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June 1990

'Weakness Is Strength'

WASHINGTON

At the Moscow summit of 1974, a Soviet leader did what he could to sustain an American President in the waning days of his power. With the shoe now on the other foot, we will see again how little one superpower can affect the internal turmoil of the other.

Unlike Mr. Nixon, however, Mr. Gorbachev has been using his nation's economic desperation and his own political weakness as the key-stone of his negotiating strategy:

Unless you help me with trade, he suggests, and stop supporting the breakaway Baltic States; unless you permit me to modernize my heavy missiles, and delay the withdrawal of my troops from Eastern Europe until Germany is neutralized, perhaps through a security component to C.S.C.E., my replacement for NATO — I will fail and be overthrown by a Stalinist villain.

The latest wrinkle in this Marshal Foch strategy is the Weimar analogy: If you add to our humiliation by making us give up our conquests, you will stimulate resentment that will be exploited by a Soviet Hitler.

Fearful of a who-lost-Gorbachev charge, the Bush Administration seemed on the brink of giving up its position of strength. In Moscow two weeks ago, Secretary Baker accepted a change of priority from the historic ending of Red Army occupation to another nuclear treaty; until Mr. Bush turned to Brent Scowcroft and Robert Gates, it seemed we would offer the desired package of economic aid despite strangulation of the Baltics.

Then came the election of Boris Yeltsin to the presidency of the Russian republic. Overnight, the nature of the threatened alternative to Gorbachev changed.

No longer would we be helping Gorbachev the reformer against the imagined evil emperors of Communist reaction; by making concessions to Gorbachev, we would be helping a dictator remain in place who resists a free-market economy and insists on continued army occupation and heavy-missile advantage.

The most likely alternative is no Sakharov (whom Mr. Bush properly quoted in his welcome), and has as many anti-Semitic connections as does one of Mr. Gorbachev's recent appointees. But he is not the anti-reform poltergeist so often conjured.

On the contrary, says a name-dropping Soviet correspondent hanging around the lobby of the Madison Hotel here, "Boris Nikolayevich is much more radical than Mikhail Sergeyevich."

Boris Yeltsin has been accusing the present regime of half-measures when drastic action is needed, while "Measure seven times, cut once" is the go-slow Gorbachev adage.

Gorbachev's strategy backfires.

On Baltic independence, Mr. Yeltsin is the Russian Jefferson Davis; his first acts were to assert Russian sovereignty and to announce interest in direct negotiations with these independent Baltic nations, undermining the Gorbachev sanctions even as the Soviet leader was threatening "more strict measures."

Nobody knows which way the cat of Kremlin control will jump, but our policy makers now know this: The Russian people, not the apparatchiks or the generals, have changed the likeliest alternative to Gorbachev in a way that removes our impetus to "help Gorbachev."

We should continue to say, as Mr. Bush does so often, that "we want perestroika to succeed," because a prosperous free market in Russia and its confederated republics are in everyone's interest. The bone in the Kremlin's throat is giving up central control.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, for all his eloquence about the pain of transition, is not the man of the future because he is a specialist in the inside acquisition of control. A physicist-economist brought into town this week to push Soviet economic weakness blurted out the truth: "Only a popular government can undertake unpopular measures."

That was untrue for 70 years, but it's true today: leaders who draw their support directly from popular majorities in elections can impose temporarily unpopular policies; the people will grumble but will bear the burden without revolt because the choice was their own.

Gorbachev fears elections because he is not one who delivers. He broke the sclerotic grip of the Communist Party, but shrinks from delivering the free system that would have put bread on the table; he abandoned the corrupt puppets of the Soviet empire, but has not delivered the end of Red Army occupation.

After a decade of gaining complete personal control, the great improvisationist could not differentiate between stability and stagnation. The Soviet leader deserves gratitude for shaking up his world, but not the help he demands to relieve the pressure for more freedom.

"Weakness is strength" was this too-cautious compromiser's most daring maneuver. Some of us have begun to miss him already. □

The Washington Post
 The New York Times A 29
 The Washington Times
 The Wall Street Journal
 The Christian Science Monitor
 New York Daily News
 USA Today
 The Chicago Tribune
 Date 1 Jun 1990

NEW YORK TIMES

June 1, 1990

Pg. 7

Faces of the Summit: The Supporting Cast

AMERICAN SIDE



Brent Scowcroft

President Bush's national security adviser and the pre-eminent White House staff official on foreign affairs. Retired Air Force general. A habitually cautious man who tries to avoid the spotlight, ceding dominance

in foreign policy to Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d. Was thrust into a political controversy for his trip to China, soon after the violence in Tiananmen Square, to try to improve relations. 65 years old.



Robert M. Gates

Deputy national security adviser in the White House. Supervises day-to-day operations of the National Security Council staff. A former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and a longtime analyst of intelligence

about the Soviet Union. Has generally advocated a cautious approach toward President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. 46 years old. Joined the C.I.A. in 1966. Then, from 1974 to 1979, worked on the National Security Council staff.



Condoleezza Rice

Senior director for Soviet affairs on the National Security Council staff. A former associate professor of political science at Stanford University. At the age of 35, one of the youngest senior officials in the White

House and one of the few women to hold a senior position there. Assigned to travel with Mr. Gorbachev to Minneapolis and San Francisco. Has a doctoral degree in international studies from the University of Denver. Worked on strategic nuclear policy at the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1986-87.



Paul Wolfowitz

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Has played a central role in reorganizing U.S. military forces to confront a changing world and a shrinking budget. 46 years old. Was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia

and Pacific Affairs from 1982-1986. Held arms control posts in the 1970's. Was Ambassador to Indonesia in the Reagan Administration.



Dennis B. Ross

Director of policy planning at the State Department. A member of Mr. Baker's inner circle. Came to the Administration from the Bush Presidential campaign, where he was senior foreign

policy adviser. 41 years old. Former deputy director of the Pentagon office that compares Soviet and American military capabilities.



John H. Sununu

White House chief of staff. Widely viewed as the link between Mr. Bush's pragmatic, split-the-difference Administration and conservative Republicans. Former Governor of New Hampshire, 50 years

old. Runs the White House's day-to-day operations, making his influence felt most strongly on domestic issues.

SOVIET SIDE



Yevgeny M. Primakov

Member of the Presidential Council. Former chairman of the Council of the Union, one of Parliament's two chambers. Former director of Imemo, the Institute of World Economics

and International Relations, one of the most influential research institutes in the Soviet Union. Adviser to Mr. Gorbachev on the press, parliamentary relations and numerous other topics, he has day-to-day contact with Mr. Gorbachev on a wide range of issues. 60 years old. A graduate of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow. A Pravda correspondent in the Middle East from 1966 to 1970.

Anatoly S. Chernyayev An aide to Mr. Gorbachev on foreign affairs. A longtime member of the International Department of the Communist Party and a specialist in Western Europe, with some expertise in American affairs. Does coordinating for Mr. Gorbachev's meetings with foreign delegations. 69 years old. Served in the Soviet Army during World War II. Has a history degree from Moscow State University.



Arkady A. Maslennikov

Mr. Gorbachev's new chief spokesman. For more than 20 years a correspondent for Pravda, including a long tour in India and tours in London and New York. An economist by training.



Col. Gen. Bronislav A. Omelichev

First deputy chief of staff of the Soviet Army since 1989. The most visible uniformed man in the arms control talks, he represents the military's interests, unlike Marshal Sergei

F. Akhromeyev, Mr. Gorbachev's personal adviser on military matters. A rising star, say Americans who saw him during the Soviet-American talks in

CAST...CONTINUED

Moscow in May. Born in 1935. Member of the Communist Party and member of the Congress of People's Deputies in Turkmenia, in Soviet Central Asia.

**Valentin M. Falin**

The main Communist Party specialist on German issues and head of the International Department of the Communist Party. Ambassador to West Germany 1971-78. 64 years old. Was an aide to Andrei A.

Gromyko. A former spokesman on arms control issues and an Izvestia political commentator, he later headed the Novosti press feature syndicate for two years.

**Anatoly F. Dobrynin**

Consultant to the Foreign Ministry on American-Soviet relations. Something of an ambassador emeritus adviser to the Soviet leadership on American-Soviet relations. Soviet Ambassador to the

United States from 1962 to 1986, during the tenures of six Presidents and nine Secretaries of State. 70 years old. Worked at the United Nations in the 1950's.

NEW YORK TIMES

June 1, 1990 Pg. D16

Food Sent to Russian Astronauts

MOSCOW, May 31 (Reuters) — The Soviet Union said today that it had launched an unmanned spacecraft to ferry equipment, food and drinking water to two astronauts aboard the orbiting Mir space station.

A special Kristall module aboard the Proton rocket is scheduled to dock with Mir on Wednesday, the official Tass press agency said.

Insulation on a Soyuz spacecraft carrying the astronauts, Anatoly Solovyov and Alexander Balandin, to Mir was damaged during its launching Feb. 11, raising fears that the two could be stranded.

The American trade journal Aviation Week and Space Technology, quoting a visiting Soviet astronaut, reported two weeks ago that the two astronauts on the space station were left "without a reliable vehicle in the event of an emergency." Soviet space officials said there was no danger to the astronauts. But they said a space walk was planned to allow the astronauts to repair the damage.

Tass said a special docking port on the Kristall module was designed to accommodate the Soviet Union's Buran space shuttle, which is to fly to the space station next year.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

June 1, 1990

Pg. B9B

And Away We Go To the Moon, Alice! Any Bright Ideas?

**NASA Would Like to Hear
Far-Out Flight Strategies,
But You Won't Get Rich**

By BOB DAVIS

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—Space nuts take note: The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is looking for new ideas to get to Mars.

But it isn't paying for them.

The space agency said it would spend \$4.5 million to canvass the public, aerospace companies and students for innovative technologies to send astronauts to the moon again and off to Mars. NASA Administrator Richard Truly said he planned to write letters this month to universities and

professional societies asking them to make suggestions. He even plans to set up an 800 number to field proposals.

"We're trying to look at the big picture, big strategy and big technologies," said Arnold Aldrich, NASA's exploration chief. But he said he won't pay now for the suggestions, even if they eventually result in new spaceships. The payoff would come in contracts to formally study or build space equipment—which won't be awarded for several years, if then.

NASA is reaching out for proposals at the behest of Vice President Dan Quayle, who heads the National Space Council and who directed the agency to "cast our net widely" in searching for new space technology. The initiative also might drum up interest in President Bush's plan to send astronauts to Mars within 30 years, which so far has drawn yawns from the public and derision from Congress.

The space agency could certainly use some help. Its plan to explore the moon and Mars comes with a \$500 billion price tag, making it a political non-starter. But the alternatives proposed so far—launching rockets from the ocean, placing inflatable space stations in orbit—have seemed

kind of silly and naive.

Of course, with space exploration, imagination is crucial. Yesterday, for instance, the Commerce Department released a report chiding big aerospace concerns for lacking vision and failing to invest in commercial space ventures. "Larger U.S. companies could lose critical know-how to foreign competitors as small, entrepreneurial U.S. companies turn overseas for corporate support," the report warned.

For its part, NASA is trying to branch out from its usual reliance on big contractors to come up with space hardware. At a news conference yesterday, Mr. Truly appointed former Apollo astronaut Thomas Stafford to head a panel that would review outside suggestions, along with government studies, and make recommendations for the design of the exploration program and the technologies to emphasize.

High on NASA's most-wanted list are proposals for new propulsion technologies. Using conventional rockets, a flight to Mars would take a year—enough time without gravity to incapacitate an astronaut. Mr. Aldrich said he expected Mr. Stafford's panel to recommend nuclear power to speed the flight.

Attends Veteran Dedication

Scowcroft Calls E. Europe Top Summit Topic



—Tribune Staff Photo by Kristan Jacobsen

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, presidential national security adviser, previewed upcoming superpower summit during dedication of a new veterans memorial park at Camp Williams.

By Walt Schaffer
Tribune Staff Writer

CAMP WILLIAMS — The most important discussions this week between President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev will focus on the political future of Europe, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, said Monday after dedication ceremonies for a veterans' cemetery at Camp Williams.

Gen. Scowcroft called the changing events involving governments around the world "nothing short of a revolution and a remarkable time as a transition period in history."

"We see changes taking place in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe where the Cold War really began, with the unification of Germany and less dramatic, the unification of Western Europe," he said.

Gen. Scowcroft said there will be agreements made and further progress on Europe as a result of the summit in Washington.

He also said he expects a united Germany to eventually be a part of NATO.

"It makes sense for the U.S., Western Europe and the Soviet Union as well," he said. "It will be a difficult thing for them [the Soviets], but we need to profit from history. Such a move would be for the Soviets' best interest for future stability."

