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2009-0275-S

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December 1989

Media Perspectives

WASHINGTONIAN DECEMBER 1989 Pg. 186

New Kids on the Block

Bush's Foreign Policy Is Run by Talented Youngsters Who, Like Their Nannies at the Top, Don't Fight With Each Other Very Much. But Can They Meet a Tough Test? ▪ By Morton Kondracke

George Bush is coming up on a year in office and, in defiance of all recent tradition, there are no foreign-policy tong wars going on—yet.

Under Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger was by now already eclipsing William Rogers. Under Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski battled almost from Day One with Cyrus Vance. And under Ronald Reagan, Al Haig quarreled with the White House staff, then George Shultz duked it out with Caspar Weinberger.

This time, there's none of that. Instead of assembling a government made up of strangers or adversaries, Bush has purposely put together a government of friends. The President and Secretary of State James Baker have been best buddies for decades. Jim Baker goes fishing in

At left, the foreign-policy nannies: George Bush, Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker, Dan Quayle. No longer on the playground (below): Alexander Haig, Richard Perle, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Schlesinger, Henry Kissinger, Donald Rumsfeld.



GOVERNMENT COMPUTER NEWS NOV. 27, 1989 Pg. 51

Army Finance Management System Still Faces Delay

BY ROBERT GREEN
GCN Staff

Clyde Jeffcoat likes to tell the joke about the caterpillar who came on the field during the second half of a football game and scored the winning touchdown.

When his teammates asked him where he was during the first half, the caterpillar replied, "I was in the locker room getting my ankles taped," Jeffcoat said at an industry briefing in Columbia, Md., last month.

Jeffcoat, the director of the Army's Finance and Accounting Center at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Ind., said the service's financial management automation system evokes the caterpillar.

"We've been in the locker room nine years getting our ankles taped," he said.

In fact, it was during the late 1970s that an accounting firm began working on a plan for the Army to bring its financial management systems into compliance with federal regulations as mandated by the comptroller general.

Jeffcoat said that 54 non-compliant subsystems now have been reduced to 11 and the finance process is near to being "a single, integrated accounting system" as the plan dictated.

Incorporated in the finance and management architecture are the Program Budget Accounting System, the Standard Financial System Redesign, and separate systems for the Army Materiel Command and the Corps of Engineers. Also included are configurations at 100 Army regional data centers.

But the process the Army uses to support its financial and budgeting tasks has itself fallen victim to recent budget cuts. Jeffcoat said he was uncertain when, or if, the work will be completed.

Proposed congressional cuts in planned Army software and hardware upgrades and redesigns imperil the finance system modernization. Jeffcoat said all components of the system, both at headquarters and installation level, could be slowed if Congress cuts the budget for the Army Standard Information Management System hardware and associated software.

GAO Criticism

Moreover, the Army Accounting System Strategic Plan — the umbrella for much of the upgrade — was criticized in a recent General Accounting Office report for containing too many subsystems. GAO recommended that funding be contingent on integration of the system so that GAO can receive semiannual reviews by the Defense Department.

Jeffcoat conceded that after nine years the system should be integrated. However, he said a series of delays "stretched out the time line." As far back as 1983 the Army began standardizing data elements and developing design requirements.

But in 1985 service officials imposed a "three-tier" hardware architecture on the finance center. A mainframe-intensive system that relied on Univac 1100s and Amdahl 5890s had to be reconfigured for microcomputing. In 1987 officials decided to rewrite the system in Ada, the Defense Department's software language of choice, adding another 20 months to the job as well as $20 million more in costs.

"We were the first Ada project," Jeffcoat said during a recent interview, "so we were stuck with about $20 million of start-up costs that no other system will have to pay for."

A great deal of the $20 million was spent on "substantial contractor costs" and hardware including computers from Rational for Ada development and from Amdahl Corp. for testing, he said.

The Ada effort was scheduled for completion of development testing by the end of last month, he said, with acceptance testing scheduled for April of next year.

Jeffcoat said the overall finance and accounting modernization was also delayed for historical reasons.

"We jumped into database design technology before industry and software development was there to support us," he said.

The Ada requirement only complicated things. "I was skeptical at the time," he said, "but things are looking good."

So far, Jeffcoat said, there have been a number of payoffs even though the modernization is incomplete.

Redundant data entry in finance and personnel systems has been reduced to "a single computer action" through the use of interactive software and the merging of systems, he said.

The introduction of Zenith Z-248 microcomputers has shifted travel, commercial accounts and disbursement tasks to distributed computing rather than the old manual system, he said.

By using an in-house rather than contractor-operated disbursement system, Jeffcoat said, the Army has saved about $6 million per year.

But deficiencies remain, he said. The system does not track Army property as well as it should.

"Army inspectors keep telling us all our property is not on the books," Jeffcoat said.

As well, the system relies on too much old technology such as batch processing for some routines and is costly and inefficient to maintain.

Systems integration is lacking, documentation is inadequate, as are audit trails and advanced payroll procedures, he said.

A request for proposals for replacement of the payroll hardware, the Univac 1100s, should be out by January, Jeffcoat said. The RFP will call for an MVS-type environment.

KIDS...

CONTINUED



Carnes Lord, foreign-policy adviser to Quayle



William Kristol, the VP's chief of staff



Condoleeza Rice, Soviet expert at NSC



Dennis Ross, State's policy-planning chief



Bernard Aronson, State's Latin America chief



Robert Kimmitt, political-affairs adviser at State

Unless you read the newspapers carefully, you haven't heard of most of these people. But pay attention—you will. They are the experts behind Bush's foreign-policy stratagems.

Wyoming with Defense Secretary Richard Cheney. Dick Cheney and national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft held top posts together in Gerald Ford's White House.

When these guys reassembled for George Bush's administration, they not only resolved to work together compatibly, but they also froze out some potential superstars—Brzezinski, Donald Rumsfeld, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and James Schlesinger, among others—whose super-sized egos could have generated friction as well as ideas.

The rule of collegiality also applies at the second and third levels of the administration. For the number-two slot at State, Baker picked Larry Eagleburger, 58, a close associate of Scowcroft and a fellow Kissinger disciple. Scowcroft picked CIA pro Robert Gates, 45, whom he'd known since the Ford days, as his second. For deputy Defense secretary, Bush went to the business community to get Donald Atwood of General Motors, the lone outsider near the top. For chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bush chose another member of the in-gang, former national-security adviser Colin Powell.

Just below the top level is a team of undersecretaries and assistant secretaries who represent the future of America's foreign-policy establishment, assuming that Republicans continue to control the White House. And believe it or not, they also get along with one another. Just as there is no Shultz-Weinberger strategic combat under way at Cabinet level, neither is there the kind of trench warfare that pitted Richard Burt (Shultz's arms-control and European specialist) against Richard Perle (the anti-Communist Dark Prince of the Pentagon).

Morton Kondracke is a senior editor at the *New Republic*, moderator of the PBS foreign-policy program *American Interests*, and a regular on *The McLaughlin Group*.

The Bush team has not been tested yet by a truly major crisis, but it survived its Panama goof-up reasonably intact and has coherent—if cautious—initiatives going on the big issues of foreign policy. Its next big challenge is the Bush-Gorbachev floating summit. In the buildup to that, some differences are emerging among Bush's key advisers, but they're nothing like the internecine struggles of old.

Like those at the top, the rising generation of foreign-policy experts is well acquainted. Its highest-ranking member, Pentagon policy undersecretary Paul Wolfowitz, 45, is a close friend and former boss of State Department policy planning chief Dennis Ross, 41, and both Wolfowitz and Ross are former State Department associates of Arnold Kanter, 44, arms-control coordinator at the National Security Council. Ross and Kanter also go back a long way with Richard Haass, 38, the NSC's top Mideast expert, and with Robert Blackwill, 50, the NSC's office director for Europe and the Soviet Union.

Haass, Blackwill, and Kanter all used to work for Burt, who's now Bush's chief strategic arms negotiator. Wolfowitz, a pal of Perle's, at one time didn't get along with Burt or Blackwill—and conflict between Burt and Wolfowitz over arms control can't be ruled out forever—but for now harmony prevails. Meanwhile, Blackwill has developed a partnership with Robert Zoellick, 36, who with Ross is Baker's other young policy genius at State. And this whole gang is justifiably bedazzled by Dr. Condoleeza Rice, 34, the black woman professor from Stanford who is Blackwill's deputy for Soviet affairs.

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
Zoellick, along with assistant secretary of



Richard Haass handles Middle East at the NSC



Robert Blackwill, NSC European-affairs head



Paul Wolfowitz, policy chief at the Pentagon

KIDS...

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Robert Zoellick, counselor at State



Margaret Tutwiler, Baker's spokeswoman and political adviser



Richard Burt, strategic arms negotiator

State Bernard Aronson, helped invent and sell Baker's bipartisan compromise on Central America. Ross and Haass developed the administration's Mideast peace strategy and Lebanon hostage policy. Blackwill and Rice invented both the "beyond containment" concept behind the administration's Soviet strategy and the "Europe whole and free" slogan for its Eastern European policy. Wolfowitz (along with aides to former Joint Chiefs chairman Admiral William Crowe) worked out the President's much-praised plan for European troop withdrawals. One of these people may be secretary of State some day, and they are not the only budding superstars in the Bush entourage.

One of Washington's wisest foreign-policy gurus, Joseph Fromm of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that the Bush team, at both the junior and senior levels, is "as experienced, talented, professional, and steady as any we've had since the early post-war era. But they are facing challenges that are even harder than we faced in the 1940s, when it was obvious that the Soviet Union was a threat.

"Now, the Soviet empire is falling apart. That could be dangerous. [Bush's] people have to create completely new structures. So far, I find them thinking mostly tactically, not strategically. They're very smart, but what's lacking is creativity."

Where did the new guard come from? Not from Wall Street law firms and investment houses, which produced much of the talent in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Wall Street now is not a place to start on the road to power, but rather a pit stop where some former officials—such as economic specialist Robert Hormats and Democratic Asia expert Richard Holbrooke—go to make money while awaiting the call back to Washington.

Nowadays, the path to power starts with a Phi Beta Kappa key at a prestigious college. Wolfowitz is Cornell '65, Zoellick Swarthmore '75—though Rice made Phi Beta at the University of Denver and Blackwill graduated well below summa from Wichita State.

Then comes a PhD from a prestigious graduate school. Haass's is from Oxford, and Dan Quayle's foreign-policy adviser Carnes Lord, 44, has two PhDs, from Cornell and Yale. Many start toward an academic career, and then go into government, perhaps forever.

The place to take time out is a think tank such as the RAND Corporation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, or Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.

Besides sharing similar IQ ranges and academic backgrounds, most of Bush's foreign-policy whiz kids are moderate-conservative pragmatists who either grew up skeptical of the Soviet Union or got persuaded in the 1970s that the United States couldn't afford to be weak. They get along partly because they occupy a rather narrow ideological band, partly because they know one another, and because they usually have their egos under control. Also a factor: Their bosses have instructed them to behave.

In the early days of the administration, NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft's swiftness in assembling a staff, coupled with Baker's slowness in getting his appointees in place and the total confusion at the Pentagon because of John Tower's confirmation problems, led to stories that Scowcroft was going to seize control of the administration's foreign policy.

Scowcroft did assemble a first-rate staff—"I am proud of my kids" is the way he puts it. Besides Blackwill, Haass, Kanter, and Rice, it includes Asian experts Karl Jackson and Doug Paal, who coordinated administration policy on

The path to power starts with a Phi Beta Kappa key at a prestigious college, then a PhD from a prestigious graduate school, then government. The place to take time out is a think tank.

KIDS...CONTINUED

trade troubles with Japan and during the upheaval in China. But those who imagined Scowcroft as a power grabber don't know Scowcroft. He worked with Kissinger for years, but avoided contracting his egomania.

Scowcroft says he has told his minions: "Our daily bread is cooperation. The NSC is not a command organization. We can't boss the State Department and the Pentagon around. To make the system work takes collegiality."

So far there has been only one personality/policy conflict—a fight over Central America between Everett Briggs, a hard-line foreign-service officer at the NSC, and Bernard Aronson, a Democrat who is an assistant secretary of State. Aronson is no softy—he favored using force to oust Noriega—but Briggs criticized him and Baker for doing too little to aid the Nicaraguan *contras*. Baker, a very hard man beneath his silken exterior, got Briggs removed.

If there is any top-level trouble ahead, it's likeliest to come between Vice President Dan Quayle, a conservative ideologue, and Baker, a super-pragmatist whose job is to negotiate deals in the world of realpolitik. Baker and Cheney may disagree over how to handle Gorbachev, but they'll stay friends. Quayle-Baker differences go deeper.

