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U.S. Agencies Are Rated by Executives

By Dana Priest
Washington Post Staff Writer

The National Security Council is tops. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is at the bottom of the federal agency barrel.


So finds a recent survey of former government executives, all members of the Washington-based Council for Excellence in Government, who were asked to rate federal agencies on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the strongest.

The 250 members who returned the survey, which was conducted for a Fortune magazine issue that appears this week, span the political spectrum and are former employees of a wide range of federal departments and agencies, said council president Mark Abramson.

Members were asked to rank agencies and offices within departments on four criteria: the quality of the management; the quality of the work force; the quality of service, and return on the tax dollar.

Their responses, said Abramson, are "based on their experience in government." For those with no direct involvement in the agencies rated, "it is their perception" of how well a certain office does its job that counts.

Abramson said the common features among the offices that rated in the top 10 were that they are older, more established agencies for which a political consensus exists about their mission. Further, these offices are generally highly visible, there is a degree of stability within the leadership and top-quality po-



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litical appointees often are assigned to these agencies.

On the contrary, the 10 agencies that scored the lowest on the survey tended to be newer organizations whose mission was less clear and for whom a national political

consensus about their worth is missing. The lack of such a consensus means they are vulnerable to funding cuts, Abramson said. Cuts, in turn, may make it harder for these agencies to attract and retain quality employees.

BY PETER ALSBERG—THE WASHINGTON POST

President Casts Wide Net for Advice on Facing Down Iraq

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The message from the White House said simply: "The president would like you to drop in this afternoon with a few other people to talk about what is going on in the Middle East."

It was sent Sunday morning, Oct. 14, to five of President Bush's friends and acquaintances, inviting them to the president's third-floor office in the family quarters of the Pennsylvania Avenue mansion for what became a two-hour "give-and-take" on the Persian Gulf crisis, according to one of the participants.

On another occasion two weeks ago, former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger went to the White House for an appointment with national security adviser Brent Scowcroft that turned into an hour-and-a-half talk with Bush about the gulf crisis. Scowcroft was delayed on the phone, and the president came out and ushered Kissinger into his own office.

For others who remain anonymous, including former government officials and some members of Congress, there have been similar unpublicized discussions with the president about the gulf crisis during small dinners in the family quarters.

As the Iraq crisis goes on, President Bush is reaching beyond aides to friends and acquaintances for ideas and advice, something he often did during his pre-White House days when confronted with problems. These private meetings have a different tenor, participants say, than the more publicized and much larger consultations the president has held with the congressional bipartisan leadership group, the latest of which took place Wednesday.

The sessions with members of Congress have occurred behind closed doors in the Cabinet room, but they have been followed by media events. White House officials generally expect that those from Congress who attend the sessions will disclose to reporters almost everything that transpired.

"This is meant to be public," said one Bush administration official involved in arranging the congressional sessions. "It gives the president a chance to make a case, and this president likes to hear what they're saying. It gives them a chance to say they told the president thus and such."

The meetings are "supposed to be an echo-chamber. [The Congress members] come out and echo what the president has said, if it works."

But increasingly the sessions appear to have more than a public relations purpose. Rep. Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.), chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a main proponent of the consultation process, said after Wednesday's session that, as the president gets "more confidence in the group, he'll put more information on the table." Fascell sees these sessions as allowing the president and the bipartisan leaders of Congress to work out their differences in private and then present a common public front.

In any case, Bush has been determined not to limit his soundings to Congress and members of his own administration. "He is more active and open than any president I've ever seen," said one former top official who has served several presidents and has met with Bush about the gulf crisis.

The president's tendency to cast a wide net in seeking opinions and counsel has engendered concern among some familiar with the process. "This approach can be incredibly dangerous when dealing with a foreign policy crisis," said one former official and longtime Bush acquaintance.

One danger comes from the perception that such multiple consultations can create for the public. "It gives the impression that you are searching for a policy and don't yet have one of your own," one participant said.

A second danger is the possibility that the president's private reflections will be made public, particularly when they involve possible future actions that affect other countries.

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For these reasons, Bush, in both his announced and unannounced meetings, has often avoided responding to complex or direct questions or statements, deferring in some situations to Scowcroft, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney—or often just changing the subject.

At Wednesday's bipartisan congressional session, Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.) made a strong statement against military action and in favor of letting the U.N.-sanctioned economic embargo against Iraq take effect. He then put a series of direct questions to Bush about what would happen if war occurred. Obey asked about the level of casualties Bush was prepared to accept, how the military battle would unfold and what the president expected the region to look like after a war.

Bush's response, sources said, was that this particular meeting was not the place to deal with such questions. After the White House session, a classified briefing was arranged for Obey on another day.

At the Oct. 14 meeting, a comparable situation occurred. The participants along with Bush and Scowcroft were Sens. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.) and Charles S. Robb (D-Va.), Lucius D. Battle, who once served as ambassador to Egypt and assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs, Washington lawyer Robert S. Strauss, who was once special presidential envoy to the Middle East, and former CIA director Richard Helms, who also served as ambassador to Iran.

Each has a personal relationship with Bush, and those who agreed to talk to a reporter about the meeting did so on condition they would not directly quote what the president said.

Sitting in an easy chair in a room he uses as an office, Bush opened with a few general remarks which turned in part on an issue that remains central in the conflict with Iraq—Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's attempt to link a solution to his invasion of Kuwait with resolution of the Palestinian issue.

One of the Mideast experts told the president that although the United States may not like the linkage, its attraction for the Arabs had to be recognized and dealt with, understanding its appeal to Egyptians, Syrians and Saudi Arabians. Bush did not reply.

At another point, Bush was asked whether diplomatic exchanges were being pursued with Iraq directly or indirectly. Again Bush did not respond, even when the point was raised a second time.

After the session, Scowcroft made it clear that the president could not react to such a question, but one participant said he was left with the feeling that "Bush seems to have precluded negotiation without first getting Saddam's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait."

At many of the sessions, Bush has gone around the room asking each participant's opinion, occasionally breaking in to make a point of his own or responding to questions. Some advice he has been given in private has been very direct, sources said.

He has been told, for instance, by a respected former government official that "his big problem is not ideas, but to come to a point," one source said. But others have urged him to remain patient in this post-Cold War era.

In the Oct. 14 session and in each of several congressional meetings, participants most frequently have counseled Bush to delay taking any military action against Iraq and certainly not move without the support of the United Nations and those Arab states allied with the United States.

Bush "showed a sense of frustration" with the situation, one participant in the Oct. 14 session said, but did not attempt to sway anyone. "He was listening, not arguing," a source said. "What do you think?" he would say to the others after a point was made. "There was no editorializing," the source said.

No one at that Sunday afternoon session "expected him to lay out his plan," one of those present said, but Bush had the use of military force on his mind even then.

"If he could get a congressional authorization [to use force] free of ambiguity," this source said, "he would probably go for it . . . even though he was told that would be raising the stakes."

At the congressional sessions, the president has been more combative. There was sharp give-and-take this week over Bush's recent announcement that up to 200,000 more U.S. troops would be sent to the gulf and Cheney's statement that there were no plans to relieve the 230,000 forces already in place.

As he had in an earlier congressional session, Bush repeatedly cited the American hostages in Kuwait "and his concern for them and their suffering," one Republican legislator said.

Bush made clear to the bipartisan group that he knew he needed congressional support in the gulf crisis and planned to continue consultations, with the next one to come after he returns from his Thanksgiving trip to Saudi Arabia. A White House aide said the more private exchanges also are continuing.

David S. Broder

What Term Limits Would Cost

As the American government approaches a fateful decision on our course of action in the Persian Gulf, the character, judgment and experience of the key players offer the best assurance that the decision will be made well. It is worth noting that most of those involved would not be in the meetings if the principle behind the proposal for "term limits," now gaining such popularity, prevailed.

As readers of this column know, I have not been reluctant to criticize President Bush and his associates for the erratic and ineffectual way they have dealt with far too many domestic-policy issues in the past two years. More such criticisms will be heard in the future, I expect.

But it is almost impossible to imagine a more sober, serious, calm, cautious, rational and prudent set of people meeting on the question of war or peace in the Persian Gulf than those this president has assembled. Individually and collectively, they measure up to the highest standards.

Starting with George Bush himself, they bring a wealth of personal experience in international diplomacy and national-security affairs and great depth of personal knowledge of the other world leaders with whom they are dealing. The secretary of state, James A. Baker III; the secretary of defense, Dick Cheney; the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft; and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin L. Powell, are, without exception, men who have earned the confidence of their peers in our government and in the governments of the many countries with whom we are working in this crisis.

The group may lack anyone with the wide-ranging intellectual and strategic sense of a Henry Kissinger. But it is blessedly free from the vaulting ambitions, the raging egos and the private score-settling agendas that have cluttered and demeaned national-security debates in most administrations from Harry Truman's through Ronald Reagan's.

No false bravado or foolish pride will influence them to rash action. No lack of confidence or experience will keep them from doing what their best judgment tells them needs to be done.

No less important to the country's confidence is the fact that these same qualities of judgment, character and experience are to be found in the leaders of the legislative branch of government who will be crucial in the decisions that lie ahead.

The most obvious examples are the leaders of the Democratic opposition in Congress, which in this case truly is trying to behave as "the loyal opposition." Speaker of the House Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.) is a political protégé and former staff member of the late Sen. Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson of Washington.

For three decades as an increasingly influential legislator, Jackson preached and practiced the view that when national security is involved, partisanship not only takes second place, it has no place in the debate. That is why his support and advice were sought and cherished by presidents of both parties.

Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Maine) is a political protégé and former staff member of Edmund S. Muskie, who served the nation as secretary of state and for many years before that as an influential member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. No less than Foley, Mitchell has been schooled for years to take the broadest conception of the national interest into his discussions with the president in these crucial world issues.

If there is to be a broad debate when Congress returns on the next steps in our Persian Gulf policy—a healthy and desirable process, I strongly believe—the influential voices will belong to people of equally seasoned judgment—senators like Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and John Warner (R-Va.) and representatives like Les Aspin (D-Wisc.) and Lee Hamilton (D-Ind.).

I would challenge anyone to list another dozen people they would prefer to see engaged in this decision-making than those who now hold these positions of leadership in the executive and legislative branch. And I would urge those who are selling the "term limit" panacea to consider if the principle of limited tenure in government office is really one they want to impose on a nation carrying the burdens of world leadership that now rest on the United States.

The youngest person I have mentioned, Dick Cheney, has 21 years of elective and appointive federal service. George Bush has 24; Colin Powell, 32; Brent Scowcroft, 32; Jim Baker, 12.

The proposals now gathering steam in the states would generally permit no more than eight to 12 years as the maximum service in the House or Senate. Does anyone really think the nation would be better served if Tom Foley and Lee Hamilton, with their 26 years, Les Aspin, with 20 years, Sam Nunn with 18 years, Dick Lugar with 14 years, John Warner with 12 years and George Mitchell with 10 years were all to be replaced in these discussions by men and women who had entered Congress within the past decade?

There are many able people in the junior ranks whose rise to leadership will be welcome. But I, for one, am grateful that it is the grown-ups who are making the tough calls in this situation.

Bush, in Germany, Finds Kohl Cool to Gulf Policy, Stressing Talks Instead

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Nov. 18 — With President Bush paying a brief visit to Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl offered only lukewarm support today for Mr. Bush's Persian Gulf strategy and referred repeatedly to the idea of conducting negotiations with President Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

The Chancellor's remarks left White House officials trying to play down seeming differences between the two leaders over gulf policy.

At a time when Mr. Bush is trying to persuade President Hussein that he must withdraw from Kuwait or face the possibility of war, Mr. Kohl expressed doubts about the wisdom of conducting a military operation in the Persian Gulf region, raising the likelihood of casualties and other worries.

In a radio interview that was broadcast moments before Mr. Bush arrived in Germany for a quick stop on the way to Paris, Mr. Kohl spoke repeatedly of

conducting "negotiations" with Mr. Hussein, a term the United States Government has studiously avoided so as not to leave the impression that Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait is open to discussion.

Mr. Kohl's comments seemed motivated more by political considerations than by any attempt to break with Mr. Bush on the gulf; he is facing elections in just over a month and apparently was reaching for a moderate stand on the crisis.

The two leaders went out of their way to stress that they were in general agreement. "I think we're together with Germany," Mr. Bush said at a perfunctory news conference after a meeting between the two leaders in Ludwigshafen, Mr. Kohl's hometown in the Rhine Valley. "I made no special request of Chancellor Kohl at all."

But their slight differences seemed to underline Mr. Bush's current political and diplomatic problems as he arrived in Paris for a conference this

week at which he and 21 other leaders are to sign a treaty reducing conventional armed forces in Europe.

Although that meeting, along with a 34-nation conference on European security, were the official reasons for Mr. Bush's visit, the gulf crisis thus far has clearly overshadowed the President's weeklong trip abroad, which began on Saturday in Prague.

In Paris tonight, Mr. Bush and President François Mitterrand discussed the gulf crisis and other issues at a private dinner in Elysée Palace that was attended only by the Presidents, their wives and two close aides. Mr. Bush was accompanied by Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser.

Germany, which has sent some military equipment and donated money to the gulf operation, is not a central member of the alliance against Iraq nor is it currently a member of the United Nations Security Council, where the United States is seeking to have a

new resolution on using military force against Iraq approved.

Still, German participation in the gulf operation has been a political issue for Mr. Bush in the United States where many members of Congress and others have called for a greater contribution from Bonn.

In a speech that Mr. Bush prepared for delivery during his visit to Germany, but was cut short by rain, the President said that with Germany reunified it was important that "Europe must not turn inward."

"Just as a new Europe must look beyond its borders, so too must a united Germany take responsibility for leadership in our commonwealth of nations," he said.

The President was clearly referring to the gulf, although he made only passing, indirect reference to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as "a naked aggression."

only and the air and ground approaches there are a variety of specific options, a number of which could be employed in rapid sequence, including bombing military and industrial targets in Iraq, attacking Baghdad's elite armored forces by air and by ground and launching an amphibious Marine assault on the beaches of occupied Kuwait. It is doubtful any single strategy would play out in isolation. More likely is an intensification that builds on and borrows from a menu of military options.

Which options are used will ultimately depend on a series of interlocking calculations about the military and political goals President Bush hopes to achieve through the use of force and the number of military and civilian casualties that could result.

Does Mr. Bush, for instance, want to force Iraq's troops to retreat from Ku-

stitute for Defense Studies at Texas A & M University.

Stripping Iraq of its air power and long-range missiles would inflict pain on Baghdad, leave it vulnerable to broader strikes and expose its large ground forces, but stop short of more destructive attacks that could result in thousands of military and civilian casualties.

"We suppress his air defenses and then give him an ultimatum," said Anthony Cordesman, a specialist on regional security in the Persian Gulf, suggesting one outcome.

Attacking primarily military targets also places less strain on the coalition, which could weaken as more Arabs, and particularly Iraqis, are killed.

But this option is not without potential problems. Mr. Hussein could begin executing American and other foreign hostages, undermining support in the United States and other countries with captives. Mr. Bush has expressed sym-

U.S. gets ready for possible fall of Gorbachev

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Bush administration is drawing up contingency plans in case Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is replaced by the military or a radical reformer.

The scenarios are the administration's first concession that Mr. Gorbachev's days may be numbered because of deteriorating economic conditions in his country.

A worst-case scenario is a military takeover masterminded by hardliners, U.S. officials said. A Bush adviser ~~noted that the military remains~~ "the biggest coherent organization" in the Soviet Union.

"The fear is of any sort of breakdown or tumble [by Mr. Gorbachev]. You never know what situation you are going to get into," the official said.

The administration also is considering the possibility of a takeover by Russian federation President Boris Yeltsin, Mr. Gorbachev's radical rival, or another reformer without close ties to Washington.

The White House and State Department are concerned that their arm's-length treatment of Mr. Yeltsin during his trip to the United States last year will come back to haunt them.

"At the time he was viewed as a country bumpkin," a White House official said. "He was discouraged because we didn't want to undercut Gorbachev and certainly didn't want to help Yeltsin."

An administration official with access to intelligence reports said the Soviet government has shown increasing concern about civil unrest.

For example, additional security troops were dispatched to guard nuclear weapons facilities at air force and submarine bases over the past several weeks, the official said.

The reports of Mr. Gorbachev's weakening position come as he and President Bush prepare to sign an arms-control treaty today marking the end of the Cold War.

"It's awkward for us," said a senior administration official. "He's our kind of guy. . . . He's been a prince, especially in the Persian Gulf, on arms control, on everything."

