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December 1990

Prolonged Buildup Reflects Doctrine Of Invincible Force

By Rick Atkinson and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush's decision to send a huge armed force to the Persian Gulf reflects a military philosophy that seeks overwhelming firepower to guarantee victory if war becomes necessary against Iraq, according to administration officials.

This doctrine of invincible force has been the main military principle underlying Operation Desert Shield for the past four months and was at the core of Bush's reasoning when he ordered the near-doubling of U.S. forces in the gulf Nov. 8. "The president has told us not to give him another Vietnam," a top official said last week.

But the drive for military certainty has created controversy in the Pentagon, where the November announcement came as a surprise to many military officers who have been worried about the enormous strains it is placing on the uniformed services.

Beyond the sheer magnitude of the new buildup of an additional 200,000 troops and the further logistical headaches this involves, the suspension of rotation plans—which would have used the fresh troops to relieve some of those already in the gulf—was the most startling revelation to most officers.

"That shivered the timbers of the whole military system," one admiral said last week. "It was a helluva signal" of the Bush administration's willingness to marshal as much military firepower as necessary to prevail in the gulf.

Bush may yet order another wave of reinforcements beyond the 400,000 U.S. troops

already committed to the gulf, Defense Department officials said.

The guiding doctrine behind the American deployment in the gulf has antecedents that can be traced through a thousand years of warfare; but it firmly took root as the prevailing U.S. approach to combat last December during the American invasion of Panama. That action, code-named Operation Just Cause, stressed secrecy, the figurative "decapitation" of the enemy leadership and the crushing shock of combat power intended to be so formidable as to prove invincible.

After Operation Just Cause, a senior Pentagon official said Friday, those principles were elevated to "a catechism." The doctrine represents a reaction to and rejection of the gradualism of Vietnam and the tentative approach of Desert One, the disastrous and undermanned effort in 1980 to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran.

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Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the new doctrine's intellectual godfather, and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney its political champion. But Bush, who Friday pledged "this will not be a protracted, drawn-out war," has become their most ardent convert.

"If there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs," Bush said. "If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win and then get out as soon as possible. . . . I will never, ever agree to a halfway effort."

"The president belongs to what I call the 'don't screw around school of military strategy,'" Cheney said in a little-noticed speech in California on Sept. 12. The administration wants to be "absolutely certain" U.S. forces can prevail in combat, Cheney added, and "it would be morally irresponsible for us to send out men and women into battle without every advantage we can give them." To do otherwise, Cheney has said privately, would be "a sin."

'The Engine Driving the Train'

Besides Powell, Cheney and Bush, two other critical policy-makers in the administration are adherents of the doctrine of overwhelming force: Secretary of State James A. Baker III and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. Officials have said, however, that Baker sees the deployment of a large force as a buttress to diplomatic efforts to avoid armed conflict.

"There are five men who believe in their heads and hearts that the remedy is to present maximum firepower," one senior administration official said last week. "The critics can debate the impact of the [economic] sanctions or the diplomacy or the timeliness of the U.N. resolutions, but that maximization is the engine driving the train. Period."

Though the Cheney-Powell philosophy—"Jesuits would call it a dogma," one Pentagon official said Friday—has provided a rationale for the size and shape of the gulf buildup, it also carries hazards that have caused confusion and alarm in the U.S. military. The United States now is in a high-stakes confrontation with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who has his own "don't screw around school of military strategy" and has raised his ante to 450,000 troops in greater Kuwait.

Officials said that the United States does not have enough forces in its active duty military to allow for some relief or rotation for those assigned or slated to

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be assigned to the Persian Gulf theater. Operation Desert Shield also has taxed the military's logistical prowess to an unprecedented degree. Given these pressures, some members of Congress and some military officers warn that the doctrine of overwhelming force may push Bush to "use or lose" his desert army before all diplomatic efforts are exhausted.

Finally, several officers said the Defense Department leadership and Bush may be reaching for certainty where certainty cannot be found.

Articulating the view, retired Adm. William J. Crowe, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, warned Wednesday: "War is not neat, it's not tidy. And once you resort to it, it's a mess." Echoing this, one senior military officer said last week: "War is a really bad business that defeats any hopeful expectations."

Nonetheless, the Bush administration has sought an insurance policy against the uncertainties of combat by mobilizing a large force from the start. By mid-October, the first wave of troops sent to the gulf had provided sufficient strength to give military officials confidence that Saudi Arabia could be defended from an Iraqi attack, which was the immediate concern after Iraq seized Kuwait Aug. 2.

U.S. military planners had also been contemplating what kind of offensive force would be needed to dislodge the invader. The U.S. Central Command's Operations Plan 90-1002, used as the initial blueprint for Operation Desert Shield and the defense of Saudi Arabia, contained an outline for U.S. offensive operations as well.

But the contingency planning was complicated by the steady, almost exponential growth of the Iraqi occupation. One U.S. intelligence estimate in August calculated that Saddam could muster 18 divisions to defend his prize, according to a Pentagon source; instead, exactly four months after the invasion, Iraq has 28 divisions in the Kuwait "theater of operations," which extends from the Persian Gulf across much of southern Iraq. "The Iraqis generated a lot more force than we thought they could," one U.S. officer conceded last week.

Services Focused on Troop Rotation

That force mushroomed from 100,000 in Kuwait on Aug. 2 to 430,000 in the theater on Sept. 25. Saddam also ordered massive armor and artillery forces south, so that by late October Iraq had 3,500 tanks and 1,700 artillery pieces in the theater, with more on the way. Simultaneously, the Iraqis began a prodigious fortification effort, digging ever deeper and laying minefields, barbed wire, tank traps and more than 500 miles of military roads.

By early October, with much of the first wave of U.S. forces either in the gulf region or on the way, U.S. tacticians had completed contingency planning for a second wave, which could provide the critical mass necessary to shift from defense to offense. The plan, which became the basis for the massive reinforcement Bush announced Nov. 8, envisioned a virtual doubling of the U.S. force in the gulf, including an additional 150,000 Army troops.

But within the four U.S. services, planning focused largely on a rotation schedule to begin replacing troops. For example, Gen. Alfred M. Gray Jr., the Marine

Corps commandant, ordered his generals to begin drafting a rotation plan on Sept. 18; senior Marine planners met at Quantico, Va., Oct. 10-12, and on Oct. 20, Gray approved a plan that would have replaced the 31,000 Marines in theater with a similar force beginning in February. Comparable plans from the other services began landing on Powell's desk.

In late October, Powell also received a top secret list of options drafted by the Joint Staff. In essence, the list offered four possibilities: keep the status quo to defend Saudi Arabia; tighten the embargo and rely on sanctions to force Saddam out of Kuwait; go to war; or up the ante by moving enough additional forces to the gulf to provide a credible offensive threat.

Powell listened to the presentation of the list without indicating his preference. He also was told that economic sanctions probably would not have any real impact on the Iraqi military for at least six more months and possibly longer.

On Sunday, Oct. 21, Powell left for Saudi Arabia and extensive talks with Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander in chief of the Central Command responsible for the forces in the gulf region. Schwarzkopf had asked repeatedly for more troops. Among other issues, the two generals discussed the configuration of a reinforcement package if Bush indicated that he wanted to send a second wave of troops.

Schwarzkopf had vowed that if war broke out, he would "guaran-damn-tee it" that the United States would prevail. He and Powell, both four-star generals, discussed "what it would take to have a decisive force," according to a senior Pentagon official.

Although Schwarzkopf and Powell talk frequently by telephone, sometimes several times a day, the chairman's visit to Saudi Arabia also allowed him to hear from Schwarzkopf's staff regarding logistics, intelligence and personnel. During 10 hours of talks, the generals also discussed factors affecting the timing of a U.S. attack—including religious holidays, weather and the time needed to deploy additional forces—and concluded that, ideally, the best time for an offensive was the first two months of 1991.

As Powell was leaving Washington, Cheney was returning. On Monday, Oct. 22, he flew back after a trip to the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Asked by a reporter on the plane whether the U.S. buildup was near an end, Cheney replied, "I want to talk to Colin. . . . He's out talking to Norm [Schwarzkopf] and will have a better feel for things when he gets back."

On Wednesday, Oct. 24, Cheney had his usual Wednesday morning breakfast meeting with Baker and Scowcroft. Shortly after noon, he was summoned back to the White House where Bush was giving renewed consideration to the possibility of adding more forces for an offensive capability.

No Hints on Hill of New Deployment

Why Bush ultimately decided to press ahead with a reinforcement plan is unclear, although he is known to have been upset by the Saudi defense minister's suggestion earlier in the week of a possible deal with Iraq, including territorial concessions. "I am more determined than ever to see that this invading dictator get out of Kuwait with no compromise of any kind whatsoever," Bush told a political rally in New Hampshire on Oct. 23.

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Moreover, the time-consuming and politically damaging budget impasse between Congress and the White House ended on Oct. 24 when Democrats agreed to compromise with Bush.

After his meeting with the president, Cheney went to Capitol Hill to brief legislators on the gulf crisis in S-407, the secure Senate room used for classified meetings. Cheney talked about command-and-control issues and other matters without hinting that discussions were underway for a new deployment of troops to the gulf, according to Senate sources familiar with the meeting.

The next morning, however, Cheney appeared on four successive network talk shows and was willing to signal Bush's new thinking. In taping the "Today" show at 6:30 a.m., Cheney said, "We are not at the point yet where we want to stop adding forces." Asked in his final appearance, on "CBS This Morning," whether he was "getting ready to send another 100,000 troops to the Persian Gulf," Cheney replied, "It's conceivable that we'll end up with that big of an increase. . . ." He added, "We've never set an upper ceiling on" the deployment, a point he repeatedly made in public since the first week of the crisis in August.

The statements surprised not only the members of Congress who had listened to Cheney just a few hours before, but also the most senior U.S. generals and admirals, including Powell and Schwarzkopf, who were "not expecting anything," according to one source.

Powell returned home from Saudi Arabia, after stops in Europe, around 11 p.m. Thursday night, Oct. 25. Cheney left the next day for a fishing trip with Baker in Wyoming. Given the president's desires, the Joint Chiefs began considering how to convert the contingency plan for offensive action into a Phase II deployment plan. As has been his custom, Bush left the details of military matters to the Pentagon; the size and shape of the second wave was up to the generals and admirals.

Over the next several days, Powell went to the Pentagon "and went deep into the bowels of the operations center, into some rooms where not many people are allowed to go, where the real hard-core planning goes on," one source said last week.

Finding the 200,000 or so additional troops Schwarzkopf thought he needed for an offensive was not easy. "It's always a hard decision when you do something like this," one senior official said last week, "but I always go back to the question: What's the objective?" The political objective set by the president, he added, "is to eject the Iraqi army from Kuwait."

The consequent military task would be to fulfill that objective quickly and with minimal casualties, which meant massive firepower. Powell's thinking on the subject, one senior officer said Friday, can be thought of as "Weinberger plus." As the one-time military assistant to former defense secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, Powell has been influenced by a 1984 speech entitled "The Uses of Military Power," in which Weinberger laid out his criteria for deploying forces into combat.

"If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation," Weinberger declared, "we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning." He stopped short of declaring that overwhelming force should be used to guarantee success in battle, a refinement that characterizes the Cheney-Powell doctrine.

As Powell reviewed the forces to be assembled for an offensive punch, they appeared formidable indeed: three aircraft carriers and their escorts plus enough Air Force jets to provide Schwarzkopf with what would amount to an additional 300 planes; a huge armor force including tens of thousands of troops drawn from Europe; thousands of combat reservists; and a virtual doubling of Marine Corps strength in the gulf.

By Tuesday, Oct. 30, most pieces of the puzzle had been pulled together in what some planners began to call Phase II. That morning, Powell and Cheney went to the White House to brief the president on the size and shape of the second wave. The next day, according to two sources, Bush formally approved the deployment, but directed that the decision be kept secret until after the election Nov. 6.

President's Stunning Surprise

And secret it remained. Some of the military's most senior officers, including some senior deputies to Powell and Schwarzkopf, continued to work on a rotation plan. As the first week of November passed, a few officers began to hear scuttlebutt that something big was about to happen. Two or three days before the president's announcement, a senior Marine general said last week, he began to hear that the Joint Chiefs were considering a reinforcement plan.

But for most of the military, Bush's declaration on Nov. 8 was a stunning surprise. "I have today," Bush said, "directed the secretary of defense to increase the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield to ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goal."

In the subsequent three weeks, the Joint Chiefs and services have labored to fully convert their rotation forces into reinforcements. In the Pentagon, civilians and military officers talk increasingly of the coming war.

Staff researchers William F. Powers Jr. and Lucy Shackelford contributed to this report.

NETWORK NEWS SUMMARY

(Sunday evening, December 2)

[Editor's note: NBC and CBS News did not air.]

GULF

ABC's FORREST SAWYER: One day after Iraq agreed to direct talks with the U.S., Saddam Hussein has declared the chances for peace in the Gulf to be "50-50." Saddam told French television peace is only possible if Secretary Baker comes to Baghdad for real dialogue and not to show the American people war is inevitable. U.S. officials emphasized their own point Sunday: President Bush's new diplomatic initiative does not mean a change of policy.

ABC's DAVID ENSOR reports the President sent out three heavy hitters to the television talks shows with one basic message: that Secretary Baker will go to Baghdad not to negotiate with Saddam Hussein, but to warn him.

(SECRETARY CHENEY: "The only acceptable outcome is the full implementation of the U.N. resolutions: the withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait and the release of all hostages. Those indeed are not subjects we can compromise on.")

But Secretary Baker suggested that there might be a reward for obeying the U.N.'s orders.

(SECRETARY BAKER: "If he complied with the resolutions his reward for that would not be a military attack by the United States.")

Baker dismissed Saddam's attempt to link his invasion of Kuwait with the Palestinian question.

(SECRETARY BAKER: "He didn't invade Kuwait to help the Palestinians, and his invasion of Kuwait has been very, very detrimental to the Palestinians. These two issues are totally separate and distinct issues, and we are not going to link them, not going to permit them to be linked.")

Critics fear the Bush administration will inevitably be drawn into compromise in order to avoid war.

(HENRY KISSINGER: "I see no benefits in making a settlement which will make a world war likely in two or three years' time. It's the same problem as in the thirties.")

(PETER RODMAN, former NSC advisor: "My concern is that Saddam Hussein will not just sit by passively. Saddam Hussein will have some response and I think we had better be prepared for the kind of curveball that he's going to throw at us.")

Secretary Baker hinted that there is room to discuss other issues not covered by the U.N. resolutions. He will, however present a stark choice: war and defeat, or withdrawal and what Baker calls a reward -- that the U.S. would not attack Iraq.

ABC's BOB ZELNICK reports Iraq tested its surface-to-surface Scud missiles. The tests were carefully monitored by U.S. forces. With word of the tests, allied forces in Saudi Arabia were put on alert; some put on protective equipment against chemical attack. U.S. officials later said the Iraqis had test-fired two Scuds, entirely on Iraqi soil.

(GEN. SCOWCROFT: "I don't know whether you'd say they have test range, but in the general east to west direction is not at U.S. troops.")

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ZELNICK continues: On "This Week With David Brinkley," Secretary Cheney said this was the first Scud test-firing since last April and described the missile's limited capability.

(SECRETARY CHENEY: "They've got a range of approximately 360-400 miles, depending upon which variant he uses. They're not very accurate -- accurate enough to hit a city, not accurate enough to hit a point.")

The Scud's lack of accuracy makes them virtually useless against such targets as ships, airbases and supply depots. Most intelligence analysts doubt Iraq can outfit its Scuds with chemical warheads. Analysts believe Sunday's test was mainly to test Iraqi-made missile components. Because Iraq now makes its own Scuds, Pentagon sources admit they no longer have a precise count on the number of Iraqi missiles, but they are cheered by the speedy U.S. detection of and reaction to Sunday's test; they say in a war most Iraqi Scuds would face destruction before they could be fired.

SAWYER reports Saddam allowed 15 hostages to leave Iraq with Muhammad Ali. A spokesman said Ali and Evil Knievel plan to return at Christmas to secure the freedom of more hostages. (ABC-Lead)

GERMANY/ELECTIONS

ABC's JERRY KING reports from Berlin Helmut Kohl won reunited Germany's first free nation-wide election in almost 60 years. Kohl won by a landslide, but failed to gain a majority. Kohl's Conservative Christian Democrats will need to enter into a coalition with the liberal Free Democrats. Hans Dietrich Genscher will begin his 17th year as foreign minister. (ABC-6)

SOUTH AFRICA/TRIBAL VIOLENCE

ABC's DON KLDSTRUP reports from South Africa on tribal warfare in black townships. A black protester shot and killed by police two weeks ago Sunday became the first black to be buried in Johannesburg's Westpark Cemetery. At the funeral, Nelson Mandela warned that peaceful racial reform could fail unless the white government brings an end to black on black on violence, which claimed ten more lives Sunday. (ABC-5)

ISRAEL

SAWYER reports 500,000 workers went on general strike, closing down the nation's banks, airports and government offices. The workers are protesting proposed cuts in the minimum wage and higher taxes on savings.

ABC's DEAN REYNOLDS reports from Tel Aviv on Israel's Soviet immigrants -- highly skilled white-collar workers who have taken up blue-collar professions. (ABC-7)

SHUTTLE COLUMBIA

ABC's JIM SLADE reports the space shuttle Columbia finally got off the ground to begin an important astronomical mission after six months of delay. (ABC-3)

BAGHDAD ACCEPTS BUSH'S INVITATION FOR DIRECT TALKS

How U.S. Won Support to Use Mideast Forces

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — President Bush's surprise offer to send Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d to Baghdad was the final move in a frenzied month of diplomatic activity in which the Administration used arguments, rewards, a few veiled threats and crucial advice from President Mikhail S. Gorbachev to build a Security Council majority for a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq.

American officials said the Baker mission, accepted today by Baghdad, was intended largely for domestic considerations — to try to convince Congress and the American people that the President was doing everything possible to avert a war. But it was also clearly responsive to the urgings of the Soviet Union — as well as to the political interest of the Administration to avoid a war that could cost Mr. Bush his Presidency — for one last effort to persuade Iraq to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait.

Discussion of Baghdad's Issues

While Administration officials and Western diplomats say Mr. Baker's only mandate will be to persuade Iraq to pull out totally or face a war, they add that the Secretary will be ready to discuss, in general terms, the sorts of issues Baghdad would like to see addressed after a full withdrawal.

The Security Council resolution, and the followup strategy now unfolding, were largely the product of month-long travels by Mr. Baker and daily phone calls by President Bush to fellow heads of state, including one which involved

tracking down the Malaysian Prime Minister in a Tokyo restaurant to brow beat him into getting his foreign minister to listen to Mr. Baker's arguments.

From the start, though, Mr. Bush, Mr. Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft were convinced that Soviet backing was the linchpin to the whole process. According to extensive interviews, mostly with American officials, it is clear that one breakthrough in the month-long diplomacy came on the crisp autumn afternoon of Nov. 8 in the library of President Gorbachev's country home outside Moscow.

'Really Ready' to Use Force

At one crucial moment, according to an official's notes from the meeting, Mr. Gorbachev looked Mr. Baker in the eye and said: "You understand now, if we pass a resolution authorizing force, and if Saddam does not move, you will have to use force. If you do it, you have to use it. Are you really ready to do that now?"

Mr. Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze had met for six hours earlier that day, going over why and why not to authorize the use of force at this time. As Mr. Baker was driven in a motorcade through the pine forests outside Moscow to see Mr. Gorbachev at his dacha, aides say, he felt reasonably confident that the Soviet Foreign Minister would support a use of force resolution, but Mr. Gorbachev was still a wild card.

American officials said they had the impression that a heated battle for Mr. Gorbachev's endorsement on this critical issue had been under way for weeks between Mr. Shevardnadze, who tilted toward the Americans, and the Middle

East envoy Yevgeny Primakov, also a Gorbachev ally, but one who after years in the Middle East tended to reflect the views of Arabists in the Foreign Ministry, K.G.B. officials and the Soviet military. These groups did not want to see their 20 years of work in building up Iraq destroyed.

But as Mr. Baker and his aide Dennis Ross sat around a table with Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shevardnadze, officials say it became clear in a free-wheeling discussion about military options that the Soviet leader was also fed up with Iraq's President and had concluded that unless threatened with real force, he would never budge peacefully. It was then that Mr. Gorbachev pressed Mr. Baker about whether the Bush Administration fully understood that once it had United Nations authorization for force, it would have to use it if Iraq refused to back down.

When Mr. Baker said President Bush understood that perfectly, the Soviet leader then broached his idea of how to proceed. Officials said Mr. Gorbachev had suggested that there be two resolutions. One that would be passed in late November authorizing use of force, but conditioned on a second resolution that would have to be passed, after diplomacy was given six weeks or so to work, actually giving a green light for war.

Mr. Baker suggested just one simple resolution authorizing force with no deadline date, or, if there had to be a date, that it should be sooner — Jan. 1. But when he heard the Soviet leader speaking in the terms he did, officials said, Mr. Baker concluded, for the first time, that somehow, somehow the Soviets were ready to get on board for the first Security Council resolution approving force since the Korean War in 1950. As soon as the Secretary returned to Moscow, he went to the embassy to telephone President Bush on specially secured phone.

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The differences could be bridged later, which they were when the Bush Administration eventually incorporated Mr. Gorbachev's two-resolution idea into one, two-tiered resolution, which authorizes force after a "pause of goodwill," until Jan. 15, to see if diplomacy under a threat of war can get Iraq to withdraw unconditionally.

Moscow to Be Told Before a Fight Starts

Although Resolution 678 now leaves the United States and its allies free to use force anytime after Jan. 15, American officials say they have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that if Iraq refuses to withdraw they will consult with him before actually giving an order to open fire. Officials say that having cooperated this far with the Soviets, they are not going to take them by surprise if the time comes to use force.

More than American-Soviet diplomacy, of course, went into producing resolution 678. Equally important to the effort, officials said, were less visible means, like the Bush Administration's decision to encourage Saudi Arabia to give \$1 billion in aid to Moscow to help the Soviets through the winter, its decision to let the Chinese know that if they did not veto the resolution their Foreign Minister would be received at the White House after 18 months of isolation and the arguments by the President and the Secretary with smaller coalition members, in which they pressed the point that if the United Nations failed to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait every small state would be at the mercy of larger predatory neighbors.

With America's place in the world, not to mention Mr. Bush's political future, riding on the outcome of the gulf crisis, the Administration never hesitated to let other nations know that their support for this resolution was vital to Washington, which would remember its friends, and its foes. Minutes after the Yemeni delegate joined the Cubans in voting against the resolution at the Security Council on Thursday, a senior American diplomat was instructed to tell him: "That was the most expensive no vote you ever cast" — meaning it would result in an end to America's more than \$70 million in foreign aid to Yemen.

While Bush Administration officials had been thinking about how to put together a use-of-force resolution since early September, the idea only became a live option at the end of October.