Quayle has hard-line positions on Central America (keep the *contras* alive, topple Noriega, save El Salvador, and counter Castro), Afghanistan (help the mujaheddin clobber the Communists), Star Wars (build it fast), and Cambodia (arm the non-Communist opposition). Baker has always been suspect among conservatives as a "trimmer" who's constantly eyeing Congress and the media rather than fighting for "principle."

The right already thinks Baker is selling out the *contras* and will deal away Star Wars and the muj, too, if he gets a chance. When Baker said in a speech that the United States wants Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* policy to suc-

Waiting in the Wings

The Democrats' Foreign-Policy Stars

Likely to be offered Cabinet or sub-Cabinet jobs in the next Democratic administration, if there is one:

David Aaron, former deputy NSC adviser under Carter, now a novelist.

Madeleine Albright, Mike Dukakis's chief foreign-policy coordinator, now president of the Center for National Policy, the Democrats' leading think tank.

Bernard Aronson, former Mondale adviser, now Bush's assistant secretary of State for Latin America; not excommunicated by the Democrats—yet.

Les Aspin, House Armed Services Committee chairman, might be offered Secretary of Defense.

Brian Atwood, former congressional liaison chief at State, now president of the National Democratic Institute on Foreign Affairs.

Mike Barnes, former Maryland congressman and Latin America expert now practicing law, could be UN ambassador.

Douglas Bennet, former head of AID, now president of National Public Radio, could be State Department spokesman.

Fred Bergsten, undersecretary of Treasury under Carter, runs Institute for International Economics, a possible Treasury Secretary.

Barry Blechman, defense consultant, a likely top Pentagon official or budget director.

Dick Clark, former senator and an Africa expert, possible ambassador to the UN.

Greg Craig, former Kennedy aide now a Washington lawyer, a possible NSC staffer.

Stuart Eisenstat, former Carter domestic-policy adviser, now into Mideast policy, might be policy planning chief at State.

Richard Gardner, former ambassador to Italy, could be assistant secretary of State for Europe.

Lee Hamilton, House foreign-policy power, conscience of the Iran-*contra* investigating committee, would have been Dukakis's Secretary of State.

Richard Holbrooke, former assistant secretary of State for East Asia, 1988 adviser to Al Gore, possible NSC adviser.



James Woolsey, a Democrat for all administrations



Representative Stephen Solarz, a future Secretary of State?

Robert Hunter, former NSC aide, now at Center for Strategic and International Studies, adviser to Richard Gephardt, possible NSC adviser.

John Kester, former Pentagon aide under Carter, now a Washington lawyer, could be general counsel at Defense.

Anthony Lake, former State Department planning chief, now a professor at Amherst, might be on NSC staff.

Jessica Tuchman Mathews, former NSC staffer, could be Secretary of Energy.

Charles William Maynes, assistant secretary of State for international organizations under Carter, now editor of *Foreign Policy*, could be on NSC staff.

Don McHenry, former UN ambassador, would be higher up next time at State.

Richard Moose, former assistant secretary of State for Africa, could be AID director.

Ambler Moss, Panama and Latin American expert, could be an assistant secretary of State.

Janne Nolan, former adviser to Gary Hart and Michael Dukakis, expert on arms control, possible NSC staffer.

Sam Nunn, Senate Armed Services Committee chairman, might be offered Defense Secretary but would rather be president.

Sally Shelton-Colby, formerly with Bankers Trust, could be on NSC staff.

Walter Slocombe, former Pentagon aide, now a Washington tax lawyer, might be chief arms negotiator.

Stephen Solarz, best-informed, most-traveled congressman, a possible Secretary of State.

James Steinberg, former adviser to Edward Kennedy and Michael Dukakis, likely bet for the NSC staff.

Paula Stern, former chair of International Trade Commission, could be US Trade Representative.

Peter Tarnoff, president of Council on Foreign Relations, could be NSC adviser or number one, two, or three at State.

Viron (Pete) Vaky, once and, possibly, future State Department chief for Latin America, now at the Carnegie Endowment.

James Woolsey, Washington lawyer and Bush's chief conventional-arms negotiator, a possible Secretary of Defense.

KIDS . . . CONTINUED

ceed and will help with technical advice, one member of Quayle's circle accused Baker of "appeasement."

Quayle insists that he too wants Gorbachev to succeed. On the PBS show *American Interests*, Quayle said, "I trust Jim Baker. . . . He's a good Secretary of State. . . . His toughness and his loyalty to the President [are] without question." Quayle also said that he and Baker have discussed the way some Bush campaign aides (hired by Baker) tried to undercut him during the 1988 campaign, and that there is "no problem" between them.

Still, Quayle presumably wants to be Bush's successor in 1996. So, it's believed, does Baker. This is a situation made for strife.

Quayle has done his best to surround himself with like-minded aides. His chief of staff is William Kristol, 36, son of neoconservative philosopher Irving Kristol and former top aide to William Bennett. Quayle rejected recommendations from Bush aides that he hire a moderate as his national-security adviser—a top candidate was Richard Solomon, 52, a former Kissinger aide who was Shultz's policy planning chief and now is Baker's assistant secretary for East Asia. Quayle instead chose Carnes Lord, a self-described "right-wing neoconservative."

Lord studied political theory under Allan Bloom, taught political theory and classics, translated Aristotle's *Politics*, and during the Ford administration served at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Fred Ikle, whose job was to be a hard-line check on the détentish policies of Henry Kissinger. Lord later worked in the early-Reagan National Security Council under right-winger Richard Allen and became a Strategic Defense Initiative backer.

On joining Quayle, Lord hired as his deputy Jon Glassman, 45, another former Ikle staffer and associate of Wolfowitz who is labeled by one of his colleagues "the rightest-winger in the career foreign service." Another calls him "an intellectual road warrior." He is a good-natured workaholic, a Latin America and Soviet specialist, and the former chargé d'affaires at the US Embassy in Afghanistan.

Baker aides worry that Kristol, Lord, and Glassman are "too reflexive" and will fan Quayle's ideological flames. But so far the three have worked collegially into the White House paper flow and have helped Quayle advance such administration objectives as promoting human rights in El Salvador and keeping US bases open in the Philippines. They pushed harder than some Baker aides thought prudent to get Congress to send guns to non-Communist forces in Cambodia. Working with Democrats Chuck Robb and Stephen Solarz, Quayle won.

While Quayle has hired a team of brilliant hard-liners, Baker has surrounded himself at State with equally smart loyalists—including Zoellick, Ross, political undersecretary Robert Kimmitt, 41, and spokeswoman/political adviser Margaret Tutwiler, 38.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Who Counts in Congress

Global Perspectives on Capitol Hill

Members of Congress overshadow aides, but some of both are more important than others. Among those with clout:

DEMOCRATS

In the Senate, Foreign Relations chairman **Claiborne Pell** is notoriously weak; **Peter Galbraith**, son of John Kenneth, guides him through the complexities. Asia expert **Richard Kessler** and foreign-aid specialist **Marcia Verville** have just been added to the staff.

Sam Nunn is a strong Armed Services chairman; his most influential aides are **Arnold Punaro** and **Bob Bell**. Others who count:

Bill Bradley's husband-and-wife duo, **John and Gina Despres**, who handle intelligence and economics, respectively; **Chris Dodd**, who conducts his own Latin policy on the left the way Jesse Helms does on the right, with **Robert Dockery** as his ambassador plenipotentiary; **Tom Harkin**, even left of Dodd, with **Ed Long**; and Majority Leader **George Mitchell's** aide, **Ed King**, who helps Dodd and Harkin vex Republican presidents.

Al Gore, global environmentalist, would-be president, and one of the intellectual fathers of the Midgetman missile, has **Leon Fuerth** as a foreign-policy adviser.

Dan Inouye chairs the powerful defense appropriations subcommittee; his brains are the veterans **Peter Lennon** and **Richard Collins**. **Bennett Johnston**, arch-foe of Star Wars, gets help from **Jim Bruce**, as drug- and *contra*-fighter **John Kerry** does from **Dick McCall**. **Edward Kennedy**, who needs a strong staff and usually hires one, has **Bill Lynn** as his defense adviser and **Nancy Soderberg** on foreign policy.

In the House, **Dante Fascell** chairs the Foreign Affairs Committee with help from **Robert Boyer, Jack Brady, Margaret Donovan, George Ingram, Spencer Oliver**, and **Ivo Spalatin**.

But foreign policy really gets influenced most by the subcommittees, the most influential of which are headed by **Lee Hamilton** (Europe-Mideast), whose chief aide is **Mike VanDusen**; **Stephen Solarz** (Asia), aided by **Stanley Roth** and **Richard Bush**; and **Howard Wolpe** (Africa), with **Steve Weissman** as chief aide. **David Obey** heads the powerful foreign-operations subcommittee, with **Terry Peel, Mark Murray**, and **William Schuerch** as chief aides.

Les Aspin, shaking up his Armed Services committee staff, has brought on **Larry K. Smith** as a key adviser. Other influential committee members are **Dave McCurdy** and **John Spratt**. Two more key players are Speaker **Tom Foley's** foreign-policy advisers, **Mike O'Neil** and **Werner Brandt**.

REPUBLICANS

Senator **Jesse Helms** runs his own far-right, mostly obstructionist foreign policy from the ranking minority position on the Foreign Relations Committee, with help from **Dr. Jim Lucier, Tom Boney**, and **David Sullivan**. Also on the far right, Senator **Gordon Humphrey**, aided by **Mike Pillsbury**.

Senator **Richard Lugar**, the mainstream GOP's leader on foreign relations, is aided by **Andy Semmel**. Senator **John McCain**, a voice on Latin American policy and defense, gets advice from **Tony Cordesman**. Senator **Malcolm Wallop**, right of Bush and left of Helms, defends Star Wars with help from **J.D. Crouch**.

House Republicans, long in the minority, have little power. But the most influential are **William Broomfield**, ranking Republican on Foreign Affairs, assisted by **Steve Berry** and **Dan Finn**; **Robert Lagomarsino**, with aide **Jake Dunman**; **Jim Leach**; **Olympia Snowe**; **Henry Hyde**; and **Chris Smith**. And on Armed Services are **Bill Dickinson**, assisted by **Dr. Andy Ellis**; **John Kasich**; and **John Kyl**.



Senator Bill Bradley (right) with intelligence and economics advisers John and Gina Despres.



Star Wars defender J.D. Crouch

KIDS...CONTINUED

Baker is a politician and deal-maker, not a strategist or intellectual. As one aide put it, "He'd rather hunt or call somebody on the phone than read a book." But Baker understands the importance of planning, so he's always had an idea man around to help him think up ploys and bring them off. In the Reagan White House and the Treasury Department, the idea man was Richard Darman, now director of the Office of Management and Budget and probably a candidate to follow in Baker's footsteps as Secretary of the Treasury and then State. The Darman role now is played jointly by Zoellick and Ross, while Kimmit supervises the State Department bureaucracy and Tutwiler handles Baker's PR and politics and briefs the press.

Darman calls Zoellick "the most brilliant staff person I've ever encountered in government, and a total workaholic." That's high praise from Darman, who is notoriously cranky and demanding of subordinates. The two met at Harvard in 1977, when Darman was teaching at the Kennedy School of Government and Zoellick was working on two degrees, a master's in public policy and a JD from the law school. He worked on the Harvard Law Review and also served as Darman's research assistant. Though a registered Republican, he worked after graduation in the law firm of Democrat Joseph Califano, then in the criminal division of Jimmy Carter's Justice Department, and as clerk to federal Judge Pat Wald, a Democratic appointee.

These connections raised eyebrows in the Reagan White House when Darman hired Zoellick as his special assistant at Treasury. Within a year, Baker made him deputy assistant secretary for financial institutions, then executive secretary of the department, then counsellor, the same title he holds at State.

Darman gives Zoellick credit for foreseeing the savings-and-loan disaster and for trying to head it off with legislation that was scuttled by the S&L lobby in Congress. He also worked on a salvage scheme for the farm credit system, and on the Canada Free Trade pact.

In July 1988, Baker made Zoellick issues director of the Bush campaign, with responsibility over speechwriters and policy papers. Dennis Ross was his nominal subordinate, but quickly became his close friend. When Bush won, Zoellick had three jobs dangled before him besides the one he took at State: undersecretary of the Treasury (Darman's old job), White House assistant for domestic policy, and deputy to Darman at OMB. Darman, who lacked Bush's trust, says that Baker told him he would support his bid to be OMB director on one condition: that Zoellick go to State, not OMB.

