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
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GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

MEDIA ARTICLES



January - July 1990

January 1990

Newsweek _____

Time _____

U.S. News & World Report _____

REGARDIE'S
Date JAN 1990


The POWER ELITE

THE 100 MOST INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE
IN PRIVATE WASHINGTON

a l s o

THE PLOT TO OUST
WILLIAM WEBSTER

THE CASE AGAINST WILLIAM WEBSTER



*Why the
White House
wants to
terminate the
director of
central
intelligence*




BY
MARK PERRY

IN AN ADMINISTRATION THAT DILIGENTLY courts hardball realists, William Webster, the nation's easygoing director of central intelligence, is clearly the odd man out. He always appears to be on the periphery of the action. Even during the White House's numerous photo opportunities he hangs back, apparently content to let others enjoy the public notoriety as the president's top advisers.

Some would argue that Webster's public posture is the consequence of inner toughness. But others contend that it suggests something potentially fatal: that he's been cut out of the loop. Indeed, it's been said that he isn't privy to the critical discussions that take place at the highest levels of government. At no time did Webster seem more on the sidelines than on October 3, 1989, the day of the bungled coup attempt against Manuel Noriega. The coup attempt

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took the White House by surprise. During the short-lived rebellion little information was available about its plotters, and even less about what was happening in Panama City. To add to the confusion, President Bush received conflicting intelligence reports from the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Pentagon.

Where was the director of the nation's most important intelligence-gathering organization, the Central Intelligence Agency?

Not even in town. Not even in the country.

The coup's collapse, just hours after it began, provoked a chorus of criticism from both Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill, who condemned the administration for not acting decisively to get rid of Noriega. Within days, however, White House officials had found an excuse for their own lack of decisiveness: it was due to an absence of good information, they said, due to what administration insiders euphemistically called "a communications breakdown."

For intelligence aficionados, those people who believe that the internal affairs of the CIA are almost as important as the Redskins' injury report, what happened next was ominous. On October 16 the *Washington Post* published a front-page story in which White House sources—unnamed, naturally—cast doubts on Webster's ability to run the agency. The story bowled over Webster's friends and top aides. Its headline, CIA DIRECTOR UNDER FIRE, was an understatement. In a town where subtlety speaks loudly, the message was clear: Webster had enemies, and they'd bought a billboard to tell him so. The story was a rolling barrage, a not-so-subtle way of telling the soft-spoken Missourian that his tenure as the nation's top spook was over.

With the publication of the story, what had only been hinted at before—that the White House was enraged by Webster's absence during the Panama crisis—became part of a vicious public fight. According to the *Post*, certain administration officials were displeased by what they described as intelligence failures in Lebanon, in China, and, most recently, in Panama. An administration source complained that Webster was an ineffective director of central intelligence and

too close to members of Congress—a nearly mortal sin, it seems, among White House officials. Another griped that Webster wasn't part of Bush's inner circle. "He's not close to [Secretary of State James] Baker. He's not close to [National Security Adviser Brent] Scowcroft," he said. "There's no reason for him to be treated with any great weight."

The criticism went to the heart of Webster's leadership of the CIA. "There is a sense that the institution is not being very energetically or effectively led," an administration source was quoted as saying. "There is unhappiness with the intelligence being provided overall and with the conclusions based on that intelligence."

Some two weeks later, Webster struck back. In a story on November 4, after a wide-ranging discussion with more than a dozen of the *Post*'s best and brightest editors and reporters, he defended his actions and undermined allegations that he wasn't up to speed on intelligence matters. He candidly discussed his views of political developments in China, the Soviet Union, Lebanon, and Panama, as well as his attempts to clear up ambiguities in the national security directive that prohibits the CIA from becoming involved in assassinations. While the luncheon had been scheduled before the White House's October 16 attack, it's clear that he was more open and more intent on defending his views than he might otherwise have been. It was, by most accounts, a formidable show of his ability to master his subject—a fit response to the White House reports that had labeled him out of touch and unable to manage the CIA.

"I think the *Post* people were surprised," an agency official says. "I've heard they were pretty impressed by Webster's knowledge. Maybe the agency made some friends."

The *Post*'s articles are irrefutable evidence that a power struggle is being waged at the heart of the Bush administration. Such struggles are common in any presidency, but only rarely do they make their way onto the front page of the capital's newspaper of record. When they do (most often veiled as explanations of why policies have failed), they're almost invariably a signal that all is not well at the top, that personalities have gotten in the way of policies.

In order to have successful policies an administration needs consensus—a group of loyalists who also trust one another. So while President Bush told the *Post* the day after the damning article that he had "complete

Mark Perry contributed the profile of CIA agent William Buckley to the February 1989 *Regardie's*. He's the author of *Four Stars*, an analysis of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is currently at work on a book about the CIA during the Bush administration.

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confidence" in Webster, the public sniping at him left reporters wondering who at the White House had planted the story.

The leaker, according to knowledgeable intelligence community officials, is John Sununu, the president's chief of staff, a roiling, boisterous, and, above all, loyal Bush insider. Sununu is the one administration official who most often defends his boss, who castigates the president's critics for not giving him a chance, and of all Bush's advisers, seemed to be the most upset by the events in Panama. "We don't even know the individuals involved," he groused on the day of the coup. And when Senator Jesse Helms claimed that the rebels wanted Bush to take Noriega off their hands but were denied, Sununu angrily snapped to Helms's top aide: "Where's your evidence? Prove it."

Today, at the end of George Bush's first year in office, William Webster finds himself embroiled in a controversy of someone else's making. He now understands what his predecessors learned shortly after they took over the nation's top intelligence agency: that the CIA's biggest battle is not in Central America nor in China nor in the Mideast. It's right here in Washington, protecting its turf.

THE ATTACK ON WEBSTER IS SURPRISING, even if his vulnerability isn't. He's known as a reformer, a public servant whose specialty is building public confidence in discredited institutions. He spent nine years as the director of the FBI, prosecuting crooked Chicago judges and Abscam-stained congressmen. When he came to the FBI, it was riddled with suspicions that had been sown during J. Edgar Hoover's dictatorship. When he left, it had few detractors. It had become a trusted arm of the government and was widely praised for its openness.

Webster took over the CIA during one of its darkest days—just after its director, William Casey, had been implicated in conducting his own private foreign policy. He rebuilt the agency's reputation in record time. In one of his first acts, he gave new instructions to the agency's officials: they were never to lie to Congress, even if it meant that they had to remain silent. He promised to take the heat and be responsible for keeping the agency's secrets. In addition, within a year of his appointment he'd dismissed or reprimanded seven CIA employees who'd broken internal rules during the Iran-contra scandal.

In the two years since his appointment, Webster has added to the agency's mission

by establishing a counter-narcotics center, strengthening its role in counterterrorism, and putting in place a system of checks on covert operations. He's also buttressed his reputation in intelligence circles by approving every covert operation that's come to him, though he's demanded that they meet new, more stringent, standards.

"No one thought that the agency would come back this fast, that he'd get it back on its feet this quickly—at least no one up here did," says an aide on the Senate Intelligence Committee. "I can't think of anyone on this committee who doesn't think he's done an amazing job."

Still, Webster's job was in doubt from the day Bush was elected in November

1988. Many intelligence insiders assumed that Bush would replace Webster with his old friend James Lilley, the agency's former national intelligence officer for China; Lilley, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea at the time of Bush's election, had served with Bush when he was ambassador in Beijing and had earned the president-elect's trust. Others speculated that Bush would appoint either William Hyland, a former deputy director of the National Security Council and the editor of *Foreign Affairs*; Brent Scowcroft, who'd yet to be named Bush's national security adviser; Colin Powell, who'd later be named the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; or Frank Carlucci, Ronald Reagan's secretary of defense.

In short, at the time of Bush's election very few people believed that Webster would be reappointed. He did have some fans, though, the biggest of whom were two tough and savvy agency insiders: Richard Stolz, the CIA's head of clandestine services, and Richard Kerr, who at the time was its deputy director for intelligence. Both had more than 20 years of agency experience under their belts, Stolz as a top operative in Eastern Europe, and Kerr as a knowledgeable, respected political analyst.

Webster didn't want to appear to be lobbying for the job, but Stolz and Kerr urged

WEBSTER WANTS
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him to keep his name in contention, according to former agency employees. Both were disturbed by Webster's feeling that if he wasn't appointed he could always return to his old law firm in St. Louis; they believed that he was well along on the road to repairing the damage that had been done to the agency by Casey.

For all his desire not to be seen as lobbying to retain his job, Webster took steps to make certain that his opinions were well known to the president-elect. Shortly after the election, for example, he told officials of the transition team that he didn't believe that the director of central intelligence should be a member of the cabinet and that he shouldn't be included in policy discussions. His position was music to Bush's ears, who wanted to make the head of the CIA less visible in his administration than Casey had been in Ronald Reagan's.

Nor did Webster forget his close ties to the press. He'd worked to win back its trust after the Iran-contra scandal by insisting that the agency hold more background briefings for reporters and that it respond to press questions without deception.

In November 1988 Webster took a major step toward remaining at Langley. He invited the *Post's* publisher, Katharine Graham, to address a class of senior agency employ-

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ees in the CIA's auditorium. In many ways her remarks were a reflection of his views. "We live in a dirty and dangerous world," she said. "There are some things the general public does not need to know and shouldn't. I believe democracy flourishes when the government can take legitimate steps to keep its secrets and when the press can decide whether to print what it knows."

Ever since the White House's attack on October 16, Webster has put his reputation in public view, using to good effect the considerable stock of goodwill he's won from the press. He made a point of refuting the criticism of his role during the Panama crisis, pointing out that his absence during the coup was due to a long-standing intel-

nificant; after all, top government officials often lose their cool during feuds with their colleagues, but their temper tantrums don't usually make headlines.

There are a number of reasons why Webster has become the target of the White House's criticism. It may be that he hasn't sufficiently ingratiated himself with the president's closest advisers, or that his forthrightness with Congress has made his loyalty suspect. Or perhaps, after 40 decades of obsessive secrecy, his plea for integrity at the CIA is so revolutionary that the White House fears it could spell the end of the agency's effectiveness.

Webster certainly doesn't have the personality to be an administration insider.

THE MOST VITAL INTELLIGENCE BATTLES THAT THE AGENCY HAS FOUGHT FOR A DECADE HAVE TAKEN PLACE NOT IN FOREIGN JUNGLES BUT IN WASHINGTON'S BUREAUCRACY

ligence-related commitment and that he was in constant, often minute-by-minute contact with headquarters during the crisis. In view of his restrained response, the criticisms that had been aimed at him have begun to look like cheap shots.

WEBSTER'S ABILITY TO STAY ABOVE the battle, to appear to be the agreeable and professional government servant, has cemented his hold on the agency. But he shouldn't have been under fire to begin with: his record should've ensured that he'd remain the nation's top intelligence official. So why would Sununu—or anyone else in the White House, for that matter—take aim at one of the most respected officials in the Bush administration?

The explanation could be transparently simple: Sununu is given to "flights of anger," a Bush appointee says. "He just went overboard." But the criticism of Webster seems to be based on something much more sig-

All the president's men—Sununu, Scowcroft, Baker, and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney—are fierce protectors of the president. Each of them has a specific role: Scowcroft is Bush's link to the cold war establishment, Cheney is his link to Congress, Sununu knows how to get things done, and Baker is an old friend whose loyalty is beyond question. They tend to be bureaucratic; for example, they handle crisis management, which was sadly lacking during the Panama crisis, through a "deputies committee," a group of foreign policy officials who filter information to them—from the bottom up, one might say.

It's clear that loyalty is important to this tightly knit group; in the 12 months of Bush's presidency, they've never criticized one another.

Webster is a different animal altogether. He cultivates cordial relations with the members of the House and Senate intelligence committees. His openness has won the praise

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of such diverse personalities as Democratic senator David Boren (Webster has a "high standard of personal integrity," he's said) and Republican senator William Cohen, who's often raved about his honesty. As a result, Webster has been forced to walk a thin and uncertain line: he knows that the CIA can be effective only if it wins the trust of Congress, but he also knows that to keep his job he must prove his loyalty to the president.

More important, Webster's philosophies threaten the administration. His primary goal is to carve out a more independent niche for the CIA than it's ever had. In his world, the head of the CIA doesn't trim his sails to catch the prevailing political wind. His vision of the agency is at stark odds with his predecessor's. Casey served the president; Webster wants to serve the nation.

IN MANY WAYS WEBSTER VERSUS THE *White House* is a typical Washington battle: instead of simply dismissing an official, the administration attempts to oust him by marshaling public opinion against him. The most effective way to do that, naturally, is to enlist a powerful member of the press to be a player in the skirmish.

But the fight also offers fertile ground for serious reflection about what the CIA is up to these days. Most people think that the agency employs the majority of its assets in the world's hot spots. But the most important intelligence battles that it has fought for a decade have occurred not in foreign jungles but in the Washington bureaucracy. It may influence the foreign press every day, as part of either overt or covert operations, but the most important newspaper that it influences isn't in any foreign country—it's in Washington.

Even more important, the Webster fight is clear evidence that all is not well in the Bush administration. It doesn't matter to his top advisers that Webster has revived the CIA's image. The only thing that matters to them is that he's charting an independent course for the agency, which makes him vulnerable to insiders who'll blame him for the administration's failures whenever they can.

The battle between Webster and the White House won't soon be forgotten. It's likely that doubts about Webster's abilities will continue to nag at the White House, but having survived one public attack, it's unlikely that he'll have to face another. The betting now is that Webster is going to be around for quite some time. R

Bush: The Secret Presidency

Warring against leaks, the president keeps tight control over his staff

BY THOMAS M. DEFRANK
AND ANN MCDANIEL

When Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined the invasion plan for Panama, he was peppered with detailed questions from his commander in chief. What kind of troops? What kind of equipment? Why this target? Why that one? The president

probed and prodded, demanding more and more information from his briefers. Then, when he had taken his fill, George Bush acted without hesitation. According to participants in the meeting, he did not pause to seek a consensus among the half dozen top advisers and military men assembled upstairs in the White House residence, or even to ask their advice. He simply said, "OK, let's do it."

Through his long and patient career as a government servant and politician, George Bush has been dogged by the suspicion that he was a little too pliant and passive, not quite his own man. During his presidential campaign, he was regarded as the tool of his political handlers; upon taking office, he was seen as a caretaker president, a decent and affable sort, but not a real leader. He seemed more interested

in planting ceremonial trees than designing a strategy for the post-cold-war world, and he played sports so avidly that at times it seemed he would chip, putt, toss, serve and lob his way through the presidency.

But suddenly Bush seems bold and decisive. In the past few weeks, he has met with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in a stagy seaborne summit, used a show of U.S. air power to save the Philippine government from a coup, sent his national-security adviser on a secret mission to China and, as if to show he really means business, invaded Panama.

What accounts for this apparent transformation from meekness to macho? One pundit wondered whether Bush had succumbed to the blood lust of earlier presidents, who were determined to show their mettle by going into battle. On a television tour of the White

House in September, Bush said he had not yet been "tested by fire" in a tone of voice that implied he wanted to be. Other observers cited Bush's penchant for surprise, and suggested that he was eager to confound critics who had accused him of timidity during the failed coup attempt against Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega.

White House insiders insist that Bush has always been comfortable making decisions. They paint him as a hands-on president who believes in top-down management. Bush has never been passive, they say; he's just extremely secretive. He has long-range plans, but prefers not to share them, even with his own staffers. Bush is a striking contrast to Ronald Reagan, whose where-am-I management style allowed his staff to run the country day to day, and whose less than loyal subordinates were constantly leaking and plotting against each other. Bush is so secretive that he has changed the

way presidents do business. Normally, policy in Washington is made out in the open: a cabinet secretary will launch a trial balloon, some other unnamed administration official will shoot it down and float his own, and through leak and counterleak, policy is gradually shaped. The final result is rarely a surprise to anyone who reads a newspaper.

The Bush administration, by comparison, has been a tomb. There have been few leaks and few open fights between cabinet members. The press, which feeds on intramural strife, has mistaken the resounding silence for inactivity. But to Bush, no news is often good news. By maintaining secrecy, he believes, he can ensure his total control over major decisions. No one aide is aware of all that Bush is planning. He tells aides only what they need to

know to do their assigned tasks, and no more. White House underlings cannot make legislative deals with congressmen because, as one says, "We never know what the president promised in a phone call last night." (His aides have long since given up on trying to keep track of all of Bush's phone calls.)