Until recently, Mr. Bush, Secretary of State James A. Baker III and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft disputed statements by Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Vice President Dan Quayle that Mr. Gorbachev might not survive the internal strife.

But the U.S. Embassy in Moscow has reported over the past few months that Mr. Gorbachev's position looked increasingly uncertain.

"We were reluctant, tardy. . . . We are late in going beyond Gorbachev," said one official. "We've continued to have our hopes pinned on Gorbachev, feeling that he was the best chance for stability. But things seem to be pretty steadily coming apart."

Another administration official said: "A lot of people are saying we're backing the wrong horse, we're on the wrong side of history."

Mr. Baker said yesterday that "there are some major dislocations" in the Soviet Union. Interviewed on ABC-TV's "This Week," he said that if the Soviet Union requested humanitarian aid, "I happen to think the president would be supportive to that request."

U.S. officials disclosed last week that the administration has begun preliminary planning to provide emergency aid if conditions in the Soviet Union worsen.

But some officials said yesterday Mr. Gorbachev is "beyond help."

"When you make reforms, there's a transition period in which expectations rise. There's often an inability to meet those expectations," said one official.

Another official spoke of a possible "confrontation" pitting military, Interior Ministry and KGB security

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forces against reformers such as Mr. Yeltsin.

U.S. intelligence agencies reported in a recent internal government publication that the deployment of about 100,000 troops in and around Moscow in September was linked to possible military action against civilians.

The troops — military airborne units — were observed training in crowd-control and anti-riot techniques, the official said.

"Obviously, Gorbachev's position has become more tenuous," a Pentagon official said.

With 34 countries ready to sign a treaty today in Paris rolling back Soviet military power in Central Europe, administration conservatives are deeply concerned at the possibility that Mr. Gorbachev might be replaced by a military government.

"They might not be able to roll across Eastern Europe anymore, but they ... have the same weaponry or better than it had just two years ago," one official said.

The Bush administration considers Mr. Gorbachev's consolidation of power over the weekend a final effort

to keep control of the situation.

The Supreme Soviet, or parliament, approved a plan by the Soviet leader that would make all Cabinet ministers directly responsible to him and limit the power of Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov.

A State Department official said Mr. Gorbachev has turned out to be "more of a centralist than we had hoped a month or so ago" and "is now leaning toward a much tougher line" on separatist tendencies, especially in the Baltic republics.

The official expressed disappointment that the Soviet leader has not opted to implement economist Stanislav Shatalin's "500-day" program of economic shock therapy.

Despite the gloomy assessment of Mr. Gorbachev's survivability, White House and State Department officials believe the administration did the right thing in sticking with him.

"I'm sure history, especially Western history, will judge him admirably," said a White House official.

• Warren Strobel, Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough contributed to this report.

U.S. Places Overtures to China on the Back Burner

■ **Diplomacy:** End of the Cold War, politics at home and instability in Beijing cool U.S. ardor for closer ties.

By JIM MANN
TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON—Over the past year, President Bush and his top aides have shelved their campaign to patch up the once-cozy U.S. relationship with China, reluctantly conceding that China's political upheavals of 1989 have caused lasting damage to ties between the two countries.

Twelve months ago, China ranked as one of the main preoccupations of the Bush Administration. Last Dec. 9, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger flew off on a secret mission to Beijing in which they offered friendly toasts to some of the same Chinese leaders who had called in troops six months earlier to clear protesters from Tian An Men Square with brute force.

Now, by contrast, the Administration is maintaining a cool distance from Beijing. Administration officials no longer treat China as so important to the United States as it was a year ago, and some of them remain miffed over what they see as a failure of the Chinese leadership to respond to Bush's overtures.

"Their [Chinese leaders'] failure to continue to be responsive to the President has changed the political landscape," one Administration official acknowledged recently.

This fall, Japan and European

governments have moved to lift many of their sanctions against China, unblocking frozen loans and restoring diplomatic exchanges. While the Bush Administration may take some small steps in the same direction, another senior Administration official said that "I wouldn't look for anything dramatic" in new U.S. overtures to China.

"All of our allies have decided to move ahead with China, leaving us increasingly isolated," observed Harry E. Harding, a China scholar at the Brookings Institution.

There are a several reasons underlying the Bush Administration's pronounced change of attitude:

- Domestic politics. Bush's efforts last year to mend fences with the leadership in Beijing proved extremely unpopular and were attacked both by Democrats and conservative Republicans. In Congress and in the American business community, there has been a marked decline in support for close U.S. ties with China.

- Instability in China. Many U.S. policy-makers believe that China's current leadership is deeply divided and won't last long. Indeed, some officials and analysts now

foresee the possibility of dramatic political changes or even a *coup d'etat* in the struggle for power that may follow the death of paramount leader Deng Xiaoping.

- Geopolitical strategy. The end of the Cold War has reduced the importance to the United States of close relations with China, which since the early 1970s had been based upon a shared perception in both Washington and Beijing that the Soviet Union was a formidable military adversary.

- Bitterness over the failed Scowcroft trip. Last December and January, Bush Administration officials believed the Chinese regime would quickly allow dissident Fang Lizhi to leave his confinement inside the U.S. Embassy in Beijing and would end its ideological attacks on the United States. Instead, Fang was not released for another six months, and the ideological diatribes continue even now.

"They [Chinese leaders] don't understand what's happened to this relationship," says one Administration official. "They don't understand the political costs of what they did last January and February."

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Those political costs were demonstrated Oct. 18, when the U.S. House of Representatives cast a series of votes against China that would have been unimaginable even a year earlier. The House voted 247 to 174 to strip China of its most-favored-nation trade status, the privilege that permits foreign producers to sell their goods in the United States under the lowest available tariffs. And the House voted 383 to 30 to attach a series of tough human rights conditions that China must meet before it gets the trade benefits next year.

Neither of these measures became law. They died in the Senate during the final, hectic days before Congress adjourned. But the congressional efforts to place human rights conditions on the renewal of trade benefits for China will almost certainly be revived next year.

Even within the U.S. business community, which lobbied Congress for a continuation of the benefits, enthusiasm for China is clearly on the wane.

"Foreign investment in China is entering a new phase that may offer fewer opportunities for American firms," the U.S.-China Business Council declared last month. "Although official Chinese statistics show foreign investment on the rise in 1990, recent changes in the investment climate are working to the detriment of many American, European and Japanese investors."

Last year, after the crackdown on the democracy protests in Tian An Men Square, China accused the United States of seeking to undermine and overthrow communism in China through a long-term strategy of subversion. The regime called this strategy "peaceful evolution."

In retrospect, Bush Administration officials now believe the President's repeated efforts at reconciliation with China have failed because hard-line elements within the leadership in Beijing killed them. The hard-liners feared that a thaw with the United States would give a political edge to more mod-

erate forces in the Chinese leadership, these U.S. officials say.

China's campaign against "peaceful evolution" began soon after Scowcroft and Eagleburger's first top-secret mission to China in July, 1989. A similar anti-American campaign was launched soon after their second trip to Beijing in December, 1989, and there were echoes of the campaign once again after the release of dissident Fang last June.

"When we have done things and the moderates [in China] have tried to do things to improve the relationship, a very strong reaction has set in and stymied efforts to get things moving in a consistent manner," one Administration policy-maker says.

Within the U.S. intelligence community and among American academic experts on China, the belief is growing that over the next few years, China will face further political upheavals.

Deng, who took the reins of power in China in late 1978, is 86 years old. He has not been seen in public since July.

"We don't dismiss the reports about him being in ill health," says one U.S. intelligence specialist. "But we've got nothing firm."

"I think there is latent instability there [in China] that we ignore at our own peril," observes Jonathan D. Pollack of the RAND Corp. "I think we ought to be looking at a whole range of options, in which a seizure of power by the military is one possibility."

Furthermore, Pollack adds, "I don't see stability in the military ranks. These are very anxious, frightened people."

Last September, officials of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA sat down at a conference with U.S. China scholars to swap ideas about the future of China's People's Liberation Army.

"One of the big questions was, 'When Deng dies, what will the

PLA do?' " says Paul H. B. Godwin, a China scholar at the National War College, who took part in the conference. "Everyone agreed there are deep fissures in Chinese society. There were divergent views on whether the PLA could fracture or not."

Some U.S. experts at the conference contended that China's army could split up along regional lines or that there could be disputes among competing factions within the military. Other participants argued that the PLA will remain a unified force and will try to refrain from intervening in politics.

In 1976, a month after the death of Mao Tse-tung, senior leaders in China's army and security apparatus engineered the sudden arrest and imprisonment of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and other top Chinese leaders who had propelled the Cultural Revolution. Some U.S. officials and scholars suggest such a scenario could be played out once again after the death of Deng.

"The military is going to be all-important in determining the succession," says a Bush Administration official. "China has a long tradition going back many dynasties of the praetorian guard overseeing the succession and sometimes changing the dynasties. . . . There's a good chance it's going to happen again when the current leadership array, the elder generation, passes away or becomes incapacitated."

The unpredictability of the political situation in Beijing reduces the incentives for the Bush Administration to renew a close relationship with China. In any event, experts say, the need for close U.S. ties with China has been dramatically undercut by the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

In mid-1989, at the time of the Tian An Men Square upheavals, some Administration officials still believed that the changes in the Soviet Union under President Mikhail S. Gorbachev might not be permanent. One senior Administration official privately warned that a new hard-line Soviet leadership could emerge and link up with hard-liners in China in a way that would threaten the United States.

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Now, by contrast, even the doubters within the Bush Administration see the Soviet Union more as an ally than as an enemy. The unprecedented changes in U.S.-Soviet relations have given the Administration new freedom to ignore China in its global strategic calculations.

Administration officials still view China as significant to American foreign policy in some lesser ways. China is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Its cooperation is important for the Administration's current efforts to obtain U.N. resolutions against Iraq and for efforts to bring peace to Cambodia.

For these reasons, the Administration may clear the way for more frequent high-level contacts with Chinese officials, such as the two meetings this fall between Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

"We need to stay in touch with them," one Administration official says.

But U.S. officials make clear they will make no new attempt at reconciliation with the Chinese leadership such as the missions by Scowcroft last year.

"In the absence of any evidence that the [political] situation has been resolved in China, it's not very fruitful to try to make a new effort on our part to reach out to the Chinese," an Administration policy-maker said.

The President

'What These Guys Did Was Wrong'

George Bush is bitter, sometimes angry, and unwilling to retreat an inch. To him, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is more than a question of power or oil. It is a moral outrage.

Listen to the words of a man who has come to know George Bush well during these most trying moments.

"Those eyes are scary. Very calm. Very cool. You look at his eyes—there is an angry man there, and every week I think he gets more angry. We say: 'Don't make a quiet man angry, because he's really hard to handle.'"

Now, another look at the President of the United States: It is 5:30 on a morning in late August. He is adrift in a dinghy on the marshes of the Kennebunk River, out behind the Old Grist Mill restaurant in his beloved Kennebunkport, Me. Casting lure after lure in an unsuccessful campaign to snare a bass, he seems impervious to frustration—be it elusive fish, hungry mosquito, or Saddam Hussein.

And one more look at the President, now neither angry nor contemplative. It is October in the heartland. Midterm elections are imminent; time for presidential hoopla: Dwarfed by the requisite backdrop of an oversized stars and stripes, George Bush bounds across the field house stage at the College of DuPage in Glen Ellyn, Ill., and thanks country singer Eddie Rabbitt, who has just stirred up the kids on the floor with a new anthem: "My older brother was GI Joe. Red, white and blue from my head to my toe. I'm an American boy."

Minutes later, Bush is brought back to Earth when a heckler butts into his speech. The United States, the heckler cries, is trading blood for oil!

On that mild, sunny day in January, 1989, when George Bush swore the simple oath of office that each of his 40 predecessors had repeated, he was, it seemed, one of the most familiar of characters ever to assume the presidency. He was something akin to the old tweed jacket of American politics: comfort against the winds of the world. A known quantity. Practical. Good old George Bush.

He had been a public figure for more than two decades: congressman, chairman of the Republican National Committee, ambassador to the United Nations, envoy to the People's Republic of China, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, vice president of the United States and, finally, a successful presidential candidate.

Yet, despite all the breakfasts in New Hampshire coffee shops and the quiet, earnest conversations in Iowa farmhouses, despite all the rallies and speeches and biographies, George Bush remains as unfamiliar as he is familiar. He is comforting in the ease with which he seems to undertake his awesome tasks, but disconcerting because he has left few footprints where he has been and offers a still fainter road map of where he would go.

Now, however, his footprints are growing in number. The lines on the map—"the vision thing," he calls it, are growing clearer. The Persian Gulf crisis presents a new picture: George Bush putting his foot down, unwilling to retreat an inch.

He is bitter. Frustrated. At times, angry. But more than anything else, this man, who believes in order among nations, is offended.

"I think he's genuinely offended by what happened—there's a sense of principle, his own sense of international order and his sense of morality and his sense of how things are supposed to play out in the world," says an aide who has watched him closely during the many tense days and nights since Iraq invaded Kuwait Aug. 2.

"Yes, he's interested in energy and the rest," the aide says. "But that's more cerebral. The more gut-type thing is that what these guys did was wrong—and what they're doing inside Kuwait is wrong—and it just can't stand. It's just principle. It's wrong what they've done. There's a strong sense of that."

For good or ill, that's the way it is with George Bush.

In his determination to act, to show immediate resolve, to leave no doubts in the minds of his allies or enemies, he would move swiftly. His troops—hundreds of thousands of young men and women—would be dispatched to the Saudi Arabian desert and seas of the Middle East. But what would they do there? What was their purpose? And how would he bring them home? Where would it all end? The questions began to well up. The answers would wait.

During the months leading up to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Bush's attentions were elsewhere.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
L.A. Times p.T10
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In May there had been a summit with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. There was the budget—and the President's politically embarrassing decision to step away from his 1988 campaign pledge of "no new taxes." There was a NATO summit in London in early July and, just days later, an international economic summit in Houston. There were negotiations to reduce conventional weapons in Europe and to slash U.S. and Soviet arsenals of long-range nuclear weapons. And just days before the invasion, Bush was faced with the resignation of Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, and the search for his replacement.

The problems of the Middle East had always been there and always would be. The President's advisers thought Saddam Hussein was just rattling his saber and would eventually pull his troops back. Each day, more pressing matters crossed Bush's Chippendale-style walnut desk in the Oval Office.

All that changed when Saddam Hussein's army crossed into Kuwait.

It was early on the morning of Aug. 2 in the Persian Gulf, about sundown on Aug. 1 in Washington.

The President had left his office for the day. He walked along the flagstone path that borders the Rose Garden to return to the family quarters on the second and third floors of the White House. But even as he was settling in for the evening, the Situation Room—a 24 hour-a-day crisis monitoring post one floor below the Oval Office—was coming alive. Fresh and disturbing intelligence reports were coming in. They were fragmentary and unconfirmed. Gunfire had erupted on the streets of Kuwait city.

Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, hurried back to the White House from his home in suburban Bethesda, Md., about 20 minutes away. Calling from the Situation Room, he delivered to George Bush the first reports. At that point, there was still little realization that the gunfire, and even the

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initial troop movements across the border into Kuwait, signaled the onslaught of a juggernaut—a military machine running at full speed into the heart of the small, Persian Gulf emirate.

Instead, Bush was told that government experts still expected Iraq's military operation to be limited. He demanded more information.

What do we hear from the State Department? What does the CIA have to say? What are we hearing from the Defense Intelligence Agency? Throughout the evening, the task of those feeding information to the President was to answer each question—and verify the disturbing, and then ever-more alarming, details.

Scowcroft and the National Security Council's senior Middle East expert, Richard N. Haass, talked to Bush by telephone, feeding him new reports until about 11:30 p.m.

Shortly after 5 a.m., Scowcroft was at the President's bedroom door and presented for his signature two executive orders freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States.

By 8:05 a.m., the top guns of Administration foreign policy had gathered around the polished oblong table in the Cabinet Room: the President, the vice president, the secretary of defense, the national security adviser, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, sitting in for the traveling secretary of state, the undersecretary for political affairs. The White House chief of staff, the secretary of energy and the budget director were there, too.

Reporters and camera crews, rarely notified that a National Security Council meeting has been called, were invited in this morning to help tell the nation—and Saddam Hussein—that the President of the United States was upset.

Twice Bush was asked by reporters the key question of the moment: "Do you contemplate intervention as one of your options?"

His reply, outdated almost as soon as he uttered it, came in halting tones: "We're, we're not discussing intervention. . . . I'm not contemplating such action."

Then the reporters and camera crews were ushered out of the room.