When asked by *The Tribune* if it's too early for massive defense budget cuts as suggested by some members of Congress, Gen. Scowcroft said it's too early for such cuts, but the Unit-

ed States is already making some reductions in Europe since the threat of a massive attack by the Warsaw Pact nations has decreased.

"But, there are a number of other areas in the world where problems still exist and we ought to use care and caution."

He said as things continue to change armed forces in Europe may be further reduced.

When asked if the U.S. was giving too much away in current arms control negotiations, Gen. Scowcroft said that's not the case.

"We're negotiating in our own best interest and in the interest of the reduction of arms," he said. "We haven't given anything away, and we won't give anything away."

As for whether the U.S. will provide economic help to the Soviets, the national security adviser said any such aid must be preceded by a number of changes in Soviet policies.

"The Soviets still offer significant support and forces to countries around that world that constitute threats to freedom, such as Cuba," he said.

Gen. Scowcroft said the Soviet Union is going through a difficult period, and whatever the outcome the country will never be the same again.


He said president Gorbachev must get much of the credit for setting the changes in motion.

Gen. Scowcroft is an Ogden native who attended the U.S. Military Academy and served in both the Army and Air Force. He has been national security adviser to two presidents.

The Washington Post

SUNDAY, JUNE 3, 1990

Summit Talks Conclude, 'Problems' Remain



WHITE HOUSE PHOTO VIA ASSOCIATED PRESS

Posing during break in talks at Camp David are, from left, Secretary of State Baker, Barbara Bush, President Bush, Raisa Gorbachev,

President Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev.



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MR. BIERBAUER: Welcome to "Newsmaker Sunday". In Washington, I'm Charles Bierbauer. Mikhail Gorbachev has left Washington for a quick cross-country tour of the U.S. Have Presidents Gorbachev and Bush achieved a rapport that goes beyond just signing documents to solving problems? And how do the two superpowers address their continuing differences over German unification and Lithuanian independence? Questions for President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, today, on "Newsmaker Sunday."

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MR. BIERBAUER (on tape): For all they achieved, all the agreements and promises, Presidents Gorbachev and Bush have also underscored the differences that remain. Lithuanian independence.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I'm not sure anything has changed. I don't recall placing it that my patience is nearing an end. I've tried to make clear to everybody that we have not recognized the incorporation of these Baltic states into the Soviet Union, and therefore, we have a difference with the Soviet Union.

MR. BIERBAUER: German membership in NATO.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV (through interpreter): I cannot say that we have reached agreement, but that does not mean that our efforts were futile. Many new arguments emerged as a result of these discussions and new possible perspectives.

MR. BIERBAUER: At a White House news conference, Gorbachev was also reminded of his political challenger back home--Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV (through interpreter): I don't think you have chosen the best place for clarifying our internal problems.

MR. BIERBAUER: Gorbachev invited Bush to Moscow. They hope to turn this week's pledge into an actual treaty by year's end to cut nuclear weapons.

The two leaders achieved a personal rapport that each feels will contribute to the future relationship of the two superpowers.

PRESIDENT BUSH: In my view, we've moved a long, long way

from the depths of the Cold War. We've moved towards a--I don't quite know how to quantify it for you, but we could never have had the discussions at Camp David yesterday or as we sat in the Oval Office a couple of days before with President Gorbachev 20 years ago. We all know that.

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MR. BIERBAUER: General Scowcroft, I'm sure you barely caught your breath from these four busy days, but thank you for joining us from over there at the White House.

The successes of this summit are certainly going to be well documented, but I'd like to talk about what's left, and I'd like to start with German unification; a question on which there are certainly differences between the two presidents.

Mr. Bush at his news conference says things have not narrowed, and Mr. Gorbachev said on the other hand, things are not futile.

Did you hear anything in the way of perspectives--as Gorbachev called them, that is new or nuanceful?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think we have to put this issue in perspective. This is the first U.S.-Soviet summit at which the political map, the future political map of Europe was being discussed. It is not something which these two leaders can resolve by themselves, and it's not anything that's going to be resolved in three days of discussion.

It's a very, very seminally important issue for the future of Europe, indeed for the world.

Now, the two had in-depth discussions on it. I think they clearly understand each other's hopes and fears for it. I believe there is, you know, a psychological advance that has been made, very little in substance. Although the two did agree that the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, that all signatories could belong to whatever alliances they wish, should be operative.

MR. BIERBAUER: Well, if that is operative, then how does

he get away--Mr. Gorbachev with saying Germany can't stay in NATO?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think what he believes is that while he has been supportive of a U.S. presence in Europe, and he was again this morning, that NATO is an anachronism, in the new Europe.

MR. BIERBAUER: What do you mean supportive of a U.S. presence in Europe?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think what he said this morning, if you recall, was that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union should be isolated from Europe.

MR. BIERBAUER: So does that go to include the presence of U.S. troops over there? Does that go to include any kind of an alliance?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't want to put words in his mouth, but I think it is significant that he does seem to feel that U.S. presence in Europe would have a stabilizing influence.

MR. BIERBAUER: Both sides have urged completing the CFE treaty, the conventional force treaty, talking about doing it by the end of this year in time for a European summit.

How do you get to that point if you don't resolve the German question, I don't believe you can?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, there's no question that the two are linked. But I think there are pressures. And interests on the part of the Soviet Union to complete a CFE treaty because that is a precondition for holding a Helsinki meeting, a CSCE meeting later on in the year, which the Soviets very much want.

MR. BIERBAUER: And concurrent with that, you really do have to resolve the German question, do you not?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, you have to resolve the major elements of it. Actually it wouldn't be necessary to. We're quite comfortable proceeding with CFE at its own timetable. But I think the Soviets, since CFE would deal with the issue of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, would like to like the two.

MR. BIERBAUER: Well, beyond these talks on conventional

forces, you're also going to have a little conversation with West German Chancellor Kohl by the end of this week. He's due in Washington Friday.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. BIERBAUER: What does President Bush tell the Chancellor, just push on, proceed as you were on the presumption that this matter will be resolved, or that in effect he'll wind up with a fait accompli to present Mr. Gorbachev?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think he will tell Chancellor Kohl that as always we have been firm, unequivocal supporters of Germany reunification. And we think it ought to proceed at its own pace, and that that pace is to be determined by the two Germans.

MR. BIERBAUER: And the U.S. and Soviet Union can only counsel from the sidelines?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That is our position, yes.

MR. BIERBAUER: All right. General, we want to take a break here. When we come back I'd like to shift to the subject of Lithuania, give you two minutes to get ready for it. We'll be right back.

(Announcements)

MR. BIERBAUER: General Scowcroft, coming into this summit, we're moving into Lithuania now, coming in there was at least an informal link that had been voiced by the president himself between the granting of most-favored-nation status on-trade with the Soviet Union and the absence in this case of a dialogue with Lithuania.

That has been dropped. The president himself said so. What convinced him to make that change?

MR. SCOWCROFT: The president remains as concerned as he ever was about Lithuania. But he also on analyzing the merits of the trade agreement, he felt that after all the negotiations, the two sides have arrived at a good agreement, and it was useful to lock in the provisions of that agreement.

And further, that just in the last week or ten days the

Soviets have announced some significant economic--inauguration of their economic program, and he thought it was useful to show support for their efforts to move toward a market economy.

MR. BIERBAUER: Even though the blockade on Lithuania continues, even though as the president himself said, he didn't hear anything change with regard to the proposal that he has made and others, of a dialogue.

MR. SCOWCROFT: He has again made very clear to President Gorbachev our views on Lithuania, and our views that the Baltic states are different than any other constituent parts of the Soviet Union. And he made those points very forcefully.

We have to remember though, that success, that is self-determination for the Baltic states, can only take place with the sufferance of the Soviet Union. And therefore it is important to try to work with the Soviet Union to get that accomplished.

MR. BIERBAUER: Was Mr. Gorbachev persuasive on this, did he make the final twist that convinced the president?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think it was really the president's evaluation of where U.S. interests lay that convinced him to go ahead with the trade agreement.

MR. BIERBAUER: But this trade agreement by all assessments that I'm hearing here doesn't mean all that much when you measure it up in dollars and rubles.

MR. SCOWCROFT: As a matter of fact, it doesn't mean that much. Because it is simply a step toward the granting of most-favored-nation.

What it deals with--it deals with intellectual property rights. And then it deals mostly with arrangements for U.S. businessmen, you know, setting up offices, the kind of practical things that would be necessary were MFN to be granted.

MR. BIERBAUER: You have heard as well as we that members of Congress have told the president either directly or publicly, don't send this to us until Lithuania's resolved. Will you sit on it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, the president has said we'll take no further steps until the Soviets have completed their legislation providing in law for free emigration.

MR. BIERBAUER: Yes. But the question is will you sit on it until Lithuania is resolved. We understand the steps necessary on MFN.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, as the president said, let's take one step at a time. And that's the next step, and we won't take that--the next step is up to the Soviets. And we won't do anything until they move.

MR. BIERBAUER: But let's assume, and it's not really hypothetical, it is a process, that they pass the emigration law, you waive Jackson-Vanik. Now you're at a point where you've got to decide whether to send MFN up there. And you still have Lithuania unresolved.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't want to prejudge what the president would do. But I think at the time--and the reason he doesn't want to prejudge it is because this is a rapidly moving world. But that--you have described the process which is before us, yes.

MR. BIERBAUER: Mr. Gorbachev's world seems to be moving rapidly too. He was asked about Boris Yeltsin today, the man who's been elected president of the Russian Republic, the largest within the Soviet Union.

He said and it caught everyone with some amusement, that this was not the best place to discuss Yeltsin.

I would presume that there was some discussion of Yeltsin and his role, was there?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, there was.

MR. BIERBAUER: And?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I--you know, I don't want to go into the details of the private conversations of the two presidents. But there was a discussion. And since it involves personalities among other things, I think I'll just let it pass.

MR. BIERBAUER: Well, Mr. Yeltsin is prepared to talk with the Lithuanians even if Mr. Gorbachev is not. Is he undermining Gorbachev, is that Gorbachev's concern?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, Mr. Yeltsin has in fact already spoken to the Lithuanians. And what his motivations are are not clear from here. And I think as President Gorbachev indicated in the answer to the question, his motivations may not be clear to Mr. Gorbachev.

MR. BIERBAUER: What is the U.S.'s assessment of Yeltsin?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't know that we have made an assessment of Mr. Yeltsin. He was over here for a visit. And I met with him and the president did drop by to meet him. There's no question that he is a very dynamic individual with a lot of charisma and good political instincts.

MR. BIERBAUER: Are there good political instincts he's showing now?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, they're certainly getting him publicity and a following in some quarters.

MR. BIERBAUER: We need to take another break. We'll be back with more for General Scowcroft.

(Announcements)

MR. BIERBAUER: On "Newsmaker Sunday" from Washington, I'm Charles Bierbauer. Joining us from the White House, General Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to President Bush.

General, it's a year and a day since we what we know as the Tiananmen massacre took place. China, I presume, was discussed--although Mr. Gorbachev mentioned it only in passing. But where are you a year and a day after Tiananmen?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, we're not in a very satisfactory position. I think what's going on in China is a struggle, if you will, to determine leadership, what individual will replace Deng as the supreme leader--Deng Xiaoping. But also it's a struggle between perspectives, between a China that looks inward--the China that we knew during the 50s and 60s--or a China that is beginning

to look out and to rejoin the world. And that has greatly complicated our policies with China.

MR. BIERBAUER: That suggests that the best you can do now is wait it out and see what happens over there?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think we have only limited influence on the outcome, yes.

MR. BIERBAUER: So you're waiting for the change in leadership, whenever it may come?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't know that we're just waiting for a change in leadership. But we are doing whatever we can to influence the Chinese to resume a course toward the outside world, rather than the closed society that they had been.

MR. BIERBAUER: Does that mean discussions of any sort at any level? Is there anything out there, other than public encouragement?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, right now there's no indication that that would be fruitful. And our policy is right now, until they make some additional moves, that there is nothing to be gained by high-level dialogue.

MR. BIERBAUER: So that means there are no secret missions going on, no secret deals? I'm not taking this--I hope you're not taking this personally, but it's a serious question. There's nothing going on, it sounds like, behind the scenes.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not right now.

MR. BIERBAUER: Even though the president extended most-favored-nation trade status to the Chinese a short while ago, is there anything that is linked to that? Is there anything coincident with that, or is that simply an extension process?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No. And that was in no sense condoning Chinese behavior at all. It was a careful determination on his part that continuing the waiver on most-favored nation was very much in the economic interests of the United States.

We have a big bilateral trade with China; and that trade particularly benefits in China those interested in having China

look outward, in having China resume its progressive course--so that the president decided that that's what he wanted to do.

MR. BIERBAUER: What did Mr. Gorbachev have to say about China?

MR. SCOWCROFT: China was discussed; but it was not a core feature. There was nothing of unusual interest.

MR. BIERBAUER: Does he--he shares the frustration?

