of prudence. Serbia's land grab against Bosnia is plainly aggression, but the political and military costs of reversing it would be prohibitive. So perhaps the world will be, at least for now, a little less disorderly if we pretend that this is "in every sense" a civil war.

Of course the United States has involved itself in civil wars. The path of U.S. foreign policy for more than 40 years (a path that led through civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador) was set in 1947, when President Truman intervened in Greece's civil war. But that war was a salient in a global conflict. Bosnia's sorrow is not.

Thatcher's argument for arming Bosnia's resistance to Serbia's formidable army recalls a controversy from 55 years ago. When General Franco led the military rising against Spain's republican government, Hitler sent him the Condor Legion. The Republic received George Orwell and Ernest Hemingway. Dictators (Mussolini, too) armed Spain's future dictator. The democracies declared nonintervention. What the Republic got from democratic societies was volunteers. Their literary quality was high. Their military value was less so.

But would things have been better for Spain, over time, if a flood of arms to both sides had made the civil war even longer and bloodier? Hard to say. However, notice the following.

For millennia the Iberian peninsula has been riven by deep-seated ethnic—some say national—differences. Catalonia is the Spanish region whose capital is Barcelona. Its separatist fever, fueled by linguistic and other ethnic distinctness, intensified Spain's murderous convulsions in the 1930s.

That was then. This is now:

As the 1992 Olympics ended, the "autonomous government of Catalonia" ran an advertisement in the New York Times singing the praises of what it calls "Catalonia, a country in Spain." That locution is illogical, and largely true, but no longer menacing.

What once was a war cry has become an advertising slogan. Thus does time heal what nothing else can.

The Reluctant Activist

1. of 3
WASH. POST: 08/17/92

Domestically, Bush Tries to Recast Himself

First of two articles 6

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

Soon after President Bush took office, his political adviser, Robert M. Teeter, explained why this president was the right man for the times.

Running through the findings of focus groups he held in Illinois, Teeter said Americans were enjoying peace and prosperity that winter of 1989, content with a president who knew there was "no constituency out there" for government activism on social problems and who pledged in his inaugural address no new deals or bold moves but simply to take the nation's good times "and make it better."

Three years later, Bush was asked what goals he had for a

second term. He did not speak with passion about anything specific, report two Bush intimates who each put the question to him and received strikingly similar responses.

"He said he wanted to be there to handle what comes up," said

BUSH AS PRESIDENT

LOOKING HOMEWARD

one aide, "that he really believes he is best suited to handle what crosses that desk."

As Bush goes to Houston this week to accept again his party's nomination, he confronts a national mood dramatically different from the one Teeter described at the beginning of the Bush administration, and an

electorate unlikely to be satisfied with the limited objectives Bush mentioned to his aides. Behind in the polls and fighting for his political life, Bush is now engaged in trying to redefine himself as an activist president in sync with a nation demanding change, and willing—as he did last week—to order a sweeping reorganization of his administration to demonstrate that domestic problems, not foreign affairs, are his number one priority.

Yet the experience of the past 3½ years suggests how difficult that transformation will be. Current and former aides describe a president committed by his Connecticut Yankee upbringing to public service but grounded in a belief that govern-

ment has only limited power to fix the economy, revive the cities, change the cycle of poverty or radically attack social ills.

One Bush friend has concluded that this reluctance to act is rooted in Bush's background, which has made the president a stranger to much of the life of his country, its racial problems, its middle class struggling to make a living.

"He understands the problems intellectually—his trouble is understanding them in the gut. He does not have any emotional attachment to carry him through the frustrations of doing something about them," said the friend, who did not want to be identified.

Bush, the friend said, "just doesn't feel it in the way that moves presidents to action." From a thousand quarters come "the seeds of solutions. . . . We keep trying to plant them in the president's soul, but they never take root."

In sharp contrast to his approach to foreign policy, the president who invaded Panama and waged war against Iraq could summarize his governing rationale in domestic policy on a bumper sticker that would read: "Do No Harm." His first term, if anything, has been more a portrait of resisting changes that might make things worse than it has been in leaping into untried and risky waters.

The word Bush uses most often to describe himself is prudent. His most solid success has been the veto. Thirty-one times he has used the veto pen. Thirty-one times he has won, a presidential record.

"I don't want to do anything dumb," Bush said in one post-election interview. "I don't want to make the wrong mistakes," he said six months later. "What I don't want to do is make the situation worse," he said of the economy in October 1991.

Underlying Bush's approach to social and economic problems are two persistent themes: an uncertainty about how to adjust from a time of prosperity and contentment to one of recession and anxiety, and an inability to rise above a cacophony of conflicting advice to seize the moment.

Twice in the past 3½ years—after the end of the Persian Gulf War when polls showed him at stratospheric 90 percent approval levels, and after the Los Angeles riots this spring—Bush had the opportunity to take a bold step in addressing the nation's problems. In both instances, many of his aides acknowledge, the opportunity was lost.

William J. Bennett, who served as director of drug control policy earlier in the Bush administration, describes the frustration of many Republicans. "He is personally one of the most impressive people I've ever met," Bennett said. "In many ways, I think he is what people should be in public life in terms of the conduct of his life. But without a governing rationale, without a clear sense of priorities, this is what is going to happen. You are going to lurch from one event to another."

Bush's aides bristle at the suggestion he has no vision or accomplishment in domestic policy. In a lengthy interview before he was removed last week as the latest White House

domestic policy czar, Clayton Yeutter offered two dozen separate items accomplished or scheduled for a second Bush term.

Reading from notes, Yeutter ticked off Bush's successes in his first term: a new Clean Air Act after years of deadlock on the issue; far-reaching legislation to help the disabled; a transportation bill providing more money for highways and mass transit; the savings and loan bailout; success in the war on drugs; a new farm bill; trade talks; proposals on education and welfare reform and health care.

But Bush's problem, his Republican critics say, is not that he has no policy, it is that he has too many policies and has fought hard for almost none of them. "The rap against Bush is he hasn't really fought for the programs he sent to Congress and has had little inclination to believe anything much was really needed," said Rep. Vin Weber (R-Minn.), a leading conservative.

Weber and others said Bush wanted a "strait-jacket" on domestic spending and got that in the 1990 budget deal. "They thought as long as Bush was popular and the economy heading for recovery, it was good government to tie Congress down that way," Weber said. When the situation changed, Bush had no inclination to untie the jacket that amounted to the only good news out of the 1990 budget deal he had sacrificed his credibility (by agreeing to raise taxes) to achieve.

The difference between a focused, activist president on foreign policy and a passive one on the domestic front remains one of the enduring mysteries to many of Bush's aides and to many on the outside who have tried to move him on issues they care about.

While his approach to foreign affairs has also been criticized as too cautious, the successes on Bush's watch, as outlined by Secretary of State James A. Baker III in his resignation speech last week, are considerable:

Germany was unified; Central America was transformed through a policy based on free elections and reconciliation; the Soviet Union was dissolved peacefully and groundbreaking arms control agreements were reached. Iraq was defeated after the United States assembled an unprecedented international coalition to prosecute the war, opening the way for peace talks among Arabs, Palestinians and Israelis.

An adviser to Bush on foreign policy issues has two explanations for the different approaches: the weakness of the president's domestic advisers and their constant bickering, and the fact that "for all presidents, foreign policy is fun. They can do it without a lot of interference from Congress and results are so much easier to achieve."

Bush, said this adviser, "knows his mind" on foreign policy but "neither knows his mind nor can get any consensus to help him" on the domestic front. The structures he has created reflect the difference.

For his dealings with the world, Bush installed two men with whom he has long, personal relationships and in whom he has deep confidence, Brent Scowcroft at the National

Security Council and Baker at the State Department. Both his first and second choices for defense secretary, John Tower and Richard B. Cheney, were both well-known to Bush and shared his general philosophies.

Baker, Scowcroft and Bush talk in person or by phone perhaps a dozen times a day and they have the sort of camaraderie that enables major elements of policy to be worked out on a boat in the Atlantic or a hunting trip in Wyoming or the phone rather than in a flurry of interagency meetings and position papers.

"Scowcroft goes in there every day and ticks off the things that are being done and why and gets a general Bush sign-off and there is usually enough of a consensus that every crappy detail over every tiny move doesn't have to be chewed over and fought over like it does on domestic policy," said one aide.

Only this summer has the White House added a daily domestic policy briefing to Bush's public schedule to signal its new status. The domestic policy apparatus has been revamped, redone and redirected several times. Its latest incarnation under Chief of Staff Samuel K. Skinner, soon to be replaced by Baker, was a complex, multilayered system that was supposed to mimic the National Security Council system but produced few visible results the past six months.

There has been no equivalent of Baker or Scowcroft for domestic policy and from the beginning of the administration there has been almost constant and often public battling on how Bush should proceed on areas from the economy to health care to civil rights. A continuous parade of officials get involved in issues as they appear on the screen but no one, or two, or three make up a cohesive advisory group capable of implementing policy the way it is done on the foreign policy side.

Virtually everyone who has dealt with Bush on domestic and economic issues describes him as "well-briefed" or "smart" or "well-educated on the issue," but they generally describe an education process in which the president is being "taught" an issue and his aides work, as one put it, "to raise his comfort level" in discussing and debating the issue. One aide involved in this process said Bush has a "set of foreign policy concepts, a world view, an umbrella, under which his various proposals can gather," but only "individual orphan concepts" with no overarching governing rationale on the domestic side.

"He's a man who sees and studies and identifies the trees of domestic policy but rarely the forest," said one Republican congressional ally, and for "some preverse reason he surrounded himself with strong foreign policy advisers where he needs it less and weak or misplaced domestic advisers where he needs it most."

On March 7, 1991, a week after the gulf war had ended, Bush, at the high point of his presidency, appeared before a joint session of Congress to say how the nation should build on that victory at home and abroad.

Overseas, Bush spoke of building a "new world order" and a "framework for peace" in

the Middle East—broad, far-reaching goals born of a belief that the war against Iraq, and the end of the Cold War, had shaken the world's geopolitics to the core, creating a major opportunity.

But at home, Bush offered two remarkably pedestrian goals. "Tonight, I call on Congress to move forward aggressively on our domestic front," he said, asking for passage of transportation legislation to rebuild some of the nation's highways, roads and bridges, and on his anti-crime package.

"If our forces could win the ground war in 100 hours, then surely the Congress can pass this legislation in 100 days," Bush said.

Congress would eventually approve the transportation bill, as it usually does because the legislation dumps hundreds of millions of dollars into local transit projects. But Congress and the White House, as they have since 1989, are still arguing over the crime bill.

In the days that preceded the address, Bush's advisers, from outside and within the administration, lobbied heavily for a far-reaching domestic and economic program to which the president could apply the communication, lobbying and one-minded determination he had applied to Desert Storm.

Some argued that Bush should reinvigorate the war on drugs, the issue he cited coming into office as his top domestic priority. Others argued that the issue should be education reform. Bush had held an education summit eight months after taking office that led to the states agreeing to set goals in education and he sporadically spoke of reforming the nation's education system.

Still others said Bush should launch the Republican version of the war on poverty. Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Jack Kemp, one of the few administration officials at home in the nation's cities, had been put in charge in mid-1990 of a task force of the president's domestic policy council that was examining a set of conservative anti-poverty proposals from welfare reform to enterprise zones.

And finally, the president's friends in the business community, some Republicans in Congress and the aggressive conservatives in his own administration were beginning to argue that the economy was not, as the administration was calculating, on the road to a strong recovery.

At the time, the White House was figuring that the combination of the end of the war and the much-maligned budget agreement of the year before that saw Bush break his no-new-taxes pledge would move the economy into a recovery. Bush was advised that he should signal his commitment to that recovery as his top priority with a stronger, more audacious economic package.

In the midst of all this conflicting advice, Bush settled at first on the minimalist route of asking for passage of the transportation and crime bills and waiting until 1992 to re-enter the battle over economic policy.

Bush aides describe him in this period of

being buffeted by advice on domestic issues but of feeling no sense of urgency and mostly leaving to then-White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu the tasks of sorting out how he should proceed on domestic and economic issues. A large domestic policy staff, under Roger Porter, and various activist Cabinet members were cranking out possible initiatives and some Republicans in Congress were papering the White House with suggestions. But Sununu, Office of Management and Budget Director Richard G. Darman and most of the president's economic advisers believed the economy would be in a solid, if not impressive, recovery by the summer of 1991 and so, sticking to the Bush precept of "doing no harm," nothing bold was needed.

Ed Rogers, a top aide to Sununu, describes in a new book on Bush, "Marching in Place," the White House attitude. "Our talking points were in order," he said, "Bush was already a successful president. . . . In 1991, we were going to have some successes, maybe a highway bill, maybe a crime bill, maybe some nominees through. Fine. We'll do a lot of foreign travel. We always get good press and good visuals from that. We'll come back in December and do domestic travel, tamp things down, and tide everyone over. By then, they'll be writing that we really came out of the recession in June, and we'll pick up at the State of the Union address (to open 1992)."

By last fall, however, that rosy scenario was abandoned. The recession had officially begun in August, but the administration would not acknowledge it for months. As unemployment rose and consumers turned anxious, Bush's Republican allies in Congress, his big contributors around the country and others began urging him to take some action.

As the recession deepened and congressional Republicans began to panic, Bush at several meetings on economic policy used weather terms to describe the economy: He called the recession a "thunderstorm" that would pass and that the White House had simply to endure and a "hurricane" that hit and caused devastation and passed. One Republican, who heard these Bush remarks, said: "I think they are a sign of the true Bush on the economy. . . . There is nothing a president can do about it but take cover and live through it and wait for the sunshine."

