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JULY

WASHINGTON WHISPERS

PEROT'S tantrum over \$100 million dismays aides


RABIN may offer Syrians a new deal on the Golan Heights

FBI seeks new funding to foil drug lords' high-tech security

■ **Not made of money?** When he first signaled that he might run for president, Ross Perot promised to spend \$100 million or more of his own money to run a "first class" campaign. But sources close to the billionaire businessman say that when top aides recently presented him with a budget approximating the \$100 million figure, Perot hit the roof. The reason: He had become so confident of his chances that he argued that the campaign could be financed with "significantly less" money. Last week, however, after polls showed a sudden rise in Perot's negative ratings, he changed his mind and approved the original \$100 million budget. His vacillation points up the frustration that even closest aides are having in getting the temperamental Texan to agree to suggested campaign strategies.

■ **Damascus démarche.** While Yitzhak Rabin, the winner of last week's Israeli elections (commentary, Page 51), has indicated he believes that resolving the Palestinian issue is the key to the Middle East peace process, sources close to the once and future prime minister say he is considering a new proposal to break the logjam in negotiations with Syria. What he has in mind is that in return for normalization of relations, Israel would lease the Golan Heights to the Syrians on a long-term basis, say 99 years, and leave open the question of sovereignty. However, Israelis would insist on maintaining a military presence in that territory. The sources also do not rule out a dramatic démarche by Syrian President Hafez Assad, who is said to want an early test of Rabin's intentions.

■ **Lost chance.** The Senate committee looking into the fate of U.S. POWs and MIAs in Southeast Asia



Henry Kissinger
His memos fill gaps on POWs.

has done some of its most profitable digging in the library of former President Richard Nixon. Based on memoranda from officials such as Henry Kissinger, then national-security adviser, and his deputy, Brent Scowcroft, who now holds the top NSC post in the Bush White House, the panel is expected to present evidence that will show that during early 1973, the Nixon administration had a chance to make progress in identifying and winning freedom for servicemen lost or imprisoned in Southeast Asia. But because of Nixon's preoccupation with the burgeoning Watergate scandal, the chance, say the sources, was lost. "It was a critical window" is how one authority describes the early months of 1973.

■ **Costly bugs.** The FBI wants an \$18 million increase in its "surreptitious entry" program. Bureau officials say that drug lords and other criminals are

installing high-tech security devices in their homes, making it harder for G-men to plant court-authorized listening devices. Agents often have to make several entries to defeat the fancy countermeasures and to make sure that their bugs are working. As a result, bureau break-ins are on the rise, from only 47 in 1985 to 218 last year. The new funds would be used by the FBI to add personnel and develop new techniques for foiling suspects' state-of-the-art security systems.

■ **Missing the missiles.** Washington's faith in the ability of its electronic intelligence to keep track of enemy missiles—shaken during the gulf war—has received another blow. The new government in Prague has discovered a cache of nuclear missiles in deep underground bunkers not too far from the border with Germany. The sites house more than two dozen SS-23s that were supposed to be destroyed under a 1987 disarmament treaty but remained intact until Soviet troops removed the nuclear warheads when they withdrew from Czechoslovakia.

■ **Uptick.** While some experts believe Perotmania will produce near record voter participation in November, Curtis Gans, the authority on turnout, disagrees. Based upon anecdotal evidence of increased registrations, Gans predicts that "if Perot remains credible, we might have an uptick of turnout. But if he falters, look for the lowest turnout since 1824."

■ **Stay tuned.** Radio Moscow will soon beam anti-Communist propaganda to Vietnam. The broadcasts are being organized and financed by a group of onetime Vietnamese refugees now settled in the United States. They took advantage of Boris Yeltsin's desire to rent out the former Soviet shortwave service, the world's most powerful. Their program is to be called "The Voice of Freedom From Moscow." Says one of the organizers: "The new Russian government is delighted because it's ready to actively oppose the world's remaining Communist regimes."

EDITED BY CHARLES FENYVESI

THE FEDERAL PAGE

Before the Gulf War, Iraq Was a 'Sixth-Floor Problem'

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

Recent congressional investigations into how Bush administration actions unwittingly bolstered Iraq's military ambitions prior to the Persian Gulf War have raised questions about which administration officials were actually minding U.S. policies at the time.

U.S. policies toward Iraq in that period were guided by a 1989 directive from President Bush—officially known as National Security Decision Directive 26 (NSDD 26)—calling for pursuit of normal relations with Iraq, on grounds that this would promote stability in the volatile gulf region.

In recent weeks, that directive has become the source of great controversy, with Bush's critics in Congress and elsewhere charging that it led the administration to help Iraq accelerate its program of nuclear arms development and encouraged its invasion of Kuwait. Some critics now contend that the directive was the springboard for the greatest foreign policy failure of Bush's presidency.

But the record suggests that Bush, Secretary of State James A. Baker III and other senior foreign policy advisers were not paying much attention to Iraq and its truculent president, Saddam Hussein, in the period between the conception of NSDD 26 and Iraq's August 1990 drive into Kuwait.

Instead, the names that crop up most often in formerly confidential administration documents trickling out of Congress make clear that during the first 1½ years of Bush's presidency, Iraq was handled as what the State Department calls "a sixth-floor problem." On the sixth floor of the State Department are the offices of the assistant secretaries of state and their deputies who deal with different regions of the world on a daily basis.

The same was true in other departments—defense, energy, agriculture, commerce—that had roles in implementing Bush's instruction to improve relations. The officials involved there and at the State Department were people who normally work in behind-the-scenes obscurity. Now they are in the unaccustomed position of seeing their paper trail of memos and recommendations exposed to intense scrutiny and second-guessing by Congress and the media.

Congressional critics charge that the documents point to an official U.S. permissiveness that ignored Saddam's support of terrorism and helped him build up the war machine used to invade Kuwait in August 1990. The officials, who have been the target of these charges, say Congress, by making documents public selectively and out of context, is engaged in a "witch hunt" that could make many in the government bureaucracy reluctant to speak candidly or to put anything that smacks of potential controversy on paper.

Among those whose foreign policy roles have become the objects of scrutiny are:

WATCHING SADDAM

ROLES OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER OFFICIALS LEADING UP TO WAR



John H. Kelly

Former assistant secretary of state, Near Eastern and South Asian affairs.

June 1989-end of 1991.

Unable to get attention of Secretary of State James A. Baker III as alarm grew over Saddam Hussein's intentions towards Kuwait.



Richard N. Haass

Senior director of Near East and South Asian affairs, National Security Council.

1989-present.

Concerned after 1990 Iraq visit about cozy U.S. attitude toward Iraq.



April C. Glasple

Former ambassador to Iraq.

July 1988-Outbreak of gulf crisis.

Met with Saddam in July 1990; performance subject to widely varying interpretations.



Richard W. Murphy

Former assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs.

1983-1989.

Perceived Baghdad's shift from moderation to hostility during 1989 visit.



Richard A. Clarke

Assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs.

1989-present.

Wrote memo saying that "no one was paying attention" to blocking Baghdad's buys of Western weapons-making equipment.



Richard T. McCormack

Former undersecretary of state for economic and agricultural affairs.

1989-1992.

Monitored Iraq's use of U.S. loans.

BY MICHAEL DREW-THE WASHINGTON POST

uation was urgent and her warning to Saddam that the United States would protect its interests in the region.

James P. "Jock" Covey, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs since June 1989. Covey, widely regarded as likely to be among the next generation of top-level American diplomats, has spent virtually his entire Foreign Service career in Middle East affairs. Before becoming Kelly's chief deputy, his assignments included deputy chief of the U.S. Embassy in Egypt, deputy director of the State Department's executive secretariat and staff director of Middle East affairs for the National Security Council. He held the NSC post in 1985 and 1986 when then-national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane oversaw the covert sale of U.S. arms to Iran, but Covey never was publicly involved in the ensuing scandal.

In April this year, Bush nominated Covey to be assistant secretary of state for a new bureau of South Asian

Department memorandum, spoke of "the new political, military and economic importance of Iraq" and stressed "the need for a cautious step-by-step approach to broadening and deepening our bilateral relations."

Earlier, Hare was one of three top department officials who prepared a confidential 1988 memorandum for Secretary of State George P. Shultz and argued against congressional efforts to impose tough economic sanctions against Iraq after Baghdad used poison gas against the Kurds.

When Kelly became assistant secretary in June 1989, he dropped Hare as his principal deputy, replacing him with Covey. Hare subsequently retired from the Foreign Service and is now a research associate with the Middle East Institute here.

Richard T. McCormack, former undersecretary of state for economic and agricultural affairs. As the secretary of state's titular chief

a network television appearance last Wednesday, he replied angrily, "We didn't know that. The State Department didn't know it. . . . If we had known it, it wouldn't have happened."

However, in his congressional testimony, Lemay said it was his understanding that his superiors passed his warning to Baker. The State Department refused to say whether Baker received such a warning, but McCormack, now out of government, told the New York Times: "Mr. Lemay's representations to the committee were entirely accurate."

Although McCormack's position meant that questions involving Iraqi loans normally would have been brought to his attention, he actually had little expertise or experience in Middle East affairs. A former aide to Sen. Helms, McCormack was made assistant secretary of state for economic affairs in the 1980s as a bow to Republican conservatives in Congress.

John H. Kelly, assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs from June 1989 until the end of 1991. During that period, he was the senior American diplomat dealing with the Persian Gulf and thus was principally responsible for implementing Bush's directive. However, he had never served in the gulf and had worked only briefly in the Middle East during a Foreign Service career centered mostly on Europe and East Asia. He made his only visit to Baghdad just five months before Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Kelly's title notwithstanding, the real boss over U.S. Middle East policy in the State Department has been Dennis B. Ross, director of policy planning and one of Baker's most trusted aides. But Ross concentrated on overseeing efforts to start the Arab-Israeli peace process and left other regional issues, including the gulf, to Kelly. Even so, Kelly was unable to get the attention of Baker or other top-level officials, even after the department's Mideast experts began expressing alarm in February 1990 about Saddam's increasing bellicosity toward Kuwait and Israel.