At State, Zoellick is formally in charge

In the Tanks

Where the Foreign-Policy Thinkers Are

Henry Kissinger once wrote that foreign-policy officials never build intellectual capital, they only spend it. Think tanks are where the ideas come from. The best thinkers, by tank:

Americas Society (moderate): Susan Kaufman Purcell.

American Enterprise Institute (neoconservative): Mark Falcoff, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Richard Perle, Joshua Muravchik, Michael Novak, Alan Walters, Ben Wattenberg.

Arms Control Association (liberal): Jack Mendelsohn.

Atlantic Council (moderate): Andrew Goodpaster, Rozanne Ridgway.

Brookings Institution (moderate): Richard Betts (defense), Harry Harding (China), Judith Kipper (Mideast), Harold Saunders (Mideast), Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Europe), John Steinbruner (arms control), William Quandt (Mideast).

Carnegie Endowment (moderate): Geoffrey Kemp (Mideast), Clyde Prestowitz (Japan), Dimitri Simes (Soviet).

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (moderate): David Abshire (Europe), DeLal Baer (Mexico), Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Hunter (Europe), Henry Kissinger, Robert Kupperman (terrorism), Edward Luttwak (strategy), James Schlesinger, Stephen Sestanovich (Soviet).

Columbia University: Seweryn Bialer, Charles Gotti (Eastern Europe), James Chace (strategy).

Council on Foreign Relations (moderate): Michael Mandelbaum (East-West), Gregory Treverton (Europe).

Freedom House (moderate): Douglas Payne (Latin America).

George Washington University: Peter Reddaway (Soviet), Gaston Sigur (Far East).

Harvard University: Graham Allison (defense), Albert Carnesale (arms control), Marshall Goldman, Richard Pipes, Adam Ulam (Soviet), Sam Huntington (strategy), Joseph Nye (arms control), Jeffrey Sachs (debt).

Hoover Institution (right): Judy Shelton, Larry Diamond.

Human Rights Watch: Cathy Fitzpatrick (Soviet).

Hudson Institute (center-right): William Odom.

Inter-American Dialogue (liberal): Peter Hakim.

International Institute for Strategic Studies (moderate): Joseph Fromm.

Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) (moderate): Fouad Ajami (Mideast), Harold Brown (defense), David Calleo (Europe), George Packard (Japan/intelligence), Riordan Roett (Latin), Hedrick Smith (Soviet), Nathaniel Thayer, (Japan), Robert Tucker (strategy).

National Security Archive (liberal): Scott Armstrong.

National Strategy Information Center (right): Roy Godson, Ken deGraffenreid.

Overseas Development Council (liberal): Richard Feinberg, John Sewell (development), Guy Erb (Mexico).

Princeton University: Stephen Cohen (Soviet).

RAND Corporation (moderate): Arnold Horelick (Soviet), Brian Jenkins (terrorism), James Thomson, Ted Warner (defense).

University of Maryland: Michael Nacht (strategy), Catherine Kelleher (Europe).

Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Martin Indyk.

World Resources Institute (liberal): Jessica Tuchman Mathews (energy).

Worldwatch Institute (liberal): Lester Brown.

Corporate or Unattached: Phil Karber, BDM International (defense); Pat Choate, TRW (trade); Robert Leiken; Elliott Abrams (Latin America); Robert Hormats, Goldman, Sachs.



CARMELO CIANCIO/YOA

Veteran foreign-policy thinker Joseph Fromm



***Trading Places* author Clyde Prestowitz Jr.**

KIDS...CONTINUED

of paper flow—he's the last person to see documents from all over the building before they go to Baker, and the first person to see what Baker sends back—but he also influences what's on the paper and therefore what policy is.

Zoellick has gotten especially involved in Central American policy (he discovered Aronson for Baker), in European policy (he favors accommodation with German desires to look East), in environmental initiatives, and in trade and economic policy (he favors hard bargaining with Japan but fears that Japan is "losable" as an ally if US policy is too hostile and protectionist). He also favors emphasizing the "values dimension" of foreign policy, both to make dedication to democratic capitalism the new glue that holds US alliances together (replacing anti-communism) and to keep American public opinion behind the administration. He represents the left end of this not-very-liberal administration.

Wolfowitz, Gates, and Blackwill represent the right end among the main foreign-policy players, with Quayle's aides farther right but with less power. No one in this administration is in Jesse Helms, Bill Casey, or Ollie North territory.

Zoellick and Ross, whose offices are side by side on the seventh floor of the State Department, consult constantly. Under Ross, State's policy-planning staff—a kind of in-house think tank—has some of the influence it enjoyed in the late 1940s under George Kennan and in the early 1950s under Paul Nitze. Since then, the policy-planning office often has been relegated to speechwriting.

Wolfowitz tried to revive it when he held the director's job in the early 1980s, but he was frustrated by resistance from "the building"—the permanent State Department bureaucracy. Nonetheless, Wolfowitz assembled an all-star cast of young thinkers, including Ross, Francis Fukuyama (now Ross's deputy and author of the much-debated article "The End of History?"), Glassman, Donald Fortier (who rose quickly to be a top NSC official under Reagan before dying of liver cancer in 1986 at age 39), and Stephen Sestanovich, who became a Soviet specialist at the NSC and is now head of Soviet studies at CSIS.

Ross exemplifies the career pattern of the rising stars of the foreign-policy establishment. A UCLA Phi Beta Kappa and PhD with expertise on Soviet policy in the Middle East, Ross apprenticed in one of the government's other top think tanks, the Pentagon's Net Assessment Office headed by Andrew Marshall. He served three years at State under Wolfowitz, went back to be Marshall's deputy at the Pentagon, then left to head the Berkeley-Stanford joint program on Soviet international behavior, where he got to know Condi Rice.

In 1986 Ross came back to be the NSC's office director for the Middle East, where he promoted strategic cooperation between the US and Israel and got to know George Bush on trips to the Mideast. Bush made him his campaign coordinator for foreign policy, and there he met Baker. After the campaign, Ross was considered for number two at the NSC as well as for the policy-planning post he took at State.

Ross is de facto in charge of Middle East peace policy and Iran/hostage strategy, overshadowing the assistant secretary of State for the Near East, foreign-service veteran John Kelly.

Israelis and Israel lobbyists generally regard Ross as their friend, while they suspect the orientation of Haass, who's also Jewish. In fact, Ross and Haass worked jointly on Baker's startling May 22 speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, where he pushed the line that AIPAC lobbyists hate most, warning

Covering the World

Top Foreign-Affairs and Defense Journalists

Influential by virtue of position, talent, or both:

New York Times: Tom Friedman, Robert Pear, Michael Gordon, Flora Lewis, Bernard Gwertzman, Leslie Gelb.

Washington Post: Don Oberdorfer, David Ottaway, Robert Kaiser, Jeffrey Smith, George Wilson, Mike Getler, David Ignatius, Jim Hoagland, Bob Woodward, Lally Weymouth, Stephen Rosenfeld.

Los Angeles Times: Doyle McManus, Robert Toth, Norman Kempster, Sara Fritz, Ralph Vartabedian, Bob Berger.

Wall Street Journal: Robert Greenberger, Fred Kempe, Walt Mossberg, Karen Elliott House, Robert Bartley, Gerald Seib, John Fialka.

Miami Herald: Clark Hoyt, Sam Dillon (Latin America).

Newsday: Roy Gutman.

Hearst Newspapers: John Wallach.

Minneapolis Star Tribune: Bill Beecher.

Associated Press: George Gedda, Barry Schweid.

Washington Times: Arnaud de Borchgrave, Bill Gertz.

Columnists: Patrick Buchanan, Evans and Novak, Charles Krauthammer, William Pfaff, Georgie Anne Geyer, William Safire, Phil Geyelin.

Magazines: Strobe Talbott, Michael Kramer, and David Aikman, *Time;* John Barry and Margaret Garrard Warner, *Newsweek;* John Walcott, *US News & World Report;* Owen Harries, *National Interest;* William Hyland, *Foreign Affairs;* Charles William Maynes, *Foreign Policy;* John Newhouse, *New Yorker;* James Fallows, *Atlantic;* Pat Towell, *Congressional Quarterly:* Morton Kondracke and Leon Wieseltier, *New Republic;* Norman Podhoretz, *Commentary.*

Broadcast: David Martin, CBS; John McWethy, Bob Zelnick, Barrie Dunsmore, and Pierre Salinger, ABC; Fred Francis and Jim Bitterman, NBC; Ralph Begleiter, CNN.

National Public Radio: Anne Garrels, Daniel Schorr, Jim Angle, Deborah Amos.

Pulitzer Prize candidates for Foreign Reporting, 1989: David Remnick, *Washington Post,* Bill Keller, *New York Times,* and Paul Quinn-Judge, *Christian Science Monitor* (now with the *Boston Globe*), in Moscow; Daniel Southerland, *Washington Post,* and Nicholas Kristof, *New York Times,* in China. Dark horses: John Kifner, *New York Times,* Middle East; Bill Branigin, *Washington Post,* Latin America; Barry Newman, *Wall Street Journal,* Eastern Europe.



NPR's everywhere correspondent, Deborah Amos



Possible Pulitzer? David Remnick, Postman in Moscow

KIDS...CONTINUED

against ambitions for a "greater Israel" in the Palestinian West Bank. Ross is seen by pro-Israelis as a check on Baker's Texas tilt toward the Arabs, though Baker doesn't tilt as much as Scowcroft.

The tight circle that Ross, Zoellick, Kimmitt, and Tutwiler form around Baker has given rise to hurt feelings and muttering among career foreign-service officers, who feel frozen out. Shultz relied heavily on "the building" and put FSOs into key jobs, but Baker announced early on that he wouldn't be "taken over" by the professionals. He intended to be Bush's man at State, not the State Department's man at White House policy deliberations. "They hate us," one career ambassador's wife complained of the Baker crew at an embassy party. "They're very smart, but they don't have the background to run things single-handedly," said an FSO. Once Zoellick was on an elevator with some FSOs who were trashing him without knowing what he looked like. As he got off he said, "I sure hope you guys are more discreet overseas than you are here."

The foreign service also complains that it has lost out on ambassadorships under Bush, that fat-cat political contributors have been appointed in disproportionate numbers. In fact, Bush and Baker kept on most of the Reagan administration's career ambassadors and replaced most of its political appointees with their own.

The cream of the foreign service—called "high-risers" or "water-walkers"—have done very well under Baker/Bush. Eagleburger, a former FSO, is number two in the department. Michael Armacost got the plum job of ambassador to Japan. Thomas Pickering went to the United Nations. Nicholas Platt was kept on in the Philippines. Morton Abramowitz got Turkey. Robert Oakley has stayed on in Pakistan, Lannon Walker in Nigeria, Frank Wisner in Egypt, and William Harrop in Zaire. FSO Reginald Bartholomew was made undersecretary for science and technology. Raymond Seitz became assistant secretary for European affairs, and Kelly, former ambassador to Lebanon, got the parallel job for the Middle East.

These officials, mainly in their early fifties, would normally be candidates for the number-three job at State—undersecretary for political affairs, formerly held by Eagleburger and Armacost—but that's occupied now by Kimmitt, a West Point graduate and lawyer who was Baker's general counsel at Treasury.

Below this tier is a cadre of younger FSOs reckoned to be candidates for top jobs later on. They include Charles Redman, chief spokesman for Shultz and now ambassador to Sweden; Mark Palmer, ambassador to Hungary; Jock Covey, formerly number two in Egypt; Kenneth Quinn, deputy chief of mission in Manila; China specialist Charles Freeman, ambassador-designate to Saudi Arabia; Soviet specialists Tom Simons and Mark Parris; Robert Gelbard, ambassador to Bolivia; Edward Djerejian, ambassador to Syria; and Mel Levitsky, State's top narcotics fighter.

The professionals were slow in warming up to Margaret Tutwiler, assistant secretary for public affairs, seeing her more as Baker's spokesperson than the department's. They and most regular State Department correspondents say that she started out knowing little about foreign policy. During the summer hostage crisis, she was asked about the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon and had to confess that she didn't know the details. "History started for her on January 20," one press regular says. But reporters have come to like her, partly because she admits what she doesn't know. And they value her closeness to Baker (she's been with him since Bush's first presidential campaign), her determination to learn, and her willingness to get answers and call them back.