Dozens of economic policy sessions were held that fall but Bush remained convinced that any large tax cuts or public spending to spur the economy was too risky. "You notice when tax cuts were proposed, long-term interest rates shot right through the roof," he said in Rome last November. "I have a responsibility to see that I don't make proposals that will set back the economy."

That Rome news conference was remarkable for a president overseas. Prepared to talk about NATO and the new post-Cold War shape of the world, Bush, instead, spent 40 minutes quizzed on health care, economic decline and politics. Harris Wofford, the Pennsylvania Democrat, had come from 40 points behind that month to beat Bush's attorney general, Dick Thorn-

burgh, for a Senate seat and Bush's political world had exploded.

When Los Angeles exploded in riots the night of April 29, Bush was at a state dinner. His first reaction was a cautious one: "The court system has worked. What's needed now is calm, respect for the law. Let the appeals process take place."

Bush, who had no urban policies to speak of, was forced to turn to Kemp, one of the president's least-favorite Cabinet members, who with his allies and outside advisers pushed Bush to use the Los Angeles riots to open a new domestic policy front.

The president was urged to give a series of civil rights speeches aimed at emphasizing racial harmony; he was urged to assemble and push an audacious urban renewal package and take it from city to city in a highly focused campaign. He was urged by Kemp to give up the budget rule that forbids taking defense money and using it for domestic problems and to be the first Republican president in a generation to make the ailing cities a priority.

But at the White House and in the Bush campaign, no public mandate for such a drive could be detected in the polling numbers. "You just didn't know what if anything Bush wanted to do," said a White House aide who favored the Kemp approach. "There was no clear direction. There was a lot of on-the-other-hands. Sam [Skinner] had no clue; he'd say, 'Ask Teeter.'" And Teeter, then established as the campaign chairman, was "worried about the polls, worried about our suburban voters."

For a brief few days, Bush seemed poised for action. In a two-day trip to Los Angeles, the president toured the burned-out shopping centers and listened to angry, frightened Angelinos pour out their fears. Tears came to his eyes as he listened to black inner-city ministers preach moving sermons on the need for leadership, not blame.

"I thought you could see the president's empathy and understanding grow with each meeting," said Sherrie Rollins, the White House assistant in charge of planning the Los Angeles tour. "I thought it was critical for him to see face-to-face the situation. And the longer he was there, the more he was attuned. It had a deep impression."

But Bush returned to Washington and within two weeks, the issue had slipped away. He gave no civil rights talks; he avoided gatherings like the U.S. Conference of Mayors; he found himself criticized by House Republicans and others who told him the political reality: Republican voters are suburban voters, not city voters. The White House barely managed to get a package of emergency aid through the House, where the majority of Republicans voted no.

Bush did devote a few days and a few speeches to enterprise zones, "weed-and-seed" programs and welfare reform, but then turned to other issues. Despite a nonstop assault by Kemp, the administration appeared willing to settle for little else besides emergency aid.

"So much for the Los Angeles riots," a disgusted Kemp said as the White House passed on anything more ambitious. "So much for the opportunity to make a real difference."

NEXT: Civil rights as case study

Ethnic Cleansing

Most of the horror stories were impossible to confirm and came from hurt, frightened people. In the north Bosnian town of Trnopolje, it was said, Serbian irregulars rounded up 100 prisoners for a move from one detention camp to another. Along the way, they pulled about 30 men out of the column and shot them. At a makeshift camp in Prijedor, the family of one starving prisoner tried to bring him a food parcel. The guards took the food and beat the prisoner in front of his relatives. In Doboj, the Serbian irregulars sprayed insecticide on loaves of bread and fed them to Muslim boys, who became violently ill. Near Tuzla in eastern Bosnia, a distraught eyewitness saw three Muslim girls who were stripped to the waist and chained to a fence "for all to use." After three days of rape, the witness said, they were doused with gasoline and set on fire. Doctors reported that other Muslim and Croatian girls had been held for months as sex slaves, and when they became visibly pregnant, they were set free to "have Serbian babies."

The atrocities apparently started last spring, when Serbian forces began the "ethnic cleansing" of newly independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs drove more than 1 million Muslims and Croats from their homes, torturing and killing some of them, abusing and terrorizing the rest. Some Muslims and Croats struck back with atrocities of their own. Now the grim results are finally showing up on television screens and the front pages of newspapers. Pictures sear the conscience of the world: a wailing baby beside a bullet-punctured window, the emaciated bodies of prisoners in the camps, an old woman shot down at her grandchild's funeral. The struggle in what used to be Yugoslavia turns out to be not just a civil war but a ruthless campaign by members of one ethnic group to "purify" the land by driving out others. Suddenly the response of the outside world so far—a lot of hand-wringing and a few relief supplies for one besieged city, Sarajevo—looks pathetically inadequate.

Two defining events last week, the sniping at the funeral and the first press visits to Serbian detention camps, put pressure on George Bush to do *something*. Former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher wrote in *The New York Times* that "Serbia should be given an ultimatum" to stop the aggression or face "military retaliation." Bill Clinton staked out a position to the right of his presiden-

Shocking images from battered Bosnia put pressure on Bush to decide what America should do—or can do—to stop the nightmare



A defining event: British television shows emaciated prisoners at a Serbian camp in Trnopolje

INDEPENDENT TELEVISION NEWS

tial rival. "I would begin with air power against the Serbs, to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity," he said. A NEWSWEEK Poll found a sharp increase in public support for airstrikes in defense of the relief effort (chart). But there was no guarantee that U.S. air power—or even a vast infusion of ground troops, if someone were willing to supply them—could stop the ancient feuds in the Balkans. Bush didn't want to look heartless, but he was equally determined to stay out of a quagmire.

'Harm's way': Faced with a political and moral dilemma, he groped for the safe middle ground. "The world cannot shed its horror at the prospect of concentration camps," Bush said. But he was reluctant to send "somebody else's son or somebody else's daughter into harm's way." Instead, he asked the United Nations Security Council for a resolution authorizing the use of force, if necessary, to maintain the flow of relief supplies into Bosnia. Neither Washington nor its closest allies had any clear idea of how force could best be exerted. The administration was in deep disarray; it wasn't known when vacationing Secretary of State James Baker would stop running foreign policy and start running Bush's presidential campaign. And despite the outcry over Bosnia, Washington still lacked a sense of urgency. "Until the pres-

It's been going on for a long time. The Balkans are scarred by the fault lines of history. Orthodox Christian Serbs face off against Roman Catholic Croats on roughly the same terrain where the Turkish invasion of Europe reached its high-water mark, leaving behind a residue of Islamic Slavs. Religion and nationality make the Balkans more a flash point than a melting pot. The unstable region provided the spark that set off World War I and produced some of the worst

atrocities of World War II, when Croats backed the Nazis and Serbs became communist guerrillas. Today, after a long truce imposed by dictatorship, ambitious politicians still play on ethnic hatreds.

The present crisis was aggravated by miscalculations in Washington and Europe.

Lawrence Eagleburger, the deputy secretary of state, admits that he misread Slobodan Milosevic, the thuggish leader of the Serbian Republic, the biggest remaining component of Yugoslavia. "I knew him when he was a banker," says Eagleburger, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Belgrade from 1977 to 1981. "I thought him fairly sensible for a Marxist economist... Where I misjudged him in those early days was in not realizing that on the political side, he was clearly a Serbian nationalist of the worst sort." Although Washington tried last year to keep Yugoslavia from breaking up precipitously, Eagleburger says that by early 1990 he recognized that the country was heading for a tragedy in

which Milosevic would play a major role. "I have said for two years that this man was intent on building a Greater Serbia," says Eagleburger. "But the question then and now is, how do you stop him? I didn't then, and I still don't, see how you do that."

Taking sides: The Europeans had no answers, either. Some of them took sides. "For their own reasons, the Germans have a good deal of sympathy for the Croats, and the French and Russians feel some sympathy for the Serbs," says an official at the British Foreign Office. "Our own view," he adds, "is that while the Serbs have been the greatest destabilizing force, none of the parties has clean hands." When Slovenia and Croatia became the first republics to declare their independence last year, the Germans pressed for early diplomatic recognition of the new countries, hastening Yugoslavia's descent into chaos. Last winter, Bosnia's Muslim and Croatian majority voted to secede from Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. When Bosnian Serbs began their "ethnic cleansing" campaign, backed by Milosevic's regime, the French at first resisted sanctions against Serbia, until Baker shamed them into it.

Two weeks ago, when Bill Clinton proposed that air power might be used, within the framework of U.N. resolutions, to protect the relief effort, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater called him "reck-



PATRICK ROBERT—SYGMA



Horror stories: A distraught mother holds her son in northern Bosnia, a Sarajevo morgue receives the bodies of Bosnian soldiers

If Serbian forces continue to block relief efforts to Bosnia, should the U.S. take the lead in seeking U.N.-backed air strikes against them?

Current
53% Yes 33% No

July 31-Aug. 2
35% Yes 45% No

Should U.S. air units participate in U.N.-backed air strikes?

50% Yes 37% No

For this NEWSWEEK Poll, The Gallup Organization telephoned 755 registered voters Aug. 6-7. Margin of error is +/- 4 percentage points. "Don't know" and other responses not shown. The NEWSWEEK Poll © 1992 by NEWSWEEK, Inc.



PATRICK ROBERT—SYGMA

less." But Clinton's proposal wasn't much different from the position Bush took in early July and warily readopted last week. U.S. forces are available for intervention from air bases in Italy and Germany and from warships, including the aircraft carrier *Saratoga*, in the Mediterranean and the Adriatic. But it's by no means certain that airstrikes alone can even protect the relief shipments, much less stop the fighting, and they might inspire Serbian attacks on the 1,600 lightly armed U.N. peacekeeping troops already deployed in Sarajevo.

U.S. warplanes could strike at Serbian artillery positions, but with a huge risk of hitting innocent bystanders—or hitting nothing at all, given the mobility of the Serbian guns. Air power is not the best way to knock out artillery; counterbattery fire is more effective, but that requires gun crews and forward observers. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney strongly opposes the deployment of Americans on the ground, and Bush has not warmed up to the idea of using force in any form. Other options are no more appetizing. They include:

■ **Open a land corridor.** The relief effort would be much more effective if it did not depend on planes landing at Sarajevo's airport. The answer might be one or more land corridors into besieged cities from places like the port of Split on the Adriatic. But again, air power alone cannot do the job. The Bosnian mountains are full of choke points that make convoys vulnerable to ambush. Ground forces would have to pacify large parts of the country. Canadian Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie, the former commander of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo, said last week that such an operation would require 600,000 to 800,000 troops "as a starting point." No one is volunteering for that job. "It's tragic," Cheney said in a recent interview with

CNN, "but the Balkans have been a hotbed of conflict . . . for centuries."

■ **Arm the Bosnians.** The Bosnians are badly outgunned by the local Serbs, who get help from the Yugoslav armed forces. "I completely agree with Mr. Bush's statement that American boys should not die for Bosnia," Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim, told an interviewer last week. "We have hundreds and thousands

of able and willing men ready to fight, but unfortunately they have the disadvantage of being unarmed. We need weapons." Washington strongly disagrees. "There are enough arms there already," Bush said last Saturday. "We've got to stop the killing some way, and I don't think it's enhanced by more and more [weapons.]"

■ **Strike at the Serbs.** In a meeting at the White House last week, American Jewish leaders suggested to Brent Scowcroft, the president's national-security adviser, that airstrikes or other carefully targeted military action could be used to punish Serbia itself if Milosevic doesn't quickly open the detention camps, which remind many Jews of the Nazi Holocaust. "He agreed that that is a reasonable proposition that the administration should consider," said one participant in the meeting, Henry Siegman, executive director of the American Jewish Congress. In her op-ed piece, Margaret Thatcher argued that "even installations on the Serbian side of the border may be attacked if they play an important role in the war." But the Serbs are tough fighters, and the Yugoslav arsenal, including surface-to-air missiles, could make U.S. warplanes pay a steep price for any punitive campaign. "The Serbs may be able to absorb a lot of airstrikes without giving way," says a Pentagon planner. And retired Gen. John Galvin, a former NATO commander, points out that the Bosnian Serbs "are



not... entirely under the control of Milosevic. They are irregulars," he says.

■ **Carve up Bosnia.** Many Europeans think it may be impossible for all of the displaced Muslims, Croats and Serbs to return to their homes in Bosnia. The only permanent solution, they say, is to carve the republic into ethnic cantons. The Economist recently called for "the least inequitable redrawing of boundaries that is compatible with resettling the maximum number of refugees." But partition would reward aggression and validate "ethnic cleansing" by allowing the Serbs to retain control over much of the territory they have seized in recent months. It would

leave many Muslims permanently dispossessed, making them the Palestinians of the Balkans. U.S. officials expect a confrontation with the Europeans on this issue. "For the civilized Western world to accept the principle of cantonization at this stage," says a senior American, "is to ask it to happen everywhere else in the former East bloc where one country decides it wants a hunk of its neighbor's territory."

For now, Washington will concentrate more on diplomacy than on military action. "The closest thing we have to a game plan is to try to get the shooting stopped, then work on a political solution," says the senior official. The process will continue this

week in various U.N. forums and later this month at an international conference in London. If the outside world cannot figure out some way to stop the fighting, clean up the detention camps and feed the starving, the struggle in Bosnia could inspire other ethnic struggles—elsewhere in Yugoslavia, in divided East European nations and in the former Soviet Union, where dozens of resentful nationalities are jostling for position. Once again, the volatile Balkans could provide the spark for conflicts engulfing millions of Europeans.

