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May 1990

Polhill Gives Bush Private Message From Captors

By Ann Devroy and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

Freed American hostage Robert Polhill delivered a message from his captors in Lebanon to President Bush yesterday in an Oval Office visit during which he also joined the president in a telephone call to Frank Reed, who was released from captivity earlier in the day.

Before receiving the message, Bush thanked Iran and Syria for their roles in the release of Reed, who was the second American hostage released in the last 11 days by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Bush expressed hope that

more hostages may follow Polhill and Reed to freedom.

According to White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Polhill delivered the private message to Bush during an hour-long visit in the Oval Office in which he recounted his personal ordeal. "The president received that message in private and indicated he would not discuss the message publicly," Fitzwater said.

Deputy Press Secretary Stephen Hart said the president apparently pulled Polhill aside in the Oval Office to privately hear the message from his captors. Polhill had been held by a group called the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Pal-

estine. The group had said at the time Polhill was released that they were sending a message to Bush, but until yesterday it had not surfaced.

"Apparently Polhill told his captors he would deliver a message privately and personally to President Bush only," Fitzwater said. "And that's what he did."

Secretary of State James A. Baker III, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, White House chief of staff John H. Sununu and First Lady Barbara Bush were present for the Polhill session in the Oval Office, but were not privy to Polhill's relay of the message, Hart said.

In a written statement, Fitzwater said Bush put Polhill on the phone line for a brief conversation with Reed in Damascus. Bush promised Reed "complete support" from the U.S. government as he recovers from captivity, Fitzwater said.

Bush, welcoming Polhill to the White House, said of the Reed release, "I hope this is a forerunner to the release of the other American hostages and others. . . held against their will. Things seem to be moving on this."

The president and other senior officials continued to insist that no secret deals had been made for the releases, but said there would be "no objection" if Israel were to free some or all of the several hundred Shiite prisoners it holds or releases. Sheik Obeid, a Lebanese cleric who was taken by Israel last year.

Speaking before the Polhill visit, Bush said he has "no knowledge" of any such action being contemplated or taken by Israel. The release by Israel of prisoners, he said, "is a matter for others to determine. I've stated that holding others against their will is not a way to facilitate political change."

Since Obeid was captured a year ago, the administration has said he should be released because he was taken against his will from Lebanon. Officials said yesterday that no intermediary with Iran, including Syria, has raised the issue of the Shiite prisoners or Obeid in connection with the two released American hostages and that no U.S. official had suggested privately to Israel that such a move would be appreciated at this time. "It has not become an issue in what has happened so far," said one official. "That's not to say the Syrians or someone might not raise it tomorrow in connection with No. 3."

The president said no overall improvement in relations with Iran could occur until the remaining hostages are set free. They "can't. . . in terms of the overall relationship between countries, expect normalcy or expect vast improvement until all Americans are freed," Bush said. "We're not, in a piecemeal basis, bidding for human life."

As if to emphasize that, the State Department yesterday officially released its annual report on terrorism that formally labels both Iran

and Syria as state supporters of terrorism. Nations on the list are subject to certain trade and economic restrictions.

The president referred to the "process" that appears underway and then quickly added, "if it is a process." That cautious comment reflected what one official said was "lack of information of whether there will be a three, or a four or any more" hostages released. The senior official said Syria, which has kept the administration informed of pending releases, has not indicated more hostages will be freed.

At several points in the question-and-answer session with Bush, the president expressed hope that other hostages would follow but offered few clues on why he felt a process of release may have begun. Asked why Iran and Syria are co-operating in getting hostages out, he said, "Because I hope there is a realization that holding people against their will is not the way to effect political change. . . I just hope the process, if this is a process, continues."

Later, he said, "Look, if it's beginning to work, and if, indeed, there's a process, I expect I speak for all Americans when I say I re-

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joice in that." Bush said, however, "That's where we've got to leave it. We've got to see every American returned. And that's the way it's going to be."

Fitzwater said earlier in the day, "There is nothing we can point to in terms of any specific reason for this release." He said the administration has had a number of contacts with

Syria, with "other third countries" that have relations with Iran, and with officials in Lebanon. "We've had a lot of third party intermediary kinds of messages back and forth with Iran," he said, but added that he knew of nothing in specific that brought Reed out.

The president, who seemed to avoid thanking Iran in the release of

Polhill, was not so reticent in the Reed release. Asked what he was thanking Iran for, he said, "Well, we did hear from Syria that Iran has been helpful. And it is that that I'm saying thank you for."

Polhill said he would "reinforce" what Bush said and added he had little information about what was going on around him while he was held.

THE Fabulous BUSH & BAKER BOYS

THEY FISH TOGETHER. PLAY TENNIS TOGETHER.
PITCH HORSESHOES TOGETHER. IN BETWEEN, THEY
PLY THEM LET'S-MAKE-A-DEAL BRAND
OF POLITICS AROUND THE GLOBE.

Scene 1: The Oval Office A foreign leader is about to arrive at the White House. The flags of the visiting nation ripple down Pennsylvania Avenue. The Secretary of State hurries in to brief the President.

James Baker tells George Bush what the sore spots are, what favors will be asked, what aid will be sought. "Mubarak is going to ask for money," Baker warns Bush before the Egyptian President enters, "and you're going to have to say no."

"You tell him he can't have any money," the President replies. "Turning down money is the dirty work. That's your job, Jimmy. I want to do the good stuff."

Savoring their duties as statesmen, the most powerful friends in the world love to play out an earthy good ol' boy ritual at such moments. The Prime Ministers and Presidents may change, but the dialogue stays the same.

"Before we start, Mr. President, I have one quick story I want to tell you," Baker says.

"Look, Jim, I haven't got time for fooling around," the President replies with feigned impatience. "I'm meeting the head of another country and you want to come in here and tell me a story."

"O.K.," Baker says, "forget it."

"Oh, no, you've ruined my morning now. Go ahead."

With his best Texas twang, the Secretary offers his latest ribald joke. The two laugh uproariously. "Now, Jimmy," Bush teases, as he walks to the door to greet the waiting dignitary, "should I repeat that story before we all sit down or after?"

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Scene 2: The Oval Office President Bush is sitting with his chief of staff, John H. Sununu, and his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft. An article in the newspaper has painted Jim Baker as the colossus of the Administration, the brainy, silky operator who must drag the cautious President and his recalcitrant aides along on some daring foreign policy gambit.

The offending newspaper is held up by its edges as though contaminated, while the President and his men wryly note that the zealous Baker coterie has been "tiptoeing through the tulips" again to promote the boss.

At another moment, after the President reads a story spiced by inside information that puts the White House in a bad light, he picks up the phone and calls Baker. "Well, yeah, we were just talking about that story," Bush tells him, "and Brent and I decided that it came from State." The tone is teasing, but it doesn't quite conceal an underlying "just so you know that I know" dart. The President and Baker are extremely competitive men, even with each other, and they always keep score.

Scene 3: The State Department Baker is sitting in his office, high above the city's monuments and the Potomac River. The phone rings. It's the President.

"Jimmy, I just got some very disturbing news," Bush says solemnly. "I got the Heritage Foundation's report card on our Administration. Hell, you're bringing down our average, boy."

The moment gleams with irony. In the Reagan years, the intellectual conservatives at the Heritage Foundation scorned Bush and Baker as chameleons without true convictions. Now the two pragmatists are out of the closet, plying their let's-make-a-deal brand of politics around the globe.

Baker answers Bush in the same deadpan style of Southern barbershop put-down humor. "Mr. President," he drawls, "I've never said this to a President of the United States before, but..." A two-syllable, down-home expletive follows.

NEVER IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICS has there been a friendship quite like the one between the 65-year-old President and the 60-year-old Secretary of State. "Top guns on top of the world," Time magazine called the country's most important elected official and most important unelected one.

The fates of George Herbert Walker Bush and James Addison Baker 3d have been entwined for three decades, ever since they teamed up to win the doubles tennis championship two years in a row at the tony Houston Country Club. "I had a good baseline game and he had a good net game," Baker recalls.

One was the Yale-educated scion of an affluent Eastern family who had come to Texas to make his fortune in the oil business. The other was the Princeton-educated scion of a wealthy Texas family with Eastern connections. They were the founding members of a new breed known as Tex-prep, a patrician twist on the old bourbon-and-brass style of famous Texas pols like Lyndon B. Johnson and Sam Rayburn.

"They're these big, tall, lanky, hot-as-a-pistol guys with ambition so strong it's a like steel rod sticking out of their heads," says Peggy Noonan, the speech writer who worked with the two in the 1988 campaign. "But they always make a point not to show it. Steel with an overlay of tennis."

Despite stresses, rivalries and shifting fortunes, their partnership has been extraordinarily successful. They began three decades ago as peers and, to a remarkable degree, they still are. Without Baker, Bush might never have become Vice President or President. Without Bush, Baker would probably still be a corporate lawyer in Houston, negotiating utility deals and going hunting on Election Day.

His taste for country music and beef jerky aside, the President is at heart an old-fashioned member of the Eastern Establishment ruling class who feels most comfortable bolstered by his own sort. Among his tight band of white, male advisers, Jim Baker is acknowledged as the first among equals.

White House officials call the flow of communication between them "unbelievable." The two call back and forth as many as a dozen times a day, and the President often wakes Baker on weekend mornings for a phone chat. When the President and the Secretary travel abroad together on Air Force One, and Barbara Bush stays home, the President gives Baker the First Lady's berth for the night.

But are Baker and Bush too equal? If the campaign manager becomes Secretary of State, is there enough distance between diplomacy and politics? Do these policy soulmates from the same rarefied background, so close that they can communicate with half sentences and glances, reinforce each other's caution and pragmatism? Instead of devising fundamental justifications for their policies, do they merely ratify each other's instincts?

"Bush wants twins around him, and that can be dangerous," says James David Barber, a political scientist at Duke University and author of "The Presidential Character." Even when the President brings in spicy advisers like John Sununu and Richard G. Darman, the budget director, Barber notes, he turns them into Cream of Wheat team players.

Bush dismisses such criticism out of hand, because his very ideology is friendship. He credits his wide and loyal network of friends with getting him elected, and likes to close his letters with "Friendship" or "Where would we be with-

out friendship?" People, not ideas or issues, drive him. When he chose Dan Quayle as his running mate, he took a flier on his intuitive feel for people; he never sat down with Quayle beforehand to discuss issues, principles or beliefs. As President, Bush is not one for solitary brooding; he has stocked his Cabinet with old friends and says he uses friendship as "a catalyst for decision-making or bull-sessing."

"I would hate to be President without friendships," he says, leaning back in his chair in the Oval Office with one foot propped on his desk, absently toying with a black Swiss Army knife that has his name engraved in silver script. "And I'm talking about friendships of people interacting with me every single day. I really would find it very hard to visualize — not just the loneliness of it, but the barrenness of it. When it comes to being sure you make the right decision, or that the decision you make at least makes sense to some. And if you were making decisions in isolation, from reading briefing papers and selecting options a, b or c, it just wouldn't be the same."

Bush pictures his friends and family as three concentric circles, with the ones he holds closest to his heart in the tiny private circle in the center. Baker can be found in this emotional bull's-eye. "Baker's right in close, he's in that inner circle in the sense of friends," the President says. "If something really hurt me, unrelated to this job, I would talk to him about it."

THE ONE PLACE WHERE the prep-school tradition and the good ol' boy tradition coincide is on the matter of introspection. Well-bred gentlemen and real men agree: self-revelation is in bad taste.

"Don't stretch me out on the couch," the President pleads.

"I'm not any good at the couch work," Baker says.

Yet the destinies of these two men — and the course of the country — have been shaped by their life together and their experiences before they met.

Both men grew up in protected, privileged enclaves wanting to emulate the imposing, authoritarian fathers they adored. The ambitions and political philosophies of the President and the Secretary grew not from any particular ideology, but from their parents' values of fair play, achievement and noblesse oblige. The two young men — handsome, athletic and popular — grew up feeling they were born to lead.

Just as "Poppy" was the captain of the soccer and baseball teams at Andover, so "Bake" was the captain of the tennis team at the exclusive Hill School near Philadelphia. Just as Bush was tapped by the most prestigious secret society at Yale, Skull and Bones, so Baker was tapped for Ivy, Princeton's most elite eating club.

Prescott Bush, an investment banker who later became a Senator from Connecticut, came at his sons with his belt when they misbehaved. "Dad was really scary," Bush told Vanity Fair. Baker père, nicknamed "The Warden" by Baker's awed young friends, whipped his son and, if he slept past 7 A.M., threw cold water on his face to wake him.

But there was one key difference in the upbringing of the President and the Secretary of State.

Bush was raised to think of politics as a high calling. Baker, from a family with older money and more millions, a family that helped build modern Houston and that founded the Southwest's most prominent law firm, Baker & Botts, was brought up to think politics beneath him. "That was sort of a creed in my family, that politics was somehow a dirty business and really good lawyers didn't involve themselves in politics," Baker says.

The two men were drawn together in Houston in the late 50's. Baker's first wife, Mary Stuart Baker, was active in the Republican Party, a lonely place in Texas in those days, and worked as a volunteer in Bush's Congressional campaigns. Baker, still a registered Democrat, was apolitical.

In 1969, when Bush was making his second run for the Senate, he suggested that Baker try for his House seat, but Baker's 38-year-old wife, the mother of four sons, was dying of cancer. The Bushes, who had suffered through their own tragedy when their 3-year-old daughter, Robin, died of leukemia, were by Baker's side in the hospital.

Partly to keep Baker's mind off his wife's death, Bush asked his friend to serve as Harris County chairman of his Senate campaign. Bush lost the election but won Harris County. Bush pushed Baker to the next level when he recommended him as Under Secretary of Commerce. Within months of accepting the Commerce post, Baker had moved up again with Bush's recommendation, shepherding delegates for President Gerald R. Ford and later managing his campaign. Baker quickly developed a reputation for wizardry; his walkie-talkie code name at the 1976 G.O.P. convention was Miracle Man. In 1978 he ran for attorney general of Texas. Three days after he lost, Bush tracked down the exhausted Baker in Florida to ask him to manage his Presidential race.

With his eye on the Vice Presidential spot for Bush, Baker cooled some of the candidate's hotter rhetoric against Ronald Reagan and pulled Bush out of the race earlier than he wanted, telling him, "You've got to know when to fold 'em." During the general campaign, Baker's street smarts so impressed the Reagan circle — Stu Spencer, Nancy Reagan and Michael K. Deaver — that he was the surprise choice for the chief-of-staff job.

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Suddenly the two old friends found themselves in adjoining offices in the West Wing of the White House. Their relationship over the next few years was discreet; they did not want to make the conservatives suspicious that they were plotting moderate mischief. But Deaver recalls that Baker acted as Bush's protector: "If Bush wasn't being treated right, Baker would come to me and say, 'This isn't right.'"

The 80's were the glory years for Jim Baker and the years in the desert for George Bush. Bush, who maintained his Velcro adherence to Reagan even when speaking privately with reporters, was portrayed as a lightweight in obsequious pursuit of Reagan's conservative base. By contrast, the press idolized Baker. When Baker went to Treasury in 1985 and Donald T. Regan took over as chief of staff, he pronounced himself "appalled" at the amount of time Baker had spent schmoozing with the press.

If Bush was Bertie Wooster, Baker was Jeeves with an agenda, the shrewd, steely-eyed Texan who knew how to attach himself to success and separate himself from failure, how to pull off a three-corner-shot to push a policy, promote his achievements or trip up a foe. When the compulsively neat Baker discovered that his White House rival, Edwin L. Meese 3d, had a messy desk, he bombarded him with so many memos that by the time Meese crawled out from under, key decisions had already been made.

Bush was a proud and competitive man constrained by his mother's adjurations never to brag. He admired and envied Baker's ability to get good reviews — sometimes even better than he deserved, in Bush's opinion. But he could not maneuver to cast himself in a good light and spike his rivals. "Baker winks and Bush's eyes are wide open," Deaver says.

Baker dressed elegantly and had dancing-school manners, but he chewed Red Man tobacco and kept a bottle of Chivas Regal in a desk drawer for the occasional afternoon swig. Like Baker, Bush wore cowboy boots and splashed Tabasco sauce on his tuna salad, but he always managed to come across as a patrician vacationing at a dude ranch.

At the end of eight years, the news magazine covers said it all. Bush looked tense on Newsweek, "Fighting the 'Wimp Factor,'" and Baker looked smooth on the cover of Time as "The Velvet Hammer."

When Bush ran for President in 1988, Baker was reluctant to leave his job as Treasury Secretary. He enjoyed politics, but detested being seen as a "pol." He had been a successful corporate lawyer, and he felt that Washington, and even George Bush, had seen him only as an operator. "When he went over to Treasury it was his declaration of substance," a Baker aide says. "To go back from that to the campaign trail was devastating for him."

But Baker had promised "Bushie," as he called him, that he would come if he was really needed. With exquisite timing, Baker joined the campaign when it was 17 points down and headlines were asking: "Can Baker Save Bush?"

Baker stayed insulated at Washington headquarters, running the show by phone. On the rare occasions he did go on the road, he went straight to the holding room. One of the worst days of his life was when he got off the campaign plane in Omaha and saw himself on the cover of Time with John Sasso, the Dukakis campaign manager, in a story called, "It's the Year of the Handlers." "He wanted to throw up," a Baker aide recalls.

The piece repelled Bush as well, since it described Baker as the "backstage puppeteer" pulling Bush's strings as he

had once pulled Reagan's. Those close to Bush say his way of showing the world that he was not a creature of this Southern Svengali was to choose Dan Quayle as Vice President and John Sununu as chief of staff — both appointments that Baker resisted.

Baker wasted no time distancing himself from the Quayle selection. "Not my choice," he told one reporter through clenched teeth as he was being made up to go on television in New Orleans and defend Bush's new running mate. From anyone else, such talk would have been considered treasonous. But Bush's friends say that when it's "Jimmy," Bush often looks the other way.

During the fall campaign, it was clear that some of the nasty cracks about Quayle's campaign performance were coming from Bush's own campaign headquarters. "Bush talked to Baker about how incensed he was about the leaking about Quayle," says one campaign official. "But Bush always behaved as though the true culprit was a third party, inexplicably outside the control of the all-powerful campaign chairman. Bush would ask: 'Who would do this? Who would do this?'"

With the sang-froid of Claude Rains in "Casablanca," Baker declared himself shocked — shocked — to learn that Quayle-sniping was going on among campaign staffers.

After the election, Baker again was hailed as a genius, gliding above the charges leveled at Lee Atwater and Roger Ailes that the Republicans had run a slashing, pandering, racist campaign. Pundits began asking who would run the country, Bush or Baker?

Quizzed during a news conference on a Florida beach about rumors that Baker would be a "deputy President," Bush snapped: "You haven't heard that here." Then the President-elect

summoned the strong-willed Sununu to Florida to offer him the job as chief of staff over Craig L. Fuller, the candidate Baker favored.

Although Bush finally has the popularity he has long craved, the skewed image of Baker as godhead and Bush as chucklehead persisted for the first several months of the Administration. A senior White House official notes that whenever Baker gets too much credit for a foreign policy initiative: "It bothers the President for a time, then he turns it into a joke. Then he is at peace with it. You talk with him and say, 'Hey, look, it doesn't really matter. You know what the facts are, and that's what's important.'"

The President is tolerant because he is more secure now, and while he and Barbara Bush keep a close eye on aides who attempt to enhance their stature, he trusts Baker to be loyal. Nevertheless, "Bush enjoys, with the greatest affection, seeing Jimmy get pasted in the press every once in a while," says Robert Strauss, the former Democratic party chief, who is friends with both men. "We all do. Hell, George Bush knows who Jim Baker is. He knows he's not Little Lord Fauntleroy."

Like many wives, Barbara Bush is the official archive for slights to her husband. And, as fond as Mrs. Bush is of Baker and his second wife, Susan, she does not cotton to the idea of an article in which the Secretary of State is presented as the friend on whose judgment the President relies most.

Mrs. Bush does her gracious best to avoid the topic. Sitting in the residence, looking smart in a royal blue jacket and her trademark pearls, she talks about other friends, Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher. "It's so hard for me to talk about one friend," she says. "Jim Baker's relationship is very special. But I would say the same for Brent Scowcroft. There's an enormous relationship between those two and they've been

friends since the Nixon days. I know you're not writing about Brent, but I'm just telling you that it's very hard for me to differentiate."

In a final, desperate bid to have the First Lady address the subject at hand, a visitor remarks that perhaps the two men are close because they share similar backgrounds. "I think it's interesting that you think that Jimmy and George have the same background," she replies, with a trace of asperity. "One grew up on a ranch and one grew up in Greenwich, Connecticut."

In the Oval Office, the President is asked whether it isn't odd that his close friend earned a black belt in the 80's in the two arts Bush disdains: handling and leaking. The aides in the room grow visibly tense and everyone looks at his shoes, except the President, who is staring at the gleaming scissors on his Swiss Army knife. Finally, Bush looks up, with just the hint of a smile.

"Leaking?" he says, with a twinkle in his eyes, "I would never think he would do a thing like that."

AT A BARBEQUE AT the Bee County Coliseum in Beeville, Tex., the President spends half an hour happily pumping the hands of each of the 857 guests. Baker stands in the back with his Mona Lisa smile, signing a few autographs. It's a telling moment, for the contrast in style between the two men could not be more marked.

If the President needs interaction to govern, Baker could do it alone out of his briefcase. Bush has little guile. Baker is brimming with it. No one is scared of Bush. No one wants to cross Baker.

Bush never dines with 4 people if he can dine with 50. Baker is a classic workaholic who dislikes official socializing and often tries to sneak out of state dinners. Baker traveled nearly 150,000 miles and visited 31 countries last year, yet rarely did he stop to take in any local color. "For Baker, there is just the battle," one Administration official says.

Bush is softhearted, the type to pass the cookie tray around during meetings in the Oval Office and spend evenings writing thank-you notes. Baker is not big on thank-you's. "He is not into Christmas parties and Easter bunny parties," says a Baker aide, noting that some of Baker's closest longtime advisers have never once been invited to his house.

When you sit across from the President, it is like holding an X-ray plate up to the light. You can see if he feels defensive or annoyed or amused. He is often distracted, toying with something on his desk. His thoughts start and stop and start again, as though he has call waiting in his brain. There is a spontaneity and warmth about him.

When you sit across from Baker, it is like looking at a length of black silk. There is stillness, as Baker holds you locked in his gaze and Southern Comfort voice, occasionally flashing a rather wintry smile. He controls the conversation with perfect sentences, perfect paragraphs and perfect pages. He shifts from on-the-record to off-the-record to background in a single thought. He has a compelling presence, but he is such a fox that you feel the impulse to check your wallet when you leave his office.

The President is willing to look a little foolish for a good cause, wearing a Halloween tie with pumpkins or taking a call from someone claiming to be President Hashemi Rafsanjani of Iran if it might help the hostages. Baker, who has a deep fear of ridicule, would never expose himself to such a risk. Just as he always keeps his suit jacket buttoned over his tailored shirts with the JAB III monogram, so he plows through foreign affairs homework each night, determined never to be caught unprepared. He wants to be seen as a great Secretary of State both for history and for his own political future — should he decide to run for President himself.

IT WAS THE STORM-lashed Saturday night of the Malta summit when the President could not get off the U.S.S. Belknap to meet Gorbachev. Bush, Baker, Scowcroft and Marlin Fitzwater, the press secretary, had a steak dinner and sat around drinking red wine in the admiral's suite. Fitzwater recalls being struck by the easy camaraderie between Bush and Baker, their long legs stretched out in the small dining room as they checked with the White House situation room on the attempted coup in the Philippines. They had to decide whether to do more for President Corazon Aquino than provide the air cover authorized the night before. With their blue windbreakers and their shorthand style of speaking to each other, the pair seemed more like a pilot and co-pilot or a team of race car drivers, Fitzwater thought.

"They knew immediately where the dividing line was with Aquino and that we weren't going to intervene militarily," Fitzwater says. "It didn't require any bureaucratic analysis or position papers. It required very little conversation. These two guys think so much alike that they just instinctively knew."

If ideology was the engine of the Reagan foreign policy, instinct drives the Bush foreign policy. Bush instinct and Baker instinct. Over the years, both men have often seemed at a loss when pressed to articulate what issues they hold dear or what they believe in. Peace, they might answer, or fairness. Their foreign policy vision, in essence, amounts to "we know best." They regard themselves as good people who will do the correct thing and, if circumstances permit, the right thing. The approach is: split the difference. Keep things stable. Democracy where possible. Free markets where possible. Apple pie where possible.

There is no sense of the moral crusade of Jimmy Carter or the impossible dreams of Ronald Reagan. Rather, the Bush-Baker foreign policy is a series of ad hoc decisions, some of them based on creative strategies designed for a particular region, others on an intuitive sense of what seems right or reasonable or popular at the moment.

"I think a lot of things grow out of my instincts," the President explains, "but we talk about them, and he'll have ideas of his own that appeal to me right away."

If what seems reasonable at the moment is to side with the Chinese power elite rather than the students in Tiananmen Square, then you side with those in power. If what seems reasonable is to split the difference between the aspirations of Lithuanians and the interests of Gorbachev, then you split the difference.

A strong case can be made that up to now the Bush-Baker instincts have served the country pretty well. Doing little when little is called for can be a stroke of genius. Many foreign policy experts believe that Bush, Baker and Scowcroft have handled the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the delicate issue of German unification adroitly.

Paradoxically, though, they have not really gotten much credit for their efforts. Their decisions may have been correct, but they were never tied to a larger vision that touched people's souls. With their cold-blooded approach, they often have ceded the world stage to the charismatic Gorbachev, while leaving audiences at home and abroad hungry for an expression of the joy at seeing Eastern Europe liberated, or outrage at the fate of the Chinese students.

Bush and Baker fail to convey passion on issues, and that can be a real liability. When a President is able to connect with voters on a gut level and, through inspired rhetoric, convince them — as Reagan so often did — that he is articul-

ing their deepest convictions and concerns, then they are less likely to question every foreign policy decision. Without that emotional bond, and the trust that goes with it, the people and the Congress will sift through the nuances of policy with a skeptical eye, and that ultimately constricts a President.

But Bush was brought up not to gloat, and Baker is incapable of expressing passion. Passion, symbols, bread and circuses — those are for political campaigns, not for governing. As a result, the Bush-Baker foreign policy has no voice, no music and no poetry. It's like a perfectly acted silent movie for an audience that likes to sing along.

"Baker doesn't commit to broad, future-oriented objectives," says a longtime associate. "He's a practical calculator who likes to commit to a goal only when he is certain he will achieve it."

Bush has failed to articulate a persuasive foreign policy because he is uncomfortable waxing eloquent about his aspirations, and because he is so caught up in the details that he can't crystallize them into a simple, evocative strategic theme.

The pair has also provoked the widespread suspicion that while their prudence has worked well as Communism has collapsed, this may have been coincidence rather than statecraft — that they would have reacted with the same caution regardless of events. Soon, big, innovative and perhaps unpopular policies will be needed to consolidate the revolutionary changes in Europe and the Soviet Union, and it remains to be seen whether the President and the Secretary will be capable of these broader strokes. As Bob Dole, the Senate minority leader, puts it, "You can't always split the difference."

Is there anything Bush and Baker believe in enough to put their popularity at risk? At a dramatic moment in history when struggling new democracies desperately need America's helping hand, will

they continue to offer mingy portions with the message: "Read my lips: increasing foreign aid is not popular"?

Bush and Baker treat their lack of "the vision thing" as a public relations problem. They will say, "I gave a speech on that subject," as if that were enough to satisfy a public restless for leadership. They do not seem to recognize the importance of forging a bond of trust with Americans at highly charged moments.

"Without a broad picture of America's role in the world, it will be difficult to summon public support for more ambitious initiatives when they are required," says Michael J. Sandel, a political theorist at Harvard University. "From foreign aid to the defense budget to arms control, the Administration won't be able to shape a new world order without the American people having confidence in their sense of direction or clarity of purpose."

As Gorbachev has demonstrated, having vision does not necessarily mean having a fixed blueprint. It means having a general direction and an ability to redefine strategy as events require. It means having an evolving, expanding and imaginative sense of the possible.

Says one senior Administration official: "So much emphasis is put by both of them on skilled management of the process it is hard for anyone to demand fundamental justifications for what we are doing."

WHO INFLUENCED WHOM?
When historians examine the relationship between a President and his Secretary of State, that question is uppermost in their minds. During the early months of the Bush Administration there was an impression in Washington that Baker was steering the President. But the reality is more complex. As President Bush drily notes: "There were a lot of perceptions that were invalid out there."

The question of who influ-

enced whom loses its meaning when the President and Secretary of State form policy by letting their instincts bounce off each other. For instance, Baker's early discussions with European leaders made it clear to him that Gorbachev was winning the day in Europe. At the same time, Bush, from his own conversations, also recognized the need to assert American leadership at the May 1989 40th anniversary NATO summit, and it was actually Scowcroft who came up with the arms-control proposals that would do it.

"Brent and Baker early on came to the conclusion that something had to be done," a senior Administration official says of the preparations for the NATO summit. "Both worked on the President. It wasn't that Bush was against the idea. He was wrestling with the nature of the arms cuts — should it be manpower or tanks, a big thing or a little thing. What I remember about Baker, though, was that he was more prepared than anyone else to keep pushing the peanut up the hill. It was Baker's constant nattering at the President that he had to do something big that really got it over the top."

On the other hand, it was Bush who decided to send Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger on two secret missions to Beijing in an effort to patch up relations after Tiananmen Square. Baker supported Bush's general instinct not to isolate China but urged a lower profile, knowing that reports of Scowcroft toasting the Chinese leaders by candlelight would be a public relations disaster.

"We were really pressing Baker to go to the President and try to talk him out of this China business," one Baker aide says. "But he knew where the red line was with the President. Finally one day Baker just told us to shut up. He hit us with one of his favorite lines: 'Let me remind you, he is the one who got elected.' Baker was echoing Bush, whose favorite resort to advisers is a half-petulant, half-kidding, 'If you're so smart, why aren't you President?'"

Nevertheless, whether it is China or the failed Panama coup, Baker is adept at distancing himself publicly from messy situations and policies he thinks are losers, prompting Bush to tease him at times with: "Hey, Jimmy, we've had some hot stuff around here for three days and you turned tail and ran with the antelopes."

It was the President, in a rare departure from the diplomacy of caution, who initiated the successful Panama invasion. It was also Bush who came up with the ideas of having an early, informal Malta summit with Gorbachev and a second round of troop cuts in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall. But it was Baker who subtly turned the Malta summit from the informal, "putting our feet up" chat initially envisaged by the President into a platform for the United States to demonstrate through a 16-point initiative that it was prepared to help Gorbachev.

If the instinctual nature of the Bush-Baker enterprise makes it difficult to sort out the question of influence, so does the peculiar personal fit between the two men. Bush has approached the Presidency like a man who inherited a successful family business from his father and does not intend to ruin it. When you are running an inherited family business, what you want most is an adviser who will help manage the store properly, not redefine it.

Bush has a short attention span; his thoughts leap about, grasshopper-style, but he always returns to important points, listening to his advisers debate ideas and spinning off new ones of his own. Baker's concentration is like a high beam, and his role is to help Bush concentrate when the stakes are high, plucking the best ideas from the inner circle and pushing them through to a decision. But he always presses deftly, as he did in the campaign, so that Bush never feels that he is being "handled."

One of the President's oldest friends, Don Rhodes, compares Baker to the revolving spotlight on a prison guard tower — "His head is always

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up there on that tower, looking the situation over."

"Baker dots every i and crosses every t," Rhodes adds. "And the President likes people there who dot the i's and cross the t's."

White House officials say Baker never abuses his friendship and always treats Bush with deference. Nevertheless, the 32-year-bond between the two men casts a long shadow. "If you know that Baker has come down hard on some issue," one Administration official says, "you are going to think twice about taking the opposite position in the interagency debates."

Those who thought, though, that Bush would want to be his own Secretary of State may have underestimated the scope of his ambitions. In some ways, the President is like a baseball player-manager who has fielded every position and just can't help penciling himself into the lineup in the late innings. He can't resist calling Gorbachev himself, or Deng Xiaoping or taking a call from someone posing as the President of Iran. He is his own Secretary, his own China desk officer, his own intelligence analyst. And that can leave Baker chafing at times; the Secretary remarks humorously to friends that he prefers solo trips to trips with the President because on joint travels he is left with the role of "the goddamn butler."

To Bush's credit, he tries not to worry about who is getting credit. And he has been in government long enough to appreciate Baker's candor. "This office intimidates people," he says, waving a hand around the airy Oval Office, filled with history and hovering aides. "They walk in here and say, 'I'll go tell this son-of-a-gun,' and they walk in and they don't tell the son-of-a-gun. I've been through it on the other side, walking through that door. And it's different." Friends

like Baker, the President says, know that they "can come and say what they think and nobody's going to bark their head off. And they will not be intimidated by the seal on the ceiling."

Asked if Baker can get away with things that others can't, the President replies drolly: "Well, if you can accept coarse vulgarity as something a little out of order, well yes, I guess he can. He's still there."

ONE DANGER IN AN instinct-driven Administration is that instinct can overwhelm a policy. That almost happened with the Middle East. Bush and Baker approach the region with identical gut feelings: no illusions about the Arabs, no illusions about the Israelis. Arab-Israeli diplomacy for them is a snake pit, to be entered at one's peril and always wearing protective gear.

Shortly after Bush became President, he and Baker were sitting around the Oval Office one afternoon with a group of Middle East advisers, discussing how they should handle the Arab-Israeli conflict. According to participants, Baker had decided that the Middle East peace process was a delicate area over which he should assume total control. One expert at the meeting, though, began arguing that the President should take the lead in the Middle East, articulate a vision of peace and assert himself. Baker brushed him off. The President has only "one shot" in the Middle East, he argued. He cannot afford to try and then fail. The ground has to be prepared before Presidential intervention. That would be Baker's role.

Bush drank in the debate, then eased back in his chair and smiled. Perhaps, he said, it would be helpful to have a few trial peace initiatives, let them get chewed up and eventually one would click.

"We'll call the first one the Baker plan," the President teased. When one comes along that finally produces some results, then the President will take over.

The President gave Baker a free hand in running the peace process out of the State Department. He designed a policy aimed at getting Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, to come up with his own peace plan — in this case one based on Palestinian elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Once Shamir had announced his plan, the Secretary would try to get it implemented.

But as Baker worked the diplomacy, Bush became preoccupied with a single issue: Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. In April 1989, Shamir came to Washington for his first meeting with Bush as President. During their talks the President vented his strong feelings — acquired during his years at the United Nations and the Central Intelligence Agency

— that Israeli settlements were an obstacle to peace. Bush left their one-on-one meeting with the belief that Shamir had made a commitment to either halt or slow down the settlement process.