The mood grew calm, matter-of-fact. One by one, the people around the table briefed the President on the military action in the Persian Gulf, diplomatic maneuvers around the world and the overnight developments at the United Nations, where an emergency meeting of the Security Council had condemned the invasion. This was George Bush conducting business—hair neatly in place, folded handkerchief tucked correctly in the

breast pocket of his olive green suit jacket, his maroon tie knotted just a fraction of an inch below the top of his collar. He spoke in an even, measured voice. The anger was still to come.

The initial concern was that the Iraqi invasion represented an attack on vital U.S. interests—Kuwait, along with Saudi Arabia just to the southwest, was a dependable supplier of petroleum to the United States, which relies on foreign sources for approximately 40% of the oil it consumes so voraciously.

Going around the table, Bush "got a report from all of us on what we were doing, and we started to talk about what to do next," one Administration official says.

"On the political side, we needed to start making contact with everyone from the Arab League, to make sure that we put together that strong, political cohesive unit that we eventually were able to pull together. Second, we knew we wanted to get full-scale economic sanctions out of the U.N., so that was our next mission up there."

But beyond that, there was a growing realization on the part of the President and his advisers that the world was facing its first major military crisis since World War II that did not immediately break down into an East-West confrontation.

Thus, even as the tensions grew, the crisis was quickly seen as presenting an opportunity to usher in a new stage of international politics. Bush decided that Secretary of State James A. Baker III, traveling in the far reaches of the Soviet Union, should issue a joint U.S.-Soviet statement condemning the invasion.

But what about the possibility of military intervention?

"The military gave a briefing on what options were available to the President, assuming a request from the Saudis," the Administration official says. Details were slim—they would come two days later at a briefing at Camp David, Md. But, the official says, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "did review . . . how quickly we could get forces there, once we made a decision on how to proceed."

And with that, the seed was planted.

"There was no doubt, almost from the start, certainly by the early morning on the second, Washington time, that we wanted to get U.S. forces out to Saudi Arabia. The only question was how many, how quickly and how would we get the invitation. I think that Bush and all of us had crossed that line very quickly, simply because there was no debate on whether it was in our vital national security interest to defend Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression," the official says.

"So to say that that decision was made on Aug. 2, I think, is absolutely correct. The decision to send out six-figure troop configurations, I don't think, was probably made until the weekend. But to get something out there was accepted right from the start."

It was not the first time Bush had been a party to such a decision. He was vice president when Ronald Reagan dispatched troops to Grenada in 1983. He visited Beirut after a terrorist bomb killed 241 U.S. servicemen in a barracks there. Last December, he launched an invasion of Panama that brought about the overthrow and capture of strongman Manuel A. Noriega. And even as he was wrestling with the problems posed by the gulf crisis, he approved the use of U.S. Marines to rescue Americans trapped in the midst of a civil war in Liberia.

"George Bush," the official says, "is not someone who is hesitant to use force when necessary."

But this was different.

"You've got to realize, this is the NFL," Powell told Bush and the assembled presidential advisers at one of the earliest meetings as he presented the military options. This was the big leagues, and any misstep could bring dire consequences.

If war broke out, this would not be a limited engagement, like Panama or Grenada—operations that were costly in terms of American lives, but which did not send thousands upon thousands of U.S. troops up against an enemy's sophisticated missiles and poison gas.

"You're firing real bullets, and if anything goes wrong, it's called U.S. lives," says a former White House official.

Looking back at his own experience as a participant or observer at crisis meetings under every President since Gerald R. Ford, one Administration official said Bush "was far more active" than Ford, Jimmy Carter or Reagan.

"So many times during the course of all

of this, including at that [first NSC] meeting, he would ask some of the questions and then he would say, either: 'Well, [British Prime Minister Margaret] Thatcher's got a little bit of a different view on that,' or 'We'd better touch base with [French President Francois] Mitterrand,' or, 'Perhaps if that's the problem, I should give [Saudi King] Fahd a call.'"

Bush hurried out of the National Security Council meeting that morning to keep an appointment in Aspen, Colo., where he would speak to a think-tank audience on the stunning shifts that had occurred over the past year in the East-West alignment and the opportunities they presented for future cooperation among the nations of the world. There, in a setting of rustic charm and wildflower color, he would meet with Thatcher.

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What about the French? Bush asked. Would they support an allied front against Iraq, a dependable customer for French weapons?

"Don't worry about France. When it gets tough, she'll be with you," Thatcher replied.

But the most important message was this: Saddam Hussein, she said, must be stopped.

By the time he left Washington on Friday, Aug. 3, for Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland's Catoc-tin Mountain area about 60 miles north of Washington, Bush had met again with his National Security Council.

But by the end of that meeting, the United States' stakes, beyond its own crucial interest in Persian Gulf oil, had become clear to the President: Hussein was threatening the balance of power throughout the region, his effort to obtain nuclear weapons could pose a threat to the entire world, and his influence over world oil supplies would have global ramifications.

The President, said a foreign visitor, "was very anxious and very angry. He could not believe that Saddam Hussein really did what he had done. He was very nervous that Saudi Arabia would ask for help and he would not be able to help. But he also was sort of reassuring that if you want help, I'm going to give it, and I'm going to give it in such a massive way that it will send the right signal to Saddam."

There could be no doubt about Bush's thinking, even as the diplomatic effort quickly became one of applying economic pressure and then an international embargo on Iraq: As the President would say publicly a few days later, a line had to be drawn in the sand. That could only be done with U.S. troops.

At Camp David the next day, Bush met again with his national security team, this time joined by Secretary of State Baker, just back that morning from the Soviet Union, and Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the four-star Army officer responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East. In Aspen Lodge, the rustic presidential conference room, Schwarzkopf and his subordinate commanders reviewed the Iraqi military threat and presented Bush with his options for countering it. Then the briefers left the room, and the senior advisers reviewed for an hour what they had just heard.

A sober mood prevailed. The array of forces was impressive: Ground troops. Air units. Carrier battle groups. Marines. The numbers were staggering: 100,000 and more. The mission, everyone agreed, was doable, but it was not going to be cheap or quick.

Now was the time for decisions. This was George Bush's job. It was for just such instances that he signed up as commander-in-chief. This was the time to run down the checklist and decide whether the mission could be accomplished; to

make sure all bases had been touched; to take charge. This was the time to wade into presidential decision-making with the same energy that he devotes to his spirited golf game. But unlike his athletic endeavors, it didn't excite him. If anything, it left him drained.

As the hours and days wore on, Bush's thoughts on the crisis—on what it meant for the United States and the rest of the world—began to gel, and his mood hardened.

When the President returned to the White House from Camp David at the end of the weekend, a reporter reminded him that Jordan's King Hussein had embraced Saddam Hussein in Baghdad.

With anger in his voice, he challenged the reporter: "What's your question? I can read."

Then the President added, icily: "This will not stand. This will not stand—this aggression against Kuwait."

He would say that almost daily from then on.

It was a message he repeated in public and in private, in speeches to audiences of thousands and on the telephone to audiences of one. On this, Bush said, there will be no compromise, and Saddam Hussein must know it. Others may talk about the importance of diplomacy, and that's fine, but just tell Hussein this: Get out of Kuwait.

The crisis became a preoccupation. In meetings and conversations, the President kept probing for all the ramifications. What about the trapped Americans; he would ask his assistants? How many have gotten out? What about other foreigners held in Kuwait and Iraq?

And always, the complexities of the Middle East.

He met one day in early September with a group of government experts on Iraq and the Persian Gulf. The meeting in the Oval Office was a seminar, of sorts, on attitudes in the region. It left Bush, if possible, even more aware of the difficulty of his task.

"What a damn complicated thing," he muttered, shaking his head, as his in-house experts departed.

The good-natured banter that often opened and closed private meetings in the White House—teasing the secretary of state about a particularly bright tie, for example, or ribbing a member of the team who had taken a hit in the press—fell off.

An unnatural quiet set in.

One day he met with the mother of a GI deployed in Saudi Arabia. It moved him

close to tears. Otherwise, he kept his emotions generally in check.

"I don't know quite how to explain that," says one close observer. "He is a fairly emotional guy. When you see him in private, he's teasing individuals, you know, and back-slapping. He has a very emotional exterior. But in these kinds of situations, he's very careful about his responses. Even in staff meetings and even around private gatherings of the staff, you very seldom hear him offer emotional opinions in response to public kinds of events. That's just the way he

thinks it ought to be conducted.

"He knows everybody watches for those kinds of things. When the U.N. passed the resolutions, he wouldn't let out a cheer or throw his fist in the air or something like that. He would just say:

"Well, that's good. That's good. That's what we needed."

With the first troops arriving in Saudi Arabia and U.N. Security Council sanctions against trade with Iraq firmly in place, Bush went on vacation.

Every year of his life, save for 1944 when World War II duty as a Navy pilot kept him in the South Pacific, Bush had spent his summer vacation at the family compound in Kennebunkport. The summer of 1990, Persian Gulf crisis or not, was to be no different.

But this time it would not be relaxing.

Each week, he returned to Washington for a day or two. And in Kennebunkport, unsettling intelligence cables arrived almost hourly, reporting military developments just moments after the action occurred—U.S. ships firing across the bow of a suspect tanker, for example, or new threats to the hostages.

There was a feeling that at any hour, the United States and Iraq could be at war. Outside, beyond the windows of the friendly, sprawling house at Walkers Point, the sun was dancing off the water. And in the President's hands was a piece of paper telling him what had happened 10 minutes before on the hostile waters of the Persian Gulf.

Visitors offered little cause for optimism.

King Hussein of Jordan, whom the President considered a friend, strode off a green and white presidential helicopter. In his exquisitely polite but formal manner, he told Bush that Jordan, sandwiched

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between Iraq and Israel, would have to follow a middle course between the hard edges of U.S. policy and Iraq.

A private meeting that was scheduled for 30 minutes stretched beyond an hour. There was no animosity between the President and the potentate. Nor, that day in Kennebunkport, was there any warmth. Just disappointment for the perplexed President and a lunch of cold lobster for the king.

Hussein left and Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal arrived, his gold-trimmed black robes such an oddity in preppy Kennebunkport that they could not help but signal that something was amiss in the world.

Nancy Ellis, the President's sister, watched her brother move from meetings with visiting advisers to the tennis court; from tennis court to speedboat; from boat to golf course; from golf course back to the cables coming in every hour from the gulf. The rushing about left some wondering if he wasn't just trying to drive the tensions, like demons, from his mind.

How sad, Ellis told a presidential adviser. Her brother couldn't relax at all.

But then, with the policy in place, international support lined up and the military traffic flowing unimpeded into Saudi Arabia, a calm settled over the President. His pace did not change. But his mood did.

With Scowcroft, his national security adviser, he spent hour after hour bobbing up and down in his twin V-8 cigarette boat, Fidelity, going over and over and over the details of Operation Desert Shield—and the impact it was having on the world.

As the cold, dark-green waves of the Gulf of Maine lapped at the gunwales of the boat, he conducted an exhaustive review—the pluses and minuses of every step, the options and contingencies and what-ifs.

After launching the most stunning mobilization of U.S. troops since World War II, the President had time to reflect on what he had done. It was then that he shifted from commander-in-chief to philosopher and historian, if ever-so-briefly assuming two roles not often associated with George Bush.

It came to this: We have taken big steps. We have to succeed. There is too much at stake to fail.

The days of waiting turned to weeks, then months. Summer in Kennebunkport became autumn in Washington.

Each weekday morning at 8 o'clock, Bush received an intelligence update. Fifteen minutes later, he went over the state of the world—and the minute-by-minute developments of the past day—with Scowcroft.

He sat down from time to time with his national security adviser, just the two of

them, and looked at the big picture. On Oct. 17, the President canceled a trip to the second game of the World Series, passing up a chance to watch Cincinnati whip Oakland. His staff said the unresolved budget debate was keeping him in Washington. In fact, he spent little time that night on the budget. Instead, he and Scowcroft ate a quiet dinner of veal and pasta in the Bush family quarters on the second floor of the executive mansion, reviewing their game plans in what an aide called a "general philosophical discussion" about the gulf. They decided to hang in there.

Publicly, the business of the presidency continued.

Bush hit the campaign trail on behalf of Republican candidates. Aboard Air Force One, he crossed the nation: As November arrived, he became a series of freeze-frames, halted momentarily in Massachusetts and Florida, Ohio, Minnesota and Iowa, California, New Mexico and Texas—a blur of rallies and flags and yet another battle cry: Saddam Hussein was dismembering Kuwait with the same barbarism shown by Hitler in the rape of Poland at the start of World War II.

After each political rally, he returned to his Boeing 747. In quiet moments between telephone calls and meetings, he picked up an 846-page book that a long-time friend had delivered to him—Martin Gilbert's "The Second World War: A Complete History." He kept it aboard the aircraft to read between stops. Chapter One: The German Invasion of Poland.

With the congressional campaign over, he came home to the White House and yet one more crucial decision: Whether to dispatch as many as 200,000 more troops to the Persian Gulf.

Twice in those weeks Bush visited the secretive confines of the Situation Room with his senior national security advisers—Scowcroft, Scowcroft's deputy Robert M. Gates, Gen. Powell, Baker, Secretary of Defense Cheney and White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu. None of the officials even listed these meetings on his private schedule.

The initial troop deployment had been completed by mid-October. Powell and Gen. Schwarzkopf, now the senior U.S. commander in the gulf, recommended more. Bush, in principle, subscribed to Powell's military philosophy that "maximum force saves lives."

On Nov. 8 at 4:05 p.m., the President left the Oval Office and headed for the press briefing room around the corner. A mix-up over the precise moment at which the news conference would begin sent him back toward his office, when an aide realized the President was scheduled to be on the air in 15 seconds.

Unflustered, Bush reversed course and strode down a carpeted hallway to the podium precisely on schedule.

To reporters and a nationwide television audience, he declared: "I have today directed the secretary of defense to increase the size of U.S. forces committed to Desert Shield to insure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary. . . ."

To his aides, Bush appeared relaxed and calm throughout the day.

But always there was the anger.

The budget debate came and went. Bills were signed. Final preparations were made for a trip to Europe and, on Thanksgiving Day, to visit the troops in Saudi Arabia.

Foreign visitors arrived for their half-hour with the President. Giulio Andreotti, prime minister of Italy and current occupant of the revolving presidency of the European Community, stopped by the Oval Office on Nov. 13. Bush told him, as he did nearly all such guests, about the horrors inflicted on the people of Kuwait by the Iraqi troops—specifically a story he had heard weeks earlier from the emir of Kuwait, Sheik Jabbar al Ahmad al Sabah, about 22 premature babies pulled from their incubators and left to die when the machines were sent to Iraq.

And there was frustration—not only with Saddam Hussein, but at home. With the Congress. With the American people. For the first time, the President's approval rating fell below 50%. The support that Congress offered before the election showed signs of fraying immediately afterward.

"If you said have you been tested by fire," Bush told TV interviewers, "I'd say it's been pretty hot out there."

As Bush and his most senior advisers tried to shore up flagging popular support for his gulf policy, they sent out multiple messages: The troops were there to protect the oil supplies—and that meant American jobs. They were there to counter a Hitler-like threat. They were there to protect the American flag flying over the beleaguered U.S. Embassy in Kuwait city.

To Hussein he was sending a message of unyielding resolve. With the American public, he was raising new fears of war. And in the White House, there was a new concern: that the confusion would weaken the new alliance of which Bush was so proud—the Arab and non-Arab states lined up against Iraq.

In the President's mind, things had not changed one bit: What Saddam Hussein had done was wrong. It was a threat to world order and stability. *This aggression would not stand.*

And over the weeks and months, as he thought about these things more and more—the stakes, the risks, the people and the price—the President of the United States, offended as never before, grew ever-more determined.

"His mood, when I saw him, was very calm. Didn't talk too much. Listened. I would say something, Baker, Scowcroft, everybody—he was just listening. And every now and then he would zap a question. I really found him, from Maine onward—the best way I can describe him is calm, cool about the situation," says the man who has come to know George Bush during these most trying moments.

"But every time I've seen him since Maine, those eyes are scary."

—JAMES GERSTENZANG

Testing Limits of New Global Federalism

In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. and Soviet Union are trying to work together to solve regional conflicts. But that cooperation may lessen their influence on other nations.

As Iraqi troops rolled into Kuwait, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III were in Irkutsk, enjoying a soft Siberian summer and a fishing holiday while they wrapped up yet another session in their continuing efforts to negotiate an end to the Cold War.