The president does not even allow his closest aides to be fully informed. When he sent national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft on a secret mission to China last July, he did not tell his own chief of staff, John Sununu. Sununu learned of the trip after two of his aides stumbled across the planning—and Bush was furious about the "leak." When Bush does confide in his aides, he swears them to secrecy. Long before he would admit it publicly, Bush asked his closest advisers to begin considering options for 50- to 60-percent reductions in U.S. troops in Europe. He felt that any public discus-



ARTHUR GRACE FOR NEWSWEEK

'OK, let's do it': Bush and Dan Quayle reflect before the Panama invasion

sion of the cuts would set them in stone, limiting his options and allowing time for Congress and interest groups to attack the plan. "Leaks tend to build backfires and resistance," says an aide. "Until the president has it together, he doesn't want it out." After one rare leak—about Bush's plans to meet Gorbachev in Malta—Bush vowed to crack down, telling his staff: "If we cannot maintain proper secrecy with this group, we will cut the circle down."

Any news is supposed to be made directly by the president. Bush has already given 32 press conferences this year, 27 more than Reagan did in his first year. But unlike Reagan, Bush prefers private diplomacy to public cheerleading. Bush was notably restrained, even tongue-tied, after the fall of the Berlin wall. Returning to the Oval Office after a strained press conference, he joked, "How about if I give them one of these?" With that, he jumped in the air, waved his arms, and yelled, "Whoooppeee!" Bush's aides had worried that his public diffidence would disappoint voters and the press. But Bush was more concerned about not offending Mikhail Gorbachev by appearing to gloat.

The president's advisers are chosen to be team players. They are by and large gray suited and sober-minded, not flashy self-promoters. Like Bush, they tend to see themselves as problem solvers and not ideologues. The president hates pontificators; "He starts looking out the window," says an aide. Two key advisers, Secretary of State James Baker and budget director Richard Darman, were master leakers and infighters in the Reagan administration. But they have shrewdly reformed under Bush, who demands absolute loyalty. Worried that Jack Kemp would spend more time looking after his own political agenda than the president's, Bush told him, "Now Jack, don't forget: you're the secretary of HUD, not the secretary of State. I picked you to help me with housing issues, not for getting the Cubans out of Angola."

Bush's presidency is do-it-yourself: he is effectively his own chief of staff. Though smart and assertive, Sununu is more of a counselor and occasional devil's advocate for conservative views. Reagan used to govern by checking the box on a one-page memo prepared by his staff. Bush, by contrast, is a "sponge for detail," says Sununu. The president is regarded as better versed on the minutiae of foreign policy than his staff. His aides are still wondering how he learned that the wife of former East German leader Erich Honecker had resigned from her government post at the same time her husband left power. When the bureaucracy bogs down, Bush will not hesitate to step in. Last spring his State, Defense and NSC advisers were unable to settle on the size of a U.S. troop cut to be proposed at the NATO summit in Brussels. Exasperated, Bush interrupted the discussions by saying, "This is the way it's going to be." He scribbled out his own numbers, which became the basis for the U.S. proposal to cut its combat forces by 20 percent. He will reach far down into the federal bureaucracy for information, occasionally excluding senior aides if he feels their presence will be chilling to a lesser staffer whose brain he wants to pick.

The president rarely shows anger to his staff. "This wasn't exactly the best way to handle this" is about his strongest reproach. As a host in the Oval Office, he has dancing-school manners. "This is coffee, this is tea," he will offer startled guests. "Would you like cream and sugar?" But Bush does not like to entertain appeals of his decisions, and he does not hesitate to remind his staffers who is boss. He can often be a little pompous: "If you're so damned smart," he will ask an argumentative staffer, "why are you doing

what you're doing and I'm the president of the United States?"

Unlike his 9-to-5 predecessor, Bush is frenetically busy. "If a meeting got canceled, and the schedule suddenly had three dead hours," says a senior aide, "Reagan would sit alone and do fan mail. With Bush you're liable to have 20 new meetings on 20 new subjects, all of which he'll take the first three steps to implement himself." Bush is legendary for doing several things at once: talking to an aide while fielding phone calls while dashing off one of his innumerable notes. During the Malta summit, Bush somehow found time to dash off 25 personal notes to friends.

Sometimes he tries to do too much. During the October coup attempt in Panama, aides now admit, Bush was paralyzed by the onslaught of unfiltered information. So many conflicting and fragmentary reports poured into the Oval Office that Bush never had a clear idea of what was happening. He thought the rebels had Noriega in custody when an aide walked in with the word that the coup had failed. Bush can be ill served by his penchant for secrecy. The stormy seas off Malta could have been predicted if Bush had simply asked his advance staff to check about Mediterranean weather in December before making the plans official. But Bush was too afraid of leaks to ask.

His basic instinct is for conciliation. The approach has helped him get along better with Congress than Reagan, who liked to go on television and beat up on Hill Democrats as slothful big spenders. Yet by sending Scowcroft on a secret mission to China last July just weeks after the massacre in Tiananmen Square, the president has come under criticism for kowtowing to the repressive Beijing regime.

Bush readily admits that he lacks the "vision thing." Instead, he regards himself as a problem solver. Though he does not hesitate to decide, he is essentially reactive, responding to events and pressures, rather than plotting a long-term course. His approach can be piecemeal and ad hoc, more aimed at getting rid of a problem than solving it. Early in his first year he was able to defuse the savings and loan crisis with a bailout bill and to puncture protectionist sentiment by naming Japan as an "unfair competitor" under a trade measure. But he has not made any serious attempt to solve the nation's biggest domestic problem, the budget deficit. Instead, he has hewed to his

campaign promise not to raise taxes and even offered to lower them with a capital-gains cut. Briefed on the government's budget woes after taking office, Bush ruefully joked to aides, "I think I'm going to be the foreign-policy president." When discussing emotionally charged issues like abortion and gun control, the president looks for the position that will cost him the least politically. He wanted to compromise with Hill Democrats on abortion funding for the poor in cases of rape and incest, but then killed the deal when it became obvious that right-wing conservatives would object. When the subject of abortion is raised, he often begins with, "That's this issue."

So far, he has managed to please the public. He has a higher approval rating, at 70 percent, than either Reagan or Carter as they ended their first year in office. But Bush's own aides know that he has been lucky. "The economy is good, the Soviet bloc is crumbling and the Democratic Party spent the first half of the year self-destructing," said one. "A president would have to be pretty much of a dope not to be doing well." In his first year, George Bush has shown that he is in charge, and that he can act when he has to. He has responded forcefully to American challenges abroad. Future crises will show whether the secretive president can solve problems at home as well.

Bush's penchant for secrecy is so great that he didn't even tell chief of staff John Sununu about the mission to China last July

Ends holdout in embassy, flies to Florida for drug trial

By John W. Mashek and Stephen Kurkjian
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON - Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's deposed military leader, turned himself over to US authorities in Panama City last night and was flown to the United States to stand trial on drug-trafficking and money-laundering charges.

President Bush, in a televised announcement, said Noriega gave up his asylum at the Vatican Embassy and turned himself over to US authorities at 8:50 p.m., less than an hour before the president spoke.

Noriega's decision to surrender came as thousands of angry Panamanian citizens surged against wire barricades outside the embassy, forcing American soldiers to protect the man they had cornered and sought to arrest.

Noriega was taken to Howard Air Force Base in Panama City, where he was placed under arrest by Drug Enforcement Agency agents, Bush said. He was then put aboard a US military transport for the flight to Homestead Air Force Base about 15 miles south of Miami.

Noriega will be arraigned on the charges in Miami this morning. If convicted on all charges, Noriega could be sentenced to 145 years in prison and fined \$1.1 million.

A White House official told the Globe last night that there was "no deal" with Noriega "in terms of trial, indictment or charges."

The official said Noriega indicated to Vatican officials sometime during the day yesterday that he would be willing to turn himself over to US authorities on several conditions: that he be allowed to make some personal telephone calls, that he leave the embassy without the glare of television cameras and without the public close by and that he be allowed to wear his military uniform on surrendering.

Gen. Maxwell Thurman, who headed the US military force that invaded Panama on

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
THE BOSTON GLOBE 1
Date **4 JAN 1990**

Dec. 20, told reporters that Noriega turned himself over voluntarily to US authorities and had not been offered any concessions.

"Mr. Noriega walked out of the gate under his own power and turned himself into custody ... no deals here," declared Thurman.

Vatican officials informed US military authorities in Panama of Noriega's willingness to turn himself in during the late afternoon. US Gen. Marc Cisneros informed Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, of the situation around 6 p.m. last night.

Scowcroft in turn told Bush of the developments. At 9 p.m., Defense Secretary Richard Cheney informed Bush that Noriega was en route to the United States. Bush said that while the United States is committed to providing a fair trial, his efforts to seize Noriega "should send a clear signal that the United States is serious in its determination" to prosecute drug dealers.

The removal of Noriega, who ruled Panama as head of its powerful military since 1982, touched off wild demonstrations in Panama City last night.

Noriega's decision to turn himself over to the United States ended 10 days of asylum within the Vatican Embassy, where he had sought refuge on Christmas Eve, four days after the US invasion toppled him from power. The United States engaged in intense negotiations with the Vatican officials during recent days seeking Noriega's release.

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In the embassy, Noriega was isolated from the associates who had sought refuge with him, sources said, and he began to show fear that the demonstrators might storm the embassy, putting his life in jeopardy.

Noriega's mistress, who was in US custody, was allowed to speak with Noriega by phone yesterday and she informed him of his deteriorated standing with the Panamanian public, the sources said.

In addition, there were indications that White House assurances that he would not be subject to the death penalty as the result of narcotics charges were a factor in his decision. At his regular White House briefing, spokesman Marlin Fitzwater went out of his way to point out that "under the terms of his indictment, he is not subject to capital punishment." Sources in Panama

told the Knight-Ridder news service that Noriega demanded that assurance as a condition of turning himself in.

Bush, who declined to answer questions about the day's events, said the capture represented a "significant milestone" in achieving the four objectives of the US invasion. The goals of the invasion, Bush said, were to save American lives, to restore democracy in Panama, to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties, which will turn the canal over to the new government of Panama in 10 years, and to remove Noriega from office.

"All of these objectives have now been achieved," the president said, adding that Noriega's decision to turn himself over to the Americans occurred "with the full knowledge of the Panamanian government."

"A free and prosperous Panama will be an enduring tribute" to the military action and the deaths of the more than 20 American troops in combat, Bush said.

The invasion was carried out by nearly 24,000 US troops operating under cover of predawn darkness on

Dec. 20. Twenty-three GIs were killed and more than 300 wounded. As of yesterday, about 1,000 troops had been withdrawn, and the president promised that more will be pulled out as soon as the "local situation would permit."

While the public as well as most members of Congress have applauded Bush's action in invading Panama, the operation has not been without criticism. The Organization of American States as well as the UN General Assembly criticized the operation as an unjustified breach of Panama's sovereignty. More than 400 Panamanian civilians were killed in the invasion, and some have questioned why such massive US firepower had to be used in the operation.

Noriega was indicted on a series of drug-trafficking, money-laundering and criminal conspiracy charges by federal grand juries in Tampa and Miami in early 1988. In recent interviews, his lawyers said they would press for release of classified US documents that would detail Noriega's long involvement with the CIA.

Bush: Invasion Hurt Ties in Hemisphere

Quayle Being Sent to 'Repair' Damage

WPJ-L-90 A

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush acknowledged yesterday that the invasion of Panama had hurt relations with Latin American leaders who in the past have been deeply suspicious about U.S. military intervention in the hemisphere. He vowed to "repair" damaged relations and said he will dispatch Vice President Quayle to the region this month.

Bush also said the government is "not seeking a deal" with deposed Panamanian leader Manuel Antonio Noriega, who surrendered to U.S. forces Wednesday and is in custody in Miami awaiting trial on drug-trafficking charges. However, Bush said he would not interfere with Noriega's legal rights to seek a deal on reduced charges.

Noriega's lawyers said he is not interested in a plea bargain.

The president opened a White House news conference, after a meeting on the Noriega case with Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, with a statement that "our policy remains that we brought him to this country for prosecution." Bush said "there's no such plan" to seek any kind of plea bargain with Noriega, who was indicted two years ago in Miami and Tampa, Fla., on federal charges of drug trafficking and conspiracy.

Bush said in his 1988 presidential campaign that he would not make deals with drug traffickers. And he broke with former president Ronald Reagan over possible plea-bargain negotiations with Noriega. Prior to the invasion last month, however, the Bush administration had held secret talks with Noriega's attorneys about a deal under which the Panamanian could escape to a third country without prosecution. Bush has said the deaths of American servicemen in the invasion changed his mind about any deal that would allow Noriega to go free.

Noriega has challenged the right of the United States to prosecute him, but a federal judge entered a not guilty plea on his behalf Thursday in Miami. Questions have been raised by others about potential weaknesses in the government's case, but Bush declared, "Our case is strong, our resolve is firm and our legal representations are sound."

Bush acknowledged that he has made some derogatory statements about Noriega but said he is determined not to make any comments that "could even inadvertently affect the outcome of this case" and has ordered others in the administration not to talk about it. Bush said he will have "nothing more to say" about his contacts with No-

riega when he was director of central intelligence in 1976 and Noriega was head of Panama's intelligence service, and later when Bush was vice president.

In Miami, Noriega met with his defense attorneys, Steven Kollin and Frank A. Rubino, at the federal courthouse. Kollin said the lawyers had discussed legal strategy as well as personal business. "General Noriega is concerned about other matters in his life, including his loved ones," Kollin said. He described Noriega's mood as "upbeat" and said, "He is ready to face his accusers and take them on."

Kollin said Noriega has rejected the possibility of a plea agreement with the government, should one be offered. "A man is innocent; he's not receptive to any plea bargain," Kollin said.

The defense lawyers said they have been assured that they will have continuing access to their client but are not to reveal his whereabouts.

Since arriving in Florida before dawn Thursday, Noriega has been kept in a small cell beneath the

President Bush said the U.S. government is "not seeking a deal" with Noriega.

courthouse known as the "Submarine." The 10-by-12-foot cell is so secret that U.S. marshals will not confirm it exists.

Security remained tight around the courthouse yesterday. One street leading to the building's underground garage entrance was barricaded by Miami police.

Meanwhile, one of Noriega's co-defendants was denied bail at a hearing yesterday. Daniel Miranda, accused of piloting an airplane that carried cash, will remain in federal custody. Miranda's lawyer, Michael O'Kane, also has challenged the government's right to try a Panamanian citizen. O'Kane said Miranda was seized from his house by U.S. soldiers and Drug Enforcement Administration agents.

In Washington, Bush acknowledged he is "concerned" by protests against the invasion registered by friendly Latin American nations. But Bush said, "I think it's something that's correctable," and he announced that Quayle would visit several Latin capitals in the next few weeks. Quayle had scheduled a trip to Honduras Jan. 27, and officials said it may be extended to include Panama and other countries.

Bush said he thinks that "there is more support than has manifested itself" in lopsided votes against the U.S. invasion in the United Nations and the Organization of American States. "I am absolutely convinced, given what happened and the reason why it happened, that if there's damage, I can repair it; we can repair it . . ."

On a related topic, Bush said he would consider recommendations from the Defense Department on assigning women to combat jobs. In the Panama invasion, some women who were serving as military police encountered fire from hostile Panamanian forces, but the president suggested this was an isolated episode, not a change in policy.

The president also described as "extraordinarily murky" the circumstances surrounding the deaths of nuns, one of whom was an American, in Nicaragua. Bush said he did not know if they were killed by the U.S.-backed contra rebels or the Nicaraguan government.

Bush also defended his decision to send national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to China twice following the June crackdown on pro-democracy students there. He noted minor gestures toward better relations from Beijing. "I would like to hope that there would be more," he said but added that he did not know if China would allow dissidents taking refuge in the U.S. Embassy to leave.

Bush was questioned about a statement by Secretary of State James A. Baker III in which he said the December mission to China by Scowcroft was the first, when it was actually the second, such visit. Baker has said he did not intend to mislead but was trying to keep the first mission secret. Bush said, "I don't think Jim Baker would ever deliberately mislead somebody, and so I will stand with him."

Pressed about how he felt about Baker's attempt to preserve the secrecy, Bush replied, "Ask him about it. I support my secretary of state."

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BUSH'S STATEMENT AND EXCERPTS FROM NEWS CONFERENCE

1-6-90 A14

Associated Press

Well, this morning I met with the attorney general, Dick Thornburgh, to discuss the legal process related to the prosecution of General [Manuel Antonio] Noriega. We are committed to a fair trial and to providing all the protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution and laws.

The attorney general assures me that our case is strong, our resolve is firm and our legal representations are sound. Our government is not seeking a deal with Noriega. Our policy remains that we have brought him to this country for prosecution.

I will be ever mindful of this legal process in the days ahead and will not comment on any aspect of this prosecution or any matters that could even inadvertently affect the outcome of this case, and I'm going to ask others in this administration to do the same.