A few days after Shamir departed, the President picked up a newspaper and read that the Israeli Government planned to establish several new settlements. He hit the ceiling. Personal diplomacy and friendship are central to Bush's whole foreign policy, and he felt that Shamir, who was supposed to be a friend, was taking him for a fool.

"Right there," the President would tell friends, pointing at a chair in the Oval Office where Shamir sat. "He sat right in that chair and told me no more settlements. Then two days later. . ."

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In July 1989 Shamir wrote the President a private letter intended to clear up the misunderstanding, but he began the letter with a long critique of the Administration's dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization and paped over the settlement dispute. The President was not amused. In November 1989, Shamir came to Washington again. Bush urged him to continue working with Baker on the peace process, but the two of them had another private chat in the President's office on the settlement question "to clear the air," as one official put it. The settlement issue had become, in Bush's mind, the litmus test of whether the Israeli leader was taking him and the United States seriously.

The air did not stay clear for long. In January 1990, Shamir announced that a "big Israel" was needed to absorb Soviet Jews, heightening the President's concern that Israel was going to house new Soviet immigrants in the West Bank and make settlements an even bigger problem. Through a Republican Jewish leader, word got back to Shamir that Bush was livid, so the Israeli leader phoned him on Feb. 22, and tried to reassure the President that less than 1 percent of newly arriving Soviet Jews were settling in the West Bank.

What Shamir did not know was that the C.I.A. had recently delivered to the President a secret study showing that Shamir's figure was correct only if Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem was not counted as part of the West Bank. Counting East Jerusalem, the figure was closer to 10 percent.

Once again, Bush felt that Shamir was not taking him seriously — treating him as though he did not know that East Jerusalem was part of the West Bank. The President stewed over the East Jerusalem issue for several weeks.

Baker shared his basic sentiments, but argued that with Shamir so close to agreeing to talk with Palestinians, now was not the time to raise the settlement question. Rationally, Bush knew Baker was right, but instinct led him to reject the advice.

Out of the blue, Baker told a Congressional committee on March 1 that the Administration was unwilling to support a \$400 million loan guarantee to build housing in Israel for Soviet Jewish immigrants unless Israel promised to stop building new settlements altogether, a totally new policy. Baker's statement was not in the talking points prepared by his aides; rather, it came out of a private discussion with the President. After his remarks set off a storm in Israel, Baker had his spokeswoman back off them slightly at the next's day's briefing.

But the President would not let go. While Baker was sitting in his office waiting for Shamir to call with a positive answer on the peace process, the President was in his office poring over aerial maps of Israeli housing developments in East Jerusalem. Finally, with the East Jerusalem issue still gnawing at him, Bush declared during a news conference in Palm Springs, "We do not believe that there should be new settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem." Shamir immediately tried to seize on the remark as a justification for not moving ahead with Baker on the peace process.

Baker's policy called for putting an arm around Israel, but the President's instinct was to stiff-arm Shamir. There's no question that in the short run, the President's remarks disrupted the peace process and temporarily soured his relations with Israel and American Jews. In the long run, though, the President's comments, while not coordinated with Baker's strategy, may

have the positive effect of forcing Israel to recognize that new democracies are now competing for America's aid and attention, and that, as a result, Israel is going to have to stop taking the United States for granted and make a more serious commitment to the peace process. Still, policy by personal preoccupation is a dangerous game. It may have worked in a backhanded way this time, but what will happen down the road is anybody's guess.

CAN THIS MARRIAGE survive one more political roundelay?

At private dinner parties in Washington, some friends take Baker's Presidential ambitions for granted. "Well," they say, "at least we all know what we'll be doing in '96."

Even though a recent Gallup Poll showed that 49 percent of the country thinks Dan Quayle should be replaced on the ticket in 1992, and even though many Republican operatives have written Quayle off, Bush intimates argue that the President would not make a switch that smacked of disloyalty. Although Baker knows that becoming Vice President would be the easiest route to the Presidency, since he has no political base, his friends say he is not unhappy to see the chair kept warm by Quayle, a man he does not consider a contender.

If you ask Baker about his future plans, he will jump up and grab a picture of his Wyoming ranch and say, "I'd go right out here and I'd be so happy." But the moment has a practiced feel to it, perhaps because he has been answering such inquiries for a decade by saying that he wants to escape to a ranch where he can "run a few cows."

"He has seen a lot of Presidents up close, Republicans and Democrats, and he thinks he is as good as many and better than most," Robert

Strauss says. "It is inconceivable that he does not want the Presidency very badly."

Many political professionals believe that Baker could no more pass up a chance to be President than Gary Kasparov could walk away from a chessboard with one move left. But opinion is divided about how well the consummate insider would do on the trail. "I can't see him spending a year out in the Iowa cornfields," a G.O.P. official says. Or as Baker once put it, "The higher the monkey climbs, the more you see of his behind."

Perhaps Bush feels that talking about Baker's ambitions would be a slight to Quayle. Or perhaps the two most powerful friends in the world do not want to tote up their running scorecards on each other right now. But the notion that they might someday share adjoining chapters in the history books is a tetchy one.

"I've never discussed that with him," Bush says.

But isn't that strange, he is asked, since they tease each other about everything else under the sun?

"Well, it doesn't come up," the President says. "I mean, I've seen it printed, but I would think he might be a little uneasy commenting on something of that nature."

Many believe that if Baker decided to run, Bush would be there for him. And watching the two, it is clear that their bond is a rare one in a town where newcomers are advised that if they want a friend, they should buy a dog.

Over the Christmas holidays last year, Baker and Bush were on Marine One, choppering to San Jose Island in the Gulf of Mexico to cast for black drum and redfish.

"Do you have your fishing license?" Baker asked the President.

"Damn," Bush replied, "I don't know whether I do or not." He got out his wallet and

found a crumpled old fishing license. Baker got out his and found a newer, neater one. They reminisced about when they first got them, just two guys in old cowboy hats and cowboy boots jawboning, oblivious to the phalanx of gray suits and sober faces surrounding them.

Such is the world of Bush and Baker. They pull and tug at each other, tease and compete. But at the end of the day, their feet are up and their cards are on the table, and they share a sense of wonder at how far they've come, a feeling Baker calls "Gee whiz, who'd a thunk it?" Forged in play and tempered by personal and political tragedies, this bond seems able to withstand any pressure — even an article that attempts to lay it bare.

One can imagine the two men on the phone on this very Sunday morning, cussing and teasing each other about who came out looking better in the prose and the pictures, laughing at the New York writers who tried to get them "on the couch," and then moving on to spin the globe — their way. ■

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By Maureen Dowd & Thomas L. Friedman

P R O F I L E S

THE TACTICIAN

A POLITICAL genius unencumbered by creed or convictions is the gist of what peers and diplomats say about James Addison Baker III, who besides being Secretary of State, they add, is President George Bush's friend, possibly his closest, and yet at some level his rival, too. This thumbnail critique stands up fairly well to close examination. "Genius" is too strong a word, but even by Washington's exacting standards Baker's political gift is seen on all sides as remarkable. And if convictions are equated with set views or strong preferences Baker doesn't have them. He is concerned with results, not ideas or causes. "I'm more interested in the game than in philosophy," he has said. Still, a man of exceptional ability—and Baker is one—isn't likely to serve in the job that Baker now holds, especially in a time of sweeping change, and not be influenced by the issues he is dealing with. Baker may acquire views, or attitudes, but he won't take a position until he has rigorously assayed its likely effects on opinion within Congress and beyond. In a city that includes pragmatism among the graces, many experienced people who have worked with Baker or have observed him closely cite him as the most pragmatic figure they've known. Other superlatives follow: "most disciplined," "hardest-working," "best listener," and—a constant—"best tactician."

Curiously, Baker's track record in elective politics places him on more losing sides than winning ones. He drifted into the arena almost by chance—helping out in George Bush's losing campaign for the Senate, in 1970. In 1976, to everyone's surprise, Baker emerged as the manager of Gerald Ford's uphill struggle to remain in the White House; although Ford lost, too, the Baker-run campaign was widely judged to have allowed him to come from very far behind and almost beat his challenger, Jimmy Carter. In 1978,



Baker tried being a candidate himself: he ran for the office of attorney general of Texas. He lost. Two years later, he was on the winning side as a member of Ronald Reagan's campaign organization; and in 1988, of course, he directed the Bush campaign.

Baker is an original. He got into politics late—at the age of forty—in Texas, a place where most political careers start early. But he made his mark in Washington, not in Texas, moving at an astonishing clip to build perhaps the most impressive résumé of any public figure of the postwar era. As chief of staff in Ronald Reagan's first term, Baker ran the best White House operation in modern memory, and in those four years—from 1981 through 1984—he had more to do with managing the country's business than anyone else. More often than not, he was also a steadying and moderating influence. For the next three and a half years, he was the Secretary of the Treasury, a time in which his department was at least as innovative as at any time since the late nineteen-sixties. The day after being elected President, George Bush appointed Baker to the job he wanted—Secretary of State. Aside from the exposure to trade policy and exchange-rate issues that any Treasury Secretary acquires, Baker brought little direct

experience to his new portfolio, and his knowledge of the world that lay beyond the sovereign writ of his friend George Bush was limited. However, Bush could be sure that Baker would not be State's man in the Administration but, rather, the White House's man at State. And, of course, Baker's surpassing political skills would remain at Bush's service.

Fully understanding either Baker or Bush may not be possible; each is a somewhat enigmatic figure—Baker especially—and so is the relationship between them, which is crucial to both. It sets them apart from past Oval Office-seventh-floor tandems.

For a President and his first minister to be old and intimate friends is probably without precedent; even for a Presidential candidate and his campaign manager to have such a relationship is extraordinary. Equally so is the role reversal that struck many as being under way when Bush and his entourage arrived in power. A President is usually the best politician in his Cabinet, and he isn't expected to be familiar with the diplomatic method or the finer points of foreign policy. These are supposed to lie within the competence of his Secretary of State, who, as custodian of traditional foreign-policy interests, competes with other constituencies for the President's ear. Bush, however, is reputed to be familiar with the nuances of foreign policy, and he clearly loves the subject, but he isn't as clever or astute a politician as Baker, who hasn't yet been elected to public office.

The relationship is full of ironies and, inevitably, some tension. Baker is in politics because Bush brought him in, from the tedium of business and corporate law. Bush is President because over a period of years Baker thought about and worked through the problems of getting him there. Indeed, if it weren't for Baker's astuteness it's not likely that Ronald Reagan would have made Bush the Vice-Presidential candidate in 1980. Bush had been every-

where, and had one of the best résumés in town. But Baker's was to become far better, because Bush, though he accumulated some notable titles, had never had one of the key jobs before becoming President, and he had always been on someone's short leash, whether Richard Nixon's or Henry Kissinger's or Ronald Reagan's. Baker has, of course, managed center-stage operations, and in his White House years he kept Vice-President Bush in the loop, never losing sight of his friend's exalted goal. Then, in 1988, Baker took over Bush's seemingly directionless Presidential campaign, with prodigious results. According to some people who know them both well, Baker reckons that he has done most of the heavy lifting, whereas it is his friend who got first prize. And almost everyone who knows them well thinks that Baker, having accomplished what he has accomplished, is confident that he could run the Oval Office as well as or better than anyone he has met, and so will eventually try returning to the White House on his own. In fact, back in the 1986-87 period some of his party's heavy hitters approached Baker about running for President himself. Bush, they felt, was either weak or thought of as weak; the "wimp factor" was seen as a potential problem. Bush was obviously aware of those overtures to his friend and counsellor.

The role reversal isn't complete. Bush, it's true, has for years been on close terms with many world figures, and he does work the phones with them a lot—far more than past Presidents have done. He is also undeniably comfortable with a range of foreign-policy issues. But his grasp of the arcana of foreign policy can be—and has been—exaggerated. As for Baker, he, like many skilled lawyers, masters a brief very quickly. "He is action-oriented—more so than Bush," says a senior Administration official who works closely with Baker. "He is decisive, and no one second-guesses his sense of timing. Neither Bush nor Baker reads history."

It's unlikely that Baker has ever worried much about his friend's greater knowledge of the big world; one portfolio isn't very different from another if you are Jim Baker, who plays to two constituencies—Congress and the press—whether he is running State or Treasury. "Bush might over-

ride Baker on a foreign-policy issue, but I seriously doubt he'd do so on a political issue," says Robert Strauss, another Texan and another of Washington's notable *têtes politiques*, who over the years has functioned as a guru for the Democratic Party. I asked Strauss if Baker was Bush's political guru. "No question about it," he said, adding that Baker, whom he knows well, "is as fine a tactical brain as any I've known and also a first-rate political strategist."

State has rarely had a Secretary with a sharp sense of political direction. Harry Truman's first choice for the job was James F. Byrnes, a colleague from his Senate days; in most ways, Byrnes was not a success, but he did help Truman defend his congressional flank. Byrnes' successor, General George C. Marshall, and his deputy, Robert A. Lovett, had a better feel for accommodating foreign policy to domestic pressures than any in a long line of successors before Baker, but Truman's foreign policy rarely drew a good press. Henry Kissinger had few peers in the art of fine-tuning press coverage—he made household names of a few otherwise anonymous television reporters—but he didn't do well with Congress; he never really understood it. Baker is unusual in being a senior foreign-policy official who is a virtuoso performer on Capitol Hill and in managing the press.


Bush and Baker have, of course, coincided with the most tumultuous and profound change in the world order in half a century. In the forties, a handful of people in Washington were trying to think through the implications of what was occurring and what kinds of novel institutions and structures might be required. No such conceptualizing is under way now. Bush has no interest in conceptual thinking, and Baker, as he says himself, doesn't think conceptually. He belongs to a recognizable type—the lawyer-

achiever who doesn't look very far ahead but relies on an aide, or aides, to do that, and on his own instincts to fit to domestic political tolerances whatever plan or design may develop. At State, however, Baker's licensed planners belong to his inner sanctum, and they have had a large involvement in operations.

Thus far, the Bush-Baker performance in foreign policy has created doubt about whether their brand of leadership will allow America to play the role that only it can play in accommodating change and fashioning a new and stable world order. Bush's approach to most issues is purely reactive, and Baker is the ideal agent for him. As a team, they are normally unwilling to take a step before satisfying themselves that all bases are covered and the short-term political effects appear favorable. "This Administration's dominant concern is not what happens three or five years out but five days out," says a senior American diplomat who has had considerable exposure to the current leadership. Another says, "After working closely with Baker, I don't know how he thinks. What I see is his flawless instinct for how an issue will go and for being on the right side of it. What he does or says about United States-Soviet relations, for example, doesn't seem to reflect analysis or deep thought or strategy. He is like a diamond cutter in Antwerp who can hit the rock once and all the facets will break as they should, with no damage to the stone. If we at State wrote a job description of what a Secretary of State should be, he would be very like Baker: lots of political savvy and a strong relationship with the President; large intellectual capacity and plenty of energy; no hangups or neuroses or ego problems. Only one thing is missing—an interest in policy."

In Washington, business-as-usual is hardly a novel approach to issues of national security. But the question is whether such an approach can work now, in so volatile and exigent a world environment. For Baker and his people, the events of 1989 were merely events, according to senior people at State. "They don't distinguish between large and small ones," one of them says. "Problems they do distinguish—between the hard ones and the easy ones."

The Bush policy would be "main-



stream—unimaginative, perhaps, but mainstream,” Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s national-security adviser, noted not long after the election. Bush has appeared to equate inaction with virtue, insisting in interviews that he is “cautious” and “prudent” and “diplomatic.” The extreme caution is a hobble. A few diplomats told me that the Administration vetoed planning for the contingency of German unification for fear of leaks. A senior official confirmed the truth of those statements. Baker is not less cautious, but he is less visibly so. And it isn’t as if his caution were designed to complement Bush’s. He is just very cautious—“the most cautious human being I’ve ever met,” says Michael Deaver, a friend and admirer of Baker and his greatest ally when both served in the Reagan White House.

Cautious is obviously better than incautious (if that is the alternative). And the Bush-Baker extreme caution is seen by some diplomats and their governments—allied and adversarial—as being at times a large plus. In the early going, Europeans were dismayed by the new Administration’s reluctance to see as an opportunity—as suiting Western interests—what Gorbachev was doing and was causing to happen. But those same Europeans were heartened and reassured by the caution that Bush and Baker showed this past autumn as East Europeans buried repressive regimes and turned their politics upside down. Gorbachev, fearful of an overreaction in Washington and, in turn, elsewhere, sent Bush a stiff message during that evening last November when the East German tide was breaching the odious wall; it urged restraint on Bush and, through him, on Bonn. Gorbachev need not have worried—not about Bush and Baker. And therein lie the strength of their approach in some volatile situations and its weakness in others.

On some issues, Baker has relatively little influence. China policy, for which Bush feels equipped with special knowledge and insights, is an example—although it is an issue that he has mishandled from the start. In East-West matters generally, Baker is less tightly tied to the past than Bush and Scowcroft, who have been slow to unlearn the thinking of the mid-nineteen-seventies. Lacking their perspective, Baker isn’t victimized by it. Thus, he reacted some time before they did to the opportunity Gorbachev was presenting and to the apparent need to “help” *perestroika*. “Jim has been forward-leaning about the Soviets,” one of his colleagues on the N.S.C. says. “He is action-oriented, and wants to do the things that State loves to do—make agreements, and so on.”

The comment conveys a simplistic view of the Baker style. “On some issues, Bush is actually out in front of Baker,” a senior diplomat says. “This is because Baker is playing to domestic political interests—doing so for Bush but also for himself.”

I asked whether Baker’s more timely switch to a pro-Gorbachev, pro-*perestroika* position was taken on the merits or for more tactical reasons.


“Baker’s switch was no epiphany,” the diplomat replied. “It reflected in-

stead his concern about the Administration’s being blamed if things went badly for Gorbachev and his new thinking.” Another of State’s close Baker watchers agreed, and added, “He isn’t a cynic, and I do like and admire him. But he has yet to betray any sense of history.”

BAKER’s ascent in politics seemingly relied upon the instinctual and effortless exercise of a blend of talents: political acuity, discipline, intense preparation, and, above all, a flair for putting together winning combinations. But even prodigal talent may be unavailing without some intervention by fortune. In Baker’s case, that meant being in the right place at the right time. After arriving in Washington, in 1975, as Undersecretary of Commerce, Baker moved in a year from being a new face in town to acting as Gerald Ford’s campaign manager, though he had never before run anything larger than an essentially local political operation. Then, in 1980, the Reagan people unexpectedly brought him into their campaign, and in no time he had become a pivotal influence and was placed in charge of the negotiations for Reagan’s debate with Carter; the event was judged a resounding success for Reagan, and two weeks

later this intruder from the Bush crowd, with no credentials as a Reaganaut, found himself invited to become the new President’s chief of staff. Flair is not uncommon, but to have flair and reliably good timing in politics is rare.

In Washington and in Houston, Baker’s home town, there are quite different views of him; the two places are, of course, very different, and politics in the outer reaches has little in common with corporate-law practice. In both places Baker is widely admired for his skills, but comments in Washington suggest a more complex and artful figure than his peer



Victoria Roberts

“I’m just not in an Australian-movie mood, O.K.?”

group in Houston sees. There Baker is known as a loyal, thoughtful friend to many, and as a community stalwart. His game, they know, is not poker but tennis, and for years he was the best club's best player. In Washington, he doesn't make friends, and he does his considerable best to restrict his social calendar. Besides being private, he has a closed side. Friends in Houston feel that Baker was heavily marked by the death of his first wife, in 1970; certainly the event caused something of a withdrawal. Washington sees his affable but rather insular style as basic to his political approach. In his personal style Baker reflects both an Ivy League education and Texas roots. He wears conservative, well-cut clothes and cowboy boots. He speaks in unadorned complete sentences, but colleagues from White House days and the campaign trail know that when he is provoked he summons the earthily graphic idiom of the prairie. He gave up cigarettes years ago, but in Houston he continues to chew Red Man tobacco, and he has also been observed doing so while playing golf (a game he recently took up) at the Chevy Chase Club, the Washington area's toniest. "He was chewing and spitting freely," I was told.

Washington sees Baker as unaggressive but nonetheless very tough. His friends in Houston concur; his


oldest and closest friend there, a cousin named Preston Moore, once called him "the velvet hammer," and the sobriquet stuck. "He is as tough as a two-dollar steak," Moore says affectionately. Among the first things that Washington noticed about Baker was the sense he conveyed of feeling secure within himself. In a town with at least its share of poseurs and puffed-up second-raters, here was someone who, though very competitive, seemed unusually capable and also comfortable with himself and his responsibilities, however heavy they might become. There was a tendency to attribute this agreeable quality to his background—to his having a sense of being part of his home town's root system. Old money and tradition, along with his talents, have unquestionably contributed a lot to the Baker persona, but since he entered politics his friendship with Bush—and the knowledge that he can rely on it and use it to their joint advantage—has surely added to the quiet assurance he conveys.

"George grew up in a political environment and Jimmy didn't," observes the Reverend J. Thomas Bagby, Rector Emeritus of St. Martin's Episcopal Church in Houston, who has been for many years the close friend and minister of Bush and Baker; they both joined his church in the nineteen-sixties and became vestrymen. Bagby himself, now

seventy-eight, grew up in Austin but has spent fifty-four years in Houston—in three different churches—and attended Bush and Baker closely during both men's family crises. "They are closer than brothers," he says. "And each is smart enough to listen to the other. Jimmy has street smarts. He has the instincts of Sam Rayburn and Jack Garner twice over. He has feel and touch." Bagby said he could think of nothing that "would create an actual difference" between Bush and Baker.

Perhaps. Others who know them well also see a fraternal relationship, but add that brothers can be competitive with each other and can have differences. There is rivalry between Bush and Baker, which, friends and political associates note, is not unusual between close friends. They are competitive on the tennis court and beyond. Bush, during his last summer holiday in Maine, seemed determined to present himself as the American engaged in the largest number of outdoor activities and a keen competitor into the bargain. It may not be possible to be Bush's friend without also being in some sense a competitor, or thought of as a competitor. Bush has on occasion said to Baker, and to others who have worked with him, "If you're so smart, how come I'm President" (or "running for President" or "Vice-President," depending on the era). And Bush, we know, set out on his long march toward the White House at a time when his record in elective politics was unremarkable and the path to his goal was strewn with more imposing and plausible aspirants. Isolated incidents along the way suggested that each friend needed to retain a measure of independence from the other. Bush is reported to have consulted no one—not even Baker—on his selection of Senator Dan Quayle to be his running mate. His determination to make the most important decision of the campaign wholly on his own says something about Bush. And for Baker, the campaign manager, to emphasize (in one way or another) his lack of involvement in the decision raised eyebrows nearly as high.

"I never quite understood the Bush-Baker relationship," says Mike Deaver. Craig Fuller, who was Cabinet Secretary during Reagan's first term and George Bush's chief of staff in the second term, says, "Bush and Baker are close friends, but the rela-



"I've enjoyed our little talk, and now I'll have myself a nice little nap."

tionship is complex. There is no small measure of competition between them, and even an element of rivalry. They pay a lot of attention to each other's press, and if one takes a hit he is kidded by the other."

Since Bush has always taken most of the hits, Baker has presumably done most of the kidding. He has always had a very good press. In fact, between the time he arrived in the White House as chief of staff and his friend's nomination for President, Baker was always able to generate a better press than Bush, whose negatives in the polls were often high—at times alarmingly so—and who was exposed to heavy shelling from various media stars. However, a President has more freedom to contrive and shape news stories than does his Secretary of State, a part of whose role is to protect the boss. But Baker "is very risk-averse," one former White House associate has said. "He is enormously concerned with what people think of him." Baker watchers, including keen admirers, note that his fingerprints are rarely visible on projects that go sour. And his instinct for avoiding the portion of blame that might otherwise fall on a key Presidential adviser at precarious moments seems undulled by this President's being a close friend and political partner. In contrast, John Sununu, Bush's chief of staff, who is abrasive and prone to error—unlike Baker; who is neither—takes a lot of the heat when things go wrong. That is a quality that Presidents cherish, and one that is not a part of Baker's equipment.

It seems not to matter, though. "There is a compatibility between Bush and Baker that is almost collegiate in nature," a senior diplomat says. "They are like locker-room buddies on a winning team—the quarterback and the running back. The team keeps on winning because of the way those two work together. There's a bit of swagger, and they do like ragging each other. They are very good in combination."

I asked Baker about reports that he and Bush talk on the phone off and on from early morning until as late as eleven in the evening.

"The calls often do start early in the morning," he said. "But they don't continue that late, because we are both in bed well before then. We kid about who folds faster at parties."

John Connally, who, besides being Richard Nixon's favorite Cabinet member (and for a time his choice for Vice-President), was a political enemy of George Bush in Texas, is very high on Baker. "He can divorce himself from his job and give the President an objective analysis of an issue," Connally says. "He isn't concerned with guarding his turf or with where State Department interests may lie. Baker is the Jim Farley of this Administration without being Postmaster General. His relationship with Bush is more important to each of them than his job and the relationship of that office to Bush as President."

Baker categorically denies wanting to run for President in 1996, but no one in Washington who has worked with him or knows him takes the denial seriously; nor do most of his friends in Houston. He wants to be President, they think, because there is no place else left to go. "He is carving out a niche that has no parallel in recent decades," says Connally (who for a time seemed to be creating just such a niche for himself, and who also had close relationships with two Presidents).


Baker has told at least one of his four sons that he has no intention of practicing law again; he told me that, too. Nor is it likely that much else in the private sector would interest him now for very long. I asked a career diplomat who has seen a good deal of him whether he thought Baker wanted to be President. "He does. He shows it by what he doesn't say, not by what he does say" was the somewhat cryptic answer.


As high achievers go, Baker seems uncomplicated. For one of his type and background, however, his life over the past twenty years or so has been highly complicated as well as memorable. No one in Washington who knows Baker would agree with his friends in Hous-

ton, most of whom like to say, "What you see is what you get."

THE first and largest part of Baker's life was unremarkable, conforming to family tradition and to what is expected of the male progeny of old money in Houston, the state's largest city and one with more than its share of the new money created by oil. Baker, who was born in 1930, went first to the obvious place, the Kinkaid School, and then to an Eastern boarding school, the Hill School, in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, and to an Ivy League university, Princeton. "Old money here sends its kids East to school so they'll learn to say 'Fantastic' instead of 'Bullshit,'" says a breezy *cousine* of Baker's. "We never thought of George Bush and others like him who came here as carpetbaggers," she adds. "There is a natural affinity between Ivy Leaguers and old money."

During spring break in his second year at Princeton, Baker went to Bermuda as a member of the rugby team. There he met Mary Stuart McHenry, who was from Dayton, Ohio, and at the time was a freshman at Finch. He never really dated anyone else after that, he says. He graduated in 1952, and they were married in Dayton in November of 1953. After a two-year stint in the Marine Corps, Baker regained the true path by entering the University of Texas Law School. A gesture he made then clearly reflected the sense of tradition and the deference owed to one's father which are characteristic of the Baker clan. On being urged by his father to join Phi Delta Theta, his own fraternity, Baker did so, even though he was married, was the only non-undergraduate, and was seven years older than most of his pledge brothers. He also submitted to the ritual hazing, which is said to have included wearing a dead fish for a week. He was quoted by the writer Taylor Branch, in an article that appeared in the *Texas Monthly* in 1982, as saying, "I did it for my father. He wanted me to do it because he had done it. He believed it was the smart thing to do. If you're going to practice law in Texas, you go to the law school in Austin and make all the contacts you can. They'll pay off later." After graduating, in 1957, Baker joined Andrews Kurth, Houston's second-oldest law firm. If it had not been for an anti-nepotism rule adopted in his father's





"The extra fifteen per cent is for the rain forest."

day, Baker would have joined the city's most notable firm, Baker & Botts, which is not only older than Andrews Kurth but also nearly as old as the city itself, having begun life in 1866 as Gray & Botts; the history of the town and the firm are intertwined. Peter Gray had been a captain in the Texas Army, fought against the Mexican invasion in 1842, and represented Houston in the first state legislature. Colonel Walter Browne Botts, a transplanted Virginian, had a brother who represented John Brown and a kinsman who defended Aaron Burr. The firm's first Baker was a state judge, who joined it in 1872. His son Captain James Baker joined the firm on July 1, 1887, and for a time thereafter the name was Baker, Botts & Baker. Those Bakers and the eldest sons of future Bakers were all named James Addison. Captain Baker's son was called Jim. His famous son James A. Baker III is called Jimmy by family and friends and is referred to by that name in Houston's smart set; the oldest of his four sons is called Jamie, and he is now married, with two daughters, and a member of the Baker & Botts Washington office.

Captain Baker, who died in 1941, at eighty-four, is a family member worth pausing over, partly because he is the one who is said to have been most like his grandson. He, too, was a mover and shaker, having been for nearly forty years Houston's dominant figure, rivalled in authority only by Jesse Jones, an influential figure in Washington during the nineteen-thirties and early forties; Jones put up a procession of buildings in Houston, Fort Worth, and New York, and was also a political kingmaker in Houston. Politics there was sorted out and decisions were made in the Lamar Hotel (Room 8-F, Baker says), which was owned by Jones, and which no longer exists. The Bakers were Southern Puritans and thought of themselves as being above politics. Captain Baker's admonition to young lawyers—"Work hard, study hard, and stay out of politics"—was and remains a basic text in the Baker household. Things weren't quite that simple, however. "Captain Baker ran the firm, and he ran the city," one of Baker & Botts' senior partners says. And Baker says now, "Grandfather was a behind-the-scenes player."

Captain Baker's son Jim, after an

obligatory passage through the Hill School, Princeton; and the University of Texas Law School, earned in the trenches of the First World War the highest distinction he would ever have. He returned to Houston an authentic and highly decorated hero. He, too, was a captain, the difference being that his father's title was an honorific. But James A. Baker, Jr., never acquired the nimbus of authority and prowess that were the natural portion of his father and his son. By family standards, he must be seen as a lesser figure, pinched between two high fliers. As it turned out, his major impact on Baker & Botts was the result of the anti-nepotism rule: it denied the firm the additional prestige, not to mention legal business, that his son's involvement would have generated.

Jim Baker and his wife, the former Bonner Means,

were childless for thirteen years, and then had a son and a daughter in swift succession. As a father, Jim was no less a disciplinarian than Captain Baker had been, and was called the Warden by kids who frequented the house. I asked his son whether it was true, as I had read, that his father would douse him with a pitcher of cold water if he failed to rise promptly in the morning. "Yes," he said. "If I wasn't up by the second call, I'd get the cold water. He took cold baths and showers. Once, he took me on a camping-hunting trip in Wyoming, and I remember that in the early mornings he would break the ice in the creek and jump in. I couldn't relate to that."

The relationship between father and son was very close. The father's example seems to have pushed Baker to become a proficient athlete and a dedicated outdoorsman. He's not much of a reader, and he has little time for museums or the opera or concerts. "His outlet is turkey hunting, not books," Bagby, the pastor, said when I asked whether Baker had another side to his busy life. Baker's closest friends concur. At least three articles on him have

opened with him explaining the finer points of turkey hunting on his ranch, thirteen hundred and sixty-seven acres of scrubland south of San Antonio on which there are a couple of tents and a few wells and turkey feeders but no dwelling. The Rock Pile Ranch, as Baker calls it, is where he used to go when he could to get away from the pressure of his life. The hunting with his father, he says, began with ducks at age six or seven. And his father, a good tennis player, began playing with him when he was ten or eleven. Baker became a state-ranked junior in both singles and doubles. He was the tennis team's captain at the Hill School, and co-captain of the freshman tennis team at Princeton. He then deserted tennis for rugby, he says, because the rugby team had that trip to Bermuda and the tennis team offered nothing as tempting.

Baker's father died in 1973, at the age of eighty. His mother, now ninety-five, is still known to many as Mrs. Baker, Jr., and she lives in the house, at 1216 Bissonnet Avenue, that has been her home for sixty-three years. It is a two-story whitewashed brick building on a large corner lot; the property's most striking feature is a riot of trees and shrubs that all but screen out the midday light. The Museum of Fine Arts is a couple of blocks away, and Rice University is close by. The neighborhood, which is distinctly prosperous, is on the edge of Shadyside, where much of the old money is concentrated. New money came to the River Oaks section, and, according to the novelist Larry McMurtry, "has provided the energy that gave the town its diversity." McMurtry, who arrived in Houston in 1954 and lived there on and off until 1981, says, "I found it wonderful—friendly and porous. It was terrifically energetic and very tolerant of newcomers, in a way no other Texas city is. Houston is at ease with itself and not defensive, like Dallas. It is open to blacks, Hispanics, and Middle Easterners." Politically, Houston still conveys a sense of rugged individualism and laissez-faire; however diverse now, much of it remains very conservative. Can there, for example, be another major city anywhere that has no zoning? "Private property is sacred here," a local political figure explains. "People feel they should be free to do whatever they want with it." Neighborhoods like Shadyside and

River Oaks are protected by private deed restrictions.


Among the city's more insular and provincial institutions was Andrews Kurth, Jimmy Baker's chosen law firm. It had very little contact with people of the sort that lawyers involved in politics are exposed to. Smaller than Baker & Botts or Vinson & Elkins, it was even more discreet and considerably more standoffish about politics. Among the clients about whom the firm had to be especially discreet was the billionaire recluse Howard Hughes; the taxes that the Hughes estate owed to Texas and California later became the subject of a major legal dispute that lasted eight years. According to Evans Attwell, an old friend of Baker's and the managing partner at Vinson & Elkins, Baker

"was seen as the firm's bright young star." Another of his friends, William Lummis, who was a cousin of Howard Hughes and handled that account, says that Baker worked under one of the firm's senior partners, Harry Jones, during the twenty years or so he spent at Andrews Kurth. "Jones was a fantastic lawyer—the best I've seen at bringing parties locked in impossible conflicts together," Lummis says. "A lot of Baker's current skills were honed by that experience."

During most of Baker's time at Andrews Kurth, his life stayed within a predictable pattern. Like most promising young lawyers, he worked hard; but he stayed fit. A plaque that hangs in a hall at the Houston Country Club shows the singles tennis tournament as having been won by James A. Baker III seven times between 1958 and 1966. Another plaque records him and George Bush as having won the doubles in 1966 and 1967. In those days, Baker was often on the lookout for a promising doubles partner, and his friendship with Bush began on the tennis court. Jamie Baker says of his father's game, "His tennis isn't overpowering, but it's steady. He gets everything hit at him back, and eventually the other guy makes an unforced error. That's his M.O.—in many aspects of his life."