RUSSELL WATSON with MARGARET GARRARD
WARNER and DOUGLAS WALLER in
Washington, ROD NORDLAND in Slavonki
Brod and KAREN BRESLAU in Zagreb

It's All Too Easy to Get Sucked Into War

BY DAVID H. HACKWORTH

On the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia between 1945 and 1953, dozens of American servicemen were killed, wounded or captured when Harry Truman's grunts and airmen exchanged shots with Tito's guerrillas. Perhaps the first KIA of the cold war in Europe was Pvt. Robert Shinn from my unit, killed in a partisan ambush. His death told me the cold war was real and the Yugoslavians were tough. In a half century of wandering around battlefields, I've never met fiercer fighters. They could easily suck the United States into a ground war—hook, line and body bag.

Sofar, no one is talking seriously about committing U.S. ground troops; the idea is that we can deal with Serbia from the air. The plan, if it comes to that, would be to replay the gulf war with all its laser and stealth wonder toys: totally antiseptic, almost bloodless and oh, by the way, a boon for the depressed U.S. defense industry, which is a heavy-duty political contributor. U.S. fighter aircraft would be used to support U.N. convoys and to attack hostile targets if on-again, off-again cease-fires break down. Since, as things stand now, the combatants stop firing only long enough to reload, it's a sure bet that



RON HAVIV—SABA

Fierce fighters: A Serbian commando unit takes aim

our pilots would see action. And history also guarantees that when the going on the ground gets rough for U.N. troops, the United States will become a major player down there in the mud and blood.

Air-control teams on the ground will be essential, especially since the USAF no longer has on active duty the slow A-10 Warthogs that were so useful in the Persian Gulf. Instead, it has only fast-burner jets. They can't loiter long over a target while getting to know the terrain and situation; they have to come in hot and fast, making accuracy more miss than hit. Air-control parties will be needed on the ground to find and fix targets for fighter aircraft. After a few are knocked off, U.S. grunts will undoubtedly be brought in to protect them.

Without these teams, our air would hit friendly troops and nonmilitary targets.

The rugged terrain, not open like the Iraqi desert, will make it easy for guerrillas to disappear, as in Afghanistan. Villages will provide perfect hideouts where insurgents can mingle with noncombatants. As in Vietnam and Iraq, fast jets will splash napalm and rain bombs on civilians, inciting the people and the guerrillas to fight harder and to treat our downed pilots with savage reprisals.

A replay of Desert Storm (a serious U.S. commitment in Yugoslavia would eventually require at least the same amount of military muscle as the fight in the desert) might temporarily galvanize the nation and bring back the yellow ribbons and those

high gulf-war poll ratings during a hotly contested political campaign. But Yugoslavia is an impossible mission. If hawks want to "stop the slaughter," they should review how air power failed Truman in Korea and Johnson in Vietnam. Both turned into nasty, prolonged ground wars that caused more than half a million American casualties between them.

The first dead man I ever saw was a U.S. Army captain zapped by a Yugoslav partisan. I helped scrape him off an Italian roadside near the border city of Trieste. I was 15 years old, having lied about my age to enlist. I served in the 88th "Blue Devil" Division's crack 351st Infantry Regiment's reconnaissance platoon. It was our job to patrol the rugged mountain border between Italy and Yugoslavia and man the many observation posts that looked into "Jug Land." I concluded way back then, with all the wisdom of a child grunt, that Yugoslavian soldiers, irregular or regular, are the meanest mothers in the valley of death and the last tigers the United States ever wants to try to tame. This doesn't mean we have to stand by and do nothing. To help prevent starvation, for example, the U.S. military could fly well above harm's way and airdrop bundles of food and water to the poor people who are trapped in the quagmire below. But this time it should be their quagmire, not ours.

Radio Free Asia: The California Echo

W. Post
8/14/92

Sen. Joseph Biden's (D-Del.) sensible case for a new Radio Free Asia patterned on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty puts President Bush in a bind between coddling China's communist dictators and playing catch-up for that Nov. 3 prize of California's 54 electoral votes, one-fifth of those needed to win.

Biden's maneuvers to get pre-election congressional passage of his RFA bill is in for a major boost. The Commission on Broadcasting to the People's Republic of China is now ready to recommend government financing for RFA. Primed by Biden, Bill Clinton has publicly backed the proposal. Biden's cosponsors go from Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) on the right to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) on the left. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) is also in Biden's corner.

But Bush has acted coyly. Asked his position during a June 19 interview in Newport Beach, Calif., he said, "You're looking at a person who supports the idea of broadcasting the truth." The problem, he said, "strictly is on money." That may not cut ice with California's 9.6 percent Asian population.

Indeed, Biden told us the first-year cost could be as low as \$35 million for new radio transmission specializing not in world events, the core of Voice of America broadcasting, but in exposing the secret police-state world of China, North Vietnam and North Korea to their own citizens. RFA's sources would be largely indigenous: a network of clandestine informants who regularly travel to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Seoul and other free states.

In addition, the U.S. Asian population sees itself as a source of internal events that go unreported in target areas. They learn their facts from the family grapevine—and by mail and telephone abroad. The Nanjing air crash that killed 100 two

weeks ago was not officially mentioned in China for almost one day, and the terrible floods last year never did get fully reported," China-born American author Bette Bao Lord told us. She praised the VOA but called it "an American spokesman that can't afford to get on the wrong side of Beijing." The president's concern about Biden's bill is not money so much as worry that RFA would undermine his kid-glove treatment of Beijing.

Despite the risk of Bush losing Asian American voters, a powerful bureaucracy comprised of the State Department, the U.S. Information Agency and the VOA is fighting RFA and beseeching Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to help. They know the money for the new radio would come out of their pockets.

The money case was put bluntly in a report last month by the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, headed by Tom Korologos, a formidable Washington lobbyist. "Rather than build a costly new Radio Free China," the report states, "use enhanced VOA broadcasts to carry news and information about internal events in Asian countries."

Reflecting the tastes of the bureaucracy, this report ignored polls showing that even today in post-Soviet Russia almost 30 percent of the "Moscow elites" regularly tune in to Radio Liberty, while VOA and British Broadcasting get a combined audience of only 25 percent of those radio listeners.

Bush could still take the play from Clinton and Biden, and he has a built-in case to make. With the end of the Soviet empire, the United States no longer need worry about "anything that might push the Chinese back toward the Soviets," in the words of Ben Wattenberg's Reader's Digest article, "Time for Radio Free Asia." The cream on the top would be the enhancement of Bush's low estate with California voters.

The First Friend

NYT 8/14/92

It's neither surprising nor unsettling that President Bush has prevailed on James Baker to come back to the White House and direct his re-election campaign. Jim Baker has starred in one Washington role after another, including campaign politics, and given Mr. Bush's dismal present standing, his return seemed inevitable.

Meanwhile, with the appointment of Lawrence Eagleburger as Acting Secretary of State, the President well serves his own political interests while assuring continuity for foreign policy.

Such continuity can advance delicate ongoing negotiations, like those concerning the Middle East. Still, it offers scant promise of producing more inspired leadership on issues like aggression and atrocities in the Balkans, reform in Russia or Chinese abuse of human rights.

Even with the departure of Mr. Baker and his top aides from State, the Administration's foreign policy team stays largely intact. That team includes the President, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and, when necessary, Mr. Baker as well. In his new job the departing Secretary of State remains a member of the National Security Council, and, as always, the President's First Friend.

Mr. Eagleburger, who moves up from State's number two job, is one of the most experienced foreign policy hands around. His career has been largely devoted to Europe; he once served as

Ambassador to Yugoslavia. But he also has wider experience, including the Middle East. He's known and respected by foreign leaders and diplomats, and well liked in Congress.

For years Mr. Eagleburger worked closely with Henry Kissinger and shares his inclination toward realpolitik: a cool, strategic chess game in which geography can be destiny and internal politics or human rights are secondary concerns.

Pragmatism is a virtue in a dangerous world, but not unmodified. Realpolitik led Mr. Eagleburger to the embarrassment of toasting the butchers of Beijing shortly after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. It may have contributed to his early judgment of the Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic as a man of his word. It is certainly to Mr. Eagleburger's credit that he now acknowledges his past errors on Yugoslavia. His reputation for candor will serve him well in his new role, as will his obvious intelligence and forcefulness.


What's less evident is whether U.S. diplomacy will now do better at responding to the basic values Americans cherish. Compassionate idealism has not been Mr. Eagleburger's strongest suit in the past, any more than it has been George Bush's.

From Sarajevo to Beijing, the limits of realpolitik are becoming painfully plain. Diplomacy needs continuity but it also needs receptivity to humane values. That's a challenge not just for Acting Secretary Eagleburger but also for chief of staff Baker and his friend.

The Reluctant Activist



W. Post 8/17/92



Bush with top foreign policy aides Brent Scowcroft and James A. Baker III after reaching nuclear arms agreement with Kazakhstan in May, another foreign policy success. The president's domestic policy, however, is seen to suffer.

AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

EXCLUSIVE

Tale of the Tape

Just how real is the evidence linking George Bush and former aide Jennifer Fitzgerald? Last week's hotly denied tabloid stories of a 1984 tryst originated in a footnote to a new book, "The Power House," by Susan Trento. The source was former U.S. ambassador Louis Fields, now deceased, who spoke of the supposed liaison in

a 1986 interview with the author's husband, Joe. In 1988, Joe Trento asked a colleague named Jay Gourley to do a corroborating interview with Fields. News-

WEEK listened to a tape of that interview. On it, Fields, a Bush admirer, at first seems to confirm the story. "I think people's personal lives are largely a matter of taste and judgment," he says. "I hope you will not delve into that because obviously I shouldn't have mentioned it to Joe." Then, he seems to back off: "I'm sure the vice president wouldn't say he had anything other than a working relationship with Jennifer. And I can't confirm they do. . . It was just old-maid gossip." ■

Fitzgerald



A low profile and a separate hotel: Quayle

THE VP

The Invisible Man

Dan Quayle's place on the Republican ticket is secure, but don't expect to see a lot of the vice president this week in Houston. With Quayle's approval ratings in some polls at a record low, George Bush's advisers plan to keep the gaffe-prone veep out of the limelight. Quayle and his staff are staying at a separate hotel from the presidential party. Bush's men didn't permit Quayle to pose with the president for news-magazine cover photos or other pre-convention photos. Asked if the Bush camp was keeping Quayle under wraps, one top

aide said, "Wouldn't you?"


Quayle supporters offer a different explanation for the strategy. In the weeks ahead, they say, the Bush camp will try to make an issue of the fact that Bill Clinton is more popular with Al Gore beside him than he is alone. "We want to compare the two candidates," says a Quayle loyalist. "It's George Bush vs. Bill Clinton. Why does Clinton need Gore at his side every two seconds? Can't he handle it alone?" ■

THE PRESIDENT

Not a Lot of Texas

To qualify as a legal resident of Texas, which has no personal-income tax, George Bush owns a tiny vacant lot in the fashionable Tanglewood section of Houston in addition to his rented hotel suite. On the eve of the GOP convention, the Independent Committee for Ethics, a largely Democratic group, will stage a media event to call attention to what it sees as Bush's bogus tax status. Among the activities: a mock sale of 50,000 square inches of a Bush neighbor's yard, one inch to a customer. ■

A tax dodge? Bush's lot



EXCLUSIVE

An August Surprise?

Bush administration officials are furious about the Sunday New York Times story that broke the news of a U.N. plan to confront Saddam Hussein over U.N. inspections of government-ministry buildings in Baghdad—and they're *really* mad about the Times's suggestion that the showdown was timed to boost Bush's image as the GOP convention opens in Houston. "Christ almighty," a senior U.S. official said. "Now we're giving Saddam Hussein early warning."

The Times story said the inspection showdown could lead to airstrikes on government buildings in Baghdad and quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying the timing "appeared calculated to give President Bush a boost" during the convention. It said "one official complained 'we are going to stage an incident' . . . that will serve as a pretext for military action and 'to help get the president re-elected'." The story also said the tactic "could damage the credibility" of the United Nations.

Administration sources told NEWSWEEK, however, that the United States was cooperating closely with the U.N. inspectors and that three weeks ago, Bush urged the United Nations not to let Iraq limit the inspectors' activities. They said Rolf Ekeus, leader of the U.N. team, proposed a surprise inspection to Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger last week and that Bush gave his approval in a conversation with national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

They said the Times story would give the Iraqis time to conceal evidence and raise the chances that Saddam would resist. "We know anything we do will be cast in a political context," one source said. "But the implication that George Bush and Brent Scowcroft are hatching up some kind of confrontation to help Bush's re-election is just not fair." ■

CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WATCH

Republican Convention Edition

The CW is tired of Clinton's lead and will do what it can to hype this one into being a horse race. Look for Bush's speech to be hailed as brilliant even if it isn't.