Deputy Secretary of State [Lawrence S.] Eagleburger and Deputy Secretary at Treasury [John E.] Robson have just given me a report on the economic reconstruction efforts in Panama. The first action that the United States took after General Noriega was removed from power was to release some \$400 million in money that was withheld by virtue of our economic sanctions, sanctions which are now being lifted. \$140 million, I believe, is already in Panama.

The revitalization of the Panamanian economy is a major priority in the months ahead as our efforts—as are our efforts for humanitarian assistance. And I would say here, I've been very grateful for the medical supplies that have gone to Panama.

I can report today that considerable progress has been made so far in returning Panama to a normal state of affairs. The new government has taken charge, and President [Guillermo] Endara is working tirelessly to meet the needs of his people.

Both Undersecretary Robson and Eagleburger were very high in their praise of Mr. [First Vice President Richardo Arias] Calderon, Mr. [Second Vice President Guillermo] Ford and, of course, President Endara. They are discussing housing programs, business development, bank loans that will help spur economic growth. We are committed to be a part of that process.

I want to assure all of the countries of Latin America that United States policy remains one of a friendly, supportive and respectful neighbor. We have worked hard and intensively to consult bilaterally and multilaterally with Latin America and we will continue to do that.

I personally will be involved in that. At the Latin American summit in Costa Rica I pledged that we would work with the countries of this hemisphere to build a better life for its citizens. Our policy of cooperation is firm.

Yesterday I had a lengthy discussion with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain, who is so well respected in this hemisphere as well. And I share his deep personal interest in seeing that the countries of this hemisphere pull together on behalf of democracy and economic freedom.

I know the yearnings of my fellow leaders in this hemisphere—leaders in Latin America—and I believe they will support the new government of Panama, and they will support the United States as we work together in this hemisphere.

I will resume that, as I said, and the vice president will be in a position to explain very clearly not only U.S. policy but our aspirations for Panama and indeed, for this entire hemisphere.

So that's where we are, and I'll be glad to take a few questions.

Possible Deal in Noriega Case

You said that the government is not seeking any kind of a deal concerning Noriega. Does that mean that you are irrevocably ruling out any reducing of charges, increasing of charges? And also, since the indictment runs from '81 to '86 and you had many contacts, apparently, with Panama during that period, were you ever aware of any drug activities on the part of Noriega?

On the first part of the question, there's no such plan. The man's entitled to do whatever is granted him under our law, so there isn't any such plan. Secondly, I have made some statements along in reply to your second question, so punch it in the computer, and I'll have nothing more to say about it. Because I do not want, even inadvertently, to prejudice this case. . . . My actions are, in my view, totally unrelated.

U.S. Forces in Panama

With General Noriega out of Panama and safely in custody in this country, it seems like you may have a difficult choice in deciding how to maintain order in Panama. Do you envision keeping a U.S. military peacekeeping force there beyond the usual contingent of 12,000 troops, or would you like to see the Panamanian Defense Forces reconstituted?

One, I'd like to see their police forces, whatever emerges, reconstituted. Two, we will get our forces that went in out as soon as possible. Three, I will just say this because your question obviously understands this, but to those listeners out there, SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] has had a force there, and that force, under the treaty, will remain there.

But the answer is, we want to get those additional augmented forces out as soon as possible. And we will.

Secrecy on China Missions

I'd like to try to follow up a question you were asked when you were last about secrecy and the two missions by General [Brent] Scowcroft to China. As I'm sure you may be aware, Secretary of State [James A.] Baker was asked about the first—what we then thought was the first China mission on one of the weekend talk shows. He indicated that it was, indeed. It turned out to be the second.

He has since acknowledged quite openly

that his answer was false, and that he felt constrained to give that answer to protect the secrecy of the mission. And I wondered first, sir, whether you felt it was worth it for him to have to do that, and second, whether that sort of thing is acceptable in your administration.

Well, let me simply say that some things will be conducted in secrecy. And I know you don't like it. Your business is to get everything out in the open, and my business is to conduct the for-

Prejudicing Noriega Case

You talk about your concern about prejudicing the case, but as you well know, you have called Noriega a "thug" and other people in the administration have gone further. You said he's poisoning our children. Haven't you already done that?

I think I've heard all kinds of characterizations of him in the press—columnists, even commentators, presidents, members of the United States Congress. He is now in custody. The time for rhetoric is over. The time for answering hypothetical questions that might prejudice the trial is over.

I would go back . . . to Watergate, where there were hearings—hearings held, charges made over and over again, editorials written and voiced. And yet the people received a fair trial.

So I am convinced that our system of justice is so fair that the person will get a fair trial. But I can tell you from my standpoint, I am going to bend over backwards and not answer hypothetical questions or not do anything that might prejudice that.

Reducing the Charges

[On the] reducing of charges: are you saying that if he wants to go for that, if he wants to try to go for reducing of charges, that we will entertain it? You said—

No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying he has a right to do what he wants, and then let the legal process determine how that should work out.

Then you're not ruling it out?

Well, I'm not ruling it in. I'm just saying he's got his rights and he ought—we ought not to stand up here and try to define narrowly what they are.

Relations With Latin America

Based on your opening remarks and your comments about the vice president's trip, it would indicate that you're concerned about relations with Latin America. Has the action that you've taken set it back?

To some degree I am concerned because I am well aware of how our friends south of our border, including my friend, President [Carlos] Salinas [de Gortari of Mexico], look at the use of American force anywhere. So I'm concerned about it. I think it's something that's correctable, because I think they know that I have tried a lot of consultation, that we have exhausted the remedies in this particular case of multilateral diplomacy.

But given the history of the use of U.S. force, I would be remiss if I didn't face up to the problem that we must go forward diplomatically now to explain how this president looks at the protection of American life, that we acted, in our view, well within our rights, but that we will continue consultation. . . .

I feel strongly about the protection of American life, so we've got to get them to understand that this isn't a shift away from what some had termed "excessively timid diplomacy."

But wouldn't that indicate that actually you were continuing old American policies that have upset the people of Latin America?

Well, to the degree—if there is that perception, then it's up to me and the secretary. And in this instance, the vice president's trip takes on

enormous importance to convince the people of the truth, and that is that we are not reverting to just, you know, a willful—what's the word I'm groping for here—use of force that has no rationale.

But when it comes to the protection of American life, please, our friends south of the border understand that this president is going to protect it.

I'll tell you one thing that's helped on this, to the degree there is a problem at all, and that is the way the Panamanian democracy is now starting to move forward. The certification of the three people who had been deprived of their right to hold office by the previous regime—that's been of enormous help. And then I think the other thing is the reception, the public reception in Panama, for our action. It has been overwhelming, overwhelming.

Panama a 'Political Jackpot?'

On that, sir, Lee Atwater, the chairman of the RNC [Republican National Committee], says Panama is a political jackpot for you, and it will wipe out the disenchantment, for example, of the way you handled China. Without saying that's why you went into Panama, sending the troops in, is one effect of it that it is a political jackpot?

Well, Jesse Jackson doesn't think so. He talked to my wife. And so, you know, there's differences of opinions on that, but this isn't—I didn't do something for political reason. That's not the reason I did that. I did it to protect American lives. A president's called on to take certain actions. We're not going in to try to furbish a political image. That's ridiculous.

Having said that, though, have you now neutralized Democrats on foreign policy? Is this the last time [Senate Majority Leader] George Mitchell (D-Maine) can ever accuse you of having a timid foreign policy?

Knowing George, he'll find a reason, he'll find a way. And that's his job. I mean, look, we're going into an election year. But this—I want to try, if I can, to separate the responsive end. He's been supportive of this. . . . But I don't think it's laid-to-rest, put-off bounds, any criticism of the president by a Democratic opposition, if that's the question, no, absolutely not.

Bringing Troops Home

Do you anticipate that the combat troops, the bulk of the additional combat troops sent into Panama, will indeed be out by the end of this month, as some administration officials have said?

And secondly and more broadly, do you now see an expanded role for the American military in small regional issues like this one, or more particularly, in the war against drugs, since there was a strong drug connection to this operation?

I see no parallel between the situation here, where American lives were at stake and you had an indicted person who'd usurped power and declared war against the United States. I don't think you can draw a parallel between that unique situation and then other countries. . . .

Some U.S. forces that went in are already out. So, I would look for an early return. . . .

International Law Implications

Isn't this setting a precedent? What is the explanation behind it?

The right to protect American lives granted under the U.N. Charter, and we will protect lives of citizens and we will go forward with that. The State Department, as I understand it, has already spelled that out, but I think you raise a good point. Yes, we should make very clear why we acted and under what authority we acted as we did.

More Use of Military Force

You just described Panama as a unique case, and I'd just like to ask you sort of a philosophical question. If the criteria you listed here—protecting American lives, having exhausted all the other diplomatic options—presented themselves again, should we look in a Bush presidency for more such deployments of military force, if your criteria were met?

Yes, if you can spell out what the criteria is, and then if you can look to the future to see the situation surrounding it. I can't visualize another situation quite this unique. . . . I don't see another real parallel here looming on the horizon at all. . . .

Female Troops in Combat

In Panama we saw women leading troops in combat for the first time. Are you comfortable with women in that role? And would you support changes in the restrictions on women in combat?

No. I think this is a matter—I'd willingly accept—listen to recommendations from the Defense Department. But these were not combat assignments. But any time you have a highly trained, gung-ho volunteer force and they're caught up in some of the firefights that went on, a person, man or woman, can be inflicted into a—put into a combat situation

But it's my understanding—and I think [Defense Secretary Richard B.] Cheney took a question on that today—that these were not combat roles. And so, I would let the heroic performance of these people be weighed and measured, and then see if the Defense Department wanted to recommend to the president any additional changes.

Reaction of Latin Leaders

Do you think that the Latin leaders have been hypersensitive to the—given the fact that in back channels, apparently, they've been supportive of the invasion? Can you say if that is correct? And then also because of that, do you think they've been hypersensitive in their public statements about U.S. forces in the region?

I like to feel that, given the way the situation is resolved, there is more support than has manifested itself in votes at the United Nations or in public statements. The vice president's trip will help on this. . . . If there is damage, I can repair it; we can repair it; the State Department and whoever else is involved can repair it. . . .

Zip My Lips: Bush's Secret Conduct of U.S. Policy

By David Hoffman

THE LAST MONTH has given President Bush perhaps the biggest triumph of his first year in office—the invasion of Panama and the capture of Manuel Antonio Noriega—but it has also given the American people a fresh look at one troubling aspect of Bush's operating style that may define the rest of his presidency.

In both the Panama operation and in his diplomatic overtures to China, Bush demonstrated anew his abid-

ing penchant for secrecy. When the October coup attempt against Noriega failed, Bush sanctioned intensified secret planning for the invasion to overthrow the Panamanian dictator. When he was determined to keep the lines open to China despite outrage around the world over the Tiananmen Square massacre, Bush twice sent National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft to Beijing and kept the first visit secret from the public for five months.

No one should be surprised to see Bush conduct his business in private again and again in the next few years. For reasons of background, experience and temperament, Bush regards secrecy as a crucial part of the way this world works—and ought to work—in everything from serious diplomacy to just having fun.

Bush is a throwback to the patrician "wise men" of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, the men who guided the United States from the period after World War II through the Vietnam War. They were diplomats and businessmen who believed they had been endowed with the education and experience to perform in the public's best interests but often without the public's knowledge.

If you listen to George Bush carefully, you will hear echoes of the wise men in his voice. "I have an obligation as president to conduct the foreign policy of this country the way I see fit," he said recently when asked to defend the secrecy of his China missions. On Friday, he told reporters once again: "Let me simply say that some things will be conducted in secrecy. And I know you don't like it."

Bush believes the powers of the presidency were eroded in the years after Vietnam and Watergate by an overly assertive press and Congress. This is no idle constitutional argument with Bush; in his first year, he has been actively trying to reassert his dominance over the other powerful institutions of the capital—and he has used secrecy to keep them at bay.

He has a strong streak of the patrician, "we know better," governing-on-our-behalf attitude," says a former Reagan administration official who has worked closely with Bush for years. "He thinks our system—with an excess of Congress and press involvement—has made it impossible to do what is right. He thinks you don't allow short-term, newspaper-driven publicity to govern what you do. You let things like China flower in private, and you figure people will be happy with the result in the end."

"Take the case of the atomic bomb. Everyone was glad we could have it and use it to end the war. But if we had been forced to have a debate over it like we do today, we would never have done it. Bush thinks there are a lot of things people would like to have in the end—but you could never get them done if you had to debate them."

For the most part, particularly if events appear to be going well, Americans seem ambivalent about how much their government tells them. When it comes to military planning and diplomacy, surveys show the president enjoys wide latitude from the public in keeping things private. And the experience of democracies over the last decade shows that control of information, particularly in wartime, can be critical to success.

Britain's strict secrecy helped Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher win the Falklands War; conversely, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, though planned in the tightest secrecy, ended as an openly-observed disaster.

But there are enormous perils for Bush if he stumbles. A mistake made in secret can prove to be that much more politically debilitating, as President Reagan discovered when the covert Iran arms sales were disclosed. Even if Bush avoids such pitfalls, the extensive use of secrecy can snare the most self-confident of leaders. By slamming the door in the face of outsiders, Bush risks losing the benefit of valuable experience and advice. What he gains in security, he gives up in cross-pollination.

So far, Bush and his team have adopted an insular management style that does not extend far beyond the executive suite. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Office of Management and Budget director Richard G. Darman and Attorney General Dick Thornburgh have all earned reputations for relying heavily on their most trusted inner circle of advisers. They are apt pupils from the Bush school of management. In the president's words, "Loyalty is not a character flaw." Rather, it is an important job qualification.

Apart from a close circle of peers, Bush has not surrounded himself at the White House with independent minds who could contribute to his presidency. Rather, he has opted for loyal implementers who will leave the decisions to him. Even members of the small circle of trusted insiders—such as Scowcroft, Baker, Darman, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady and Chief of Staff John Sununu—are not all privy to all the decisions. By his own account, Bush did not feel compelled to tell Cheney or CIA Director William Webster last July that he had invited Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to a summit.

Bush is very much a man of the present: He does not like to be boxed in by either the past or the future. He insisted there be no "second-guessing" about the Panama invasion or, earlier, about the failed coup attempt in October. One of his frequent expressions is, "That's history," even if it was something that happened yesterday. Nor does Bush look too far ahead—he just doesn't think anyone knows for sure what is going to happen in six months or a year.

Secrecy in decision-making allows him the maximum amount of flexibility in the present. If no one is carping at you about some long-ago promise you made, if you are not under pressure to meet some imaginary future standard, you have a lot more room to maneuver. Bush once remarked to an aide that the Nexis data-retrieval system was one of the most nettlesome inventions

ZIP... CONTINUED

of his career—reminding him of all those things he'd said over the years.

The point is that Bush's need for secrecy is more than just a concern that he reap the maximum public-relations advantage from an announcement, more than just a phobia about the press or leaks. It is central to his thinking about how to get things accomplished with a minimum of opposition and debate. Bush has his own strongly-felt sense of timing—what friends call an "inner clock"—and he doesn't like to be pushed into something he is not certain about.

This desire for control is woven into the fabric of his everyday life. Although he often comes across in public as casual and freewheeling, in private Bush is intensely calculating about the people and information around him, even to the seating at dinner parties. He compartmentalizes everything, giving people discreet tasks but never showing the full picture. Friends often marvel at how he delights in launching what amount to little covert missions and intelligence operations for his own edification.

Just before the 1988 Republican National Convention, for example, he asked a young campaign aide to quietly look up stories in newspaper microfilms about how vice presidential nominations had become public over the last 20 years. The aide reported what Bush suspected: The choice usually leaked out ahead of time. Armed with this knowledge, Bush announced his selection of Dan Quayle so quickly as to surprise even some of those around him who thought they would have more time to talk about his choice.

Bush's desire for secrecy and surprise is also driven by the very kind of presidency he is managing—one that relies less on communications skills and more on private wheeling and dealing.

Through December, Bush had received less than a third of the television news coverage given to Reagan in his high-profile first year, according to the Center for Media and Public Affairs, which has been monitoring television news coverage. Reagan tried to reach his goals by constantly telling people what he wanted; presumably if enough of them agreed, the Congress would get the message. Even on foreign policy matters, Reagan may have desired a lot more secrecy, but he used communications

to broadcast his overall direction.

Bush, however, has a deep aversion to telegraphing his goals until he knows whether they are achievable. His constant telephoning and reaching out has often been advertised as one of his strengths, guaranteeing he would not get isolated. But we are also discovering that much more of his presidency is conducted with a hidden hand. The first Scowcroft mission to China might not have become public for months or years if Bush and Scowcroft had their way.