When George and Barbara Bush moved to Houston from Midland,

Texas, in 1959, they knew about the Bakers, because Mary Stuart had lived across the street in Dayton, Ohio, from a cousin of Bush's who was called, Baker says, Teensie Bush. Also, Mary Stuart, like George, was a keen Republican, and there weren't many others around. Baker recalls that shortly after he and Mary Stuart moved to Houston, in 1957, she held a precinct meeting. "One person came," he recalled. "I served the refreshments that night. But now the Seventh District, where we



lived, is the largest Republican district in the country." Of that earlier time he says, "I was apolitical—too busy trying to make it in competitive law practice. I voted Democratic then." (Some friends say that he would more often than not ignore Election Day and go hunting.)

"The Republican Party barely existed, and didn't even run candidates for most local offices." Democrats controlled the state. Republicans didn't have a Presidential primary until 1964. Not before then did they put together a facsimile of a statewide Party organization.

In 1963, Bush became the chairman of Harris County, which, they say in Houston, is the country's third-most-populous county, and has more people than twenty-two states. In 1964, he ventured into elective politics by running for the United States Senate against an incumbent Democrat, Ralph Yarborough; it was a bold but rash move. Running for statewide office as a Republican was then quixotic, and, as a political matter, Bush hadn't shed his Connecticut Yankee patina. He nonetheless did well, running ahead of Barry Goldwater on the Party ticket and receiving forty-four per cent of the vote. Bush had sued to redistrict Harris County. The suit was successful, and thus the western part of Houston, by then a Republican redoubt, became the Seventh District. In 1966, Bush ran for Congress from the district and won. Running again in 1968, he was unopposed. Bush had put away the Seventh for his party, and he was gearing up for another run at Ralph Yarborough's Senate seat. He would probably have won if Yarborough, a liberal, had been the candidate, as everyone expected. But destiny—or, more accu-

ately, John Connally—interceded to collapse Bush's hopes. Connally had left the State House in Austin early in 1969, and he, along with other Democrats, could see that in 1970 a well-worn liberal like Yarborough would have a hard time against the more conservative Bush. Connally persuaded Lloyd Bentsen, who was then running a prosperous insurance business, to run against Yarborough in the primary. Bentsen, an authentic conservative, won. Connally's political organization was intact and very good. ("The state had seen few as good," Connally says.) It was put at Bentsen's disposal and "orchestrated his campaign," Connally said. "It wasn't just an endorsement," he added, making sure that I fully understood the import of what had occurred. Bush lost, and took the defeat hard. He did carry Harris County (his and Bentsen's home county)—by sixty per cent to forty, according to Baker, who was making his political debut, as Harris County campaign chairman.

Baker's friends say—and Baker agrees—that if it had not been for Mary Stuart he would not have been drawn into politics. Although she was a very private person and was absorbed in her children, she belonged to a group that was striving to make a two-party state of Texas. She was devoted to the cause of George Bush, and had served in his earlier campaigns as a "Bush belle," wearing a straw boater and passing out leaflets. Baker, after twelve years of practicing law, was ready for something new, some of his friends now say. In 1969, he considered running for Bush's congressional seat, since Bush would be vacating it to run for the Senate. Bush strongly encouraged the idea, but Baker didn't file, because Mary Stuart, who had been suffering from what was first thought to be an arthritic condition, was found to have cancer. Baker didn't tell her why he wasn't filing. She died in February of 1970, at the age of thirty-eight. It was a turning point in Baker's life, which then departed from its predictable course. "He spent a lot of time after her death sorting out what he would do with the rest of his life," William Lummis says. "He was having problems. He was trying to practice law and look after four kids. But he needed time by himself." There was guilt as well. Baker was quoted years later as saying that in fifteen years he

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and Mary Stuart had taken only two planned vacations.

Baker's friends rallied to him, or tried to. These friendships were—and remain—very close, dating in some cases from school days. Some of the people were also on warm terms with George Bush, but the Bush-Baker friendship, according to Al Ebert, one of Baker's two or three closest friends and a partner at Andrews Kurth, "was separate from his friendships with people like Preston Moore and me, who knew and liked Bush but were not close to him." George and Barbara Bush perhaps stayed closer to Baker than any of the others did, and helped to the extent that he could be helped. (Mary Stuart's portrait hangs in the Bush house in Kennebunkport, Maine.) A friendship that began on the tennis court was sealed by what some say was a "bonding" that resulted. Bush persuaded Baker to take the job of county chairman in his campaign that year because it would be something different and so might relieve his pain.

Three different members of Baker's circle in Houston told me that "old money is quiet money and sticks to-

gether," as one of them put it. "Being a widower in this closed society was tough," says another, a lifelong friend. "He had four boys under the age of sixteen, and their playmates were offspring of his old friends. All those memories. They all played tennis together. He had to break out of his environment."

As hard as things may have been for Baker, his four sons—Jamie, Mike, John, and Doug—seem to have had an even more difficult time. The law being a jealous mistress and Baker an unregenerate workaholic, their mother had been the center of their lives. "It was the only time when I have felt at a loss as to the future," Baker says now. "I did maintain my work habits, and I couldn't satisfy the emotional needs of the boys. I couldn't be both mother and father to them. We had a succession of housekeepers—not a happy experience. This was 1970, and a tough time to be raising kids." Two of the boys eventually developed drug problems that required in-patient hospital treatment, according to an article by Marjorie Williams in the *Washington Post* magazine. And one of them, she

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reported, was arrested in 1982 for selling marijuana to an undercover police officer. "He was fined \$2000 and entered a drug-treatment program a short time later," she wrote.

Baker remarried in 1973. His wife, Susan Garrett Winston, was the daughter of a rich and colorful rancher, Whispering Jack Garrett. She was divorced from an old friend of Baker's, James (Jimbo) Winston, who had been an alcoholic and died of pancreatitis. Susan Winston had been among Mary Stuart's closest friends, and, according to Al Ebert, "was at her side constantly in the last days." She had three children of her own. The marriage, I had been told, came as a shock to Baker's sons, and I asked Jamie about that. "It would depend on who it was you asked," he said, adding that he had more or less expected it but his brothers might have been surprised. "About two weeks before the wedding, Dad and I were talking in the kitchen and he was about to go out with Susan somewhere," he recalled. "I said, 'Are you going to marry her?' And he said, 'Well, I don't know. What do you think I should do?' I said, 'I think

you should do what you want to do.' That was one of the few times that he and I ever communicated directly. Now we are getting better at it. A big reason was me. After Mom died, I dealt with grief by walling it off."

Susan and her three children created a "double whammy" when they moved into the Baker ménage, according to one of the Baker lot. John Baker, who had been nine when his mother died, was quoted by Marjorie Williams as saying, "For me, he was never home, and so that was very difficult." As for the marriage, he added, "I was just bound and determined to make their life miserable, because I didn't care about anything else." He was consciously trying to break up the marriage. Susan had to cope with seven children, each of whom had experienced the loss of a parent and associated difficulties. I asked her what all that had been like.

"It was explosive—wild," she said. "We were married in August, and enrolled three kids in the seventh grade in September. My oldest daughter was six months younger than Jimmy's youngest. There were only three bedrooms at first, and they took turns sleeping on stair landings in sleeping bags. We expanded the house as fast as we could."

Susan Baker is eight years younger than her husband, and, like him, she radiates a sense of well-being and serenity, although reminders of past intrusions on their life together—notably Baker's high-pressure years in the White House—suggest that she hasn't altogether got over them, and has decidedly mixed feelings about life near the top of the tree. She smiles easily, and is easy to talk to. Among the first things one hears about Susan Baker is the intensity of her religious faith and how it sustained her in the early days of her second marriage. "If I hadn't known about prayer and the word of God, I don't know what would have happened," she says. She was raised a Catholic, but is a member of a non-denominational Bible-study group that is closely identified with Joanne Kemp, the wife of Jack Kemp, who is Bush's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. "Faith is a way of life, not just a Sunday-go-to-meeting kind of thing," she says. She doesn't feel constrained to be a member of any particular church. Susan Baker is an ally of

Tipper Gore, the wife of Senator Albert Gore, Jr., in the campaign to regulate "porn rock."

"All the kids are O.K. now and are doing something," Preston Moore says of the Baker children. The Bakers concur; the same, they add, is true of Susan's three. And Baker's friends say that his second marriage is as strong as the first. Susan, they feel, is less private than Mary Stuart, but, besides being close friends, the two women had in common an interest in politics, and Susan, too, had been a Bush belle. (Another former Bush belle from old Houston is Daphne Murray, who is the director of the Institute of Museum Services.) "I've been politicking since I was little," Susan says. "My parents helped organize the Republican Party in Brazoria County. Mary Stuart and I gave our husbands hell because they were thinking Republican and still voting Democratic."

Susan Baker didn't mind coming to Washington the first time, in 1975. By then, only two of the seven children had to be uprooted (the rest were away at school or college), and Baker's job at the Commerce Department wasn't demanding enough to intrude on their lives—yet he liked it. Most people, Baker included, believe that he was invited into the Ford Administration because George Bush, while serving as United States representative to the People's Republic of China, in the mid-seventies, had urged Rogers Morton, who visited Beijing, to find a job for him. Bush and various other G.O.P. notables felt that fresh talent was needed in Washington if their party was to revive nationally in the post-Watergate period. Morton was the Secretary of Commerce, a job he was soon to leave to take over as chairman of the Ford election campaign. Baker can't be sure that Bush did take such an initiative, because Bush, for

whatever reason, has never admitted doing so. Baker's stint at Commerce was short—nine months—but for three months of that time he was Acting Secretary. He was keeping the chair warm for Elliot Richardson, who was then serving as Ambassador to the Court of St. James's.

In the spring of 1976, Baker travelled to Houston on Air Force One with Gerald Ford, who asked him during the trip to leave Commerce and come to work on the campaign as chief delegate hunter. Ford's campaign was struggling, and his chief delegate hunter had just been killed in a car crash. The legend of Jimmy Baker, political wizard, begins right there. From the first day, he demonstrated instincts—how to deal with reporters, how to generate the appearance of winning—that cannot be taught. The chief delegate hunter isn't usually a potent or significant figure. A Presidential candidate's momentum normally develops after the early primaries, and delegates can be scooped up then. But 1976 was different. The struggle between Ford and Reagan probably turned on thirty to sixty delegates, so each delegate was important. John Sears, Reagan's campaign manager and a highly skilled professional, was working at this job, too. He and Baker would both issue announcements whenever one or two delegates fell in the direction of their candidate. Baker added a new wrinkle: he would give reporters the phone number of a newly bagged delegate, so they could verify his information. Sears didn't do that—it wasn't customary—and the distinction drawn by the press served Baker well: he acquired instant credibility. Nor did it harm his cause to be able to arrange breakfast meetings at the White House for undecided delegates. (Some of them appeared to reporters to be breakfasting there constantly.) Baker immediately became known as accessible and easy to deal with. "He was very well organized, and that was what the Ford campaign needed," Sears recalls. "You could see the difference after he arrived. The Reagan people thought they'd been doing well—playing the part of a less potent force than a sitting President but one that was more adroit politically and less prone to error. Baker straightened out that campaign."

After the 1976 Republican Convention, in Kansas City, Ford and his staff



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met in Vail, Colorado; the question of who would manage his campaign had to be settled, because Rogers Morton was then terminally ill. It was decided to ask Baker, who by then was back in Houston, to take the job. The consensus is that he did it remarkably well, almost snatching victory from Jimmy Carter, who had started with a big lead and had seemed certain to prevail over the bruised and tempest-tossed Republicans.

One who doesn't concur is John Connally, though he is a Baker admirer. "They lost the campaign, and they didn't have to," he says. Sears, for his part, feels that Baker did a first-class job, but says that as campaign manager "he seemed to lack imagination and an instinct for major moves," and adds, "He wasn't a risk taker, which sometimes you have to be." The campaign ended with money left over instead of the usual deficit, and there was some grumbling that Ford might have won if Baker had spent a little more in a couple of key states, like Ohio and Pennsylvania.

The failed campaign aroused in George Bush, who had badly wanted to run as Ford's Vice-Presidential candidate, a resolve to run for President himself, and to do so with the help of his friend and protégé Jimmy Baker. Baker himself was left with a deep and lasting thirst for more elective politics: his interest in helping Bush was exceeded by a fancy to try his own chances. "I had practiced law for twenty years, and, coming off the experience of running a Presidential campaign, I'd been bitten by the political bug," he says. A number of Texas Republicans were looking for one of their own to emerge from the state's biggest city, Houston, and become a major force in state politics. They fed Baker's desire to run. Running for governor against Dolph Briscoe was briefly considered. Baker decided that Briscoe, a conservative, couldn't be beaten, and he decided to run instead for attorney general, if only because the presumed opponent would be Price Daniel, Jr., a liberal.

Party primaries often scuttle the best-laid plans, and they did so in Texas in 1978. The popular Briscoe managed to lose the Democratic primary to the state attorney general, John Hill. And, much to Baker's disgust, Price Daniel refused to spend on the primary any of the funds he had

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earmarked for television ads; he was saving them for the general election. But he was not to contest that, because he, too, was upset in the primary—by Mark White, a conservative, who later went on to become governor.

Baker got forty-four per cent of the vote—a better-than-respectable showing. Since Reconstruction only two Republican candidates had done as well in a “down ballot” Texas race—that is, any state office below the level of governor or United States senator. Mark White knew that he had been in a fight. “By the third debate, I sensed that this guy had got himself tuned in,” he says. “And I told my staff, ‘Listen, we’ve got this won unless we find a way of losing it.’ I wasn’t interested in doing a lot more debating.”

Opinion divides on how Baker reacted to his defeat. Some say he took it in stride; he and Susan were seen on the following day playing tennis in T-shirts that said “Mark White for Attorney General.” Yet, even though the outcome was never in serious doubt, the competitor in Baker is believed by some of his friends to have taken it badly. “I think it took him a long time to get over the anguish of having run for office and lost,” Al Ebert was quoted as saying.

Agreement was nearly unanimous on one point: Baker had been uncomfortable with the retail end of politics. “He is an unbelievably fierce competitor,” says Evans Attwell, who, like Bush, had won a doubles championship with Baker. “In that campaign, he had beautifully done-up press kits. Everything was organized to the nines, because he is always so remarkably well prepared. He did very well in the cities, thanks mainly to his superior organization. But he was uncomfortable in rural settings. He doesn’t like small talk, and is not very good at it.”

“He didn’t relish the essential ingredients in Texas politics—barbecues and small functions,” Al Ebert says.

“It’s hard for me to imagine my dad putting on a hat with a pig snout and hugging old ladies and kissing babies,” Jamie Baker says.

Among those who knew, only Susan Baker said that Baker was comfortable campaigning for himself. “He enjoyed it,” she told me, “even if he wasn’t a

typical good-old-boy pol—except for the money-raising. ‘I hate having to ask people to give me money,’ he’d say.”


Everyone agrees that George Bush was an anxious offstage presence. He was gearing up for his run for the roses, and he quite clearly wanted Baker at his side, not in Austin. Only fourteen months separated the end of Baker’s ill-advised campaign from the first 1980 Presidential event, the Iowa caucus. “I had talked to George Bush about my running,” Baker recalls. “He said that it would be uphill and that

a down-ballot race wouldn’t attract much attention anyway.” He and Bush had gone to California earlier in 1978 to inform Reagan that Bush intended to run for President in 1980—recognizing, Bush said, that Rea-

gan, too, was running and would be the front-runner. “This was a very classy gesture,” says Mike Deaver, who was there, and who then accompanied Reagan when he came to Texas in 1978 to campaign for Baker. Deaver, like Stuart K. Spencer, Reagan’s closest political adviser, was strongly impressed by Baker, and had spoken to him even before Bush’s visit about joining the Reagan camp. Deaver recalls Baker’s saying, “I’ll do whatever George wants me to do.”

Before running for office himself, Baker had begun Bush’s long march by organizing a political-action committee for him. I asked Baker whether people in Houston and elsewhere in Texas took Bush seriously as an opponent of John Connally, who was also running in the Republican primaries. “Everyone laughed at us,” he replied. “They said Connally would clean our clocks. ‘How can you do this?’ they asked.”

Of the moves that Baker made as campaign manager in 1980, two stand out. The first concerned Bush’s derisive characterization of the so-called Reaganomics as “voodoo economics.” The phrase was written into a Bush speech by his press secretary, Peter Teeley. Upon hearing it, Baker vetoed further use of the term. He didn’t disagree, but he had for some time been focussing on the Vice-Presidency, and didn’t want to close off that possibility by offending the Reagan camp. Similar reasoning may have influenced Baker’s second, and far more significant, move.



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By May of 1980, Reagan had clearly won the nomination, but Bush, although he was beaten, wouldn’t give up. Baker and Bush’s other advisers wanted him to announce his withdrawal from the remaining primaries, including California’s, that he had planned to contest. Not withdrawing, they argued, could split the Party and harm Bush’s prospects. Taylor Branch, in his article in the *Texas Monthly* in 1982, cited one of Bush’s campaign aides as saying, “Jimmy made the decision to knock George out of the campaign without telling him. . . . It had to be done. Jimmy Baker had to cut his best friend off at the knees, and he did it.” Baker denies having made any such high-handed move. “What happened is this,” he says. “We were short of money. I was running a decoy operation in California to make the Reagan people think we would make the effort there. I sent two people out there. After a couple of weeks, the press began to smell a rat, and when they asked what we really had going out there I told the truth. ‘We have nothing going out there,’ I said. It was already obvious to the press that we weren’t going to contest California. We had no resources. The press reported this as signalling the end of the road for George Bush, and that did come as a surprise to him. He quite properly anguished over what to do. He felt obligated to contest Ohio and New Jersey, where people had gone out on a limb for him.”

Bush was campaigning in New Jersey when the news of Baker’s press conference reached him. He was reported to have been furious, and, it was said, his family had been, too. Baker justified his action, according to Branch, by noting that if Bush had stayed in the race and entered Reagan’s home state he would not have been forgiven and become Vice-President. I asked Mike Deaver whether Reagan would have kept Bush off the ticket if he had continued. “Nancy would have been ticked off if he had gone into California,” Deaver said. “He already had voodoo economics to live down.”

Asked to assess the probable effect of this episode on the Bush-Baker relationship, John Sears said, “It had to jar it. Candidates don’t like it when the campaign manager is proved right and they are wrong. But these kinds of tensions are normal, even when things are going well. It is a totally different

kind of relationship from any other. You get to know people better than you ever wanted to. You see the weaknesses much more clearly than friends normally see one another's weaknesses. You acquire knowledge of the other person that friendships don't require. It's like being married except there was never any love."

Bush and Baker had been at cross-purposes for over a year: one was striving to become the President, the other to secure the second spot on the ticket for him; Baker knew that the top spot wasn't attainable, and that capturing second place could be difficult. "We went to the Convention without the foggiest notion of who the V.P. would be," Deaver says. At about ten o'clock on the night of the nomination, Deaver called Henry Kissinger, who seemed to be Ford's negotiator, and said that Reagan wanted to know whether Ford would join the ticket. Ford thereupon went to see Reagan and told him the answer was no. Reagan, without hesitating, picked up the phone and called Bush. "No one prompted him," Deaver says. "In twenty years, this was one of two or three times I saw him do something like that without prompting or coaching."

There was no love lost between Bush and Reagan, but, as Baker says, "Bush was the only other one at the Convention with delegates and an independent following." As for Baker, he found himself being invited by Stu Spencer to help out in the campaign—on the Reagan plane, not Bush's—and he accepted. "Early in September," Bob Strauss recalls, "Baker came by my apartment for a drink and said, 'Bob, one thing I want you to understand. I haven't been with the Reagan people long. I know how much authority I don't have. You may be able to commit the President, but I'm only an agent.' But by mid-October he was a dominant part of the process. And that, in my judgment, is how the Reagan campaign evolved. As chairman of the Carter campaign, I wasn't happy that he had moved up." On the issue of the number and format of the Carter-Reagan debates, it was Jim Baker whom Strauss encountered on the other side of the negotiating table. Baker says that fitting into the Reagan campaign wasn't especially difficult. Edwin Meese III, a major Reagan adviser, didn't want him there, but by then Baker had more political experience

than anyone in the Reagan group except Stu Spencer, and was the only person around who had run a Presidential campaign. Baker had been parachuted into an enemy camp, and he was there to stay.

ED MEESE had been chief of staff when Reagan was governor, and he expected to have the same role in Washington. Just before the campaign ended, Mike Deaver took Stu Spencer aside and observed that someone would have to run the government, and asked if Jim Baker would be interested. Spencer thought that Baker would be. Deaver then told Reagan that even though he, Reagan, was superstitious, he would nonetheless have to start thinking about what would happen after the election, and who the chief of staff would be. Deaver noted Meese's interest, but added that a few of the other Reagan people, including him, thought the job should go to someone with Washington experience. Reagan didn't reply, and Deaver cited Baker as an example of what he had in mind. Reagan asked, as he invariably did when aides proposed someone for a big job, "Do you think he'd do it?" Deaver said yes. Deaver had taken the essential precaution of clearing his idea with Nancy Reagan, and she talked with her husband about it. "Deaver's relationship with Nancy Reagan was very useful to Baker," a former Baker aide says. "She was very good about identifying the people who could help her husband, and Baker handled her very skillfully."

Meese heard the bad news over lunch with Reagan and Deaver the day after the election. He wouldn't be chief of staff but would be Reagan's counselor—an idea that Deaver had planted with Reagan. Reagan told Meese that he didn't want him running day-to-day operations, because he needed his judgment and counsel. Meese never trusted Deaver again, Deaver says.

The following day, Baker met with Reagan and Meese at the Century Plaza Hotel, in Los Angeles, and produced a piece of paper that split the functions of the chief of staff and the counsellor into two columns. He was linking his acceptance of the job to a clear and binding definition of his and Meese's roles. The document, which both signed, gave Meese more prestige, but Baker, wiser in the ways of power, would have more of that. Meese, he

agreed, would have Cabinet rank and the right to coordinate and supervise the operations of the N.S.C. staff and the Domestic Policy staff. But Baker reserved to himself control of the President's schedule and the flow of paper in and out of the Oval Office—a power that he knew would allow him to dominate White House operations. A key intangible was Baker's unexcelled gift for working the press. He would envelop White House reporters in what one of them later described as "a conspiracy of candor." His enemies—Meese and other Reaganauts—seethed over Baker's alleged penchant for leaking stories that suited his purposes.

Some high achievers are reluctant to let anyone flourish in their shade, and so do not recruit the best people. Baker is a very conspicuous exception. He understands better than most that high performance and a high-quality staff have a one-to-one relationship. Thus, even though he had to live down being an outsider, he recruited non-Reaganauts for key staff jobs. Foremost among them was Richard G. Darman, who is currently the director of the Office of Management and Budget; he had worked with Baker at the Commerce Department. Darman would have flunked any litmus test administered by the Meese faction. He is a product of Harvard College and its faculty, and had served as a senior aide to Elliot Richardson, an unflawed model of traditional Northeast Republicanism, in each of Richardson's numerous Cabinet jobs. Darman, too, had the patina of an Eastern liberal. That aside, he and Baker complemented each other perfectly. Whereas Darman was undiplomatic, impatient, and even abrasive, Baker was endlessly patient and tactful. More important, Darman, besides being a fellow-workaholic, was a first-class heavy-duty thinker, with an obsessive interest in problem solving; he excelled at political strategy, just as Baker excelled at political tactics. Baker had unerring instincts, Darman an uncanny feel for putting together the bureaucratic tools to transmute the Baker instincts into policy. Together, Baker and Darman ran rings around the others. As the press continued to report on them, the hard right grumbled about each, but it was unable to clip the wings of a partnership that soared into legend within the Beltway.

"That piece of paper"—the Baker-

Meese compact—"had to be produced from time to time just to keep Meese at bay," Deaver says. "It was awful—just awful—toward the end." Meese, the ideologue, was the only member of the troika—Baker, Deaver, and himself—who had a serious interest in the substance of policy. But he was far too disorganized to push the ball down the field very far. Baker says very little about his time in the White House. An old Houston friend recalls asking him if he would ever consider writing about it and Baker's saying, "No, but what I remember best is what they didn't do—all the crazy things."

I asked Baker whether, being an outsider and an ally of Bush, he had been able to keep his friend the Vice-President in the loop.

"I had to establish my loyalty to President Reagan, and I did that," he replied guardedly. (Affable but guarded is the Baker style.) "I was able to do that without affecting my relationship with George Bush. Our offices were next to each other, and I would often drop in." Actually, keeping Bush in the loop wasn't difficult, since Reagan was a remarkably hands-off chief executive. A copy of everything prepared for him was made for Bush—a situation that can hardly be compared with that of the Bush White House, from which a torrent of notes and phone calls to world figures and people around the country routinely goes forth. Keeping Vice-President Quayle in the loop just wouldn't be possible.

With Baker gone from the White House in Reagan's second term, Bush had a thinner time. "When Jimmy was here, it was different," he would tell his staff. Bush never felt at ease with Howard Baker when he was brought in to replace Donald Regan, Baker's successor as chief of staff, and take charge of a White House operation that seemed on the verge of capsizing. Bush also felt that the White House was keeping its distance from him in the second term because Senator Robert Dole impressed some as the stronger contender for the next Presidential nomination.

Jimmy Baker did fail—dramatically, at that—when he tried, with Deaver's help (and doubtless Nancy Reagan's as well), to stage a palace coup that would have put him and Darman in charge of the N.S.C. staff; Deaver would have replaced Baker as chief of staff (although Baker would

have retained some responsibility for operations generally). Baker was keen to acquire experience in national-security matters; the White House's domestic affairs were running smoothly, but the decision-making process for foreign policy was wholly chaotic. Baker and Darman were determined to fix it and leave their imprint. Opportunity arrived in October of 1983, when William Clark, the national-security adviser and a chief Reagan crony, announced that he was moving on to be Interior Secretary. Darman then drafted an announcement of the Baker-Deaver plan which Reagan could give to the press. But first Reagan had to meet with and tell the other key players. Baker then made perhaps the greatest error of his career: he decided not to attend this meeting. A rump group composed of Meese, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, the C.I.A. director, William Casey, and Clark himself took Reagan aside to argue against the Baker plan. They won. Robert McFarlane became the N.S.C. adviser, and Baker stayed where he was. But the tensions let loose by this affair stayed on, too, and helped persuade Baker to pass up another stint in the Reagan White House. "Baker lost a lot of heart after that episode," Deaver says. "He never felt that Reagan really trusted him."


In politics, it's best to leave a job before being forced to go. Politicians constantly evaluate their positions—where they are and where they want to be. Setting a brisk pace is one way to keep one's enemies off balance, and Baker had accumulated several enemies on his party's far right. Moreover, he was tired. He had held Washington's most demanding job longer than anyone else, with the exceptions of Sherman Adams, who served with Dwight Eisenhower and was brought down by scandal, and H. R. Haldeman, a casualty of Watergate. It seems that for a time he wanted to be baseball commis-


sioner. Deaver recalls that Peter Ueberroth, a friend of his from college days at San Jose State (and the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Committee chairman), phoned one day early in 1984 to say that Baker was trying to have himself made baseball commissioner and would fail, because Ueberroth himself would be named to that job. Ueberroth warned that a news story would embarrass Baker and the White House. Deaver recalls saying, "It's impossible. We have no secrets." Deaver says that he then confronted Baker, who said, "He isn't going to get it, and I'm not, either." (Ueberroth was named baseball commissioner, several weeks later.)

What Baker did arrange was a simple job swap with Donald Regan. He had wanted State or Treasury, and the first was not available. In his book, "For the Record," Regan claims credit for the idea of swapping jobs, although some Baker watchers feel that Baker may have subtly planted an idea that Regan came to regard as his own. Baker demurs. "It was Regan's idea," he states flatly. "He said, 'I'm going to make you an offer you can't refuse.'"

Deaver recalls that Regan came to his house and said, "You are the logical guy. The President wants you. I'll drop the idea if you are interested." Deaver wasn't, and Baker, he says, then asked him to take up the idea with Reagan. After first covering the Nancy Reagan base, Deaver approached Reagan, who said he wanted to think about it. "He may have wanted to discuss it with Nancy," Deaver says. The next day, Reagan spoke with Regan and then told Deaver that the job swap was approved. Baker had managed to separate himself from an increasingly poisonous environment and would have a show of his own to run. Regan had separated himself from an office that gave him a good deal less power and influence than he had expected, and would move into the office where, as he had discovered, the real power was centered. The loser in the exchange was Ronald Reagan, not to mention the national interest.

"TRY a metaphor—turkey hunting—if you want to understand Baker," says the most astute Baker watcher I know. "He combines caution, patience, and discipline in extraordinary measure, and also has an unbelievable instinct for taking action





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at just the right moment. Turkey hunting demands fantastic patience, discipline, and this rare instinct for knowing exactly when to act." A lot of hardship is also involved. At Rock Pile Ranch, Baker rouses his guests at about 4:30 A.M., and everyone must then attack the surrounding area with large sticks so as to clear away any rattlesnakes and scorpions that may be lurking about; all this is happening before sunrise. One wears camouflage garb and is covered from head to toe for protection against ticks and occasional columns of red ants. Because the turkey's sight and hearing are astonishingly acute, the hunters must neither move nor speak. Any sound or movement spooks the birds, and they may not reappear for days. As the sun rises, it becomes very hot very quickly. Baker, I'm told, may sit there immobile and silent until as late as 4:30 P.M. But when the turkeys appear he knows just when to fire or to signal a guest to fire. What some guests remember as a truly hellish experience is Baker's passion, and in South Texas he is widely known for his prowess in felling the furtive turkey.

At Treasury, the wary Baker avoided mixing into the troubled affairs of the Regan-run White House, and stayed close to his job. There he reversed some of his predecessor's entrenched policies within a short time. First, and most important, he and Darman, who came with him as Deputy Secretary, challenged the notion that the foreign-exchange market is always right, and that wherever it puts the dollar in relation to other currencies must be the right place. Since the beginning of Reagan's first term, the dollar had been allowed to rise by as much as seventy-three per cent, even though its inflated value was a drag on economic growth—especially on exports. Protectionist tendencies were aroused. At the Plaza Hotel in New York in September of 1985, the United States and Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan—the major hard-currency nations—met and agreed to act together so that exchange rates would from then on more closely reflect "fundamental" market forces. The initiative for the meeting was Baker's. He and the other finance ministers, along with the central-bank governors,

agreed on a program for lowering the value of the dollar and raising the value of the other currencies. (Italy and Canada later joined the effort.) The second step involved coordinating economic policy within the same countries. Before Baker and Darman arrived, Regan and his people had been saying to them, in effect, "Just follow our example and you will be O.K." The collegial approach was quickly seen to make more sense.

Baker's role in much the most dramatic happening on his watch—tax reform—is far from clear-cut. Regan had proposed a far-reaching reform of the tax code—one that even liberal reformers applauded—which was known as Treasury I. Baker saw it as strewn with traps politically, hence as undesirable. He was not about to fall on his sword for tax reform, however rational and desirable, that would anguish—indeed, enrage—large sectors of the business community. But Ronald Reagan, apparently without understanding the politically lethal nature of Treasury I, got himself committed to tax reform in his 1985 State of the Union message. Having praised Trea-



sure I as an "excellent reform plan" in his address, he expressed doubt on the following day about whether he could support the sweeping changes embodied in it. Still, he was tilting toward reform of some kind. That much was clear.

Darman had already begun to reconsider Treasury I, seeing in it strong political plusses as well as minuses. "I sometimes wish I had thought of it myself," he was later quoted as saying. Although Baker had got himself behind the power curve, he caught up fast. He and Darman launched secret negotiations with the key players in Congress. The result was the tax-revision act of 1986. Baker drew a lot of credit for his role in working it out with his interlocutors on Capitol Hill, most of whom actually cared about tax reform and were taking political risks. He shared none of their intellectual involvement with or commitment to the enterprise; nor was he taking risks. He was merely doing a job, and, as usual, he did it well. Into the bargain, he took care of a constituency—the oil and natural-gas drillers—with which he and Bush had had a lot of experience. Regan's Treasury I would have forced this industry to share the pain with other sectors by peeling back its large tax break. Baker deflected pressure in that direction: his plan imposed a small, all but cosmetic alteration in the tax allowance for the oil and natural-gas people.

Baker's time at the Treasury was not unmarked by controversy. He rarely puts a foot wrong, especially in public, but he did so over the weekend that preceded Black Monday, October 19, 1987—the day of the stock market's historic plunge. In two television interviews—one Saturday, one Sunday—he hinted that unless West Germany stopped squeezing America with unnecessarily high interest rates the Administration would abandon the multinational accord and allow the dollar to fall. His words aroused fears of a rise in American interest rates, and thereby contributed to what happened on Black Monday, according to several financial analysts and economists. Other experts felt that the market would have taken its bath with or without the Baker warning.


The ripple effect of the crash com-

plicated what was already a tough question for Baker: whether to take charge of George Bush's headless Presidential campaign, and, if so, when. "Black Monday meant that Baker had to stay on the job for at least six months," a close associate says. "His glitch made it important for him to be there and go from strength to strength." Add to that Baker's fondness for the job, a serious doubt about his friend's prospects as a Presidential candidate, and, perhaps most important, a distaste he had developed for campaigns—above all, primary campaigns. A return to those squalid affairs would amount to a giant step down from the political height that Baker had reached in the nineteen-eighties. Despite his political gift, he has a strong aversion to being thought of as a politician. There was



his grandfather's admonition about politics, and the certainty that his father would have deplored the descent from a highly responsible Cabinet post back into raw politics. (One wonders whether Baker ever paused to reflect on what his father and grandfather would have said about the Bush campaign against Dukakis.) "I would have preferred to help my pal by keeping the economy on track rather than by reacquiring the patina of the pol," Baker says now. "But George Bush knew from Day One that I'd be available in the general election. 'I'll be there if you want me,' I said."

Bush's key people admired Baker and hoped that he would take command. "My fear was that he'd join too late—that his presence would be only symbolic," recalls one former aide, who, like some others, suspected a hidden agenda; Baker, they felt, might be reasoning that if Bush didn't make it and Michael Dukakis did, the path to the G.O.P. nomination in 1992 wouldn't be blocked by a sitting Republican President. A canvass of Party professionals who know Baker and Bush throws doubt on the hidden-agenda theory. Baker's own words probably capture his position well, although he does seem to have delayed the inevitable as long as possible. He left the Treasury on August 5th and took over as campaign manager little more than a week before the Convention, in New Orleans. A decision-



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maker had arrived. Until then, a committee of six people—equals—had been in charge. The crucial decision, of course, was the choice for Vice-President. Two of the six—Robert Teeter and Roger Ailes—were pushing Dan Quayle, who was a name on the short short list. Ailes had handled the media and Teeter the polling when Quayle ran for reelection to the Senate in 1986. They knew that Quayle would play well to the Party's right wing; his youth might also give the ticket a big "generational bump." Bush was listening to everyone, including Baker, and saying nothing. It was assumed—wrongly, it turned out—that Baker would have a lot to say about the choice.