Inside the administration, she's valued for her sense of what the press and public care about. White House aides say it was Tutwiler who urged that the administration express outrage at the massacre in Tiananmen Square while Baker and Bush were preoccupied with maintaining stable relations with China. In 1984, as Baker's liaison between the White House and the Reagan campaign, Tutwiler warned top Republican operatives not to utter male-chauvinistic remarks about the nomination of Geraldine Ferraro, even in jest. Tutwiler is a feminist—granddaughter of the first woman ever admitted to the University of Alabama—but she based her case on politics the boys could understand: Whatever you say will leak, and it will widen Reagan's gender gap.

Except perhaps for US Trade Representative Carla Hills, Tutwiler is the most influential woman on Bush's foreign-policy team, but there are others. Janet Mullins, 41, a former Senate staffer and director of Bush's political action committee, is Baker's assistant secretary in charge of congressional affairs. At the NSC, former Air Force captain Virginia Lampley, 35, is in charge of congressional liaison. And Heather Wilson, an Air Force Academy graduate and Rhodes scholar, works on arms control under Kanter.

Of all the women on Bush's team, the one most esteemed by those who know her is Condi Rice, a onetime piano major who got interested in international relations while taking a course from the father of Michael Dukakis's future foreign-policy coordinator, Madeleine Albright. Rice has written two books on Soviet military affairs, has lectured in Russia—in Russian—and has bewitched even Air Force brass with her under-

The Representation Game

Activists, Lobbyists, and PR Consultants

Representing causes, countries, and foreign corporations is a booming business in Washington. Some of the bigger boomers:

Activists

AFL-CIO (pro-democratic abroad, protectionist at home): Lane Kirkland, Tom Kahn, Adrian Karatnycky, William Doherty, David Jessup.

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (the Israel lobby): Tom Dine, Liz Schrayer, Steve Rosen.

Heritage Foundation (right): Ed Feulner.

Cato Institute (Libertarian): Doug Bandow, Earl Ravenal.

Center for Defense Information (left): Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque.

Center for Security Policy (right): Frank Gaffney.

Freedom House (center-right): Bruce McColm, Penn Kemble, Frank Calzon.

Human Rights Watch (center-left): Aryeh Neier, Holly Burkhalter.

Institute for Policy Studies (left): Richard Barnet, Marcus Raskin, Saul Landau.

Lobbyists/Public Relations

Richard Allen: Korea Inc., Taiwan Inc.

Black, Manafort, Stone & Kelly: Jonas Savimbi (UNITA), Chile, Zaire, Kenya, Philippine opposition, Peru.

Fred Dutton: Saudi Arabia.

William Forrester: US-USSR Trade Council.

Leonard Garment: Japan Inc.

Hill and Knowlton (Frank Mankiewicz, Gary Hymel, Jill Schuker): Turkey, Japan Inc., Korean electronics industries.

Sylvan M. Marshall: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, People's Republic of China.

Langhorne Motley & Company: Brazil Inc.

Neill & Company: Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya, Jamaica, Guinea, Taiwan.

Patton, Boggs & Blow: Japan Inc.

Paul Reichler: Nicaragua.

Robinson, Lake, Lerer & Montgomery: Japan Inc., Pakistani opposition.

John P. Sears: South Africa.

Mark Siegel: Pakistan.

H. William Tanaka: Japan Inc.

KIDS...CONTINUED

standing of military hardware and strategy (not to mention her beauty). "If the Republicans stay in power," says one of her colleagues, "this woman is destined for the Cabinet. She's talented. She's nice. She's velvety. But if you lift the velvet, there is a bar of steel."

Rice was a Democrat briefly, though her father, former dean of Stillman College in Alabama and later associate chancellor of the University of Denver, had been a Republican. Rice says she became a conservative when she began specializing in Soviet military power.

Rice wrote her PhD thesis on Soviet influence on the Czech military, joined the Stanford faculty in 1981, and became a tenured professor at 32. She met Scowcroft and Blackwill at arms-control conferences in Aspen, Colorado, and knew Ross, Kanter, and Henry Rowen (Wolfowitz's Pentagon deputy and onetime boss) from work she did for the RAND Corporation and the Hoover Institution at Stanford. When Bush was elected, she got calls from all of them. She decided on the NSC, she says, because the staff was small and close-knit.

Rice and Blackwill deserve credit, Scowcroft aides say, for coming up with a formula for economic assistance to Poland that would encourage capitalist reform, would not repeat the errors of the 1970s (when US aid was wasted and simply added to Poland's debts), and was affordable in the Gramm-Rudman budget era. Unfortunately, the chintzy amounts of money called for reinforced doubts about the administration's ability to respond creatively to a major foreign-policy opportunity.

Prior to Bush's trip to Europe for the NATO 40th anniversary summit, Rice and Blackwill worked out the "beyond containment" theme for Bush's Soviet strategy. "Containment"—prevention of Soviet expansion—was the Kennan concept that's governed US strategy since 1947. "Beyond containment" is less definite, but it implies the possibility of cooperation with the Soviets, if they are willing to behave responsibly.

Besides Rice, Ross, and Zoellick, the likeliest candidates for achieving Cabinet rank probably are Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Burt. Once they were pals, but they aren't now. Both went to Cornell, but Burt graduated in 1969, four years after Wolfowitz. They had very different college experiences. In the midst of anti-war activism, Burt became a radical. Wolfowitz, son of a Cornell math professor, was brought up a John F. Kennedy-Cold War Democrat and got disgusted when professors asserted that the Viet Cong was a genuine nationalist movement or blamed the United States for US-Soviet tensions.

Like Lord, Wolfowitz was influenced by Allan Bloom, the conservative political theorist, who expanded Wolfowitz's horizons beyond his major, biophysics. In graduate school in political science at the University of Chicago, he became (like Bloom) a disciple of the philosopher Leo Strauss, whose movement is occasionally the subject of conspiracy theories but actually is based on the idea

Rice has bewitched even Air Force brass with her understanding of military hardware and strategy—not to mention her beauty.

that fundamental ethical values are not arbitrary (or religious), but are based on reason.

Wolfowitz is no longer a Straussian, but he says that one thing Straussians learn is to read documents very carefully. Strauss believed that ancient philosophers wrote for one another in code—so as not to get burned at the stake for heresy. Wolfowitz says much the same holds true in diplomacy: "Government statements have hidden meanings, and if you don't understand that, you're just an innocent waiting to be fleeced."

At Chicago, Wolfowitz was quickly latched onto by another guru, Albert Wohlstetter, the hard-line nuclear strategist who fathered the idea that US weapons had to be protected from Soviet attack. Under Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz wrote his master's thesis on fallout shelters (he was for them) and his PhD thesis on President Eisenhower's proposal to set up nuclear desalinization plants in the Middle East (which Wolfowitz found a nutty idea bound to lead to nuclear-weapons proliferation).

Wolfowitz also studied economics under Milton Friedman and worked a summer in Lyndon Johnson's Budget Bureau, where he met two young Rhodes scholars, James Woolsey and Walter Slocombe, later high-ranking Pentagon officials under Jimmy Carter. Woolsey is now Bush's man in charge of conventional arms talks with Russia, but if Democrats ever get back into power, he'll be a good bet for Defense Secretary. Through Wohlstetter, Wolfowitz also met Richard Perle, and Perle introduced him to another young defense hawk, Edward Luttwak. In 1969 the three of them worked under Paul Nitze lobbying on behalf of an American anti-ballistic missile system.

Wolfowitz started an academic career at Yale but was waylaid to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1973 and has been in government almost ever since. At the end of the Ford administration, he was a member of the so-called "B" team—a group appointed to critique official CIA estimates of Soviet nuclear power. Some members of the team, such as Harvard professor Richard Pipes, argued that the Soviets were so powerful that they might actually launch an attack on the United States. Wolfowitz said they wouldn't, but would use their power as an umbrella under which to expand their influence in the Middle East and Africa. That's exactly what he thinks they did during the Carter administration, moving into Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

Right-of-center Democrats recommended Wolfowitz for a job in the Carter National Security Council, but he was blackballed for having worked on the B-team. Instead, he was taken into the Pentagon, where he discovered that no planning had been done for the possibility of a Soviet attack on Persian Gulf oil facilities or the replacement of the Shah of Iran by a hostile regime. Wolfowitz's planning didn't save the Shah, and the 33 Soviet divisions he was worried about went not to Iran but to Afghanistan. Still, Wolfowitz's studies did lead to "hardening" of Gulf oil facilities to protect them from attacks that were to come during the Iran-Iraq war.

Enticed by Nitze, another of his mentors, Wolfowitz left government briefly in 1980 to work at SAIS, but in January 1981 he came back as head of policy planning under Al Haig.

Another Haig appointee was Richard Burt, who had spent the Carter administration as the *New York Times's* national-security correspondent, getting scoops from Zbigniew Brzezinski. After Cornell, Burt received a master's in international relations from Tufts University, went to the London School of Economics, and then to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, where he became assistant director at the age of 28 and lost his young leftism. Joe Fromm, a founder and board member of the IISS and retired deputy editor of *US News and World Report*, recommended Burt to the *New York Times* and to Al Haig, who hired Burt as director of politico-military affairs at the State Department. Burt in turn hired another of Fromm's IISS disciples, Richard Haass, and brought in FSO Bob Blackwill as his deputy.

At the outset of the Reagan administration, Haig's two bright young men, Burt and Wolfowitz, had direct lines to each other's offices. But the relationship soured. Haig, Richard Nixon's old chief of staff, was one to foster competition among subordinates, not collegiality. Burt was the

KIDS...CONTINUED

hungrier infighter, and came to be considered by Wolfowitz & Co. as vain, opportunistic, and manipulative.

Burt's deputies, Blackwill (formerly with Kissinger aide Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Brzezinski) and James Dobbins (now deputy assistant secretary of State for Europe), were two of the hardest bureaucratic ballplayers in the foreign service. According to Wolfowitz aides, they pulled all the tricks: representing joint ideas to Haig as their own, substituting PM (politico-military, Burt's bureau) for SP (policy-planning) memos so that PM documents could arrive at the boss's office first. Burt aides say that Wolfowitz was just slow, and neutrals agree that, brilliant as Wolfowitz is as an intellectual and policymaker, he is not the world's strongest administrator.

Before Haig was ousted, Burt got promoted to chief of the European bureau at State. Wolfowitz, who had not prospered under Haig, quickly became an intimate of George Shultz and was promoted to the parallel job of assistant secretary of State for Asia.

Burt spent his time fighting with Richard Perle over arms control in a rivalry immortalized in Strobe Talbott's book, *Deadly Gambits*. Wolfowitz deserves to be immortalized, too, for coolly turning Reagan policy in the Philippines against Ferdinand Marcos and toward the democratic triumph of Corazon Aquino. Wolfowitz's allies in the endeavor included Pentagon aide Richard Armitage, Gaston Sigur at the NSC, State's then-intelligence chief Morton Abramowitz, and Stephen Bosworth, ambassador to Manila. All of them deserve to be back one day as movers and shakers.

Burt and Wolfowitz had little contact as regional assistant secretaries of State, and hardly any at all in the later years of the Reagan administration, when each became a highly visible ambassador abroad—Burt and his wife Gahl (former social secretary to Nancy Reagan) as go-go entertainers in West Germany, Wolfowitz (whose wife Clare is an anthropologist) as a patron of dance and other cultural activities in Indonesia.

When Bush won the election, Wolfowitz was offered two jobs—the one he took and Burt's old job as assistant secretary of State for Europe. Burt reportedly wanted to combine the job he has as chief strategic arms negotiator with that of director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency but was denied the double billing.

In the race for Cabinet rank, if there is one, Wolfowitz is ahead. He has a higher-level post and is closer to the center of policy action. Burt's START talks, superseded by conventional arms-control talks, have lower priority for Bush than they did for Reagan, and Burt is out of the limelight. He is respected by Baker but is not an intimate, and he is forced to be away from Washington in Geneva much of the time. Wolfowitz, meanwhile, has become one of Cheney's closest advisers. But Wolfowitz has been less eager for publicity than Burt, and both Bush and the Soviets could put START back on the front burner and make Burt a major player.

James Baker and Dick Cheney may fish together, but Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Burt don't. Will they go at each other?

Observers say that both men have undergone character changes in recent years. According to Burt's friends, there is a "new Rick" who is less combative and competitive than before, more of a team player, and less a self-promoter.

Wolfowitz always has had that reputation. In his case, the change is ideological. It's said that the B-team ideologue has turned into the pragmatist of Philippine policy. Wolfowitz himself says that, in the case of the Philippines, he came to the conclusion that Marcos, by refusing to reform, was aiding the Communists and that the better way to fight them was through democratic government. And he remains suspicious of the Soviet system. Despite Gorbachev, he says, "it will be a long, long time before we can discount the possibility of the revival of the Soviet threat."

