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April 1991



WHO'S WHO

When asked about the State Department instructions that authorized Ambassador **April Glaspie** to give **Saddam Hussein** a wink as he prepared to invade Kuwait last July, **James Baker** made clear he wanted the buck to stop somewhere else: "What you want me to say is that instructions were sent specifically by me or on my specific orders. There are probably 312,000 or so cables that go out under my name." Of course, insiders know that 311,000 of those cables are concerned with trivial house-keeping details, such as when some minor-league bureaucrat is going to arrive in Lagos. By long-standing custom, they are all signed with the secretary of state's name, even though he may never see them. The remainder, like the ones instructing Glaspie, are concerned with policy, and they are not only signed with Baker's name but are cleared with him or his top aides. If, as Glaspie now seems to maintain, such instructions were never sent, observers wonder why Baker felt he had to deny responsibility for them. . . .

We should have included **Brent Scowcroft's** name in last month's list of administration figures whose careers were enhanced by Desert Storm. Scowcroft and **Dick Cheney** were consistently more hawkish about war in the Gulf than James Baker and thus more finely attuned to the biggest hawk of all, **George Bush**. Scowcroft is close to both Cheney and General **Colin Powell**. One insider confided to **Andrew Rosenthal** of *The New York Times*, "He can play Cheney and Powell off against Baker, which gives him a new boldness." . . .

White House aides are bracing for a power struggle over who will emerge as the president's image king. **Sig Rogich**, the president's assistant for public events, was unhappy over the news that **Dorrance Smith**, a Bush family friend and creator of ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley," would be joining the administration. Smith is expected to be the gatekeeper of network appearances for senior aides, a job that **Marlin Fitzwater** largely controlled and Rogich wanted. Smith's arrival also seems to further erode the modest power of **David Demarest**, the White House communications director. . . .

Vice President **Dan Quayle's** deputy chief of staff, **Spencer Abraham**, replaces **Ed Rollins** as co-chairman of the National Republican Congressional Committee. Rollins angered **John Sununu** by advising GOP lawmakers to disassociate themselves from George Bush's reversal on tax policy. Abraham's successor: **Al Hubbard**. Quayle's counsel from Indiana and former fundraiser for **Pierre DuPont's** unsuccessful 1988 GOP bid. . . .

Ronald Kaufman has succeeded **Ed Rogers** as Sununu's chief political aide. Some say Rogers walked the gangplank to fend off criticism of his boss, while others suggest that Bush loyalists were upset because Rogers seemed more committed to Sununu than to the president. It certainly didn't help that Rogers had irritated the president by bad-mouthing **Rich Bond**, a friend of Bush's, when Bond was up for chairman of the Republican Na-

tional Committee. Kaufman, Who's Who fans will recall, was the Bush campaigner who staged the Boston Harbor and Massachusetts police embarrassments to Michael Dukakis in 1988. . . .

While congressional Democrats search for an issue to awaken their moribund party, Republicans have been fighting tooth and nail over who will replace Rep. **Robert Michel** as head of the minority party. **Newt Gingrich**, the Republican whip, has engaged in trench warfare with hopeful Rep. **Vin Weber**. Other would-be leaders who believe Michel may retire in 1992 include Reps. **Jerry Lewis**, **Duncan Hunter**, and **Henry Hyde**. . . .

Two people who will not be pleased by *Opening Arguments*, a book by a former lawyer in the Iran-contra special prosecution office, are **Elliott Abrams** and **Robert "Bud" McFarlane**. The author, **Jeffrey Toobin**, thinks Abrams should have been indicted and that McFarlane, who some deem the guiltiest of the guilty, should not have been permitted to escape with a plea bargain and no jail time. . . .

Conservative Sovietologists were thrilled that **Condoleeza Rice**, the president's assistant for Soviet affairs and one of the most liberal policy voices in the administration, returned to Stanford University. But they were less than thrilled by the decision of **Brent Scowcroft** to replace her with Brookings moderate **Ed Hewett**. The anti-Gorbachev crowd suspects that James Baker had a hand in the Hewett appointment—part of his continuing quest to undermine Scowcroft's deputy, **Robert Gates**. . . .

Washington's premier plum, the Commerce undersecretary for travel and tourism, has gone to **John Keller**, the former director of presidential advance, one of the most grueling jobs around. Apparently Bush felt Keller deserved a paid vacation. Meanwhile, the White House continues to lose top aides to the greener pastures of the private sector. The three top deputies in the legislative affairs office—**Robert Portman**, **Boyd Hollingsworth**, and **Nick Calio**—have moved on to better paying jobs, although some speculate that their departures were influenced less by money than by the fact that their prospects at the White House weren't bright. . . .

Ins—Commerce: Deputy Secretary—**R. Anthony Schnabel**. Undersecretary for Travel and Tourism—**John Keller**. Housing and Urban Development: Assistant Secretary for Administration—**James E. Tarro**. Assistant Secretary for Housing—**Arthur J. Hill**. White House: Assistant to the President for Public Affairs—**Dorrance C. Smith**. Chief Speechwriter—**Tony Snow**. Political Director—**Ronald Kaufman**. Director of the Office of Political Affairs—**David Carney**. Agencies and Commissions: Governor, Federal Reserve Board—**Lawrence B. Lindsey**.

Outs—Housing and Urban Development: Assistant Secretary for Legislation and Congressional Relations—**Timothy L. Coyle**. Treasury: Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs—**J. Roger Bolton**. White House: National Security Advisor to the Vice President—**Carnes Lord**. Chief Speechwriter—**Chriss Winston**. Political Director—**Ed Rogers**. Agencies and Commissions: Governor, Federal Reserve Board—**Martha R. Seger**.



THE HARTSOCKS AND PETER
Retiring to Good Life After Big Win

POTOMAC PRODUCES PRIZED POODLE

The "most poodley poodle" and best-in-show at New York's prestigious Westminster Kennel Club in February was a gussied-up dog named Peter.

Known on the dog-show circuit as Champion Whisperwind on a Carousel, Peter earned the 93rd best-in-show award of his career. His owners, Joan and Frederick Hartsock of Potomac, retired him to stud after his hundredth win a few weeks later, but figure the bitches will keep Peter busy. Before his retirement, Peter averaged one lady-caller each month, but he traveled to shows every weekend. Now he has more leisure time, and the Hartsocks can make up some of the \$100,000 they have spent on him.

—MEG EGAN



WALTER JOHNSON SLEPT HERE

Here's your chance to walk the same floorboards and sleep under the same roof as one of the greatest pitchers ever to throw a baseball. Former Washington Senators great Walter Johnson's old house is for rent.

The classic five-bedroom wooden manse, at 9100 Old Georgetown Road, was built around 1906 as a summer home in the wilderness of Bethesda. In 1925, Johnson, then the premier pitcher in the major leagues, bought the house, and it stayed in the Johnson family until 1936. Until recently it housed the Teaching Team, a tutorial and academic-testing company.

Johnson moved on to a farm in northern Montgomery County

and served as a county commissioner. He also ran for Congress. But it was as one of the five original members of baseball's Hall of Fame and as a 416-game winner that he will be remembered. He may well be Washington's greatest sports hero.

And for \$11 a square foot per year, the 3,200 square-foot house could be yours. The Montgomery County Council granted historical status to the house in 1990, and some want to make it into a museum, but it is now available for commercial use or as a private home. Call Noah & Cummings Property Management, 301/258-9100, if you want to live in the shadow of greatness.

INSIDE THE WHITE HOUSE DID LEAKING GET STAFFER THE BOOT?

■ George Bush, who hates leakers, personally engineered the firing of White House political operative Ed Rogers, one of chief of staff John Sununu's closest aides. Rogers had been fingered as being much too cozy with reporters, and reportedly leaked the name of former Bush aide Rich Bond as a successor to Lee Atwater as chairman of the Republican National Committee. Bond complained about his name being kicked around, an investigation was made, and Rogers was called on the Oval Office carpet. Ironically, one of Rogers's jobs had been to ferret out White House leakers. He now plans to set up a law firm in Washington.

■ Bush has been careful to dampen the rumors about National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft being more highly regarded than Secretary of State Jim Baker: Both have recently received invitations for weekends at Camp David. Scowcroft was invited to recuperate there from a bout with the flu; Baker's visit was on the eve of the ground war and was cut short when the action began.

■ A plane chartered by the International Television Network to ferry its reporters and other press people from Saudi Arabia to London at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf war had to be diverted to Rome. It seems that the press passengers, experiencing alcohol for the first time in six months, got extremely rowdy—starting fights, getting sick, and generally creating such turmoil that the pilot touched down in Rome and threw the offending journalists off the plane.

■ Kim Hoggard, assistant to State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler, is quitting to rejoin her husband in Australia. They have had what must certainly be one of the longest-distance commuter marriages in history: two years between the US and Australia. He's a reporter on the Australian equivalent of 60 Minutes.

■ The President has taken up power walking, setting such a pace that Secret Service agents are complaining of blisters. But even the President is not immune to aches and pains. Some nights, after jogging on a hard surface, he sleeps with a pillow between his knees.

■ Bush's mispronunciation of the Iraqi leader's name as Saddam was directed by the CIA. According to sources there, the word as Bush pronounces it means "a little boy who cleans out the shoes of old men."



WALTER JOHNSON'S BETHESDA HOUSE
Available for Immediate Occupancy

Bush lets Mitchell's idea drop

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

ISLAMORADA, Fla. — President Bush yesterday brushed off Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell's suggestion that U.S. troops shoot down Iraqi helicopters that attack civilians.

"He did? Always glad to have his opinion," Mr. Bush said of the Maine Democrat as he flew here aboard Air Force One for his first vacation since he called a halt to the war with Iraq on Feb. 27.

Asked if he agreed with Mr. Mitchell and fellow Democrat Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana, a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the president cracked, "Glad to hear from him."

Mr. Mitchell said he endorsed the Bush administration's general hands-off approach to the Iraqi civil war, but he said U.S. forces should fire on Iraqi helicopters used to kill rebelling Kurds and Shi'ites.

"The clear intent of American policy at the outset was to prohibit the use of aircraft which might threaten American forces — and that was both fixed-wing and helicopters — from operating. I think we should enforce that policy," he said on NBC-TV's "Meet The Press."

Mr. Hamilton, chairman of the Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, said on Cable News Network's "Newsmaker Sunday": "I think those helicopters now are creating a blood bath there" and should be stopped.

Iran's U.N. ambassador said that Iraq was using chemical weapons — possibly fired from helicopters — against rebels in both northern and southern Iraq. Kamal Kharrazi, asked on CNN's "Newsmaker Saturday" if he had evidence that Iraq was using the chemical weapons, replied, "Yes, they are, because among the refugees in Iran, as well as the southern part of Iraq, there have been many cases that they had been injured by chemical weapons."

This was proved by American as well," Mr. Kharrazi said, apparently referring to a comment last week by Col. Mike Deegan, the U.S. commander of Checkpoint Charlie in southern Iraq, that he had received unverified reports of chemical-weapon use.

On his Florida fishing trip, Mr. Bush also similarly dismissed all other policy questions, including queries about National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft's mysterious mission to the Middle East last week.

"No, can't say anything about that either," he said.

One White House official said that even some National Security Council officers were in the dark about the trip. The purpose and destination were not revealed.

But, Mr. Bush did reveal, without details, that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had replied to his letter calling for him to clear obstacles to two arms treaties and a planned superpower summit in the next two months.

A senior White House official said there has been some progress during several exchanges between the two leaders.

In Iraq, American fighter jets have shot down two Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft in support of a ban imposed by the Feb. 27 cease-fire. But Iraq has continued to launch helicopter gunships against the rebels.

Persian Gulf commander Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf admitted in an interview last week that he was tricked by Iraqi negotiators into allowing the helicopter flights. The general said he had been assured the aircraft would only be employed for civilian purposes.

Administration officials have said the Schwarzkopf side agreement will not be reversed because of the difficulty in detecting low-flying helicopters and in discerning whether the flights are military or civilian.

The administration in recent days has been pressed to defend a post-war policy that calls on the Iraqi people to oust President Saddam Hussein, yet withholds any support for the ongoing, two-front rebellion.

Mr. Mitchell said Mr. Bush's non-intervention policy is correct.

"I don't think the United States can intervene in every internal conflict, however despicable the circumstances may be," he said. "I think it is particularly so in this case since, as I said, the Iraqi army in effect didn't fight against a stronger military force and now appears to be, to some extent, taking it out on their own civilians."

The senator predicted Saddam eventually would be toppled, even without direct U.S. intervention.

After gaining a clear victory in expelling Iraq from Kuwait, the administration does not want to become engaged in a potentially drawn-out conflict that results in a fractured Iraq.

White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk reiterated Mr. Bush's position.

"The issue of internal unrest in Iraq is an issue that has to be settled between the government and the people of Iraq," Mr. Popadiuk said Friday. "It's a decision for the people of Iraq to make in terms of the leadership."

Mr. Bush's Florida fishing vacation was prescribed by first lady Barbara Bush on Feb. 28, the day after the president ordered a halt to the Persian Gulf war.

Perhaps in the spirit of her advice, Mrs. Bush accompanied the president on this trip — a rare event for an expedition that is traditionally stag. They flew down after attending Easter services at Camp David.

"We're going to have a good time down there," Mr. Bush said. "It's Easter. It's a day to, you know, count your blessings."

The president's first evening, however, was not so blessed. Power to his Tarpon Flats condominium — and 50,000 other locations in the is-

land chain — was lost for about an hour, said White House Deputy Press Secretary Steve Hart.

Mr. Bush and his entourage had emergency generator power for communication but were left in the dark.

So, the president and Mrs. Bush dined by candle light.

Mr. Bush has been making annual spring trips to Islamorada, a resort island in the Upper Keys, since 1979, fishing for bonefish and tarpon in the shallow waters. He was joined on the trip by Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, Deputy National Secu-

rity Adviser Robert M. Gates and Deputy Chief of Staff Andrew Card.

Mr. Bush does not plan to attend today's funeral in Columbia, S.C., for his former campaign manager and Republican National Chairman Lee Atwater, who died Friday. Mr. Bush will attend a memorial service Thursday.

On the way back to Washington on Wednesday, Mr. and Mrs. Bush will spend the day at the Palm Beach County winter home of his ailing mother, Dorothy, who is 89.

• Rowan Scarborough contributed to this report.

BRILLIANT PEBBLE

By Fred Barnes

The dates to remember are January 3 and January 18. On January 3 President Bush went to the Situation Room in the White House basement for his first full briefing on the Pentagon's scaled-back version of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The new SDI has a post-cold war mission. Rather than deter a massive missile attack on the United States by the Soviet Union, it's designed to protect against limited missile strikes by countries like Iraq. Bush asked a few small-bore questions, such as whether mini-SDI would bust the budget. Budget director Richard Darman interjected that it wouldn't. Secretary of State James Baker wanted to know how the Soviets would react. He was told they might like the idea, since they face a greater threat of a limited missile assault than the United States does. Baker seemed pleased by the answer. Only Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, was skeptical. He asked if the new program—known as GPALS, or Global Protection Against Limited Strikes—could operate effectively from the ground alone. Nope, Pentagon officials said, the space-based part is critical.

Bush quickly approved GPALS. But its chances of gaining congressional assent were poor. Then, on January 18, a Scud missile fired from Iraq was shot down over Israel by a U.S.-made Patriot missile. "It was the first destruction of an enemy ballistic missile in a combat situation," says a Pentagon official. And it gave all missile defense programs an extraordinary political boost. Now Bush stands a good chance of achieving what Ronald Reagan never could: explicit approval by Congress of SDI in its Star Wars configuration, a space-based anti-missile system.

For two years SDI took big spending hits. For 1990 its funding was cut by Congress from the \$5.6 billion proposed by Reagan (and Bush) to \$3.9 billion. For 1991 SDI was shaved back to \$2.9 billion, and sharp restrictions were put on how much could go for the space-based part. With the end of the cold war, full-blown launching of Soviet missiles against America became a remote possibility. Full development, much less deployment, of SDI became a remote possibility too.

There were other problems. The program lost its greatest advocate when Reagan left office in 1989. Bush supports SDI, but he's never been as emotionally committed to it as Reagan. Meanwhile, Congress denied

BRILLIANT PEBBLE...CONTINUED

the first SDI director, General James Abrahamson, a fourth star (Reagan had requested the promotion). Abrahamson was forced to retire, and his replacement, Lieutenant General George Monahan, ran the program without championing it. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, always an SDI backer, was obsessed with touting the B-2 bomber. Bush, distracted by Soviet relations and German reunification, took little interest. But his fleeting reference to missile defense during a visit to Lawrence Livermore Laboratory in California in February 1990 was notable: SDI can defend against "attacks from the many other countries that, regrettably, are acquiring ballistic missile capabilities. In the 1990s strategic defense makes much more sense than ever before, in my view."

Civilian officials at the Pentagon had come to the same conclusion. (The military brass, in contrast, generally look askance at SDI.) In March 1989 the National Security Strategy Review reassessed all Pentagon policies. This led two months later to a request for an independent review of SDI. Henry Cooper, who had been the chief negotiator in the Defense and Space Talks with the Soviets, got the task. In the spring of 1990 he recommended that the program emphasize development of a defense against limited attacks. Cooper soon took over as SDI director, and the program began examining the architecture of what became GPALS. Cooper and his allies decided that Brilliant Pebbles, the box-shaped satellites that are supposed to orbit the Earth and attack offensive missiles in the launch phase, should be deployed. But fewer would be needed than in the original plan for Phase 1 of SDI.

To combat a Soviet first strike, 4,600 to 6,000 Brilliant Pebbles were required. To cope with a limited strike, approximately 1,000 are needed. Ground-based interceptors were cut back in GPALS to 500 to 1,000, down from 2,000 to 3,000. And a battlefield (or "theater") missile defense capability, a sophisticated updating of the Patriot, was added. This would allow ships to defend against ballistic missile attacks and anti-missile systems to be deployed with American troops overseas.

The land (and sea) parts aren't controversial. Sam Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and other Democrats look favorably on them. It's the space part—not only Brilliant Pebbles but also sensors known as Brilliant Eyes, which guide ground-based missile defenses—that draws criticism. Why? Because if deployed, the space-based elements would violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. So why are Bush and the Pentagon advocating them? "To have global protection, you've got to have space-based weapons," says a Pentagon official. "They're always in position. If Saddam had a 4,500-kilometer weapon, he couldn't reach the U.S., but he could hit most of Western Europe. Where would you put your ground-based interceptors? You'd have to have them everywhere. The beauty of space-based interceptors is they protect many targets at once. The

equivalent protection cannot be done from the ground. Besides, you're better off environmentally and politically having the stuff in space. In space, nobody sees the things."

At the White House the noisiest proponent of space-based missile defense is Vice President Dan Quayle. If Bush's speech in February 1990 was prophetic, Quayle's two months later was clairvoyant. Quayle focused on Saddam, noting that he'd moved Scud launchers to western Iraq, closer to Israel. This, along with Saddam's threats to use chemical weapons against the Israelis, touched off "a new strategic era in the Middle East," he said. "Even if the Soviet 'new thinking' results in new, more responsible behavior, I am afraid the Middle East could well become a much more dangerous place over the next few years."

Once Bush endorsed GPALS, Quayle made sure the president plugged it in his State of the Union address on January 29. At his urging, Bush said that "with remarkable technological advances like the Patriot missile, we can defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians." Thus, he said, SDI was being "refocused on providing protection from limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source." Bush followed that on February 15 with a speech at the Raytheon plant in Andover, Massachusetts, where Patriots are manufactured. As initially drafted, the speech spelled out Bush's rejection of theories, such as mutual assured destruction, that preclude defense against missile attacks. Scowcroft and his staff took out some of this. But Bush did say: "Thank God that when those Scuds came in, the people of Saudi Arabia and Israel and the brave forces of our coalition had more to protect their lives than some abstract theory of deterrence."

Bush now confronts an opportunity Reagan never had. He could push the program to the point where deployment is not only imminent but practically irresistible. "The pro-SDI political climate after Desert Storm will never again be duplicated with the intensity it currently enjoys," says a senior White House official. Fifteen of the nineteen Democratic senators up for re-election in 1992 voted against the use of force in Desert Storm. They may be reluctant to oppose any bill to protect American troops or civilians from missile attack. Still, the White House (but not Quayle) flinched when Republican Senator John Warner of Virginia called for the fastest possible SDI development, even if tests in space violate the ABM Treaty.

To understand White House trepidation, recall January 3. Development of GPALS was sold as consistent with the treaty. Scowcroft was leery anyway of doing anything in space. Baker worried about the Soviets. Bush didn't say so on January 3, but he isn't eager to break the ABM Treaty, annoy Gorbachev, and give Soviet generals an excuse for their own backsliding on arms reduction agreements. Putting SDI on the fastest track can wait. Bush is happy just to have it alive and well. ●

SOVIET WEAPONS...CONTINUED

NEW REPUBLIC

April 1, 1991

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"it's only in the past one and a half years that I've had an opportunity to speak before groups like this. Until then, the entire rocket and space program was the deepest state secret."

Krunichev makes the Soviets' workhorse Proton rocket—used to launch planetary probes, communications satellites, and the Mir space station—and space station components. Conversion means reduction in space projects, and entry, for example, into three new areas: ecology, cancer treatment, and emergency situations. In 1988, only 7% of output was for civilian use. This will reach 40% this year, and 60% in 1993. A top priority is to maintain the enterprise's high technological level, and to hold on to its skilled personnel.

Thus, the enterprise has applied space technology to begin building high-frequency ozone converters, used to treat drinking water and wastewater and to clean up smoke stacks. Krunichev engineers are working on hyperthermal equipment for localized treatment of tumors, applying exact temperature regulation technology from the Mir space station. And they are using lunar vehicle technology to develop two radio-controlled robots for emergency situations where humans can't go, such as the Chernobyl reactor.

Krunichev's activities exemplify what Carter calls "taking advantage of the strengths" of military industry: "Using a systems approach, developing the ability to deal with complex problems." Indeed, says Albert Trifonov, vice chairman for science and technology of the Soviet cabinet's State Commission for Defense Production, the conversion program does emphasize "areas in which we're strongest," where the Soviets can cooperate with foreign firms or even go it alone.

These include aviation, space, shipbuilding, communications, and clean technologies for energy production. There are also programs in cooperation with the republics for production of consumer goods that are science-intensive, such as medical technology. And there is work to improve the quality of Soviet life, including "technical equipment for some sectors of our economy that are in an absolutely horrendous state, such as light industry, trade, public food service, and food processing."

Richard Seltzer

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Cheneys couple prominence with power

By John W. Mashek
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON — "We Win War" reads the blaring newspaper headline hanging on the refrigerator of Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and his wife, Lynne, in their Virginia townhouse.

The headline explains in large measure why Cheney, a former White House chief of staff and congressman from Wyoming, has risen to national prominence.

In a recent Los Angeles Times national poll, Cheney's very favorable rating leaped from 3 percent before the Gulf War to 33 percent afterward. And 69 percent recognized his name compared with only 26 percent before the war.

Cheney shares the spotlight with Lynne, his wife of 27 years, who is chairwoman of the National Endowment for the Humanities, part of the federal agency that supports the humanities and the arts. The Cheneys have taken over as the capital's No. 1 power couple since Elizabeth Dole, whose husband, Bob, is Senate minority leader, left the Bush cabinet to become chairwoman of the American Red Cross.

Lynne Cheney, who considers herself more politically conservative than her husband, "is the same goal-oriented person he is. She's a perfectionist who drives herself in everything she does, again just like him," said Vic Gold, a friend with whom she wrote a political novel.

She was a writer for Washingtonian magazine when former President Reagan named her to the NEH in 1986. She was given another four-year term by President Bush last year.

Lynne Cheney operates in a world as politi-

cal as her husband's. "There are highly political fights in the academic world, too," she said in a joint interview Friday. "Many educators have a policy of scorched earth and burn all the bridges."

She has definite views on what government should do and not do. She said some people were surprised when she opposed removing controversial photos by Robert Mapplethorpe from a Cincinnati exhibit.

"I am opposed to censorship, and I think Dick is, too," Lynne Cheney said, and her husband nodded his head.

The Cheneys have come a long way from the sparsely populated range land of Wyoming. He was the football captain, she the cheerleader and baton twirler at their high school in Casper.

She went on to Colorado College to study English, while he took up political science at the University of Wyoming. They both pursued master's degrees at the University of Wisconsin.

Cheney began his career in Washington in the Office of Economic Opportunity during the Nixon administration. After Richard Nixon resigned, Cheney, at age 34, became President Ford's chief of staff.

When Ford lost to Jimmy Carter in 1976, Cheney returned to Wyoming and two years later ran for Congress. That summer, he had a heart attack.

"My cardiologist said hard work never killed anybody, when the suggestion was made that I look to some less stress-filled job," Cheney said, laughing. "Lynne became the candidate for the next six weeks."

Cheney won and immediately became a star in the GOP minority in the House. He was reelected easily five times.

Cheney's career took a turn when John Tower, the former senator from Texas and Bush's choice for defense secretary, was rejected by the Senate for his past drinking and womanizing. Brent Scowcroft, now national security adviser, who had worked with Cheney in the Ford era, was Cheney's chief advocate.

Cheney's relationship with Bush, friendly but not close, is still developing. A senior White House official said Bush respects Cheney "because he's a team player, knows how to play the Washington political game and he's loyal."

Many in the party consider Cheney a logical challenger to Vice President Dan Quayle when, and if, the two seek the Republican presidential nomination after Bush leaves office. Cheney's health would be a consideration. After a second heart attack, he had a quadruple bypass operation in 1988.

"I quit smoking in 1978 (after the first attack), I play some tennis, go skiing, take walks with Lynne and watch what I eat," Cheney said. "I laugh when people came up during the war and told me how good I looked. I know what they were really thinking."

The war, along with his friendship with Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, has given Cheney wide exposure for the last seven months.

That's had its pluses and minuses. "There was some antiwar sentiment and dump Cheney talk," he said, referring to the invitation to deliver the commencement address at his daughter's graduation from Colorado College this spring. "But we won the war and I'm apparently okay now."

NATIONAL NEWS

PRESIDENT'S GONE FISHIN'

ISLAMORADA -- President Bush, heeding advice from his wife to "get a little fishing and get a little rest," flew to the Florida Keys for a four-day fishing vacation, his first since the Gulf War ended. "We're going to have a good time down there," the president told reporters on Air Force One.

The president declined to answer questions about U.S. policy matters, including a recent unannounced trip to the Mideast by Brent Scowcroft. Bush was bound for Islamorada, where White House aides said he planned to do very little business and had no meetings or public events scheduled. (Tom Raum, AP)

MINIMUM WAGE UP 45 CENTS TODAY, UNIONS CALL IT INADEQUATE

Millions of Americans begin earning larger paychecks as the federal minimum wage jumps by 45 cents an hour, but organized labor says the boost falls well short of lifting many workers out of poverty. "They can't support a family on this and in many cases can't support themselves," said Rudy Oswald, chief economist of the AFL-CIO, which wants the base wage increased to \$5.75 an hour from \$4.25 by April 1994. Sen. Kennedy called the 45 cent raise an "April Fool's increase, well below what low-wage workers deserve."

Business executives dismissed the need for another boost, and the White House indicated it probably would oppose another increase. (Karen Ball, AP)

MITCHELL WON'T FOLLOW REAGAN ON GUN BILL

Sen. Mitchell said he was unswayed by former President Reagan's support for establishing a seven-day national waiting period to buy handguns and predicted the bill would fail. "I don't think the Brady bill will pass in the form in which it now stands. I don't support that bill. I think that we can make some changes in it to have a waiting period that makes sense and accomplishes something," he said on Face the Nation. "I don't oppose the concept of a national waiting period, but it presupposes that there's a waiting period so that a check can be made and there is something to check. There is not now any central national register with which to check," Mitchell said. He said he favored establishing such a register, an approach similar to the Bush administration's stated position of backing the creating of an instant-check system to link gun shops with a national computer system. (J. Jennings Moss, Washington Times, A3)

SCHWARZKOPF FACES REPUBLICAN DRAFT

A Florida Republican is raising money to draft Gen. Schwarzkopf for a 1992 race against Sen. Graham. The organizer of the drive, W.J. Latvala, is using his direct-mail company to raise money for the "Draft General Schwarzkopf '92 Committee." Florida GOP officials have said he would be an ideal candidate to challenge Graham. (Washington Times, A3)

NETWORK NEWS SUMMARY

(Sunday evening, March 31 -- CBS News pre-empted by basketball.)

IRAQI UNREST

NBC's Garrick Utley: The war is not over in Iraq, not the fighting, not the dying. Even as American troops come home at the rate of 3,000 men and women a day, Saddam Hussein continues to crush the rebellion against his rule there. The outcome is now clear: Saddam will win. He is using helicopter gunships as well as troops to defeat the Kurdish forces in the northern part of the country. Today, more Kurds fled Iraq as refugees. And today the Iraqi government allowed journalists to visit the city of Kirkuk, which had been captured by the Kurds.

NBC's Tom Aspell reports from Kirkuk under Iraqi censorship. No one knows how many Iraqis are dying in the uprising. Foreign newsmen were escorted to Kirkuk to see for themselves that Saddam's troops are now in full control of the city for the first time in nearly two weeks. Civilians described the occupation by insurgents as a nightmare.

(Civilian: "Many people died from Kirkuk, innocent people."

(Civilian: "They come inside the private house and broke and stole everything.")

The damage indicated that the nine-hour (according to Iraq) battle was no pushover. Offices of the ruling Baath Party and provincial headquarters buildings were totally destroyed. The governor said Kirkuk had been occupied by Kurds, Iranians, religious fanatics, and deserters from the Iraqi army. He blamed most of the civilian deaths on what he called groups of thugs. He said they had overrun Kirkuk only to loot and kill. The fighting in Kirkuk has boosted morale in the Iraqi army. Iraqi officials announced in Baghdad this evening that the army has taken back two other important towns in the north. As far as the government is concerned, the uprising is all but over. (NBC-Lead)

The BBC's Michael MacMillan reports from the Kurdish side in Kirkuk, not subject to Iraqi censorship. This is the result of the Iraqi offensive.

(TV Coverage: Children crying in hospital.)

No one can estimate the number of injuries. What's clear is that the Kurds have no medical supplies. There's little chance of survival for those with serious injuries, and with no food the rebels will find it difficult to keep up the fight. In the distance, we could see Iraqi helicopter gunships, which have, according to the refugees, been firing quite indiscriminately at anything which moves. This is the weapon the Kurds fear the most. They can't understand why the U.S. is willing to shoot down fixed-wing aircraft but are still allowing helicopters to fly. (NBC-2)

The ITN's Edward Storton reports on the unrest, cleared by Iraqi censors. We journalists toured enough of Kirkuk to be able to say with some confidence that the government's forces now control it again. During the two-and-a-half hour visit we neither saw nor heard anything to indicate the resistance is continuing.

Scowcroft Talks With Saudi King

Officials Say Aide Discussed Sensitive Mideast Matters on Unannounced

By R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writers

White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and a senior White House aide flew to Saudi Arabia last week for talks with Saudi King Fahd about sensitive Middle East matters, senior U.S. officials said yesterday.

The disclosure by officials who insisted on anonymity ended several days of speculation about where Scowcroft had gone, but not uncertainty about the topics discussed. A source said the topics were considered too sensitive for

routine exchanges by lower-ranking officials or embassy staffs.

White House deputy spokesman Roman Popadiuk said yesterday he was not authorized to provide any information about the trip. Senior officials said last Friday that Scowcroft and Richard Haass, the senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs, had departed Washington for the Middle East on March 26 and returned two days later.

Officials said yesterday the visit was requested by Fahd to discuss certain matters about the future of the Middle East in the aftermath of the allied victory over Iraqi military

forces occupying Kuwait. One senior official said he understood that Scowcroft's trip focused on questions involving the Middle East peace process and was "a follow-up" to Secretary of State James A. Baker III's March 8-14 trip to the region.

The secrecy surrounding the trip comes as the Bush administration is trying to ease Arab-Israeli tensions, invigorate negotiations on Palestinian autonomy and reach agreement on new security arrangements for the Middle East. The administration has been unusually cautious about discussing its plans for the region prior to a United Nations vote ex-

pected this week on a resolution that would set terms for a permanent cease-fire with Iraqi forces.

Sources also disclosed yesterday that President Bush wrote last weekend to the emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jabir Ahmed Sabah, but officials declined to elaborate. One official said the letter was a reply to a congratulatory note from the emir on the conduct of the war and dealt with "the political and economic challenges in Kuwait."

Smith reported from Washington, Devroy from Islamorada, Fla. Staff writer Al Kamen contributed to this report.

Disclosed
' Trip Last Week

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times A 9
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 2 April 1991

Scowcroft Went to Talk : With Saudis, U.S. Says

By PATRICK E. TYLER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 1 — President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, traveled to Saudi Arabia last week for high-level security consultations requested by senior advisers to King Fahd, according to Administration officials.

The officials, who declined to reveal any further details about the talks, said the trip took place after President Bush decided last Tuesday not to intervene further in the internal unrest in Iraq, an issue that is of potentially vital importance to the Saudi monarchy.

One official sought to play down the sensitivity of the trip and any reasons for shrouding Mr. Scowcroft's agenda in secrecy. The official said the Saudis wanted to hold consultations before King Fahd and other members of the royal court departed for Mecca for the final weeks of Ramadan, the Muslim month of fasting.

Another official said the Saudis have been anxious to focus the Bush Administration more intensely on its commitment to making progress in the peace process between Israel and its traditional Arab foes.

Talks on Regional Security

In addition, major elements of the United States military in Iraq or at rear areas in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are scheduled to begin withdrawing after a formal cease-fire agreement is reached at the United Nations.

United States officials are discussing a new regional security structure with

Saudi Arabia, other Arab gulf states, Egypt and Syria. This arrangement is likely to include prepositioning enough military equipment in Saudi Arabia to equip an American Army division, increasing the frequency of joint exercises and putting a United States military headquarters in the region for the first time on Bahrain, which is connected to Saudi Arabia by a causeway.

Syria's Foreign Minister, Farouq al-Sharaa, arrived in Saudi Arabia today for talks on postwar security arrangements.

Officials said that whatever the main focus of the consultations with Mr. Scowcroft, Saudi interest in the situation in Iraq and future relations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq under Saddam Hussein would be one important subject on the agenda for the talks.

Common Approach to Iran Sought

Mr. Scowcroft's trip may also have been prompted by the temporary incapacitation of Saudi Arabia's ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who last week was at Walter Reed Army Medical Center for treatment of a back ailment. Prince Bandar, a nephew of King Fahd, is the primary conduit for high-level communications between Washington and Riyadh.

Middle Eastern diplomats said they believed the Saudis, who just re-established diplomatic relations with Iran

after a three-year break, wanted to discuss an approach to Iran on regional security issues and on the attempts to free the American hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon.

Another likely issue on the agenda was Saudi Arabia's harsh attitude toward King Hussein of Jordan, whose historically good relations with the United States and with President Bush personally are expected to help the King rehabilitate himself in Washington and continue to play a role in helping to mediate the Arab-Israeli dispute and its central question of Palestinian rule.

Scowcroft Talks With Saudi King Disclosed

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Washington Post Staff Writers

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The Washington Post A16
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 2 April 1991

U.S. TO MEET WITH KURDISH OPPOSITION FIGURES

Administration officials plan to meet this week with Kurdish opposition figures who are trying to overthrow Saddam Hussein, a State Department spokesman said Monday.

Spokesman Richard Boucher said the meeting is at the request of Kurdish leaders and it does not signal a departure from U.S. policy of staying away from Iraq's internal affairs.

"We received several meeting requests from Iraqi opposition figures," Boucher said. "We're evaluating those requests. We anticipate that some meetings probably will take place this week and probably with officials of the (State Department's) Near East Bureau." (Frank Csongos, UPI)

SCOWCROFT TALKS WITH SAUDI KING DISCLOSED

Officials Say Aide Discussed Sensitive Mideast Matters
On Unannounced Trip Last Week

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Another official said the Saudi have been anxious to focus the Bush administration more intensely on its commitment to making progress in the peace process between Israel and its traditional Arab foes. (Patrick Tyler, New York Times, A9)

The Unsettling Calm of Dick Cheney

Defense's Civilian Chief and Seasoned Washington Hand, Playing It Cool

By Phil McCombs
Washington Post Staff Writer

As a regular matter, Dick Cheney does much of the family grocery shopping, and the cooking too. During the war he didn't do as much of this, of course, because he was busy. But the other day he and his wife, Lynne, were back at the shopping center in McLean, just like any other suburban couple on a Saturday morning, and he was loading his shirts in the car in front of the cleaner's when an old guy pulled up and said, "Are you who I think you are?" "Well, I'm the secretary of defense," Cheney replied in his usual understated way. And the old guy got out and said, "I just feel really proud of what happened in the Persian Gulf."

The same sort of thing happened when he went into Crown Books to stock up on the histories and biographies he favors but hasn't had time for. And in the Gourmet Giant the guys behind the meat and fish counter even made up a "thank you" card for him with a little American flag pasted inside. Although, as Ken Adelman, the conservative arms control intellectual who is one of Cheney's old buddies and not a man to let any slight irony go unremarked, notes, "There was dried meat juice on it."

While the warplanes were bombing Baghdad, Cheney still managed to be home by 8 or 8:30 most nights, chatting about his day with Lynne over dinner, hearing about hers. Weekends, they sometimes got in some tennis with Ken and Carol Adelman, and one Sunday the couples drove out to L'Auberge Chez Francois for a leisurely brunch, getting pleasantly lost in the Virginia countryside for a couple of hours on the way back. All in all, though, he didn't get out much, because people tended to worry: *Lord, who's running the war?*

Indeed, at the Pentagon, Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, seemed so unfailingly cool and competent when they appeared on television to explain the action that a jittery nation was soothed. There was the immediate sense that here was no new American Desert Screw-Up. Here, finally, was some *fahrvergnügen* you could get into, tanks that worked, choppers that flew, bombs that were smart.

Even Cheney's mom and dad, back home in Casper, Wyo., were impressed. "We had mixed feelings on the whole thing when it started," admits Richard Cheney Sr., a retired U.S. soil conservation official, "and were more than agreeably surprised at the progress. It seems unbelievable they can run around that sandpile like that."

"Be sure to put in there that he was senior class president," adds Marjorie Cheney.

"And he played high school football," says her husband.

"And Lynne was homecoming queen," says Marjorie.

Having moved to Defense from the number two Republican spot in the House, that of party whip, Cheney was surefootedly political throughout the Persian Gulf crisis, massaging congressional egos and delivering a barrage of speeches in support of the president's policies. Just before the ground offensive, he asked Hill leaders in charge of defense issues—including Sens. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and John Warner (R-Va.)—to make a secret visit to the gulf and report back, which they did. They were happy to be asked.

"Believe me," said one participant, "there was a sigh of relief on Capitol Hill that John Tower wasn't there during the sensitive business of using these troops and balancing it with diplomacy." (Humor among the big boys: After Cheney was "inducted" into his Pentagon job in the spring of '89 following the Tower fiasco, Adelman offered him a beer. "Beer, hell," Cheney said, "I'll have a double Scotch.") When Saudi King Fahd was less than enthusiastic about the proposed influx of U.S. forces last August, it was Cheney the president dispatched to perform the delicate arm-twist.

When the war was over, America seemingly stood atop golden hours. Bush basked in his 91 percent approval rating, Powell was being touted for—at least—vice president, and two publishing houses were scheduling instant books on Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf, the growling, tenderhearted commander of Desert Storm.

But where was Cheney?

"Wow, Cheney?" exclaimed an aide to former defense secretary Frank Carlucci, who with Cheney, Adelman and Donald Rumsfeld had been a bright young Nixonaut at the Office of Economic Opportunity, where they set about dismantling the poverty program. "We've had 500 requests for interviews about Powell. This is the first one for Cheney."

Talk about low profile.

Here's a man who's ambitious, respected by his party and whose name keeps popping up as a presidential possible for '96. So why hasn't he ascended to hero status? Was he too cool on the tube, not human enough, less than charismatic? Is it that it's tough to get a patriotic lump in your throat about a desk-chair warrior who had so many draft deferments during Vietnam that it takes all the fingers on one hand to count them? Is it that

he has a reputation among his opponents for getting a little nasty in the clinches? Or is it simply that Cheney, ever wary of the kind of verbal misstep that embarrassed Schwarzkopf last week, has pulled back, to watch and await his opportunity? "I'm very much a fatalist about the future," he says smoothly. "I don't spend a lot of time worrying about what I'm going to do next."