The relationship between a Presidential candidate and his manager tests both people. "If you begin as close friends, it is even more difficult," John Sears says. "The candidate can't be objective, and the campaign manager doesn't want him trying to be, because he may become less responsive to advice. Candidates start thinking, and it messes up their heads. A candidate shouldn't think." Or, as David Keene,

another Republican campaign adviser, has noted, "handlers and consultants and managers always tend to view the candidate as a necessary pain in the ass."

Bush didn't share his thinking about the Vice-Presidential choice with Baker, or with his own family, either. On the plane to New Orleans, Baker, Ailes, Fuller, and Teeter held a lottery on the question, with each tossing in a name. By then, most of them thought that either Robert Dole or Jack Kemp would be picked. No one guessed right, although Ailes, Fuller, and Teeter in varying degrees preferred Quayle. "I was told when we hit the ground in New Orleans," Baker says. "He told me about fifteen minutes before telling the others."

Baker, I'm told, felt that at one point Quayle had been removed from consideration. Some of those close to Baker thought that Dole was his choice. Baker has never disclosed to anyone—not even his wife—what his own recommendation was. He and his staff reacted angrily, according to a senior Bush aide. "Although the staff members were part of the Bush camp, their

first loyalty was to Baker, and there was a lot of irritation," the aide says. "Baker didn't pick this guy, but we have to clean up the mess' is what they were saying." Some of this reaction quickly found its way into print, and a recent book by *Newsweek's* special election teams says, "Baker didn't need to be told they had a problem. He had been appalled by Quayle's performance [after the announcement] and was angry at himself and his boss, associates said, for the situation he found himself in, sweeping up a mess he had done his best to prevent. Jimmy was *used* to his friend doing stupid things, one chum who saw him soon after the convention said, but not on so epic a scale; he was, in this account, tired, frustrated, aggravated, disgusted with the slipshod screening process and furious with the vice president, who had wrought it." Bush had blown his first big-league decision, and only Quayle was there to take the heat with him.

As a candidate himself in 1978, Baker ran an exemplary campaign. And the earlier campaigns he had managed for others were high-road affairs. Yet he did nothing in the fall of



1988 to moderate the smarmy attack-dog style of the campaign against Dukakis. Obscured by the public squalor were Baker's cunning and experience. In the negotiations over the number and the timing of the debates between the candidates, for example, he routed Paul Brontas, Dukakis's friend and Harvard Law School classmate. Susan Estrich, the other side's campaign manager, had tried to offset the inexperience of Brontas by pairing him with Richard Moe, a Washington lawyer who had taken part in past debate negotiations. But Moe never got into the room. Baker called Brontas and objected to Moe on the ground of a conflict of interest; Moe, he said, was vice-chairman of the Commission on Presidential Debates, and it wasn't then clear whether this group or the League of Women Voters would sponsor the debates. That was a transparent ploy; there was no conflict. Baker just didn't want to negotiate with someone who had been over this ground (once with him, actually, in 1980) if he could deal with a novice instead. Baker hadn't really expected Brontas to bump Moe. But Brontas did, and Bob Strauss later told Moe that Baker had had a good laugh over it.

Baker's role in the new Administration was a matter of great interest not just to him but to a handful of others who would be joining Bush, and to some who would be giving him advice from the outside. Would Baker be only the Secretary of State—nothing more? Wouldn't Bush want to exploit Baker's across-the-board competence and experience? A page-one story in the *Times* less than a week after the election suggested that Baker's reach would extend into "many aspects of domestic and economic policy as well as foreign affairs." Unnamed aides of Bush were cited as sources. The *Times* suggested, further, that Baker's instrument for enhancing his authority might be Darman. Farther down in the story, Edward Rollins, a prominent Republican operative, was quoted as saying that "for all practical purposes, Jim Baker will be deputy President." Two days later, another story in the *Times* reported tension over whether Bush would make John Sununu or Craig Fuller his chief of staff, Fuller having held that job while Bush was Vice-President. Bush was said to be leaning toward John Sununu. The story also


talked about a White House troika composed of Fuller, Sununu, and Teeter.

Various Baker loyalists and friends suggested that Baker had been set up. Stories like that, they said, could only anger the President and complicate life for Baker, who in any case would have his hands full as Secretary of State. It's true that Bush was angered by the stories. (He concealed his feelings well.) However, Baker had not been set up; the sources for the stories were not his enemies. On the contrary. Baker was unhappy about the prospect of Sununu's becoming chief of staff, for Sununu would surely be a strong and competitive player. Baker had wanted to see Fuller, an ally, in that role. As for the reference to Darman, the plan, it seems, had been for Baker to manage foreign policy and Darman domestic policy; Fuller would have functioned as their surrogate. That was in a way reminiscent of the coup de main that Baker, Deaver, and Darman nearly achieved in the Reagan White House in October of 1983. And the two stories in the *Times*, which turned up nowhere else, may have reminded Bush that his friend of thirty years had an agenda that was far from simple.

ALTHOUGH Baker had little direct experience with foreign policy when he arrived in the Secretary of State's cherry-paneled seventh-floor office overlooking the Lincoln Memorial, he did intend to isolate his department's principal business from the busy hands of its career professionals. He arrived with four aides, each of whom had worked for him in other places. The four became an inner circle; they alone had direct access to Baker and were familiar with most of what went on. Baker had operated in this way at Treasury—a place where four compe-

tent people can shape what is reported about its rather specialized business. Treasury story rarely finds its way page one, and even more rarely to spot on the evening network news. Few congressional bodies follow Treasury's affairs closely. State is a different place. It seethes with new much of which is shared with or spilled into other agencies and, in any case, cannot be contained or managed on these days, screened from tight congressional scrutiny. "Baker doesn't understand that you can't keep foreign policy off page one when you want to," the chairman of a major congressional committee told me last spring.

Direct responsibility for the press was vested in Margaret Tutwiler, who for many years has been a combination of aide and alter ego for Baker. Some Republican professionals feel that her political antennae are as sensitive as Baker's, and that this sensitivity explains the relationship. (She and Darman are probably his only real friends in Washington. While he is on warm terms with a few others, like Bob Strauss, he and they aren't actual friends but are useful to each other. Tutwiler, who is thirty-nine, is a former debutante from a suburb of Birmingham, Alabama. She got to know Baker during the Ford campaign, and worked closely with him in the White House and then at Treasury, where she was Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and also the spokeswoman. She has the same job at State. Reporters who cover the Department say she does not want the spokeswoman role but Baker insisted that she take it. He wanted someone in that job who sees the domestic political aspects of a issue exactly as he does, and is a reflection of him in fielding questions from the press. Reporters and career diplomats alike say that Tutwiler is very capable but is miscast as spokeswoman. Like Baker, she came to State with little knowledge of foreign policy, but her transition was tougher than his and isn't yet complete. As spokeswoman she is still uncomfortable when reporters take her beyond the guidance that State's experts have prepared. But her shaky grasp of substance isn't a concern of Baker's. "She controls his schedule by overseeing the office that schedules him," a senior diplomat says. "She is comparable political brain, and therefore is next to him at nearly all his meetings with foreign ministers and



ambassadors, and also at his staff meetings." Another says, "She tells him what he can do and not do. When she speaks, he listens."

Diplomats say that listening carefully to Tutwiler's answers to questions is as good a way as any of finding out what Baker is working on at a given moment. According to a story in the *Times*, it was she who inspired a tougher initial Administration response to the carnage in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June of 1989. Bush and Baker had been loath to disrupt the government-to-government rapport, the story says, until she called Baker at home and said, "You've got to turn on your TV set. You can't believe what's happening unless you see these tanks." A longtime member of the State press corps says, "She is seen by us as a great spokesperson for Jim Baker, but not for the Department, and they are two different entities."

There was no mistaking the new Secretary of State's priorities—Congress and the press—or his determination to manage both constituencies. On January 30th, three days after his arrival, Baker gave a cocktail party for State reporters and their spouses. This was an unusual gesture. The customary party for the diplomatic corps was not held last year, because, I'm told, a date for it that fitted into Baker's schedule couldn't be found.

Baker understands better than most the need for bipartisanship in foreign policy, and does more than most predecessors to promote it. A conspicuous example is the bipartisan agreement he reached with congressional leaders early in the Administration to settle the rancorous struggle over aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. With this accord, the Administration's foreign policy was off to a good start with Congress. Baker put in about forty hours on Capitol Hill working it out, Tutwiler says. The process began with a dinner that Bob Strauss held for Baker; Nicholas Brady, the Secretary of the Treasury; and Jim Wright, who was then the Speaker of the House and the foremost congressional critic of policy on Nicaragua. (During the negotiations over tax reform, Strauss had arranged a similar affair for Baker; Senator Lloyd Bentsen, the chairman of the Finance Committee; and Dan Ros-

tenkowski, the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee.)

There was a bittersweet tinge to Baker's early success; the agreement was criticized by C. Boyden Gray, the White House legal counsel, as having encroached upon Presidential powers. Gray's reproach momentarily revived what had been for Baker a searing episode a few weeks before. He and Gray, both of whom are members of distinguished Southern families and heirs to old money, had come under fire for putative conflicts of interest involving their private assets. Gray's trouble began first, and, rightly or wrongly, he was seen by many in Washington as having tried to divert attention from himself by disclosing Baker's possession of a multimillion-dollar block of stock in Chemical Bank,



one of the big banks with considerable debt exposure in the Third World. The subject of Third World debt was, of course, one that Baker had been immersed in at Treasury and would be involved with again at State. He had for many years held stock in Texas Commerce Bancshares, the offspring of the bank that Captain Baker, his grandfather, ran. In May of 1987, that company merged with Chemical New York, the holding company of Chemical Bank. In February of 1989, Baker's apparent reluctance to divest himself of the shares was roundly criticized. "Imagine that you are a cabinet officer whose actions can rescue American banks that have lent billions in shaky loans to third world countries," the *Times* thundered. "Should you hold stock in one of these banks? The obvious answer is no, but it doesn't seem obvious to . . . James Baker."

"I never dealt with matters in which that bank was involved," Baker says now. "That was the advice of the lawyers. Whatever I did was pursuant to the advice of career government lawyers. My grandfather had been chairman of the predecessor bank. My father was chairman of the executive committee of that bank, and he'd been a director. It once represented a large part of what we had as a family. I took a big hit, but it took me only three days to sell the stock and everything else I had that was public." Baker was inclined at first, according to reports, to

seek a waiver of the conflict-of-interest rule. Then, as the pressure grew, he divested, as he says. But his conduct surprised most people who know him—in Houston as well as in Washington—because it constituted an egregious political blunder, and he almost never makes those. Quite clearly, nothing in this life other than an old family tie could have clouded Baker's political judgment as this matter did.

Besides Tutwiler, Baker's incoming inner sanctum consisted of Robert M. Kimmitt, Dennis B. Ross, and Robert B. Zoellick. Kimmitt became Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, State's third-ranking title. A lawyer, he had been, among other things, the general counsel of the N.S.C. and of Treasury, and he is now responsible for managing State's role in the interagency process. Ross, who runs policy planning, served as Bush's senior foreign-policy adviser during the campaign. He has been in and out of government for nine years, specializing in both Soviet and Middle Eastern affairs. Zoellick, who worked first for Darman and then for Baker at Treasury, is probably the *primus inter pares* of the trio. Zoellick is known as the Gatekeeper and the Super Exec. Sec. Any paper destined for Baker must first be cleared by Zoellick. Although he is less experienced in foreign policy than Kimmitt or Ross, he is judged to be authentically brilliant, and he is as quick a study as Baker himself.

The attitude of the career foreign service toward the new leadership has evolved from deep hostility to ambivalence. Rightly, professional diplomats felt altogether shut out for a time, and to some extent they still are. "It's like reading the reviews instead of seeing the play," one of them comments. Baker and his small team were obviously more than bright enough, but at first they struck people at State as being unaware of or indifferent to what they didn't know and might not have time to learn. The Baker system was reminiscent of the tight control that Henry Kissinger exercised over State when he was Secretary. He, too, relied on four people, but career diplomats recall that system as having been slightly more porous than this one; they add that Kissinger and his quartet had had a good deal more direct experience with foreign policy at the outset than Baker and his lot.

Being led by someone who is close to

BRUTE IMAGE

It's a question of altitude, or latitude,
Probably. I see them leaving their offices.
By seven they are turning smartly into the drive
To spend the evening with small patterns and odd,
Oblique fixtures. Authentic what? Did I say,
Or more likely did you ask, is there any
Deliverance from any of this? Why yes,
One boy says, one can step for a moment
Out into the hall. Spells bring some relief
And antique shrieking into the night
That was not here before, not like this.
This is only a stand-in for the more formal,
More serious side of it. There is partial symmetry here.
Later one protests: How did we get here
This way, unable to stop communicating?
And is it all right for the children to listen
For the weeds slanting inward, for the cold mice
Until dawn? Now every yard has its tree,
Every heart its valentine, and only we
Don't know how to occupy the tent of night
So that what must come to pass shall pass.


—JOHN ASHBERY

the President appeals to career people, and they were also pleased to see that Baker and his team had no doctrinal side—that, indeed, Bush's national-security apparatus would be shorn of the ideological hangups that disfigured the Reagan era. Most career people who know Baker like him, and they are impressed by him and his first circle but remain somewhat skeptical about what they are likely to achieve. "I have seen a lot of seventh floors, and this one is head and shoulders above the rest," one closely involved diplomat says, yet he and others complain that no effort is being made to define America's role in a changing world. No one, they say, is looking at where major pieces on the board, such as China and Japan, ought to fit. "It has become a Gorbachev-centered foreign policy," one of them says. "But there is no creative interest in where his disintegrating country might be headed." Baker and Bush,

diplomats say, avoid problems that offer high risks and low returns—low political returns, that is.

Moreover, a system that relies on an unusual compatibility of key players—in this case, Bush, Baker, Scowcroft, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney—must have the defect of its virtues. The utter mess made of the coup that some Panamanian officers tried to stage against Manuel Noriega last October was illustrative. "That fiasco showed up a cozy, personalized system that didn't work, because it hadn't been organized in a way that allowed it to react to a fast-breaking crisis," a senior diplomat says. "The machinery was not and is not oiled. George Bush was sitting there trying to evaluate raw intelligence instead of seeing a coordinated intelligence product. He was operating as the desk man on Panama, not the President."

Like many successful executives, Baker cannot cope with the whole menu of problems at the same time. Like many successful executives, he concentrates his energies. In his short time at State, East-West issues and the Middle East have headed his agenda (aside from the Nicaraguan accord). Even before Bush's inauguration, it seemed that he and Baker might actually be serious about pushing for agreement on the Palestine question. Baker worried the Israelis, because he seemed aloof. Egypt's President Hosni



Mubarak was the first official visitor, and Bush had already put the Israelis on notice that the status quo on the West Bank was intolerable. In May, Baker addressed the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee. He broke no new ground, but the language was tough. "For Israel, now is the time to lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel," he said. "Forswear annexation. Stop settlement activity. . . . Reach out to the Palestinians as neighbors who deserve political rights." The speech went down badly with much of the audience, and I asked what it had meant politically.

"We have a better chance of biting the bullet than anyone has in the past," a senior Administration official said. "The Israelis never had an Administration with which they were more totally in synch than Reagan's. George Bush worked hard at trying to get a significant portion of Jewish support, but, even coming off the Reagan experience, he didn't succeed. Now Bush is secure for the nomination in '92, and if he couldn't get Jewish support after Reagan, well . . . So you see, he may have more independence than his predecessors. And Israel is losing the public-opinion battle because of the *intifada*—the Arab uprising on the West Bank.

In East-West matters, Baker got off to a bad start with his own professionals, and the fault was at least as much theirs as his. His first trip abroad—in early February of 1989—was a visit to fifteen North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries in eight days. Baker didn't know much, and it showed; there was some sniping from European capitals. However, his political instincts told him that the position he was carrying on the outstanding issue of the day—short-range nuclear weapons—was a hopeless nonstarter politically. State's specialists, strongly backed by many of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's, in Whitehall, wanted West Germany to allow deployment there of a modernized tactical nuclear weapon called Lance. For a long list of reasons, the Germans were unwilling to accept yet another nuclear device. The politician in Baker saw that much after being exposed for a few hours to fellow-members of the trade—Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. "Baker had a bad first trip to Europe because he inherited a lousy

position from the bureaucracy on short-range nuclear forces," says an American diplomat who worked on the problem. Baker also discovered that although Genscher was the pivotal influence on German foreign policy, Washington had been bypassing him and dealing mainly with Kohl's aides, because their line was more congenial. Baker put a stop to that, and developed a good rapport with Genscher.

On the larger issue of relations with Moscow, the Administration's performance over the first several months was strangely inept and defensive. Bush and his entourage felt that Reagan had swung from an excessively hard line, born of zeal, to a naïvely soft line, born of exposure to one man—Gorbachev. Bush set out to plant his policy in the firmer stuff of prudence and patience. Nothing need be done in a hurry. If Gorbachev was in a hurry and trying to stay ahead of one disaster or another, the problem was his, and was hardly within the gift of any outside power to affect, even if it wanted to. What Bush and Baker wanted was to know whether Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, were "for real," as it was put. Moscow's so-called new thinking would have to be tested, Baker said on the eve of his first trip there in May. After this trip, Baker gradually became aware that policy toward Gorbachev would have to become less wary and more responsive—that the world was indeed beginning to change in some fundamental way. On July 29th, Baker met with Shevardnadze at a conference in Paris that was supposed to find a solution for Cambodia's tormented affairs. Their tête-à-tête lasted nearly three hours, and was devoted wholly to a discussion of internal Soviet problems. Baker was deeply impressed by Shevardnadze's candor in explaining their nature and scale. If he hadn't known it already, he found that Shevardnadze, too, had a political weight that foreign ministers rarely possess. When Baker was reminded that some of his colleagues doubted whether Gorbachev would survive, he said, "It's still foolish not to try when United States interests also benefit. We should seek points of mutual advantage and do as much as we can. The risk is that we wait too long—sit on our duff. One thing we can do is provide a stable international environment."

The Soviets are relieved that Bush

and Baker have shown an understanding of their internal problems, and that they haven't tried to exploit the revolution in Eastern Europe or the harsh dilemma posed by Lithuania. Reacting with caution to a cascade of astonishing events is obviously desirable, but what happens when the cascade ceases and the problem becomes one of instability and basket-case economies? As East Europeans tire of smashing Red icons and pursuing secret policemen, they must find ways of avoiding political and economic chaos—of governing themselves. An Administration that won't do much about pressing domestic needs isn't likely to do much for Poland and Romania. Baker's comment on America's being able to "provide a stable international environment" has a hollow ring.

BAKER cannot consider a run at the Presidency in 1996 unless he distinguishes himself at State, and that means helping George Bush run his own foreign policy. In a sense, Baker is where Bush used to be—operating in the shadow of another's authority. He may feel, as Bush did, that to be a figure in his own right will require a move to the White House; otherwise, he could be remembered only as a first-rate chief of staff and a man with a great résumé. Baker takes strong exception to the idea that he harbors such thoughts. "I will be sixty-six years old at the end of the Bush Presidency," he says. (That is three years younger than Ronald Reagan was when he became President.) "If the President is re-elected and wants me to stay and I do, I'll have had sixteen years of these high-pressure jobs by then." When I observed that most of those who know him best think he will have a try, he said, "I'm not going to do it. You and I will meet in 1996 so I can say 'I told you so.'"

Baker would have sounded more convincing if it had not been for his answer to a question about whether he had enjoyed the retail end of campaigning—the barbecues and assorted nonsense—when he ran for attorney general of Texas, in 1978. "I didn't mind that at all," he said. "I enjoyed it, in fact." Everyone I spoke with in Houston and Austin, however, felt that he hadn't been at all comfortable in that role. And everyone, including his wife, Susan, said that he had disliked raising money for himself. Yet

by Baker's own account he liked even that part.

After saying in response to a question that he would not return to an active law practice, Baker told me, "I might affiliate with a firm. I'd like to discover the ranch and enjoy my grandchildren." A year or so ago, he bought a fifteen-hundred-acre ranch in the Wind River Range, in western Wyoming. Baker clearly loves this rugged property, and would like to spend more time there. One of his close Houston friends has no opinion on whether Baker wants to be President. Another friend, William Lummis, doubts it. "I hunt with the man, fish with him, and we talk, and I've never detected any interest on his side in becoming President," Lummis says. Within a wide circle of other friends, former associates, and assorted political figures with whom I spoke, everyone else felt strongly that Baker did want to be President; most of them felt that his chances of being a viable candidate were good—some said excellent. The only other professed naysayer that I've met is Susan Baker. She says, "He's never felt as if he wanted to run for President. Unlike George Bush, it has never been a goal with him. It's just something he isn't going to do. He'll never stop working, but there is a lot of life after Washington. Wyoming is the light at the end of the tunnel." But she was quoted in *Time*, less than a month after Bush's Inauguration, as saying, "Jimmy has a tremendous ambition and drive to reach the top. . . . Right now, he's got to be the best Secretary of State he can. The rest may come from that later."

No one has run for the Presidency from the State Department since John Quincy Adams did so (and won), in 1824. And Baker isn't likely to do so, either. Baker watchers in Washington reckon that he'll resign a year or so into Bush's second term (if there is one) and set about running—provided that at that time he can point to some concrete achievements at State. Baker would then be expected to begin addressing foreign-affairs councils around the country—not just the big ones but those in middle-sized cities. And Republican precinct chairmen from everywhere within a hundred miles or so would be invited to attend. He would also be addressing Lincoln Day dinners and campaigning for Republican officeholders and aspirant of-

ficeholders. These are dues that he has yet to pay.

Baker has no political base, and isn't likely to try to acquire one by returning to Texas to run for the United States Senate. He would have to run for Lloyd Bentsen's seat in 1994, and that is too soon, or for Phil Gramm's seat in 1996; that would be too late, and it's just not conceivable that Baker would covet the role of junior senator. Nor does anyone expect him to consider running for governor of Texas. He might not win, and the growing problems of the state would almost surely becloud any incumbent's Presidential ambitions.

"He doesn't have to go back to Texas," John Sears says. "You don't need a base any longer. That is old style. What is mainly needed now is name recognition, and Baker will have it. He will also have that terrific résumé. Also, no one out there is a threat, and it will take time for someone elected in 1992, or even in 1990, to fill out politically and threaten Baker. Whoever it might be would have to emerge fast."

The clearest track to the nomination would be a run from the office of Vice-President. And there Baker would have plenty of time for paying party dues. Dan Quayle was chosen in large part to please the far right. The more he was mocked by the press during the campaign, the better the hard right liked him. But his approval rating in the polls has remained at a very low level for a very long time. Quayle hasn't caught on; he is therefore of no great use to the hard right, and some politicians reckon that he is vulnerable and will not be on the ticket in 1992. This seems to be a minority view—so far, anyway. Most Republicans I've talked to expect Quayle to remain. "It would take a sin of major proportions for Bush to push him off," a senior Administration official says. "Bush's code of honor will cause him to keep Quayle." Bush may also regard Quayle's standing in the polls as of no importance. He won with him last time, and may feel that he can do so again.

Still, those among the skeptics who are closest to the situation do not wholly rule out the bumping of Quayle. "If a change were to be made, Baker would not want anyone else to replace Quayle," Sears says. "Quayle

suits him very well as a second-term V.P., because he is no competition."

"Baker as Veep would put his relationship with Bush to the ultimate test," says a friend and former associate of both. "Also, there's a lot of difference between them. Bush loves working the crowd. Not Baker. His skills at dealing with people are enormous, but at a different—higher—level. And running for President as Vice-President is deadly. Bush discovered that." The job itself is deadly, as Bush also discovered. But he and Baker might find a way of making it a real job—for example, by perhaps allowing the Vice-President in this case to serve also as national-security adviser.



The Constitution frowns on a national ticket headed by candidates from the same state. A Bush-Baker ticket would oblige one of them to change his voting residence, or else the ticket might have to forfeit the electoral votes of Texas. Bush would be unlikely to leave Texas. He has tentatively decided to establish his Presidential library there, probably in Houston, and he has told various people that he would not change his voting residence. Baker would be the more likely to make such a change—from Texas to Wyoming, if it ever came to that. Or, he might move from Washington to the Virginia suburbs so as to help obtain that state's electoral votes. However, any such gambit might be considered too clever by half and hence misfire politically.

The more likely possibility would be for Baker to do nothing after leaving government except run for President. In Houston, Andrews Kurth would love to have him return and become a "rainmaker"; he'd have an office there, and plenty of time to run. But Baker isn't likely to use the offices of a law firm for that purpose, and if he did the firm would be Baker & Botts.

Not everyone agrees that Baker would be a good candidate. He has plenty of name recognition—just as, say, Lee Iaccoca does—but he has no political identity in the ideological sense. His party doesn't know where he stands on issues. Bush had that problem, and would probably have lost the nomination if he had not been Vice-President. Baker and Bush are attracted to the process of government, not to goals. Ronald Reagan was interested only in goals; as for the process,

he would say, "The fellas will take care of that." Some Republicans feel that either Jack Kemp or Phil Gramm would be a stronger candidate than Baker. Each is considered an idea man with a strong ideological edge.

One Baker watcher compares him with Mario Cuomo, saying, "They look at themselves and each knows that he measures up as a candidate for President in terms of experience, knowledge, and ability. But each has his difficulties—deep caution and reserve, along with a sense of vulnerability, on Cuomo's part, and the absence of any sort of political base, in Baker's case."

Baker raised eyebrows around Washington last February by giving what is known as "Christian witness" at the National Prayer Breakfast; he rose and described his personal journey of faith. To have taken this step, as Mary McGrory, the columnist, noted, "was utterly out of character for the secretary, who is as reserved as he is hard-nosed." A cynical town saw Baker as trying to create an identity to which a largish portion of his party, notably its right wing, could relate. His indistinct doctrinal hue might in the end not be a problem for him. The mantra of the right is likely to lose resonance, with the result that political figures will be less vulnerable to pressure from fringe groups, however well organized. The direction of the abortion issue tends to support this view. Also, fortune may once again smile on Baker: he is likely to leave the State Department as the first of its Secretaries in the postwar era who was not in one way or another damaged by the Cold War. Still, he has potential liabilities. The past could work against as well as for him if the economy were to turn sour at a politically awkward moment. Baker would be recalled as having served in both the White House and the Treasury Department when the huge budget deficit developed. It's also true, though, that any Republican Presidential candidate would probably fare badly in the wake of a recession.

When Baker leaves State, he will have a large menu of options. He could take charge of some large investment bank with global reach, or perhaps the World Bank. If he wanted to return to Houston, he could probably run the Texas Commerce Bank (but might not want to, despite its strong Baker-family associations). Ben Love, a major Houston figure, who retired as the

chairman of the bank last December, built an office for Baker several years ago that adjoined his own and was identical in every detail to his. "On a couple of occasions while he was chief of staff in the White House and was totally worn out, he came up and looked at this office," Love says. "We had an understanding then that if he left and returned to the private sector his first conversation would be with Texas Commerce. That office has never been occupied." Love's idea had been for Baker to become president of the bank and then succeed him as chairman.

Baker now works from a sofa instead of a desk, in a small room that adjoins the Secretary's large, ornamental office. At sixty, he seems for the most part unmarked by the years and the high-pressure jobs. His trim, though sturdily built, figure looks as if it had neither gained nor lost an ounce over the decades; the even planes of his alert face remain youthful. By every account, he enjoys being Secretary of State. He liked his last job, too, but budget and currency-exchange issues do not compare with those involving war and peace, which America can influence more than any other country can. "I've never seen him happier, more content with himself, than he is now," says Preston Moore. Mary Bonner Baker, Jim and Susan Baker's daughter, who is twelve, is a large presence in his life, and receives the kind of careful thought that his sons were denied, or so they felt. Although Baker is a very sociable man, he has no social life in Washington, and he prefers it that way. He usually arrives home from the office at about nine in the evening, at which point, Susan Baker says, "he'll have a beer, eat supper, and collapse." His friends are in Houston, but they are likely to see less of him, because the ranch in Wyoming will preempt much of the time he doesn't spend at his job in Washington, whatever that may be.

THE competitive instinct and the habit of competition are part of the essential Baker. He will almost certainly compete for the Presidency, which, as he knows, at least as well as anyone, is the only job in Washington that is wholly worth striving for. As usual, Baker is in the right place at the right time. He is well aware that his friend the President will shun the tougher challenges—the budget defi-

cit, the education deficit, the infrastructure deficit—and devote himself to the more alluring challenges abroad, most of which are politically cost-free. The good news and the nice surprises of Bush's Administration emerge from his foreign policy, and will continue to do so unless the domestic agenda presents him with an actual crisis.

Neither Bush nor Baker is a candidate for the Republican Party's hagiography, or likely to become one. Whether either earns a place in the country's lasting good opinion is an imponderable. Bush is remarkably popular, but he doesn't take steps that many other leaders would regard as essential: he won't sacrifice any of his current popularity in order to secure a hard core of support that will stay put in bad times as well as good. He gives the country what he thinks it wants, not what it needs. Baker resembles Bush in some ways. If, like Bush, he sets a course for the White House and manages to get there, much would be expected of a man with the best résumé around. But the chemistry of the Oval Office and any occupant of it cannot be predicted. Baker might be very good in a crisis: the sharp instinct for action which he possesses would allow him to see all the possibilities open to the office of President in a dramatic, fast-breaking situation. Add to instinct his skills, experience, and energy, and one can imagine a Baker Presidency as being more thematic and less rhetorical than Bush's. But the country's real problems are deep and long-term, and they seem to defy solutions that are not politically contentious. It isn't clear that Baker would be any more willing than Bush to tackle them frontally. On his form to date, Baker is as risk-averse as he is competitive.

—JOHN NEWHOUSE

Scowcroft letter on Afghans blasted

By Richard Mackenzie
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft has angered conservative Republicans with a rosy letter about how problems in supplying the fractious Afghan resistance have been solved.

In his April 18 letter to 19 members of Congress, Mr. Scowcroft said that a recent meeting with representatives of a key Afghan resistance leader confirmed the "problems you raised have been resolved."

The letter clearly misrepresents what was said during the March 14 meeting, according to several people who were present, including Sen. Gordon Humphrey, New Hampshire Republican.

Mr. Humphrey said: "It's just bureaucratic runaround. It's scandalous. We've spent a fortune over there, the geopolitical stakes are very high and the thing is not even on auto-pilot any more. Nobody's in charge."

"We need somebody in charge of this damned program who will find out what's going on and hold people accountable."

Rep. Don Ritter, a Pennsylvania Republican who has played a key role in overseeing administration aid to the Afghan rebels, also expressed outrage: "You get to a point where you don't know who to believe."

Two emissaries from guerrilla leader Ahmad Shah Massoud were in Washington in February and March to meet with senior administration officials and members of Congress. Mr. Massoud, who is

fiercely independent but friendly to the West, has been denied supplies of weapons and ammunition, even though the vital Salang Highway, the Moscow-Kabul lifeline, runs through his territory.

Pakistan, the conduit for hundreds of millions of dollars a year in U.S. aid to the Afghan resistance, assists only those groups it can control. It is backing anti-Western firebrand Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

The Pakistani actions are strongly supported by elements within the CIA, which works closely with its Pakistani counterpart, the Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate.

In his letter, Mr. Scowcroft said "it was clear" from discussions with Mr. Massoud's representatives that "weather or internal problems in the Jamiat party" were to blame for delays "since early last year" in shipments to the resistance leader.

Several persons present at the meeting with Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates, a former CIA deputy director, say the problems are far from being solved. They say the talks focused on complaints that Pakistani and U.S. intelligence agencies are manipulating the war, resulting in serious military and political mistakes.

The two Afghan visitors, Daoud Mir and Haroon Amin, also explained how their leader is trying to rally the Afghan resistance, which is plagued by infighting at its Pakistan-based political headquarters.

Almost 1.5 million Afghans have died so far in the war, and 5 million have fled as refugees. While the Soviets withdrew on Feb. 15, 1989, they continue to provide more than \$4 billion a year in weapons to the communist regime of President Najibullah.

Until recently, the Afghan resistance had ardent support from the Bush administration, but that enthusiasm has waned as the United States concentrates on a political solution.

Addressing suggestions of a coalition government between the rebels and Najibullah, a former secret police chief, Mr. Massoud's men said such an idea was as unacceptable to Afghans as Nicolae Ceausescu would have been in a coalition in Romania.

The briefing by the Afghans was scheduled to last 30 minutes but went on for more than an hour amid

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
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The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

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spirited discussion, according to several participants. Mr. Scowcroft was not present.

The Afghans presented a two-page "position paper" outlining their case, then answered questions.

"We believe that new thinking is the only hope to save Afghanistan from a disastrous future," Mr. Mir said, adding that past attempts to micromanage the war had been a terrible failure and could only lead to a worsening situation. "We are sure you do not want another Lebanon there," he said. "That is a real danger."

The Massoud paper also discussed shortcomings of the Afghan exile government, known as the Afghan Interim Government.

Mr. Massoud's representatives pledged his cooperation in uniting the Afghan people. Large parts of Afghan society have been ostracized by the Pakistani-sponsored AIG, they said, including expatriates, exiled technocrats and Afghans from the minority Shi'ite faith.

Mr. Massoud would help organize a "shura" or grand assembly of Afghans from all across the country, his emissaries said.

Incredulous at the Scowcroft letter, one person who attended the meeting said bitterly, "We certainly were not there to chat about the weather."

"We can't give up," Mr. Ritter said. "We have invested too much in this, and too many lives have been lost fighting for what is right in Afghanistan for it simply to be dropped."

A White House spokesman declined to comment on the controversy.

Failures of Intelligence?

Why the CIA has repeatedly missed the mark in forecasting changes in the Soviet empire


From Lithuania to Latin America, virtually every foreign-policy decision George Bush makes these days is at least partly based on secret intelligence—and Bush, as an old CIA hand, is regarded by insiders as the most sophisticated consumer of the U.S. intelligence community's "product" since Dwight Eisenhower. So how does the White House rate the CIA these days? The answer seems paradoxical. President Bush has told CIA Director William Webster he is "pleased with the product." Yet one of Bush's chief foreign-policy advisers ranks the agency's recent track record as only "fair"—"good at analyzing trends," he says, but "poor at predicting the timing of events in the collapse of Eastern Europe." Former Pentagon official Fred Ikle, under secretary of Defense in the Reagan years, is tougher still. The CIA's analysts, he says, "collect a lot of facts and organize them very nicely. But their predictions are wrong."