The China missions were actually foreshadowed long ago. In 1984, it was Bush's idea to send Scowcroft, then a private citizen, to Moscow with a letter from Reagan for Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko. The idea was to open up a back channel at a time of continuing U.S.-Soviet tensions. The Kremlin refused to receive Scowcroft.

In another instance, Bush sent Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Carter, on a secret mission to Poland to pave the way for his own 1987 visit there at a time when the State Department saw little merit in such a trip.

Bush is an old hand at this game and his presidency is an extension of all that he has learned about how to play it. One painful lesson came at the United Nations when Bush was defending the U.S. policy of keeping Beijing from gaining a seat that was held by Taiwan. Unbeknownst to Bush, President Nixon, Secretary of State William F. Rogers and Henry Kissinger had already concluded that U.S. hope of preserving a Taiwan seat was a lost cause. Bush did not forget the experience.

He also learned at the U.N. how public rhetoric and private reality often do not match. "For two years at the United Nations, I listened to what people said," he recalled, "then they would walk out the door and tell you what they mean. What they said and what they mean are sometimes two very different things." Later, as director of Central Intelligence, Bush learned even more thoroughly the value of secret missions and compartmentalizing information.

The political community marveled and scoffed at Reagan's image-makers when they tried to "manipulate" the news media. Now, perhaps, a different kind of manipulation is occurring. While Bush wants to avoid the show-biz excesses of the Reagan years, he is no less nimble in trying to con-

nect and disconnect himself selectively from political accountability. By simply disappearing, by using secrecy to shield his actions, he can avoid being associated with the downside of many issues. He can wave off the "second-guessing" and show up only when there's good news to announce, like the surrender of Noriega.

In a certain way, Bush has gone beyond manipulating *how* we see things, to manipulating *what* we see. For example, during the latest coup attempt against Philippine President Corazon Aquino, the president was on his way to the Malta summit. Back in Washington, Bush's advisers paid close attention to the question of how to handle the matter to make the president look "decisive" just before his first meeting with Gorbachev. Perhaps toward this end, the officials sent to Malta a chronology of events that, in effect, began with Aquino's call for help and Bush's swift response from Air Force One authorizing it. The chronology was used as the basis for briefing reporters about how Bush made his decision. But it omitted some earlier exchanges between U.S. and Philippine officials in which the administration suggested which requests would be met with approval and which would not.

That wouldn't have looked as presidential.

Perhaps the crack-cocaine buy in Lafayette Park for the president's televised anti-drug speech last September—in which the dealer was lured to the park so Bush could say the crack was purchased near the White House—was not an isolated incident but a symptom of something larger.

In many cases, particularly in diplomacy and military planning, secrecy is an essential ingredient. Certainly, the July mission to Beijing would have blown up had it been known at the time. But at what point does Bush owe the nation a fuller accounting than the one-paragraph statement the White House issued acknowledging that Scowcroft had made the July trip? Congress may demand an accounting, and public opinion may eventually weigh in. But in Bush's world, the only real accounting is the one he faces in 1992.

"If the American people don't like it," he commented recently about his secret endeavors, "I expect they'll get somebody else to take my job. But I'm going to keep doing it."

of his career—reminding him of all those things he'd said over the years.

The point is that Bush's need for secrecy is more than just a concern that he reap the maximum public-relations advantage from an announcement, more than just a phobia about the press or leaks. It is central to his thinking about how to get things accomplished with a minimum of opposition and debate. Bush has his own strongly-felt sense of timing—what friends call an "inner clock"—and he doesn't like to be pushed into something he is not certain about.

This desire for control is woven into the fabric of his everyday life. Although he often comes across in public as casual and freewheeling, in private Bush is intensely calculating about the people and information around him, even to the seating at dinner parties. He compartmentalizes everything, giving people discreet tasks but never showing the full picture. Friends often marvel at how he delights in launching what amount to little covert missions and intelligence operations for his own edification.

Just before the 1988 Republican National Convention, for example, he asked a young campaign aide to quietly look up stories in newspaper microfilms about how vice presidential nominations had become public over the last 20 years. The aide reported what Bush suspected: The choice usually leaked out ahead of time. Armed with this knowledge, Bush announced his selection of Dan Quayle so quickly as to surprise even some of those around him who thought they would have more time to talk about his choice.

Bush's desire for secrecy and surprise is also driven by the very kind of presidency he is managing—one that relies less on communications skills and more on private wheeling and dealing.

Through December, Bush had received less than a third of the television news coverage given to Reagan in his high-profile first year, according to the Center for Media and Public Affairs, which has been monitoring television news coverage. Reagan tried to reach his goals by constantly telling people what he wanted; presumably if enough of them agreed, the Congress would get the message. Even on foreign policy matters, Reagan may have desired a lot more secrecy, but he used communications

to broadcast his overall direction.

Bush, however, has a deep aversion to telegraphing his goals until he knows whether they are achievable. His constant telephoning and reaching out has often been advertised as one of his strengths, guaranteeing he would not get isolated. But we are also discovering that much more of his presidency is conducted with a hidden hand. The first Scowcroft mission to China might not have become public for months or years if Bush and Scowcroft had their way.

The China missions were actually foreshadowed long ago. In 1984, it was Bush's idea to send Scowcroft, then a private citizen, to Moscow with a letter from Reagan for Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko. The idea was to open up a back channel at a time of continuing U.S.-Soviet tensions. The Kremlin refused to receive Scowcroft.

In another instance, Bush sent Zbigniew Brzezinski, former national security adviser to President Carter, on a secret mission to Poland to pave the way for his own 1987 visit there at a time when the State Department saw little merit in such a trip.

Bush is an old hand at this game and his presidency is an extension of all that he has learned about how to play it. One painful lesson came at the United Nations when Bush was defending the U.S. policy of keeping Beijing from gaining a seat that was held by Taiwan. Unbeknownst to Bush, President Nixon, Secretary of State William F. Rogers and Henry Kissinger had already concluded that U.S. hope of preserving a Taiwan seat was a lost cause. Bush did not forget the experience.

He also learned at the U.N. how public rhetoric and private reality often do not match. "For two years at the United Nations, I listened to what people said," he recalled, "then they would walk out the door and tell you what they mean. What they said and what they mean are sometimes two very different things." Later, as director of Central Intelligence, Bush learned even more thoroughly the value of secret missions and compartmentalizing information.

The political community marveled and scoffed at Reagan's image-makers when they tried to "manipulate" the news media. Now, perhaps, a different kind of manipulation is occurring. While Bush wants to avoid the show-biz excesses of the Reagan years, he is no less nimble in trying to con-

nect and disconnect himself selectively from political accountability. By simply disappearing, by using secrecy to shield his actions, he can avoid being associated with the downside of many issues. He can wave off the "second-guessing" and show up only when there's good news to announce, like the surrender of Noriega.

In a certain way, Bush has gone beyond manipulating *how* we see things, to manipulating *what* we see. For example, during the latest coup attempt against Philippine President Corazon Aquino, the president was on his way to the Malta summit. Back in Washington, Bush's advisers paid close attention to the question of how to handle the matter to make the president look "decisive" just before his first meeting with Gorbachev. Perhaps toward this end, the officials sent to Malta a chronology of events that, in effect, began with Aquino's call for help and Bush's swift response from Air Force One authorizing it. The chronology was used as the basis for briefing reporters about how Bush made his decision. But it omitted some earlier exchanges between U.S. and Philippine officials in which the administration suggested which requests would be met with approval and which would not.

That wouldn't have looked as presidential.

Perhaps the crack-cocaine buy in Lafayette Park for the president's televised anti-drug speech last September—in which the dealer was lured to the park so Bush could say the crack was purchased near the White House—was not an isolated incident but a symptom of something larger.

In many cases, particularly in diplomacy and military planning, secrecy is an essential ingredient. Certainly, the July mission to Beijing would have blown up had it been known at the time. But at what point does Bush owe the nation a fuller accounting than the one-paragraph statement the White House issued acknowledging that Scowcroft had made the July trip? Congress may demand an accounting, and public opinion may eventually weigh in. But in Bush's world, the only real accounting is the one he faces in 1992.

"If the American people don't like it," he commented recently about his secret endeavors, "I expect they'll get somebody else to take my job. But I'm going to keep doing it."

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ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, January 7, 1990

GUESTS:

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Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

FRANK RUBINO

Attorney for General Noriega

INTERVIEWED BY:

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George F. Will - ABC News Analyst

Sam Donaldson - ABC News

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MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Rubino, thanks for coming in.

MR. RUBINO: Good morning.

MR. BRINKLEY: Glad to have you with us.

Here in the studio are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC NEWS. Now, Mr. Rubino, you will be Noriega's lawyer if his case comes to trial, as apparently it will.

MR. RUBINO: Yes, sir.

MR. BRINKLEY: Do you know of any evidence likely to come out that will be embarrassing to the U.S. government?

MR. RUBINO: At this stage of the proceedings we have not got into the discovery part of the case, which is wherein we will petition the government to provide us certain various materials, which we will then review for the importance of those materials to be used in court.

We've not reached that stage yet.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, I know there are some aspects of the case you don't want to discuss in advance, and in fact can't. But you have spent some time with the general, discussed his background, and so on. Is there anything in what he says that you think might embarrass the government if made public?

MR. RUBINO: Well, at this stage my conversations with the general since his arrest have been going over certain areas in which we'll be filing pre-trial motions to dismiss the case based on various grounds. None of those go into sensitive documents or areas yet.

MR. BRINKLEY: I see.

MR. WILL: David asks about sensitive documents that might embarrass the United States generally, or the current administration in particular. You would, however, be after documents that would exculpate your client. How might that work? What might you find in American files that would wash away the liability here?

MR. RUBINO: Well, this would all be speculation at this point as to what the government may have. I think we just

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, I know there are some aspects of the case you don't want to discuss in advance, and in fact can't. But you have spent some time with the general, discussed his background, and so on. Is there anything in what he says that you think might embarrass the government if made public?

have to wait until we receive those documents--

MR. WILL: But you must have some idea what you might find. Give us a hypothetical that would indicate--

MR. RUBINO: The one thing I've never done in 16 years of practicing law is to guess what may happen. I think the better course is to wait, to look at the documents, see what they are, and then try to competently use them.

MR. WILL: There's a whole new raft of documents allegedly found by American troops when they went into Noriega's headquarters. They probably did not have proper warrant when they were doing that, at least by American search and seizure standards. Would you try and attack the admissibility of that evidence?

MR. RUBINO: Oh, obviously. I mean, there is no provision in law for armed soldiers to kick down your door and seize documents from your home. There is no question that they will be severely challenged.

MR. WILL: You also, I gather then, will argue your client in any case, having been described as a narco-thug terrorist and other things by American officials, cannot possibly get a fair trial. Others will say, Jack Ruby got a trial, and he committed his crime on television. How do you then argue that there's no way he can get a fair trial, or will you?

MR. RUBINO: I definitely will argue that General Noriega cannot receive a fair trial. You have to look at the whole equation of what it takes to make up a fair trial.

Two problems we do not have. One, the prosecutor in the case, Myles Malman, is a competent prosecutor, who I honestly believe will do his best to ensure a fair trial. Judge Hoover is probably one of the best jurists we have, and I'm sure that he's going to, without a doubt, do his best.

But the pretrial publicity is just amazing, the amount--and not only the amount of publicity, but the type of publicity. People have equated this case to North.

MR. WILL: Well, given that you have this sort of,

you think, a large club with which the beat the prosecution with on the publicity issue, might you then want to plea bargain?

MR. RUBINO: Absolutely not. The government chose to bring General Noriega to trial, and they shall have their trial.

MR. DONALDSON: Your initial complaint was that we had no jurisdiction, that Noriega did not fall under the jurisdiction of the United States. But have you lost that now?

MR. RUBINO: Absolutely not. That is one of the motions that will be filed. We did previously litigate an area of head-of-state immunity, but at that time, General Noriega was in fact the general of the army. After that, he has now been appointed the maximum leader. At the time he was seized by the government, he was the maximum leader of the country which would give him, in our opinion, head-of-state immunity. There are other grounds also we'll be attacking it on.

MR. DONALDSON: In other words, one fellow, I've forgotten him name, from the Bahamas--not the prime minister of the Bahamas, but from some small portion of that--who was technically a head of state or government, and we convicted him of drug dealing.

MR. RUBINO: I think you're speaking of the Turks and Caicos case.

MR. DONALDSON: I'm sure I am.

MR. RUBINO: That particular gentleman, because that is actually a colony or a protectorate but not an independent country, he was not in fact head of state.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, do you see Noriega? Have you seen him?

MR. RUBINO: Oh, yes.

MR. DONALDSON: Where do you see him?

MR. RUBINO: I meet with him in the federal courthouse.

MR. DONALDSON: In other words, not in his cell?

MR. RUBINO: No, the Marshal Service has been kind enough to bring him out to a room, giving us a lot more--you know, considerable size and space so we can meet with him.

MR. DONALDSON: For various reasons, is there any plan that you know of to move Noriega around to various federal installations through the United States, for his safety, for instance?

MR. RUBINO: No, the government is very concerned, and rightfully so, about his safety, and they have advised us that they will move him to a secure location, but make him readily available to us at any time.

MR. DONALDSON: How long do you think the trial will take?

MR. RUBINO: The trial itself--the government announced two months--but I extremely doubt that. I would honestly say, the trial itself, from the time we actually begin the case, less picking the jury, could take about four to six months. The jury selection could go on forever.

MR. DONALDSON: All right, let us explore that. What are the challenges that you will make to prospective jurors when you're picking the jury?

MR. RUBINO: The pretrial publicity is not the problem in and of itself. The question the judge will ask is, you've heard of General Noriega. You've received this pretrial publicity. Based upon that, are you able to put this out of your mind and give this man a fair trial? Or have you already decided in your mind as to his guilt or innocence?

Since he has been portrayed in every form of press, television--the president of the United States said that he was a thug and a purveyor of drugs to children. I mean, obviously, how can someone strike that from your mind and be able to give this man a fair trial.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, are you saying that no jury could be found in the United States anywhere?

MR. RUBINO: Well, I think we may be able to find someone who hasn't heard of this. But is that person qualified to be on a jury? Obviously, you want a jury of intelligent people who can go through the evidence, which will be very complex in this case, and

come upon an intelligent verdict.

MR. WILL: But you're postulating a rule of jurisprudence here, where by the more infamous you are, the more you immunized by your infamy.

MR. RUBINO: Well, we didn't create the infamy; that's the problem. The government could have done this in such a way as to not publicize General Noriega in the horrible negative light they have. They've created their own monster in this case.

MR. DONALDSON: Are you going to apply for bail? Perhaps you have, and I missed it.

MR. RUBINO: No, at this stage, we have not asked for bail, at the initial appearance.

MR. DONALDSON: Will you?

MR. RUBINO: It is doubtful we will.

MR. DONALDSON: It wouldn't be granted?

MR. RUBINO: I think it's quite obvious it wouldn't.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Rubino--

MR. RUBINO: Yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: --if you were a private citizen and on the list for jury duty, and you understand that this trial is going to run for months, wouldn't you be likely to give an answer that is unsatisfactory, so you would not be on the jury?

MR. RUBINO: That happens quite often. I've tried long complex cases wherein you go through a tremendous amount of people until you can reach people that can spend that much time. A lot of people probably will attempt to exclude themselves. Then on the other hand, you have the problem of people who will try to get on the jury on purpose because they have some type of evil motive, and that's a point that we have to sort out, too.

MR. BRINKLEY: One other question before our time runs out. Did the U.S. government at any time offer Noriega the option of going to some third country?

MR. RUBINO: You mean during the negotiations at the Vatican?

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, at any time in recent weeks, months, as far as you know?

MR. RUBINO: The last we had--"we" being the lawyers-- had contact with the U.S. government with respect to this was in October. At that time I personally met with representatives of the government, and options were discussed at that time. But since that date, nothing.

MR. DONALDSON: How much are you going to be paid for representing Noriega?

MR. RUBINO: At this point, I don't know that answer.

MR. DONALDSON: Where will the money come from? Because clearly you're not going to do pro bono work, are you?

MR. RUBINO: Well, obviously, this case is so complex one basically will have to shut their office down, and do nothing but this case, I interpret, for about a year and a half.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, a lot of people say that Noriega's funds are illegally derived. They're drug money. Can you accept money that in fact is drug money?

MR. RUBINO: I cannot accept money that in fact is drug money. But just because a lot of people say it is, doesn't make it true.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, we have to watch you as you perform this with great interest.

MR. RUBINO: Yes, sir.

MR. BRINKLEY: And thank you very much for coming in today.