MR. SCOWCROFT: He didn't indicate any sentiments like that.

MR. BIERBAUER: Over the weekend, there was a report out of Beijing in reference to the dissident, Fang Lizhi, who's been in the American Embassy for a year in sanctuary there, suggesting that the Italians would be happy to take him in. I'm sure there are others. But is there anything going that suggests a solution to the Fang problem?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, we continue to believe that he should be released to leave the country and go wherever he wishes.

MR. BIERBAUER: And I take that answer as meaning no, nothing is happening.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Not so far as I know at the moment.

MR. BIERBAUER: Let me, before we wrap up this segment, change, change to a question about the Palestinians. It came up today at the president's news conference.

In light of the incident which he cited--these raids on Israel--is the PLO terrorist or not?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's a very--it's a very serious question. As you know, we resumed a dialogue with the PLO on the condition that they renounce terrorism and denounce any terrorist acts. That now is under serious question as a result of this attempted assault last week.

MR. BIERBAUER: What precisely does that mean--that it's under discussion, under consideration? Could you--

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not sure we have the final word yet, Charles; but we're reviewing it very, very carefully. And if

it is true that Arafat or the PLO have renounced, if you will, by their actions that agreement, then there will be consequences on our side.

MR. BIERBAUER: All right. We need to take a final break. We'll be back to wrap up in just a moment. Stay with us, please.

(Announcements)

MR. BIERBAUER: General Scowcroft, he did it again: Mr. Gorbachev took the streets, charmed the American public--people screaming as if he were a rock star. What is it about this guy?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Charles, he's a very exuberant personality; he's very outgoing, very effervescent, very dynamic. He obviously likes people, enjoys mingling with them. I think he enjoys his encounters with the press. Quite a man.

MR. BIERBAUER: And the day at Camp David, both men seemed in particularly good spirits coming out of that.

MR. SCOWCROFT: They had really good discussions, and it was not that the issues got any easier or that they resolved them all by any means. But what they did is establish an environment in which they could discuss these things frankly, openly, in a relaxed fashion. And that helps a lot when you're dealing with some of the kinds of problems they're facing.

MR. BIERBAUER:—Well, was that a different environment than at the White House?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think it was. I think the whole ambience of Camp David facilitates the kind of casualness that lets people let down their guard and discuss things openly.

MR. BIERBAUER: Golf carts and horseshoes?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Golf carts and horseshoes.

MR. BIERBAUER: All right. Now, what's the real truth? Was it his first pitch of a horseshoe, and was it a ringer?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I wasn't there. But, yes, horseshoes is not a Soviet sport. And it's my understanding that he was working by the horseshoe pit--he picked up a horseshoe and threw it and got

a ringer on his first throw.

MR. BIERBAUER: And there weren't any sucker bets, like, if I make this, you get rid of all your cruise missiles?

MR. SCOWCROFT: (Laughs) No, the president wasn't even there, I don't think.

MR. BIERBAUER: Oh, so this was a--he was just practicing, warming up for the horseshoe tournament?

MR. SCOWCROFT: That's right.

MR. BIERBAUER: Was does George Bush feel coming out of this? What does he do next? I mean, you've got this promise of a START treaty, a strategic arms treaty. Is it there?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think--I think it's there. I think what we do next is to go back now, roll up our sleeves, and get busy on all of the issues that were discussed, taking advantage of the nuances, pressing them home so that we can complete a START treaty, we can complete a CFE treaty, we can make progress on the issue of Germany and so on.

MR. BIERBAUER: Then we drop into Moscow later in the year.

General Scowcroft, thank you very much for being with us. Enjoy what's left of the weekend. Mr. Bush doesn't give any of us much of a weekend. Thank you for joining us on "Newsmaker Sunday in Washington." I'm Charles Bierbauer.

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FACE THE NATION WITH LESLEY STAHL

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MS. STAHL: Welcome to "Face the Nation." I'm Lesley Stahl.

Mikhail Gorbachev came to the summit to take advantage of President Bush's desire to help him succeed. Weak at home, Gorbachev got what he wanted in Washington.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV (through interpreter): Hence, the question of how long will Gorbachev stay in his office, and how this whole perestroika will end, and so and so forth--even this, I think, fits into this process of profound change.

PRESIDENT BUSH: May I simply add that the United States is not trying to deal from strength or weakness.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV (through interpreter): I'm looking at you, looking at the Americans. I feel really at home.

MS. STAHL: On the surface, Gorbachev was the picture of confidence--his old, self-assured style on display. But in private meetings with the president, even at the state dinner, he came close to doing what he said he wouldn't do--beg for the trade treaty he needs to bring home to a country on the verge of economic collapse.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV (through interpreter): ...not yet put in place a working system, a new system. And our ship has lost anchor; and, therefore, we're all a little sick.

A favorable gesture from the U.S. Congress on trade would, I am sure, be very helpful--mostly, I would say, politically.

MS. STAHL: He scored with his sarcastic reference to Mr. Bush's granting special trade status to China, while denying it to him because of Lithuania.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV (through interpreter): Maybe we should introduce presidential rule in the Baltics, and fire some rounds in the Baltics.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Bush finally signed the trade treaty without any assurances on Lithuania. He said he'd ask for MFN, most-favored-nation trade status, as soon as the Soviets pass an emigration law, which is considered imminent.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I looked at the overall relationship. If somebody wants to argue with me, fine; we'll take them on. I'm doing what I think is in the best interest of the United States of America.

MS. STAHL: While Mr. Bush was helping Gorbachev, his rival back in Moscow was poking him in the eye. Newly-elected president of the Russian Republic, Boris Yeltsin, held his own summit with the president of Lithuania.

In Washington, the two leaders signed fifteen separate agreements and protocols, and a statement on approval of the main points of a strategic nuclear arms treaty.

PRESIDENT BUSH: The agreements we record today and those yet to come will advance the cause of peace.

MS. STAHL: Will the summit give Gorbachev a boost at home? We'll ask Soviet central committeeman Georgi Arbatov and national security advisor Brent Scowcroft.

PRESIDENT GORBACHEV (through interpreter): And I set high store by the personal relationship that the president, myself, have established--a personal rapport between us.

MS. STAHL: Improving super-power relations--is the enemy image gone? An issue facing the nation.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, "Face the Nation with Lesley Stahl."

This issue of "Face the Nation with Lesley Stahl" is sponsored by the Archer Daniels Midland Company, ADM, supermarket to the world; and by McDonnell-Douglas, a company of leaders.

(Announcements)

MS. STAHL: President Gorbachev is just about to leave the back of the White House, the Mall area. Secretary of State Baker is with him. He is about to get on a helicopter to go to Andrews Air Force Base, and then on to Minneapolis, and later tonight on to San Francisco. And we will proceed with our broadcast, but we'll bring you these pictures of him departing.

Sitting beside me is Georgi Arbatov, a member of the

Soviet Central Committee. Welcome to "Face the Nation," Mr. Arbatov. I think the first question I'd like to ask you is about this emigration law. President Bush says he's going to hold up most-favored-nation trading status until you pass it. What's holding it up?

MR. ARBATOV: Mainly bureaucratic procedures in the Supreme Soviet; and also the very nature of it. You know, our parliament hasn't worked in the proper way for a long time; so there is a succession of laws demanded by perestroika on freedom of the press, not less important than emigration.

MS. STAHL: Well, let me interrupt. On emigration, it's hard to believe, frankly, that it's being held up for that. If you have free emigration, how concerned is the Kremlin that people will flood out the way they left Eastern Europe?

Aren't you more afraid of that, and isn't that really what's holding up this law?

MR. ARBATOV: But, you know, it doesn't affect--the absence of the law doesn't affect the emigration. Practically everybody who will be let out under the law is being let out now.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about people who just want to travel--want to go to the West? They can't just do that now.

MR. ARBATOV: And they, a lot of them, you know, they are more-held up by the absence of airplane tickets. So I think this will be a very important agreement.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about getting in a car and crossing the border? You still can't do that, can you, as a citizen of the Soviet Union?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you can; you can, you can. There are some procedures, but you can.

But, you know, this is really so--that the major issue is this. There are some--in the discussion around the law, there are some other things mentioned. One of them is by the bureaucrats and who will pay. You will have to--our ruble is not convertible.

MS. STAHL: You'll take--

MR. ARBATOV: So if millions of people go, you have to change who will pay. This money is needed for medicine, for some other needs. And this is a question which has to be resolved.

MS. STAHL: And the brain drain.

MR. ARBATOV: And the brain drain.

MS. STAHL: Meaning?

MR. ARBATOV: Brain drain meaning, you know, not even emigration. We cannot stop it with those who want to emigrate already now--but those who go on contract for two, three years, et cetera.

MS. STAHL: You know, Boris Yeltsin, who was just elected president of the Russian Republic, had a meeting with the head of Lithuania. He says he's going to try and open economic relations between Lithuania and Russia--maybe even to help break that embargo.

What kind of a threat is Boris Yeltsin right now to Gorbachev's authority, popularity?

MR. ARBATOV: See, I really hope that both gentlemen--Yeltsin and Gorbachev--and it looks that Gorbachev understands it, maybe Yeltsin also--will understand very good that the state of affairs which exist now in the country, there is major need, overriding need, for their cooperation, not for their rivalry. And they have to do it. Otherwise, I think the public will turn away from those of the gentlemen whose fault it was.

It is understood, I think, even by those who voted for Yeltsin--most of those, and those who support Gorbachev, this is really not the time for squabbles. It's a very serious time; we have serious problems--they have to be dealt with.

MS. STAHL: Can Yeltsin have his own foreign policy for the Russian Republic, or is there a way to stop him? Or will he go forward and--

MR. ARBATOV: You see, according to the constitution, it is--he has partially--he has a minister of foreign affairs. But the major things have to be resolved by the Union. But there will be a new law on the Union; and what will be there, I don't know.

MS. STAHL: Let me ask you about what you just said, in light of Gorbachev's survivability. You said if these two men squabble, then you suggested they both should go.

How does Gorbachev go, if it's decided that his economic plan after five years is a failure, which it looks like; if it's decided he's squabbling and not handling Lithuania correctly, whatever? How does--what's the mechanism?

MR. ARBATOV: No, no. I hope he will not go. He has four-and-a-half years before him, according to the constitution, of the presidency--even a little bit more. And I hope he will stay. I don't see an acceptable successor. But, you know--

MS. STAHL: Even Yeltsin you don't see as a successor?

MR. ARBATOV: I don't see in him--and this is--the major test is before Yeltsin still. You know, it is one thing to be in a position. When you get in office, you have to deliver. And this remains to be seen.

MS. STAHL: But, you know, he was elected; and, therefore, has some kind of a mandate. Gorbachev's never been elected.

MR. ARBATOV: Here he was elected just in the same way as Gorbachev was elected. He was elected by the Russian parliament; Gorbachev was elected by the all-Union parliament.

MS. STAHL: Well, but he was elected into the parliament.

MR. ARBATOV: And with more votes.

MS. STAHL: All right. Let me ask you quickly another question. Is the economic plan that was just put forward a couple of weeks ago dead--dead on arrival, as we say?

MR. ARBATOV: You know, I think what our council of ministers does--it's actually, they call it the government, we call it the government, but it's not completely the government because the major ministers are in the presidential cabinet now.

But it was a failure, a deep failure; and I think they have proven already that they cannot deliver.

MS. STAHL: So what happens now?

MR. ARBATOV: I don't know. It would be--for me, I would

be very radical. But Mr. Gorbachev and the Supreme Soviet have to decide. I, as a member of--

MS. STAHL: Is it in Mr. Gorbachev's head to be radical, or is he going to continue the half measures?

MR. ARBATOV: Mr. Gorbachev promised to be radical, especially in the economic field. But this, what was proposed to him by Ryzhkov, is a wrong kind of radicalism.

MS. STAHL: I hear a lot of distancing of this plan from Gorbachev. I also sense some criticism of Gorbachev from you here. Are you disappointed in him?

MR. ARBATOV: No, no.

MS. STAHL: You sound it.

MR. ARBATOV: I support him; I don't see any alternative to Gorbachev.

MS. STAHL: Okay.

MR. ARBATOV: But it doesn't prevent me from voicing some criticism. I think in economic affairs, it's a bit too slowly.

MS. STAHL: Okay, Mr. Arbatov, thank you for being our guest. We will be right back with national security advisor Brent Scowcroft--from the White House.

(Announcements)

MS. STAHL: Joining us live from the White House, from the Roosevelt Room right across from the Oval Office, General Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to the president. General Scowcroft, welcome to "Face the Nation" from the White House.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Good morning, Lesley.

MS. STAHL: Good to see you.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Thank you.

MS. STAHL: As you know, tomorrow is the first anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre. In the last two weeks, twenty people have been executed. The Chinese have no emigration law.