He just turned 50, yet seems already to have been around Washington forever. Dick and Lynne moved here in 1968 when he took a congressional internship, rented an apartment in Annandale and settled in to write their doctoral dissertations (his: models of congressional roll call voting; hers: influence of Kant on the poetry of Arnold). Six years later, at 34, he became Gerald Ford's chief of staff, and began working closely with Brent Scowcroft, who was then, as now, the president's national security adviser. Pictures from the time show young Cheney with a worried, almost sour look on his face. "I'm so proud of him," Ford says today, "because I knew him when he was a young man."

Cheney "hired" Jim Baker, as he puts it, to chair Ford's '76 campaign, and after the defeat ("White House Chief of Staff Richard Cheney... is blamed by Ford insiders for a succession of campaign blunders," Evans and Novak reported) began his meteoric career in the House. Lynne went on to the chairmanship, today, of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Their friend Adelman, who became chief of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Reagan, now hangs his hat at the Institute for Contemporary Studies, a conservative think tank on K Street where—as he sits spinning yarns about Cheney to a reporter—Vice President Quayle telephones him to shoot the breeze.

You start to get the picture of a tight little group. Carol Adelman has become a high official at the Agency for International Development, and Elizabeth Cheney, Dick and Lynne's oldest daughter, works for her. And so on.

The old Cheney-Scowcroft-Baker ties are one reason the war was managed so seamlessly. Baker couldn't be bothered getting uptight when Cheney did the Fahd thing. And Bush likes it this way—his own management style tends toward the informal. "There was never a time," Cheney says, "when I went to the president and said, you know, 'I need call-up authority, you've got to sign an executive order so I can call up 250,000 reservists,'" when the president wouldn't do it. "Done! No problem!"

Sure, friends say today, Dick would make a great president himself—if it weren't for those three heart attacks (the first at 37), and the quadruple bypass (June of '88), or the fact that Wyoming has only three electoral votes.

Or, they say, he'd make a great

House speaker, a job he always wanted, except the Democrats seem to have it permanently locked.

So Cheney is back cruising the aisles of the Gourmet Giant, taking morning walks with his wife, planning his next fly-fishing trip to Wyoming. And, at work, getting the boys and girls home, making postwar security arrangements in the gulf and hunkering down for the budget battle with Congress.

Part of the Eternal Government.

Heart and Mind

Of all the president's close advisers, Cheney was said to be the most hawkish, prepared to ride the stallion of battle all the way to the Apocalypse. But suppose things hadn't gone so well, and those 16,099 olive-drab, chloroprene-coated body bags the Pentagon ordered had been needed? Would Dick Cheney still be cruising for Lean Cuisine, still defending presidential policy?

Absolutely.

"The first obligation of the federal government," he says flatly, "is to provide for the national security." This, he believes. In speeches during the war, he'd joked about himself: the congressman who never saw a weapons system he didn't love. Now, in an interview in his Pentagon office, Cheney presents his usual competent, low-profile image, talking with amazing speed, as if he were reading aloud from an article in Foreign Affairs, his head cocked to one side, then the other, words spewing in a soft machine-gun monotone from a bunched spot somewhere toward the side of his mouth. One is reluctant to break eye contact—perhaps the steady stream of words would suddenly come to a stop like a phonograph when the plug is yanked.

"The, uh, I think the value of American commitments and our ability to give meaning and substance to those commitments in terms of military capability is greater today than at any time since the end of World War II," he says in one breath. "There can't be any doubt in the minds of our allies around the world about our capacity and willingness to use force to keep our commitments, to protect our interests, to protect those of our friends and allies."

And this guy flunked out of Yale.

"Uhm," he continues, "the military itself, as an institution in the United States, stands higher today than it has at any time since World War II. A lot of the criticism that was part and parcel of the '70s and '80s—uh, stupid generals, uh, equipment that doesn't work, uh, idiots running the Pentagon who don't know what they're doing—clearly wasn't valid."

Cheney is wearing his accustomed conservative suit, white shirt and striped tie over a pair of spit-shined Lucheses that you don't notice till he crosses his legs. He's not quite a short man, and seems heftier up close than the TV images of his abstracted talking head would suggest. You'd

certainly never call him beefy, but it's suddenly clear how he could have captained the team at Natrona County High.

And how he could have had the bypass surgery—so goes the spin—not because his life was threatened by the repeated heart attacks or because he internalized stress or anything, but so he could "safely engage in his rather vigorous lifestyle," as his physician, Allan M. Ross, put it to the Senate committee considering the nomination: the six-day backpacking trips into the wilderness with Baker and Republican consultant Stu Spencer; the skiing out West last year, "way too fast" according to one observer, at 14,000 feet with the temperature at 20 below.

"You become very much aware of your own mortality," he says of his heart problem. "When you're 37 years old and you have a heart attack, it's a total surprise. . . . It leads you to question what you're doing and why you're doing it. It happened in the middle of my first campaign for Congress, and I spent about six weeks recovering before I could go back out on the campaign trail." He had considered medical advice to change his lifestyle, but concluded

that "it was really important to do what you wanted to be doing . . . that coronary artery disease was something you managed."

Like war.

In his cavernous office, Cheney allows himself to sink into a comfortable slouch for the 25-minute appointment. He sips caffeine-free Diet Coke, though not from the can. On a table is a football, somewhere off to the side a silently flickering TV; there's an aura of dark wood paneling, deep leather. He's looking at you squarely through gold-rimmed glasses, and it's impossible to discern the color of his eyes.

Asked to recount his worst moments during the gulf crisis, he mentions a number of them, including the terrible early weeks when Saddam Hussein could simply have marched south and taken the Saudi oil fields and ports, but didn't. Then there was the ground war. "We planned for a much worse eventuality than actually occurred," he says of the action that began at 8 p.m. (Washington time) on Saturday, Feb. 23. Instead of going into why it was a "worst moment" for him, however, Cheney tells the story this way: "Sunday morning we went to church with the president across Lafayette Park, and in the church service he asked me . . . how things were going, and I passed him a note saying they were going well."

"He then invited me [back at the White House] to come upstairs. The president had his wife and family with him, and I took my wife and daughter upstairs and had coffee after the church service, and then I went back in the back room and I gave him a read-out, the report I had at that point from Norm, which was that the campaign was going extraordinarily well. . . . It was obviously a great relief to the president to know that it had gone that well, but also that the cost had been minimal in terms of U.S. casualties. As I recall, he said, 'You know, that's great news.'"

No kidding. Cheney has chosen to reveal this private moment between

two men—at a time that may well be remembered as a turning point in their careers, and perhaps in American history—yet without pause he screeches verbally onward, like the political science professor he once wanted to be, with his analysis: "It was a very important moment for him because it meant the decision he'd made—and ultimately it's his decision, the rest of us only give advice—we had been able, it looked like we were going to pull off the ground campaign with minimal loss of life on our side, which is something that a president always thinks of."

He sips, silently, from his glass of Diet Coke.

What to make of all this? Perhaps it's simply that, as Charles Levendosky, editorial page editor of the Casper Star-Tribune, puts it, "People out here in Wyoming like the understated rather than the overstated."

Getting Serious

Before the interview, there had been warnings not to attempt conversation with Cheney about his emotions, that he's very private. "He's not going to respond to feeling-type questions," advised Pete Williams, the Pentagon spokesman. "The Life magazine guys were in here and they would hold up a picture from his trip to Saudi Arabia and say, 'How did you feel at this time?' and that just didn't work at all. The interview was going nowhere."

Nor will the Cheneys receive a reporter in their McLean home, warns another spokesman. Whatever his emotional landscape, Cheney has clearly decided not to reveal it à la Stormin' Norman, the decorated, wounded Vietnam veteran who choked up publicly over the fate of his troops and bemoaned the "profanity" of war.

Cheney's all there, his friends claim, he just doesn't gush. "What you've seen on television is what I've seen at home," says his wife. "He's calm, deliberate, not given to speechifying in an old-fashioned way, just

says what he thinks the situation is. He's an unusual politician, not a back-slapping kind of guy. . . . He works a room very well, by talking about things that are real and serious. He doesn't do small talk."

Dick worries privately, she says, about how "it's an amazing thing to affect the lives of so many people, and to send people in harm's way. . . . I think the thing that affects him most is actually talking to enlisted people, and he makes a very great effort, when he travels, to break out of the envelope of generals and talk to people doing the hard, slogging work. . . . Talking with those young people [during a trip to Saudi Arabia] was a particularly affecting experience—just what fine young people they are, to shake their hand and feel their pride."

Meet Dick Cheney: a People Person.

Adelman calls back at one point to offer a delicate adjustment on this theme: "Dick's always less geo-strat-

tegic, in that he would talk a lot more on the horrors of Kuwait. It was kind of that, 'This occupation is terrible.' Kind of a moral crusade. He's a politician, a guy who relates to people rather than balancing triangles like Schlesinger and Kissinger and some of these guys in the field traditionally. McNamara was one of those. With Dick the war was always on a very personal level. 'This is the right thing to do. Real people are involved.'

Cheney's admiration for these fine young Americans in uniform, however, can't quite burn with the same warmth one would feel from having been there. As a student, he enjoyed four 2-S draft deferments from 1963 through '65, and a fifth in 1966 under the 3-A classification—"registrant with a child or children; or registrant deferred by reason of extreme hardship to dependents."

Those were frightening times for draft-eligible American men. Congress had approved the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on Aug. 7, 1964 (coincidentally, Dick and Lynne married 22 days later), and in March of '65 U.S. Marines landed at Danang in the Republic of South Vietnam. After six years of study at three colleges, Cheney had just received his B.A. when the troops went in, and was starting on his master's when, along with his brand-new diploma, he received a brand-new 1-A draft classification on May 19—"available for military service."

On July 28, President Johnson announced that draft calls would be doubled, and toward the end of the year—on Oct. 26, 1965—the Selective Service lifted the ban against drafting childless married men. Nine months and two days later—on July 28, 1966—Elizabeth Cheney made her entrance into this world, the first-born child of her joyful parents. Times being what they were, the new father hadn't hesitated in applying for his 3-A status—in fact, he had already received it on Jan. 19, 1966, when Lynne was about 10 weeks pregnant.

"I had other priorities in the '60s than military service," Cheney told a reporter two years ago.

In his Senate confirmation hearing, he asserted that he "would have obviously been happy to serve had I been called."

Early in his academic career, before the draft began breathing down his neck, he admits to having goofed off. "I flunked out" of Yale, he says. Given a scholarship by the university, he entered in the fall of '59 and withdrew, according to a university spokesman, on June 14, 1962. Cheney says his grades fell "too low for me to be able to sustain the economic assistance the school was providing."

"I was not well organized in my youth," he says. "... I really didn't like it, I didn't like the East, I wasn't a good student. ... I don't like to blame the university. It wasn't their fault. I just wasn't prepared to buckle

So, he explains, "I left and went to work. Spent a couple years building power line transmission [towers] out in the West, then got serious about getting married, and it was clear that Lynne wasn't going to marry a line-man for the county. I had to go make something of myself if I was going to consummate the relationship, and so I went back to school at the University of Wyoming and finished up a BA and a master's there and then went to [the University of] Wisconsin and did all the work for my doctorate except the dissertation."

School records show that, while

Cheney may have spent a couple years on power line jobs, he also maintained an unbroken student status from January '63, when he entered Casper Community College (he didn't mention it in the interview, perhaps because he was there only one semester), through January '67, when he turned 26 and was no longer eligible for the draft. He later abandoned his dissertation when Rumsfeld, impressed by a memo Cheney wrote while a congressional intern, hired him to come to the Office of Economic Opportunity.

"In terms of the qualification for the current job," he says now, "I'm the fourth civilian, the fourth secretary who has no prior military service. It's a civilian job, and so I've never felt it a hindrance of any kind."

"I get paid to go find people to give me military advice, not to be one of them that offers military advice."

Losing and Winning

During his decade on the Hill, Cheney was also the congressman who never saw a welfare program he didn't hate. He had a reputation among Republicans as a go-along, get-along guy. With a 90 percent rating from the American Conservative Union and a 4 percent from Americans for Democratic Action, he presented a public persona as principled yet nonabrasive—what Andrew Melnykovich, who covered him for the Star-Tribune, calls "this image as a pragmatic moderate. He wasn't aloof, but he kept his personal and professional life separate. What I always got from him was a clear sense of purpose."

Others, Democrats in particular, got something else. "He's able to appear so cool and rational, but there's this other side," says a former congressional aide who witnessed private meetings between Cheney and other members of Congress on aid to the Nicaraguan contras. "There was a harshness, that sneer he'd get, sort of attributing bad motives to his opponents, that you were suspect, that you were pro-Communist. There was venom—he made some very vicious remarks. He scares me." This former aide asked not to be identified, citing Cheney's popularity and success in the war.

Cheney's relentless partisanship broke the surface when he issued a 155-page minority report as a member of the congressional Iran-contra committee, rejecting the committee's condemnation of the Reagan administration and asserting that there had been "no systematic disrespect for the 'rule of law.'"

But always—in public at least—the flat, calm exterior.

"Never loses his cool," says his buddy Carlucci.

Never?

Of their regular Sunday morning tennis games, Adelman says, "We've beat them for 15 years solid. They get such a thrill out of winning a point."

"Adelman," says Cheney, "he lies about his tennis game."

Adelman: "The only time Dick was really furious with me was on the court. Dick's a little wild on the court, winds up like crazy. Well, one time when he served, Carol got hit in the stomach, got the wind knocked out of her. And I said to her—it was a joke—in hushed, worried tones, 'Does Dick know your condition?' And he just about fainted. Then she said to me, 'You jerk, why'd you do that?' And Dick turned to me and said, 'That really was not funny.' He was really mad."

Usually the guy doesn't get mad, he just has heart attacks?

Adelman: "Every time he's behind in the polls, he pulls the heart attack trick. They're all in August or September, all in even years."

In 1983, the Cheneyes coauthored a book, "Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in the House of Representatives," a historical study of important House leaders. They concluded, among other things, that "a future leader will identify aspects of the institution that can be used as instruments of leadership, although their potential has heretofore gone unnoticed or been unrealized."

As he faces a battle with Congress over the shape of the mandated 25 percent cut in U.S. military forces over the next several years, Cheney says he's already identified one thing that will come in handy.

"It helps," he says, grinning, "to have just won a war."

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NBC News

MEET THE PRESS

Sunday, April 7, 1991

GUEST:

BRENT SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

MODERATOR:

Garrick Utley - NBC News

PANEL:

Elizabeth Drew - The New Yorker
Tim Russert - NBC News

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(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: International politics and individual human tragedy, that is what we are witnessing this weekend; hundreds of thousands of refugees continue to flee the rule and the repression of Saddam Hussein. Iraq has accepted the tough U.N. conditions of a permanent cease-fire; and Secretary of State Baker is in the Middle East on a sudden new mission.

A lot to talk about this morning with our guest, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who is in Houston with the president today. And with me here in Washington are Elizabeth Drew of The New Yorker Magazine, and Tim Russert, Washington Bureau Chief of NBC News.

Good morning, General, thank you for being with us.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Good morning, Garrick.

MR. UTLEY: General, Iraq yesterday, this weekend, has accepted the formal U.N. cease-fire, in effect the terms of surrender, but expresses some reservations about that. Does this concern you or do you take the Iraqi response to be an unequivocal acceptance of the cease-fire and the end of the war?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think we really have to wait and see. We've looked at the very long letter from the Iraqis; it was addressed, of course, to the secretary general, and it will be up to the Security Council to decide whether it's acceptable. In the last paragraph, the letter does say that Iraq has no choice but to accept. But whether or not some of the complaints up in the front are really conditions will have to be worked out.

MR. UTLEY: Yesterday, the president said that he was encouraged by the Iraqi response. Assuming that this is an acceptance and the U.N. accepts the Iraqi response, what does this mean in terms of the American position on the ground in southern Iraq? The president says he wants to bring the troops home more quickly. What's the time-table in your view?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, those troops in southern Iraq have been thinned out already; and once the cease-fire is accepted, once the blue-helmeted troops from the United Nations observer force are put in place, then the withdrawal of those troops can be completed, and I think, as the president said yesterday, we're talking about days, not weeks or months.

MR. UTLEY: Elizabeth?

MS. DREW: General Scowcroft, when the president said on February 15th, the date of Saddam Hussein's first peace feeler, that now is the time for the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and replace their government, was he just specifically addressing the military and perhaps the Ba'athist elite? And should the Kurds and Shi'ites have understood that he didn't mean them?

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specifically the army and the people of Iraq to take matters into their own hands--he also said explicitly it was not a goal of the United States or the coalition to remove Saddam Hussein from power. And he constantly reiterated that, and also said that the United States supported the territorial integrity of Iraq. So that on the one hand he said there can be no normal relations with Iraq as long as Saddam Hussein is there, but it was not an objective of this operation to remove him from power.

MS. DREW: But he's explicitly--he made it clear that he would not mind at all, he would not weep, and so on, if that happened. Were any positive steps taken to tell the Kurds: if you rise up, that's fine, but don't expect us to give you any military help or protection?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't--I don't think that we said, no, don't rise up or you will get nothing from us--but I think the president made that clear in all his public statements that we would not take any steps to promote the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

MS. DREW: But were there not broadcasts and other activities to encourage them to rise up?

MR. SCOWCROFT: There may have been from Saudi Arabia and maybe Radio Cairo.

MR. RUSSERT: General, wasn't it the Voice of Free Iraq, which had been in part subsidized by the C.I.A.?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not going to talk about any intelligence operations.

MR. RUSSERT: Well, did the president then not sign a finding in January encouraging psychological warfare in attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not going to talk about what the president did or did not do in intelligence operations, but what I'm saying is that this policy was consistent in all its aspects.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me try this. What would you say this morning, as President Bush's representative, to the million Kurds who are fleeing the country? What message would you send them from the United States?

MR. SCOWCROFT: The message I would send them right now is that we will do our best to help them (a) survive, and (b) to be able to return to their homes. Whether that will be possible will depend on circumstances.

MR. UTLEY: General, these refugees are not really in our control. But the situation in southern Iraq is totally different. There are thousands of Iraqis who have fled to the areas controlled by American force because they're afraid of what will happen in terms of Saddam's reprisals.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. UTLEY: When our forces move out, we're going to face a very difficult moral and ethical situation and question. Do we turn these people back over to the Iraqis? Do we take--

MR. SCOWCROFT: We will not--excuse me.

MR. UTLEY: Or do we take them with us? What will our policy be?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We will not abandon those people. My recollection is there's some 40,000 in the southern zone; and whether or not they would be moved down to the border in the demilitarized zone, I don't know. But they will not be abandoned.

MR. UTLEY: So they will not be forced to go back under Iraqi control?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, they will not.

MR. UTLEY: Who will take care of them, then? Is it the Saudis, the Kuwaitis, American support--because they have their lives to lead, these 40,000?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, that still has to be worked out. You know, what we've done is launch an emergency effort--this applies primarily to the Kurds. The U.S. forces are taking care of those in the south. But for the long term we do have a major problem in dealing with all of the refugees.

There are also very large numbers in Iran, and that is something for the United Nations, certainly with our enthusiastic help, to sort out. We don't have all the answers right now.

MR. UTLEY: As you, the president, then, your circle of top advisers look back on the events of the past week, would you share the sentiment of many Americans in this country that the administration has led more with its head rather than its heart--and that if you had to do it over again you might have taken a different approach on this human crisis?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it's a real tragedy. There's no question about it, and it's horrible to see the pictures of innocent people being savaged or even killed. But the policy has to be clear--and for us to get involved in a civil war in Iraq means occupying it, means replacing the government, means setting up a new government which undoubtedly would be overthrown as soon as the coalition troops left. That's a horrible morass which to get in, and from a policy standpoint it's just unacceptable.

MRS. DREW: Would you and the president like to see the emir of Kuwait set a date for parliamentary elections soon?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think what we're trying to do is have the Kuwaitis put their own house in order rather than to have Uncle Sam stage-managing any kind of process. We hope that that process gets under way. You have not only the problem of elections but the problem of forming a government. And the timing of elections has a lot to do with who's prepared to serve in a government and how that long that government would act. So it's a complicated situation, I would think.

MRS. DREW: But do we feel fairly strongly that they should have these elections?

MR. SCOWCROFT: They're under no doubt how we feel. But, as I say, I think it should not be a managed-in-Washington operation, but managed from Kuwait City.

MRS. DREW: How do you feel about the behavior of the emir and his top people since the end of the war?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I don't think it matters how I feel about it, Elizabeth. I think the important thing is that there's a tragic situation there, that they're trying to put their lives back in order, they're trying to learn from the experiences that they've had and to shape a life which would be better for all their people. And I think they should be allowed some time to sort that out for themselves.

MR. RUSSERT: General, let me follow up on Garrick's question about the events of the past week. Watching these pictures of the Kurds, and they're chanting "Hajji Bush" and now feeling that they had been betrayed, has all that dampened the after-glow of the military victory?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it certainly is a terrible problem which has ensued, very likely as a result of the military victory. But I think one has to remember that Iraq has had a turbulent political history, at least since 1958 when the last king was overthrown and killed. And it has been--it has had the surface of tranquility because of the brutal repression of Saddam Hussein.

MR. UTLEY: Well, I want to follow up on this point, though--Tim's point, too--because many people look at what's happening there right now, our policy, our attitude towards Saddam Hussein. It seems we're trying to accomplish two things. We want to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq; we don't want it to be come a new Lebanon--we've stated that many times. At the same time, we want to have Saddam out of power. But in effect we're letting them guarantee the integrity of Iraq by putting down this rebellion, and then hoping that one day he may be out of power.

Isn't the first in many ways sort of betrayal of those who've been rebelling, the second nothing more than a distant hope?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, those policies are in some respect in contradiction. But I think you could argue, Garrick, that as long as the internal turbulence continues, there is actually less chance that Saddam Hussein would be replaced by those with actually the power to do it because neither the army nor the Ba'athist Party nor the power elements in the country want to see Iraq split up. So they're probably all joining together to deal with the insurgents.

MR. UTLEY: All right, General, there are many contradictions and problems to face in that part of the world. We'll get to some of the other questions in just a moment. We'll continue here on "Meet the Press," and we'll be right back.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: We're back now on "Meet the Press." Elizabeth Drew, Tim Russert, and I are talking with the National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who is with the president in Houston today.

General Scowcroft, a week ago you made a secret trip to the Middle East, met with the Saudi leaders. Today Secretary of State Baker is in Turkey and then going on to Israel and Arab countries to talk about the crisis there. What's going on?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What's going on, Garrick, is an attempt to move on the problems of the

Middle East, both those of security and development in the gulf area and dealing with the aftermath of the war, and also moving on the peace process, where we feel that as a result of the upheavals in the area there's probably as good a chance to make progress as there has been in the long and tragic history of that conflict.

MR. UTLEY: All right, that sounds encouraging. Let's be more specific. You did take this trip yourself under tight security wraps. The secretary's trip has been called on very short notice. What specifically leads the secretary, Secretary Baker, to think that he can accomplish something on this trip? Why the rush? There must be something going on that he has learned or heard.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think there's a general sense of rush, Garrick, in that we feel that there is an opportunity now, that there have been changed attitudes as a result of the recent crisis, but that this window of opportunity, if you will, will not stay open long; and if everyone doesn't move to take advantage of it, attitudes will slip back into the old intransigent mode. So that's the general reason for hurry.

MR. UTLEY: Well, two quick follow-up points, do you detect a change in the Israeli position?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the Israelis realize the changed situation, they realize the new elements: there are new voices in the Arab world, the position of the P.L.O. has changed dramatically. And I think that the Israelis as well realize that now is the time to try to take advantage of the situation.

MR. UTLEY: Did you detect any change in the Saudi position when you were there last week, or a week before last, in terms of recognizing Israel as part of a settlement?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not going to say where I was, Garrick, but I think on the Arab side, yes, there is a new recognition of the opportunities; there's also a recognition of the price that's being paid by that 40-year-old dispute. So I think there is a willingness to entertain ideas. Whether there is also the willingness to take the hard steps that are necessary on each side is what we have to find out. And that's the reason that Secretary Baker has returned only such a short time after his first trip.

MS. DREW: General Scowcroft, just before the break you yourself said that Iraq has had a very turbulent history and has only been held together by brutality. So let us say that, as the president wishes, the military takes over or somebody else from the ruling Ba'athist group, will they be able to hold Iraq together other than through brutality?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know the answer to that question, Elizabeth. The Iraqi political history since 1958 has been one of being held together by brutality; the kingdom before that, however, did not operate on that kind of a basis. And hopefully, hopefully, the Iraqi people themselves, all of them, would have a greater opportunity to begin a political evolution in which they all might play a constructive role in that country.

MS. DREW: As a matter of curiosity about the history of this period, what was foreseen by way of an uprising on the part of the Kurds and Shi'ites? Did the administration see that one would probably happen? What did they expect?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I think we thought that was entirely possible with the breakdown of the tight control by the military, because, as I say, that country had been held peaceful by repression. The breakdown first came in the south with the destruction by the coalition forces of the military elements down there. But Saddam Hussein still had over twenty divisions which had played no part in the conflict in the north. He brought those down to repress the insurgency in the south, thus withdrawing them from the Kurdish areas, which then rose up, and those forces are now back up in the north putting down the Kurds.

MR. RUSSERT: General, let me ask you a little bit about your trip. Did you meet with King Hussein of Jordan during your trip to the Middle East?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, Tim, I'm not going to say what I did, what I didn't do, on this trip. There are some things which are important to do quietly, out of the eye of the camera. This was one of them. I think you will probably never see any particular results from it. It was an important mission, but it was not one of dramatic policy-making nature.

MR. RUSSERT: Can I ask, did you have any discussions regarding the hostages in Lebanon?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No.

MR. RUSSERT: No, you didn't.

MR. UTLEY: General, coming back to the situation now with the Iraqi acceptance of the U.N. conditions, the formal end of the war, the cease-fire, Iraq has many war planes in neighboring Iran, Iraq's having stationed them there since the start of the war. As far as we're concerned, they can come back to Iraq now? And would we then let those fixed-wing aircraft be used in putting down any further rebellion?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We have not come to any conclusions about the Iranian aircraft--the Iraqi aircraft in Iran. That's a particular aspect of the general requirement of the cease-fire, which is no military equipment of any kind should be shipped into Iraq. Now, they ostensibly do have title to it, but we'll have to deal with that situation.

MR. UTLEY: Well, that's a very tough position we're taking on those Iraqi planes which are flying the Iraqi flag, although they're today in Iran. Let's get to another specific point--those are the gunships that have been used. Now, we know the dispute over that. Do you have any second thoughts about the wisdom of not going after the Iraqi gunships and shooting them down?

MR. SCOWCROFT: It would have been very self-satisfying to do so. We grounded the aircraft, especially the fixed-wing aircraft, so that there could not be the possibility of suicide missions and so on, which could harm the coalition forces in southern Iraq.

Now, how we grounded the helicopter gunships, it would have taken the Iraqi forces longer to do what they've been doing, but it would not have changed the outcome in any respect.

MRS. DREW: General Scowcroft, about that famous interview by General Schwarzkopf, he said that on the day that it was decided to end overt hostilities that he had recommended that we march

on. And then later, when the flap grew up about that, he said it had been in the plans.

So I guess the question is--I think it's understood that he was agreed at the end, that everybody was agreed at the end. And you said that. Did General Schwarzkopf at an earlier time that day or the day before recommend that we keep going? Or when was this plan changed?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not to my knowledge. As far as I recall, there was general unanimity throughout; and that when the military commanders in the field said our mission had been accomplished that we stopped the firing so that there would be no more unnecessary bloodshed.

MRS. DREW: But what did he mean that it had been in the plan?

MR. SCOWCROFT: You'll have to ask General Schwarzkopf.

MR. RUSSERT: In that same interview, General Schwarzkopf said that the United States had been suckered by allowing the helicopters to continue to fly. In retrospect, wasn't General Schwarzkopf correct?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know that that's what he said.

MR. RUSSERT: Well, he did.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Certainly, the reason they asked to have an exemption for the helicopters was not the reason for which they subsequently primarily used the helicopters.

MR. RUSSERT: But they have used the helicopters against their own people?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, yes, they have.

MR. UTLEY: All right. General Scowcroft, many more questions, but our time is up. Thank you very much for being with us today from Houston, Texas.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Garrick.

MR. UTLEY: In a moment, Elizabeth Drew, Tim Russert and I will be back with some personal observations.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: Back now--"Meet the Press." Tim, Elizabeth, as we sort out what's happening after the war, we see the plight of the tragedy, really, of all the refugees; and yet something else is happening.

We are really accelerating our effort to get the American forces out of there. We're rushing out. We've won the war, but we know there's trap afterwards. We want to get out as quickly as possible. This is the way you see it?

MR. RUSSERT: I do, and it's interesting in General Scowcroft's demeanor today--very concerned, restrained almost. We had this enormous military victory, as you mentioned, and now, as

we continue to see the destabilization of Iraq, our plan is to get the troops home--and yet what can we celebrate when we see a million Kurd people in suffering?

MR. UTLEY: There's a problem just sort of letting the chips fall where they may in that immediate region--even though he said today, interestingly enough, Elizabeth, that we will not turn those refugees under the American-controlled area in southern Iraq back over to the Iraqis.

MRS. DREW: Well, yes, there's no question that even if the troops come home, there are many complexities. I find it quite understandable, though, the reluctance to get involved in this civil war. I mean, the military is very against it; the military is for declaring victory and getting out of there. But even if we had somehow grounded the helicopters, what other steps could we have taken to keep the Iraqis from still slaughtering those Kurds? We would have been in the middle of a civil war, and then what? Responsible for setting up the next government, protecting it?

Horrible as it is to see--and I think there are questions about whether we did encourage the Kurds--I find it understandable that they don't want to go further.

MR. UTLEY: But, Tim, President Bush knows what the American people want, and they want the troops back, right?

MR. RUSSERT: They want them home.

MR. UTLEY: And that's why they're coming home?

MR. RUSSERT: Exactly right.

MR. UTLEY: All right. Tim, Elizabeth, thanks for being here this morning.

Finally, yes, there is a word for it, a word for the American decision not to support those rebelling against Saddam Hussein, a word for what this war was in many ways really about. And that word is "Realpolitik," policy based more on practical factors rather than moral objectives. There is no single word for it in English, so we use the German, which offers precision if not much human comfort.

Now, the fact is, George Bush is a master of "Realpolitik"--it's in his genes, in his fingertips. That is how he was able to organize the coalition against Saddam Hussein and wage the war. That is why he went easy, relatively speaking, on the communist leaders in China when they rolled over the students in Tiananmen Square--and, yes, that is why he has been lukewarm in his support of the legitimate aspirations of the Baltic republics seeking their freedom from the Soviet Union.

Now, history may show that the president's "Realpolitik" was the right, correct "Politik" in all of these cases. But this rubs against the American grain: we like to have a moral imperative in our foreign policy; and we cannot or do not, we are uncomfortable, as we are now.

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
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TIM RUSSERT, *NBC News*

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Yes, Saddam Hussein should answer for crimes against humanity. Yes, we should do more to provide food, shelter and comfort for the refugees. And, no, George Bush should not have gone off to Florida, fishing and playing golf while this was all happening on the television screens. As they say in the circle he grew up in, appearances count.

I'm Garrick Utley. I hope you'll join us this evening for "NBC Nightly News," and again next week for "Sunday Today" and "Meet the Press."

the tragedy, really, of all the refugees; and yet something else is happening.

We are really accelerating our effort to get the American forces out of there. We're rushing out. We've won the war, but we know there's a trap afterwards. We want to get out as quickly as possible. This is the way you see it?

MR. RUSSERT: I do, and it's interesting in General Scowcroft's demeanor today — — very concerned, restrained almost. We had this enormous military victory, as you mentioned, and now, as we continue to see the destabilization of Iraq, our plan is to get the troops home — — and yet what can we celebrate when we see a million Kurd people in suffering?

MR. UTLEY: There's a problem just sort of letting the chips fall where they may in that immediate region — — even though he said today, interestingly enough, Elizabeth, that we will not turn those refugees under the American-controlled area in southern Iraq back over to the Iraqis.

MRS. DREW: Well, yes, there's no question that even if the troops come home, there are many complexities. I find it quite understandable, though, the reluctance to get involved in this civil war. I mean, the military is very against it; the military is for declaring victory and getting out of there. But even if we had somehow grounded the helicopters, what other steps could we have taken to keep the Iraqis from still slaughtering those Kurds? We would have been in the middle of a civil war, and then what? Responsible for setting up the next government, protecting it?

Horrible as it is to see — — and I think there are questions about whether we did encourage the Kurds — — I find it understandable that they don't want to go further.

MR. UTLEY: But, Tim, President Bush knows what the American people want, and they want the troops back, right?

MR. RUSSERT: They want them home.

MR. UTLEY: And that's why they're coming home?

MR. RUSSERT: Exactly right.

MR. UTLEY: All right. Tim, Elizabeth, thanks for being here this morning.

Finally, yes, there is a word for it, a word for the American decision not to support those rebelling against Saddam Hussein, a word for what this war was in many ways really about. And that word is "Realpolitik," policy based more on practical factors rather

president made that clear in all his public statements, that we would not take any steps to promote the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

MS. DREW: But were there not broadcasts and other activities to encourage them to rise up?

MR. SCOWCROFT: There may have been from Saudi Radio and maybe Radio Cairo.

MR. RUSSERT: General, wasn't it the Voice of Free Iraq, which had been in part subsidized by the C.I.A.?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not going to talk about any intelligence operations.

MR. RUSSERT: Well, did the president then not sign a finding in January encouraging psychological warfare in attempts to overthrow Saddam Hussein?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not going to talk about what the president did or did not do in intelligence operations, but what I'm saying is that this policy was consistent in all its aspects.

MR. RUSSERT: Let me try this. What would you say this morning, as President Bush's representative, to the million Kurds who are fleeing the country? What message would you send them from the United States?

MR. SCOWCROFT: The message I would send them right now is that we will do our best to help them (a) survive, and (b) to be able to return to their homes. Whether that will be possible will depend on circumstances.

MR. UTLEY: General, these refugees are not really in our control. But the situation in southern Iraq is totally different. There are thousands of Iraqis who have fled to the areas controlled by American force because they're afraid of what will happen in terms of Saddam's reprisals.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. UTLEY: When our forces move out, we're going to face a very difficult moral and ethical situation and question. Do we turn these people back over to the Iraqis? Do we take — —

MR. SCOWCROFT: We will not — — excuse me.

MR. UTLEY: Or do we take them with us? What will our policy be?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We will not abandon those people. My recollection is there's some 40,000 in the southern zone; and whether or

not they would be moved down to the border in the demilitarized zone, I don't know. But they will not be abandoned.

MR. UTLEY: So they will not be forced to go back under Iraqi control?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, they will not.

MR. UTLEY: Who will take care of them, then? Is it the Saudis, the Kuwaits, American support — — because they have their lives to lead, these 40,000?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, that still has to be worked out. You know, what we've done is launch an emergency effort — — this applies primarily to the Kurds. The U.S. forces are taking care of those in the south. But for the long term we do have a major problem in dealing with all of the refugees.

There are also very large numbers in Iran, and that is something for the United Nations, certainly with our enthusiastic help, to sort out. We don't have all the answers right now.

MR. UTLEY: As you, the president, then, your circle of top advisers look back on the events of the past week, would you share the sentiment of many Americans in this country that the administration has led more with its head rather than its heart — — and that if you had to do it over again you might have taken a different approach on this human crisis?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it's a real tragedy. There's no question about it, and it's horrible to see the pictures of innocent people being savaged or even killed. But the policy has to be clear — — and for us to get involved in a civil war in Iraq means occupying it, means replacing the government, means setting up a new government which undoubtedly would be overthrown as soon as the coalition troops left. That's a horrible morass which to get in, and from a policy standpoint it's just unacceptable.

MRS. DREW: Would you and the president like to see the emir of Kuwait set a date for parliamentary elections soon?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think what we're trying to do is have the Kuwaitis put their own house in order rather than to have Uncle Sam stage-managing any kind of process. We hope that that process gets under way. You have not only the problem of elections but the problem of forming a government. And the timing of elections has a lot to do with who's prepared to serve in a government and how long that government would act. So it's a complicated situation, I would think.

MRS. DREW: General Scowcroft — — about that famous interview by General Schwarzkopf, he said that on the day that it was decided to end overt hostilities that he had recommended that we march on. And then later, when the flap grew up about that, he said it had been in the plans.

So I guess the question is — — I think it's understood that he was agreed at the end, that everybody was agreed at the end. And you said that. Did General Schwarzkopf at an earlier time that day or the day before recommend that we keep going? Or when was this plan changed?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not to my knowledge. As far as I recall, there was general unanimity throughout, and that when the military commanders in the field said our mission had been accomplished that we stopped the firing so that there would be no more unnecessary bloodshed.

MRS. DREW: But what did he mean that it had been in the plan?

MR. SCOWCROFT: You'll have to ask General Schwarzkopf.

MR. RUSSERT: In that same interview, General Schwarzkopf said that the United States had been suckered by allowing the helicopters to continue to fly. In retrospect, wasn't General Schwarzkopf correct?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know that that's what he said.

MR. RUSSERT: Well, he did.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Certainly, the reason they asked to have an exemption for the helicopters was not the reason for which they subsequently primarily used the helicopters.

MR. RUSSERT: But they have used the helicopters against their own people?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, yes, they have.

MR. UTLEY: All right. General Scowcroft, many more questions, but our time is up. Thank you very much for being with us today from Houston, Texas.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Garrick.

MR. UTLEY: In a moment, Elizabeth Drew, Tim Russert and I will be back with some personal observations.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: Back now — — "Meet the Press." Tim, Elizabeth, as we sort out what's happening after the war, we see the plight of

MR. RUSSERT: General, let me ask you a little bit about your trip. Did you meet with King Hussein of Jordan during your trip to the Middle East?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, Tim, I'm not going to say what I did, what I didn't do, on this trip. There are some things which are important to do quietly, out of the eye of the camera. This was one of them. I think you will probably never see any particular results from it. It was an important mission, but it was not one of dramatic policy-making nature.

MR. RUSSERT: Can I ask, did you have any discussions regarding the hostages in Lebanon?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No.

MR. RUSSERT: No, you didn't.

MR. UTLEY: General, coming back to the situation now with the Iraqi acceptance of the U.N. conditions, the formal end of the war, the cease-fire, Iraq has many war planes in neighboring Iran, Iraq's having stationed them there since the start of the war. As far as we're concerned, they can come back to Iraq now? And would we then let those fixed-wing aircraft be used in putting down any further rebellion?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We have not come to any conclusions about the Iranian aircraft — the Iraqi aircraft in Iran. That's a particular aspect of the general requirement of the cease-fire, which is, no military equipment of any kind should be shipped into Iraq. Now, they ostensibly do have title to it, but we'll have to deal with that situation.

MR. UTLEY: Well, that's a very tough position we're taking on those Iraqi planes which are flying the Iraqi flag, although they're today in Iran. Let's get to another specific point — those are the gunships that have been used. Now, we know the dispute over that. Do you have any second thoughts about the wisdom of not going after the Iraqi gunships and shooting them down?

MR. SCOWCROFT: It would have been very self-satisfying to do so. We grounded the aircraft, especially the fixed-wing aircraft, so that there could not be the possibility of suicide missions and so on, which could harm the coalition forces in southern Iraq.

Now, had we grounded the helicopter gunships, it would have taken the Iraqi forces longer to do what they've been doing, but it would not have changed the outcome in any respect.

MRS. DREW: But do we feel fairly strongly that they should have these elections?

MR. SCOWCROFT: They're under no doubt how we feel. But, as I say, I think it should not be a managed-in-Washington operation, but managed from Kuwait City.

MRS. DREW: How do you feel about the behavior of the emir and his top people since the end of the war?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I don't think it matters how I feel about it, Elizabeth. I think the important thing is that there's a tragic situation there, that they're trying to put their lives back in order, they're trying to learn from the experiences that they've had and to shape a life which would be better for all their people. And I think they should be allowed some time to sort that out for themselves.