Burt is not soft on the Soviets, but there are areas where he and Wolfowitz may come into conflict over START—such as whether the US should delay or dispense with Star Wars in order to get an agreement, or trade away the MX missile for the Soviet SS-24.

Institutionally, it's the business of State Department negotiators to make deals, while Pentagon planners don't want to give up American hardware in return for Soviet promises. By nature, too, Baker and Burt are pragmatists and negotiators; Cheney and Wolfowitz are hard-line anti-Soviets. Baker and Cheney may fish together in Wyoming, but Wolfowitz and Burt don't. Will they go at each other? Stay tuned.

In addition to Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney has assembled other rising stars on his team. They include David Addington, 32, a Georgetown summa, former general counsel of the CIA, and minority counsel on the House intelligence committee, who's now Cheney's special assistant; David Gribbin, 50, Cheney's AA on the Hill and now assistant secretary for congressional liaison; Peter Williams, 37, Cheney's Hill press secretary and now assistant secretary for public affairs; Stephen Hadley, a Cornell Phi Beta Kappa, former counsel to the Tower Commission, and now assistant secretary for international security policy; and Henry Rowen, former president of the RAND Corporation who now is assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs.

Cheney also relies heavily for advice on an old pro, David Chu, another Phi Beta Kappa-PhD who's assistant secretary in charge of program analysis and evaluation. When Cheney took over at the Pentagon, he had to put together a new budget fast. Chu did it.

Cheney also had to get a position ready on what strategic missiles the United States should build. He and Wolfowitz were fans of the mobile MX, but Scowcroft was partial to the one-warhead Midgetman. Baker wanted a solution that would get through Congress, then believed to be pro-Midgetman.

Resolution of the conflict says something good about this administration: The disagreeing Cabinet members didn't go to war in the media; instead, they put their cases before the President, the way it's supposed to work. He decided to build MX first, Midgetman later.

Whether that was the wisest decision or not, it demonstrated one thing: We now have a president who can write his own three-by-five cards, and a staff that doesn't spend its time conniving and cutting throats.

Collegiality was put to an even tougher test after the Panama coup collapsed. In any recent administration, the press would have been full of leaks and counter-leaks about who had (or lacked) nerve, and who kept (or lost) his cool. This time, except for some criticism of (and from) the CIA and some grumbling that the Pentagon never wants to use the weapons bought for it at $300 billion a year, the administration hung together. Its policy—of not rushing into military action to topple Noriega when conditions weren't ideal—may even have been the right one at the time.

Still, Noriega remains in power, and it's not at all clear that, for all its brainpower and experience, the administration has plans in place to handle a real crisis—say, an eruption in East Germany—or the vision to take advantage of the opportunity now available to spread democracy around the world.

It's nice when policymakers get along, but it's more important that the policies they make meet the real challenges at hand. □

Profiles

The Washington Monthly DEC. 1989 Pg. 10

Born to be Mild

He's influential, informed, and responsible. But do you really want Sam Nunn to be president?

by Timothy Noah

Dressed in Sunday-best pastels, the ladies of the Georgia Federation of Women's Clubs sit in a conference room of the Macon Hilton, hands folded in laps, waiting to hear from their senator, Sam Nunn. Nunn, in a beige suit and red tie, sits behind a dais decorated with daisies. His presence has created an electric sense of anticipation: One month earlier, he made headlines by engineering the rejection of John Tower, President George Bush's choice for secretary of defense. Introducing Nunn, Barbara Fallin, a longtime family friend, speaks of the growing national reputation of the senior senator from Georgia and chairman of the Armed Services Committee. "He knows more about NATO than any other member of Congress," she says proudly.

Nunn rises to a standing ovation and takes the podium. He jokes about a tongue-tied friend who introduced him on another occasion by saying Nunn had been "vitally involved in fraud, waste, and abuse." The women laugh warmly. Nunn discusses the role of women in the professions. He praises the Federation's commitment to volunteer service. "Without the willingness to serve others," he says, "a democratic society simply cannot flourish and compete in the world." The crowd is in the palm of his hand.

As he shifts to global issues, however, Nunn starts to display his usual weakness on the stump—a tendency to get lost in a thicket of details. "We're spending about 5 1/2, 6 percent of our gross national product on national defense," says Nunn, while "the Soviets are spending about 20 percent—18 percent to 20 percent—as much as 18 to 20 percent." There are scattered coughs in the audience. "As recently as about 20, 25 years ago—don't hold me to the exact numbers and dates here—we had at that time in the United States, we controlled about 50 percent of the world's gross national product. . . .Today, that's down to about 25 percent." More coughs. "As recently as about 15 years ago, the United States had something like 70 percent—we produced about 70 percent of all the new technology coming out in the world. . . .Now it's down today to about 20, 25 percent."

By this time, the excitement has faded to respectful drowsiness more appropriate to a Sunday school sermon than to an oration by a rising political star.

No one has ever accused Sam Nunn of being charismatic. Yet the same quality that serves him so poorly before a crowd—a compulsion to dot every i and cross every t of quantifiable fact—has earned him the highest respect on Capitol Hill. "He is the most effective politician inside the Senate that I have seen," says Sen. Albert Gore Jr., who serves with Nunn on the Armed Services Committee. Nunn's military expertise is so highly regarded that his vote frequently determines whether a president gets what he wants on defense. The Tower defeat demonstrated one application of Nunn's power. Last summer's Senate vote on the administration's defense budget,

Timothy Noah is a contributing editor of the New England Monthly *and* The Washington Monthly.

REFUGEES

How Nice, Nadia

Nadia Comaneci has always seized the day. It's no surprise, then, that the Olympic gold medalist and recent Romanian émigré has agreed to let David Frost make "Nadia," a film about her life that she hopes will "ensure that people never forget what the Communist dictatorship did to the people of Romania." Odd, Nadia didn't mention that she lived like a rock star under the brutal Ceausescu regime, which gave her an eight-room villa, a dacha, a nice car, jewelry and several servants. Her old boyfriend: Nicu Ceausescu, the late dictator's mean-spirited bully of a son. ■



Flexible Comaneci

WASHINGTON FAX

Travel Plans

President Bush trusted Richard Nixon well enough to let him meet with Chinese hard-liners in October, but the White House chose not to tell Nixon about national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft's previous, secret trip to China in July. The former president says he is not angry that he was not briefed about the Scowcroft visit because he is a strong supporter of secret diplomacy . . . **One top White House aide** says he expects that President Bush will soon make a trip to Panama to congratulate American troops. Bush probably would not go while Manuel Noriega remained in Panama; the most likely time for the visit will be at the end of this month.



President Bush going after game birds in South Texas last week

EXCLUSIVE

A Leaky Invasion

President Bush puts a high priority on secrecy; nonetheless, he was apparently unable to prevent leaks in the hours before the invasion of Panama. Sources have told NEWSWEEK that a newspaper reporter called House Speaker Thomas Foley to inquire about an imminent invasion of Panama; this occurred not long before Bush called the Democratic leader to bring him up to speed on the operation. The journalist was reportedly tipped by a colleague at Time magazine, which was part of the press pool alerted in advance. Military officials are now claiming that press-pool reporters violated security restrictions by disclosing information before they were given clearance. For their part, many reporters flown to Panama by the Pentagon are now complaining that the military deliberately kept them away from the action. They had similar complaints after the 1983 Grenada invasion. ■

OUT OF BOUNDS

Delta Force to the Rescue

The secret Delta Force, which had failed to rescue hostages in Iran, had better luck in Panama. Fifteen minutes before the main military assault, Delta Force troops stormed a prison near Noriega's PDF headquarters. One soldier was killed and a helicopter pilot injured, but the force succeeded in rescuing an American prisoner, Kurt Muse, held by Panamanian police since April. ■

Delta struck hard and early



JUDGES

Diamonds in the Clink

If you ever come before Wichita, Kans., municipal court Judge Thomas Bush, ditch your gold zodiac medallions. Wearing two gold chains, several gold rings and a diamond ear stud into court, Terry Franklin recently made the mistake of asking Bush for a court-appointed attorney to defend him against two misdemeanor charges of marijuana possession and a count of illegal gambling. Franklin said he was unemployed and had no assets. To which Bush responded, "If you want an attorney, sell your jewelry." Franklin waived his right to an attorney, pleaded guilty and was jailed. When he was booked, he turned in $1,100 in cash.

NED ZEMAN *with bureau reports*



CONVENTIONAL WISDOM WATCH

Epoch-Making Edition

The CW on the 1990s is that millennialism will make it a decade of weirdness. Cutting issues will include Japan's might, the environment and health care.

DECADES	Conventional Wisdom
1930s ▲	Darker CW mood says bread lines, compassion, bank failures coming back into style.
1940s ▼	Wars? What are they for? Toss out that map they drew of Europe.
1950s ▲	Now entering *third* decade of "Happy Days" nostalgia. Suburbs, car pools, babies, white socks.
1960s ▲	Woodstock revival flopped, but CW's kids will rebel, wear love beads in mid-'90s.
1970s ▼	Earth shoes, mood rings and disco won't *ever* come back. But gas lines and cults might.
1980s ▼	Greedy Yuppies screwed homeless. Big party on deck of Titanic.

CLOCKWISE FROM TOP: AP, HAL MAYFORTH, GENTILE FOR NEWSWEEK, TANNENBAUM—SYGMA

Destiny in Air, Leaders Arrive For the Summit

NYT 12-2-89 A1

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

VALLETTA, Malta, Dec. 1 — President Bush and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union arrived today on this Mediterranean island for a summit conference beginning on Saturday during which both hope to start the search for a new world order.

The meeting has no formal agenda, but it comes at an extraordinary moment. For the first time in 40 years, almost all aspects of the relationship between the two superpowers are open for discussion.

Even before the two leaders met, some of their aides were talking about fostering a "spirit of Malta" that would speed the transformation of adversaries into friends or something approaching that.

'All the Generations to Come'

Speaking aboard the aircraft carrier Forrestal, operating near here, Mr. Bush called his mission a "great and noble undertaking," borrowing from the prayer of Dwight D. Eisenhower on the eve of D-Day, the invasion of Europe on June 6, 1944.

Mr. Bush said "the times are on the side of peace" as he meets Mr. Gorbachev for the first time as President.

Mr. Bush told thousands of sailors gathered in the warship's cavernous hangar that this would be "a meeting for your generation, and all the generations to come."

Mr. Gorbachev landed here more than 12 hours after Mr. Bush, having met this morning with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican and then having flown north to Milan for a news conference.

The Soviet leader said that although his meetings with the American President would take place on warships, he had come here "on a quest for peace."

Both leaders have tried to portray their conference as a get-acquainted meeting rather than a negotiating session. But events in Eastern Europe since the meeting was announced only a month ago, including the opening of the Berlin wall and the sweeping triumphs of the opposition in Czechslovakia, have given greater urgency to rethinking and reshaping the power relationships that have prevailed since the end of World War II.

The impression has been left by some American officials, and by Mr. Gorbachev himself in his meetings in Rome this week, that new proposals will be put on the table, even if no final agreements are reached here. Indeed, despite President Bush's assurances to the contrary, some Western European leaders are worried, as one put in this week, "that he'll do a Reykjavik" — that is, get carried away and exceed his brief, as Ronald Reagan very nearly did in the Icelandic capital in 1986.

During his stay in Rome, the Soviet leader was in ebullient form, asserting that religion had a large role to play in modern life, announcing that the Soviet Union no longer believes "that those who disagree with us are our enemies," and proposing a conference of European nations in Helsinki next year. An Italian official who met and dined with him, and who had expected to find him weighed down with his domestic problems, said that he had instead found Mr. Gorbachev "cocky, determined and thoroughly in command."

Mr, Bush was in high spirits, too, his mood seemingly unaffected by the attempted coup in the Philippines or by the long overnight flight. He seemed to take great delight, as a former naval aviator, in watching flight operations on the Forrestal, trading old Navy jokes with the crew and piling his mess tray high with lasagna and chicken legs, doused with hot sauce.

Churchill once called Malta "a tiny rock of history and romance." A little larger than Martha's Vineyard in square miles, this strategically placed group of islands survived two of the greatest sieges in history, by the Turks in 1565 and by the Germans between 1940 and 1942.

Valletta, the capital, is a photogenic little city on a promontory between two harbors, but Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev got just a glimpse of its narrow streets and fine old limestone forts and palaces, which were built by the Knights of St. John in the 16th and 17th centuries. They will spend the next 48 hours working and sleeping in far less picturesque surroundings.