"By mid-October there was a real sense of drift," acknowledged one Administration Middle East policy maker. "The crisis had lost its newness and the whole focus in the Security Council was being deflected by the Israeli-Palestinian thing. Our coalition partners and a lot of the President's friends were coming to the White House and saying, 'Look, you are losing the initiative.'"

Another factor weighing on the minds of senior Administration officials at the time, aides say, was that despite the dispatch of more than 200,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, President Hussein had not really been intimidated.

In early November, Mr. Bush, after several meetings with his senior advisers in the White House Situation Room, decided simultaneously to double the number of American forces on the ground — to make the threat more credible to the Iraqi leader — and to explore going to the Security Council for a resolution authorizing use of force to prove to President Hussein that Washington could attack him without breaking apart its coalition, officials said.

Senior Administration officials say they thought only such a two-pronged approach might avert a war, which, if it does not go well, could make George Bush a one-term President.

A Decision to Make Diplomacy Personal

In thinking about how to put together a majority of 15 council members for such a resolution the President, Mr. Baker and Mr. Scowcroft, and Undersecretary Robert M. Kimmitt, who had been delegated to supervise the United Nations diplomacy from the start, agreed that Mr. Baker should personally go around the world and meet with the leaders of all 15 Security Council member states.

This was because senior Administration officials had concluded during previous debates that some of the United Nations delegates of several key countries were virtually "out of control" of their home governments. Mr. Baker, an aide said, had been "driven crazy" during the debate over the Security Council condemnation of Israel for the Temple Mount killings on Oct. 8, when the Secretary would cut a deal with one foreign minister on wording, only to have it reversed by the same country's United Nations' delegate. Administration officials knew that this was both a result of bad coordination and deliberate good-cop, bad-cop routines by some allies, particularly France.

"Bush and Baker decided from the very beginning that they were going to negotiate this directly," said a senior Administration official, "so that if and when all of the foreign ministers gathered in New York for a vote, Baker would be in a position to look them in the eye and say, 'As you and I agreed in city X...'"

On Nov. 3, Mr. Baker embarked on a trip to the Middle East and Europe to poll Washington's coalition partners about their attitude on such a resolution. Initially, Mr. Baker was very circumspect about his objectives. Aides said he did not want to appear totally committed to the idea of seeking a resolution, because if he was seen to have tried and failed it would make it even more difficult to go it alone later.

Mr. Baker's first stop on his tour were the Arab gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Their leaders all echoed the same theme: They wanted a military solution and they wanted it sooner rather than later. If Washington felt that a Security Council resolution authorizing force would make it sooner than they were all for it, but as far as they were concerned it was unnecessary.

As Mr. Baker moved north, though, and spoke with the leaders of Egypt and Turkey, a somewhat different message emerged: They needed the cover of a Security Council resolution to protect themselves against domestic political opposition, and they strongly urged Mr. Baker to go for it.

While in Cairo, Mr. Baker met with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in the V.I.P. lounge at Cairo's airport. Mr. Baker prefaced his question regarding China's attitude toward a resolution by pointing out to the Chinese minister that Beijing's support for American diplomacy in the Persian Gulf would have a big impact on American domestic attitudes toward China, still hostile since the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, officials said.

Mr. Qichen was delphic in his response. Officials said he left the vague impression with Mr. Baker that Beijing would not veto such a resolution.

From there, Mr. Baker headed for Moscow, and 13 hours of meetings on Nov. 8 with Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Gorbachev. That long day concluded with the Soviet Foreign Minister saying at a news conference with Mr. Baker in the gold-gilded conference hall of the Osobnyak guest house that "the use of force... could not be ruled out."

With Congress, A Turning Point

Brief stops in Paris and London found the French and the British basically supportive. When Mr. Baker got to Washington he reported to the President that there was a lot more sympathy for the resolution than he actually expected, officials said. But before they decided whether or not to proceed with it, though, the President had scheduled a meeting with the Congressional leadership at the White House on Wednesday Nov. 14.

This proved to be another turning point. The Congress was up in arms over the President's decision to double the number of troops in Saudi Arabia and to give them an offensive option. Congressional leaders complained that America, once again, seemed to be "going it alone."

Mr. Bush, Mr. Baker and Mr. Scowcroft essentially decided after this meeting with the Congressional leadership that they needed a Security Council resolution not only to keep the international coalition together but also to

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bring Congress along. The rationale, which may have been overly optimistic, was that if countries like Ethiopia and the Soviet Union were prepared to sanction a use of force, surely the Congress would too.

Shortly after his meeting with Congressional leaders, Mr. Bush sent Mr. Gorbachev a secret cable outlining his rationale for seeking a Security Council resolution and making it clear that he intended to proceed down this path and wanted Mr. Gorbachev's formal approval in Paris, officials said.

During the Paris summit meeting on Nov. 19 and 20, Mr. Gorbachev told Mr. Bush that he was prepared to accept the American idea of a single resolution authorizing force, as opposed to one authorizing it and another setting it in motion, but that resolution would have to be two-tiered. That is, officials said, the Soviet leader told the President that he wanted the resolution to authorize force, but to state explicitly that before force could be used, a period of grace would be given for a renewed diplomatic efforts to engineer a peaceful Iraqi withdrawal.

Officials said Mr. Bush told Mr. Gorbachev that this approach was fine although Mr. Bush still insisted on Jan. 1. The two men agreed on all the basic language of the resolution, but Mr. Gorbachev asked Mr. Bush not to make their agreement public until he had a chance to consult with the Chinese and with the Iraqis one more time. The Americans agreed, even at the cost of leaving the impression with reporters that there were still differences with Moscow.

American officials said that it was apparently very important to Mr. Gorbachev that he not appear to be simply following American dictates, but shaping the diplomacy himself. It was also important for him to know that the Chinese would not veto, because Mr. Gorbachev, for domestic reasons and for Soviet standing in the third world, did not want to be alone with the Americans, French and British while Beijing voted against.

The Soviet leader also wanted, again largely for domestic reasons, to satisfy his army, the K.G.B. and the Foreign Ministry Arabists, to be seen to be giving the Iraqis one last chance, officials said. As a result, he invited Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to Moscow and sent Mr. Shevardnadze out to talk to the Chinese.

U.S. Rejects Iraqi Effort To Include Palestinians

By MAUREEN DOWD
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — Neither President Bush nor Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d responded publicly today to Iraq's acceptance of Mr. Bush's offer of talks on the gulf crisis.

But Administration officials rebuffed the Iraqi government's suggestion that any direct talks between Iraq and the United States on Kuwait should deal with the issue of a Palestinian homeland.

In its statement, Iraq welcomed the chance for the two countries to have "a serious and deep dialogue," but did not make its acceptance of Mr. Bush's offer conditional on discussion of the Palestinian issue. But the statement also said that "Palestine and the other occupied Arab territories will remain before our eyes and at the forefront of the issues that we will discuss in any dialogue."

In making his offer, Mr. Bush said that Mr. Baker would be willing "to discuss all aspects of the gulf crisis" on his visit to Baghdad.

"Palestine is not an issue on the table," Vice President Quayle said on Cable News Network today. "There is no linkage."

Roman Popadiuk, a White House spokesman, seconded Mr. Quayle when he said, "Our position all along is that there is no linkage of the Gulf crisis to other issues, including the Middle East."

President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has said many times that he will leave Kuwait only if the Israelis leave the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

While the President and his advisers have publicly refused to link the fates of Kuwait and Palestine, what appeared to be a carrot on linkage was inserted into a speech Mr. Bush gave at the United Nations on Oct. 1, when the President suggested that diplomatic opportunities would exist in the Middle East after Iraq made an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

The President met today at Camp David with his top advisers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their chairman, Gen. Colin Powell; the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft; Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Mr. Baker. The group reviewed military options in the gulf even as they waited for an official response to the President's offer to send Mr. Baker to Baghdad to hold direct talks on Kuwait with Mr. Hussein.

The offer, which Mr. Bush first made during a White House address and news conference on Friday, was conveyed formally today by Joseph Wilson, deputy chief of mission in Baghdad, to Nizar Hamdoon, an Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister. It is seen as a last resort for a peaceful solution, since a resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on Thursday gives Iraq until Jan. 15 to pull out of Kuwait or face possible military action.

Because the invitation was delivered late in the day in Baghdad, no formal response was expected until Sunday. But the 10-man Revolutionary Command Council chaired by President Hussein did issue a statement to the press, in response to Mr. Bush's press conference, saying that it would accept the offer from "the arrogant" Mr. Bush for an emergency meeting in Baghdad, as well as an invitation for the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to meet with Mr. Bush in Washington.

Mr. Quayle said today that the point of the direct talks is not to negotiate, but to persuade Mr. Hussein that this is his last chance to comply with the United Nations resolution before force is used. Mr. Bush said on Friday that Mr. Baker was not making "a trip of concession" but that he would be willing "to discuss all aspects of the gulf crisis." Middle East experts say it is

inevitable that trade-offs would be broached — by the Iraqis if not by the United States.

In the C.N.N. interview, Vice President Quayle was asked why the President had changed from the patient approach of economic sanctions to the aggressive approach of a military deadline.

"Okay," Mr. Quayle replied. "Patience means, in essence, that we're not going to do anything for 18 months. Well, what about the hostages in Iraq? Are we prepared to let them stay there for another 18 months?"

At the beginning of his Administration, Mr. Bush promised that he would never personalize American hostages held in the Middle East, because it would likely increase their value as objects of ransom. But he and his top advisers have consistently tried to personalize the fate of the hostages in Iraq recently as a way of building up American support for possible military action.

The Washington Post
The New York Times **A 18**
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
Date **2 DEC 1990**

Relieved Reactions

The President's offer to "go the extra mile for peace," an effort to persuade a skeptical American public that he is not rushing into an unpopular war, has once more quelled the rising voices for a special session of Congress to debate the Administration's policy.

It triggered a wave of relieved reactions this weekend from Congress, allies and from the Arab world.

William Broomfield, a Republican lawmaker from Michigan who is the senior Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the proposed diplomatic talks would offer "wigggle room" for Mr. Hussein to save face. "Anything the President can do to keep the focus of the crisis on diplomacy and not on war is all to the good," Mr. Broomfield said.

State Department officials said that they had received calls from the Ambassadors of Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other key Arab states saying they were pleased and relieved about Mr. Bush's approach.

Kissinger Dissents

One of the few voices of dissent was Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State who said on ABC-TV's "Nightline" on Friday that the President's action filled him with "foreboding."

"I feel extremely lonely," Mr. Kissinger said. "I have not been this worried in decades."

Mr. Kissinger argued that "the arrival of an American Secretary of State in a country that is holding a thousand hostages, a country that has been compared to Nazi Germany and been threatened with war crimes trials" would create an atmosphere that would favor Mr. Hussein.

He suggested that the military option and the United States bargaining position would erode if Mr. Hussein was allowed to narrow the issue so that he would leave Kuwait and take only two disputed islands and some northern oil fields.

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CBS News

FACE THE NATION WITH LESLEY STAHL

Sunday, December 2, 1990

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and the
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MODERATOR: Lesley Stahl - CBS News Chief White House
Correspondent

GUESTS: **BRENT SCOWCOFT**
National Security Adviser

FRED BARNES
The New Republic

JUAN WILLIAMS
The Washington Post

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MS. STAHL: Welcome to "Face the Nation." I'm Lesley Stahl.

Where are we in the war-or-peace equation? The signals from both sides are so confusing, no one could possibly figure it out. Hawkish rhetoric--but gestures of restraint.

PRESIDENT BUSH: To go the extra mile to peace, I will issue an invitation to Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz to come to Washington.

MS. STAHL: Retreating from his refusal to negotiate with a hostage-taker, the president offered to send Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad. But the president denied he was blinking.

PRESIDENT BUSH: There can be no face-saving. That's not what this is about.

MS. STAHL: There were reports the Soviet Union insisted on the mission in exchange for its vote at the U.N. Certainly, there was pressure from Congress--the message: Don't rush into battle.

ADMIRAL WILLIAM CROWE (former chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff): If, in fact, the sanctions will work in 12 to 18 months, instead of six months, the trade-off of avoiding war with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would, in my estimation, be more than worth it.

MS. STAHL: Saddam's signals were confusing, too--threatening to fight while sending fruit and vegetables to the beleaguered American embassy in Kuwait.

President Bush's overriding message was still that he's prepared to go to war.

PRESIDENT BUSH: This will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war.

SOLDIER'S MOTHER (America Tonight): The question is whether or not I am prepared to bury a 23-year old son. The answer is, Daniel is prepared to die for what he believes is correct.

I ask you, if we are in fact to be watchdogs and defender of the free world, then somewhere, some day, we are going to decide what we are willing for our young men to die for.

PRESIDENT BUSH: It's a tough question, but a president has to make the right decision. And if a shot is fired in anger, I want to guarantee each person that their kid whose life is in harm's way will have the maximum support, will have the best chance to come home alive, and will be backed up to the hilt.

MS. STAHL: Is Saddam being offered a face-saving way out? We'll ask National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, and we'll talk with Fred Barnes of The New Republic and Juan Williams of The Washington Post.

The count-down--is it to war, or peace--an issue facing the nation.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, "Face the Nation with Lesley Stahl."

This portion of "Face the Nation with Lesley Stahl" is sponsored by the Archer Daniels Midland Company--ADM, supermarket to the world.

(Announcements)

MS. STAHL: With us, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. General Scowcroft, two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a former head of the NSA, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee all wonder why the administration has decided not to wait and let the sanctions work. They think you should. What's the real reason that you decided not to go forward with your policy of patience?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We are being patience, Lesley. We have been patient. This latest situation that we have now is really a move for peace. It is designed to show Saddam Hussein the strength of the world coalition against him, the fact that there's no temporizing, that there's no negotiating, that he has to get out. Now, if we let sanctions run a year, or two years, whatever, as some say, each day that goes by he thinks, well, if I could just hold out a little longer, something will turn up.

What we're trying to tell him is nothing's going to turn up. If sanctions will work in year, in eighteen months, they our peace move right now will work. If he's prepared to give in to the pain of sanctions sometime, faced with the draconian alternative he has now, he will do what he ought to do.

MS. STAHL: One of the arguments of the generals at the hearings on the Hill was that if you let sanctions go on a little more and we do end up at war, he'll be all the weaker by waiting; that, in fact, it would be an easier fight for us.

MR. SCOWCROFT: The one thing that is the last to get weaker will be his military machine. He has enormous stockpiles built up. He will protect his military from the effect of the sanctions. That will be the last thing to weaken.

MS. STAHL: Well, it seems by arguing against waiting that you're actually arguing for war. Senator Kennedy said this morning that the American people do not want you to go to war. You keep talking about the lessons of Vietnam. The main lesson of Vietnam is that you can't go to war if the American people don't support it.

MR. SCOWCROFT: In 1941, Lesley, two years--two years into World War II, the draft passed the U.S. Congress--continuation of the draft passed by one vote.

MS. STAHL: So you're saying you can go to war with the full support of the American people.

MR. SCOWCROFT: What I'm saying is that this is an important issue. It's an important issue for all the reasons the president has been articulating over and over and over. We are now perhaps setting the stage for a new world as we come out of the post-war, the post-Cold War world. We have the former enemies, the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, we have the great powers as envisioned in the United Nations behind moving toward this new world. That's what want.

MS. STAHL: You don't have China. I wanted to ask you about China. I'm glad you brought up China. Why did President Bush personally meet with the foreign minister of China at the very point in time that that government is rounding up students, charging the leaders of the pro-democracy

movement with sedition, and appear to be on the verge of executing some of them

MR. SCOWCROFT: One of the reasons he did it is to make it unmistakably clear, personally--not through emissaries, but personally to the Chinese government--that there was no forgetting Tiananmen Square, there was no let up for sanctions, and he did call explicitly to his attention that issue and the fact that we could cooperate on issues of global importance, which is important, and the Chinese are an important player.

MS. STAHL: They abstained.

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's right.

MS. STAHL: They didn't even vote with us, and the president rewarded him--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Suppose they had voted against us.

MS. STAHL: Yes, but they had already abstained, and then the president met with him. Isn't it--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Suppose they had voted against us, Lesley?

MS. STAHL: Do you really think they would have voted against us and have the whole world turn against them for that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know whether they would or not, but this meeting was in no way a reward for anything.

MS. STAHL: I still don't understand why a meeting with Baker wasn't sufficient, given what they're doing back home, which is taking those very pro-democracy students we put these sanctions on to support being--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Let me tell you why: because the president wanted to say again to the Chinese leaders, through their foreign minister, that the U.S.-Chinese relationship was important, that it could not resume unless the Chinese took the steps we have been demanding.

MS. STAHL: Wouldn't a snub have said it all the better?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No. We've been snubbing them for a long time.

MS. STAHL: And they don't want us to snub them anymore.

MR. SCOWCROFT: We don't want them to go on with their practices any more, either.

MS. STAHL: Yes, but they're going to execute these kids. While he--didn't it seem to you that they were just thumbing their noses at us?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not in the least, Lesley.

MS. STAHL: Then why did they start these trials at the very point in time that he came over here?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know that, Lesley. But what I'm saying is the president made his position abundantly clear.

MS. STAHL: This morning, Iraq apparently fired off a Scud missile as a test? Is that--do we know?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Presumably it was a test.

MS. STAHL: Was that a signal to us, a message of toughness?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know what it was. It's the first such test, as far as we know, since last April. It could have been a gesture of defiance. But what it does is underscore the fact that this is a man of unpredictable behavior, with powerful, deadly weapons, and the means to put mass destruction devices on the front of them, and he can use them at a moment's notice.

MS. STAHL: You and the president and Mr. Cheney have said that they could develop a nuclear device, weapon of mass destruction, within months. And yet, one intelligence analyst after the next has come along to dispute that, including the International Atomic Energy Agency that went over to examine that capability. They say nothing's changed in the last several months, if not a year. Do you have evidence that international agency may have been misled, or that they have made changes in the last few months?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, Lesley. All the International Atomic Energy Agency examined was the fact that they have not diverted enriched uranium which was provided to them. One of the things they could do, if they diverted that, is possibly within a matter of months convert that into some kind of a crude device. They have not done that yet. That doesn't deal with their unsafeguarded research, their development, the kinds of technology they've been buying on the black market and so on.

But let me say, the range goes from a matter of a few months for a crude device up to as much as ten years, and serious nuclear scientists are in different positions on that. But, I guess, as the president has said, if one is looking at such a horrific possible development, it is important to err on the side of conservative.

MS. STAHL: Do you have any evidence that they have gotten anything on the black market over the last few months that lead you to think that this month that we're closer to him developing some crude weapon within months instead of the longer range view, since you brought it up?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the short range view and the long range view are for different ways to develop nuclear weapons. One is with definite foreign help, with using the safeguarded material and so on and so forth. The other is through their own devices by trying to

acquire centrifuges and devices to produce their own enriched uranium. And, I am not a nuclear expert, Lesley, but I think that one has to take seriously the possibility that perhaps through the diversion of the safeguarded material, should he decide to do so, that he can have something which can be exploded and create serious casualties in the coalition forces within a foreseeable period.

MS. STAHL: The reason I ask you this is because there was no mention of this nuclear possibility until a CBS News poll came out in mid-November saying that this was the only reason that the American people could see going to war for, was to prevent him from getting this, and then suddenly the president starts talking about the nuclear--

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, you're wrong. The president, in one of his very first statements talked about weapons of mass destruction. That included the nuclear weapons. What one of the arguments against why not let sanctions run forever is the possibility that he could in one war or another develop some kind of device which would dramatically increase casualties to the coalition forces if there were a conflict.

MS. STAHL: One of the things the president said when he announced this overture to Saddam Hussein about high level meetings was that other officials from other countries would be invited to the meeting here in Washington, and now the Iraqis are saying, okay, fine, but when Baker comes to Baghdad we want to invite other officials. Maybe he's talking about the PLO, maybe the Libyans. Who knows? Are we getting into a negotiation over the negotiation at this point?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think not Lesley, and I'm just hypothesizing, but perhaps the best thing to do is to make the talks bilateral on both ends so that we don't get into haggling about the shape of the table or anything like that.

What the president wants to do is to insure directly, both himself with the foreign minister, and our secretary of state with Saddam Hussein that there is no misunderstanding about the demands of the world community and the will of the world community to enforce those demands.

MS. STAHL: Saddam seems to be a master of small measures. He lets the hostages out one at a time. He delivers 150 cucumbers to the embassy, but doesn't turn the electricity on. Have you thought through the possibility that he's going to start retreating, but not completely retreat? Pull out a thousand troops today and 200 tomorrow? What happens then? And isn't that a real, live possibility, sort of a halfway retreat? How can we attack if he's retreating?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We have looked at all kinds of alternatives, and you're right. He comes up with an idea a day. All I'd say is that the Security Council has spoken, and Saddam Hussein has to comply with the 13, 12, 13 Security Council resolutions.

MS. STAHL: Yes, but what happens if he's retreating? How do you enforce if he's actually--

MR. SCOWCROFT: I will use the shopworn phrase, we're not going to deal in hypotheticals. But we have been thinking about it.

MS. STAHL: A quick last question. On the embassy in Kuwait, have they delivered any more

food, medicines and--do you have a better handle on how that's happening and why?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We don't have any better handle on why it's happening. We had a report yesterday that they delivered, I believe it was ten cases of Pepsi. So, we don't know. It obviously is being done officially, because that embassy is surrounded and has been cut off, still no electricity, still no water. But some kind of a gesture. As you say, he is a master of small gestures.

MS. STAHL: Okay. Thank you, very much, Brent Scowcroft, for being our guest.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Lesley.

MS. STAHL: We'll be back to talk about domestic policy. Stay with us.

(Announcements)

MS. STAHL: Joining us to talk about domestic politics and policy in Washington, Fred Barnes of the New Republic and Juan Williams of The Washington Post.

Well, the White House--George Bush came in and said he wasn't going to have one of those typical back-stabbing White Houses--and now here we have civil war. I guess that's not back-stabbing. The conservatives at the White House versus Darman--Richard Darman, the budget director, whom they accuse of, oh my God, pragmatism. Fred, what's going on at the White House?

MR. BARNES: Well, it really is an ideological fight. There's a lot of back-stabbing and civil war, both. And it's a fight over what direction the Bush administration is going to take in domestic policy in the last two years of Bush's first term. And it's a little bit of fight over the future of the Republican Party. You have, on the one hand--

MS. STAHL: Not to mention Bush's mind--throw that in.

MR. BARNES: Not to mention Bush's mind, you know, and Bush has dipped into both sides--the pragmatic side and the conservative side off and on during his entire political career. And, obviously, the conservatives who are also allied with HUD Secretary Jack Kemp and Newt Gingrich, the House Republican whip, want an agenda that goes past the budget agreement. They want to forget about it and move on to new tax cuts, empowering the poor with--

MS. STAHL: Tax cuts?

MR. BARNES: Tax cuts. And Richard Darman and John Sununu at the White House apparently--Sununu and Darman, for sure--want the budget agreement to be the blueprint for the next couple of years, and it's a much more--a paler domestic policy.