MR. RUSSERT: General, let me follow up on Garrick's question about the events of the past week. Watching these pictures of the Kurds, and they're chanting "Hajji Bush" and now feeling that they had been betrayed, has all that dampened the after-glow of the military victory?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it certainly is a terrible problem which has ensued, very likely as a result of the military victory. But I think one has to remember that Iraq has had a turbulent political history, at least since 1958 when the last king was overthrown and killed. And it has been — it has had the surface of tranquility because of the brutal repression of Saddam Hussein.

MR. UTLEY: Well, I want to follow up on this point, though — Tim's point, too — because many people look at what's happening there right now, our policy, our attitude towards Saddam Hussein. It seems we're trying to accomplish two things. We want to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq; we don't want it to be come a new Lebanon — we've stated that many times. At the same time, we want to have Saddam out of power. But in effect we're letting them guarantee the integrity of Iraq by putting down this rebellion, and then hoping that one day he may be out of power.

Isn't the first in many ways sort of betrayal of those who've been rebelling, the second nothing more than a distant hope?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, those policies are in some respect in contradiction. But I think you could argue, Garrick, that as long as the internal turbulence continues, there is actually less chance that Saddam Hussein would be replaced by those with actually the power to do it because neither the army nor the Ba'athist Party nor the

power elements in the country want to see Iraq split up. So they're probably all joining together to deal with the insurgents.

MR. UTLEY: All right, General, there are many contradictions and problems to face in that part of the world. We'll get to some of the other questions in just a moment. We'll continue here on "Meet the Press," and we'll be right back.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: We're back now on "Meet the Press." Elizabeth Drew, Tim Russert, and I are talking with the national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, who is with the president in Houston today.

General Scowcroft, a week ago you made a secret trip to the Middle East, met with the Saudi leaders. Today Secretary of State Baker is in Turkey and then going on to Israel and Arab countries to talk about the crisis there. What's going on?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What's going on, Garrick, is an attempt to move on the problems of the Middle East, both those of security and development in the gulf area and dealing with the aftermath of the war, and also moving on the peace process, where we feel that as a result of the upheavals in the area there's probably as good a chance to make progress as there has been in the long and tragic history of that conflict.

MR. UTLEY: All right, that sounds encouraging. Let's be more specific. You did take this trip yourself under tight security wraps. The secretary's trip has been called on very short notice. What specifically leads the secretary, Secretary Baker, to think that he can accomplish something on this trip? Why the rush? There must be something going on that he has learned or heard.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think there's a general sense of rush, Garrick, in that we feel that there is an opportunity now, that there have been changed attitudes as a result of the recent crisis, but that this window of opportunity, if you will, will not stay open long; and if everyone doesn't move to take advantage of it, attitudes will slip back into the old intransigent mode. So that's the general reason for hurry.

MR. UTLEY: Well, two quick follow-up points, do you detect a change in the Israeli position?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the Israelis realize the changed situation, they realize the new elements: there are new voices in the Arab world, the position of the P.L.O. has changed

dramatically. And I think that the Israelis as well realize that now is the time to try to take advantage of the situation.

MR. UTLEY: Did you detect any change in the Saudi position when you were there last week, or a week before last, in terms of recognizing Israel as part of a settlement?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not going to say where I was, Garrick, but I think on the Arab side, yes, there is a new recognition of the opportunities; there's also a recognition of the price that's being paid by that 40-year-old dispute. So I think there is a willingness to entertain ideas. Whether there is also the willingness to take the hard steps that are necessary on each side is what we have to find out. And that's the reason that Secretary Baker has returned only such a short time after his first trip.

MS. DREW: General Scowcroft, just before the break you yourself said that Iraq has had a very turbulent history and has only been held together by brutality. So let us say that, as the president wishes, the military takes over or somebody else from the ruling Ba'athist group, will they be able to hold Iraq together other than through brutality?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know the answer to that question, Elizabeth. The Iraqi political history since 1958 has been one of being held together by brutality; the kingdom before that, however, did not operate on that kind of a basis. And hopefully, hopefully, the Iraqi people themselves, all of them, would have a greater opportunity to begin a political evolution in which they all might play a constructive role in that country.

MS. DREW: As a matter of curiosity about the history of this period, what was foreseen by way of an uprising on the part of the Kurds and Shi'ites? Did the administration see that one would probably happen? What did they expect?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I think we thought that was entirely possible with the breakdown of the tight control by the military, because, as I say, that country had been held peaceful by repression. The breakdown first came in the south with the destruction by the coalition forces of the military elements down there. But Saddam Hussein still had over twenty divisions which had played no part in the conflict in the north. He brought those down to repress the insurgency in the south, thus withdrawing them from the Kurdish areas, which then rose up, and those forces are now back up in the north putting down the Kurds.

1975: Background to Betrayal

By Daniel Schorr

The Washington Post D3
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____
 Date 7 April 1991

"OUR MOVEMENT and people are being destroyed in an unbelievable way, with silence from everyone. We feel, Your Excellency, that the United States has a moral and political responsibility towards our people, who have committed themselves to your country's policy."

That could have been written last week to President Bush by Massoud Barzani, leader of the devastated Kurds. It was, in fact, written by his father, the legendary Mustafa Barzani, to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on March 10, 1975.

It was a cry of anguish to the United States government, which three years earlier had organized a Kurdish insurrection against Saddam Hussein as a favor by President Nixon to the shah of Iran, only to abandon the Kurds to destruction when the Iranian and Iraqi leaders settled their border dispute.

The letter will be found in the suppressed 1976 report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, headed by Rep. Otis Pike (D-N.Y.), which had investigated the misdeeds of the CIA. The House, at the urging of President Ford and the CIA, voted to suppress the report, of which I had a draft. To this day, the draft in my possession contains the only public record of the betrayal of the Kurds and to this day, the Pike Report has not been released, although accounts of it have appeared in the press.

Here, with some deleted names supplied, is the narrative that emerges from the Pike report:

President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, visiting Tehran on May 31, 1972, on their way home from a Moscow summit, were asked by the shah to arm and finance an insurrection of the Iraqi Kurds as a favor to the Iranian ruler, "who had cooperated with U.S. intelligence agencies and who had come to feel menaced by his neighbor."

The covert-action project was put together within weeks by the White House and the CIA (headed by Richard Helms, who, a year later, would be observing the operation from the other end as ambassador to Tehran). Kissinger

decided to keep Secretary of State William P. Rogers and the entire State Department in the dark. Treasury Secretary John Connally, who was assuming an important role in the Nixon re-election campaign, was sent on a secret mission to Tehran to inform the shah that the project had been approved.

It carried a \$16-million price tag and called for supplying the Kurds mainly with Soviet weapons provided by Israel, which was a partner in the enterprise. The shah could easily have financed the operation himself, but the Kurds, not trusting him, insisted that the United States be the "guarantor." Mustafa Barzani was quoted as saying that he "trusted no other major power," and that, if his cause succeeded, he was ready for Kurdistan to "become the 51st state."

Barzani expressed great admiration for Kissinger (who in 1973 assumed the additional position of secretary of state). Barzani sent Kissinger three rugs and, when he married Nancy Maginnes, a gold and pearl necklace as a wedding gift. Kissinger wrote in a memo to his assistant, Brent Scowcroft, that the gifts should be kept secret because the relationship with the Kurds was "extremely sensitive."

For three years the Kurds fought the Iraqi forces, sustaining thousands of casualties. Through the CIA, the U.S. government discouraged the Kurds from negotiating a measure of autonomy with the Iraqi central government but also restrained them from undertaking an all-out offensive. The policy was, says the Pike report, "that the insurgents simply continue a level of hostilities sufficient to sap the resources of our ally's neighboring country."

A White House memo from Kissinger to CIA Director William E. Colby in October 1973 said that Nixon "concurs in your judgment" that "we do not repeat NOT consider it advisable" that the Kurds should "undertake the offensive military action" which had been proposed by Israel. Israel, then at war with the Arabs, had its own reasons to want the Iraqi forces diverted.

But by that time, the shah had started moving in a different direction. As early as October

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1972, the CIA got wind of overtures towards a settlement of the border dispute between Iran and Iraq. But the agency was ordered not to inform the Kurdish command and to keep the Kurds fighting, thus providing the shah with "a card to play" in his negotiations with Saddam Hussein. The Pike report commented, "Even in the context of covert action, ours was a cynical enterprise."

On March 5, 1975, without advance word to either the United States government or the Kurds, the shah concluded his agreement with Iraq, which was announced the next day in Algiers during an OPEC session, and Iran abruptly pulled the plug on the Kurdish insurrection. The Pike report describes what followed:

"The insurgents were clearly taken by surprise. Their adversaries, knowing of the impending aid cut-off, launched an all-out search-and-destroy campaign the day after the agreement was signed. The autonomy movement was over and our former clients scattered before the central government's superior forces."

A message to the CIA from Kurdish headquarters said, "There is confusion and dismay among our people and forces. Our people's fate in unprecedented danger. Complete destruction hanging over our head. No explanation for all of this"

The CIA station chief cabled Colby to warn that if the U.S. government did not "handle this situation deftly in a way which will avoid giving the Kurds the impression that we are abandoning them, they are likely to go public."

Some 200,000 Kurds escaped into Iran, of whom 40,000 were forcibly returned to Iraq. Appeals for humanitarian assistance and for political asylum in the United States were ignored. The last message recorded in the report was an April 10, 1975, cable from the CIA station chief in Tehran to Colby, saying: "If senior Americans like Kissinger who are aware of their relationship do nothing to help the Kurds in their present extremity, we may be sure that they will not lie down quietly to be buried without telling their story to the world. Hence, even if nobody in the State Department or Dr. Kissinger cares what happens to the Kurds, they had better do something to help them, if only in USG and administration interest."

The report tells what happened next: "Help never arrived." It quotes a "high U.S. official" as having remarked to the committee's staff, "Covert action should not be confused with missionary work."

Kissinger later denounced the Pike report as "a collection of distortions and untruths."

Barzani, suffering from cancer, was eventually brought to the United States by the CIA and treated at the Mayo Clinic in Minnesota. He told me he had agreed not to speak out publicly against the U.S. government. He also feared for his compatriots who had taken refuge in Iran.

His last days were spent in a modest house in McLean. Before his death, in March 1979; he gave one interview—to New York Times columnist William Safire—in which Barzani said:

"We do not want to be anybody's pawns. We are an ancient people. We want our autonomy. We want *sarbasti*—freedom. I do not know who will take my place one day. But they cannot crush us."

Present during the interview was the general's young son, Massoud, who, 12 years later, would be leading the Kurds into fruitless battle again.

Daniel Schorr, currently senior news analyst for National Public Radio, was threatened with imprisonment in 1976 for contempt of Congress for refusing to disclose how he had obtained the suppressed Pike report.

Baker visits Iraq refugees today

By Johanna Neuman
USA TODAY

ANKARA, Turkey — Secretary of State James Baker today visits Iraqi refugees on the Turkish border after defending the U.S. "hands off" policy toward the rebels.

"We are not prepared to go down the slippery slope ... into a civil war," said Baker. "However, we cannot be indifferent to ... human suffering in Iraq, and we haven't been."

U.S. transport planes dropped food, tents and blankets Sunday to refugees in northern Iraq, primarily Kurdish rebels whose uprising against Saddam has fizzled.

More flights, including French and British planes, are planned today and Tuesday.

Baker warned Iraqi President Saddam Hussein not to interfere "with this humanitarian relief effort."

Turkish President Turgut Ozal expects up to 1 million Iraqis to seek refuge in Turkey.

Iran said almost 700,000 Iraqi refugees had reached its territory by Sunday. Tehran is urgently seeking international help with the flood of refugees.

Said Ozal Sunday: "I don't think the refugees actually want to ... leave their homeland. They want to see only Saddam" leave. Also Sunday:

► Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said the United States may seek a buffer zone under U.N. control for refugees in northern Iraq.

A similar zone will be set up in the south, under a U.N. cease-fire resolution Iraq has indicated it would accept.

► National security adviser Brent Scowcroft said the United States will not abandon 40,000 refugees in southern Iraq, soon to be vacated by U.S. troops for U.N. peacekeepers.

► President Bush repeated he had not misled the rebels about assisting them, saying he never implied U.S. use of force "beyond the mandate of the United Nations."

But Kurdistan Front spokesman Barham Salih, on ABC's *This Week With David Brinkley*, said Bush's "call for the Iraqi people to rise" against Saddam was interpreted as support for a rebellion.

► In Kuwait, the emir pledged to hold parliamentary elections within a year. Sheik Jaber Ahmed Sabah also said he would study giving women the right to vote.

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New York Daily News _____
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The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 8 APRIL 1991

U.N. Buffer Zones In Iraq Suggested

Cheney Offers Idea to Safeguard Refugees

By Bill McAllister
Washington Post Staff Writer

Bush administration officials, responding to mounting concern about the plight of Iraqi refugees, suggested yesterday that the United Nations could establish buffer zones in northern and southern Iraq to protect the hundreds of thousands of people fleeing from President Saddam Hussein.

Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney raised the possibility of having U.N. peace-keeping forces establish the safe zones inside Iraq, which has been torn by civil war since shortly after Iraqi forces were ousted from Kuwait by a U.S.-led coalition in February. But Cheney conceded that U.S. officials have not addressed how such an area could be created inside northern Iraq, where thousands of Kurdish rebels and their supporters were reported to be on the move.

Because U.S. forces still occupy a large section of southern Iraq, where an estimated 40,000 Shiite refugees have fled, American officials have said the refugees could be easily protected by the U.N. forces that are expected to replace the U.S. troops there.

"We will not abandon those people," said Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, on NBC's "Meet the Press." Scowcroft attacked Saddam for killing the rebels and described their plight as "a real tragedy. There's no question about it, and it's horrible to see the pictures of innocent people being savaged or even killed."

Both Scowcroft and President Bush reiterated that the president and U.S. officials have never suggested the United States would support a rebellion against Saddam. "I went back and reviewed every statement I ever made about this,

every single one, and there was never an implication that the United States would use force beyond the objectives which we so beautifully achieved," the president said at a Houston news conference.

Bush's remarks contrasted with a statement by Barham Salih, a spokesman in London for the Iraqi Kurdistan Front. On ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley," Salih repeated the rebels' assertion that the Bush administration had implied it would help them.

"When President Bush made his call for the Iraqi people to rise against the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, people interpreted that as a policy statement by President Bush that the Iraqi people were to be supported in their struggle for democracy and human rights against the tyranny of Saddam Hussein," Salih said.

"We are not going to expand the use of U.S. forces," Bush said later. "Indeed, I want them to come out and they will be coming out as soon as possible."

"We're talking about days, not weeks or months," the president said at a joint news conference with Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari on economic and trade issues.

The problem of Iraqi refugees has become so big that the United Nations should address it, Bush said. "When you have a refugee problem of this enormous consequence, then that comes under the heading of United Nations business," Bush said. "Through that, perhaps, we can try to enhance the peace, bring peace back to this troubled land."

Neither Bush nor his aides spelled out what they expect the United Nations to do. "We don't have all the answers right now," Scowcroft said.

Cheney said the administration might return to secure another Security Council resolution directing Iraq to open its borders to humanitarian aid for the refugees.

U.S. officials expressed hope yesterday that the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq will coalesce in areas where the United States began dropping thousands of pounds of food and supplies. The officials said they hope these would become U.N.-guaranteed sanctuaries for the refugees.

Turkish President Turgut Ozal, interviewed on the ABC program, said that U.N. troops should be prepared to use force against Iraq, if necessary, to create a buffer area for the Kurdish refugees near the border with his country.

Ozal, who meets today with Secretary of State James A. Baker III, said that Iraqi refugees heading north toward his country may number 1 million, with entire cities being emptied by the Iraqi forces. "All of northern Iraq is on the move," he said. Bush administration officials had no immediate comment on Ozal's statement.

"But . . . for us to get involved in a civil war in Iraq means occupying it, means replacing the government, means setting up a new government which undoubtedly would be overthrown as soon as the coalition troops left," Scowcroft said. "That's a horrible morass which to get in, and from a policy standpoint it's just unacceptable."

Scowcroft said that the United States had anticipated that its military action ousting Iraq from Kuwait might lead to unrest in Iraq.

Bush said the United States had flown 72,000 pounds of ready-to-eat meals and water to the refugees in northern Iraq. The supplies were

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The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
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dropped from three Air Force C-130s, which made two flights each into the region.

More flights are planned today, according to presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. The operation was expected to last 10 days, but Fitzwater said, "There's no duration."

U.S. officials notified Iraqi officials in Washington of such intentions Saturday night, Fitzwater said.

Staff writer John Yang in Houston contributed to this report.

Rowland Evans
And Robert Novak

Bush's Big Mistake

President Bush's military triumph in the gulf has been soiled and he has been exposed to political danger not because he erred in refusing to insert U.S. troops into a bloody Mideast civil war but because he failed to explain this prudent policy to the American people when the problem loomed a full month ago.

Administration policy makers assured us in early March, with the first signs of uprising against Saddam Hussein by Kurdish nationalists and pro-Iranian Shiites, that there was little to worry about. "It's vastly exaggerated," a key official said privately, "even if there is a stirring of the pot."

Given that lack of alarm, the president did not take seriously the portent of all-out revolt. He failed then and there to explain why U.S. counter-action would perforce be severely limited and probably ineffective. Having not made those preparations, Bush ended up being seen fishing and golfing in Florida while Kurds were massacred in Iraq. A withering rhetorical assault was levied against him, strongest from ardent supporters of Israel who had been Bush's original backers in confronting Saddam Hussein.

Even late last week, as criticism mounted that Bush had incited revolt in Iraq and then ignored it, the president's men seemed reluctant to state in its simplest terms an obvious tenet of American foreign policy: The United States cannot be in the business of using force to effect political change abroad, install democracies or satisfy aggrieved minorities, no matter how compelling their case.

Beijing's Tiananmen Square, the scene two years ago of government-ordered slaughter of students and workers, is cited by Bush's detractors as an earlier case of his insensitivity to the cause of democracy analogous to his hands-off attitude to the Kurds. In fact, the Chinese case is the antithesis of Iraq.

After Tiananmen, Bush's critics demanded strong sanctions against the Communist Chinese government that would have terminated trade, cultural exchanges and normal diplomatic relations. Not even the most outraged friend of the persecuted Chinese asked Bush to overthrow the Beijing regime. But for Iraq, there is literally no further sanction Bush can impose today short of military action; he has already employed them all, from trade embargoes to demanded reparations.

In the Vietnam War, no president from John Kennedy to Gerald Ford sought the overthrow of the Hanoi regime despite the killings of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese anti-Communists. In Nicaragua, no anti-Sandinista hard-liner pushed for the United States to shoot down government helicopters slaughtering pro-contra peasants. Not the staunchest supporter of freedom for the Baltic states calls for U.S. military intervention.

The crusade to save the Kurds with American arms is particularly strong among backers of Israel. That fits Israel's bedrock policy: widen Arab religious and cultural schisms, exploit inter-Arab feuds and stimulate Arab wars. Breaking up Iraq, while certainly not U.S. policy, is inherent in Israeli strategy. Administration sources wondered whether Syria might be next after the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee's (AIPAC) Near East Report of March 18 headlined "The Syrian Threat."

Only once has Israel embroiled its own army in the muck of a no-win policy to attempt imposing a government on a neighboring Arab state. The 1983 invasion of Lebanon did not work and in the process imposed heavy political costs on Israel. But if the United States does the intervening, to keep the Arab world in civil war would be a good policy for Israel.

However, that is not what Bush wants or will accept for the United States. In separate conversations inside the administration last week, as the Kurdish tragedy reverberated in the media, both Secretary of State James A. Baker III and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft flatly ruled out any change in the president's policy.

To do otherwise would risk upheaval in Turkey, Syria and Iran and on down to Saudi Arabia. It would stick the United States with the thorny question of Saddam's successor government and launch that regime with a made-in-Washington kiss of death.

The Washington Post A17
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 8 April 1991

The president could have explained this a month ago, but then and now he labors under a burden of his own making: his successful campaign to convince the American people that Saddam Hussein was worse than Hitler. That kept up American morale on the war front and the home front. But it makes it more difficult now to explain that the cause of the Kurds, however morally justifiable, is not the reason to shed American blood.

The Presidency

Hugh Sidey

Getting Gorby on the Line



CAROL T. POWER / THE WHITE HOUSE

Long-distance diplomacy: Bush chatting with Gorbachev last January

Just decided. Just placed the call, and his phone rings. It works." That was from George Bush. He was talking in the filtered sunlight of the Oval Office about the three times he has reached out and touched Mikhail Gorbachev. The first time was just after Bush took over the presidency. The second call came in January, when German unification was hot, the third in February, after the Nicaraguan elections.

Last week, with the Lithuanian situation coming to a boil, Bush noted that Britain's Margaret Thatcher had phoned Gorbachev. Bush wondered aloud to aides if he should call Gorbachev again. Bush was walking a high wire, supporting both Lithuania's right to be independent and Gorbachev's leadership. His message had been conveyed in public statements, diplomatic channels. But phoning is different. "Just to call," Bush explains, "say, 'Look, how's it going? What do you think about this?' I learn from it. I mean, it's a two-way street. It's better than a cable."

Bush has elevated the phone to new virtuosity. "Interesting diplomacy," he says. "If there are going to be disagreements between the Soviet Union and the U.S.—and there will be—I want to be sure they're real and they're based on fact, not on misunderstanding. If [Gorbachev] knows the heartbeat a little bit from talking, there's less apt to be misunderstanding."

An echo from 30 years ago: John Kennedy held up Barbara Tuchman's book *The Guns of August*, told visitors that its story of the start of World War I and the modern age of slaughter was a tale of failed communication. Still, he never called.

"The President has a propensity for physical communication," says Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Adviser. From a phone conversation, Bush gauges things like Gorbachev's conviction and assuredness, which are beyond the printed word.

The Bush-Gorbachev phone relationship is not yet on a George-and-Mike basis, but maybe next time, says Bush. Nor, despite the President's easy "just placed the call and his phone rings," is it quite that simple yet. When Bush gets the urge to call, he signals Scowcroft, who goes to Soviet Ambassador Yuri Dubinin, who checks out Gorbachev's availability, which so far has been afternoon Moscow time and morning in Washington. The Kremlin insists on placing the call to the Signal Corps in the White House. An interpreter and a notetaker listen in on extensions in the Situation Room in the White House basement, and Bush pens personal notes on the talk.

There were no jokes, no patter in the three long-distance hookups. "It's more serious, but very open, agreeable," says Bush. And private. "Part of the reason for phone calls is that you build a relationship that is confidential, where you can speak freely [and] frankly discuss differences," he says.

Bush assesses the message and the emotion of the moment with aides. The notetaker rushes through a memo. The President's secretary, Patty Presock, copies Bush's own hand scratchings, and all of it is consigned to dark, barricaded cabinets, silent records of the next best thing to a face-to-face conversation. ■

End of a War

WASHINGTON POST

April 10, 1991

Pg. 23

Iraq's acceptance of the formal cease-fire terms dictated by the United States and the United Nations brings the Persian Gulf War to a close. The end of the affair teaches lessons as important as the beginning.

At the start, the miscalculations were all on Saddam Hussein's side. He did not believe that the United States would respond to his aggression against Kuwait or his threat to Saudi Arabia. He did not believe that his Soviet patrons would abandon him. He did not believe that Arab countries would join a coalition in which Israel was a silent partner. And he did not believe that his army and air force would crumble under fire.

All those miscalculations created a situation in which President Bush, as the creator and leader of the coalition, achieved as much for peace and the rule of law in the world as he did for his own political standing at home. It was a victory well won—and worth winning.

But since Bush declared the hostilities suspended, the miscalculations have been on our side. The victims were the Kurds who believed the United States would support their bid to overthrow Saddam, and the Bush backers who believed that morality and principle required him to do just that. Their cries of disillusionment have filled the airwaves and the newspaper columns, given moral force by the heartbreaking television pictures of the plight of the Kurdish refugees.

The Kurds have reason to cry out against the latest injustice in a history

Those who charge Bush with callousness do not explain how we would have been on a higher moral plane if we had massacred surrendering Iraqis.

of international abuse. The president did encourage civil insurrection against Saddam by his own words and—it is hinted—by covert actions as well. To say now that he also made it clear the United States would not intervene directly in the struggle is at best a mitigating claim against the moral responsibility he accepted.

If we wanted Saddam overthrown, without our participation, it behooved us to strip him of the forces he needed to quash the threats to his rule. That we did not do. White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said Sunday on NBC's "Meet the Press" that when we declared a halt to the battle, Saddam still had 20 unscarred divisions.

That fact—and not the subsequent U.S. decision to allow Iraqi helicopter gunships to be used against the Kurds and the Shiite rebels in the south—determined the fate of the rebellion. Had we grounded the 'copters, Scowcroft said, "it would have taken the Iraqi forces longer . . . but it would not have changed the outcome."

To change the outcome, we would

have had to destroy those remaining Iraqi divisions. We had the capacity to do that, and Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf hinted in his interview with David Frost that he wished to do it. But destroying those 20 divisions would have meant slaughtering troops who had abandoned the fight and wanted only to surrender. Those who charge Bush with moral callousness toward the Kurds do not explain how we would have been on a higher moral plane if we had massacred surrendering Iraqis.

Nonetheless, the disillusionment with Bush being expressed by many who supported his war policy tarnishes his victory. It also reveals something of the character of this president, who has demonstrated over and over again that he is ready to "rise above principle" when it collides with power realities.

Bush was in the fortunate position, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, of being able to argue for intervention on a hierarchy of causes, ranging from the American national interest in protecting access to Persian Gulf oil, to international law against aggression, to the moral revulsion against Iraqi atrocities

in Kuwait. All of the justifications added weight to a powerful case for U.S. and international action against Saddam.

But no one should have believed that absent the national interest in the Persian Gulf and its precious resource, half a million Americans would have been fighting in the desert.

Principle alone simply doesn't cut it with Bush. He kept 2,100 Marines offshore of Liberia for two months in 1990, waiting to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals, while volunteer doctors pleaded that they come ashore and protect civilians being slaughtered in the fighting between rebels and the U.S.-backed government.

He sent Scowcroft to Beijing and recommended continued trade advantages for China even after the massacre of students in Tiananmen Square. He sent his secretary of state to Moscow and continued dealing with Mikhail Gorbachev even after the bloody repression in the Baltics last winter. With both the Chinese and the Soviets, Bush said it could not be "business as usual," then went back to business as usual.

The American public seems to accept these compromises as necessary. Principle separated from a clear sense of national interest led to such foreign policy fiascos as Versailles and Vietnam. So voters welcome a president who tempers principle with prudence. But others pay a high price for the selectivity of our moral outrage.

Book Reviews

THE
NATIONAL
INTEREST

SPRING 1991

Pg. 101

How Gorbachev Saved Reagan, Bush,
and the World

William C. Bodie

Sidney Blumenthal, *Pledging Allegiance—The Last Campaign of the Cold War* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990). 386 pp., \$22.95.

IN MID-1989 a senior editor at a major New York publishing house was asked about the relative merits of several upcoming volumes on the 1988 U.S. presidential election. His firm, which had published political chronicles in the past, declined to bid on books about the Bush-Dukakis contest. "Television coverage has made the Teddy White approach to these campaigns obsolete," he remarked. "These days, to sell an election book, you really need a gimmick."

It is indeed hard to imagine today's publishing barons, or journalism students, buying into Theodore White's *Making of the President* series, with its careful reportage, modest prose, and quaint respect for American political institutions. For some time, would-be campaign historians have sought other pegs—or gimmicks—on which to hang their tales. To the *Nightline* generation, even Joe McGinniss' treatment of Republican "handlers" in the 1968 Nixon-Humphrey race or Timothy Crouse's angle on press coverage of the 1972 election may seem archaic. With *Pledging Allegiance*, Sidney Blumenthal hopes to revive the genre by wedding electoral

politics to another large theme—in this case, no less than the history of the Cold War itself.

Readers interested in the campaign's prosaic details—primary results, campaign strategies, vote counts—will be disappointed. Such minutiae as the results of the Democratic primary in New York, for example, are not mentioned. Instead, the dust jacket boasts that, "Blumenthal takes the reader behind the public facade of American politics." This is achieved, in the author's words, by relating the election to "the largest event in the world"—the end of the Cold War. Blumenthal is nothing if not a big thinker.

Blumenthal, who covered the 1984 campaign for the *New Republic* before serving as a *Washington Post* political reporter, is perhaps best known for his acerbic distaste for the conservative "counter-establishment" that sprouted in Washington during the Reagan years. But in his new book, the usually acidic Blumenthal reveals a decidedly warmer side with his near adolescent infatuation with Mikhail Gorbachev—a figure variously credited by the author with "saving" Ronald Reagan's presidency, sparing George Bush from exposure in the Iran-*contra* scandal, and "creating the preconditions for the revival of liberalism" in America (all this, and destroying communism in Russia and liberating Eastern Europe, too).

The thesis of *Pledging Allegiance* is that while Gorbachev was remaking the world and destroying old "shibboleths and taboos," the political class of the United States was behaving like a dysfunctional family, playing out destructively familiar roles, and unable to

William C. Bodie, a New York-based writer, is chairman of the Manhattan Institute Seminar on International Affairs.

SPACE NEWS...CONTINUED

figure out when a program in the Soviet Union is funded and approved," he said.

On the other hand, the years-long process of approving space projects in the United States makes it difficult for U.S. officials to respond quickly to offers of collaboration from the Soviet Union, Keller said.

Soviet officials do not yet seem to have mastered the art of commercial negotiations, said Martin Harwit, director of the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum in Washington.

Harwit said he and his staff have encountered numerous

problems in negotiations with Soviet space officials relating to exhibits at the museum.

For example, Soviet officials demanded millions of dollars in fees to carry sophisticated movie cameras aboard the Soviet Union's Mir space station and aboard a Soyuz spacecraft flying to the space station.

Footage from the cameras would have been used to produce a wide-screen Imax movie portraying Soviet activities in space.

Soviet officials demanded that a theater equipped to show such movies be built in Moscow. Project officials agreed. However, demands by the Soviet space agency Glavkosmos and NPO Energiya continued to escalate. Soviet officials even came to insist

on exercising creative control over the final product, and negotiations foundered, Harwit said.

NASA has carried such movie cameras aboard its space shuttles at no cost, recognizing the value of the publicity generated by the dramatic movie footage, Harwit said.

"The value of free publicity at the very least has not been recognized by Glavkosmos and Energiya as having the same importance to them as it does to NASA," Harwit said.

Financing for new innovations in space technology, and promotional projects is only one area in which the Soviets are seeking aid.

The view of the Earth from the

Soviet space station Mir is marred by evidence of the Earth's damaged environment, said Georgy Grechko, a cosmonaut who now heads a laboratory at the Institute of Atmospheric Physics in Moscow.

The Soviet Union's Ural Mountains are obscured by black, red and yellow smoke, as is the U.S. city of Chicago, Grechko said.

The Soviet Institute of High Temperature, currently conducting studies of Soviet nation's energy consumption, is seeking financing for an international center to study the global consumption of fossil fuel and its damaging results.

Staff writer Renee Saunders contributed to this story.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

Japan Softens on Reaching Pact With Soviets on Disputed Islands

By URBAN C. LEHNER

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

TOKYO—With the long-awaited visit of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev only three weeks away, Japan is softening its position on the biggest outstanding issue between the two countries.

It's an ever-so-slight softening, and an enormous gap remains between the Japanese and Soviet positions. Still, the change has Tokyo abuzz with talk of a deal that would give Japan sovereignty over four disputed islands in return for extending aid to the struggling Soviet economy. Traditionally, the Japanese government has insisted that the Soviet Union return all four islands simultaneously and has said it won't talk about extending credits or loan guarantees to Soviet development projects until the islands issue is resolved. Now top political leaders are beginning to say that all four islands don't have to be returned simultaneously—Japan would take two now and two later as long as the Soviets "recognized" Japan's sovereignty over all four now.

Japanese officials insist they aren't making concessions or changing their fundamental position. They paint the softening as a mere recognition of the difficult logistics of transferring territory. "Since as many as 20,000 Russians live there [on two of the islands], there is a question of what these people will do," Ichiro Ozawa, secretary-general of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, said in an interview. "It will take them time to seek new jobs and build new houses. We understand that it will take some time. And that is all right."

Today, Mr. Ozawa begins two days of talks with Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow to



Ichiro Ozawa

March 25, 1991

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prepare for the Soviet leader's scheduled visit to Japan next month. Besides being willing to accept a delayed return of two of the islands, Mr. Ozawa also hints he will show a slightly more positive attitude on economic cooperation.

"Japan has always said that the Soviets should be the one to make the first move. 'You've done something bad so you should solve this issue first.' But that doesn't solve the problem," Mr. Ozawa said. "That's why I'm saying we should sincerely talk with each other. In that sense, this is a bit different from what the government has been doing. We will also become a little [more] flexible is what we're saying."

Although Mr. Ozawa dodges specifics on the economic aid question, the Japanese press abounds with speculative articles putting huge price tags on the islands. Japan's largest-circulation daily, the Yomiuri Shimbun, recently quoted unidentified Soviet officials as saying Japan was offering \$28 billion in credits and loans for various Soviet projects, from car factories to petrochemical plants. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Japan's leading financial daily, said Japan is considering extending as much as \$7 billion over 10 years in development assistance.

An islands-for-aid deal would have major implications for the Soviet economy and for the security of East Asia. But the Japanese press reports are all premised on the assumption that the Soviets are prepared to give Japan from two to four islands. With conservatives gaining increasing power in Moscow, the assumption that Mr. Gorbachev is prepared to give any islands is at least open to question.

"You may think, 'If he can give up Eastern Europe, why should he have so many qualms about these four islands, which never had the strategic significance of Czechoslovakia.' But it's not that easy," said Angela Stent, an expert on the Soviet Union at Georgetown University. Speaking to a group of foreign reporters in Tokyo,

Ms. Stent noted: "It's a particularly difficult time to give up two islands."

The islands, north of Hokkaido, make up what Japan refers to as its Northern Territories and what the Soviets consider part of the Kuril Islands. The traditional Soviet position has been that various agreements and treaties gave it the right to seize the islands at gunpoint in 1945, and therefore there is no "territorial" question to discuss. Over the last couple of years Soviet diplomats have relented to the extent of being willing to elaborate, in a series of working-level meetings, on why the islands are rightfully the Soviet Union's. But the Soviet government has otherwise refused to give ground, even though Soviet academics and the Soviet media have floated islands-for-aid proposals.

Last week, the independent Interfax news agency in Moscow said the Soviet Union would revive a 1956 pledge to return the two islands closest to Japan, Shikotan and the Habomais. That offer was part of a Japanese-Soviet joint statement that was supposed to lead to a peace treaty officially ending World War II between the two countries. The peace treaty and the islands offer eventually fell through as relations worsened between the Soviet Union and Japan's major ally, the U.S., in the late 1950s.

Japanese officials take a wait-and-see attitude towards the Interfax and other Soviet media reports. "There's no one else than Gorbachev who can make decisions there, so I won't know until I actually talk with him," Mr. Ozawa said in the interview Friday.

While a return to the 1956 formulation would be a sign of progress, it probably wouldn't be enough to satisfy Japan. Senior Japanese diplomats have repeatedly stressed that Japan's bargaining position has improved since 1956. After waiting four decades, they expect more from Mr. Gorbachev than they were offered then.

But with the first visit to Japan by a Soviet ruler fast approaching, both sides are also aware that there may never be another opportunity as favorable for cutting a deal. "I think that now is the biggest chance for Japan and the Soviet Union," said Mr. Ozawa. "If we let this chance go, the ties of both countries will recede once more."

SAVED...CONTINUED

deal with new therapies. Blumenthal believes the Cold War—which he alternately refers to as a “metaphysical system” and an “epistemological system”—has shaped and deformed American political life for the past four decades. Anyone who challenges the comfortable mantras of “Cold War Conservatism” is “speaking the unspeakable” and banished from the political mainstream. In an ironic Cold War coda, Blumenthal presents Ronald Reagan, whose “politics involved a massive misapplication of memory,” as the one voice of “reality” in the political vacuum of 1988 (though only after Gorbachev helped him shed all the vestiges of Reaganism).

Although Chapter One is entitled “A Long Twilight Struggle” after the JFK speech which marked the “zenith” of the Cold War, Blumenthal shows little interest in examining the U.S.-Soviet rivalry as anything other than an exercise in psychotherapy. On Washington’s reaction to the emerging competition in the 1940s, for example, he is satisfied to recount Walter Lippmann’s rationalization of the Red Army’s occupation of Eastern Europe. We read nothing of Stalin’s imposition of communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe, his “two camp” thesis, the infiltration of labor movements in the West, or Soviet involvement in the Greek civil war. The Baltic states may exist in the paranoid celebration of Captive Nations Day, but nowhere else. The Korean War, it appears, was important only because it created an “overheated political atmosphere” in which liberals “obscured their inherent realism even from themselves.”

One does find the occasional hasty critique of Moscow—“the Soviets provoked voyages to the brink over Berlin and Cuba,” “there was a Soviet buildup in the 1970s”—but they are few, and always followed by an exculpatory “but.” “Cold War” is used exclusively to identify all manner of American ills and malefactors, with Richard Nixon as the archetypal figure. “The Cold War,” Blumenthal asserts with a confident flourish, “was Nixon’s reason for being.”

Pledging Allegiance begins with a neatly

revised history of the Institute of the United States and Canada, an organization that serves the propaganda interests of the Politburo. For Blumenthal, however, “The task of the institute’s experts was to comprehend America and to communicate their views to the Central Committee and the Soviet president.” For such purposes they “had been granted a remarkable freedom,” even though “some of them were lying, perhaps even without knowing they were doing so.” Under Gorbachev, though, “These Soviets, who formerly thought of themselves only as experts or Communists, have taken on the mentality of citizens.”

As for the leader and his works, Blumenthal is likewise tolerant: “Though Gorbachev did not immediately bring dishwashers into the average Russian’s kitchen, his policies did something more important. The heart of totalitarianism was now stone dead.” In its place there appeared an order we might even learn from. A Soviet official is quoted approvingly: “We are only just coming to democracy, just discovering its virtues. But, in some ways, Russia might be more liberal, in terms of discussing alternatives.” And when Ronald Reagan himself was wounded by scandal, his “deliverance came through a *deus ex machina*, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, who was determined to end the Cold War.” Dissenting views—say, from citizens of Lithuania, or any of the republics—are absent from this account.

INDEED, Blumenthal’s primary focus is how the U.S. political culture was found wanting when it came to purging itself of Cold War demons. In the Reagan era, of course, these demons were ascendant, especially as conservatives “raised tens of millions of dollars and achieved control over a host of foundations.” He postulates something called the Movement State, in which conservative zealots “embedded” in Washington prevent us from recognizing our problems. This Movement State led to the Iran-*contra* scandal and the establishment’s whitewash of it, abetted by the cowed press

SAVED...CONTINUED

corps. The Tower Board was composed of the Washington "establishment. The powers that were, are and will be. . . . Power, as they understood it, neither began with [Reagan's] election nor would end with it." Howard Baker, brought in to clean up the mess in the White House, had "been the ranking Republican on the Watergate committee, where his job was to protect the party from scandal." Nowhere do we learn the identity of his employers. Nor is the "Iran" end of the scandal considered, since the lesser "contra" end fits far more neatly into Blumenthal's Cold War matrix.

His views on the press during this period may surprise some readers, for he was a member of Washington's elite press at the time. He paints his colleagues as more compliant than vigilant, more confused than enlightened, ratifiers rather than inquisitors. During the Iran-*contra* hearings, our "political press corps were like critics who did not know if they were reviewing Samuel Beckett, David Mamet, or Neil Simon." Little improvement is detected on the campaign trail; of the candidacy of Richard Gephardt, Blumenthal notes that "the press, reflecting the Washington opinion making elites, refused to accept his candidacy as genuine." A campaign book by a team of *Newsweek* scribes is dismissed as "less a book than a corporate product—Teddy White as an assembly line." He is especially critical of those "objectivist" reporters who disavowed any conscious biases: "In an election notable for its manipulativeness, the reporters who believed their 'straight' craft insulated them were the most manipulated figures in political society. Thus the press, too, played its role in the Cold War drama of 1988." Again, the reader is left to wonder about the identity of this drama's producer.