Why is the administration giving the Chinese most-favored-nation trade status, and not the Soviet Union?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think the issue in China is that it

is in the interests of the United States to continue the most-favored-nation exception. There are about \$18 billion in trade between the United States and China. Indeed, just a couple of days ago the Chinese signed an agreement with Boeing Aircraft which could amount to as much as \$4 billion more. In addition, the people who are on the Chinese side of the most-favored nation are the people that we're trying to help to support--the progressives looking outward. There's just no question that the most-favored--nation treatment for China is in the U.S. national interest and in the interest of broadening the Chinese and keeping them facing toward the United States.

MS. STAHL: Since we granted or renewed MFN to China, they have done these executions and tightened up. Speak about where human rights fits into Mr. Bush's whole policy--because, if the Soviets do come through with their emigration law, you say you're going to ask for most-favored nation for them, despite Lithuania.

So human rights is being taken out of this equation, I gather. And explain the policy to the public.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, the emigration--the Jackson-Vanik restriction on most-favored nation deals specifically with emigration. Now, of course, emigration is a part of human rights. Emigration has never been a particular problem with the Chinese; and therefore that treatment is different from the Soviet Union.

But the president has made it quite clear his abhorrence of some of the human rights practices of the Chinese. Indeed, they have been condemned officially in our annual report on that. So that is really quite clear.

What we're talking about is an issue which is of undoubted economic benefit to the United States.

MS. STAHL: But even in Lithuania, can't Mr. Gorbachev go home and say, look, my policy in Lithuania is in no way a penalty; it's not in any way hurting my relationship with the West? And is that really what we want him to go home and feel and say?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Most-favored nation for the Soviets is a prospective issue, not an ongoing one, as it is with the Chinese. There is virtually no trade with the Soviet Union at the present time.

The reason that the president signed the trade bill is that the negotiations have gone on, hard negotiations were worked out, it is a good treaty--good agreement; and he wanted to lock in the provisions. Now, he will not move forward with that until the Soviet Union completes its emigration legislation, because, in the Soviet Union, emigration has in the past been used as a political lever. And that's the difference.

MS. STAHL: Well, now you heard Mr. Gorbachev in the news conference just a few minutes ago say that he may suspend the exit visas for the Soviet Jews if Israel doesn't agree immediately to stop allowing Jews to settle in the occupied territories.

Does it concern you that they'll be using emigration as their own policy?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Of course--and I think that's why the president has said we have signed the trade agreement; it will not be sent to the Congress until the emigration policy is clarified and legalized in the Soviet Union.

But he has also made quite clear our policy on Lithuania, the Baltic states, and reiterated it over and over again to President Gorbachev. So there's no doubt about that.

MS. STAHL: I want to get onto the other subjects of the summit, but one more on China.

You went over just about a year ago and made that toast. Do you regret, in light of what's happened in the last year, that toast?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Most of what I regret about the toast is that no one has printed the whole text of the toast, including the part where I criticized them severely for the performance at Tiananmen Square.

MS. STAHL: So--no regrets?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, you know, one practices diplomacy in certain ways. And I think you cannot have a dialogue if you're not to practice the civility that goes along with having a dialogue.

MS. STAHL: Okay. On the summit, tell us, if you will, where we all stand on what was supposed to be the central question of Germany, a united Germany, in NATO? What's your impression of how this was left and where we go from here?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think it was basically left that, first of all, these two leaders cannot resolve the question of Germany by themselves. It is a question for, first, the four powers, a question for the NATO alliance, and a question for all of Europe. This is a major issue. What we're doing is remaking the political map of Europe, and it's not surprising that it is going slowly.

I think that the two sides understand each other much better. I think that the statement the president made that both sides agree with the Helsinki Final Accord in 1975, that Germany and all states are free to choose their alliances, is a step forward. And I think negotiations and consultations will continue.

MS. STAHL: If there really were a vote on this issue about alliances and the Soviets put forward the notion of neither alliance as something for the German people to vote on, are you that confident that a united Germany would vote to stay in NATO or any alliance?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MS. STAHL: You're confident?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MS. STAHL: Okay. The larger goal, though, the primary major goal of the West, as I understand it, is to get Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe completely and out of East Germany.

Do you have a feeling that you moved any closer to that goal at this summit?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think we did. I think, you know, these things again are not going to be solved in one quick

meeting. We did have an agreed statement on troops in Europe, on the CFE negotiations. And both sides agreed that we should push forward on them--and that a CSCE, a Helsinki-type conference, would not be held before the completion of this agreement.

So, I think, yes, we made some progress.

MS. STAHL: All right. We may show you some pictures of Mr. Gorbachev's helicopter overhead as he leaves for Andrews Air Force Base while we talk. So don't be startled by that. Here it comes.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Surely.

MS. STAHL: Okay. I wanted to ask you about our attitudes toward Gorbachev. There's been a lot written about the policy of trying to help him, or save him. He seems to be someone in the Soviet Union that's trying to reform communism rather than dismantle it.

Has there been any shift away from this focus of trying to help him, perpetuate him, in light of his policies?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: The United States does not and really cannot gear its policy to one individual. We have to gear our policy to U.S. national interests and to the Soviet system as a whole.

Now, there has been much good that has happened in the Soviet Union since President Gorbachev has been in office. It is a significantly different system; and what has happened has largely been in the interests of the West. Therefore, we hope for a continuation of those kinds of policies. Inasmuch as they do at the present time reflect President Gorbachev, then there is a convergence of our interests on Mr. Gorbachev and on the Soviet Union itself.

MS. STAHL: Is it true, as has been reported, that there is a gnawing feeling, a growing feeling, in the White House that he may not be able to make it because of all the problems at home, and particularly because of this election of Yeltsin to the head of the Russian Republic, that Mr. Gorbachev, you know, could be replaced-

-not by a communist, but by a so-called democrat--as has happened in Hungary and Poland and so forth?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not aware of a gnawing feeling in the White House, Lesley.

I think there is a realistic appraisal, not only in the White House but in the Kremlin, of the enormous problems that President Gorbachev faces. Indeed, he outlined them in his press conference this morning--remaking the Soviet society, remaking the political system, remaking the economic system. That is an enormous challenge.

MS. STAHL: Yes, but all within communism, right? He's not out there trying to dismantle that system; he's trying to reform it.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: President Gorbachev this morning used the terms "freedom" and "democracy" as the hallmark of the reform. I'll leave it to him to describe it, but those are pretty good words.

MS. STAHL: Quickly let's switch to the Middle East. Arafat--he refuses to condemn that terrorist action by a PLO faction. Does this mean that we are going to end our dialogue with the PLO?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, it's a serious problem because, if you remember in late 1988 when Arafat not only renounced terrorism but indicated he would condemn it, we then resumed a dialogue with the PLO.

If he is, in fact, going back on those conditions--

MS. STAHL: Hasn't he?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: --then we will have a serious problem. We're still discussing with him. I don't think we have the last word yet.

MS. STAHL: Okay. Thank you very much, General Brent Scowcroft. We will be back with a final word.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I pride myself as a horseshoe player. And President Gorbachev picked up the horseshoe, never having

played the game, to my knowledge, and literally--literally, all you horseshoe players out there, threw a ringer the first time.

(Announcements)

MS. STAHL: Our final word is from Barbara Bush.

MRS. BUSH: Whatever the era, whatever the times, one thing will never change. Fathers and mothers, if you have children, they must come first. You must read to your children, and you must hug your children, and you must love your children. Your success as a family, our success as a society, depends not on what happens in the White House, but on what happens inside your house.

Who knows? Someone out in this audience may even be someone who will one day follow in my footsteps and preside over the White House as the president's spouse--and I wish him well.

(Laughter)

MS. STAHL: Barbara Bush, speaking at Wellesley College. Thanks for joining us. See you again next Sunday.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of "Face the Nation with Lesley Stahl" was sponsored by the Archer Daniels Midland Company--ADM, supermarket to the world; and by McDonnell-Douglas, a company of leaders.

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Top-Level Defense Report Receives Little Attention

By PHILIP FINNEGAN
Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Despite a year and a half in the White House, the Bush administration has failed to take action on recommendations made by top-level defense strategists before the presidential election.

One of those strategists, Brent Scowcroft, is U.S. President George Bush's national security adviser. The other, James Woolsey, is the chief U.S. negotiator to the Conventional Forces Europe talks in Vienna.

The recommendations, under the title the American Agenda, were issued in late 1988. They were not binding but simply regarded as sound advice for the incoming administration.

The American Agenda was part of a bipartisan project headed by

former presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter.

The recommendations included moving a number of forces from active to reserve status, making greater use of simulators and relying more on smaller ships or submarines, rather than aircraft carriers.

The change in naval strategy is based on the belief that submarines and smaller ships, armed with cruise missiles, can be deployed to world trouble spots cheaper than aircraft carriers.

"There certainly has not been any major movement [on their proposals]," says one congressional defense analyst.

"These two have not moved the glacier much. It shows that even if you are the national security adviser, you can't move the Department of Defense much."

The proposal to move troops from the active forces to the reserves has received little support from the military services. In its six-year spending plan for 1992-1997, the Navy has proposed greater reliance on the active forces.

The American Agenda recommended operating some carriers with reserve air squadrons. Instead, the Navy has proposed retiring two carriers but would continue to have the same 13 active air wings and two reserve wings.

The Army and Navy, in their six-year spending plans, do propose greater reliance on reserves. But that will be the result of cutting active forces more than cutting reserves, not in shifting missions.

"Scowcroft feels a lot more strongly about relying on the reserves than anyone over here," concludes one Pentagon official.

Defense analysts say the American Agenda recommendation on greater use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has fallen by the wayside.

"I don't see that the Scowcroft report has done anything for UAVs, plus or minus," says Bob Roy, president of Sunnyvale, Calif.-based RJR Associates, a marketing research firm.

Although there is general agreement that UAVs should be used more, budget cuts at the Pentagon have slowed projected increases in funds for UAVs.

"Progress is disappointingly slow," Roy said.

Regarding the American Agenda recommendation to use more simulators in military exercises, Robert Reed, head of the National Training Systems Association in Arlington, Va., said there has been "a lot of ferment but no action yet."

He says the increased interest in trainers and simulators has been "driven more by economics than by what they had in their report."

Although he says "nothing has happened as yet" in the overall implementation of the Scowcroft-Woolsey proposals, Barry Bleckman, a former assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, thinks these are directions in which the military services will be forced to move in the future.

Conventional Arms Pact, Germany Question Tied

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

The decision by U.S. and Soviet leaders not to grapple extensively during the summit with the security questions raised by the unification of Germany leaves much to be done if a new treaty on conventional arms reductions is to be signed before the end of 1990, U.S. and Soviet officials said yesterday.

The officials acknowledged yesterday that although a new treaty reducing European conventional forces has not been officially linked with an accord on Germany, the two issues are inescapably intertwined in political terms.

Previously, the United States had rejected the Soviet contention that Moscow could not participate in any demilitarization of the continent unless Germany's future military capabilities have been satisfactorily limited. But the public and private remarks of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on this score evidently won some grudging U.S. acceptance.

"We're quite comfortable proceeding with... [a new treaty on European conventional forces] at its own timetable," national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said on Cable News Network. "But I think the Soviets, since [the treaty] would deal with the issue of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, would like to link the two."

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, a senior adviser to Gorbachev on arms matters who took part in many of Gorbachev's discussions with Bush last week, explained the

Soviet position in an interview yesterday. "At this point, we do not link the Vienna talks with a solution of the German question because we do not want to interfere with the completion of the agreement," Akhromeyev said. "But once we do have a treaty prepared for signing, I personally cannot imagine how Gorbachev could sign the prepared treaty without a solution" to the German question.

Gorbachev said at a joint news conference with Bush that the conventional arms negotiations in Vienna could be slowed, if not halted, if the West imposed its own view that a unified German state must join the existing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). "Then we should go back and see where we are: What's happening to our security? What should we be doing with our armed forces? What should we do about Vienna?" he asked.

U.S. officials interpreted this allusion to a potential withdrawal of past Soviet commitments for sweeping new arms reductions as a sign that Gorbachev wants additional leverage in negotiations with the West.

Akhromeyev said he could not accept a Western view that the process of German reunification is "out of control" and beyond any influence by Soviet leaders distracted by immense domestic problems or undermined by defecting Warsaw Pact allies. He cited his nation's continued, post-war right to station troops in East Germany as another potent lever in the debate.

U.S. officials said the two sides may consequently be forced to settle simultaneously

the issue of Germany's potential membership in the Western alliance, the future character of the alliance, the possibility of some constraints on German and allied Western troops, and the myriad details associated with a new arms accord between

23 nations. Gorbachev reiterated yesterday that he hopes to sign such an agreement at a summit involving the 35 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation before the end of the year.