MR. WILLIAMS: Well, I think you're being a little generous, Fred--that in reality what we have here is sort of a brain-dead administration. They had no domestic policy in the first place, so I don't see that it's an argument about where to go with domestic policy. They didn't have a domestic

policy.

The only domestic policy they had was his request for a capital gains tax cut--an absolutely failed attempt. Now, you get into that situation now; what happens is, Darman, having won that fight, and a lot of conservative Republicans especially up on the Hill, represented by Gingrich--but also Jack Kemp--are really angry about it and saying that Darman shouldn't be running things. Darman and his tax-cutting, they say, is pretty much in alignment with Ted Kennedy and the Democrats. That's the way they're picturing Darman.

MR. BARNES: Well, yeah, but let me tell you why this is so--

MS. STAHL: Let me ask a question, please--one. Then, I'll let you go.

What has always driven me nuts, covering White Houses, is when everybody blames the aides. This was George Bush's tax increase--

MR. WILLIAMS: Exactly.

MS. STAHL: --as it always is the president's. And now all the conservatives are looking at Darman when they really are meaning Bush.

MR. BARNES: No, they don't. No, they do mean--

MS. STAHL: Why do they mean Darman? It was George Bush's program, and it will always be George Bush's program.

MR. BARNES: Yeah, but they can't fire George Bush.

MS. STAHL: That's what I said.

MR. BARNES: They can get Richard Darman out, and they can get another budget director in who will send Bush different recommendations.

You know perfectly well, Lesley, that the president has been distracted by the Gulf policy. He's never liked domestic policy much. And his advisers are very important.

MS. STAHL: That tax increase was George Bush's, and you know it.

MR. BARNES: George Bush went along with it, but here's the question that Bush has to meet right now. And that is, is he going to unite the Republican Party, bring the conservatives back in the fold for him to run in 1992? And that's why he needs to go along with at least some--not all, but at least some of the Kemp-Gingrich agenda.

MR. WILLIAMS: That's always been the weak point for George Bush--is how does he make peace with the right wing of the Republican Party? He's right now trying to do that in any way that he can. He's trying to keep those people happy.

But the fact is that the vision thing--if you recall back to the campaign--the vision thing still haunts this man. If you go back to this mid-term election, when it came to domestic issues, Lesley, he

was absolutely stalled. He was in trouble. The budget mess was absolutely bringing the house of cards down on the Republican Party's head. He had to go and ask the nation to look overseas, look to what's going on in the Gulf, to save himself and save the Republican Party from absolute destruction on election day.

MR. BARNES: Well, you're right about that. And it did help him. But the conservatives now do have an agenda. They do have some ideas, despite what we've heard here. We do have--Juan says they don't have any ideas; they do--vouchers, they have a whole empowerment agenda for the poor. They have tax cuts. The one thing that unites the Republican Party is tax cuts.

MS. STAHL: But it's unrealistic. Where are we going to get the money?

MR. BARNES: President Bush only has to advocate tax cuts to unite the Republican Party. He doesn't have to get the Democrats--

MS. STAHL: It's phoney.

MR. BARNES: --to agree to them.

MS. STAHL: But it's phoney, and everyone will see right through it.

MR. BARNES: No, they won't.

MR. WILLIAMS: Not only that. We're going to go back to another round next year; we're going to have to look at the deficit again. So, there's going to be another round of talk about tax cuts. If George Bush comes back with more tax cuts, I think a lot of people in the Republican Party will say, "Great, but it's not going to happen--anything realistic is not going to happen on the Hill."

So, what do you get instead? You get all this talk from Jim Pinkerton and others of the New Paradigm--talk about vouchers, welfare, how to reform welfare, ideas for how to manage the government a little differently. But the fact is, these are all very superficial ideas. They're not changing the way we handle key issues in this country.

I will say this to the credit of the Republicans. I will say this to the credit of Pinkerton and Kemp--these people are thinking. There has to be some way to deal with poverty issues in this country.

MS. STAHL: But it costs money.

MR. WILLIAMS: It costs money is right, Lesley. And right now, no one is willing to put up the money because, certainly, the most powerful tool in American politics today is to say that you're against taxes. Nobody wants to pay more taxes in this country. I don't care who you are; you don't want to pay more taxes.

MS. STAHL: But this program--

MR. BARNES: But you can shift money from tired, old programs--shift money from the Small Business Administration, grants there, and send it to--and send it to local school districts with grants

to support voucher programs and choice programs.

MS. STAHL: Fred, the conservatives, the Republicans never came up with a way to cut the budget, and you know it. They never presented a package of budget cuts that got you down enough to get any kind of budget reduction going. They never did.

MR. BARNES: Well, they had one. It just didn't reach the \$500 billion figure. Many people don't think that the administration did. It depends on who's doing the score-keeping.

MR. WILLIAMS: I don't think they were sincere, either.

MS. STAHL: In the Darman question at the White House, is he really in trouble, or is Bush behind him 100 percent? Where do we stand?

MR. BARNES: You know, contrary to what some of the enemies of Darman think, they think Bush doesn't really like him. I think Bush does, and respects him and wants to keep him. And I think what we'll probably see is Darman will move towards the conservatives, and they'll meet in the middle. And Bush will once again reach a compromise, happy to--happy to both sides.

MR. WILLIAMS: Darman's whole card in all these negotiations has always been, you know, look, behind closed doors, guys, I'm really one of you liberals. You know, I really care about social issues. I'm really sensitive. And I'm not like some of these, you know, Pat Buchanans of the world, who's kind of a raging conservative; I really care. And I think a lot of the right-wingers are just tired of him and just see him as somehow, you know, the wrong guy in the house--that he's the guy behind closed doors who gets Bush's ear and tells Bush to do silly things. And they're tired of it.

And I might add that when you go into this, John Sununu, the White House chief of staff, then becomes a player because John Sununu is no great fan of Richard Darman's.

MS. STAHL: Well, is John Sununu is any type of trouble?

MR. BARNES: Well, I think he's in a lot less than the press thinks. The press has overplayed this because reporters who cover the White House don't like John Sununu, and they've written stories about he's about to leave. Darman's in a lot more trouble. My guess is they'll both stay.

MS. STAHL: They'll both stay--because Bush wants them to.

MR. BARNES: He wants them to; but he's going to have to adopt some of this conservative agenda, this New Paradigm--whatever you want to call it--just to make the conservatives happy so he'll go into '92 with a united party.

MS. STAHL: He'll do the no-new-taxes because it sounds good.

MR. WILLIAMS: Not only that, he needs something for the State of the Union. So, you're going to see him pop these things up for the State of the Union; but how much impact will it have in the long run? Zero.

MS. STAHL: Zero? We'll find out. Thank you both.

MR. BARNES: I think a lot.

MS. STAHL: Fred Barnes, Juan Williams, thanks. We'll be back with a final word.

PRESIDENT BUSH: The status quo of centralized bureaucracy is not working for the people. It's the people who have the best answers for themselves and their families--not the government.

(Commercial announcements)

MS. STAHL: Cartoonist Wayne Stayskal shows us the action in front of a fur salon. "Uh-oh, they're looking this way. Better woof a few times."
I'm Lesley Stahl; join us again next Sunday.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of "Face the Nation with Lesley Stahl" was sponsored by G.E.--from satellites to medical systems, we bring good things to life.

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VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT SUPPORTS U.N. RESOLUTION

SAN FERNANDO DE APURE, Venezuela -- An estimated 100,000 people held a rally in southwestern Venezuela Sunday to call for a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis.

President Carlos Andres Perez, joined by former Costa Rican President Arias at the annual "March for Peace," told the rally in the southwestern capital, 250 miles from Caracas, he was "enormously satisfied" with the prospect of a meeting between Secretary Baker and President Saddam.

Referring to President Bush's proposal to send Baker to Iraq, Perez said: "It demonstrates that there is not an insistence on war, but rather that they are trying to take all possible steps to arrive at agreements and understandings."

But he also voiced his support for the latest U.N. resolution effectively authorizing the use of force against Iraq if it failed to withdraw from Kuwait by Jan. 15. (Reuter)

BAKER SAYS IRAQ SANCTIONS MAY NEVER WORK

Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney on Sunday gave the bleakest assessment to date of the effect of economic sanctions against Iraq, with Baker suggesting that they may never work, no matter how long the U.S. waits.

In a series of television appearances, Baker, Cheney and National Security Adviser Scowcroft all went to great lengths to counter recent arguments on Capitol Hill that the U.S. should avoid military action and give the sanctions against Iraq more time.

Their seemingly coordinated remarks suggested that the Bush Administration now believes it must resolve the Persian Gulf crisis over the next few months, rather than trying to maintain the international embargo over a longer period of time. Baker and Cheney are likely to press this theme again when they testify at congressional hearings later this week.

"No one can tell you that economic sanctions, standing alone, will ever get (Saddam) out of Kuwait," Baker said on NBC's "Meet the Press."

"...We would have hoped they (the sanctions) would have worked by now," Baker continued. "And many major nations around the world told us they felt, initially, that there would be a good chance that they would work inside two or three months. It's quite clear that's not the case."

(Jim Mann, Los Angeles Times, A1)

BAKER PUSHES U.N. RESOLUTIONS, SAYS NO WAR A 'REWARD'

Secretary Baker said Sunday if President Saddam obeyed a tough U.N. resolution and pulled his troops out of Kuwait, he would get the "reward" of avoiding attack by U.S. forces.

Baker, who will be going to Baghdad sometime this month for direct talks with the Iraqi leader, said U.S. demands in the Persian Gulf remained complete Iraqi withdrawal from the oil-rich emirate, the restoration of the Kuwaiti government and the release of foreigners still in Iraq and Kuwait.

Speaking to NBC's "Meet the Press," Baker said last week's U.N. resolution authorizing force in the gulf...would be reiterated in talks with Saddam, but stressed the talks should not be construed as negotiations.

"If he complied with the resolutions, his reward for that would not be a military attack by the United States," Baker said.... Speaking on CBS's "Face the Nation," Gen. Scowcroft said: "We are being patient, we have been patient. The latest situation is a move to peace -- a show of the strength of a world coalition against him."

(Reuter)

U.S., IRAQI OFFICIALS HOPEFUL ON ACCORD

As American and Iraqi diplomats exchanged public hints and private notes about how to sit down and talk to each other, officials on both sides expressed optimism Sunday about prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis.

Secretary Baker said there was an "excellent chance" world opposition could persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Abdul Amir Anbari, Iraqi ambassador to the U.N., said his nation "was prepared to talk about all the issues that exist in the region" with "no reservation and no condition."

At the same time, Baker reiterated that the demands made in 12 U.N. resolutions were not negotiable. "We are not going to negotiate short of the U.N. resolutions," Baker said. "We shouldn't do that. We are not going to do that. And I hope that we can put that to rest with this statement." Baker said President Saddam would avoid an American military attack if he complied with U.N. demands. Top U.S. officials said Iraq and the U.S. were still at a delicate stage in working out parameters of the talks President Bush proposed on Friday. But suggestions emerged that the U.S. was prepared to alter Bush's original proposal.

(E.J. Dionne and Ann Devroy, Washington Post, A1)

SADDAM SAYS CHANCES OF WAR 50-50; IRAQ TESTS MISSILES

Saddam Hussein's armies rattled nerves around the Persian Gulf Sunday with the first test of surface-to-surface missiles since the invasion of Kuwait, and Iraq's president said the chances of war are "50-50."... The U.S. military refused to say whether the American forces went on alert Sunday when Iraq launched surface-to-surface missiles in what appeared to be test launches. The missiles were fired -- and landed -- in Iraqi territory, U.S. military officials in Saudi Arabia said in a statement....

(A) military statement did not say what kind of missiles were involved, but Secretary Cheney, interviewed in Washington by ABC, said they were SCUD missiles "or SCUD variants." He said it was the first such firing since April.

(Laura King, AP)

-more-

U.S., Iraqi Officials Hopeful on Accord

Arrangements for Talks Under Discussion

By E.J. Dionne Jr. and Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writers

As American and Iraqi diplomats exchanged public hints and private notes about how to sit down and talk to each other, officials on both sides expressed optimism yesterday about prospects for a peaceful settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis.

Secretary of States James A. Baker III said there was an "excellent chance" world opposition could persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Abdul Amir Anbari, Iraqi ambassador to the United Nations, said his nation "was prepared to talk about all the issues that exist in the region" with "no reservation and no condition."

At the same time, Baker reiterated that the demands made in 12 U.N. resolutions were not negotiable. "We are not going to negotiate short of the United Nations resolutions," Baker said. "We shouldn't do that. We are not going to do that. And I hope that we can put that to rest with this statement." Baker said Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would avoid an American military attack if he complied with U.N. demands.

Top U.S. officials said Iraq and the United States were still at a delicate stage in working out parameters of the talks President Bush proposed on Friday. But suggestions emerged that the United States was prepared to alter Bush's original proposal.

Bush had said U.S. allies in the gulf would attend the talks in Washington, but administration officials hinted yesterday that they could now accept bilateral talks with Iraq, with no allies present. Bush has proposed sending Baker to talk to Saddam in Iraq and to receive Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz at the White House.

Administration officials who insisted on anonymity emphasized that they did not regard the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council's statement on Saturday as an official acceptance of Bush's offer to talk.

"While we are aware of the statements of the Revolutionary Council and other public statements by Iraqi officials, we are involved in private exchanges that do not yet amount to an acceptance of the offers," said one official.

In the meantime, Saddam said in a French television interview that the chances of war or peace were "50-50."

"If this meeting is to be a true path to dialogue, then we are closer to peace," he said. "But if this meeting is to be nothing more than a formal exhibition for the American Congress, the American people, and for international public opinion... then we are closer to war."

In an apparent show of force, Iraq launched surface-to-surface Scud missiles in a test within its own borders. "The flight path of the missiles was away from U.S. and coalition forces," the U.S. military's General Information Bureau in Saudi Arabia said. "The firing appeared to be part of a test and training mission."

There were reports that allied troops in the gulf went on alert after the test. A Pentagon spokesman said the military does not release information on the alert status of its forces.

Top administration officials used yesterday's interview shows to sound the complicated themes now at the heart of American policy—that the United States is willing to hold discussions with Iraq to avoid war but does not regard them as "negotiations" and remains adamant on the fundamental demands of the United Nations.

Appearing on NBC News's "Meet the Press," Baker said the United States was still demanding "complete withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, freedom for the hostages."

Baker sought to encourage Saddam by saying he could avoid attack if he met these demands. "There's never been any suggestion that force would be used if the United Nations resolutions are fully complied with," Baker said. "That would give some assurance, it seems to me, that if he complied with the resolutions, his reward for that would not be a military attack by the United States."

The statement was significant because administration officials

have made it clear that their concerns about Iraq transcend Kuwait and include grave worries about Saddam's access to chemical and nuclear weapons. Baker appeared to leave open the possibility that other issues Saddam has raised could be negotiated once he withdrew his forces from Kuwait.

Still, both Baker and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney reiterated the broader U.S. concerns. Appearing on ABC News's "This Week With David Brinkley," Cheney pointed to "Iraq's enormous military capability" and "its desire to develop even more nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, et cetera." He called for sanctions "targeted specifically on those technologies."

Baker said he saw an "excellent chance" for Iraqi withdrawal if Saddam is convinced of world unity against him as evidenced in the U.N. resolutions. "Once he understands very clearly that the entire international community and the United States as a whole is determined to see that happen... then we have really something that we can use diplomatically to achieve a political solution," Baker said.

As officials staked out their public positions, diplomats sought to nail down exactly how the United States and Iraq would carry out their discussions.

Joseph Wilson, the U.S. charge d'affaires in Baghdad, delivered Bush's invitation on Friday to the No. 2 official in the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, an administration official said. In return, Wilson was given questions from Saddam about the talks.

The official said most of the questions were "procedural in nature," but some were substantive. The State Department sent its replies to Baghdad Saturday and was still awaiting a response last night, officials said.

An administration official said the Iraqis' inquiries suggested that if the United States demanded that Kuwait and other U.S. allies be included in the Bush-Aziz talks, Iraq would insist that Palestinian representatives be included in the Baker-Saddam talks in Baghdad. The U.S. counterproposal suggested that the talks include only American and Iraqi officials.

Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security adviser, hinted at this resolution during an appearance on CBS News's "Face the Nation." Scowcroft said, "Perhaps the best thing to do is to make the talks bilateral on both ends so that we don't get into haggling about the shape of the table or anything like that."

NEXT

Baker reiterated U.S. opposition to including the Israeli-Palestinian issue on the agenda. "What we're going to say when he asks about the Palestinians is: 'We don't think you invaded Kuwait to help the Palestinians, and if you did, all you've done is hurt the Palestinians,'" Baker said.

Although the administration's call for talks with Iraq has reduced domestic opposition to the gulf buildup, there were still dissenting voices.

Appearing on the Brinkley program, former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger said he was "deeply worried" that Bush's new direction could prove "extremely dangerous."

He warned that if the United States began talks, others would inevitably interpret them as negotiations and it would become "extremely difficult, if not impossible," to hold the anti-Iraq coalition together as other nations began opening "their own lines to Baghdad."

Asked about Kissinger's criticisms, Baker argued that the American public wanted talks before going to war. "If force ends up being used, we owe it to the American people and to others to show that we left no stone unturned in the search for peace," Baker said.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) said the administration ought to give the sanctions against Iraq far more time to work than the 45 days now left until Jan. 15, the date the U.N. resolution sets as a deadline for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

"What I have serious reservations about is that we are on a path towards a war," Kennedy said. "And when the bullets start flying, it's going to be the Americans who are going to experience casualties. Ninety percent of the casualties will be Americans. And I don't believe that that's right."

But Baker insisted that "no one can tell you that economic sanctions standing alone will ever get" Saddam out of Kuwait.

Meanwhile, Muhammad Ali flew out of Baghdad with 15 American hostages whom Saddam released after talks with the former heavyweight boxing champion. Also on the Iraqi Airways flight were two Canadian and six British hostages.

Staff writer David Hoffman contributed to this report.



Wait! Don't panic, George has a plan

Look, maybe these guys are smarter than a lot of us have reluctantly concluded they are.

Maybe George Bush has a master plan. Maybe James A. Baker III can show Henry Kissinger a thing or two about negotiating.

Bereft as he is of "the vision thing," there's no way this president could dream up the goofy things he does — his habit of one strategy in the morning, an opposite strategy for the afternoon.

That's why some people are taking comfort in the notion that maybe what appears to be the kind of goofiness you expect to find at the bar at the country club is really a clever plan laid out for him by a mad genius hidden in a White House closet.

For days, the mad genius has sent the president hither and yon, hopscotching continents, talking not only about kicking Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait but of the greater necessity of relieving him of his capacity for nuclear weapons, poison-gas bombs and germ-warfare cannisters.

The strategy of the mad genius, who first earned the president's confidence with the strategy of splitting the Republican Party by breaking the blood oath not to raise taxes and then promising probably never to break a blood oath again, is clearly a strategy of sowing confusion.

How else to explain Jim Baker's casual remarks yesterday that if Saddam will only get out of Kuwait the United States will leave him alone with his nukes, gas and germs intact for another day.

Confident though the president may be of the brilliance of the mad genius, it's difficult for the rest of us to be so sanguine about sending Jim Baker to the Middle East to negotiate with Saddam. Mr. Baker was a society lawyer before George Bush recruited him for Republican politics, habitually losing races for minor state offices and managing the affairs, as it were, of the sun-blackened matron-fish of what passes for society in Houston.

Anyone who has ever tried to buy a pomegranate in a Baghdad bazaar knows that offering an Arab

every penny he asks is only the beginning. He'll offer you coffee and a comfortable chair for the serious negotiations.

Mr. Baker insists that U.S. demands continue to be Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of the Kuwaiti government and the release of the hostages, so the negotiations should not be construed as "negotiations." Of course not. Saddam will understand perfectly. Mr. Baker



Neville Chamberlain

will leave Baghdad without his pants.

Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, also insists the negotiations with Saddam won't be negotiations. "We are being patient, we have been patient," he says. "The latest situation is a move to peace — a show of the strength of a world coalition against him."

Mr. Scowcroft is a retired general, so we probably shouldn't hold such gibberish against him. But Saddam, who shoots his own generals who say silly things, knows very well how to recognize such "moves to peace" as "moves to vacillation."

In fact, Saddam seemed to enjoy needling the president and his men in the wake of the appointment of Mr. Baker as designated supplicant, allowing as how the negotiations Mr. Bush wants to open might be all right unless they are meant only to assuage congressional wimpiness at home.

An arguable case might still be made for delaying the application of force, and debate is a very good thing. But George Bush, who is too timid to debate with anyone else, insists on debating with himself — taking three positions at breakfast and refuting them with two more after lunch.

"The first thing we are going to tell Saddam," says our secretary of state, "is to make sure that he understands that the international community, not just the United States but the international community, is very, very serious about not ruling out the option of the use of force."

What Mr. Baker is counting on is that if Saddam isn't scared of 400,000 Americans, half of the Air Force, most of the Navy and every National Guardsman and pregnant reservist we could scrape up to reinforce the Army, we can straighten him out by threatening him with the military prowess of Sweden, Liechtenstein, and Haiti.

Baker offers Iraq safe path of retreat

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The United States pledged clearly for the first time yesterday not to attack Iraq if President Saddam Hussein withdraws from Kuwait.

The statement by Secretary of State James A. Baker III, whom President Bush has offered to dispatch for face-to-face talks with Mr. Hussein, appears to be part of the Bush administration's effort to offer the Iraqi leader a clear path of retreat.

A senior administration official said the United States had yet to receive a formal, direct response from Iraq on Mr. Bush's offer Friday for talks in Washington and Baghdad on the Persian Gulf crisis.

Iraq's ruling Revolutionary Command Council accepted the offer publicly Saturday but said the talks should include the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

The official indicated the United States is unsure how hard Iraq will press this linkage, which Washington repeatedly has rejected.

Iraq's U.N. ambassador, Abdul Azhar, appeared conciliatory in a television interview yesterday.

"We'll be willing to talk about all the issues that exist in the region," he said. He did not reiterate Iraq's claims to Kuwait.

Mr. Bush proposed Friday that Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz come to Washington toward the end of next week and that Mr. Baker go to Baghdad between Dec. 15 and Jan. 15.

Mr. Bush's proposal has been warmly received in Congress and by U.S. allies and foes alike. But some, such as former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, termed it a grave error that could lead to concessions and an unraveling of the anti-Iraq coalition.

Mr. Baker, asked in a television interview whether the United States would promise not to attack Iraq if it quit Kuwait, replied: "There's never been any suggestion that force would be used if the United Nations resolutions were fully complied with."

He said Thursday's U.N. resolution authorizing force would be inoperative if Mr. Hussein withdraws, and added:

"That would give some assurance, it seems to me, that if he complied with the resolutions, his reward for that would not be a military attack by the United States."

The resolutions call for Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait and release of all hostages.

Although the United States has never said it might attack Iraq regardless of what it does, there has been much speculation that unstated U.S. policy goals include destroying Mr. Hussein's strategic weapons and even toppling him.