Kelly currently is U.S. ambassador to Finland.

Richard N. Haass, special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs for the National Security Council (NSC). When Bush took office in early 1989, he ordered a wide-ranging review of global problems. As part of that process, Haass in February 1989 wrote the criteria for an interagency review of U.S. policy toward Iraq that led to the directive Bush later signed.

Despite a long-standing interest in the region, Haass had no previous high-level experience with Middle East policy. In the Reagan administration, he had worked at the State Department as a specialist on Greece-Turkey-Cyprus affairs, then took a post at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. During the 1988 presidential primary campaigns, he advised Sen. Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) on Central America issues and, following Bush's election, joined the NSC staff under national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

Like Kelly, Haass visited Iraq early in 1990, and he came away concerned that the U.S. policy of friendliness was not having the desired effect of moving Baghdad toward moderation. He initiated a series of interagency discussions about whether the policy required some tinkering. But the exercise was confined to working-level officials, and the concerns were not communicated to senior policy makers.

April C. Glaspie, ambassador to Iraq from July 1988 until the outbreak of the gulf crisis. Although her performance in the days leading up to the invasion of Kuwait has been the subject of controversy, Glaspie went to Baghdad with a reputation among her Foreign Service colleagues and Middle East experts as a seasoned diplomat with extensive contacts and astute assessments in the politics of the Arab world. She was the first woman to rise to an ambassadorship through the ranks of America's Middle East diplomatic corps.

Most of the dispute about her role centers on her interview with Saddam on July 25, 1990, just before his move against Kuwait. Critics have charged that her overly friendly tone in the interview, her statement to Saddam that the United States had "no opinion" on Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait and her failure to give Sad-

tries in the region. But last month Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, asked for indefinite postponement of hearings on Covey's nomination. Senate sources say Helms and other committee members want to probe Covey's involvement in U.S. policy toward Iraq.

State Department sources say that while Covey's name appears in some of the policy documents of the prewar period, he was in the process of transferring from the U.S. Embassy in Cairo to Washington when Bush's policy directive was being prepared. By the time he became Kelly's deputy on June 18, 1989, the policy line toward Iraq had already been decided. Between then and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the sources said, Covey had only intermittent contact with Iraqi matters, which were handled inside the bureau by Kelly and the deputy assistant secretary for Persian Gulf affairs.

Richard A. Clarke, assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs. Clarke's name entered the controversy about Iraq with the disclosure of a secret memorandum he wrote assessing U.S. monitoring of Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons programs in the decade leading up to the gulf war. He concluded in the memo that "no one was paying attention" to blocking Baghdad's purchase of Western equipment for weapons of mass destruction.

He is a career civil servant who has worked for two decades as a State Department and Pentagon analyst of issues involving strategic and conventional weapons in Europe and the Middle East. He was named assistant secretary at the outset of the Bush administration in 1989.

Earlier this year, he became a target of controversy after the State Department inspector general charged that his office had been lax in monitoring Israel's alleged diversion of U.S. military technology to other countries. Clarke denied acting improperly, and while the department rejected some of the inspector general's charges, it reprimanded Clarke for limiting official inquiries into the subject. Many State and Defense Department officials say that he had been following a long-standing practice within the U.S. government of giving Israel considerable slack on arms transfer questions and had been caught in the cross-fire from those who want the Israelis treated more strictly.

Richard W. Murphy, former assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. When he retired in January 1989 after six years as assistant secretary, Murphy was the dean of the U.S. diplomatic service's Mideast hands. In his 33-year career, he had served as ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Syria, as well as the Philippines and Mauritania.

One of his last actions was to write a detailed memo titled, "U.S.-Iraqi Relations: Picking Up the Pieces," assessing how the United States should deal with Baghdad in the wake of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, which ended in 1988. The memo concluded that a policy of carefully measured cooperation with Baghdad offered some hope of coaxing Iraq toward moderation. The memo is regarded as an influential forerunner of Bush's directive on improving relations.

However, while visiting Baghdad in March 1989 as an adviser to private business interests, Murphy quickly became aware that the moderate tendencies evident a year earlier were giving way to a shrill new hostility

McCormack was partially responsible for monitoring Iraq's uses of loans it received from the United States.

During the 1980s, the Commodity Credit Corporation, an Agriculture Department agency, guaranteed loans totaling nearly \$1.8 billion to Iraq, ostensibly for purchase of U.S. farm products. Two weeks ago, Frank Lemay, who had been McCormack's special assistant, told the House Judiciary Committee that in October 1989 he had warned his superiors that Iraq apparently had spent part of these loans to illegally buy nuclear arms technology.

When Bush was asked about Lemay's charges during

However, his weak expertise in economics reportedly annoyed then-Secretary of State Shultz, who had McCormack transferred to the post of ambassador to the Organization of American States. When Baker became secretary, McCormack was elevated, in a new bow to Helms and his followers, to the undersecretary's post. But, until his departure from the department several months ago, real decision-making power on economic matters within the State Department rested not with McCormack, but with Robert B. Zoellick, counselor of the department and one of Baker's most trusted aides.

dam a stern warning against military action apparently encouraged the Iraqi leader to believe that the United States would not oppose his move into Kuwait.

Glaspie's Foreign Service colleagues maintain that she has been treated unfairly, and they cite the charges against her as the most egregious example in the Iraq controversy of how reliance on documents can produce a misleading picture of what actually happened. They note that because her meeting with Saddam took place unexpectedly and on short notice, she did not have detailed instructions from Washington about what to tell him and was not authorized to warn him about specific retaliatory actions the United States might take if Iraq moved against Kuwait.

In addition, the officials say, the impression of a weak and indecisive stance conveyed in her reporting cable—which was subsequently made public—reflects the traditional Foreign Service dictum that a cable should emphasize the position of the other side and keep descriptions of the U.S. ambassador's response to a minimum. In oral reports on the meeting, the officials say, Glaspie described in much greater detail her sense that the sit-

toward the outside world. He ascribed the problem in large part to the fact that Saddam had mortgaged Iraq's oil revenue to pay for the Iran-Iraq War and ambitious development schemes and was regarded in the international financial community as a poor credit risk. Later, Murphy was to conclude that Saddam's frustration over money was what impelled him to attack his tiny but wealthy neighbor, Kuwait.

"To get out of bankruptcy, you rob a bank," he said. But he also acknowledges that despite the warning signs in early 1990, no one realized just how far Saddam would go.

Paul J. Hare, former acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Hare, who had been Murphy's principal deputy, served as acting head of the Middle East bureau between Murphy's retirement and the time Kelly assumed the assistant secretary post.

During his four months in that position, Hare headed the interagency working group that produced the draft document from which Bush's directive eventually was derived. The draft, according to a confidential State

New York Times 7/7/92

U.S. Talks of Using Military To Get Food Past the Serbs

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

MUNICH, Germany, July 6 — As leaders of the Group of Seven met to consider the crisis in the Balkans, the United States said tonight that it would support the use of air and naval power to get humanitarian aid into Bosnia and Herzegovina by sea or by land if Serbian forces blocked the United Nations-supported airlift to Sarajevo.

In remarks clearly aimed at stepping up the pressure on European leaders and paving the way for further action by the United Nations if necessary, President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said American air power could be used to cover ground operations if a new United Nations Security Council resolution authorized them to get the aid through.

"The heads of government are deter-

"Because you can't supply Sarajevo indefinitely by air, we want to find ways in which we can get land convoys into Sarajevo from Split or Zagreb or some other point outside the zone of conflict," another American official said.

Until now, United States officials had not indicated that they would even consider sending American ground troops into the fighting in Yugoslavia.

Their statements tonight, and hints from German and French leaders that the leaders would take strong action at the Munich meeting, seem to add to the pressure on the Government of the Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic, at a time when opposition to his policies appears to be mounting in Belgrade.

But he showed no sign tonight of calling off the siege on Sarajevo.

Little Progress Seen on Security

As officials discussed ways to deal with the situation in Bosnia, summit leaders were reported to have made little headway in talks aimed at trying to reach agreement on a new framework of European security that could prevent similar military conflicts in the future.

France held to its view that the United Nations should remain primarily responsible, delegates said.

France has also stuck on its own to the position that the 52-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe should not turn to NATO to supply troops for peacekeeping operations in Europe, because the NATO alliance is dominated by the United States, diplomats said.

All the leaders here except Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa of Japan are to fly to Helsinki on Thursday for the first East-West summit meeting since the collapse of the Soviet Union last year, and the German Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, said he hoped the issue would be resolved by then.

"The Helsinki meeting started as a celebration of the new era," an American diplomat said, "but the mood has become very troubled, and now it will be just trying to stave off catastrophe."

Fighting has continued not only in former republics of Yugoslavia but in the former Soviet Union, including the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh and regions of Moldova and Georgia.

Lack of European Unity

The Europeans' attempts to deal with the crisis have been thwarted by a lack of unity among themselves and by French concerns about the continuing influence of the United States in Europe's affairs now that the threat from the Soviet Union is gone.

NATO agreed last month to consider peacekeeping missions if asked to take them on by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.



The New York Times

Additional routes to get aid into Sarajevo are being considered.

mined that humanitarian relief be provided to those in need in Sarajevo," he said. "They will seriously consider getting it through in any way that is required — air, ground, whatever."

Asked whether the seven leaders gathered at the annual summit meeting of the world's most powerful industrialized democracies would support the opening of a land corridor from the Adriatic coast into Sarajevo, the besieged Bosnian capital, if necessary, Mr. Scowcroft answered, "I think that is a reasonable speculation."

He said President Francois Mitterrand of France had initiated the discussion. It was Mr. Mitterrand's flight into Sarajevo on June 28 that opened the way for the international airlift.

British officials said the summit leaders had discussed a communiqué to be issued on Wednesday that does "not exclude" the use of force to keep aid flowing to the besieged residents of Sarajevo. The nations would seek Security Council authorization for additional military steps if the airlift proves inadequate, the British officials added.