Akhromeyev, reflecting comments by Gorbachev and other Soviet officials, said at one point that Moscow "could not abide" the integration of German military forces into the unified NATO military command—an act that would essentially place them under U.S. control. He said this was unacceptable even as a short term solution while NATO was undergoing reform, citing a Russian proverb: "There is nothing as permanent as something that is considered to be temporary."

But Akhromeyev also said, "What we do need is a show of goodwill," hinting, along with other Soviet officials, that a compromise may be possible if Gorbachev can tell his domestic critics of a Western concession. Indicating some new Soviet flexibility, he said "one option" may be to eliminate the military component of NATO's command structure,

and allow German membership in a Western alliance structured to consider "purely" political issues. Under such an arrangement, there would be "no need for [alliance] military doctrines—they would disappear."

He said an alternative solution might be found in the proposal of West Germany's minority Social Democratic party, to establish a unified European military alliance with just five members: the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, Britain and France. Military officers from each country would be assigned to work in a headquarters at a site to be determined later.

Asked if Bush demonstrated an appreciation of Gorbachev's concerns about a potential Russian backlash to Germany's membership in NATO, Akhromeyev said: "Bush has a position of his own. He tries to convince us that the U.S. position would be beneficial for the Soviet Union." Although this is a mistake, Akhromeyev said, the two sides laid the foundation at the summit for further work that can lead to accommodation.

WIRE NEWS...from Pg. 1

threats. He also said that by the end of the century there will be 15 or 16 Third World countries with ballistic missiles tipped by nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. (Reuter)

MARINES GIRD FOR BUDGET WAR:

Even as 2,100 U.S. Marines awaited orders off the coast of Liberia, top military officials at home faced perhaps their bloodiest battle ever--the budget war. With the U.S. Army honing its own mobile attack units in shifting from the prospect of war in Europe to terrorism and Third World conflicts, the question was whether the Marine Corps itself would be protected. Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Colin Powell said in testimony before Congress that there is a need for flexibility and that there is not major duplications of missions. (Reuter)

OFFICIALS TESTIFY: Top Bush Administration officials will defend their \$307 billion proposal for U.S. military expenditures before Congressional budget negotiators today, but they face tough opposition from key members of Congress. The White House and congressional negotiators will hear from Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Sen. Sam Nunn (D.-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, will speak against them and for a reduction to \$290 billion. (Reuter)

NO ROLE IN LIBERIA: The American military has "no role to play" in Liberia's internal conflict even though more than 2,000 marines are poised to help evacuate U.S. citizens from the African nation, officials said yesterday. Despite pleas, officials have rejected the idea of involving U.S. servicemen in the West African nation's civil strife. A four-ship flotilla is in international waters off the coast on a contingency basis in case it becomes necessary to evacuate American citizens. (AP)

FIXING THE SHUTTLES: Engineers are prepared to pump rocket

fuel aboard the shuttle Columbia today in a last ditch effort to pinpoint a leak that threatens to ground the ship until August. In addition, technicians are inspecting the shuttle Discovery after that craft was damaged during an accident Monday. In that accident, the right-hand payload door was pulled up more than 10 inches when a crane was moved. The Columbia was supposed to launch in May. The Discovery is slated for an October launch date. (UPI)

DELAY AT ROCKY FLATS URGED: An advisory committee has recommended delaying a restart in production of nuclear weapons components at the Rocky Flats plant near Denver until at least October, an Energy Department official said yesterday. The Energy Department had hoped to restart the plant this month. Rocky Flats is the only source of plutonium triggers for nuclear weapons. The committee, chaired by former Nuclear Regulatory Commission member John Ahearne, believes changes in the plant and in training will not be finished in time. (AP)

CHANGES MADE TO COUNTER COUPS: The Philippine armed forces have made internal changes to counter the threat of another coup attempt by army rebels and to improve combat effectiveness, said Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos yesterday. Ramos said "value-formation and reorientation activities" were being undertaken with officers and men to strengthen their com-

mitment to the government and the constitution. (Reuter)

BUSH PRAISES NEW GI BILL: President George Bush paid tribute yesterday to the peacetime GI Bill and credited the bill's college benefits for helping the armed forces attract better recruits. Bush said it serves as an "important component in the success of America's all-volunteer force." Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said the bill is crucial for recruiting and retention. The Rose Garden ceremony was held to honor the program as the number of participants reached one million since it started in 1984. (AP)

U.S. LEASED F-86F JET CRASH: A U.S. civilian-owned single-seater F-86F Sabre jet leased by the U.S. Air Force crashed off Okinawa yesterday, Japanese Defense officials said. The pilot ejected safely and was rescued by a Japanese air self-defense force helicopter. The accident occurred inside an air force training zone over the East China Sea about 137 kilometers north-northwest of the U.S. Kadena Air Force Base, where the plane was based. The aircraft crashed after developing engine trouble during a training operation, 313rd Air Division Public Affairs Chief Lt. Col. Winkelmann said. (Combined Wires)

FRANCE - SAUDI ARABIA: France and Saudi Arabia yesterday signed an investment agreement linked to a wider accord under which Paris is to provide Riyadh with three Lafayette anti-air attack frigates. The agreement covers an "offset program" of French investment in Saudi Arabia to counterbalance the purchase of the frigates. The investment will include a high proportion of high technology projects, French officials said. The investment deal forms part of an overall \$3.1 billion frigate deal agreed to last June. The frigates are part of Saudi Arabia's Sawari program to modernize its navy.

(Summarized from wire copy. Source material available at CNARS, Room 4C881.)

On the defense

British sources, quoting insiders at the U.S. Defense Department, suggest Dick Cheney will be out in six months to a year for several reasons, including being on the losing end of power struggles with Jim Baker and Brent Scowcroft. Mr. Cheney is also said to be increasingly caught up in squabbles with top military brass. And, if that's not enough, he is described as losing influence on Capitol Hill. One possible ploy would be to move Mr. Cheney over to Interior, where Manuel Lujan is just barely rocking along. What might save the former Wyoming congressman would be that he is not particularly close to President Bush. So Mr. Baker and Mr. Scowcroft would not want risk his being replaced by someone with more influence, the sources say.

Who is the fairest of them all?

TWO vignettes from the summit encapsulated the fickle way in which public esteem settles or does not on the presidency. Both concern first ladies. On the morning of June 2nd, at Camp David, the press had just finished bawling questions to Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, who had driven away in a golf cart. A second golf cart tore back, one rider in it. It was Mrs Barbara Bush, returned to pick up Ranger, one of her spaniels, which had been left behind. Billing and cooing, the White House press corps, which includes some of the most hard-bitten men in America (and you should see the women) fussed around the nation's granny like chicks round a hen.

Second vignette. It is San Francisco, and the scheduled breakfast meeting between the Gorbachevs and the Reagans has been put back an hour. Why might that be? One rumour (quite unfounded, but never mind) has it that Mrs Nancy Reagan is determined to reduce the time that President Gorbachev is to spend at Stanford University, where he is due later in the morning. Stanford, you see, embarrassed her husband by turning down the chance to house his papers.

Poor Mrs Reagan can do no right; nice Mrs Bush, whom one recent poll found the most popular person in America, can do no wrong. These judgments are not baseless. Mrs Bush's speech at the graduation ceremony at Wellesley University, to which she took Mrs Gorbachev, really was a model of its kind; affecting, wise, and funny. Its triumph was all the greater because some feminists on the campus had doubted whether this quintessential wife and mother was a satisfactory role model.

As for Mrs Reagan, that breakfast must have been terrible, whatever she said afterwards. In Mrs Reagan's book "My Turn", Mrs Gorbachev is variously called rude, condescending, too talkative, insensitive, impolite, and looking "like a prison matron".

The inevitable comparisons between Mrs Bush and her predecessor echo the contrasts between their husbands' administrations. During the week of the summit, Mr Oliver North was back before a grand jury, with Mr Brendan Sullivan, his lawyer, screaming at the prosecution lawyers once more. How long ago it all seems. Those angry thrifty men from the South and the west who came to Washington to take their revenge on government: where are they now?

Of competence and ideology

Replaced by impeccably competent grey-haired graduates, whose forte is sorting out the messes left by the now thrift-enriched men. The figure of Mr Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser and competence personified, so ubiquitously close to the president all week, would never have looked so at home in the Reagan White House. The people around Mr Bush prize themselves

more on their ability to manage policy than to create it. Even the more ideological ones, such as Mr John Sununu, chief of staff and guardian of the conservative flame, are apostles of technocratic competence. There are plenty of incompetents in the cabinet and below; but none of them has the singleminded zeal—call it ideology—of those who epitomised those madcap years of the 1980s.

The comparisons with the Reagan presidency can be overdone (and not only because Mr Bush and Mr James Baker, among many others, were and are central to both presidencies). At least two, mutually contradictory arguments are made against the idea that Washington has seen a sea-change of attitude from flaky incompetence to stern managerialism.

The first—from the left—is that the Bush administration only looks competent by comparison with its immediate predecessor. The bloodless aspects of Mr Bush's presidency that are now praised, says Mr Michael Kinsley, a liberal columnist, are precisely those for which President Jimmy Carter (to say nothing of Mr Michael Dukakis) was excoriated. From the right comes the argument that Mr Reagan was anything but incompetent. His central goals for the presidency were to cut public spending on welfare programmes, challenge communism and build up America's armed forces. He achieved all three.

If competence, not ideology, pervades the administration, then it follows that the president's popularity stands or falls with his achievements. So however well Mr Bush may do in the opinion polls—and at

present he stands far above the levels reached by his two predecessors at the same points in their terms of office—the pundits refuse to believe that there is sufficient affection for him in the country at large to carry him through difficult times. So far, managing has served him well. His main task has been to direct America's reactions to great events, like the revolutions in Europe, which have not been directly of its making. But neither he nor his grey men can read the future, can spot what exigencies will require something more than the qualities for which he has won respect.

Presidents who, like Mr Reagan, inspire strong feelings in their detractors sometimes seem also to be more secure in their support. Mr Bush's easy popularity, one might think, may one day vanish like snow in the spring. Yet Mr Bush has his diehard supporters and will fall no farther in the polls than events and recessions dictate. And he has one thing going for him: being married to a woman whose sheer old-fashioned niceness casts a brilliant light on all around her.



WASHINGTON UPDATE

Policy and Politics in Brief

THE OTHER SUMMIT IS STALLED

BY LAWRENCE J. HAAS

Q uack, quack? Last year, it was Office of Management and Budget (OMB) director Richard G. Darman's duck test ("If it looks like a duck . . ."), which he used to rule out new taxes, that prompted a few smiles as Washington struggled over an otherwise grim chore—cobbling together a fiscal 1990 budget.

This year, it's a lame duck that is attracting attention. With Congress and the White House facing the politically awesome task of cutting the 1991 deficit to \$74 billion to avoid across-the-board spending cuts, and the newly launched budget summit currently heading nowhere, more policy makers are talking openly if grudgingly about the need for a lame-duck congressional session that would be devoted to drafting a budget.

Sen. Bob Packwood of Oregon, the Finance Committee's senior Republican who has been involved in the budget talks with the White House, made such a forecast recently on CNN's *Evans and Novak*. "We will come back in session shortly after Thanksgiving," he said, "and reach a budget conclusion at about Christmas."

Other key lawmakers seem to be getting used to the notion of a callback, although House Speaker Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash., wants to avoid reconvening after Election Day. Rep. Lee H. Hamilton, D-Ind., the chairman of the congressional Joint Economic Committee, has made it known he expects a lame-duck session.

The lame-duck talk comes amid continuing discomfort about the summit. Along with well-known differences between the political parties on fiscal matters, and personal animosities between key negotiators that go back to last year, there is a widespread belief that the summit was awkwardly timed to begin with. "We're sort of at this half-baked stage," a top House aide said.

In part, that view reflects the competing theories among budget experts about

how a big deficit-cutting deal could work. One theory suggests that a deficit reducing plan should be constructed gradually, over months of study, with White House and congressional leaders building support for it around the country. The second suggests that the deal can take shape only in an atmosphere of crisis, when lawmakers can point to a tangible economic problem—such as a sharp jump in interest rates—to convince skeptical voters that they must pay higher taxes.

This budget summit does not seem to fall under either approach. Rather than using the potential opening accorded when House Ways and Means Committee chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill., unveiled a five-year deficit cutting plan in early March, President Bush waited two months before calling for high-level budget talks. That delay pushed the negotiations even closer to the midterm elections that will impede bold decision making.

On the other hand, there is no tangible economic crisis driving the summit. The economy, although sluggish, is not expected to slip into recession any time soon. The stock market, which inspired the 1987 budget summit after a record-breaking crash, continued in early June to reach dizzying heights.


Not even the prospect of deep spending cuts under the 1985 Balanced Budget Act is likely to conjure up a crisis atmosphere. Faced with difficult targets in 1987 (be-

fore the stock market crash), Congress, with the Reagan Administration's concurrence, simply changed the deficit targets. That Congress and the White House will do so again is considered a foregone conclusion, according to lawmakers and White House aides.

