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WHAT MAKES THIS TOWN SO WONDERFUL

▪ **For dessert they're serving yam kippers:** A prominent southern senator recently told a lobbyist that he couldn't schedule a bill's mark up for a particular day in September because, after consulting his calendar, he determined that it was "Rose Hannah's Birthday" and he had noticed a number of senators and staffers always left work to attend it. That's Rosh Hashanah, Fritz.

▪ **You can't tell the players without a scorecard:** Leaders were coming and going so fast in Eastern Europe that CIA head Bill Webster took to compiling and carrying in his pocket a little list of current government heads of Eastern Bloc nations. Finally, the CIA staff started issuing a daily tally sheet so Webster and other top officials could keep them straight.

▪ **Another woman in combat:** White House reporters delving into the story about Captain Linda Bray, the Military Police officer who led the charge on a dog kennel in Panama City, were dubious about the necessity of such firepower for that target. Demanded one at a briefing by press spokesman Marlin Fitzwater: "Why didn't they just strap hand grenades on Millie and send her in?"

▪ **Spearing a Marlin:** Fitzwater had just recovered from a message sent to him by Margaret Tutwiler, the State Department spokesperson who was touring East Germany with her boss, Jim Baker. The White House was in the midst of dealing with the fire storm surrounding national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft's courtesy trip to China, which invoked outrage from those who felt that US officials shouldn't be visiting China so soon after the Tiananmen Square massacre. From East Germany Tutwiler telephoned Fitzwater's office and left word that they had decided to go to China instead of coming home and would fax their message of greetings to the Chinese people back to the White House. A bit later came another message to the frantic Marlin: Just kidding.

INSIDE REPORT**Kemp's ultimatum to Bush:
Fire my nominee and I quit**

BY ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

JACK Kemp has made clear that if Sen. John Heinz's price for supporting the China veto includes choosing the new head of HUD's Philadelphia office, President Bush had better start looking for another secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

Heinz, a Pennsylvania Republican, voted to sustain Bush's veto of the Chinese student protection bill only after the White House agreed to fire Linda Marston from the Philadelphia post. She originally was named by Kemp over Heinz's objections, and it had been assumed that the senator would pick her replacement.

But Kemp has sent a hard message that he is not about to concur in John Heinz's use of middle-level posts at HUD as senatorial patronage. For the president to reject whomever Kemp selects as Marston's successor would mean the first Bush cabinet resignation.

HENRY A. Kissinger has quietly resigned from the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) — because "advisory service to the government should be beyond controversy," he insists privately, not because of any conflict of interest.

The former secretary of state is founder and head of Kissinger Associates, which offers high-priced and highly valued advice to scores of foreign clients. His access to U.S. secrets as a member of PFIAB brought conflict-of-interest charges, which he angrily dismissed as neo-McCarthyism.

Brent Scowcroft, President Bush's national security adviser and a former executive of Kissinger Associates, urged his former boss to stay on the board.

Not a chance, replied Kissinger. He asked Scowcroft to get the president to accept the resignation at once,

which Bush did.

HEAVY White House lobbying of House Republican Whip Newt Gingrich on the China veto persisted even after attempts to override President Bush had failed.

Following the Senate vote upholding the veto, Bush aides primed Gingrich's financial contributors back home in Georgia to call and remonstrate him for failing to back the president. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft scolded him for going public in his opposition.

By coincidence, Gingrich was flying with Bush to a presidential speaking date in Atlanta on the same morning of news reports quoting the minority whip as saying of the China veto, "I cannot for the life of me understand what their strategy is."

But on Air Force One, he found out. The president gave Gingrich a hand-written list of his Chinese aims.

INDIANA Gov. Evan Bayh's successful backstage drive against casino gambling in Gary, Ind., which could have blighted his promising national political career, was helped by an unusual ally: Donald Trump.

Nevada casinos, including Harrah's and the Golden Nugget, were backing the Gary bill in the Indiana legislature. But Trump, whose widespread interests include casinos, is opposed to any such gambling outside of Nevada and New Jersey.

Bayh, 33, whose future is predicated on family values and a middle-road philosophy, faced a dilemma in the casino gambling issue. He did not want to have to oppose it because black Democratic political leaders were pushing the bill to revive economically devastated Gary.

The governor's agents in the House defeated it, with a unseen assist from Trump.

TIME/FEBRUARY 5, 1990

China Breach

Congress sets the tone for an election year with a bruising—and losing—challenge to the President's foreign policy. So much for bipartisanship


By DAN GOODGAME

Fit and sassy after a nine-week recess in such sunny spots as Bermuda and Hawaii, congressional Democrats got a wet-blanket welcome when they returned to Washington last week. The capital's skies spat and drizzled. The public-approval rate of President George Bush had climbed to nearly 80%. And the early victory the Democrats had planned against Bush over his unpopular China policy proved a washout. In the process, both Congress and the White House made it clear that the uneasy partnership they attempted last year will give way to the partisan bickering of an election year.

The Democrats had chosen what they believed was a winning issue: they were determined to override the President's veto of a bill that would have allowed 40,000 Chinese students to remain in the U.S. rather than face possible persecution in their homeland in the wake of the June massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators. Last November, after that legislation passed both houses of Congress without dissent, Bush blocked it. He argued that he could extend the students' visas on his own authority but would not sign legislation that could anger China's rulers.

Early last week his advisers told Bush that his veto could not be sustained in Congress. Adamant, Bush and his combative chief of staff, John Sununu, insisted the White House must prevail if Bush were to convert his passive public approval to tangible political clout. In an interview with *TIME* on the eve of the China vote, Bush urged that Congress not "just seek confrontation in an election year." He warned, "I won't be any pushover."

He wasn't. Focusing on the Senate, Bush made the issue a test of personal and party loyalty. He called Senators to a White House breakfast and followed up with personal notes and phone calls. He publicly promised that "no student will be forced to leave the U.S. against his will." (One Chinese student, however, sharply reminded a Senator that Bush broke an earlier promise: "He promised no high-level contacts with China" but within a month secretly dispatched National Secu-



Symbol of revolt: Chinese students hoist a "Goddess of Democracy" at the Capitol

TERRY O'NEILL

city Adviser Brent Scowcroft to Beijing.)

Last week Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker joined Bush's lobbying campaign by phone, while G.O.P. Chairman Lee Atwater and Vice President Dan Quayle prowled for votes in the corridors and cloakrooms of the Capitol. Even Richard Nixon phoned wavering Senators to say that Sino-American relations would suffer if Bush was defeated.

As expected, the House crushed the veto, 390 to 25. But 37 Senate Republicans were more receptive to Bush's blandishments, and the 62 votes to override fell four short of the required two-thirds.

At a news conference later, the President denied any intention to "gloat" or "crow" yet could scarcely restrain himself. Said he: "I do think [the victory is] going to be helpful in reaching accommodation in the House and Senate on some of our objectives." Added Mary Matalin, Republican Party chief of staff: "It's just another case where people underestimated the tenacity of George Bush. When he gets pushed up against the wall on something that he knows and cares about, he does whatever is necessary to win."

And he will do more. Skirmishes will multiply as the few efforts at bipartisan cooperation of the recent past recede from Washington's memory. For one thing, the Democrats are plainly frustrated. In a fit of complaisance early last year, the White House and Democrats agreed to set aside differences on policy toward Nicaragua, collaborated on a plan to bail out the savings and loan industry and settled on the outlines of the federal budget. But the budget accord unraveled, largely over Bush's insistence on a capital-gains tax cut that would mainly benefit taxpayers earning \$200,000 or more a year. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell blocked that measure, promising that he would make no more budget deals with the White House and observing sourly that "for them, bipartisanship is a one-way street."

A senior Administration official concedes, "It is not unreasonable for Democrats to feel that we define bipartisanship as their doing what we want them to do. Being cooperative did not get them much last year." This official would prefer to trade favors and make deals—to allow the Democrats "to be the winners sometimes to get what we want." But Sununu and others, adds the official, "have a real desire to inflict pain for its own sake."