Mr. Baker's pledge, made on NBC-TV's "Meet The Press," may give the Iraqi leader reason to think he has something to gain by withdrawing.

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft also appeared on talk shows yesterday, insisting that the proposed U.S.-Iraqi talks will not lead to concessions to Mr. Hussein.

"On those basic, fundamental conditions that the United Nations has endorsed and ... are at the heart of U.S. objectives in the area, Jim [Baker] will not be going to negotiate," Mr. Cheney said. "We will be going specifically to make it clear that the President is deadly serious" about using force if necessary, he said.

The senior official echoed those comments privately but acknowledged there are dangers in the Baker mission.

"There are risks in everything we do," including pursuing repeated U.N. resolutions, he said.

The official, requesting anonymity, said Mr. Baker will be ready to talk with Mr. Hussein about what would happen in the region after an Iraqi withdrawal. But he insisted no promises will be made beforehand.

Mr. Kissinger said, "I don't believe we can maintain the distinction between discussion and negotiations."

"It will inevitably lead to a negotiation," he said on ABC-TV's "This Week." "Above all, it will be perceived as a negotiation by our allies, many of whom I believe will now start their own lines to Baghdad."

Congressional hearings that have complicated Mr. Bush's desire to present a united front to Iraq resume today. Mr. Cheney and Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Sen. Edward Kennedy, Massachusetts Democrat, said yesterday on NBC-TV's "Meet the Press" that regardless of the U.S.-Iraqi talks, Mr. Bush should continue relying on economic sanctions.

"I wish this president would get the message from the American people: They do not want to go to war now; sanctions should be getting a chance to work," he said.

Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, Kansas Republican, proposed sending congressional leaders with Mr. Baker on his trip to Baghdad — a journey he predicted would not accomplish much — to show Congress' support for Mr. Bush's policy.

• J. Jennings Moss contributed to this report.

Baker Cites 2 Aims: Kuwait and Captives

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 2 — Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d said today that the United States would not attack Iraq if President Saddam Hussein withdrew his forces from Kuwait and freed the hostages it holds.

In one sense, Mr. Baker was doing no more than restating the United States intention to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions, which are limited to ending Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, restoring the legitimate Government of Kuwait and gaining the release of the hostages.

But in recent weeks Administration officials have cited a reason to consider military action that goes beyond the United Nations resolutions: Iraq's continuing efforts to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

While the Administration has never threatened to attack Iraq even after it evacuated Kuwait, some officials have pointed out that such a course has not been explicitly ruled out, either.

Iraqi Uncertainty Cited

The Administration rationale for considering military action, as well as President Bush's strong denunciations of Mr. Hussein, has led some lawmakers, such as Representative Lee Hamilton of Indiana, the second-ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, to argue that the Iraqis are likely to be uncertain whether the United States' ultimate objectives go beyond liberating Kuwait to include "the removal of Saddam Hussein from power or the removal of the exotic weapons" in Iraq's arsenal.

Mr. Hamilton urged that the United States open talks with Iraq to clarify its objectives, a step Mr. Bush announced on Friday.

Discussing his coming mission to Baghdad, Mr. Baker said in an interview on the NBC News program "Meet the Press" that no military action would be taken if Iraq fully complied with the United Nations resolutions.

"There's never been any suggestion that force would be used if the U.N. resolutions were fully complied with," Mr. Baker said. And if they were fully complied with, the resolution recently passed by the United Nations would not be self-executing and wouldn't come into force," he asserted, referring to the Security Council resolution on Thursday authorizing the use of military action against Iraq.

Other Issues Left Open

"That would give some assurance, it seems to me, that if he complied with the resolutions, his reward for that would not be a military attack by the United States," he said.

Mr. Baker said Iraq's compliance with the United Nations resolution was not negotiable, but he was careful to leave open the possibility of substantive discussions on other issues, such as how to assure stability in the Persian Gulf.

"We will not be negotiating backwards from those United Nations resolutions," Mr. Baker said. "So there won't be a negotiation in that sense."

"The President said we could talk about aspects of the gulf crisis," he said. "Now what the President means by that is political, economic and military." He did not elaborate.

Mr. Baker's comments came as Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said Iraq has test fired Scud surface-to-surface missiles, in a move that some Administration officials take as a demonstration by Iraq of its military abilities.

An Administration official, who asked not to be identified, said the Iraq's test-fired two Scud missiles over a distance of about 200 miles. The missiles were launched inside and landed inside Iraq, and they flew from east to west, the direction the missiles would fly if Iraq attacked Israel.

Mr. Cheney said on the ABC News program "This Week" that it was the first time the missiles have been flight-

tested since April. Mr. Cheney added that the missiles have a range of 360 to 400 miles, depending on which variant is used, and that they are accurate enough to hit cities but not accurate enough to hit more specific targets.

Iraq has previously armed the missiles with high explosives, but American and Israeli officials assume for the purposes of military planning that Iraq may be able to arm them with poison gas.

Several Questions Raised

Mr. Bush's decision to open talks with Iraq and Mr. Baker's clarification

Destroying Iraq's weapons potential is not mentioned.

today of American objectives raised several key questions.

If Iraqi forces leave Kuwait and a settlement is reached, how will the United States slow down the Iraqi nuclear program and reduce Iraq's other military abilities, such as its ballistic missiles, that threaten the area?

Would the current blockade against Iraq's oil exports be maintained to deprive Baghdad of revenues needed to maintain its weapons programs?

Would some American forces continue to be based in the Persian Gulf as a military counterweight to Iraq? Where would they be deployed and at

what strength?

Iraq's Ambassador to the United States, Abdul Amir al-Anbari, said today that American efforts to disable Iraq's military were unacceptable.

Further Sanctions Seen

Mr. Cheney — who is scheduled to testify with Gen. Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Monday — said some form of international sanctions would still be needed to prevent Iraq from acquiring dangerous military technologies, but he was not specific on how they would work.

In other developments, Mr. Bush's statement that he would invite ambassadors from several of the nations in the multinational coalition against Iraq to take part in the Baghdad talks appears to have been dropped in light of Iraq's statements that it would invite "countries and parties that are connected with unresolved disputes and issues," an apparent reference to the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Mr. Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said today that "perhaps the best thing to do is to make the talks bilateral on both ends so that we don't get to haggling about the shape of the table."

Mr. Scowcroft also said on the CBS News program "Face the Nation" that Iraqis have continued to supply some provisions to the American Embassy in Kuwait, which is running short of food. The Iraqi move appears to reflect concern that the United States might use its concern over a shortage of food at the embassy, which Mr. Bush has pledged to keep open, as a rationale to intervene militarily.

Baker Says Iraq Sanctions May Never Work

By JIM MANN
TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON—Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney on Sunday gave the bleakest assessment to date of the effect of economic sanctions against Iraq, with Baker suggesting that they may never work, no matter how long the United States waits.

In a series of television appearances, Baker, Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft—the senior members of the Bush Administration's foreign-policy team—all went to great lengths to counter recent arguments on Capitol Hill that the United States should avoid military action and give the sanctions against Iraq more time.

Their seemingly coordinated remarks suggested that the Bush Administration now believes it must resolve the Persian Gulf crisis over the next few months, rather than trying to maintain the international embargo over a longer period of time. Baker and Cheney are likely to press this theme again when they testify at congressional hearings later this week.

"No one can tell you that economic sanctions, standing alone, will ever get him [Iraqi President Saddam Hussein] out of Kuwait," Baker said on NBC's "Meet the Press."

"... We would have hoped they [the sanctions] would have worked by now," Baker continued. "And many major nations around the world told us they felt, initially, that there would be a good chance that they would work inside two or three months. It's quite clear that's not the case."

Last week, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, two former chairmen of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff—retired Air Force Gen. David C. Jones and retired Adm. William J. Crowe Jr.—urged the Bush Administration to give more time for sanctions to work.

A number of senators and Congress members have echoed this same argument in recent days, posing a serious political obstacle to the Administration's effort to persuade Hussein that the United States is prepared and willing to take military action to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

When asked Sunday about Crowe's and Jones' testimony, Baker indirectly challenged their credentials to speak out on the effectiveness of sanctions.

"We're talking about sanctions," the secretary of state said. "We're not talking about military operations. We're talking about whether or not, as a political matter, these sanctions can work."

Baker and Cheney acknowledged that the United States and other countries misjudged how effective the international sanctions against Iraq would be, in part because Hussein's government is doing a better job than expected of stepping up food production.

"It turns out that Iraq is, indeed, a major importer of food in the past, but that's not because they can't produce their own. That's because of incompetent economic policies," the defense secretary said. "There are three occasions in the last 25 years when they've doubled their production of cereals, for example, within 12 months. That's clearly what they're doing again now, and they should be able to sustain themselves from an agricultural standpoint."

Cheney said the international embargo has had some impact on Hussein's ability to obtain spare

parts for his military. However, he said, the tempo of operations for the Iraqi military isn't high now. "The expectation that sanctions will definitely produce a result, it seems to me, is a risky one," Cheney concluded in an interview on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley."

Scowcroft, appearing on CBS' "Face the Nation," said Hussein "has enormous stockpiles built up. He will protect his military machine from the effect of the sanctions. That'll be the last thing to weaken."

The senior Administration officials also argued that, even if the economic sanctions are effective, there would be serious drawbacks to a U.S. policy of delaying a final resolution of the gulf crisis.

"There's a penalty to be paid by delay," Cheney said. "This [international] coalition that we put together, that everything now rests upon, wasn't there four months ago. ... Being able to maintain and hold that together over that length of time, I think, is a risky factor."

Scowcroft raised the specter that during a delay of a year or so, Iraq might develop more deadly weapons.

"One of the arguments against 'Why not let sanctions run forever?' is the possibility that he [Hussein] could, in one way or another, develop some kind of a device which would dramatically increase casualties to coalition forces if there were conflict," the national security adviser said.

During his interview, Baker repeated past Administration assurances that if Saddam Hussein withdraws fully from Kuwait, the United States would not take military action against him. "If he complied with the [United Nations] resolutions, his reward for that

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CONTINUED

would not be a military attack by the United States," the secretary of state said.

On Friday, a day after the United Nations authorized the use of force against Iraq if it does not withdraw from Kuwait by Jan. 15, President Bush offered to send Baker on a mission to Baghdad in what Bush called an effort to "go the extra mile for peace."

Iraq issued a public statement accepting the offer, but by Sunday night the White House said it had still not received any direct confirmation or details from Iraqi officials concerning the proposed trip.

Baker on Sunday rejected Iraqi suggestions that the upcoming talks cover Palestinian questions as well as the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.

"What we're going to say when he [the Iraqi president] asks about the Palestinians is, 'We don't think

you invaded Kuwait to help the Palestinians. And if you did, all you've done is hurt the Palestinians.' And secondly, these things should not be linked. They are two entirely different issues."

Also Sunday, Hussein said in a French television interview that the chances of war or peace in the gulf crisis are "50-50." He said the outcome will depend on whether the dialogue offered by Bush is genuine or simply "a formal exhibition."

Hussein's "50-50" comment was in response to the question: "Are we closer to war or to peace?"

The Iraqi leader, who has agreed to Bush's offer of talks to avert a war, appeared suspicious of American motives for opening a dialogue after four months of military build-up. "If this meeting is to be a true path to dialogue, then we are closer to peace," he said.



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NEWSMAKER SATURDAY

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National Security Adviser

MODERATOR: Gene Randall - Newsmaker Saturday

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MR. RANDALL: The promise of freedom for hundreds of Americans and others held hostage by Saddam Hussein--does it diminish the threat of war? A U.S. decision to pull its besieged diplomats from Kuwait--a policy reversal--why? And is there a deal taking shape to defuse the Persian Gulf crisis?

Welcome to "Newsmaker Saturday." I'm Gene Randall in Washington. Joining me to answer those questions is President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, whose most pressing responsibility these days is helping the administration chart its Persian Gulf strategy.

MR. RANDALL (on tape): The most encouraging news out of the Persian Gulf this week--Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's pledge to release all his hostage, beginning as early as this week end.

HOSTAGE: It's the best Christmas present anybody could have--that piece of paper--the best Christmas present.

MR. RANDALL: Saddam Hussein said he had guided by humanitarian principles. He also indicated he simply no longer needed the hostages, that his military forces were now ready for any attack that might come. In fact, to many people, it seemed a cynical maneuver aimed at public opinion, its timing dictated by the impending U.S.-Iraqi talks being planned for Washington and Baghdad.

IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER TAREQ AZIZ (ABC News' "Nightline," December 7th): I'm not going to Washington on the basis of pre-conditions. I--there was an invitation to go to Washington. We welcome this invitation. Mr. Bush is free to say whatever he wants to say; and on my turn, I'm going also to tell him our position about all the topics he wants to raise. And we have also our topics which we want to raise in the meeting.

MR. RANDALL: As he traveled in South America during the week, President Bush said this was no time to relieve the pressure on Saddam Hussein.

PRESIDENT BUSH: The release of all hostages would be a very good thing. But the problem is the aggression against Kuwait; and the man must leave Kuwait without reservation, without condition.

MR. RANDALL: Secretary of State James Baker emphasized that the hostage release announcement came just a week after the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force to push Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. Testifying on Capitol Hill, Baker also issued a warning about the nature of any offensive action against Iraq.

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER (Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, December 5th): Our aim is to ensure that, if force must be used, it will be used suddenly, massively and decisively.

MR. RANDALL: But, on Friday, another potential flashpoint was removed from the Persian Gulf equation. The United States announced it would pull its diplomats from the embassy in Kuwait, although Saturday morning, in Caracas, President Bush said evacuating the embassy would give him,

quote, "one less worry" if he decided to attack the Iraqi forces that hold Kuwait forces.

Also Saturday morning, in Saudi Arabia, where tens of thousands of U.S. troops practice for battle every day, one Arabic-language newspaper was reporting that the crisis was moving rapidly toward a conclusion.

General Scowcroft, welcome.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Good afternoon, Gene.

MR. RANDALL: Does that Saudi newspaper have it right? And, if not, have we at least taken a step away from war this week?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think we--I don't think we've--that we've taken a step in any other direction. We are still moving in the direction of trying to convince Saddam Hussein that he has two options. And that is to withdraw, to respond to the U.N. resolutions, or to face catastrophe.

MR. RANDALL: Well, at the very least, does freedom for the hostages have a chance of improving the atmosphere for talks between Iraq and the United States?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not so far as we're concerned. (A) He never should have taken the hostages in the first place. I think he's decided that he got a black eye by doing it, and he's trying to make the best of a bad bargain, and he's cynically using them and has. This is just the last step. So, I don't think it changes anything.

MR. RANDALL: The president would like to send Secretary of State Baker to Baghdad, and would like to receive the foreign minister of Iraq here in Washington. But the Iraqis have so far rejected the dates you have proposed for the Baker meeting in Baghdad. Are you concerned about that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I'm concerned by it. We offered them four dates over a two-week period. And they've said none of those are convenient; and they offered a date much closer to the United Nations deadline for their compliance--which, again, seems to indicate that he's not serious about this. This is just another ploy that he's trying to use to drag things out and to avoid seriously facing up to what the world community is demanding that he do.

MR. RANDALL: Iraq TV is reporting that Baghdad expects the talks--if and when they take place--to be an exchange of viewpoints. It is also saying that Iraq will make proposals and will adhere strongly to what are called Iraqi national rights, including the right to what Baghdad calls the province of Kuwait.

If that is the case, what do you see as the prospects for those sessions? Or, do you see this as posturing?

MR. SCOWCROFT: As far as we're concerned, it may be posturing. As far as we're concerned, the subjects for the discussion are the United Nations resolution and Iraq's compliance with those resolutions, and our determination to ensure that compliance, speaking for all of the coalition.

MR. RANDALL: I know you and the administration reject the term "negotiations" for what

may take place in Washington and Baghdad. But would you also reject the term "dialogue?"

MR. SCOWCROFT: Dialogue--not necessarily, but a dialogue focused on him getting out of Kuwait and complying with the U.N. resolutions. A dialogue with any extraneous issues--extraneous to those particular issues--yes, we would reject.

MR. RANDALL: But does that mean that we go into Baghdad or have this meeting in Washington with our half of the dialogue being "you must leave Kuwait," and his part of the dialogue being, either for Mr. Aziz or Mr. Hussein, being either yes or no--end of dialogue.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't rule that out. But it seems to me that it is essential--and it was essential to the president--before any further steps be taken that Saddam Hussein understand clearly that the world community is against him and that the United States is determined to enforce, with the coalition, those United Nations resolutions, and that his options are very limited.

MR. RANDALL: Well, General Scowcroft, let's look at the practicalities of this. Suppose Saddam Hussein or Tareq Aziz says to U.S. officials, "We have some items we would like to bring up," do we say, "No, that's not part of this framework?"

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, we can't--we're not going to put a gag on his mouth. But so far as we're concerned, there is no dialogue on any other issues.

MR. RANDALL: We'll be back with more questions for General Scowcroft in just a moment.

(Commercial announcements)

MR. RANDALL: General Scowcroft, how about the administration's decision to take its diplomats out of Kuwait City? Why should that not be seen as a U.S. move to help defuse the situation in response to the promised release of hostages?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Because I think, as you know, the president has talked repeatedly about his concern about the hostages and about the embassy in Kuwait. And what it does is remove for him one agonizing issue should he, in fact, have to take action.

MR. RANDALL: But it also removes, doesn't it, one potential flashpoint in that the safety of those diplomats has been so important in the president's words?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, it does do that.

MR. RANDALL: So, to that extent, does it help defuse the situation?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, it could if, in fact, Saddam Hussein had designs against the embassy, yes.

MR. RANDALL: General, you've been around this town long enough to recognize that there

is a lot of talk going on that, in fact, there is some kind of deal in the works; and while we may not like to use the term "negotiation" or even the term "deal," that there are forces acting together that will produce at some point a scenario that will end up becoming a deal.

Now, is there anything going on that we don't know about? Or, is what we read and what we hear all there is?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What you read and what you hear is all there is. I have noticed the speculation in the press in the last few days. There is no deal in the making or operating; there is no linkage. There is no change in our objectives.

MR. RANDALL: Is what we read and what we hear a form of public negotiation?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, we are not trying--what we are trying to do is to convince him of the seriousness of the situation, and the determination of the United Nations Security Council and the United States to enforce the U.N. resolutions; and that there is no wiggle room--there is no negotiations. He's not going to split the coalition. He's not going to split the American people, that that's what he has to do is get out.

MR. RANDALL: There were very tough words from the administration this week from many quarters--the defense secretary, the secretary of state, the president himself in South America, including Saturday in Caracas--about the possibility of war, the option of war.

But, in fact, won't the hostage release make it more difficult to get the kind of public support any administration needs to get into hostilities?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What I would say is that, to the extent it's not a cynical maneuver on his part, it's an indication that our strategy is, in fact, working, and that he is finally, perhaps, taking us seriously. I hope that is the case.

MR. RANDALL: Well, was that a note of optimism on your part--that we're heading toward a resolution?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think it's too early to say; I think it's too early to say.

MR. RANDALL: And at what point might it be possible to make that kind of statement tinged with optimism? Should we use the term "watershed" when we discuss the impending visit of Secretary Baker to Baghdad? Will that tell us yes or no on the military option?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not necessarily so.

MR. RANDALL: What will tell us that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think when we see Saddam's tanks pulling out of Kuwait, his troops going back. It only took him 36 hours to take over Kuwait. He ought to be able to get out in the same amount of time.

MR. RANDALL: General, has the administration now simply forewarned the possibility, any possibility that sanctions by themselves will work in the Persian Gulf?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't say that. You know, we have never, ever said sanctions in and of themselves were--we're confident they would work. It is one of the pressures that we have got upon Iraq, along with others. The president has always said he is going to keep his other options open, if the event sanctions don't. I think it is quite clear--and most of the testimony in the last week, it is quite clear--that, for the foreseeable future, sanctions are unlikely to apply the pressure to a man used to privation and a very self-disciplined man--to get him to do what it is he has to do.

MR. RANDALL: General, when people talk about the war option, it's very comfortable to fall into this idea that somehow we can tie together a very tidy package of air power and go through a relatively painless period of warfare and come out of this with our hands not very dirty.

But, in fact, I think the recognition is growing that, if there is to be war in the Persian Gulf, as Secretary Baker said, it will be massive, it will be decisive, and that will take a lot more than air power.

Now, without getting into war strategy, is there any way you can characterize for the American people what they should be prepared for, if there is a war in the Persian Gulf?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, let me say in the first case, we're not on a war strategy. What we are trying to do is to convince him of the mass arrayed against him, and what he faces if he will not comply with the United Nations.

Now, in the event he does not do that, in the event force is necessary, I wouldn't want to go much beyond what Secretary Baker says. It will be massive; it will be sudden; and I hope mercifully swift.

MR. RANDALL: Air, sea and land?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Air, sea and land.

MR. RANDALL: We must take a break; we'll be back in just a moment.

(Commercial announcements)

MR. RANDALL: Welcome back to "Newsmaker Saturday." I'm Gene Randall in Washington. My guest is President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft. General Scowcroft, the president has some very tough words in South America on Saturday when he was asked about taking the hostages out of Kuwait and Iraq, and also withdrawing our embassy personnel from Kuwait City, and in effect he said, well, that's one less thing to worry about if I decide to send the military in against Iraqi forces in Kuwait City. Now, is that kind of tough talk fitting the pattern we're seeing the past few days, a pattern which has included the promise of a hostage release from Iraq? I mean, is this the time for that tough talk? Might that jeopardize this hostage release, for instance?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't think it will jeopardize it, because I think, as we've talked before, I think he's doing it for very different reasons. I think the greater danger is that he may interpret our

statement about closing the embassy if all of the American hostages are released as a conciliatory gesture which somehow relieves the pressure on him and indicates we're prepared for indefinite negotiations. I think that's the greater danger.

MR. RANDALL: Is he also attempting to stop the erosion of public support which we've seen in the polls for our Persian Gulf policy?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think so. I haven't talked with the president since he made that statement, but it seems to me that what he's saying is, don't take this move on our part as an indication that we're responding with a conciliatory gesture to what you've done on hostages.

MR. RANDALL: General Scowcroft, there is certainly a strong argument that when Saddam Hussein went into Kuwait, the Palestinians and the welfare of Palestinians were not upper most in his mind. But would you admit that he has played the Palestinian card skillfully.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think he's trying to. I don't think he has had any effect. I believe, you know, the PLO has, by and large, given him fairly strong support, I think much against their own self interest. But I don't think he's succeeded, but he continues to try to link the PLO, the West Bank, the Arab-Israeli issues with the gulf in the attempt to divide the Arab world.

MR. RANDALL: Will the United States support a U.N. resolution which is critical of Israel, and which calls for an eventual Middle East peace conference which Israel opposes?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, as you know, there is a resolution being debated now; the exact format of that resolution, the content of it, is a subject of intense negotiations in the United Nations right now, and I am not going to jump in the middle of very delicate discussions.