At the same time, a notable electoral scare has sent a shudder through the House. Members are expected to be extra careful to avoid unpopular preelection votes after Rep. John P. Murtha, D-Pa., a supposedly unbeatable 16-year veteran, won just 51 per cent of the vote in his May 15 primary. Other incumbents have also faced primary problems.

All of this may explain the somnambulist pace of the summit. Two weeks of talks in May produced nothing but sparring over the size of the deficit problem. The third week, coming after a recess for Memorial Day, was scheduled to consist of walk-throughs, nicknamed "budget seminar 101," on major spending and tax categories. Experts were to address the 20-odd lawmakers and White House aides. Leading the talks on defense, for instance, would be Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, House Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin, D-Wis., and his Senate counterpart, Sam Nunn, D-Ga. Nobody knew where the summit would go after that.

At the same time, the House Appropri-



Senate Finance Committee member Bob Packwood, R-Ore. He's among those predicting a lame-duck session devoted to drafting a budget.

Richard A. Bloom

ations Committee is planning to move ahead on fiscal 1991 spending bills, guided by the budget resolution that the House passed on May 1. Senate Democratic leaders—pressured by Appropriations Committee chairman Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., who wants some action on his panel's bills—are thinking about moving their Budget Committee-passed resolution to the Senate floor. Both developments are expected to complicate the

summit, if only because key members will have to keep an eye on House and Senate floor matters.

Assuming they hope to avoid controversy before the elections, lawmakers need to finesse a few challenges. The most imposing will come on Oct. 15, when OMB almost certainly will report that Congress's failure to reach fiscal 1991's deficit target will trigger the huge, across-the-board spending cuts.

At that point, Congress and the White House could let the cuts take effect, with the promise of overturning them with a more rational deficit cutting approach in a lame-duck session. Or, with the same promise, they could suspend the Balanced Budget Act for a couple of months. Or they could avoid the issue by revising the deficit targets sometime before then and adopting a modest budget deal that largely avoids the deficit problem. ■

MEANTIME, BACK IN THE SOVIET UNION . . .

BY ROCHELLE L. STANFIELD

President Bush gave Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev a political present by signing a trade agreement on June 1 at the Washington summit. But for now, the agreement is little more than a symbol. Bush does not plan to submit the pact to Congress until the Soviet legislature approves a new emigration measure.

Even if the trade agreement is implemented, it would not do much for the Soviet Union for years. The Soviet economy is in such a shambles that the country couldn't increase its exports to the United States by much. (The United States had a \$3.5 billion trade surplus with the Soviet Union in 1989.)

Nonetheless, Gorbachev needed a trophy from the summit to help him con-

front the political opposition of newly elected Russian Republic President Boris N. Yeltsin, the continued ethnic and nationalistic pressure in the republics and what is probably the most dangerous crisis he faces, the further disintegration of the Soviet economy. During the first quarter of 1990, Soviet national income diminished, industrial output went down, inflation rose and consumer goods became even scarcer than before.

A lot more than symbolic gestures will be required to turn the Soviet economy around.

Soviet officials, for their part, insist they are serious about making changes. "What is happening in the Soviet Union, the change in the political system, the change in the economy—all American specialists know exactly what is going on over there," Lev Spiridonov, *Pravda's*

deputy editor in chief, said in a late-May interview with *National Journal* reporters. "I think it gives plenty of indication as to the seriousness of our direction and just what our leadership is all about, what our country is looking for in terms of resolving our own problems."


Even Soviet economists concede that it has

taken five years of *perestroika* (restructuring) for Moscow to institute economic changes. "This transition to a market economy is long overdue in the Soviet Union, yet practical steps toward carrying out this reform are only about to be made at present," Vladen Martynov, director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations, told a summit-related news conference in Washington. "Everything we have done so far were half-measures or one step forward, two steps backwards, to use Lenin's famous phrase."

But many American specialists question how effective Moscow's current reform plans will be and whether the Soviet population will allow them to go through. "Gorbachev wasted five years during which he could have done something," Ed A. Hewitt, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and an expert on the Soviet economy, said. "Now as they debate a coherent strategy [for economic change], the population has lost faith. If they say it will be painful but beneficial, the population believes only that it will be painful."

In fact, Hewitt argues, the changes announced before Gorbachev's departure for Washington won't be painful enough. They would triple bread prices on July 1 and raise prices on other commodities on Jan. 1 if a referendum approves the move, but compensate workers by increasing their salaries. Over time, the plan would decontrol prices on most goods, Martynov said.

"The idea is to avoid shock therapy that was chosen by, say, Poland when they shifted to market economy," he said.



Strobe Talbott


For He's a Jolly Fellow

Lightweight, demagogue, buffoon, windbag. At best naive, at worst dangerous. Those were among the put-downs of the newly elected president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic that came sluicing anonymously out of the U.S. Government on the eve of last week's summit. The name-calling stemmed in part from memories of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Washington in September.

Yeltsin called on Brent Scowcroft at the White House. "What is the objective of your visit?" asked the National Security Adviser. With no more encouragement than that, Yeltsin launched into a hortatory rhapsody about how U.S. business could "rescue" *perestroika* by building 1 million apartments and an entire service sector for the Soviet economy; he also plugged a joint mission to Mars. He talked virtually nonstop for a full hour.

Just as Scowcroft's patience was giving out, George Bush stopped by to say hello and, as quickly as possible, goodbye. Asked about Yeltsin later, the President paused, smiled and said he had found him "a jolly fellow."

In the eight months since, American policymakers have frequently cited Yeltsin as living proof that there is no "serious" alternative to Mikhail Gorbachev. It is crucial to Gorbachev's strategy in dealing with the U.S. that Americans worry about



ROBERT TRIPPETT-SIPA

Yeltsin's visit to the U.S. last year left official Washington distinctly unimpressed

his being replaced by a neo-Brezhnevite, if not a neo-Stalinist. Now along comes Yeltsin to pose the tantalizing possibility of a Soviet leader who would be more accommodating on a wide range of issues. He has indicated, for example, that he might give back to Japan islands occupied since the last days of World War II. Still, his victory last week was at first taken as little more than further evidence of how unhunged the Soviet Union is these days.

Ironically and significantly, some of the Soviets who accompanied Gorbachev to Washington last week wasted no time in buttonholing their American counterparts and privately urging a little constructive revisionism in the Yeltsin case. Their argument went like this:

Whatever his foibles, Yeltsin seems dedicated to all that is most welcome (if not most promising) in *perestroika*. Therefore he is a natural ally for Gorbachev. Even the disagreements between them constitute a tactical opportunity for Gorbachev. In dealing with his conservative constituencies in the military and the party apparatus, he can point to Yeltsin over his left shoulder and say, Do business with me or you may end up with that guy instead.

Several of Gorbachev's advisers added that they were concerned about his thin skin and his tendency to personalize political disputes. Hence they were upset to find the U.S. press awash in what they took to be officially instigated presummit Yeltsin bashing.

"We have a big job ahead of us," said one Gorbachev associate to an American who is close to Bush. "We must persuade our leader to make common cause with Yeltsin. It's in your best interests that we succeed. So don't play to Gorbachev's sense of his own indispensability."

All perfectly reasonable, but also perfectly extraordinary. Soviet officials used to chastise Americans for "interference in the internal affairs of the U.S.S.R." Now they solicit help in teaching their boss the ways of democratic politics. ■

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THE OPEN QUESTION

WHY CAP IS WRONG

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FOR MOST of our history we have been able to count on public figures to contribute to our political maturation through memoirs dealing with their stewardship in office. Such records are necessarily biased, for they describe events from one person's perspective. Yet, because most of our statesmen have been just that, and honest as well, such modest exaggerations and even errors as their testaments may include are forgivable. Paul Nitze's recently published memoir of the cold war is an especially praiseworthy example of the genre. It provides a rich and instructive tableau of the evolution of both policy and process in our government during the past fifty years. George Kennan and Henry Kissinger made equally valuable contributions of serious scholarship. Not so for former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

The decade of the Eighties, during which Mr. Weinberger served, encompassed the most sweeping ideological change since the Russian Revolution, as well as countless lesser events deserving treatment by those involved. There is much to learn from Cabinet-level perspectives on the collapse of

Communism and the spread of democracy in the Eighties, or even from such ignominious episodes as the Iran-Contra affair. The latter event is treated in an excerpt from the secretary's memoir, *Fighting for Peace*, in the May 14 issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. The article is an astonishing, anti-intellectual, *ad hominem* tract; a mean-spirited assemblage of distortions and falsities, of which I am the chief though not the only target.

But it takes a second reading to absorb that the defamations are only tactical devices, libelous provocations put forth to distract the reader and allow the author to evade the central issues that any public official is obligated to address in a memoir: "How well or poorly did our institutions function during your service? What was your role? What can we learn from your experience?"

One or two examples illustrate this article's consistent use of slander as a device for evading responsibility. The secretary implies in one reference that I urged offering Egypt "several" . . . American supporting divisions, to invade Libya." Elsewhere, regarding the tragic U.S. involvement in Beirut, he states that I "demanded that we commit more troops and military resources, presumably to 'save' Beirut."

Both references are simply and verifiably false.

Concerning the value of providing Egypt with some confidence that we would not stand idly by if Qaddafi carried out one of his persistent threats to attack Sudan, Egypt, or Chad, it required years to get Secretary Weinberger to accede to even minimal contingency planning with Egyptian forces. The resultant plans—which emerged from sensitive diplomacy carried out by Admiral Poindexter, the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—were extremely effective both in deterring such Libyan attacks and in rallying Egyptian confidence. By contrast, in Beirut, such time was not available. My reporting cables from Beirut presented the following facts so that the President and his Cabinet in Washington could use them in making decisions: Both our Marine forces and our diplomatic presence in Beirut were vulnerable to almost daily artillery shelling. Yet counterattack by our forces, if we were seen to be taking sides, risked compromising our role as arbiters. The President deserved to know those facts if he was to forge a sensible politico-military strategy for walking that fine line. But my cables were far less important in this decision process than what happened to them back in Washington. Because of Secretary Weinberger's obstructionist tactics, no such strategy was ever devised. I expect this to be thoroughly treated in the forthcoming memoir of former Secretary of State George Shultz.

Sitting Ducks

ONE CAN argue whether or not the U.S. ought to have become engaged in our prolonged nightmare in Lebanon. Indeed Judge Clark and I believed from the start that the eight months between September 1982 and May 1983, spent in an effort to help secure the aborted May 17 agreement, was a poor investment of U.S. political capital. But once the U.S. committed our political weight and our forces (along with the French, British, and Italians), they ought to have been engaged in some useful peacekeeping purpose such as acting as buffers to separate the withdrawing forces, not left as sitting ducks at the airport.

There are other examples of Mr.

Mr. McFarlane was National Security Advisor in the Reagan Administration.

CAP...
CONTINUED

Weinberger's using the tactic of diversion to mask the more fundamental issue. Regarding the Iranian affair, Mr. Weinberger alleges variously that I gave intelligence on Iraqi positions to the Iranians; that President Reagan never approved the Israeli transfer of arms starting in August 1985; and that he (Weinberger) was unaware that any American was engaged in meetings with Israelis on the subject of establishing contact with Iranian pragmatists, until he read of it in intelligence reports which started in September of 1985.

Who Knew?

THE FIRST CHARGE—that I passed intelligence on Iraqi positions to Iran—is an outright lie. It is interesting, however, to note that throughout these years, Secretary Weinberger was a frequent advocate of a U.S. "tilt" toward Iraq and succeeded in persuading President Reagan to allow the CIA to pass intelligence to Iraq concerning Iranian forces. In his book, the secretary characterizes the Iraqi regime as having rational, limited aims. This is the same Iraq led by Saddam Hussein, who recently notified the world, with murderous pride, that he had the means *and the will* to use ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction against his neighbors.

The secretary's second point, regarding President Reagan's approval of the Israeli transfer, was explored thoroughly by the Tower Board and the Joint Congressional Committee. Both believed that the President did in fact approve the policy. Secretary Weinberger ignores the very existence of these verdicts. Instead he deceives the reader by referring to President Rea-

gan's letter to the Tower Board, *after* the President was tutored by Don Regan, to make his readers believe that the President could not remember whether he had approved the transfer or not. Mr. Weinberger conveniently ignores the President's answer when he was *first* questioned by the Tower Board (and before Regan intervened). He welcomed the Board to his office by presenting them with a copy of my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which I had presented the entire history of the President's approval. He had read the full transcript and made annotations in the margin. His comment to the Board, according to one of those present at the meeting, was essentially, "Here, read this, Bud's laid it out just as it happened." This original recollection of the President is buttressed by simple logic. Is it sensible to expect that I would have approved Israel's selling missiles which could only be replaced by Secretary Weinberger's Pentagon, when I knew that he was opposed to it? Not likely.