PLAYERS

Conventional Wisdom

- | | | |
|------------------|---|---|
| G. Bush | ↔ | Puts entire fate in hands of Nixon's speechwriter. CW sez, single-digit bounce. |
| B. Bush | ↑ | Big Mama takes charge, executes perfect GOP straddle on abortion balance beam. |
| D. Quayle | ↔ | Like Clinton, he'll tell life story in speech—just an all-American newspaper heir. |
| M. Quayle | ↔ | Her speech will show a bright, angry, humorless lawyer/mother. The GOP's Hillary. |
| J. Baker | ↑ | All hail our savior Allah, Christ, Yahweh—whomever. It shouldn't have come to this. |
| H. Truman | ↑ | In hot new bio, he runs against "Do Nothing" Congress. Give 'em hell, George? |

WARRIOR FOR TH

In an excerpt from their new book,
TIME's White House correspondents
 depict George Bush as a deeply
 practical man who decided that what
 he most wanted to do in his first term
 was win a second term

By **MICHAEL DUFFY** and **DAN GOODGAME**

SOME OBVIOUS QUESTIONS AWAITED GEORGE BUSH ON Wednesday, Nov. 9, 1988, his first day as President-elect of the United States of America.

What were his plans? Would he move quickly to make good on his vows to clean up the nation's skies, fully fund Head Start and broaden opportunities for disabled Americans? How would he persuade lawmakers to go along with such proposals after a campaign of ugly attacks on Democrats and considerable Congress bashing? How would Bush's kinder and gentler promises mesh with his oaths to halt regulatory red tape, rein in the Federal Government and reduce the deficit? How would Bush do all that and still uphold his "no new taxes" pledge?

Appearing before reporters that morning, Bush was asked to describe his mandate. He replied, "Well, I don't know whether I want to use the word mandate . . . I would simply say the people have spoken, the verdict was clear, and therefore I will take what I think the prime issues of the campaign were and work constructively with Congress to attain the will of the people."

Bush was forecasting a great deal when he eschewed the word mandate. His campaign had been a bewildering fugue of mixed messages designed to hold together an unlikely coalition of mainstream Republicans, activist conservatives, Reagan Democrats and independent suburbanites. Bush won with a coalition whose demands were so contradictory that it would prove almost impossible to govern. But then a mandate had never been Bush's objective. Getting elected was. He had assembled a coalition not to govern, but simply to acquire the 270 electoral votes he needed to win the presidency.

It was only a matter of weeks after Bush's Inauguration that his aimless style began to worry many of his aides. Bush, they complained, was flitting around from St. Louis to South Korea to South Carolina without communicating a clear sense of his priorities to the country or even to his staff. Only six weeks into his term, Bush felt obliged to call a press conference to deny that his Administration suffered from "drift."


In fact, Bush did have a strategy, and John Sununu, his chief of staff, revealed its essence during a fractious staff session in his big corner office on the evening of March 6, 1989. That meeting, unusual amid the informal, walk-in-anytime atmosphere of the Bush White House, was called at the urging of

*From **Marching in Place: The Status Quo Presidency of George***

Bush by Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame, published by Simon & Schuster. © 1992 by Michael Duffy and Dan Goodgame.



THE STATUS QUO



His is an old-fashioned "order" conservatism, which seeks to impose no new vision of society but rather to defend the status quo and avoid mistakes.

a group of senior officials, who for weeks had been telling one another, in whispered asides and computer-mail messages, that the President was being badly served by his scattershot planning.

Several senior aides recommended that the White House agree on a set of legislative priorities and political messages and pursue them single-mindedly over the next several months: coordinating Bush's travel, speeches, meetings and—especially—TV news coverage, in a theme-of-the-week, line-of-the-day routine. Hearing this, Sununu erupted, "No! No! Government doesn't work that way!" What he meant was that George Bush wouldn't work that way. Weekly themes, Sununu insisted, were "too confining, too cumbersome" to suit Bush's peripatetic personality or the political constraints that he had inherited. Bush, unlike Ronald Reagan, did not have a Republican-controlled Senate, effective control of the House or a clear mandate from the voters to accomplish any specific, big-ticket reforms.

Sununu then provided his aides what they needed: not a set of domestic priorities so much as a political strategy and a way of understanding what Bush was up to. What was the single, overriding goal of the Bush Administration? Sununu's answer: a "successful presidency" that would bring re-election in 1992. Next question: How can the Bush Administration best ensure that the voters judge it a success? The answer: by putting together a solid record of accomplishment on which to campaign in 1992; a checklist of bills passed that major constituencies would applaud, of bills vetoed that other constituencies—particularly conservatives—had despised; and a tally of presidential actions taken, crises handled, opportunities seized. Sununu referred to this presidential platform in the making as "talking points."

Here, finally, was "the vision thing": the image Bush saw when he imagined a better future for America was... himself in the Oval Office through January 1997! Silly as it might sound, this revelation proved useful as "an organizing principle," in the recollection of one senior official present at the meeting, and "gave us a quiet, internal coherence" that had been missing until then. Bill Kristol, the chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle, later explained that Sununu "had us think of the record that we'd like the President to run on in 1992 and work backward from there."

This approach offered another advantage, which Sununu described as "tactical flexibility"—a nimbleness, unencumbered by sticky specific goals or principles, that would allow Bush to quickly seize political opportunities as they arose. During the 1988 campaign, Bush committed himself to as few specific policies as possible, believing that such undertakings would confine him after the election. After Bush took office, his reluctance to commit himself only grew stronger and gained an additional rationale: laying out to the public a clearly defined agenda would make it more difficult for Bush to shift his attention to unexpected crises and opportunities, at home and abroad, that offered bigger political payoffs. Budget Director Richard Darman made this point to his colleagues at the March 6 meeting, in words that nicely prefigured the entire term: "Remember, much of how a President is going to be evaluated is how he handles surprises, not necessarily how he handles his own agenda."

BUSH THE REGULAR JOE

Americans sensed that they had elected a different sort of President when George Bush let it slip that he showered with his dog. This was something new: an emperor who admitted that he (at least for a few minutes every morning) had no clothes. The disclosure was not as startling as it might have been. Bush, America knew, or would soon learn, owned a bowling ball. He hated broccoli. He had trouble finishing his sentences. He had a fancy estate at Kennebunkport, Maine, which had been in his family for generations, but he ran errands to town and invited just about everyone to lunch. He preferred country to classical music. The anecdotes about Bush's "normal" habits tumbled forth from White House staffers like so many talking points. The message was obvious: the President is a regular Joe. "This is the first normal guy to hold this office in 25 years," a senior official said.

Some of those habits were not quite as advertised. During the 1988 campaign, Bush injected more of a Texas twang into his voice. "Fair" became a two-syllable word. He no longer intended an action; he was "fixin' to" do it. Bush did not excise all fancy words from his vocabulary, but he did spell them out syllable by syllable, as if reading them for the first time. Even "ed-jew-cay-shun" got this aw, shucks treatment. He had his picture taken throwing horseshoes rather than playing golf or tennis. Campaign officials discouraged photos of the Bush spread in Kennebunkport. The owner of an expensive speedboat and an avid angler for the exotic bonefish of the Florida Keys, Bush now emphasized his love of fishing for the humble largemouth bass and attended the Bass Masters exhibition in Alabama. He also let it be known that he liked to unwind with a beer (domestic, of course) and a big bag of pork rinds.

As soon as he was elected, Bush dropped most of his working-class affectations. It turned out that his favorite snack was not pork rinds but popcorn, and beer gave way to vodka martinis (on the rocks with lots of olives) and white wine. Bush once again strapped his watch to a striped-cloth band that had been banished during the campaign as too preppy. He similarly resumed wearing shirts with white collar and cuffs over striped or pastel-colored bodies: "what Roger calls my 'elitist shirts,'" Bush joked in a reference to his savvy campaign adman and image adviser, Roger Ailes.

Bush's eight years at Reagan's side taught him a great deal about how to be President and about how *not* to be President. He learned that a well-liked Commander in Chief, which Reagan was for most of his two terms, would be forgiven many a political gaffe or unpopular policy initiative. Bush also learned that a President who promised too much, who raised expectations for sweeping change, would, like Reagan, in the end be seen to fall short of the mark. So Bush set out to endear himself to the American public while at the same time working to lower its expectations both of him and of his presidency.

To the task, Bush brought something special: an ironic, self-mocking approach to the job. He went through the motions of being President that tradition dictated, but often with his tongue planted in his cheek. He once gathered his advisers in the Oval Office, placed a crystal ball on his desk and widened his

eyes over the orb as a photographer snapped the picture with a Polaroid. (An aide later forwarded the snap to a reporter, saying, "The President wanted you to know how he *really* makes decisions.")

Film actress Melanie Griffith recalls standing on the road outside her home in Aspen, Colorado, and watching the President's motorcade go by one day in August 1990. In fact, it wasn't just any day; it was Aug. 2, 1990—the day after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. But Bush, seeing Griffith, stopped his car, activated the special speaker in the rear of his limousine—Bush calls this device "Mr. Microphone"—and barked at Griffith's one-year-old daughter, "What's the matter, Dakota? Never seen a talking car before?" Bush invited Dana Carvey, whose *Saturday Night Live* imitations of the President were frighteningly convincing, to the White House. There, during a 15-minute Oval Office chat, Bush and Carvey stood in front of the fireplace and talked simultaneously at each other, one being Bush, the other doing Bush. When Carvey began chopping the air with one hand and talking about "Daaaan Quaaaayle—getting stronger, learning ev-er-y daaay," Bush doubled over in laughter.

This downsizing of the presidency served a dual political



Anecdotes about Bush's "normal" habits and hobbies like bass fishing tumbled forth from the White House.

purpose: Americans came to like Bush and to expect less of him. It was as if to say, "Like me? Trust me." And it was hard not to like a man who, surrounded by grim-

aced Secret Service agents, howled with laughter when he played the \$20-bill-on-the-end-of-a-string trick on unsuspecting waiters at the Chinese embassy; who would greet visitors to the Oval Office by placing a windup mechanical bumblebee on the floor and letting it buzz around; who walked around the White House with a voice-activated stuffed monkey that socked itself on the head whenever the Commander in Chief began to talk. As Bush's old friend from Yale, Thomas ("Lud") Ashley, liked to say, "It's easy to underestimate George Bush because he's so damned genteel and nice."

BUSH THE LOYALIST

In looking for a chief of staff, Bush wanted a bad cop and one who was loyal to him alone. Bush had watched his friend Jim Baker, as Reagan's chief of staff, privately blame the Commander in Chief for much of what went wrong and take the credit for most of what went right. Bush was determined to find a more selfless

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chief of staff, and thus picked John Sununu, the deeply conservative New Hampshire Governor who had saved Bush's flagging presidential bid by helping him win his state's primary. Bush deployed Sununu as a double-sided human shield, whom liberals would blame for taking a moderate Administration hostage and to whom conservatives would turn when the President abandoned their causes. Sununu ran interference when Bush needed to shuffle to the right on such issues as judicial appointments or abortion, absorbing the blame of Bush's latest pander to his party's extremist wing. But because his ties to conservatives were so strong, Sununu could mollify the powerful G.O.P. faction when the President needed to veer back to the middle on taxes and fiscal questions. "Sununu took all the arrows," explained an aide, "and Bush got all the credit."

While Sununu seldom exceeded his brief from Bush, his style was gratuitously insulting. He made enemies that neither he nor Bush needed. Nor did Sununu realize that by treating people maliciously, he ceased to get the best out of them; once burned by Sununu, most Republicans and White House aides just stopped saying anything or making suggestions. It wasn't until Sununu flew afoul of White House travel rules in May 1991 that Bush realized how few friends his obnoxious chief of staff had.

Bush began to nudge Sununu out just before Thanksgiving 1991. Moving with characteristic stealth, Bush dashed off an identical note to seven or eight longtime political allies asking for their "advice" about the upcoming campaign. He sealed the notes in White House envelopes and passed them to his son George. The younger Bush inserted the letters in larger plain brown envelopes bearing his return address in Dallas. He followed up with telephone calls, speaking individually with each of the outside advisers. The response to the secret letters was nearly unanimous: the recipients reported that they'd love to work in the 1992 campaign but could not imagine doing so if Sununu would retain authority over the campaign as chief of staff. As one member of the high command put it later to another, "I'm not working for that little son of a bitch."

On the day before Thanksgiving, sounding more like a Dutch uncle than an executioner, the younger Bush tried to break it to Sununu gently in the chief of staff's office. "You know, I've talked to a lot of people. They're down on you. It's going to be tough for you to work with these people. I've got to tell my father, and you've got to talk to him about it." George W. delivered his heave-ho but left the session doubtful that he had accomplished his mission. Indeed, Sununu concluded that he still had some wiggle room left and went to see Bush, who told him to come to Camp David that Sunday.

When Sununu arrived he surprised Bush by fighting for his job. "I can survive this thing," he told Bush. "I can work through it." The Commander in Chief couldn't bring himself to cut the umbilical cord. Having relied on Sununu to do his dirty work, Bush discovered that there was no one around to ax the hatchet man. So Bush again demurred, postponing his next move for another day. "Let's think about it. Let's talk tomorrow."

On the morning of Monday, Dec. 2, Sununu tentatively offered to resign, thinking Bush would reject it. Bush's response seemed vague: "Let me see what we ought to do," he said, "how we can handle it." Sununu didn't get it at first, but

within an hour he realized that "maybe" meant yes. Bush's ambivalent refusal to a half-serious offer of resignation was in fact a request for the real thing. "He didn't clear it up," Sununu later explained to friends. "He didn't clear it up."

In fact, he did, but in his own way. Both the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* led their front pages the next day with stories about Sununu's pending departure—unmistakable leaks from the President's allies. Sununu immediately went to see Bush and told him that they had both suffered enough. "I don't want my family to go through another day of this," he said.

Within days the former Governor had explained to friends that he was disappointed that Bush couldn't deliver the bad news himself but relied instead upon his son to do his dirty work. "What really bothers me," said a close Sununu ally from New Hampshire, "is that the President couldn't tell John to his face, that he sent his kid to do it. John deserved better than that, and I know it bothered John too."