As with so many works of contemporary non-fiction, *Pledging Allegiance* takes leap after speculative leap into the minds of its principals. Thus Gorbachev, listening to Ronald Reagan's utopian view of nuclear disarmament, "came to understand this vision. . . . [and] emerged as Reagan's ultimate han-

dlar." After Iran-*contra* broke, "When Reagan sank to his lowest point, Gorbachev, with an eye cocked to the ticking clock, began furiously rewriting." Even Reagan's mind is open to Blumenthal's reading, as in this novel interpretation of the 1985 Geneva summit:

He explained that he had glimpsed a new age in which nuclear weapons were banished and the two superpowers truly cooperated. He had seen, perhaps, the 1951 movie *The Day the Earth Stood Still*, in which an alien threatens destruction of the planet if all nuclear weapons are not done away with. Perhaps Reagan did not have the movie in mind—who knows?

Who, indeed? One suspects that this reference tells us more about how Blumenthal's mind works than Reagan's.

As for the campaign itself, we learn almost nothing new about Bush or Dukakis. Bush is portrayed as the dutiful establishmentarian son of a series of demanding Dads: father Prescott Bush, mentor Richard Nixon, and benefactor Ronald Reagan. Dukakis is sketched predictably as the bloodless technocrat whose refusal to adopt a full-throated liberalism in the campaign made him "Bush's chief co-conspirator in perpetuating the Cold War drama." The only figures who seem to engage his sympathies are Gary Hart and Mario Cuomo. Yet here, too, consistency is not one of the author's virtues. Thus Hart, whose windy perorations comparing himself to Gorbachev are fondly received by Blumenthal, "set up a think tank, The Center for New Democracy," which "became a policy and speechwriting shop, in the service of his immediate political needs." But woe unto conservative Pierre duPont, whose "new ideas" had been gleaned by his staffers, who raced through the conservative think tanks in Washington, picking up the most extreme economic proposals." Governor Cuomo, praised for going *mano a mano* with Richard Perle and Elliott Abrams, "brought a physical audacity to politics." Bush adviser Roger Ailes, however, is taken to task for similarly instructing "his candidates to invade the men-

SAVED...CONTINUED

tal and, if possible, the physical space of their opponents."

The book's most intriguing pages are those devoted to the curious schisms among the foreign policy advisers in the two campaigns. On the Democratic side, the disparate forces for good (and sources for the author) are portrayed as underdogs struggling against the cabal of "Cold War mandarins" at Harvard's Kennedy School. This group, Blumenthal charges—save the "influential" professor Robert Reich—kept Dukakis from accepting the wisdom contained in Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.¹ On the GOP side, Blumenthal discovers an alleged split between former Henry Kissinger aides such as Brent Scowcroft, always "following the latest Kissinger ukase," and Bush's wily political partner, James Baker, himself slow to counter the Kissingerians until his eyes were opened by—whom else?—Eduard Shevardnadze.

In a 386-page book about the 1988 presidential election, this is all the author has to say about the result: "On election day, November 8, George Bush won the presidency, 54 to 46 percent, with 426 votes in the Electoral College to 112. The degradation of political debate produced the lowest voter turnout since 1924." There is nothing on such mundane things as how close the vote was in key states, on how the tickets fared in various regions, on how the vice presidential candidates helped or hurt the tickets. It is not merely that Blumenthal is bored with the election (though he is); more than that, he is anxious to describe the events of 1989 as Gorbachev's triumph and Bush's awkward acquiescence. The intimidation of the Baltic by Moscow in 1989 is absent, as is any other fact embarrassing to Gorbachev. And why not? As Blumenthal explains, "After Tiananmen Square, the course of repression, if it were ever a real option for Gorbachev, was decisively ruled out."

This book proudly repackages the "revisionist" view of the origins of the Cold War, which holds that the U.S. bears the brunt of the historical blame for the onset of hostile

relations between the superpowers. This thesis has not stood the test of rigorous scholarship or the release of archival evidence from Soviet sources. But even the revisionists tried to explain what the "Cold War" was about: the division of Europe, strategic competition, alternate views of social relations, and so on. Blumenthal has no such explanation; nor does he seem to feel the need for one.

Certainly the 1988 election was not among this country's most edifying. Neither candidate will be remembered for his oratorical resonance or strategic vision. Both were negative campaigners. Neither expressed certainty about the permanence of Gorbachev's reforms, a decision which now appears to be quite sensible. However one judges their competing foreign policy views, it is unfair to adduce, as Blumenthal does, psychological impediments for a reticence that was actually the product of a cautious and careful reading of available evidence.

Because of the author's selective approach to a conceptually daunting topic, this book fails as an account of either the 1988 election or the end of the Cold War. What interest it has derives from its illumination of how certain leftist polemicists have coped with communism's collapse. Behind the foggy musings on metaphysics and world historical events that are meant to elevate "mere" political reportage, there is the same readiness to see events in the Soviet Union from the point of view of the ruler rather than the ruled that has often stained much left-of-center thinking in the past. But once that has become clear, the book is tedious going, leaving one yearning for the appearance of a new Teddy White—or even the old Hunter S. Thompson. □

¹Blumenthal plugs Kennedy's book repeatedly, a favor returned by Professor Kennedy with a blurb in the publisher's advertisement for *Pledging Allegiance*: "Beautifully done, ironic, learned, and with a strong argument." Similar logrolling occurs with James Chace, who is flattered in the Acknowledgments and flattering on the back cover.

COMMONWEAL

March 10, 1991

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EVERY FIFTEEN YEARS

THE VIETNAM WARS, 1945-1990

Marilyn B. Young

HarperCollins, \$25, 386 pp.

Murray Polner

"Mr. President," HEW Secretary Wilbur Cohen asked Lyndon B. Johnson at a cabinet meeting in early 1968, "why are we in Vietnam?"

Cohen had prefaced his question by saying that his fourteen-year-old son and friends had posed the very same question of him. "How would you answer it?" he asked LBJ.

Years later Cohen described Johnson's explanation: "The president took half an hour to answer, and the answer didn't make any sense whatsoever....If he had given that answer publicly, he would have been laughed out of court."

Yet until 1968 the overwhelming majority of Americans stood behind the war in Vietnam. Then, as now, ordinary Americans embraced the emotional patriotic appeals while the elites—in Washington, in corporations and unions, and in the media—backed the war with few questions or challenges. Only two senators, Wayne Morse and Ernest Gruening, voted against the Tonkin Gulf resolution. And every president, from Truman to Eisenhower and Kennedy to LBJ and Nixon, set in motion the events that led to the deaths of fifty-eight thousand Americans and hundreds of thousands of Laotians, Vietnamese, and Cambodians.

Marilyn Young, an Asian history scholar at New York University, painstakingly discloses the mistakes and lies of those years

MURRAY POLNER wrote *No Victory Parades: The Return of the Vietnam Veteran* (Holt, Rinehart & Winston) and edited *When Can I Come Home?* (Doubleday Anchor).

in her illuminating and riveting synthesis. Her book opens by noting that, two months after the surrender of Japan, twelve U.S. troop ships were ordered to ferry thirteen thousand French soldiers to Saigon to fight the Vietnamese seeking independence, the same Vietnamese who had cooperated with the Allies in resisting the Japanese occupation. The pattern was repeated in the Philippines where General Douglas MacArthur had installed as head of state Manuel Roxas, "a collaborator closely associated with the most exploitative Japanese occupation policies," writes the author.

Where foreign policy was concerned, an uncritical generation of Americans passively accepted increasing military intervention in Southeast Asia. It was a generation deeply affected by Munich and terrified—with some reason—of Stalin's Soviet Union and Communists. Still, a nation born of revolution had now become the world's leading counterrevolutionary force, opposing virtually every regime it chose to define as Communist.

With little or no understanding of the consequences, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy (harshly criticized by Young) and their successors plunged into a region they barely understood, determined, as they repeated endlessly, to stop communism and resist aggression. The old dictum, that what was good for General Motors was good for America, was stood on its head. Young points out that we had once again assumed a responsibility grounded on the conventional premise that, "a world ordered by the principles and practices of the liberal capitalist system that governed America was good for America and good for the world."

The absurdity of applying this sweeping formula to Southeast Asia escaped most people in Washington. But, notes Young, there were exceptions like Paul Kattenberg, then the State Department coordinator of an interdepartmental group on Vietnam. In August 1963 Kattenberg returned from

an official visit to Saigon and sat in on a National Security Council session attended by Dean Rusk, Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, Roger Hilsman, Bobby Kennedy, and LBJ. Years later Kattenberg described the meeting:

I listened for about an hour or an hour and a half....There was not a single person there that knew what he was talking about....They were all great men. It was appalling to watch....They didn't know Vietnam. They didn't know the past. They had forgotten history....The more this meeting went on, the more I sat there and thought, "God, we're walking into a major disaster."

Finally, he spoke up, questioning their judgment. "They all just disregarded it or said it was not backed by anything."

Then, as now, Washington policy makers drew a tight circle about themselves and rendered life and death decisions without benefit of naysayers. Then, as now, a few experts were allowed in to confirm their wisdom; and Young reminds us of their flawed advice. Then, as now, Undersecretary of State George Ball was alone in trying to talk sense but was overwhelmed by those like the *New York Times's* influential military correspondent, Hanson Baldwin, who wrote that, while "Vietnam is a nasty place to fight...there are no neat and tidy battlefields in the struggle for freedom [my italics]." And then as now, the rationale for the war kept changing—from the Soviet and Chinese threat, to the "domino theory," to America's burden in defending freedom, a burden (then, as now) never shared by our war party's children and grandchildren, let alone themselves.

Framed in terms of "the struggle for freedom," a generation of trusting Americans could hardly be expected to envision any alternatives to so massive a military intervention. Hanoi was portrayed as a Moscow-Beijing puppet and Ho as an easy-to-hate tyrant. But when the human toll began to mount, LBJ himself became a victim, as Gabriel Kolko has written, "not simply of his own political errors but also of the failure of an entire class in pursuing the war and the hegemonic goals of

BUSH BACKS ARMS TREATY COMPROMISE

President Bush has proposed to skirt a dispute with Moscow over arms levels in Europe with a compromise that requires partial Soviet compliance with the initial U.S. reading of the Conventional Forces in Europe accord, U.S. officials said Thursday.

Bush's view, developed after consultants this week with U.S. allies and conveyed in a letter to President Gorbachev, is aimed at overcoming a deadlock and moving the arms treaty toward legislative approval by the 22 nations that signed it last year, officials said. The treaty "is on its way to resolution," one official predicted in disclosing the new U.S. plan.... Six Democratic senators, led by Sen. Biden, wrote Gorbachev Thursday to back the U.S. position.... National Security Adviser Scowcroft Thursday told a Washington forum sponsored by the French army chief of staff college that the dispute is holding up completion of a separate U.S.-Soviet treaty on strategic nuclear arms.

(R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, A16)

FRIDAY, APRIL 12, 1991

The Washington Times

Ultimate power lunch!

Quite a guest list assembled in honor of U.S. Ambassador to Germany **Vernon A. Walters** at Blair House today! Host: Chief of Protocol **Joseph Verner Reed**. Occasion: A celebration of the soldier-diplomat's half-century of service to Uncle Sam.

The three-star general, who's served every prez since **Franklin Roosevelt**, with the exception of **Jimmy Carter**, has been deputy director of the CIA and U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.

Among the expected guests: **John Sununu**, **Alexander Haig**, **Don Regan**, **Clark Clifford**, **Jeane Kirkpatrick**, **Brent Scowcroft**, **Donald Rumsfeld**, **Richard Helms**, **William Colby** and **Count Wilhelm Wachtmeister**.

And **Richard Nixon** is hoping to attend. Gen. Walters, by the way, was in the car with Mr. Nixon when the then vice prez's limo was ambushed in Caracas.

The Washington Post A16
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____
 Date 12 April 1991

Bush Backs Arms Treaty Compromise

By R. Jeffrey Smith
 Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush has proposed to skirt a dispute with Moscow over arms levels in Europe with a compromise that requires partial Soviet compliance with the initial U.S. reading of the Conventional Forces in Europe accord, U.S. officials said yesterday.

Bush's view, developed after consultations this week with U.S. allies and conveyed in a letter to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, is aimed at overcoming a deadlock and moving the arms treaty toward legislative approval by the 22 nations that signed it last year, officials said.

The treaty "is on its way to resolution," one official predicted in disclosing the new U.S. plan.

White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft yesterday told a Washington forum sponsored by the French army staff college that the dispute is holding up completion of a separate U.S.-Soviet treaty on strategic nuclear arms.

Progress has been blocked for months chiefly due to a Soviet claim, not shared by any other

country, that about 3,700 tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers assigned to Soviet land-based, coastal-defense and naval-infantry units are exempt from an accord that generally covers only army and air forces.

The United States and other nations had maintained instead that this Soviet equipment, plus another 1,700 weapons associated with Soviet strategic rocket forces and civil-defense units, is subject to destruction under treaty provisions aimed at producing military parity on both sides of the former East-West border in Europe.

Six Democratic senators, led by Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr. (Del.), wrote Gorbachev yesterday to back the U.S. position and urge reconsideration of the contrary Soviet claim.

In a letter to Bush last week, Gorbachev did not accept the U.S. treaty interpretation but proposed a complicated formula for partial compliance with it "as a gesture of goodwill," a U.S. official said.

Gorbachev specifically promised to withdraw from Europe those

weapons associated with coastal defenses, or about half of the total number of disputed Soviet weapons. These arms would be substituted for older weapons to be destroyed east of the Soviet Ural mountains. This area is outside the European region covered by the accord, which extends westward from the Urals to the Atlantic Ocean.

The initial U.S. position had been that all of the disputed Soviet arms would be subject to destruction at approved sites in Europe. But Bush said in his letter that Washington accepted Gorbachev's plan for the coastal-defense weapons and asked for the additional withdrawal from Europe of the same number of weapons as are held by naval-infantry units.

Bush's plan would accept the destruction of some equipment outside Europe but states that it should occur only under U.S. and allied inspection. In exchange, Moscow would not be required to destroy the 1,700 weapons associated with its rocket forces and civil-defense units; it also would not have to affirm the treaty interpretation accepted by others.

Winning the War and Struggling With Peace

U.S. Unprepared for Iraqi Retribution, Extent of Exodus in Conflict's Aftermath

By Ann Devroy and Molly Moore

Washington Post Staff Writers

Reports of Iraqi combat helicopters raining death on rebels and fleeing civilians filled the news on the morning of March 26, but helicopters were not on President Bush's mind when he summoned to the Oval Office the seven senior advisers who had guided his policy through months of Persian Gulf diplomacy and war.

Bush requested a timetable for "getting our kids out" of the gulf, according to officials present. Only late in the meeting, according to one source, did the issue arise of whether to intervene militarily in Iraq at least to stop the helicopter attacks.

Army Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recited a "precise military case against" intervening, according to the source. With little debate, the case was quickly closed, and White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater told reporters soon afterward that the civil war in Iraq, then entering its final throes, would proceed without intervention by the United States.

Within days, forces loyal to President Saddam Hussein moved from crushing Shiite Muslim rebels in southern Iraq to methodically suppressing a Kurdish rebellion in the north, and a cacophony of voices began asking how Bush, who had suggested the people of Iraq rise up against Saddam, could have turned a blind

eye to the massacres of Iraqi rebels and civilians.

In less than a month, the euphoria of February's military triumph had become the anguish of March's civil war as nearly 2 million destitute, hungry and scared men, women and children fled for their lives. How the United States dealt with that unfolding crisis is a story not so much of a failed policy as an administration unprepared for the aftermath of a war—an administration that remained virtually "inert," as one official put it, until the horror and sheer magnitude of what was happening in Iraq compelled it to act.

It also is a story of how a president, who boldly led the international community in

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confronting Saddam, later became fixated on getting U.S. troops out of the region as quickly as possible and had to be nudged by allies—and critics at home—to confront the tragic aftermath of the war.

Today, the United States is spearheading a massive relief effort for the refugees. It also has joined the international community in trying to establish an informal safe haven in northern Iraq to protect the Kurds from Saddam's forces, a move bound to create a whole new set of conditions with still unpredictable consequences for Iraq, its neighbors and American aims for the region.

'Devil's Advocate Debate'

Senior officials at the White House, State Department and Pentagon said in interviews last week that the decision to withhold military support for Iraq's rebels was rooted in policy debates last autumn when the United States was preparing to go to war over the August invasion of Kuwait. After what one official called a "devil's advocate

debate," Bush decided that the United States would not target Saddam and would not make as one of its military or political goals the Iraqi president's overthrow.

The reasons, according to a senior official, "covered the gamut from international political imperatives to practicality." Foreign nations allied with the United States in opposing Iraq's occupation of Kuwait did not want to see the United States toppling governments in the Middle East, and the public sales job that would be needed for an effort extending beyond the liberation of Kuwait was seen by administration officials as virtually impossible.

Most compelling of all for Bush, officials said, was that his military advisers were demanding a definite military goal with a definite timetable, a demand that fit precisely with the president's passion to avoid another Vietnam. "The thing that could make it like Vietnam was to go into Iraq and get bogged down, establishing a new government, protecting a new government against a hostile population. That would be a recipe for disaster," one

official said. Recalled another, "The more we shook that bowl of jelly, the more it kept coming out in the same shape: Don't do it."

Last month, when the question of helping the rebellious Shiites and Kurds to oust Saddam confronted Bush, "he had already decided, no, for substantial policy reasons, we should not," a senior official said.

Bush signed at least one intelligence "finding" early in the gulf conflict authorizing the government to undertake covert action in Iraq, but a senior official firmly denied that the United States has been involved in any "operational" efforts to assassinate Saddam or directly help the rebels do so. Still unclear is whether Bush ever authorized other forms of clandestine assistance for the rebels or psychological operations such as radio broadcasts inciting Iraqis to rise up against Saddam.

U.S. military commanders in particular were loath to set Saddam's demise as one of their goals, with Powell reminding Bush how difficult it had been in Panama in December 1989 to locate and eventually capture Manuel Antonio Noriega, the

Panamanian leader. Senior American diplomats too had little enthusiasm for the prospect of trying to help establish a new government in Baghdad, which would then make the United States essentially responsible for that government and for the postwar reconstruction of the nation.

What resulted was a policy, affirmed often since then by Bush, that U.S. goals in the conflict with Iraq were to restore Kuwait's government and eliminate Iraq's military ability to threaten its neighbors, but not to take a hand in replacing the government in Baghdad.

Decision to End the War

On Feb. 26, Powell walked into the Oval Office with good news for Bush. The ground war was entering its third day, but already a rout was in progress and only a couple of days more at most would be needed to finish the job. To go much beyond that, Powell said according to two officials present, would be "unchivalrous."

The next day, Feb. 27, Powell produced charts and graphs to il-

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had destroyed Saddam's ability to take offensive action while keeping enough of his army intact to allow him some defensive capability against covetous neighbors; the continuing carnage on the battlefield began to make senior officials uncomfortable.

"The scope of the slaughter was so great that we would have come off as bloodthirsty murderers," a senior military official said last week. Explained another, "The whole law of war is based on the concept of chivalry—that the defeated enemy is to be treated with honor."

What had been a decision motivated largely to prevent, in the words of national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, "more unnecessary bloodshed," ironically allowed new bloodshed as Saddam used some of the same troops that escaped from the allies to massacre rebels and fleeing refugees. U.S. intelligence sources originally underestimated how much Iraqi military equipment and men survived the allied attacks.

"The intelligence picture was very ambiguous," one official said. "In the end, more had survived than we thought."

Military officials said that much of the Iraqi theater was "a jumbled mess," making it difficult to interpret aerial intelligence data, and little of Iraq's command and control system remained to even tap. As a result, the administration received little "real time" intelligence in the days immediately following the war.

"After the war, we thought we had sufficiently devastated the Iraqi military capability and thought Saddam Hussein's days in power were tenuous at best," one Defense Department official said. "What we didn't realize was that Saddam Hussein retained a significant military capability and was able to recoup and regroup."

"He did not pose a threat to us," the official added. "We didn't factor in the threat to his own people."

On the day Bush ended the fighting, U.S. officials estimated that 580 Iraqi tanks, about 1,000 armored personnel carriers and 970 artillery pieces had escaped destruction in the war zone. Military officials now believe that about 700 tanks, 1,400 armored personnel carriers and 340 artillery pieces moved back to Iraq, along with surviving members of three Republican Guard armored divisions: the Tawalkana, Medina and Hammurabi. In addition, 20 Iraqi divisions, including some Republican Guard

units, never became involved in the war, officials said.

While continuing the war for another few days would have permitted allied forces to destroy more Iraqi weaponry and kill or capture more troops, many senior military officials believe this would not have lessened Saddam's ability ultimately to suppress the rebels. "It just may have taken him a little bit longer," one military official said.

Tent Meetings

Schwarzkopf met Iraqi officials in a tent at the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border town of Safwan on March 3 essentially to dictate the terms of a provisional cease-fire. The outlines of the Shiite uprising against Saddam in southern Iraq were only then emerging, and in northern Iraq Kurdish forces were just beginning to launch their rebellion. Officials in Washington predicted Saddam would easily put down the revolts.

"Our minds were on cleanly ending the war," one administration official said. "We were not thinking at all—the thought was on no one's mind—about starting some other military action inside Iraq."

At the tent meeting, after the official business had concluded, the Iraqi officers asked Schwarzkopf if helicopters could be used to transport administrative personnel. Several other senior officials confirm this account, adding that the issue of helicopters had not been addressed in the formal cease-fire document, which banned flights of Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft as potential threats to U.S. forces.

"Norm was on his own" to consider the helicopter request, said an official, and granted permission. The general later said in the PBS television interview that he "was suckered because . . . they intended . . . to use those helicopters against the insurrections that were going on."

Ten days after the tent meeting, Bush was asked at a press conference in Ottawa about the status of the cease-fire and American troop pullout. "I must confess to some concern about the use of Iraqi helicopters in violation of what our understanding was," he said.

The follow-up question was not about the helicopters but whether Bush was satisfied with progress on the cease-fire. Bush, however, brought up the helicopters again. "... These helicopters should not

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ustrate to the president how little of Iraq's forces in Kuwait and southern Iraq remained. That Oval Office session was followed by a later one that day in which it was decided to end the fighting at midnight that night Washington time after 100 hours of ground war. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. forces in the gulf, was consulted by phone and concurred in the decision.

Bush now is accused by some of ending the war too soon by allowing too much of Iraq's military to escape for use against the rebels, a charge fueled by Schwarzkopf himself who, in a PBS television interview last month, said "my recommendation had been, you know, continue the march." The general's statement was quickly contradicted

by Bush, Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and numerous other officials. Interviews with dozens of officials found none who recalled a Schwarzkopf suggestion or recommendation at that time to keep the war going, and the general has apologized to Bush for what he termed a "poor choice of words."

The concern in the two Oval Office meetings on Feb. 27 was not about possibly ending the war too soon, but allowing it to go on too long.

Officials were receiving reports that characterized the U.S. pummeling of retreating Iraqi forces as a "turkey shoot" or likened it to "shooting fish in a barrel." U.S. forces had achieved their major objectives of evicting Iraqi troops from Kuwait and decimating supporting units in southern Iraq; they

be used for combat purposes inside Iraq," he said. The next day, Bush was asked to clarify what he meant about the helicopters. "My answer on the helicopters is that was not our understanding that they'd be used to quash their own citizens," he said.

Bush was literally correct. But officially, the United States had not banned Iraqi helicopter flights as it had fixed-wing aircraft. The president hoped that by raising the issue, the Iraqis would hear a threat and keep their helicopters on the ground, officials said.

One official close to Bush said the president had not been briefed thoroughly on the helicopter issue. Bush had seen intelligence reports that day suggesting the Iraqis were prepared to use chemical weapons against the rebels, and helicopters were the way those chemicals were to be delivered. "His answer was given in that context," the official said.

In any case, administration officials, pressed on whether U.S. forces intended to shoot down Iraqi helicopters, deliberately kept the U.S. position ambiguous.

In the days following, as troops loyal to Saddam consolidated their hold over southern Iraq and then moved north to crush the Kurds with a vengeance, the issue of whether the United States should intervene to forestall more massacres was raised inside the administration, but only in what officials described as a sort of tangential,

running discussion.

Powell, officials said, made the basic case against going after Iraq's helicopters. Downing the helicopters, he reportedly argued, would not help the rebels all that much and would be the first toe into a sea of endless commitment. Intelligence data, Powell told Bush, indicated that heavy artillery and tanks were causing more severe problems for the rebels; he said shooting down helicopters would amount only to "empty symbolism."

According to a senior official, Bush's principal advisers were unanimously against entering the civil war, although Vice President Quayle reportedly expressed some concern about whether the United States had a moral obligation to get involved.

At the March 26 meeting in the Oval Office, Powell told Bush the United States "could almost get inexorably drawn into a mighty mess just protecting yourself" if Iraqi helicopters were targeted, according to an official present. Because the helicopters were then operating largely in northern Iraq, far from U.S. forces in southern Iraq and Kuwait, and because the aircraft are largely undetectable by AWACS surveillance planes, U.S. aircraft would have to be sent to find the helicopters if a decision were made to shoot them down. Protecting those planes would involve further engagement, Powell said, as would potential rescue operations.

"He portrayed for the president how the process of getting drawn in would be so easy," the official said.

Bush, committed to a quick exit from the war and horrified at the prospect of a messy reengagement, had no problem reaffirming his original decision to keep the United States out militarily, his aides said.

Refugee Response

By then, hundreds of thousands of panic-stricken Iraqi Kurds were beginning a strenuous mountain march to the borders of Turkey and Iran to escape Saddam's forces. Their stories of death and deprivation and heart-wrenching photos of their suffering dominated international press coverage and presented governments with a new and urgent crisis.

The Bush administration had been prepared for war refugees, but not this. "Some of our war-end scenarios predicted civil unrest," one official said, "but I can assure you that none of the policy papers or briefings I was involved in suggested that the whole northern part of Iraq would rise up and move out."

"When the war started, everyone geared up to take up to 100,000 refugees at different locations," one Pentagon official said. After the war ended and the rebellions erupted, military officials concede they learned the extent of the refugee problem from news reports.

Initial attempts to organize an emergency relief effort became mired in bureaucratic disorganization, interagency struggles and the U.N. trade embargo against Iraq.

"There has been a reluctance to be drawn into the humanitarian assistance role for fear that when the

time came to pull out, none of the relief organizations would have arrived to take over, and the military mission would be modified for a humanitarian assistance mission," one Defense Department official said.

U.S. government agencies also argued with international relief groups about how much general aid should be allotted for humanitarian relief in Iraq, how the funds should be distributed and what agencies should be responsible. "It took a long time to move," said one Pentagon official.

A senior official said the administration had an even more fundamental reason for failing to show up early with humanitarian aid. "Frankly, we wanted to wait for the civil war to be over so our involvement would be seen not as a decision to help the rebels overthrow Saddam, but as a decision to provide humanitarian help," one source said.

"The bottom line was that the administration was portrayed as doing nothing or not doing enough," acknowledged a Pentagon official.

U.S. officials concede they were overwhelmed by the extent of the Kurdish catastrophe. Satellite and aerial surveillance failed to detect the magnitude of the disaster because of the constant movement of the refugees, the mountainous terrain and poor weather, according to military officials.

As the French appealed to the United Nations to act on the Kurds' plight, the Bush administration continued to hesitate, and Turkish au-

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authorities sought to keep the refugees in border zones pending guarantees of international assistance. When U.S., French and British planes finally began last weekend dropping foodstuffs and other supplies on some refugee areas, one military official compared the limited move to "throwing popcorn at pigeons," with no coordinated distribution method on the ground.

Later in the week, U.S. officials announced plans for a much larger land-and-air relief effort dubbed "Operation Provide Comfort," but stressed their intention to turn the operation over to international agencies by next month and complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region as soon as possible.

With a U.N. observer force presently assuming control of a demilitarized zone in southern Iraq where Shiite refugees are being sheltered, Turkish and British authorities proposed last week to protect the Kurds with a U.N.-sanctioned enclave in northern Iraq. U.S. officials doubted that the So-

viet Union, China and many Third World countries, sensitive to intrusions on sovereignty, would approve the formal establishment of such a sanctuary over Iraq's opposition to it. But the Bush administration appeared to settle on an informal route to the same end, issuing firm warnings last week to Iraq not to interfere with humanitarian efforts north of the 36th parallel.

Concerned that the refugee camps not become permanent sites of squalor and misery for the Kurds as well as potential breeding grounds for terrorists, U.S. officials hope to see the refugees eventually reintegrated into Iraq. But a senior official said Friday this "will be a big, big problem" and can only occur if Saddam leaves power. And the likelihood of that, he said, remains as uncertain as ever.

Staff writers Bob Woodward, David Hoffman, R. Jeffrey Smith and George Lardner Jr. in Washington, correspondents David B. Ottaway in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and William Drozdiak in Paris, and researcher Mark Stencel contributed to this report.

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PROGRAM TO "ABC NEWS' THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY."

ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, April 14, 1991

GUESTS:

FORREST SAWYER
ABC News Correspondent

BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Adviser

ARIEL SHARON
Israeli Minister of Housing

HOSHYAR ZEBARI
Spokesman, Kurdistan Front

INTERVIEWED BY:

David Brinkley - ABC News

George F. Will - ABC News Analyst

Sam Donaldson - ABC News

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER:

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MR. BRINKLEY: Forrest Sawyer of ABC News, as you have seen since the gulf war started, has been in the Persian Gulf from the beginning, months ago, and has been there and seen it all until now. Now he has been on the Iran-Iraq border, and today now he is in Paris where we will talk with him. And here in studio are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC News.

Forrest, how are you?

MR. SAWYER: I'm just fine, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: Good, tell us what's happening. Is the food getting there?

MR. SAWYER: Well, to my knowledge. I left the border a couple of days ago. We just talked with some people who are in touch with what's going on at the border as of this morning, and the answer is no. Inside Iran, international food is not arriving at all, nor is any other kind of help. The only help that is being provided to those refugees at this point is by local villagers, who have organized themselves--school teachers, shopkeepers, clerks, working day and night to try to get them food. The farthest distance that I know that relief is coming from is the regional capital of Bahktaran, about three hours drive. And that, frankly, is all that's getting there.

MR. WILL: Forrest, what can you tell us about the motives that were causing these hundreds of thousands of people to start moving on foot? Is it fear of the 'army or is it fear of life in Iraq generally? That is, what hope can we have that these people will become either reconciled to or feel safe about life in Iraq?

MR. SAWYER: Well, I would say it's more than fear; it's abject terror, George. These people have seen people killed in front of them; they have seen helicopters drop napalm; they claim that chemical weapons have been used against them. I have seen myself children that have been badly injured. I saw one die in front of me from the injuries caused by the Iraqi army. They simply feel they cannot be safe. If they go back, as Saddam has invited them, they're convinced there will be yet another massacre. And I believe that history is likely on their side. They just don't believe anything that Saddam has to say; they believe it's genocide and that he's not going to stop until they are all out or they're dead.

MR. WILL: So your understanding from watching these people and seeing the palpable fear at work among them is that they're going to continue across the border and the world is going to have, for the foreseeable future, then, a sizeable refugee problem in neighboring countries?

MR. SAWYER: Unquestionably. I don't see any reason for them, given what they believe, to turn back from an escape to some kind of refuge.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, Forrest, if they don't want to turn back, what's the situation in Iran, where you have been just a couple of days ago? Does Iran have any capability of feeding these people, of housing them? Does it have any desire to?

MR. SAWYER: Well, there's a dispute that appears to be going on right now, Sam, between the international agencies from the west and Iran--this we're being told by those international agencies

themselves. Iran wants the west not to have the kind of propaganda windfall they believe that would come if they were to control the delivery of the goods from beginning to end. Now, quite obviously, the agencies themselves are concerned that the supplies reach the people they are trying to help and not wind up in the black market, as they have in the past in many countries. So that dispute is stalling a lot of supplies from actually reaching there.

In addition, there's a tremendous bureaucratic problem inside Iran. I know that a lot of supplies didn't move simply because they were on holiday for Ramadan. And finally there's the logistical problem, Sam: they are so far up in the mountains, and these roadways are so clogged, as they cling right along the sides of those mountains, that for the goods to actually get there is very, very difficult indeed. And only a lit bit is going.

MR. BRINKLEY: So vanity, ego, and bureaucratic infighting are stopping the food from reaching people who are starving. Slightly disgusting, isn't it?

MR. SAWYER: It's terrible to actually see it because every day, David, as I watched, the conditions grew worse and the panic and fear on these people's faces grew worse. When they'd see a bread truck, they'd gather around it and begin fighting among each other. It is an awful thing to have to watch, and, of course, far more awful to live through.

MR. BRINKLEY: Forrest, thank you. Come on home now and get some dry socks, will you? Now, in London, Hoshyar Zebari, who is a spokesman for the Kurdish Democratic Party.

Mr. Zebari, thanks for coming, we're pleased to have you with us. Now, you were staying in communication with your--you're in London--staying in communication with your people by short wave radio, is that right?

MR. ZEBARI: That's right, yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: Tell us, what are they telling you this morning?

MR. ZEBARI: Well, the situation is desperate in many ways. This human tragedy is still unfolding; it's an epic tragedy, I mean, by all standards. And relief aid is not getting through. There are a number of obstacles--bureaucracy, logistic, and terrain, are all hampering this relief operation. And what has been arriving is too little and too late. People are dying every single day. Yesterday, we had an estimate of 1,000 people are dying a day.

So the situation is very desperate, and it has been described by some aid workers as apocalyptic. And more aid is needed and more concerted international effort is needed. And it's not time to worry and to concern oneself about legal niceties. People are desperately in need of immediate food, medicine, doctors, and the air drop operation has not been going well. In fact, we know that many of the drops have fallen on the Turkish side; the Turkish soldiers are preventing people from getting them; and it has caused a number of fatal deaths by people when they are dropped on them. We hope that this new operation to drop things by helicopters--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me--may I just interrupt you for a moment and ask you whether you have any word of continued attacks by Saddam Hussein? He came yesterday to the north, as you know, and promised that there would be no armed assault and he invited all the Kurds to come back

and said--except for the ones who were killers, in his words--they would be safe.

MR. ZEBARI: Well, last night, we had a report that there has been heavy fighting just north of Sulaimaniya to control a mountain range called Guyaja (phonetic); and they heavily bombarded and shelled the mountain range and also convoys of refugees who are fleeing toward the Iranian borders in Shwarta and Penguin (phonetic).

MR. DONALDSON: May I ask you to just--

MR. ZEBARI: The day before also there was heavy fighting and it was reported by independent correspondents who were on the scene just north of Erbil.

MR. DONALDSON: May I ask you, sir--may I just ask you how certain you are of that? As you know, the United States has now laid down a marker, in a sense, by saying to Saddam Hussein that he must not do that. If he were doing that, then the United States did not move--our marker would be worthless.

MR. ZEBARI: Well, I'm afraid the United States are not abiding by this promise. I mean, a number of operations have been carried out north of the 36th parallel, and the latest was in Salah al-Din, the day--yesterday, where there was heavy fighting and also north--further north in Zukho, they have used six helicopter gunships. So in fact our people back in Iraqi Kurdistan, I mean, tell us that the United States threat are not serious at all and the argument has been put in a confused way that either military intervention or nothing. I think there is a great deal in between which the United States could do. The argument which has been put forward by President Bush that he want to get the kids back home-- we want them to go back as soon as possible--but in fact there is a moral responsibility the United States should take as these people--

MR. WILL: Sir, if I may interrupt, one of the proposals for overriding what you call the "legal niceties" in this case is for the international community, perhaps the U.N., to establish and enforce within Iraq a safe haven for the Kurds. Is that what the Kurdish community wants? And, if so, can you tell us how long U.N. and other forces would have to be there in order to guarantee the safety of the Kurds against the central government of Iraq?

MR. ZEBARI: Well, this proposal is welcomed by our leadership, by the Front leadership, in fact, and we have expressed our cooperation to the prime minister, when he received us a few days ago at 10 Downing Street. This is a temporary solution to protect people and to feed them for now, but, in fact, longer solutions are needed for these people. Our people have no faith whatsoever to go back to Saddam Hussein's--

MR. WILL: But, sir, if I may interrupt, isn't that--that's the point that worries a lot of people: for the long term that wouldn't be satisfactory; you say yourself you have no faith in the Baghdad government. Isn't the logic of any intervention that sets up an independent safe haven, eventual secession, autonomy, and essentially the splintering of the territorial integrity of Iraq?

MR. ZEBARI: Well, I don't think so because, in fact, never it has been our intention to set up

an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. Our policy has been very clear from the beginning, that we are calling for a democratic change in which we would be part of it. I am for the Kurdish people to be to enjoy regional autonomy. This has been our objective. I don't think that will encourage the Kurds, you see, to have an independent entity. I'm afraid the U.S. policymakers have been putting things upside down; I mean, never, never the Kurdish intention has been to set up an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq because that is not viable and could not be possible politically, economically, and geographically. What these people need is protection, international protection, basically, which the United Nations has the mandate in fact to go that far.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Zebari, thank you. Thank you very much for being with us and giving us your thoughts on this. We'll be back with a background report on the Middle East peace conference, if any, and, shortly, Ariel Sharon, Housing Minister of Israel, and General Brent Scowcroft, assistant to President Bush for national security--in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Nothing is settled, nothing, between Israel and the Palestinians, but at least the conversations have gone further than ever before, including an agreement to have a peace conference under a long list of preconditions. Before we ask about it, here's some back ground from Jack Smith.

(Video backgrounder.)

MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, Ariel Sharon, who is Israel's Housing Minister; and, shortly, General Brent Scowcroft, assistant to President Bush for national security, in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: General Sharon, in Israel, thank you very much for coming in today.

MINISTER SHARON: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: We're glad to have you with us. You know everyone here, George Will and Sam Donaldson. Now, General, your policy is to go ahead with Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, as we hear all the time? What do you say about this to Secretary Baker when he is there visiting and discussing it with you? What do you tell him?

MINISTER SHARON: I never had a chance to meet with Secretary Baker personally. If I would have had a chance, of course, I would have explained the purpose, why the government of Israel decided to build Jewish communities in Samaria, Judea, Gaza in the past; it's a government decision, it's a government policy. And I would say the government, with any prime minister, are full partners in this process. I'm only the member of the government who is in charge of execution, but that is a decision, a government decision. The reason for the decision that we took years ago was in order to keep in our hands the most vital terrain for our existence.

We were never interested not in agricultural land, we were interested in the high controlling

hills and mountains in order that our overlooking our coastal plain where two-thirds of our population live there, and mostly now after the last war, maybe we understand even better the importance of strategic depths. Therefore, the purpose of it--nothing to do with the peace process. I personally believe that it will not harm the peace process, it may only contribute. Because one must understand when we talk about confidence-building measures, confidence-building measures should give Israel the feelings of security, that we are secure; and these settlements or communities gives us these--a feeling of security. Therefore, they will only contribute to peace.

MR. WILL: Mr. Sharon, let me ask you about that. There are those in the American government who argue as follows: They say that the real lesson of the gulf war, and particularly the lesson the Scud attacks on Israel, is that there is no connection any longer between land and security, between what you call "strategic depth" and the security of Israel. What do you say to the people who say that recent developments in war in the gulf indicate that there is no connection between the West Bank and the security needs of Israel?

MINISTER SHARON: Of course, I will not accept it. The situation in the Middle East now, when there is a new arms race now--and, first of all, Syria now is getting arms and ground-to-ground missiles. The missiles are not replacing the conventional arms--they are not replacing tanks; they are not replacing artillery; they are above and beyond all the conventional weapons which exist there in thousands of numbers. Syria itself is having at the present time 4,600 tanks, so that is in addition.

Beside that, if you would have been here during those days of the Scud attacks and you would have seen tens of thousands, maybe hundreds of thousands of people leaving in long convoy the center of the country, rushing to the south, rushing to the east; and when the Scud started to hit the southern part of the country, rushing back to the north. Israel is a tiny, small country and you cannot live without having the depths, and to that I will add, I would say our warning systems--all which I would say we need in order to know in advance what's happening--is based upon those mountains.