Downtown, on the streets of Irkutsk, the mood was not so relaxed. The city's 630,000 inhabitants, like those elsewhere in the Soviet Union, were desperate. Earlier that week, riot police had been called to disperse a crowd of about 1,000 shoppers shoving to get into a store that had managed to come up with a shipment of imported men's boots. Across Uritsky Street, Siberian consumers participated in a kind of lottery in hopes of winning prized items such as razors, cigarettes and toothpaste.

Baker and Shevardnadze were nearing the end of their talks when Lt. Gen. Howard Graves, a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was in the secretary of state's delegation, informed Baker of the Iraqi invasion. Baker immediately told Shevardnadze. The Soviet foreign minister was stunned. The previous day, he had told the Americans he was convinced that Saddam Hussein would not invade Kuwait. "This is what 40 years of our policies in the Middle East have come to," Shevardnadze later would tell an aide.

It was too early to know exactly what was happening. Baker left the Soviet Union for Mongolia, while Shevardnadze flew back to Moscow. Aboard Shevardnadze's Aeroflot jet were two of Baker's top aides—Dennis Ross, director of policy planning, and State Department counselor Robert Zoellick. They had intended to sit down with Soviet officials at a *dacha* outside Moscow to work out the agenda their two governments should confront in the coming year.

But as their plane soared across the Urals, talk turned quickly to the Iraqi invasion. Ross' Soviet counterpart, Sergei Tarasenko, bitingly disparaged the brutality of Saddam Hussein, a longtime Soviet ally. Ross and Tarasenko began talking about the possibility of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement condemning the invasion and embargoing arms sales to Iraq. In Moscow, Ross rushed to the American Embassy and called Baker in Mongolia. The Soviets might agree to a joint statement on Iraq, Ross said, if Baker would fly to Moscow and deliver it alongside Shevardnadze.

Baker liked the idea. A joint statement would show the world that a new era had arrived, one in which the two superpowers had a new relationship. Such a statement would make it difficult for the other major nations of the world to lag behind in condemning Iraq. And it would put the lie to any claim by Saddam Hussein that he had international support for his invasion.

Still, ever-cautious, Baker instructed Ross: "Make sure the statement is a good one."

The idea for a quiet weekend at a *dacha* was abandoned. Tarasenko invited Ross to an office in an annex of the Soviet Foreign Ministry compound. He told Ross they should get the latest news from Iraq. The American visitor thought his Soviet colleague was about to pick up the phone and call some Mideast specialist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, or perhaps the KGB. Instead, Tarasenko moved over to an office television and turned on CNN.

Tarasenko phoned Shevardnadze and got tentative approval for a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on the invasion. Ross' aide, Andrew Carpendale, was assigned to begin work on the drafting. All the typewriters in the Soviet Foreign Ministry offices had the Cyrillic alphabet; finally, after a frantic search, Soviet officials located an electric typewriter with the Latin alphabet, and Carpendale went to work.

His draft included an explicit Soviet-U.S. condemnation of Iraq and a demand that Hussein pull his troops out of Kuwait. But on Aug. 3, as Baker and his party were already flying from Mongolia to Moscow, this draft came under attack. Traditionalists in the Soviet Foreign Ministry thought that the statement was too strong. The Soviet Union had not aligned itself with the United States in the Mideast for decades. Wasn't this going too far?

The haggling and uncertainty among Soviet officials continued until just before Baker landed. In the end, Tarasenko, Shevardnadze and, ultimately, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev won out. On Friday night, Aug. 3, soon after Baker's Boeing 707 touched down at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport, the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state appeared before television cameras to

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____
 L.A. Times p. 76
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read the prepared statement.

The two superpowers made clear that their efforts would extend beyond the mere rhetoric of condemnation. "The United States and the Soviet Union believe the international community must not only condemn this action," the two superpowers said, "but also take practical steps in response to it."

The gulf crisis shows how the superpowers hope, in the future, to work together to solve conflicts, and why the Soviet Union has become a staunch champion of a stronger U.N. Security Council—even one able to deploy multinational forces against aggressors.

In seeking to restrain Iraq, the United States and the Soviet Union are working together in an area of the world where Americans and Soviets have been at odds

for more than three decades, virtually since the beginning of the Cold War.

"A major event in the Near East is no longer a subject for confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, whereas before now it had always been a subject of confrontation," observes former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. A senior Bush Administration official terms the gulf crisis "the first major military operation or conflict which hasn't almost immediately taken on East-West overtones."

But the crisis also has underscored one of the paradoxes inherent in what President Bush and others call the "new world order." As the two superpowers cooperate, they may have less influence on the clients they subsidize and support around the world. "The end of the fear of a global conflict may have lifted a restraining force on regional disputes," says UC San

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Diego professor Lawrence B. Krause.

At the same time, the crisis illustrates how a strengthened Security Council could serve the interests of Soviet foreign policy.

"The Soviet Union has learned firsthand the dangers of military overextension, particularly because of serious economic crises at home and in Eastern Europe," wrote Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler in *Foreign Policy* magazine last summer. "As a result, the Kremlin has become perhaps the most active and vocal advocate for a more dynamic United Nations."

Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders have been motivated by more than a belief in world federalism, Weiss and Kessler say. By relying on the United Nations, they argue, "the Soviets are able to extricate themselves abroad and cut the costs of military assistance elsewhere, while using multilateral diplomacy to prevent the United States from taking advantage of this retreat."

A stronger United Nations, they conclude, could help give the Soviet Union "an increased diplomatic role in Central America and the Middle East," two areas from which the Soviets have long been excluded.

Throughout the gulf crisis, Soviet officials have been reluctant to authorize the use of force by the U.S.-led forces in the Persian Gulf. When President Bush met with Gorbachev in Paris early last week, the Soviet leader balked at approving a United Nations resolution that would explicitly authorize military action against Iraq.

Instead, Gorbachev said he felt the solution to the gulf crisis "must be political."

The need for Mideast oil prompted both the quick American response and the determined U.S. effort to enlist Soviet backing.

"While we are concerned about aggression or violation of the U.N. charter and the rest of it, if it were only carrots or wheat that were being produced in the Middle East, rather than the oil on which the world depends, I'm not sure that our reaction would have been as immediate," says James R. Schlesinger, a former secretary of defense, energy secretary and CIA director.

INSIDE CHINA

While Baker and Shevardnadze were reading their joint denunciation of the Iraqi invasion, Assistant Secretary of State for Asia Richard H. Solomon sat furtively with U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack F. Matlock in a small reception room at Vnukovo Airport, hidden from the reporters in Baker's traveling party.

Solomon had been aboard the secretary of state's plane from Mongolia; now he was waiting for a midnight flight that would carry him back across the Urals.

He was about to make a hurried, secretive visit to China.

Only a few minutes before Baker's plane landed in Moscow, the airborne secretary of state had gotten a call from the White House, giving the President's approval for Solomon's trip. Its principal aim was to ensure the Chinese government's cooperation, or at least its tacit acquiescence, in the diplomatic effort against Iraq.

China had an extremely active policy in the Mideast and had, in recent years, been one of the most important arms suppliers to Saddam Hussein.

More important, China was one of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, meaning that Beijing would have the power to veto any resolution imposing an embargo or other collective international action against Iraq.

International revulsion against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has marked a significant turning point in China's campaign to restore ties with the West. Although few could have predicted it, the invasion has offered a possibility for China's gradual return to a modicum of global respectability.

Ever since its crushing of the democracy demonstrations at Tian An Men Square in 1989, China had been treated virtually as an outcast.

Sending Solomon to Beijing itself marked a small step forward for the Bush Administration. After two unsuccessful trips to Beijing by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft the previous year, the Bush Administration had maintained a ban on official contacts with Beijing at the level of assistant secretary or higher. Nonetheless, Solomon was not part of the top inner circle of the Administration's foreign policy team. And the United States kept his contact with the Chinese government at a relatively low level, requesting a meeting only with Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei.

In Beijing, following his all-night flight, Solomon rested and showered at the residence of U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley. Then he went to see Li Peng. Solomon pointed out that not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but also other major countries, including Japan, already had condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. China should not be left out, he argued.

Over the next few days, China joined in the U.N. Security Council resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and imposing international sanctions against

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Iraq. In September, China also went along with the crucial Security Council resolution that implicitly authorized the use of force on behalf of the U.N. embargo.

Thus, China joined in the diplomatic effort. And its cooperation won results.

A few months after the Iraqi invasion, the European Community lifted some of its economic sanctions against China. The World Bank prepared to clear the way for some new loans to China. And Secretary of State Baker met twice this fall with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen—thus increasing significantly the frequency of high-level talks between the United States and China.

INSIDE JAPAN

If it weren't for the curtain of thick clouds, Japan's famed Mt. Fuji would have formed a majestic backdrop to a very odd ceremony. On Sept. 8, in the town of Gotemba, Japan's defense Establishment was celebrating the 40th anniversary of the founding of its postwar military—taking time off on a Saturday morning for target practice with tanks, helicopters, 203-millimeter artillery and Stinger missiles.

In any other nation, such troops would be called an army. In Japan, which has the third-largest military budget in the world, they are labeled the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), a name intended to underscore the passive nature of their mission. But at these ceremonies in Gotemba, the Japanese troops were flaunting their destructive abilities before an enthusiastic crowd of more than 20,000 civilian spectators.

The crowd cheered as formations of tanks roared across the foreground, swiveled their turrets and blasted small targets stuck to the hills some 10 football fields distant. A narrator with a loudspeaker described the hardware as it rolled onto the field, and in the background a high-pitched voice screamed commands to fire.

The shooting went on for nearly two hours. There was a short intermission so the spectators could buy beer, box lunches and military souvenirs—SDF key chains, posters and tractor caps—from stands behind the bleachers. Soldiers in green fatigues milled about.

Sgt. Yuka Komiyama, 26, said she enlisted six years ago and wants to make a career out of the military, even if she marries and rears children. She said it never occurred to her that she might be sent overseas, but added that many of her colleagues are disappointed that Japan had all but ruled out any form of SDF deployment in the Persian Gulf until laws can be revised.

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She was ambivalent about the idea herself.

"If I was ordered to go, I'd go. Maybe I should say I'd be glad to," she said. "A lot of the others would like to go, but we're aware that there are voices in the public that would be opposed."

The crisis in the Persian Gulf casts new doubt upon the seriousness of Japan's professed aspirations to be a major power, to exert its own independent influence in international affairs. And, more than ever, the crisis calls into question the future stability of Japan's alliance with the United States.

In the process, it has exposed all the underlying contradictions of Japan's role in the world and in its relations with the United States:

- Japan's economy, now the world's second-largest, obtains 70% of its oil from the Persian Gulf, yet Japan long has relied on the United States to safeguard such supplies.

- Japan's pacifist constitution, which says the Japanese people "forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation," had been all but imposed upon it by the United States. Yet now, 44 years later, the United States was asking Japan to send its own military forces—mine-sweepers, military transports, SDF logistic personnel—to help out in a possible war against Iraq.

- Recently, as Japan has grown into one of the wealthiest nations in the world, the United States has encouraged Tokyo to develop its own, more assertive and independent foreign policy. Yet in the gulf crisis, U.S. officials scathingly criticized Japan for not following the American policy line.

During the 1980s, the United States and Japan worked in tandem. The United States supplied troops, security and diplomatic leadership, while Japan provided money. The aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion shows that in cases where there is a potential for war and American casualties, the United States will ask Japan to share a new, different, non-financial burden—the burden of risking the loss of life.

From the outset of the gulf crisis, Administration officials had made it plain that cash would not be enough. The United States wanted Japanese personnel and equipment—personnel for support, logistics and other noncombat roles; equipment to transport troops and supplies. Otherwise, U.S. officials said, the American forces might be seen as mercenaries, defending Japanese interests in exchange for payment.

"We're the ones whose asses are on the line, and they're getting 70% of their oil from the area," said one State Department official.

But in Japan, there was intense resistance.

One nationwide poll by Tokyo Television indicated that 78% of the Japanese public opposed sending any SDF forces to the Persian Gulf. Ultimately, none were sent.

The dispute about the use of SDF personnel undermined Japan's position in Washington. And Japan's standing with the Bush Administration was further eroded by additional wrangling and delays about the amount of money Japan should contribute.

When the Bush Administration first asked Tokyo for financial help toward the effort against Iraq, Japan seemed to act as though it were in the midst of yet another business negotiation. Tokyo made some initial low bids, tested the reaction, then came up with a new, higher offer.

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu initially offered \$10 million toward the relief effort in Jordan. A day later, Japanese officials volunteered \$1 billion toward the costs of the multinational forces in Saudi Arabia.

Quickly, President Bush dispatched Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady to Japan to ask for more money. But Brady seemed to get nowhere. Kaifu made no commitments or promises of any kind.

Finally, on Sept. 13, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding that Tokyo pay more money or risk a pullout of 5,000 U.S. troops a year from the American bases in Japan.

A day later, Japan found more money. Kaifu's government offered another \$1 billion for the multinational forces in the Mideast and \$2 billion to help countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. That brought Japan's total financial contribution to \$4 billion.

The White House said it was satisfied. Others were not. For the first time in years, biting criticisms of Japan could be heard not only in Congress but also in the State Department and the Pentagon.

If sufficiently irked by continuing American criticisms and pressure, Japan could reduce its reliance on the United States and bolster its own independent military power. Such a development would alarm Japan's neighbors in Asia,

including China, South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia.

INSIDE EUROPE

On Aug. 2, the day of Iraq's invasion, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher happened to be in Aspen, Colo., preparing to give a speech to the Aspen Institute on the subject of "Shaping a New Global Community." President Bush, too, flew to Colorado to address the symposium.

Inevitably, as the two leaders stood on the grassy lawn of a ranch owned by U.S. Ambassador to Britain Henry Catto, reporters asked them about the unfolding events in Iraq and Kuwait.

Bush temporized. He listed the foreign leaders that he had telephoned. He said he was "concerned about the situation" and was "hoping that a peaceful solution will be found."

Thatcher was much more forceful. What Iraq had done, she said, was "totally unacceptable—and if it were allowed to endure, then there would be many other small countries that could never feel safe."

To onlookers, it appeared as though Thatcher knew that the Iraqi invasion would require a tough response, while Bush still wasn't sure.

Afterward, Bush would say he had been "comforted" by the fact that, in the first days of the invasion, "the prime minister was there with me, answering the tough questions and standing shoulder-to-shoulder."

Iraq's invasion has changed relations between the United States and Europe.

Throughout most of the Cold War, Europe had been the prime battleground, and the United States and its Western European allies had worked primarily on joint endeavors in Europe itself. Now, in this first post-Cold War crisis, the battleground is outside Europe—in the Middle East.

And what counts most is the extent to which Western European countries are willing to support and join American military initiatives.

The Europeans have lined up alongside the Americans to an extent that would

have been unimaginable during the Vietnam War era. At the same time, the gulf crisis has spurred efforts by the European powers to develop their own, united foreign policy in the future.

Britain has led the way among the Europeans in supporting the American military effort against Iraq, in effect reviving its old special relationship with the United States. In the first weeks after the invasion, the British sent naval and air units to the gulf, and by mid-September, it agreed to send ground forces.

Such efforts put Britain once again in a leadership role within Europe. Britain's old rival, Germany, had no desire or ability to play a leading role in the European efforts in the gulf crisis.

No one in Europe wants to spur the remilitarization of Germany. And the Germans can plausibly argue that they have been preoccupied, both emotionally and financially, by the changes in Europe over the past year.

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Germany—which eventually donated \$2 billion to the gulf effort—has been wrapped up in the very first stages of reunification. Moreover, earlier this year, it pledged to contribute more than \$10 billion to get Soviet troops out of Germany and to build housing for them back home. And Germany has promised other, smaller amounts to the new governments of Eastern Europe.

In the year before the Iraqi invasion, Thatcher and other British officials had looked on with dismay as the Bush Administration devoted ever-increasing attention to Germany. The gulf crisis, a British diplomat recently observed, "has given us a chance to be blue-eyed in Washington once again."

And support has come from other European nations, as well.

Last week, after a meeting with President Bush, French President Francois Mitterrand announced that he would support a United Nations resolution that explicitly authorizes the use of military force against Iraq, and he predicted that such a resolution will be approved by the Security Council by mid-December. Since August, France has contributed about 15,000 troops to the Persian Gulf forces, including 5,500 in Saudi Arabia.

"In Europe, we've seen a level of support for the American activities in the Mideast that is unprecedented. It's not just the British, but the French, the Italians, the Dutch," says David P. Calleo, a specialist on Europe at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

INSIDE THE THIRD WORLD

On Thursday, Aug. 16, two weeks after the Iraqi invasion, the lights in Ramna Park in Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, went off early in the evening. They would do so for the foreseeable future. "It looks as though we are at war or in some kind of emergency," said one unhappy stroller as he headed for the gates.