These are hard times for spooks—even for the button-down, number-crunching analysts who now run the show at the CIA's Langley, Va., headquarters. The hardball years of "black ops," Cointelpro, Vietnam and the Bay of Pigs are gone—and so is the late William Casey, who dragged the agency into the Iran-contra scandal. Today, the CIA lives (and, critics say, dies) by the accuracy of its analyses. But if that mission is arguably safer and less controversial than destabilizing hostile governments, it has problems of its own. Right now, for example, the CIA is embroiled in an increasingly public dispute over its estimates of Soviet economic strength, which were recently attacked by Soviet experts as far too optimistic. Even worse, from the standpoint of CIA loyalists, the hard view of history will almost certainly be that when it came to forecasting the epochal developments now shaking Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the CIA almost completely missed the boat. Says Kenneth Adelman, who headed the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for Ronald Reagan: "They're very good on technical stuff. But on wheth-

er or when Gorbachev will shift from saying 'No, never' to 'Yes, OK,' they're no better than your average political pundit."

It is a fact, of course, that no intelligence agency anywhere was able to predict the breathtaking pace of change in the Soviet empire. It is also true that the CIA is only one of nearly a dozen separate (and usually competing) U.S. intelligence bureaucracies. Indeed, since the late 1960s, the CIA and other U.S. analysts have relied more and more on hard data collected by satellites and electronic intercepts and less and less on "humint," the term for field reports from spies and secret agents. This reliance on technology may be one reason why the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies were caught flat-footed by Mikhail Gorbachev's revolution. Satellites are essential for assessing Soviet military capabilities. And electronic intercepts can sometimes reveal precisely what a national leader intends to do. But the Soviets protect their communications zealously, and satellites cannot photograph a Soviet leader's mind. *Perestroika*, in short, was a shock to almost everyone.

But there are other reasons for the CIA's shortcomings as well—and in the critics' view, some of them are deeply embedded in the agency's institutional culture. That culture, many argue, is too much influenced by the tidy constructs of academic political science and, at the same time, too driven by the CIA's longstanding rivalry with the Defense Department and the DIA, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. In this view, CIA analysts have for years been prone to view Soviet leaders as rational bureaucrats who make reasonable choices on national-security policy. As a result, and also because the agency has often tried to offset the DIA's hawkish views, the CIA has historical-



P.F. GERO—SYGMA

No better than the average pundit? Webster (top), national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Cheney

ly been more dovish than the Pentagon.

The controversy over the CIA's estimates of the Soviet economy is a critical case in point. If, as the agency has reported for the past decade, Soviet gross national product is about half the size of U.S. GNP, Soviet military spending would be about 16 percent of total national production—substantially higher than the United States', but still a reasonable figure. But if the Soviet economy is much weaker than the



KENNETH JARECKE—CONTACT

A World of Confusion: Agencies at Odds

When interpreting data on the Soviet Union, the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies often disagree. When they do, American foreign policy can suffer:

The Backfire Bomber: Analyzing this new Soviet plane in the early '70s, the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said it was designed to reach targets on U.S. soil. The CIA disagreed. The rift hampered strategic arms talks, until the DIA gave way.

Nuclear Artillery: Later in the '70s, the DIA detected the Soviets adding these weapons to their East European forces. The CIA disputed the idea until 1983, underrating Soviet strength in the region for seven years.

Afghanistan: A CIA flip-flop: when the Red Army invaded in 1979, the agency predicted it would crush the Afghan rebels. Ten years and a Soviet retreat later, the CIA forecasts a mujahedin win in the stalemated civil war.

Soviet Air Defenses: The CIA: Russian air space is next to impenetrable. The U.S. Air Force: they're no match for our planes. The likely truth: somewhere in between.



BERNARD SIDLER—SYGMA

Assessing the threat: Soviet troops on parade

CIA believes, the Kremlin's military outlays are an almost unimaginable drag on Soviet society. A growing minority of economic analysts now believes the Soviet GNP may be as little as a third of the United States'. If this view is correct, the Soviet military buildup of the past 25 years has been nearly irrational—and its true cost, which even Soviet economists will have a hard time calculating, must now be a driving force behind perestroika.

Wrong analysis: The issue is much more than academic. If Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders have a well-founded fear of economic collapse, they are much more likely to seek compromise in superpower negotiations—which is precisely the kind of analytical judgment an American president must have. It could also help explain why, in contradiction to nearly every forecast by both the CIA and the DIA, Gorbachev now seems willing to let the Soviet bloc fall apart. In March, CIA Director William Webster told Congress the intelligence community now believes the changes in Eastern Europe "are probably already irreversible." That pronouncement led to a public dispute with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, who inclines to a more pessimistic view. But it also led some critics to wonder what took the spooks so long. "The community's mind-set was that the Soviet Union would always hold on

to Eastern Europe," Adelman says. "Turns out the analysts got it bass-ackwards."

The more charitable view is that the CIA, along with the DIA and all the other bureaucratic fiefdoms of the intelligence community, performed tolerably well through the years of the cold war—and that the powerful uncertainties of peace, at least from an intelligence expert's point of view, is the real hell. The truth about the Soviet GNP is that absolutely nobody knows how big it is—not even a ranking Soviet academician like Oleg Bogomolov, who recently admitted that Soviet officials have been hiding their defense spending for so long that today "we cannot trace it all even when we try." As one CIA veteran says, there are secrets and there are mysteries, and the difference is crucial. "Secrets are questions somebody has the answer to... and we're pretty good at getting those. Mysteries are questions nobody has the answer to, except maybe God." For the CIA, and for Bush, that sounds like a recommendation for prayer.

JOHN BARRY in Washington

SECRETARY CHENEY

Jennings: A report this evening on shifting fortunes in Washington. When Defense Secretary Cheney moved from the Congress to the Pentagon last year, he was widely praised as a seasoned bureaucratic infighter -- just what the Pentagon needed -- just the man to handle a monster department at a revolutionary time in world affairs. But now Cheney's attitude towards Moscow has him out of step in Washington.

ABC's Bob Zelnick:

(**President Bush** with Cheney on March 10, 1989: "Dick, welcome aboard.")

He came as an insider with the White House and Congress, the ideal man to lead the Pentagon after the President's first choice, John Tower, was rejected. But just over a year later, as the military faces massive cutbacks, Cheney has often appeared out of sync with the Administration, Congress, and military leaders inside his own building.

(**Lawrence Korb**, former assistant secretary of Defense: "Philosophically I think he is so far out of step that they basically cut him out of the decision-making process.")

Out of step, because the Administration believes that deals can be struck with President Gorbachev permanently reducing tensions with the Soviet Union. Cheney has been far more pessimistic. It began after less than a month in office when he predicted Gorbachev would fail.

(**Cheney**, April 29, 1989: "He's likely to be replaced by somebody who will be far more hostile than he's been in terms of his attitude towards the West.")

The President, having invested so much in the relationship with Gorbachev, promptly rejected Cheney's comment. Variations on the same theme would occur months later -- Cheney vs. CIA Director Webster on whether the recent events in Eastern Europe and Moscow were reversible, Webster saying they were not; Cheney vs. Bush on Lithuania, with Cheney blasting Gorbachev's handling of the Baltic state while Bush was trying to downplay the conflict.

(**Cheney**: "I am a bit of a skeptic by nature about the Soviet Union. There are clearly differences. I think the President is served by differences of opinion on the major issues that we're faced with.")

(**Gordon Adams**, Defense Budget Project: "If I were the Secretary of Defense and as many things got pulled out from underneath me as have been pulled out from underneath Dick Cheney I'd begin to wonder who was listening.")

Certainly the President listens to Secretary of State Baker, a dominant voice on NATO and relations with the Soviets. And he listens to National Security Adviser Scowcroft, who has also overshadowed Cheney.

[TV COVERAGE of President Bush walking with Scowcroft across the South Lawn.]

During planning for the Malta summit last December, Cheney was kept in the dark. And on the critical defense budget, OMB Director Darman has diverted billions of Pentagon dollars to such areas as the anti-drug war and aid to Panama and Nicaragua and Eastern Europe. Cheney insists his voice is being heard.

(**Cheney**: "I am involved in all of those decisions at that level that I need to be involved in.")

-more-

DE KLERK VISIT

Brokaw: The White House said today that President Bush will meet with South Africa's President de Klerk toward the end of next month. It would be the first such visit by a South African leader to this country since 1948. The exact date, however, is not certain, and it is expected to be a week before a White House meeting with Nelson Mandela. (NBC-5)

PAN AM 103

Brokaw says that presidential commission investigating the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 released its report today, and as we reported last night, the commission found that aviation security was flawed -- that the terrorist attack might have been prevented.

NBC's Robert Hager says that commission report got mixed reviews. Families of the bombing victims supported most findings but worried about whether much will really change as a result. The report was presented to the President by commission chairman Ann McLaughlin, who later met reporters.

(McLaughlin: "The sad truth is that the aviation security system administered by FAA has not provided the level of protection the traveling public demands and deserves. The system is seriously flawed and it must be changed.")

The commission found the bombing may have been preventable had it not been for security lapses by Pan Am and the FAA; suggested future consideration of military strikes against known terrorist enclaves; recommended terrorist threats be made public if they appear credible and specific; and said deployment of new thermal neutron luggage screeners should be deferred because the machines don't work well enough yet.

(James Busey, FAA Administrator: "Mistakes were made. We think that we have worked hard to put corrective measures in place over the last year or so.")

(Tom Plaskett, Pan Am chairman: "The commission has taken a lot of circumstantial evidence and some facts and tried to weave together a scenario, and unfortunately it's simply speculation and I think it's premature.")

But the strongest reaction came from families, concerned about whether the government will do anything about the report. The commission has asked the government to report within six months on what it's done to follow up on the commission's recommendations.

(NBC-4)

ABC's Bettina Gregory reports that it's up to President Bush to enact the 60 recommendations in this report. If he doesn't the four members of Congress who served on this commission say they'll propose new laws to improve airline security. (ABC-6)

CBS's Mark Phillips reports:

(Sen. D'Amato: "The FAA's performance was nothing short of dismal.")

(Sen. Lautenberg: "It's time to punish anybody that we can prove took our airplane down.") (CBS-6)

Woes seem to be part of Cabinet jobs

Controversy is no stranger to Cabinet members and top White House aides.

And many on the Bush team are experiencing the stings felt in past by such officials as Edwin Meese, Donald Regan, Hamilton Jordan, Bert Lance, H.R. Haldeman, John Mitchell and Robert McNamara.

Among the controversies touching Bush administration members:

► **James Baker**, secretary of State, was baptized by fire on his first trip to Europe, where he found himself in the middle of an unexpected controversy over the future of short-range NATO nuclear missiles. He also got in hot water over stock he held that could have posed a conflict of interest because of Third World investments. He agreed to sell it.

► **Dick Cheney**, Defense secretary, has been accused of being too hawkish in protecting the Pentagon budget as world tensions ease, and has been caught disagreeing with CIA Director William Webster over the assessment of Soviet military strength.

► **John Sununu**, chief of staff, has angered environmentalists with his skepticism of global warming, and his urging the president to move slowly on environmental matters. He more recently upset Democrats by speaking out against tax hikes as budget negotiations were about to begin. Democrats said it indicated bad faith on the part of the White House.

► **William Bennett**, drug czar, has been accused of talking a good game but producing little in the drug war. Reports of his early demise circulate intermittently.

► **Manuel Lujan**, Interior secretary, upset environmentalists last week when he said the Endangered Species Act that protects near-extinct animals and plants is "too tough" and threatens jobs and economic development.

► **Brent Scowcroft**, national security adviser, felt the heat after the president sent him on at least two secret missions to China. There, he toasted Chinese leaders just months after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. Bush had publicly banned such trips.

► **Louis Sullivan**, Health and Human Services secretary, got in trouble during his confirmation hearings for departing from the administration line against abortion. He also raised eyebrows by supporting a clean-needles program for drug addicts to protect against disease.

► **Lauro Cavazos**, Education secretary, was criticized by Hispanics last month who disagreed with his statements that parents bear some of the blame for the high dropout rate among that ethnic group.

► **Samuel Skinner**, Transportation secretary, had to tell state and local governments the administration wants them to pay a larger share of transportation costs.

— **Richard Benedetto**

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today A-8 _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

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Vision Test

Despite His Successes, Baker's Critics Say He Lacks a Broad Strategy

Secretary's Mastery of Tactics,
They Add, Isn't Enough
In Handling Big Problems

Betting Heavily on Gorbachev

By ROBERT S. GREENBERGER
And WALTER S. MOSSBERG

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

It looks like a political campaign in the American heartland—except it is in Sofia, Bulgaria.

As Secretary of State James Baker's black Cadillac limousine pulls up to the Sheraton Sofia Hotel on Lenin Square, more than a thousand enthusiastic Bulgarians wave hand-lettered signs saying "USA—your democracy is our dream" and chant, "So-fi-a, Wash-ing-ton."

But Mr. Baker is uncomfortable. He hustles up the steps, offering the crowd only an awkward smile and stiff wave. His press spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler, steps in and urges him to say something. He turns and offers a few limp phrases about America's admiration for what Bulgaria's people are doing. Then, he flees inside, where he conducts a closed-door, two-hour seminar for Bulgarian opposition leaders on how to beat the ruling Communists in the country's first free election.

Mr. Baker, whose natural habitat is the smoke-filled room, has displayed his skill in political tactics during his first year in office. With communism collapsing from Moscow to Managua, he forged a bipartisan foreign policy at home, kept America's allies united and built a solid relationship with his Soviet counterpart. All the while, he courted Congress and the press.

But now the tactician must show a feel for strategy. The recent upheavals have made him the first post-Cold War secretary of state. Before him is a world-wide realignment of power that requires not just wheeling and dealing but also a clear sense of direction from the U.S. So far, though,



James Baker

he and President Bush have had trouble presenting a comprehensive strategy.

Finding the Road

"Baker is very skillful at negotiating every sharp turn in the road," says Burton Yale Pines, an official at the conservative Heritage Foundation. "But what I see missing from U.S. foreign policy is a grand sense of where we are going."

Mr. Baker declines to comment on the view that he lacks a long-term strategy or vision. But a close adviser bristles at the criticism: "We say just judge him by the results. Was it vision to come up with the compromise on Central America? Was it vision to come up with the NATO arms-control proposals? You can't do those things without a strategy."

Clearly, however, clever tactics, not grand strategy, got Mr. Baker where he is today. Texas-bred and Princeton-educated, he honed keen political skills as a campaign chairman for Presidents Ford, Reagan and Bush. Few people in U.S. history have played such important roles in so many successful presidential campaigns. And few have built such spectacular resumes: Mr. Baker has moved in succession through three of Washington's top posts, from White House chief of staff to Treasury secretary to State, mastering the arcane details of policy all the way.

But by experience and instinct, he manages foreign policy as if he were still on the campaign trail. During the Bush campaign, an old colleague recalls, Mr. Baker would canvass top aides every morning on what the candidate needed to do that day. Then, the colleague says, "He'd call Bush and say, 'Here's what's important today.' He really did control things."

A Clear Danger

The disadvantage in that closely held operating style, says another former campaign worker, was that "if you weren't in the inner circle—and I wasn't—you never saw the guy." That could prove more dangerous in international diplomacy, where Mr. Baker is still a newcomer, than it did in presidential campaigning, where he is regarded as a black-belt master.

At State, as in the past, Mr. Baker relies almost exclusively on a few intensely loyal, youthful aides who were by his side at Treasury or in campaigns. To the chagrin of career diplomats, the small in-group handles important issues such as German unification, Soviet relations and Mideast peace talks.

For instance, it was Robert Zoellick, a former Treasury official, Bush campaign adviser and now State Department counselor, who was dispatched to Bonn earlier this month to prepare for the Allies' talks on German reunification. Only the day before, Mr. Zoellick had returned from Mexico, where he led a trade delegation.

Unlike many of his predecessors, who often hit stone walls in dealing with the White House, Mr. Baker speaks by tele-

phone with his "candidate," George Bush, at least a half-dozen times a day. In a small but symbolic show of power, he sometimes phones the Oval Office in the middle of the president's daily 8 a.m. meeting with National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, a potential rival.

The frequent telephone talks permit Messrs. Bush and Baker to discuss problems or make quick decisions unencumbered by the bureaucracy. They enjoy a mutual confidence dating back to the 1960s, when they were doubles partners on the tennis courts of Houston's country clubs. Recently, for instance, President Bush needed quick advice before heading into a White House meeting with four congressmen who wanted the administration's view on legislation that would guarantee \$400 million in housing loans to help resettle Soviet Jews in Israel. Most presidents would have turned for in-house help from the national security adviser. Instead, Mr. Bush phoned Mr. Baker.

"The president and Jim Baker have a social relationship that's very different," says White House Chief of Staff John Sununu. "There's no introductory language necessary; they communicate in shorthand with each other."

The unusually tight White House tie also makes Mr. Baker a formidable secretary of state to his peers abroad. "He is so close to the president you can rely on everything he tells you," says West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

So far, Mr. Baker's instincts have served the administration well. Early in the Bush presidency, Mr. Baker surmised that what was being viewed as Mr. Bush's excessive caution would curtail the honeymoon usually accorded new administrations. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was dazzling the world while the U.S. was bogged down with an ill-advised foreign-policy review that yielded only an empty slogan, "beyond containment."

The administration's foreign-policy strategists gathered at the White House. Aides such as Mr. Scowcroft urged a go-slow approach. But the new secretary of state, though still learning his job, took charge. "Baker insisted that, by the May [1989] NATO summit, the president would have to be ready to assume the leadership of the West with a bold approach. It was like getting ready for a debate or a primary," recalls a senior aide.

Arms-Cut Proposal

The result was a Bush proposal last May in Brussels to negotiate cuts in American troops and Western aircraft in Europe. Mr. Bush's proposal was, in part, just a clever public-relations move because the cuts were almost inevitable. But afterward, Mr. Bush was viewed, for the first time, as having seized the diplomatic initiative from Mr. Gorbachev.

For all that, Messrs. Bush and Baker haven't yet demonstrated skill in navigat-

OVER →

Bush, on TV, scolds the Hill on Latin aid

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush yesterday abandoned discreet lobbying for \$720 million in aid to "jump start" new democracies in Panama and Nicaragua and tried on national television to shame Congress into appropriating the money.

"The inability of the Congress to do business in a prompt and orderly fashion" jeopardizes "hopes for freedom in these two fledgling democracies," Mr. Bush said at a press conference.

"I will call on the Congress to remain in session until it completes action on a bill that I can sign," he said. The change in strategy came after phone calls to House Speaker Thomas Foley did not produce results.

Mr. Foley said yesterday morning — before the president's press conference — that he expected the House to take up the bill Monday. "I certainly hope we can settle it before the end of next week," he said. Congress plans to take a 10-day break beginning May 25.

The president's impassioned statement raised the specter of failure for U.S. policy in Nicaragua, which recently held free elections after 10 years of civil war, and Panama, where 23 U.S. servicemen died and 324 were wounded in installing an elected government.

Mr. Bush asked for \$300 million for Nicaragua and \$500 million for Panama. He accepted a move by Congress to reduce aid to Panama to \$420 million.

Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro asked for a \$40 million emergency loan while the bill works its way through Congress. But Mr. Bush said his "hands are tied" because it would be illegal to make a loan based on future action by Congress.

He also revealed that National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady explored the possibility of encouraging private loans, but were stymied by the absence of collateral.

During the 28-minute press conference, Mr. Bush also predicted that roadblocks to a strategic nuclear arms treaty with the Soviet Union would be cleared in time for an agreement at the summit in two weeks. He also called the budget-deficit crisis the biggest domestic test of his leadership.

"We have negotiated with the Soviets when all of Eastern Europe was in captivity, and when we had Cold War times," Mr. Bush said in defending the decision to hold the summit despite Moscow's economic pressure on Lithuania.

Mr. Bush said that one possible solution to the deficit crisis might be extending the compulsory Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction timetable that could force a cut approaching \$100 billion this year.

The president's main thrust was an attempt to move the "dire emergency" bill containing the \$720 million in aid for Nicaragua. Unrelated amendments have brought its cost to more than \$3 billion.

An administration official said Mr. Bush has asked other nations to provide aid to Nicaragua and Panama, but they face the same kind of "internal decision-making" delays. Japan, Spain, Scandinavian nations and Venezuela are among the countries that have indicated plans to help.

"The money is not flowing and the need is immediate," the official said.

"I think the American people are frustrated by the inability of the Congress to do business in a prompt and orderly fashion," Mr. Bush said.

Mr. Bush also criticized votes to add unrelated spending and social issues, including an effort to allow the District of Columbia to pay for abortions with locally acquired funds.

"I will not accept the Nicaragua-Panama bill with that mischievous language placed on it," Mr. Bush said, promising another veto if the provision remains. "It has nothing to do with Nicaragua and Panama and it ought to be taken out."

Citing a cable he received Friday from Mrs. Chamorro, Mr. Bush said, "The situation in Nicaragua is critical. Mrs. Chamorro's government is absolutely bankrupt, and there are strikes and demonstrations in the streets."

He said Panama is also in trouble, "in dire need of the jump start that our assistance will give to enable it to recover from the economic devastation of the Noriega dictatorship."

Mr. Bush also addressed the following topics:

• **Civil Rights bill:** He said he was meeting with interest groups, seeking to narrow differences. Mr. Bush

met yesterday with representatives for religious groups, the disabled, Hispanics and women. He met earlier with black advocates. Attorney General Dick Thornburgh has advised the president to veto the bill because it could lead to hiring quotas.

• **Mandatory parental leave:** "I think it boils down to the concept of whether you are in favor of mandated benefits or not, and one of the

complaints I get from our close proximity to the governors and working with the governors is, 'Please don't mandate more benefits from the central government.'"

• **Trade with China:** He has made no decision on whether to renew Most Favored Nation status at the end of May, noting "It isn't an easy call." Mr. Bush said editorial comment and other advice opposes ending MFN status even among "people that were quite critical of me in the way I handled the student matter."

• **Offshore oil drilling:** A long-delayed decision on whether to continue a ban on drilling in two lease sites off California and one off southwest Florida will be made within days. "I've already said that I'm concerned about the environmental aspects as it relates to Florida... but I don't want to suggest that I don't feel that way about certain areas off California."

• **Philippine base negotiations:** He backed the threat by negotiator Richard Armitage to withdraw U.S. forces if the bases lease is not renewed and said, "We don't have a total blank check regarding this." Mr. Bush said that U.S. interests in the Pacific would remain secure. "There are other ways to skin this cat, but some of them are quite expensive and some of them are less expensive."

• **Chris Harvey contributed to this report.**

Capital Briefs

5-19-90 H.E.

★ President Bush stunned conservative supporters last week by announcing that he was entering a "budget summit" with congressional Democrats and that increased taxes would be on the table. Establishment commentators lauded Bush's "realism," but GOP politicians predicted ruinous consequences if the President reneges on his solemn "no new taxes" pledge.

★ "The biggest difference between Republicans and Democrats is the perception that Republicans don't want to raise taxes," said Ed Rollins, co-chairman of the National Republican Congressional Campaign Committee. "Obviously, this makes that go right out of the door. Politically, I think it is a disaster." Rollins told *Human Events* he's gotten calls from all over the country opposing any tax hike, and thinks such a move might cost Republicans at least 10 House seats.

★ Rollins spoke for the vast majority of younger GOP congressmen. And Republican challengers around the country expressed incredulity that their anti-tax legs were being cut out from under them. But House GOP leader Bob Michel was reported to be jubilant that the President had finally bowed to "economic reality."

★ Even before the White House announced the tax flip-flop, Michel was pushing hard for abandonment of "Read my lips." Emerging from a White House meeting with Bush and other congressional leaders, Michel told reporters, "I don't know how you make these figures match without doing something on revenues. I don't think we're going to be talking about a small package of things."

★ Office of Management and Budget Director Richard Darman is described by associates as "passionate" in his belief that tax increases must come out of the budget "summit." White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, however, appears to be resisting. Indeed, Sununu — identified only as the "senior White House official... who is the main link to conservatives" — was quoted by the *Washington Post* as saying that "tax options are not the right economic answer" to the deficit.

★ Eighteen Senate Republicans led by Florida Sen. Connie Mack wrote President Bush imploring him to resist new taxes and to press instead for a cut in the capital gains tax. On the other side of Capitol Hill, Rep. Vin Weber (R-Minn.) carried White House disfavor by saying, "House Republicans remain the center of opposition to new taxes.... We're not ready to give up on the basic premises of the Reagan revolution's economic policies."

★ Weber said he believed Bush would not capitulate to the tax increase forces. "We're nervous about it, but we trust him," said Weber.

★ A former female prostitute will testify before the House ethics committee that Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.) was "lying" when he told the panel that he did not know a prostitution ring was operating out of his Capitol Hill apartment. The woman, identified only as "Lynn," told the Cable News Network last week that she and her former partner, Frank's then live-in lover, Steve Goble, operated the ring from 1985 to 1987.

★ Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene was treated downright shabbily the other day when she arrived for an Oval Office meeting with President Bush, a session which the White House agreed to only reluctantly when it realized that a snub would be politically damaging.

★ There were no Lithuanian flags greeting Prunskiene, no Marine guards, not even a waiting escort. Indeed, Prunskiene was not permitted to enter White House grounds in her sedan. She was forced to get out of the car, show a Soviet — not Lithuanian — passport, cool her heels for 10 minutes, then walk forlornly toward the White House for her meeting with Bush. All because the White House did not want to offend Mikhail Gorbachev.

★ The Lithuanian prime minister made it clear that the Bush/State Department concern about her ruffling Gorbachev was unworthy of a great power. "Even the world's darling does not have the monopolistic right to decide the right of other nations," Prunskiene said on Capitol Hill. Currying favor with Gorbachev soon "degenerates into toadyism, and the latter gives birth to a cult."

★ Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) will have to wait until June 5 to find out who will be his Democratic opponent this fall. Former Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt led last week's Democratic senatorial primary, but fell two points shy of the 40% necessary to avoid a run-off. He will meet Southport District Attorney Michael Easley, who received 30% of the vote, in the run-off.

★ Easley, a liberal who was endorsed by the state AFL-CIO, portrays himself as a drug-busting prosecutor who supports the death penalty. Gantt, who hopes to become the first black Democrat ever elected to the Senate, is a liberal who opposes capital punishment and supports abortion.

★ National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft sought the other day to assure congressional supporters of the Afghan resistance that everything was coming up roses. His argument was unconvincing. In a letter to 19 House and Senate Republicans, Scowcroft referred to a meeting with key mujaheddin representatives and said that the problems the lawmakers had raised "have been resolved."

★ Nonsense, according to several lawmakers who were present at the White House meeting. "It's just bureaucratic runaround," said Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-N.H.), the Senate's leading resistance backer. "It's scandalous. We've spent a fortune over there, the geopolitical stakes are very high and the thing is not even on auto-pilot anymore. Nobody's in charge. We need somebody in charge of this damned program who will find out what's going on and hold people responsible."

Bush Hails Arms Talks In Moscow

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

AUSTIN, Tex., May 19—President Bush declared tonight that the arms control talks in Moscow were a "breakthrough" putting the superpowers within reach of "the major substantive elements" of a strategic nuclear weapons treaty, but national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said the Soviets are "stonewalling" in negotiations on conventional, or non-nuclear, weapons.

In an outdoor commencement address at the University of Texas here, Bush said "there is additional work to be done" following the Moscow meetings among Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

But Bush, who this morning reacted cautiously to reports from Moscow, tonight delivered an upbeat assessment of Baker's progress. Bush did not mention problems on conventional weapons talks, but he said

the Moscow sessions were "a major step forward" that "should allow us to meet the important goal we set in Malta" of completing a treaty to reduce long-range strategic nuclear weapons.

"In addition, we will be able to conclude other arms control measures with the Soviets, including an agreement on dramatic reduction in chemical weapons, as well as technical and commercial agreements," Bush said. He predicted that the Washington summit with Gorbachev beginning May 30 would be "another solid step forward" in the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

Scowcroft said the Moscow meeting had put relations back on track after the Soviets appeared to be pulling back on some arms control positions this spring. "It's back together again," he told reporters as he flew here with the president.

But Scowcroft said that despite the progress on strategic weapons, the Moscow meetings failed to make headway on the conventional weapons talks, and that the Soviet squeeze on Lithuania still casts a pall over the superpower summit. "Sure, there's a cloud over the summit because of Lithuania," he said. "It can't help."

In the Moscow negotiations, Baker and his team brought new ideas for the 23-nation talks on reducing land armies and other non-nuclear forces of East and West in Europe, but the Soviets "weren't able to respond meaningfully at this time," Baker said.

Scowcroft said of the talks: "Conventional did not go so well. . . . Apparently the Soviets hung pretty tough on the issues that are blocking conventional." The conventional

talks are "still hung up," he said, adding that the Soviets are "stonewalling."

"While they moved ahead on START [and] on the bilateral relationship, there's no indication . . . that they have moved on" the conventional arms talks, Scowcroft said. Bush and Gorbachev had expressed hope at the Malta summit last December that they could initial the basic outlines of a strategic arms treaty at the Washington summit. Scowcroft said, "There are a lot of minor things which still have to be done" but "none of them, I don't think, we would consider right now [to be] treaty-stoppers." Scowcroft added that "it's fair to say by the time of the summit we will have done what the two leaders said they were shooting for in Malta, which will complete the major substantive elements of a START treaty."

Earlier in the day, Bush had taken a more pessimistic approach. This morning, when asked about the Moscow meeting, Bush said, "We still have some unfulfilled arms control problems that we're all familiar with." Bush, who was visiting the headquarters office for the July economic summit in Houston, said, "So it's a mixed review right now. But we'll keep going forward. We want the Gorbachev summit to be successful, but it's going to take some give on the Soviet side, in my view. But we're going to keep pushing."

Bush was not specific about what arms control problems were still unresolved.

In the last of a series of commencement addresses before the summit, Bush offered the graduates a philosophical discussion of the meaning of the East European movement toward democracy over

the last year. "From Austin to Berlin to Budapest, we live during a remarkable moment in world history, an exhilarating time—the triumph of freedom," he said.

He challenged the students to "make the most of our changing world, to live these remarkable times, to take risks to do something extraordinary."

The president offered generous praise for Vytautas Landsbergis, the president of Lithuania, who led his country in a bid for independence from Soviet rule that has complicated the summit. Previously, Landsbergis had drawn private criticism from Bush and other U.S. officials for what they considered a hasty drive for a complete break from Moscow, one that provoked an economic boycott by Gorbachev. This week, Gorbachev finally met with Lithuania's prime minister, a move that U.S. officials view as at least a symbolic gesture toward negotiations.

Tonight, Bush included Landsbergis as a champion of freedom alongside Andrei Sakharov, the late Soviet dissident, Poland's Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity trade union, and Czechoslovakia's playwright president, Vaclav Havel.

"What one man draws from history, another finds in music," Bush said. "President Landsbergis of Lithuania, who adopted Beethoven's Ninth Symphony as an anthem for his people's movement, was asked why the strains of Beethoven should resound through the streets and squares of Vilnius. He replied that it is because the Ninth is 'a symphony of freedom and victory against slavery, insidiousness and darkest hatred.'"

Inside the CIA

A top spook comes to Maine

CONSIDERING all the cloak-and-dagger trappings in which the Central Intelligence Agency is wrapped, The Woodlands Club in Falmouth seems an innocent place to get an unlikely one-on-one interview with the No. 2 man at CIA.

The man is Richard J. Kerr, a very unspookish looking spook. He looks like a prosperous, Middle American banker, but he is in charge of worldwide undercover intelligence and spy operations which cost taxpayers an estimated \$30 billion a year. That includes thousands of foreigners and tens of thousands of Americans on hidden payrolls — figures that Kerr flatly refused to talk about.

At 54, Kerr, a father of four, is graying at the temples, wears tortoise-shell glasses for reading, has a trim body 6 feet 3 inches tall and the healthy suntan of a man who exercises regularly outdoors. He was born Oct. 4, 1935, in Fort Smith, Ark., and graduated as a history major from the University of Oregon.

Thirty years ago he was recruited into the CIA and has worked for the spy agency ever since. Kerr has done almost every kind of CIA intelligence work in every part of the globe, from undercover "black operations" to sweet-talking foreign leaders and congressional committees.

SOME OF the "jobs in plain view" Kerr has held include: CIA representative to the commander-in-chief of the Pacific, executive officer of the Intelligence Community Staff, vice chairman of the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation and director of worldwide intelligence analysis.

President Bush nominated Kerr, the Senate confirmed him and, on March 20, 1989, he was sworn in as deputy director of CIA. Kerr took over the post from Robert M. Gates, whom Bush took to the White House. Earlier, Gates had been deputy to the late, notorious William Casey.

Now, as America's latest No. 2 superspook flew into Maine, he acted like a typical tourist. He ate lobster and went shopping at L.L. Bean — with this difference: He had bodyguards.

Kerr's suave, bankerish look and mannerisms are very good camouflage for a man who has

record, to the World Affairs Council of Maine. When the session was over, two Secret Service agents led me to the room set aside at The Woodlands Club for this interview.

A WORD of explanation is in order about how this unlikely session was arranged. It was incredibly simple. I telephoned James W. Greenleaf, CIA's director of public affairs (I didn't know the CIA had public affairs) and asked him to arrange it. Overnight, Greenleaf did, perhaps largely because Greenleaf is a Maine man, born in South Portland in 1941, and keeps close ties to his Maine roots.

Here is what Kerr had to say about how the White House is now using the CIA very differently from the way it was used under Presidents Reagan and Nixon.

"I have never in 30 years seen any White House so well informed



By
Bill
Caldwell

on intelligence and how to use it, and not use it, as this one. That's partly because President Bush once headed CIA himself," he said.

"But the difference goes far deeper. Many of the senior White House staff have intimate knowledge and understanding of how to use the intelligence as one ingredient in arriving at foreign policy decisions."

Kerr cited the fact that Gates is now deputy national security adviser to Bush; that Defense Secretary Richard Cheney is an old CIA expert from his years as a key member of the Congressional Oversight Committee, the watchdog of CIA operations, and that Gen. Brent Scowcroft, head of the National Security Council, and James Baker, secretary of state, have all had long firsthand experience with the CIA.

removed the director of the CIA, William H. Webster, from Cabinet meetings and also directed that the CIA make its daily briefings directly in person to the president instead of through national security advisers.

These changes, he said, demonstrate the new Bush concept that the CIA should be involved solely with intelligence gathering and not with policy-making. This means that CIA intelligence assessments are not now vetted or tinged to support foreign policy decisions advocated by the National Security Council.

Asked for his assessment of what is happening inside the Soviet Union, especially the drive to independence by Baltic republics, Kerr talked about an aspect seldom spotlighted: the pervasive political power and overwhelming economic, governmental and military strength of the Russian republic. It is bigger and stronger than all other 14 republics combined and a giant compared to each of them individually.