MR. WILL: Can I ask you very quickly if that means--this need for strategic depth means that in your judgment it is impossible for Israel to consider yielding back to Syria the Golan Heights?

MINISTER SHARON: I think that we made it thoroughly clear in the past. The Israeli parliament, the Knesset, received a resolution in December, 1981, that the Golan Heights are integral part of the state of Israel. And when we talk about the Syrians, one must understand that with Syria we have many problems. I mean, the immediate one, of course, is the purchasing, acquisition of tremendous amount of weapons. But beside that we have the problem that Syria is occupying most of Lebanon and endangering us from the northern part.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, General, if I may ask you, if you're not going to entertain any possibility of returning occupied territories, what are you going to give the Arabs? If you sit down at a peace conference or in any way direct face-to-face talks, what do they get out of making peace with Israel?

MINISTER SHARON: I think that the time arrived that the Arabs should be asked, what are you going to give for peace? Peace is important for the Arabs not less than for ourselves. And I

believe that many things can be done.

MR. DONALDSON: But what do they get out of a peace? What do they get out of a peace?

MINISTER SHARON: What they will get out of the peace will be first of all, a possibility to use their financial means, their budget, for development, for education, for industrializing their countries, for many other things; I mean, there are many things that should be solved in the Middle East that I believe that we can do together with the Arab countries.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Minister, could I just ask you a quick--almost a yes-or-no answer: Was the United States right to stop when it did in Iraq? Or should the coalition forces have gone in and actually deposed Saddam Hussein?

MINISTER SHARON: I think that Saddam Hussein had to be removed. We are speaking about a war criminal that controls again Iraq, having still now almost 3,000 tanks that are massacring the Kurds, doing the most terrible things. And when I see the way that he controls Iraq now, I am very much afraid that it will be very short time until he will become again the main danger to the Middle East.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, thank you. Thank you very much for giving us your views today. Pleasure to hear from you, good luck.

MINISTER SHARON: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, General Brent Scowcroft, who is assistant to President Bush for national security. In a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: General Scowcroft, thanks for coming, pleased to have you.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Good morning, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: The perception is around that the Bush administration did not anticipate and was surprised by the aftermath of the gulf war, the blood and the killings and so on. Is that true?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't think that's true. We did anticipate that there would be a lot of chaos and that the winning of the war would not solve the problems of that region by any stretch of the imagination. Indeed, we had relief supplies positioned at the various exits from Iraq. One of the things I think we perhaps did not anticipate was the severity of Saddam Hussein's attack with the Kurds with possibly the intention of solving his Kurdish problem by driving them out.

MR. BRINKLEY: Had we been able to anticipate it, which would perhaps be superhuman, but had we been able to, what might we have done about it? Removed him from office?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think so.

MR. BRINKLEY: I know you didn't want to do that, but--could we have done it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, no, we didn't want to do that. That would have changed the whole character of the situation. What we could have done is perhaps preposition more supplies in Turkey; that's a very difficult border and it is hard to get supplies in; it is hard for the people to survive now at those altitudes; we perhaps could marginally have improved that, but only marginally.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, we've just heard from Forrest Sawyer, as maybe you've heard, that this stuff is simply not getting there because of the difficulty of the terrain, and there are no railroads, no roads, no nothing.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it's my understanding that Forrest was talking primarily about the Iran border in his discussion. The supplies are getting to the Turkish border refugees now by air; the real problem there now is organization on the ground. There's nobody there to control the distribution and so on; big problem still.

MR. WILL: There seem to be three alternatives, not one of which is very attractive. One is that Saddam Hussein succeeds in causing such panic that the Kurds flee the country and he solves his problem that way. The other is that they are left to his tender mercies, blocked from leaving, and we stand in the outside world and watch this. The third is that there be some kind of safe haven created. How does the U.N. or the U.N. with the coalition partners create a safe haven within Iraq without becoming permanently involved in organizing the internal arrangements, perhaps federalism, a confederation, and all these complicated matters that it took our country two centuries to straighten out? How do you avoid doing that without becoming enmeshed for decades?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's a very--that's a very difficult issue, George, and you've described it accurately. What we are de facto creating now is a kind of safe haven, simply to protect the refugees; that is, in our view, a short-term solution. The longer term solution, absent the departure of Saddam Hussein, which we would still like to see, is some kind of protection which would allow them to return to Iraq; and we have not solved that problem.

MR. WILL: Isn't a safe haven an instant West Bank? That is, no one's happy with it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think that's fair enough, yes.

MR. WILL: Let me ask you another question going back to the West Bank and the Middle East. We just heard Mr. Sharon talking in terms of Israel's need for strategic depths. That sounds as though once the Sinai was given up, which was, I guess, 95 percent of all the land captured in the '67 war, that Israel now feels it has reached the limit of its ability to yield land for peace contingent on keeping its own security. Do you think that the lessons of the war confirm, refute, or are neutral on that position?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think they tend to refute it. Indeed, I think history tends to refute it.

What Israel did with Egypt is give up territory for a piece of paper, for a peace treaty; and they've given up all the Sinai now. They don't have strategic depth there against the largest force in the Middle East and they are quite secure on that border because they have an agreement with Egypt. Minister Sharon, for example, talked about the need for strategic depth on the ground, but when he discussed the last war, the only--and Syria--the only thing he talked about was the terror of the Scud missiles and the Syrians now having Scuds. It seems to me that the lesson of this war is that Israel's security does not solely depend on the--

MR. WILL: But he did also talk about the tanks and the number of tanks the Syrians have that were last seen in Israel pouring down the Golan Heights. Is that not a legitimate concern?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, it's a legitimate concern, but I would argue that the same thing can be done and needs to be done in that area that was done in Egypt with the added condition that one has to get rid of the possibility of Scuds or more modern missiles out of the range of Israel's strategic capability.

MR. DONALDSON: General Scowcroft, as I understand it, the United States has warned Saddam Hussein twice now, last weekend and in the middle of the week, not to conduct offensive ground or air operations against the Kurdish refugees in the north. Yet we've just heard a Kurdish spokesman maintain that Saddam is doing that. What is the fact?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, what we have done is warn him against interfering with refugee operations. So far as I know, there--we don't have any confirmation that he is. There have been some battles going on north of al-Sulaimaniya--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me see if I--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Those are between, as I understand it, between Kurdish armed forces and Iraqi armed forces.

MR. DONALDSON: Kurdish armed forces?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: Who are they? You mean guerrilla fighters?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, of course.

MR. DONALDSON: What do they have, small arms?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What I'm trying to say is what we're saying is we will not countenance interference in refugee operations. We are not going to intervene as we had in the performance of the war.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, I think, General, the president's policy must have been widely

misunderstood, at least in some quarters. I think some people believed that what the administration was saying to Saddam was that he was not to kill Kurds anymore. But you are saying that he can kill Kurds as long as it's not an interference with an on-the-place refugee relief operation.

MR. SCOWCROFT: In fact, there are not great hostilities going on now, but what we did--I'm talking about the specific warning we gave him, was not to interfere with the refugee operations.

MR. DONALDSON: So, in your view, he has not been interfering with the refugee operation?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not to any significant extent that we're able to--

MR. DONALDSON: General, let me ask you about the enclave idea that you and George were discussing, as well as the buffer zone in the south that I understand the president has now said U.S. troops are to withdraw from--is that correct? How long will U.S. troops stay to guarantee safety within either the buffer zone in the south or any enclaves in the north.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, by buffer zone I think you mean the part of Iraq that we have been occupying?

MR. DONALDSON: Yes.

MR. SCOWCROFT: And from which we are now beginning to withdraw. The actual buffer zone is along the border, 10 kilometers north of the border into Iraq and five kilometers south--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, the U.N. buffer zone, I understand.

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's the U.N. buffer zone.

MR. DONALDSON: No, I'm talking about U.S. troops that are currently in Iraq. When will they be withdrawn completely?

MR. SCOWCROFT: They are being withdrawn now; they'll be out probably in a few days.

MR. BRINKLEY: Isn't there something strange, General, in the fact that we have won the war but Saddam Hussein is still in office?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it's certainly disappointing, yes, but we decided early on last fall what our objectives were and to stick to those objectives. And in the past, when the United States--

MR. BRINKLEY: Are you glad, are you sorry? Do you feel good about having him there?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't feel good about what has happened, but I feel good about our decisions and about sticking to them.

MR. BRINKLEY: George, you've got a few seconds.

MR. WILL: The Saudis particularly might be expected to feel a certain gratitude toward the United States over its actions since last August 2nd. Can you tell us, in the sign of that gratitude on the part of the Saudis, for example, are they reconsidering their support of the P.L.O.? Are they considering abandoning the boycott of nations that do business with Israel? Any sign at all of moderation?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't want to get out ahead of what Secretary Baker is doing right now. Let me just say, George, that there are signs from Saudi Arabia, from the rest of the Arab world, and from Israel, that we now do have what one could call a narrow window of opportunity where there is, at least temporarily, a changed attitude. Whether it will result in people taking steps which they heretofore have found painful, we're still exploring.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, thank you; thanks very much for coming; pleased to have you.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, David.

Jim Hoagland

Here's a New One: The Beirut Syndrome

Like Mark Twain, the Soviet and American military establishments can now muse pleasurably over premature obituaries about them last year. Instead of fading away, these soldiers rebound, taking charge of global security issues that the politicians seemed to control only a few months ago.

Events have invested Gen. Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and his Soviet counterpart, Gen. Mikhail Moiseyev, with authority to rein in the freewheeling restructuring of international relations that George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev promised at the Washington summit last June. After five years of hectic change, playing it safe becomes the order of the day.

In Washington, the military command deploys the credibility and clout gained by the Desert Storm victory to get its way and get out of Iraq quickly. The Bush administration also cold shoulders requests from the new democracies of Eastern Europe for Western commitments to defend them and tones down bold ideas on reorganizing NATO to give Western Europe defense autonomy.

This does not mean that Powell and his colleagues want to see Saddam survive and Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel fall. They don't. But their reluctance to consider new commitments as circumstances change limits America's ability to prevent such unwelcome results. In Iraq and in the new Europe forming in the twilight of the Cold War, the Joint Chiefs seem to be demanding a clarity and tidiness that could exist only if they had completely vanquished the enemy on the battlefield.

"The press and the public underestimate the role the U.S. military is playing in driving policy right now," a senior administration official said of the messy aftermath in Iraq. "People who wear uniforms have a great deal of credibility in this town," offered another senior policy maker in a conversation about Europe.

In Moscow, chief of staff Moiseyev manipulates failure the way Powell has used success to gain political ascendancy. Smarting over the retreat from Germany and the loss of its Arab clients in the Middle East, the Soviet military has clawed back the policy ground it lost in the early days of perestroika and glasnost.

At a high-level U.S.-Soviet meeting in Moscow last month, Moiseyev made it clear to U.S. negotiators that the Soviet military now controls the fate of the deadlocked CFE Vienna arms control accord. He offered a grudging concession, subsequently endorsed by Gorbachev, but he refused to discuss modifying it in any way. Moiseyev was contemptuous of the Soviet Foreign Ministry participants as well as the members of Secretary of State Jim Baker's team, according to a U.S. account of the meeting.

Powell's strengthened clout was evident in his success in watering down the "You fly, you die" warning Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf gave to the Iraqi military at the beginning of the cease-fire. That warning was intended to cover Iraqi combat helicopters as well as fixed-wing aircraft, as President Bush said on March 13 in Ottawa.

But the policy was undone at a March 26 White House meeting, where it was decided to announce publicly that the United States would not shoot down Iraqi helicopters attacking Kurdish and Shiite rebels. The announcement had the political effect of giving Saddam carte blanche for massacre.

Throughout the meeting, Powell pressed Bush, Baker and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to define what mission U.S. troops would be pursuing if they "reengaged" the Iraqi army. The fuzzy answers he got allowed Powell to push for and get a preliminary decision on total immediate

BEIRUT...

CONTINUED

U.S. withdrawal from the Iraqi-Kuwaiti theater.

"The debate in the administration had to be settled," one White House official said. "The president felt it had gone on long enough. The announcement about the helicopters was made to show that it was over." The crucial decision was to withdraw as quickly as possible, which fits Bush's main political problem: How can he resume fighting when he had already declared total victory?

"Powell recalls constantly that we left Marines sitting in Beirut without a mission, and they got bombed" in 1983, says one official. "He uses that effectively to challenge his civilian superiors to be very clear about committing U.S. force. He argued we would use assemble massive force, use it ruthlessly and then get out immediately. That is still his program. We won 100-0. Why reopen the game?"

The Joint Chiefs' determination to avoid American casualties and imprecise goals in Iraq is admirable in itself. So is their reluctance to replace the Brezhnev Doctrine with a Bush

Doctrine to use force to protect the new democratic system taking root in Eastern Europe.

But a Beirut syndrome emerges to replace the Vietnam syndrome President Bush says America has kicked. The military's reluctance to live in and work with uncertainty inhibits U.S. policy in the gulf and in Europe in a crucial moment of change.

The tragic flight of the Kurds has reopened the debate in Washington and gained the Kurds some protection in the areas where U.S. relief supplies are distributed. The Bush administration repairs some of the damage by putting the U.S. military in charge of the emergency relief effort in northern Iraq. But more must be done.

Improvising as the situation changes—in this case, making it clear to Saddam that U.S. forces will stay there as long as his regime is in power and slaughters its citizens—will avoid even greater tragedy and instability for the future. The need for a force on the ground to make sure Iraq lives up to the strict terms of the United Nations cease-fire also argues against a headlong rush out of Iraq.

Saddam bet that the United States would "run out of breath" in the confrontation with Iraq and quit rather than achieve victory. His massacres extend the finish line. This is a challenge the U.S. military's new influence and power should be employed to meet, not to duck.

Insights on Desert Storm



Bruce van Voorst, TIME's Senior Correspondent for National Security Affairs, is a veteran foreign correspondent who has served stints in Bonn, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Beirut and Tehran. He has also covered the worlds of high tech and business, reporting cover stories for TIME on subjects as diverse as IBM and the breakup of AT&T. With a beat that takes him to Capitol Hill, the State Department, the CIA and the Pentagon, van Voorst had one of the best perches in Washington from

which to watch the nation — and its leadership — cope with the stress of war. Recently TIME INSIDER asked van Voorst for his impressions of two key figures in the winning of that war.

Q. Talk for a minute about the relationship between Secretary Cheney and General Powell. How do they interact when they're together?

A. Cheney is Mr. Outside; he states the policy. On the plane coming back from the Middle East a couple of weeks ago, Cheney sat in the Secretary's chair, very much in command, and Powell had to scramble for a seat just like the rest of us. But every once in a while, Cheney will defer to Powell. He'll say, 'General Powell has to tutor the Secretary of Defense' on this or that. Powell is enormously gregarious, but he is also a no-nonsense administrator. And remember that the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs the real leader of the armed forces. It's a job that's tailor-made for someone like Powell. The service chiefs have been downgraded, almost to the point where they now just supply the men and matériel. The real power is Powell's, and he uses it.

Q. Are the two close personal friends?

A. No. They meet every afternoon at 5:00 when they're in the city for an update on the situation, but then Powell retires to repair Volvos, and Cheney reads about fly-fishing.

Q. Volvos?

A. Yes, Powell loves Volvos. I asked him once, as a sort of test of the legend, about the firing order on a 4-cylinder Volvo, and he shot the answer right back at me. He often has grease under his fingernails, and he laughs that his secretary lectures him about it. Cheney subscribes to six magazines about fly-fishing, and he reads them instead of murder mysteries.

Q. How have relations been among the top men in the Administration during this crisis? The public hears very little backbiting among the White House, DoD and State.

A. Given the egos involved, it's incredible. There's nothing like the struggle between Weinberger and Shultz. There's been almost no rancor. Partly, that may be because the U.S. was on the march toward victory. But there are other reasons, too. [National Security Adviser] Brent Scowcroft is a straight arrow. He's 66, and he doesn't have his own agenda. Also, Bill Webster, the director of the CIA, is a lovely person but is a relatively weak figure in the inner councils. And Cheney and Baker are friends. Cheney's the reason Baker bought his ranch in Wyoming, and Cheney introduced him to fly-fishing. But also, the President insists on loyalty, and the President has turned out to be a pretty hard-nosed guy. He defers to the people he trusts, and most important, he deferred to the on-site commander, Norman Schwarzkopf, who happens to be a very good general. Bush

was not like JFK, saying where the tanks could go in Berlin, or LBJ, picking bombing targets, and people like to work for him.

Q. How did you feel about the news blackout that was announced at the outset of the ground attack in Desert Storm?

A. I couldn't fight it, to be honest. As much as it runs counter to my professional interest, I think the refusal to give briefings in the first phase was perfectly reasonable. Saddam's only eyes were our press reports. We had total intelligence, and he knew virtually nothing about us. The U.S. was involved in two major feints that, if detected, would have left American troops vulnerable. Saddam's information network consisted of a few Bedouins wandering across the border. I interpreted his forays

like the one at Khafji as intelligence-gathering missions. It was imperative that no one [in the news media] help him by divulging tactical information. Notice that Cheney killed this after two days when the military situation permitted.

Q. How do you think the Pentagon's pool policy worked?

A. It didn't work very well. During a visit in early January, I was able to wander around the front relatively unhindered, but by the time the war began on January 17, the military pool system was in effect and dampened

all initiative. To be sure, the campaign at that point was largely an air war, with little for American correspondents to do but interview returning pilots after a mission. The basic problem was that the system prevented correspondents from talking with the troops, which after all is their chief mission and has been in every conflict since the Civil War. It's true that a lot of the correspondents who were sent to the gulf should have been home covering city council. They weren't war correspondents. Covering a war is a specialized kind of reporting. You wouldn't send your music correspondent to cover a war, why would you send your city council man? Many of them sat in their hotel rooms and yelled that they weren't being given any information. The irony is that because of the constraints, the Pentagon will not have a video record of much of the combat.

Q. Who was responsible for the policy?

A. Cheney, of course, but also Pete Williams, his spokesman as well. I will say a lot of nice things about him, but I would still object strongly to the pool. Pete was brought in by Cheney. He knew virtually nothing about military affairs. He learned [about] the Pentagon very quickly, and he's emerged as the most effective guy in that slot in my memory. He runs a big operation: the Pentagon spends \$2 on public information for every dollar we and the networks spend covering defense affairs. He's an articulate, relaxed and funny man. But the pool was a bad idea.

Q. Do you think the policy really hurt coverage?

A. I don't believe it hurt TIME. Our problem was not really too little information. I think what our readers wanted were judgments that made use of the information we had to put the action in some perspective.

Q. Can you give us some perspective on the military lessons?

INSIGHTS...CONTINUED

A. Yes. First, I think the success we had in destroying SCUDs will stimulate development of SDI—the antimissile system. Patriots can't destroy an ICBM, and people saw what a difference being able to shoot down a missile makes to a country's defense. Second, the inability to find many of the mobile SCUD launchers will force another look at the B-2 bomber. Seeking out Soviet mobile missiles had been one of the Air Force's justifications for the bomber, which costs as much as if it were built of gold. The F-117A fighter, also a stealth-technology aircraft,

appears to have performed well, but that's against a second rate Iraqi air defense, which proves little about how the B-2 would fare against sophisticated Soviet systems. Third, the accuracy of the Tomahawks may make us reappraise the need for another generation of manned bombers. And finally, the call up of the Reserves and National Guard showed gross deficiencies that call into question the whole total force concept that requires early use of Guard and Reserve units. Those are the most immediate questions that will be addressed, I think. There are plenty of other, more general issues, but those are some of the purely technical ones that occur to me. ■

KUWAIT INVITES NON-U.S. COMPANIES TO BATTLE OIL WELLS INFERNO

KUWAIT -- Kuwait Saturday set a target of seven months to extinguish all its 500 blazing oil wells and planned to bring in non-U.S. companies because U.S. experts were not working fast enough.

Oil Minister Rashid al-Ameeri said non-American companies would be invited in with the aim of cutting by nearly two-thirds the American experts' two-year timetable to put out all the fires.... "I'm very much concerned about the pace, it's relatively slow," Ameeri told a news conference. Bringing in non-U.S. companies would surprise the American firefighters, he added. "It will make them work faster."

(John Rogers, Reuter)

ISRAEL SENDS MIXED MESSAGE TO PALESTINIANS ON PEACE

JERUSALEM -- Israeli leaders have sent mixed signals to Palestinians -- offering them limited self-rule in the occupied territories while pledging to expand Jewish settlement there.

Prime Minister Shamir told reporters Sunday that Palestinians could control their internal affairs except foreign relations and defense, as outlined in the 1978 Camp David accords for peace between Israel and Egypt.

"...In the negotiations for Camp David Accords, we spoke of full autonomy. And there was an impressive list of the powers (Palestinians) will receive in all areas of life except for some things which make the difference between the type of rule they will receive and an independent state," Shamir said....

Shamir and his advisers said the proposal was not new but based on an agreement between Egypt and Israel to grant the Palestinians an interim period of self-rule followed by negotiations for a permanent solution....

Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Levy told reporters after the weekly cabinet meeting Sunday, "No one promised to stop construction in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Our right cannot be challenged."... Housing Minister Sharon defended Israel's decision to build more housing in the occupied territories in an interview Sunday on ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley." Sharon...said the West Bank had to be settled to provide military "strategic depth" for Israel.

National Security Adviser Scowcroft, appearing later on the same program, disagreed. Citing Egypt as an example, Scowcroft said that land for peace was the only real solution for Israel for protection from missiles from nearby countries.

Shamir, speaking at an airport news conference before flying to London, said his government's policy was to expand development in the West Bank and Gaza.

(Marjorie Olster, Reuter)

Scowcroft Hits Israeli Housing Plan

Reuter

Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Sharon yesterday defended his country's decision to build more housing in the occupied territories, drawing criticism from White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

Sharon, a hard-liner in Israel's ruling Likud party, said the West Bank had to be settled to provide military "strategic depth" for Israel.

"We were never interested in agricultural land; we were interested in the high-controlling hills and mountains overlooking our coastal plain where two-thirds of our population lives," he said from Israel on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley."

Sharon said the land is vital to protect Israel from attack. But

Scowcroft, interviewed later on the same program, disagreed. Citing Egypt as an example, he said that land for peace is the only real solution for Israel to protect it from missiles from nearby countries.

"What Israel did with Egypt was give up territory for a piece of paper, for a peace treaty," he said. "They've given up all of Sinai now. They don't have strategic depth there against the largest force in the Middle East and they're quite secure on that border."

During the Persian Gulf War, the Israeli population was under attack from Scud missiles fired by Iraqi forces but the inaccurate missiles caused few deaths.

The Likud is committed to settlement in the territories although the policy has been widely condemned.

CAPITAL LINE

USA TODAY'S BRIEFING ON WASHINGTON

Bush aide, Israeli spar over territories



AP

SCOWCROFT: Israel 'secure on border'

Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Sharon and U.S. national security adviser Brent Scowcroft wrangled Sunday on U.S. TV over settlements in Israel's occupied territories. Sharon, a hard-liner in Israel's ruling Likud Party, said the settlements provide "strategic depth" for Israel, "... overlooking our coastal plain where two-thirds of our population lives," he said from Israel on ABC's *This Week with David Brinkley*. Sharon said the land was vital to protect Israel from attack. Scowcroft disagreed, arguing that Israel had already

traded land for peace. "What Israel did with Egypt was give up territory for a piece of paper, for a peace treaty," Scowcroft said. "They've given up all of Sinai now. They don't have strategic depth there against the largest force in the Middle East and they're quite secure on that border." The Likud has sponsored Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, captured in 1967. The settlements have been criticized by the United States and other countries.

NEWSMAKERS

BEHIND THE SCENES WITH PEOPLE IN THE HEADLINES

President weighs in as charity fisherman

By Richard Benedetto
USA TODAY

PINTLALLA, Ala. — President Bush lifted the weight of world affairs from his shoulders this weekend and weighed fish instead.

He spent Saturday competing in an Alabama bass tournament.

It was the kind of down-home event local politicians show up at in election years. This tournament, which raised \$100,000 for the Pintlalla Baptist Church building fund, drew the leader of the free world.

Bush spent five hours on a 55-acre private lake casting for bass from a three-seat boat. He said he caught six fish, but threw back all but one in hopes of hooking bigger ones.


The professional bass anglers in the tournament paid \$5,000 to compete for the \$50,000 prize money and to fish alongside the president.

Roland Martin of Clewiston, Fla., and Orlando Wilson of Woodstock, Ga., won the right to fish in Bush's boat by throwing darts at a picture of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

After fishing, Bush spent another hour officiating at the weighing-in, doubling up in laughter as a bass slithered off the scale and landed on a Secret Service agent's shiny black shoes. The agent hardly blinked.

Things were so informal that Ray Scott, tournament host and Bush's fishing pal, kept referring to the president as "Coach," as in, "How much does that weigh, Coach?"

When Bush's diminutive national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft,



Reuters

'BAMA BASS: President Bush — or 'Coach,' as the tournament host called him — displays his best bass before officiating at the weighing-in.

pulled in, he held up his biggest bass.

"It's as big as Brent," quipped Bush, who often jokes about Scowcroft's height.

One contestant, Bill Shrader, said he went by Bush's boat and shouted, "Mr. President, we love you!"

Bush replied, "Why don't you let some bass come by my way?"

"I don't love you that much!" Shrader yelled back.

Bush found an excuse to be in Alabama on tournament day by giving a 9 a.m. speech on Europe and the Soviet Union at Maxwell Air Force Base in nearby Montgomery.

He appeared touched when the congregation of Pintlalla Baptist made him an honorary lifetime member, but deadpanned, "Thanks a lot, Ray," when Scott handed him 52 weekly contribution envelopes.

Bush's team finished well down in the pack of anglers, weighing in with a seven-fish catch of 15 pounds, 8 ounces. The winning catch was eight fish at 34 pounds, 14 ounces, by Charley Ingram of Spring Hill, Tenn., and Guy Eaker of Cherryville, N.C.

Remaining U.S. Forces in Iraq Pulling Back

By Molly Moore
Washington Post Staff Writer

The remaining U.S. military forces inside Iraq began withdrawing from occupied territory yesterday to a thin buffer zone along the country's border with Kuwait, according to U.S. military officials.

Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney said yesterday that most of the troops will be out of Iraq within the next few days—about seven weeks after the war against Iraqi forces ended. Army officials said they expect that between 3,000 and 5,000 troops will remain in a demilitarized zone that extends 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) inside Iraq until a U.N. observer force can assume its duties there. Cheney also said that Iraqi refugees in the area, most of them Shiite Muslims, would be protected and not left “to the tender mercies of the Iraqis.”

“We are getting out of that part of Iraq that we previously have occupied,” Cheney said yesterday on NBC’s “Meet the Press.” The region occupied by U.S. forces covered about 15 percent of Iraq’s national territory.

President Bush ordered the pull-out on Saturday, according to Cheney. He said the U.S. Central

Command chief, Army Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, was told “to withdraw U.S. forces from the Euphrates [River] area . . . to the buffer zone that’s specified in the cease-fire resolution” signed Thursday.

While the Army will pull most of its remaining 75,000 troops out of the occupied region south of the Euphrates within the next few days, Pentagon officials said the effort will not increase the pace at which forces return to their home bases in the United States and Europe.

Most of the Army forces withdrawing from Iraq—which are from the Kansas-based 1st Infantry Division and the European-based 3rd Armored Division—will remain at temporary transit camps inside Saudi Arabia with other U.S. forces awaiting return home.

Cheney, who like most military officials has pushed hard to withdraw American forces as quickly as possible, said U.S. forces in Iraq will not abandon their aid to refugees in the southern region. The U.S. Central Command, in a statement released yesterday, said allied forces would “continue to protect and provide humanitarian assistance to refugees in the demilitarized zone to include the refugees

at Safwan.”

Central Command officials also said other refugees in the region now occupied by allied troops will be invited to move into the demilitarized zone for assistance and protection. About 30,000 Iraqi refugees are now in the Safwan area about three miles inside Iraq from the Kuwaiti border, officials said. Another 13,000 refugees remain at a camp in the town of Fafha, which is outside the demilitarized zone, authorities said.

The refugee problems in southern Iraq, however, pale in comparison to the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees suffering in squalid camps along Iraq’s border with Turkey. Cheney said that the camps on the Iraqi side of the border remain chaotic, while those in Turkey are somewhat better organized and controlled. He said the U.S. military will continue airdropping food and supplies to the refugees until international relief organizations begin operating effectively in the region.

Cheney said that the Pentagon has been unable to confirm press reports that Iraqi forces have attacked Kurdish refugees north of the 36th parallel—the line the

United States ordered Iraq to observe as a safe region for fleeing Kurds.

White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, appearing on ABC’s “This Week With David Brinkley,” said that as he understood it, the military action in the north involved Kurdish guerrilla fighters and Iraqi armed forces and did not involve attacks on refugees.

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BACK...from Pg. 4

He also said the clashes were limited and did not interfere with refugee operations.

Scowcroft was asked whether the president's warning against carrying out military activity in a wide swath of northern Iraq, delivered to Iraqi diplomats in Washington and at the United Nations, could not have been construed as applying to attacks on all Kurds, not just refugees.

Scowcroft replied, "The specific warning we gave him was not to interfere with the refugee operations."

Scowcroft also said that although the United States expected chaos after the Persian Gulf War was over and had relief supplies in place at

various "exits from Iraq," the severity of the attack by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's forces on the Kurds was not anticipated.

Had the Kurdish situation been anticipated, he said, the United States might have put more relief supplies at the Iraq-Turkey border, but said such an effort would have helped only marginally.

More than half of the 540,000 U.S. forces sent to the Middle East region during the Persian Gulf conflict are still waiting to return home. According to Central Command officials, about 295,000 American military men and women remain on the Arabian peninsula and aboard ships in the surrounding waters.

The withdrawal from Iraq follows the formal approval Thursday of the permanent U.N. cease-fire. The

agreement established a demilitarized zone along 120 miles of the Iraq-Kuwait border, extending 10 kilometers into Iraq on one side of the border and five kilometers into Kuwait on the other. The first contingents of a 1,440-member U.N. peace-keeping force arrived in Kuwait Saturday. The unit will eventually assume control of the patrolling of the demilitarized zone.

Cheney said yesterday, "I do not foresee any set of circumstances in which we want to leave U.S. ground divisions in that part of the world." He said that while the U.S. military likely will maintain larger naval and air presences in the region, "Our basic, fundamental policy right now . . . is to bring our boys home."

Military sources said the U.S. Army plans to leave about one division's worth of heavy armor

equipment prepositioned in Saudi Arabia in the event of a future crisis. The equipment, which according to tentative plans will be located at King Khalid Military City in northern Saudi Arabia, would include 400 tanks, 400 armored personnel carriers and other support equipment. The U.S. military is also discussing plans for significant ground combat exercises in Saudi Arabia in coming years, much like those it conducts in other regions of the world.

Cheney also noted yesterday that in the aftermath of the war, the U.S. military has received an increase in requests for arms sales from Middle Eastern nations, partially because "Soviet equipment fared so poorly." The Soviet Union was Iraq's main arms supplier.

INSIDE REPORT

Big biz angers White House by seeking rights-bill deal

PRESIDENT Bush's top aides angrily demanded that big business stop its quest for a compromise civil rights bill after learning that the Business Roundtable had been privately negotiating for months with the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights.

"I think you'll find this is going to be shut off," a senior Bush aide told us.

White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, who tried and failed to agree on a compromise bill last year, was furious over the backdoor approach by business. While both the White House and conservatives are determined to prevent a quota system from being imbedded into law, corporate America is more interested in an agreement that will prevent lawsuits.

The Bush administration is sensitive to a public perception that the Business Roundtable, composed of CEOs of major American corporations, can speak for the Republican Party. The word from the White House is that whatever the business leaders do, the new civil rights bill likely to be passed by Congress will be vetoed by the president, as last year's was.

■
CONGRESSIONAL intelligence insiders privately predict that Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates will soon replace Judge William Webster as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, even though Gates withdrew his 1986 nomination to be CIA director because of Iran-Contra questions.

Gates has been given unusual operational control of the NSC bureaucracy by his boss, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who spends most of his time with President Bush.

Webster, whom Bush retained at the CIA two years ago when he became president, has now run the agency longer than all but three predecessors.

■
FIDEL Castro has ended a



**ROWLAND EVANS &
ROBERT NOVAK**

period of relative quiet with an explosive decision to give late-model air-to-air missiles to El Salvador's communist insurgents, his first major operation outside Cuba since Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* reform began running into serious trouble last year.

Cuba's communist master surprised the Bush administration by sending the FMLN Salvadoran insurgency both SAM-14s and later-model 16s. That renders meaningless the FMLN's agreement several months ago to return its store of older anti-aircraft missiles to the Sandinista-controlled Nicaraguan army.

Castro's ties to Moscow have steadily weakened since Gorbachev took power seven years ago and began to cut Soviet arms aid and reduce a huge subsidy in the Soviet price for Cuban sugar.

■
CONSERVATIVE Republican House members, noting a leadership void on the party's right wing, are privately urging Sen. Trent Lott of Mississippi to start moving around the country to position himself for a possible run for president in 1996.

That follows frustration over Housing Secretary Jack Kemp's apparent decision not to build a new political base by running for the Senate from California. Sen. Phil Gramm of Texas has clashed with House conservatives over tax policy, and they doubt Vice President Dan Quayle can make it.

Press Clips Doug Ireland

Black Mass

The arrant iniquity of George Butch's Middle East policy is no longer denied. George was bleating on Sunday about "the objectives so beautifully achieved" by his unnecessary war on Iraq, a locution rendered obscene by the mounting accumulations of human carrion that are now strewn about that country's landscape. Sights and sounds of unbearable human suffering, beamed to us by satellite, made a mockery of the crocodile tears shed from the pulpit by Preacher Bush on what he, in an excess of dominical public relations, had proclaimed a national day of prayerful thanksgiving.

While Bush was mouthing his poll-prompted orisons, his petrovicar, James Baker, was holding hands in Ankara with the repulsively autarchic Turgut Ozal and proclaiming to the press that "the border, as far as we know, is open" between Turkey and Iraq. At that very moment, Ozal's army was driving tens of thousands of starving, ill, and wounded Kurds—those who had survived Saddam Hussein's phosphorous, napalm, and cluster bombs to risk the mortally arduous trek to safety in subfreezing weather—to slog through the mud and back up the mountains whence they came, according to Sunday's *ABC World News Tonight*. Turkey is our heavily subsidized ally, and the forced march of those exhausted refugees back to the frontier, within range of Saddam's Western-supplied weaponry, is just one more crime of conscience for which Bush will have to atone when he goes to that great Groton-in-the-Sky (there to rejoin the idol of his youthful matins, Henry Stimson, the U.S. secretary of war who refused to save the Jews by bombing the railroad lines to Auschwitz).

There is a pornographic cynicism about the way in which Bush, Scowcroft, Cheney & Co. have allowed whole peoples to be consumed in the fiery furnace that is Saddam's Iraq. Any TV war potato would have to have been transformed into a pillar of salt by his staring not to know by now that the massive rising of the Kurds and Shiites against the Herod of Baghdad was prompted by Bush's strident calls to revolt.

In the early '70s, the U.S. put into effect a Henry Kissinger plot which, as Daniel Schorr reminded us in Sunday's *Washington Post*, "organized a Kurdish insurrection against Saddam Hussein as a favor by President Nixon to the shah of Iran, only to abandon the Kurds to destruction when the Iranian and Iraqi leaders settled their border dispute." Surely, then, we can believe the wary Kurd leaders when they tell us that, without Bush's unequivocal encouragements, they would never have summoned their masses to arms (weekend revelations about a CIA-sponsored radio station that for months beamed appeals for rebellion into Iraq seem almost superfluous, since Bush's verbal bugle calls were uplinked to the entire attentive world).

Why, under the tutelage of General Scowcroft—Kissinger's former factotum—did Bush decide that a Ba'athist military dictatorship was his government of preference for Iraq? This administration's seesawing foreign policy, ahistorical and visionless, has in no small part pinned its

The Washington Post _____
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realpolitik to the Machiavellian imperatives of an unholy trio: Fahd, Assad, and Mossad. The Wahabite monarch was scarcely less terrorized than Saddam by an Iraqi Shiite revolt with even the most tenuous Iranian ties—it might be contagious—and has convinced Bush that America's petroclients in the gulf have more to fear from Teheran than from a defanged Saddam. Having transferred to the sanguineous ruler of Damascus the most-favored-tyrant status his administration once accorded to Saddam, Bush wants to keep this skittish coalition partner in the U.S. orbit, and Syria's ruler would be discomfited by anything too closely resembling a successful democratic revolt from below in his next-door neighbor. As for the Israeli secret service, which can be said to form that country's permanent government where foreign policy matters in the region are concerned, it shares Assad's horror of a possibly autonomous Kurdistan: if the Kurds must be permitted, at long last, their own state, how can one be denied to the Palestinians?

If, as Bush claimed, Saddam really was the "new Hitler," and the need to emasculate him the most important moral issue since World War II, the logic of the administration's policy would have dictated some form of intervention at the first signs of revolt, when it could have aided those who responded to America's call with a minimum of direct military involvement—keeping Saddam's air arm from the skies, for example, while offering weapons, training, military counsel, and food and medical aid to the rebel coalition, through client states if necessary (a long-standing U.S. practice around the world in other, less urgent circumstances). Bush's failure to do so reveals that the administration's rationale for his bloody war—with its hundreds of thousands of casualties, most of them morally innocent conscripts or civilians—was a lie from the gitgo.

Sadly, the debate currently raging in the U.S. over aid to the Kurdish rebellion—help for the already annihilated Shiites, now picking through the rubble of Basra and their other destroyed cities, is scarcely mentioned these days—has come too late. Tom Wicker is right when he wrote in Saturday's *Times* that "the turmoil now convulsing Iraq was predictable before a single smart bomb was launched at Baghdad." The military situation on the ground means that, for the moment, the U.S. can do little more than care for the refugees that our firestorm and its political aftermath created—not only the displaced Kurds and Shiites, but the stateless *gastarbeiters* being chased from Kuwait by the antidemocratic and anti-Palestinian pogroms of the al-Sabah family.

Since Pentagon talent so speedily found a way to refurbish in gold the bathrooms of the Emir of Kuwait, it ought to be able to do more than dump six paltry planetloads of

CONTINUE

ready-to-eat chicken à la king (complete with napkins) on the millions of Kurds now trying to make their way to Turkey (that's the sum total of the Bush-ordered relief aid that had reached their vicinity by press time). The odious Ozal, who has tents and food galore, is the creature of our largess, and should be *ordered* to make them available. Restoration of full relations with Iran, and massive help for the refugees both there and in Jordan, must be high on the agenda. And *all* the borders around Iraq should be opened for the transitory flight of those escaping this new Cambodia.

If the U.S. can spend \$100 billion for a war that didn't have to be, surely America and its wealthy noncombatant bankers among the world's richest nations can find the 10th part of that sum to relieve and relocate that war's most innocent victims. But this administration's inclemency up to now means you shouldn't hold your breath. And every time George opens his mouth, we can only growl, as Tennessee's Big Daddy once did, that there's too much mendacity in the world.

No Quick Exit From Gulf

President's Commitment Seems Open-Ended

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush yesterday put to rest his dream of a quick, clean U.S. exit from the Persian Gulf and put aside some of the policies underlying that dream.

Only last week, the White House rejected the formal establishment of zones of safety for Kurdish refugees as anathema to some U.S. allies and at odds with the policy that Iraq should not be split and turned into another Lebanon. Only days ago, White House officials said Bush was so intent on getting U.S. forces out of Iraq that he was opposed to any additional troops crossing the Turkish border into Iraq to help with relief efforts.

When Bush announced the orig-

inal humanitarian aid airdrops into Iraq less than two weeks ago, the effort was portrayed as the U.S. contribution to an operation that would be organized and run by the United Nations and international relief agencies. Officials estimated 10 days of airlifts would be needed, and later White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the president expected that within 30 days the relief agencies would be in place to supervise and run the effort.

Yesterday, Bush, who seemed to be struggling to contain what aides say is his anger with critics who accused him of acting too slowly to help the Kurds, committed the United States to an effort in Iraq whose timetable he could not delineate.