MR. RANDALL: Even to say if we support that that Saddam Hussein will claim it as a victory?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think--I don't know what it is we would be supporting or what it is we'd be opposing, because the language is still subject to change, Gene, so I'd rather really not get into delicate negotiations.

MR. RANDALL: General Scowcroft, let's talk about the possibility that Saddam Hussein will decide it's time to leave Kuwait, it's time to meet the U.N. demands. What happens then? Israel, as you know, has said that if there is no war, and Saddam Hussein is not a victim of that war, that Israel may have to act on its own to deal with Hussein and his military threat, and his nuclear potential. But what do we do if that happens? What's our role?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think one of the things to point out is that notably lacking among the United Nations resolution is a requirement that Saddam Hussein has to give up power, has to leave Iraq. But that doesn't mean that all is forgiven if he complies with the U.N. resolutions.

MR. RANDALL: What does that mean?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What does that mean? He is still, for example, he has devastated Kuwait.

MR. RANDALL: So you want reparations?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Perhaps. I don't want to say what we want, but what I'm saying is then we turn to negotiations. There still are sanctions. Will they be kept? Won't they be kept? There are a lot of things--there are a lot of things then to discuss, but we will have stepped back from the perilous position that we are in now because of his intransigence, that of a possibility of a conflict.

MR. RANDALL: And how about the military machine, and the nuclear potential? There's been so much talk about that from the administration. How do we deal with that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think we would certainly--certainly take some steps to deal with that, and exactly how we would do it, you know, I think would be in part a discussion among the Permanent Five of the U.N. Security Council.

MR. RANDALL: We must take a final break, General. We will be right back.

(Announcements)

MR. RANDALL: General Scowcroft, are you confident that the United States can keep this international coalition together in all circumstances? And I cite one possible set of circumstances: Saddam Hussein establishing a pattern of partial compliance with the U.N. resolution. Suppose he keeps those two islands and that oil field? Do you keep the coalition together under those circumstances?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think you've hit on a very important point. I think one of his tactics may be to try to divide the coalition, to divide the American people, the Congress and the president by taking some partial steps, or by trying to drag out negotiations with a hint that just around the corner is a settlement, and so on. I'm quite comfortable at this point that the coalition is strong in their insistence on full compliance with the U.N. resolution?

MR. RANDALL: Can you tell me why there was no advance notification to our multinational allies that Secretary Baker was going to Baghdad?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I believe it was because we saw that as simply a tactic to insure directly that Saddam Hussein understood what the situation was, and it was not opening a negotiation and so on. We did consult with them very quickly after the president made his comment. This is a tactic, not a change, or not a substantive development.

MR. RANDALL: General, before we end this, I want to get back to a question you touched on earlier, because I think maybe there was more to say, and I perhaps cut you off. But if there is to be a war option--and I'm not saying that we have a war strategy--but if there is to be a resort to force, is there any way you can define for the American people the kind of war it is we would be forced to fight? It's one thing to say it would be decisive or sudden or massive, but what should the American people

be prepared for so they can, on an informed basis, make a judgment about how they feel about that kind of situation?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's a difficult question to answer in public, Gene. But let me just say that I think any conflict would be designed by us to maximize our points of advantage which are really air power, mobility, striking power, and not play into his advantages, which is dug in defenses and so on.

MR. RANDALL: General Scowcroft, thanks very much for taking a time out from your busy schedule. We appreciate your being with us.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Nice to be here.

MR. RANDALL: And we thank all of you for being with us. I'm Gene Randall in Washington. Have a good weekend.

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NBC News

MEET THE PRESS

Sunday, December 9, 1990

GUESTS:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

AMB. ABDUL AMIR AL-ANBARI

Iraqi U.N. Representative

MODERATOR:

Garrick Utley - NBC News

PANEL:

Thomas Friedman - The New York Times

David S. Broder - The Washington Post

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MR. UTLEY: On "Meet the Press" today, Iraq, the U.S. and the U.N.--what happens now? Our guests this morning are Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser; later in the program we will talk with Amir al-Anbari, Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations.

Finally, there is some movement in the Gulf crisis. The hostages will be coming home--coming home today, many of them at least. American and Iraqi diplomats will be talking to each other at the highest levels. But what does that mean, if anything?

On the surface, the issues are clear-cut: Iraqi forces still occupy Kuwait; the U.N. resolutions still stand; the January 15th deadline is still in effect. But now George Bush and Saddam Hussein have each moved pieces on the chessboard,⁷ and we have to figure out what that will mean.

Will Iraq make further concessions? Will American public opinion stand behind the president's hard line towards Baghdad? Are we closer or further from war than we were just a week ago? Well, that's what we're talking about this morning, first with Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser. Later we'll hear from Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations. And joining me here this morning on the panel are David Broder of The Washington Post and Tom Friedman of The New York Times.

Gentlemen, thanks for being here this morning. Let's start with some haggling over dates. The Iraqis say they want Secretary Baker to come to Baghdad to talk with Saddam Hussein on January 12th. We think that's too late. What happens now? What is our response?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, we have offered them four dates between the 20th of December and the 3rd of January, over an almost two-week period. And we think that's ample opportunity for them to select a date convenient to them.

To me, what it shows is that they're still playing games; they're still manipulating for advantage; they're not serious about talking to us.

MR. UTLEY: So what you're saying is we will not go for the January 12th date. Is that it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That is too late.

MR. UTLEY: So what is the latest date we would accept?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What we have suggested is by not later than the 3rd of January.

MR. UTLEY: So that's where we stand right now?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's where we stand right now.

MR. UTLEY: Is that going to be an obstacle? Are they going to have to--

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't know. We will wait and see.

MR. UTLEY: But you're saying that if they do not agree--the Iraqis do not agree to receive Baker by, let's say, the third of January, there's no real prospect for talks.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, let's wait and see.

MR. UTLEY: You confident it will be worked out?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I'm not--no, I'm really not. I think it depends whether or not he's serious about trying to do something or whether or not he's manipulating, as he has very skillfully for advantage here, and not taking the situation seriously.

MR. UTLEY: So you would think in many ways the signals he is sending with the January 12th date is that he's not really serious about talking at this point?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's the impression that I have.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Brent, just to clarify that, then, we are in effect saying it's either January 3rd at the latest, or no talks at all?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I wouldn't--I wouldn't go that far, Tom. What I'm saying is, we think we have offered him a very reasonable selection of dates in a period. And there's no particular reason why one of those would not be satisfactory.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Can I shift to the United Nations for a minute?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Sure.

MR. FRIEDMAN: We've seen a debate going on in the Security Council going on over yet another resolution related to the Palestine question.

On the table is a draft which includes language calling for an international conference, properly structured at the appropriate time--standard American language. Obviously, if such a resolution were passed now, it would imply a certain linkage--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. FRIEDMAN: --between the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israel conflict. Is this administration ready to accept any U.N. resolution at this time that would contain language calling for an international peace conference some time down the road?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not going to come down firmly in the middle of what are very delicate negotiations going on at the United Nations over the language of a possible resolution. But you have put your finger on one of our major problems--and that is direct or implied linkage between the Gulf and the other disputes in the region. And that we have declared is not acceptable.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Direct or implied linkage will be unacceptable?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, you know, as I say, we're working, and we'll see how it comes out. But what I'm saying is that, for us, the issue of linkage is an important issue.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Let me ask you another question again related to Israel, since Prime Minister Shamir will be here on Tuesday.

There's been a great deal of ambiguity since the beginning of this crisis about coordination between the United States and Israel, if a war were to begin. I wonder if you could clarify for us--if Iraq were to initiate a war by attacking Israel, would the United States consider that a casus belli, and immediately respond with its forces in the Middle East today?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not going to say precisely what would or would not be a casus belli. But I think offensive, serious offensive action by Iraq, we would take very, very seriously.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Very, very seriously?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Wherever the, if you will, break-out occurred--absolutely.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Do you think--sorry, go ahead, David.

MR. BRODER: General, as I'm sure you noticed when the Iraqi leader made his announcement about the release of hostages, he tied it to the statements and expressions from the Senate Democrats. Is what's going on in Congress interfering with the conduct of foreign policy by the president?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What's going on in Congress is the American practice. This is the way we debate; this is the way we make up our minds; this is the way we decide things. Whether it is the most effective or not the most effective way to conduct foreign policy is almost beside the point, David.

You know, what we are trying to demonstrate right now to Saddam Hussein is that he is, in a way, at the moment of truth. The world community has spoken--he has to get out, and he has to get out by January 15th. We're underscoring that by moving more forces in. We are trying to convince him that he can't play games, that time is not on his side. And, you know, whatever--whatever kinds of things indicate to him that maybe that may not be true are not helpful; but I certainly would not criticize what is going on in the U.S. Congress.

MR. BRODER: There are reports on Capitol Hill that the president may invite Tareq Aziz to meet with members of Congress, if and when he comes here; and perhaps even invite some members of Congress to join Mr. Baker on the delegation to Baghdad, if that should happen.

Is that correct?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not that I know of--although, you know, if members of Congress and the Iraqi foreign minister would like to meet, we would not have a problem with that. But I would not imagine that there would be congressional members with Secretary Baker. That is, at least, not the usual practice.

MR. UTLEY: President Bush yesterday, of course, welcomed the hostages being freed coming home. He said that is one less worry he has. He also said that we are not necessarily any closer to peace.

The fact that the hostages will no longer be there, does that mean in some ways perhaps we could be closer to war because there is that one less worry?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't say that it's closer or farther away, Garrick. I think what it does is remove one terrible burden on the president, and that is a concern for those hostages and how to deal with them in terms of our overall policy. And I think the president was expressing that aspect of it.

But I think the hostage release may be the first indication, though, that our policy of steadily increasing pressure may be working. I don't know. This is one of the first movements that he's made in a long--in a long period of time.

MR. UTLEY: All right. Let's look ahead. If Saddam Hussein decides to get out of Kuwait, pull his forces back, the crisis is defused. Would that be the end of the situation, the problem, for us? Or would we want to maintain pressure--sanctions, perhaps--on Iraq until we are sure that there are guarantees in place that Iraq would not be a military threat in the future, even after they leave Kuwait?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, that certainly would not be the end of the situation--nor even of the crisis very broadly, if I read--

MR. UTLEY: It would continue?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Of course. We still have big problems with Iraq. We had them before. Simply complying with the U.N. resolutions would not remove all the problems we have.

He's demonstrated that he is a ruthless dictator. He has been moving in an area of vital interests to the United States in a very defining moment in world history. So, no, we would still have some things we had to do.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Brent, the president suggested yesterday that one of the reasons we've closed the embassy in Kuwait is because we wanted to get these people out of harm's way--the United States wanted to get its embassy staff out of Kuwait before a war, to put it bluntly.

Are we considering also closing the American embassy in Baghdad?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't think so, I don't think so. You know, I think that we do have--the Kuwait embassy is a particular problem because of what he's done to Kuwait and the fact that he declared Kuwait a province of Iraq, and, therefore, diplomatic missions are no longer appropriate. That's not the case in Baghdad.

MR. FRIEDMAN: There's was a good deal of disquiet in the past ten days among many of our Arab allies who were taken by surprise by the administration's announcement that Secretary Baker was being sent to Baghdad.

Can you tell us a little bit about what the Saudis and Egyptians said to you, and what you said to them to calm their fears?

MR. SCOWCROFT: There was some surprise. I think what we said is, look, this doesn't change anything--this is a tactical move; the president cannot contemplate the use of American forces without making clear to the American people and in his own mind that he has gone the last mile, that he has

confronted directly the Iraqis and made clear that we're serious--and what he faces, if he does not comply with the U.N. resolution.

So I think that's--

MR. FRIEDMAN: Do you think they're mollified now?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think so, yes.

MR. BRODER: Let me go back to the question that Garrick raised with you. You and the president and others in the administration have raised serious concerns about the potential Iraqi nuclear threat. That's not one of the U.N. resolution demands. Is it part of our agenda? Is it part of the mission of the troops that we have in the Persian Gulf to stay there until that threat is removed?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I wouldn't--I wouldn't tie it that directly. But part of our overall problem with Iraq is their efforts to develop nuclear capability--absolutely. They have a chemical capability; they have some--or are working on a biological capability and nuclear. Those are terrible problems for us.

MR. UTLEY: But just to follow up, to tie up these loose ends, if Iraq gets out of Kuwait, there are still other items on the agenda. You said we still have to deal with those.

What would we want to see, even after an Iraqi withdrawal?

MR. SCOWCROFT: What we would want to see is his weapons of mass destruction programs, or his nuclear, biological and chemical programs, under strict international supervision so that he cannot develop that kind of capability.

MR. UTLEY: Do you think he's prepared to agree to that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We still have, you know--we still have sanctions; we still have an international community dedicated to remove the kind of aggressive threat he represents. So I think, yes, we could move on those things.

MR. UTLEY: A lot of work to be done.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. UTLEY: General Scowcroft, thank you very much for being with us this morning.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, Garrick.

MR. UTLEY: Next, the Iraqi view. Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations--Amir al-Anbari. We'll be right back.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: We've just heard the administration view of what will or should happen next in the Gulf crisis. Now David Broder, Tom Friedman and I are talking with Iraq's representative to the United Nations--Ambassador Amir al-Anbari, who is in New York City this morning.

Good morning, Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: Good morning to you. I am very glad to be with you from New York.

MR. UTLEY: Happy that you are with us this morning.

You just heard General Scowcroft talking about this dispute over the dates when Secretary Baker should go to Baghdad. Your government wants him to come not until the 12th of January--three days before the January 15th U.N. deadline. He says Baker should come no later than the 3rd of January.

Is this going to be resolved?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: Yes, indeed. I believe this is a marginal issue; it's a minute one. And it is more of a technical and practical one rather than anything relating to the intention or the objective of the negotiation.

As you know, our foreign minister, right after he returns from Washington--of course, I don't know how long he'll be staying in Washington, he had to meet with the president of the European Community in Rome. And this might take a few more days--and then again, to go to Baghdad, report, you know, about his findings to the president, to the leadership. And this is why we suggested the first date.

However, if it's not suitable to the secretary of state or the United States, I believe it should be no problem to find a more suitable date.

MR. UTLEY: Do you think a more suitable date could be, from the Iraqi viewpoint, could be as early as the 3rd of January, say?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: I wouldn't exclude that.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you could clarify something for us now. The United States has offered to send Secretary Baker to Baghdad. It's taken several of our Arab allies by surprise.

Can you tell us--you know, there's an old saying in the Middle East that all roads lead to the bazaar--have some of your Arab neighbors--the Saudis and Egyptians who are now aligned against you--also sent out feelers to Baghdad to indicate they might be interested in sending an envoy or talking themselves and not just depending on the United States?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: No. Well, you know, the United States not only imposed the economic embargo on Iraq; it also imposed a dialogue embargo on Iraq. And this is why none of the Arab allies of the United States dared to try to reach Iraq or contact them because they were under such order.

However, that is why they were surprised to see that the United States, which asked them not to get into any sort of contacts or dialogue, asking for one.

MR. FRIEDMAN: But you're saying up to now none of these other Arab countries have contacted you, trying to open line of communications themselves?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: To my knowledge, no. Perhaps-- definitely not direct; but perhaps there have been some indirect contacts.

MR. BRODER: Mr. Ambassador, many of the people in this country are interpreting your government's decision to release all the hostages as a sign that the pressure, both military and economic, is really beginning to work, and that your government has blinked, and now we can expect further concessions. Is that correct?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: No, it's not correct. Whatever Iraq does in terms of good-will gesture or in terms of peaceful steps, it's interpreted by the cynics in this country as a cynical manipulation.

We had to keep foreigners in our country as something like the lesser of the two evils. We were expecting a surprise attack for our cities and our military bases, industrial plants. And this is why we thought perhaps some foreigners would prevent such an attack. And, to us, in a way, they did serve this peaceful purpose.

And now we are in a better shape to resist any aggression.

MR. BRODER: But you've heard President Bush himself say that this removes one obstacle to his possible decision to launch military operations against your country. Haven't you, in fact, made it easier for him to go to the war option?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: Well, frankly, I'm a bit saddened to hear the president of the United States say that. Particularly he mentioned at the beginning of his election that he would have-- try to have a kinder and gentler administration.

How about the millions of the Arab population in Iraq and in the region? And how about the tens of thousands of American soldiers and other allied soldiers? Aren't they humans and should also be considered, that they should be protected?

MR. UTLEY: Mr. Ambassador, just a moment ago, turning to the U.S.-Iraqi relations directly, we heard General Scowcroft say that even if Iraq pulls out of Kuwait and fulfills the remaining U.N. resolutions, there are other issues to discuss--namely, guarantees that Iraq will never again be a military threat to the other Arab neighboring countries.

Is that something that you would accept as part of the agenda after a pull-out?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: Well, I would like to make two points clear. First, up to now, most people in this country have been talking about two alternatives, or two options--war or sanctions. Actually, neither one is sort of a viable option. The only viable option would be simply genuine negotiation between United States and Iraq.

However, if the United States would like to impose unacceptable conditions, we simply would not accept. I believe the United States goes to war--and I just read an article in the current issue of Nation attributed to Marine Colonel Carl (inaudible) saying that the lethality of a single day in the

Gulf war would overshadow the lethality of the whole Vietnamese war. That means, any war would make really that region of the world simply hell--and perhaps also the rest of the globe into a blockade--into, sorry, a crisis which I don't know whether we will recover from it or not.

MR. UTLEY: Well, Mr. Ambassador, I want to follow up on this point. If Iraq withdraws from Kuwait, are you prepared to discuss guarantees that would limit Iraq's war-making potential in the future?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: Well, for a long time before the beginning of the crisis, we said we are ready to consider--and I believe Secretary Baker did allude to this a few days ago--if it's on a regional basis. But if it's just against Iraq, singling out Iraq, it is simply not acceptable.

MR. FRIEDMAN: Mr. Ambassador, since the president announced the mission of Secretary Baker to Baghdad and the invitation of your foreign minister to Washington, there seems to be, at least by one interpretation, a kind of shadow negotiation going on already between us and Iraq. We announce this overture; Iraq releases hostages; we move at the United States at least to consider a resolution on a peace conference; Iraq feeds our embassy in Kuwait.

I wonder if you could clarify for us--are we seeing the beginning of negotiations? Has the bazaar opened, or not?

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: Well, I believe the president had taken a step in the right direction, and we immediately responded positively. And I believe had we started on this course earlier in the crisis, perhaps by now we would have settled quite a lot of issues involved, if not a final issue or a final settlement.

So you are right in the sense that both parties and the rest of the world are hoping that we are approaching a peaceful settlement.

MR. UTLEY: Ambassador al-Anbari, thank you very much for being with us this morning from New York City.

AMBASSADOR al-ANBARI: Thank you; it's my pleasure.

MR. UTLEY: In a moment, David Broder, Tom Friedman and I will be back with some personal observations.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: We're back now here on "Meet the Press."

Tom and David, two things seemed to come out of the two interviews this morning. The Iraqis apparently will give on that January 12th date. The talks between Baker and Saddam will take place probably in early January. And General Scowcroft said even if the Iraqis get out of Kuwait, there are other big issues; the pressure will be kept on in terms of Iraqis' military might.

Are we really getting into negotiations now, Tom?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Garrick, I'm not sure the bazaar is open yet, but the shopkeepers are

definitely jingling for their keys and clearing out the cash registers.

I think what we're seeing right now is all of the fall-out from the decision of the president to send Baker to Baghdad--a decision that, as far as we understand, was taken primarily for domestic political reasons to prove to the American public that the administration is going the extra mile to avert a war.

MR. UTLEY: Is that a good enough reason, in your view, to go there--for primarily domestic reasons?

MR. FRIEDMAN: Well, I think it's a legitimate reason; but it definitely is going to complicate the diplomacy. When that U.N. resolution was passed authorizing the use of force, the administration, for the first time, had really presented a clear choice--a simple choice--to Saddam Hussein: stay in Kuwait and die; leave and live.

The next day, by offering to send Baker to Baghdad, the president immediately muddied the waters. It's like we had a clear shot one day, and the next day it was like an arcade game where all kinds of people are getting in the way.

MR. UTLEY: But, David, of course, it's not that simple because there is domestic public opinion.

MR. BRODER: Of course, there is. And I would have to disagree from the domestic perspective with what Tom said because I think the offer of direct talks has achieved something significant here at home.

First of all, it has led apparently to the release of the hostages, which is a major achievement for success for the administration policy. But Tom is right, I think, that it makes it far more difficult, along with these clear signals coming from Capitol Hill, for the administration really to threaten the war option.

MR. UTLEY: So when you add it up, the events of this past week--the Baker mission, our hostages being freed--did Bush come out ahead or behind, stronger or weaker, from your two different perspectives--David?

MR. BRODER: I think he's stronger now; and I think the prospects of success are greater.

MR. UTLEY: That's domestically speaking?

MR. BRODER: Yes.

MR. UTLEY: Tom, in terms of the international scene?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I think he's far weaker internationally. I think he's going to have a very difficult time keeping our Arab allies on board up through January 15th. And I think he's got his work cut out for him.

MR. UTLEY: Tom, David, thanks very much for your different perspectives, for being here this

morning on "Meet the Press."

To sum up where we are or where we appear to be now, the events of these past few days have answered one question at least--that is whether Saddam Hussein is a rational human being or a mad man bent on destroying everything rather than conceding anything. His decision to free the hostages shows that he is rational, prepared to cut the best deal he can. We may breathe a little easier because of that. But now that we know what we face or whom we face, there are new traps for George Bush, as we've been discussing.

Talk, talk, it has been said, is better than war, war. But if Saddam can keep the president and Secretary of State Baker talking from now through March, he knows there is a good chance there will be no war. And after that, he may not be interested in talking any more.

What is George Bush to do? It is possible--even likely--that at some point in the coming weeks, the president will feel he has to set another deadline--perhaps even issue an ultimatum to Saddam to cut the talk and get out of Kuwait. If not, his policy, his very credibility, could be pulled down into the verbal quicksand of the Middle East.

So any relief over the hostages coming home today, tomorrow, in the coming weeks, could be limited. The real heart-stopping moments and decisions are still to come for Saddam Hussein, George Bush--for all of us.

I'm Garrick Utley. I hope you'll join us this evening for "NBC Nightly News," and again next week for "Sunday Today" and "Meet the Press."

White House's Most Frequent Flier

By Gaylord Shaw

WASHINGTON BUREAU CHIEF

Washington — America's have-plane-will-travel president is back from a 12,000-mile journey to South America, a five-nation tour that carved a few more notches in his diplomatic holster and added millions of dollars to a growing White House travel tab being picked up by the taxpayers.

The weeklong trip brought to more than 275,000 the number of miles Bush has traveled aboard Air Force One since taking office less than 23 months ago, a pace that promises to make him the most-traveled president in history. His plane has touched down in foreign countries 30 times, and he has visited all but five of the 50 states, a travel tempo far outdistancing his predecessor, Ronald Reagan. And, in less than two years, he has nearly equaled the 308,402 miles logged by Dwight Eisenhower in his entire eight years in office.