Weeks later, after Sununu was gone, many of the same officials who had received the secret letters from the President tried to impress upon reporters that George W.'s role had been vastly exaggerated. As one insisted, "I know for a fact that he hadn't been sent there by anyone." This was revisionism. Bush was just covering his tracks after the kill, perhaps embarrassed that he lacked the guts to fire his chief of staff himself.

BUSH THE BIT PLAYER

In his first 22 months in office George Bush made the evening news a third as often as his predecessor. The tactic was intentional: Bush believed that too much time on television would only raise public expectations about what he could accomplish.

Atwater on Defeating Bush

WHEN GEORGE BUSH PUT TOGETHER HIS 1988 CAMPAIGN, HE MOVED TO ADDRESS his patrician image by hiring Lee Atwater, who was steeped in the status anxieties and resentments of working-class whites in his native South Carolina. Atwater war-gamed how he would run against Bush if he were working for the Democrats and decided that he would connect the voters' reservations about Bush's privileged and insular upbringing with their fears about the Republican Party's economic agenda. "One of the most potent and consistent factors in American politics is the distrust and resentment of élites," said Atwater, who died of a brain tumor in 1991. Many swing voters are convinced that "various élites and special interests are stacking the decks against them."

Thus, to beat Bush, Atwater would revive the latent image of the G.O.P. as "a bunch of rich, old snobs" and link it to a devastating caricature of George Herbert Walker Bush: chauffeured to the Greenwich Country Day School during the Great Depression, spanked by his father with a squash racquet, inducted into the nation's most élite secret society at Yale as well as the suspicious Trilateral Commission and launched into politics with the help of Washington politicians who played golf with his Senator father. If he were running against Bush, Atwater would build TV ads around pictures of the Republican nominee as a fopish-looking Ambassador to the U.N. during the early 1970s, with his half-rim eyeglasses, long hair and sideburns, and flashy neckties. Pictures of Bush playing golf, and in tennis whites, dancing a silly pirouette to celebrate winning a close match. Pictures of the sprawling oceanfront Bush family mansion in Kennebunkport, with a voice-over saying, "No wonder he wants to cut capital gains taxes on the wealthy..."

Don't get him wrong, Atwater cautioned. He loved and admired Bush and believed such attacks would be outrageously unfair; they would discount his decency and service to his country, his hard work and his sympathy for those who had not had his advantages. Still... Atwater drawled with a mischievous grin, "if I was managing the Democrats' campaign, I think I might be able to beat George Bush." Instead, with Atwater's help, Bush struck first by painting Michael Dukakis as the élitist in the race: the creature of Harvard and the A.C.L.U., too "sophisticated" to say the Pledge of Allegiance or to kneel in prayer. ■

"It's not honest," press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said. "The President of the U.S. cannot solve every problem from wants to aids." David Demarest, Bush's communications director, put it this way: "This President does not see himself at the center of national attention." Bush had reason to worry that if he became too commonplace in America's living rooms, the public would tire of him prematurely. Pollster Robert Teeter had data that suggested the public actually resents a President who is on the news every night. Teeter regularly surveyed Americans for their sentiments about Bush and discovered that, as he once put it, "they don't like having to come home every night and turn on the television to learn what he did today." A President, as



Bush deployed Sununu as a double-sided human shield. "Sununu took all the arrows," explained an aide, "and Bush got all the credit."

Bush put it, could get "overexposed." By keeping his head down, Bush was subtly telling Americans not to look to Washington, and particularly the White House, for answers.

Bush instead sought to dial back his exposure, trimming the role of the presidency in the lives of most Americans. In this way, he was making a virtue of necessity: his inability to affect a swaggering leadership style dovetailed with his minimalist agenda. Plainspoken by nature, Bush was uncomfortable with dramatic language and hyperbole. He often deleted the most memorable passages from his speeches as he delivered them. He skipped over emotional lines about patriotism and national service, both before the Gulf War and after. (Radio reporters, who relied more than most reporters on strong words from a President for good stories, routinely let loose howls of frustration when Bush omitted the best lines from prepared texts.) The President didn't really believe that ideas could change people's minds. That, he figured, required careful, one-on-one negotiation—the kind of personal hard pitch that works best after a personal acknowledgment in a presidential speech.

When their White House mess privileges were revoked early in 1989, Bush's speechwriters realized their work would be less important to the 41st President than it had been to his predecessor. His writers complained privately that the only portions of speech draft that the boss seemed to care about were the "acknowledgments"—the several paragraphs of names and perfunctory thank-yous that led nearly every Bush speech, in which he recognized by name the friends, political allies and

routine famous people in every audience. If Bush saw someone he knew who was not mentioned in the text—and he nearly always did—he would break away in the middle of his comments to recognize the luminary, and often sent a stiff note to the errant researcher afterward. It was, several speechwriters explained, the only thing Bush ever complained about.

Several White House officials tried to take advantage of Bush's interest in public opinion polls to present him opportunities for rhetorical leadership. They sent the President surveys that asked respondents not only what they thought, but how much they knew and didn't know, and whether new information and arguments might change their opinions. For example, a July-August 1990 poll by Teeter's old firm, Market Opinion Research, asked 1,000 registered voters whether the government spends "too much, not enough, or just the right amount on federal farm subsidies." Most of the respondents, thinking of aid to small farmers in need of drought assistance and such, answered "not enough" (43%) or "the right amount" (12%). Then the respondents were told, "In 1988, 43% of federal farm subsidies went to farm operators whose average net income was \$96,000 per year." With this new information, 55% of those polled said that "the federal program should be changed [and] we should only help small farms." This offered an opening for Bush to shift public opinion and policy against the farm subsidies for the wealthy that he said he opposed. But he failed to follow through in any bold way.

Nor did he think he needed to. Midway through his term, Bush concluded that his Administration had already done enough to win re-election. "Let me suggest the following," Sununu said in November 1990 to the annual meeting of the Conservative Leadership Conference. "There's not another single piece of legislation that needs to be passed in the next two years for this President. In fact, if Congress wants to come together, adjourn and leave, it's all right with us. We don't need them."

BUSH THE GENERAL

Saddam Hussein was a hard man and reckoned he knew a patsy when he saw one. The Iraqi leader had watched with contempt as Bush tried for years, as Vice President and President, to appease him with trade concessions, intelligence sharing and an obsequious, boys-will-be-boys attitude toward Saddam's use of chemical weapons and torture against his own people and his threats against Israel and Kuwait. Saddam also saw how Bush had tried to appease the rulers of China after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, and Mikhail Gorbachev after his March 1990 crackdown on Lithuania.

But after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Saddam learned better about Bush, and so did Bush's countrymen. In the opening words of his somber televised address on Aug. 8, 1990, announcing the initial dispatch of U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush could have been describing himself as easily as America: "In the life of a nation, we are called upon to define who we are and what we believe."


In the gulf crisis, George Bush found something to believe in. He saw almost immediately that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait threatened vital U.S. interests and must be reversed—probably by force. And perhaps for the first time in his long political career, he never wavered. He defied the consensus of his aides on several crucial questions, including the decision to intervene in the first week of August and the move in early January to seek explicit backing from Congress before starting the

air war. He encountered public resistance at half a dozen turns in the crisis and overcame it, not with soaring rhetoric, but with bold actions, each of which shifted public opinion toward support of his policy.

Crucial to Bush's success in winning support at home and abroad was his well-practiced and ruthless use of deception. He repeatedly misled Saudi Arabia, the other coalition allies, the American public and Congress by exaggerating the nature of the threat that Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia and by concealing a number of intentions: the massive size and duration of the military deployment he had in mind, his immediate determination not only to defend Saudi Arabia but also to liberate Kuwait and his private assessment from the early weeks of the crisis that all-out war was likely.

Through it all Bush radiated an eerie calm and sense of command. Gone was the shrill, arm-waving creature who reversed himself on taxes, civil rights and abortion. The qualities Bush displayed throughout the gulf crisis—stubborn resolve and adherence to principle, resourcefulness and foresight—were particularly striking in contrast with his feckless performance at home. In his speeches Bush evoked a “new world order” in which the U.S., as the sole superpower, would cooperate with the humbled Soviet Union and work through the U.N. to resolve conflicts. This new order represented an appealing hope and vision, but Bush focused his war aims squarely on the restoration of the old order, which he and his aides strictly defined as the status quo *ante bellum*—the situation that existed before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the gulf crisis Bush performed with uncommon con-

Bush, shaking hands in Billings, Montana, in 1990, set out to endear himself to the public while working to lower expectations of his presidency.



viction and ingenuity, but he served as he did at home: as a warrior for the status quo.

The U.S. strategy toward Iraq was worked out far in advance during a relaxed, four-hour session between Bush and Brent Scowcroft, as they trolled for bluefish off Kennebunkport. The two men assumed the U.S. would do whatever was necessary to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, but was that enough? What further objectives should they pursue? The overthrow of Saddam? Destruction of Iraq's chemical-, biological- and nuclear-weapons programs and its ballistic missiles? As a lesson in the dangers of expanding one's war aims, Scowcroft recalled the U.S. experience four decades earlier in defending South Korea from invasion by the communist

North. Rather than merely expel the invaders, the U.S. tried to unify Korea by marching all the way to the border with China. In response, China intervened. The conflict lasted nearly three more years, cost tens of thousands of additional casualties and poisoned U.S.-Chinese relations for 20 years. All to end up back at the status quo *ante bellum*.

If it came to war, Scowcroft argued, the U.S. would have ample opportunity to bomb deep inside Iraq, to destroy its unconventional and ballistic weapons and to cripple its conventional army as an offensive threat. But those objectives must remain unstated. Nor must the overthrow of Saddam be a public objective. When he retreated from Kuwait, or was driven out, Bush and Scowcroft were assuming, his generals and Baath Party leaders would tear Saddam apart like carrion and elevate a new leader who would be eager to restore ties with the rest of the world.

As it turned out, the ground war lasted only one hundred hours. But even weeks after victory over Iraq, Bush was nagged by the problems of the Kurds. Baker had just returned from a visit to the Kurdish

Light 'Em Up

AFTER TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE, BUSH RESEMBLED NOTHING SO MUCH AS A MEDIEVAL boy king who woke up one morning, found himself atop the throne and began tugging at the bell ropes for servants, ordering up royal carriages and scheduling banquets and tournaments. “In case you hadn't noticed,” Bush often explained, “I really love my job.”

Bush's ebullience often seemed limitless—as hundreds of local Congressmen and political officials who attempted to buttonhole him during a presidential visit to their states discovered. Most politicians try to put to good use the brief ride from the local airport into town, making a pitch for help with a project or a hand in solving a snarled political problem.

Bush, however, often pre-empted such appeals with an adult car game called “Light 'em up.” In the back of his armored Cadillac limousine, Bush faced forward with his guest on the jump seat facing aft. As the limo moved through the streets, Bush would pick out someone from the crowd, usually an attractive woman or child, point and wait until—pow!—eye contact and the victim realizes, He's looking at me! That's when the target “lit up.” Because the limo was moving forward, it fell to the guest facing aft to report to the President when he asked, “Did I get her? Did I light her up?” And then the game would begin again. The anticipated tête-à-tête about the local water project never came off. The bewildered politician's disappointment, not to mention the spectacle of another local dignitary forced to play the silly game, never failed to amuse the White House staff—or the President.

refugees in northern Iraq and phoned Bush to describe the horrors he had seen. What was more, the camera crews with him had seen them too; night after night, the networks were leading the news with pitiful Kurdish children dead and dying. Then Bush received a phone call from President Turgut Ozal of Turkey. The plight of the Kurds, Ozal insisted, was "an embarrassment to you and a political threat to us, and it will get worse, believe me." Then Ozal said firmly, Here is what you must do. First, you must get the Kurds down out of the mountains to the flatlands where they can be helped. Second, to get them out of the mountains, you must protect them from the Iraqi military.

This went against Bush's oft-stated instinct to avoid entanglement in Iraq's ferocious tribal conflicts. Yet as Bush canvassed the European allies, he learned, as Baker had warned, that they were prepared to move without the U.S., leaving him to look cold and heartless and, more important, like a man surrendering the leadership of the new world order. By Tuesday evening, Bush had turned his policy 180°. He would send ground troops into northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. "So much for our nice, clean victory," carped one White House opponent of the new policy, "and for not getting bogged down in Middle East politics."

The Kurds would be only the first bit of unfinished business in Iraq to gradually corrode what should have been an untarnished triumph for Bush's leadership in diplomacy and war. Yet those who chided Bush for not "finishing the job" by ousting Saddam seldom thought through the costs and difficulties of such a mission. "Saddam was not going to sit and wait on his veranda for us," said Bob Gates, then Scowcroft's deputy. "We saw how difficult it was to find Manuel Noriega in a much smaller country with a smaller army." Saddam's ouster would have required a full-blown takeover of Iraq, incurring additional U.S. casualties. It would have committed the U.S. to putting a new government in place and would certainly have splintered the wartime coalition, leaving the U.S. to do it alone. "Can you imagine how we would be pounded," Gates said, "if

In the gulf crisis, Bush found something to believe in. And perhaps for the first time in his long political career, he never wavered.

we were 'bogged down' in an 'inconclusive civil war' in Iraq?"