Major Powers to Stiffen Stand on Serbia

U.N. Troops Seen Opening Relief Land Corridors

By Marc Fisher
and Stuart Auerbach
Washington Post Foreign Service

MUNICH, July 6—The world's seven leading economic powers began today to plan stronger measures to end the bloody Bosnian civil war, including more vigorous enforcement of U.N. economic sanctions against neighboring Serbia and possible drives by U.N. troops to open land corridors for humanitarian aid to besieged Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities.

A senior U.S. official said tonight that "rigorous enforcement of the sanctions" against Serbia and the new Yugoslav state it controls "is a necessary element" of a renewed drive for a political solution in Bosnia, where Serb militia forces backed by Serbia's nationalist government have seized about two-thirds of the republic.

Among the new steps under discussion, sources said, are a naval blockade of Serbia and its small satellite, Montenegro, and efforts to close land supply routes from neighboring Romania.

A senior French official said the summit leaders will issue a statement on the Yugoslav crisis Tuesday in which they will pledge continued humanitarian aid to the people of Bosnia "at all costs" and warn that the United Nations will be prepared to stop any attacks on U.N. troops delivering the aid.

Even if the current international airlift bringing food and medicine to Sarajevo airport is unimpeded, White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said tonight, land relief convoys are likely to be needed as well because of the great volume of supplies required to sustain Bosnia's beleaguered civilian population. He and other officials indicated that the United States is

prepared to provide air cover for the land convoys if needed, after authorization for such action by the U.N. Security Council.

New U.N. authorization is also likely to be needed for stricter enforcement of the current sanctions, as well as for any expanded military role in the relief effort. Officials of several summit nations suggested that the G-7 leaders are ready to back any new U.N. authorizations deemed necessary.

■ *Financial markets respond to Munich summit with a yawn. Page D1*

The upheaval in Bosnia and other former Yugoslav republics, which dominated a dinner meeting of the seven leaders tonight, overshadowed the summit's announced purpose: an attack on the recession plaguing most of their countries.

In another important addition to the planned agenda, President Bush and British Prime Minister John Major pushed the Uruguay round of trade talks into the summit discussions, over the objections of the

summit host, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, who sought to avoid the contentious issue.

Scowcroft said the leaders decided tonight to direct their trade experts to continue meeting here to see if further progress can be made toward resolving the long-stymied talks. Although no resolution is expected during the three-day summit, officials said they still hope for a political push strong enough to get the trade talks moving again.

On the Yugoslav crisis, White See SUMMIT, A14, Col. 1



ASSOCIATED PRESS

HELP FOR THE HUNGRY

Two refugee Muslim women from war-torn eastern Bosnia plead for food yesterday at a relief center in Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital, where a U.N.-sponsored airlift has landed about 500 tons of food and medicine. Meanwhile, Bosnia's Croats proclaimed an autonomous state in the former Yugoslav republic. Story on Page A14.



ASSOCIATED PRESS

Italian Prime Minister Amato walks past colleagues to find his spot in a group photo. From left are: Delors of France, Miyazawa of Japan, Mulroney of Canada, Mitterrand of France, Kohl of Germany, President Bush and Major of Britain.

Leaders at G-7 Summit Discuss Ways to Stop Bosnian Fighting

SUMMIT, From A1

House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said tonight that "nothing is ruled out" by the leaders of the seven nations—United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada.

He refused to discuss specific military plans but said the United States is ready to provide air cover for "whatever forces might be necessary to secure the [Sarajevo] airport" or a corridor by which humanitarian aid could be delivered to the city, whose 300,000 remaining residents have been under siege by Serb militia forces for three months.

Italian Foreign Minister Vincenzo Scotti said he will call a meeting of the nine-nation Western European Union later this week in Helsinki to establish a naval blockade in the Adriatic Sea aimed at enforcing the U.N. embargo against Serbia. French officials said the naval action might be aimed at a wider area to stop supplies bound for Serbia that come through Romania, which is reported to be trading heavily with Serbia.

Italian and French officials said the summit leaders also want the United Nations to get more involved in the peace effort launched by the European Community's envoy, Britain's Lord Carrington.

Bush brought up the six-year-old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks at every meeting today, aides said. A senior French official said the United States "seems keenest on getting some kind of an agreement" on the trade talks during the meetings here. A British official said the Uruguay round "is the subject the prime minister cares about most . . . [his] number one priority at the moment."

Major called this afternoon for "forceful intervention" by the summit leaders in the trade talks, according to a Japanese official.

French President Francois Mitterrand replied that "both sides will

have to make sacrifices, but we expect the greater sacrifice from the United States," according to Dieter Vogel, the German spokesman.

Mitterrand, who has been under strong pressure from French farmers not to negotiate away their subsidies, met Sunday night with Bush. But the trade talks took just 10 minutes before both sides realized they shared little common ground, French officials reported. Still, the Anglo-American push made the trade talks the main topic of tonight's working dinner, Fitzwater said.

At the same time, chief U.S. negotiator Warren Lavorel and his European counterpart, Hugo Palmén, held a series of unannounced meetings to try to break an 18-month stalemate over how far Europe will drop its farm subsidies.

"No one has found the magic formula yet, although they are making a lot of effort," said a senior U.S. official. The efforts will continue Tuesday morning, when Bush meets with Jacques Delors, president of the European Community's executive commission, which handles trade negotiations for its 12 members.

While U.S. and European officials doubt there will be a breakthrough in the next two days, they said a strong declaration by summit leaders could give the talks the political push needed to reach an agreement before a congressionally mandated U.S. deadline next March.

Strong declarations at the last two summits failed to produce that kind of push, and since then the weakened economies of the major industrialized nations and the more perilous political positions of their leaders make it even more difficult to achieve a compromise now, senior U.S. and Canadian officials said.

But British officials and Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady underscored the importance of trade to global economic growth—one of the twin themes of this year's summit. "The prosperity, the jobs and investment that are going to come

in the next several years will come because of trade," Brady said.

As of now, the official summit communique to be issued Wednesday does not mention the GATT talks—an indication of how much Kohl wanted to keep the issue away from the summit table.

The leaders' aim appears to be to show enough progress to revitalize formal negotiations going on in Geneva. As a result of the stalemate over the farm question, negotiations in other critical sectors have ground to a halt.

Because of the political sensitivity of the trade talks, officials said it is unlikely that any agreement will come before September's French referendum on European unity and November's U.S. elections.

The first day of the summit featured what French spokesman Jean Musitelli called a "morose discussion" of sluggish economic growth in the seven countries. Bush told his colleagues the American people have low expectations of an improved economy and a "difficult psychological attitude," according to German spokesman Vogel.

Although the seven leaders agreed they must boost growth in all countries, they also agreed to let each country develop its own growth strategy.

After a ceremonial opening, the leaders met for most of the afternoon and attended a working dinner. Earlier, Bavarian police waded into a crowd of about 500 protesters away from the summit site, beating demonstrators with batons in an action Munich Mayor Christian Ude called disproportionate.

Summit organizers said Russian President Boris Yeltsin, already scheduled to join the G-7 leaders Wednesday, will now also have dinner with them Tuesday. But Japan remained resistant to any new aid to Russia until the status of the Russian-occupied northern Kuril Islands, claimed by Japan, is resolved.

Staff writer Don Oberdorfer and correspondent William Drozdiak contributed to this report.

Into a New Quagmire?

Relief finally reaches besieged Sarajevo, but the United States comes closer than ever before to being drawn into Yugoslavia's ancient blood feuds

Citizens of Sarajevo came out of their bomb shelters, blinking in the daylight and searching for food. The Serbian shelling of their city had more or less stopped, at least for the moment, and foreign relief supplies were beginning to land at an airport that was under the shaky control of United Nations peacekeeping troops. But the Serbs were still a threat to their neighbors in Bosnia. Serbian irregulars were trying to "cleanse" Sarajevo and other areas by driving Croatian and Muslim residents out of their homes. Embattled Bosnians wanted more than relief rations. "Thank you, but this is not real help," retired economist Husnija Sehovic said as he watched U.N. trucks deliver food to a distribution center in Sarajevo. "Until we clear the [Serbian] artillery from the hills, it won't improve. We need the help of the Americans and President Bush."

The Americans were ready to fight, if need be, but only with air and naval power—no U.S. ground troops were to be sent in—and only to protect the relief effort, not to defeat the Serbian aggressors. Though he pointedly kept all of his options open, George Bush made it clear that this operation would be no Balkan Storm. Nor would the United States "go ramming in as the sole perpetrator of force," he promised. "There is quagmire potential here," said his secretary of state, James Baker. "We cannot be the world's policeman." Still, the administration clearly intended to join an international police force protecting the relief operation and bailing out the long-suffering Bosnians. Baker said "we cannot just stand back and not participate" in the effort to end a "humanitarian nightmare" in the former Yugoslavian republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.


Conflicting signals: There were serious risks in participating. "Everyone had better understand that a relief operation doesn't solve the fundamental problem," said a senior administration official. "It isn't clear when, if ever, you can leave. The minute we leave, [the civil war] starts again." The administration restricted itself to sending in supplies aboard air force C-130 transport planes and threatening air and naval action if the Serbs interfered. Even that limited role could cause U.S. casualties—and political damage to Bush. "I don't know how much public support

there is for risking young American lives, and losing them, for a place most Americans have never heard of," said a State Department official.

Perhaps to minimize the risks, Washington sent conflicting signals last week. First it ordered a naval task force, including 2,200 marines, into the Adriatic Sea off the

cure. That seemed a dubious proposition, given the weak U.N. grip on the airport and the countless previous cease-fire violations by all sides, notably the Serbs.