Overall, 143 million people live in the Russian republic. It is the place where Moscow is and the Communist Party, the military and the KGB secret police are centered. Compare that to 1.5 million people in Estonia, 2.5 million in Latvia, 3.6 million in Lithuania.

Russians make up 20 percent of the population in Lithuania, 80 percent in Latvia and 40 percent in Estonia. He suggested this may be one reason Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is emphasizing that Soviet law requires that at least two-thirds must vote for secession.

These ethnic Russians living in other Soviet republics not only hold many key government posts, frequently appointed by the Communist Party apparatus in Moscow, but they are also key players in regional party organizations. These are tight-knit groups, because only about 6 percent of the 285 million people in the Soviet Union are party members. Yet the Communist Party runs everything in the Soviet Union.

Kerr said that CIA intelligence operations are changing as East-West military tensions, together with the possibility of surprise attack, lessen and the Bush-Gorbachev summits on nuclear arms reductions bear fruit. However, he said, the need for CIA intelligence remains vital for tracking developments in chemical and biological weapons, which are otherwise extremely difficult to monitor.

He said the CIA continues to make changes in its own way of operating, placing higher priorities on studying and forecasting economic and public opinion changes all over the globe.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
MAINE SUNDAY TELEGRAM
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Reaction to Gaza Strip Killings

TOM BROKAW: The weekend massacre of seven Palestinians by an Israeli man has triggered protests that threaten to expand to civil war in that country. And tonight there are ominous signs that the whole Middle East could be inflamed. Israeli soldiers shot and killed three Arab protesters and wounded close to a hundred in the Gaza Strip today.

NBC's Martin Fletcher tells us tonight this is a time of agony for both sides.

MARTIN FLETCHER: This is Israel's worst nightmare, that Israeli Arabs, Israeli citizens will join hands with their Palestinian cousins who live under occupation and rebel against Israel. It happened today in Nazareth, East Jerusalem, half-a-dozen other Arab towns.

Because these are Israeli citizens, the police, not the army, put down the protests. No deaths, no wounded.

A different story in Gaza, where there were deaths and wounded, although the 650,000 Arabs there are under curfew.

The outbreak of violence is all in protest over yesterday's massacre of seven Palestinians near Tel Aviv. This man did it. He stole his brother's army uniform and assault rifle and fired into a crowd of a hundred Palestinians. Police said he's deranged. And Israeli leaders warned Arabs not to use the tragedy to stir up the uprising.

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER BENJAMIN NETANYAHU: This is the opportunity they've been

waiting for. The intifada has been dying out. They hope they can resuscitate the violence and the bloodshed. We hope we don't.

FLETCHER: But they are. In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees call for revenge and promise to attack Israeli targets. In Jordan, a Palestinian took revenge, shouting, "This is for the Gaza martyrs," as he shot up a busload of French tourists, wounding nine. He was arrested. And in Syria, Palestinian leader George Habash promised to help the occupied Palestinians until Israel is overthrown.

That's bad enough, but the worst for Israel would be if Israeli Arabs really did join in the uprising that began 2 1/2 years ago. But that doesn't seem likely. You can see the difference in the way police relate to the youths who moments before were throwing stones. The emotions are real but the hatred is missing.

TUFIK TUBI [Arab Member of Parliament]: Let people express their feelings of protest, of solidarity. This is legal.

FLETCHER: But not if they burn banks, stone the police, call for their own state.

This is what the Israelis didn't want. The big fear is that the uprising will take off again and the violence will spread, not only in the occupied territories, but in Israel proper.

Martin Fletcher, NBC News, Nazareth, Israel.

BROKAW: In this country, the White House is concerned for several reasons: the senseless loss of life, first of all; the damage done to the chances for a peace agreement; and the possible impact on

DEFENSE DIALOG



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TUESDAY, May 22, 1990

Radio & TV Reports, Washington, D.C. Summaries not to be quoted.


Tuesday, May 22, 1990 (Broadcasts of Monday, May 21, 1990)

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS EDITION

REACTION TO GAZA STRIP KILLINGS: Violent demonstrations spread from the Gaza Strip into Israel proper in response to the killing of seven Palestinians by a deranged Israeli. A State Department spokesman was critical of Israel, linking the violence to Israel's rejection of an American peace plan. U.S. officials are reportedly concerned that the incident will further reduce the prospects of an early release for the remaining hostages held in Lebanon. Reports by Martin Fletcher and John Cochran, NBC; Bob Simon, CBS.

NORIEGA CASE UPDATE: The Federal Government has agreed to pay for lawyers defending Manuel Noriega. Report by Peter Jennings, ABC.

CHINESE POLITICAL PRISONERS: In an apparent effort to dampen international criticism, China has begun releasing some of its political prisoners. Human rights experts say there are no firm figures on how many political prisoners there are in China, but that the number is undoubtedly staggering. Report by Todd Carrel, ABC.



American hostages still being held in Lebanon.

NBC's John Cochran is traveling with the President tonight.

JOHN COCHRAN: White House aides traveling with President Bush on the West Coast say the carnage in Israel is the kind of tragedy no one could predict. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said, "It's a mess."

In Washington, pro-Palestinian demonstrators outside the State Department protested the spilling of Arab blood. And the State Department was surprisingly critical of Israel. A spokesman linked the violent weekend to Israel's rejection of an American peace plan for Israeli talks with Palestinians.

RICHARD BOUCHER: We're disturbed by the number of casualties inflicted by the Israeli army.

Well, in the absence of a peace process, the potential for this kind of senseless violence and spiraling responses afterwards goes up.

COCHRAN: U.S. officials say that since the Israeli accused of killing seven Arabs seems to be mentally deranged, his actions should not affect the American hostages in Lebanon. But logic and Lebanon do not always go together, as was evident today when a Hezbollah leader in Beirut, Hussain Musawi, said the killings of the Palestinian workers will have a negative impact on Western hostages.

After the release of two hostages last month, President Bush hoped the others would soon be freed. But by last week, even before the killings in Israel, the President was losing hope that a process had

begun to free all hostages.

PRESIDENT BUSH: I see no reason to be encouraged that the process is under way.

COCHRAN: Those holding the Americans have demanded the release of these Lebanese prisoners held by the Israelis. President Bush has refused to pressure Israel to release them, mostly because Bush wants to avoid anything that looks like a hostage swap.

But the Bush Administration is willing to pressure Israel to talk peace with the Palestinians. The President believes that once that happens, a lot of good things could follow, including good news for the American hostages.

John Cochran, NBC News, Los Angeles.

Big Bad John Sununu

He's smarter than you are, and he wants you to know it. That's why George Bush prizes his brusque but brilliant White House chief of staff




By **DAN GOODGAME**

The winds lay calm on the Caribbean that evening, but 30,000 feet up in a White House jet the President's chief of staff was stirring a political storm. Returning to

Washington from the inauguration of Costa Rica's new leader, John Sununu wandered to the rear of the Boeing 707 to schmooze with the traveling press. But first he shed his suit jacket, his title and his name. At his insistence, Sununu was now a "senior White House official."

The conversation quickly turned to the hottest topic of the week: Could Sununu reconcile President Bush's campaign pledge of "no new taxes" with his invitation for congressional leaders to join him in budget talks with "no preconditions"? Sununu shook his head impatiently.



At the Old Executive Office Building: despite his reputation for rudeness, Sununu has emerged as Bush's most inspired choice for any senior post
He and Bush are like a wrestling tag team — Gentleman George and Snarlin' Sununu; the King of Kind and Gentle and his Dark Prince.

"We're allowing the Democrats to bring their good arguments for taxes to the table," he said. "And it is our prerogative to say no. And I emphasize the *no*."

How, then, asked a reporter, could Bush be sincere about no preconditions? Were there any circumstances, another inquired, under which he would trade new taxes for cuts in federal spending? "You've got a one-track mind on a trivial question," Sununu snapped, his voice rising. "Small minds ask small questions."

It says a great deal about John Sununu's reputation for rudeness that, when the "small minds" quote appeared on the front page of the *Washington Post* the next morning, half the town knew immediately which "senior official" was talking. The Democrats whom Bush was trying to lure into budget talks accused the Administration of negotiating in bad faith. But Sununu had accomplished his goal: reassur-

vana with a funny name. Bush pointedly ignored the protests of such close advisers as Secretary of State James Baker, leading the Washington establishment to conclude that he had "done another Quayle." Sununu was obviously brilliant: a three-term Governor of New Hampshire and former engineering professor with an IQ estimated at 180. He had been an invaluable political asset, rescuing Bush's faltering campaign by masterminding a victory in the New Hampshire primary. But he lacked any experience in the clannish world of Washington and was so relentlessly abrasive that one wag dubbed him "Morton Downey Jr. with a Ph.D." The smart money gave him at most a year in the job.

That was 16 months ago. Today Bush is surfing along at 60%-plus public-approval ratings, and much of the credit falls to Sununu. His White House displays al-

ting tag team on late-night cable: Gentleman George and Snarlin' Sununu; the King of Kind and Gentle and his Dark Prince. Bush may call himself the Environmental President and the Education President, but he has Sununu to make sure that this rhetoric stays relatively cheap.

Their slap-and-stroke routine extends to Oval Office meetings, where Bush is unfailingly gracious, whether with earnest junior staffers or craven special pleaders. It is Sununu's role to wring useful information out of unctuous presentations and rebut one-sided arguments, and he delights in it. Bush clearly relishes the edge and the rigor that Sununu provides. "He has made a lot of friends for our Administration," Bush says, "on the basis of competence, sheer competence."

But as the President knows, Sununu has also made plenty of enemies through sheer insolence. He slammed down the phone



Sununu cemented his relationship with Bush during the darkest moment of the 1988 campaign. "Don't you see," he asked a friend, "how much good I'm going to be able to do for the next President?"

ing the Republican faithful and the voters that Bush remains staunchly opposed to any broad new taxes. When the President subsequently dissociated himself from Sununu's remarks in a chat with House Speaker Tom Foley, the strategy was complete. Bush was able to posture as Mr. Fiscal Responsibility, willing to entertain any proposal, including higher taxes, to help balance the budget.

This good-cop, bad-cop routine has become a staple of the Bush White House. No one plays the heavy better than Sununu, and no one takes more heat on Bush's behalf. That is why Bush picked Sununu as his right-hand man, and why he prizes him.

When he named Sununu his chief of staff shortly after the 1988 election, Bush handed the ultimate insider's job to a bumptious outsider with a chip on his shoulder: a double-hyphenated Lebanese- and Greek-American, born in Ha-

most none of the backbiting and leaking that roiled the Reagan Administration. He adroitly appeases fellow right-wing Republicans who have never much trusted Bush. On the other flank, Sununu exuberantly baits environmentalists and others into blaming him, rather than the President, when the Administration backslides from Bush's gauzy promises. Though he possesses no more "vision" than Bush does, Sununu has substituted a quiet and canny strategy to attain the President's paramount goal: re-election in 1992.

In fact, Sununu has emerged as Bush's most inspired choice for any senior post. Amid the bland Washington-retread Wasps with whom Bush has peopled much of his Cabinet and staff, Sununu adds both spice and balance. His brisk certainty and willingness to take bold stands complement his risk-averse boss.

The two play off each other like a wres-

During moments of crisis, Sununu is never far from the President's side. He and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft listened as Bush consulted with foreign leaders during the Panama invasion.



during a foreign policy argument with Republican Congressman Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma. He shouted obscenities at Senate Republican leader Bob Dole's press secretary over a routine news release. He berated House Republican leader Bob Michel for not supporting the President with sufficient enthusiasm, moving Michel to note that "sometimes we have to remind Governor Sununu that this is not the New Hampshire legislature." Democratic Senator Tim Wirth of Colorado says what many Washington insiders feel: Sununu "thinks he's the only smart guy in town. He shows little respect for anyone else's intelligence or point of view."

Nor is Sununu above using double-dealing and deception to achieve the President's goals. In March he told Delaware Democrat Joseph Biden that Bush would veto the clean-air bill the Senate was debating if it included an expensive amendment. Meanwhile, he privately told Idaho Republican Steve Symms just the opposite.

Symms had favored the amendment because he hoped it would trigger a veto of the bill, which Symms opposed as too tough on polluting industries. Sununu led Symms to believe the amendment would only make things worse because Bush was inclined to sign the clean-air bill with or without it. Both Senators voted against the amendment, and it was dropped from the bill—precisely what the President wanted.

Sununu does not think like Bush or any other let's-make-a-deal politician. He was trained as an engineer and a debater, and it shows. The engineer in him enormously enjoys the substantive questions of governance: What kind of pollution control is cost-effective? Which jet fighter technologies should we share with Japan? To such questions, Sununu brings voracious curiosity, a keen analytical gift and near total recall. Budget Director Richard Darman, Sununu's only intellectual peer in the Bush inner circle, points out that "Sununu is trained in fluid dynamics and has a good

ment of individuals, however, Sununu shows astute insight into groups. He cleverly divines which arguments will be most persuasive to which audiences. And though he is deeply conservative on social issues like abortion, Sununu is supple and ambitious enough to accommodate the raging moderation of George Bush.

In a city of strange bedfellows, Bush and Sununu make one of the oddest couples ever: ideologically, temperamentally, even physically. A common sight around the White House is the 6-ft. 2-in. Bush, his lanky frame impeccably clad in an \$800 suit, trailed by what an admirer calls "this fat little pirate," 5 ft. 9 in., 190 lbs., his wavy hair tousled, sweating, with tie loosened, jacket off, sleeves rolled up, pants sagging beneath his paunch and shirttail sneaking out in the back.

The contrast extends to the hours they prefer, even their table manners. Bush bounds eagerly out of bed at 5:30 a.m., and

Ask Sununu to name an influential teacher or a prize student, and none comes immediately to mind. He looms larger in others' lives than they do in his.

Unlike Bush, who keeps a Rolodex of his 6,000 closest "friends," Sununu reserves his warmth for a handful of close friends and his family. Once, after a Bush political dinner in Miami that ended well past midnight, a reporter saw Sununu heading out to spend three hours, round trip, on I-95, just for a brief visit with his parents, now retired in Gulf Stream, Fla.

Sununu jealously reserves most weekends for his wife Nancy, a fund raiser for the Republican Governors Association, and their children at their four-bedroom home in Oakton, Va., 17 miles northwest of the White House. Asked his greatest accomplishment, Sununu replies without hesitation, "Eight great kids." An avid softball player, he enjoys taking swings in the batting cages with the two youngest sons, Chris, 15, and Peter, 10, who still live



Even the self-confident chief of staff can find himself at sea. At the Malta summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Sununu braved the tumultuous Mediterranean aboard the presidential launch.

One of the most frequent sights around the White House is the tall and impeccably clad President, trailed by what an admirer calls "this fat little pirate."



sense of the dynamics of a problem," unlike lesser minds, who "see the world in static terms."

But years before he studied engineering, Sununu was whipping older boys in high school debate tournaments. Then as now, he could argue either side of a question with equal gusto. Unlike lawyers, debaters never seek friendly, out-of-court settlements: their goal is to intellectually destroy the opponent. Sununu wields his prodigious memory like a sword, inundating his adversary with data. And he resorts early and often to ad hominem bullying. Observes a senior White House official: "There is something in Sununu's personality where he cannot stay in his seat if someone says or does something that he thinks is foolish. He feels obliged to immediately expose the person as a fool."

Sununu often discounts the intelligence of those who do not debate as ferociously as he. For all his brusque misjudg-

always has. Sununu is a night owl who, when studying engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, would organize a marathon bridge game or keep fraternity brothers awake while thwocking a lacrosse ball off his wall, then handle his homework in an hour or so before class. Bush is so exquisitely considerate that at meals, without breaking conversation, he will shift his water glass to give the waiter more room as he arrives with the soup. When Sununu receives guests in his White House office, he will pour himself a cup of coffee (he drinks only decaf, which everyone agrees is a good thing) and grab a handful of M&M's without offering anything to anyone else.

For pop psychologists who believe that politicians play out their inner conflicts in public, Sununu is a study in narcissism. The world revolves around him. He's O.K.; you're probably not O.K. He is smarter than you are, and he wants you to know it.

at home. Sununu plays third base much the way he plays chief of staff: setting up almost in the batter's face to cut off the bunt and daring him to get one past.

For a time, Sununu wrote stories and poems for children. Concord lawyer Ned Helms recalls that when his wife fell ill, Sununu gave her a book of poems that he said he enjoyed, by Sylvia Plath. A voracious speed reader, Sununu keeps about three books going at a time: from a biography of Richard Nixon to a thriller by Tom Clancy to a tome called *The Theory of Numbers*, which his executive assistant, Ed Rogers, dryly describes as "recreational mathematics." During spare moments on Air Force One, he plays with Game Boy, a hand-held Nintendo video game.

Sununu's humor runs toward practical jokes (dressing Budget Director Darman in a gorilla suit for Bush's birthday), physical gags (suddenly flopping like a high jumper over the back of his office couch)

and, of course, sarcasm. After the White House lost a major struggle on Capitol Hill, Sununu arrived at his morning senior staff session to find his chief lobbyist, Fred McClure, perusing the newspapers. "What are you reading, Fred?" Sununu rasped. "The help-wanted ads?"

In February, after cocaine lords threatened to shoot down the President's plane as it flew to a summit meeting with South American leaders in Colombia, reporters pressed for more details about security arrangements. Sununu deadpanned, "We're gonna paint the press plane to look like Air Force One, and we're gonna send it in ahead of the President." The following month, when Bush learned that critics of his AIDS policy might try to disrupt a speech he was to deliver, he peevishly told his aides, "Well, then I just won't give the speech." Sununu raised his eyebrows and said, "This, from the man who braved the drug lords of Cartagena?" Bush laughed—and gave the speech.

Sununu's most common expression is not a scowl but a pixieish, if somewhat smug, little smile. Even his characteristic fits of trash-can-kicking fury pass quickly. Still, most White House officials have learned not to take bad news to Sununu before getting a "weather report" of his mood from his deputy, Andy Card.

Sununu, like Bush, grew up in the shadow of a highly successful father in a comfortable home in a leafy bedroom community, attended private boarding school and displayed nary a flicker of rebellion. The crucial difference is that Bush was heir to both material and social comfort, while Sununu was always an outsider.

He was born in 1939 in Havana, where his father briefly distributed foreign films and other imported products. His father, whose parents were Lebanese, grew up in Boston. His mother hailed from El Salvador, though her parents were Lebanese and Greek. When Sununu was an infant, his family migrated to the tony neighborhood of Forest Hills, N.Y. Their home was filled with letters from relatives in half a dozen countries as well as books and conversations in several languages. Thanks to his mother, childhood trips to Europe and college studies, Sununu is fluent in Spanish, speaks decent French and reads German. But all his life he has been teased about his name. Even Bush once joked that he picked Sununu because his surname rhymed with "deep doo-doo." In Arabic, *sununu* means sparrow, and appears often in poetry and songs.

Almost as soon as he entered Catholic parochial school, little Johnny was spotted as something special. He was athletic, outgoing and excelled at his studies. He won a full scholarship to La Salle Military Academy, a boarding school on eastern Long Island. There Sununu rose to lieutenant colonel and commanded the other cadets. On graduation day, he won so many awards that the headmaster, rather than call him from his seat again and again, simply handed him a silver bowl and had him stand on-stage to collect his loot. Though Sununu insists that he displayed no interest in politics until 1969, his fellow seniors in 1957 voted him Class Politician, as well as Outstanding Senior Student, Outstanding Orator, Most Energetic and Most Likely to Succeed.

Sununu went to M.I.T., where he earned a doctorate and founded an engineering firm. He met a young woman named Nancy Hayes, a tall, fair-haired, Irish American from Boston College. She

As the nation's economy recovered, New Hampshire's boomed by attracting vacationers and high-tech companies. Never a Reaganite, antigovernment conservative, Sununu presided over an expansion in state revenues and expenditures. He brought computerized management to inefficient state agencies, increased spending on mental-health programs, expanded prisons and set aside more land for parks. Then as now, Sununu took a generally dim view of environmental activists, as he championed the unpopular Seabrook nuclear power plant. But after careful study, he promoted curbs on the air pollutants that cause acid rain.

He also emerged as a prominent spokesman for Arab Americans, a role that prompted suspicion from pro-Israel groups. Those doubts grew in 1986 when Sununu refused to sign a proclamation denouncing the U.N. resolution that equated Zionism with racism. He has since met with many supporters of Israel and convinced them that he means no harm to their cause. At the same time, in speeches to Arab-American groups, he has spoken forcefully of the "spleen" and "frustration" he feels over anti-Arab prejudice.

Sununu cemented his relationship with Bush during the darkest moment of the 1988 campaign. Bush had just been clobbered by Bob Dole in the Iowa caucuses. And his lead in the polls was evaporating only a week before the primary in New Hampshire, where Sununu was running the Bush campaign. A friend who stopped by to cheer up Sununu found him staring out the window

in the Governor's office. "I just heard the news from Iowa," said the friend, "and thought you might like to talk about it." Sununu turned from the window with a wolfish grin and replied, "Yeah, isn't it great?" Then, seeing his visitor's puzzlement, he explained that the Iowa defeat had left Bush desperate for a win. "Don't you see," he confided, "how much good I'm going to be able to do for the next President of the United States?"

Sununu delivered on his boast. He persuaded Bush to become at once more folksy among voters and more slashingly negative toward his opponents—particularly in TV ads that attacked Dole as a closet taxpayer. The shift in tactics propelled Bush to victory in New Hampshire and dramatically revived his campaign.

The one Washington job besides chief of staff that interested Sununu was Vice President. Bush asked him to submit disclosure forms as a potential running mate,



Skiing with a fellow conservative, Vice President Dan Quayle

Making friends through competence and losing them through insolence.

found him smart and funny and "very sure for his age of where he was going." They married at age 20.

After graduation, Sununu taught engineering at Tufts University. At 27, he was a professor running his own consulting firm on the side. In 1969 he moved his family just across the state line, to Salem, N.H., in search of lower taxes and "a better life-style for my family." There he began his political career, winning a spot on the local planning board, then a seat as a state representative. He ran unsuccessfully for a number of higher offices, including state and U.S. Senator, before finally winning the governorship in 1982. That victory came at the trough of the Reagan recession. Sununu prevailed by promising to balance the state budget without broad-based new taxes. New Hampshire is one of the few states with no state personal-income or sales tax.

and some of his supporters were so encouraged that they brought BUSH-SUNUNU placards to the Republican Convention at the New Orleans Superdome. Bush's selection of Dan Quayle badly disappointed Sununu, who pretended to return a pair of expensive suits, folded up, to a haberdasher friend in Manchester. He explained, only half jokingly, that "they didn't get me the nomination, so I want my money back."

As his chief of staff, says a presidential adviser outside the government, Bush wanted someone "who would not get along *too well* with the Congress, *too well* with the press, *too well* with the staff." That conviction hardened as Bush watched, with deepening wariness, the performance of his close friend Jim Baker as Ronald Reagan's chief of staff. Baker expertly ingratiated himself with lawmakers, journalists and others, often at the expense of Reagan. He distanced himself from unpopular decisions and took credit for those that worked out well. The pattern, Bush felt, carried over from the Reagan White House to the 1988 campaign.

Sununu, on the other hand, is a natural lightning rod. He is not only willing to take heat for the President but "loves to take heat—and gives as good as he gets," says New Hampshire G.O.P. Senator Warren Rudman, a Sununu friend. As Bush's bad cop on environmental issues, Sununu drew the fire of the Sierra Club and other activist groups, which denounced him for consistently siding with corporate polluters. They scarcely mentioned Bush, even though Sununu was only carrying out the President's policies. Such loyalty is prized by all chief executives, but especially by George Bush. Moreover, Sununu's unorthodox political calculations have often been vindicated, most impressively when he has stood against the consensus of more seasoned Bush advisers.

Example: the Senate in late January sought to override Bush's veto of a bill that would have allowed Chinese students who feared persecution in their homeland in the wake of last year's Tiananmen massacre to remain in the U.S. The bill had passed the Senate overwhelmingly, and most of his advisers recommended that Bush not invest his prestige in an uphill battle to uphold his veto. Sununu strongly disagreed. He persuaded Bush to put a full-court press on every Republican Senator, promising to protect the students by Executive Order without offending the

prickly Chinese leadership. What was at stake, Sununu stressed, was the President's ability to conduct foreign policy without congressional meddling. The argument worked and the veto stuck.

Example: on the eve of the Nicaraguan election in February, "everyone here hoped the resistance would win, but only Sununu really believed it and said so," recalls Robert Gates, the deputy national security adviser. When intelligence experts predicted victory for the Sandinista government, Sununu argued that they must be missing something: Nicaraguans had to be fed up with their crashing economy, even though under such a repressive regime they would be afraid to tell pollsters the truth. During Bush's morning intelligence update on the Friday before the election, a CIA briefer again predicted a Sandinista victory, and Sununu puckishly bet him an ice-cream sundae that he was wrong. On the following Monday morning, the CIA man had to pay up.

Sununu is consolidating his role as the Administration's de facto chief political

preparing "wedge" issues to sharply distinguish Republicans from Democrats. These include opposition to broad new taxes, support for a constitutional ban on flag burning, and aggressive brandishment of the presidential veto to hold down government spending. Mindful that voters are more inclined to trust Republicans than Democrats on law-and-order issues, Sununu has pushed to define the drug issue to his party's advantage. In his view, curbing drug abuse is more a matter of hiring cops and building prisons than of education and treatment. The latter, says a senior Republican, are things "any fool Democrat can do."

It is a sound political strategy. But the question remains whether Sununu will be around to see it implemented. Those who know him best say there is no limit to his abilities or political ambitions. When a well-wisher at Sununu's inauguration as Governor remarked to his mother that she must be very proud, she replied, "Oh, Governor is nice, but President—now that would really be something."

For his part, Sununu says he wishes only "to serve George Bush as long as he wants me"—for eight years, he hopes. That would be a feat never accomplished since the advent of the modern chief of staff. Yet for Sununu to survive two full terms, he might have to temper the fire-eating act that wins him Bush's respect and trust, which are in turn the source of his power. As a senior White House official observes, "Although there appears to be mortal combat in Washington, most people here treat one another with extraordinary respect. There is a lot of continuity, and people have to

live and work together for a long time. So the Sununu approach would be better for a short-timer than a longtimer."

The early defeat Bush and Sununu suffered in the Senate over the nomination of John Tower as Defense Secretary is an object lesson in the perils of arrogance. Tower was for years a power in Washington as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee—but like Sununu, he made enemies he did not need to make, including fellow Senators. And, though it took a while, Tower got his payback when his colleagues denied him his crowning glory at the Pentagon.

A Lebanese proverb holds that "one kisses the hand that one cannot yet bite." John Sununu doesn't work that way. The rest of Washington does. —With reporting by Michael Duffy/Washington



A family portrait: Sununu says his greatest accomplishment is "eight great kids"

Unlike his boss, he does not have a Rolodex listing 6,000 close "friends."

officer. Last week, after Jim Wray, director of the White House political office, took a new job at the Republican National Committee, Sununu put his executive assistant, Ed Rogers, in charge. From the beginning, Sununu has served as a key political liaison to right-wing Republicans. He assiduously solicits their views and appoints their candidates to key second-level posts in the Administration: for example, placing staunch opponents of abortion at the Department of Health and Human Services.

Sununu is quietly shaping a handful of issues on which Bush can run for re-election. On one front—clean air, child care, education reform, help for the disabled—Sununu and Bush are stealing popular issues that traditionally belong to the Democrats. On another the White House is

NATO MINISTERS TO CONFER:

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney joins NATO defense ministers in Brussels, Belgium, this week to evaluate the diminished Soviet threat and chart the future of the Western military alliance. The meeting follows U.S.-Soviet agreement, announced Saturday in Moscow, on cooperation to ban production of chemical weapons and resolution of major disputes on cutting long-range nuclear arms. The defense ministers will focus on NATO's plans for its armies and non-nuclear weaponry, and to hear an updated report on the threat posed by Soviet forces. "....The threat may not have disappeared totally, but it certainly would appear to be headed in that direction," said Cheney in a speech Friday at the State Department. (AP)

WIRE NEWS HIGHLIGHTS

CHENEY EYES ARMS ISSUE: The Bush administration is proposing new ideas to solve certain issues holding up East-West agreement on reducing conventional forces in Europe, said Defense Secretary Dick Cheney Friday in an interview with Associated Press Broadcast Services. He confirmed the proposals were taken to Moscow by Secretary of State James A. Baker III. But gave no details about the proposals except to say they were developed by himself, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser **Brent Scowcroft**. Cheney said the conventional forces talks were complicated and that he believed the Soviets have slowed the talks down. (AP)

2nd summit is expected in November

President Bush will go to Moscow — probably in November — for another super-power summit with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

The goal, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said Monday in Portland, Ore., is signing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — or START — after more than eight years of complicated negotiations.

Secretary of State James Baker, who jump-started the treaty process during the past weekend in Moscow, briefs Bush on the treaty today.

During a summit in Washington next week, Bush and

Gorbachev will initial an outline of the treaty — calling for limits on air- and sea-launched cruise missiles.

Details of the agreement remain to be worked out before the two presidents can formally sign it.

Speculation earlier had Gorbachev visiting Brown University in Providence, R.I., to address graduates. He won't go, but he will take time out from next week's summit in Wash-

ington to receive an honorary Brown doctorate.

Gorbachev also got a vote of confidence at home Monday: Parliament gave him a pay increase to 4,000 rubles (\$6,400) a month from the current 1,500 rubles (\$2,400). But he now will be required to pay Soviet income taxes on his salary.

He also gets an entertainment budget and residences in Moscow and the Crimea.

— Jessica Lee

KEN ADELMAN

Out of place at a skewed summit

It's shaping up as the "skewed summit," after Secretary of State James Baker's setup session with the Soviets.

Next week's full-scale Bush-Gorbachev summit is skewed — first and foremost and favorably for us — since it's the first U.S.-Soviet summit since the 1950s of palpably unequal powers. Even when President Eisenhower and Nikita Khrushchev met in those post-Sputnik days, the Soviet Union conducted itself as a power on the rise.

No longer. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is clearly drowning in the sea of troubles, straining to keep his sliding economy afloat and disintegrating empire a whole. Only his consummate skills as a politician and sparkling presence mask his relative weakness.

Despite its splash, this summit seems a sideshow to Soviets. Little that President Bush *could* do and nothing he *should* do can address or redress Mr. Gorbachev's woes. They're his to tackle or juggle.

What the Marquis de Custine wrote 150 years ago has come to pass: "The Russians have rotted before they have ripened." Mr. Gorbachev, who scorns the "stagnation years of Brezhnev," has by his own admission begun with an economy in stagnation and man-

aged to make things worse.

It's a skewed summit since the Bush administration has allowed Moscow to maneuver arms control into the middle, as the main measure of movement.

The most amazing things are happening in the real world! Yet Mr. Bush seems poised to lunge for the capillaries in the world of arms-control arcania.

Handed the rare opportunity to be "present at the creation" of a new world, and molders of that world, Mr. Bush's team operates less like Harry Truman and Dean Acheson and more like technicians. The minutiae of arms control can overshadow and overwhelm the historic issues of European security, German unity and overall stability.

The summit is skewed since the administration let the Soviets move strategic arms ahead of a conventional arms agreement, which Mr. Bush initially claimed would accomplish more.

He then was right. For a conventional agreement sought to help end the Cold War where and how it began, with the imposition of Soviet troops in Central Europe.

Sadly, the Soviets so far just say no to such a scheme. Sadder still, the administration just says OK to such Soviet stonewalling.

It's skewed since, even within the strategic realm, Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev aim only for an "agreement in principle," which the Reagan administration steadily shunned.

And for good reason. George Marshall once said, "Don't ask me to agree in principle; that just means that we haven't agreed yet."

Few folks fathom that such an agreement is *not* a real arms agreement. Areas of disagreements are therein shoved aside or jacked up to a lofty level of abstraction.

When the ink was drying on the last strategic "agreement in principle," the Vladivostok Accord of 1974, each side started squabbling over whether Backfire bombers and

cruise missiles — ironically, two of the most contentious issues 16 years later — were included or not.

It took five years after Vladivostok for SALT II to be finished. Mr. Baker now sees that done in five months.

Tired and tried, Mr. Baker admitted in Moscow, "Of course, there are still several remaining issues, details" yet to resolve. Many aren't "details" at all. Setting limitations on mobile missiles, Soviet heavy missile tests and Backfire bombers — and fashioning a whole host of verification schemes — have bedeviled negotiators for a decade.

Finally, it's a skewed summit since even a complete START accord can't match its billing.

Arms control resembles medieval love — pure and chaste when viewed from afar. It's only when facing Dulcinea close up that she loses some of her lure.

A START accord will become less enchanting as the public faces that it will *not* save much, if any, money, reduce the overall numbers of strategic weapons, or strengthen strategic stability significantly.

Before joining the Bush administration as national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft — along with our current ambassador to conventional arms talks, R. James Woolsey, and expert John Deutch — concluded that START could push the United States into "a new kind of triad: vulnerability, wishful thinking and a hair trigger." Not terribly reassuring but still true.

As Dulcinea approaches, the luster tarnishes. Already Mr. Baker has changed START's billing from a 50 percent strategic cut down to 30 percent.

But as the summit approaches, expectations rise. For they are fun. All presidents adore summits, for the glitz they provide and for the "breakthroughs" they anticipate from them.

Still it's good to remember that a summit is like Cleopatra: luring and exciting to be involved with, yet tricky to handle well.

Ken Adelman is a nationally syndicated columnist.

May 26, 1990

No Sharp Elbows

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft displays little aggressiveness in creating policies. But his influence may come from knowing his subject and being close to the President.

BY CHRISTOPHER MADISON

Brent Scowcroft believes that national security advisers should be seen and not heard.

As President Bush's national security adviser, Scowcroft has become a familiar face: newspaper and magazine pictures show him huddling in the Oval Office with his boss and White House chief of staff John H. Sununu. Odds are, however, that the accompanying articles, if they're not about Bush, concern the controversial Sununu, not Scowcroft.

In a job where power and influence are the subject of bragging rights, Scowcroft, who held the same post in the Ford Administration (when Bush was director of central intelligence), is self-effacing to a fault. He seems content to continue his career in the background, if not the shadows, of foreign policy.

"Scowcroft *reflects* the President rather than influences him," said a foreign policy expert outside of government. "Scowcroft is by Bush's side constantly, and Bush has his own foreign policy ideas. That makes Scowcroft the implementer and interpreter of the President's policy."

"Brent Scowcroft is an immensely important figure," a National Security Council (NSC) staff member from the Reagan Administration said.

That's why his anonymity is somehow unsettling. During the past year, when the Berlin Wall was crumbling, the Soviet empire appeared on the verge of collapse and much of postwar foreign policy was becoming obsolete, one almost expected a certain razzmatazz from the President's national security adviser. But the slight, polite Scowcroft offers little that is jazzy, even in a geopolitical context.