But even victory began to work against Bush. Pollsters reported that although Americans were mightily impressed with Bush's performance during the gulf crisis, they resented the fact that he did not apply the same skills to reversing America's economic decline. "If he ever exerted the same kind of leadership on domestic issues that he did in the Persian Gulf," said Representative Leon Panetta, the California Democrat who chairs the House Budget Committee, "there's no question President Bush could have a significant impact."

BUSH THE CAUTIOUS COACH

When Bush says he considers himself a conservative, he sees his role as a *conservator*: one entrusted with an inheritance and concerned less with expanding it than with guarding it. His is an old-fashioned "order" conservatism, which seeks to impose no new vision of society but rather to defend the status quo and to avoid mistakes of commission—in sharp contrast with the risk-taking, china-breaking conservatism of Reagan and Barry Goldwater.

Bush often volunteers, in contrast with the rhetoric of Reagan, that he does not "hate government." Bush is, however, deeply skeptical and pessimistic toward attempts by government to force the pace of human progress. He believes that progress comes, when it comes, through glacial changes in attitudes. When Bush ran for the U.S. Senate from Texas in 1964, for example, he made opposition to civil rights legislation the centerpiece of his campaign. "I believe that the solution to this grave problem," he stated in a campaign brochure, "lies in the hearts and goodwill of all people."

The first duty of a President, Bush believed, was "prudence," a quality he esteemed above all others. Bush further defined this duty in terms of the teachings of Hippocrates, the ancient Greek known as the father of medicine, who counseled young physicians, In trying to heal, first take care to do no harm. Though masked by the President's sunny disposition and boundless energy, the phrase "Do no harm" became a pessimistic leitmotiv for the Bush Administration. Where John



Kennedy won the presidency in 1960 on the slogan "We can do better," Bush's byword, uttered often by him and to him in private strategy sessions, was "We could do worse."

"I don't want to make any early-term mistakes like Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs," Bush told his advisers. Bush could always see the pitfalls he wished to avoid more clearly than any affirmative goals he might have in mind. Defending his restrained response to the Soviet crack-down on Lithuania in early 1990, Bush quoted one of his favorite philosophers, Yogi Berra, saying, "I don't want to make the wrong mistake." When he was pressed in late 1991 to fight the double-dip recession with a middle-class tax cut and extended unemployment benefits, Bush demurred, endorsing the laissez-faire view that recessions can be beneficial in helping businesses to become "leaner" and "more competitive." He added that "my goal is to see that government doesn't get in the way." Bush also argued that recessions are largely self-correcting, saying, "That is an argument for not doing anything dumb... that's going to make it worse."


Bush often tries to portray his dearth of principles and his irresolution as virtues. Asked by an Iowa student why he reversed his stand on abortion rights and embraced Reagan's staunch pro-life stance, Bush replied, "Have you ever changed your mind? That's one thing about intellectual honesty."

At other points, however, Bush has defended his abortion switch by pointing out that the number of abortions had grown enormously and convinced him that the practice should be curtailed by law. This line of argument is common with Bush, and telling. Few particular practices, whether abortion or S&L shysters forking out billions in taxpayer-insured deposits to their cronies in commercial real estate, are abhorrent to Bush inherently, but only when taken to excess. Thus, after reading *Den of Thieves*, the James Stewart tale of Wall Street market rigging and self-dealing, Bush pronounced himself disturbed by the "greed" involved but drew no larger conclusions about deregulation of taxpayer-insured financial industries. Thus, the moral question at the heart of the abortion debate—the rights of a fetus versus those of its mother—are of less interest to Bush than the number of fetuses involved.

Pollster Teeter, like Bush, often quotes former Republican National Committee chairman Ray Bliss, who advised that in politics one should always wait a few days before taking an important position or making a major decision, because "by then, you might not have to decide at all." With the Democrats in control of both houses of Congress and with Bush disinclined to wage partisan jihad, compromise seemed the President's only hope of accomplishment. Still, even Teeter warned Bush to guard against the impression that he was some sort of national real estate broker whose only goal was to close a deal, any deal. Teeter and other close advisers urged Bush to "tell people what you would do if you were a dictator, if you didn't have to deal with Congress."

Bush seldom followed that advice. Whenever he was asked why he wasn't leading on some controversial issue—say, the need to reduce the burden of regressive Social Security taxes on

He wasn't passive or indolent, but he was reactive, always less interested in doing anything specific as President than in just being President.



middle-income wage earners—Bush would spread his arms, shrug and reply, "Why don't Republicans and Democrats [in Congress] rise up and do something about it?" Bush expected the Democrats in Congress to take the lead in domestic policy and told them so repeatedly in private sessions. While Reagan had staffers dig out Harry Truman's old placard *THE BUCK STOPS HERE* and place it on his desk, Bush as President sent the thing back into storage.

Bush left no doubt of his defensive, risk-averse temperament in a 1989 interview about his baseball career at Yale, where he served as team captain and first baseman, despite having one of the worst batting averages on the squad. Asked what kind of manager he would be, Bush replied, "Probably fairly cautious. I'd play by the averages, probably get people on, be cautious about too much stealing and bunt 'em over... I think just steady is what I'd say."

Bush lacks a clear rationale for a second term in part because the imperative that drove his first four years—re-election—will be moot on Nov. 4, 1992. Absent the political goal of winning a second term, Bush would have no star to chart by. Already, the Bush White House is in danger of intellectual exhaustion after not four but 12 years in office. Many of the brightest Bush aides have no plans to stay around for a second term because they know the fun that goes with the heavy lifting of legislation is over. "You've got to get out of here soon," said one top official as he pondered his options in the spring of 1992, "because *nothing* is going to happen here in a second term."

A second Bush term would look a lot like the first: more of the same, only less. Bush would rely on his instincts, reacting to events as necessary. His goals wouldn't be bold, but then his actions wouldn't be imprudent. Like the experienced captain of a cruise ship, Bush would take care to coddle the first-class passengers, and though he would be indifferent to the vessel's course and destination, he could at least be trusted not to sink it. ■

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NBC News

MEET THE PRESS

Sunday, August 30, 1992

GUEST:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

MODERATOR:

Tim Russert - NBC News

PANEL:

David Broder - The Washington Post
Robert Novak - The Chicago Sun-Times

- - -

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ANNOUNCER: From NBC News in Washington, this is "Meet the Press," with Tim Russert.

TIM RUSSERT: Welcome again to "Meet the Press." Some of our issues this Sunday morning: Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and the former Yugoslavia. Our guest: the assistant to the president for national security affairs, Brent Scowcroft.

General Scowcroft, welcome to "Meet the Press."

BRENT SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Tim. It's nice to be here.

MR. RUSSERT: And joining me this morning, David Broder of the Washington Post and Robert Novak of the Chicago Sun-Times.

General Scowcroft, what's the latest in Iraq this morning?

MR. SCOWCROFT: It's really quiet. They are flying reconnaissance patrols, and so far there's been very little--in fact no activity which could be taken as opposition.

MR. RUSSERT: There was a report in yesterday's Washington Post quoting administration officials saying that our position in Iraq will evolve from one of monitoring military activities to banning all movements and activities. Any truth to that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, no. I think the purpose is what it's--what it had been declared, and that is to fly reconnaissance in order to observe his compliance with Resolution 688.

MR. RUSSERT: Now, Congressman Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said yesterday that his intelligence briefings tell him several things have occurred--that Shiite troops have been attacking Iraqi troops, that there has been a movement or a gathering of Iraqi troops on the 32nd parallel, and that some troops, Iraqi troops in southern Iraq, have moved away from there, we don't know where. Can you talk about that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, the Shiites in the marshes have periodically attacked Iraqi troops, emerged from the marshes for hit-and-run kinds of attacks. I don't know that there's anything new there.

There are a couple of divisions in the south that have moved out of their garrisons, and there have been signs of preparations for another ground offensive for several weeks now.

MR. RUSSERT: A ground offensive by the Iraqis against the Shiites?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. RUSSERT: And if that occurs, what will our response be?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, that's still hypothetical, and I wouldn't want to say exactly what we'd do, but I think Saddam ought to take the prospect very seriously.

MR. RUSSERT: We would not sit by and allow the slaughter of Shiites?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't want to speculate, but we're flying over there for a reason, and that is to observe his compliance with 688, so--

MR. RUSSERT: There was also a report that in June, there was a coup attempt against Saddam Hussein by the Republican Guard. Can you talk about that a bit?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, not very much. There are some indications that there was some kind of a disturbance and that--it is at least speculated that one of the reasons for Saddam going negative about compliance with all of the U.N. resolutions about that time was that he had to try to demonstrate his authority.

MR. RUSSERT: Do we have any evidence on this Sunday morning that Saddam's position in Iraq has weakened?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think you can get evidence on both sides. I think it is weaker. I think it is significantly weaker. But it is hard empirically to demonstrate.

MR. RUSSERT: What are the chances of a coup against Saddam within the next few months?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Coups are inherently difficult to predict. I think, as I say, there was some kind of disturbance in June, and I think that just the fact that something occurred in regime that is so despotic and so security-minded is an interesting manifestation.

MR. RUSSERT: David.

DAVID BRODER: General Scowcroft, you say--and I can understand why--you don't want to signal publicly what our response would be to an Iraqi offensive against the Shiites. Is there an agreement among the United States and its allies as to what actions would be taken under those circumstances?

MR. SCOWCROFT: There is a general coordination of plans, contingencies, yes.

MR. BRODER: Have you communicated in some fashion to Saddam Hussein what he would face if he should take that step?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We have told him that we're there to enforce compliance with 688, and I think our actions to date indicate that we're serious about it.

MR. BRODER: There has been some question raised, as you know, about why we did not, in this particular instance, go back to the Security Council for a resolution specifically authorizing this kind of patrol that we're doing. Why didn't--what's your answer to that question?

MR. SCOWCROFT: It was the view of at least four of the five permanent members of the Security Council that authority did exist for this operation. There is always some hazard in going back

over and over and over to the Security Council. We did brief and consult with the secretary-general, and we think it was all done properly.

MR. BRODER: The president has made it clear that he does not want and hopes not to see partition of the country.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. BRODER: But with this embargo on operations by the central government in the southern third of the country, isn't de facto partition what we're most likely to get?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think not under these circumstances. This is a limited action, and the Shiites have really limited capability. Indeed, they're doing well if they can defend themselves.

But what he started to do recently, both against the Kurds and against the Shi'ites, is in the north to tighten in effect a blockade around the Kurds and in the south to launch the most massive offensive that he has to date. That is what this is designed to deal with.

MR. NOVAK: General Scowcroft, you say "recently" in regard to the Shi'ites, but of course the Iraqi forces have been harassing the Shi'ites ever since the end of the war.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, that's right.

MR. NOVAK: Isn't it rather suspect that only two months from the election does the administration get interested in this and start showing an assertiveness at the present scale?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, not at all, not at all--I don't think so.

MR. NOVAK: Just a--

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, it is coincidence. In March, about March, Saddam made a great show of complying with the U.N. sort of across the board; it was mostly rhetorical. But he cooperated with inspections and he helped the humanitarian relief and so on, I suspect in hopes that sanctions would be lifted. It didn't happen. And so around May--somewhere around there, don't hold me too close--he turned strongly negative against compliance with all of the U.N. resolutions, and, as a part of that, launched a massive offensive against the Shi'ites, and at that same time there was a report by Ambassador Van der Stoep on human rights in Iraq dealing with the Shi'ites, and it was those events that precipitated the--

MR. NOVAK: And it took the Bush administration this long to react to those events in last May?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, it didn't, no, it didn't. Oh, the events of last May. Yes, look, it didn't take the Bush administration that long. Remember, Bob, that we are not doing these things unilaterally; we're trying to do them cooperatively with the U.S. or with the coalition. That always is a more difficult process.

MR. NOVAK: Sir, wouldn't you say objectively that the scale of bloodshed and the massacre of minority groups is much more intense in Bosnia than it has been in Iraq?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I wouldn't want to compare; I think it's reprehensible in both places.

MR. NOVAK: Why in the world is the United States taking such an assertive military role in Iraq while in Bosnia we say our policy is let the diplomats talk it out? What's the difference?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think the situation is fundamentally different--fundamentally different.

MR. NOVAK: How?

MR. SCOWCROFT: In Bosnia you have the remnants of the break-up of a country, an inter-ethnic country; it is a civil war in its worst kind of aspects. It is something that we have been trying to deal with, first in cautioning about the break-up in a bloody way, and then in trying to deal with it. I think it has no comparison--

MR. NOVAK: Iraq is not a civil war?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think the comparison between Iraq and Yugoslavia is not no fly zones; the comparison is our reluctance to go in and occupy Iraq to deal with the problems, similarly reluctant to go in and occupy Yugoslavia as a way to deal with the problem.

MR. NOVAK: But, sir, just to clean that up, you certainly are not alleging--what's happening in Iraq is not a civil war going on. I mean, you say it's fundamentally different than the former Yugoslavia in a civil war.

MR. SCOWCROFT: In the manner of its starting, in the manner of our involvement in Iraq, it is a very different situation.

MR. NOVAK: But it is a civil war in both places.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, yes, there is an ethnic struggle also.

MR. RUSSERT: But, General, isn't that the point? The human rights of Bosnians are being trampled on on a daily basis. The human rights of young people in Tiananmen Square in China, Armenia, Somalia, places all around the world. Why has the United States only chosen Iraq to protect the rights of the Shi'ites?

MR. SCOWCROFT: (A) because our conflict with Iraq started out of different circumstances, and (B) it is clearcut and we are able to deal with it more effectively. I think one has to look at these inter-ethnic conflicts--and they are either active or potential around the world, and not as a single phenomenon for which a single answer is true, but you have to deal with the phenomenon based on the circumstances.