Privately, the Pentagon was anxious about sending in the C-130s unescorted. But after reviewing their intelligence on the airport and after seeing that French



SIPA

'This is not real help': Aid arrived in the battered Bosnian capital, at first on French planes, but residents hoped the U.S. carrier Saratoga (left) would come to their rescue



coast of Yugoslavia. Then, apparently satisfied that the Serbs took the point, Washington sent the ships to liberty ports in Italy and Greece for the Fourth of July weekend. A stronger task force, including the aircraft carrier Saratoga, was kept in the northern Mediterranean, also scheduled for port calls. By holding back its gunboats, Washington may have meant to signal that it wanted to avoid military intervention. But that meant that the first two U.S. C-130s had to fly into Sarajevo without naval air cover. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney told reporters air cover wasn't needed; the United Nations had assured Washington that Sarajevo's airport was se-





PHOTOS BY ANTOINE GYORI—SYGMA



transports encountered only harmless small-arms fire as they landed, officials grudgingly concluded that "the risk to the C-130s was moderate to low," as one of them put it. The first two flights were completed safely, and there were contingency plans for retaliation if something went wrong later on. Air force warplanes based in Germany or Italy could respond quickly, and the Saratoga could quickly be moved into position to launch its planes. Still, a Pentagon official conceded: "That airport is extremely vulnerable, and people in this building are nervous about it."

The Pentagon had been nervous all along about getting into Yugoslavia. "This has all the factors that lead us not to want to get involved," says one U.S. military analyst. "There's no clear-cut objective and no end date. It's a quagmire waiting to happen." Baker began to anticipate the need for a relief effort backed by military force as long ago as April, when Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic, a Muslim, described for him in moving detail the genocidal nature of the Serbian offensive. Convinced that his European allies were paralyzed by internal divisions, Baker jaw-

boned them into economic sanctions against the remaining, Serbian-dominated portion of Yugoslavia. The sanctions were later adopted by the U.N. Security Council. Pentagon officials, including Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were reluctant to insert U.S. forces into the ancient blood feuds of the Balkans. Powell and Cheney fended off suggestions for U.S. forces to take a relatively aggressive role in the relief effort.

In anticipation of having to do something, the Pentagon entered into delicate negotiations with the United Nations. At one point, it offered to provide U-2 overflights to gather intelligence on Serbian military moves. U.N. officials declined, for fear of alienating the Serbs. The Pentagon also offered to send in air-traffic controllers to direct relief flights, but after the Serbs complained, U.N. officials rejected that offer, too. The Serbs did the Pentagon, and Bush, one favor. They insisted that U.S. ground troops not be included in the peacekeeping forces. Under U.N. rules, the parties to a conflict have to approve the nationality of the peacekeepers.

Decision day: Finally, at a crucial meeting in the White House on June 26, Baker and Brent Scowcroft, the president's national-security adviser, argued that the United States had to step up its involvement in Yugoslavia. They feared starvation among besieged Bosnians, and they concluded that the Sarajevo airport would never become completely secure, particularly if the United States did not demonstrate its willingness to use force. Bush agreed.

The president was prodded from other quarters. Two weeks ago, Bill Clinton issued a statement declaring that "Serbian aggression . . . must end." In an interview with *The New York Times*, the Democratic presidential candidate said Bush "may have been a little slow on the uptake" in dealing with the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Then Bush was upstaged by a foreign friend. On June 28, French President François Mitterrand unexpectedly flew into Sarajevo with "a message of hope" for the Bosnians. Mitterrand, 75, complained about the difficulty of getting action from world leaders—"an enormously heavy thing to move," he said.

Mitterrand had supported the Serbs previously, and his grandstanding may have been motivated in part by political problems at home. But his brave visit sent a meaningful signal to the Serbs, and it helped to break the logjam. The Serbs, who had left the airport, promised to re-deploy their artillery. Soon French and British supply planes were landing in Sarajevo. A Canadian battalion, keeping the peace in neighboring Croatia, drove to Sarajevo, joining small Canadian and French contingents that already were struggling to secure the airport. Even so,

there were outbursts of fierce gunfire from Serbs in the hills surrounding Sarajevo.

If the Serbs attack the peacekeepers, the Security Council will quickly authorize the use of military force. "It will be a matter of hours, not days," says a top State Department official. In that case, U.S. warplanes would attack Serbian gun emplacements and try to protect the relief operation in other ways. So far, the Serbs apparently were trying not to provoke the West. "If they hadn't withdrawn from the airport, there would have been intervention," said Bosnian Defense Minister Jerko Doko. "The Serbs saw that and withdrew."

Sniper fire: They kept the pressure on the Bosnians elsewhere. In Gorazde, a city 30 miles southeast of Sarajevo, 60,000 people, mostly Muslims, were besieged by the Serbs, and there were reports of thirst and epidemics. Even in Sarajevo, atrocities were still being committed. In a Jewish cemetery two weeks ago, seven people were shot and wounded by Serbian snipers. They lay there for days, their rescuers driven back by gunfire until all of the victims died. Last week U.N. personnel made it into the cemetery but were able to recover only four bodies before sniper fire forced them out.

The Bosnian Serbs are still supported—at least with supplies and encouragement—by the rump government of Yugoslavia and by the pugnacious leader of the Serbian republic, Slobodan Milosevic. The newly independent Bosnian state thinks it deserves military support and arms from the West. "We need only limited air action to even out the odds," says Mohammed Sacirbey, the Bosnian ambassador to the United Nations. "Just imagine what we could do if their air force was prevented from flying over our territory, if their supply lines were cut off, if their artillery and heavy weapons were knocked out, and we had some weapons to fight with ourselves."

The relief effort alone is some help to the Bosnians, but the United States does not want to side with them more forcefully than that. The economic sanctions are beginning to bite, and rallies in the streets of Belgrade reflect persistent political opposition to Milosevic. Yugoslavia has designated as its new prime minister a naturalized U.S. citizen who promises to work for peace. "I know I am going on a pirate ship," Yugoslav-born Milan Panic told a reporter in Washington. "But if I become captain, the pirate ship will be turned into a ship of peace." That won't happen easily; Yugoslavia's ethnic pot has been boiling furiously for centuries. But now that the outside world has intervened—if only with relief supplies and punchless peacekeeping troops—Serbia finally may be compelled to pull in its horns.

RUSSELL WATSON with CHARLES LANE in Sarajevo, MARGARET GARRARD WARNER, DOUGLAS WALLER and ANN MCDANIEL in Washington and JOEL BRAND in Belgrade



ALBERT FACELLY—SIPA

The funeral: Boudiaf went up against both fundamentalists and the power elite

Murder on the Mediterranean

Who wanted Algeria's president dead?

Muhammad Boudiaf died with the word "Islam" on his lips. That was one of the few things known for sure last week about the assassination of Algeria's president after he was gunned down while addressing a rally. A 26-year-old presidential guard was the leading suspect; other members of his unit were detained for questioning. Still, the mystery of who was behind the murder remained, turning every Algerian into an amateur sleuth. Even the president's son spoke of conspiracy. "We have to know the truth," said Nacir Boudiaf. "Everybody has to know who killed him and why." But the country's yearlong political crisis has provided a surplus of candidates.

The obvious suspects were members of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The Muslim fundamentalist party was on its way to winning parliamentary elections last January, but hard-line military officers weren't willing to see that happen. They outlawed the FIS, forced President Chadli Benjedid to resign and called Boudiaf back from exile in neighboring Morocco to be head of state. Since January, FIS terrorists have picked off more than 45 soldiers and police officers in drive-by shootings. President Boudiaf was killed in Annaba, a fundamentalist stronghold, just days after several FIS leaders were brought before a special security court. The FIS clearly had ample motive: revenge and the desire to show that its reach is long even while most of its leaders and some 5,000 members are in jail. The party denied responsibility for the murder but certainly wasn't mourning; from Iran, it announced "the good news" that Algeria had moved closer to an "inevitable" Islamic state.

There was also plenty of cause to suspect powerful insiders. Boudiaf, 73, may have

angered the power elite by becoming more than a figurehead. Because he went into exile in 1964, two years after independence, Boudiaf was untainted by the corruption that came to plague the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN). And he had begun building an independent political base. His apparent strategy was to crack down on the FIS, then cripple the old guard of the FLN, including senior military officers suspected of lining their pockets. In his Annaba speech, Boudiaf lamented the lack of trust between the people and their leaders since independence and the role of "clans" and of Islam. "He spoke directly to the people," says Zouaoui Banamadi, publisher of the weekly *Algérie Actualité*.

Little respect: Who now can lead them? Algeria's real rulers—Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Khaled Nezzar and his top officers—are unlikely to assume power directly, particularly given the alleged killer's military connections. For one thing, that would heighten popular suspicion, as opposition politician Hocine Ait Ahmed puts it, that Boudiaf was "a sacrificial lamb." Instead Nezzar and crew installed Ali Kafi, a leader of Algeria's independence-war veterans, as president. But titles don't mean much in Algeria anymore. What the government lacked was not a president, but legitimacy. Algerians desperately want order and stability restored, not least so they can concentrate on rebuilding their economy. Hundreds of millions of dollars of aid from the European Community and other donors are at stake. But there is little respect for a regime that would use "stability" as a pretext to short-circuit democracy, and little real hope that a credible regime will soon find its way to power.

NANCY COOPER and CHRISTOPHER DICKEY in Algiers

NYT
July 15

U.S. TIGHTENS LIMIT ON NUCLEAR TESTS

Move by Administration Has
Little Practical Effect on
Atom Arms Program

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 14 — In an effort to forestall Congressional efforts to ban nuclear testing, the Bush Administration told lawmakers today that it was establishing new limits on the number and yield of its nuclear tests.

While offering a political commitment that nuclear testing will proceed at a low level, the new limits will have little or no practical effect on the United States' current nuclear testing program, which has shrunk considerably over the last few years.

The Bush Administration decision was conveyed in letters to Congressional leaders from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, Energy Secretary James D. Watkins and Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser.

Six Tests a Year

Under the new limits the United States will not conduct more than six nuclear tests per year. No more than three tests per year will exceed 35 kilotons. In addition, the purpose of the tests would be limited to insuring the reliability and safety of existing weapons — not the development of new ones. The restrictions would apply for a five-year period.