In that respect, Sununu is a useful "bad cop" to Bush's "good cop." The President emphasized to *TIME* that he will renew his offer of cooperation with Congress this week in his first State of the Union address. But he warned half-jokingly, as he rolled his eyes in the direction of a smiling Sununu, "You've got some [people] sitting around here that aren't quite as kind and gentle." Never a patient sort, Sununu has grown exasperated with Congress's failure to act on the Adminis-

tration's agenda and has persuaded Bush to depict the Democrats as a band of tax-happy do-nothings.

Bush may also be more willing than ever to veto legislation. That power is essentially negative: it can stymie the Democrats, but it can seldom accomplish anything positive. Similarly, the Democrats, who lack a two-thirds majority in either house, cannot override Bush's veto without Republican support. Their strategy, according to one of their number, will be to send the President legislation on popular issues that bears a strong Democratic imprint, and dare him to veto it. Among the most divisive of those upcoming issues:

TAXES. New York's Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan wants to roll back Social Security taxes that have become burdensome for most middle- and lower-income wage earners. Bush opposes any cut in Social Security taxes as too expensive and claims that it would threaten future retirement benefits. At the same time, the President will continue to press for cuts in capital-gains taxes.

THE BUDGET. Bush has warned Congress against spending any "peace dividend" from a reduced defense budget. He will propose to cut only about \$10 billion in defense for the next fiscal year, and insists



"won't be any pushover": Bush braces for a rough session with Congress

that those savings are needed to reduce the budget deficit. When Congress demands deeper cuts, the Administration will challenge members to cut in their own districts by eliminating unneeded military bases.

CLEAN AIR. Congress is intent on passing clean-air legislation that is more stringent, more expensive and less market oriented than the proposal Bush submitted last year. Asked whether he can afford in an election year to veto any clean-air bill, the President told *TIME*, "Yes, because I'll be talking about jobs and a person's right to make a living [as well as] my commitment to clean air."

CHILD CARE. Republicans prefer a child-care program that would work through tax incentives and grants to states. Democrats favor creating a new federal bureaucracy and federal regulations.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM. If a bipartisan House task force does not submit a bill by early March, Oklahoma Democrat David Boren will introduce his own in the Senate. Democrats generally favor campaign-spending limits and use of public funds in campaigns; Republicans oppose both.

FOREIGN AID. Bush endorses the efforts of Senate Republican leader Robert Dole to

give the President and State Department more flexibility in apportioning aid to the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America. Democrats, along with many Republicans, defend the current system, under which Congress earmarks the greatest aid to five recipients: Israel, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and the Philippines.

This is a heavy legislative load, and with elections ahead the temptations will be greater than usual to posture and obstruct, to veto and delay. But if the current Washington gridlock continues, the voters may eventually see to it that incumbents of both parties get a much longer vacation than they wanted.

—With reporting by Hays Gorey/Washington

Building a "Big Tent" Around Abortion

By MICHAEL KRAMER


There he was again last week, dealing with the "abortion thing." Every year around flu season, the President is called upon to convince a rally of right-to-lifers that he is the best friend of the unborn. So George Bush did it for 90 seconds last Monday, over a loudspeaker by telephone from the Oval Office. His tone was muted, but the message clear: "Let me assure you that this President stands with you on this issue of life."

Bush's abortion record is hardly a model of consistency. When he ran for the 1980 G.O.P. presidential nomination, Bush supported the Supreme Court's landmark abortion-rights ruling, *Roe v. Wade*. A few months later, as Ronald Reagan's No. 2, he adopted his boss's anti-*Roe* stance. On his own now for a year, Bush has led the charge against *Roe* by vetoing four abortion-funding bills—heavy lifting to qualify for the Right-to-Life Hall of Fame.

But the real story last week was further evidence of a slow but sure retreat from the pro-life stance that has been official Republican policy for ten years. Look at the G.O.P. as a "big tent," said party chairman Lee Atwater. "Forget politics. Do and support what you truly, truly believe. We are an umbrella party." Anyone who thinks Atwater is freelancing without higher approval has been smoking crack with Marion Barry.

What's going on here? The political terrain is shifting, and the smartest Republicans are scampering to keep pace. "The electorate's composition is changing," says a G.O.P. strategist. "The baby boomers are taking over, and their credo is 'Live and let live.'" A move to the left could alienate Bush's base of antiabortion conservatives, he acknowledges, "but those people will probably stay with us in the end, and we'll need the young libertarians in '92."

Even some of those who oppose abortion are now claiming they are pro-choice. "I am pro-life and pro-choice," says Ann



A new line of march: G.O.P. placards for pro-choice

Stone, the brains behind the right wing's wildly successful direct-mail operations: "The question is, Who decides, us or the government?" Stone will soon announce creation of Republicans for Choice, a political-action committee that will support pro-choice G.O.P. candidates and work to change the Republican platform's rigid antiabortion plank. Like Atwater, Stone is not flying solo. "Let's just say we know what she is up to," says a Bush aide.

Atwater's "big tent" talk and Stone's new PAC are just two manifestations of a long-term strategy. "It's like *perestroika*," says a Bush adviser.

"It takes time and hard work to change positions previously carved in stone." In other words, concedes the G.O.P. strategist, "the party is going to have to be hit over the head in the 1990 elections. Our big winners will likely be those who are pro-choice; our big losers those who are pro-life. It will take the shock of '90 before a change can really be set in motion."

Bush meanwhile will go blithely on his way, until the Big Test. "Everyone figures there will be a Supreme Court vacancy before '92," says a White House aide. "And that will be the ball game. At that point, no matter how many pro-abortion bills the President has vetoed or how craven he has been in his support of the right-to-lifers, it will all come down to how he handles that nomination."

How would Bush play such an opportunity? A G.O.P. dream scenario runs like this: Bush (obviously) avoids choosing a trustee of Planned Parenthood, but he does select a new Justice whose position is ambiguous enough to generate a mini-outcry from the pro-lifers. Then the former wimp sticks by his man (or woman), stands up to the antiabortion lobby and creates a political triumph that dwarfs even Panama.

George Bush is the Mr. Lucky of American politics. He will probably get a court vacancy, play it beautifully and finally put the "abortion thing" behind him. If he manages that, the Democrats will be reduced to praying for a Depression. ■

Chance to be a history-maker

KEN ADELMAN

Baker should raise sights

Moscow-bound this week, Secretary of State James Baker faces glittering possibilities for creative work. Widely respected as a consummate deal-maker, Mr. Baker should now raise his sights higher — to become a history-maker.

The times beckon it, and President Bush helped pave the way with his new State of the Union Address proposal on further cutting troops in Europe.

Just as his predecessor, Dean Acheson, could title his memoirs "Present at the Creation," so could Mr. Baker if he would only grasp the opportunities with both hands.

This entails molding future conditions, not rehashing past problems. It's downright depressing to think that Mr. Baker will, as he has touted, dive into the capillaries of strategic-arms talks by addressing air-launched cruise missiles, non-deployed missiles, and encryption.

What for? When all is said and done about these negotiations, more is said about them than could be done by them.

For a START accord will *not* save money, change fundamental realities, or even help our strategic stability. Before becoming Mr. Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft (along with others) wrote that our START proposal could push the United States into "a new kind of triad: vulnerability, wishful thinking and a hair trigger." Not too reassuring but too true.

It's still somewhat depressing to think of Mr. Baker going to Moscow to push the conventional-arms talks, even after Mr. Bush's new offer for the United States and the Soviet Union each to have 195,000 troops in Central Europe.

Again, what for?

After 40 years of our adamantly refusing to legitimize any Soviet troop presence in Eastern Europe, these ne-

gotiations, even if successful, would still legitimize 195,000 Soviet troops there for years to come. While better than before Mr. Bush's State of the Union Address, it's still not sufficient.