Hundreds of drivers lined up outside gas stations to fill their cars in advance of a newly imposed nationwide ban on oil and gas sales each Friday, the Muslim holiday. That Thursday night, and on succeeding nights, the shops in Dhaka and other cities in Bangladesh closed their doors at 8.

Bangladesh President Hussain Mohammed Ershad had ordered these new austerity measures to conserve energy. Ershad and his government were desperate, because they knew that for countries like Bangladesh, the crisis in the Persian Gulf was a crushing economic disaster.

Bangladesh had about 85,000 workers in Kuwait and Iraq, from among its 400,000 Bangladeshis employed throughout the Middle East. The earnings these

Middle East workers sent back home was Bangladesh's largest single source of foreign exchange, about \$477 million a year. Bangladeshi workers in Kuwait sent home \$89 million last year, and those in Iraq sent home another \$9 million.

As if all of this were not enough, Iraq and Kuwait had served as one of the principal markets for Bangladesh's two leading exports, jute and tea. Iraq alone had bought a quarter of the 40,000 tons of tea auctioned in Bangladesh each year.

Now, this valuable export income was gone. Even if the crisis were short, the government estimated that Bangladesh would lose \$17 million in sales to Iraq and Kuwait.

When the Bangladesh government added it all up, it figured that even a short-term crisis, without a war, would cost Bangladesh from \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion.

The gulf crisis is proving once again the hard lesson that the Third World learned during the oil crises of the 1970s: When the rich get a little poorer, the poor get much poorer.

At times of world crisis, the most impoverished nations in the world find themselves paying higher prices for oil. They are forced to move ever further into the future their slim hopes for paying off their international debts.

Bangladesh cannot afford the luxurious, tree-lined surroundings of Washington's Embassy Row. Its embassy in Washington is perched on the third floor of a functional office and residential complex, just above the Gold Star Cleaners and the A & A Fine Wine & Spirits. Inside, Ambassador A. H. S. Ataul Karim and his staff of 15 spend their days trying to find the money and resources to keep their homeland afloat.

Before the gulf crisis, Karim admits, he and other Bangladeshi officials had hoped that the end of the Cold War would bring about a series of changes that might benefit the poorest nations in the world. There might be some sort of worldwide peace dividend, he thought. "If the world spent less on armaments, there may be more for development."

In retrospect, that was only a fond hope.

Bangladesh had been working hard to promote an international meeting known as the United Nations Conference on Least Developed Countries, the first session of its kind in nearly a decade. Its purpose would be to draw attention to and, perhaps, some new financial help for what are called the LDCs—the least developed countries in the world, those at the very bottom of the heap.

The U.N. conference began Sept. 3, just a month after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. And delegates from the LDCs

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quickly found that the gulf crisis had wrecked whatever chance they had of getting more economic help.

A delegate from Saudi Arabia bluntly warned that there would be less Arab aid available for the poorest nations. The Iraqi invasion had wiped out any possibility of money from Kuwait, he noted, and Saudi Arabia would be required to pay billions of dollars toward the cost of multinational troops in the gulf.

Richard McCormack, Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, told the conference that the United States would resist committing itself to a specific target for aid to the poorest nations. The most important factor, McCormack said, was not the level of aid but having "democratic, accountable governments and market-based economies."

At midpoint in the conference, Iraq's Saddam Hussein publicly offered the poorest nations free oil—so long as they could collect it themselves.

Hussein apparently intended his offer as little more than a joke and a political ploy. However, officials from the poorest nations, desperate for cheap oil, took Hussein's offer literally—and were outraged by it.

"How do you bring the oil back through a blockade?" asked Thomas Chery, Haiti's delegate.

"Did Saddam Hussein not know before that we needed oil?" asked Botswana's representative, F. G. Mogae. "If he wanted to help developing countries, he should not have attacked [Kuwait] in the first place."

—JIM MANN

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PROGRAM TO "ABC NEWS' THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY."

ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, November 25, 1990

GUESTS:

BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Adviser

JOHN BIFFEN
Conservative Member of the British Parliament

TERESA GORMAN
Conservative Member of the British Parliament

PEREGRINE WORSTHORNE
London Sunday Telegraph Columnist

INTERVIEWED BY:

David Brinkley - ABC News

George F. Will - ABC News Analyst

Sam Donaldson - ABC News

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MR. BRINKLEY: With us now, from London, Peregrine Worsthorne, who is a columnist for the London Sunday Telegraph. Mr. Worsthorne, thank you for coming in. We're very happy to have you with us.

MR. WORSTHORNE: Nice to be with you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you. Here with us in the studio are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC News. Now, Mr. Worsthorne, tell us, assuming the new prime minister is one of the three we now see and hear about, what changes would you foresee in Britain?

MR. WORSTHORNE: I don't think there will be any dramatic change in policy. This isn't a change of party, and most of the--in fact all of the contenders have been--are members, obviously, of the Conservative Party, and they've all been members of a Thatcher government. So there's not going to be any dramatic change so far as foreign policy is concerned, or indeed so far as domestic policy is concerned. I think what we're going to miss is the inspirational leadership of a personality, of an individual. The vigor and the resolution of Mrs. Thatcher is something which can't be replaced by any of those three people, and that's what we're going to miss.

MR. WILL: Mr. Worsthorne, she seems to have been brought down by a combination of three things: fear, resentment, and an idea. The fear was that she could not win a fourth election. The resentment was of her personal manner. But the idea was Europe. To what extent will the Conservative Party continue to reflect her skepticism about the unification of Europe?

MR. WORSTHORNE: I think that's the great unknown quantity. I think she did feel more strongly and more passionately than perhaps anybody else at the top rank of British politics that monetary and political union would be the end of Britain as we know it, to use that cliched phrase. I think others feel that they can finesse the changes so that Britain will really continue much as before. I think she felt that here was a watershed, here was a choice, and that she stood clearcut that at the moment we couldn't join monetary union, we couldn't commit ourselves to going ahead into political union, because, whereas France and Germany, the other two great powers, could find a European super state acceptable to their national identity, we couldn't. It was curtains for Britain, for the historic Britain, and she was going to stand up and prevent that happening. I don't think any of the other leaders who are contending for her position feel as passionately as that, except possibly and potentially John Major, who comes from the same kind of social background as Mrs. Thatcher, i.e., what we call here, the lower middle class, and they are the patriotic section of this country at the present time. It used to be the upper class you could rely on for those kinds of strong sentiments about the importance of being, maintaining an independent Britain, but now it's the lower middle class. Major is the man in my view.

MR. WILL: In 1975, I believe it was, the British had a referendum on the subject of entering Europe and voted yes. Do you think there might be a referendum today, and how might it turn out?

MR. WORSTHORNE: Well, Mrs. Thatcher pretty well committed or, she said she had an open mind about the possibility of a referendum. And I think, myself, this is a way--I don't know whether either, any of the people who are going to succeed her, or might succeed her would share that view.

I think there's a lot to be said for a referendum. I think the British people deserve it. At the end of the negotiating period, when the British government or the British prime minister of the day has got as best a deal as they can out of the inter-governmental conferences that are going to start next year, I think when they've got the deal they could come back to the British people and say, here is the deal we propose, or we think you shouldn't accept, or we think you should accept. We put it to you to make the final decision. That would take a lot of the inter-party or the inter-faction steam out of the issue, and I think it would be a good idea myself. Mrs. Thatcher was keen on it. I don't know any of the others yet who have committed themselves on it.

MR. DONALDSON: You just a moment ago said Major was the man, in your view. It is said that Mrs. Thatcher favors him also. Do you believe he will win next Tuesday, or is that simply your preference?

MR. WORSTHORNE: I think he's got a very good chance. I think it will go to a third ballot. Many of the people who are, at the moment, going to back Mr. Hurd in the second ballot, when he falls out, I think they could switch to Mr. Major, and I would say he's got a very, very good chance. Of course, at the moment, Mr. Heseltine is the favorite. His name is being tremendously--given a lot of publicity in the last few days. People know the name. They don't really know the name of Major very much. But over this weekend they're getting to know it. I think Major is in the race with a very, very good start at winning.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, of course, Heseltine is the man who did it. He's the one who stood up to her. Do you dislike him so that you discount him?

MR. WORSTHORNE: I think it would be very dangerous ever to discount a man because one dislikes him. You can't exaggerate the degree to which I dislike him, but I don't discount him. I think he's got a larger momentum behind him. He's a very charismatic personality. As you say, he's the man who wielded the dagger, and they don't usually inherit the crown. But in his case, he's got so many golden locks that the crown would look pretty on his head, and he's got a very good chance, too.

I don't think he's the man with the caliber to lead Britain. He's got all glitz and glamour. I don't think he's got substance. No, I think the--he's not the man to succeed.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Worsthorne, thank you. Thank you very much for coming in and giving us your views. It's been a pleasure to have you.

Coming next, also from London, John Biffen, a Conservative member of Parliament, and former cabinet minister, and Teresa Gorman, a Conservative member of Parliament, in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Biffen and Ms. Gorman, thank you both very much for coming in. Pleased to have you with us today.

MS. GORMAN: Nice to be with you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you. Now, the names we hear on this side of the Atlantic--perhaps

the same ones you hear there--are those of Heseltine, Major and Hurd--candidates to succeed Mrs. Thatcher. Mr. Biffen, do you have a choice among the three?

MR. BIFFEN: Well, I've not told anyone. I haven't told the chairman of my caucus, and I'm maintaining that secrecy.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, you would like--you would want to tell him before you tell us, right?

MR. BIFFEN: Certainly.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, I understand that. Ms. Gorman, do you have a choice?

MS. GORMAN: Mr. Heseltine is the man who began to bring down Mrs. Thatcher, and I wouldn't vote for him if he were the last politician alive. He's a playboy, a man who's used his private wealth for a number of years to try and bring about this coup. Mr. Hurd is a highly respected, bookish bureaucrat. He was originally a diplomat.

Mr. Major is, perhaps uniquely amongst politicians, both honest and nice. And I think we're seeing in him the birth of a new Abe Lincoln type character--from a relatively humble background--not much education because he went out to earn money for his family early on; but very bright, very attractive, and certainly the person most likely to carry on where Mrs. Thatcher left off.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you. George?

MR. WILL: Mr. Biffen, beginning with you, I'd like each of you in very short compass--I know it's a difficult task--tell us what Mrs. Thatcher accomplished and what is apt to last of that. Mr. Biffen?

MR. BIFFEN: Well, I think that she very much represented the rebirth of the social market economy in Britain, with an emphasis upon the use of market forces and of sound money and of some of the traditional liberal values. I think that she will be remembered for that.

MR. WILL: Ms. Gorman, could you answer that question also and say who threatens that, who's most apt to carry it on--and I gather your choice is Major. What would happen, from an American point of view, looking at the special relationship, so-called, if either Hurd or Heseltine replaces her?

MS. GORMAN: I think in terms of that, and also in terms of the Gulf situation, all candidates--and across political parties in Britain--we are resolved to stand by the position that Saddam Hussein must leave the Kuwaiti territory. So I don't think there's any difficulty there.

So far as domestically, I think that John Major's ideas are in the tradition of Mrs. Thatcher. Mrs. Thatcher completely changed the way in which British people regard themselves. She restored our self-respect when we were on our knees politically and internationally. She gave us back a sense of pride, and she changed the economy of Britain out of all recognition.

MR. DONALDSON: I'm sorry, go ahead. I didn't mean to interrupt you.

MS. GORMAN: Well, we were being dominated, as you know, by trade union strife. Our economy was in a parlous condition. And she reinstated the idea that people had to earn their money before they could spend it. The idea that free trade was the basis of economic progress, and those principles which really are very similar, I think, to yours in America, were the foundation of her great success.

But she embodied for people the feeling of Britishness. And that is why this country today, the people in this country, are mourning her demise. And I am furious with our politicians for doing this to her.

MR. DONALDSON: The people in the country, according to the polls, said that they would not re-elect Conservatives, if she was the head of the party. But let me throw a little cold water on all of this.

You have very high inflation, you have low growth. It is said that Mrs. Thatcher was arrogant. And, Mr. Biffen, am I correct, you at one time called her the last of the great Stalinists?

MR. BIFFEN: Yes. I certainly said that there was a very authoritarian ring about government, and I used the word "Stalinism"--not quite the phrase that you used, but I'm happy to accept it.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me ask you--I'm going to draw you out more about Mrs. Thatcher. We've talked about her good points. But clearly she was not ousted simply because the fates had it without any independent reason. Wasn't there a reason why she was deposed?

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, it's a very complex topic--not one to be resolved in a few seconds' exchanges trans-Atlantic television. But, quite clearly, after eleven years, you build up a certain amount of resentment, you build up a certain amount of being accepted for granted.

I think that the difficulties of the poll tax were very formidable, were laid at her door. I think the economy was not performing as well in the last two or three years as in the early period of her premiership. And I think the European Community issue--I'm quite certain she was trying to strike out a very defensible role for the British. Nonetheless, it did result in division within the cabinet.

It was against that background--but, above all, against the background that the party was not doing well in by-elections-- that the atmosphere was created which enabled a challenge to be undertaken.

MR. DONALDSON: Ms. Gorman, how about that? I mean, is it not correct that it appeared that the Conservatives would not win the next election with Ms. Thatcher as its head?

MS. GORMAN: Well, I think the issue which was causing most of the problem--certainly a high inflation rate and the descent that went with that--was related to Europe. Europe is the key to all of this. Mrs. Thatcher was torpedoed by Sir Geoffrey Howe who was very pro-European, who was one of the authors of the treaty which will take us into political union with Europe, possibly now in Mrs. Thatcher's absence. And it was this issue which was dividing our party.

The incidents of Mr. Heseltine being around looking or waiting for his chance to grab the job in a way was almost incidental to that. I don't think your American audience will perhaps realize that what Britain is on the edge of doing, on the brink of doing, is parting with its sovereignty, its ability

to make its own laws in parliament. And that is what Mrs. Thatcher was trying to alert the public to, and to prevent. And the timing of this incident is very much tied up with the fact that, in December, the final act of that union is likely to be signed. Mrs. Thatcher saw the potential danger. Britain fought its only civil war to retain the sovereignty of its parliament.

But there were other factors involved. Mrs. Thatcher has always been an outsider politically from the establishment point of view. She was a woman, to begin with. She was a domineering woman in the sense that she knew where she was going. She is enormously popular with the public, but not with the grandees in the Conservative Party who find it very difficult to relate to women, except as nannies or grannies or lovers--but certainly not in a position of authority over them. That's always got up their nose.

A cabal of those people together have brought down the finest politician that this country has probably produced this century.

MR. WILL: Ms. Gorman, you spoke very generously a minute or two ago about Mr. Major. He has said that he would like to produce in Britain a classless society. Is that possible? And, if so, how?

MS. GORMAN: I think it's very difficult. I imagine that what he means is some greater distribution of the wealth of the country. I hope that he doesn't mean--and I don't believe he means--that this will be done through taxation and forcible redistribution.

MR. DONALDSON: May I just ask Mr. Biffen to respond to Ms. Gorman's assertion that Ms. Thatcher was brought down to a large extent because men saw her only as a domineering woman who should have kept her place in the kitchen or the bedroom. Is that right?

MR. BRINKLEY: I don't think that would be my interpretation of Tory politics, or of the men involved in it. But Teresa Gorman is absolutely right in saying that the European issue is of the most profound importance in the United Kingdom; but at this stage, it is still largely a Westminster issue, rather than a popular issue. And it was the defection of major figures like, for example, the chancellor of the exchequer and the deputy prime minister on the European issue which carried tremendous significance at Westminster.

If you then go to the countryside for the current unpopularity of the government, that is related to other matters--like, for example, the community charge; like, for example, the high levels of interest rate and the high levels of inflation. And you mustn't confuse what is the matter of popular action in the countryside and what actually is the matter for destructive and decisive action within the world of Westminster.

MR. BRINKLEY: George, we have a little bit of time left. George.

MR. WILL: Mr. Biffen, at Bruges two years ago, the prime minister, said, "We have not rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain to see them imposed again at the European level." Would that make a suitable subject for a British referendum on Europe?

MR. BIFFEN: I think a referendum is an extraordinarily difficult thing to devise. We had one on the question of British membership of the Rome treaty.

MS. GORMAN: But John knows--

MR. BIFFEN: Sorry, can I just conclude? And the experience there was, whatever the referendum was about, it really wasn't about the narrow issue on the ballot paper. That's the difficulty. That's why there is a profound unease in the United Kingdom over the use of a referendum as a means of government.