Nor could he say how many forces would be involved, although he spoke of "relatively small numbers" of troops.

Bush said the administration is working under the assumption that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein will not attack the Kurds and the Americans protecting them, but the administration's predictions of how Saddam and his nation would behave have been off the mark in major ways since the end of the Persian Gulf War.

According to senior administration officials, Bush's action yesterday represented an acknowledgment that the refugee problem is far larger and more difficult to solve than he had anticipated, and that action is necessary, whatever the long-term consequences of establishing refugee camps.

"Every day [that] we looked at it and said, 'We'll do this,' it was worse the next day, and the things we rejected the day before seemed less objectionable," an official said.

Another official described the unfolding tragedy of the refugees as "a nightmare" the administra-

tion began waking up to only after Secretary of State James A. Baker III visited Turkey last week. The situation there was so chaotic that "every system is short-circuited, every system is overloaded," the official said. "You have to put aside the medium problems and the long-term problems and deal with today and the fact [that] 1,000 people a day, a day, are dying and we are being held responsible."

Officials said Bush faced pressure from France, Britain and particularly Turkey as well as other allies to take a more active role in relief efforts and to acknowledge that the United States, not international agencies, would have to carry the major humanitarian burden or the effort would fail.

From Turkey, Baker laid out the case for greater U.S. involvement in telephone conversations with Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney and Bush as well as in a long telegram to the president, officials said.

"This is an instant education process for us," said one official. "Every day that went by, the more we got educated—educated on what the international organizations can't do, how much the Kurds fear going back, how hard it is to get aid in there. Sure we're reacting on a minute-to-minute

basis and it's 'ad hocery.' But you can't crucify us for doing nothing and then crucify us for not laying out a plan for a crisis no one saw coming down the pike."

Yesterday's announcement also amounts to a public acknowledgment that Bush's dream of a quick overthrow of Saddam remains that, a dream. The president was reduced to wishing aloud that some "broker" would arrange a deal to carry Saddam into exile in some third country.

Privately, some senior policy-makers are saying that crushing the uprisings in Iraq have made Saddam stronger and more likely to hold on to power, a view at odds with previous administration predictions that he would quickly fall and the refugees would return to their homes.

Bush and his advisers had to swallow a lot of their old rhetoric yesterday, especially about the necessity of avoiding any move that would segment Iraq, even temporarily, so that Iraq would be able to remain a counterweight to Iran in the region. And they had spoken passionately in the past 10 days of the significant, long-term problems associated with formally establishing, under U.S. protection, zones in Iraq barred to Saddam.

Last Sunday, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft agreed that a safe haven for the Kurds could in the future result in an instant West Bank, a collection of refugees once considered temporary that becomes permanent. As another official put it, the establishment "all but invites" more refugees to flock into the area and makes the United States responsible for them.

This week these officials outlined some of the pitfalls of the move that Bush took yesterday.

They said the U.S. commitment to maintaining the refugee camps would have to be open-ended because neither the size of the occupying force necessary nor the length of time it will be needed is predictable.

In addition, the United States would have to assume responsibility, in effect, for tens of thousands of Kurds—moving them, feeding them, protecting them and arranging their future. Some moves, they said, might take United Nations authorization that could be extraordinarily difficult to obtain.

And finally, they added, the U.S. involvement would be based on an "assumption" that Saddam would not interfere—and there are no guarantees of that.

Jim Hoagland

Back on Track in Iraq

Like Gregor Samsa, the Bush administration awoke from the Persian Gulf War to find it had been turned into a cockroach, or the moral equivalent thereof. A change as mysterious and hideous as the opening scene in Kafka's "The Metamorphosis" had come over the gang that shot so straight and fast in getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

Now comes another amazing turn in character that not even Kafka would have dared. President Bush has taken on the responsibility for protecting the lives of Kurdish refugees inside northern Iraq, despite renewed frothing at the mouth and threats by Saddam.

Welcome back, Gregor. But don't stop the re-metamorphosis too soon.

The president's press conference Tuesday leaves him half-pregnant. He recognizes that the United States has a responsibility and the resources to stop Iraq from becoming a giant death camp. But he still flirts with overstating the difficulties involved in forcing the Iraqis to abandon their campaign of slaughter, while he minimizes what is at stake in this cruel aftermath of Operation Desert Storm.

The president has usefully brought back to life the ambiguity of what the United States will or will not do militarily to stop the threat Saddam's regime poses to its own citizens. But he must be prepared to follow through on forcing Saddam to back down if it comes to that, as he was in Kuwait.

Bush knows that the United States has the resources and the responsibility to stop Iraq from becoming a giant death camp.

Otherwise he will risk repeating the error the United States made in leaving Europe in 1919 and leaving a half-defeated, vengeful German nation to its own devices.

Iraq is not Germany. But the Middle East is the Middle East. That is, oil, Israel and the fragile, unfinished nature of the Arab nation-state system make regional turmoil a global problem. Already the administration's failure to anticipate the backlash and pressures the Kurdish death march would create in Turkey endangers the government of Turkish President Turgut Ozal, a key American ally.

Military victories "produce power imbalances," the historian John Lewis Gaddis notes in the spring issue of *Foreign Affairs*. "It was precisely to avoid this danger that the peacemakers of 1815 and 1945, who designed the two most durable peace settlements of modern times, moved quickly after their respective triumphs to rehabilitate defeated adversaries and to invite them back into the international state system."

In other words, they did exactly the opposite of what Bush is doing in the Persian Gulf. And it

worked. But for nearly a month, the United States had misread that lesson and neglected in the Middle East and in most of Eastern Europe what Gaddis calls "the problems of reconstruction and reintegration" the world faces in the post-Cold War era.

Congressional leaders meeting with Bush and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft at the White House last week peppered the two men with questions about the U.S. flip-flop on grounding and then ungrounding Iraqi helicopters. It was a case the president knew intimately. But he repeatedly turned to Scowcroft with a puzzled look on his face, as if he were hearing of the matter for the first time. The discussion went nowhere as Scowcroft explained how difficult and dangerous it would be for U.S. forces to risk re-engaging Iraqi forces.

But has the Iraqi army staged a deathbed recovery in the past six weeks while 100,000 U.S. troops sat on Iraqi soil? If so, why so and how so? And why did the United States take a back seat in the war's aftermath, as the European Community called for safety zones for the Kurds, a war crimes

trial for Saddam and United Nations involvement in stopping the Kurdish massacre? Why choose cockroach status in the wake of victory?

Rep. Stephen J. Solarz played a vital role in getting House approval for the U.S. war on Iraq. The New York Democrat now urges that Saddam be ordered to resign or face a new U.N. military campaign. Edward Mortimer of the Financial Times proposes that the United Nations simply appoint a new government for Iraq and empower it to hold democratic elections.

These bold suggestions go beyond the president's own barely veiled offer to Saddam on Tuesday of safe passage out of Iraq if he quits. They respond to the totally new situation Operation Desert Storm has created. Until Tuesday, Bush seemed ready to deny that a new situation demanding new responses existed.

The dying and endangered Kurds and Shiites said otherwise. The need for Ozal to keep control over a restive Turkish military said otherwise. The need for Iraq to mend and rejoin the international community as quickly as possible said otherwise.

Bush did the right thing in Kuwait. Then by transforming himself overnight from bold warrior to passive observer, he let his policies contribute to the present tragedy in Iraq. With the 90-degree turn in policy—it is still not a complete reversal of course—Bush has given himself a second chance to save Iraqi lives and American honor.

U.N. chief, Bush differ on relief role

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush was sharply at odds with U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar yesterday over the legality of the emergency U.S. military rescue of Kurdish refugees.

Mr. Perez de Cuellar questioned Mr. Bush's authority to act under United Nations authority as the first American troops scouted locations for refugee camps and U.S. diplomats warned Iraqi authorities not to interfere.

Bush administration officials continued to say the force in Iraq would be less than 10,000 troops, but there were signs of a large support commitment.

Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams said some limited reserve call-ups might be needed. The force also will draw on military specialists from commands around the world. Air combat cover was increased, and dozens of huge air transports were earmarked for use in northern Iraq.

"We will cover it, whatever it costs," said White House Press Sec-

retary Marlin Fitzwater, who had no estimates but claimed the action had unanimous support in Congress. "I have not heard anyone suggest otherwise."

Lt. Gen. Martin Brandtner, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said seven to 10 teams of U.S. soldiers, totaling about 100 troops, were flown into northern Iraq.

The White House said Tuesday that U.S. forces in the operation total 7,776, including a 3,000-man amphibious landing force of Marines, sailors at a nearby port and some special forces. Britain will add 90 troops and France 121, but those numbers may also increase.

Mr. Fitzwater also explained yesterday why the president changed his mind since Easter Sunday, when he first objected to the concept of enclaves for refugees.

"The answer is simply that the problem grew beyond our ability to handle it under the other scheme.

That's all," he said.

Mr. Bush did not address the legal issue yesterday but said, "The priority is get the relief to these people that are suffering."

Some 60 U.S. helicopters continued to deliver food and blankets to remote highlands yesterday as an estimated 1,000 refugees a day were dying.

Mr. Bush also rebuffed Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's request to ship \$900 million worth of oil so his country can feed its own people.

"Let them be fed, let medicine get in there. And then when that is done and everything's done peacefully and harmoniously, then I might be willing to consider something else," Mr. Bush said.

National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft informed the Cabinet at a closed-door meeting that Mr. Perez de Cuellar had called for "special consultation" by the Security Council on the mercy mission during yesterday's one-hour meeting with French President Francois Mitterrand.

A senior White House official said Mr. Scowcroft's report to the Cabinet contradicted news reports quoting Mr. Perez de Cuellar as saying the

operation needed Security Council approval in a new resolution.

The administration fears China would veto such a resolution.

U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III told reporters in Luxembourg that the United States was acting under an existing U.N. resolution to save "hundreds of thousands of those poor souls on those mountain-tops."

Pentagon and White House spokesmen, still vague on logistics, insisted Mr. Bush already has full authority under Security Council Resolution 688, passed April 5, which guarantees Iraq's sovereignty and allots relief roles to the U.N. and "international humanitarian organizations."

Mr. Fitzwater declined to claim that status for the soldiers and Marines sent by the European Command to protect a flow of some 800,000 Kurdish refugees along the Turkish border.

"Our forces are simply there operating to carry out the U.N. refugee operations," Mr. Fitzwater said.

Mr. Williams said about six relief villages surrounded by smaller satellite camps would be ready within 15 days to receive tens of thousands of refugees each. The camps, to be built along roads leading south from mountainous areas, will provide food, shelter and medical care until the refugees can return home safely.

Gen. Brandtner said the first two locations selected were at Zakhu and Dahuk in Iraq.

The forces providing humanitarian aid, as well as air and ground units guarding camps, refugees and U.S. troops are directed by Army Lt. Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, deputy commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe and the 7th Army. The units carrying out Operation Provide Comfort are virtually all from the U.S. European Command rather than from Central Command units that fought Iraq in the south.

The few exceptions would be a very few linguists, medical teams and engineers, but their assistance would not stall deployment of Operation Desert Storm units to bases in Germany and the United States, Mr. Williams said.

Mr. Williams said psychological operations units would begin dropping leaflets and using sound systems on trucks or helicopters to invite refugees to move toward the camps.

"We would like first to be in contact with the Iraqi authorities to see their reaction to such a military presence on their territory," Mr. Perez de Cuellar told reporters in Paris as reports circulated Iraq might approve a U.N. relief effort. He said the effort would be viewed differently if countries were going in on their own and not under U.N. auspices.

Mr. Bush says he wants to turn the camps over to the U.N. as soon as possible and Iraq indicated to U.N. officials it would welcome U.N. administration.

"Once we get the centers up and running and get the refugees down to them, then the administration and security of the temporary refugee centers will be turned over to the United Nations and humanitarian organizations as soon as is practical," Mr. Williams said.

Gen. Brandtner said there are about 30,000 Iraqi soldiers, mostly infantry with little armor, in the area declared a "safe haven" by Mr. Bush.

"We are telling the Iraqis ... to just cease and desist, and to evacuate that area or to be in a position not to interfere in any way with this operation," Gen. Brandtner said, later amending his statement to say the Iraqi army had not been ordered out of the area.

"And remember, we're going in there in a humanitarian mode, and not in a combat mode," he said, adding that highly mobile air and ground Army and Marine forces were "tailored to be able to respond to the threat that we perceive, if in fact it does materialize."

Mr. Williams said the "quick reaction force" of soldiers and Marines will establish a base at an undisclosed spot inside Turkey.

Allies Urged Bush to Use Land Forces

By David Hoffman
and Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writers

When senior policy-makers met at the White House Monday afternoon to discuss accelerating aid to the Iraqi Kurdish refugees, the plan they developed envisioned U.S. air support and engineering help to an international relief effort inside northern Iraq. But there was no provision for the use of American troops to protect the refugee camps.

A day later, President Bush announced that the United States would contribute between 5,000 and 10,000 troops to an expanded and open-ended allied effort to create and protect the camps inside Iraq's northern border.

According to administration officials, the decision to add troops, and to endorse the creation of a network of refugee encampments inside Iraq, came in response to repeated appeals to the Bush administration from France, Britain and Turkey. These appeals propelled Bush into a new commitment of American military forces despite his oft-stated reluctance to leave U.S. troops inside Iraq.

Turkish President Turgut Ozal, for example, tele-

phoned Bush twice last weekend. Officials said Ozal told Bush Turkey could not handle the exodus any longer and the international community needed to find a way to persuade the refugees to come down out of the mountains, where they are suffering from starvation and exposure, and return to Iraq.

Also last weekend, senior French diplomats here visited the State Department to appeal to U.S. officials to support a plan for the creation, under U.N. auspices, of humanitarian "way stations" that would provide food, aid and medicine to refugees and guide them back to their homes deeper inside Iraq. The French plan envisioned a military contingent to protect the humanitarian workers and refugees.

When British Prime Minister John Major first suggested the idea of such protected enclaves inside Iraq for the Kurds, he found little enthusiasm in Washington. Officials said they were concerned Major's idea could lead to a long-term allied presence in Iraq, perhaps contributing to further tension and splintering of the country. Senior U.S.

Instead, the United States was attempting to meet the needs of the refugees, congregated along the mountainous Turkish-Iraqi border, by dropping supplies to them from the air.

But in the last four or five days, officials said pressure mounted for deeper U.S. involvement. Despite the American air drops of food and tents, the refugee exodus was growing, along with the number of casualties from extreme cold, hunger and deprivation in the mountains.

"The size of the problem grew into the millions," said a White House official. "By Monday, it was clear to the president that our hopes of doing it through airdrops or other ways was just not going to work."

The French plan outlined during the weekend addressed one of the U.S. problems with the British enclave idea—it would create only temporary shelter for refugees as they headed home. "In no case a permanent shelter is to be provided," said the French proposal. Rather, it envisioned "simple transit centers" in Iraq "as a first step before a final return."

The plan also proposed a U.N. presence "within cities and villages in order to protect civilians coming back home and to provide them with necessary assistance."

A diplomat familiar with the French plan said "our main concern" was that the refugee concentrations

"The British and French said, 'If we're going to have our forces on the ground, so should you.'"

—senior U.S. official

in Turkey were threatening to become semi-permanent locations for the Kurds that could spell political and economic headaches for Ankara for years to come. Moreover, it was getting more and more difficult to feed and assist the refugees in the mountains and officials wanted to at least find better terrain on which to aid them.

But this diplomat said that as of last weekend, U.S. policy-makers were still cautious about a large-scale commitment of American troops on Iraqi soil.

On Monday afternoon, the Deputies Committee, a group of high-level U.S. officials chaired by Robert M. Gates, the president's deputy national security adviser, met at the White House. Gates told the others that Bush—after hearing

from Ozal and Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who had just returned from the region—was prepared to accelerate the aid effort.

According to informed officials, the plan drawn up by the Deputies Committee basically accepted the French plan, and envisioned some U.S. engineering help on the ground and combat air patrols over the "way station" area in northern Iraq. But a sizable commitment of U.S. troops inside the country was not contemplated.

Later that afternoon, on the patio outside the Oval Office, Bush met with Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin L. Powell, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Gates to hear a report on where the planning stood. Baker also had a separate meeting with the president.

Officials said it was not clear precisely when Bush decided to make the deployment, but there were discussions about a U.S. military role. Powell reassured the president that whatever commitments were needed for the refugees would not slow the planned withdrawal of troops from the gulf war. The military presence would be supported by the U.S. European Command, headquartered in Germany, rather than the Central Command that ran the gulf war.

One administration official said the key impetus was the desire of French President Francois Mitterrand and Major that any troop commitment on their part would be joined by a U.S. military presence. "The British and French said, 'If we're going to have our forces on the ground, so should you,'" the official said. The decision to involve the American military was made "mind-bogglingly fast," said another U.S. official.

Bush devoted most of Tuesday to consulting with both Mitterrand and Major before making the announcement. "It was clearly a political decision made at the highest level," said a European diplomat.

Fighting the postwar battles

The end of the gulf war has not brought peace to the Kurds, the Shiites, the Arabs or Israel

The gulf war ended without even a whimper in an office in New York last Thursday when United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 went into effect, establishing a permanent cease-fire between Iraq and the allied forces. But even before the first chapter of the gulf crisis ended, a new, more troubling one had begun.

The unforeseen consequences of Operation Desert Storm are multiplying daily, leaving the Bush administration with an array of half measures for controlling the bloody aftermath and making good on its promise to restore stability to the region. Even Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of U.S. forces in the gulf, felt compelled to defend what was undeniably a magnificent feat of arms. "I have a great feeling of a great victory," said Schwarzkopf during a visit to liberated Kuwait last week. "Anyone who dares even imply that we did not achieve a great victory obviously doesn't know what the hell he's talking about."

As American troops in southern Iraq savored the prospect of returning home, some 27,000 Iraqi refugees huddled under American protection near the Kuwaiti border. Many of them are Shiite Muslims who fled Hussein's Republican Guard and fear slaughter by the Iraqi Army once the Americans are replaced by a lightly armed, 1,440-member U.N. peacekeeping force. United Nations officials worry that fear-crazed refugees will riot or sit in front of American tanks to prevent them from leaving.

On the Turkish and Iranian borders, almost 2 million Kurdish refugees are freezing and starving in icy, ankle-deep mud. French doctors who traveled through the Kurdish areas report seeing many victims of napalm and phosphorous bombs dropped by Hussein's Air Force that left their faces blistered with black and white scabs and doctors sponging off hemorrhages with dirty rags. "We need a massive mobilization,"


says Dr. Francis Charhon of Doctors Without Borders, a French relief group that has sent almost 40 doctors and nurses into Turkey and Iran to help the refugees. "The Kurds are dying."

President Bush finally came up with the idea of an emergency relief airlift for the Kurds while in Newport Beach, Calif., after watching scenes of Kurdish suffering on the evening news. Calling National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater to his suite, he said, "Have you seen the pictures? This is just terrible. We've got to do something, and we've got to do it now. I want an airlift." Last week, the United States warned Iraq not to carry out "any kind of military activity" north of the 36th parallel, where the Kurdish refugees are concentrated.

The crucial issue, however, is not simply how to help the Kurds, but where to help them. If they leave Iraq, they may never be allowed to return, even if, as the Bush administration wishes, members of the Iraqi military overthrow Saddam Hussein. "You will solve the Kurdish problem in Iraq, and create it in Turkey and Iran," says Charhon.

Ethnic sensitivities. The Bush administration sidestepped the political quagmire that would result from formally establishing U.N.-supervised enclaves for Kurdish refugees, relying instead on the presence of international relief workers to deter Hussein from attacking the refugees. Administration officials say China and the Soviet Union, because of sensitivity about their own ethnic problems, could have blocked or delayed international efforts to help the Kurds if the United States and its European allies had insisted on formal "enclaves" that might be seen as a prelude to the dismemberment of Iraq.

A senior U.S. official also warned that the enclave idea "might force Saddam to react with force, however suicidal that might be," heating up the gulf war all over again. So the world has decided to



THE KURDS

Across a narrow rope bridge on the border Kurds have come across the border in their



THE PALESTINIANS

The PLO has now lost the financial support of States and the Saudis are discussing ways new



between Iraq and Turkey, thousands of Kurds flee Iraqi troops. Turkish officials estimate that 500,000 country. Hundreds of the refugees already may have died from cold and hunger.

RINA CASTELNUOVO - CONTACT

ROMEO GAGAN - AFP

treat the Kurdish question as a purely humanitarian problem and to ignore the political grievances that created the Kurdish tragedy in the first place.

While Saddam Hussein fought the Kurds and the Shiites by his own rules, the United States, Israel, Egypt and Syria scrambled to write new ones for another round of Mideast diplomacy. Secretary of State James Baker toured the region last week in an attempt to use the administration's enhanced prestige to "break the taboos" of mistrust and hate that divide Arabs and Jews and revive peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.

Baker is hoping that if he can bring Israel and its Arab neighbors face to face at a negotiating table, such a historic meeting will generate its own momentum. "Don't call this a conference," said one of Baker's aides. "What we're looking for is a mind-altering event."

In an attempt to set the stage for such a mystical event, Bush and Baker are searching for threads of agreement to weave into

some sort of progress. After listening politely to visiting European officials argue for an international Middle East peace conference last week, Bush frowned and replied, "We're looking at something less. We've got to do what works."

As Baker made his Mideast rounds, Israel, Egypt and Syria all accepted in theory the idea of a peace conference. But that was about all they agreed on, and Baker's tour sometimes resembled nothing so much as the comic-strip game of "Calvinball," in which a boy and his stuffed tiger make up rules of convenience as they go along. According to Israeli officials, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's government and the United States reached nine "points of agreement" to guide the negotiations. But the nine points leaked by the Israelis restrict which Palestinians could participate in a conference and give Israel veto power over the negotiating process. For example, according to Israeli officials, the Palestinian delegation may include no members of the Palestine Liberation Organization; no Palestinian



THE SHIITES

Iraqi Shiite Muslims fleeing Hussein's killing machine seek protection behind American lines. They do not want U.S. troops to leave.

Saudi Arabia and other gulf states. The United leadership might emerge.

WORLD REPORT

who formally advocates the creation of an independent Palestinian state and no members from East Jerusalem, which Israel annexed in 1967.

Israel also insisted that it would come to any conference with its own interpretation of U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which have formed the backbone of

Mideast peace efforts for almost two decades. Arab nations insist that these resolutions require Israel to trade the occupied West Bank and Gaza for peace; Israel claims it has already fulfilled that land-for-peace requirement by returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.

The Egyptians also wrote their own ground rules. A smiling Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid said Egypt was

willing to consider the conference "very seriously with an open mind," but the semiofficial newspaper *al Ahram* published five conditions for participating in any Mideast peace conference, including demands that Israel stop building settlements in the occupied territories and that Arab countries negotiate collectively, not individually, as Israel would like. In Damascus, Syria's President Hafez As-

ISRAEL'S SUCCESSION SCUFFLE

Is peace good politics?



LETTER FROM JERUSALEM

After only 90 minutes of talks at the start of Secretary of State James Baker's visit to Jerusalem last week, Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy stood at the microphone alongside Baker and told reporters that Israel and the United States had reached a sweeping understanding on convening a Middle East peace conference. Speaking in the grand rhetorical style that is his trademark, Levy proclaimed that all the "minefields have been removed." Baker, however, was more restrained. He has learned the hard way that septuagenarian, hawkish Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is the only one who counts in Jerusalem. Responding to Levy, Baker hinted he preferred to withhold judgment "until I speak to the prime minister."

The critical fight. In fact, the battle to succeed the 75-year-old Shamir within Israel's conservative Likud Party could have as much impact on the prospects for peace negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors as either Baker's high-profile diplomacy or the gulf war.

Foreign Minister Levy, who staunchly opposed the peace process last year, when it was the province of his predecessor and rival, Defense Minister Moshe Arens, is now its biggest booster. A diplomatic success would transform Levy, a self-taught former construction worker whose career is rooted in the politics of resentment, into a bona fide statesman.

Arens, who as defense minister is now in charge of administering the occupied West Bank and Gaza, argues for Israeli retention of the West Bank, although for security reasons rather than the traditional biblical

reasons that are cited by other Israeli leaders. MIT-educated, reserved and monotone where the Moroccan-born Levy is alternately expansive and indignant, Arens is Shamir's closest associate in Israel's coalition government, and he represents the more

because he believes Arabs will never accept Israel's right to exist. Standing on a West Bank hilltop overlooking some Jewish settlements, Sharon pointed to a crumpled map covered with dots marking proposed settlements. "I presented this plan to the government in 1977," he boasted. "Then it was a dream, now it is real."

Still, the differences between Levy, Arens and Sharon may be mostly a sideshow because Shamir retains the



Jewish settlement. Sharon says his West Bank dream has been fulfilled.

Western and middle-class element within the party.

But now Levy and Arens—who did not even talk to each other during the first month of the gulf crisis—appear to be uniting against a common nemesis intent on thwarting any peace movement—Housing Minister Ariel Sharon. If Levy wants a diplomatic success, Arens knows that without some meaningful effort at negotiations, the occupied territories may erupt into violence again.

Sharon is unlikely to back down. He is staking his claim to Likud leadership on his true-believer credentials, and he thinks diplomacy is a waste of time

real power, and it remains unclear whether he wants to drive a hard bargain with the Arabs or to ensure that there is no bargain at all. His critics say Shamir's only vision is of the past, and many Israelis think he is too passive to cope with the massive challenge of absorbing hundreds of thousands of Soviet immigrants. But the prime minister may have more energy than his would-be successors think. Officials in his office are letting it be known that when elections roll around next year, Shamir will probably run for another four years.

BY DAVID MAKOVSKY

sad agreed in principle to a conference, then piled on his own conditions.

The small delegation of West Bank Palestinians that met with Baker was crestfallen that he had failed to extract any Israeli commitment to halt Jewish settlement in the West Bank and Gaza or a promise to trade land for peace. Last week, Israeli Housing Minister Ariel Sharon reiterated plans to build

13,000 new units in the territories in the next two years. That is a troubling issue for the Bush administration, which has agreed to help Israel build new housing for tens of thousands of Soviet Jews pouring into the country and which released \$400 million in housing-loan guarantees last week—under the condition that none of the units be in the occupied territories.

While Secretary Baker gamely told reporters after his round of talks in the Middle East that he saw “some progress,” the political problems facing the region now may make Operation Desert Storm look remarkably easy. ■

BY LOUISE LIEF WITH CARLA ANNE ROBBINS IN BAKER'S PARTY, DAVID MAKOVSKY IN JERUSALEM, KENNETH T. WALSH, AND EVA POMICE AT THE UNITED NATIONS

FEEDING THE HAND THAT BITES YOU

How America appeased Iraq

While Secretary of State James Baker struggled with the post-war chaos in the Middle East last week, inquisitors on Capitol Hill began examining whether a decade of misguided foreign policy led to the gulf war in the first place.

A tougher U.S. policy toward Iraq probably wouldn't have derailed Saddam Hussein's designs on Kuwait: The French, Soviets, Germans and others sold Baghdad more weapons and technology than did American firms. And there are some political motives in reassessing U.S. policy in the gulf—Republicans blame it on embarrassed, antiwar Democrats grasping at straws. But the Bush administration never even tried to confront Hussein. Instead, a growing body of evidence suggests it tried to appease him.

Fired or not? Last week, Under Secretary of Commerce Dennis Kloske was dismissed the day after he testified in the House that he had urged tighter controls on exports of U.S. technology to Iraq. The White House denied firing Kloske, insisting he was leaving anyway. Another House committee is examining \$2 billion in U.S. commodity credits extended to Iraq and \$4 billion more issued by the Atlanta branch of Italy's Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.

One U.S. agency, however, worried that Iraq was a bad risk, both economically and politically. In reports prepared for three 1989 Export-Import Bank board meetings, which were attended by officials from the State and Treasury departments and the CIA, Ex-Im Bank risk analyst Clement Miller explained the bank's view: “Iraq is expanding its purchases of foreign military equipment and technical assistance in order to beef up its forces for possible future combat.” Miller also predicted “renewed war” between Iraq and its neighbors. “We had

a simple idea,” says John Bohn, then Ex-Im Bank chairman. “If you don't pay me back, there is not a lot of incentive for me to give you more money.”

The bank, which promotes trade by making loans and credit guarantees on exports, considered Hussein a dead-

should look carefully at getting involved,” Pilzer says. Another top Ex-Im official recalls it differently: “We were constantly fighting about it. There was pressure from everywhere.”

In 1987, the bank bowed to the pressure and agreed to extend \$200 million in short-term credits. After Iraq ended its war with Iran, “There was a lot of pressure on us to open up medium-term credit, especially from the State Department,” says one Ex-Im Bank of-



Peacemaker? As Hussein armed for war, the U.S. tried to sway him with exports.

beat. During its war with Iran, Iraq made only sporadic payments on the billions of dollars it borrowed from European credit agencies, and the Ex-Im Bank saw no point in joining the parade of lenders. But staffers at the bank say they came under intense pressure from Iraqi officials, businesses and the State Department to back U.S. exports to Baghdad. At one point, the bank had requests for more than \$12 billion in Iraqi export credits.

Arthur Pilzer, an Ex-Im vice president, says the State Department advised, but didn't coerce, the bank. “Their advice was that Iraq was going to buy a lot of equipment, and we

ficer. Four months before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly told Congress that sanctions against Iraq “would hurt U.S. exporters and worsen our trade deficit.”

In the end, it was Iraq's creditors that got hurt. European credit agencies may be out more than \$20 billion. The U.S. lost \$347 million in commodity credits. And Iraq still owes the Ex-Im Bank \$58 million. That is a sizable sum, but only a fraction of what it would have been if the bank had given more weight to foreign policy and less to sound banking principles.

BY STEPHEN J. HEDGES

Sununu Travel Records to Be Opened

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 22 — Hoping to stop a run of embarrassing publicity, President Bush today authorized the disclosure of the travel records of his chief of staff, John H. Sununu. A spokesman said the records would show that Mr. Sununu paid for personal and political trips taken aboard military airplanes.

Marlin Fitzwater, Mr. Bush's press secretary, said the information would be made public as soon as possible, but the White House later said it would not be available until Tuesday at the earliest.

"We don't think there's anything wrong," Mr. Fitzwater said at his daily news briefing, during which he was asked more questions about Mr. Sununu's travels than about the Kurdish refugees in Iraq.

Still, concerned that there might even be the appearance of impropriety, White House officials were considering having an outside lawyer or other kind of consultant review Mr. Sununu's travel schedule after it is made public.

The White House normally refuses to make travel records public; it has consistently refused to disclose the cost of the President's travels or document how his political trips are paid for.

White House Anxiety

But the Administration's anxiety about the spate of news reports of Mr. Sununu's use of military aircraft was clear. The reports began over the weekend in U.S. News & World Report and The Washington Post, and Mr. Fitzwater said the President and Mr. Sununu discussed the issue by telephone on Sunday and again this morning.

Democratic members of Congress, many of whom harbor ill will toward Mr. Sununu from the bitter negotiations over the Federal budget in 1990, responded to the reports by demanding a Congressional audit of his travels.

Flying on an Air Force executive jet, Mr. Sununu returned today to Washington from New Hampshire, where he was Governor before joining the White House staff in 1989. He used a military plane 27 times last year for trips to New Hampshire, and in all took about 60 flights aboard military planes.

Mr. Fitzwater said the President and Mr. Sununu were satisfied there was "no ethical impropriety" in the chief of staff's use of the planes, which can cost 10 times as much to operate as a commercial airline ticket would cost for a particular route.

He said the records would show that in keeping with Federal policy, Mr. Sununu paid the Government the cost of a commercial, coach-class ticket whenever he used a military airplane for private business. When Mr. Sununu travels as a Republican official, the party pays for the flight.

Mr. Fitzwater said Federal policy authorizes Mr. Sununu to use the military planes but does not require him to

Trying to quell a storm over an official's flying.

do so, as officials had asserted over the weekend.

He seemed hard-pressed to provide a clear explanation for why Mr. Sununu must travel aboard Government aircraft. He said the chief of staff uses military planes because they can carry electronically secure communications systems, but he could not say whether Mr. Sununu might be able to use a portable communication system that could be carried aboard a commercial aircraft.

Mr. Sununu is also not in constant contact with the White House during his holidays, which often include skiing.

Mr. Fitzwater said the White House would also provide a list of trips by Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, who is also authorized to use military aircraft. But Mr. Fitzwater indicated the list would not include politi-

cally sensitive trips like Mr. Scowcroft's secret mission to the Middle East last month.

Bush Affirms Policy

Mr. Fitzwater said that Mr. Sununu makes his own decisions about travel and that the President had affirmed a policy started in 1987 that allows the chief of staff and the national security adviser to use military aircraft on official and nonofficial trips alike.

The chief of staff, Mr. Fitzwater said, needs a secure telephone link to the White House at all times in case of emergency, "the most extreme" of which would be if the President died and Mr. Sununu needed to help make new arrangements for "putting together the government and making sure things flow well."

"I don't use that example as the justification for this," he said, "but I use it because it's the one that is most easy to describe and one you're most familiar with."

Mr. Fitzwater was referring to a White House policy of making arrangements for the press to travel with Mr. Bush, and of having the White House press secretary fly aboard Air Force One, in case something happens to the President.

President Authorizes Accounting of Sununu Travel

By John E. Yang
and Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush yesterday authorized a full public accounting of White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu's travel on military jets as administration officials defended Sununu's use of the aircraft for numerous apparently personal and political trips over two years.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said Bush supports a four-year-old policy allowing both the chief of staff and the national security adviser to use government aircraft so they can remain in touch with the White House.

However, Fitzwater yesterday changed his description of the 1987 directive, saying that it authorized the two officials to use military aircraft, but does not require it. Last week, responding to an inquiry from *The Washington Post*, Fitzwater said that a memorandum President Ronald Reagan signed in August

1987 "requires the use of [military] aircraft" because "a number of communications and national security reasons requires them to have immediate voice contact with the White House at all times."

Whether to use a military plane, Fitzwater said yesterday, "does require discretion and decision on the part of the chief of staff, and he makes that whenever he travels."

Pentagon travel records indicate that over the last two years Sununu made more than 60 trips by military jet, including many that appeared to be personal or political. He went skiing in Colorado twice, traveled to New England, where he maintains a home, 27 times and made numerous appearances for Republican candidates around the country.

Government policy requires reimbursement for personal trips, but that rate covers only a fraction of the flights' actual cost to the military, more than a half-million dollars in Sununu's case.

Fitzwater said Sununu's detailed travel records, which could be re-

leased as soon as today, would show the nature of each trip and how much Sununu paid the government for personal trips. Details of national security adviser Brent Scowcroft's use of military planes would also be disclosed, Fitzwater said.

"The governor indicates it's all been reimbursed," Fitzwater said. "There's no evidence that there's any ethical impropriety here. . . . It's all operated according to policy."

Fitzwater said Bush discussed the trips with Sununu over the weekend and again yesterday morning after the former New Hampshire governor returned from a trip to his home state—where he spoke Friday night to the Manchester Republican Committee—aboard an Air Force C-20 twin-engine jet.

Bonnie Newman, former assistant to the president for management and administration, said yesterday that Sununu had to be persuaded to use the military jets early in the administration. Newman said in an interview that Sununu at first

"wasn't convinced it was necessary" for him to fly military aircraft with secure voice communications.

After Bush could not reach him while he was on the way back to Washington from New Hampshire on a commercial flight in early 1989, she said, she told Sununu about the policy from the previous administration. After that, Sununu flew the military jets "about 99 percent of the time," she said.

Newman said written requests for planes would come from Sununu's office stating whether the trip was official, personal or political, and indicating where the bill should be sent. The White House military office would send the bills, she said, and "I was never made aware of any billing difficulties."

Sununu made at least one trip last year on which he did not take a military jet. He and his wife, Nancy, were among the guests Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady flew to Louisville on a chartered private jet for the Kentucky Derby May 5, according to a Treasury spokeswoman, Desiree Tucker-Sorini.

She said Brady paid for the trip with personal funds because it had nothing to do with his official duties. She said she did not know what kind of communications facilities were aboard the plane.

Newman and James C. McKinney, director of the White House military office during the last 1½ years of the Reagan administration, said when the president makes a purely political trip, the sponsoring political organization is supposed to pay the entire cost of flying the military jet—currently \$3,945 an hour for the C-20, the military version of the Gulfstream III corporate jet.

White House aides have said Sununu's political trips were reimbursed at coach commercial fares, which would be much lower.

Congressional Democrats yesterday seized on the reports of the flights by Sununu, who as chief of staff has been a frequent and vocal critic of what he considers wasteful congressional spending. "When John Sununu isn't breaking up negotiations on the civil rights bill, apparently he's flying out to Vail to ski at the taxpayers' expense," said Rep. Vic Fazio (Calif.), chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.

Chairman John Conyers (D-Mich.) of the House Government Operations Committee asked the General Accounting Office to look into Sununu's use of military aircraft.

Staff researcher Lucy Shackelford contributed to this report.

U.S. Aides Hold Talks With Premier of Russia

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 22 — Displaying their readiness to expand ties with reformist leaders of the Soviet republics, senior Administration officials met today with the Prime Minister of Russia, Ivan S. Silayev, to discuss how to improve the investment climate there for American business.

The officials emphasized that their meetings with Mr. Silayev, an ally of Boris N. Yeltsin, the Russian republic's leader, was not intended as a slap at President Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

American officials last year cautiously began to meet with leaders of the Russian republic, who have demanded increasing autonomy from the Kremlin. These meetings have become more open and frequent.

Today, after meeting at the White House with the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Silayev said: "We feel the readiness of the American Administration to conduct a relationship with the Soviet republics. We had very interesting meetings."

The session coincided with a growing Administration realization that Mr. Gorbachev faces severe political troubles and that Washington must therefore widen its relations with Soviet leaders.

Former President Richard M. Nixon, though an admirer of Mr. Gorbachev, is believed to have driven home the same point at a lunch today with President Bush and other officials, during which he briefed them on his recent trip to the Soviet Union.

Bush orders Sununu's trip ledger released

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush moved yesterday to spike charges that Chief of Staff John Sununu abused his perks with bargain joy rides on military planes.

After consulting with Mr. Sununu, the president ordered information released on each flight taken by his chief of staff and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.

"He [the president] said release it, put it all out," White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater told reporters yesterday.

Mr. Fitzwater said the use of military planes with secure communications was important for "any number of activities that require constant contact" but the most extreme need would arise if the president died.

Mr. Sununu "has responsibilities under the various rules and regulations for putting together the government and making sure things flow well and that sort of thing," Mr. Fitzwater said.

He said the need for secure communications would be "of paramount importance if you're trying to maintain stability in the world during a time of crisis."

Mr. Bush ordered the White House staff to release destinations, purposes of travel, and repayments made by Mr. Sununu and political sponsors.

The information was not released last night, but Mr. Fitzwater said it might be available today.

He said Mr. Sununu and Mr. Scowcroft are authorized to use military jets for political and personal travel as well as official business under a policy set by President Reagan in 1987. Mr. Bush supports that policy, and it is not being re-examined.

"The chief of staff decides which trips he takes, and, of course, they're all subject to the rules and regulations with regard to reimbursement," Mr. Fitzwater said. "We don't think there's anything wrong."

Mr. Sununu returned yesterday from a weekend in New Hampshire. He traveled by military jet Friday with Sen. Warren Rudman, New Hampshire Republican, who said yesterday he would pay his own fare.

Both men spoke Friday night to the Manchester Republican City Committee. Mr. Sununu attended an awards ceremony Sunday.

"The president called up twice on the trip up," said Mr. Rudman, who added that he asked to accompany Mr. Sununu on the flight.

U.S. News & World Report, in its current issue, reported 63 trips by Mr. Sununu on military planes, involving 148 takeoffs and landings. The magazine said the travel was "raising eyebrows around the Bush



John Sununu

administration," even though officials said Mr. Sununu spent at least \$45,000 of his own money on the trips. The Republican Party paid for some travel, and some was official business at government expense.

Mr. Scowcroft has made about 20 trips on military planes in the past two years, a senior White House official said yesterday.

Government Operations Committee Chairman John Conyers, Michigan Democrat, has asked the General Accounting Office to confirm that all regulations were followed in the use of military planes by White House officials.