The limits represent a political assurance and not an ironclad guarantee. The restrictions, the Administration officials wrote, would apply "under currently foreseen circumstances." However, the Administration also expressed the hope that further reductions might be possible.

Administration officials said that the proposal was being made in the hope of fending off Congressional efforts to impose even greater restrictions. The House has voted to ban all nuclear tests

In 1982, for example, the United States conducted 18 nuclear tests. In the 1991 budget year, eight tests were conducted at the nuclear test site. Before today's initiative, the Bush Administration had planned to conduct only six nuclear tests in the 1993 budget year. That is the same number of tests as the new ceiling the Administration is establishing suggesting that the limits were drafted so as to conform with the United States basic testing plan.

Production of Nuclear Material

The Administration's approach on testing was similar to the one it took Monday in announcing it would no longer produce plutonium and enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In that case as well, the Bush Administration was codifying a situation that has persisted for years.

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1974 to limit the size of their underground nuclear blasts to 150 kilotons. The Reagan Administration persuaded the Russians to agree to on-site verification of that agreement in return for a commitment to seek further restrictions on nuclear testing. But with the Pentagon opposed to new testing restrictions, the Bush Administration refrained from trying to negotiate new limits with Moscow.

The failure of the Bush Administration to negotiate further restrictions with the Russians was assailed in a March letter to Mr. Scowcroft from three Democratic Senators — Sam Nunn of Georgia, Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee and Paul Simon of Illinois.

Mr. Gore complained in a June 17 speech that the Bush Administration has not answered that letter and said that as a result he would cosponsor a Congressional amendment to cut off all nuclear testing for one year. At the same time, Mr. Gore said that he did not favor moving immediately to an indefinite ban on all nuclear testing, suggesting that a very limited amount

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MODERATOR: Bob Schieffer - CBS News Chief Washington Correspondent

GUESTS: BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Adviser

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR (R-Ind.)

REP. LES ASPIN (D-Wis.)
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

JIM HOAGLAND
The Washington Post

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Marianna Spicer-Brooks

PRODUCER: Carin Pratt

DIRECTOR: Paul L. Taylor

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NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, INC.
1333 H Street, N.W., Suite 500
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 682-9050

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER (on tape): This is just another example of Iraq's cheat-and-retreat approach to United Nations Security Council resolutions.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Saddam Hussein tests U.S. resolve once again. What is the Iraqi leader trying to do? How should the United States react? We'll ask national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Senator Richard Lugar of the Foreign Relations Committee, Congressman Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and Jim Hoagland of The Washington Post.

New tension in the Persian Gulf--an issue facing the nation.

ANNOUNCER: "Face the Nation" with Chief Washington Correspondent Bob Schieffer.

And now from CBS News in Washington, Bob Schieffer.

MR. SCHIEFFER: And welcome again to the broadcast. Joining us this morning to talk about this stand-off in Iraq, first the president's national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

General Scowcroft, thank you very much for coming.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Good morning, Bob.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Give us the latest information. What is the situation as of this hour?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, right now, Ambassador Ekeus, the head of the inspection regime for the United Nations, has presented the team that he says insists will go into the agriculture building. And we're waiting for the Iraqi government to say yes or no.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Mr. Ekeus said yesterday he expected a final answer from Baghdad today. On Saturday he was expecting it on Saturday. Do you have any indication that there will be an answer today?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, only that we're down to a simple yes or no. And so I would expect that there would be one today, but we don't have any assurance.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, is today the deadline? Has the United States set a deadline as to when they want an answer as to whether Saddam Hussein is going to live up to this agreement?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, the United States is not setting the deadline. This is a U.N. operation. But I would assume if there's no answer today we would come to the conclusion that there's not going to be a favorable answer.

MR. SCHIEFFER: And if that happens, then what?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Then we will pursue compulsions.

MR. SCHIEFFER: How do you do that, General Scowcroft? I mean, the president said yesterday all options are still open. What are the options?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, the options basically are those that would make him obey the United Nations resolutions, and he is now in a policy of sort of confrontation across the board. The agriculture building is really the tip of the iceberg. It's the precipitating incident. But whether it's 688 humanitarian issues, where he's launched a major attack against his own Shi'as in the south and is trying to starve the Kurds in the north, where he's harassing U.N. humanitarian people in there trying to get aid to the suffering people; on Kuwait he's refused to accept the U.N. Boundary Commission--he's now starting to talk again about Kuwait being a province of Iraq--so it's just across the board he seems to be in a policy of stiffing the United Nations.

And so in a sense the United Nations and its ability to act in this new world is at stake.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, let's back up just a minute, because perhaps not everyone follows these things certainly as close as you do. But what is happening is that Saddam Hussein agreed to certain U.N. resolutions when the war stopped, and one of the things that he agreed to was to allow inspection of facilities by international inspectors.

What the inspectors want to do now is go into the agriculture building and inspect certain documents that are there which they believe may pertain to some sort of weapons building, things of that nature.

But I guess the question in my mind--while he's been denying them access, couldn't all of that have been moved?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I think we have to assume that it will have been moved and destroyed or something, and in fact we will not find anything when we go in. But the principle has to be that those inspectors can go where they want, when they want to, in order to root out all the vestiges of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, which is the mandate.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, let me make certain--I understand what you're saying here this morning--let's suppose now at five o'clock this afternoon he says, all right, I'll be happy for them to come into the agriculture building now. Is that going to be enough for the United States to say, all right, we won't consider the option of forcing you to comply with certain resolutions?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, that doesn't end it. As I say, that deals with the tip of the iceberg, and the whole iceberg remains. Now, removing the precipitating incident changes the character of how we'll respond. But I think it's important that the United Nations now keep the pressure on Iraq and not let him willy-nilly decide what he will or will not do.

MR. SCHIEFFER: While administration spokesmen have been hesitant to say what the options are, obviously one option is the use of military force. That is certainly one option that is being considered.

MR. SCOWCROFT: That clearly is one option.

MR. SCHIEFFER: What does Saddam Hussein have to do today for the administration to say, all right, using military force is no longer an option?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the minimum he would have to do is to allow that inspection

team into the agriculture ministry forthwith.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right, we'll take a break here. We'll come back and talk about this in more detail in just a minute.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of "Face the Nation" is sponsored by the Archer Daniels Midland Company--ADM, supermarket to the world.

(Announcements)

MR. SCHIEFFER: And we're back with the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft. General Scowcroft, if Saddam Hussein does not back off, if he remains defiant, and if the United States does decide to use military force, do you need some sort of approval from the Security Council of the United Nations? Would you seek that? Would the United States be willing to go it alone if the decision was made to use force? Explain to us exactly where you would be on that.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it's our general feeling that we have ample authority to go ahead without further U.N. Security Council resolutions. Whether or not we would still seek one, we'd have to decide. But I think we would turn to the coalition as well for any military action that might be--

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, what is the coalition now? Is it still the same coalition?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't think--you know, we're not talking about Desert Storm II here, we're talking about enforcement action, if you will, not the full range of people, but certainly our strong partners, like the British and French.

MR. SCHIEFFER: If military force--if that option is exercised, what would be the objective? What would be the targets?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think--I won't talk about targets, Bob--but I think the objective is to point out to him that there's a severe price to pay for not abiding by U.N. resolutions, and in fact to bring him to compliance with those resolutions.

MR. SCHIEFFER: When I say "targets," I wouldn't mean to point out which specific towns or sites. But would the objective be to cripple his army? Would Saddam Hussein himself be an object of an attack?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it's very difficult to attack an individual or anything, but I think, as I say, what he has to know, that there's a serious price to pay, so that the targeting would be designed to bring that home to him, so that a little pinprick that he would then laugh off and say, well, look, the U.N. is impotent, I can do what I want. So any reaction has to be measured to be proportionate to what he's doing, which is very, very serious. Not excessive, but certainly not below the threshold to get his attention, to get his attention and thus compel his compliance.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Obviously you can't go into detail on this, but has there been any additional

build-up or reinforcement of U.S. troops, forces, in that area in recent days?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, there hasn't been really; there are a few precautionary moves under way right now.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Would you say that Saddam Hussein, from a military point, is stronger now than he was six months ago?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, probably marginally, because as time passes he's able to organize, reimpose discipline on his units and so on and so forth, and get them back in shape. He's still not--he is not a threat to his neighbors, which was one of the major objectives of Desert Storm.

And the thing to remember is that Saddam right now is a peril only to his own people, and the whole purpose of this U.N. inspection regime is to keep it that way. And the inspectors have done a wonderful job in finding out where his chemical-biological-nuclear facilities are, insisting that they be destroyed, and so on. And the purpose of all this is to make sure that he is not again an international threat.

MR. SCHIEFFER: I don't suppose anyone can read the mind of Saddam Hussein, but why is he doing this? Is it because of the recent coup attempt against him? Is it something else that we don't know about? What is your estimate of why he is taking this course of action?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, any answer to that has to be purely speculative--we really don't know. But I think there are two ways you could hypothesize: one, there was some instability directed at him recently, and it may mean that he feels he has to crack down in this way to show that he's still on top of things; on the other hand, it could be that he's decided that, with elections in the United States, with the U.S. and Europe preoccupied with Yugoslavia, that he can get away with it. And anything he gets away with of course shores up his strength at home.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Have you talked to the Israelis about if violence or if action should break out again, would Israel again stand down as they did during the Desert Storm operation?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, we're discussing the issue with all the countries that would be involved one way or another.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Because there are reports coming out of Israel that Israel is at least dropping hints, no, don't count on us doing nothing this time around.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think circumstances are very different. But we would be in discussions with them.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Would you ask them to stand down this time?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't want to comment on that.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right, General Scowcroft, thank you very much for being with us.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Bob.

MR. SCHIEFFER: We'll be back in a minute to talk with some other experts on all of this--in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, joining us now for our roundtable discussion--Republican Senator Richard Lugar is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate; Les Aspin, who is the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee; and Jim Hoagland, the foreign editor of The Washington Post.