MR. BRINKLEY: Ms. Gorman, we have a few seconds left. I'll give you the last word.

MS. GORMAN: Well, the British people and Mrs. Thatcher are not anti-Europeans. Mrs. Thatcher saw Europe as an opportunity to broaden trade, to do away with barriers. But the people who wish to take us into Europe will be taking us into a restrictive market which will make it difficult to trade freely, which has caused food prices in Europe to be twice what they need to be, and distorted the whole concept of free trade. That is what Mrs. Thatcher was battling against. The British people have never been desperately pro-Europe. Even in that poll, only a minority of people even voted. And that is the issue on which the next election will be fought.

MR. BRINKLEY: Ms. Gorman and Mr. Biffen, thank you. Thank you both very much for coming in--delighted to have you with us. Come again.

MS. GORMAN: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, finally, the other news of the week--the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, the president and the threat or talk of war. So, coming next, General Brent Scowcroft, assistant to President Bush for national security--in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: General Scowcroft, thanks for coming in. Glad to see you, as always.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, first of all, bring us up to date. What's happening in the Middle East that we should know about?

MR. SCOWCROFT: The president has just finished consultations with two of the primary allies, members of the coalition in the Gulf--King Fahd and President Mubarak.

MR. BRINKLEY: Syria.

MR. SCOWCROFT: And both of them urged that he see President Assad. And so he did that. And I think it was an important thing for him to have done. And I think the coalition, by and large, is in good shape.

MR. BRINKLEY: Both of them insisted on a peaceful settlement. They're not very eager for any sort of military action, are they?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't think anybody is eager for military action. But neither are they eager to have this drawn out over an indefinite period of time with all the hazards. This international coalition is a disparate group of people. There are all sorts of tensions and pressures one way or another. And I think there's a common feeling, not only within the coalition, but I think within the members of the (inaudible) that it needs to be brought to an end.

MR. BRINKLEY: This is an unfair question, but I'll ask it anyway. Tell me in terms of percentages what you think the chances of war really are.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I really don't want to do that.

MR. BRINKLEY: I thought you wouldn't.

MR. SCOWCROFT: But let me say this. It is my judgment that the best chance to avoid war is to confront Saddam Hussein with the prospects of war.

MR. WILL: You suggest, General, that the president went to see Assad because the president of Egypt and the leaders of Saudi Arabia suggested it. Is that your implication?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, not solely. But the visit was not scheduled before we left on the trip. And I think that they did have something to do with his seeing him.

MR. WILL: The president's moral characterization of this enterprise in the Middle East is that Saddam Hussein is a terrorist, an aggressor, and a killer of his own people. That describes Mr. Assad to a tee.

Is there some danger, as the Israelis think, that we are now doing with Assad of Syria what we did in cozying up to Saddam Hussein of Iraq before he began to run wild?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't think we cozied up to Saddam Hussein. There always is some danger when you deal with people who have unsavory aspects, as does President Assad.

MR. WILL: Do you disagree with my characterization of Assad?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't; no, I don't. But I think, in this particular instance, he does have sizeable military forces which he is prepared to use--which make an important contribution. And he significantly widens the spectrum of Arabs opposed to what the Iraqis have done.

MR. WILL: Can you tell us if either the secretary of state or the president in their dealings with Mr. Assad have asked him to either expel from Damascus or, better yet, turn over to us, Ahmed Jibril who is suspected of being--and there is considerable evidence, I gather--of being connected with the bombing of Pan Am 103?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Without getting too explicit, yes.

MR. WILL: What did he say?

MR. SCOWCROFT: He said we'd like some proof.

MR. WILL: Do we have it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We're discussing that with him at the present time.

MR. DONALDSON: General, next Thursday, there will be a what--a meeting of the Security Council to act on a resolution. And it is said that we have now abandoned the idea of putting in the words about the use of force but will use some other words to make it clear that's what the resolution would authorize.

Tell us what kinds of words we want to use.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, you know, I can't tell you what words will be used because that will be a part of the negotiation which has been going on for some time and will conclude presumably this weekend. But it will be something like taking the necessary means to enforce the ten U.N. resolutions which so far Saddam Hussein has ignored.

MR. DONALDSON: And it will be understand that if you say the "necessary means," that means military force, if necessary?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's correct.

MR. DONALDSON: Now, if that resolution passes and the president then has that authorization, will he still feel the need to abide, I guess, by the Constitution and go to the Congress, if, in fact, we're going to declare war on Saddam Hussein?

MR. SCOWCROFT: It's a complicated question. The president--

MR. DONALDSON: If I may, General, I thought it was a rather simple question.

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, no. It's a complicated question because there is a perennial issue between the Congress and the president, and there has been for 200 years, on the constitutional role of each in the making of war. And without--that's the complicated part of it because the Constitution is ambiguous.

MR. DONALDSON: Are you challenging the--

MR. SCOWCROFT: The president has consulted very, very closely, every step of the way here; and he intends to continue.

MR. DONALDSON: Are you challenging the premise that it is the Congress that has the right to declare war?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I'm not.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you believe the president does?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No--but the president is the commander-in-chief as well.

MR. DONALDSON: So your premise is he can conduct a war, just simply not declare it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Even the War Powers Act does not say that the president does not have the right to move troops into an area of conflict.

MR. WILL: General, granted that there's a broad grey area here and grant that the presidential discretion and close calls get respected, but it's one thing for Jefferson in an age when Congress is dispersed all over bad roads in this country to send ships to deal with the Barbary pirates. You have 400,000 American troops at a standing start in the desert. Wouldn't that seem to be a pretty clear case where Congress ought to speak first?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think the president is working with the leadership of Congress, and will try to keep them fully apprised and in discussions with them, as he's had before--consult with them.

MR. WILL: Let me recur to the U.N. question. Sam asked if it gets passed, then, is it our position that, before we can legitimately exercised force--since we've now made something of a cult of the multilateral aspect of all this--that before we can use force, we need the U.N. resolution to legitimize it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, no. It is not our position, no.

MR. DONALDSON: General, let me ask you about the idea that the president brought up in the Gulf, that Saddam Hussein is nearing the point where he'll have a nuclear weapon. How long before you think he'll have a nuclear weapon?

MR. SCOWCROFT: The estimates--and I'm not an expert on that--the estimates from months to as much as ten years.

MR. DONALDSON: You say months to as much as ten years. So you say within a few months he could have it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: There are some nuclear experts who feel that is the case.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, we're basing policy, I take it, on what we think to be the case.

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I think the point the president is making is that for those who say let sanctions run a year, two years, whatever, raises the possibility that we could face an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, which would dramatically change the character of any conflict.

MR. DONALDSON: All right. Building one bomb or one nuclear device is one thing; having a number of nuclear weapons is quite another. Do you really believe that Saddam Hussein will have an array of a nuclear arsenal within a few months?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No. Building even one could make a significant difference for troops fighting in the region.

MR. DONALDSON: But is that a reason--may I ask, General, is that a reason to go on the offensive against Saddam Hussein, all other things being equal? That is, we need to take him out before he obtains nuclear capacity. Are you putting that forth as the reason why we should go to war?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I'm putting that forth as a reason that has to be considered among other reasons when we look at the possibilities of conflict and the danger to our and the coalition troops.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, are we sufficiently concerned with the fact that the country we are confronting has a taste for terrorism--blowing up airplanes, truckloads of bombs driven by a suicide driver, machine guns at airports, that sort of thing? Isn't that something we should consider?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, it is something that we should consider.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, how do we deal with it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: And we have many indications that he's doing what he can to prepare terrorist attacks, yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: What we have heard is that he has gathered a whole raft of terrorists into his country, and they are standing around awaiting instructions. Is that right?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's right.

MR. DONALDSON: General, if we have a war, how bloody do you think it will be? How many American casualties do you think we'll suffer?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I'm not going to estimate the number of casualties.

MR. DONALDSON: But isn't that one of the considerations also? Wouldn't it be?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Of course, of course.

MR. BRINKLEY: George, you've got a few seconds.

MR. WILL: On a range--if our intelligence says between a few months and ten years for nuclear weapons, we must be basing it on one of something in that continuum. Are we basing it on a worst case that it might be soon? And, if so, we lived confronting the Soviet Union with 13,000 nuclear

weapons for a number of years. Does possession of a nuclear weapon radically change the calendar by which we calculate when we must choose to use force or not?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I believe that the chief impact of the timing of his obtaining nuclear weapons is that, in terms of casualties, for example, it could dramatically change the casualties we might face were we to use force. And there's every indication. You know, there are enormous inhibitions about the use of nuclear weapons by the major powers; but nobody else has used gas in the way he has either. So I think one has to assume that he might be more willing to use nuclear weapons than has any other power.

MR. DONALDSON: I know you can't estimate casualties within a few numbers, and I'm not asking for that. But there are some people who say, of course, air power will do it--and we'd have a pretty bloodless war when it came to American casualties. And others believe that in fact American troops would have to get in there on the ground and root out the Iraqi army.

And that's why I asked you what estimate you make of the possibility of American casualties.

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think we have to estimate that he has a large army, fairly sophisticated technologically, and battle-hardened, by and large--and that he will not be an easy opponent to deal with. Now, it may turn out that way because he's never faced air power such as he's facing now--never had to fight without air superiority. We'll have to wait and see.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, thank you. Thanks for being with us. Come again.

MR. SCOWCROFT: My pleasure.

Lonely at the top

Bush's 'Skull and Bones' diplomacy is causing confusion and undermining his Gulf policy

In the darkest hours of the budget crisis, George Bush could always comfort himself with the thought that his strongest suit—and the source of his highest approval ratings—was foreign affairs. But now, as his efforts to frighten Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait threaten instead to erode domestic support for his Persian Gulf policy, Bush is learning that foreign policy and domestic politics are inseparable.

The President's trip to Europe and the Middle East this week should restore some of the shine to his Foreign Policy Presidency, especially if he and Secretary of State James Baker return with the votes to pass a U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing military action against Iraq. But Bush's problems will not go away without some soul-searching by the President and his top advisers about why they are doing such a poor job of convincing Congress and the American people that the nation's vital interests are on the line in the Persian Gulf.

Six reasons to fight. On the surface, the explanation is confusion: Administration officials have offered, with varying degrees of conviction, at least six overlapping reasons why American men and women may have to die in a war with Iraq. Baker told U.S. troops in the Gulf they are defending a new world order. Bush, after initially avoiding any mention of American "hostages," has expressed outrage at Hussein's treatment of his "guests" and also of the beleaguered American Embassy in Kuwait. The President also has cited the principle of combatting aggression, and oil sometimes is cited and sometimes rejected as a *casus belli*. In Tokyo, Vice President Dan Quayle suggested the U.S. must stop Hussein from obtaining nuclear weapons. In Bermuda last week, Baker added still another explanation

for why Americans are risking their lives in the Gulf: "If you want to sum it up in one word," he said, "it's jobs."

All these reasons have merit; it is the random way they appear that is undermining the administration's case for confronting Hussein. But poor communications is only a symptom. At the core of the problem, say analysts inside the government and out, is Bush's personal philosophy of foreign affairs and an elitist management style—both of which dismiss the importance of domestic politics in crafting foreign policy. "There are so many conflicting statements about our policy because no one knows what it is—including the [cabinet] Secretaries—except George Bush," says a senior military official.

With experience in China and at the U.N., and as director of the CIA, Bush has confidence in his own judgment, and there is no one in his inner circle, including Baker, who has the expertise or the experience to challenge him. The President is his own Henry Kissinger.

Bush never tires of quoting the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who declared that politics "stops at the water's edge." But when Vandenberg made his remark in 1948, he was speaking of a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy forged in response to a hostile, nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Today, the Soviets are U.S. allies in the Gulf, and Hussein, despite the Hitler comparisons, is a less convincing threat to American security.

The costs of the administration's failure to create a political foundation for its Gulf policy are now becoming apparent. The President's belated acknowledgment that U.S. forces must be prepared to go on the offensive, coupled with the decision to double the number of troops in the Gulf and an off-the-cuff statement by Defense Secretary Dick



The inner circle. General Powell, Baker,

Cheney (which took his own top military commanders by surprise and was quickly "clarified") that U.S. troops won't be rotated, set off a mini-rebellion on Capitol Hill. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), a bellwether of congressional opinion, was not alone in sensing the administration's shift from a defensive posture to an offensive one—or in observing that Bush has failed to make the case for liberating Kuwait. Even conservative Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.) admits that the White House has a problem: "I think the American people are anxious about where we are, and so am I."

Others on the Hill—and privately some in the Pentagon—worry that Bush's Gulf policy is turning into a per-



Scowcroft and Cheney hold the only spots at the table when the President makes foreign policy

sonal crusade against Saddam Hussein, one that may be gathering a momentum all its own. "Bush is simply getting himself into a box and making it very difficult not to take offensive action," says Representative Tony Beilenson (D-Calif.).

One senior official blames White House Chief of Staff John Sununu for failing to bring Congress into the loop, out of arrogance and ideology, and for limiting Bush's access to outside opinions—shutting out even the President's closest friends. But Baker, the President's best friend and former campaign manager, should know better. Admirers suggest Baker is too busy learning diplomacy to worry about Bush's political standing. Detractors say he is too busy worrying about his own reputation to

care. Bush friends say the President will put up with almost anything from Baker, even recent leaks from the State Department suggesting that Baker provides the brakes on Bush's march to war.

Despite Bush's failures and Congress's growing fears, the administration remains firmly in control: Fearful of appearing soft on Saddam Hussein, the Democrats for now are content to carp and criticize and reluctant to confront the President.

But the administration's elite, secretive Skull and Bones (Bush's secret society at Yale) diplomacy leaves top policymakers isolated, talking mostly to each other. Bush has not convened the full National Security Council to discuss the Gulf crisis since Iraq invaded Kuwait on

August 2. Instead, he relies on five advisers—Baker, Cheney, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell and at times Sununu. Among the key voices not heard—nor sought out—are CIA chief William Webster, Atty. Gen. Dick Thornburgh and Quayle. "One of them might be able to provide the kind of outside, common-sense assessment we need," says one official.

Elitism is also flourishing in the State Department, where Baker relies on a small inner circle of generalists, most brought over from the staff of the Bush campaign or the Treasury, and disdains the advice of experts and diplomats.

Self-serving leaks. When the world was tilting in their favor last year—the Berlin Wall crumbling and the Soviets withdrawing from Eastern Europe—Bush and Baker delighted in foreign policy by surprise. It added drama, and a semblance of leadership, to what was basically a reactive foreign policy. And by restricting decision making and information to a small number of players they choked off unfavorable news leaks and filled the vacuum with their own self-serving ones. Reluctant to submit their policies to open debate, even within the administration itself, Bush and Baker have relied on campaign-style sloganeering, closed-door politicking with congressional leaders and spin control to sell their ideas.


The absence of a mandate for an attack, reflected in the anxiety on Capitol Hill and in a *Los Angeles Times* poll showing 53 percent of Americans oppose war with Iraq, is undermining Bush's effort to pry the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Although dissent in America could convince the Iraqi dictator that he has nothing to fear, in post-Vietnam, post-Watergate America it is not likely to fade.

Even more troubling, many of the American troops bivouacked in the Saudi desert are increasingly perturbed by the absence of a clearly defined mission—and of even a vague timetable for action. "The real goals still aren't clear," says Army Specialist Richard Ramirez of Lubbock, Tex. Adds Marine Lance Cpl. Christopher Bost from Hot Springs, Ark.: "I can take anything—even the

U.S. NEWS

idea that there's no rotations... [but] the longer you stay with nothing happening, the more people put it on the back burner, the more opposition it's going to get back home. ... No support at home: That's what a lot of us would find hardest to take."

Other costs may become clear only with time. After the crisis, Mideast experts warn, America will confront a host of troublesome issues in the Middle East, from regional arms control to the Arab-Israeli conflict, to possible rebellions against pro-Western Arab leaders, especially if the conflict ends in war. "I have no sense that they're planning for any of these," says William B. Quandt of the Brookings Institution. "When you've got five people all stretched to the limit, there is little time for anything more than crisis management." Quandt says the 1973 Arab-Israeli war "caught Henry



JACQUES LANGEVIN - SYGMA

Desert quarters. The troops wonder if they can ever leave

Kissinger by surprise. But he immediately began asking, 'What position do we want the U.S. to be in when it's over?'"

Already, there are signs that some of the allies Bush and Baker are counting on may have different outcomes in mind. Yevgeny Primakov, a Soviet Mideast expert who sometimes — but not always —

reflects official thinking, last week suggested a deal that could give Iraq control over some Kuwaiti oil and territory, launch an international conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict (something Washington has long opposed), demand that Israel sign a nuclear nonproliferation agreement and leave Israel's borders guaranteed by Moscow and Washington.