MR. RUBINO: You're welcome.

MR. BRINKLEY: Pleasure to have you with us.

Coming next, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, national security assistant to President Bush. In a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Gen. Scowcroft, thanks for coming. Glad to have you with us.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Good morning, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: You know everyone here.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, indeed.

MR. BRINKLEY: I would like to ask you a question I put to Mr. Rubino, and I didn't really quite get an answer. At any time in recent weeks, months, was Noriega offered a chance to go to some third country and stay away, stay out of sight?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: There was some discussion of that early in October, but not since then.

MR. BRINKLEY: And what? Was the offer made to him?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I don't think it was ever presented personally to him. But the president made some comments that if he went to a third country with which we did not have an extradition treaty, that that would be all right. But that was some time ago.

MR. WILL: In the Iran-contra trials, two Republican presidents have taken pretty stiff lines, saying even if it costs us the ability to proceed with certain prosecutions, we're going to hold the line on not releasing potentially embarrassing or I guess injurious classified documents.

Would you expect that to be the same policy in the Bush administration regarding Noriega that you're prepared to see his prosecution fail rather than release certain documents?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think it certainly--George, let's distinguish embarrassing from important issues. Embarrassing, no, certainly not. And I think it's also important to remember that Gen. Noriega has been indicted on drug charges. That's a fairly narrow kind of--narrow part of his whole relationship with the United States. So I'm quite comfortable.

MR. WILL: I think a lot of Americans say, well, we'd like some idea, hypothetical, but a specific idea of what might be an injurious document that would be released. Can you give us some idea?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, I really can't. At the moment, as far as I know, there aren't any. And you had the attorney general

saying he didn't anticipate any problems of that character.

I don't--you know, I don't know whether the files have been searched to the ultimate.

MR. WILL: Now, you emphasize that this is a drug indictment, a common criminal case we have here. But what's uncommon about this is the use of the American military as a posse to get a head of state to bring him back here to be tried.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, indeed.

MR. WILL: Now, some Americans say there must be other leaders, if not heads of state, certainly people active in politics in Latin America, equally vulnerable to this kind of operation. Would you see other people being warned by this, and perhaps us going after others?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I would not say that this is a precedent for any other action. Panama, in a number of ways, is unique. And therefore I would say this case, incident, whatever you want to call it, is unique. I would not draw conclusions from it.

MR. DONALDSON: Is it correct, general, that Colombia has resisted our effort to use our fleet to blockade Colombia, or in anyway interdict the drug supply?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We haven't really started discussions with Colombia. There are some stories that have leaked in the press. We are looking at ways we might be able to improve interdiction across the Caribbean. Before we undertake anything, we will of course consult with any of the countries--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, one of the stories had it that Colombia refused to consult with us last week. Is that correct?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: There have been some difficulties resulting in some premature, and I think probably, inaccurate leaks, about what we had in mind.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, define difficulties for me then?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think, you know, the term that was in the paper, for example, was blockade. Now that's a warlike negative term. What we would be doing is, if we did anything down

there, would be a cooperative effort, in conjunction with the countries there, to help get better control over the drug trafficking.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, a cooperative effort. But it is apparent at the moment that President Barco of Colombia is resisting the idea of cooperating.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No.

MR. DONALDSON: He is not resisting?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: This--this--this is a reaction to premature and inaccurate leaks. I think it'll work out.

MR. DONALDSON: General, if I may, sir, you can't blame the press, can you?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I'm not blaming--I'm not blaming anyone. I'm not blaming anyone.

MR. DONALDSON: I'm asking questions now about what the facts are; not what has been in the paper. You've just told us that General--President Barco is not resisting. So he's going to cooperate with us?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: So far as I know, President Barco has not been seized with the problem. We have not presented it in that sense to President Barco, so far as I know.

MR. DONALDSON: So it's not a case that the fleet is steaming even before we have consulted with President Barco?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Not so far as I know.

MR. WILL: A word that keeps appearing in press reports speculating on how long American forces might be in Panama in their current role is reconstruction; it depends on how fast the "reconstruction" of the Panamanian army, civil government, economy takes hold. Is that the aim of American policy right now: reconstruction of Panama?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, the aim of American policy is to assist the new Panamanian government to be able to turn itself into an operating government. They have come to power on very, very short notice, and to the extent that we can be helpful, we want to.

I think it's important to distinguish between the troops

that are in Panama on a more or less permanent basis, about 12,000, and the augmented troops that were sent down for the operation.

MR. DONALDSON: How many casualties were there in Panama of civilians? A former attorney general, Ramsey Clark, is saying this morning that he believes there were over 1,000 civilian casualties, and we've heard figures of 2- or 3,000?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I honestly don't know, but I'm pretty certain neither does Ramsey Clark.

MR. DONALDSON: Would you think it would be in the hundreds?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I don't want to speculate. Because there was a lot of chaos, a lot of confusion, and I think until there is some kind of an inventory, it's very difficult to say how many. But I think the numbers he suggests are probably quite high.

MR. BRINKLEY: Did Gen. Noriega at some time in the past have some relationship with the CIA?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. BRINKLEY: Could you tell us what it was?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Not--not in detail, I can't, no.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, in general, what was it?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: He was--he did have a relationship in which he provided information to us.

MR. WILL: Can you not tell us--

MR. BRINKLEY: One more, George. Was he not at the same time acting as a double agent, and telling whatever he learned to Castro?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I don't know that.

MR. BRINKLEY: You don't know that? George.

MR. WILL: That's I guess my question. Is that you don't know his relationship with the CIA, or it would be injurious to the national interest to say so?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I don't know precisely what it was, but I think whatever it was, the Central Intelligence Agency would certainly have been aware that he could have been working for--

MR. BRINKLEY: Let me interrupt here briefly, Sam, George, General. We'll be back with more questions for Gen. Scowcroft in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Sam, I interrupted you. Go ahead now if you want.

MR. DONALDSON: A couple of more questions on Panama. Can you clear up the confusion over whether there actually was a deadline given Noriega to leave the papal nuncio? Archbishop Laboa says that in fact he gave Noriega no deadline, but U.S. officials have said otherwise?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I can't really clear it up. I wasn't there. And I would take what the archbishop, the papal nuncio, said very seriously.

MR. DONALDSON: Two other stories. The papal nuncio says that he tried to contact General Thurman, the U.S. commander down there, when Noriega called in, said, pick me up here at the Dairy Freeze, or wherever he was, in order to get U.S. troops over there. Is that correct?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I don't know that.

MR. DONALDSON: I'm batting zero at the moment, but I'll try one more.,

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Sure.

MR. DONALDSON: Archbishop Laboa says this morning that in fact Noriega told him when he came on the phone that if he wasn't granted asylum that he would commence a series of massacres in Chiriqui province. Do you know anything about that?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I only know what I--what I read about it.

MR. DONALDSON: Over to you, George.

MR. WILL: Well, let's leave Panama for a moment to the larger world. It's been American policy for half a century now that the Baltic states were unlawfully incorporated into the Soviet Union as a result of the Hitler-Stalin pact.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: That's correct.

MR. WILL: Is it still our policy, and would we like to see them independent?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: It is our policy. We have never recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states.

MR. WILL: Do you expect them to be independent states?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I don't know. I don't know.

MR. WILL: But they have a right to secede from the Soviet Union, is what you're saying?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Obviously, it is one of the larger problems that Chairman Gorbachev has to deal with at the present time. It's a very sensitive one. And what I would say is that we hope that the resolution of the issue would be by peaceful means.

MR. WILL: But you hope the peaceful outcome will be what we've advocated for 50 years, which is secession from the Soviet Union.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We have never recognized the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states.

MR. WILL: Now, in another aspect of this changing U.S.-Soviet relationship, I believe Secretary of State Baker was, I guess, standing next to the French foreign minister when, with turmoil in Romania, he said that it might be quite all right for the Soviet Union to intervene on behalf of those rebelling against Ceausescu, because Romania was in--and the French foreign minister used the phrase--"Soviet sector".

Is it our view that the Soviet Union has some kind of special rights over Eastern Europe?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, and I don't believe the secretary of state indicated that. We believe Eastern Europe should be moving the way it is, that is, on the basis of self-determination.

MR. DONALDSON: What can you tell us about President Gorbachev--

MR. WILL: Just one more question on Eastern Europe. There are those who are now saying that the Soviet Union has some

kind of legitimate security interest in the existence of 380,000 Soviet troops in East Germany. Do you believe that to be true?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No.

MR. DONALDSON: What can you tell us about President Gorbachev's whereabouts, and his status at the moment? There is a lot of speculation that, once again, he may be terribly threatened, and that he has cancelled some appointments with foreign visitors.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: He obviously has very serious problems. the problem with Lithuania is acute, and he has undertaken to go to Lithuania to try to resolve it. There's also a problem on the Soviet-Iranian border. So it would not be surprising if he's cancelled appointments in order to focus on these issues.

MR. DONALDSON: Yes, but last Friday the stock market, apparently with Gorbachev jitters, dropped somewhat. Can you tell us what you think his status is? He has problems, but does he appear to be more or less threatened in recent days?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I can't account for the stock market, Sam.

MR. DONALDSON: No one can, general.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: But certainly the problems that the chairman faces are not diminishing in--either in scope or intensity.

MR. DONALDSON: On the question of arms control, the Soviets now are proposing even deeper cuts in conventional troop strength in Europe than are on the table at the moment. Would we go along with deeper cuts?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Are you speaking about the German proposal this morning? The East German proposal--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, there's an East German proposal. But then I think there's a wider Soviet proposal. Take them one at a time.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't know that the purported Soviet proposal is in fact a proposal. We would look at the possibility of further reductions as the situation in Europe changes.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me see if I have the numbers right. Are we talking 300,000 on either side, and reduced from that?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, what we have proposed is that U.S. and Soviet troops go down to a level of 275,000. And the Soviets right now have a little over 600,000 in Eastern Europe. So we would presume--

MR. DONALDSON: But you're telling us, we would look at deeper cuts?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: --down to parity at 275. Now, lower numbers in consultation with our allies could certainly be contemplated. We are interested, of course, in getting Soviet troops out of Eastern Europe.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, the new Soviet parliament, which has been acting in--much more independently than its predecessor, voted--I believe I have this right--voted to support Latvia, Lithuania withdrawal, or withdrawal from the Soviet Union; isn't that true? And if so, why is it such a difficult problem for Mr. Gorbachev?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: It's a difficult problem for Mr. Gorbachev because the central committee was not at all sympathetic to the notion--what we're talking about is the Lithuanian Communist Party constituting a separate party, rather than as a part of the Soviet Communist Party.

And the central committee had some reservations about that, and commissioned Chairman Gorbachev to try to resolve it.

MR. WILL: In your visit to China, and in your toast with the Chinese leaders, you said, in both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces.

Who are the negative forces in this country comparable to the ones in theirs?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I--you know, I think it is in the United States' national interest that we have a productive relationship

with China. It started in 1972. I believe that the evolution of China since 1972, not because of but in part consequent to that relationship, has been beneficial.

I suggest there would have been no Tiananmen Square had there been no opening to China in '72. Remember the opening to China took place at the height of the cultural revolution when terrible atrocities were taking place there.

MR. WILL: But terrible atrocities are supposed to be taking place right now affecting a billion Chinese.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. WILL: Are we not aligning ourselves with a gerontocracy that is bound to be gone, and by aligning ourselves with them, making more difficult our relationship with what we assume will be a more democratic leadership?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: That is not our intention, and I hope not. Our intention has been, first, to explain to the Chinese the consequences of what they did, and the reaction to it, the sincere reaction to it, in the United States from the president on down, to explain to them what that does in their own long-term national interest, and in the interest of a cooperative relationship.

MR. WILL: There is one very famous dissident now in the American Embassy--

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. WILL: --protected there. It is generally predicted that sooner or later he will be, with much fanfare, allowed to leave the embassy and perhaps the country.

Will that be a satisfactory Chinese step, or do you want--do you have really a comprehensive program whereby they can show their good faith with regard to the other billion Chinese?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: That would be certainly a helpful indication. But the Chinese are aware of what it is we are interested in, and what it is, for example, they can do to repair the terrible damage that has been done.

MR. DONALDSON: Let me just bring the record up to date.

Have you been to China since the Tiananmen Square massacre twice?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, twice.

MR. DONALDSON: And both times they were secret times.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No.

MR. DONALDSON: The second time--well, you announced it when you got there.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, it wasn't at all secret.

MR. DONALDSON: It wasn't until you got there. But the first time was absolutely secret, in July.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, it was.

MR. DONALDSON: In reflection, was that a good idea?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Oh, I think it was an excellent idea. What we were trying, in June, was to convey to the Chinese the import, the consequences, in the United States, and to their own interests, as we saw them. Now, if that had been a public--

MR. DONALDSON: Why not do it publicly?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Because first of all, we never probably would have gotten there. They would have said, this is a matter for the internal--internal Chinese matter. We don't want to talk to you about it. What we were trying to do is to get a message across. I think we got the message across. Whether it was successful, I don't know.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, thank you--

GEN. SCOWCROFT: It was very important that not be public.

MR. DONALDSON: Are you going back? Are you going back?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Have no intention, have no present plans.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, if you decide to go, let us know next time, will you?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I will.

MR. BRINKLEY: Thank you, general. Thanks very much for being with us today. Pleasure to have you.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Thank you.

World-Wide

WSJ 1-8-90 A1

CRISTIANI INDICATED military men murdered six Jesuits and two others.

The president of El Salvador, in a five-minute nationally broadcast address, said, "It has been determined that there was involvement of some elements of the armed forces." Cristiani added that a commission has been created to determine the exact circumstances of the Nov. 16 slayings of the priests, their housekeeper and her daughter. Earlier, El Salvador's army chief had said members of an elite battalion were being questioned in connection with the murders.

In the days following the slayings, several high-ranking Salvadoran military officers had publicly accused rebel guerrillas of the massacre.

* * *

THE U.S. SAID Colombia is opposed to anti-drug moves by the American military.

As a U.S. aircraft carrier and cruiser were headed toward South America, National Security Adviser **Scowcroft** acknowledged on ABC-TV that there have been "some difficulties" with Bogota over plans to use U.S. warships near Colombia to help block supply routes used by drug traffickers. Pentagon officials said the vessels were in the Atlantic for training exercises, denying reports that the ships would set up an immediate blockade to intercept drugs.

Colombia's government has ruled out joining the U.S. in military maneuvers in the Caribbean, saying it won't authorize such exercises in its waters.

* * *

NORIEGA'S LAWYER REJECTED seeking a plea bargain for the Panamanian.

Frank Rubino, one of several attorneys defending the former Panamanian leader against federal drug charges in Miami, said he would "absolutely not" plea bargain, adding that Bush administration officials "shall have their trial." Last week, Bush refused to rule out a plea bargain, although one of his aides indicated that the White House was comfortable with the idea of a trial despite the possible release of data that could be sensitive to national security.

Noriega's wife and three daughters, still holed up in the Cuban ambassador's residence, are seeking passage out of Panama, a Havana official said.

* * *

Anti-Communists in Romania marched and prayed to honor those killed in battles last month against forces loyal to executed hard-line leader Ceausescu. Students in several cities also rallied for educational changes and a greater say in national affairs. (Related story on Page A8)

* * *

NASA officials decided to proceed with the countdown toward today's launch of the space shuttle Columbia, despite forecasts of poor weather at the Cape Canaveral, Fla., launch site. The main mission of the spacecraft's five astronauts is to retrieve a bus-size satellite that was placed in orbit in April 1984 by the shuttle Challenger.

* * *

The Kremlin has deployed troop reinforcements in a remote region of the Caucasus mountains, where renewed tension between rival Georgian and Ossetian communities is mounting. The groups have been setting up sporadic blockades since clashes in November. The unrest is the latest in a series of disturbances facing Gorbachev.

An Iranian legislator assured protesters in Azerbaijan that Tehran wants closer relations with the Islamic residents of the republic, but said that demonstrations along the frontier are useless. The protesters in the Soviet region, mostly Shiite Moslems, want freedom to travel into northern Iran.

* * *

The PLO sent hundreds of guerrillas to southern Lebanon in an attempt to halt battles between rival Shiite Moslem militiamen. In Beirut, Christian troops and Moslem fighters battled with mortars and tanks across the city's sectarian dividing line. The violence in the capital came after a three-month lull in the 14-year-old civil war.

* * *

Israeli soldiers killed an armed infiltrator from Jordan near a resort about five miles from the Sea of Galilee. It was the fifth such shooting within a week. In Jerusalem, authorities banned nine pro-PLO activists from traveling abroad, a move criticized as an attempt to disrupt U.S.-backed efforts for Arab-Israeli peace talks.