Gentlemen, one of the great advantages of being a reporter is I don't have to pretend to know everything--I'm not an expert. What was Brent Scowcroft telling us this morning, Senator Lugar?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, Brent said that there are several things that are in violation. The fact that they fixed the agriculture ministry situation doesn't mean that we're necessarily going to jump at that alone. And I think he's absolutely correct in that respect, that we've let some things accumulate, and this is the tip of the iceberg.

But there's no indication right now that the Iraqis are even going to buy letting us back in there. All of the stipulations seem to be to deny Americans and others the right to be a part of the inspection team, and that really won't sell.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, Les Aspin, where does that leave the United States?

REP. ASPIN: Well, I think we're in a very, very bad situation here. I think we're in a position where Saddam Hussein is succeeding in eroding the authority of the U.N. resolutions, chipping away at the authority here. And I don't think we're handling it very well.

These negotiations going on just add to the erosion of the authority. Why is there negotiation? The U.N. resolution says that the U.N. inspectors can go anywhere, any time, any way they want. And to have even negotiations is a victory for Saddam Hussein here.

I also think the fact that they've backed off from the ministry and were actually chased out of the country is a victory for Saddam Hussein here. We're establishing very, very bad precedents.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, all right, that certainly begs the question. What would you do?

REP. ASPIN: Well, I think the use of military force is clearly in the range here, and I think that what we ought to do is we ought to immediately issue an ultimatum, give him a time line, and then use military force if he doesn't meet it.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, I'm going to get to Jim Hoagland in just a minute, but I think--Republican Senator Richard Lugar, is Les Aspin taking it too far here?

SENATOR LUGAR: No, he's not, and I would just carry it a step further, and that is I think, as Brent Scowcroft said, there are targets that we have; we want to show him that we have some force

and make it painful.

But I think the thing that we have to think beyond that is, we have to be successful on this occasion. By that I mean, it will not be enough to show Saddam there's some pain, and then he still closes the agricultural ministry and still harasses the Kurds and the Shi'ites--and I think we have to say the military situation here includes something beyond what might be thought of as bases or mass destruction weapons. It includes the grid system, the infrastructure of power in the whole country. We have the ability to shut that down. We have the ability to stop the road from Jordan into Baghdad through which the embargo on the economic situation is being hit.

Now, when we get to that point, then the country comes to a halt in Iraq, and we're going to at least prevail. If we're not prepared to do those things, we could be embarrassed--the president could order this military force, it might not work, and then we appear to be impotent along with the U.N.

MR. SCHIEFFER: What's your observation on this, Jim?

MR. HOAGLAND: Well, Bob, I think that Senator Lugar and Congressman Aspin both have very good points. This is about control. Saddam Hussein is trying to re-establish control over his country. Diplomats call that sovereignty. What we're seeing is Saddam chipping away at the U.N. resolutions time after time. This is the fourth crisis we've had like this, the fourth confrontation. Each time in the past he's backed down. I believe he will probably back down again this time on the ministry of agriculture, so that he can come back later on.

I think we heard a very important thing from General Scowcroft earlier when you asked him whether Saddam is militarily weaker or stronger today than he was six months ago. And the general admitted that Saddam is beginning to be stronger; he's re-establishing military discipline, he's re-establishing his air defense by flying fixed-wing aircraft. The United States has permitted him to do that for more than three months now.

This is a way of endangering any American pilots who might have to go in and take out those targets. That's a very crucial thing.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, just to play the devil's advocate here, and to quote a Pentagon official who was sort of quoted around town last week after one study was made that said any military action against Saddam Hussein at this point is fraught with risk. And I suppose if you could go in there and hit hard, and if it were successful, and there were low casualties, then there would be no question about doing it.

But somehow things sometimes can go wrong. Isn't there a great risk to go back again, Congressman Aspin? Things went so well the last time, you just wonder can it really go this well again.

REP. ASPIN: I think you've got to worry about that, and of course the danger is that you get a pilot that's captured and then you've got a real problem on your hands. I think what that means is that you ought to use Tomahawk missiles against isolated military targets. Now, Tomahawks, because they don't involve pilots; isolated because you don't want to cause civilian casualties; and military targets because that's what the Iraqi regime holds in high regard.

MR. SCHIEFFER: What about Saddam Hussein? Should Saddam Hussein be a target this time, as it were, Senator Lugar?

SENATOR LUGAR: If we knew where he was, I don't think we should hesitate to make him a target. He clearly is the heart of the problem, the cause of the suffering of millions of people. I think Brent Scowcroft is correct: trying to isolate an individual for a Tomahawk missile is a very difficult thing to do.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, would this solve it? Let's suppose that air strikes are ordered. What happens after that? So you go in and you take out some targets. Does then Saddam Hussein say, okay, I give up? He didn't do that the last time.

MR. HOAGLAND: No, I don't think he does, and I don't think he will. He would try to use the air strikes obviously to rally public opinion in his own country but also in the Arab world. One of the games he's playing here is to try to erode the support in the Arab world for coalition military action. We already see Egypt very prominently distancing itself from the effect of military action. I think they will still support it in the end, but they're uncomfortable.

Other Arab countries, while still afraid of Saddam, fearful of what he could do, as this thing drags are reducing the amount of open opposition to Saddam.

So I think he can play this thing to his public opinion advantage in the long run.

REP. ASPIN: Bob?

MR. SCHIEFFER: Yes.

REP. ASPIN: I think one thing that we ought to think about here is the distinction between military action which is punishment for Saddam Hussein's intransigence, and the other is enforcement military action, in other words, military action that reinforces the goal that you try to do, which would be to send some military force in there and force your way into the agricultural ministry.

The punishment military action is--you can design that in which there would be low risk of U.S. casualties and things. But then the question is--I think you raised it and Jim Hoagland raised it--what happens if it doesn't work? I mean, what happens if Saddam Hussein still says no?

The real question on military action is whether you're willing to use force to go in there and actually force the compliance of the U.N. resolutions. That's a deeper problem; it's a quagmire. That one is fraught with risk of getting stuck in a quagmire here. That's I'm sure what they were talking about up at Camp David yesterday and in other discussions today.

MR. HOAGLAND: Bob, there's also the political risks that have to be taken into account. I'm sure that this was not a subject of open discussion at Camp David yesterday, but I'm sure that the president and the president's men have it in their minds all the time. If there are military strikes now that do not bring down Saddam, isn't that going to simply remind voters that the president's initial claims of sweeping victory, total victory, were somewhat exaggerated?

I think he has to calibrate this. I think if this situation were to repeat itself in late September or early October, where he'd be close enough to the election for American public opinion to rally around him for three or four weeks, we'd be seeing him more apt to take action than he would be today.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Why is Saddam Hussein doing this? I asked General Scowcroft that. I'd

like to get your--

SENATOR LUGAR: Clearly to test the system. He thinks we'll get tired at some point and leave him alone; he'll rebuild his forces, get back to his weapons of mass destruction at some point, that we'll be tired of it. We may have come almost to that point. This is the moment of truth.

This is why I get back to the point I made earlier: we have to be successful. Punishment won't be enough; we have to enforce the action, we have to reaffirm what we want in Desert Storm. I think we can do this, and this is why I cited specifically the grid system of the country, the power system, the cut-off of any embargo-defying activities economically. If we do these things, we may come to a new agreement with Saddam--if he still lives--quite apart from the one we had before, in which we have a lot more access to the country.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Senator Lugar, let me ask you just a related topic. As a Republican, you're for the president. Do you think with this situation so tenuous, with the Middle East as it is in general, should Secretary of State Baker now leave his post at the State Department and come to the White House in some role of running the campaign?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, he hasn't left. You speculated that he will, and most of us have done so, too. But he's still secretary of state. He's coming back right now to help the president with regard to Saddam Hussein. That's where he belongs, side by side with the president, working on that problem.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, would you like to see him stay or would you like him to come to the campaign?

SENATOR LUGAR: From the standpoint of the campaign, I would like for him to take charge-- I think that would be very important to the president's political success. From the standpoint of the country at this particular moment, I'm glad he's secretary of state and that he's coming to Washington promptly.

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, can he stay on the government payroll as secretary of state or in some other government role and also run the campaign?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, I suspect that that's a judgment that he and the president will have to make, but it seems to me wherever Jim Baker is, he's going to be very effective in American foreign policy and in serving the president.

MR. SCHIEFFER: We have about 15 seconds. Any final thoughts, Congressman Aspin?

REP. ASPIN: No, I think that part of the answer to the question you asked, why did Saddam Hussein do this--I think he perceives he's succeeding. I think he's been able to erode the authority, he's been able to chip away--as Jim Hoagland said, we've had four crises, this is the fourth crisis. I think he wins a little bit every time; I think it causes him to want to come back and try again. I think we're already on a slippery slope here.

MR. SCHIEFFER: All right. Well, we have to go, we'll leave it there. Thanks to all of you. We'll be back in just a second.

(Announcements)

MR. SCHIEFFER: Well, that's our broadcast for the day. Thanks for joining us. See you next week.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of "Face the Nation" was sponsored by Dean Witter--there are many ways to measure success, Dean Witter measures success one investor at a time; and by the Archer Daniels Midland Company--ADM, supermarket to the world.

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Iraq Move on Inspection Does Not Satisfy Bush

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 26 — President Bush said today that he was not satisfied with Iraq's agreement to permit a United Nations team to inspect a Government building in Baghdad. Senior officials said Mr. Bush would continue confronting Saddam Hussein and left open the possibility for military action in the future.

Clearly more restrained than in some of his other face-offs with Mr. Hussein, Mr. Bush still seemed eager to assert power over the Iraqi President this afternoon as he returned to the White House from Camp David after discussions there Saturday with national security advisers.

Mr. Bush called the Iraqi leader "the bully, the dictator, the brutal merchant of death." And he proclaimed that Mr. Hussein had "caved in after a lot of bluster," even though Mr. Hussein drove the original United Nations inspection team from Iraq.

More Confrontation Seen

"Behavior along the lines we've just witnessed will not be tolerated," Mr. Bush said, adding that there would be further confrontations over Iraq's re-

Option of military action remains open.

sponse to United Nations' effort to uncover and destroy Mr. Hussein's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs. The inspections were provided for under the cease-fire resolutions that ended the gulf war.