MR. RUSSERT: Isn't there some personal pique towards Saddam Hussein by President Bush?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I'd be amazed if there was not.

MR. RUSSERT: And is Saddam Hussein a continuing embarrassment as we approach the election?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I don't think he's an embarrassment; we'd like to get rid of him, yes.

MR. RUSSERT: Why doesn't that same policy carry over to other areas of the world where minority groups are being deprived of their rights, even though it doesn't have the personal pique directed towards Saddam Hussein?

MR. SCOWCROFT: It does carry over, but in the case of Iraq--first of all, you have a United Nations that specifically has ordered Iraq to stop doing this. It is a continuation of a whole regime that the United Nations has put around Iraq, and that we think it important to enforce. We are trying to deal with human rights problems wherever they appear.

MR. RUSSERT: One last quick question. Yitzhak Rabin of Israel has said that Israel will respond in kind if attacked by Iraq or any other country over there, which is different from their stand-down policy in the Persian Gulf war. Have you been notified officially of that position?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not that I'm aware of.

MR. RUSSERT: He said part of the reason--Israeli officials said some of the reasons for Mr. Rabin to say that was to pre-empt any attempt by you to urge restraint by the Israelis.

MR. SCOWCROFT: We have discussed it with the Israelis.

MR. RUSSERT: But you expect the Israelis to respond in kind if attacked?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I would not comment on that.

MR. RUSSERT: We'll have to take a break here. We'll be back in just a minute with more from General Brent Scowcroft.

(Announcements)

MR. RUSSERT: We're back talking to President Bush's right-hand man for national security, Brent Scowcroft.

General, there's been some discussion just the last few weeks that the administration is changing its position on some sale of weapons around--aircraft around the world.

For example, a \$5 billion sale of 72 F-15s to the Saudi Arabians--where does that stand?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, the president has commented both on the F-15 sale and on the sale of F-16s to Taiwan, that it was under review, and that's where it stands.

MR. RUSSERT: Now, there is some suggestion that perhaps the reason it's being reviewed is for domestic political reasons. One administration official said that the driver of this is the politics and economics of it, not the national security issue. Does the fact that the F-15 is made by McDonnell Douglas in Missouri, a state with 11 electoral votes, have any role?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, no. There is one phenomenon about that. Well, first, you know, there has been an electoral process in Israel and getting something like that involved in it would not be a very good idea. Secondly, the production line for the F-15s is closing down now, and so if it is to be done, it has to be done quickly. And that is the driver on that one.

MR. RUSSERT: But the F-16s to Taiwan, the president announced its review on a local TV hookup to Texas. It so happens those planes would be made by General Dynamics in Texas.

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's right.

MR. RUSSERT: Also the V-22 Osprey, which is made in Pennsylvania, a state with 23 electoral votes. I mean, isn't this crass politics--

MR. SCOWCROFT: No.

MR. RUSSERT: --where fundamental national security decisions are being driven by the places where these aircraft are being made?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, it really is not. In the case of the F-16s, the Soviets have--I mean, the Chinese have just purchased some modern aircraft from the Chinese. The French are in negotiations with the Taiwanese for the sale of fighters to Taiwan. So that is what brings about those circumstances.

The V-22 is a battle that the administration has had with the Congress, I think for about three years now. And you know, we're trying to compromise and get that issue behind us.

MR. RUSSERT: But the loss of jobs in the aircraft industry in Pennsylvania, Texas and Missouri--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, yes.

MR. RUSSERT: --had nothing to do with this decision?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I wouldn't say that. The loss of jobs is important. The loss of jobs is always important, of course.

MR. RUSSERT: But Secretary Cheney, Secretary of Defense Cheney said that the Pentagon should not be a social welfare agency.

MR. SCOWCROFT: It's not a social welfare agency, but if one can justify the aircraft on national security grounds, and that would be the ground for any sale in either case, then it would be nice to be able to preserve jobs.

MR. RUSSERT: David.

MR. BRODER: General, a few years ago, you served as one of the three members of the Tower Commission, looking into the Iran-contra affair. I want to call on your expertise in that area.

Five years ago this month, I did an interview with then Vice President Bush in which he said that he had not argued against the arms sales in part because he'd never heard the objections that were being raised to it by Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger. His phrase was, "I was out of the loop."

Last week, we learned from court documents that were filed in the case against Secretary Weinberger that the day after my interview story ran, Secretary Shultz dictated the following memo:

"Vice president in papers yesterday said he not exposed to Cap or my arguments on Iran arms. Cap called me and said, that's terrible. He"--meaning Bush--"was on the other side. It's on the record. Why did he say that?"

Closed quotes at that point.

What do you make of this?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't make anything in particular of it. It was our examination that, while the vice president was in some of the meetings, he was not--we had no indication he was an active player in this, and obviously that note, whatever it is based on, we didn't have access to and neither has anybody else up to now.

MR. BRODER: You knew Cap Weinberger and George Shultz very well.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. BRODER: George Bush told me in that interview three separate times that he was unaware of their objections to this arms sales policy. Do you think that was a truthful statement?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think it's quite possible it was a truthful statement.

MR. BRODER: Quite possible.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I see no reason that it would not--was not.

MR. BRODER: So then what was this memo about?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I have no idea what the memo was. I read it in the paper the other day. I have no idea of the basis on which it was written, whether it was written on fact or--

MR. BRODER: In a period when--

MR. SCOWCROFT: I really don't know.

MR. BRODER: --when the president is making trust an issue in the campaign, do you think this deserves further examination?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I would have absolutely no problem with it being examined to the fullest. Everything else on Iran-contra has been.

MR. NOVAK: General Scowcroft, why is it that the U.S. military can perform so efficiently, so admirably in Desert Storm and now in the no-fly zone in southern Iraq, and there are such problems in helping our own people in Hurricane Andrew in Florida? Why is that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: There is no problem with the military. The military, once they were given the order, are down there en masse. They're operating very, very quickly. We had time for a very careful buildup in the Gulf. We had time, as you pointed out, since May to get ready for a no-fly zone. This was a very, very short period of time, and I think the military has performed admirably.

You will recall that it is up to the governor to ask for help, and this is a procedure which has been set out for disasters for years and years.

MR. NOVAK: You're blaming Governor Chiles, then?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not blaming anybody. I'm not blaming anybody. But I think to have the kind of massive military presence there about five days after the hurricane is not bad.

MR. NOVAK: Well, the people in Florida were very unhappy about the tardiness of aid coming in, of food coming in. And the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Congressman Aspin, says that it's a problem of no orders from the top, meaning the commander-in-chief.

MR. SCOWCROFT: And if Chairman Aspin has his way with defense cuts, we won't be able to provide aid to anybody anywhere.

MR. NOVAK: So you think that the cuts have limited the ability?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, no, but they will.

MR. NOVAK: You think, then, that President Bush acted properly and Congressman Aspin is wrong, that there wasn't any--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Your question was about the military. When the military got the order to go, they moved and they moved fast.

MR. NOVAK: The slow order was not the president's fault?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not--no, I don't think it was, no.

MR. RUSSERT: General, on that subject, the general manager of a radio station in Florida said that there is a contrast continually on the reaction to Florida storm versus Desert Storm.

Let me give you one example. When Iraq invaded Kuwait at 9:00 at night, Colin Powell was in the Oval Office the next morning at 8:00 AM. Isn't there a difference in reaction time for that kind of world crisis as opposed to a domestic crisis?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, of course there is.

MR. RUSSERT: Why?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Because that was a military invasion of a country that was of prime importance to the United States. This is, in the first case, a domestic catastrophe of serious proportions, but there are regular procedures for the calling in of federal forces to aid in domestic crisis.

MR. RUSSERT: Were all those procedures met?

MR. SCOWCROFT: They were, but some of them obviously were slower than they could have been.

MR. RUSSERT: General, we'll have to leave it there. Thanks for coming by this morning. In a moment, I'll be back with David and Bob to talk about the presidential campaign.

(Announcements)

MR. RUSSERT: Bob Novak, in this morning's New York Times, an op ed piece by Ross Perot. On Wednesday, he sent a letter to the state of California saying, I am a candidate for president, put me on your ballot. He's now on in 48 states.

Since he stopped being an active candidate, he has spent \$3 million. Mr. Perot, flirting or leaning?

MR. NOVAK: I think it's hard to take him seriously. I think he just hates not being in the limelight. He's now 1 percent in the national polls, which is I think about right. He has changed his position 180 degrees. He was against any tax increase. He felt that would be only the last resort. Now he wants to tax the dickens. I think it's very hard to take Ross Perot seriously, and 99 percent of the voters seem to agree with me.

MR. RUSSERT: I think he's positioning himself, however, to take advantage of any crisis that may strike the campaign in the fall.

MR. NOVAK: But will anybody care?

MR. RUSSERT: We'll see.

David, you've covered a few campaigns in your life. Are there rules of combat, rules of honor? We had a situation in this campaign about Hillary Clinton--lying about her record, was the accusation.

Also about the whole tax issue, the Bush people saying Governor Clinton has raised taxes 128 times; and then a campaign aide telling the Boston Globe, we know it's not true, but it works.

The Clinton campaign saying, well, that material didn't come from--it came from Sheffield Nowse (phonetic), an opponent of Bill Clinton; when it in fact came from a legislative committee, according to the Bush campaign.

Is there any honor left in these things?

MR. BRODER: There's never been any kind of a rule against exaggeration or even distortion in campaigns. I think in this case the Bush people have overstated the record of Governor Clinton's tax increases.

But you know, I think from voters' point of view, what this comes down to is a question as to not what's happened in the past, whether it was George Bush changing his mind about no new taxes or Bill Clinton's record, as to what they're going to do in the future.

And the hopeful thing about this campaign is that I think for the first time in this last week, we saw both these candidates addressing some of the serious policy choices that have to be made in the future, Bush talking seriously about trade policy, Clinton talking seriously about what he calls investment and the Republicans call spending. People are beginning to get a sense as to--that there are real differences between the way these two men would deal with the domestic economy of this country.

MR. RUSSERT: Bob.

MR. NOVAK: I think it's really silly for the media to get involved in whether it was 128 increases or 50 or 60. There's no doubt, and everybody has known that for years, that Bill Clinton raised a lot of taxes as the governor of Arkansas. Many--

MR. RUSSERT: Every governor raised taxes.

MR. NOVAK: Not every governor, but most governors did.

MR. RUSSERT: But for the record, how many taxes were increased by George Bush as vice president and president during the last 12 years?

MR. NOVAK: Well, he didn't increase any as vice president. As president, he increased a lot. He's got a bad record on that as well. But the question of whether Bill Clinton wants big government and more taxes is a valid campaign issue. And I think this question of whether the dog track increase was valid as one of the 128, I think that is silly, and I think that the media plays into Clinton's hands when it says, yes, he's lying because he listed it as--Bush listed it as 128 increases.

MR. RUSSERT: We have 68 days to go in the race. How do you see it?

MR. NOVAK: I think it's down to a 10-point race, and that means that Bush has to get over 5 percent to get even. I think it's going to be very tough to do that. I think there is a--I don't think President Bush has made a lot of progress since the convention in convincing people that they want a second Bush term. I think it's still Bill Clinton's race to lose.

MR. RUSSERT: David.

MR. BRODER: I think it'll probably hang at this stage for another few weeks. The first debate is going to be very important.

MR. RUSSERT: David, Bob, thank you. That's all for today. We'll be back next week. If it's Sunday, it's "Meet the Press." See you then.

Boxing In Saddam

A ban on Iraqi flights over the southern marshes is the Bush Administration's latest military—and political—battle plan

By JILL SMOLOWE

EVERY TIME GEORGE BUSH CONJURES up the triumph of Desert Storm, a nasty fact bedevils him: the tyrant still holds vicious sway in Baghdad. There's no question the President would like to show Saddam that there are limits to his misbehavior, and last week he looked like he was about to teach him that lesson. First came a New York *Times* story that claimed Bush planned to provoke a confrontation over weapons inspections, a confrontation exquisitely timed to take place while the Republicans met in Houston. The idea was for a U.N. team in Baghdad to show up at a military ministry and demand entry; if Saddam balked, the allies would fire cruise missiles at selected targets. But the U.N. team, perhaps embarrassed by the publicity or unwilling to look like a U.S. pawn, quietly wrapped up business, pronounced its mission a success and left.

Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney furiously denied the *Times* story and the implication that the President would attack Saddam to give himself a boost in the polls. But the two men were being disingenuous in their categorical dismissal of the *Times* report, since there was a secret scheme to attack Saddam if the U.N. team's mission had ended in failure. A few days later, the allies announced plans to carve out a security zone in southern Iraq, home of a persistent Shi'ite insurgency, that would be off limits to Saddam's combat aircraft. "We are not doing this for no good reason," British Prime Minister John Major explained. "It's happening because there is clear evidence now of the systematic murder, genocide, of the Shi'ites."

The plight of the Shi'ites is serious, but the note of selfless compassion did not quite ring true. Just 17 months ago, when Saddam was ruthlessly crushing their rebellion in the south, Western leaders stood by and did nothing. At the time, they argued plausibly if heartlessly that an allied intervention risked both a military quagmire and an unstable partition of Iraq that could extend Iran's influence in the region. Neither prospect has disappeared. With Bush in Houston trying to reinvigorate his political fortunes, it was impossi-

ble to escape cynical questions about what was for real—and what was for political effect. No more convincing was the sudden European eagerness to provide air protection to Iraqi Muslims solely on humanitarian grounds; Europeans have not yet made a similar commitment to the Slavic Muslims in neighboring Bosnia.