Even with the continuing Persian Gulf crisis, Bush shows no signs of slacking off in his burgeoning foreign travel. Under tentative White House plans, he is to visit the Soviet Union, Turkey and Greece in January; and Japan, Korea, Australia and perhaps other Pacific nations during February. With the latter trip, he will have visited every continent except Antarctica since becoming president.

"Antarctica? Heck, we could do that in a day trip. Then we'd have been to every one," smiled a White House staffer all too familiar with Bush's travel habits.

Even as he plans a heavy foreign travel schedule for early next year, however, there are signs that Bush's

pell-mell pace is taking its toll — at least on some of those who usually travel with him. First Lady Barbara Bush, for instance, skipped last week's trip to Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela, citing a sinus condition aggravated by "going up and down in airplanes." She had accompanied her husband on his six-nation swing through Europe and the Middle East during Thanksgiving week after visiting more than a score of U.S. cities as she campaigned for Republican candidates. She also was with the president in September when he logged a 20-hour round-trip flight to meet for a few hours in Helsinki, Finland, with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. And late last month she joined Bush on a two-day journey to Mexico.

Two of Bush's top advisers, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, also remained in Washington last week, sending aides in their stead. There are hints that Bush has decided to scale back travel that might be classified as vacations. For instance, this year he has canceled his annual post-Christmas quail hunting trip to Beeville, Texas. "The problem with Beeville is that it is fairly remote," White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said.

Another problem, left unspoken by Fitzwater, is the political and public relations fallout from images of a commander-in-chief vacationing during a crisis — images that haunted Bush's August vacation in Kennebunkport, Maine, soon after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait triggered the still-bubbling Persian Gulf crisis.

With the deployment of U.S. combat troops in the region soon to reach 400,000, and with Bush's diplomatic initiative about to yield face-to-face talks with Iraqi leaders, Fitzwater said, "it is not an easy time to be traveling." Ironically, this comment came in Santiago, Chile, on Thursday night even as the traveling president and his entourage were scrambling to assess Saddam Hussein's announced decision to free western hostages in Iraq and Kuwait.

In the view of travel-weary White House staffers, Bush's penchant for frequent flying has only been

Jet-Setting President

President George Bush is eclipsing records for presidential travel. In his 22½ months in office, according to White House and Newsday counts, he has:

- Traveled about 275,000 miles, aboard Air Force One.
- Spent approximately 730 hours aloft on Air Force One, or the equivalent of nearly 20 typical (37½-hour) work weeks.
- Visited 28 foreign countries. Five of them (Belgium, Canada, England, France and Germany)

he has visited twice.

- Traveled to 45 of the 50 states (he hasn't been yet to West Virginia, Utah, Nevada, Arizona, Arkansas).
- Visited 117 U.S. cities, 27 more than once.
- Made 11 visits to Kennebunkport, Maine, where his summer home is located. Other cities on the most frequently visited list: New York, 8 times; Houston, 8; Baltimore and Los Angeles, 7 each; San Francisco, 6; Miami and Chicago, 4 each.

FREQUENT FLIER... CONTINUED

accelerated by the delivery in September of the new Air Force One, a sleek and spacious 747 that replaces a 25-year-old 707 as the mainstay of the presidential fleet.

"Have plane, will travel," Bush told reporters with a grin during the maiden flight of the \$181.5-million plane built by Boeing under a contract negotiated during the Reagan administration. From the outside, the plane resembles the 747s in commercial service. But inside, it has a stunning array of gadgets and luxuries — everything from a fold-down presidential bed to leather swivel chairs emblazoned with the presidential seal to a bathroom with a presidential shower to a conference room big enough for half the president's Cabinet.

Bush has no trouble sleeping on planes — even during landings and take-offs. Thus, his foreign travel invariably includes overnight legs. The latest example was his flight last Sunday night from Washington to Brazil — he left the White House soon after dinner and landed in Brasilia at dawn. He arrived in Brazil appearing refreshed. Red-eyed, others on the plane's manifest wearily tried to keep up with him during a long day of meetings, motorcades and speeches.

The White House declines to provide a comprehensive accounting of the costs of Bush's travel, but some

indications of the tab can be gleaned from various sources. The Air Force, for instance, estimates that the hourly operating costs of a 707 is \$5,287. Since Bush was aloft 3,576 hours in logging 1.3 million miles as vice president, the bare-bones cost in those two terms exceeds \$18.5 million.

But Air Force One's fuel bills are but a small portion of the costs of presidential travel. A back-up plane, usually a fully equipped 707, follows Air Force One to every stop. Big military transport planes, usually C5s, haul presidential limousines to every city Bush visits. Six limousines were flown to South America along with an equal number of Secret Service vehicles.

On longer trips, C5s also ferry military helicopters for use by the president and his entourage. Normally, these are Marine Corps helicopters. But for the South American trip, so many helicopters were needed that the Army had to be enlisted to help. It supplied at least a half-dozen Blackhawk helicopters from bases in Washington State, California and Panama.

Hundreds of government personnel travel with, or in advance of, the president. This contingent includes scores of Secret Service agents, dozen of secretaries and such support personnel as the technicians who set up and operate the teleprompter Bush normally uses in his speeches. There's even a government-hired television crew that records every public appearance made by Bush.

WASHINGTON POST

December 12, 1990

Pg. 26

A Revised Space Program

THE SPACE program has been the subject of much dispute ever since the end of the Apollo program that put men on the moon. Its goals have been ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. Particularly in recent years, its undertakings have been more ambitious than its budget. Its reputation for flawless execution has also been compromised. The investigations that followed the Challenger disaster showed that, contrary to widespread assumption, NASA had long had major defects in its technical and administrative procedures. The Hubble telescope setback this year reinforced the sense that the agency had lost its edge.

For a series of interconnected reasons, from its scientific value to its effect on national prestige, the space program is too important to be abandoned. Yet it is also too important—and too large a budget item—to be left in its current state. A White House advisory commission drawn largely from the space establishment has now issued what is meant to be a clarifying and restorative report. The report's every recommendation is unlikely to be followed. But if its example is followed, in that the goals of the program are rethought, it will have proved a useful document.

It urges that scientific research become the emphasis and rationale of the program; there are suggestions that this will be easier if and as the program's semi-military applications fade. The program should be used on "missions to and from planet Earth," in roughly that order—to study and monitor the global climate and environmental change while gradually preparing on the basis of "go as you pay" for a manned mission to Mars. In pursuing both objectives the panel suggests it will be possible to rely less on the space shuttle (by using more unmanned rockets to launch cargoes into space) and to scale back the proposed space station, the purpose of which has never been as clear as its likely cost.

The immediate goals of the space program would be less elaborate than now, but more feasible and clearly useful. Even so the panel looks to a budget expanding at a rate of 10 percent a year after inflation; for the next few years, at least, that is unlikely. The panel proposes a scaled-down space program that would be focused and affordable without renouncing the long-term goal of manned space exploration. That seems about right.

Bush to aim at Hill doves

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Bush administration this week is launching a counteroffensive to congressional attacks the White House feels have diluted its hard-line message to Iraq.

Setting the stage for diplomatic meetings in Washington next week, President Bush and his top aides will also send new and stronger signals of war to Iraq, according to officials familiar with the anti-Iraq strategy.

The strategy springs out of a renewed effort to keep the interna-

tional coalition against Iraq intact as the United Nations' Jan. 15 deadline approaches for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, officials said.

"There will be a strong effort to get the administration's word out" and cool congressional criticism, said an administration official. "The president is not going to let up" on his criticism of Iraq's Aug. 2 blitzkrieg of Kuwait, the official said.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft were dispatched to TV studios yesterday to promote the White House position. Both said the administration remains insistent that some 500,000 Iraqi troops leave Kuwait.

Vice President Dan Quayle, meanwhile, will tell the Republican Governor's Association today that Congress must shed its call for continued diplomatic actions and back the administration's efforts. Mr. Quayle, who recently led the administration's call for a quick end to the crisis for "moral" reasons, is expected to attack Congress for appearing wishy-washy.

"He's going to urge more congressional support," said an administration official.

While officials have publicly welcomed congressional debate on the Gulf policies — mainly at hearings held by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn — privately they are angry, convinced the hearings have sent a mixed message of American resolve to both Iraq and U.S. allies.

The administration "is going to make a new effort to explain why we are there," said another official, who expressed hope that Mr. Nunn would end his call for 18 months of diplomacy before war.

The scramble to quell domestic criticism comes as Mr. Bush asks the Soviet Union and Israel to continue supporting American threats of war, officials said.

The president will meet Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze Wednesday to get President Mikhail Gorbachev's input on the tone the White House should take when Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz comes to the Oval Office next Monday, officials said. The Soviets recently endorsed Mr. Bush's call for the possible use of force against Iraq.

Tomorrow, Mr. Bush plans to thank Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir for his country's low profile during the crisis, officials said. Hard-liners in Israel have urged a swift military strike against Baghdad and Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapon facilities.

The strategy of turning up the international heat on Mr. Hussein is in part aimed at quieting rumors in London and Washington that the White House is cutting a deal with Baghdad in return for release of American hostages, officials said. They said they also want to mute criticism of their decision to evacuate the American Embassy in Kuwait.

But a dispute has opened in the administration among officials who fear that the abandonment of the embassy does concede defeat. "It's going to make things tough" trying to persuade the public that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait is crucial to American policy and Western security, said a senior administration official.

But another senior official said the removal of the hostages will make it easier to go to war because there will be no threat of accidentally killing American "human shields" or of Iraq executing hostages.

Mr. Bush will emphasize that this week.

Iraqi Signals Willingness To Hold Meeting Sooner

By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Staff Writer

Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations yesterday signaled his country's willingness to accommodate U.S. demands for a meeting between Secretary of State James A. Baker III and President Saddam Hussein earlier than the Jan. 12 date Iraq had insisted on.

The United States has argued that Jan. 12 is too close to the Jan. 15 deadline by which the United Nations said Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait or face possible military action.

Baker, meanwhile, foreshadowed a long-term U.S. military role in the Persian Gulf—even after Iraq withdraws from Kuwait—citing the continuing need for multinational forces to "contain" Saddam and "create a new world order ... based on international law and not international outlaws."

Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir Anbari, appearing on NBC News's "Meet the Press," said he "wouldn't exclude" a U.S. proposal to hold the meeting between Baker and Saddam Hussein as early as Jan. 3, which Baker has said is the latest acceptable date for such a meeting.

A senior Bush administration official said that if Iraq gives way on the timing of Baker's mission, the White House would be ready to host a two-day visit by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz Dec. 17. That meeting would be the first leg of high-level talks initiated by President Bush 10 days ago in an effort, he said, to "go the extra mile for peace."

The official said Baker then would be sent to Baghdad between Jan. 3 and Jan. 12.

Baker, in a separate interview on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley," insisted that anytime later than Jan. 3 is "unacceptable." In that interview, in which he apparently was unaware of Anbari's remarks, Baker said Saddam was "playing games" and trying to delay the U.N. deadline by proposing a

meeting three days before he is supposed to withdraw 500,000 troops from Kuwait.

"We will not be a party to circumventing the Jan. 15 deadline in the United Nations resolution," Baker said.

Baker, for the first time projecting future U.S. military presence after an Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, said the multinational force would still be needed to "guard against" Saddam's "disproportionate military power" and the "possible use of his weapons of mass destruction."

"We have a substantial ability to maintain security by virtue of our multinational presence in the area," said Baker, referring to the U.S.-led international force of more than 550,000 assembling in the region.

Asked whether the United States could hold together the multinational coalition if Saddam complied with the U.N. resolution, Baker replied, "Sufficiently to contain him."

Baker emphasized that the United States would not interfere in efforts by Saddam to resolve his "differences" with Kuwait once he pulls back his occupying forces. But he noted that far from being bullied by its stronger neighbor, Kuwait would "have on its side during the course of any discussions that might follow the entire multinational consensus that has supported it so far."

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft added that even with an Iraqi withdrawal, "terrible problems" for the United States would remain because of Saddam's possession of chemical weapons and efforts to develop a nuclear capability.

Scowcroft, also appearing on "Meet the Press," called for "strict international supervision" of the Iraqi arsenal to prevent Saddam from developing an even more dangerous military capability.

Scowcroft and Baker said the administration rejects any suggestion of "linkage" between efforts to solve the gulf crisis and a pending U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an international peace conference to settle Israeli-Palestinian problems.

The Washington Post A21
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 10 DEC 1990

Saddam has repeatedly tried to link resolution of the gulf conflict to the Palestinian issue.

Baker said that while such a conference, "properly structured, at an appropriate time, might be useful," Washington opposes it now because it would "establish linkage."

Scowcroft added that the "major problem" with the resolution is "direct or implied linkage between the gulf and other disputes in the region. And that, we have declared, is not acceptable."

He said a U.S. veto would be made easier because some Arab allies do not want Saddam to take credit for the resolution.

Staff writer David S. Broder contributed to this report.

U.S. Accuses Iraq of Trying to Delay Baker's Visit

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

HOUSTON, Dec. 9 — The Bush Administration today accused President Saddam Hussein of Iraq of trying to delay his meeting with Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d as long as possible to give Baghdad an excuse for not withdrawing from Kuwait by the Jan. 15 United Nations deadline.

The Iraqis have told the State Department that because of President Hussein's busy schedule he cannot see Mr. Baker until Jan. 12. That is only three days before the deadline set by the United Nations Security Council for Iraqi troops to be out of Kuwait or be evicted by force. The Americans have suggested that the meeting be held no later than Jan. 3, because if it is delayed much beyond that Iraq will be able to argue that it has not been given enough time to prepare its withdrawal.

"We will not be party to circumventing the Jan. 15 deadline in the United Nations resolution," Mr. Baker said in an interview on the ABC News program "This Week." Mr. Baker then flew here, where he will hold three days of talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

"We will not be a party to playing games that back us right up to that deadline," Mr. Baker said. "After all, this resolution talks about his withdrawing his forces from Kuwait, something that he cannot do in just a matter of hours with 500,000 dug-in troops in Kuwait." It is important, said Mr. Baker, "that we have this discussion and that we have it reasonably early."

Iraq's Ambassador to the United Nations, Amir al-Anbari, said in an interview on the NBC News program "Meet the Press" that it "should not be a problem to find a more suitable date." He offered no suggestions, however.

American officials said that despite Mr. Anbari's remarks there was no word from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry about any earlier dates that might be available. The American chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, Joe Wilson, was ordered to convey Mr. Baker's remarks to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry today.

A Tug-of-War

Ever since President Bush announced on Nov. 30 that he was inviting Iraq's Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to meet him in Washington and that he was sending Mr. Baker to Baghdad for talks with the Iraqi President, Washington and Baghdad have been engaged in a behind-the-scenes tug-of-war over the dates. The real issue is not one of conflicting schedules, but of conflicting strategies.

The United States first proposed that Mr. Aziz meet President Bush on Dec. 15 and that Mr. Baker go to Baghdad on either Dec. 20, 21 or 22, or Jan. 3. The Iraqis countered on Saturday that Mr. Aziz would go to Washington on Dec. 17 and that Mr. Baker would go to Baghdad on Jan. 12.

American officials said they chose their dates because they assumed that if Mr. Baker went to Baghdad, where his only mission is supposed to be to present to President Hussein the stark choices of withdrawal from Kuwait or war, the Iraqi leader would respond with a vague counteroffer.

Credibility a Worry

For instance, officials suggest, Mr. Hussein could say that Iraq is developing some new diplomatic ideas of its own on how to resolve the crisis, but that it needs a few more weeks to complete them.

If Mr. Baker goes to Baghdad on Jan. 3, that would still give him time to say to Mr. Hussein that Iraq can have a few more days to present its ideas, but it must meet the Jan. 15 deadline.

If Mr. Baker were to go Baghdad on Jan. 12, and the Iraqi leader appealed for a few more weeks or even days, it could prove very difficult for the Bush Administration to say no. And Administration officials say they fear that once they become a party to officially letting the Jan. 15 deadline slip, by even a day, its credibility will be lost.

The national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said on "Meet the Press" that Jan. 12 "is too late," but he declined to say that the Administration would cancel the proposed talks if Iraq did not agree to an earlier date.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times A12
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 10 Dec 1990

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By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Staff Writer

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Baker, meanwhile, foreshadowed a long-term U.S. military role in the Persian Gulf—even after Iraq withdraws from Kuwait—citing the continuing need for multinational forces to “contain” Saddam and “create a new world order . . . based on international law and not international outlaws.”

Iraqi Ambassador Abdul Amir Anbari, appearing on NBC News's “Meet the Press,” said he “wouldn't exclude” a U.S. proposal to hold the meeting between Baker and Saddam Hussein as early as Jan. 3, which Baker has said is the latest acceptable date for such a meeting.

A senior Bush administration official said that if Iraq gives way on the timing of Baker's mission, the White House would be ready to host a two-day visit by Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz Dec. 17. That meeting would be the first leg of high-level talks initiated by President Bush 10 days ago in an effort, he said, to “go the extra mile for peace.”

The official said Baker then would be sent to Baghdad between Jan. 3 and Jan. 12.

Baker, in a separate interview on ABC's “This Week With David Brinkley,” insisted that anytime later than Jan. 3 is “unacceptable.” In that interview, in which he apparently was unaware of Anbari's remarks, Baker said Saddam was “playing games” and trying to delay the U.N. deadline by proposing a

meeting three days before he is supposed to withdraw 500,000 troops from Kuwait.

“We will not be a party to circumventing the Jan. 15 deadline in the United Nations resolution,” Baker said.

Baker, for the first time projecting future U.S. military presence after an Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, said the multinational force would still be needed to “guard against” Saddam's “disproportionate military power” and the “possible use of his weapons of mass destruction.”

“We have a substantial ability to maintain security by virtue of our multinational presence in the area,” said Baker, referring to the U.S.-led international force of more than 550,000 assembling in the region.

Asked whether the United States could hold together the multinational coalition if Saddam complied with the U.N. resolution, Baker replied, “Sufficiently to contain him.”

Baker emphasized that the United States would not interfere in efforts by Saddam to resolve his “differences” with Kuwait once he pulls back his occupying forces. But he noted that far from being bullied by its stronger neighbor, Kuwait would “have on its side during the course of any discussions that might follow the entire multinational consensus that has supported it so far.”

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft added that even with an Iraqi withdrawal, “terrible problems” for the United States would remain because of Saddam's possession of chemical weapons and efforts to develop a nuclear capability.

Scowcroft, also appearing on “Meet the Press,” called for “strict international supervision” of the Iraqi arsenal to prevent Saddam from developing an even more dangerous military capability.

Scowcroft and Baker said the administration rejects any suggestion of “linkage” between efforts to solve the gulf crisis and a pending U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an international peace conference to settle Israeli-Palestinian problems.

The Washington Post A21
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 10 DEC 1990

Saddam has repeatedly tried to link resolution of the gulf conflict to the Palestinian issue.

Baker said that while such a conference, “properly structured, at an appropriate time, might be useful,” Washington opposes it now because it would “establish linkage.”

Scowcroft added that the “major problem” with the resolution is “direct or implied linkage between the gulf and other disputes in the region. And that, we have declared, is not acceptable.”

He said a U.S. veto would be made easier because some Arab allies do not want Saddam to take credit for the resolution.

Staff writer David S. Broder
contributed to this report.

Notes and Comment

FOR almost four months, the United States has been sleepwalking toward war. Though there are the trappings of a debate—hearings in Congress, argument and speculation on the editorial pages, discussion on the public-affairs programs—thus far they have seemed insubstantial when set against the reality of President Bush's military buildup. Since early August, the Administration has pushed inexorably forward, assembling a vast American Army in the Saudi Arabian desert and bringing it steadily closer to combat. Not until early November, when the President's decision to send two hundred thousand additional troops made war seem suddenly more real, did the American people and their representatives in Congress, like drugged patients struggling to shake off sleep, begin to raise objections. Weren't the troops there to protect Saudi Arabia? By sending so many more, hadn't the Administration made it difficult to maintain the Army over the months it would take for sanctions to work? The Administration's response to these and other questions has done little to encourage the sort of vigorous debate that should precede the decision of a democracy to go to war; rather, President Bush and his aides have been doing their utmost to put the patients back to sleep.

From the beginning, President Bush's policy in the Gulf—recently described by Brent Scowcroft, the national-security adviser, as an effort to avoid war by confronting Saddam Hussein with "the prospect of war"—was better suited to a dictatorship than to a democracy. For the policy to have a chance of working, the United States had to show itself absolutely determined to go to war if Hussein did not unconditionally withdraw from Kuwait. The President, preoccupied with showing such resolution himself as he spent his days conferring with world leaders, seemed to take it for granted that the American people would follow along. Indeed, he has often appeared eager to avoid any debate whatever, seeking to calm Americans by telling them that he hasn't made up his mind, while at the same time building up

United States forces and threatening Iraq with attack.

As opinion polls have shown Americans growing steadily more skeptical about the President's course, he has made increasingly impatient, and even irritated, attempts to rally them—or, rather, to quiet them. Though some critics complain that the President has not "made the case" for war, he has in fact made too many cases, like a salesman trying ever more farfetched pitches to sell a product that unaccountably won't move off the shelves. In August, he warned that the invasion of Kuwait put the American "way of life" at risk; in October, having apparently concluded that the economic argument might not convince enough Americans, he began emphasizing the need to confront "naked aggression." When his November decision to send the additional troops was greeted with criticism, he changed tack again. "Every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear-weapons arsenal," he told the troops on Thanksgiving. "And that's why, more and more, your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency." No evidence was offered for this newly heightened "urgency," however, and most experts still contend, as they have from the beginning of the crisis, that Iraq would need at the very least a year, and more likely five or ten years, to produce a usable nuclear device. What *had* changed, it soon became evident, was the market research: two days before Mr. Bush's speech, the *Times* had published a poll suggesting that the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq was what now most worried Americans.

Disturbing though it is to see our President market war like a breakfast cereal, the implications of Mr. Bush's behavior for democratic government are more disturbing still. After several prominent senators publicly questioned the President's decision to nearly double the number of American troops in the Gulf without consulting Congress, he confronted them with excerpts from Iraqi newspapers quoting their remarks, and charged that by speaking out the senators had undermined his policy. The details of that meeting were immediately leaked, apparently with the aim of conveying the message that

elected officials who dared to speak out against war could be publicly branded as willing to give aid and comfort to the enemy. And by maintaining that he had still not made up his mind whether or not to go to war, the President managed to blunt an attempt by Congress to organize a special session to debate a declaration of war. Congress, apparently relieved to be able to avoid debating what Representative Les Aspin called "hypothetical situations," decided that it would just hold hearings.

However welcome the hearings, Congress's retreat allowed the President to push forward with actions—deploying the additional two hundred thousand troops and securing a United Nations ultimatum that Iraq must relinquish Kuwait by January 15th—that have severely circumscribed this country's options: not only will it be extremely difficult to maintain such a huge force long enough for sanctions to accomplish their purpose but if the U.N. deadline that the Administration worked so hard for comes and goes and the United States does not attack Iraq, its inaction will be widely perceived as a miserable retreat.