"There are no reasons, be they of political, military security, or arms-control character, that would justify the stationing of foreign troops on the territory of Hungary," said Hungary's foreign minister. Poland's Lech Walesa echoes this, while the Czech government negotiates with Moscow to remove all its troops from there by the year's end. East Germany, now hosting the bulk of Soviet troops abroad, will follow after its March elections.

The cry has become contagious. Even Moscow talks that way. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrosky has declared, "Our final goal is to have not a single Soviet soldier abroad by the year 2000." No conditions were mentioned. No conditions are proper, since American troops in Europe never had an occupation role.

Rather than fuss with outdated talks, Mr. Baker can open discussions on Europe's future. Czechoslovakia's broad-thinking president, Vaclav Havel, laid out his vision: "We want to belong to a Europe that is a friendly community of independent states, a stable Europe, a Europe that does not need protection from superpowers because it is capable of defending itself by constructing its own security system."

Working with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to remove all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, and with the Eastern Europeans to integrate their economies into those of the West, constitute the first steps. These will take some doing, especially as to Germany's future.

Mr. Baker also could work with Mr. Gorbachev on remedying his severe ills. Last month, Mr. Gorbachev dispatched 11,000 troops to mollify,

PATRICK BUCHANAN

Troop offer overtaken

Had President Bush gone before Congress a year ago, to propose reducing U.S. and Soviet troop strength in Central Europe to 195,000 on either side, he would have riveted the world's attention. History, however, has passed the president by.

Czechoslovakia is already talking to Moscow about complete withdrawal of the Red Army before year's end; Hungary and Poland want total withdrawal before the end of 1991. These nations want Soviet troops out, while Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is still there to order them out.

Their anxiety is understandable. They do not know how long Mr. Gorbachev has; they are apprehensive about any East-West deal that "legitimizes" a permanent presence, on their national soil, of Soviet troops they consider to be a foreign army of occupation.

Why, it is being asked insistently, should the United States negotiate mutual withdrawals with Moscow, when anti-communist revolutions are forcing unilateral and total withdrawals of the Red Army? Mr. Bush's arms-control advisers argue that a treaty, ratified by 23 states, would make Moscow's departure permanent, would entail verified destruction of the tanks and guns Mr. Gorbachev's successor would need to re-establish a Soviet military presence in Central Europe.

But East-West negotiations are being overtaken by events.

It is no exaggeration to say that this week's meeting of the Central Committee will determine whether Lenin's party, the mighty instrument of world revolution forged by Josef Stalin, survives.

Consider what the party elite, the nomenklatura, confronts:

On March 4, elections at the city and regional level, and for the supreme soviets of the republics, are to be held. The outcome is foreordained: The Communist Party faces

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ADELMAN...CONTINUED

Azerbaijan, while some 17,000 Interior Ministry troops remain stationed elsewhere in the Soviet Union on emergency duty.

The Soviet crackup proceeds apace. Yet all of us have a stake in assuring that Mr. Gorbachev's command and control over nuclear and chemical weapons stays strong during these tumultuous times. For Mr. Baker to initiate a quiet dialogue on this hot topic would be wise.

Politically, Mr. Baker could share thoughts on federalism as the only long-term remedy for the Soviets' long-festering disintegration. Now that six of the 16 Soviet republics move toward independence, Mr.

Gorbachev can hold the place together only by concocting a confederation.

Power must devolve from Moscow to the regions informally, by letting it happen, or formally, by Mr. Gorbachev's calling a national constitutional convention.

Eventually, the Soviet Union may resemble Switzerland, whose core is weak and cantons strong. Or perhaps Canada, with its confederation agreeable even to ethnically distinct Quebec. And new formulas could be tried, like granting the Baltic republics seats in the United Nations, just as the Ukraine and Byelorussia have now.

Looking broadly and thinking cre-

BUCHANAN...CONTINUED

wholesale repudiation and national humiliation. To permit these elections to go forward is to march directly into a massacre, with concomitant loss of power and position all over the country.

Patrick Buchanan is a nationally syndicated columnist.

atively, Mr. Baker can begin to accomplish great things. He can at least avoid the charge Henry Adams made against then-secretary of state, James Madison: "He ignored the heart of every issue to fret the extremities."

Ken Adelman is a nationally syndicated columnist.

U.S. denies report of hostage talks

By Bill Gertz
 THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Bush administration said yesterday that a French newspaper report about U.S.-Iranian negotiations for the release of American hostages in Lebanon was "total nonsense."

"Pure fiction, as far as I know," National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who is traveling with President Bush in California, said of the report.

"It's just total nonsense," said State Department spokesman Richard Boucher. "We don't make deals for hostages. We don't negotiate for hostages."

The French daily newspaper Le Figaro reported in Paris yesterday that Mr. Bush had called French President Francois Mitterrand regarding negotiations with Iran for the release of eight Americans held hostage by terrorists in Lebanon.

The release of the Americans was linked by Iran's negotiators to the release of a convicted murderer, Anis Naccache, who is being held in a French prison for killing two persons in a 1980 attack on former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar, the newspaper said.

Naccache's life sentence could be commuted to 20 years, and he could be freed as early as next year, the newspaper reported, quoting French Foreign Ministry sources.

"President Bush personally telephoned Francois Mitterrand to tell him of a development in the negotiations between Americans and Iranians to obtain the liberation of American hostages held by Hezbollah [Party of God] in Lebanon," Le Figaro reported.

But Mr. Boucher said as far as he knows Mr. Bush did not telephone Mr. Mitterrand about the issue.

"Without commenting on the specific case [of Naccache], our approach to the problem of terrorism has always been that the rule of law has to be applied to terrorists," he said. "That's the way we deal with the problem."

Mr. Boucher said the administration is willing to negotiate with the "authoritative" Iranian government representatives, "but so far they have not been willing to do so."

The only official contacts between the United States and Iran have taken place at the World Court in The Hague, Netherlands, over the issue of U.S. reparations to the victims of the 1988 Iran Air disaster, Mr. Boucher said.

A U.S. warship shot down the airliner, killing 290 people on board, in what the Pentagon said later was a case of mistaken identity. The ship's radar mistook the commercial airliner for a warplane.

The Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist group is believed by U.S. officials to be holding the American hostages. Naccache, a Lebanese national, was a European spokesman for the group.

According to the newspaper account, the Iranians brought up the name of Naccache and said that his release was a precondition for the release of the eight Americans held in Lebanon.

A spokesman for France's Foreign Ministry declined to comment on the report, Reuters news agency reported from Paris.

A total of 17 Americans are believed to be hostages of terrorists in Lebanon allied with Iran.

France restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 1988, in a deal that brought the release of several French hostages from Lebanon.

Eagleburger Defends China Policy; Senators Unconvinced

By John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writer

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger yesterday defended President Bush's China policy as serving the best interests of the United States and the Chinese people, but he failed to defuse congressional charges that the administration has not been tough enough in reacting to the massacre of dissidents in Beijing's Tiananmen Square last June.

The administration was hit by a storm of criticism for alleged appeasement of China's communist rulers after it was revealed that Eagleburger and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft made secret trips to Beijing in July and December to discuss U.S.-Chinese relations.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday, Eagleburger said the first trip was to advise Beijing of how seriously Bush viewed its crackdown on students demonstrating for more democracy. He said the second trip followed up on signals that China might be easing the repression, and he added in reference to coverage of Scowcroft offering a toast to their Chinese hosts:

"All the talk of clinking glasses, surprise announcements and warm toasts misses the point. The Chinese leadership needed to know how they could improve their relations with the United States, and we told them."

The administration is quite aware "that not enough has been done" to improve the human rights situation, he said, but "we never expected to reverse events overnight."

Tracing the up-and-down nature of U.S.-Chinese relations in the postwar era, Eagleburger argued that it would be a great mistake to play into the hands of those "xeno-

phobic forces" in China that want to eliminate any U.S. influence.