* * *

Thousands of Liberians are fleeing into neighboring Ivory Coast to escape violence that erupted after an attempt last month to overthrow the government in Monrovia. President Samuel Doe, who seized power in a 1980 coup, denied reports by the refugees that the army had killed a large number of civilians while quelling the unrest.

He Should Have Asked First

The White House has been working hard to assure Latin Americans that the Panama invasion did not represent a new Bush Doctrine of aggressive North American action in the hemisphere. But the suspicion of neighboring nations has been raised anew by the weekend deployment of two U.S. Navy ships off the coast of Colombia. The protests of Colombia are understandable. The Bush Administration's explanation is not.

Senior Administration officials confirmed at the outset that the ships' mission is drug interdiction. Officially, however, the "cover" story is routine maneuvers. Neither explanation is helpful.

Even if this were a routine training exercise, it's insensitive to deploy the fleet in such a sensitive area less than three weeks after American military action that has drawn almost universal public condemnation from Latin American governments.

For interdiction to be effective, there must be close cooperation with the nations involved. Increased surveillance of surface and air traffic by sophisticated plane-based radar operating from the USS John F. Kennedy will serve only a limited purpose unless it can be translated into interception, including military and law enforcement responses by other Latin nations.

"Before we undertake anything, we will of course consult with any of the countries [involved]," Brent Skowcroft, Bush's national security adviser, said. Good idea. But he said it only Sunday, at least a week too late, after the diplomatic damage had been done.

Hume continues: Still, officials here are trying to make the most of even small steps by the Chinese. They fear that the controversial Scowcroft missions will need more to show for them than this. Otherwise, they fear Congress will enact stiff new sanctions against China with enough votes to overwhelm a Presidential veto. (ABC-2)

Brokaw: The Bush Administration was taking at least some of the credit for the Chinese decision. But others see this as more gesture than progress.

NBC's John Cochran reports that Vice President Quayle, meeting with a Japanese official, insisted that the news from China was good for George Bush and bad for his critics.

(TV Coverage: Vice President Quayle meeting with Japanese official.)
(Vice President Quayle: "It is a positive step forward for human rights. I believe that you are beginning to see dividends from the President's policy toward China.")

That policy included National Security Adviser Scowcroft's controversial trips to China.... Today, a White House spokesman said the Administration would like to think that Gen. Scowcroft's trip played a part in the lifting of martial law. But many in Congress thought the White House was taking credit for something that doesn't amount to much.

(Rep. Pelosi: "The lifting of martial law in China is a feeble attempt on the part of the Chinese authorities to give the illusion to Western leaders that something is different.")

Chinese students in the U.S. have often criticized Bush's policy, but today some thought it was paying off.

(Chaoying Ron, Georgetown University: "Now I think the Bush Administration is doing the right thing toward the Chinese [and] China.")

President Bush will now ease sanctions against China by permitting World Bank loans for humanitarian purposes, such as helping earthquake victims. Bush hopes Communist hardliners will respond by easing political repression and by permitting dissident Fang Lizhi to leave the U.S. Embassy for exile abroad. The secrecy of so much of Bush's China policy has intimidated some of his critics, who are now reluctant to say that policy is a failure. Although not impressed by the lifting of martial law, some of those critics suspect that the Chinese have secretly promised Bush a gradual end to the crackdown. (NBC-2)

CBS's Lesley Stahl: While most of Washington reacted to Beijing's move as a public relations ploy, it got good reviews in one key place: the White House. Vice President Quayle called the lifting of martial a positive step for human rights.

(Vice President Quayle: "We view China's decision to lift martial law as a step forward. I believe that you are beginning to see dividends from the President's policy toward China.") Quayle's contention is that the President's much-criticized decision to send his national security adviser on secret missions to China....is paying off. But members of Congress in both parties issued strong statements disagreeing. The ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Rep. Broomfield, said today's action in China was "more blue smoke and mirrors and would not fool anyone in Congress."

(Rep. Pelosi: "No matter what the Vice President says about it, it is not a positive step for human rights. And I know he would recognize one when he saw it.")

Faced with that kind of reaction, the White House says it will stick with most economic sanctions against China, but is beginning to make exceptions. Beijing is about to seek renewal of a \$20 million World Bank loan for earthquake relief.

(State Department spokeswoman Tutwiler: "It's a partial change. Our view is that basic human needs, loans -- for instance, earthquake relief -- should be permitted periodically to go forward.")

(Haiching Zhao, Chinese Student: "Once the money gets to China, they will just use whichever way they want. Right now we are confused about this Administration's policy toward China.")

Bush also recently permitted U.S. satellites to be launched from China, and allowed import-export bank loans. And what has the U.S. gotten in return? Well, officials here say Beijing has toned down its criticism of the U.S., but they can point to little else.

(CBS-2)

PANAMA/WOMEN IN COMBAT

ABC's Jim Wooten reports that the Army said that the women soldiers in Panama who saw combat won't get the Combat Infantryman's Badge because they were military police, not infantry, and that the ruling applies to both men and women. Not good enough, said Rep. Schroeder.

(Rep. Schroeder: "They get everything except the glory. And that's really not fair.")

To say no to either sending women in battle or decorating them after they come under fire is sexist, says Schroeder.

(Rep. Schroeder: "It is not fair to put people in life-threatening situations and then not give them the medal that the Commander-in-Chief hands out for that.")

The women, like everyone else, are eligible for medals of valor: the Bronze Star, the Silver Star, the Distinguished Service Cross, and even the Congressional Medal of Honor, which no woman has ever won. But, says the Army, be reasonable: No tank commander has ever won the Navy Cross. And if women served in the infantry, there would be a Combat Infantrywoman's Badge. Still, the Army often breaks its own rules on decorations. In Grenada, everybody got some kind of a medal. And in Panama, they have already waived the minimum of 30 days under fire for the Combat Infantryman's Badge. The real issue here is: To pin it on women is to further erode the Army's position on their presence in combat, which, of course, didn't seem to matter much in Panama, anyway. (ABC-7)

NBC's Fred Francis reports that officially the almost 1,000 females in Panama did not go to war, because that is against the Army's rule that females must be excluded from combat.

(Lawrence Korb, former Asst. Defense Sec.: "This distinction between combat positions and being in combat only works if the enemy attacks you right in the front. But if the enemy comes around the side or the battle doesn't go as you expect, you're going to see women in combat.")

NETWORK NEWS SUMMARY

(Wednesday Evening, January 10)

CHINA/MARTIAL LAW

ABC's Peter Jennings: We begin tonight with the significance of symbolism. Today, as it said it would, the government of China has lifted martial law in the capital city Beijing and pulled the troops out of Tiananmen Square. While many Chinese do not believe it is anything more than a symbolic gesture, the Bush Administration found it significant enough to ease the pressure on China again.

ABC's Nathan Thomas reports that at midnight the fences that had surrounded Tiananmen Square since June were dragged away, and the guards marched out, leaving the Square to a group of journalists, tourists and a few Beijing residents hoping the end of martial law will mean more freedom. That appears to be wishful thinking. When Premier Li Peng went on television to announce the end of martial law, he called it a great victory, and said the country is now stable. But not all that much has changed. The martial law soldiers have been replaced by police. The martial law regulations that banned demonstrations have been replaced by city laws that are just as restrictive. So tonight there were no loud celebrations. But the response Chinese leaders are looking for will come from outside the country. China hopes to win back cancelled loans as well as investment and tourist dollars lost when troops first went into Tiananmen Square. (ABC-Lead)

NBC's Tom Brokaw: The troops are gone from Tiananmen Square in Beijing tonight; martial law is at an end there for the first time since troops and tanks roared through the square last June, reclaiming it from pro-democracy demonstrators in a bloody massacre. The Bush Administration was quick to praise the end of martial law as a step forward. However...that does not appear to be the case in China.

NBC's Keith Miller reports that removing the armed guards does not signal a change in the government's hard-line opposition to dissent. On state-run television, Premier Li Peng portrayed the lifting of martial law as a victory over what he called the counterrevolutionary rebellion. And he justified the brutal crackdown on student-led demonstrations last June as necessary, timely and correct. There was relief among residents of Beijing. But recent restrictions make it illegal to stage anything but pro-government demonstrations. Lifting martial law, according to Western diplomats, is largely cosmetic. China needs a new image to lure back the foreign investment, trade and tourism that all but vanished after the Tiananmen massacre. But even if relations with the West improve, diplomats say Tiananmen will not easily be forgotten. A human rights organization reports that since the massacre, more than 6,000 people have been arrested, and unofficial estimates put the figure as high as 30,000. The mass arrests of dissidents and widespread intimidation apparently made government leaders secure enough to pull troops out of Beijing, and it appears they were motivated by economic, rather than humanitarian, concerns. (NBC-Lead)

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CBS's Dan Rather: The Chinese army that took over Tiananmen Square with a massacre last June finally pulled out today. Hardline Communist Premier Li Peng said it marked an end to martial law in Beijing. He said China has returned to "peace and contentment." Many other observers saw the move as strictly a public relations gesture aimed at trying to win back foreign aid and investment. Here in Washington, spokesmen for President Bush hailed it as progress for human rights and suggested it was the fruit of Bush's recent secret initiatives.

CBS's Bill Whitaker reports that seven months after marching onto Tiananmen Square to crush pro-democracy demonstrations, Chinese soldiers tonight marched off. Tonight Premier Li went on national TV to end martial law. China is stable now, he said. On the crowded streets of Beijing, the news was met with skepticism. People in Beijing say the lifting of martial law won't make any difference. Even without martial law, authorities have wide power to suppress dissent. Heavily armed police patrol the city and new laws ban strikes and demonstrations. Student leader Wuer Kaixi, who fled martial law, called the government's actions cynical and meaningless. (Wuer Kaixi: "The lifting of martial law is a hollow gesture because there are 20,000 military soldiers in Beijing who have been reassigned, given new uniforms and have become the local police.") Some Western observers here call it a cosmetic gesture to win back foreign business in hopes of jump-starting the stalled economy. (Matthew Dersani, international lawyer: "They felt they had to do something to placate the American Congress and the foreign community, and this is a very safe way of doing that, because nothing really changes for them, and they have the symbolic action of lifting martial law.") (CBS-Lead)

CHINA/WHITE HOUSE

Jennings: In Washington today, the White House was quick to say it was pleased with what the Chinese have done.

ABC's Brit Hume: The Vice President was first to speak the Administration line on China this morning, during a photo opportunity with a Japanese trade official. With the President under heavy fire for his continued dealings with the Chinese regime, the White House is not about to play down any progress in China.

(Vice President Quayle: "I believe that you are beginning to see dividends from the President's policy toward China.")

At both the White House and the State Department, official briefers greeted the Chinese move with these same words:

(State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler: "We welcome this action. We are pleased with the lifting of martial law, and see it as a positive step.")

In the aftermath of the bloodshed in Beijing last summer, the Administration blocked the flow of World Bank loans to China. But following National Security Adviser Scowcroft's second visit to China since June, the Administration began easing its sanctions. Today, they were further eased to permit the World Bank to consider some loans to China. If the lifting of martial law was what the Administration was really looking for, it is likely the President would have come out to hail the action.

Quayle Sees 'Dividends' From U.S. China Policy

By David Hoffman
and Hobart Rowen
Washington Post Staff Writers

Vice President Quayle said yesterday the decision of China's leadership to lift martial law in Beijing shows "you are beginning to see dividends" from President Bush's controversial policy that included two high-level missions to China in the wake of the crackdown on pro-democracy students.

But Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), sponsor of legislation to protect Chinese students in the United States that Bush vetoed last year, called the decision to lift martial law "an empty gesture." Sidney Jones, executive director of the human rights group Asia Watch, said "martial law in practice still exists. Troops are still out on the streets, students are still being arrested, workers are still being executed."

Meanwhile, administration officials said the United States is considering giving its support for the resumption of a relatively small amount of World Bank lending to China for humanitarian needs. However, officials said, the United States would remain opposed to a larger segment of World Bank lending for other projects, such as economic development.

The administration has been looking for signals from China that it is easing the crackdown on dissent that began with the Tiananmen Square massacre last June. Bush sent two high-level officials, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, to China twice last year on unannounced trips in efforts to keep open lines of communication to the leadership. Bush has said he did not want to see China isolated in the wake of the crackdown.

Congress, however, is expected to take up the Chinese students bill when it reconvenes later this month and there appears to be ample support to override Bush's veto.

White House and State Department spokesmen issued identical statements yesterday saying the

administration welcomes the Chinese action. "Obviously, we must assess the full scope of this action after observing its implementing," said State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler. "Over the last few weeks we've witnessed a number of positive steps. We will continue to monitor developments in China."

White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk said Bush was informed by the Chinese Embassy of the decision late Tuesday. Bush had no public appearances on his schedule yesterday.

Previously, Bush has cited as evidence of China's desire to improve relations the readmission of a Voice of America correspondent and the Chinese reiteration of a pledge not to export ballistic missiles to the Middle East. Yesterday, Tutwiler also cited Chinese discussion of renewing the Fulbright exchanges with the United States and "they have reduced their critical commentary about the United States in their domestic media."

Tutwiler said the administration, in a "partial change" of view, was prepared to support a renewal of World Bank lending on a case-by-case basis for "humanitarian, basic human-needs-type loans," but not for economic development projects.

At the time of the Tiananmen Square crackdown, there were seven World Bank loans to China being considered, totaling about \$750 million. Bush announced at the time that the United States was postponing support for such loans, and at the Paris summit in July, the leaders of the Western industrial democracies asked the World Bank to hold them up.

Officials said World Bank President Barber Conable has been hoping to get the loan process restarted and has suggested resumption on a case-by-case basis of loans to deal with humanitarian needs. This includes a \$30 million loan to offset the worst damage of a 1989 earthquake, and a \$60 million "anti-poverty" loan to one of China's least-developed areas, Jiangzi province, where the rural per capita income is less than \$10 a month.

Scowcroft Seeking Ban On Some Mobile Missiles

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft is pressing for a new U.S. arms-control proposal aimed at eliminating two major U.S. and Soviet strategic missile systems, but has yet to overcome opposition by Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney and win the endorsement of President Bush, U.S. officials said last week.

Scowcroft has told Bush and other senior U.S. officials that he favors presentation of the proposal to ban mobile, land-based missiles carrying multiple warheads at a Feb. 6-7 Moscow meeting between Secretary of State James A. Baker III and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, intended as a planning session for a summit between Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in late June.

The proposal, which also has attracted support from key congressional leaders, would bar future deployment of 50 U.S. MX missiles carrying 10 warheads apiece aboard railroad cars to be moved from site to site in order to escape a preemptive Soviet attack. In exchange, Moscow would have to eliminate roughly 20 SS-24 missiles now deployed on rail cars and pledge not to deploy any more of the 10-warhead weapons.

Scowcroft has argued that killing both rail-based missile systems would limit risks associated with a future U.S.-Soviet accord on strategic missiles by wiping out powerful weapons that potentially could be hidden from the other side. He and others in the administration also have argued that it would save the United States billions of dollars at a time of increasing political pressure to shrink the defense budget.

But when Cheney and Scowcroft clashed over the idea at a recent White House meeting on strategic arms-control issues, no other top military or diplomatic advisers came to Scowcroft's defense.

As a result, several of the partic-

ipants have said privately they believe the idea is unlikely to be presented before the U.S.-Soviet negotiations are concluded later this year.

This outcome runs counter to the advice of Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), who has told the White House that including the proposed missile ban would make a new arms accord more popular on Capitol Hill.

Nunn also warned that Congress, which narrowly approved preliminary construction of the rail-mobile MX system last year, will likely vote to kill it this year unless it becomes a bargaining chip in the arms negotiations.

His point is that legislators under pressure to reduce military spending will be reluctant to eliminate the MX rail system if U.S. negotiators stand a good chance of trading it away for a significant Soviet concession.

Nunn and Scowcroft have said they favor eliminating the MX and the SS-24 as the first step toward eliminating all multiple-warhead missiles. Nuclear analysts consider

BAN...Pg. 16

According to this theory, military planners would be more likely to initiate a nuclear attack in the midst of an international crisis if they believe only a few missiles such as the MX or the SS-24, each carrying many warheads, could be used to destroy many enemy targets, leaving the side that goes first with a relative advantage.

Single-warhead missiles, in contrast, are considered less destabilizing because the attacking side would be forced to expend as many or more such missiles than it destroys.

Although the administration is considering unilaterally eliminating the entire force of 450 single-warhead Minuteman 2 missiles, it is also planning to begin building a new force of single-warhead Midgetman missiles in coming years.

At the recent White House meeting attended by Scowcroft, Cheney, Baker and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cheney argued that dropping plans to withdraw 50 existing missiles from silos for deployment on rail cars also would be strategically risky because the silo-based missiles are more inviting targets than rail-based missiles.