The secretary's last point—that he was unaware of my meetings with David Kimche, Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, or the basic plan until September—is also false. The secretary acknowledges, later in the piece, that he was present at the meeting in the White House of August 6, 1985, where the entire Israeli proposal was explained. To his credit, he opposed it, but he was surely aware of the original idea and its key antecedents (e.g., the Kimche meetings, the involvement of Ghorbanifar). Following that White House meeting, the secretary acknowledges that he received the intelligence reports which treated the entire dialogue between Ghorbanifar and his henchmen in Teheran. For almost a year after I left government, the secretary continued to receive these reports. If he felt as

strongly as he states, he could have offered to resign and, if necessary, resigned. His justification—that he could not have affected anything by such action—is ridiculous.

What are the real issues behind the abortive attempt to restore a dialogue with Iran? Was it reasonable in 1985 to attempt to determine whether or not there were any pragmatists in Teheran? Should we not have been interested in denying to the Soviet Union (which at the time had over one hundred thousand troops next door in Afghanistan) a prize whose oil and geographic proximity to the largest oil deposits in the world, if lost, could bring the international economy to its knees? Of course we should. Were there not several reasons to expect that there might be an emerging circle of leaders in Teheran (headed by then-Speaker, now-President Rafsanjani) who had tired of a brutal war with no apparent end in sight, which threatened economic and social chaos? Was it not even reasonable to be willing to provide arms to truly anti-Khomeini forces if that's what it took to dislodge such a tyrant? Of course it was. More often than not, that's how governments change in the Middle East. We cannot count on dealing with paragons of liberal philosophy as we seek to defend our interests and promote democracy. Bear in mind that 19 years ago, during our secret diplomacy which preceded the U.S. opening to China, that country was still emerging from a revolution in which it had murdered huge numbers of its own citizens—just like in Iran in 1985. China was also contributing directly to the death of American servicemen in Vietnam. But President Nixon had the wisdom to see that we had larger interests which warranted talking to Chou En-lai. And therein lies the central difference. The glaring error of the Iran affair—my error and the President's—was in al-

CAP...CONTINUED

lowing arms to be introduced into the equation before it was clear that those with whom we were dealing were both committed to changing Iranian policies and strong enough to do so. Neither requirement was met in 1985, and it was for that reason that I recommended to President Reagan in December 1985 as I left government, and again in May 1986 after the trip to Teheran that he had asked me to undertake, that the opening to Iran be closed. Secretary Weinberger knows this, for he was at the December 10 briefing in the Oval Office sitting across from me and next to the President. At the end of my debriefing to President Reagan, in which I recommended that he break off the contacts, Mr. Weinberger interrupted and said, "Mr. President, Bud is right, we must bring this effort to a close; it is simply too risky." This is almost a verbatim quote. As I have stated many times over the past three years, the error of this initiative was mine. But there is no doubt in my mind that if Mr. Weinberger had expressed the depth of his apparent conviction by an offer to resign or by resigning, the operation would have come to a halt.

By drawing you in with these sensational charges, Mr. Weinberger avoids treatment of the relevant question: "Was the Reagan Administration capable of developing and implementing coherent politico-military strategy?" In most cases, the answer was no, as a direct consequence of Secretary Weinberger's personal animus toward Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George Shultz and his ambition to succeed them.

There is a book to be written about Mr. Weinberger's stewardship in the Reagan Administration, but it is unlikely to be written. For what would it say? It ought to treat his record in handling the two fundamental responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense: defining an effective strategy for using our military forces to keep the peace, and managing the expenditure of huge sums with prudence and efficiency. Never in seven years did Mr. Weinberger show the least qualification to do either. This is not my verdict alone but that of Senators John Tower, Sam Nunn, Bob Dole, and Howard Baker, Chairman Les Aspin, Bill Dickinson, Sam Stratton, former Secretary James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, and many others who have helped to shape

national-security policy through the years. Indeed matters became so chaotic that the President had to appoint two commissions to do those two basic jobs—one to define a sensible nuclear strategy, another to restore order from the chaos Mr. Weinberger had inflicted on the Pentagon in four years' time. I suppose one could say that there already is a book on the former secretary—in fact, there are two. One is the Scowcroft Commission report on nuclear strategy and the other is the Packard Commission report on Pentagon management. They express all one needs to know about Mr. Weinberger's record.

When I voluntarily testified in the Iran-Contra hearings and before the Tower Board, I told everything I knew. I described the paralysis that affected foreign-policy planning in the Reagan Administration because of the personal and policy struggle between the State and Defense Departments' leadership. It is well known in Washington that Mr. Weinberger was the official

most to blame for this struggle and therefore most responsible for the inability of the Administration to develop policy in an orderly and coherent way. His book presents his own self-interested version of this history. In Mr. Weinberger's view, each position he took was unarguably correct and everyone else's was invariably wrong. The history of difficult public events is always infinitely more complicated.

Enough Blame to Go Around

WE SHOULD all be trying to learn from Iran-Contra, and there is enough blame to go around. Prose written out of pride to redeem a dubious public record, like Mr. Weinberger's version of Iran-Contra, makes this almost impossible. He was party to our getting into this quagmire. Now he refuses to help get us out of it. Instead, he offers his readers a scapegoat. Well, if Mr. Weinberger wants a public debate on this subject, I am happy to oblige. □

MR. WEINBERGER REPLIES

MR. McFARLANE has a new scriptwriter, and so the prose is slightly more penetrable. But the facts cannot be changed no matter how much is omitted and distorted.

Mr. McFarlane's prior record and sadly unfortunate problems, and his difficulties in recalling the truth as displayed in his testimony in the various Iran-Contra trials, make it unnecessary to refute in detail all of the new recollections and petulant foot-stamping used in this outburst.

Particularly unfortunate are his continuing attacks on the President whom he served so badly. This is most evident when, in the middle of one of McFarlane's many confessions, he contends that the President was also guilty of McFarlane's "glaring error." He is quite willing to create remarks that I never heard uttered by the President to support his case. However, when the President's remarks are on the record denying McFarlane's ver-

sion, then he says that Don Regan "tutored" the President. And so it goes.

One final point demonstrates why it is so unnecessary to spend time correcting each of the vast number of errors in this newest tirade. That is the absurd and breathtakingly wrong statement that I was "party to our getting into this quagmire." This is the same quagmire that George Shultz and I opposed from beginning to end with all the fervor at our command; the same quagmire that McFarlane confesses was his doing; and the same quagmire that he compounded by trying (successfully for a time) to keep me from seeing the intelligence reports which disclosed the ridiculous and very dangerous game McFarlane was playing in, and with, Iran.

Even a new scriptwriter using "quotes" we doubt were ever quoted cannot change what really happened. And no diversionary dust in the form of easily refutable charges about the record of others can change the history I set forth in *Fighting for Peace*.

—CASPAR W. WEINBERGER

Mr. Weinberger was Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration.

MILWAUKEE SENTINEL

May 23, 1990

Pg. 12

Tests for 'big monsters'

Oshkosh, GM hope to win defense contract for mobile tactical truck, despite budget cuts

Army drivers are putting 10 monster trucks built in Oshkosh through tests this month that could keep Wisconsin's major contractor in the military business for years to come.

Despite the billions of dollars being cut from the defense contract, the military still needs the basics, like trucks.

"Cutbacks in defense spending will have much less effect on Wisconsin people than the people in other states where they are in the aerospace business or making guns and bullets," said Pres Grove, who keeps track of Oshkosh Truck Corp. defense contracts here.

Few firms in Wisconsin shared in the contracts let during the buildup of missiles and sophisticated ships and planes that would be used in a strategic or nuclear war with the Soviet Union. As a result, defense cuts won't have much impact there, compared with aerospace centers in California, Texas and Massachusetts.

Oshkosh and General Motors are in the final stages of competition for a new class of heavy trucks that will use a palletized loading system. A single driver — in one case at Aberdeen, Md., proving grounds a 95-pound woman — can load and unload pallets filled with equipment.

On the present trucks, including the Oshkosh Heavy Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT), loading and unloading is a time-consuming chore that requires heavy lifting and many people.

Oshkosh and GM received \$10 million contracts to design and build the test trucks. Oshkosh built 10 test trucks and a spare, Grove said, and has been told that the test results will be made public by the end of June.

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney



Washington report

By RICHARD BRADEE
Sentinel Washington Bureau

has already ordered cuts in spending by all the services, including the Army, and the budget summit between President Bush and congressional leaders is expected to call for more.

Oshkosh has built about 13,000 of the HEMMT trucks in the last decade. The project received national notoriety when Bush, during his 1988 campaign, put it at the top of his list of congressionally promoted programs to be eliminated.

Despite Bush's comments during a televised presidential debate, the Army is still ordering HEMMTs with money that Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services committee, Sen. Robert W. Kasten Jr. (R-Wis.), member of the Senate Defense Appropriations subcommittee, and other friends of Oshkosh put in the defense budget over the past several years.

Grove said the Army and other services still need more of the HEMTT trucks for tankers and for recovery vehicles.

The program for the new trucks has not escaped budget cuts completely.

The original program called for

the purchase of 4,300 trucks which have been cut to 2,700, Grove said. But even at the scaled-back level, the contract would keep the plant in Wisconsin occupied for two or three years. That would generate hundreds of millions of dollars worth of business.

So far, Cheney has tried to save money in the future by reducing force strength and by scaling back expensive projects like the B-2 bomber, cut \$14 billion so far. The Navy's aircraft carrier plan has been cut from 15 carriers on duty to 12 since Bush took office.

Arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union also could produce billions in savings, if new missile cutbacks are accepted.

Like other contractors in times of dwindling defense dollars, Oshkosh argues that buying new trucks now will save money in the long run by reducing the number of people the Army will need for hauling equipment.

Grove describes the new trucks as "big monsters" with five axles and 10 driving wheels. The Army's Test and Evaluation Command at Aberdeen isn't releasing information about how the tests are going while the competition is under way, according to a spokesman there.

Grove, however, says the Oshkosh trucks are holding up well and should perform even better for the Army than the HEMMT, if Oshkosh wins the contract.

The HEMMT trucks were bought under a different procedure, and some testing was conducted after the contract was let.

With the new procedure, the weaknesses will be found at Aberdeen and at other test sites in Arizona and Colorado, Grove said.

Cheney: No accords, no clout

By Fred Kaplan
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON - It's a tough time to be secretary of defense and Richard Cheney seems not to be making the best of it.

News Analysis

Inside the Bush administration, Cheney has lost nearly every major battle over arms-control policy and the

budget. On the vast array of accords marking improvements in US-Soviet relations, Cheney's fingerprints appear nowhere.

He is widely viewed in Congress as an increasingly irrelevant political player, incapable of dealing either with the massive changes in the world or with the drastic cuts needed to meet the budget's deficit-reduction targets.

In recent months, he has poured salt on his own wounds by adopting a confrontational stance toward Congress, even though he was hired for his presumed ability - as a former Republican congressman himself - to manage Capitol Hill.

Sen. Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has said Cheney's budget reflects "a 1988 defense policy" - a damning statement, given all that has happened since 1989: the weakening of

anything," said David Lange, chief of intergovernment relations for the U.S. Army in Europe. Now, he said, European governments are beginning to demand compliance with their environmental laws and insist that the United States shoulder the cost of returning military facilities to safe and usable condition.

"Clearly, there has been a double standard when it comes to overseas projects," said David Wirth, a former State Department attorney now on the staff of the New York-based Natural Resources Defense Council.

"There is always a severe foreign policy risk in that. We want to maintain good relations with countries where we had bases and are now turning them over. To hand over environmental problems we wouldn't tolerate ourselves is a ripe area for a foreign policy crisis," he said.

The German people are just now becoming aware of the extent of lasting damage caused by the hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops based in West Germany since the end of the World War II.

There are currently 255,000 American troops stationed at about 1,000 installations in West Germany.

"The Americans, they see Germany as a U.S. military-industrial laboratory," said Olaf Achilles, founder of a small organization in Bonn that monitors the environmental behavior of the United States, West Germany and other NATO militaries.

"Every German environmental law exempts the military, and the local authorities know very little about what goes on on U.S. bases. Our government is so stupid and blind to all this," Achilles said.

The 28-year-old urban planner noted the environmental record of the military in the United States as documented by the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. "Now they know what they've done wrong in the United States," Achilles said. "They've done much more wrong outside of the United States."

Another West German citizen, Wilma Herzog of nearby Gerolstein, expressed disappointment that the United States, where she lived for 12 years, has treated the German people and the German countryside with such apparent disregard for so long.

"I feel sadness and shock that America has such a dark side," said Herzog, 55, who is organizing a citizens group to address low-level flying and other military intrusions.