The first day's talks will take place on the Soviet cruiser Slava, with the concluding session Sunday on the United States cruiser Belknap. Both at anchor in Marsaxlokk Bay on the island's east coast.

Mr. Bush will sleep on the Belknap, occupying a cabin vacated for the weekend by its usual occupant, Vice Adm. J. D. Williams, the commander of the Sixth Fleet. Mr. Gorbachev will sleep not on the Slava but on the cruise ship Maxim Gorky, which is docked nearby.

According to Marlin Fitzwater, the White House press secretary, the United States delegation on the Slava will include Mr. Bush; Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d; John H. Sununu, the White House chief of staff; Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, and Robert Blackwill, the top European and Soviet expert on the staff of the National Security Council.

The Soviet group, Mr. Fitzwater said, will be composed of Mr. Gorbachev; Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh; Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the former Soviet Ambassador to Washington; Aleksande N. Yakovlev, a Politburo member with special responsibility for foreign affairs; Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Mr. Gorbachev's adviser on military affairs, and Anatoly S. Chernyayev, a special assistant to Mr. Gorbachev.

Each side will also have an interpreter present.

Mr. Fitzwater said that President Bush would speak first and planned "to lay out a number of issues that respresent U.S. interests in the Soviet Union and which will demonstrate the U.S. desire for progress and improvement in East-West relations."

In addition to visiting the Forrestal, meeting briefly with Prime Minister Eddie Fenech Adami of Malta and keeping pace with developments in the Philippines, Mr. Bush had a final meeting with a dozen aides, in the Belknap's ward room at a long table decorated with United States and Soviet flags in small holders.

Bush Sent U.S. Planes Into Action Fearing Aquino Defeat, U.S. Says

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 1 — President Bush took the unusual step of ordering American aircraft into action against Philippine rebel forces after he was advised that President Corazon C. Aquino was in danger of being overthrown, Administration officials said today.

The decision, taken by Mr. Bush as he was flying to the Malta summit meeting, allowed American F-4's to fire on rebel aircraft if they tried to take off from air bases they had occupied. The threat apparently kept the older rebel planes grounded.

Thousands of Troops Over Years

In addition, a Pentagon official said that Mrs. Aquino had asked that American forces be available to evacuate her from the presidential palace if she was in danger. But the evacuation proved not to be necessary. As of Saturday morning Manila time, no American shots had been fired, the Pentagon said.

The United States has thousands of troops based in the Philippines under a series of mutual security arrangements. But this was the first time that they were sent into action with orders allowing them to use force in a purely domestic Philippine situation. Military advisers routinely go out on anti-guerrilla missions with Philippine forces but they are not supposed to fire except in self-defense.

The significance of the order to use the American F-4's to support the Aquino Government goes beyond the military action, Philippine experts in the Government said. By being seen as asking for American military intervention in the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino runs the political risk of being attacked by nationalists from the right and left, both of whom resent the American influence that is so obvious in this former American colony.

With the military situation in the Philippines apparently in the Government's favor, after a day in which it was unclear if the rebels might cause serious problems, the Administration appeared eager to congratulate itself on its speedy response to a request for help sent by Mrs. Aquino late Friday night, Washington time, through the United States Ambassador, Nicholas Platt. Officials contended that the American response helped prevent the ouster of Mrs. Aquino.

The Administration officials, in Washington and with Mr. Bush's party in Malta, said that the quick action showed that Mr. Bush and his aides had improved crisis management procedures since October, when they were criticized for mishandling an effort by Panamian Defense Forces to overthrow Gen. Manuel Noriega, the Pana-

BUSH...CONTINUED

mian leader.

White House officials also went out of their way to praise Vice President Dan Quayle's role in dealing with the Philippine crisis. They said Mr. Quayle directed officials in Washington on Thursday night as meetings were held in the White House to develop recommendations for Mr. Bush, who was crossing the Atlantic at the time aboard Air Force One enroute to Malta for his meeting with President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union. Officials said Mr. Bush made all the final decisions.

A White House Commitment

The American intervention developed as Government and rebel forces fought for control of Manila in the first hours of the coup attempt, according to Administration officials. At Mr. Bush's direction, two American F-4 fighters took off from Clark Air force base in the Philippines and flew over two air bases to pin down aircraft under rebel control. The insurgents were informed by the Americans that the F-4 fighters were authorized to shoot down rebel planes that took off from the bases.

The Philippine Air Force, largely under rebel control, had launched air attacks against the presidential palace in Manila and other Government buildings, prompting an appeal Thursday night from Mrs Aquino for American air support.

Administration officials said Bush's decision to send American military forces into play, made about 12:25 A.M. on Friday, was grounded in a White House commitment to prevent the overthrow of the Aquino Government and to come to the assistance of a democratically elected government that had requested American help.

When asked to justify the American military intervention American officials simply cited international law. Richard A. Boucher, deputy State Department spokesman, said: "We were coming to the assistance of a democratically elected government who requested our assistance. And that's in absolute complete conformity with international law."

American and Philippine officials said that they believed that the American planes had made an important difference as events unfolded rapidly in Manila, even though the aircraft did not fire on the rebels.

Because Mr. Bush was enroute to Malta as the coup unfolded in Manila, Vice President Quayle convened a 11:30 P.M. meeting of top national security officials at the White House.

Cheney Reached by Telephone

The meeting was attended by Robert Gates, the Deputy National Security Adviser; Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Secretary of State; Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; William H. Webster, Director of Central Intelligence, and Andrew H. Card Jr., deputy to the White House Chief of Staff, John H. Sununu. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney participated by telephone from his home.

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, Mr. Sununu and the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, were with President Bush on Air Force One.

In a briefing for reporters this afternoon, a senior Pentagon official said that the rebels had abandoned military bases near Manila, which they had used to launch their air attacks.

The official said the rebel forces, which had numbered about 1,000, were now down to about 300 to 400 troops, who were moving around the outskirts of Manila. A senior Administration official said "the forces loyal to Mrs. Aquino are regaining control but are certainly not yet in control."

An analysis prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, which was distributed throughout the Government this morning, had worried some Administration officials because it asserted that the moral of Government forces in Manila was poor. The analysis, part of the C.I.A.'s daily intelligence report, expressed doubt that the Government forces in Manila would be sufficient to repel the better trained rebel army and air force troops without Government reinforcements from the outside of Manila.

Explaining the Administration's decision to send the F-4's into action, the Pentagon said this morning that the American action to pin down the rebel planes was required because the rebels had taken over most of the Philippine Air Force.

A Pentagon official said that the presumed coup leader, Col. Gregorio (Gringo) Honasan, had concluded that a previous coup attempt had failed because he did not have air support.

In the current coup attempt, rebels used T-28 planes and helicopters to attack the presidential palace, the military headquarters at Camp Aquinaldo and the Philippine constabularly headquarters at Camp Crame, the Pentagon official said. The Philippine Government only had nine F-5 planes at its disposal at a base near Clark Air Base.

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
BOSTON GLOBE A-4
Date 2 DEC 1989

US moved fast to aid Aquino

Bush officials hope providing air cover demonstrated resolve in crisis

By Michael Kranish
GLOBE STAFF

WASHINGTON – As Pentagon officials boasted that US fighter jets played a critical role in slowing a coup attempt in the Philippines, administration officials said yesterday they hope President Bush's quick decision to authorize military force puts an end to criticism that the White House has not acted forcefully enough in such situations.

But the US military intervention – and the fact that the Philippine president, Corazon Aquino, apparently believed she needed it to survive the rebellion – has raised concerns of a possible political backlash against Washington and Aquino when the fighting subsides.

Some analysts warned that resorting to US strength could haunt Aquino, whipping up anti-American sentiment. The question of whether the United States will be allowed to maintain military bases in the Philippines beyond 1991 has been one of the most contentious in the country and was supposed to be the subject of negotiations this month.

A sharply mixed response

John Bresnan, a senior research scholar at the East Asian institute of Columbia University, said yesterday's use of US fighters is likely to evoke a mixed response. He said that while many Filipinos strongly support the US role, an equally strong group opposes it.

"This is going to create a situation more conflict-laden than ever," Bresnan said. "It likely will strengthen both points of view. It could very well mean that this is the last time we are able to use our muscle like that in this area."

White House officials pronounced themselves highly satisfied with yesterday's action, noting that it came under the extraordinary constraint of President Bush giving orders aboard Air Force One and Vice President Dan Quayle chairing a top-level security meeting at the White House at night.

Some observers have criticized the slow manner in which Bush previously made a decision on deploying military force, when US troops did not directly help rebels attempting to overthrow the Panamanian military leader, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega. Such criticism seemed to hang over the administration's response yesterday.

"The process worked extremely well under difficult circumstances," Bush spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told reporters aboard the USS Forrestal off the coast of Malta. A White House official in Washington who requested anonymity said that "certainly no one here is going to object" if the action improves Bush's image as a decision maker and Quayle's image as a full participant.

Did not resolve questions

However, while the action had strong bipartisan support, some Democrats said it did not resolve questions about whether Bush can use military force decisively. Some said the action was easy to take because it was requested by a standing government and did not result in firing weapons.

"I think this is certainly not the test," said Sen. John Breaux of Louisiana, a Democrat. "I mean, it is one thing to let planes fly around – I support that – but I am not sure that is a good indication of the test."

Pentagon officials said US F-4 Phantom jets did not fire but helped provide cover for troops loyal to Aquino, helping the government to turn back the rebels.

In addition, about 100 American troops were brought in to guard the US Embassy in Manila, though none came into contact with rebels.

Speaking just hours after the US military response, Pentagon officials gave the effort credit for helping to stall the coup attempt.

"No rebel aircraft have tried to take off since US planes went up," a Pentagon spokesman, Pete Williams, told reporters.

According to US officials, this is how events unfolded:

In late afternoon, shortly after rebels started bombing the presidential palace in Manila, Aquino notified US officials that she might need help in quelling the revolt. White House officials learned of the development shortly before Bush was to leave Andrews Air Force Base on Air Force One for his Malta summit with Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

At 5:30 p.m., a meeting of senior officials from numerous areas, known as the Inter-Agency Policy Coordinating Committee, was convened at the White House.

Meeting of key agencies

Then, as Bush departed, Robert Gates, deputy National Security Council adviser, held a meeting of the deputy heads of key agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency. That group was established following criticism that the White House did not act swiftly enough in the Panama coup situation.

Around 11 p.m., Quayle arrived, just as the officials in the White House situation room, the nerve center of the government's world crisis management center, received an official request from Aquino for the use of US jets to provide cover for her troops. Quayle then had a brief discussion with Gates and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney.

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Shortly thereafter, Quayle called an emergency meeting of the members of the National Security Council who had remained in Washington. It was not considered a formal meeting because many of the key figures, including the president, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, were traveling on Air Force One. Those members stayed in touch with the meeting through radio or telephone.

The meeting, during which numerous military options were discussed, lasted about 45 minutes. Although White House officials declined to discuss the content, there was talk of the possibility that US soldiers might be killed and that an anti-American backlash might ensue. But in the end, the members voted unanimously to support Aquino's request. Quayle telephoned Bush with the recommendation.

Bush then held a 15-minute meeting with Baker, Scowcroft and the White House chief of staff, John Sununu. The president decided to send the planes into action. It was around 1:20 a.m. Bush relayed the go-ahead to Quayle, who called Aquino.

Quayle also woke up the Senate majority leader, George Mitchell of Maine, and House Speaker Thomas Foley of Washington state to advise them that US forces had been sent into action. The White House has 48 hours to advise congressional leaders in such emergencies.

Stephen Kurkjian, the Globe's Washington bureau chief, contributed to this report from Malta.

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
L.A. TIMES A1
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Bush Vows to Maintain U.S. Aid to Aquino

By DAVID LAUTER
and JACK NELSON
TIMES STAFF WRITER

VALLETTA, Malta—President Bush, responding to the crisis in the Philippines on Friday even as he moved toward his first summit meeting with Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, vowed to continue American aid to the embattled government of President Corazon Aquino.

"I strongly support Mrs. Aquino and she knows it," Bush said, as U.S. officials expressed "cautious optimism" that the Philippine leader had survived the most serious assault thus far on her government—by restive military officers.

Bush, speaking to reporters shortly after arriving here, said his decision to provide U.S. air cover for troops loyal to Aquino was justified by the need to defend a democratically elected government. "We're doing what has been requested of us," he said.

White House aides later added that protection of American lives was another major factor in the decision. They noted the presence of 106,000 U.S. citizens in the Manila region alone, with thousands more in other parts of the country, many of them U.S. armed forces and civilian personnel attached to the huge American air and naval bases in the Philippines.