"There is no guarantee of consistency or evenness in our relations," he said. "Contacts and relationships could only help promote reform within China and enhance respect for human rights. Such contacts also help to shorten the periods of tension between China and the United States."

However, his arguments did not appear to impress skeptical senators, who repeated charges of administration kowtowing to Beijing and who, in some cases, suggested that Bush might have set a precedent that could lead the Soviet Union to use force in dealing with mounting dissent in its Baltic republics.

The harshest criticism came from Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), who likened Eagleburger's testimony to speeches made in the 1930s by the late British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, advocating appeasement of the Nazi regime in Germany. "There are many evil regimes in the world today, but none deserves more to be overthrown by its people than the one in Beijing," Helms said.

Eagleburger also heard expressions of concern about the administration's course from those who have supported Bush, such as Sen. Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-Kan.). She was among the Republicans who two weeks ago voted against a Senate move to override Bush's veto of legislation that would have given Chinese students in the United States the right to remain here indefinitely.

Kassebaum said she was swayed by administration arguments that passing the legislation might lead Beijing to cut off educational exchanges with the United States. It was dismaying, Kassebaum said, to read a report yesterday that Beijing authorities plan to require university graduates to work five years before they become eligible to study abroad.

For Bush, a Mission Impossible?

The Washington Post A-25
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____
 Date 9 FEB 90

By Ann Devroy
 Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush, who has made extensive efforts to establish a rapport with reporters who cover him, saw one of those efforts backfire last week in the continuing, mostly subterranean struggle between journalists and the president over secrecy and deception.

Last week Bush invited a handful of reporters to a White House lunch at which his comments would be off the record. The lunch occurred the day before the State of the Union address in which Bush proposed a major troop cut in Europe, a secret he was then keeping from all but his closest aides to have a "surprise" for the speech.

The reporters, according to sources who heard accounts of two attendees, engaged in a general discussion of secrecy. ABC correspondent Brit Hume told Bush that journalists recognize a president's right to secrecy, but not a right to deceive. Sources described the discussion as good-natured and said Bush was asked what has become an almost standard question: Had the president sent any top aides on secret missions lately?

Bush said no. But the denial was made as two top aides were en route home from a secret mission.

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger and deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates had been sent secretly to brief European leaders on the troop cut proposal. The two made a similar secret foray last spring, before Bush announced his first round of troop cuts.

A White House official said Bush considered the European trip a "routine consultation with allies" and not a secret mission.

The issue of White House deception about secret trips is a sensitive one that exploded publicly when CNN discovered Dec. 18 that Eagleburger and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft had been

sent on a secret mission in July to China when the White House was stating unequivocally that because of the bloody repression of pro-democracy students in June, high-level exchanges between Chinese and U.S. officials were banned.

Only days earlier reporters woke up to see Scowcroft on their tele-

visions toasting the Chinese in Beijing. That trip that was announced about 2 a.m. Dec. 9, as the U.S. officials were flying to China.

Officials trapped in the China secrecy web included Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who stated on national television just before the CNN revelation of the July mission, that no secret trips to China had occurred other than the one the White House announced. Baker later apologized for the statement.

At the luncheon last week, Hume reportedly engaged Bush in what some called a "good-natured" argument over the issue of a president's right to secrecy versus the public's right not to be deceived. Bush repeatedly has said he has the right to keep secrets and that diplomacy, in particular, is more effective if conducted in secrecy. Challenged about deceiving the public, Bush and others have resorted to semantic arguments: Bush said secret trips to China were not "exchanges" but "visits" so the announced ban on "exchanges" had not been violated.

According to sources, the debate between Bush and the reporters was civil. The day after the luncheon, it was revealed that officials had been on a secret mission.

Hume, sources said, decided to send Bush a note when both were aboard Air Force One Tuesday en route to the first of three days of presidential speeches around the country. Hume scribbled what administration officials describe as a non-confrontational note picking up the arguments over secrecy and

deception without accusing Bush of lying or citing the specific secret mission. Bush sent back a handwritten note that one source said was characteristically conciliatory and somewhat tongue-in-cheek.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater declined to comment on why Bush had told reporters no secret missions were underway. He said both the lunch with reporters and the exchange between Hume and Bush were off the record, which prohibits reporters who attended from writing or broadcasting anything about the lunch.

Nor would Hume describe the lunch or exchange of notes. He said that on a recent television show, during which several White House reporters were interviewed, he pointed out that reporters recognize a president's right to keep secrets but not to lie. Hume and the other reporters said senior officials have ways of avoiding revealing secrets without deception, including saying no comment.

Bush's running argument has occurred despite extraordinary efforts to maintain good relations with reporters. Hume, for example, has been invited to White House lunches and state dinners, tennis with Bush at Camp David and other social activities.

Bush knows many of the reporters on a first-name basis and, until the issue of deception began emerging, has had an easy, bantering relationship with the press corps quite unlike the arms-length, formal relationship President Ronald Reagan had.

East Bloc Political Upheaval Shakes U.S. Strategies

As Soviets join rush to reform, American lawmakers face new questions on arms, troops and NATO

President Bush spent Feb. 6-8 doing what commanders-in-chief do: He watched Army maneuvers in the California desert, he tried out the pilot's seat of a B-1 bomber parked near Omaha, he praised the troops for their skill and sacrifice and he jocularly advised missile launch crews at the end of a broadcast speech that "the pointy end is up."

But his three-day swing through defense facilities also had powerful political overtones. As largely peaceful revolutions rocked Moscow and Eastern Europe, shattering principles of U.S. defense policy for the past 40 years, Bush tried to build a backfire against congressional assaults on his \$306 billion defense budget.


The changes are real, he acknowledged, and a substantial reduction in East-West tensions might well be within reach. But until deep cuts in Soviet military hardware are enshrined in ratified treaties, he warned, too rapid a retrenchment of U.S. military power would be counterproductive.

"We must not let impatience born of euphoria jeopardize all that we hope to achieve in the future," Bush told San Francisco's Commonwealth Club on Feb. 7.

He put the point more bluntly the next day. The new era would require "hard choices between defense programs," he said at a political fundraiser in Columbus, Ohio. "But we've got to be careful. We've got to do our cutting with a scalpel, not a meat ax."

In the end, Bush may prevail. But first, he will have to fend off vigorous efforts on Capitol Hill to slice billions from his Pentagon budget request, kill off some high-profile strategic arms programs and cut back the 300,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe.

The budget and nuclear arms have



been staples of the congressional defense debate since early in Ronald Reagan's presidency. It probably is in the latter area that Bush faces the greatest risk of outright defeat, as broad and potentially powerful coalitions gear up for runs at the B-2 "stealth" bomber and the MX and Midgetman mobile missiles. (*Box*, p. 398)

But this year, in addition to those long-running debates, the White House may also face a direct and politically powerful challenge, for the first time since the early 1970s, on the issue of how many U.S. troops should be stationed in Europe.

For more than a decade, Capitol Hill has smoldered with resentment over the cost of deploying U.S. forces abroad to defend allies who are also commercial competitors. But congressional demands that the NATO allies and Japan pay a greater share of the cost of mutual defense efforts typically have stopped far short of trying to significantly reduce the number of

U.S. personnel abroad.

With the Warsaw Pact's virtual disintegration as a coherent military alliance in the past few months, longtime critics of the overseas deployments, such as House Armed Services Committee member Patricia Schroeder, D-Colo., may be in a better position to force the pace of U.S. troop cuts abroad. "It's going to be a very live issue," she said. "The [Soviet] frontier's just moved a thousand kilometers east."