Scowcroft's aides at the NSC are also nearly invisible. In contrast with the Reagan Administration NSC, where the heavy ideology of Richard V. Allen pre-



National security adviser Brent Scowcroft
"The NSC's morale doesn't depend on getting in the newspapers."

Richard A. Bloom



Deputy security adviser Robert M. Gates
Scowcroft gets a fair hearing for all views.

ceded the cowboy diplomacy of Oliver L. North, Scowcroft's staff is a corral of relative unknowns. (See box, p. 1280.)

The NSC staff in past Administrations was more than just a source of embarrassment—Iran-contra was a historical aberration, most observers agree—it was a talent pool of policy initiators. Under Scowcroft so far, little policy has been initiated, at least not visibly. "Most of these guys are Washington insiders," a lobbyist said. "They are not going to shake anything up like the crowd during the Reagan Administration."

The Scowcroft NSC is also small—150 persons, down from 200 before Bush—and staff members concentrate on mundane but necessary tasks, such as preparing Bush for his whirlwind schedule of foreign visitors, telephone calls, trips and summits, and coordinating interagency decision processes.

As a result, the NSC is sometimes forgotten when the Bush White House is analyzed and portrayed. "This is the fourth President I've served under on the NSC staff," said Robert M. Gates, Scowcroft's deputy, "and I would say that the NSC staff probably gets less attention than under any of those."

An insight into the current NSC's character could be gleaned early in Bush's term, when, at Scowcroft's suggestion,

Bush ordered a review of the Reagan Administration's approval of the plan to co-develop with Japan the tactical jet fighter known as the Fighter Support Experimental (FSX).

As Gates recalled it, the FSX program "came to us pretty tangled from the Reagan Administration because the Department of Commerce and some others felt like they hadn't gotten a fair hearing. And so, we basically started over and made sure that everybody had a fair shot and got a fair hearing."

Scowcroft "figured the FSX was too important to be forced down the throats of the agencies," another NSC aide said. In the end, after the review, the Administration came to the same decision the Reagan White House came to, the aide said, "but no one can complain: It was a sound choice. That's the kind of player [Scowcroft] is."

Gates said, "When a controversial issue goes to the President, everybody's views are going to be fairly represented." The Scowcroft trademark, he added, is to generate "a confidence in the legitimacy of the process."

IN BAKER'S SHADOW

Scowcroft, 65, began his White House career as a military aide during the Nixon Administration in 1971, when he was an Army general. A year later, he became deputy to then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger. After Kissinger had become Secretary of State and President Nixon had resigned, Scowcroft moved up as President Ford's national security adviser.

His association with Kissinger continued when the former Secretary of State launched a consulting firm, Kissinger and Associates, in the early 1980s. (In the Bush era, the firm has contributed two other key members to the foreign policy apparatus: deputy secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger and NSC counselor Peter W. Rodman.)

The comment heard most often about Scowcroft these days is that, as Gates put it, "there is a very strong deference to [Secretary of State James A. Baker III] as the principal foreign policy spokesman of the Administration."

It should come as no surprise that Scowcroft is self-effacing in his NSC role. In 1987, as a member of the President's Special Review Board investigating the Iran-contra scandal (the so-called Tower Commission), Scowcroft sketched out his view of the role of the national security adviser: "The Secretary of State has traditionally been the President's spokesman on matters of national security and foreign affairs. To the extent that the national security adviser speaks publicly on these matters, . . . the result may be confusion as to what is the President's policy."

Alton Frye, Washington representative of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City, who is a friend of Scowcroft's, said in an interview: "I've always taken seriously Brent's conception of the role of the national security adviser and staff. They are not there to garner the limelight, but to be a sensible presence and minimize the friction [between the various players]. I don't think you'll find any jealousy for Baker's role. I think he's comfortable with Baker out front."

Of his relationship with Baker, Scowcroft, in an interview, said: "I think it's very good. We get along, and we have similar outlooks. We do have differences, but they are amicable."

At the same time, there is a hint that Scowcroft and his aides may be moving out front more often, to publicly assert their role in the Administration's policy deliberations and to counter the widely held view that Baker is, in the words of one of his predecessors, the vicar of U.S. foreign policy.

"I don't think there is anyone knowledgeable about foreign policy in Washington or abroad that has any misapprehension about the role that Brent plays in formulation of foreign policy," Gates said.

A Democratic congressional aide said: "The NSC is keeping a lower profile. That doesn't mean it is not influential: just that you can't see what it's doing." Perhaps to suggest a more visible NSC role, Gates recently accompanied Baker to Moscow for his meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

Nevertheless, Baker, so far, has won the public relations battles to establish the notion that he and his aides are in charge of most policy initiatives. A comment by a congressional foreign policy aide is typical: "Everyone knows Baker's in charge."

Baker's operating mode at State has become a source of curiosity in Washington foreign policy circles. It also explains the NSC's low profile. Baker has surrounded himself with a handful of close aides, by all accounts shutting out most career foreign service officers at the State Department as well as at the NSC.

Baker's circle includes Robert M. Kimmitt, undersecretary of State for political affairs; Robert B. Zoellick, Baker's executive secretary; and Dennis B. Ross, chief of State's policy planning office. Two others close to Baker are spokeswoman Margaret D. Tutwiler and Janet G. Mullins, assistant secretary for legislative affairs. Of this entourage, only Ross is a bona fide foreign policy expert. The rest are considered quick studies whose primary skill is anticipating Baker's way of looking at—and solving—problems.

Baker's team appears to have established preeminence in key areas of U.S.-Soviet relations, on the so-called 2+4 talks on the reunification of Germany, in the Middle East peace process and on Central America. Other policy areas are tended by the career bureaucracy, watched over by semi-careerist Eagleburger, Baker's deputy.

Traditional line officials outside of State—notably, at the NSC—have been left out of the policy development process. On the 2+4 talks, for example, Baker has entrusted Zoellick with the lead responsibility for U.S. participation. He is backed up by policy planning chief Ross, an expert in U.S.-Soviet relations and the Middle East. Neither is expert on Germany, and so they have called in career foreign service officer Roger George for technical advice.

The NSC's secondary role, according to Daniel Hamilton, an expert in U.S.-German relations at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, can be seen whenever West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher visits Washington. "Genscher clearly knows who is running the shop: He talks to Baker, and his staff talks to Zoellick," Hamilton said.

Scowcroft and Gates have recently promoted Condoleezza Rice to the senior director level and assigned her to the 2+4 talks. But her expertise is in U.S.-Soviet relations, not Germany, critics assert.

On Middle East peace issues, policy development is compartmentalized in Baker's inner circle at State. Baker has put a high priority on efforts to bring about negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians and has handed the day-to-day management of the portfolio to Ross, leaving the NSC's senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs, Richard N. Haass, out of the policy development process.

But Baker and Ross's preeminence is not always the last word. When the Middle East peace process faltered earlier this year, it was in part because Bush decided to push the Israelis hard on the issue of establishing new Jewish settlements in Israeli-occupied territories.

Baker and Ross, according to informed Middle East experts, argued against such



Foreign relations expert Alton Frye
The NSC is there to minimize friction.

a course, but Bush plunged ahead anyway, and he was supported by Scowcroft. Speaking later of Bush's willingness to overrule recommendations from his advisers, Scowcroft described Bush as "very independent."

MESSAGES TO MOSCOW


There is some dispute about who did what in the development of the early Bush

policy toward the Soviet Union. Last year, Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, facing resistance to his economic reforms and threats of secession from various Soviet republics, was showing a new willingness to deal with the West on issues of arms control and conventional forces in Europe.

It is widely accepted that the Administration was slow getting off the mark. "The Bush team was skeptical of the Soviets," Frye said. That shifted, he said, in part because "Baker was on a fast learning curve." In addition, Frye continued, Bush became impatient "with the way his policy was forming. He said, in effect, 'This doesn't fit the reality we're dealing with.'" Frye added that the initial caution was generated from within the bureaucracy, not by Scowcroft.

Baker, meanwhile, had ordered up a series of speeches that set a new tone that appeared to outflank the national security adviser. A knowledgeable congressional aide said that "Scowcroft for a fact was very skeptical about the START Treaty [the major pending U.S.-Soviet strategic arms reduction pact]. Baker's speeches led the way. That was the moment when the policy-making apparatus began to move."

Scowcroft played down the review of Administration policy toward the Soviets, attributing the demand for new policy studies to the fact that the original papers ordered for Bush "were not exciting."



Carnegie Endowment German relations specialist Daniel Hamilton
The West Germans know the State Department runs the foreign policy shop.

Shepard Sherbell/SABA

John Elsie

A Scowcroft Staff Roster

Robert M. Gates, 46, assistant to the President and deputy for national security affairs, previously was at the National Security Council (NSC) from 1974-79; during part of that time, he served with current national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. Before joining the Bush Administration's NSC, he was deputy director of central intelligence. He first joined the CIA in 1966. He received a doctorate in Russian and Soviet history from Georgetown University.

Peter W. Rodman, 46, is NSC counselor and special assistant to the President, positions he held at the end of the Reagan Administration. Rodman served on the NSC staff from 1969-76, where he was closely associated with top NSC officials Scowcroft and Henry A. Kissinger. After the Ford Administration left office, Rodman worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies until 1983, helping Kissinger prepare his memoirs. Although he has spent his entire career in foreign policy, he is trained as a lawyer.

Robert D. Blackwill, 50, is senior director for European and Soviet affairs and special assistant to the President. A career diplomat, he was ambassador and chief negotiator at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks in Vienna from 1985-87. Earlier in the Reagan Administration, he was principal deputy assistant secretary of State for European affairs, as well as principal deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs.

Condoleezza Rice, 35, is director for Soviet and East European affairs. She was associate professor of political science at Stanford University. From 1986-87, she was special assistant to the director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. She has been a fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace and a consultant to ABC News.

Arnold L. Kantor, 45, is senior director for defense policy and arms control. From 1985 until June 1989, he was a senior staff member at the RAND Corp. Earlier, he served for eight years in the State Department, first as deputy assistant secretary for political-military affairs and later as an aide to the deputy secretary of State.

Richard N. Haass, 38, is senior director for Near East and South Asian affairs. He served in State's Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and as special Cyprus coordinator during the Reagan Administration, as well as in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. From 1985-89, Haass was a lecturer on public policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. A Rhodes scholar, he holds a master's and a doctorate in international relations from Oxford University.

Karl D. Jackson, 47, is senior director for Asian affairs and a specialist in Southeast Asian politics. He served in the Defense Department during much of the Reagan Administration. His tour there included two years as deputy assistant secretary for international security affairs and deputy director for policy planning. He is on leave from the University of California (Berkeley), where he is an associate professor of political science.

David C. Miller Jr., 47, is the NSC's senior director for African affairs and for international programs. He has served as ambassador to Zimbabwe and Tanzania, and was briefly director of the State Department's South Africa Working Group during the Reagan Administration. A lawyer, he began his Washington career as a White House fellow during the Nixon Administration and later was director of the White House Commission on White House Fellows.

Timothy E. Deal, 49, is senior director for international economic affairs. A career foreign service officer since 1965, he has served in a variety of overseas and Washington posts. Most recently, he was director of East European and Yugoslav affairs at the State Department.

William W. Working, 44, is senior director for intelligence programs and a veteran of 21 years in various intelligence posts.

Nicholas Rostow, 40, special assistant to the President and the NSC's legal adviser, held the same post during the Reagan Administration's last year.

William T. Pryce, 54, is senior director for Latin America and the Caribbean. He is a career foreign service officer whose most recent post was to the Organization of American States.

It was Scowcroft, according to NSC officials, who initiated Bush's two troop reduction proposals, the first, in May 1989 and the second, unveiled in Bush's State of the Union address this year. These proposals reestablished U.S. momentum in the conventional forces negotiations with the Soviets.

But on arms control for the most part, the signals are mixed. Because of Scowcroft's long interest and expertise on the subject, no one underestimates his role in developing the U.S. approach to the START talks. Scowcroft's well-known views against the MX missile, for example, and his advocacy of a single or dual-warhead mobile missile are likely to be decisive in the Administration's deliberations with Soviet negotiators and with Congress.

Furthermore, Scowcroft and Robert D. Blackwill, the NSC's senior director for European and Soviet affairs, "have given more attention to arms control because of their background," Hamilton of the Carnegie Endowment said. Another arms control expert said: "Scowcroft has firmly held ideas, and when he was out of government, he spent all of his time working these issues. Now he's in a position to persuade Bush to do something."

But at the same time, there is a sense that the new directions in arms control policy are also coming out of State. This causes frustration among lower-level NSC staff members who thought they were going to be involved in developing initiatives.

An arms control expert not in the executive branch said: "I suspect they feel that when arms control policy is made below the senior level, it is Baker and his aides developing a strategy, then it's Baker selling a plan to Bush. Scowcroft doesn't need any staff."

INTIMATE ADVISER

These fragments of history behind recent policy movements suggest that even though the influence of the NSC staff has waned in the Bush presidency, Scowcroft himself, because of his experience and his long-standing relationship with Bush, may be more influential than any other NSC adviser since Kissinger.

Scowcroft's value may not come in initiating policy as much as serving as Bush's most intimate adviser on a subject in which he takes an intense interest.

"He is a consistent and trusted sounding board for Bush," a former NSC staff member said. "He and Bush have developed a close relationship. Brent's role is really that of the key insider on all of this. He is not out there as a major presence in negotiations."

Robert E. Hunter, European studies chief at the Center for Strategic and Inter-

national Studies, agreed. "Scowcroft is one of those who believes very strongly in Franklin Roosevelt's dictum: that assistants to the President should have a passion for anonymity," Hunter said. "That does not by any stretch make him inconsequential. It leads to me to believe the NSC role is very significant. I know that to be a fact in the European area."

In the interview, Scowcroft tersely asserted that major policy initiatives in arms control, U.S.-Soviet relations and Europe are coming from the NSC, not State. "The NSC's morale doesn't depend on getting in the newspapers," he said. "My job is substance, not public relations."

Not all has been sweet success for the foreign policy team, of course. Questions were raised about NSC missteps during the unsuccessful October 1989 coup against Panamanian strongman Manuel A. Noriega, and critics have noted Scowcroft's role in Bush's efforts (largely unsuccessful so far) to encourage political liberalization in China following last year's massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.

NSC officials said that in the case of Panama, the major culprit was glitches in the decision-making process that kept de-

partments and agencies from sharing information, and that communications have improved through regular meetings of a Deputies Committee, an interagency panel of senior officials.

Scowcroft defended Bush's China initiative, which involved only mild, temporary trade sanctions and two secret high-level visits to Beijing by U.S. officials. "I think we're exactly where we should be," he said. But he conceded that the Administration may have underestimated the effects of turmoil in Eastern Europe, particularly Romania, on Chinese officials. The United States might also have underestimated the "paralysis" caused by the power struggle among Chinese leaders last year, he said. Scowcroft called China a "great power" with whom the United States must have a relationship.

As for his over-all role in the White House, Scowcroft said, "I have to make sure that the President has the benefit of all the options and is in the best possible position to make a decision." It's a matter of integrity for Scowcroft that he make clear to Bush when he is presenting his own views and recommendations. "I have strong views," he said.

Scowcroft also acknowledged that

lower-level aides might feel left out because he does not need to be briefed on many issues. "I don't feel naked without staff," he said.

Even some of Scowcroft's critics limit their negative comments to his management style, and the effect of his Oval Office role on staff morale. "It's not clear that [the new arrangement] isn't OK," a critic said. "The NSC staff had grown so big. Why should it be that these unconfirmed officials [at lower levels] make policy? I don't have any trouble as long as it doesn't create bad decisions."

Geoffrey Kemp, who served on Reagan's NSC staff, said that "99 per cent of the work of the NCS is process. This is a fairly middle-of-the-road, routine staff, but it's also powerful because so much is happening," he said. "What's different is that Bush is making decisions."

What is unclear is whether the increased attention given Baker's foreign policy role in recent months will entice Scowcroft and his aides to be more public about their role. "I don't see any sharp elbows at work here," Frye said.

For Scowcroft, that might be too radical a change in character. But perhaps no sharp elbows are needed. □



Working close by President Bush daily, Scowcroft is said to be "the implementer and interpreter of Bush's policy."

Michael Sargent/The White House

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ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, May 27, 1990

GUESTS:

YITZHAK SHAMIR
Prime Minister of Israel

BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Adviser

ROBERT LEGVOLD
Director, Harriman Institute, Columbia
University

ANDREI KORTUNOV
Arbatov Institute of the United States
and Canada (Moscow)

INTERVIEWED BY:

David Brinkley - ABC News

George F. Will - ABC News Analyst

Sam Donaldson - ABC News

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: David Glodt

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MR. BRINKLEY: Now, in Jerusalem, the prime minister of Israel, Yitzhak Shamir. We are delighted to have you, Mr. Prime Minister. Thanks for coming in.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Thank you. Good morning. I am glad to be with you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, thank you. Here with us in the studio are George Will, and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC News.

Now, Prime Minister, tell me. You're getting a good deal of advice from the United Nations and from others saying that you should allow United Nations peace keeping forces in Israel to help keep things quiet. You object. Tell us why?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't think we need peace keeping forces for having peace. We want to get peace in our country. We want to have peace. And our experience is that such forces are not bringing peace. They are causing tensions, and not peace. What we need for having peace is to have peaceful talks with our adversaries, to talk, to negotiate. This the way to get peace. We don't need peace keeping forces.

MR. BRINKLEY: Peaceful talks with adversaries? Meaning the Palestinians?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Palestinians, other Arabs, generally, who are not happy with our existence, and with the independence of the state of Israel. There is a conflict, you know. It's a known thing. There is a conflict between us and the Arab world. We believe this country's ours. They believe the country's theirs. Therefore, there is a confrontation, and then you have to deal with the confrontation. There are two ways to settle it. One is to confront each other. The second is to negotiate. We prefer negotiations.

MR. WILL: Mr. Shamir, David Brinkley's question concerned a U.N. peace keeping force in the territories. There are other forms of U.N. presence, however. Would your position also rule out U.N. observers of any sort?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I don't think we need U.N.

observers. You know, we have a long experience in our country, and it is U.N. observers have nothing to do with peace. They will bring only tensions as I said before. We don't need foreign military men to police the country, the area. We need peaceful talks. That only.

MR. WILL: Well, let's talk for a moment about the peace talks. Can you make clear for an American audience that doesn't spend full time examining the terrible complexities of these negotiations, can you tell us what is holding up implementation of what is, I think, the Shamir plan for having local elections to elect local leadership in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to negotiate direct directly with Israel for a long term solution? What is the problem?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I will explain it willingly. I am, you know, the father of this plan, and what I have proposed to the Arab world, not only to the Palestinians, is to sit down and to negotiate about all the questions that separate us from them.

Because we have a conflict among us, and I would say the moment we will sit down and negotiate, everyone will explain his position. We will try to find out an agreed solution.

MR. WILL: But, sir, is the problem the composition of this group? Is it the venue? What is holding this up? Is it demands that are coming from Washington that you consider unreasonable or dangerous?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: What is important is the intention of the people who will come to negotiate with us. If there intention is to get peace, to understand our point of view, and to be determined to find out an agreed solution, then everything will be okay. We will find together. It will take time.

MR. WILL: How, sir, do you gauge the intention? By what criteria do you say these people have, we know now, the correct or the incorrect intention?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: They will have to accept the

framework we propose. You know, what we proposed in our peace plan is only a framework for negotiations. It means we have proposed to elect people among the Palestinians from among the Palestinians who will represent the Palestinian population in their negotiations with us. Then, what will be the subject of the negotiations? Autonomy, because we are ready to give to this people, to the Palestinian population, full autonomy for a few years. And after these few years of autonomy, we will start a process of negotiations about the permanent solution of the status of the territories.

MR. DONALDSON: Go ahead, sir. Finish.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: The framework, the framework of our plan, not the solutions they will propose, everyone is entitled to propose the solution he thinks is just. And when the intention, when the goal of the people sitting down to the negotiations will be to look for an agreed solution, because the outcome has to be agreed by both parties.

MR. DONALDSON: Now, Mr. Prime Minister, may I just say, sir, that I want you to respond to the fact that the patience of the United States government with Israel appears to be running very thin. Secretary of State James Baker has said the United States may well consider backing a plan to send U.N. observers to the occupied territories. Doesn't that give you some reason to reconsider your policy?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, I think our policy is a just policy. It's a policy of peace. I think that you need, and we need, and all the parties need a lot of patience in our area.

MR. DONALDSON: But, sir, I'm asking you this question, because if the relations between the United States and Israel become terribly strained, almost to the breaking point, does that help Israel?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: I don't think the situation is so difficult. I think we have to overcome the difficulties and sit down with patience to listen to each other, to try to understand

the position of the various parties to the conflict, and to talk reasonably and look seriously for a solution that will be acceptable to both parties. After all, the United States government is not a party to the conflict. They are mediators. They are ready and willing to help the parties to come to an understanding. And we are ready to cooperate with the United States government.

MR. DONALDSON: Let me just ask you about one other thing, if I may. The Palestinians and other Arabs complain that you have kidnapped Sheik Obeid, you hold a number of Shi'ites hostages, that until you release those people, there cannot be a true peace. Will you release them?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, it has nothing to do with it. You know, there is a conflict in the Middle East. One part of the conflict is with the Palestinians Arabs, who's--a part have decided to organize and to make riots and various violent manifestations against Israel, and our army has to restore order. It's one problem. The other problem is how to overcome it and to come to negotiations, to talk about agreed solutions.

MR. WILL: Mr. Shamir--

MR. BRINKLEY: You've got a few seconds.

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: And not something else.

MR. WILL: Mr. Shamir, very briefly, in April, 10,000 Soviet Jews arrived in Israel. Can you tell us, a) how many Soviet Jews you expect Israel to receive in the next few years, and b) have you received any assurance from the United States that Mr. Bush at the summit will press Mr. Gorbachev for direct flights of Soviet Jews from Moscow to Israel?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: Well, we are very grateful to the United States government about the role they have played in this process of getting out the Jewish people from Soviet Russia after so many years. You know, it was a long struggle for getting a permit to these Jewish people, to leave Russia--

MR. WILL: But, sir, how many do you expect?

PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR: --and to come to Israel. And

now we have this happy experience. We see every day and every night Soviet Jewish people coming to Israel and we are very glad to receive them--

MR. BRINKLEY: Prime Minister Shamir, thank you very much. I'm sorry. Our time is up. Pleasure to have you with us. We hope you will come again. Coming next, Robert Legvold, director of the Harriman Institute, devoted to the study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University, and Andrei Kortunov, a fellow at Moscow's Arbotov Institute of the United States and Canada; and, shortly, Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security assistant, in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: With us now from Miami, Robert Legvold of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, and Andrei Kortunov of Moscow's Institute of the United States and Canada.

Welcome, glad to have you with us today, both of you.

First, tell me what are you doing in Miami, Mr. Legvold?

MR. LEGVOLD: We're down here for a meeting between Soviets and Cuban-Americans and American specialists on the Soviet Union, talking about problems of regional instability.

MR. BRINKLEY: The town of Miami has a great number of Cubans eager to go back to Cuba and run for president, right?

MR. LEGVOLD: I'm not sure they all want to run for president. But they certainly want the current leader out.

MR. BRINKLEY: So what has happened at the conference, anything so far?

MR. LEGVOLD: I think it's been rather interesting for the dialogue. The Cuban-Americans have expressed strong views on the Cuban situation, and, as far as the Soviet Union's concerned, they've made it plain they would like the Soviets to cut Castro off. They think that would make a difference.

The Soviet side in turn has said that they really do take a different approach to regional issues now, but they're not willing to intervene in order to force the decision in Cuba,

because they say it's their new policy toward the third world and indeed toward international politics generally: nonintervention.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kortunov, what do you expect to happen at the summit this week in Washington?

MR. KORTUNOV: Well, I think that it will be a very important event and I guess they will make a certain progress in the sphere of arms control, specifically in the strategic sphere. And I also guess that they will discuss a lot of issues concerned around the situation in Europe.

MR. BRINKLEY: Concerning what?

MR. KORTUNOV: Concerning the current situation in Eastern Europe.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kortunov, before going on to other matters, since you are there talking about Cuba, what do you say to those, and I know there are a lot of them in Miami who say it, that if the Soviet Union is serious about easing its financial problems, why doesn't it stop subsidizing tyranny in Cuba?

MR. KORTUNOV: Well, I think that there will be a current change in the Soviet relations with Cuba. But this change will take some time, of course, to turn it from an artificial basis to a commercial basis.

MR. WILL: Mr. Legvold, the mood in Washington after evaluating the proposed changes in the Soviet economy, this so-called five-year transition period to a regulated market economy, is that it's much too little, much too late, that it's going to be a command economy still, with prices set, but at a higher level.

Is that your feeling?

MR. LEGVOLD: Absolutely. This last week we've had essentially a nondecision in Moscow from my point of view. And that comes at a time of deep economic crisis in the Soviet Union. Almost certainly, that economic crisis is going to deepen over the next half year. And then we'll have to see what happens. It's potentially a dramatic situation.

MR. WILL: Mr. Kortunov, expand on that, and tell us why

people in the West should not now conclude that Mr. Gorbachev is all talk and no action about perestroika?

MR. KORTUNOV: Well, I think that he's confronted with a very difficult issue. On one hand, he wants to go faster, to go to radical reforms. But, on the other hand, he's not sure that social strains that will be related to this radical economic reform will be not fatal to his presidency.

MR. WILL: But if he were a directly elected president, might he not have a mandate to go forward with this? What I'm asking is, did he not make a mistake in not becoming more of a democratically elected figure?

MR. KORTUNOV: Some people claim that he made such a mistake and that he had to take a chance to try to get elected by direct vote rather than through the institution of the congress of the Supreme Soviet.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Kortunov, what is likely to happen? Prime Minister Ryzhkov will resign, is that it? He will be the fall guy for this? Or is this unhappiness and the fact that this reform program may not work enough to topple Gorbachev?

MR. KORTUNOV: Well, I guess that if the program is not adopted, then the government will have to resign. And I also think that many more decisions will be taken on the level of republics, specifically in the Parliament of the Russian Federation, which is becoming more and more important.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Legvold, what about that? Is Ryzhkov's resignation enough to propitiate the anger about all of this, or does Gorbachev himself face in July some sort of vote that removes him?

MR. LEGVOLD: I don't think it's going to come as quickly as July. I think the problem is going to mature, ripen over the next three or four months. So I would anticipate the trouble in the fall or in the early part of the year. And they may not, in fact, try to hold this referendum, which accomplishes in part what Mr. Will was asking about a moment ago, until some time in the

fall.

I think at this stage, however, the outcome--the political outcome is likely to be very unpredictable. A Ryzhkov removal is not going to address the problem at all; it's not going to solve the situation for Gorbachev. Whether he in fact has to step aside by early next year I think is very difficult to know. It's possible, as one scenario, that they'll go to a kind of Polish round table where they try to build a national consensus, and Gorbachev would convene that round table. But no one can say.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, the question always in Washington is should Washington do something about this? Is there anything Washington can do? The Soviets clearly were hoping for a most-favored-nation treatment, agreement, with the United States, but that's not going to happen now.

Should Washington take some sort of action?

MR. LEGVOLD: Well, in fact I think that within fairly short order, the Soviet Union will get the commercial agreement, and as a consequence we will then take steps to lift the Jackson-Vanik amendment which allows them to have most-favored-nation treatment. That probably will happen by some time this summer, if we get progress on the Lithuanian issue. And I think we will get progress on the Lithuanian issue.

But the key point is that even if we give most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union, it doesn't begin to solve the economic problem that we're talking about.

MR. DONALDSON: Mr. Kortunov, from where you sit, what does it look like on the Lithuanian issue? Does that get resolved to the extent that the United States can then move forward with most-favored-nation?

MR. KORTUNOV: I think that both sides, in Moscow and in Vilnius, are in the direction of compromise. And I guess that the negotiations Prunskiene had with Gorbachev in Moscow is a first step in the direction of this compromise.

But still, you know, it will depend on how smart they are

on both sides, and how ready they are for a compromise.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Kortunov and Mr. Legvold, thank you both very much. Pleased to have you with us today. See how it all turns out.

Coming next, General Brent Scowcroft, national security assistant to President Bush--in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: General Scowcroft, thanks for coming.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Good morning.

MR. BRINKLEY: Delighted to have you with us.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now, on the summit. It takes place in your place of work, the White House. We know what President Bush would like to have from Gorbachev: an arms agreement and more. What do you think Gorbachev wants? What would he like to go home with?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I think the summit--first of all what President Bush wants, I think the fundamental issues at the summit are not going to be arms control; the fundamental issues are talking about remaking a political map of Europe and also secondarily what's going on in the Soviet Union. I think that Gorbachev would like understanding at a minimum of what he's doing, what he's trying to do in the Soviet Union. and some respect for it, and also very much to press his point on the structure of Europe that he sees. And that, I think--there are really fundamental issues going on. This is only one dialogue, you know.

MR. BRINKLEY: Understanding of what he's trying to do. Will he also like some help with it, do you think, in some form?

MR. SCOWCROFT: We'll have to wait and see.

MR. DONALDSON: May I just go down a list, though, of specifics and get your view on what's likely to happen. Let's start with arms control. I take it everyone agrees there won't be a full START treaty. Is that correct?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Oh, no, that's impossible.

MR. DONALDSON: All right. Will you, in fact, however, sign some documents which put in a framework sense the agreements on SLCMs and ALCMs and SS-24s and -25s?

MR. BRINKLEY: What are these terms you're using, Sam? Come on.

MR. DONALDSON: Do I have to explain them?

MR. BRINKLEY: Yes. Not everybody in the country knows all that stuff.

MR. DONALDSON: Air-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles; the SS-24s and -25s are the Soviet's long-range missiles, and one of them is mobile.

MR. SCOWCROFT: At Malta, the two agreed as an objective by the time of the summit to have the major issues involved in the START treaty resolved. I think by and large that will be the case. We'll have to wait and see. There are still-- there are still some open issues, but I think we're far enough along on most of the major ones that the two will be able to say, yes, the framework of the treaty, the major issues, have been resolved and now we need to go out, the negotiators, and put it in treaty languages.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, on trade I take it there will be no most-favored-nation agreement at this summit.

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, there certainly will not.

MR. DONALDSON: But you heard Bob Legvold suggest that by some time in mid-summer the conditions might be correct so that we could grant it. Do you foresee that?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, there is one technical issue, and that is the Soviets must pass an emigration law before we can grant most-favored-nation, and they have not done that.

MR. DONALDSON: But a lot of people, if I may, General-- a lot of people think that they were prepared to do that but because they saw that we would not grant this after Lithuania, they simply didn't put it on the table.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, the other issue is one that the president alluded to, and that is the issue of Lithuania which does

in fact cast a shadow over this summit.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, final on my laundry list. We want Gorbachev to agree that a united Germany will be a member of NATO.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. DONALDSON: But he warned about two or three days ago that they would have to reconsider their own arrangements in Europe if that were the case. How seriously do you take that warning? What do you think will happen?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I take it very seriously because I think the Soviets have a real dilemma with respect to Germany. But I think that it is the president's obligation, which he's looking forward to, to convince President Gorbachev that our proposed solution, the West's proposed solution, for Germany in NATO is right not only for the West but for the peace and security of Europe--and for the Soviet Union.

MR. WILL: The United States, its allies, both Germans, want Germany to be in NATO. There are three hundred and some thousand Soviet troops in a country that doesn't want them there. I guess the question is: What business is it of the Soviet Union what the Germans do? Aren't the Germans going to do in the next few years pretty much what a sovereign nation, which they are, want to do?

MR. SCOWCROFT: George, that's part of what all this debate is about, and that is the Germans doing what the Germans want to do and--

MR. WILL: I'm sorry, I guess what I'm asking is what leverage does Gorbachev have? I mean, if the German government, a unified Germany, says please go home, won't they have to go?

MR. SCOWCROFT: In the end, in the end, very little except at enormous costs which they're probably not prepared to pay. But I think they can or feel they can make serious problems within the body politic here.

MR. BRINKLEY: What's the cost?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Beg pardon?

MR. BRINKLEY: The cost, the enormous cost, what is it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, to reverse what has happened now, to stay against the will of the East Germans, the Poles, because they need a communications-transportation net, that would be a serious cost for them.

MR. WILL: A most interesting question to most Americans is: What are we dealing with in this man Gorbachev? Now, in recent months, he's been booed atop the Lenin mausoleum, he denounces the crowd in Red Square as rabble, talks ominously about people trying to storm the Kremlin, a law gets past making it a crime to insult the president, Mr. Gorbachev; finally, he comes out with an economic program that looks like the mountain labored and gave birth to a mouse: they're going to just fix prices at a higher level, a command economy tinkered with. What do we make of this man now? He's unpopular at home and seems timid.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Seems timid, but at the same time very bold. When you look--he's been in for five years. When you look at the Soviet Union in 1985 and the Soviet Union now, can you not say that there are dramatic, indeed breathtaking changes?

MR. WILL: But isn't the change all glasnost, that is, talk--it's not trivial by any means, important to change the climate--but structurally hasn't there been precious little done, particularly when compared, say, to the bold strokes of Poland?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Yes, indeed there has. I think one of the things one has to remember is the deep character of the revolution in perestroika that is being discussed, much tougher than in Poland where you have a unified society that has been under state central domination for a relatively short period of time. Here you have over 70 years of a fundamentally different system that you're overturning.

MR. WILL: The Soviet Union in the person of Mr. Gorbachev comes to the West as a mendicant rattling a tin cup, saying we're poor and need help. Let me ask you about two questions. First of

all, Cuba, and a very expensive drain--should that not be a test of their seriousness if they would cut Cuba free?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Our estimate is that the Soviets maybe spend as much as \$15 billion on aid to states which are contributing to problems around the world. We think a good place to start would be rectifying that, and Cuba would be at the beginning. After all, Castro has not seen the glasnost message.

MR. WILL: Military spending in the Soviet Union, the level of it, is still a mystery and hard to decipher. But, so far as people can tell, it has not been cut very much, something like still a quarter of GNP being spent on this. Again, if they're seriously in trouble, and serious about changing it, why haven't they made more dramatic steps toward cutting their armaments?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think they have made some steps. They have made unilateral withdraws from Europe and they're proposing now in CFE to make really dramatic cuts.

MR. DONALDSON: General, may I just ask--

MR. BRINKLEY: Two seconds, Sam.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you think Gorbachev will survive?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I don't think anyone can answer that question.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, Dick Cheney says he doesn't think he will, and I think most people in this town believe that Cheney and you think alike.

MR. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think as I recall what Dick Cheney said was that he wasn't sure he would succeed. I don't know that he talked about--

MR. DONALDSON: What Cheney said is he thinks the economic problems are such that eventually Gorbachev will not survive.