Why the sharp turnaround, and why now? It appears the West's steeliness is more reactive than provocative. For months, Western patience with Iraq has been wearing thin. Since January, Saddam has tweaked his enemies time and again, counting on Bush, Major and French President François Mitterrand to be too distracted by domestic issues to respond. "Saddam concluded that with all its problems, the West lacked the stomach

the doors. According to Pentagon officials, infuriated allies were on the brink of launching strikes against military targets around Baghdad. At the last moment Saddam backed down, but the victory proved hollow when the U.N. allowed him to dictate who could enter the ministry. Soon after, British diplomats say, allied leaders determined that whatever the next provocation, they would issue an ultimatum, then strike if Saddam did not comply.

Plan A called for the next U.N. inspection team to enter an off-limits Iraqi ministry. Anticipating Saddam's refusal, a special U.S. Air Force air-control group was dispatched to Saudi Arabia to guide the expected aerial attacks. When press leaks last week forced the mission to abort, the mounting atrocities in the south came into focus as an attractive alternative. Plan B calls for establishing the "no-fly zone" over the Shi'ite marshes. U.S. officials say an ultimatum will be issued this week giving Saddam just 24 hours to clear the southern airspace. The stated purpose is to insure unimpeded reconnaissance missions, but if Saddam dares to field his air



Just 17 months ago, Saddam was ruthlessly crushing the Shi'ite rebellion in the south

to go to war with him again," says a senior British diplomat. "He saw that as an excellent opportunity to push his luck."

And push he did. Early in the year, he deployed 15 divisions along the internal border with the Kurdish-held north. More recently he reportedly stepped up attacks on the Shi'ite south, draining wells and defoliating the marshlands to target rebel enclaves better. Saddam also thumbed his nose at the international community, impeding the work of U.N. inspection teams, blocking aid convoys and attacking U.N. guards.

Then came the standoff last month at the Agriculture Ministry when the Iraqi leader refused to let a U.N. team through

force, said National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, "then we will take appropriate countermeasures."

The political objectives are less clear. Is this just another shot at weakening Saddam, or do the allies hope it might provoke a coup? Given the talk of genocide, does the mission imply a long-term commitment to insure the safety of Shi'ites? In the wake of Desert Storm, the West put a premium on keeping Iraq intact for fear of sparking destabilizing Kurdish and Shi'ite rebellions. Today Western leaders are willing to take a calculated risk with Iraq's integrity, as long as Saddam is put in his place.

—Reported by William Mader/
London and Bruce van Voorst/Washington



U.S. Took Slow Approach to Somali Crisis

Delay in Action Attributed to Civil War, Other Global Problems, Lack of Media Attention

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

For more than six months, the United States has been officially describing the man-made famine in Somalia as "the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today." For more than three months, U.S. documents have been reporting that millions of Somalis face the threat of starvation.

Yet it was only 10 days ago, on the eve of the Republican National Convention, that the White House ordered its first dramatic action to deal with the crisis, an emergency U.S. military airlift of food.

According to interviews with officials involved and close observers outside of government, the Bush administration's slow-motion reaction to the Somali tragedy—an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 people have been dying there every day—was caused by a complex and intractable civil war on the ground, the relatively low priority given to the crisis by the news media until recently, and a policymaking apparatus consumed by a proliferation of other humanitarian problems, from Yugoslavia to Iraq.

"It bothers me a lot that these things happen, and I am ultimately responsible for this and I sit a lot and say, 'What could I have done differently over the last year,' because it weighs on me a lot," said Andrew Natsios, the overseas relief chief for the Agency for International Development (AID) and recently named by President Bush to be special coordinator for Somali relief. Natsios, who is described by insiders as well as outside relief officials as among the most concerned and outspoken proponents of U.S. action, concluded, "I don't know what else we could have tried."

Since its first commitments of food aid 14 months ago, the United States has been in the forefront of providing humanitarian relief to Somalia—more than \$85 million so far. But because of the underlying problems of clan warfare and growing chaos, some of the food could not be delivered and some was diverted by hoodlums. But even huge amounts of outside aid could not keep up with sharply increasing



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Kenyans load sacks of U.S. split peas onto trucks at the airport in Wajir, Kenya, a center for feeding more than 1 million Kenyans and Somali refugees.

nations, including the U.S. and Soviet ambassadors, from the lawless capital of Mogadishu.

With no presence on the ground and the situation worsening, the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs last fall began considering sending at least a few diplomats back to deal with the crisis, even if they had to operate from hotel rooms. The proposal was rejected within the State Department on security grounds.

Starting last November, as the dimensions of the human suffering grew clearer, the United States encouraged the International Committee of the Red Cross to undertake a massive feeding program in Somalia, something it had never done before. But the crisis was so massive that, despite its best efforts, the Red Cross was unable to cope with it all.

Washington then urged the United Nations, which had pulled out its civil servants, to return to Somalia to direct a second track of humanitarian relief. It found an ally in new U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an Egyptian with extensive contacts and interest in Africa.

Boutros-Ghali in February convened peace talks in New York of rival factions and, in March, brokered a tenuous cease-fire in Mogadishu that reduced the fighting there. He also appointed Mohamed Sahnoun, an Algerian diplomat, as

had spent a day visiting native Kenyans and Somali refugees in northern Kenya. Hempstone, a longtime Washington Star reporter and editor, headed his gripping cable, "A Day in Hell." (It was published in yesterday's Outlook section of The Washington Post.) Somehow the cable got to Bush, who read it and wrote in its margin, according to an administration source, that "this is a terribly moving situation. Let's do everything we can to help."

On Sunday, July 19, the New York Times carried a lengthy front-page account of death and starvation in Somalia from Jane Perlez, its Africa correspondent. (The Washington Post had carried four front-page accounts earlier this year, and more later.) Immediately after the Times story, the White House asked the State Department for a briefing paper for Bush. After reading it, Bush wrote in the margin, according to an administration official, that "he was very upset by these reports and he wanted something done, both in Somalia and northern Kenya."

In addition to Bush's growing interest, White House officials were energized by unfavorable public

comments about the contrast between the urgency shown about Bosnia and the lack of urgency about Somalia and by pressure for action from Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.), who had just returned from a visit to the Kenya-Somalia border.

Natsios, as the administration's senior relief manager, received a call from White House officials. "They said, 'What are you going to do?' I told them what we were trying to do," Natsios recalled. The White House asked, "Tell us what additional measures we can take."

At that point, the administration was mobilized at a higher level and at a greater intensity than ever. Plans were drawn up and decision papers written.

On Aug. 12, Bush met in the Oval Office with Baker, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to discuss what was now recognized as the Somalia crisis. They decided in principle on the emergency U.S. military airlift of food to northern Kenya refugee camps and into Somalia's interior, if experts found this to be practical. They also set in motion plans for a new U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing additional relief for Somalia and a U.N. conference involving the major Somali warring factions.

The following day, the White House announced that the United States was offering a military airlift of 500 U.N.-sponsored Pakistani troops to Somalia as guards for the food shipments to Mogadishu.

On Aug. 14, following a meeting on Somalia of the deputies group, a high-level interagency committee, the White House announced the emergency airlift and the other measures. "The growing suffering and mass death by starvation in Somalia is a major human tragedy," the White House declared. "The United States will take a leading role with other nations and international organizations to overcome the obstacles and ensure that food reaches those who so desperately need it."

U.N. special representative to seek a political solution to the fighting. Sahnoun, working nearly alone with little backup, has won praise from U.S. officials for his effort, which is considered the most important bid to deal with the causes of the crisis.

Natsios had been saying at least since January, in comments before congressional committees and to anyone who would listen, that Somalia was "the most acute humanitarian tragedy in the world today."

Starting in March, reports were received of masses of children being "severely malnourished," which is the last step before starvation. (Some estimates are that one-fourth of Somalia's children under 5 have now died.)

Beginning in May, the Office of U.S. Disaster Assistance began reporting U.N. estimates that 4.5 million people in Somalia "are facing the threat of starvation due to the effects of civil strife" out of a total population of 6.5 million Somalis. This month, the starvation-risk figure was downgraded to 1.5 million people on the basis of an International Red Cross estimate that is considered more reliable.

By July, according to Natsios, it was clear that the Red Cross and U.N. efforts were failing "because the death rates were going up, not down." Asked what he did about it, he said, "I made a lot of telephone calls. I have a volcanic temper some times. They were not fun telephone calls." He added, though, that "it is very difficult to handle multiple crises simultaneously."

The first clear indication of presidential interest resulted from a July 10 cable to the State Department from U.S. Ambassador to Kenya Smith Hempstone Jr., who

needs. The fundamental crisis in Somalia is political: the collapse of government, authority and social order. Except for modest efforts by the United Nations, some of which were complicated by U.S. reluctance to accept new peace-keeping obligations, little has been done to restore order. Neither Africans, Europeans nor Americans summoned the will to compel efforts to quell the crisis.

A State Department official said the Bureau of African Affairs tried in vain to obtain the priority attention of Secretary of State James A. Baker III, his top echelon of senior advisers and the White House. A key problem, he said, is that top officials react to headlines and television pictures, and that "there are certain things that are news, others that are not news. For many months, Somalia was not news."

Suddenly, all that has changed.

The Somalia crisis, rooted in the country's history and social structure, came to the forefront following the January 1991 ouster of the country's longtime leader, President Mohamed Siad Barre. For 21 years, Siad Barre ruled brutally but cleverly, destroying many existing institutions and turning clan groups and factions against one another. After his fall, there was fighting between rival groups and eventually sub-groups, widespread looting and disintegration.

U.S. diplomats were not around to see the fall of the man the United States had armed and supported during the last decade of the Cold War, nor the bitter aftermath. Three weeks before Siad Barre's final collapse, U.S. Marine helicopters evacuated the diplomats of 10^②

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**U.S. Is Said to Prepare
An Ultimatum to Iraq**

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 — The United States and its allies plan to issue an ultimatum to Iraq early next week, instructing Baghdad to stop military flights in the south or risk having the planes shot down, Administration officials said today. Officials said they expected the demand to be issued late Monday or early Tuesday.

Iraq has used planes and helicopters to attack Shiite Muslim communities in the south, where there is widespread political and religious opposition to President Saddam Hussein.

Officials said the timing would depend on how long it took to deploy additional aircraft to the area. British and French planes need to be flown to the region.

Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, said Wednesday night that the allies were not trying to dismember Iraq and wanted to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation.

"What we're trying to do is protect the minority groups, the Kurds in the North, the Shiites in the South," he said, "not to cause or encourage the split up of Iraq — not at all."

Some military experts say, however, that even if a protected zone is established, Iraq can still do great damage to the Shiites using ground troops. Administration officials have not said what they would do if Iraq attacked the Shiites on the ground.

'No-Fly Zone' in Iraq Is Set, Scowcroft Says

Allied Planes to Monitor Treatment of Shiites

By John Lancaster
Washington Post Staff Writer

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft said yesterday the United States has agreed with Britain and France on a plan to ground Iraqi flights in the southern third of the country by shooting them down if necessary.

"It's been solidified," Scowcroft said on public television's "MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour," adding that some details remain to be worked out.

Scowcroft's comment was the first public confirmation by a U.S. official of an allied plan to establish a "no-fly zone" across a broad area of southern Iraq below the 32nd parallel, where Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has lately stepped up his military campaign against the region's largely Shiite Muslim population.

"There is increasing evidence that he is pursuing genocidal policies in the south," Scowcroft said. "What we're saying is that we're going to monitor and watch what he's doing there. And in order to do that with reconnaissance, he has to

"The monitoring may in itself cause him to back off," said one official. "For one thing, his ground forces are nothing like what they used to be and, except for the Republican Guard, the morale is pretty terrible. It's not a sure thing these guys could take on the people in the marshes or would even want to without air cover."

Saudi Arabia's King Fahd agreed to the use of air bases in his country to support the flight ban when Secretary of State James A. Baker III made the request during his last trip to the region in late July, according to a source familiar with the negotiations.

The administration official said the ban would be enforced using AWACS radar planes based in Saudi Arabia and escorted by U.S. fighter aircraft, which include Air Force F-15 strike planes and Navy F-14s and F/A-18s. The official said, however, that the main emphasis would be on "reconnaissance," adding: "I wouldn't say there would be constant stuff in the air."

The official said that Britain has offered to contribute six Tornado fighter aircraft and two tankers to a multinational force enforcing the

luctant to aid the Shiites during their rebellion in the immediate aftermath of last year's Persian Gulf War, citing fears of further destabilizing the region.

Scowcroft said yesterday that avoiding the breakup of Iraq "has all along been a concern of ours," adding that the administration continues to "believe in the territorial integrity of Iraq."

"What we're trying to do is protect minority groups . . . not to cause or encourage the split-up of Iraq," Scowcroft said.

Several analysts said fears that Iraq might fragment were overblown, based in part on exaggerated concerns about links between Iraq's Shiites and neighboring Iran.

"These are Iraqi Shia who were quite loyal to Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war" of 1980-88, said a State Department official.

Explained Shlomo Avineri, a former director general of the Israeli ministry of foreign affairs and now a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution: "The gap between the Iraqi Arab identity [of the Shiites] and Iran is much deeper than the fact that there is a religious common language."

An Iraqi opposition leader said the opposition has been in frequent contact with various factions in Iran, asking the Iranians not to intervene in the Shiite area as the allies carry out their plan. As of now, he said, most of the Iranian factions consulted have agreed to follow this advice.