To be sure, Bush's generally cautious approach includes some sweeping departures from current U.S. policy, most notably his call in the State of the Union address to cut the number of U.S. and Soviet troops in central Europe to no more than 195,000 for each country. This would amount to a reduction of nearly one-third in the number of U.S. personnel now on the continent, compared with a previous U.S. proposal that would have limited U.S. and Soviet forces to 275,000 troops each. (*Weekly Report* p. 334)

But what looks daring in comparison with longstanding U.S. policy takes on a different aspect in light of fast-moving and far-reaching events in Eastern Europe. On the day of Bush's San Francisco address, for example:

- In Moscow, the Communist Party called for an end to its legal monopoly on political power in the Soviet Union, preparing the way for a multiparty Soviet political system to emerge.

- In Bonn, the West German government set up a Cabinet ministry to manage the unification of East and West Germany — a process many German political leaders expect to begin within months, if not weeks.

Against that background, some leading Hill Democrats criticized Bush's defense budget and arms control strategy as hopelessly overtaken by events.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

By Pat Towell

KISSINGER... CONTINUED

be accepted with alacrity by Western Europe as a hedge against German revanchism or renewed Soviet aggressiveness.

In short NATO is needed for the internal West European balance and as a guarantee of European security. To be sure, the American deployments in Europe and the overall strength of NATO should take account of the declining

military threat. But abolishing NATO cannot be a quid pro quo for the ailments of the Warsaw Pact. What NATO must do is to redefine the threat it is supposed to deal with, the strategy appropriate to it and the organization that reflects the changed roles of Europe and the United States.

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Pg. 6

A Troop-Cut Assent

Gorbachev Accepts Vital Part of Plan By Bush to Reduce Forces in Europe

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9 — With his troop reduction proposal today, President Mikhail S. Gorbachev in effect accepted a key premise of the Bush Administration's troop reduction plan: that the United States should continue to maintain a large military presence in Europe.

News Analysis Ever since President Bush made his troop-cut plan public in his State of the Union Message last week, Administration officials have been adamant that Washington not agree to reduce American forces in Central Europe below 195,000.

Administration officials had been fearful that the Soviet President would try to trump the American proposal, as he has often done in the past, by insisting on far greater troop reductions. But Mr. Gorbachev resisted the temptation, an indication that Moscow is seriously committed to a speedy completion of an agreement cutting conventional forces in Europe.

But Mr. Gorbachev balked at one important element of the Bush Administration's plan: the expectation that Washington could keep more troops in Europe as a whole than Moscow.

Sending Moscow a Message

President Bush's troop-cut proposal set separate limits of 195,000 on American and Soviet troops in Central Europe, which it defined as embracing West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark and all of the Eastern European nations except Romania and Bulgaria.

Mr. Bush's proposal was carefully drafted to exclude other American troops outside that zone, in nations like

Britain and Turkey. Mr. Bush said the United States intended to keep 30,000 troops in nations outside the central zone, giving Washington a net advantage in troop deployments closest to the frontier between the two blocs.

Administration officials said the proposal for unequal troop levels was intended to demonstrate that the American military presence in Europe was not justified solely by the presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. In effect, the Bush Administration plan was intended to send the message that large numbers of American forces would stay in Western Europe regardless of what actions Moscow took to withdraw its troops from Eastern European nations.

"America's democratic allies have made clear that they want a substantial American presence," Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, said in a recent speech. "So we will remain."

Call for Equal Troop Limits

But Moscow also appears to have seen Washington's insistence on unequal troop levels as symbolically important, and Soviet officials almost immediately criticized that aspect of the Administration's plan.

Moscow has long seen arms-control agreements as a way to demonstrate that the Soviet Union and the United States have equal standing in world politics as superpowers, as well as a means of constraining American military capabilities. And it was unlikely from the start that Moscow would agree to unequal levels of American and Soviet troops in Europe. Not surprisingly, President Gorbachev today

called for equal ceilings on troops stationed in Europe.

The Soviet leader proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union reduce their troops in all Western and Eastern European nations to 195,000 — a move that would deprive Washington of any advantage. If Washington believed that figure was too low, Mr. Gorbachev said, Moscow was prepared to agree to set equal ceilings of 225,000 for American and Soviet troops.

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d called Mr. Gorbachev's proposal "very interesting," suggesting that Washington saw the plan as an important advance in the conventional-arms negotiations that left the two superpowers with significant but reconcilable differences.

On another issue, Mr. Baker said he had told Mr. Gorbachev that the United States "does not favor neutrality for a unified Germany, that we favor a continued membership in, or association with, NATO."

His comments rekindled speculation that the United States was moving toward acceptance of something less than full membership in NATO's military and political structures for a unified Germany. Administration officials here declined to elaborate on Mr. Baker's comments.

Administration officials have acknowledged that if Germany is united, if NATO troops are restricted to what is now West Germany, as has been proposed, and if the political role of NATO begins to take on more importance than its military role, then the nature of Germany's membership in NATO would have to change.

But it was not clear whether Mr. Baker's addition of the word association indicated that the United States would accept a change in Germany's NATO status, or whether he was doing what Washington has been doing for weeks — using deliberately ambiguous language to avoid drawing firm lines on the negotiations.

Mr. Baker said the United States was not changing its policy.

"Of course, the preferred position of the United States is that Germany retain its membership in NATO," he said. "However it is our view that NATO itself is going to change in character as I outlined in my recent remarks in Berlin, so it would become less of a security alliance and more of a political alliance."

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"There are new realities in the world but no new thinking at home to match them," said House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin, Wis. House Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt, Mo., derided Bush for "beating plowshares into swords" in his effort to drum up support for the defense budget.

If it comes to that, however, a congressional challenge to current U.S. deployments in Europe may be the least of Bush's NATO problems.

Many officials in Germany and the United States expect the process of unifying East and West Germany to begin in earnest very shortly after the East German parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 18. So by the time Congress begins debating the defense authorization bill in May or June, Bush and his top aides, like policy makers all over Europe, including in Moscow, may be groping for answers to wrenching questions that seemed reassuringly hypothetical only a year ago:

- What will be the relationship between a unified Germany and NATO on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other?

- If Germany remains in NATO, as is the policy of the right-of-center coalition in Bonn, what will its military strategy be? In particular, how will NATO's military planners deal with the presence of more than 300,000 Soviet troops in enclaves throughout the country's eastern third, like raisins in a cake?

- What will be the mission of U.S. military forces in Europe if the East-West military standoff centered in Germany fades away — fairly quickly?

Toward One Germany

It has taken less than four months for the East German regime to make the transition from hard-line anchor of the Soviet bloc to political basket case.

It began unraveling in earnest last October, when it became clear that Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev would not use his troops in East Germany to bolster the government of East German Communist Party boss Erich Honecker against massive public demonstrations in Leipzig and other cities calling for political and economic liberalization.

By some accounts, Gorbachev collaborated with some top East German officials to push aside the elderly and ailing Honecker in mid-October.

In any case, the new government in

East Berlin fared no better than Honecker's. Popular pressure for further liberalization only increased, and the East German economy began to slow down, partly because East Germans were emigrating across the virtually open border into West Germany.

On Nov. 28, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl unveiled a 10-point plan for German reunification under which the two German governments would go through an interim stage of confederation.

Early in December, the East German government, which by then included a substantial minority of non-Communists, set parliamentary elections for May 6. But by late January, the regime was in a critical state, with its citizens decamping for the West at a rate of 3,000 per day, according to some estimates.

By then, it had become generally accepted in West Germany that the long-held goal of unification was at hand, willy-nilly.

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Moreover, there was a consensus in Bonn that the East German population quickly had to be given credible assurances that their lot would improve fast, lest the government and economic system in East Germany simply collapse.

Under pressure from Bonn, the East German government advanced parliamentary elections from May 6 to March 18. And by early February, the Bonn government was pushing for a rapid monetary and economic union between the two German states.

On Feb. 9, West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher called such an economic union a top priority. Coupled with West German economic aid, he said, the currency union would help to stabilize East German industry, stop the exodus to the West and help guarantee stability in Europe.