MR. SCOWCROFT: The economic problems are absolutely enormous--for anybody.

MR. DONALDSON: So you agree with Cheney?

MR. SCOWCROFT: No, I don't--you know, I don't want to predict what might happen. This is a society in revolution.

MR. BRINKLEY: When you make up your mind on this, will you come back here one Sunday and tell us about it?

MR. SCOWCROFT: I'd be delighted.

MR. BRINKLEY: In the meantime, thank you.

MR. DONALDSON: Have you been to China recently, General?

MR. SCOWCROFT: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Pleasure having you speak with us.

The circle in the Oval Office

From a big network,
only a few advisers
have Bush's attention

By John W. Mashek
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON - To no one's surprise, the gregarious President Bush has maintained a large network of friends and advisers inside and out of government for many years. It is less well-known that as president he keeps only a tight circle of advisers with a clear entree to his decision making.

During Bush's 16 months in office, he has continued to work the telephones and write personal notes to stay in touch with literally hundreds of political and personal friends spanning a public career of nearly three decades in Texas and Washington.

However, interviews with several close associates show that Bush relies generally on a chosen few whose judgment he trusts and whose advice he regularly seeks out.

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, the president's chum from Houston and a contemporary whose political ascension has paralleled Bush's, is in a class by himself when it comes to Oval Office access and influence. Baker, who vacations with Bush every year on a South Texas fishing and hunting expedition, is in on policy decisions far beyond foreign issues. He is the only member of the Cabinet with the authority to offer advice beyond his assignment.

"For all the kidding and friendly competition between the two, Bush looks to Jim on a range of issues but especially his overall political sense," one key adviser said. "There's a real bond there."

Outside government, Bush's head can be turned by a few advisers. For example, the Republican National Committee chairman, Lee Atwater, working at home while battling a brain tumor, reinforced Bush's opinion to look more favorably on civil rights legislation opposed by some conservatives. According to White House sources, Atwater talked to Bush several times on the telephone about the measure, which is still under consideration in Congress.

Sununu is a dominating presence

As much as Baker dominates the Cabinet in terms of power, John H. Sununu, the chief of staff, towers over his associates in the White House. A lone exception is the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, with whom Bush enjoys a relaxed relationship of mutual trust and common goals.

The often irascible Sununu not only is in Bush's shadow throughout most working days, but he also enjoys being the president's lightning rod. He loves being tagged as the mean guy in the administration. His office ordered 40 copies of a recent issue of *Time* magazine, whose cover depicted the former New Hampshire governor as the bad cop in the Bush administration.

"Look, Sununu revels in all of that," said a fellow aide who sees the president regularly. "He doesn't mind taking the heat for the president at all."

Almost every decision, piece of paper and visitor list passes through Sununu before it reaches Bush. And the supremely confident chief of staff is not shy about offering his advice either, no matter the subject.

Scowcroft, a retired Air Force general, shares Bush's love for foreign policy as well as his penchant for secrecy. It was Scowcroft who went on the secret missions to China last year, carrying Bush's controversial message of reconciliation to the leaders in Beijing despite the massacre of the students in Tiananmen Square last June. Scowcroft is in perfect harmony with Bush on sticking with the Chinese leaders despite their apparent unwillingness to bend on human rights.

The third major player on the White House staff is Richard G. Darman, Bush's bright but prickly budget director. Darman, whose career is due in large part to Baker, has managed to adjust his personality to Sununu's, a surprise to many who predicted their two massive egos would collide early and often.

"Actually they need each other, and they are both smart enough to realize it," said one associate of the cooperation between this unlikely pair.

A foothold of power

Under that troika in the White House, there is a considerable falloff in influence. Economic adviser Michael Boskin, a single-

minded economist who sees eye to eye with Bush on a market-oriented economy, has gained a foothold of power. Roger Porter, the domestic adviser, is a sincere workaholic but has remained in the background. Bobbie Green Kilberg, who is in charge of bringing in various constituency groups, is a little-known Texan outside the White House but one who has Bush's ear in her special field.

Bush has been consistent about sticking to his weekly working lunch with Vice President Dan Quayle. It is arguable whether Quayle has any weight on Bush's decisions, but the president is careful to bring him into meetings, doubtless recalling that he was considered a supernumerary by critics when Ronald Reagan was in office.

As for clout in the Cabinet, Baker ranks alone at the top, with Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady next in line but for different reasons.

Bush has worked with Cheney since the Ford administration, when Bush was CIA director and Cheney was a young chief of staff in the White House. Their time working together goes back to those troubled days when the Republicans were struggling to recover from the Watergate scandal and Richard Nixon's resignation in disgrace.

Brady has been a close personal friend of many years. The wealthy New Jersey native was an ally during some of Bush's unhappier days as vice president when he was accused of being a wimp who fawned over Reagan. Bush likes him as a friend and counselor.

Kemp viewed as a team player

Other members of the Cabinet trail far behind the top three in influence, but a few are noteworthy. Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner, a Chicago lawyer who had to handle the issue of the Exxon oil spill in Alaska early in Bush's term, has the president's confidence. Onetime political rival Jack Kemp, now serving as Bush's secretary of housing and urban development, has earned Bush's respect as a team player. Kemp has publicly voiced opposition to a tax increase. But that stand will probably not get him in trouble with anyone in the White House despite Bush's assertion that there are no preconditions on negotiations with Congress on the budget.

The other members of the Cabinet are

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in the gray area. Bush makes them feel at home but their influence is negligible. In fact, three of them, Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan, Secretary of Education, Lauro Cavazos and Attorney General Dick Thornburgh have been in disfavor at least some of the time for either problems relat-

ed to managing their departments or for failing to establish strong presences with members of Congress.

Outside government, Bush reaches out to a number of people, including a few Democrats. Former Democratic Rep. Thomas Ludlow Ashley of Ohio, a classmate at Yale who served in the House with

Bush in the late 1960s, is a confidant. So is Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery of Mississippi, another Democrat.

On civil rights, Bush is comfortable talking to Benjamin Hooks, the executive director of the NAACP, or with Vernon Jordan, the former head of the National Urban League, who is practicing law in Washington.

Bush Wants to Narrow Differences on Germany

President Lists Priorities in Soviet Interview

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine, May 27—President Bush, describing Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev as a "tough guy" in negotiations, said that when the two leaders meet this week he hopes to narrow their differences over the role of a united Germany in Europe.

Bush, who is vacationing here before the Thursday opening of the summit, said in an interview with Soviet television broadcast there today that, in addition to the German issue, he hopes for progress on the strategic arms treaty and "more progress" on reducing conventional forces in Europe, a subject that has bogged down in recent weeks.

The president also said he would not "sweep under the rug" the issue of Lithuania and the other Baltic republics that are trying to break away from Moscow. "I have to have him understand the constraints on any U.S. president until self-determination is visible and forthcoming there," he said.

Bush said he wants to "sit and talk" with Gorbachev about U.S. "aspirations for a post-German-unification Europe. I want to convince Mr. Gorbachev . . . that the U.S. presence in Europe, a unified Germany, a Germany in NATO not only is no threat to the Soviet Union, but preserves the kind of stable Europe that the Soviets should welcome."

Acknowledging the Soviet position, reiterated by Gorbachev this weekend, that a unified Germany should not be part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bush did not suggest the two would agree. "But I want to narrow the differences. That's what I expect on that," he said.

Bush brushed aside suggestions that Gorbachev comes to the table weakened by the deteriorating economic and political situation in the Soviet Union. "It's not a question of who is stronger, who is weaker, who has got bigger problems, who has got less problems," Bush said. It is a question of trying "to convince him where we differ that our position is correct, just as he will be trying to convince me."

Secretary of State James A. Baker III, appearing on the CBS News program "Face the Nation," said the United States is "risking nothing" by negotiating with Gorbachev, despite his difficult domestic problems. If Gorbachev remains in power, "he will deliver" on any arms or other agreements that are reached now "without regard to what his future prospects are," said Baker. If Gorbachev should be overthrown, he said, "at least you have an agreement there that will make it harder for the successor government to reverse those things."

Baker said that while Gorbachev has "very difficult problems" at home, he has strengthened his political position by becoming the Soviet Union's first executive president. "In terms of a threat to him from the top, I think it's perhaps less than it was before. . . . A threat from the bottom up is greater than it was before," said Baker.

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft, appearing on ABC News's "This Week with David Brinkley," described the Soviet Union as "a society in revolution." Scowcroft, who was reported skeptical of Gorbachev's changes in the early months of the Bush administration, took a different view yesterday. "When you look at the Soviet Union in 1985 [when Gorbachev took office] and the Soviet Union now, can you not say that there are dramatic, indeed breathtaking changes?" Scowcroft asked.

Bush, in the Soviet television interview, shied from assessing his relationship with Gorbachev, other than to say it was generally good and to add he "may be mad with me over some things because we do have some differences."

He took issue with suggestions that the United States bases too much of its policies on Gorbachev personally, considering the precarious state of the Soviet Union and the risks of the reforms he is proposing. "Some of my critics . . . say, 'Hey, you're putting too much emphasis on Mr. Gorbachev,'" Bush said. "And I'm saying I know him. I'm confident we can have good open discussions. He deserves credit for what he has done."

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The Christian Science Monitor _____
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Bush issued, as he has repeatedly during the past year, a strong endorsement of Gorbachev's economic reforms, arguing that a more prosperous Soviet Union will make for a more peaceful world and may directly benefit the United States in increased trade. "When I think of *perestroika*, I think of dramatic reform and change, which we salute and we want to see it continue," Bush said.

Bush, putting the talks in personal terms, noted both leaders have grandchildren and can discuss their differences "as human beings. Hey, what are we going to do to make things a little safer? If we argue, we'll do that pleasantly. He's a tough guy. He'll listen. I've been around him enough to know that he drives his point home. Well, I can do the same thing. I think it's important that I level with him."

Unlike President Ronald Reagan's pre-summit regimens, Bush appears to have engaged in little special preparation for the summit during his long weekend in Maine. Reagan routinely had days of special briefings and discussions with his top aides, but Bush has incorporated that in his regular schedule, aides said.

None of the president's top national security and foreign policy experts accompanied him here, with deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates the only national security aide along for the four-day respite. The president has stuck to his Kennebunkport routine of running, boating, golfing and other sports. He returns to Washington Monday night.

Helms Got Kissinger Ousted From Board

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) got Henry A. Kissinger bounced from a presidential panel and may do the same for John G. Tower.

The panel is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It advises the president on whether he is getting quality, reliable information from his spy agencies. The panel members don't oversee those agencies, but they have security clearances. If they are close enough to the president, they can influence how he sets the national intelligence agenda.

Kissinger was on that panel until last February, when he resigned without explanation. We have learned that Helms led the secret opposition to Kissinger's place on the board and pressured President Bush to remove him. Helms did not like the fact that Kissinger, a paid Washington consultant for several countries and international corporations, had his fingers in the business world and the White House at the same time.

No one has proved, or even publicly alleged, that Kissinger used inside information from PFIAB to help clients. But Helms didn't like how things looked.

Kissinger has had a long association with Chinese business and government leaders. After the brutal Chinese suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstration last June, Kissinger took a soft public stance on the issue. Worse, when Bush sent secret envoys to China, he chose two former employees of Kissinger's consulting firm—national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger.

One PFIAB member, who is also a friend of

Kissinger's, told us that PFIAB never advised Bush on Tiananmen Square because the issue there involved foreign policy, not intelligence. "So, whatever information Henry secured, he did not get it from PFIAB."

Such assurances did not convince Helms and others who wanted Kissinger off the board.

Helms's concentration on Kissinger temporarily deflected his interest from Tower. As we reported earlier, Bush put Tower on PFIAB as a consolation prize after the former senator from Texas couldn't get confirmed as secretary of defense.

Tower's confirmation hearings focused on allegations of womanizing, drinking and conflicts of interest because he served as a consultant to defense contractors. But behind the scenes, some members of Congress worried that Tower was a security risk. The Senate Armed Services Committee and a House panel secretly looked into allegations, for instance, that he had consorted with a Soviet KGB spy posing as a prostitute while serving as an arms control negotiator in Geneva.

We have learned that several GOP senators, Helms included, were so concerned that Tower had been compromised that they would likely have bucked Bush and voted against Tower's nomination for defense secretary if they hadn't been sure the Democrats would block the confirmation.

Helms was able to stick with the party line and vote for Tower's confirmation because the Democrats had the majority against Tower. But Bush is about to restructure the PFIAB, make Tower chairman and give every current member except Tower walking papers. Our sources say that if Bush tries to give Tower the job, Helms will protest.

NBC's Tom Pettit reports from Moscow that there has been ethnic turmoil in Armenia, political turmoil in Moscow and economic turmoil everywhere. In Yerevan over the weekend, troops battled armed militants and troops went in to contain ethnic unrest. Fighting continues in outlying regions of Armenia.

(Vadim Perfilov, Soviet Foreign Ministry: "Now we can speak about 20 persons killed during this last two days, I think.")

In Moscow, the struggle for leadership of the Russian Republic remains unresolved. Gorbachev-watchers will see whether Boris Yeltsin can capitalize on economic discontent.

(Yeltsin, through interpreter: "We have a program for shifting to the market system without sacrifice.")

Gorbachev has gone on national television to plead for a stop to the food-buying frenzy. Against this backdrop of economic and political problems, President Gorbachev is leaving the country. His press secretary, Arkady Maslennikov, says no problem.

(Maslennikov: "The very fact that he's leaving, he wouldn't have left if he thought that is a danger.")

If Gorbachev is quite sure of the situation, he may be the only person in the Soviet Union who is.

Pauley: As President Bush looked toward this week's summit, he too was talking about Gorbachev's problems, calling them enormous. Still, the President thinks Gorbachev will survive.

NBC's John Cochran: Getting his final whacks in before the summit, President Bush expressed sympathy for Gorbachev's problems but made it clear he does not think it is his job to save Gorbachev's job. (TV coverage: President teeing off.)

(President Bush: "I don't think that's my business to sort that out. I deal with the Soviet leader that's there, in place, coming to the United States to discuss these matters. My own personal opinion is that he's pretty darn strong there. It's not our business as the United States to sort out the other person's economic problems. We got some of our own.")

Near the Soviet Embassy in Washington, demonstrators backed President Bush for refusing to reward the Soviet Union with most-favored-nation trade status. Until the Kremlin passes a new freedom of emigration law, the U.S. refuses to give Moscow favorable trade benefits. But the emigration dispute is not the only obstacle from granting most-favored-nation status.

(General Scowcroft: "One is the problem of Lithuania and the use of economic pressures there, make it difficult for the President to try to improve economic relations.")

At Memorial Day festivities in Kennebunkport, the President tried to signal good will and toughness on the hard issues such as German reunification.

(President Bush: "So I go to the summit with open arms to welcome the president of the Soviet Union, but we must stand on our principles when we discuss world peace.")

The President said he expects no surprises from Gorbachev. Bush's advisors do think Gorbachev is coming with some positive proposals, but they won't really be surprises because the U.S. side believes Gorbachev is looking to make some deals. (NBC-Lead)

Gorbachev to get U.S. offer on Germany

By Paul Bedard and Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush is ready to offer Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev a deal to ease political backlash at home if he agrees to a reunified Germany that belongs to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"There are things we're prepared to do to ease the difficulty [Mr. Gorbachev] faces going along with it," said a senior administration official yesterday after Mr. Bush held strategy talks with ranking advisers. The official refused to provide

details of the deal.

"That's what the president wants out of it," the official said of the four-day super-

power summit. Mr. Gorbachev arrives at Andrews Air Force Base at 6:30 p.m. today and will travel in a motorcade to the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Gorbachev is scheduled to hold

cut short his trip, the senior official said.

"We're prepared to look at a variety of things that might help Gorbachev over the psychological problem he has with NATO that makes it look like a semblance of equality on each side," said the official.

While other officials warned reporters not to focus on the summit as a sports match, the senior official said Mr. Bush will claim victory if Mr. Gorbachev indicates he understands Mr. Bush's argument. That argument, repeated often by Mr. Bush in recent days, is that German membership in NATO poses no threat to the Soviet Union.

"This is an issue of a gravity beside which all other things pale," said the senior official.

Another official, who briefed White House reporters, underlined that: "The bottom line, which is that the Germans have the right to choose their alliances and they have made known to us their desire to be in NATO, is immutable.

"I'd urge you ... to put away

five negotiating sessions with Mr. Bush, starting tomorrow, and then travel to Minneapolis and the San Francisco Bay area. But the Soviet leader's growing problems at home could force him to

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scorecards on this one about who's winning and who's losing, about what agreements are signed and trying to enumerate them," said the official.

"No one should underestimate the value of finishing agreements that we have sought and painstakingly negotiated for years," the official said, but added: "This is not a summit devoted to the celebration of agreements that we can sign. We are now down to the bare-bone essentials, down to fundamental issues, and those are not going to be settled easily."

"Against a backdrop of internal Soviet turmoil and U.S. anger over the Lithuania deadlock, the superpower leaders hope to continue developing a personal relationship and work on arms and economic pacts begun during December's summit in Malta.

"To get a greater flavor of the Bush administration, Mr. Gorbachev has extended an invitation to Vice President Dan Quayle. The two plan to meet Friday afternoon after the Kremlin leader's lunch at the Soviet Embassy with President Bush.

Mr. Quayle represents the conservative wing of the administration, which has questioned Mr. Gorbachev's long-term political survivability.

chev's long-term political survivability.

The vice president will urge the Kremlin leader to increase U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space exploration.

Mr. Quayle lunched with the president yesterday after Mr. Bush spent the morning reviewing the summit schedule and arrangements with National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Mr. Bush also joined three other political and economic briefing sessions that included Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, CIA Director William Webster, Chief of Staff John Sununu and Mr. Scowcroft.

Another briefing is set for this morning. "And then he'll be ready," said Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater.

This summit will be different, a senior official said, because of "the earthquake through which we have lived in the past six months," referring to the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

"The issues that President Bush and President Gorbachev will discuss lie at the very root of the U.S.-Soviet conflict: ending the division of Germany, the course of change in the Soviet Union itself, the aspira-

tions of the Baltic peoples, significant reductions in the military threat to the West and to the U.S.," the official said.

The official said Moscow's trade embargo against Lithuania "calls into question Soviet promises to handle political disputes by political means."

Asked whether Mr. Bush would float new proposals, one official said that there would be "no surprises," then quickly added: "I won't say that we won't have new ideas, but I wouldn't think of it in terms of ... grand initiatives."

Several officials said the United States plans to push its agenda despite Mr. Gorbachev's domestic difficulties. The goal is to lock in any agreements, "to inoculate them against possible reversal," one official said.

"If you get a CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] agreement in which the Soviet armed forces are required to cut up tanks, that's a lot less reversible than simply moving tanks behind the Urals. If you have an emigration law on the books to which at least people can refer, that is more concrete than simply referring to Soviet levels of Jewish emigration at any particular point in time," the official said.

Gorbachev Arrives, Stressing Arms Reduction

By Don Oberdorfer
and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev arrived here last night for a four-day summit meeting with President Bush that Gorbachev said holds the promise of "the first major step to reduce strategic nuclear arms" and new understandings on European and other issues.

As Gorbachev flew to Washington, Bush was told by his top arms control negotiators that talks have advanced to the point that he and Gorbachev will be able to issue an "agreement in principle" that they have resolved the major outstanding issues of a landmark Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). They also are prepared to issue a second joint statement proposing objectives for broader and deeper cuts in a successor START II pact, according to a White House official.

The prospects of agreement are much dimmer on Germany and Lithuania, which were alluded to by Secretary of State James A. Baker III in his airport welcome to the Soviet leader. White House officials said Bush was advised that these difficult issues are not likely to be resolved here but that it may be possible to "set a direction" toward future accord.

Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa, stepped off his special Soviet airliner in the bright sunshine just before 7 p.m. after a state visit to Canada in which he took a hard line on the future of a united Germany and the independence-minded Baltic republics. After greeting U.S. and Soviet Embassy officials and walking down a red carpet, he was given a brief ceremonial welcome by Baker on the Andrews Air Force Base tarmac.

"The eyes of the world are on you and they are on President Bush," Baker said. "Together, our nations have the responsibility to leave behind not only the Cold War but also the conflicts that preceded it.

"To do that, we must see a Germany unified and Europe reconciled; we must reduce the danger of war by controlling nuclear, chemical and conventional arms, and by resolving regional conflicts," Baker declared. In a veiled reference to Gorbachev's troubles at home, he added, "And, of course, we want to see continued movement toward democracy and openness in the Soviet Union."

Gorbachev responded through his interpreter that "this summit stands out in its importance, first of all, for the promise it holds of the first major step to reduce strategic nuclear arms. Both sides have

House this morning for a formal arrival ceremony and the start of talks.

Gorbachev's arrival came 2½ years since his previous trip to Washington at the invitation of President Ronald Reagan in December 1987, and two years to the week since Reagan traveled to Moscow for the last formal U.S.-Soviet summit.

Since then, all six Soviet allies in Eastern Europe moved toward abandoning communism, the Berlin Wall came down and Germany began moving rapidly toward unification after 45 years of division. Since Bush and Gorbachev met last December at Malta, nationalities disputes, secession crises, economic turmoil and political controversies have raised serious questions for the first time about the internal stability of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's leadership.

Gorbachev appeared older and grayer than in his last Washington appearance. He looked tired from his grueling trip and from a series of crises in the past few days, including panic buying in Moscow food stores and the election of a bitter rival, Boris Yeltsin, to a key political post.

White House officials said Bush and Gorbachev will meet in the Oval Office initially, joined only by one

interpreter and one note-taker on each side, and then move into the Cabinet Room for expanded talks.

Joining Bush will be Vice President Quayle, Baker, Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates and U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock.

On the Soviet side, according to the White House, will be Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Presidential Council and Politburo member Yevgeni Primakov, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, presidential foreign affairs adviser Anatoli Chernayev, presidential military adviser Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Foreign Ministry USA Department chief Alexei Obukhov and Ambassador to the United States Alexander Bessmertnykh.

Bush devoted most of yesterday to private summit briefings with aides on economic issues, arms control and an overview, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said. He said "very specific and meaningful agreements" would be approved by the leaders, including accords on grain sales, maritime transportation, study of oceans, exchange of cultural information, expanded civil aviation and the environment.

Fitzwater did not list a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, which has been completed in full detail, as among those to be signed. A White House official said later the trade agreement "could still go either way" depending on the discussions.

The summit also will include signing of a long-disputed set of treaties on nuclear testing, and a chemical weapons accord. But the two leaders are expected to clash in their private talks on the future of Germany and on Lithuania's bid for independence.

Before Gorbachev arrived, Bush spoke by telephone with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He also talked with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney after Gorbachev had departed Canada.

In Canada, Gorbachev expressed displeasure at what he described as Western efforts to dictate the future of Germany within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, but also suggested he might be bringing new ideas to Washington.

Fitzwater said earlier that Bush, in discussions with Gorbachev, would not propose direct limits on the size of a future German army. However, he said, the U.S. view is that future negotiations on conventional forces in Europe could consider further reductions in forces in a "central region." He added, "We are opposed to any proposal which would single out Germany for special limits."

Bush's top Sovietologist stands out in summit crowd

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

When U.S. goals clash at the summit with a Soviet hard line, the riddle is shunted to the Bush administration's top Sovietologist, a young black woman whom Soviet diplomats once thought too pretty to be serious.

Condoleezza Rice, 35, a child of segregated Birmingham, Ala., who trained as a concert pianist, is portrayed by White House officials as something of a superwoman whose moderate optimism on Soviet issues is immune from ideology of the right or left.

At Malta, as senior director of Soviet affairs for the National Security

Council, Miss Rice was separated from President Bush at the bargaining table only by Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Sexist and racist though it might seem to have noticed, there discussing the fate of the world was a young, attractive black woman in a red dress and 15 older white men in suits.

"I have met several surprised senior Soviets over the years who said, 'Oh, she is really serious,'" said one of her mentors, Catherine Kelleher, professor and director of the University of Maryland Center for International Security Studies. "Because she is, at least in my opinion, quite beautiful, they did not expect her to be rigorous and analytically sharp."

Miss Rice, who is single and jealously protective of her private life, says little about policy in public. When she does, it is on background so her views are not attributed to her by name.

Her book "Uncertain Allegiance: The Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Army" was required pre-summit reading. She reportedly is working on a sequel, "Soviet High Command."

And despite the weight of her concerns, Miss Rice is given to humor. When Mr. Bush addressed a Solidarity union crowd of 25,000 in Poland, she recalled Marx's comment on workers united: "This is what Karl Marx had in mind. It just didn't turn out the way he expected."

Some in the intelligence community regard Miss Rice as inexperienced and somewhat soft on Soviets but have general respect for her knowledge. It troubled some conservatives that she was recruited by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, a Henry Kissinger protégé who met Miss Rice through the Aspen Study Group, an organization of specialists in strategy and arms control.

Mr. Scowcroft said of her appointment: "Condi brings prodigious expertise, both academic and practical, to her position. She has a broad intellectual conception of the problems and realities of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."

Said Mrs. Kelleher: "She really has developed quite a reputation. Her unique blend of expertise is both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union."

Condoleezza, whose name is adapted from an Italian phrase translatable as "with beauty" or "with sweetness," was a classmate of one of four girls killed in the 1963 Birmingham church bombing. About the same time, she said, her father, John, photographed her in front of the White House and she told him, "One day I'm going to be in it."

When she was 15, the Rice family moved to Denver. At the University of Denver, she switched majors mid-stream from music to political science and graduated cum laude at age 19.

After earning a master's at Notre Dame, Miss Rice returned to Denver for her doctorate and crossed paths with Mrs. Kelleher, a veteran of the NSC long-range planning staff in the Carter administration, who encouraged her along her present course.

Since then, Miss Rice has thrived on a reading diet of Soviet news and military journals in Russian. She is fluent in both Russian and Czech.

Being a woman and black is no longer an inhibition, if it ever was, for ascendancy to a key White House position, said Mrs. Kelleher. "In some ways," she added, "I think it may even at some initial novelty level pique the interest of some people."

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times A-10
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
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The Washington Post A1
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
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 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 31 May 1990

Aides Tell Bush of 'Agreement in Principle'

By Don Oberdorfer
 and David Hoffman
 Washington Post Staff Writers

Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev arrived here last night for a four-day summit meeting with President Bush that Gorbachev said holds the promise of "the first major step to reduce strategic nuclear arms" and new understandings on European and other issues.

As Gorbachev flew to Washington, Bush was told by his top arms control negotiators that talks have advanced to the point that he and Gorbachev will be able to issue an "agreement in principle" that they have resolved the major outstanding issues of a landmark Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

They also are prepared to issue a second joint statement proposing objectives for broader and deeper cuts in a successor START II pact, according to a White House official.

The prospects of agreement are much dimmer on Germany and Lithuania, which were alluded to by Secretary of State James A. Baker III in his airport welcome to the Soviet leader. White House officials said Bush was advised that these difficult issues are not likely to be resolved here but that it may be possible to "set a direction" toward future accord.

Last night, Gorbachev summoned Soviet officials and journalists to the embassy for a meeting. Several participants said afterward that he opened the session by expressing high expectations for the summit, particularly in the arms control area. He then canvassed his guests for their assessment of the mood of the United States and the Bush administration, the participants said. They responded to Gorbachev that

his stock was high in the United States and that Americans are expecting much of his visit, they said.

Earlier, Gorbachev and his wife, Raisa, stepped off his special Soviet airliner in the bright sunshine just before 7 p.m. after a state visit to Canada in which he took a hard line on the future of a united Germany and the independence-minded Baltic republics. After greeting U.S. and Soviet Embassy officials and walking down a red carpet, he was given a brief ceremonial welcome by Baker on the Andrews Air Force Base tarmac.

"The eyes of the world are on you and they are on President Bush," Baker said. "Together, our nations have the responsibility to leave behind not only the Cold War but also the conflicts that preceded it.

"To do that, we must see a Germany unified and Europe reconciled; we must reduce the danger of war by controlling nuclear, chemical and conventional arms, and by resolving regional conflicts," Baker declared. In a veiled reference to Gorbachev's troubles at home, he added, "And, of course, we want to see continued movement toward democracy and openness in the Soviet Union."

Gorbachev responded through his interpreter that "this summit stands out in its importance, first of all, for the promise it holds of the first major step to reduce strategic nuclear arms. Both sides have worked painstakingly together to prepare it."

In what seemed to be a reference to their Malta talks last December, cut short by a violent storm, Gorbachev said the current meetings are special because "this is the first time that the president of the United States and I will have enough time to reflect on and discuss, not only in a formal setting, but also in more informal surroundings, one on one, all questions either of us might have that fall within our responsibility."

The Gorbachevs, accompanied by Baker and his wife, Susan, and a 40-car caravan, traveled by motorcade to the Soviet Embassy on 16th Street NW, where they were to spend the night before going to the White House this morning for a formal arrival ceremony and the start of talks.

Gorbachev's arrival came 2½ years since his previous trip to Washington at the invitation of President Ronald Reagan in December 1987, and two years to the week since Reagan traveled to Moscow for the last formal U.S.-Soviet summit.

Since then, all six Soviet allies in Eastern Europe moved toward aban-

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doning communism, the Berlin Wall came down and Germany began moving rapidly toward unification after 45 years of division. Since Bush and Gorbachev met last December at Malta, nationalities disputes, secession crises, economic turmoil and political controversies have raised serious questions for the first time about the internal stability of the Soviet Union and about Gorbachev's leadership.

Gorbachev appeared older and grayer than in his last Washington appearance. He looked tired from his grueling trip and from a series of crises in the past few days, including panic buying in Moscow food stores and the election of a bitter rival, Boris Yeltsin, to a key political post.

White House officials said Bush and Gorbachev will meet in the Oval Office initially, joined only by one interpreter and one note-taker on each side, and then move into the Cabinet Room for expanded talks.

Joining Bush will be Vice President Quayle, Baker, Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates, and U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock.

On the Soviet side, according to the White House, will be Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Presidential Council and Politburo member Yevgeny Primakov, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, presidential foreign affairs adviser Anatoli Chernayev, presidential military adviser Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Foreign Ministry U.S.A. Department chief Alexei Obukhov and Ambassador to the United States Alexander Bessmertnykh.

Bush devoted most of yesterday to

private summit briefings with aides on economic issues, arms control and an overview, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said. He said "very specific and meaningful agreements" would be approved by the leaders, including accords on grain sales, maritime transportation, study of oceans, exchange of cultural information, expanded civil aviation and the environment.

Fitzwater did not list a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, which has been completed in full detail, as among those to be signed. A White House official said later the trade agreement "could still go either way" depending on the discussions.

The summit also will include signing of a long-disputed set of treaties on nuclear testing, and a chemical weapons accord. But the two leaders are expected to clash in their private talks on the future of Germany and on Lithuania's bid for independence.

Before Gorbachev arrived, Bush spoke by telephone with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. He also talked with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney after Gorbachev had departed Canada.

In Canada, Gorbachev expressed displeasure at what he described as Western efforts to dictate the future of Germany within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization but also suggested he might be bringing new ideas to Washington.

Fitzwater said earlier that Bush, in discussions with Gorbachev, would not propose direct limits on the size of a future German army. However, he said, the U.S. view is that future negotiations on conventional forces in Europe could consider further reductions in forces in a "central region." He added, "We are opposed to any proposal which would single out Germany for special limits."

Staff writer Gary Lee contributed to this report.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS AT A GLANCE

James A. Baker III

Baker, 60, earned his spurs as President Ronald Reagan's chief of staff from 1981 to 1985, emerging as a smooth, polished political operative and a man able to get results. At State, he has surrounded himself with a

The Americans

small group of aides, and has instant access to the president.

Baker served as commerce undersecretary from 1975-76, and was campaign chairman for George Bush's unsuccessful 1980 bid for the GOP presidential nomination. He later ran Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign and was treasury secretary in the second Reagan administration. Baker also ran Bush's 1988 presidential campaign.

Richard B. Cheney

The 49-year-old Cheney was selected to run the Pentagon after 10 years in the House of Representatives where he amassed one of the most conservative voting records on Capitol Hill. The Wyoming

representative also served as House Republican Whip. As

defense secretary, he has taken a stiff stand against congressional pressure for deep cuts in military spending, and has repeatedly warned that the United States must keep its defenses strong despite political changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

Gen. Colin L. Powell

Powell, 53, the first black to serve as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, served as President Reagan's national security adviser in the aftermath of the Iran-contra scandal. He

briefly headed the Army's Force's Command at Fort

McPherson, Ga., before assuming his current position.

Powell also has commanded the 101st Airborne Division, the U.S. Army's V Corps in Germany and was Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger's senior military assistant.

Brent Scowcroft

The president's national security adviser, 65, has served the last three Republican presidents and was Bush's touchstone on foreign policy and national

security issues in the 1988 presidential campaign. A graduate of the U.S. Military

Academy, Scowcroft held the same post he now holds in the Ford administration. He is one of Bush's closest counselors, at his elbow constantly when he is not down the White House hall in his West Wing office.

John H. Sununu

The 50-year-old chief of staff is a politician, not a foreign policy expert, and his involvement in the issues leading up to the summit has been minimal. A former

governor of New Hampshire and key adviser in Bush's 1988 presidential campaign,

Sununu is the president's main adviser and implementer on domestic issues and the domestic political impact of foreign issues. He also is the conservatives' man in the White House.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev

Akhromeyev, 67, joined the Soviet Army in 1940 at the age of 17. He was a chief in the Defense Ministry from 1974 to 1979, first deputy chief of general staff of the armed forces from 1979 to

The Soviets

1984 and chief of staff from 1984 to 1988. Akhromeyev, the most accessible of the key Soviet leaders, is now Gorbachev's personal military adviser. In recent months, he has battled in the press against cutting the military budget "too deeply" and has dismissed Soviet and western anxieties about a possible military coup as "plain nonsense."

Alexander Bessmertnykh

The 56-year-old Bessmertnykh was born in Siberia and graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He has worked in the Soviet Foreign Ministry system since 1957, serving in the

Soviet Embassy in

Washington from 1970 to 1983. He speaks fluent English and has participated in nearly all U.S.-Soviet summits and foreign ministerial meetings since 1983. Bessmertnykh was named ambassador to the United States last month and is considered in Moscow to be a sharper analyst of American politics than his predecessor, Yuri Dubinin.

Anatoli Dobrynin

Dobrynin, 70, joined the diplomatic service in 1946. He was counselor and later minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1952 to 1955. From 1962 to 1986

he was the Soviet ambassador to the United

States and was known for his ability to circulate easily in Washington society. Since returning to Moscow, Dobrynin's influence has reduced, but he is considered a valuable source and has been an adviser to Gorbachev on American affairs.