Other defense officials said that Cheney is anxious to fend off any step that could lead to elimination of the MX, which is said to be a highly accurate weapon. Cheney, advancing a long-standing Air Force position, favors the multiple-warhead MX over the single-warhead Midgetman because it offers "more bang for the buck."

Although some State Department officials had backed the missile ban earlier this year in internal administration deliberations, Baker did not convey their enthusiasm in the recent meeting, officials said.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, a senior military adviser to Gorbachev, said during a U.S. visit last year that his government will consider a ban on multiple-warhead mobile missiles at the continuing Geneva arms talks. But he indicated that Moscow would wait for Washington to propose it first and would seek significant U.S. concessions in return for accepting it.

Oval Office Looks Small From Inside

JIMMY CARTER was recently on the cover of a national magazine in recognition of his increasing influence as a private citizen in national and foreign affairs. The article called attention to his constructive initiatives and his good sense.

Implicit in the article was the contrast between his apparent ineptness as a president and his wide-ranging usefulness out of office.

Almost every former president has experienced a resurgence. One of my most vivid memories of Dwight D. Eisenhower was his buoyant attitude just before completing his presidency in 1960. He had come to New York to speak at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

After his talk we met at the official residence of the US ambassador to the UN at the Waldorf-Astoria Towers. The president seemed to me to be in a remarkably good mood. When I commented on this fact, he said he was excited about his return to private life so that he could work for world peace.

The implication was clear enough. Eisenhower always had strong ideas about world peace, especially about the need for strong world organization as a primary source of national security. Once in the presidency, however, he discovered that these beliefs had to run a bureaucratic gauntlet. There was only a remote likelihood that his ideas would emerge in anything resembling their original form.

His departure from the White House made it possible for him to express these convictions in their pure state. Freed of the multiple restraints that are built into the office, he was able to give voice to his ideas about the wide range of issues before the country.

Few people have any sense of the internal pressures that limit the ability of an American president to put his own convictions to work. When he begins his term, he has to contend with policies and plans already in motion, many of which belong to powerful agencies that are largely immune from the electoral process. Some of these agencies operate out of unvouchered funds and are not beholden to a president for support. A president soon feels the force of these accumulated powers.

In matters of foreign policy, he is surrounded and confounded with a multitude of agencies and advisers. Nominally, the State Department is designed to help the president fashion and carry out foreign policy.

But the president also discovers that the Pentagon is heavily involved in foreign policy — not just in terms of the military implications of such policies but in terms of basic conceptual design. The Pentagon maintains an assessment branch hardly less comprehensive than that of the State Department. It has its

own diplomatic representatives.

Nor can the president ignore the actions and findings of the foreign affairs committees of both houses of Congress. The president has to cope with the CIA, which can carry out undercover operations abroad with profound implications on the making of foreign policy. Most of these pressures come together in the National Security Council and the national security adviser, who has a White House office next to the president's.

No one need fear that the president may be lacking in advice on important matters. What is to be feared, rather, is that the president is often an accessory after the fact.

Little wonder that Jimmy Carter won a reputation as being ineffectual. Whatever his natural assets may have been — keen intelligence, analytical ability, good will — all were subject to the powerful undertow of

bureaucracy.

Gerald Ford was viewed as a semi-comic figure in the White House. Whether or not this impression was the result of his difficulties in contending with often contradictory forces within the White House, the fact is that as ex-president he has demonstrated a balanced and valuable perspective on national and foreign affairs. He has joined forces with Jimmy Carter in organizing and carrying out forums for the scholarly examination of US foreign policy and domestic issues.

Even Richard Nixon has found a certain measure of redemption in his role as ex-president. Relieved of the occasion to submerge himself in plot and counterplot, he has been able to focus more sharply on improving relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

It's doubtful whether the American people recognize that when they elect a president they are not just choosing a chief executive, but a person who is an adjunct to a vast apparatus.

A generation ago, former president Herbert Hoover headed a commission designed to increase efficiency in government operations.

A similar commission may be needed today to examine all the constraints that prevent an American president from fulfilling the kind of role defined in the Constitution.

No one is suggesting that the president be deprived of expert advice. What is necessary is to find a way to keep a president from becoming a captive of agencies and forces that operate increasingly outside the system of checks and balances that are supposed to be the main props of governance in America.

■ Norman Cousins, former editor of *The Saturday Review*, is on the faculty of the School of Medicine at UCLA.

NORMAN COUSINS



THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

Capital Offense

In City of Shaky Egos, Treasury's Mulford Bruises Quite a Few

His Third World Debt Policy And Confrontational Style Increasingly Draw Fire

Insults to Fed and Mexicans

By ALAN MURRAY and PETER TRIELL
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—The Treasury Department's decision last week to slip debt-burdened Mexico a back-door subsidy of \$350 million has raised plenty of eyebrows in Washington and on Wall Street. But, then, so has the plan's author.

"It's vintage Mulford," says Lawrence Kudlow, a former Reagan budget official who is now chief economist for Bear, Stearns & Co.

He is referring to David Mulford, the Treasury's undersecretary for international affairs, who steam-rollered the controversial Mexican plan over the objections of other U.S. policy makers. In the past year he has emerged as the nation's most powerful international economics official. Some say he has also become a case study in the pitfalls of arrogance in Washington.



David Mulford

Mr. Mulford, who arrives at work in a Saville Row suit, striped suspenders, detachable collar and gold cuff links, is given to starting shouting matches. Holding forth from his powder-blue office, which was refurbished with gilt and lavender trim, he has come into conflict with the chairman and vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, several of President Bush's top advisers, the heads of the nation's largest banks and colleagues throughout the Treasury Department.

"You hear comments from everyone with regard to his arrogance," says Rep. Jim Leach of Iowa, a Republican on the House Banking Committee.

But his style hasn't just hurt him personally; it has, in some key instances, affected U.S. policy making. His plans for dealing with the Third World debt problem and for stabilizing the dollar, which he conceived while often ignoring comment from other officials, have produced questionable results and plenty of criticism. In a city where comity and cooperation get things done, and where egos are easily bruised, Mr. Mulford's manner sometimes undercuts his own best intentions.

A Slight Remembered?

That was certainly the case earlier this year when Manuel Johnson, vice chairman of the Fed, traveled across town to visit Mr. Mulford. Mr. Johnson had scheduled the meeting to smooth over some policy differences. Mr. Mulford, however, kept him waiting in his outer office for more than 30 minutes—a first-degree insult by sensitive Washington standards. Usually a patient man, Mr. Johnson finally left without seeing Mr. Mulford—and without getting an explanation until months later. Asked about the incident recently, Mr. Mulford said he may have been in a meeting with his boss, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, and couldn't get away.

That wasn't the end of it. Several weeks later, his differences with the Treasury Department still unresolved, Mr. Johnson voted to deny Federal Reserve funds for a Treasury-led effort to drive down the dollar in exchange markets. It was an unusual dissent, but the frustrated Mr. Johnson confided to associates that he felt there was no other way to communicate his displeasure with the Treasury undersecretary's policies.

The vote fueled anxious speculation in the financial markets that a serious rift was taking shape between the Treasury and the central bank. Some even say that fear of a rift contributed to the panic that swept the stock market last Oct. 13.

Finding Time for Protocol

Mr. Mulford's close-to-the-vest style has already prompted Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, to personally complain to President Bush and Secretary Brady, according to one senior White House official. It has also raised tensions within the Treasury Department itself.

That was evident in October, when the Treasury's domestic-finance bureau—which usually confines itself to U.S. affairs—prepared a briefing paper that happened to mention international financial-market regulation. Upon seeing the document, Mr. Mulford flew into a rage, accosting people from the domestic-finance bureau in the hall to shout at them.

"He was accusing people of cutting him out of the process, ranting and raving," one official says. The incident prompted a rebuke from Secretary Brady.

Mr. Mulford defends his policy initiatives but doesn't entirely dismiss the criticism of his style. "There are a lot of pressures in this job that aren't really normally associated with government jobs, because it is such a market-sensitive job," he says. "There is maybe less time for the consultative approach that's common within the administration on certain other kinds of policy issues, like Poland."

He adds, "As I look back over my past experiences—my father dying when I was very young, going to university and South Africa and Oxford and the Middle East—I was always on my own. . . . Without meaning to, that develops characteristics which are sometimes not as sensitive to coordination as it might otherwise be."

The controversy over last week's Mexico deal illustrates the problems that can arise as a result. The deal is part of a broader agreement between Mexico and its foreign bankers for refinancing the nation's huge debt. Under the arrangement struck last week, the Treasury will sell Mexico about \$33 billion of zero-coupon bonds that Mexico will, in turn, use to pay off debt maturing in the future.

But Mexico will get the bonds at a below-market price, reducing Mexico's upfront costs by about \$350 million, according to Wall Street bond experts.

The Treasury undersecretary insists the pricing arrangement was agreed to last July, when a tentative deal to refinance Mexico's debt was first reached. If that is so, it was apparently done without the approval of the Treasury's domestic-finance bureau, responsible for selling debt. When finally informed of the idea, officials in the bureau balked, saying the Mulford plan amounted to a U.S. taxpayer subsidy.

Mr. Mulford responded that if the Treasury backed out now, the entire Mexican agreement would collapse. That would endanger the Treasury's strategy for dealing with Third World debt—a strategy, called the "Brady Plan," with which Mr. Mulford and his boss are closely identified.

Mr. Mulford's argument carried the day.

Respect From the Boss

Secretary Brady, whose background in international economic affairs isn't extensive, not only supports Mr. Mulford but relies on him heavily, giving him wide authority to represent the U.S. in global financial affairs. Last March, in fact, when the Treasury was about to unveil its new debt plan, Secretary Brady walked down the hall to Mr. Mulford's office to prepare the announcement—an action the previous Treasury secretary, James Baker, would have considered beneath him.

Clearly, there are many who endorse Mr. Mulford's programs and hard-charging approach. They credit him with, among other things, getting Japan to further open its financial markets to outsiders. "Mulford isn't paid to be a sweetheart," says David Smick, a Washington consultant who specializes in international financial policy. "The U.S. has had too many negotiators in the past who have tried to win popularity contests."

Adds Marcilio Marques Moreira, who has known Mr. Mulford for 17 years and is now Brazil's ambassador to the U.S.: "He's very frank, and he delivers on what he says."

Mr. Mulford's background is rooted both in mainstream America and the international scene. He was raised in Rockford, Ill. "I'm a Midwestern person," he says. "Grew up in a regular home . . . worked hard, had jobs the whole time, went to college, played a lot of sports." At graduate school in England, he gained a doctorate in African politics at St. Antony's College, Oxford—"Intellectual stuff," he says—and nearly became a professor.

After serving as a White House fellow, he turned to international finance, joining the investment banking concern of White Weld & Co. and remaining there well past its eventual acquisition by Merrill Lynch. Then, in 1974, he was dispatched by the firm to Saudi Arabia to advise the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, which was rolling in cash.

As the petrodollars poured in, Mr. Mulford helped manage a portfolio of investments that grew to \$130 billion. He also helped the Saudis direct their billions to Western banks, which in turn lent much of the money to Third World nations—loans that later went sour.

In his free time he would change into a latter-day Lawrence of Arabia. "He'd go native in his villa, wear the Saudi garb," says Paul Hallingby, his boss in those days. "He kind of adopted the Saudi ways in private. In for a penny, in for a pound, I guess."

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

At Merrill Lynch Mr. Mulford got to know Donald Regan, Merrill's caustic chairman. And when Mr. Regan invited Mr. Mulford to join him at the Treasury in 1984, Mr. Mulford gladly accepted. Now he was being asked to handle problems with the very Third World loans that all the Saudi money, as a result of the bad judgment at the U.S. banks, had facilitated.

Mr. Mulford thrived in those years. "He didn't suffer fools, he had very strong views and some people considered him bullheaded," says Bruce Thompson, who was an assistant secretary at the Treasury at the time. "But Regan encouraged internal conflict to see that all the views were hashed out. People would yell and scream over issues, and Regan would just sit back and smile."

New Boys on the Block

But in 1985, when Mr. Baker became the Treasury Secretary, Mr. Mulford found himself straining at the end of a short leash. Mr. Baker and his deputy, Richard Darman, set the policies; Mr. Mulford was left to carry them out. The new pecking order became especially evident to Mr. Mulford in a small but telling incident in September 1985. Economic policy makers from around the world were gathered at the Plaza Hotel in New York, where they were preparing to unveil a landmark agreement on global economic cooperation. Mr. Mulford was sitting next to Secretary Baker going over some details when Deputy Secretary Darman arrived. Mr. Darman tapped him on the shoulder, and made him yield his seat.

Ever more constrained, Mr. Mulford was about to leave the Treasury when President Bush made Mr. Brady head of the department. The new boss's laid-back style promised officials like Mr. Mulford a freer hand in running Treasury affairs, which led Mr. Mulford to decide to stay, his associates say. He asked for and received a promotion from assistant secretary to undersecretary.

Mr. Mulford immediately spread his wings, framing a new strategy for dealing with one of the Treasury's most vexing problems: The Third World debt crisis. Previously, the Treasury had been encouraging banks to lend new money to debtor countries that were making progress in upgrading their economies. Mr. Mulford, however, conceived a plan to offer banks some guarantee of repayment on their Third World loans if they wrote off some of the principal or accepted cuts in interest rates on the loans.

Going to the Top

On paper, few could argue with the merits of the strategy. But in formulating the specifics, and later in implementing the plan, Mr. Mulford worked to freeze out experienced White House and Federal Reserve staffers. For instance, he insisted on dealing directly with Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, cutting out Edwin Truman, the head of the Fed's international department and the central bank's longtime point man on the debt problem. White House officials say that when they asked Mr. Mulford for reports to back up his assertions, he initially refused, and eventually provided only incomplete information.

As a result, his critics say, the plan vastly overestimated the willingness of banks to reduce the money owed by the debtor countries. The strategy originally projected cutting the commercial bank debt of 39 countries by 20% within three years. But so far, it hasn't made a dent. "They miscalculated," Michael Bradfield, the Fed's former general counsel, says of the Treasury. "They thought they could push the banks around more than they were able to. The strategy and tactics were wrong."

Mr. Mulford has been at odds with the banking community for years, making many banks all the less inclined to support his plan. Several bankers are still smarting over his presentation to an international banking conference in Boca Raton, Fla., in 1988, when he lashed them for what he considered foot-dragging on new loans to Ecuador.

Some foreign officials, too, have been stung by Mr. Mulford. One evening last July, after months of talks with U.S. bankers, the top members of Mexico's negotiating team began collecting their papers from a conference room in the Treasury building. Suddenly, Mr. Mulford strode into the room. He glanced around and turned to Pedro Aspe, the finance minister of Mexico. "What have you got your [expletive] numbers guys here for?" he demanded. Mr. Mulford later said he was frustrated because the Mexican staffers were making it impossible to reach a deal. But the Mexicans never forgot the insult and some, mocking the undersecretary, still jokingly refer to each other as "[expletive] numbers guys."

His critics notwithstanding, Mr. Mulford counts the Brady Plan a success and says it has resulted in specific debt agreements with Mexico, the Philippines and Costa Rica. He says the target of a 20% reduction was never meant as a hard and fast goal. "In terms of the design, introduction and implementation of a new strategy for one of the most complex issues," he says, "the results are extremely good." He considers recent improvements in investor confidence in Mexico's economy evidence of the plan's effectiveness.

As for complaints that he hasn't worked well with his colleagues in the U.S., Mr. Mulford promises improvements. "Policy coordination within the administration is something that is improving, and will continue to improve," he vows.

WHITE HOUSE ASKS CONGRESS SUPPORT ON CHINA POLICIES

A FULL LOBBYING EFFORT

With Lawmakers From Both Parties Critical, a Bush Veto May Be Reversed

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 — The Bush Administration pressed members of Congress today to support the President's handling of relations with China, but the effort was greeted by a storm of opposition from both Democrats and Republicans.

The Administration's initiative was prompted by a pending vote in Congress over whether to override the President's Nov. 30 veto of a bill that would allow the 40,000 Chinese students in the United States to remain in the country after their visas expire.

Both houses of Congress overwhelmingly passed the legislation last year in response to Beijing's violent crackdown in June on democracy demonstrators, many of them students.

Loss of Congressional Confidence

While the matter at hand was Mr. Bush's veto, which he explained in part by saying that he could accomplish the bill's goals administratively, the real issue today was broader: Congress's apparent loss of confidence in President Bush's handling of relations with China and the Administration's attempt to win that confidence back before it loses control of the policy to legislators.