East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow had conceded Jan. 30 that rapid amalgamation of the two Ger-

manys was inevitable. Modrow insisted that the new unified Germany would have to be neutral, but Bonn and the other NATO governments rejected that demand out of hand.

Bonn's center-right coalition of Kohl's Christian Democrats and Genscher's Free Democrats proposed a different solution to the question of the unified Germany's international status: The country would remain a part of NATO, the government maintained; however, non-German NATO military forces would stay out of the territory that had comprised East Germany.

The Soviet government, which had ruled out any discussion of rapid German unification as recently as late January, announced Feb. 8 that Gorbachev would meet Feb. 10 with Kohl and Genscher. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze called Genscher's plan for German membership in NATO "interesting" and said it would be discussed in the meeting.

Moscow's main concern regarding German unification, Shevardnadze said, was preserving the stability of Europe — a goal that, he implied, required that Germany's economic power and military potential be counterbalanced in the new European order. "We are in favor of a European Germany," he said, "not a German Europe."

Where To Put the Troops?

The impact of events on West German politics — and their potential impact on NATO — was vividly apparent at a conference of national legislators, government officials and defense analysts from NATO countries held Feb. 2-4 in Munich.

The conference, an annual affair sponsored by the West German defense journal *Wehrkunde*, is a venue for informal and frank, though public, discussion of issues facing the Western alliance. "It's the NATO establishment conference," Aspin says. "The discussion is always right of center and ... cautious."

But this year, the conference broke out of the usual pattern. Unification was the big issue, with West German participants debating the implications for West Germany's membership in the alliance.

West German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg outlined his government's notion of a unified Germany in NATO but with non-German troops remaining in what is now West Germany.

Stoltenberg did not discuss the status under that proposed arrangement of the 355,000 forces now in East Ger-

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many. But several U.S. and German officials at the conference speculated that all parties concerned would have an incentive to simply accept their continued presence for the time being. For several weeks, the Soviet units in East Germany have not maneuvered outside their base areas.

The Bonn government's view was challenged by Egon Bahr and Karsten Voigt, who are leaders of the opposition Social Democratic Party. Both men brushed aside as impossible the Bonn government's notion of continued NATO membership with some kind of special status for the territory formerly making up East Germany.

With democratization sweeping Eastern Europe and a multilateral treaty nearing completion that would slash conventional forces in Europe, the continent was approaching the situation for which the opposition Social Democrats have been pushing, Voigt said, in which no country or alliance would have the physical ability to threaten a significant military offensive. "The capability of surprise attack [will be] done away with," he said.

Bahr, one of the Social Democrats' foreign policy spokesmen, insisted that a process of psychological "demobilization" was well under way in the armed forces of both German states. "The Germans won't shoot anymore," he said. "Whenever they shoot, all they can shoot are Germans."

Opinion polls give Kohl's coalition a slim majority over the Social Democrats in West Germany, where national elections have long been scheduled for this December. But long before Adolf Hitler seized power in 1933, there was a strong Social Democratic tradition in parts of Germany that fell under communist control when the country was partitioned in 1945.

If that tradition survives, nationwide elections in a unified Germany could produce a Social Democratic government by year's end.

Looking to the shorter term, Aspin speculated that the Bonn government's gamble probably was correct: that Gorbachev would accept NATO membership for the new Germany.

But the emotional intensity with which the German Wehrkunde participants debated reunification also illus-



A sign of changing times: House Armed Services Chairman Aspin welcomes his counterparts from the Soviet parliament.

trated its powerful hold on them across the political spectrum. "Unification is No. 1," Aspin said, "and where this unified Germany is, is a distant second."

And How Many To Keep?

On Feb. 3, White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft assured the Wehrkunde participants that Bush's proposal to limit U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe to 195,000 was intended to set a floor below which U.S. troop strength in Europe would not decline for the time being, regardless of whether the Soviets made additional reductions.

"The United States has an enduring responsibility to remain here," Scowcroft said, "as a counterweight to the Soviet Union's permanent geographical advantage on this continent."

But several members of the predominantly Republican congressional contingent at Munich expressed doubts that Bush could hold the line at 195,000.

Noting that West Germany has announced plans to trim its military by about 20 percent, Senate Armed Services Committee member Alan J. Dixon, D-Ill., has vowed to push for a proportional U.S. troop cut in fiscal 1991 — a reduction of about 60,000. That would be "a modest number," he said, that took due account of the changes sweeping Eastern Europe. Bush's proposal to stand pat pending a negotiated reduction to 195,000, Dixon said, was "way behind the curve. The American people are very unhappy with that."

Notwithstanding budget pressures at home and developments abroad, several members of Congress predicted that Bush's proposal for a nego-

tiated cut to 195,000 might help him fend off Hill suggestions of a smaller immediate reduction.

But Schroeder disagreed, contending that the apparent ease with which Bush revised the U.S. negotiating position would make it easier for Congress to impose its own judgment. "He can't come and plead with us to be cautious when he can pick up the phone [and] go down to 195,000 that easily," she said.

Schroeder did not commit herself to pushing for a fiscal 1991 reduction of any particular size.

Whatever the outcome of any congressional skirmish over the number of U.S. troops in Europe, there was strong consensus among congressional participants in the Wehrkunde meeting that the changes in Eastern Europe would have at least one clear effect on Bush's fiscal 1991 defense budget: It likely doomed any chances that Congress would approve the \$112 million requested to develop a nuclear-armed missile with a range of nearly 300 miles, intended to replace the aging, shorter-range Lance missiles deployed in Europe.

U.S. Gen. John Galvin, NATO's military chief, insists that the new missile would be uniquely suited to beef up the alliance's deterrent force in a way that air-launched nuclear weapons could not match.

However, the "Lance follow-on" has drawn intense opposition in West Germany because it could reach only targets in Eastern European countries, including East Germany.

NATO finessed the issue by deferring until 1992 a final decision on whether to deploy the new missile. But several Hill defense specialists warned Galvin at the Munich meeting and elsewhere that the political changes in Eastern Europe probably have doomed the program.

"You can't let one go without blowing away a lot of innocent women and children," says Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee member Warren Rudman, R-N.H.

According to Senate Armed Services member William S. Cohen, R-Maine, the missile was doomed by the likelihood that no West German government would approve its deployment. "Galvin has logic on his side," he said, "but logic has nothing to do with it."

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Bush Faces Decision on Arms Talks

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 13 — With conflicting advice from the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, President Bush faces a decision on whether to wrap up a strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union or introduce major new proposals that could delay its completion, Administration officials say.

At issue in broad terms is whether Mr. Bush wants to put his own imprint on a treaty that was largely completed during the Reagan Administration. More specifically, the issue is whether to go ahead ahead with the Pentagon's \$5 billion program to put 10-warhead MX missiles on rail cars or seek a ban on this kind of weapon in the treaty.

Mr. Scowcroft advocates a ban, as a step toward prohibition of all land-based missiles with multiple warheads. Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d favors Mr. Scowcroft's proposal, though officials say he has not fought hard for it. But Mr. Cheney opposes it.

The main elements of the treaty to cut long-range nuclear arms were worked out during the Reagan Administration and, by and large, are aimed at accommodating new American strategic weapon programs, such as the plan to put MX missiles on rail cars and deploy the B-2 Stealth bomber.

Facing a self-imposed deadline of concluding a strategic arms treaty this year, President Bush must soon decide whether to make new proposals or complete the treaty as it stands.

"Do you really press ahead and wrap this up and say sure it is a Reagan Reagan treaty but let's get this signed, sealed and delivered and then focus on what we want to do?" said a senior Bush Administration official. "Or does

President Bush say, 'I want to put my particular imprint on this one, with the possibility that by introducing new elements you slow up the process?'"

The President "has not declared himself," the official said. "I would not rule out that something could be done, but every day that passes makes it less likely."

Complicating the equation are Congressional politics over the military budget and uncertainty about how the Soviet Union would respond to new proposals at this stage.