Bush arrived in Malta, where he and Gorbachev will hold two days of summit meetings, looking drawn, clearly tired after a nine-hour transatlantic flight during which he was awakened at least twice to deal with developments in the Philippines.

After landing, he traveled to the 16th-Century Knights of Malta castle for a ceremonial greeting from Prime Minister Eddie Fenech Adami. Even there, Bush was interrupted by aides briefing him on Philippine developments.

The unfolding crisis not only disrupted the President's pre-summit schedule but also posed a special challenge for an Administration stung earlier this fall by criticism of its seemingly disorganized response to the abortive coup attempt in Panama.

Crisis Management

Since then, the Administration's foreign policy crisis management structure has been reworked—"fine-tuned," in the words of White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk. As a result, he said, even though Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III were on Air Force One en route here and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney had just returned to Washington from NATO meetings in Europe, this time, "the process worked extremely well under very difficult circumstances."

Nonetheless, despite the apparent success, Administration officials were clearly discomfited by the degree to which the Philippine fighting overshadowed Bush's arrival here, which was already in danger of being eclipsed by Gorbachev's dramatic meeting with Pope John Paul II at the Vatican.

Until officials grew confident that Aquino's side had begun to prevail, White House press officials here referred inquiries about the crisis to Washington in an apparent attempt to distance Bush from the story.

Later in the day, as news from the Philippines improved, White House officials began releasing details of how the Administration was handling the crisis. But they also took pains to detail Bush's final briefings on the Gorbachev meetings, insisting to reporters that despite the distractions of a distant war, the President was fully prepared for today's negotiations aboard the Soviet cruiser Slava.

The Administration's handling of the Philippine uprising contrasted sharply with its actions during the Panama coup attempt. During that affair, when the United States provided limited and seemingly ineffectual backing to Panamanian officers seeking to overthrow strongman Gen. Manuel A. Noriega, key information about events failed to reach Bush and his senior advisers in an organized and timely manner, a top-level Administration review later concluded.

And although Administration officials insist that better information would not have changed their decisions, nor the outcome of events in Panama, they decided in the wake of the coup's failure to restructure the information process.

The chief reform was to strengthen the role of a panel known as a "deputies committee," made up of the senior aide to each of the President's top national security advisers and chaired by Deputy National Security Adviser Robert M. Gates.

That panel is now supposed to serve as a crisis management team, collecting information, analyzing options and preparing recommendations for Bush, Baker, Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.

Through Thursday night and on into Friday morning, that panel met to arrange support for Aquino.

The crisis began to unfold at an awkward time for Bush: Washington was notified of the details of the developing coup at roughly 5:30 p.m. Thursday, barely more than an hour before the President's scheduled departure for the Mediterranean. Over the next seven hours, officials met repeatedly to analyze the situation and prepare options for Bush, who ultimately approved the decision to deploy the Air Force at about 12:30 a.m. Friday.

According to a chronology of Administration actions provided by senior Administration officials, the crisis management team first met at the White House at 6:30 p.m.

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Thursday, as Bush's helicopter was lifting off from the White House lawn en route to Andrews Air Force Base. At the same time, Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, convened his top aides at the Pentagon's National Military Command Center to begin analyzing military options.

Gates' group met for three hours, keeping in touch with Air Force One by telephone. But then, with no word from the Philippines and no request from Aquino for help, the committee went into recess.

At just that moment, however, Aquino and Philippine Defense Secretary Fidel V. Ramos were contacting U.S. Ambassador Nicholas Platt in Manila, asking for U.S. air support to immobilize mutinous elements of the Philippine air force at two bases outside the capital. Gates, an official said, received word of Platt's request just as he arrived home shortly after 10 p.m. and hurriedly returned to the White House. He was quickly joined by other senior officials.

By 11 p.m. Gates' team had reconvened and updated Bush on Aquino's request. At 11:30 p.m., Vice President Dan Quayle, joined by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, CIA chief William H. Webster, Gates and Deputy White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, convened a senior-level meeting in the White House Situation Room and, after a 45-minute discussion, recommended to Bush that the request be approved.

Call to Aquino

Quayle then called Aquino, reaching her at about 1:30 a.m. Washington time. At the same time, the vice president called three congressional leaders, House Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.), Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) and House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.) to inform them of Bush's decision. Pentagon and State Department officials also briefed members of the House and Senate Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees, Administration spokesmen said.

Despite congressional concern in the past about being informed of military options before any final decision is made, White House spokesman Popadiuk insisted that this after-the-fact notification had satisfied both the Congress and all legal requirements for U.S. military action.

"The President, as commander in chief, has a constitutional right to act to protect American lives," he said.

Times staff writers Melissa Healy and Norman Kempster, in Washington, contributed to this story.

INSIDE WASHINGTON

MODERATOR: Gordon Peterson. PANEL: Jack Kilpatrick, Charles Krauthammer, Carl Rowan, Strobe Talbott.

Program begins with a discussion of Gorbachev's meeting with the Pope before moving to the Malta meeting.

ON THE MALTA MEETING:

PETERSON: Once again, Mr. Gorbachev has upstaged President Bush. President Bush had not even left for Malta and Mr. Gorbachev was on center stage.

ROWAN: Mr. Gorbachev managed to upstage himself.... Who, before this summit, would pull off this deal at the Vatican?

TALBOTT: But the weather upstaged both of them, and I think in this case, I know it's a cliche, but I think the weather is really kind of a metaphor for history here. What's been going on at the summit is that you have the two leaders of the superpowers trying to tell each other and tell the world they still are the leaders of true superpowers and that they still have some control over events and along comes some gale force winds to remind them that they don't have that much control.

KRAUTHAMMER: I think that's half right, but of the two leaders the one who really doesn't have things under control is Gorbachev. After all, it's his empire which collapsed last month and not ours....

TALBOTT: ...But which of the two leaders -- Bush or Gorbachev -- is getting credit around the world for leadership, for vision, for being in some kind of control?

KRAUTHAMMER: Who cares about credit? If Gorbachev gets the credit for letting his empire dissolve, I'd give him double credit. Let him dissolve his own Soviet Union.... Let him give up Nicaragua and get even more applause. He can have applause and we'll have pieces of his empire.

KILPATRICK: Let me rise to the defense of our President just for a minute. I know Gorby is a master of public relations and image-making and so on, but I kind of like the way President Bush has approached this -- very calm, composed....

TALBOTT: ...I would not fault President Bush on the substance of his policy. It just seems that he has not risen much to the occasion of articulating, of enunciating of what he calls the vision thing. He has appeared to be sort of passive and applauding tepidly rather than in some sense --

KRAUTHAMMER: But you don't have to have a vision when the other guy's committing suicide. All you have to have is patience and discipline. And I think he's doing exactly the right thing.

SCOWCROFT: I think there's no question that we're in a new phase. The world in which we all grew up and know that's so familiar, the kind of confrontational world between the United States and the Soviet Union is changing. The post-World War II world is collapsing about us, and I think it's premature to say what will follow. It's a very exciting time but a very perilous time because it could still blow up. I don't think it will, but we have to move very cautiously and prudently.

UTLEY: ...Could it not be said that...Malta is in many ways as important as Yalta was?

SCOWCROFT: I hope it will prove to be. The reason the President doesn't like the Yalta reference is not only from the political consequences of Yalta and what happened, but there it was the great powers settling the fate of Europe and the President said...it's not up to us and it's not up to the Soviet Union to settle Europe. It's up to everybody involved....

BROKAW: ...What was it like out on the Belknap? ...Was it terribly uncomfortable and was it a good idea to make these arrangements under these kinds of dicey conditions?

SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think it was good to make these arrangement. I don't think they interfered with the meetings in any significant way. And yes, it was slightly uncomfortable on the Belknap last night.

COCHRAN: ...Did Gorbachev indicate he just can't control Castro?

SCOWCROFT: He did say that he had urged Castro to get along with perestroika, to follow the Eastern European example. But then he said, after all, I believe in self-determination, now, so Mr. Castro can take his own course.

PANEL DISCUSSION (JOHN DANCY joins the panel.)

COCHRAN: ...George Bush could have said Gorbachev was lying [regarding arms in Central America]. Instead, George Bush said: I believe what Gorbachev is telling me and I believe that the Nicaraguans are lying to Gorbachev. In effect, Bush is saying: You are not a crook, Mikhail Gorbachev. I think it's very important that this was out on the table early on. And it removed, I think, what could have been a rather nasty atmosphere.... Basically what they've done is agree to disagree....

DANCY: I was interested by the fact today that the Soviets, and Gerasimov particularly, tried to drag George Bush kicking and screaming to a declaration that the Cold War was over and he would not do it. He would not say the words.

UTLEY: Didn't we see a change in our President at this Malta summit? At his news conference this afternoon, he was saying to White House journalists, he was saying: I'm going to push the bureaucracy to get these arms agreements by this summer.... This is not George Bush being passive George Bush. He's going to go out there and kick some rear ends, on the American side, assuming Gorbachev's doing the same thing.

COCHRAN: Adrenaline was flowing in George Bush today.

COCHRAN: ...In the face-to-face meetings with President Bush, what did Gorbachev say in terms of how far he's prepared to let these [Eastern European] countries go towards capitalism, towards democratic governments...?

SCOWCROFT: What he said was that he believes fundamentally in self determination.... And he didn't put any limits on that.

COCHRAN: Do you, did President Bush, take all of this at face value? Are there any doubts in your minds in terms of what Gorbachev is prepared to allow to happen in Europe today?

SCOWCROFT: He seemed very sincere. Indeed, he seemed to take credit for what's happening in Eastern Europe as a reflection of what he's trying to do in the Soviet Union with perestroika.

BROKAW: The President is going to meet with Chancellor Kohl of West Germany. Will he encourage him to move forward even more rapidly with his concept of a federated Germany in which you have, in effect, two governments, one country?

SCOWCROFT: I see no reason he should suggest that we move forward even faster. I think that the President feels events should take their own timing and velocity.... Let me put it this way. The President will certainly not stand in the way of German reunification. At the same time, the Soviet Union is very nervous about events in Germany. So again with the idea that we move slowly, cautiously, to keep things going, not to destabilize it to the point this whole process could be disrupted. I think that's what the President is likely to talk about.

COCHRAN: It's reported in the Washington Post this morning that President Aquino asked President Bush to permit American planes to make air strikes on rebel-held targets during this rebel insurrection in the past several days, and that the President refused. True?

SCOWCROFT: What we agreed to do was in a way a kind of functional equivalent. And that is to fly cover over two airfields.... We made it clear to her that we did not want to get into the business of killing Filipinos.

COCHRAN: Let me go back to what happened here on Malta. President Bush offered some limited economic help to President Gorbachev. Now, President Gorbachev represents a superpower. Was he pleased or offended?

SCOWCROFT: Well, limited help, you have to define that more carefully. We talked about a trade agreement as a precondition for most-favored-nation.... We talked about the Soviet Union getting observer status at GATT. But, you know, that's the kind of thing. We're not talking about economic aid in that sense....

BROKAW: ...Give us your best vision about what is going to happen. Has this been a triumph for democracy and liberal thinking throughout the world, as some people have suggested...or are we merely in a transition to a new phase that we cannot yet be certain about how it's going to take hold?

NBC's MEET THE PRESS

MODERATOR: Garrick Utley. PANEL: Tom Brokaw and John Cochran.
GUEST: General Scowcroft.

UTLEY: In the news conference with Bush and Gorbachev earlier today, both leaders said they have given their aides...specific instructions to advance the negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe. How specific are those instructions?

SCOWCROFT: They're fairly specific. First of all, their was guidance to the foreign ministers as to the START topics they should take up in January, and then more general guidance that we hope to have all of the major issues in START resolved by the time of the summit next June in order that a treaty could be signed somewhere in 1990.

UTLEY: Let's get specific here. Is the guidance to meet this deadline or do these guidelines include specific figures the foreign ministers haven't given?

SCOWCROFT: No, no. They do not include specific figures. All of these were fairly general, and it was more timetables than it was issues which were resolved between the two of them.

UTLEY: But in effect the order has gone out Bush and Gorbachev want agreements by the summit next summer?

SCOWCROFT: That's right.

COCHRAN: ...Based on what happened here in Malta, is it more likely now that you can have some fairly deep cuts in the Pentagon budget?

SCOWCROFT: It certainly isn't less likely, but I would be [wary] of saying deep cuts in the Pentagon budget.