"Republicans as well as Democrats are going to vote in the House to override the President's veto," Representative Mickey Edwards, Republican of Oklahoma, said at a ceremony with Chinese students outside the House today. "The President has simply made a mistake, but the American Congress and the American people stand very strongly with those people in China who want to get those same rights of democracy and liberty that mean so much to us."

The pending vote to override the veto has also taken on significance as an expression of Congressional sentiment after recent Administration gestures toward Beijing. These included a resumption of high-level contacts suspended after the crackdown and the lifting of some economic sanctions.

House Vote Imminent

A vote is expected on Wednesday in the House and Thursday in the Senate.

The White House Chief of Staff, John H. Sununu, and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d met with Republican senators on Capitol Hill, while Mr. Bush telephoned others in an effort to secure the 34 votes needed to block the two-thirds majority required for an override in the Senate. Administration officials have all but conceded that the veto will be easily overridden in the House, where the original bill passed, 403 to 0, in November. The Senate adopted the bill without a recorded vote.

Senators and members of Congress from both parties seemed to return from their holiday vacation angry over the Administration's recent gestures toward Beijing. Some of the most controversial were revealed while they were on recess, including two trips to Beijing by the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, and the lifting of several economic sanctions without any significant human rights concessions by the Chinese authorities.

Importance of China

The Administration said such high-level contacts were essential with a country as important as China, and pointed to Beijing's lifting of martial law on Jan. 10 as a vindication of its overtures. Many members of Congress sharply disagreed, saying that the lifting of martial law was an empty gesture.

This morning, a group of leading Democrats and Republicans made it their first order of business to join with the Chinese students in dedicating outside the House of Representatives a plaster model of the Goddess of Freedom, similar to the one erected in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. At the ceremony, the Senate Democratic leader, George Mitchell of Maine, denounced the Administration for engaging "in embarrassing kowtowing to an aging Chinese Communist leadership."

The ceremony was followed by a special hearing of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on immigration and refugee affairs, headed by Edward M. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts. The hearing was entirely devoted to policy toward China.

"The secret White House missions to China," Mr. Kennedy said, "have dealt a serious blow to the confidence of Congress in the Administration's China policy, and to the confidence of the Chinese students that the Administration has their best interests at heart."

Borrowing a remark frequently made by President Reagan in his dealings with the Soviet Union, Mr. Kennedy said: "President Bush says, 'Trust me.' We say, 'Trust but verify.'"

Technically, the debate between Congress and the Administration is focused on the President's veto of the Chinese Emergency Immigration Act, a bill passed with broad bipartisan support that would give Chinese students now studying in this country four more years to apply for new visas, or for permanent residence, while also waiving the requirement that they first return to China.

In an effort to provide the same safeguards without passing a law that would offend the Chinese authorities, the President accompanied his veto with an administrative directive to the Immigration and Naturalization Service that offers Chinese in the United States — students and non-students alike — much the same protection. The Administration argued that if the Congress overrides the President's veto, Beijing will choke off all student exchanges with the United States.

Constitutional Infringement?

The White House has also contended that such a law would be an infringement on the President's right to make foreign policy and only lead to a further isolation of China from the United States.

Supporters of the bill, which was initially put forward by Representative Nancy Pelosi, Democrat of California, have argued that legislation is necessary because the President's administrative order could be withdrawn at any time, because it might be challenged in court as illegal, and, most important, because it sent too mild a signal to Beijing.

Testifying at Senator Kennedy's hearing, Winston Lord, who served as Ambassador to China during the Reagan Administration, said: "Fairly or unfairly, the vote on this issue will be interpreted abroad and at home not just as a decision on how best to protect Chinese students in America, but more fundamentally as a referendum on our posture toward the current Chinese regime."

After a lunch with Republican Senators, Mr. Baker said it was too early to predict whether the Administration would be able to stop an overriding of the veto.

Secretary's Argument

"We're making the point," Mr. Baker said, "that the President has done as much, or more, administratively as you get through the legislation. We're pointing out that things are at a very sensitive stage over there and what could happen if you override the President's veto is get a reaction over there that would, in effect, close off student exchanges."

Nevertheless, Alan K. Simpson of Wyoming, the Senate minority whip, predicted that a veto override "will pass like a dose of salts."

There won't be five of us who will vote" for the President, he said.

Aides to the Senate minority leader, Robert Dole of Kansas, said he told Mr. Baker that he would tally the votes he can muster. If it appears that he is close to 34, Mr. Dole is expected to try to enlist everyone from past Presidents to China experts in an attempt to block an override. If the number is too small, Senator Dole is not expected to "waste any time" on the matter, aides said.

The Chinese government yesterday denounced the House vote as a threat to improved relations, but some senators, such as Boschwitz, said the threat alone would have been enough to convince him to vote to override the veto. Chinese sensitivity to Congress's action was all the more reason for Congress to take a tough stand, Armstrong said.

Chinese students said they were disappointed and scared that they might now be deported. "I don't believe Mr. Bush," said Xiaxia Gong, 33, a Harvard University graduate student. Bush, he said, "already cheated and sent high-level

officials to China when he said he would not."

In his remarks after the vote, Bush acknowledged that the vote was a test of his support in Congress. "When they heard the full argument, I think they decided, 'Well, we should support the president on this one.'" He said he had not made specific promises to any senator to win a vote.

Bush again defended his use of secret diplomacy in sending national security adviser Brent Scowcroft

to Beijing last year. "The missions were kept secret because I believe this is the best way in dealing with China to effect change, positive change . . .," Bush said.

Since he took office a year ago, Bush has vetoed 10 bills and has been sustained on all. Only on the China bill did even one chamber vote to override.

Staff writer David Hoffman and researcher Ralph Gaillard Jr. contributed to this report.

How Senators Voted on the Veto

Associated Press

Here is the 62 to 37 roll call by which the Senate yesterday refused to override President Bush's veto of a bill protecting Chinese students in the United States. Although 62 senators voted to override, the majority was four short of the two-thirds necessary.

DEMOCRATS FOR

Adams (Wash.), Baucus (Mont.), Bentsen (Tex.), Biden (Del.), Bingaman (N.M.), Boren (Okla.), Bradley (N.J.), Bryan (Nev.), Bumpers (Ark.), Burdick (N.D.), Byrd (W.Va.), Conrad (N.D.), Cranston (Calif.), Daschle (S.D.), DeConcini (Ariz.), Dixon (Ill.), Dodd (Conn.), Exon (Neb.), Ford (Ky.), Fowler (Ga.), Glenn (Ohio), Gore (Tenn.), Graham (Fla.), Harkin (Iowa), Heflin (Ala.), Hollings (S.C.), Inouye (Hawaii), Johnston (La.), Kennedy (Mass.), Kerry (Neb.), Kerry (Mass.), Kohl (Wis.), Lautenberg (N.J.), Leahy (Vt.), Levin (Mich.), Lieberman (Conn.), Matsunaga (Hawaii), Metzenbaum (Ohio), Mikulski (Md.), Mitchell (Maine),

Moynihan (N.Y.), Nunn (Ga.), Pell (R.I.), Pryor (Ark.), Reid (Nev.), Riegle (Mich.), Robb (Va.), Rockefeller (W.Va.), Sanford (N.C.), Sarbanes (Md.), Sasser (Tenn.), Shelby (Ala.), Simon (Ill.), Wirth (Colo.).

DEMOCRATS AGAINST

None.

REPUBLICANS FOR


Armstrong (Colo.), Boschwitz (Minn.), Cohen (Maine), Gorton (Wash.), Helms (N.C.), Kasten (Wis.), Pressler (S.D.), Wilson (Calif.).

REPUBLICANS AGAINST

Bond (Mo.), Burns (Mont.), Chafee (R.I.), Coats (Ind.), Cochran (Miss.), D'Amato (N.Y.), Danforth (Mo.), Dole (Kan.), Domenici (N.M.), Durenberger (Minn.), Garn (Utah), Gramm (Tex.), Grassley (Iowa), Hatch (Utah), Hatfield (Ore.), Heinz (Pa.), Humphrey (N.H.), Jeffords (Vt.), Kassebaum (Kan.), Lott (Miss.), Lugar (Ind.), Mack (Fla.), McCain (Ariz.), McClure (Idaho), McConnell (Ky.), Murkowski (Alaska), Nickles (Okla.), Packwood (Ore.), Roth (Del.), Rudman (N.H.), Simpson (Wyo.), Specter (Pa.), Stevens (Alaska), Symms (Idaho), Thurmond (S.C.), Wallop (Wyo.), Warner (Va.).

NOT VOTING

Breaux (D-La.).



First Monday

SPRING 1990

The Republican Magazine

FREEDOM BREAKS THROUGH

"Our goal ... to ensure democracy's advance."

— President George Bush

Macho Do About Nothing

The Alfalfa Club's Males-Only Annual

By Roxanne Roberts
and Barbara Feinman
Special to The Washington Post

There are lots of changes after 6. The boy now usually squirms when his mother tries to kiss him. His aversion spreads to all girls; he calls them silly or disgusting.

—Benjamin Spock, "Baby and Child Care"

The Alfalfa Club's annual dinner is a strictly "No Women/No Press Allowed" affair, one of the last gasps of the cigar-chomping, back-slapping, boozy days of yore. It's a night when the president, most of the Cabinet and congressional heavy-hitters don't have to worry about public image.

Talk about power crokers: If the roof of the Capital Hilton had fallen in on Saturday night, the only leader left to run the country would have been Dan Quayle, who was on a diplomatic mission to Latin America and missed his induction as a member to the club.

With all the pomp of a coronation, 535 members and guests attended

this year's 77th annual black-tie dinner. The private, nonprofit social club was named for the plant reputed to send its roots farthest in search of liquid refreshment.

The agenda is simple: Five hours of drinking, eating and carousing. After cocktails, the illustrious crowd swept into the ballroom for lobster, three kinds of wine and male bonding.

Sen. David Boren, the incoming Alfalfa president, had one complaint about his predecessor, Sen. Alan Simpson.

"President Simpson failed miserably . . . to resolve the most pressing issue facing our club. He failed to assuage the powerful forces demanding that we admit women. But tonight I'm here to announce a Bush-type compromise. We will admit women . . . posthumously."

As Washington speech writer Landon Parvin explained, "If women were admitted, it would ruin the whole purpose of the evening, which is to see how long middle-aged men can hold their bladders."

This is the age for the blossoming of gangs and clubs. A number of kids who are already friends decide to form a secret club. They work like beavers making membership buttons, fixing up the meeting place (preferably hidden), drawing up lists of rules. They may never figure out what the secret is.

—Ibid

Secrets are the mainstay of the Alfalfa Club, which explains why reporters were treated like Shiite terrorists Saturday. What goes on in the room is strictly off the record, although a few moles surfaced with the night's best lines.

President Bush, who cut his teeth at Yale's Skull and Bones and is a past Alfalfa president, jumped into the spirit of things.

"I was telling Barbara, 'Let's send out for Chinese.' The next thing I knew, Scowcroft was in Beijing," he cracked.

The dinner took its traditional leisurely pace. "The evening lasted so long I was about ready to call the papal nuncio to spring me," Bush said.

He then took a stroll down the massive head table to embrace House Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, this year's mock presidential nominee on the Alfalfa Club ticket.

Next it was Rosty's turn. "I want to make it perfectly clear that a Rostenkowski White House will prove a dramatic change from the Bush era. None of your cucumber sandwiches and spritzers. None of this kinder, gentler malarkey. No. We're talking a presidency of kielbasa and boiler-makers. We're talking shooting craps—not pitching horseshoes. And none of your damn dogs in the shower."

There's an easy camaraderie to the event. It's like the YMCA, said

Republican National Committee Chairman Lee Atwater, where "you get to swim without any clothes on."

"It's not a club with heavy responsibilities," said Speaker of the House and new member Tom Foley.

You're more comfortable with people of your own kind. That's human nature. It used to be a tradition that men had a night out with the boys. There's a greater self-consciousness about it now.

—Ralph Wittenberg, Washington psychiatrist and clinical professor of psychiatry at George Washington University

Contrary to popular opinion, the all-male club is not preoccupied with dirty jokes.

"Not particularly . . . no . . . I don't remember them being . . . no," said Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan.

"I like the humor," drawled Sen. Lloyd Bentsen. "It's sensuous, but it doesn't burn."

"We poke fun at ourselves," said former senator John Tower. What about dirty jokes? "No-no-no-no-nooooo. . ."

"We don't allow that here," said former chief justice Warren Burger.

The real attraction seems to be the band.

"The best thing about the Alfalfa Club is the Marine Band," said Joe Barr, former secretary of the Treasury. "They march in to that one . . . that 'Stars and Stripes Forever.' I tell you, they really do that one."

"Oh, golly. The marching band. It's wonderful," said Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher.

"It's people and great humor and a lot of patriotism," said West Virginia Gov. Gaston Caperton. "You don't get the Marine Band and not have good music."

It seems to help the child, when he's trying to be more grown-up, to get together with others who feel the same way. Then the group tries to bring outsiders into line by making them feel left out or by picking on them. It sounds conceited and cruel to grown-ups . . . but the children are only feeling the instinct to get community life organized.

—Spock, "Baby and Child Care"

This was a nonpartisan evening. Everyone got picked on.

About Atwater: "Lee has a reputation for being a cold-eyed political strategist. But he also has a sensitive side," quipped Boren. "A little earlier he was telling me about a Republican congressman who'd just died after a long, painful, debilitating illness. Lee was getting a little choked up about the guy, so I said, 'That's terrible. What did he have?' And Lee said, 'The 4th District.'"

About Simpson: "Alan was a little late getting here tonight," Boren observed. "He was over at the first annual Jesse Helms Arts Festival. Alan said it was the finest collection of paintings on black velvet he'd ever seen."

About Boren: "His wife says that

marriage to Dave is a religious experience," said Simpson. "It's a living hell."

About Congress: "The president was telling me earlier that his relations with Congress are disappointing," said Boren. "He said dealing with Congress was just like his fishing trips—hours of matching wits with tiny-brained creatures with nothing to show for it."

About Michael Dukakis: "We could have put Mike Dukakis back in a tank and sent him in [to Panama]," observed Rostenkowski. "If the tank didn't knock off Noriega, Mike could have bored him to death."

About Ronald Reagan: "I'm kind of pessimistic about closing our gap with Japan," mused Boren. "It seems the only commodity the Japanese are interested in buying is Ronald Reagan."

The fact is, jokes aside, the night is no laughing matter. Attendance at the dinner means you've arrived. Bigwigs from the political and business worlds, including Occidental Petroleum Chairman Armand Hammer, Henry Kissinger, David Rockefeller and Cabinet members James A. Baker, Nicholas Brady and Samuel Skinner, welcomed eight new members into the fold: Quayle (in absentia); Foley; Martin Marietta Corp. Chairman Norman Augustine; Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney; Reader's Digest Chairman George Grune; Washington attorney Vernon Jordan; Chief of Protocol Joseph Verner Reed, and Washington attorney Anthony Thompson.

Women remind men of their mothers and they want to get away from their mothers for the night. Women shouldn't take this personally. Boys will be boys. Half the fun of being a boy is getting away with something your mother doesn't know about.

—Ralph Wittenberg

Meanwhile, 10 wives—the "Alfal-fa Sprouts," a group founded by Jane

Wilson, wife of Gen. Louis Wilson—gathered downstairs at Trader Vic's restaurant for their 10th annual get-together.

"I think it's wonderful they have the night out," said Elizabeth "Mike" Heflin, wife of Sen. Howell Heflin.

"I do *too*!" agreed Jeanne Tappan, wife of Fluor Corp. Chairman David Tappan.

"I think it's just a traditional thing that should stay that way," said Heflin.

(Upstairs, that tradition includes the obligatory jokes about wives. "But the Panama thing did raise the whole issue of women in combat," said Boren. "I don't know why it's such an issue. Anyone who says women don't belong in combat has never been married.")

A second group of wives—let's call them the "Neo-Sprouts"—gathered at the Willard Hotel. "We're a different generation," said one, who preferred to remain anonymous. "We're younger. We all work. We're all friends." Forty-six women, including Marilyn Quayle and Georgette Mosbacher, met for the "very private" dinner. As with their husbands, no reporters allowed, despite a press release announcing the event.

Why do grown men act dumb? Same reason grown women do—to let your hair down.

—Ralph Wittenberg

"It was a wonderful evening. Very American," said Soviet Ambassador Yuri Dubinin. "The fact that I was invited to be present—it is an exceptional expression of *glasnost*." His favorite joke? "Ohhhh! The whole thing. The whole concept."

"I've been a member of this club for about 15 years," said Rostenkowski. "It's a fun thing for members to come from all over the country to enjoy each other's company without a moment's serious note. The only person that's allowed to be serious is the president, and he just did it with a touch of class."