"They are destroying the environment and torturing the people," Herzog said. "I thought the Americans were smarter than this. I

administration pressure to accept the US proposal but faces strong domestic criticism across the political spectrum. While some Bolivian coca farmers have switched to legal crops, others have held street demonstrations against the US plan, protesting that it will ruin their livelihood with no compensation.

In Peru, security forces are preoccupied with battling a violent Maoist insurgency, and civilian officials are far more concerned with the nation's abysmal economic problems than with curbing coca production. At this point, it is not certain whether President-elect Alberto Fujimori will approve the proposed military agreement.

In all three countries, entrenched problems of military corruption or brutality have raised fears that American aid will strengthen the hand of tainted elements within Andean armed forces. In Colombia and Peru, security forces have built reputations for brutal behavior in battling leftist rebels, and Colombian military officials are often reported to be in league with right-wing drug traffickers.

Some human rights groups argue that under US law banning military aid to governments that show "gross and consistent patterns" of human rights abuses, neither Peru nor Colombia should qualify for aid. Others suggest Washington could demand improvement in human rights as a price for its offer of equipment and assistance to armies and police.

"To be effective in their fight against the drug cartels," US officials must use the new aid as "leverage" to wean Colombian security forces from collaborating with drug mobsters and death squads, wrote Juan Mendez of the human rights group Americas Watch. Otherwise, he added, the United States "could be arming the very enemy it hopes to defeat."

Administration officials say they are aware of the checkered history of Andean military establishments and plan to keep careful tabs on any aid they receive.

"Are we building up Latin American militaries to overthrow governments? No, but we are certainly keeping" the danger "in mind," said the State Department official. Any serious human rights problems, he added, "could and

thought the Americans were better than this."

NEXT: As many military bases in the United States prepare to close, a dispute simmers over how to pay for the pollution they will leave behind.

July 1986. About 150 US troops assist jungle drug laboratories. Congress anti-drug missions in Andean nation.

Mid-1987. Drug enforcement administration Snowcap, deploying 60 agents to P

January 1989. US-financed crop eradication of attacks by guerrillas and traffickers to protect program.

September 1988. Congress passes increasing military aid to Andean governments and prohibits on US aid to foreign police.

August 1989. Bush administration orders emergency military aid after prominent mob in Bogota.

September 1989. President Bush provides immediate military aid and \$2 billion to three Andean nations to fight drugs. authorized to accompany foreign anti-police base opens in Peru.

December 1989. Administration declines to participate in arresting wanted drug.

February 1990. President Bush meets and Colombia at one-day drug summit proposal is not discussed.

March 1990. Drug eradication project helicopter air lifts and Peruvian police.

September 1990. American military troops begin arriving in Bolivia and Colombia; Peru's participation in doubt.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

St. Louis Post P 1-C
Date 19 June 90

LAWRENCE M. O'ROURKE WHITE HOUSE

What Sununu Can Tell The Soviets

WASHINGTON

JOHAN H. SUNUNU, the White House chief of staff, has been invited to the Kremlin by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev wants Sununu to explain to the Kremlin's managers how a modern presidency works. Sununu will offer examples of how decisions of President George Bush's administration are made and carried out.

It was Gorbachev's idea that Sununu share his knowledge and experience with the Kremlin officials. The presidency as the Soviet Union's highest office is only a few months old. While in Washington and Camp David for the summit meeting, Gorbachev was impressed with the smoothness and efficiency of the White House operation.

Gorbachev was apparently struck by how well the U.S. side was prepared for the summit negotiations over weapons cuts and trade. He was amazed at how easily and quickly Bush was able to get information from the federal bureaucracy. Gorbachev has not been as successful in getting the Soviet bureaucracy to serve his needs.

Sununu, who did a spell as an instructor at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, will tell Gorbachev and his associates that a system that works for one U.S. chief executive may not work for another. Sununu is prepared to say that White House operations vary according to the styles and personalities of the presidents.

Just to go back a few years, President Jimmy Carter was, like Sununu, trained as an engineer. Carter was fascinated by the way things, including government procedures, work. Carter's weaknesses in a few instances included an inability to anticipate outcomes down the road. As Sununu sees it, Carter became so wrapped up in narrow questions that he lost sight of the big picture. In addition, Carter was convinced by the logic of his decision, but ineffective at convincing the public and politicians.

President Ronald Reagan was the opposite of Carter. He disdained details, leaving them during his first administration to James A. Baker III, Edwin Meese and Michael K. Deaver, the triumvirate of top White House aides. To a great extent, they shielded Reagan from internal government disputes.

The Tower Commission investigated the origins of the Iran-Contra scandal during Reagan's second administration and concluded that it stemmed partly

from poor management at the White House. The commission put much of the blame on White House Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan. A copy of the Tower Commission's 1987 report is undoubtedly already on file in the Kremlin library. If not, a copy can be purchased at the U.S. Government Printing Office.

Reagan was the philosopher, Sununu will tell the Kremlin's managers. Sununu believes that Reagan was right on most issues but made a fatal mistake in not maintaining tighter control over his own staff and in not going to the mat with Congress over government spending.

Naturally, Sununu will tell the Soviet officials that Bush's system works best of the three. Bush puts his hands on the levers of government power when appropriate, knows when to let others carry the load, works hard at persuading Congress, the public and the press and keeps constantly informed on the critical issues, especially foreign and military strategy.

Sununu set up the system that suits Bush's style, personality and high energy level.

Bush welcomes divergent opinions until decisions are made. Then he wants absolute loyalty. Sununu could say how he enforces that. His message to the White House staff is to work hard, keep your nose clean and keep your mouth shut outside the White House.

Sununu's tutorial might also include a lesson on how he, as White House chief of staff, has a larger role than making the helicopters arrive on time and the paper flow to the president without typographical errors.

Sununu has expressed his opinions as an adviser on issues that include abortion, environmental policy, federal aid to education, spending and taxation, relations with the Democratic majority in Congress, and — here Gorbachev might pay special attention — how to deal with the Soviet Union. Sununu is more conservative than Bush.

On the last point, Sununu has acknowledged that he has no great background in Soviet affairs, but he knows politics and politicians well enough to evaluate them. In addition, Sununu has learned a great deal about the world since he resigned as governor of New Hampshire to become White House chief of staff. Sununu attends daily intelligence briefings with Bush and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and has the right to read all cables and attend all meetings with national security.

Sununu can tell Gorbachev he might improve internal Kremlin communications. Sununu's best advice to Gorbachev might be to find for his staff competent people who will do the job with care and express honest opinions on what is best for the country, not themselves.

Hugh Sidey

His Failure Was Political

Retired Admiral John Poindexter, Ronald Reagan's National Security Adviser, helped weave the Iran-*contra* web that ensnared him, yet there was little enthusiasm in Washington last week at his reckoning. He has legal bills of more than \$3 million, has seen four years of his life wasted, and now has been sentenced to six months in jail. Chances are slim for a successful appeal of his convictions for deceiving Congress. A presidential pardon is even more remote. Poindexter is the seventh person found guilty in this sad drama and the only one so far to be ordered to jail. He may keep that distinction.

The feeling is that independent prosecutor Lawrence Walsh's legal juggernaut, which has cost \$21 million and fielded as many as 60 lawyers and support staff, is running thin on defendants, new evidence and sympathy. A grand jury may explore further links to Reagan and George Bush, and Poindexter could be called to testify with a grant of immunity. People who know the admiral well are convinced that the effort will come to naught, that history will have to judge Reagan—where the buck really stops—on the fuzzy story before us. "John Poindexter was made a flag officer in the U.S. Navy for the express reason that he would not break in a crisis," says retired Admiral Clarence Hill Jr., a friend and manager of Poindexter's legal fund. "He did not. And he is not going to break in the future. He believes he is right."


When the news of Poindexter's sentence ran through the capital, some of his former White House colleagues were in black tie at the President's Dinner, the Republican Party's grandest Washington fund raiser. "I felt sick," said one. "There was not a criminal bone in his body. He was doing what he thought his Commander in Chief wanted. He got a jail term for political incompetence. Since when is that a felony?"

Few people in power have had such a record of personal and professional competence and honor. Poindexter was first in his class at the Naval Academy, excelled at sea command and Pentagon maneuver, and reared five sons (four of whom are pursuing naval careers); his wife became an Episcopal minister four years ago. Poindexter was devoted to trying to thwart terrorists, free American hostages and bring democracy to Nicaragua. Nobody argued with those objectives. "No defect in character," declared a former Cabinet officer who worked with him. "But a defect in judgment. He should not be so punished for that."

"There were horrible people down there doing horrible things," contends Harvard's Richard Pipes, who served two years on the NSC staff. "It was all piled on his head. He was just in the wrong job."

Former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger brushed aside the suggestion that the lesson of Poindexter is that military men should not head the NSC staff. "They should do a better job of teaching constitutional law at the Naval Academy," he said, noting that Army General Colin Powell successfully held the job after Poindexter and that retired Air Force General Brent Scowcroft has the position now.

When the picture of the Iran-*contra* beast is finally drawn, in all probability it will not be as large or menacing as many thought. Yet the portrait will never be complete. These days in the muted luncheon-table conversations among both prosecutors and defense-team members, there is the acknowledgment that the one man who really put the grand plot together has left the scene. That is Bill Casey, the CIA director who died in May 1987 from pneumonia after surgery for a brain tumor, a man who loved power, position and a good mystery. John Poindexter did not have the temperament for the shady back-alley intrigue that Casey concocted. ■



Supporters cheer Poindexter and his wife

LUKE FRAZZA—AFP

Bush Indicates Openness to an East-West Nonaggression Pledge

By R. Jeffrey Smith
and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

The United States is willing at next week's summit meeting of 16 Western leaders to consider joining in a pledge of nonaggression toward members of the Warsaw Pact alliance, President Bush said in an interview published yesterday.

The idea of a nonaggression pledge, first proposed by Soviet officials several weeks ago, is one of several initiatives that North Atlantic Treaty Organization leaders could take to ease Soviet concerns about a unified Germany's membership in NATO, officials said. The officials said that efforts to allay the Soviet concerns over German NATO membership will likely dominate the London summit next Thursday and Friday.

Another Western initiative being prepared for the summit is intended to provide for an expanded political role for the 35-nation Conference

on Security and Cooperation in Europe, officials said. The Soviet Union has urged that the group, now a loose-knit organization, should become the central forum for European security discussions.

NATO leaders have rejected this idea, but officials say the alliance likely will approve a plan to give the group a permanent staff, a schedule of regular meetings, and an expanded role in promoting human rights, preventing conflicts, and monitoring elections and arms control agreements.

"I think there are ways in which it can become very clear to what's left of the Warsaw Pact and . . . a restructured NATO . . . that there won't be any threat to each other, and maybe there can be some declaration" that would fall short of a formal treaty, Bush said in an interview Wednesday with European and Japanese journalists.

While declining to give the idea a blanket endorsement, Secretary of State James A. Baker III told re-

porters at the White House yesterday that a declaration of "nonaggression, defensive intent, peaceful intent" from the NATO alliance to individual members of the disintegrating Warsaw Pact alliance is "the kind of thing that you'll see discussed at the NATO summit."

Several officials said Bush's statement about the idea caught the State Department by surprise. Baker said a week and a half ago, after the idea was promoted by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, that it had positive as well as negative aspects.

West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl recently said he will urge the leaders to endorse a nonaggression declaration, and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has also endorsed the idea, U.S. and diplomatic officials said. But officials in France and several other countries have expressed concern that such a statement would imply parity between NATO and the crumbling East-Bloc alliance.

Kohl has said this can be avoided if the Western declaration is made to members of the Eastern alliance, rather than to the alliance itself as suggested by some Soviet officials.

U.S. officials cautioned that the meeting probably would not fulfill a stated goal of establishing detailed plans for future East-West negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Baker said yesterday that it would more likely "kick off" a review of these objectives.

The officials said this decision followed a general Western consensus to avoid fractious debate over U.S. nuclear weapons deployments in Europe at a time when Kohl, who is preparing for a German election in December, is particularly vulnerable to public, anti-nuclear sentiments.

Baker said the summit would also begin a review of NATO's conventional, or nonnuclear, force deployments in light of an expected East-West arms accord later this year. But officials were uncertain yesterday whether the leaders would fulfill

an earlier plan to propose future limitations on troops in a united Germany.

Bush said that he felt in these discussions a "disproportionate responsibility to convince [Soviet President Mikhail] Gorbachev" that German membership in NATO "is not threatening to the best interests of the Soviet Union." He added, however, that he expects the summit to embrace ideas that will refine NATO's current mission, rather than "radically alter" it.

Bush, who departs today for his home in Kennebunkport, Maine, will be joined on Monday by Baker, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin L. Powell and Vice President Quayle. These officials are expected to give Bush a series of briefings before his departure for London on Wednesday.

Cheney plans to leave Monday for discussions with officials in Norway, Greece, Turkey and Portugal.