Mr. Rudman called press reports about Mr. Sununu's trips yellow journalism. "They can't nail the president. They are trying to nail the president through the chief of staff. I know he knows right from wrong," he said.

Like all travelers on Air Force planes who are not on government business — including reporters and families of officials — Mr. Sununu is charged the unrestricted coach fare for each person in his party. That normally is far less than the \$2,780-per-hour cost of operating the C-20 Gulfstream jet provided to travelers of Mr. Sununu's rank.

While he was governor of New Hampshire, Mr. Sununu was criticized by state legislators and members of the Executive Council for refusing to maintain flight logs on his use of a 12-passenger state police plane. The \$210,000 Piper Cheyenne II was purchased in 1987, and Mr. Sununu traveled widely in it while chairman of the National Governors Association.

Bush Orders Sununu's Trip Ledger Released

President Bush moved Monday to spike charges that Chief of Staff Sununu abused his perks with bargain joy rides on military planes. After consulting with Sununu, the President ordered information released on each flight taken by his chief of staff and national security adviser.

"He said release it, put it all out," White House Press Secretary Fitzwater told reporters.

(Frank Murray, Washington Times, A3)

Support For Sununu Is Tempered

The White House on Monday issued a qualified defense of Chief of Staff Sununu's extensive use of government planes for travel to ski resorts and political appearances -- making clear that the taxpayer-subsidized travel was something that Sununu chose, not something President Bush required....

At the same time, Republicans on Capitol Hill were slow to rush to Sununu's defense, reflecting the poor relations between Bush's congressional supporters and his pugnacious chief of staff. "There's a feeling that he stuck it to us, and now he's getting it back," said an aide to a senior Republican congressman....

While they await review of the records, Bush's top aides took a cautious approach to defending the irascible and often controversial chief of staff.

"Only John and Ed know what those records show," said one senior White House official.... "If it shows he took a trip to Vail and called it official because he gave someone an award, we could be in trouble."... While they qualified their own responses, Bush aides expressed concern about the notable lack of support for Sununu among Republicans on Capitol Hill....

Virtually no questions have been raised about use of military planes by National Security Adviser Scowcroft, who travels less often than Sununu but who is widely respected in Washington. "If he was a beloved figure, there might be some people speaking up for him," said an aide to a congressional Republican leader. Sununu, the aide added, "is not beloved."

(David Lauter, Los Angeles Times, A1)

Nixon briefs Bush on Soviet trip

Former President Richard Nixon lunched with President Bush at the White House yesterday to report on his recent trip to the Soviet Union.

The visit came

at a time when Washington and Moscow are at loggerheads over disarmament talks and

a planned summit meeting awaiting an agreement.

The White House released no information on the luncheon except to say it also was attended by Vice President Dan Quayle, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, Chief of Staff John Sununu, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy, Robert Gates.

Bush Should Clip Sununu's Wings -- "...What's most galling is the arrogance and the attitude of self-importance that [the Sununu affair] reflects on the part of one of the President's closest advisers. Someone needs to pull Sununu aside and teach him that he is the public's servant, not its master.... Why did Sununu do it so often when, for example, Brent Scowcroft...did not? One suspects that someone insecure in his office is more likely to flaunt its perks than someone who is secure. Scowcroft, an old Washington hand, has learned to wear his importance easily and modestly; Sununu, a Washington parvenu, wears his like an imperial robe. If he is wise, the President will curtail his chief of staff's flying privileges and bring him down to earth."

(Chicago Tribune, 4/24)

Sununu Deems Only 4 Plane Trips 'Personal'

By Charles R. Babcock and Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writers

White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu designated only four of the more than 70 trips he took on military aircraft the last two years as "personal" trips, describing the others, including two ski trips to Colorado, as "official" or "political" business, according to records released yesterday.

As chief of staff, Sununu has the sole authority to determine whether he, the government or Republican Party groups pay for such trips. On trips he designated as official, such as those he and his wife made to Aspen and Vail in Colorado, the government pays his hotel and meal expenses as well as the cost of the plane.

On personal or political trips, the government is reimbursed at rates for full commercial coach air fare, but this covers only a fraction of real costs. The Pentagon estimates that it now costs \$3,945 an hour to fly the twin-engine C-20 Air Force jet that Sununu usually uses, not counting salaries of the usual five-member crew.

Of the four trips Sununu designated as personal, two were to visit his dentist in Boston, according to the records. None of the 27 trips he made to New Hampshire, where the former three-term governor maintains a home and a strong political base, was listed as personal.

The White House, which released the records yesterday, has offered differing explanations for whether Sununu could have flown commercial aircraft on any of the trips. Last week, in response to questions from The Washington Post, a spokesman said Sununu was required to take the Pentagon planes because security concerns made it necessary that he have "immediate voice contact" with the White House at all times.

On Monday, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said a 1987 memorandum President Ronald Reagan signed on the use of Pentagon planes authorized the chief of staff and national security adviser to use them but did not require such use. Whether to use a military plane, Fitzwater said Monday, "does require discretion and decision on the part of the chief of

staff."

Yesterday, White House officials told reporters that Fitzwater was in error and that the policy "requires" the use of such planes. Asked to explain a trip last year to the Kentucky Derby when Sununu did not fly aboard a Pentagon plane with secure communications, an official said Sununu "had control of the plane" and could have ordered it back to Washington or elsewhere if President Bush needed him.

The release of documents was the first White House effort to deal with questions about Sununu's travel raised on Sunday by stories in The Post and U.S. News & World Report.

White House officials had refused for days to respond to questions from The Post on Sununu's travel, but on Monday Fitzwater announced that Bush had authorized the release of the records for both Sununu and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

Fitzwater said at the time: "There's no evidence that there's any ethical impro-

made at least 22 official trips in 1989 and 1990. The list did not include "classified" travel.

Many of the official trips, according to the records, were to brief former presidents, or to update Bush when he was out of town during the Persian Gulf crisis. Scowcroft reimbursed the government \$1,052 for a ski trip to Utah he took with his daughter in March 1990.

The records show that Sununu reimbursed the government \$1,267 for the four personal trips he took. Besides the trips to Boston in April and December 1990, for which he reimbursed the government a total of \$900, he went to New Jersey in January 1990 for a farewell to Republican Gov. Tom Kean and a football game (\$200 reimbursed), and to see his parents in West Palm Beach, Fla., (\$167) in April 1990.

A Sununu aide said the chief of staff went to Boston for dental work because it was important to go to the same dentist who did the original work. The round-trip flying time to Boston is about 2½ hours. At the Air Force flight costs used at the time, this meant the trips cost the government more than \$14,000.

Another \$16,058 was reimbursed for flights in which Sununu's wife, Nancy, or other family members accompanied him on travel he designated as official or political. A Sununu aide said yesterday he didn't know how much of this amount was reimbursed by Sununu personally and how much by GOP political groups. He did say that \$8,198 of the reimbursements came from leftover money in a Sununu campaign committee account in New Hampshire.

The White House list did not indicate when the reimbursements were made, but a Sununu aide said the chief of staff's payments were made soon after invoices were sent for the trips.

In addition, GOP candidates and party organizations have reimbursed the government or been billed for an additional \$45,597 of Sununu's travel.

For example, Sununu flew from here to New Hampshire on Oct. 31, 1990, for a fund-raiser for Rep. Robert C. Smith (R-N.H.), then engaged in an ultimately successful campaign for the Senate. The trip cost the Pentagon more than \$8,000 for the two hours and 15 minutes of flight time, based on flight costs at that time. The campaign was billed for \$1,168.

Asked yesterday whether this amounted to a taxpayer subsidy of Republican campaign activities, administration spokesmen referred questions to White House counsel C. Boyden Gray, who did not return a reporter's call.

Another unanswered question is

whether the difference in value between what was paid for Sununu's trips and their real cost to the government could be counted as personal income and subject to taxes.

An official said yesterday that Sununu has on a number of occasions driven to New Hampshire and carried with him secure phone equipment in a small suitcase. The official, asked why Sununu could not just routinely carry this equipment aboard commercial planes to save the large costs of Pentagon aircraft, said, "The policy requires that when he flies, he flies on a Pentagon plane."

On Monday, Fitzwater said Bush "believes that those planes and that travel was authorized in the last administration and continued in this one for a reason, and that is so that they can maintain voice contact and secure contact with the president and White House whenever they travel."

But documents from the Reagan administration authorizing use of the planes, which were released along with the travel records, did not mention the necessity of "secure contact." A memorandum to Howard H. Baker Jr., then chief of staff, stated that planes would be available but that most of them "will not be equipped with the highly sophisticated secure voice communications."

An administration official said the planes Sununu now flies are so equipped.

The two ski trips to Colorado that Sununu took with his wife were designated official trips because Sununu had been invited to speak to members of the ski industry, a Sununu aide said. Each trip cost the government about \$30,000. Sununu reimbursed the government \$2,022 for his wife's travel expenses.

Dick Needham, editor of *Ski* magazine, which sponsored both of the gatherings, told *The Post* last week that "he comes for the pure enjoyment of skiing with us." He added that the group did not pay any expenses of Sununu and his wife. "He was doing it on his own nickel."

Contacted yesterday, Needham said Sununu had been invited because of his high position in the administration. He referred other questions to a spokeswoman who didn't return a reporter's call.

In a trip in March 1990 described as "political," Sununu flew to Chicago for what the White House listed as an Illinois State/County GOP fund-raising event, with the government being reimbursed \$642. The three-hour, 25-minute round trip cost \$6,464 at the Pentagon rate for operating the plane.

The White House list did not say that Sununu, his wife and others attended the wedding reception in Chicago that night of David Carney, a longtime political aide of Sununu who now serves in the White House

political office. In response to questions, a White House official acknowledged that Sununu and his party had attended the reception.

Asked if the party event was arranged so that Sununu could attend the wedding festivities, an official said, "I am not aware of which invitation came first."

The official said a billing error accounted for the records failing to show reimbursement for Nancy Sununu and that the government would be reimbursed for the cost of a coach ticket.

The White House declined to identify passengers who traveled with Sununu on any of his trips, unless a family member was aboard. But officials said that Edward M. Rogers, executive assistant to Sununu, was on most of the trips, and that Sununu never traveled without Rogers or some other personal aide.

On all the trips, Rogers or the designated aide was traveling officially, White House aides said, so their expenses, including hotel rooms and meals, were paid by the government. An official said Rogers traveled "in his official capacity and solely to assist the chief of staff in performing his duties."

Asked what Rogers did, exactly, on trips such as the ski excursions, an official said he carried the secure phone.

Staff writer John E. Yang and researchers Ralph Gaillard Jr., Lucy Shackelford and Mark Stencel contributed to this report.

SUNUNU...from Pg. 7

priety here. . . . It's all operated according to policy."

Congressional Democrats, however, have called on the General Accounting Office to examine the Sununu records and travel practices. Rep. Vic Fazio (D-Calif.), chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, said yesterday that the documents do not resolve "all the questions that have been raised surrounding" Sununu's travel.

The records show that Scowcroft

Hill not eager to reveal travel

By Paul M. Rodriguez
and Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The two House Democrats who launched a probe of John Sununu's travel as White House chief of staff ducked reporters' questions yesterday about expanding the investigation to include Congress.

Democratic Party leaders said they have no objection but made no formal request on their own.

"I have no problem with the GAO [General Accounting Office] looking into the private use of military or government planes by the executive branch or the Congress," said Speaker Thomas S. Foley, Washington Democrat.

Meanwhile yesterday, the White House released six pages of documentation on travel by Mr. Sununu and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Published reports had suggested that Mr. Sununu abused his right to use military planes by frequently flying home to his native New Hampshire and jetting to ski resorts.

President Bush's two top aides have taken 100 trips on military air-

craft, with a quarter of the flights designated as personal or political use.

The documents show that Mr. Sununu took 77 trips on military jets over the past 27 months; 24 were political, and four were personal. Mr. Sununu reimbursed the government a total of \$47,044.

Mr. Scowcroft took 23 trips on government aircraft between March 7, 1989, and Oct. 26, 1990. Only one was listed as unofficial — a ski vacation with his daughter to Utah on March 10, 1990. The records show he reimbursed the government \$1,052.

Mr. Sununu's official flights included two ski resort destinations where he gave speeches. Mr. Sununu also took 16 flights to New Hampshire, where he was governor before coming to Washington. None of the trips were listed as "personal."

A 1987 policy signed by then-President Reagan orders the chief of staff and national security adviser to fly on military aircraft. "They must be reachable at all times. . . . No chances at all can be taken that they might be on a hijacked plane somewhere because of the immense amount of sensitive, current information they possess,"

said the policy memo written by then-Secretary of State George Shultz.

Mr. Foley said in an interview yesterday that a GAO investigation might be useful from a public policy standpoint. "The question has been raised [in the Sununu] case as to the use of military aircraft for what are clearly more private purposes," he said.

Maryland Rep. Steny Hoyer, who also is chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, said that a GAO probe of White House travel would be useful, but not necessarily of the legislative branch.

"What's being missed here is not whether this [use of military planes] is legal, but . . . whether we want to fund this type of activity," Mr. Hoyer said.

In his request for a GAO probe, Rep. John Conyers, Michigan Democrat and chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, limited the investigation to Mr. Sununu.

John Gorman, deputy press secretary for Mr. Conyers' committee, said yesterday that "there are no plans to expand the probe at this time."

When informed of the statements by Mr. Foley and Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Gorman said: "Really, they said that on the record? That's great. But you know, it's up to my superiors to make those decisions. I'll have to get back with you about what they think."

By publishing time yesterday, Mr. Gorman did not respond. Nor did Mr. Conyers or any of his aides, despite repeated phone calls.

Several calls to Rep. Vic Fazio, California Democrat and chairman

of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, were not returned. Mr. Fazio had joined Mr. Conyers in calling for the GAO probe.

Rep. Steve Gunderson of Michigan, chief deputy GOP whip, said he wasn't surprised by the Conyers and Fazio silence.

"One of the things I've learned in public office is that when you can't attack on substance you attack personally," Mr. Gunderson said. "And if the greatest criticism of this administration is the chief of staff's travel, then I think the Bush administration is doing a pretty good job."

When asked about expanding the probe for public policy purposes, Mr. Gunderson said: "Sure, I don't think that that's unfair. If we're going to investigate travel for the administration to determine political and personal use, we ought to also scrutinize the Congress."

Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski, Pennsylvania Democrat, also supported an expanded GAO probe. "The focus ought to be all high-level officials who use military or government aircraft," he said.

Mr. Kanjorski, who has sponsored a bill for several years to make executive and judicial branch travels and expenses a matter of public record, said that Congress currently is required to detail all aspects of its expenditures, including its annual \$25 million travel budget.

"There are public records detailing each and every member's travel expenses," Mr. Kanjorski said. But the \$55 million spent annually by the federal judiciary and the \$50 million spent by the White House excluding presidential travel, are not revealed. "They ought to be and that's what I'm advocating," he said.

According to the documents released by the White House yesterday, many of Mr. Sununu's costs were paid by the Republican Party. Political organizations, for example, paid for more than \$53,400 of his trips.

The political trips included Mr. Sununu's April 1 flight to Colombia, S.C., to attend the funeral of Republican National Committee General Chairman Lee Atwater. The RNC has promised to pay \$17,568 for the trip, which included 31 guests.

Among the personal trips was a January 1990 trip to Newark for a football game, costing \$200; an April 1990 trip to Boston for a dentist appointment, \$480; an April 1990 trip to Florida to visit his parents, \$167; and a December 1990 trip back to his dentist, \$420.

Many of Mr. Scowcroft's trips were not listed for national security reasons, according to White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. Among those not listed: Mr. Scowcroft's flight to China in the summer of 1989 following the Red Army crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.

Schwarzkopf, Bush make peace at White House lunch

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A hungry Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf lunched at the White House yesterday and, like the card-carrying magician he once was, graciously made the debate on capturing Baghdad disappear behind a veil of laughter.

Even without his trademark desert camouflage, Gen. Schwarzkopf made a four-star impression on the

chef as well as the rowdy White House press corps. But he wouldn't say whether his 240-pound frame felt comfortable in the Oval Office.

"What I'd really like to say is, if the president's not going to answer any questions, I damn sure am not going to answer any," Gen. Schwarzkopf said after listening to President Bush praise his victory in Iraq.

"What I'll say to him," Mr. Bush told reporters, "is welcome, well-done, and what he and his troops did in terms of fulfilling our objectives is fantastic, and what he and his troops did for the morale of the United States of America is unbelievable."

The president then led the way to his family dining room on the second floor of the White House for a feast of chicken soup, mixed grill with bearnaise sauce, broiled tomatoes and mushrooms, fried potatoes, salad, fruit, and cookies.

Later, out of Gen. Schwarzkopf's earshot, Mr. Bush also praised the appetite of the soldier known as "The Bear" in apologizing to 4,500 Naval Academy midshipmen for being late after the lunch.

"He hasn't had a good meal in a long time. You should have seen the guy eat," Mr. Bush said, drawing howls of laughter from the Annap-

olis crowd of 5,000. "I'll tell you we can't afford to invite him over there anymore."

Gen. Schwarzkopf has given no hint of his plans beyond retiring this summer after 35 years as a much-decorated officer and four years as a West Point cadet. He declined the chance to be Army chief of staff.

Florida Republicans have invited him to run for the Senate, and in giddy moments there have been suggestions he could emulate Dwight Eisenhower and run for president. Corporate and academic possibilities also have been mentioned.

Mr. Bush and Gen. Schwarzkopf — who share magic as a hobby — walked together to the Rose Garden at noon after meeting for 30 minutes, their first conversation since the general said Mr. Bush ignored his recommendation to continue the ground war for another 24 hours.

Attending yesterday's largely jovial session were Vice President Dan Quayle, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chairman Gen. Colin Powell, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger substituting for traveling Secretary James A. Baker III, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy, Robert Gates.

Both generals wore dress greens instead of "cammies." As he strolled along the Colonnade with Mr. Bush, Gen. Schwarzkopf said, "First time I had this on in eight months."

The twice-wounded 56-year-old general, who began his teen-age years living in Iran with his Army-general father, will enter civilian life with far more than his master's degree in missile engineering and the union card from his days with the International Brotherhood of Magicians when he put on magic shows for youth groups and birthday parties.

Among the tools he is armed with: a rumored \$4 million book contract, speaking invitations at \$60,000 per talk, a sarcastic wit, an IQ of 170, fluency in French and German, and the thirst for "another cause."

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Jose R. Lopez/The New York Times

Bush to Schwarzkopf: 'Don't Change Your Style'

President Bush welcomed Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf to the White House yesterday and referred inquisitive reporters to the gulf war commander, saying, "O'mon Norm, and don't change your style."

White House Details Sununu's Trips

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 23 — Under pressure to account for John H. Sununu's use of Government airplanes, the White House today released documents showing that it paid for 49 flights by the Chief of Staff over the last two years, including four trips to mountain resorts where he made speeches and also went skiing.

But the documents also showed that Mr. Sununu or Republican Party organizations were charged for 28 of the other trips by Mr. Sununu that were listed as political or personal business.

The White House released the documents at President Bush's personal order in an effort to back up its assertions that Mr. Sununu had followed Federal policy on using military airplanes. That policy allows him the use of a military plane so he can be in constant, secure voice contact with the White House, but that payment must be made for all non-official flights at the going commercial rate for a coach-class ticket, plus \$1.

In one case, Mr. Sununu paid \$167 for a flight on April 20, 1990, from Key Largo, Fla., where Mr. Bush was staying, to West Palm Beach, to visit Mr. Sununu's parents. The airplane had to be flown from Washington to pick him up. From West Palm Beach, the plane flew him to New York, where he was interviewed by CBS News and spoke at a police breakfast, and then flew him back to Washington. The price tag for the trip, at the rate the Air Force calculates the cost of his airplane: \$23,670.

Mr. Sununu is not expected under Government regulations to make up the full cost of his flights. But the expense has stirred strong criticism on Capitol Hill and has vexed Mr. Bush because it involves the head of a Presidential staff that is under strict orders to avoid even the suggestion of impropriety.

Inquiry Begun by Democrats

Democratic lawmakers have begun an investigation to review, on economic and security grounds, the practice of having the White House chief of staff and the national security adviser fly on Government planes. From an ethical standpoint, lawmakers want to know whether Mr. Sununu has billed Washington for trips whose official function might be debatable.

"I don't think that anybody inside or outside of the White House can help but be distressed at the use of Government equipment in this fashion," said Representative John Conyers Jr., the Michigan Democrat who is chairman of the House Committee on Government Operations, which asked for the inquiry.

"On the face of it, it raises serious questions of judgment," Mr. Conyers said, citing among other things the trips to ski resorts.

Mr. Sununu's flights have become especially controversial in Washington because they involve a man whose un-

yielding management techniques and abrasive negotiating style have left him with a stock of ill will and without many willing defenders on the White House staff and on Capitol Hill.

Nationally, interviews on television in recent days suggest that it has hit a nerve with ordinary travelers who have been forced to deal with delays caused by congestions, travel disruptions from failing airlines and security measures prompted by the Persian Gulf war.

So far, the documents showed that Mr. Sununu has paid \$14,391 for non-official flights, including the four listed as personal, and tickets for his family on political and official trips. Party organizations have paid \$32,653 more and still owe the Federal Government nearly \$21,000 for airplane trips in the past six weeks, the documents show.

The documents do not say when the payments were made. Mr. Sununu's office said there has "never been a backlog" and that none of the payments

Bush's aides try to fend off a hint of impropriety.

were made after the articles on his traveling first appeared.

The White House also documented about 45 flights by Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, who has made classified trips that were not listed. The list included missions abroad, trips to brief former Presidents and an official trip to New York for a dinner at which the host was Henry A. Kissinger, the former Secretary of State and a former colleague of Mr. Scowcroft.

There was one personal trip, an eight-day skiing vacation in March with his daughter, for which Mr. Scowcroft paid \$1,052.

Mr. Scowcroft's office said he was involved in negotiations on the unification of Germany and preparations for a NATO summit at the time and needed to stay in contact with Mr. Bush during his flights.

The Federal policy, as released today by the White House, says that when an official plans a vacation "for a period of time which makes their immediate return unlikely, the travelers should evaluate the use of military air transportation on the basis of appearance or impropriety."

Mr. Scowcroft's trips have not been at issue, but the White House released a list of them because he is the only other official authorized to use military planes on non-government business.

According to the documents, Mr. Sununu has not paid for any of several trips to his home state of New Hampshire, all of which were billed as official or party business. Most recently, Mr. Sununu flew up on Friday to address the Manchester Republican Par-

ty's Robert Frost Award Dinner and spent the weekend, returning to Washington on Monday.

At the \$3,945 hourly rate that the Air Force assigns to the modified Gulfstream jet that Mr. Sununu uses, and figuring flying time of two and a half hours, that trip was worth \$9,862.50. The party organization was billed \$519, the going rate for a coach-class ticket on that route.

The White House argued that such comparisons are distorted. Officials said the far larger sum does not actually leave the Federal coffers at that rate since the airplanes are rarely idle; they carry other officials and dignitaries and go on training and maintenance flights.

The documents showed that Mr. Sununu and his wife, Nancy, traveled to Vail, Colo., in December 1989. Mr. Sununu flew at Government expense to address a Ski Magazine conference and The Times-Mirror newspaper organization. He also went skiing.

Last December, he made a similar trip to Aspen and flew to New Hampshire in February 1990 and February 1991 for a fund-raiser at a ski resort for a foundation named for Christa McAuliffe, one of the Challenger crew. Mr. Sununu spoke at both events, and went skiing, his office said.

According to the documents, Mr. Sununu went to Boston to visit his dentist twice. His office said they were follow-up visits to continue work started earlier.

Official explanations of the policy on military flights have been contradictory.

At first, the White House said Mr. Sununu and Mr. Scowcroft were required to use military aircraft at all times. On Monday, Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, said they were "authorized" to do so.

The documents today include an Aug. 4, 1987 memorandum from then Secretary of State George P. Shultz to President Ronald Reagan in which he said the national security adviser and chief of staff "should always travel on Air Force planes."

"I agreed with your reaction that they should be told to do it this way and not to be given an option," Mr. Shultz wrote.

Accompanying documents spelling out the policy do not say whether the officials should or must use military aircraft.

Critique of Sununu's Plane Use Draws Audience From Among Many Enemies

By MICHEL MCQUEEN

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — After White House Chief of Staff John Sununu nixed former Indiana Rep. John Hiler for a job in the housing department, Rep. Thomas Bliley, a Virginia Republican, got so upset he began threatening to vote against one of the administration's top legislative priorities.

"Let's just say the White House looks for our support every week on a variety of issues," says Rep. Bliley. "Life is a two-way street."

Even within the administration, Mr. Sununu is a controversial figure. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, for instance, complained directly to President Bush when Mr. Sununu told a banking group that the Treasury's banking overhaul plan probably wouldn't pass Congress this year. And other cabinet members complain privately that the chief of staff bars them from seeing the president.

Mr. Sununu's penchant for making enemies is well-known in Washington; but it is taking on new meaning these days as the powerful chief of staff faces scrutiny for his extensive use of government planes for political and personal trips, as well as official travel. Yesterday, the White House released details of Mr. Sununu's trips and reimbursements made on his behalf.

For popular chiefs of staff—such as James Baker and Howard Baker who served in the job under Ronald Reagan—such disclosures might have been dismissed as a tempest in a teapot. But for Mr. Sununu, whose abrasive personality has long grated on sensitive egos inside the Washington beltway, the issue could make him an even bigger lightning rod for Republican dissatisfaction, and a weapon for Democrats trying to gain political advantage against Mr. Bush.

"He's famous for being a difficult person to get along with," says William Schneider, a political analyst with the conservative American Enterprise Institute. "Members of Congress don't like him" and neither do members of the Washington press corp, he says. As a result, "when something like this happens there's an audience for it in this town."

The travel documents were released by the White House in response to stories published over the weekend in the Washington Post and U.S. News & World Report giving details of some of Mr. Sununu's trips, including numerous political trips to his home state of New Hampshire, where he served as governor.

The documents show the chief of staff made 77 trips on government planes since April 1989. Of those, 49 were designated as official and 24 as political in nature, and four were listed as personal. (Of the 49 official trips, however, four were for speeches at ski resorts.) The White House documents show that the government was reimbursed more than \$47,000 for Mr. Sununu's nonofficial travel and for the cost of family members who accompanied him. The White House didn't specify whether Mr. Sununu or someone else made those payments.



John Sununu

The reimbursements at normal commercial travel rates are far below the actual cost of operating military aircraft on those trips—by some estimates as high as \$500,000. But the White House has defended Mr. Sununu's use of military jets by saying the trips are in accord with a Reagan-era White House policy of keeping the chief of staff in "immediate voice contact" with the president. The policy also applies to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who made far fewer trips than Mr. Sununu. The White House said it didn't release a complete list of Mr. Scowcroft's trips because some are classified.

The White House directive on travel for the chief of staff and national security adviser was initiated in August 1987 when Howard Baker was chief of staff and Frank Carlucci was national security adviser. According to White House documents, the policy resulted from concerns that the two men would be impossible to reach on commercial flights and might be vulnerable to terrorism or harassment.

But other White House sources said the true purpose of the 1987 directive was to enable chief of staff Howard Baker to regularly visit his ailing wife in Tennessee. The directive also advised both men that they should evaluate their use of military aircraft for "vacations and similar travel" "on the basis of appearance or impropriety."

Even Democrats who have been critical of Mr. Sununu's extensive travels and called for a congressional audit concede there is no evidence that the law or ethical guidelines were violated. But other analysts note that there is an issue of appearance that Democrats could be quick to exploit.

"It's a Johnny Carson story—there'll be too much fun made of it," says Doug Bailey, a GOP political consultant and the publisher of a political news digest based here.

But the story could just as easily go away. It holds little interest outside Washington, Mr. Bailey and other analysts say. Also, there haven't been stories about the Bush administration suggesting a pattern of ethical lapses or abuses of perquisites and power, such as those that dogged the Reagan administration. And, notes former Reagan administration political director Mitchell Daniels, "It's a staff story and people don't pay much attention," especially when there's no evidence of clearcut abuse.

However many enemies Mr. Sununu may have made, there's no evidence to suggest that he has alienated his most important friend, President Bush. For one thing, Mr. Sununu remains a strong link to the GOP's conservative wing, which has never fully embraced Mr. Bush for very long. Secondly, Mr. Bush prizes his aide's

loyalty and returns it, in part for Mr. Sununu's strong performance in helping him win the New Hampshire primary when Mr. Sununu was governor.

Finally, aides and Bush watchers have long noted, Mr. Bush likes having a controversial, somewhat hard-edged figure in his employ to compensate for Mr. Bush's own preference for conciliation over confrontations. During the last presidential campaign, the hard guy was Lee Atwater. Since Mr. Bush won the White House, it has been John Sununu.

"The fact is, he's performed the job the President wanted him to do—and the consequence is that rather than the president being the object of anger, John Sununu is," says Mr. Bailey.

Mr. Sununu still has a way to go before he has to worry about finding a new job. "If I were a betting man—and I am—one person I'd put my money on to survive in this town is Sununu," says Craig Shirley, a Republican consultant. "He's smart, he's tough, he's capable."

But the flap over his travel might leave him a bit humbler, at least temporarily. Only a few weeks ago he blocked former Rep. Hiler, who had opposed the deficit reduction/tax increase compromise that Mr. Sununu helped fashion last fall. But yesterday afternoon the White House chief of staff met with Mr. Hiler to discuss a possible job in the administration.

—Jackie Calmes contributed to this article.

DATE: 4/24/91

Congress wary of travel probe

By Paul M. Rodriguez
and Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The two House Democrats who launched a probe of John Sununu's travel as White House chief of staff ducked reporters' questions yesterday about expanding the investigation to include Congress.

Democratic Party leaders said they have no objection but made no formal request on their own.

"I have no problem with the GAO [General Accounting Office] looking

into the private use of military or government planes by the executive branch or the Congress," said Speaker Thomas S. Foley, Washington Democrat.

Meanwhile yesterday, the White House released six pages of documentation on travel by Mr. Sununu and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Published reports had suggested that Mr. Sununu abused his right to use military planes by frequently flying home to his native New Hampshire and jetting to ski resorts.

President Bush's two top aides have taken 100 trips on military aircraft, with a quarter of the flights designated as personal or political use.

Mr. Foley said in an interview yesterday that a GAO investigation might be useful from a public policy standpoint. "The question has been raised [in the Sununu] case as to the use of military aircraft for what are clearly more private purposes," he said.

Maryland Rep. Steny Hoyer, who also is chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, said that a GAO probe of White House travel would be useful, but not necessarily of the legislative branch.

"What's being missed here is not whether this [use of military planes] is legal, but . . . whether we want to fund this type of activity," Mr. Hoyer said.

In his request for a GAO probe, Rep. John Conyers, Michigan Democrat and chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, limited the investigation to Mr. Sununu.

John Gorman, deputy press secretary for Mr. Conyers' committee, said yesterday that "there are no plans to expand the probe at this time."

When informed of the statements by Mr. Foley and Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Gorman said: "Really, they said that on the record? That's great. But you know, it's up to my superiors to make those decisions. I'll have to get back with you about what they think."

By publishing time yesterday, Mr. Gorman did not respond. Nor did Mr. Conyers or any of his aides, despite repeated phone calls.

Several calls to Rep. Vic Fazio, California Democrat and chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, were not returned. Mr. Fazio had joined Mr. Conyers in calling for the GAO probe.

Rep. Steve Gunderson of Michigan, chief deputy GOP whip, said he wasn't surprised by the Conyers and Fazio silence.

"One of the things I've learned in public office is that when you can't attack on substance you attack personally," Mr. Gunderson said. "And if the greatest criticism of this administration is the chief of staff's travel, then I think the Bush administration is doing a pretty good job."

When asked about expanding the probe for public policy purposes, Mr. Gunderson said: "Sure, I don't think that that's unfair. If we're going to investigate travel for the administration to determine political and personal use, we ought to also scrutinize the Congress."

Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski, Pennsylvania Democrat, also supported an expanded GAO probe. "The focus ought to be all high-level officials who use military or government aircraft," he said.

Mr. Kanjorski, who has sponsored a bill for several years to make executive and judicial branch travels and expenses a matter of public record, said that Congress currently is required to detail all aspects of its expenditures, including its annual \$25 million travel budget.

"There are public records detailing each and every member's travel expenses," Mr. Kanjorski said. But the \$55 million spent annually by the

federal judiciary and the \$50 million spent by the White House excluding presidential travel, are not revealed. "They ought to be and that's what I'm advocating," he said.

According to the documents released by the White House yesterday, many of Mr. Sununu's costs were paid by the Republican Party. Political organizations, for example, paid for more than \$53,400 of his trips.

The White House documents show that Mr. Sununu took 77 trips on military jets over the past 27 months; 24 were political, and four were personal. Mr. Sununu reimbursed the government a total of \$47,044.

Mr. Scowcroft took 23 trips on government aircraft between March

7, 1989, and Oct. 26, 1990. Only one was listed as unofficial — a ski vacation with his daughter to Utah on March 10, 1990. The records show he reimbursed the government \$1,052.

Mr. Sununu's official flights included two ski resort destinations where he gave speeches. Mr. Sununu also took 16 flights to New Hampshire, where he was governor before coming to Washington. None of the trips were listed as "personal."

The political trips included Mr. Sununu's April 1 flight to Columbia, S.C., to attend the funeral of Republican National Committee General Chairman Lee Atwater. The RNC has promised to pay \$17,568 for the trip, which included 31 guests.

Among the personal trips: a January 1990 trip to Newark for a football game, costing \$200; an April 1990 trip to Boston for a dentist appointment, \$480; an April 1990 trip to Florida to visit his parents, \$167; and a December 1990 trip back to his dentist, \$420.

As Democrats assailed Mr. Sununu's travel, however, only one Republican, Rep. Bob McEwen of Ohio, took the House floor yesterday in his defense.

Many of Mr. Scowcroft's trips were not listed for national security reasons, according to White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. Among those not listed: Mr. Scowcroft's flight to China in the summer of 1989 after the Red Army crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.

A 1987 policy signed by then-President Reagan orders the chief of staff and national security adviser to fly on military aircraft.

Bush should clip Sununu's wings

The Bush White House busied itself Tuesday with a giant exercise in missing the point.

Stung by disclosures of extravagant use of military aircraft by chief of staff John Sununu, the administration hastened to lay out the dollars and cents of the matter and assure the public that the Treasury was reimbursed for any personal or political trips.

But the dollars and cents, while not unimportant, are not what is most galling in the Sununu affair. What's most galling is the arrogance and the attitude of self-importance that it reflects on the part of one of the president's closest advisers. Someone needs to pull Sununu aside and teach him that he is the public's servant, not its master.

According to U.S. News & World Report and the Washington Post, Sununu took advantage of a directive issued by President Reagan to commandeer military aircraft for more than 75 trips in two years. The total cost was estimated at more than \$500,000.

Sununu reportedly reimbursed the government at first-class commercial airline rates when the travel was

personal. The Republican National Committee reportedly made the reimbursement for political travel.

In neither case, however, did the reimbursement approach the actual cost of \$3,945 an hour (not including crew members' salaries) to operate the military aircraft. And the categorizing of some trips—like a three-day visit to Aspen, Colo.—seemed questionable.

Why did he do it? Well, said White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater, commercial flights aren't always readily available and such a key adviser needs access to secure phone links with the White House.

But why did Sununu do it so often when, for example, Brent Scowcroft, who as national security adviser could have exercised the same privilege, did not? One suspects that someone insecure in his office is more likely to flaunt its perks than someone who is secure. Scowcroft, an old Washington hand, has learned to wear his importance easily and modestly; Sununu, a Washington parvenu, wears his like an imperial robe.

If he is wise, the president will curtail his chief of staff's flying privileges and bring him down to earth.

GOP: Add Hill to probe of travel

By Paul M. Rodriguez
and Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

House Republicans said yesterday they want the General Accounting Office to broaden its probe of White House Chief of Staff John Sununu's travel on military aircraft to encompass trips by all senior government officials, including members of Congress.

Rep. Frank Horton, New York Republican and ranking minority member of the Government Operations Committee, is to deliver the formal request today in a letter to the GAO. The letter was drafted after committee Democrats refused to join the GOP in a call for an expanded inquiry.

Mr. Horton said other officials should be put under the same "magnifying glasses" being used on Mr. Sununu.

"I have read the newspapers, seen the news reports and am convinced that the Congress, the executive branch and the American taxpayer would benefit from a broad investigation of the use of military aircraft by senior government officials, not just in the executive branch but in the Congress as well," he said in a draft of the letter.

Meanwhile, President Bush, emphatic about maintaining high ethical standards, yesterday ordered a review of a policy forcing Mr. Sununu and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to fly on military aircraft — even on personal or political trips.

"As one who's vowed to stay above even the appearances of impropriety, perhaps it is appropriate to review the policy," he told reporters.

Rep. Bob McEwen, Ohio Republican, joined other top GOP officials in the House in calling for the GAO to expand the Democratic request to investigate Mr. Sununu's travel beyond a focus on the White House.

"I am certainly concerned about this matter," Mr. McEwen said yesterday in an interview. "If the Democrats won't ask for it, I certainly plan to ask for such an investigation so that it doesn't become just a partisan probe of the White House."

Rep. Robert Walker, Pennsylvania Republican, said that House GOP leaders are considering making a formal leadership request to the GAO for such a probe in the event that the congressional watchdog agency refuses to honor Mr. Horton's letter.

"This should be looked at not from a political aspect, but as a policy issue," Mr. Walker said. "It ought not to be singular [and focus only on Mr. Sununu]; it ought to be a general investigation to determine whether

there are abuses, and if so, by whom."

Mr. Walker said he would have filed his own request sooner, but historically, "GAO doesn't seem to comply with requests from the minority side unless [senior] Democrats also sign on. . . . This has been a running battle for a long time. GAO will comply with a single Democrat's request but not a Republican's without a committee chairman's signature."

Mr. McEwen said, "I think we should know what the costs are of operating an Air Force wing used exclusively for government travel and determine if that's something we want."

A senior Republican aide said GOP leaders had considered the risk of losing all travel privileges on military aircraft.

"We may lose a good thing, but if that's the price of the investigation, that's the price," said the aide.

Rep. John Conyers, Michigan Democrat and chairman of the Government Operations Committee, and Rep. Vic Fazio, California Democrat, asked the GAO to determine if any of the Sununu flights were improper.

But those same congressmen have been noticeably silent on the sensitive political issue of taxpayer-funded congressional travel.

Although Democratic leaders said they had no problem expanding

the probe to include congressional use of military or government planes, no such calls have been forthcoming from Capitol Hill.

"I don't like this jumping all over Gov. Sununu when he has complied with the policy and has made full disclosure. What more can you ask of a man?" Mr. Bush said in a three-minute gathering with reporters after an Oval Office meeting with Djibouti President Hassan Gouled.

"The president supports that policy, yes." — Marlin Fitzwater

Asked if Mr. Sununu had abused his use of military jets by taking several "official" trips to ski resorts, Mr. Bush said, "I think he complied with the existing policy . . . so how can it be abuse."

The president's announcement of the policy review reversed the Bush administration's steadfast support of the policy earlier in the week.

The review, ordered four days after news reports detailed the trips of Mr. Sununu and Mr. Scowcroft, will determine if the 4-year-old policy should be changed.

"We'll get our best people to review it in the light of practice and see whether it should be altered in any way," Mr. Bush said.

The president said he would have

his counsel, C. Boyden Gray, review the policy.

On Monday, however, when asked if the policy was under review, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said: "Not to my knowledge. . . . The president supports that policy, yes. There should be no question about that."

The policy was drawn up in 1987 to make sure that the White House chief of staff and national security adviser are kept in constant contact with the White House and out of the hands of hijackers.

Mr. Bush went out of his way yesterday to demonstrate that he is not upset with his chief of staff even though the Sununu flights may conflict with the intent of the president's orders demanding that all his staff adhere to high ethical standards.

The White House on Tuesday released a detailed explanation for each of his 77 trips and said that the chief of staff reimbursed the government \$47,044 for those deemed political or personal.