But if he cannot mobilize enough domestic support to convince Hussein that he must get out of Kuwait or face destruction, Bush may be forced to accept an unpalatable diplomatic settlement or else launch an unpopular war. "Foreign policy was supposed to be his strong suit," says an old friend. "If he botches this, it's all over."

BY CARLA ANNE ROBBINS WITH KENNETH T. WALSH, STEVEN V. ROBERTS AND BRUCE B. AUSTER AND RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF IN SAUDI ARABIA

FOLLOW THE MONEY

Desert Shield deadbeats?

War is not only hell; it is expensive. Last week, as 200,000 more troops were dispatched to the Gulf, the Congressional Budget Office doubled its 1991 cost estimate for Operation Desert Shield — to \$12 billion. If the shooting starts, that guesstimate will be the first casualty. The second may be the burden-sharing arrangements the United States has brokered with allies.

Clashes on the financial front already have begun. More than 40 countries have pledged some \$20 billion in aid through 1991, but the Germans haven't provided a cent of the \$260 million they pledged for 1990, nor has South Korea, which promised \$50 million this year. Japan has sent \$376 million, but is behind, officials say, on the remaining \$624 million in promised in-kind contributions, such as equipment and airlift costs.

Those countries say the money is on the way. "We have already done quite a bit," says a Japanese diplomat. "We know there is some more to do, but we're doing our best." But the Bush administration is a bit angry. "We'd like to see faster disbursements," Treasury Under Secretary David Mulford said recently. Why the recalcitrance?

"They're balking at cold, hard cash because it has all kinds of overtones," says Lawrence J. Korb of the Brookings Institution. "It is the mercenary aspect."

There is no danger that Desert Shield will go unfunded. So far, Congress has appropriated \$2 billion for

The checks are in the mail

Some wealthier nations have been slow to provide promised aid to Operation Desert Shield. As of November 13, the United States had received about \$3 billion from its allies.

	PLEGGED	PAID
Kuwait	\$2.5 bil.	\$1.75 bil.
Pledged through 1991: Undetermined		
Saudi Arabia	\$760 mil.	\$760 mil.
Pledged through 1991: \$10 bil.		
Germany	\$260 mil.	\$0
Pledged through 1991: \$2.1 bil.		
South Korea	\$50 mil.	\$0
Pledged through 1991: \$220 mil.		
Japan	\$1 bil.	\$376 mil.
Pledged through 1991: \$4 bil.		

Note: Pledges for 1991 are money, economic aid and material.

the operation. Each Tuesday, the U.S. Treasury receives a \$250 million wire transfer from Kuwait's government-in-exile. Saudi Arabia is covering logistic costs for U.S. troops there — bills for gasoline, for jet fuel, for drinking water — things like that, says a Saudi official. Gasoline and jet fuel alone, he claims, cost at least \$500 million a month. But the Saudis are earning \$50 million to \$150 million extra each day thanks to rising oil prices.

Nations contribute to Operation Desert Shield in four ways. They commit forces. They provide fuel and medical teams. They contribute money to the U.S. for the cost of fielding the Gulf force. And they offer economic aid to "front-line states" that bear the burden of sanctions against Iraq.

No one contends that squabbling will crack the Desert Shield, though actual fighting could change the burden-sharing equation. Korb puts the daily cost of conflict with Iraq at \$1 billion, though the calculation is crude (he simply reduced by three quarters the Pentagon's old estimate of the cost of fighting the Warsaw Pact). But few challenge his math. "The fact is," says one Pentagon analyst, "no one really knows what this could cost."

BY STEPHEN J. HEDGES WITH RICHARD Z. CHESNOFF IN SAUDI ARABIA

Support rises for war to defuse a nuclear Iraq

By Stephen Kurkjian
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON - Military specialists are divided on how long it might take Iraq to develop a nuclear bomb, yet eliminating that nuclear threat has become the most compelling reason cited by Americans as justification for a Persian Gulf war.

As Congress prepares for hearings on President Bush's handling of the crisis, polls show that elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction - its supplies of chemical bombs and its programs to develop nuclear and biological weapons - is the only goal seen as worth the loss of American lives.

In contrast, barely a third of those polled agreed with Bush that forcing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and freeing the region's massive oil reserves are worth the cost of launching a war.

Bush may be taking notice of the shift in attitudes. On his visit to US troops in Saudi Arabia, the president suggested that Iraq may develop nuclear weapons far sooner than the five to 10 years most analysts have cited.

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said yesterday that although Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is making "steady progress" on developing a nuclear bomb, "no one can put a timetable" on when he might succeed. "What we do know is he is doing everything he can to acquire the capability," Cheney said on the CBS News program "Face the Nation."

In a separate interview, Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, said some specialists in nuclear development have estimated that Iraq may be only "months" away from developing a bomb.

Scowcroft, appearing on the ABC News program "This Week With David Brinkley," said Bush had decided to emphasize Iraq's closeness to developing a nuclear weapon to show that the United States could not wait "a year or two years" for the economic sanctions to resolve the crisis peacefully.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
BOSTON GLOBE A-1
Date **26 NOV 1990**

Uncertain timetable

Iraq's nuclear weapon would be a "crude" one, Scowcroft said. But he expressed little doubt that Saddam Hussein would use it in any conflict with the United States, and increase casualties among US troops dramatically.

Several of the specialists interviewed recently said there is little hard evidence to determine how long it would take Iraq to make a nuclear device. "There is some indication that it could be three years at the soonest, while others are convinced that it would take 10 years," said Seth Carus, a specialist in military affairs at the Washington Institute of Near East Policy.

A recent study by the Congressional Research Service concluded that Iraq lacks the uranium and the facilities to produce weapons-grade plutonium needed to make a nuclear warhead. While there is evidence that Saddam Hussein has spent millions trying to smuggle in the manpower and resources for the nuclear program, that effort has been hampered by the worldwide embargo of trade with Iraq.

"On the whole, if Iraq could import the technology, materials and supplies needed for uranium enrichment, and if it could successfully build and operate such a facility without interference from abroad, it could produce weapons-grade uranium and make crude but destructive nuclear bombs in perhaps five to 10 years," the study concluded.

Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, who has been the toughest critic in Congress since Bush increased the deployment of US troops in the gulf this month, recently discounted the immediate threat of Iraq acquiring a nuclear weapon.

CONTINUED

A difficult goal

In urging Bush to allow economic sanctions to remain in place for at least one or two years before going to war, Kennedy said "I have knowledge" that Iraq could not acquire nuclear weapons in that time. Kennedy declined to elaborate, but as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Kennedy is privy to secret military briefings on Iraq's military capabilities.

Analysts agreed that getting Saddam Hussein to disarm might be difficult to achieve peacefully.

Preventing these weapons from entering Iraq's arsenal might be an unrealistic expectation, some administration officials said, if Saddam Hussein goes along with other US demands for peace: withdrawal from Kuwait, release of the hostages, restoration of the Kuwaiti government to power and unimpeded access to the region's oil supplies.

If Saddam Hussein agreed to peaceful negotiations, the United States probably would demand that he allow an international inspection to prove that he had reduced or eliminated production facilities for Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d has said that there would be no lasting peace in the Persian Gulf until Saddam Hussein proved that he had stopped producing the weapons.

Reports have circulated in Europe recently that Saddam Hussein might be willing to negotiate restrictions on his weapons of mass destruction if Israel agreed to give up its nuclear production program, according to Sen. William Cohen, a Republican from Maine. Both the administration and Israel would probably reject such terms.

The administration fears that without assurances that Iraq has ended its nuclear program, Israel might attack its production facilities. In 1981, Israeli fighter planes combed the Iraqi nuclear facility outside Baghdad. Israel drew international condemnation, but the Iraqi program was brought to a standstill.

Widening proliferation

However, in the past three years Saddam Hussein has once again pumped money and resources back into his nuclear program. CIA Director William Webster said recently that by the end of the decade he expects Iraq and five other nations, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Pakistan and India, to produce nuclear bombs. Such weapons are already possessed by the United States, Soviet Union, France, Britain and China.

Middle East analysts say they doubt Saddam Hussein would agree under any circumstances to reduce his research or production of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, or even allow for inspections. They stress that Saddam Hussein has expended billions of his country's oil profits on his weapons programs and that Iraq is the only country to have gone ahead with a nuclear production program after signing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

"From everything we know about Hussein and Iraq, it is very difficult to imagine that there are any circumstances that would cause him to give up this program voluntarily," said Carus, the specialist in Middle East military issues.

While conceding that little is known about Iraq's nuclear capability, Sen. Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican, said he had been urging Bush to place greater emphasis on the threat from Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons when justifying US involvement in the gulf to Congress and the public.

"The president has to make the case that it is the time to stop the threat, but it means going beyond the principles that he has already set out, to get to the heart of the matter - that the leadership of the country has to change and that the nuclear and chemical potential has to be controlled or destroyed," Lugar said.

Shadow over Kansas

A poll in The New York Times last week showed that 54 percent of Americans believed that stopping Saddam Hussein's development of nuclear weapons would be sufficient reason to take military action against Iraq.

Last week's poll by The Boston Globe also reflected the public's mounting unease over Bush's performance on the crisis. Since he announced a massive new deployment of US forces and a shift to a potentially offensive strategy, approval for Bush's handling of the crisis has fallen below 43 percent, 27 points lower than in late September.

A White House official said Friday that Bush was aware of the poll results, and that the president would probably speak out against Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But the official voiced doubt that Bush would elevate the elimination of those weapons to a condition for a pullout of US troops from the region.

The official said, "I don't think we want to put ourselves in that tight a corner."

Gulf Crisis Casts Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar In a High-Visibility Role on the Global Stage

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — The most important ambassador here these days isn't some somber, gray-haired figure in striped pants. He's a brash, cigar-smoking 41-year-old former fighter pilot—who also serves informally as his leader's personal envoy to the Soviet Union, China and Britain at a crucial juncture in big-power diplomacy.

Since Iraq rolled into Kuwait Aug. 2, Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan has greased the skids for the enormous U.S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia, served as the main conduit for intelligence between the two nations and become a prominent spokesman for maintaining a credible military threat against Iraq.

In the past month, this garrulous nephew of King Fahd has become a needed weapon in the Bush administration's battle to rebuild public support for a hardline Persian Gulf policy. In recent days he helped to prepare for last week's crucial meeting between President Bush and King Fahd—and was one of only a handful of Saudi officials in the room when the two met in Jidda.

Yet Prince Bandar's new prominence here only begins to tell the story of the unusual position in world affairs he holds. His work as King Fahd's special envoy with the Soviets, Chinese and British makes him a pivotal Saudi link to four of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council as that group ponders a resolution authorizing the use of military force to drive Iraq from Kuwait.

Secretary of State James Baker is expected this week to preside over a U.N. Security Council session to discuss a resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq. The U.S. already has circulated draft language for a resolution, according to dip-

lomatic sources.

Speaking yesterday on ABC News' "This Week with David Brinkley," National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said negotiations were still under way with other Security Council members over the wording of such a resolution.

When asked whether the resolution would use the word "force," Mr. Scowcroft responded that it might use a phrase like "taking the necessary means to enforce the 10 U.N. resolutions that so far Saddam Hussein has ignored." He added that such wording would be understood to mean the use of force.

Prince Bandar's place on the world stage even had Saddam Hussein calling on his services. Last spring, after threatening to burn "half of Israel" if that nation hit Iraq, the Iraqi president asked Saudi Arabia to send the prince to Baghdad. There, the prince says, Saddam asked him to deliver a secret message to President Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher saying Iraq didn't intend to attack Israel.

The gregarious prince is known more as an operator than an intellectual. "No one has ever suggested to me that he is someone who is deep, or a man of ideas," says Moshe Arad, Israel's ambassador to the U.S. until last month. And his brash style can put off some key officials.

It is his aggressiveness, combined with his convenient background and, most notably, his contacts back home, that have enabled him to achieve such prominence lately.

Early in the Bush administration, for instance, he demonstrated his brashness by calling the White House and arranging an appointment with the president on a few hours' notice—simply to test whether he would have direct access, as promised by Mr. Bush, or whether he would be forced to work through aides.

He also holds a strong position in Washington as a Saudi comfortable with the U.S. military. In the uncertain hours after the Kuwait invasion, U.S. officials, wanting to convince the Saudis they might be next, showed the prince satellite photos indicat-

ing that, among other things, the three Iraqi divisions in Kuwait were heading for the Saudi border. Alarmed, Prince Bandar sent word to King Fahd, helping pave the way for the crucial Saudi decision to invite U.S. troops.

It is that final factor, the close tie to King Fahd, his political godfather, and the guardian of the world's largest oil fields, that is most important. "I think that his credibility derives foremost from the fact that he clearly speaks for Fahd and that he is able to assure that communications will reach Fahd," says Robert McFarlane, a former national security adviser who made a secret mission to Lebanon with the prince during the Reagan administration.

King Fahd has known Prince Bandar since he was a boy attending the weekly family dinners that are a trademark of the Fahd wing of the royal family. The king, probably the most pro-U.S. of all the senior princes ruling Saudi Arabia, eventually guided his nephew through a career that has thoroughly Americanized him.

As a young man, Prince Bandar learned to be a fighter pilot at U.S. Air Force bases in Texas, South Carolina and Mississippi. His affinity for U.S. jet jockeys persists. He went to see the movie "Top Gun" with then-Vice President Bush a few years ago. A couple of months ago he flew an F-16 Hornet with Marines in California.

He became military attache to the U.S. and then ambassador in 1983. During the Reagan administration, according to the congressional testimony of others, he played a critical role in arranging covert Saudi financing for U.S.-backed Contras in Nicaragua after Congress cut off U.S. arms support for them in the mid-1980s. The prince denied that.

Partly by design and partly by circumstance, the role Prince Bandar plays for King Fahd has expanded well beyond his U.S. portfolio. Because the fervently anti-Communist Saudis only recently moved to open full diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and China, Prince Bandar has been unofficial liaison to those two nations, conducting business with their diplomats here. And he developed close ties with Britain by secretly negotiating Saudi purchase of Tornado fighter jets a few years ago, and subsequently stopped to see Mrs. Thatcher several times a year and is likely to continue this relationship with her successor.

But it is his Americanization that is most striking. Though raised in a Bedouin culture alien to most Americans, Prince Bandar looks and sounds like a rising U.S. politician as he discusses the Gulf crisis. Sitting in his elegant Washington office with evening newscasts flickering on five television sets in the background, he spouts the sports-laced slang of U.S. politics, calling Saddam Hussein a "phony" and dismissing the "Monday morning quarterbacking" of some U.S. critics.

He also invokes a saying of Lyndon Johnson in explaining why the new deployment of an additional 120,000 U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia was necessary: "Don't tell a fellow to go to hell unless you intend to



Bandar bin Sultan

STAGE...

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send him there."

The prince is certainly willing to take the offensive when he senses a threat to the tough U.S.-Saudi stand. When Jordan's King Hussein, who is sympathetic to Iraq, went on Cable News Network with an impassioned talk about the danger of placing Western troops in the Persian Gulf, the prince immediately struck back. First, he appeared on CNN with a scathing personal retort questioning the king's honesty and honor. "Your Majesty, I long had great respect and affection for you," he said. "But I no longer can feel that you are the same man I knew." Then, in an unusual step, his remarks were printed the following day on the op-ed pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times.

In another move unusual for an ambassador, he recently sent notes to congressional leaders offering to fly to their home states to brief them on Gulf developments during the congressional break. And in a move extraordinary for a Saudi ambassador, he recently hosted a breakfast meeting at his home for a group of strong U.S. supporters of Israel, such as Rep. Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.).

U.S. Aides Press Iraqi Nuclear Threat

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 25 — The Bush Administration today stepped up its effort to raise American concern about Iraq's ability to develop nuclear weapons, saying Baghdad might be able to produce a crude nuclear device within a year.

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, said in separate appearances that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program was advancing despite the embargo, and they provided intelligence estimates intended to buttress President Bush's statements about Iraq's emerging nuclear ability made during his Thanksgiving visit to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Bush's statements, and the remarks today by the two officials, were clearly intended to add weight to the Administration's argument that the situation in the Persian Gulf must be brought to a decisive turn this winter.

The Iraqi nuclear program is not a new concern for Washington, and the assertion today that Iraq might build a rudimentary nuclear device within a year appeared to be an attempt to counter Democratic lawmakers who have suggested that the United States should give sanctions a year or more to work so war might be avoided, as well as to influence the United Nations Security Council meeting on the gulf crisis to be held on Thursday.