Congress may move to kill the plan to put the MX missiles on rail cars, regardless of what position the United States takes in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, known as Start. This raises the question of whether the Administration should play the MX card before the Congress takes it away.

Three former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the United States could not afford to develop both the mobile MX missile and the costly single-warhead Midgetman missile, which is to be mounted on truck-like vehicles.

Noting this testimony, Senator Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, urged the Administration to try to trade its plan for the MX missile system for the Soviet Union's mobile version of the SS-24.

Advocates of such a trade say it could make it easier to verify the Start agreement and reduce the risk that Moscow could rapidly expand its missile force beyond treaty limits during a crisis. In addition, Senator Nunn argued that such a trade would be a first step toward a long-term goal of

banning all land-based multiple-warhead missiles in later negotiations.

"I am afraid that the State Department is in too big a hurry to get a Start agreement without looking at some of the substance of the Start agreement," said Mr. Nunn.

But others in Congress argued against making new proposals that might delay the talks.

"We are on the verge of completing the first strategic arms agreement in a decade," said Senator Joseph R. Biden, the Delaware Democrat who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on Europe. "Rather than changing a sound framework, we should move to lock in our progress and commence missile cuts on both sides."

Mr. Cheney has told Congress that a proposed ban on land-based missiles with multiple warheads would not be in the interests of the United States even if it did not delay the talks.

Such a ban would leave the United States without any mobile land-based missile for most of the decade. The Pentagon says the Midgetman will not be deployed until late 1997, while the Soviet Union has already deployed single-warhead SS-25 missiles.

The Pentagon also argues that banning mobile MX and SS-24 missiles would deprive the United States of the quickest and cheapest way of alleviating the vulnerability of its land-based missile force, which is now deployed in fixed concrete silos.

Mr. Scowcroft, in contrast, has expressed more concern about the effect that multiple-warhead land-based missiles on both sides have on stability. Without them, the Soviet ability to launch an attack would be sharply constrained, he has argued, and small American mobile single-warhead missiles would be able to survive whatever attack Moscow could muster.

Bush wants OK on military help

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush wants the leaders of the world's top cocaine-producing nations to give American troops a bigger role in the drug war and let the United States station an aircraft carrier off Colombia's coast, administration officials say.

Wrapping up preparations for the six-hour drug summit in Colombia, senior White House officials said Mr. Bush will press the presidents of that nation, Peru and Bolivia to allow the carrier Kennedy to provide a "radar net" between the American Gulf Coast and the Andean region.

"We would be interested in improved cooperation in that kind of

interdiction," National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said.

A senior administration official, meanwhile, said Mr. Bush will offer the Andean governments additional military equipment and a greatly expanded training program. But new U.S. troops won't be sent to those countries, which are locked in an armed struggle with drug producers and Maoist terrorist groups, the official said.

Mr. Scowcroft said the aircraft-carrier proposal — rejected by Colombia when word leaked out last month — would provide a "better indication of where the [drug-smuggling] planes were coming from and where ... they were coming back from."

But, clearly aware of the anti-American sentiment meeting U.S. military proposals in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, he added: "We are not trying to push the use of U.S. military forces where they're not needed — or wanted."

A senior administration official said the military proposals are "not a big centerpiece" of the Bush proposals.

On the subject of military aid, Mr. Bush said this week: "I'd like to convince them ... we can be extraordinarily helpful, particularly to Colombia in their courageous fight against narco-traffickers, by a sophisticated interdiction effort."

The summit between Mr. Bush and Peru's Alan Garcia Perez, Bolivia's Jaime Paz Zamora and Colombia's Virgilio Barco Vargas marks the first phase of an international effort to fight the Colombian drug cartels with a unified "anti-drug cartel," said William Bennett, Mr. Bush's drug czar.

The United States is the top consumer of illegal drugs. Peru and Bolivia are the leading growers of the coca plants used to make cocaine. Colombia has the most productive cocaine labs in the world and is home to the Medellín and Cali cartels, which control international drug trafficking.

The four countries are set to sign an agreement pledging each to tackle its end of the drug problem, an administration official said. As part of that agreement, the United States will seek aid for the drug war in the Andean region from the United Nations and the European Community.

Washington, which provided the Andean countries between \$60 million and \$70 million in drug-fighting aid in 1988, has proposed a five-year, \$2.2 billion program as part of the administration's \$10.6 billion drug initiative.

Mr. Bush admitted this week that he must convince the South American leaders the United States is doing its best to reduce drug demand. "One of the points I'll emphasize at the beginning is 'Look, I know you three leaders think that this is all the fault ... of the demand in the United States. And let me assure you, we're not just talking about interdiction, we're not just talking about anti-crime aspects of this in the United States, we're talking about major efforts on the demand side.'"

Mr. Bush indicated he'll ask the Andean countries to stop griping about the need for Western financial support in order to replace coca with other crops. Calling it a moral question, Mr. Bush said the leaders "ought not to be condoning the growth of crops that are illegal in some areas and certainly crops that are clearly used in the cocaine trade."

Colombia has also complained that the United States is making it hard for Colombians to export coffee and flowers to U.S. cities. But Mr. Scowcroft said that dispute probably won't be settled at the summit.

The proposals Mr. Bush will set forth would cut U.S. exports of chemicals used to make cocaine and provide new military aid, economic assistance and trade incentives for the Andean nations, Mr. Scowcroft said.

"It will be a substantive agreement, and for the first time it establishes a broad and flexible framework for the four governments to work together in a coordinated operation to deal with the drug problem," he said yesterday.

Growers Are Invited To Summit

*U.S. May Be Asked
For Anti-Drug Funds*

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

To the consternation of U.S. officials, Peruvian President Alan Garcia has invited several coca producers from the Upper Huallaga Valley to join him at the Cartagena summit this week, where Garcia and Bolivian President Jaime Paz Zamora are expected to press President Bush for more economic aid to supplant the benefits of the coca crop.

The United States does not have the large amount of money that would be necessary to replace the crops that are the first step in the production of cocaine. A White House official said yesterday that Bush aides had been informed of Garcia's plan to invite the producers to Cartagena but "I don't anticipate the president would meet with them."

Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security adviser, told reporters yesterday that some economic aid to help supplant the coca crop is possible, but said it is "premature" to talk about a major expansion of aid. Asked if he thought crop substitution would work, he replied, "I didn't say I thought it would work."

Scowcroft said U.S. policy was to stress improved interdiction efforts and try to slow U.S. demand, measures he predicted would force coca growers to turn to other crops.

Asked this week what he would tell the Andean leaders who requested more money, Bush responded, "Well, we'll listen to what they have to say on it, but they . . . ought not to be condoning the growth of crops that are illegal in some areas and certainly crops that are clearly used in the cocaine trade. And so that's a moral question."

Scowcroft said Bush would discuss with the Andean leaders his now-postponed plan to use U.S. military forces, including an aircraft

carrier, to throw up a radar net off the coast of Colombia to track the flights of cocaine traffickers. Bush was forced to shelve the plan recently after word of a U.S. naval "blockade" sparked a furor in Colombia.

Scowcroft said the radar idea has "merit" but added, "It's on the shelf for the moment."

Colombian authorities have complained about the flow of U.S. guns to the drug traffickers, but Scowcroft said Bush plans no further restrictions on the manufacture of such weapons and instead would seek to enforce existing restrictions on gun purchases for export.

Security for Bush's visit will be extraordinarily tight because of repeated terrorist acts by Colombian cocaine traffickers. "All the agencies involved in presidential security are comfortable with the arrangements," Scowcroft said.

National drug control policy director William J. Bennett said yesterday he had called Special Trade Representative Carla A. Hills to discuss reports that the administration was considering a sharp increase in import duties on Colombian cut flowers, that nation's third-largest legal export, in response to a dumping complaint filed by American flower growers. Bennett said there may be some "flexibility" on the flower issue but the administration cannot circumvent the trade laws.