"The international community cannot tolerate continued Iraqi defiance of the U.N. and the rule of law," Mr. Bush said in a statement to reporters on the White House South Lawn.

In a coordinated series of public statements, Mr. Bush and his top aides listed violations of Security Council resolutions well beyond Baghdad's interference with the weapons program inspections: among them were the economic blockade of the Kurds in the north, attacks on the Shiites in the south and refusal to join negotiations on the Kuwait border.

Mr. Bush and his advisers seemed to deliberately hold open the possibility of military action to force compliance in these other areas. "The options that the United States and our partners have available to us are well known," Mr. Bush said.

Appearing today on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said, "We always have the option, if the President

makes the decision, to once again use military force to enforce those U.N. resolutions. We did it before. We can do it again."

Mr. Cheney's statement was made before Iraq agreed to permit inspection of the Agriculture Ministry building, the standoff that started the latest round of hostilities, and was clearly intended to bolster support for a military attack had Iraq refused to go along.

But the comments of American officials were also aimed at laying groundwork for the kind of military response that American planners had in mind: a larger attack on a wider range of Iraqi targets than might seem justified by the issue of the agriculture building or any other single site.

Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, said any attack would have to be more than "a little pinprick" and must show Mr. Hussein "that there's a serious price to pay" for defying the United Nations.

'Precautionary Deployments'

Iraq's action today removed the immediate threat of war. But it was not known if Washington would reverse what Mr. Scowcroft called the "precautionary deployments" of recent days. Administration officials said these included dispatching a cruise-missile-equipped Aegis cruiser to the Red Sea and Patriot anti-missile batteries to Kuwait.


Iraq's compliance gave a reprieve not only to Mr. Hussein, but also to Mr. Bush.

The Iraqi leader may have concluded after a recent coup attempt that allied bombing might unleash uncontrollable forces of insurrection, especially if the bombs were aimed at the Republican Guard or Iraq's communications and power grid, as some American officials have advocated.

For his part, Mr. Bush still faces the formidable task of pulling together a consensus within the allied coalition, which officials say he now lacks, for broad military action. The President must also find new and credible ways to keep up the pressure on Mr. Hussein.

Domestically, Mr. Hussein's continued defiance has turned Mr. Bush's greatest victory into a heavy burden on his re-election campaign. While an inconclusive military action that ends with Mr. Hussein thumbing his nose at Washington would be a political disaster, it is not clear how a tug of war with Baghdad would play politically. Mr. Bush has already been criticized for stopping the war before Mr. Hussein was killed or driven from power.

Mr. Cheney said Mr. Hussein would be a "legitimate target" of military action. But he and other officials took pains to say that it is hard to target an individual with bombing attacks, an



Associated Press

President Bush, talking to reporters after returning from Camp David, said yesterday that the international community could not tolerate continued Iraqi defiance of the United Nations cease-fire resolutions.

apparent attempt to forestall expectations that Mr. Hussein would be removed and prevent the tensions from turning into an even more personal confrontation than it already is.

After being forced to cancel a holiday at his home in Kennebunkport, Me., this weekend as tensions grew, Mr. Bush clearly wanted to avoid any further perception that he is a prisoner of Mr. Hussein's agenda.

But the political pressures were obvious. "I think we're in a position where Saddam Hussein is succeeding in eroding the authority of the U.N. resolutions, chipping away at the authority here, and I don't think we're handling it very well," Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said today on the CBS News program Face the Nation.

But there is disagreement among Mr. Bush's own advisers about whether to attack Mr. Hussein's forces again.

Mr. Scowcroft and the other officials suggested that there is justification for

an attack. But with the flash point of the Agriculture Ministry building removed, American officials said they would need some clear confrontation, what a senior policy maker called "an acute point of conflict," before military action could be taken.

Mr. Scowcroft, who also appeared on "Face the Nation," said that, had Iraq refused to permit the inspections, Washington had support for military action from Britain and France.

But a senior official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said Mr. Bush did not have a mandate for a military operation intended to enforce general compliance with the United Nations sanctions, finally break Mr. Hussein's resistance or, indeed, remove him from power.

The coalition members, the official said, "are sympathetic, but the problem always is that unless you have something acute to point to, it's hard to rally people." He added, "The will is there, but the occasion is what one needs."

Iraqis to Allow U.N. Inspection ^{7/27/92}

Bush Warns of Further Confrontations

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

A United Nations envoy yesterday announced an end to the tense standoff with Iraq over weapons inspections, but President Bush—calling Iraqi President Saddam Hussein “a bully, a dictator, a brutal merchant of death”—warned of continuing confrontation as Iraq tests U.S. willingness to risk military action in the midst of a presidential campaign.

At the United Nations, Rolf Ekeus, director of the U.N. commission charged with inspecting and destroying Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, told reporters that Iraq had agreed to a new inspection team that is scheduled to enter the Agricultural Ministry building in Baghdad Tuesday. Iraq's refusal to allow inspection of that building had been the immediate cause of a 21-day standoff. But Ekeus and all senior U.S. officials acknowledged it was unlikely the team would find anything of value because of the lengthy delay.

The team, appointed and accompanied by Ekeus, has been reconfigured to place a German, rather than an American, at its head, and to include two Americans who will

remain outside the building to examine material, rather than inspect inside. Iraq had objected to allowing inside its government buildings citizens of the countries that defeated it in last year's Persian Gulf War.

In Washington, Bush arrived on the White House South Lawn from a weekend in Camp David to bitterly condemn Saddam in language deliberately aimed at humiliating the Iraqi leader. While noting Saddam's “cave-in after a lot of bluster,” Bush read off a list of U.N. agreements Saddam is accused of violating in addition to resisting the inspections.

Bush's statement that no immediate U.S. action is needed lessened the sense of pending military confrontation, but the president also accused Saddam of refusing to negotiate over Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait, of refusing to release detained Kuwaiti citizens, of thwarting U.N. humanitarian efforts and of persecuting the Shiites in the south of Iraq and the Kurds in the north—all violations of the cease-fire agreements that ended the gulf war.

Saddam, Bush said, had “caved in” only after “deliberately and callously harassing and abusing” U.N.

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U.N. and Iraq End Tense Standoff Over Arms Inspection

IRAQ, From A1

inspectors, and he predicted no let-up in tension with Iraq as inspections of the agriculture ministry and other sites go forward. Echoing a string of administration officials who took to the television talk shows yesterday, Bush outlined what he called a new "pattern of willful non-compliance" with the U.N. resolutions and warned that "we cannot tolerate" continued defiance.

What further action the administration might take, in conjunction with the United Nations and U.S. allies, is "an open question," Undersecretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger said on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley."


As a demonstration of resolve, the Pentagon yesterday ordered the aircraft carrier USS John F. Kennedy and eight accompanying warships to cut short a port visit in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, and head for the Mediterranean. Another carrier, USS Saratoga, is already in the Mediterranean and a third, USS Independence, is in the gulf region.

The Pentagon also is considering moving a Patriot missile battery into the region to guard against possible Iraqi Scud missile attacks, a Pentagon official said. The official declined to specify the destination except to say it was not Israel. The frequent target of Scuds during the gulf war, Israel already has installed several Patriot batteries.

A senior official said in an interview that the White House regards the Iraqi decision as little more than "a tactical retreat" while the regime continues its defiance and said the administration will consult allies on additional measures that might force a broader shift in Iraq's behavior.

The solution worked out at the United Nations appears to defuse a mounting crisis while giving each side a concession. However, it also gave the impression that Iraq had succeeded in part in dictating the composition of the team.

Since the crisis began July 5, Baghdad had refused to allow the inspectors into the agriculture ministry building, claiming that the team was being used by the United States and its allies for espionage. Iraqi officials argued that the inspection would violate the country's sovereignty and threaten its security.



BY MARGARET THOMAS—THE WASHINGTON POST

President Bush tells reporters that Iraq "caved in" only after "callously harassing and abusing" inspectors; Iraqi envoy Abdul Amir Anbari leaves United Nations.



AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

lieve it. The minuses far outweigh the potential pluses."

The official said that most Bush aides view the Iraq situation "not as a political opportunity but as evidence that presidents are captives of the office they hold, and that gives them a tremendous number of advantages but also means they cannot avoid" responding to events.

Bush's response to Iraq was al-

ready being labeled too mild yesterday by some lawmakers. Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.) said on "Face the Nation" that the administration had "let some things accumulate" and that its response to denial of inspections should go beyond the immediate inspection issue to threatening military action that would bring Iraq "to a halt."

On the same program, Rep. Les

Aspin (D-Wis.) accused the administration of letting Saddam "erode the authority" of the United Nations by allowing 20 days of negotiations and allowing the original inspection team to be "chased out of the country." He added, "I don't think we're handling it very well."

Campaigning in California yesterday, Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton told Los Angeles

television station KCBS that the Bush administration "made a big mistake" by ending the gulf war too soon "and then just letting the Kurds and the Shiites and the others who wanted to rise up against Saddam Hussein twist in the wind."

At the time, U.S. officials said they believed that a breakup of Iraq would destabilize the region.

Saddam, Clinton said, "has

abused his position for a year. I'm glad we're standing up to him."

One senior administration official said that although there are no new ideas about how to pressure Iraq, the administration will consult allies about "options not exercised in the past," including limited use of force. He declined to give details, but acknowledged that shooting down Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters would effectively undermine Iraq's offensive against the Shiites.

The administration has toyed with that option before, but rejected it as requiring too great a U.S. involvement in what many military officials regard as an internal Iraqi dispute with little importance to the United States. Officials said yesterday that they are unsure how Britain and France would regard such military options, now that the principal focus of allied anger has been defused.

The military options given to Bush before the Iraqi compromise varied from "a lightning demonstration" of allied force to "Chinese water torture," a military official said.

Asked if Washington could take a deep breath now that the standoff was over, another official said, "Take a deep breath and hold it."