Now, after rendering the sanctions policy difficult, if not impossible, to maintain, the President apparently hopes to confront Congress with a fait accompli. While making his perfunctory attempts to build domestic support, he was intensively lobbying the Security Council, and he clearly plans to use his hard-won resolution to pressure the members of Congress. A senior White House official told the *Washington Post*, "It would be hard for them to say they won't go along with what the international community agrees is needed." (Of course, for all the talk of a "coalition," no member of the "international community" has deployed more than a small fraction of the men and arms the United States now has in the Gulf.) Mr. Bush has just recently promised to "consult the extra mile" with Congress, declaring himself "ready" for Congress to "endorse what the President of the United States has done and what the United Nations Security Council has done." But he also says, "What I don't want to do is have it come back and end up where you have four hundred thirty-five

NOTES...CONTINUED

voices in one house and a hundred in the other saying what *not* to do, and saying kind of a hand-wringing operation that would send bad signals."

Having demanded that Congress either endorse his actions or keep quiet, Mr. Bush announced that he was sending Secretary of State Baker to see Saddam Hussein—not to negotiate but "to make sure he understands the commitment of the United States," and he added, "There can be no face-saving." By emphasizing the nuclear issue and bluntly stating that "the status quo ante will not be enough," the President has implied that it might not be possible to forestall war even if Hussein withdraws unconditionally from Kuwait—a step that many analysts believe would cost him his rule, and perhaps his life. Meanwhile, Hussein has given no sign of backing down. According to the *Times*, the Hussein government is stepping up its "efforts to raise the cost in casualties of any attack on its armed forces . . . by fielding a numerically superior army whose total defeat can be accomplished only through a punishing and unpredictable conflict." He

undoubtedly believes, as he told the American Ambassador a few days before invading Kuwait, that America is "a society that cannot accept ten thousand dead in one battle."

The difficulty for President Bush is that in this instance Hussein is probably right. From the beginning, the Iraqi leader has recognized what the President has willfully ignored—that lack of domestic support is his greatest weakness. Americans, whatever their fears concerning the price of oil or the danger of nuclear weapons, have given no sign that they are ready to support a bloody war to free Kuwait. But the President has declared, "This will not be another Vietnam. I will never ever agree to a halfway effort." It's ironic and worrying to hear him invoking that episode in America's history at the very moment when he is trying to ignore the country's growing division over his policy in the Gulf. As war appears to draw closer, the voices of opposition are sure to grow louder. The President may well criticize the dissent, declaring, with some reason, that it weakens his position. The problem, however, lies not with the dissent but with a policy that unwisely counted on its absence and now deplores its existence.

cans met mostly with low-level Foreign Ministry operatives, not Saddam's close advisers. In the two years that U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie served in Baghdad, her only private meeting with Saddam was the ill-fated one on July 25 when, critics say, she in effect flashed the Iraqi dictator a green light to invade Kuwait. "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait," she told him. Since the invasion, Chargé d'Affaires Joe Wilson has met but once with Saddam.

In Washington, Iraqi Ambassador Mohammad al-Mashat has met no official higher than Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

Embargo's effect: Today the United States knows plenty about what Saddam can do, but almost nothing about what he *will* do. Washington has been able to monitor Iraqi imports of sensitive nuclear technology and equipment, for example, but can only guess the direction nuclear-weapons development will take. Last week CIA Director William Webster provided the House Armed Services Committee with eye-glazing detail about the embargo's economic effects on Iraq, but had to admit, "It is more difficult to assess how and when these conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior."

NEWSWEEK

December 17, 1990

Pg. 22

'Like Working Moscow in the Old Days'

I've always preferred to make my decisions without the involvement of others. My decisions are hard, harsh, just like my desert.

—SADDAM HUSSEIN

Part windy self-promotion, part gritty political confession, these lines from an Iraqi Information Ministry biography, one of 131 official biographies, typify Saddam's attempts to cloak himself in mystery. For George Bush, dealing with Iraq's "dear leader" means penetrating the fog of legend and imagery that obscures the inner workings of this solitary ruler—something the U.S. intelligence community has largely failed to do. "We have very little intelligence about . . . his inten-

tions," says a House Intelligence Committee source. "We do have some assets in the country, but what we don't have is any kind of clear picture of his thinking."

In part, this is a result of the diplomatic rift following the Six Day War of 1967. Washington didn't resume full diplomatic ties with Baghdad until 1984, when the Reagan administration tilted toward Iraq in its war with Iran. Before, there was no embassy to provide diplomatic cover for CIA recruitment of Iraqi agents. Even then, the administration was preoccupied with Iran. It saw little reason to target a supposedly friendly country.

Americans who did try to recruit agents were no match for Saddam's East-bloc-trained counterintelligence agents.

Few CIA case officers even speak Arabic and after the gulf war ended in 1988, budget cutbacks forced the CIA to reduce its presence in Iraq, intelligence officials say. "Working Baghdad is like working Moscow in the old days," says a U.S. intelligence official. Instead, the United States specialized in satellite surveillance, which it traded to Israel for intelligence from agents on the ground. American officials grumble privately that Israel's "humint" is only marginally useful.

Despite efforts at warm diplomatic relations, Washington got little worthwhile information through formal channels. "Iraqi contacts have always been difficult for our embassy to cultivate," says one State Department official. Ameri-

American officials concede they do not even know whether Saddam takes Bush's threats of force seriously. As a religious viewer of CNN, Saddam gets plenty of news. But he reportedly surrounds himself with yes men who suppress objective readings of the news. As a result, says Jerrold Post, a psychiatrist at George Washington University who has developed a psychological profile of Saddam for the government,

"Saddam probably hears the Western words of President Bush through a Middle Eastern filter," a filter that regards the harshest threats as mere rhetoric. If so, misunderstanding prevails on both sides—and that may be the biggest threat to peace of all.

DOUGLAS WALLER in Washington

Let's hold hands?

Well, gang, there's a New Wrinkle to the ole **Brent Scowcroft**-goes-to-the-CIA-to-replace-Web-fave-**William Webster** rumor: A bit of chatter that Prez **George Bush** is contemplating putting his old friend, Ambassador to China **James R. Lilley**, into Mr. Scowcroft's place at the National Security Council.

As ya know, Mr. Scowcroft is the prez's chief hand-holder. But an ole

friend 'n' fellow ol' China hand like **Jim Lilley** might be equally comfy in the role.

The prez and Mr. Lilley, by the way, had a one-on-one chat a coupla weeks ago, but nobody knows what was discussed.

Drawback to any immediate change: A White House source told the Web that the prez simply won't make such a switch in the midst of the Gulf crisis. Something's gotta give first.

News/Opinion

WALL STREET JOURNAL

December 17, 1990

Pg. 10

Split Between Kissinger and Brzezinski on Iraq Reflects Search for New Foreign-Policy Consensus

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—Henry Kissinger foresees disaster if the U.S. waits for sanctions to drive Iraq out of Kuwait: International resolve will crumble, the military option will evaporate, Saddam Hussein will prevail. "I believe that many of those who advocate sanctions are using it as a cop-out," he declares.

Nonsense, says Zbigniew Brzezinski. Sanctions will work over time, he insists. The real disaster, he argues, would be a war. "It could be quite expensive in both money and blood."

He scoffs at Mr. Kissinger's theory that the conflict could be limited in scope, saying acidly that it "reminds me a little bit of his arguments for how to terminate the Vietnam War."



Henry Kissinger

Mr. Kissinger calls that an "unworthy comment." The real calamity, he says, would be for the U.S. to slink away, which would "undermine all friends in the area."

In the first crisis of the post-Cold War era, these two titans of the foreign-policy establishment, whose world view was usually in sync during the Cold War, are proposing diametrically opposed courses of action. Mr. Kissinger thinks the proposed diplomatic mission to Baghdad by Secretary of State James Baker—which remains unscheduled because of a U.S.-Iraqi dispute over dates—is a bad idea; Mr. Brzezinski applauds it. They disagree on the usefulness of sanctions, on how much time the administration has and on what course would leave a more stable Middle East.

Their disagreement over virtually every aspect of the showdown with Iraq symbolizes the schism dividing America's foreign policy thinkers and the country at large—a schism that has only deepened since Iraq's decision to release American hostages.

These disagreements come from two men who exercise enormous influence on official American thinking in both political parties. Mr. Kissinger, the top foreign-policy adviser to Presidents Nixon and Ford, was a mentor of Brent Scowcroft, who is now President Bush's national security ad-

viser, and Lawrence Eagleburger, the No. 2 man in the Bush State Department. White House aides say Mr. Kissinger has talked privately with Mr. Bush, and he has generally supported the administration publicly.

Mr. Brzezinski, who was President Carter's national security adviser and who has privately counseled Mr. Bush on European issues, is close to many in Congress, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D., Ga.). His views have seeped into congressional broadsides.

Mr. Brzezinski recently had a private session with Democratic Sen. Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, for instance.

Shortly afterward, the senator used statistics Mr. Brzezinski had provided on civilian casualties during the bombing of North Vietnam as ammunition against a witness testifying before the committee. The target: Mr. Kissinger.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

The two are also illustrative of the schism in the nation's opinion-making community. In Mr. Kissinger's corner are such heavyweights as former top Defense Department adviser Richard Perle and former United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. But this camp is an increasingly lonely place; Mr. Kissinger sometimes muses that his position is like Churchill's in the 1930s as he argued in vain about the dangers of Nazi Germany.

In Mr. Brzezinski's corner are such heavy hitters as former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and many former U.S. military leaders, ranging from former Joint Chiefs Chairman William Crowe to former Navy Secretary James Webb.

The split also has important long-range meaning. In the past, the foreign-policy establishment was often galvanized around a strategy designed to deter Soviet advances, but the Soviet threat is gone. "The old foreign-policy consensus built around containment and all those things that worked is no longer there, because the Soviets as a threat are gone," says Nicholas Vellotes, a foreign service officer and former assistant secretary of state.

More immediately, the debate among opinion leaders is critical to the Bush administration as the clock ticks toward the Jan. 15 deadline contained in a United Nations resolution authorizing the use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.

The debate even reflects some personal animosity. "Quite frankly, I don't think Kissinger's interested in resolving the issue," Mr. Brzezinski says. "I think Kissinger wants to destroy Iraq, period. Kuwait is just an excuse."

"A very unjust statement," counters Mr. Kissinger, who asserts he hasn't any desire to destroy Iraq, merely to see its offensive capabilities reduced. He won't detail on the record what he thinks about Mr. Brzezinski's stand.

But Mr. Kissinger argues that if the U.S. had confined itself to protecting Saudi Arabia and had left the liberation of Kuwait to the world community—"the Brzezinski option," he calls it—"it would have been a bad mistake, but a retrievable one." It didn't happen that way, though; the U.S. took the lead in pushing for liberating Kuwait and sent hundreds of thousands of troops. If the U.S. now shrinks away, he argues, "it will be perceived that the radicals faced us down, that 1,000 American hostages were taken without any consequence, that the moderate governments who bet on us would be discredited."

At the heart of the split is a dispute over whether economic sanctions can be counted on to force Iraq out of Kuwait.

Mr. Kissinger says that there's nothing even close to a guarantee they will work. Sanctions advocates "are saying that they think in 12 to 18 months sanctions will work," he says. "They have produced no evidence that this is true. . . . I have said from the beginning that time wasn't on our side. I said from the beginning that we would have to choose between sanctions and military options somewhere along the line."

Mr. Brzezinski counters that there isn't any evidence sanctions *won't* work in this case, because the sanctions on Iraq are far more severe than any ever imposed. "I think sanctions have already had a massive attriting impact on Iraq, and if maintained for a year or so they would probably bring that economy to a total standstill," he says. "So they have already established the lesson that the aggression didn't pay."

Mr. Kissinger maintains that "the best

CONSENSUS...CONTINUED

that sanctions can do is to begin negotiations"—and negotiations are another area where the two men cleanly split.

Mr. Kissinger fears that a process of negotiating with Iraq will inevitably be dragged out by Saddam Hussein, leading to the collapse of the international coalition opposing him, an easing of sanctions and a reduction of the American military force in Saudi Arabia.

And in negotiations, he says, America inevitably would have to compromise on its goals to get a deal. "If the U.S. leaves under conditions that are a disguised Iraqi success—that is to say, where Iraq gains something in Kuwait even if it is given to them by the Kuwaitis, or by an Arab summit—and if the military preponderance of Iraq remains unaffected, then I think we will have suffered a defeat," he says.

That's why Mr. Kissinger has publicly voiced his disapproval of Secretary of State Baker's trip to Baghdad, though he's now ceasing his criticism to avoid undercutting the secretary. The prospective Baker mission to Baghdad, though, remains in doubt after the U.S. and Iraq failed over the weekend to resolve a dispute over dates. Iraq has insisted that Mr. Baker see Saddam Hussein on Jan. 12. The Bush administration maintains that's too

close to the Jan. 15 deadline set by the United Nations for Iraqi withdrawal and therefore would represent an opportunity for Iraq to push back the deadline. The administration has insisted on a date no later than Jan. 3. As a result of the dispute, a visit to Washington by Iraq's foreign minister, once expected to occur today, has been postponed.

The Brzezinski camp, by contrast, hasn't any such fear of negotiations. Mr. Brzezinski says he prefers the term "discussion," but sees no problem in talking with Iraq about ways it could resolve its disputes with Kuwait over their common border, its desire to lease two Kuwaiti islands or its big debts to Kuwait. The discussions, he says, might produce "some arrangement for adjudication" of those issues.

"I see nothing wrong with that, and I find such an outcome perfectly acceptable," Mr. Brzezinski says.

One of the most emotional splits involves the question of whether the U.S. could limit military action to air and naval strikes. Mr. Kissinger maintains that even with such contained fighting the U.S. could force Iraq to retreat. Mr. Brzezinski says wide-scale ground combat would be inevitable, arguing that air strikes didn't succeed in Korea or Vietnam.

The broadest area of dispute encom-

passes the future of the Middle East: whether war or a failure to cut Saddam Hussein down to size would cause the more dangerous mess.

Mr. Kissinger argues that the U.S. must find a way to scale back Iraq's dangerous chemical and nuclear weapons programs now or face a far deadlier conflict down the road as the Iraqi dictator expands his control over the Persian Gulf and its oil fields.

America's friends would crumble in the face of such a hostile power—an outcome Mr. Kissinger suggests needs to be prevented even if it means some military action now. "I balance the fear of the collapse of all the moderates against whatever the result may be of my preferred option of selective reduction of Iraqi military preponderance," he says.

But in Mr. Brzezinski's eyes, military conflict itself would create "long-lasting enmity" toward the U.S. that would destroy governments friendly to the U.S. Just as bad, the positions of Syria and Iran would be enhanced and the region even more destabilized.

Continued Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would be "sad," Mr. Brzezinski says—but not as sad as the result of military conflict. "I just don't see the argument for the proposition that a major war by the U.S. in this area is a solution," he says.

BALTIMORE SUN

December 16, 1990

Pg. K-1

SAUDI ARABIA: AN ALLY THAT'S VERY FOREIGN

THE OUTLOOK

View of world quite different from U.S.'s

By Robert Ruby

H e is a Saudi economist, educated in the United States, where he vacations each year, and he sits at a desk papered with charts and surrounded by computers, telephones and a fax. Judged by appearances, a thoroughly Westernized man in a luxuriously Westernized land.

Robert Ruby is The Sun's Mideast correspondent.

THE MILITARY

Why the Saudis can't defend themselves

By Robert Ruby

B y calling on foreign troops to defend it against Iraq, Saudi Arabia has inadvertently raised unwelcome questions at home about how the country could spend billions of dollars buying arms but remain incapable of defending itself.

The arrival of the foreign forces, including more than 260,000 Americans, has encour-

Robert Ruby is The Sun's Mideast correspondent.

A Great American Screw-Up: The U.S. and Iraq

By PAUL A. GIGOT

On June 19, 1981, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin addressed Holocaust survivors at the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem. Twelve days earlier Israeli warplanes had undertaken a spectacularly successful bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor, Osirak. "What's the difference if it's radiation and not Zyklon B gas?" Mr. Begin said.

On the same day at the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was preparing to cast a vote on the Osirak bombing. She would vote to condemn Israel, not Iraq. That U.S. response is the symbolic beginning of a decade of American misjudgment. The climax was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990, an invasion that caught nearly everyone in the U.S. government by surprise.

In her classic book on Pearl Harbor, Roberta Wohlstetter writes about the difficulty of selecting genuine policy "signals" from a world of "noise." U.S. policymakers all claim to have heard the aggressive signals from Saddam Hussein. What they failed to do was change their hypothesis about Saddam's intentions. They couldn't shake what even they themselves now call "the mindset" about Iraq.

From this mistake flowed a second one: Failing to signal American intentions. U.S. officials thought that conciliation, rather than a new policy of containment, had a better chance of persuading Saddam. So when they did send warning messages, the messages were mixed in a way that Saddam could plausibly interpret as appeasement.

For two decades before the fall of the Shah, the U.S. had viewed Iran as its strategic bulwark in the Persian Gulf. The rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and the taking of U.S. hostages changed everything. The Carter administration turned its attention toward a new "pillar of stability" in the Gulf, Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Howard Teicher, a Defense Department official at the time (he later joined the Reagan National Security Council), wrote a 50-page paper about the dangers of this tilt and predicted that Iraq would invade Iran. No one paid much attention. By April 1980, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski could assert that, "We see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the U.S. and Iraq."

Iranian Threat

Even when Iraq invaded Iran, the overriding U.S. view was that Iran was stronger and would be the greater threat if it emerged from war dominant in the region. So the U.S. became Iraq's silent ally. In 1982, the U.S. took Iraq off its list of na-

tions promoting terrorism and, by 1984, had resumed full diplomatic relations. The final tilt was the U.S. decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers in 1987.

Arabs made a point of underscoring that Saddam was no longer a radical. Mr. Teicher recalls a meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in April 1982. "Mubarak gave me a 15-minute lecture about how Iraq had changed. He said, 'You have to do everything you can to make Iraq survive the war. You have to tell President Reagan.' He kept shaking my hand and wouldn't let go."

Not everyone agreed, of course. Mr. Teicher and Graham Fuller, a CIA analyst at the time, collaborated on a memo in 1985 arguing that Iran remained a strategic prize, and that Saddam's barbarity meant his "change" might be cosmetic.

But their memo took on a tragic cast during the Iran-Contra hearings, when it was interpreted as the intellectual basis for President Reagan's failed opening and sale of arms to Iran. Congress scorned any attempt to deal with Iran as futile, even absurd, but never questioned assistance to Iraq. Peter Galbraith, a Senate Foreign Relations and Iran-Contra Committee aide, says the Iraqis gave him extraordinary access to Iraqi Kurdistan in 1987 in large part because "the Iraqi Ambassador thought we were doing the Lord's work." Congress must bear some of the responsibility for creating an environment in which dissenters on the Gulf could not be heard.

Iraq's surprising decision to end the war in August 1988 offered a new chance for the U.S. to reassess its Gulf policy. Instead, "the mindset" continued.

In late August, ethnic Kurds began streaming over the Iraq border into Turkey. Their testimony and physical condition provided evidence that Iraq had used chemical weapons against its own people. The State Department publicly condemned the attack, but privately also sent a message of conciliation. As one State official told the New York Times on Sept. 8, 1988: "The approach we want to take is that, 'We want to have a good relationship with you, but that this sort of thing makes it very difficult.'"

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal **A 14** _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date **18 DEC 1990**

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The mixed message continued as a battle raged in Congress over U.S. sanctions against Iraq. Secretary of State George Shultz privately complained to Iraq's foreign minister and received a promise that Iraq would not use gas again and would attend an arms-control conference the next January. "It was enough to persuade us that working on it privately was enough to be productive," says Richard Murphy, State's Middle East point man at the time.

It is impossible to know if U.S. sanctions in 1988, or later in 1990, would have changed Saddam's behavior. But it is possible that Saddam was learning "that his actions would be met solely with rhetorical opposition," says Mr. Galbraith.

Meanwhile, inside the State Department, Zalmay Khalilzad, a Columbia professor hired to offer advice on Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, was concluding that Iraq had replaced Iran as the foremost threat to American interests in the region. His logic was that Iran had emerged from the war so weak that it could no longer balance Iraq.

Mr. Khalilzad's memo was debated at the highest levels. But as one official familiar with the period observes, "That was pissing into the wind in Washington, and still is."

In 1989, the new Bush administration had another chance to reconsider Gulf policy. It conducted a long "strategic review," but its conclusions were close to those of the Reagan team.

This isn't surprising: Richard Haass, the new Middle East point man at the NSC, had worked at Defense when the Carter administration began to consider overtures to Iraq. Dennis Ross, now head of State's policy planning shop, had worked in the late Reagan NSC before joining the Bush presidential campaign. And Richard Fairbanks, who headed the Bush campaign's Middle East policy team, had also worked on Middle East issues in the Reagan years. By then out of government, Mr. Fairbanks was until recently also Iraq's registered agent in Washington.

Most of these officials understood but rejected the strategic arguments made by Mr. Khalilzad. As one White House official who developed the policy put it, after the Iran-Iraq War "there was a sense that the Gulf had come out of a difficult period and was getting better." Both sides in the war were thought to be exhausted. "The detente analogy" prevailed, says this source. The U.S. might not like everything Iraq did, and might detest its human rights record, "but if we could have a more normal relationship with Iraq, why not try?"

Like the Soviets in the 1970s, however, Saddam Hussein refused to cooperate. On Feb. 24 Saddam gave a blistering speech to the Arab Cooperation Council. He warned that with declining Soviet power, "the Arab Gulf region will be governed by the

wishes of the United States." In March, Iraqi agents were arrested in Britain for smuggling parts to build nuclear weapons. Then on April 2, Saddam declared he had binary chemical weapons and that, "By God, we will make the fire eat up half of Israel, if it tries to do anything against Iraq."

The April speech inspired the Bush team's only serious reconsideration of its Iraqi policy. Mr. Ross and John Kelly, the assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, have told reporters they went to Secretary of State James Baker and urged a new policy of limited sanctions against Iraq. Mr. Baker is said to have agreed.

But the policy review died aborning. Mr. Baker turned the effort over to Robert Kimmitt, State's undersecretary for political affairs, who made a case to the inter-agency "deputies committee," a set of officials just below the Cabinet level. Accounts differ on what happened next. By State's account, its initiative met resistance from the Commerce Department and the NSC, including NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft.

Other sources, the majority by far, insist State never really made much of an effort. "My impression was they were worried more about public positioning than about the policy," says one official. Another claims, "I don't know what was said to the secretary, but State did not represent a policy position that was at variance with anyone else's." The meeting reached a consensus not to renew commodity loan credits to Iraq, but to attribute this decision to a scandal involving a bank. "We tried to de-politicize the decision," says one of the deputies, in order not to risk antagonizing Saddam.