Hearing Due This Week

Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, is scheduled to lead Armed Services Committee hearings this week that are expected to become a forum for challenging the Administration's decision to speed up its timetable for resolving the crisis caused by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on Aug. 2.

In recent weeks the Administration cited a variety of reasons for forcing a resolution of the gulf crisis, including destruction in Kuwait, the holding of hostages and threats to the economy of the United States and the world.

In his appearance today on the ABC News program "This Week," Mr. Scowcroft said the Administration was also motivated by concern that the coalition confronting Iraq might dissolve if the crisis was prolonged. It was the first time a senior official has publicly acknowledged that factor.

"This international coalition is a disparate group of people," Mr. Scowcroft said. "There are all sorts of tensions and pressures one way or another." He added that there was a "common feeling" within the coalition that the crisis "needs to be brought to an end."

Poll Results Cited

None of those rationales for possible military action against Iraq appears to have decisively swayed public opinion. In contrast, in a recent New York Times/CBS Poll, 54 percent of the respondents said they believed that preventing Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons was a good enough reason to take military action against Iraq.

An Administration official said the survey results had been noted by the White House, which is also looking for an argument that will sway the public. Another Government official, who insisted that he not be identified, said the Administration's statements today that Iraq could produce a bomb in a relatively short period was unduly alarmist, considering the difficulties of the technical processes.

While Mr. Bush gave new emphasis to Iraq's nuclear potential during his Thanksgiving visit to American troops, he did not provide intelligence estimates about how long it might take Iraq to develop a bomb.

More Detailed Estimates

Today, Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Cheney sought to buttress Mr. Bush's statements by providing more detailed estimates about Iraq's nuclear potential. Administration officials said the remarks by Mr. Cheney and Mr. Scowcroft reflected a classified intelligence estimate that Iraq could develop a nuclear bomb in six months to a year, but probably longer, even if it conducts a crash program.

Such an effort would involve using about 27 pounds of highly enriched uranium that has been supplied by France and was recently inspected by officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency, experts say. In addition, Iraq might also use a small quantity of less highly enriched uranium that it has acquired from the Soviet Union.

"If he were to take that material, he could produce a crude device with it," Mr. Cheney said on the CBS News program "Face the Nation," adding that a "worst-case assumption held that such a weapon might be developed in a year or less.

"It wouldn't be anything you could deliver from an airplane," Mr. Cheney said. "It wouldn't be anything that would be weaponized in the sense that we think of a nuclear weapon. But it would be capable, for example, of doing some damage, of producing some kind of a yield — a very crude system."

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The Defense Secretary asserted that the Iraqis could build a more sophisticated weapon in 5 to 10 years by developing the ability to refine crude uranium available in Iraq.

Mr. Scowcroft said Government estimates about when Iraq might acquire a nuclear weapon ranged from "months to as much as 10 years." That estimate includes the possibility that Iraq might conduct a crash program to develop a crude bomb as well as its ongoing, longer-term effort to build a more sophisticated weapon that could be delivered by a missile or plane.

The national security adviser then drew a direct link between the prospective Iraqi nuclear threat and the need to resolve the gulf crisis in a short period of months.

Waiting a year or two to see if sanctions will work, as some Democratic lawmakers suggest, Mr. Scowcroft said, "raises the possibility that we could face an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, which would dramatically change the character of any conflict."

"I would think it would be a reckless, desperate act to threaten four nuclear powers with one untested bomb," Mr. Milhollin added.

Danger Called Exaggerated

Gary Milhollin, an expert on the spread of nuclear weapons, said the Administration was exaggerating the danger that Iraq could develop a nuclear weapon in a short period to buttress its case for considering a war this winter.

"What are you going to do with one untested, unwieldy bomb when facing three nuclear weapons powers — the United States, France and England — that have already deployed troops and a fourth nuclear power Israel that is not far away?" Mr. Milhollin said.

Security Council Debate Will Cap U.S. Lobby Effort

Baker Invites Ministers to Thursday Session

By Ruth Marcus
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration's diplomatic effort to win support for a United Nations Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq will come to a head in New York Thursday when the idea is put before the 15 members of the council, Secretary of State James A. Baker III said yesterday.

Baker and President Bush have spent the last 10 days lobbying the members of the Security Council to back a resolution to force Iraq out of Kuwait if it does not leave voluntarily.

Baker has invited the foreign ministers of nations that make up the Security Council to take part in Thursday's debate.

"We're talking about a resolution that would lay the political foundations for possible use of force if we were unable to achieve a peaceful and political solution to the crisis," Baker said in Houston, Reuter reported.

"I can't tell you what words will be used because that will be a part of the negotiation which has been going on for some time," national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said. "But it will be something like taking the necessary means to enforce the 10 U.N. resolutions which so far [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein has ignored" since Iraq invaded Kuwait Aug. 2. The Associated Press, citing unnamed sources, said last night that the proposed resolution authorizes force if Iraq is not out of Kuwait by Jan. 1, but that report could not be confirmed.

Both Scowcroft and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, in separate appearances on television talk shows yesterday, said the United States does not need U.N. approval to take steps to force Iraq from Kuwait if U.S. officials judge that the

U.N.-authorized economic sanctions are not working.

But Cheney said a U.N. resolution would "be a very useful first step."

Cheney and Scowcroft also reiterated the position Bush raised last week that Iraq's potential to produce nuclear weapons is another reason to confront the Iraqi dictator.

Cheney, on CBS's "Face the Nation," said Saddam "is closer today than he was a few months ago" to being able to produce nuclear weapons and could have "some kind of a crude device" in a year or less.

Scowcroft, on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley," said Iraq could have a nuclear bomb within "months" and that—though it will be far longer before Saddam has an arsenal of nuclear weapons—"building even one could make a significant difference for troops fighting in the region." Scowcroft warned that "one has to assume that he might be more willing to use nuclear weapons than has any other power."

Bush, during his Thanksgiving trip to the Persian Gulf last week, added Iraq's potential to produce nuclear weapons as a reason for the U.S. presence in the region.

Cheney warned that even if Saddam complies with the demands of the United Nations and withdraws from Kuwait, "you still are going to have to worry about the problem of his acquisition of sophisticated weapons." Cheney said that "one way or another, within a few years, Saddam Hussein is likely to acquire nuclear weapons."

To prevent him from doing that will require "a far more aggressive set of sanctions than anything we've seen up till now," Cheney said. "Even if Saddam leaves Kuwait, the sanctions wouldn't go totally away. You're going to try to deny him any further access to the kind of technology he would need to develop this capability."

Many Western experts estimate it will be five to 10 years before Iraq is

capable of producing a small nuclear arsenal. Cheney said yesterday that Iraq's short-term nuclear capability is limited. He said the highly enriched uranium it uses as fuel for a research reactor is not "anything that would be weaponized in the sense that we think of a nuclear weapon" but could be used to produce a "very crude system."

Iraq reported last week that officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are inspecting its nuclear program to verify it is not developing nuclear weapons. The IAEA said it found no such violations in an April inspection.

Scowcroft, in response to questions, said there is evidence Saddam is "doing what he can to prepare terrorist attacks."

"What we have heard is that he has gathered a whole raft of terrorists into his country and they are standing around awaiting instructions. Is that right?" he was asked. "That's right," Scowcroft replied.

Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine), also appearing on "Face the Nation," said he would be reluctant to reconvene Congress to authorize Bush to use force in the gulf in the absence of a presidential request for such power.

Meanwhile in Frankfurt, 104 Germans returned home after being held for nearly four months in Baghdad, meaning all but a few Germans in Iraq and Kuwait have been freed.

Former world heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali was in Baghdad awaiting a meeting with Saddam. An associate, Arthur Morrison, said Ali was on a "goodwill mission" designed to win the release of American hostages.

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Iraqi pullout not enough, Cheney says

By Michael Ross
Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney said yesterday that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would not solve the Persian Gulf crisis because it is "only a matter of time" before Iraq acquires the ability to threaten the world with nuclear and biological weapons.

Suggesting that Iraq may be less than a year away from manufacturing a "very crude" nuclear device, Cheney said aggressive sanctions must be maintained against the regime of President Saddam Hussein even after the question of Kuwait is resolved.

Meanwhile, a U.S. official said that Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d later this week will seek U.N. Security Council approval for a resolution authorizing force if Iraq does not get out of Kuwait by Jan. 1. The official, who asked not to be identified, emphasized that while the deadline was "not locked in concrete," it was in the written version being discussed with Great Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union.

Cheney and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft suggested in separate interviews yesterday that time may be working against the coalition opposing Iraq.

Echoing the new emphasis that the Bush administration is placing on

Iraq's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons, Cheney said on CBS' *Face the Nation*, "If he [Hussein] were to come into compliance and withdraw from Kuwait, you are still going to have to worry about the problem of his acquisition of sophisticated weapons."

"That's going to require a far more aggressive set of sanctions than we've seen up till now," he said. "That means the sanctions won't go totally away."

"It's not clear whose side time is on," Cheney said, adding that economic and political pressures could affect the anti-Iraqi resolve of financially pressed coalition partners such as Egypt, Turkey and the governments of Eastern Europe.

"I don't think anybody's eager for military action, but neither are they eager to have this drawn out over an indefinite period of time," Scowcroft said on ABC's *This Week with David Brinkley*. "There's a common feeling ... that it needs to be brought to an end."

Hearings on the administration's gulf policy will be held on Capitol Hill, where Democrats have voiced concern about what appears to be President Bush's increasing impatience with sanctions and his willingness to consider using force to oust Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Appearing with Cheney, Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D., Maine) said he was alarmed by

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the "attitude of inevitability" that appears to be spreading through Washington concerning the possibility of war.

Arguing that more time was needed "to determine whether or not the sanctions will have their desired effect," Mitchell said "the best course is to stay the course originally set out by Bush when the United States organized the world community behind sanctions after Iraq invaded Kuwait Aug. 2.

Scowcroft, however, argued that Iraq's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons poses too great a risk for the world to wait for the one or two years most experts say will be required for sanctions to really work.

Cheney said intelligence reports indicate that Hussein is working "very hard" to become a nuclear power and that "it's only a matter of time until he acquires nuclear weapons and the capability to deliver them."

That has to be "an element of concern as we decide how to deal with the problem," he said.

Most experts estimate that Iraq is between two and 10 years away from developing a nuclear device. Cheney said that "worst-case" intelligence assessments indicate that Iraq could be less than a year away from developing a crude nuclear device.

Bush raised the specter of Iraq's nuclear threat when he visited U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia over Thanksgiving. Since then, administration of-

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officials, stung by criticism that they have not articulated clearly the reasons for the U.S. troop buildup, have been stressing the nuclear threat.

In other gulf developments:

- Canada doubts that a U.N. deadline will help get Iraq out of Kuwait but will not oppose an American-backed ultimatum in the Security Council, Foreign Minister Joe Clark said yesterday.

"Our preference would be for a resolution that would be more straightforward, that simply stated the goal of authorizing the enforcement of the existing Security Council resolutions," he told a news conference in Egypt. Canada's term as an elected member of the Security Council expires at the end of December.

- Canada canceled \$11 million in Egyptian debt yesterday to help Cairo overcome economic damage from the gulf crisis and hinted at further relief if Egypt took steps to reform its economy. Clark said Canada would also give Egypt about \$22 million in emergency balance-of-payments aid. Clark estimated total Egyptian debt to Canada at \$515 million to \$600 million.

- One hundred and four Germans held in Iraq returned home yesterday. The Germans and one Briton arrived in Frankfurt from Baghdad aboard an Iraqi Airways aircraft. Former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, who had gone to Iraq to win the release of German hos-

tages, said yesterday that about 15 Germans remained in Kuwait and some who had been in hiding were making their way to Baghdad to return home.

- Kuwaiti gunmen have wounded an Iraqi official who served briefly as governor of Kuwait, a spokesman for the exiled Kuwaiti government said. There was no immediate Iraqi confirmation of the Kuwaiti account, which was also reported yesterday by newspapers in Bahrain and Qatar.

The Qatari report said the official, Ali Hassan Majeed, was killed. Majeed, known for leading the brutal repression of Kurds in northern Iraq, was appointed governor after the annexation of Kuwait. Earlier this month, Hussein named Aziz Saleh No'man to replace Majeed, without giving any explanation.

The Associated Press and Reuters contributed to this article.

No Plans for Recalling Congress, President Says

By Ann Devroy
and Tom Kenworthy
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush, urged by Senate Republicans this week to call Congress back to Washington to approve a resolution authorizing the use of force in the Persian Gulf, expressed strong reservations yesterday about a special session.

Bush met at the White House with House Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.) and House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.), both of whom urged him not to call the 101st Congress back into session. Senate Republican leaders, including Robert J. Dole (Kan.) and Richard G. Lugar (Ind.), have joined with Vice President Quayle in arguing that Bush should use yesterday's U.N. vote authorizing the use of force in the gulf to get the same sort of backing from Congress as the next step in pressuring Iraq and of forcing Democratic critics to commit themselves one way or another on the possible use of force.

Foley said after yesterday's meeting that he had urged Bush to allow the next Congress, to be sworn in on Jan. 3, to take up the debate. White House officials said Michel made the same case.

In a television interview after the session with the leaders, Bush said, "I have no plans to call them back for what you properly call a lame-duck session." The president pledged "a lot of consultations" this week and next with congressional leaders and said he was anxious "to see what they think is important." But asked again whether he was considering a special session, the president said, "No, I'm not."

Bush is to meet with a group of bipartisan leaders at the White House today.

The debate over a special session occurred as another former senior military official testified before Congress that it was a mistake to

commit 430,000 troops to the region. Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney are scheduled to testify before Congress next week, and the White House hopes their appearances will help shift the public emphasis away from this week's hearings in which a string of officials have questioned the president's gulf policy.

In testimony yesterday, James H. Webb Jr., who served as secretary of the Navy during the Reagan administration, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Bush administration has erred in sending such a large force to Saudi Arabia and that "the president's mistake in sending so many troops should not be compounded by a further error in using them in a premature, unprovoked ground offensive."

Webb also criticized Bush for seeking authorization for offensive action from the U.N. Security Council when the White House "has no mandate" from the American people. Webb called it "perplexing and even cynical" for the administration to use the U.N. vote as "a lever to force the Congress to support offensive action."

Webb was the latest in what is becoming a parade of former high-ranking military and defense officials who have turned this week's hearings into a trial of Bush's recent strategy for forcing the Iraqis to withdraw their forces from Kuwait. His testimony echoed earlier warnings from former defense secretary and CIA director James R. Schlesinger and from two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom said that the large commitment of troops could itself drive the United States toward an offensive military action against Iraq.

The committee chairman, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), said he is open to a special session if his party's leadership wants one, but he said any debate on Persian Gulf policy

would be "much more meaningful" once a consensus emerges in Congress.

If Bush wants carte blanche authority to use the offensive military option, said Nunn, "then I think he has to make the corresponding case that the current policy is not working. . . . That case has not yet been made."

One reason it has not been made is this week's series of hearings before Nunn's committee, where the Georgia Democrat, who is enormously influential on defense matters, is building a strong case for patience in the gulf. The Bush administration now appears to be paying a heavy price for its decision that it would not send any top officials to testify before Nunn's panel until after yesterday's U.N. vote.

Though some witnesses—former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger on Wednesday and former assistant defense secretary Richard Perle yesterday—have questioned whether economic sanctions will be sufficient, they largely have been overshadowed by those urging a continued cautious approach.

Perle told the committee yesterday that the time has come to "make the transition from buying time to using it for the broader purpose of mobilizing for the destruction of Saddam Hussein's military machine." A U.S. defeat in the gulf, said Perle, would "gravely diminish" the U.S. role and authority in the world.

In the meantime, Bush got an earful of dissent over the troop

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buildup in the gulf in the unlikelyst of settings—a White House reception Wednesday afternoon for newly elected members of Congress.

Paul Wellstone, a newly elected Democratic senator from Minnesota, said he told Bush during a receiving line exchange that the coun-

try "would be ripped apart" if Bush initiated military action without provocation. He said he urged the president to give economic sanctions more time to work.

Wellstone, who also had exchanges with national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Chief of

Staff John H. Sununu, said he left the reception "really disturbed. I think they are pushing things real fast without giving the country a chance to discuss what we are getting into."

Wellstone gave Bush a letter urging him or a member of his administration to attend a series of town meetings on the Persian Gulf he will be holding in Minnesota starting next week. Wellstone, a college professor and community organizer, also said he was considering whether to organize a protest demonstration in Washington.