Staff writers R. Jeffrey Smith and John Lancaster in Washington, John E. Yang in California and special correspondent Trevor Rowe at the United Nations contributed to this report.

Baghdad had initially demanded that the inspectors be citizens of neutral or non-aligned countries. Instead, the six-person team scheduled to enter the building Tuesday will be made up of two Germans and inspectors from Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Russia. One Russian inspector will join the two Americans outside the building.

In describing the composition of the new team, Ekeus acknowledged that "we took into account certain signals and sensibilities without compromising the quality of the inspection."

When asked if the threat of force had helped him secure a deal with the Iraqis, Ekeus said, "I'm afraid that it helped. It was difficult to get the seriousness [of the confrontation] through to the Iraqis."

However, a U.N. official said that Ekeus had threatened to resign if there was not a peaceful solution. The threat appeared aimed at the United States and its allies, which had warned that a military strike on Iraq was increasingly likely.

U.S. officials yesterday portrayed Saddam as engaging in a broad pattern of defiance, and two of them said in interviews that they believe it may be partially connected to a belief by the Iraqi leader that Bush is too politically weak to assemble a coalition and launch military action as he struggles with his reelection effort.

Saddam "has within the last few weeks embarked upon a course of apparent confrontation with the United Nations, refusing to comply," Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney said on NBC's "Meet the Press." "The question is his non-compliance across a broad front that has developed in recent weeks and that we think, and our coalition partners think, is unacceptable."

Asked if Iraq's backing down on the inspection would end the crisis, Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, said no.

"No, that doesn't end it," he said on CBS's "Face the Nation." "That deals with the tip of the iceberg, and the whole iceberg remains."

A senior official, speculating on Saddam's motives, said, "He misread George Bush once before, and he is probably misreading him and the situation now. He may believe that the president is so politically weakened, he cannot do anything and this is the time to call our bluff."

Some of the president's political advisers strenuously dispute a thesis that Bush could provoke a military confrontation to recapture the popularity he has lost since the successful end of the gulf war. One of them said yesterday, "To engage in a military move now is a ridiculously high-risk move, and there are a half-dozen reasons why. You remind the voters that the job was not done and Saddam is still there; you risk American prisoners-of-war and deaths with no guarantee of any success other than the bombing itself; you open yourself to being accused of resuming a war for political reasons—and you can deny that to death and many voters won't be-

Saddam's opponents ask for allied air umbrella to be extended

From Patrick Cockburn in Washington

IRAQI opposition leaders, meeting the US government in Washington, believe President George Bush is likely to ban Iraq from using helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft against Kurdish and Shia rebels. The six-member delegation, which includes the Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, was scheduled to meet James Baker, the US Secretary of State, yesterday and Brent Scowcroft, the US National Security Adviser, today.

In the aftermath of the Gulf war the US said it would shoot down any Iraqi fixed-wing military aircraft. The use of helicopters was also banned north of the 36th parallel, which is patrolled by US, British and French aircraft. An air raid by Iranian bombers on an Iranian dissident camp at Baquba led the Pentagon to drop its ban.

Hoshyar Zebari, a senior adviser to Mr Barzani, said the delegation was in

Washington "to find out how committed the Americans are to political change in Iraq". He said the allies had over-emphasised ceasefire resolutions concerning Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and neglected other Iraqi ceasefire violations such as the economic blockade of the Kurdish provinces.

Mr Zebari said the allied air umbrella over northern Kurdistan was essential "until there is political change in Baghdad". The Kurds have asked for the air umbrella to be extended further south. Other requests by the delegation include the establishment of a safe haven for the marsh Arabs of southern Iraq and the unfreezing of some Iraqi assets for use in Kurdistan.

The administration is likely to be more responsive to the Iraqi opposition following the crisis over the access of UN inspectors to the Agriculture Ministry in Baghdad. Although they were allowed to search the building yesterday, the exclusion of US, British and French

inspectors has accentuated Saddam Hussein's resurgence. President Bush, influenced by this week's polls showing Americans in favour of military action against Iraq, is considering increasing the pressure on Baghdad, but without launching an all-out war.

A further incentive for the White House to back the Shia and Kurds is the support they are receiving from Bill Clinton and Al Gore, the Democratic candidates, who accuse President Bush of abandoning them to President Saddam. Nevertheless, the US opposes Kurdish independence, in order to maintain good relations with Turkey, its chief regional ally.

Mr Talabani said the Kurds were also in need of weapons. "We are in great need of anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons" he said. Iraq still has 2,000 tanks and 500,000 soldiers, some 100,000 of which monitor the blockade line that seals off Kurdistan.

N.Y.T. 7/28

IRAQ WON ITS POINT ON U.N. INSPECTORS, TOP U.S. AIDES SAY

WHITE HOUSE STAFF SPLIT

Bush Says Hussein 'Caved In,'
but Baghdad Now Has Role
in Selecting Inspectors

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 27 — Reflecting divisions within the Administration over policy toward Iraq, some senior officials said today that Washington had compromised important principles by allowing Iraq a say in determining the composition of a United Nations inspection team in Baghdad.

Under the cease-fire drawn up after the Persian Gulf war, United Nations inspectors were to have quick and unimpeded access to Iraqi installations to insure that Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction were destroyed.

But under the accord announced on Sunday, citizens of the United States and other countries that were part of the military coalition that defeated Iraq were excluded from the team that is to be allowed inside the Agriculture Ministry in Baghdad. The ministry is believed by the United Nations to have contained materials relating to the Iraqi arms program.

Bush vs. Aziz

President Bush said on Sunday that Baghdad had "caved in" by agreeing to the inspection. But Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz, said today that Baghdad had established a precedent and that international inspectors could no longer enter buildings on their own terms.

Mr. Aziz said inspection of the Agriculture Ministry, expected to be carried out on Tuesday, would be totally different from earlier inspections.

"The claim that they achieved what they wanted in the latest standoff is incorrect," he said. "We put the United Nations in a position in which it was forced to deal with us in a different way."

Such assertions have added fuel to a debate within the Administration and among policy experts, some of whom argue that the plan represents an important erosion of the United Nations inspection rights.

Who Spoke to Whom?

The process of consultation between the United Nations and the Administration is not clear. One Administration official said that Washington had been

Iraq Won Point on Inspection By U.N., Top U.S. Aides Say

Continued From Page A1

was the chief inspector for Iraq's nuclear weapons facilities, said in an interview today. His vigil in a Baghdad parking lot over a similar dispute last year captured world attention.

Mr. Ekeus has defended the composition of the team. He will go to Baghdad with them, and he said those who enter the building will have the necessary expertise. But Mr. Ekeus told BBC television as he left London today on his way to Iraq that he is "quite pessimistic now about making any major catch at the facility" because Iraq has had time to remove sensitive materials.

Who Names the Guards?

While Administration critics of Sunday's agreement declined to be identified, one official said the Pentagon was unhappy with the inspection plan that Mr. Ekeus had negotiated.

"The Defense Department is puzzled by the compromise because it appears to give Iraq the ability to decide the composition of the inspection team, which it clearly has no right to do," a senior Defense Department official said.

The official also complained that the plan gave Iraq "plenty of time to get the goods out of the Agriculture Ministry" before inspectors arrived.

In contrast, a State Department spokesman, Joe Snyder, praised the compromise. "We support the work of Ambassador Ekeus," Mr. Snyder said, echoing Mr. Bush's statements.

Today, at a campaign stop near Grand Rapids, Mich., Mr. Bush vowed that President Hussein would comply with all terms of the cease-fire.

"He is going to do it," Mr. Bush said. "He may not know it, but he's going to do it."

Pressure on Administration

The perception that Iraq has been successful in limiting the United Nations authority is putting pressure on the Administration to demonstrate that it is being tough with Baghdad. The pressure has been increased by the Administration's own effort to broaden its list of concerns to include the Iraqi suppression of the Shiite Muslim rebellion in southern Iraq as well as other actions by Baghdad.

Pentagon officials confirmed news reports today that a battery of Patriot missiles is being dispatched to Kuwait. The United States may also dispatch Patriot missiles to Bahrain, a Pentagon official said. The Patriots are designed to shoot down attacking missiles, such as the Scuds used by Iraq

might become targets if the United States attacked Iraq.

But this evening, officials said the Pentagon might cancel its plan, announced earlier, to send a second aircraft carrier to the Middle East.

Mr. Bush met tonight with Mr. Baker, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, Gen. Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's National Security Adviser.

In past weeks, senior officials have considered a number of ways to step up the pressure on Iraq, including seizing the proceeds from the sale of Iraqi oil exported just before the embargo against Iraq into effect.

Officials are also considering whether to put inspectors on the Jordanian border to monitor compliance with the United Nations trade embargo. A large part of the goods entering Iraq in defiance of the embargo are believed to come through Jordan.

As Mr. Ekeus, a Swede, negotiated the inspection arrangement, the Iraqis initially took the position that only inspectors from neutral nations could enter the Agriculture Ministry. As the compromise came out, the six-member team that is to enter the building will be made up of two Germans, a Finn, a Swede, a Swiss and a Russian. Two Americans and one Russian inspector will be allowed to stand outside.

"It was not that critical that the inspector that goes inside carry an American passport," an Administration official said. "The inspectors are going as part of a United Nations team. The pity of the thing is that it took 21 days to do this."

But Mr. Kay, the former inspector, said the compromise not only sets a bad precedent for future monitoring of Iraq but is an unfortunate example for arms inspection arrangements for other nations. One of the major flaws of the inspection procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which failed to uncover Iraq's nuclear bomb program before the Persian Gulf war, was a provision that allowed the country being inspected to veto inspectors it did not like, Mr. Kay said.

Previous United Nations inspections of Iraq represented an major improvement over the IAEA procedures, Mr. Kay said, because they did not give Iraq the right to influence the choice of inspectors.

Mr. Kay said that in past months, Baghdad had tried to determine the identity of inspectors but had been rebuffed. He also said the delay in inspecting the Agriculture Ministry vitiated the concept of surprise inspections, which have led to the discovery