"Of course, they complicate our effort . . .," he said in response to questions about the impact of fair trade laws on the administration's anti-drug efforts.

Staff Writer Michael Isikoff
contributed to this report.

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U.S. on highest alert for summit security

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The U.S. Secret Service, a robot that defuses explosives, bomb-sniffing dogs, and thousands of U.S. and Colombian troops are ready to protect President Bush during tomorrow's drug summit in Colombia, where cocaine lords are based and anti-American demonstrations broke out yesterday.

In Bogota, the capital, police clashed with students at the National University who chanted anti-U.S. slogans and threw rocks.

And in Medellin, home to a powerful cocaine-smuggling cartel, pro-Cuban rebels kidnapped two U.S. citizens to protest Mr. Bush's visit. Local media reported last night that one American had been released and the rebels promised to free the other shortly.

U.S. military forces will be on the highest state of alert as they maneuver Mr. Bush to the summit site in Cartagena for talks with the presidents of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, administration officials said.

But even with those efforts, there remains substantial concern among Mr. Bush's closest advisers that the safety net knitted over the past few weeks may not be tight enough.

National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said, "It's an unusual situation, because there are in Colombia these guerrilla bands, terrorist bands, with access to funds to purchase . . . any kinds of arms, and so naturally there are unusual circum-

stances."

Eight years ago, then-Vice President Bush was the apparent target of an unsuccessful assassination plot, in which a load of dynamite was buried under the lone runway at the Bogota International Airport.

This time, Mr. Scowcroft said, "we're comfortable about the president's security. All the agencies involved in presidential security are comfortable with the arrangements."

Drug cartel members indicated earlier that they were working on plans to shoot Mr. Bush's aircraft — he arrives on Air Force One, then transfers to the helicopter Marine One — out of the sky. The cartels have since denied making the death threat.

Concern that the cartels might retaliate for Colombian President Virgilio Barco's recent crackdown has prompted unusually strong security measures.

Colombian officials said 5,000 security agents and troops will be on the streets.

Mr. Bush said he isn't about to take any risks. "I love the guy," Mr. Bush told a California audience last week, referring to himself. "I am not going to do something stupid or macho."

Secret Service Special Agent Allan Cramer said the service is well aware of the threats to Mr. Bush from the cartels. "We read the headlines, too," he said. But investigations into those threats have turned up nothing "to alter our posture," he said.

The summit will take place at a highly fortified naval base, home to two submarines, five warships and a brigade of Marines.

According to military officials, the USS Nassau with 1,700 Marines, helicopters, and a detachment of six or seven AV-8B jump-jet fighter

planes is about to arrive off the coast of Colombia.

Mr. Bush will arrive on Air Force One at Barranquilla, about 60 miles from Cartagena, early tomorrow.

• *Peter Almond contributed to this article, which is based in part on wire service reports.*

White House heard reports of missiles before Bush's trip

Data from Colombia called hard to confirm

By Stephen Kurkjian
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON - Despite repeated assurances of President Bush's safety, the White House acknowledged yesterday that the Secret Service knew there was a possibility that members of drug cartels had missiles capable of shooting Bush's plane down as he flew to Colombia last week.

Ten such weapons have been seized by Colombian police in recent days, but there was confusion as to whether they were confiscated before or after Bush's one-day trip Thursday to Cartagena, on the northern coast of Colombia.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told reporters yesterday that the United States had received "intelligence" that the drug cartels possessed "various kinds of missiles and rockets and other kinds of equipment," but that the reports had proven difficult to confirm.

Pressed by reporters about whether US officials had known before Bush left for the summit that drug cartels had obtained surface-to-air missiles, Fitzwater said, "The Secret Service was aware of these kinds of activities there."

Fitzwater declined to provide details on the intelligence gained by the White House before Bush's trip, but tried to play down the substance of the reports that were being received. "We did not have any confirmable information that there was a threat from SA-7 missiles," he said. "To my knowledge that has not changed. But there's intelli-

gence suggesting all kinds of capabilities that always have to be matters of concern, but nothing we can confirm."

White House aides sought to assure the public before Bush left for the summit that all possible precautions for the president's trip had been taken. The national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, in briefing reporters earlier in the week, said all agencies responsible for Bush's security had signed off on the adequacy of security for the trip.

While Bush flew to Colombia on Thursday, Assistant Secretary of State Bernard Aronson said aboard Air Force One that Bush would be as safe in Colombia as he would be anywhere else in the world.

However, the head of the secret police force told reporters in Bogota on Monday that two drug cartel suspects, Guillermo Oswaldo Gaitan and Octavio Pineda Galvis, were arrested in a house in the southern section of Bogota a week ago. He said 10 French-made missiles, which can be shoulder-fired, were also seized. "What they were planning to do was atrocious," Gen. Miguel Maza Marquez said. "The attacks were aimed at the spinal column of the security of the state."

He said the control tower at Bogota's El Dorado International Airport was a potential target of the missiles. He did not name other potential targets.

United Press International reported that

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the arrests and missile seizure had been made on Feb. 12, three days before Bush's visit. The Associated Press, however, reported from Bogota yesterday that the police had not made their arrests until Monday.

Fitzwater declined to say when the White House had received its intelligence of

a possible attack on Bush's security.

Air Force One did not fly directly into Cartagena, where the approach would have been over land, but into a more secure airport in Barranquilla, where the approach was over the sea. A helicopter carrying Bush then flew fast and low into Cartagena, accompanied by four other helicopters that zigzagged in a diversionary pattern.

BUSHES HOST MAESTRO ROSTROPOVICH

President and Mrs. Bush celebrated a glimmer of glasnost Wednesday in welcoming maestro Rostropovich back from a nostalgic return to the Soviet homeland from which he was banished 16 years ago.

Rostropovich, 62...was honored at a White House reception after conducting the National Symphony Orchestra last week at concerts in Moscow and Leningrad.

Before an audience of invited guests that included artists and patrons of the arts, industrialist Armand Hammer and Soviet Ambassador Dubinin, Bush bid Rostropovich a "warm welcome home" from a trip that dramatized the new era of East-West relations.

"The orchestra's long-awaited trip to the Soviet Union reflects the drama of our changing world," Bush said. "None of us here could have imagined the recent events there or the changes in the lives of you and your wife, Galina, after so many years of waiting and hoping." (UPI)

MITCHELL AIDE VISITED CHINA IN DECEMBER

Senator Sharply Criticized Bush
Over Similar Trip By Scowcroft

Last December, Sen. Mitchell attacked President Bush's decision to send National Security Advisor Scowcroft to China for talks with the leadership that crushed pro-democracy demonstrators in June in Tiananmen Square.

He accused the President then of an "embarrassing kowtowing" to Beijing that made a "mockery" of American concerns for human rights. Mitchell repeated his criticism of the Administration's China policy Wednesday in response to a State Department report detailing a continuing crackdown on dissent there. "The Administration's deeds are contrary to its words," he said.

Mitchell didn't mention that one of his aides was part of a congressional staff trip to China in December, the same time as the Scowcroft visit.

Sarah Sewall, a staff member of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee that Mitchell heads, visited China Dec. 9-20. The trip was paid for by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, a group funded by the Chinese government, according to a State Department official....

Mitchell spokeswoman Diane Dewhirst said the senator had approved Sewall's trip, and argued that the staff visit was different from the Scowcroft trip Mitchell criticized.

Scowcroft was a key Administration policy-maker "whereas the congressional group was not engaged in making policy," Dewhirst said. "It was engaged in fact-finding for legislative purposes and there's a big difference between the two." ...

Others who made the trip were staff aides to Democratic Sens. Cranston, Dodd, Baucus, as well as an aid to Rep. Herger (R.-Calif.) and staffers from the House Foreign Affairs and Agriculture committees, she said.

(Charles Block, Washington Post, A4)