The policy requires that Mr. Sununu and Mr. Scowcroft pay commercial coach fare plus \$1 to use the military C-20 Gulfstream jets when on a personal trip. The Air Force estimates that it costs \$3,945 an hour to operate the 12-passenger plane. When all of Mr. Sununu's trips are added up and his reimbursements placed against the actual costs of operation, taxpayers appear to have provided some \$500,000 in subsidies.

Bush Says Counsel Will Review Policy Covering Military Flights by Sununu

By John E. Yang
and Charles R. Babcock
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush said yesterday he would order White House counsel C. Boyden Gray to review the travel policy that authorizes Chief of Staff John H. Sununu to use military airplanes for all his trips to determine whether the practice creates the appearance of impropriety.

Bush was described as surprised by the extent of Sununu's use of military planes but uncertain how to handle the matter without publicly undercutting his chief of staff.

Speaking with reporters outside the White House, Bush said Sununu "has my full confidence. . . . I don't like this jumping all over Governor

Sununu when he has complied with the policy and has made full disclosure."

The president said he would ask Gray and other officials to examine a policy dating from the Reagan administration that authorizes Sununu and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to use military planes so Bush can more easily contact them when they are traveling and as a security precaution.

In the past week White House officials have offered differing interpretations of the policy and whether it requires Sununu and Scowcroft to travel on military aircraft rather than simply giving them the option.

"I want our administration to be above even a perception of impropri-

ety," said Bush, who earlier ordered that Sununu's travel records be released. "If that policy leads to a perception problem, then I'll take a look at it. . . . We'll get our best people to review it in light of practice and see if it should be altered in any way."

Asked if Sununu's travel under that policy has been excessive, Bush replied, "You make that judgment."

Bush's comments, his first since stories last weekend described the chief of staff's travels, came after he, Sununu, Gray and other administration officials met in the Oval Office early yesterday morning, officials said.

On Tuesday, the White House released records showing that Sununu took more than 70 trips on

military aircraft from April 1989 through last weekend. Sununu designated four of them, including two trips to Boston to visit his dentist, as "personal" and reimbursed the government at rates based on commercial air fares.

He classified the other trips, including two three-day visits to Colorado ski resorts, as "official" or "political." The official trips were paid for by the government, the political ones by Republican Party organizations.

Sununu or others paid the government \$17,578 for his personal trips and trips his family took with him. Almost half that sum came from funds left over from his New Hampshire campaigns for governor.

GOP candidates and organizations were billed about \$45,000 for the political trips.

The total reimbursements made by or for Sununu amount to a fraction of the trips' actual cost to the government—more than \$600,000, using Air Force cost figures.

Sununu, who has canceled interviews and declined to take questions about his travels, laughed off the controversy yesterday. Asked if he thought he was being unfairly criticized, the often-combative former governor said with a grin: "Anybody with a nice, warm personality like I have has to go through these in public life."

Bush said he believes Sununu had made "full disclosure. And if people say it's not full, we'll ask for whatever else is."

White House officials yesterday seemed intent on avoiding discussion of the issue. During his daily briefing for reporters, presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater re-

sponded to various inquiries about the matter by saying: "The policy is there. It's been complied with."

Other administration officials followed his lead. "You can put us down as 'no comment' on all questions," said a Sununu aide.

The record of Sununu's travel noted that three of the trips had been incorrectly characterized for billing purposes. For example, a University of Florida student group was billed \$2,124 for a "political" speech that the White House now calls "official." And a fund-raising appearance two months later for then-Rep. Bill Grant (R-Fla.) was mistakenly listed as "official."

In addition, a Sununu appearance at a National Governors Association meeting in Mobile, Ala., last summer was billed as a political appearance and the group was incorrectly charged \$2,576.

Congressmen digging up their own travel records

By Paul M. Rodriguez
and J. Jennings Moss
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Worried members of Congress are deluging the Pentagon with requests for information about their own use of military aircraft as questions continue about White House flights.

Capitol Hill lawmakers and their top aides did not want to be quoted by name when asked if they were among the ones making the requests, but they acknowledged many in Congress are seeking travel logs and other data.

The congressional concerns were spurred largely by reporters' questions about travel related to Congress.

The flurry of requests comes in the aftermath of published reports about the use of military aircraft—for official and personal purposes—by White House Chief of Staff John Sununu.

"We have received a number of requests in the last couple of days, yes sir," a Pentagon spokesman, who asked not to be identified, said yesterday. "I can't say how many [members or their aides] have called, but there certainly seems to be a lot of calls coming in."

As the requests flooded the Pentagon, the General Accounting Office confirmed yesterday that it will investigate not only Mr. Sununu's travels, but also those of other senior government officials and members of Congress.

Initially, the GAO was asked by Rep. John Conyers, Michigan Democrat and chairman of the Government Operations Committee, to probe only Mr. Sununu's use of the aircraft and determine whether the policy allowing such flights should be changed.

At the request of Rep. Frank Horton, New York Republican and the ranking minority member on the Government Operations Committee, the GAO agreed to expand the investigation to all high-level government officials and members of Congress who use military planes stationed at Andrews Air Force Base, home of the 89th Military Airlift Wing, which also operates and maintains the presidential air fleet.

"We will be having a meeting with them [the congressmen who asked for the probe] sometime next week and we will work out the details of the job," said a GAO spokesman. The Government Operations Committee is the panel responsible for oversight of the GAO, a congressional watchdog agency.

As news spread about the GAO probe, congressional members and aides in both political camps began worrying about the effects the investigation will have on congressional use of military aircraft.

And because of the bipartisan nature of congressional travel on military aircraft, including those stationed all over the country and overseas, few of those interviewed wanted to be quoted by name.

"This is really going to tar-baby the institution," commented one senior Democratic official.

"I think you are going to see a marked decline in the number of flights taken by the members," said a second high-level Democratic official in the House.

"There's no question that this is going to hurt some members and there's no question that it's going to help some members," said a third Democratic aide, who noted that partisan jockeying on the issue already has begun on what one senator has called the "Air Sununu" controversy.

Sen. Bill Bradley, New Jersey Democrat, spoke up during a debate on the 1992 budget resolution and pointed to the difference in costs between using a military plane and a commercial carrier.

"There is a big gap. One might cost a couple hundred dollars, the other might cost 17 or 15 thousand dollars. The taxpayer has to pay. It seems to me what we ought to do is think about [changing the law] not to only have honest campaigns, but so

we can have honest government," he said while the Senate was considering an amendment to kill the public financing system for presidential elections.

Sen. Hank Brown, Colorado Republican, countered, "Would you be willing to extend the same rule to members of Congress and also provide that when they take a corporate jet to campaign fund-raising [events] that we have a similar rule for all?"

"I would have no problem with that," Mr. Bradley said.

The proposal was never formally offered as an amendment to the budget resolution.

On the broader question of the need for a federal review of congressional travel, several lawmakers said in interviews they would have no problem with a probe. But they also doubted it would do much good.

"If it's proper to review the executive branch, it's certainly proper to review the legislative branch," said Sen. Mitch McConnell, Kentucky Republican.

Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole said a thorough review was fine but he defended the use of military planes to ferry officials. The Kansas Republican said the planes provided "security, safety, efficiency and getting there without wasting a lot of time."

Democrats were more circumspect when asked about the probe.

"It's hard for Congress to be objective about it because the public perceives that travel is junkets and boondoggles. Some may be, some may not be," said Sen. Dennis DeConcini, Arizona Democrat.

Sen. John Glenn, Ohio Democrat and chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee, shook his head when asked if there should be a complete investigation of all travel. He said the first step should be to see what President Bush decides related to the White House policy.

"It's easy to write that every bit of congressional travel is wrong, but I think it [the travel] serves a useful purpose," he said.

In the past 22 months, Mr. Sununu has taken 148 trips on Air Force planes for official and personal purposes. White House policy requires him and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to use the planes, apparently to maintain communications and avoid danger. But President Bush has ordered a policy review in light of the revelations about personal and political trips.

Although Mr. Sununu has reimbursed the government in all cases involving personal or partisan political travel, Democratic critics have complained that Air Force travel costs the taxpayer substantially more than the commercial flying rate Mr. Sununu has been using to reimburse taxpayers.

A Quagmire After All

How the Bush administration trapped itself while trying to wage the peace

The Kurds have no friends." In the mountains of northern Iraq, the old maxim is the stuff of common sense. When the gulf war began, it also held true in the corridors of Washington. Last August, within a few days after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Jalal Talabani, exiled leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, phoned Peter Galbraith, a staffer for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "Peter," he said. "Should I come to Washington?" "Absolutely," Galbraith replied. "If there was ever a time that the U.S. government needs to know what is going on with the Kurds in Iraq, this is it." But when Galbraith called to arrange an appointment with the assistant secretary of state for human rights, he got nowhere. Word had come down from the seventh floor. No meeting.

Eight months later Secretary of State James Baker stepped out of a helicopter at Cukurca, a military base in Turkey. He hopped into a jeep and set off on a twisting mountain road that led to Iraq. As he came around a bend, he suddenly saw 50,000 Kurds clinging to the mountain and a valley below. Pushing through the reporters and photographers, a haggard Kurd begged for help against Saddam. Baker listened impassively. He stayed for only seven minutes. But when he got back to Diyarbakir, he called his aides to the forward cabin of his plane. "We can't let this go on," he said. "We've got to do something—and we've got to do it now."

The epiphany on the mountain was long overdue. If the president showed strategic courage and imagination in prosecuting the war, he tumbled into flip-flops and errors in waging the peace. His hope that a palace coup would rid the world of Saddam—"the 7.62-millimeter retirement plan," in the gallows humor around the Pentagon—went aglimmering. The White House underestimated the dictator's staying power and the loyalty of his Army. It

failed to predict a bloody civil war. No one anticipated those images on television: the burned, blood-streaked faces, the children's graves that marked the path of the Kurdish exodus from Iraq. Trying to eliminate Saddam even as it needed him to pre-


return his call. Later that week, when Schifter was testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on another matter, chairman Claiborne Pell asked why he was ducking the Kurds. "A misunderstanding," the diplomat replied blandly. He agreed to see them.

Encouraged, Galbraith then tried to score a meeting at the National Security Council, too. With delphic evasiveness, a top Mideast hand told him, "Our policy is not to overthrow the regime, it's to get rid of Saddam Hussein." And when the hapless Kurds arrived at the State Department, Schifter was "regrettably" busy. Two junior aides met them in the C Street lobby and hustled them out of the building to a corner coffee shop.

Gawky puppet: The president had his reasons for being elusive; many were well considered. His mandate from the United Nations was to liberate Kuwait, not to occupy Iraq. Victorious Kurds might demand a country of their own, a prospect that appalled the Turks and Iranians, which have sizable Kurdish minorities of their own. To meddle in the civil war, the United States would have to create a gawky puppet government. There was the danger of Lebanonization. Bush had promised the Saudis and the Egyptians a quick withdrawal.

In the United States, there were yellow ribbons on every other front porch. America wanted its sons and daughters home.

Although the president had called on Iraqis to revolt, he never believed civilian dissidents would be able to topple Saddam. His scenarists had spun a different plot: the Iraqi Army, embittered after its drubbing, would march back to Baghdad and dump Saddam. To encourage such a putsch, CentCom salted the first 20,000 POWs to be sent home with senior officers, those thought most likely to lead a revolt. But in the end, the Army chose to stand by its dictator. "When you get the crap kicked out of you, the way you recover is to kick the crap out of someone lower than you,"



GAD GROSS—JB PICTURES

A Kurd shoulders his weapons and heads for battle

President Bush wanted to avoid being 'sucked into' a civil war

serve Iraq's territorial integrity, the administration lurched from high principle to low expediency.

The contradictions of Bush's policy emerged the moment the ground war against Saddam ended. "We thought there would be a political revolt by the Army and the power structure," one top White House aide recalls. "No one expected the Kurds to rise up." That was because no one was listening. That same week in late February, Talabani returned to Washington with a group of Iraqi opposition leaders to make the rounds of the think tanks and talk to senators. Once again Galbraith phoned the State Department. Richard Schifter, assistant secretary for human rights, didn't

one of the president's men now concedes.

Obsessed by Vietnam, the president wanted to avoid being "sucked into" a civil war. He sought to get out cleanly and quickly. The cease-fire he declared only 100 hours after the ground war began took even his own field commanders by surprise. "We were shocked," a CentCom aide told *Newsweek* last week. "Another two days and we would have taken out everything the Iraqis had in the south." Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf knew Saddam could use escaping troops to suppress the Kurds and Shiites. Stormin' Norman seethed.

Slamming on the brakes was the idea of Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. From the outset of the gulf crisis, Powell was leery of landing the United States in another Vietnam War that would cost lives and reopen old domestic wounds. His political instincts told him he had no choice but to go along with his commander in chief's desire to get Saddam. But he set the military requirements for intervention extremely high. His calculation was that the build-up would take so long that diplomacy would have time to resolve the crisis, according to a critic high up in the Army. It didn't work out that way.

Then, when the Iraqis crumpled, Powell worried about the impression the United States would make on television if it shed too much blood in cutting up Saddam's retreating forces. He didn't worry much about the Kurds or the consequences of a quick cease-fire on a civil war. "He was thinking in White House terms," recalls the senior military critic. "What we needed perhaps was a military voice saying, 'Mr. President, the job has not been done yet.'"

Given another 24 hours, American and allied armored units swinging eastward out of Kuwait would have sealed the trap. As it was, at least three heavy divisions of Iraqis escaped. Saddam used these to suppress Shiite rebels in the south. Even before the cease-fire, he issued a secret general order that whisked senior officers and headquarters personnel out of harm's way. To boost morale, he gave a pay bonus to troops straggling in from Kuwait. Within a week he rebuilt badly scarred units like the Hammurabi Division of the Republican Guards. Even in defeat, he wound up with perhaps 300,000 combat-ready troops and 2,000 tanks—enough to savage the Shiites and Kurds.

The first intelligence reports of the Shi-

ite revolt in Basra came on March 1; within a week the Kurds were rising up in the north. The administration was still smarting from the criticism it took for failing to warn Saddam forcefully enough to keep him out of Kuwait; it knew it could not stand by and do nothing.

When intelligence intercepts showed Saddam was authorizing the use of poison gas, the State Department warned Iraq's representative in Washington to stop it. After the president warned against the use of fixed-wing aircraft to attack rebels, the Air Force destroyed an Iraqi fighter over the northern part of the country.

The president had encouraged the insurgents in other ways. From Saudi Arabia,

trous attack that killed more than 400 civilians in a bunker near Baghdad. One of the raid's planners now says, "We bombed it that night because we thought Saddam was sleeping there."

The Kurds believed mistakenly that the token gestures foreshadowed more military help from the United States. For a time they pummeled Saddam. In mid-March the CIA confirmed Kurdish claims that the rebels held most of northern Iraq. By March 20, Kurdish leaders in Damascus said virtually all of Iraqi Kurdistan had been liberated. On March 26 Talabani returned from three years of exile to his hometown in Iraq. At the peak of the Kurds' success, Saddam struck back hard and the course of battle reversed. The White House froze. Not wanting to tip the balance, the president decided to do nothing.


Not everyone within the administration agreed with the policy; younger officials, less spooked by Vietnam, called for tougher action. They wanted to warn Iraqi soldiers to stay in their barracks. Anything that moved—choppers, tanks, artillery or troops—would be attacked. They thought they had the support of Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Vice President Dan Quayle.

On March 26 the president convened a White House meeting of his Big Eight: Quayle, Cheney, Baker, Powell, White House chief of staff John Sununu, national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft and NSC deputy Robert Gates. Among other things, they considered shooting down Iraqi helicopter gunships. Powell argued that the job was complex and would take too many men and weapons. Not everyone in the Pentagon agreed. "Of course we had the assets," says one senior offi-

cer. "Don't get me wrong—there may be decisive political arguments against getting involved in Iraq. All I'm saying is that the idea that taking on a bunch of Iraqi helicopters posed some kind of big military challenge is bullshit, and whoever says that is playing politics."

Quayle argued mildly that it might be a good idea for the United States to take a "less neutral stand" toward rebels willing to fight Saddam. Cheney kept his counsel. Powell offered another tempting prospect to the president. He said it would be possible to get all American troops out of southern Iraq in four days.

By March 31, Saddam's advancing troops forced Kurdish guerrillas to stage



LARRY DOWNING—NEWSWEEK

Advice from the vice president to the commander in chief

We should take a 'less neutral' stand toward rebels willing to fight Saddam

Radio Free Iraq urged Iraqis, specifically the Kurds, to rise against Saddam. The Saudis paid for the station, but sources close to them say the CIA helped to supply the transmitters and other equipment and to recruit broadcasters. British special forces worked with the Kurds to foment an uprising. And while Bush said last week that his object had never been "the demise and destruction of Saddam personally," that was not entirely true. "We didn't send in hit teams against Saddam because we didn't think they would succeed," says one allied source. "But we certainly targeted anywhere we thought he might be." The list included every leadership bunker the targeters could find, including one disas-

what they called "a strategic retreat" in the north. Knowing what would happen when Saddam arrived with his enforcers, panic-stricken Kurdish civilians headed for the hills. Short of using military power to remove Saddam, the administration could not have prevented the flight of the Kurds, but it could have done a good deal more to anticipate the exodus and to mitigate its human suffering. "The moment the Kurds and Shiites picked up guns, we should have seen their defeat as imminent and planned for relief operations," says Court Robinson of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, a private monitoring group. In fact, the Pentagon did begin in late March discreetly planning a major relief operation. It had already stockpiled supplies for perhaps 100,000 refugees. But planners had believed they would be mostly Shiites, not Kurds, and that they would leave through the south and by way of Jordan. Plastic sheets for tents were in Saudi Arabia. There were only modest supplies at a British base on Cyprus. "Nobody had warned us to expect a tidal wave into Turkey," recalls one Pentagon topsider.

Stop shooting: On April 2 Turkey's President Turgut Ozal alerted the U.N. Security Council that 30,000 Iraqi Kurds had entered Turkey in two days and that an additional 220,000 were on the way. France proposed a resolution that would have ordered Saddam to stop shooting. The rest of the world was still more interested in getting the United States out of the gulf than in helping the Kurds. Washington, London and Moscow all wanted the United Nations' permanent cease-fire resolution passed before attending to the Kurds' plight.

Then the TV evening news began to run footage of desperate Kurds, ragged men and women and blood-spattered children trekking through the mountains. Conservative columnist William Safire attacked the president for a "loss of nerve ... and sense of purpose" and the "worst humiliation" since Desert One, Jimmy Carter's hostage-rescue fiasco, and JFK's disastrous Bay of Pigs. "People like the too trusting Kurds now know they can get killed by relying on Mr. Bush," he sniped. Stung, Bush launched a \$10 million relief program. Otherwise, he refused to interfere. "There are no gives, takes, ifs, ands or buts whatsoever," said one top White House aide. "A hundred Safire columns will not change the public's mind. There

is no political downside to our policy."

The president still hoped international relief agencies could handle the problem. But mounting pressure from Turkey's President Ozal forced a compromise. On April 6 Bush authorized Operation Provide Comfort, a limited relief effort confined to airdrops of food to the starving Kurds. Fearing that they might become staging areas for guerrillas, the president would not support relief camps.

Ozal said it was not enough. At Bush's order, Secretary of State Baker went to Ankara on Sunday, April 7. He went immediately to the presidential palace. Over dinner Ozal told him, "Turkey is being overwhelmed." The president said the only way



FRANCOISE DEMULDER—SIPA

Iraqi troops roll in to suppress the rebellion

**The defeated Army was in
no mood to turn on its leader,
but the Kurds were easy prey**

to stop the flood toward Turkey was to install a United Nations peacekeeping force inside Iraq. Baker was noncommittal. After dinner Ozal pointed toward a television and VCR at the end of the room. "Now, Mr. Secretary, there's something I want to show you," he said and flicked on the VCR. Baker found himself looking at pictures of Kurds trudging barefoot through ice and snow, and a mother weeping over the body of her child, a 3-year-old who had died of exposure. The images were of total chaos. When Baker got back to his hotel he ordered soundings on the prospects for getting the Security Council to launch a peacekeeping force. They were bleak. It was one thing to send troops to

protect Kuwait from Iraq, quite another to send them to protect a people from its own government. The Soviets, who have their own problems with restless ethnic minorities, didn't like the idea; and China would probably veto it.

The next day, as Baker made his trip to the mountains, British Prime Minister John Major weighed in with the idea of setting up enclaves to protect the Kurds. The American reaction was tepid. No one wanted to create a new West Bank or Gaza Strip in Iraq. But by now, the Baker team knew it had to devise some way of moving the Kurds back down from the mountains and of keeping Saddam from massacring them. The question was how to do it without creating an embryonic Kurdish state. On the way back to Washington Baker stopped in Geneva. After spending half an hour with the grumbling heads of the largest international relief agencies, he knew one thing for certain: they were not up to the job.

At about the same time, Bush convened another meeting at the White House. "Let's go out on the patio," he said, and everyone trooped into a patio by the Rose Garden. Colin Powell set up an easel and reviewed the airdrop. The only decision was to order CentCom to issue a statement over the weekend accelerating the pace of the American troop withdrawal. The Sunday talk shows went badly for the administration. By Monday the morning intelligence reports put the Kurdish body count at 1,000 a day.

No real friends: Then Ozal called the president. "I'm being overwhelmed," he said once again, and he pleaded for help. He appealed to Bush to send large numbers of American troops deep inside Iraq to persuade the Kurds to return to their villages. His plea was backed by similar pressure from the French and British. On April 16, after 10 days of dithering, Bush committed U.S. ground forces to set up relief camps inside Iraq. "It's hard to have a lot of hope for this," said one gloomy administration topsider. "The truth is that everyone was opposed to it, but everyone realized it had to be done." Huge numbers and searing images had overwhelmed the cold calculations of policy. Temporarily. The Kurds still had no real friends.

TOM MATHEWS with
MARGARET GARRARD WARNER
in the Middle East and
THOMAS M. DEFRANK, DOUGLAS WALLER and
JOHN BARRY in Washington

Mission of Mercy

Date **29 APRIL 1991**

By dispatching U.S. troops to set up camps for the Kurds in northern Iraq, Bush undertakes a humane but risky endeavor

By **GEORGE J. CHURCH**

The Kurds were dying. Starvation, exposure and disease were killing as many as 1,000 a day. And that brute fact overcame the nervousness about being sucked into an endless political and perhaps military quagmire. Prodded by distressed allies, by outraged U.S. and European public opinion, and not least by his own conscience, George Bush last week finally did what he should have done long before: set in motion an unprecedented and bold operation that might at last bring effective succor to the Kurds—at least to the 850,000 or so squatting along the Iraq-Turkey border and possibly to the 1.5 million who are seeking asylum in Iran.

To that end, American, British and French troops over the weekend began moving into northern Iraq, an area the allies had largely left alone throughout the gulf war. Over the next two weeks or so, these soldiers will build on relatively flat land as many as seven tent cities, each housing up to 100,000 Kurds. The idea is to bring the refugees down from the barren, freezing and almost inaccessible mountain slopes where they are perched and relocate them where they can be given adequate food, water, shelter, sanitation and medical care. And, of paramount importance, safety: the camps will be protected by as many as 10,000 soldiers from the U.S., 5,000 from Britain, 1,300 from France and 1,000 each from the Netherlands and Italy, from any attempt by Saddam Hussein to exact bloody vengeance for the Kurds' failed revolt.

But for how long? And what follows the supposedly temporary relocation? Nobody can say, but at minimum it seems that Bush will have to bid farewell to his hopes for a quick and clean American military withdrawal from the Middle East. The risks of the new effort, dubbed Operation Haven, may not have justified the President's long dithering in providing effective relief. But those risks are real, not chimerical.

Immediately, there is a danger that U.S. and other allied troops involved in Opera-

tion Haven will become enmeshed in a long-running battle between Baghdad and the Kurds. Few think Saddam would be so mad as to order a deliberate attack on the camps and their allied protectors. That would expose what remains of his army to more of the allied bombing that proved so devastating during the gulf war. But the allied soldiers could easily get into unplanned and escalating shooting incidents with the 30,000 or more Iraqi troops in the area.

U.S. Army Lieut. General John Shalikashvili, commander of the relief effort, met with Iraqi officers near the border town of Zakhu to warn them to keep their troops away from the camps; at further meetings Americans and Iraqis will try to work out some ground rules to keep the two forces apart. But it is by no means certain that they can succeed, especially if allied soldiers decide to seize Iraqi military airstrips to land construction materials and relief supplies for the camps. The Operation Haven troops could also get caught in cross fire between Iraqi soldiers and Kurdish guerrillas using the camps as bases from which to stage raids. The allies say they will not allow guerrilla activity in the tent cities, but are not at all clear about how they intend to stop it.

It is also difficult to see when and how the allies can wind up Operation Haven. The U.S. and its friends insist they do not intend to let the tent cities become a second Gaza Strip, home to generations of embittered, stateless and disruptive exiles. Washington and London hope to turn over protection of the refugee settlements to a United Nations peacekeeping force in one to three months, and eventually to resettle the Kurds in their old homes under the eye of U.N. observers.

But that may be wishful thinking. U.N. Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar insists that a new Security Council resolution would be required to empower the organization to take part in Operation Haven. Any such resolution might well be vetoed by the Soviet Union or China. They would be afraid of setting a precedent for intervention that one day could be applied to the Baltic republics or Tibet.

Even getting the Kurds to come down from the mountains in the first place may not be easy. Some Kurds fear precisely what the allied governments hope—that the

U.S., British and French soldiers will leave in a month or so. If so, many Kurds believe, Saddam's forces will massacre them all, U.N. observers or no. Enticing the Kurds to return to Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah or the other cities from which they fled looks impossible as long as Saddam is in power. Already Administration officials assume that the U.S. and allied forces will have to stay until the dictator

goes. But since Washington has no strategy for forcing Saddam out, that could mean maintaining garrisons for years in a country perpetually on the brink of explosion. "Going in is easy," sums up a high-ranking officer attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Getting out may be the problem."

It was exactly this fear of an open-ended commitment that for weeks kept Bush from organizing any effective relief effort. As late as Saturday, April 13—only three days before he finally ordered Operation Haven—the President declared in a speech at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama: "I do not want one single soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in Iraq that's been going on for ages." But while Bush was still in Alabama, where he had gone to fish for largemouth bass, Secretary of State James Baker phoned to report growing pressure from Congress and allies to save the Kurds. British Prime Minister John Major had already publicly proposed several versions of a plan to establish "safe havens" for the Kurds inside Iraq, and France had sent senior diplomats to the State Department to plead for U.S. participation in some such effort.

The Turkish government, Baker reported, was especially agitated. Turkish President Turgut Ozal confirmed as much in a phone call to Bush on Monday morning. Turkey could not take in the refugees, said Ozal, and American efforts to get aid to them in the mountains by airdrop or helicopter were insufficient; more were dying every day.

Bush reported this to his top national security advisers at their regular Monday morning meeting, and the group assigned Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates to devise a plan. Gates convened a "deputies committee" of the second-

CONTINUED

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ranking officials at State, the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs and the CIA. By Monday afternoon they sought their chiefs' approval for Operation Haven, which Bush announced Tuesday afternoon after telephoning Major, French President François Mitterrand and Turkey's Ozal.

Some advisers were unenthusiastic to the end. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell "were not crazy about this idea" of sending troops into Iraq, says one high official. (A Pentagon source puts it more forcefully: "Colin got steamrollered.") National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft had argued since long before the gulf war that the U.S. should set two limited objectives—drive Iraq out of Kuwait and break Saddam Hussein's offensive military power—and once they were accomplished, get out quickly. But Bush, says a senior official, decided that "we simply could not allow 500,000 to a million people to die up there in the mountains. And that's precisely what might have happened."

The Administration has also decided to come to the aid of the Kurds who are stranded near the Iran-Iraq border. Initially, Bush suggested that the strain in American relations with Iran would limit U.S. assistance for the refugees. But late last week Iran made a formal plea for U.S. help through Swiss intermediaries. The Administration replied that it was prepared to send relief supplies once the Iranians detailed exactly what they needed. Said an Administration official: "We are comfortable doing it for humanitarian reasons."

The relief operations for the Kurds, however, do nothing for 50,000 Shi'ites who have taken refuge in the occupation zone of southern Iraq, from which coalition troops are rapidly withdrawing. The allies plan to place these refugees in camps within a nine-mile-wide demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border that will be patrolled by a U.N. force.

Seen in this light, Operation Haven looks less like a bold venture and more like a minimum effort that is long overdue. Certainly the U.S. could, and should, organize a major relief effort for the Kurds fleeing toward Iran and try to ensure the safety of the southern Shi'ites. And it has bargaining levers to use with Saddam. Following the requirements of the cease-fire that ended the gulf war, Baghdad last week meekly asked the U.N. Security Council for permission to sell almost \$1 billion

worth of oil and use the money to buy badly needed food, medicine and other necessities for the populace still under Saddam's control. The U.S. and its allies, which have veto power in the council, are in a position to trade consent for some satisfactory arrangement bringing relief to the refugees.

Even then, the long-term stationing of military forces inside Iraq entails very genuine risks. Bush's worries about a Vietnam-style "quagmire" are not at all unrealistic. But the risks will just have to be borne. The alternative would be to abandon the Kurds to their fate, and no humane nation can do that.

—Reported by Dan Goodgame
and Bruce van Voorst/Washington and William
Mader/London

DATE: 4/29/91

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Another Official May Determine When Sununu Uses Military Craft

By MARTIN TOLCHIN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 27 — White House lawyers are likely to recommend that an official other than John H. Sununu, the chief of staff, determine whether his use of military aircraft is for personal, political or official business, a Bush Administration official said Saturday.

Under existing procedures, Mr. Sununu makes this determination himself when he travels by military plane, as he is authorized to do by a White House policy adopted in 1987. Of the more than 70 trips he has made over the last two years in Air Force planes, only four were designated personal, according to a list released earlier this week by the White House.

Although the military aircraft cost nearly \$4,000 an hour to operate, Mr. Sununu pays a nominal fee for his personal trips, reimbursing the Government, as the policy requires, at the commercial rate of coach fare plus \$1.

The White House legal staff is also considering tightening the rules on the use of military aircraft for political business, said the Administration official, who spoke only on the condition of anonymity. The policy authorizing Mr. Sununu and Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, to use military aircraft distinguishes only between official and unofficial business. It does not require that political travel be billed to the appropriate party, as is done when President Bush or Vice President Dan Quayle make trips deemed to be political rather than Government business.

All Trips Reviewed

Although some Republican groups have, in fact, made such payments for Mr. Sununu's flights to attend fundraising events and other party activities, the official said the legal office was reviewing all the Sununu trips to determine if some political groups should be billed for travel for which the taxpayers have paid.

"I think you're going to see a sharply revised policy," Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, the Senate Republican leader, said today on the ABC News program "This Week." "I think you're going to see a tighter policy on the part of White House staff. It would be my guess the President is going to insist on that."

The new rules could require a pro-

rated payment for flights that combine official business with personal or political matters. When Mr. Bush and Mr. Quayle mix business with politics, for example, the Republican Party or a specific candidate's campaign fund must reimburse the Government for the political portion of the trip.

The White House policy on the use of military planes for the chief of staff and national security adviser was initiated in 1987 to enable the two officials to maintain constant contact with the White House. President Bush last week ordered C. Boyden Gray, the White House counsel, to review the policy after a furor erupted on Capitol Hill and in the news media concerning Mr. Sununu's use of military aircraft for personal business, including visits to ski resorts in Colorado. The records released by the White House list those trips as official.

Questions on Ski Trip

The May 6 issue of Time magazine asserts that Mr. Sununu may have violated Federal ethics law by accepting free lift tickets, lodging and meals in return for speaking at an annual ski industry conference. The magazine said the American Ski Federation, a Washington-based lobbying group for the ski industry, also paid \$802 for the round-trip flight to Aspen for Mr. Sununu's wife, Nancy.

In the documents released by the White House this week, the ski federation was identified as a not-for-profit educational group. The distinction is critical, because Federal law prohibits officials from accepting such payments from any groups other than charitable or educational organizations.

And the May 6 issue of U.S. News & World Report said the White House was likely to rewrite ethics rules to require the Republican Party to reimburse the Government for the full cost of Mr. Sununu's political trips, a cost that is often 10 times the amount of commercial fares.

Kondracke: I have a solution to this problem. The solution is that when they are on official business that they should fly -- these are aides to somebody who's involved in an important enterprise -- they do need to be in voice contact with the White House.... When he's on a political trip the RNC should reimburse the Air Force....

Page: The problem is this is the same chief of staff who's been cutting the money to libraries and to social programs. When people see him flying off to the golf course on Air Force planes, --

Barnes: We had a budget agreement. All of the Democrats, or most of them, signed on to it too. They're cutting the same libraries and social programs. The flap over this is because John Sununu is a conservative and he's unpopular with the establishment in Washington....

Buchanan: Nobody went after Brent Scowcroft. It was John Sununu, and everybody in town knows why. Because they're out to get the chief of staff. One dog bites him and then all the dogs pile on.... I think he gets an 'A' performance, he has been loyal to Bush, he has swallowed stuff I guess he doesn't agree with, and I think he's been loyal down the line....

McLaughlin: This is a cheap political demagogic trick.... Will Sununu weather this storm? **Buchanan:** Easily, but the President will change the policy.... **McLaughlin:** If he does it will show pusillanimity. **Barnes:** More to come. The guy is going to get a full frisk from the press, every dime he spent in the last 10 years.... **Page:** I think he will. I predict he will weather it, but after a week of damage control next week. You just watch. **Kondracke:** He's got the President behind him and he will weather it. **McLaughlin:** He's got the regulation completely behind him. He's fulfilling the language of the regulation. Of course he'll weather the storm.

On whether the Kurdish-Iraqi accord, if it materializes, means that George Bush is off the hook:

Barnes: It does not mean that George Bush is off the hook no matter what he thinks, because the only way this thing can be guaranteed is by U.S. troops....

Page: If Saddam Hussein makes it, and I think he will, George Bush is not off the hook. He's off the hook in so far as the current pictures we see on the evening news are not of Kurdish suffering, perhaps. But Saddam Hussein is still in power. He's like a Timex watch. He still keeps on ticking.

Kondracke: To his credit, Bush is going to protect the Kurds. We are not going to get out of here and leave him to the tender mercy of Saddam Hussein. This deal with the devil sealed with a kiss is just empty....

THE McLAUGHLIN GROUP

Moderator: John McLaughlin. **Panel:** Pat Buchanan, Fred Barnes, Clarence Page and Morton Kondracke.

On Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin:

Buchanan: ...If Yeltsin and Gorbachev are moving to loosen up, that is utterly contradicted by what happened in Lithuania, so...let's wait and see what these guys are up to [with their agreement last week on Soviet reforms].

McLaughlin: On a scale of zero to ten,...tell me whether or not this reform coalition of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, dramatic as it is, will arrest the chaos in the Soviet Union. **Buchanan:** Zero.

Barnes: Only Gorbachev now follows through and moves toward a free market. **Page:** Ditto. I'll give them an eight if the communists learn to become capitalists. It's asking a lot at this point.

Kondracke: One. **McLaughlin:** I'm giving them a five.

On whether the White House travel controversy is a tempest in a teapot or a legitimate rap:

Page: More like a time bomb than a tempest in a teapot. I think that this will not bring Sununu down, but it puts him on the brink. It is true that it's his own unpopularity going back to his relationship with Capitol Hill that has made this into a major controversy. However, the other aspect that people aren't talking about is that George Bush has tried very hard to separate himself from the sleaze factor in this Administration. He has tried very hard to preach ethics and good government, and this looks like a blot on his record....

Barnes: I suspect there's sleaze everywhere, but this isn't an example of it. When Sununu came to office as White House chief of staff, he started flying commercially. That's what he expected he had to do. Then the White House military liaison came to his office...and said you can't do that. You have to fly, no matter where you go -- political, private, official, whatever -- you have to take an Air Force plane. Now it looks bad for him, I admit.... But he's been required to do exactly that.... Here's the problem for him. He doesn't really have many friends around Washington outside of the Oval Office.... And now you have the press doing a full strip search on him....

McLaughlin: You know why he's not popular. He's the long-lost twin of Roseanne Barr.

Buchanan: ...Air Sununu is going to be merged out of existence.... [President Bush] is very, very sensitive to this type of thing, some of which went on in the Reagan White House and shouldn't have gone on.... He is being hammered right now because he is John Sununu. But let me tell you, when they turn this focus up there on the congressional airlines, a lot of guys are going to be terribly unhappy about it and I think there's a lot there....

Ski Industry Lobby Paid Expenses for Sununu, Wife in Aspen

By Charles R. Babcock
and John E. Yang
Washington Post Staff Writers

A ski industry lobbying group said yesterday that it paid the expenses for White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu and his wife, Nancy, during a three-day trip to Aspen, Colo., last December for a speech, a practice that was not permitted by government ethics rules.

The American Ski Federation said the payment was a mistake. The group had "agreed in advance" to pay the Sununus' expenses out of a charitable foundation, but "inadvertently" made the payment from the trade association account, according to a statement by federation president Joseph Prendergast.

Federal ethics rules state that the government should pay the expenses of White House aides on official business. The only non-government groups allowed to make reimbursements are non-profit educational or philanthropic organizations.

The Aspen trip was one of more than 70 that John Sununu made on military aircraft over the past two years. In an accounting released by the White House last week, Sununu

described the trip as official business because he gave a speech in Aspen in connection with the 20th annual Ski magazine week. Because it was an official trip, the government paid for his flight on a military plane to the Colorado resort. The ski federation paid for Nancy Sununu's travel on the plane, as well as both her and John Sununu's expenses while in Aspen.

Sununu has refused to discuss his trips on military aircraft, and the White House press office said yesterday it would provide no further information on them. Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said there are no plans to review the trips to see if the reimbursements violate ethics rules.

"What's done is done," said another senior White House official. "What we are trying to do now is put in place the right policy and go from there."

White House counsel C. Boyden Gray is reviewing the policy that permits Sununu and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to travel in military planes so they can remain in immediate contact with the president.

The review is expected to be completed in several days, Fitzwater said yesterday. It includes in-

terviews with officials of former administrations to assess why the original policy was put in effect, according to a senior administration official.

New questions, however, continue to arise over the Sununu trips.

For example, the records released last week by the White House showed Sununu as making an

official trip to Lawrence, Mass., last June to speak at a dinner sponsored by the Lawrence Eagle Tribune.

Newspaper officials said the paper had paid for some of Sununu's family members to travel with him on a military plane to the dinner. It is not clear whether federal ethics regulations permit corporations to pay expenses of officials' families.

On another trip, to Boston in January 1990, Sununu accompanied his wife to an event in which she had been invited to participate. In the White House records, Sununu described the trip as "official" and listed its purpose as "Card Law Bfast w/ Family Values Group/Speech Camp David/Multiple Sclerosis Event."

Schedules for Cardinal Bernard F. Law, archbishop of Boston, show no record of him having breakfast with Sununu on any of the dates listed, according to a spokesman for the archbishop. Law and Sununu both attended a reception for Women Who Affirm Life Inc., an anti-abortion group, at the Sheraton-Tara Hotel in Braintree, Mass., the night of Jan. 18.

The invited guest that night was Nancy Sununu, not the chief of staff, according to Marianne Rea-Luthin, the group's treasurer. Sununu accompanied his wife to the reception and made impromptu remarks that lasted less than five minutes, Rea-Luthin said yesterday.

On Jan. 19, the Sununus participated in a celebrity ski race in Bartlett, N.H., to benefit the Genesis Fund, a charity that raises money for the care and treatment of children with birth defects.

The White House list showed that the government was paid \$338 to cover Nancy Sununu's travel, but does not indicate who paid it. Rea-Luthin did not know whether Women Who Affirm Life made any payment; officials of the Genesis Fund could not be reached.

Yesterday's statement by the American Ski Federation did not say how much of the Sununus' expenses were paid for on the Aspen trip. A senior White House official said last week the group may have paid the Sununus' lodging, food and ski lift tickets, as well as \$802 to the government for Nancy Sununu's travel on the Air Force C-20 that she and her husband used.

The ski group said it is "taking immediate action" to make a new payment from the foundation account. Time magazine reported in this week's issue that the foundation has been inactive for years and has less than \$100 in its bank account. Prendergast did not return several calls for comment and by mid-afternoon, the office number was being answered by a machine.

Staff writer Ann Devroy contributed to this report.