The review's failure is partly explained by the way national-security advice is transmitted to President Bush. His administration really has two national-security policy systems. The first, and least important, is the formal interagency process, led by the NSC. The other, much less formal but much more influential, system is dominated by George Bush's close friend, James Baker, his small team of aides and whatever allies they include.

But this second system's strength is also its weakness: It relies on a small nucleus of people. If an issue drifts off their radar screen, it is probably being run on autopilot by the permanent bureaucracy. Mr. Ross is Mr. Baker's Middle East expert, but he is also a main adviser on Soviet policy. For most of the Bush Administration, Mr. Ross's Middle East preoccupation was the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Gulf was left to Mr. Kelly and his Near East bureau, which would never change policy without orders from above.

State's spokeswoman quickly denounced Saddam's April speech as "inflammatory, outrageous and irresponsible." But 10 days later, five U.S. senators,

CONTINUED

led by Kansas Republican Bob Dole, met Saddam in the Iraqi city of Mosul. They presented a letter expressing "very deep concerns" about his chemical and biological weapons, but according to a transcript released by the Iraqis, the senators were less than profiles in indignation.

Mr. Dole said President Bush would probably veto sanctions against Iraq and that, "We in Congress also try to exert our utmost efforts in this direction." Howard Metzenbaum, the Ohio Democrat, chimed in that, "After listening to you for about an hour, I realized you are a strong and an intelligent man, and that you want peace."

The episode that may best symbolize the muted warnings to Saddam was State's quashing of honest commentary by the U.S. Information Agency. On February 15, a Voice of America editorial, entitled "No More Secret Police," hailed popular revolts against "dictatorial rule." It included the following reference to Iraq: "The secret police are still widely present in countries like China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba and Albania."

Saddam must have reacted furiously, because the response at State was to mollify him. "Our guess is that the President himself heard it on February 15," U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, cabled to Washington. She had been called to see Iraq's deputy foreign minister, who protested a "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Iraq," according to the cable, which was uncovered by New York Times columnist William Safire.

After Saddam's complaints, State asked to see all VOA editorials on Iraq before they were aired. So on July 25, one week before the Kuwait invasion, VOA submitted a draft editorial that would prove to be prophetic. It read: "... the U.S. remains strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of its friends in the Persian Gulf. ... The U.S. would take very seriously any threat that put U.S. interests or friends at risk." Mr. Kelly's bureau killed even that tepid warning to Saddam Hussein.

Nearly as telling is the way NSC staffers toned down an April 30 speech by Vice President Dan Quayle. According to White House sources who saw it, the speech draft included a reference to Saddam's April 2 "threats." Comments on the draft from the NSC asked that this be changed to Saddam's "remarks." Another NSC comment: "Emphasis on Iraq misplaced given U.S. policy, other issues."

Congressional Sanctions

The Bush team was also resisting anti-Iraq sanctions in Congress. Douglas Waller has reported in the New Republic that Sen. Dole put a legislative "hold" on one sanctions bill right up to the day of the invasion. Expressing the administration's view

of sanctions attached to a farm bill, Sen. Richard Lugar (R., Ind.) said that, "Passage of this legislation would badly undercut any possibility we have of influencing Iraqi behavior in areas from the peace process to human rights, terrorism to proliferation."

The most famous exchange is the July 25 meeting between Ambassador Glaspie and Saddam in Baghdad. Saddam threatened and blustered, all but declaring his intent to invade Kuwait. Ms. Glaspie replied: "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."

This conversation has been taken as the decisive signal to Saddam of U.S. weakness, and it well may have been. But it also wasn't far removed from the pattern of U.S. policy, especially over the previous five months.

Indeed, after Ms. Glaspie's meeting, with Iraqi troops massed on the Kuwait border, a cable was sent to Saddam under President Bush's signature. According to the Middle East Policy Survey newsletter and to sources familiar with the text, the cable gave a "firm" but general message opposing the use of force. It offered no specific security guarantees to Kuwait, and it held out the hope for better relations. April Glaspie was not alone.

To the very end, U.S. officials expected that Saddam would not invade. By all accounts, U.S. intelligence documented the Iraqi buildup near Kuwait, but missed his intentions until Aug. 1. "The theory was that everything he was doing was to coerce" Kuwait, says one ranking source. "He wanted the money, or maybe the two islands in the Persian Gulf, but not Kuwait. So what was the problem?"

Could a different policy have deterred Saddam? It is impossible to say. Administration officials are naturally defensive about their decisions, and Secretary Baker has gone so far as to denounce as "shameful" the "20-20 hindsight going on." Perhaps he is right, but it is undeniable that U.S. policy failed to send even the most basic signal that might have deterred Saddam. The policy failed to understand a basic truth of international relations: That bullies who threaten American interests cannot be appeased; they must be opposed.

Mr. Gigot writes the Journal's "Potomac Watch" column. A longer version of this article appears in the current issue of The National Interest.

U.S. troops in Gulf for long haul

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

With the chances for peace talks drying up, the Bush administration yesterday focused on war contingency plans with Iraq, and senior officials said the U.S. military will remain in the Gulf area for years to come.

President Bush, Vice President Dan Quayle and a top Pentagon official said Washington will seek United Nations approval to install a peacekeeping force on the Kuwait-Iraq border after Iraq withdraws, will push for new economic sanctions against Iraq and keep naval forces in the region to thwart any future war move by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.

"The return to where we were before Saddam invades his neighbor is unacceptable," Mr. Bush told a gathering of regional reporters.

Mr. Quayle, in a address to the

Foreign Policy Research Institute, said: "Restoring the status quo ante would not be enough. Having tried to erase an entire nation from the face of the earth, Saddam cannot simply walk away without penalty, and in a position to repeat his aggression."

Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense for policy, added that a long-term security plan for the region must include "steps to significantly tighten arms control measures aimed at blocking Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs."

Mr. Quayle hit former military chiefs and congressional critics that have cautioned patience in the Gulf. He said Americans are ready for war, noting that a majority of the public "believes that the United States should, if need be, take all action necessary, including military force, to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait."

The tougher anti-Iraq rhetoric was prompted yesterday by Mr. Hussein's indication that he won't talk with Secretary of State James A. Baker III in Baghdad. A senior administration official said the White House never believed Mr. Hussein was interested in talks. The president sought them nevertheless to show that he was willing to go to unusual lengths to win a peaceful solution to the crisis.

Asked what would lead to Iraq's withdrawal, Mr. Quayle said: "It depends on Saddam Hussein. He can resolve this crisis today, tomorrow, the day after tomorrow, peacefully, if he wants to. The choice is his. We are prepared for either course."

Mr. Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft indicated that several war contingency plans have been studied — including one where Iraq attacks Israel in a bid to split Arab nations away from the international coalition against Iraq. The administration presumably has won Israeli approval to let the United States retaliate.

"If he attacked Israel, I'm convinced the coalition would not fall apart," Mr. Bush said. "I can't give you the specifics on it, but I'm absolutely convinced of it, and you can assume, the way I've answered the

question, that we've inquired about it."

The United States has rewarded Israel for taking a backseat in the crisis.

Should war break out after the U.N.-imposed Jan. 15 deadline for Iraq to withdraw, Mr. Bush vowed that it would not be prolonged. "We are not looking at another Vietnam."

"I don't think ... that support would last if it were a long, drawn-out conflagration," Mr. Bush said.

The Pentagon, meanwhile, said it may seek approval from Congress to keep reservists on active duty in Operation Desert Shield for six months longer than now permitted.

Anthony Cordesman, a respected war analyst and aide to Sen. John McCain, Arizona Republican, said at the Foreign Policy conference yesterday that casualties could reach 10,000 and deaths 1,000 in the early days of a war.

He said if U.S. forces bomb Iraq in the opening days of war, Baghdad may withdraw from Kuwait more quickly. "That can happen," he said.

Administration officials said yesterday that regardless of how Iraq leaves Kuwait, the United Nations is already considering establishing a peacekeeping force in Kuwait.

A senior administration official said a tentative plan would station U.N. forces in Kuwait and along the Iraq-Kuwait border. The official said if Iraq withdraws to just inside its border, the U.N. force — probably with U.S. support — would have to remain strong.

Mr. Wolfowitz also said that the military needs to "preposition" military goods in the Gulf.

Mr. Wolfowitz and Mr. Bush said that American security interests in the Gulf could be guaranteed without stationing U.S. troops in the area, although the makeup of any U.N. force remains under study.

Bush Sees a Firm Coalition Even if Iraq Attacks Israel

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 18 — The Bush Administration said today that it had reached an arrangement with its allies in the Persian Gulf to keep the coalition against Iraq from falling apart if Baghdad attacks Israel and draws that country into fighting in the Middle East.

The specter of an attack on Israel has been especially troubling to American policy makers as they prepare for the possibility of war with Iraq. Washington's concern has been that the historic enmity between Israel and its Arab neighbors would resurface and break apart the international coalition if Israeli were involved.

Today, the Administration appeared to go out of its way to leave the impression that this was no longer a problem. But officials refused to provide any details and it was not clear if there had been some specific agreement among the allies on this score or whether the Administration was simply anxious to set aside the issue before the Jan. 15 deadline set by the United Nations for Iraq to leave Kuwait.

Pursuing Their Campaign

As has been the case in recent days, White House officials used each public appearance today as an opportunity to pursue their campaign to bolster public support for the gulf operation.

In a speech today, Vice President Dan Quayle sought to counter what he said were Americans who "questioned the morality of coming to the defense of what they call a 'feudal,' 'reactionary' and 'repressive' regime" in Kuwait. Mr. Quayle said those accusations were false and seemed to differentiate between groups of people who are worth protecting and groups who "are expendable."

"This is precisely the warped and evil morality used by Stalin and his henchmen to justify their infamous campaign of terror during the 1930's," Mr. Quayle said. "The people of the Soviet Union have turned their backs on the morally demented legacy of Stalinism and so shall we."

When asked at a news conference with a group of newspaper editors about the possibility of an attack by Iraq on Israel, President Bush said he was "convinced the coalition would not fall apart."

'I'm Absolutely Convinced'

"I can't give you the specifics on that," he said, "but I'm absolutely convinced of it and you can assume the way I've answered the question that we've inquired about that."

Mr. Bush went on to praise the Israelis, as he has done before, for keeping "what I would call a low-profile position on all of this."

He added: "It is not easy. They have their security they feel could well be at stake from some radical act by Saddam Hussein. But I have no argument with Mr. Shamir over the way that the Israelis have conducted themselves, nor do I think the coalition partners, on that particular point."

Earlier, Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, was asked by the same audience about the possibility of an attack on Israel. While noting that was a hypothetical question, Mr. Scowcroft acknowledged that Washington had discussed the issue with Israel.

He said the United States, Israel and its allies were "satisfied" with their understandings about "a variety of scenarios" in the gulf.

Another senior official, briefing reporters on condition of anonymity, said the United States had "talked about a variety of contingencies" with other nations supporting the military operation. "They're comfortable and we're comfortable with the outcome of these discussions," the official said.

The official refused to answer when asked if Israel had agreed to allow the United States to respond militarily on its behalf in the event of an attack by Iraq.

A third official, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, said the United States has assured Israel that it would be secure if there were a war because one of Washington's first military priorities would be to destroy Baghdad's ability to launch an air or missile attack, which would have the effect of protecting Israel as well as Americans.

Two Troubling Themes

But it was not known if there was any arrangement that went beyond such assurances.

At the news conference today, Mr. Bush repeatedly returned to two

themes evidently troubling him as the January deadline looms — the longevity of public support for a war and the fear of some Americans that the United States is being drawn into what could become a long, inconclusive conflict like the war in Vietnam.

Seeming at times to be almost thinking aloud, Mr. Bush told the newspaper editors that he is concerned that support for a war would erode if it did not end quickly.

"If the United States had to do its part to implement the United Nations resolution, I believe the country would support that," he said. "But I don't think that support would last if it were a long, drawn-out conflagration. I think support would erode as it did in the Vietnam conquest — I mean, conflict."

Mr. Bush said he could not predict how long a war in the gulf might last.

But he repeated his vow not to let the Persian Gulf become "another Vietnam." He said that "one of the reasons that I moved this additional force, or had it moved, was because every individual life is precious and if there had to be some confrontation militarily, I would want to be able to assure the parents and the families there is enough force there to minimize the risk to every single American kid."

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The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

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Scowcroft says Iraqi talks possibly backfired on U.S.

By Gelareh Asayesh
Sun Staff Correspondent

WASHINGTON — President Bush's last-ditch attempt to prevent a Mideast war by proposing talks with the Iraqi president may have backfired, coming across as a sign of weakness, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said yesterday.

"There are some indications that when the president offered direct talks that the Iraqis thought the president had blinked," Mr. Scowcroft told a group of regional newspaper editors and reporters at the old Executive Office Building.

The situation illustrates a familiar dilemma the administration has faced in the course of the crisis. Officials have tried to convince Iraq that the United States is willing to go to war even while reassuring Americans that the United States is doing its utmost to avoid war.

Indeed, Mr. Bush, talking to the journalists, suggested the talks in an effort to show Congress and the public that he was willing to go "the last mile" in trying to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz was to have come to Washington Monday, but the visit was delayed after the two countries failed to agree on a date for a visit by Secretary of State James A. Baker III to Baghdad.

The only date Iraq was willing to set was Jan. 12 — three days before a U.N. deadline for Iraq to pull out of Kuwait.

"I think it's pretty obvious that it's a case of them using this for manipulative purposes, not the purpose which we had in mind," Mr. Scowcroft said.

"Right now we're still waiting to see if they change their mind. I think we need to let the dust settle a little bit and see whether or not the Iraqis are really serious about a meeting."

Mr. Bush and Mr. Scowcroft also said the administration had discussed with its allies the possibility of an attempt by Mr. Hussein to break the coalition arrayed against Iraq by an attack against Israel.

"I'm convinced the coalition

would not fall apart" if Iraq attacked Israel, Mr. Bush said. "I can't give you the specifics on it, but I'm absolutely convinced of it, and you can assume, the way I've answered the question, that we've inquired about that."

Mr. Scowcroft said that with such a ploy, Mr. Hussein would "try to change the character of any conflict by drawing the Israelis in and thus, arguing that this is a war for Zionism, not a war for the punishment of aggression and the liberation of Kuwait." He added that "we don't necessarily expect that to happen."

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Date 19 DEC. 1990

Bush team pushes to keep gulf policy in public's eye

By Jessica Lee
 USA TODAY

President Bush is pressing a four-front public relations blitz to sell his Persian Gulf policy.

The battle plan: to scare Saddam Hussein, while firing up the American people, Congress and U.S. partners in the coalition against Iraq.

Anticipating the Christmas week lull, Bush and his national security team fanned out for a day of campaigning Tuesday.

It was a snapshot of the long-term strategy to keep Bush's gulf policy uppermost in the public mind until Jan. 15 — the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

Bush and his advisers put the sales strategy together after the U.N. set the deadline Nov. 29 — just as Bush's policy was unraveling at home before a questioning Congress.

"It was at that point that we developed a communications plan that would extend basically through the 15th," said Bush spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. "The plan was to gradually raise the visibility of the issue and problem in a way to keep it before the public."

Tuesday, the White House targeted the audience beyond the Washington area:

► Representatives of regional newspapers were lined up for a White House briefing on

the policy, with details supplied by Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

After lunch with Bush's key image makers, journalists got a question-and-answer session with Bush himself.

► Secretary of State James Baker worked the world audience, standing with members of the European Community in Brussels, Belgium, where they refused any meeting with Saddam's representatives before direct Baghdad-Washington talks.

► Defense Secretary Dick

Cheney left for his third trip to Saudi Arabia since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. His mission: to rally the troops personally.

► Vice President Dan Quayle was assigned to defend the policy before the intellectuals of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

The White House rejected a strategy suggested by some lawmakers to dramatize the campaign in a TV address.

"We resisted because we thought that would build anticipation too quickly, make people frightened and then disappear," Fitzwater said.

Meantime, Congress still is not convinced. Lawmakers' questions about the cost of the deployment, allies' commitment and Bush's authority to order military action could come to a head at the beginning of the new year.

Congress returns Jan. 3 to Washington for its swearing-in ceremonies. But rather than return home until the start of official business later in the month, it's likely they'll stay to debate gulf policy.

Today, Bush will meet with senators who recently returned from the Persian Gulf to get their impressions and ask for their support. He'll also meet with business leaders.

Thursday he'll sell the policy in an interview with *Time* and newspaper columnists.

'We won't let him do that'

National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft discussed the Gulf crisis, growing tensions in the Soviet Union and other issues with U.S. News Senior Editor Kenneth T. Walsh last week. Excerpts:

Scheduling a meeting with Saddam Hussein. We offered them 15 days—including Christmas Day. On virtually 10 minutes' notice he will see people like [former British Prime Minister] Ted Heath and John Connally and [former Japanese] Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone. To me it's evidence that he's using this as he does everything else, to manipulate the situation to his advantage. And we're not prepared to let him do that.

Talks with Iraq. The President made clear the purpose of these meetings. It is not to negotiate anything but primarily to make it crystal clear to Saddam Hussein what his options are, that the U.N. Security Council has said, "You've had enough time to comply with our resolutions, now do it by the 15th of January or we authorize our members to force you to do it." . . . We're not talking about conducting diplomacy with him. That preceded his August invasion and will perhaps eventually resume after he does what he's supposed to do . . . but it is not appropriate now to discuss terms or conditions. . . . If this has worked out well, it means he withdraws.


No linkage. There are no negotiations going on either directly or by implication. There are two clear phases in this. Phase 1 is he has to get out of Kuwait. Now, the world doesn't end after he's gotten out. There are still the issues that he announced as the reasons for his brutal invasion, and there's also the fact that he has the sixth-largest Army in the

world, together with weapons of mass destruction which still have to be dealt with in one way or another. So there are other things that have to follow his getting out of Kuwait. But what we're saying is those have to be clearly separate—no connection, no linkage between the two. . . . Some partial move, some gesture, something which just strings this out in an attempt to avoid doing what he must do to comply is not acceptable.

easier. A lot of people will be dissuaded from easy resort to force to solve their problems. And the next time, all it may take is a single U.N. resolution to solve the problem and not deployment of massive armed forces.

A possible crackdown on Soviet republics. We're concerned about it. We think that [Mikhail] Gorbachev has done some really precedent-shattering things in the way he has moved the Soviet Union to the place it is now with *perestroika* and *glasnost*. It would be too bad if he had to reverse direction by the employment of coercive methods. . . . The Presi-

CHARLIE ARCHAMBAULT FOR USNEWS



In the eye of the storm. Scowcroft on the telephone in his White House office

"New world order." This is a defining moment in world history. The cold war is over. We have the prospect of incipient cooperation among the major powers who have an inordinate responsibility for both the rule of law and peace and security in the world. If we can establish in this case the role of the United Nations, the role of the Permanent Five, of the great powers, for the maintenance of an international order in the way that one should work to resolve disputes, then I think the next time it might be

dent has said [to Gorbachev] that. . . it is important, for his own evolution and for our relationship, to continue in the direction of introducing democratic methods and procedures.

The potential breakup of the Soviet Union. I wouldn't say it's inevitable. . . . In any system that has been so dominated by the central authorities for so long, the lifting of that brings out a certain kind of exuberance and national parochial tendencies, and I think that's what we're seeing.

Of Generals, Feints and Bluffs

MARY McGRORY

How come one general tells something about U.S. war plans in the Persian Gulf and gets sent to the cellar like a bad dog, while another general spills the beans about our unreadiness and it gets confirmed by the secretary of defense?

One may have frightened Saddam Hussein. In September, Gen. Michael Dugan, erstwhile Air Force chief of staff, said we would carpet-bomb Baghdad and make a point of getting Saddam and his mistress. But the administration at that moment did not want to scare Saddam—even though last week President Bush warned him he would “get his ass kicked” in any hostilities.

Dugan's offense, it seems, was to reveal information that could have come only from Israeli intelligence—hard as it may be to believe that only a spy could know Saddam is a one-man show and that knocking him off would “decapitate” Iraq.

No one specifically said that what Dugan said was not true, just that he should not have said it. Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney fumed that Dugan “showed poor judgment at a sensitive time.” National security adviser Brent Scowcroft huffed that

“Gen. Dugan is not in the chain of command and he does not speak for the administration.”

Actually, Cheney said just about the same thing as the general, but in Pentagonese: “Should there be a provocation, it would be appropriate to hold at risk targets—assets, if you will—that Saddam holds dear, and specifically, assets inside Iraq.”

By using the word “mistress” instead of “assets he holds dear,” Dugan probably ruffled the sensibilities of those who object to heavy bombing because of civilian casualties. We are eyebrow-deep in sensibilities in this psy-war phase, although the sensibilities are mostly those of Saudi Arabia, a nation we have undertaken to defend from Iraqi aggression despite the doubts of the fundamentalist Islamic clergy that we are pure enough to do the job.

We went so far as to classify a Christmas Day Bob Hope show in case the mullahs might find something gross in the utterances of an infidel entertaining infidel troops, whose presence the mullahs can barely tolerate.

Whatever his crime, Dugan is paying the price. He is down in the basement of the Defense Department doing the lowly job of reviewing officers' report

cards and trying to guess the needs of future pilots. One need they obviously won't have is to level with the press. The general before his fall advocated more “openness with reporters.”

Last week, Gen. Calvin A.H. Waller was notably open with reporters, but fate and the top brass have been kinder and gentler with him. He still has his job as deputy commander of U.S. forces in the gulf, despite the fact that he told reporters the United States “will not be ready for combat activities” on Jan. 15, the deadline set by the United Nations for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

The White House grumbled at this indiscretion, saying they might not be ready for “all contingencies.” There were learned, frowning articles from the national security theologians saying that Waller had “undermined” the Bush policy, which is to threaten Saddam with a “a terrible swift sword.”

Quite marvelously, nonetheless, a week after the flap, Secretary Cheney came back from one of his periodic trips to the gulf—where he brightened Christmas for the troops by telling them that war is “inevitable”—and reportedly told the president that Waller is right: the troops won't be ready until February.

Baffled Americans are beginning to wonder if maybe this news is not for them, that they are eavesdropping on a message intended solely for Baghdad, a bit of misinformation that Waller was ordered to deliver. Surely, there is a

discretion alert among our commanders after what happened to Dugan.

The conspiracy theory is hard to avoid. Maybe our high command wants Saddam to think there is sand in the gears of the mighty military machine we have dispatched to the desert. Maybe we want to soothe him into a sense of superiority so that he will stop mobilizing armies, stop holding air raid drills and decide he will try to schedule last-ditch negotiations with Secretary of State James A. Baker III for Valentine's Day.

Do they think he will listen to Waller, to Cheney, and say, “Aha! They are weak, I am strong, I will attack.” Maybe we have contingency plans to surround and engulf him. Who knows?

If there are hostilities, we have to hope they are better managed than these bluffs and feints, which are on the transparent and even clumsy side. The president keeps telling us Saddam is another Hitler. Why then are we treating him like a not-too-bright 8-year-old?