BROKAW: Based on what we saw in the news conference today...obviously there are still differences about Central America. Did you put on the table before him the evidence that you have that if not the Soviet Union, certainly its clients, Cuba and Nicaragua, continue to send weapons into El Salvador.

SCOWCROFT: We didn't put it on the table specifically, that evidence. The President alluded to it in his presentation and then the two foreign ministers...were going to discuss it. Secretary Baker said he just didn't have a chance. But we will make that evidence available to them.

BROKAW: Is it your impression that President Gorbachev has gone to Cuba and/or Nicaragua and said to them, cool it, we don't want any more arms going to El Salvador while we're trying to resolve these wider issues of peace and war on a global scale?

SCOWCROFT: He says he has and I think there's no reason not to believe him. But if he has said it, it has not stuck. It has not taken hold.

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NBC News

MEET THE PRESS

Sunday, December 3, 1989

GUEST: BRENT SCOWCROFT
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

MODERATOR: Garrick Utley - NBC News

PANEL: Tom Brokaw - NBC News
John Cochran - NBC News
John Dancy - NBC News
Jim Bitterman - NBC News

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GARRICK UTLEY: Hello, again. From Malta--on "Meet the Press Today," the Bush-Gorbachev summit. What does each side think? Our guest is Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser.

MR. UTLEY: Good morning, General. Thanks for coming by.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Good morning, Garrick.

MR. UTLEY: In the news conference with Bush and Gorbachev earlier today, both leaders said that they have given their aides, and that includes you, specific instructions to advance the negotiations to reduce nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe. How specific are those instructions?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Garrick, they are fairly specific. First of all, it was guidance to the foreign ministers as to the START topics that they should take up in January; and then more general guidance that we hope to have all of the major issues in START resolved by the time of the summit next June in order that a treaty could be signed somewhere in 1990.

MR. UTLEY: Let's get specific here. Is the guidance to meet this deadline, or these guidelines include specific figures the foreign ministers have been given?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, no; they do not include specific figures. All of these were fairly general; and it was more timetables than it was issues which were resolved between the two of them.

MR. UTLEY: But, in effect, the order has gone out. Bush and Gorbachev want agreements by the summit next summer.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That's right.

TOM BROKAW: General, what about SLCMs, these submarine-launched or sea-launched cruise missiles that have been a problem in the past? Are you confident now, given our advantage in that area, that we'll be able to work out something between now and June with the Soviets on a limitation on SLCMs?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, it is one of the most complex

issues left in START; and there was a discussion of it in a general sense, basically by Mr. Gorbachev. It's not resolved yet; and, as I say, it will take some heavy lifting to do.

MR. BROKAW: All right. Given the favorable conditions that existed here and the possibility of signing a START agreement--that is, the long-range nuclear weapons--in June, and then a conventional forces agreement later this year, or in 1990, where do we go from there in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, what would be your next step?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, we've got a long way to go before we get there. I think the thing one does then is take a look at the force balance in Europe, in the NATO area--Central Europe area, and see what might sense to do in that arena of conventional arms. And then we have to take a breather in START and focus and see where we can go in START that will further enhance stability of strategic arms--hopefully, at lower numbers.

MR. COCHRAN: General, before the president came here, he said back in Washington that he didn't want to negotiate over troop levels in Europe with Gorbachev, that that's something that has to happen between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, the president said he did want to talk about such things as what troop levels should be ten years from you? What are the president's ideas, and what was Gorbachev's reaction?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, that didn't really come up. We did not talk troop levels in Europe. It was much broader than that. And the president did say, you know, that he couldn't do anything prior to consultation with his allies.

But, well, you know, it came up in a broad sense that there were changing circumstances--that Eastern Europe especially and the Soviet Union and Western Europe were all evolving and the alliances should evolve to meet that. And President Gorbachev suggested they should become more political than military.

MR. COCHRAN: Lot of talk back in Washington by the president and others that you need to save money in the area of

defense. Based on what happened here in Malta, is it more likely now that we can have some fairly deep cuts in the Pentagon budget?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, it certainly is not less likely, but I would be chary of saying deep cuts in the Pentagon budget.

MR. BROKAW: General, we welcome you, by the way, to our South End guest house studios here in South Malta. You've got the bay right behind you. You've got a little condensation and a fog going in the room.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: So I see.

MR. BROKAW: But there's a lot of clarity in your answers here today, and we appreciate that. Based on what we saw in the news conference today between President Gorbachev and President Bush, obviously there are still differences about Central America. Did you put on the table before him the evidence that you have that, if not the Soviet Union, certainly his clients--Cuba and Nicaragua--continue to send weapons into El Salvador?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We didn't put it on the table specifically, that evidence. The president alluded to it in his presentation; and then the two foreign ministers while the presidents had their one-on-one, their private conversation, the foreign ministers who were going to discuss, Secretary Baker said they just didn't have a chance.

But we will make that evidence available to them.

MR. BROKAW: Is it your impression that President Gorbachev has gone to Cuba, and/or Nicaragua and said, Cool it--we don't want any arms going into El Salvador while we're trying to resolve these wider issues of peace and war on a global scale.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: He says he has; and I think there's no reason not to believe him. But if he has said it, it has not stuck; it has not taken hold.

MR. BROKAW: Tell us about the evidence that you have--two planes were knocked down, or at least one was found on the ground, the other one crashed.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That's right.

MR. BROKAW: Did you find documents on those airplanes?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We did find documents in the one that crashed; and they ere documents indicating quite clearly that that plane came from Nicaragua.

MR. BROKAW: And did it show a Soviet connection of any kind?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Only that there were a number of AK-47 cases of ammunition, and also some SA-7 anti-aircraft weapons; and those are--well, you know, they're of Soviet design. They were not necessarily sent directly from the Soviet Union.

MR. BROKAW: I mean, you can buy those things on the black market almost anywhere in the world, including American-made weapons, by the way.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: And Mr. Gorbachev pointed that out.

MR. UTLEY: General, coming back to the heart of much of this discussion the past day and a half, Europe specifically, Germany, what's been happening in Eastern European countries to go through these dramatic changes. But in the face-to-face meetings with President Bush, what did Gorbachev say in terms of how far he is prepared to let these countries go towards capitalism, towards democratic governments with non-Communist governments?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: What he said was that he believed fundamentally in self-determination, that it ought to be up to those countries to decide how they want to form their governments, how they want to organize their lives. And he didn't put any limits on that.

MR. UTLEY: But obviously there's a limit in terms of the Soviet Union's security, which is the Warsaw Pact itself. Did he emphasize that point?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, he didn't really emphasize that point. He said that, well, specifically with respect to East Germany and the German question, he said that history had created the two Germanies; neither President Bush nor he created them--

and that we ought to really rely on history to solve it.

MR. UTLEY: And do you, did President Bush take all of this at face value? Are there any doubts in your minds in terms of what Gorbachev is prepared to allow to happen in Europe today?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: He seemed very sincere; indeed, he seemed to take credit for what's happening in Eastern Europe as a reflection of what he's trying to do in the Soviet Union with perestroika.

MR. BROKAW: Are you concerned at all, General, that events in Eastern Europe are happening--however, joyful they may be--that they're happening too fast, that there's the possibility of instability and then other more conservative forces moving in to a void created by economic and political chaos?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think we can't say whether it's too fast or not. But there certainly is the possibility that things can get out of hand if they move very, very rapidly. And I don't think either side wants that to be happen. And Mr. Gorbachev did point out that going too fast could cause some problems.

MR. UTLEY: General, Tom, John, we're going to take a pause right now. We'll be back with more questions on "Meet the Press" with General Scowcroft in just a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: Continuing this morning on MEET THE PRESS from Malta, our guest is Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor. Joining me here from Malta are Tom Brokaw and John Cochran, NBC NEWS correspondents.

General, we've just received some startling news from East Germany this morning. It refers to what Tom was talking about a moment ago--the danger of instability in Eastern Europe. The news is that in East Germany itself, the entire Politburo, the Central Committee, the leadership of the Communist Party has resigned. There's a crisis meeting of the party there.

Isn't this an example of the unpredictable nature of what's happening in Eastern Europe, and again, should this be cause

for concern?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, it is a prime example of the kinds of instabilities that are there and that we have to worry about.

Now the East German government's been under a lot of pressure as not moving sufficiently sincerely or rapidly. But one of the things Mr. Gorbachev pointed out in response to Tom's question--he did say that we could not always anticipate that future developments in Eastern Europe would not produce some instabilities which would cause problems, and therefore we needed to be very cautious and very careful.

MR. UTLEY: Well, let me get your best guess on these developments in East Germany. What is this going to lead to? What do you predict?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I would only guess that we could have a development something like has taken place in Poland, where you would--the Communist Party would do away with its primary role in the political life of the country, and you could have non-communists running. That's just a guess, though.

MR. UTLEY: Tom.

MR. BROKAW: General, the president's going to meet with Chancellor Kohl of West Germany.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. BROKAW: Will he encourage him to move forward even more rapidly with his concept of a federated Germany in which you have, in effect, two governments, one country?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh, I'd see no reason he should suggest that he move forward even faster. I think that the president feels events should take their own timing and philosophy.

MR. BROKAW: Come now, General. We have an enormous stake, politically and economically, and militarily in that part of the world. Chancellor Kohl has been in close touch with President Bush throughout all of this. Surely the chancellor will be seeking his advice, if the president isn't offering it at the first blush.

Wouldn't the president like to encourage that kind of thing?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, let me put it this way: the president will certainly not stand in the way of German reunification. At the same time, the Soviet Union is very nervous about events in Germany. So, again, with the idea that we move slowly, cautiously, to keep things going, not to destabilize them to the point this whole process could be disruptive, and I think that's what the president is likely to talk about.

MR. COCHRAN: General, let me switch to another part of the world, Asia. There's a report in The Washington Post this morning that Philippine President Cory Aquino asked President Bush to permit American planes to make air strikes on rebel-held targets during this rebel insurrection of the past several days, and that the president refused. True?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: What we agreed to do was, in a way, a kind of a functional equivalent, and that is to fly cover over two airfields in the Manila--

MR. COCHRAN: There's a lot of different in flying cover and making strafing attacks.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, but in a sense it isn't because what we were doing is preventing aircraft from taking off from those two airfields to contribute to the battle.

MR. COCHRAN: So you didn't actually turn down a request from her to make actual strafing runs?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, we made it clear to her that we did not want to get into the business of killing Filipinos.

MR. COCHRAN: Okay. Let me go back to what happened here on Malta. President Bush offered some limited economic help to President Gorbachev. Now President Gorbachev represents a super power. Was he pleased or offended?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, "limited help"--you have to define that more carefully. We talked about a trade agreement as a precondition for most-favored nation agreement, or waiver of the

most-favored nation, Jackson-Vanik limitations. We talked about the Soviet Union getting observer status at GATT.

But, you know, that's the kind of thing. We're not talking about economic aid in that sense of--

MR. COCHRAN: Still it's going to help the Soviet economy, you hope?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, what we hope--you know--President Gorbachev said he really wants to begin to inject the Soviet economy into the world economy, and if he wants to do that then observer status at GATT is a very useful thing, because then the Soviet Union will have the opportunity to see how the world economy works, and what they have to do to become a part of it.

MR. COCHRAN: You know, back home in the United States, President Bush has been accused of not helping Gorbachev enough with perestroika. Did Gorbachev seem to feel that he is being helped now?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, he does.

MR. COCHRAN: He did?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

MR. BROKAW: General, step back for just a moment. You have grown up personally and professionally during the Cold War.

Now, at least, we're on a cusp of change; whether or not we're in for a profound change we can't be sure. Give us your best vision about what is going to happen. Has this been a triumph for democracy and liberal thinking throughout the world, as some people have suggested, "the end of history" as it has been called? Or are we merely in a transition to a new phase that we cannot yet be certain about how it's going to take hold?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think there's no question that we're in a new phase. The world in which we all grew up and know--so familiar--the kind of confrontational world between the United States and the Soviet Union is changing. The post-World War II world is collapsing about us, and I think it's premature to say what will follow.

It's a very exciting time but a very perilous time because it could still blow up. I don't think it will but we have to move very cautiously and prudently.

MR. UTLEY: General, going into this summit conference, the Russians of course were playing it up, George Bush was playing it down, trying to control euphoria, if you will, and one of the phrases that came out of Moscow was "Yalta to Malta."

That didn't sit very well in Washington, but in a way, Yalta did set the division, the picture of Europe after World War II. And could it not be said that after Malta--we've now had the events in Eastern Europe over the last several weeks, and the fact that Gorbachev is there--that Malta is, in many ways, as important as Yalta was?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I hope it will prove to be. The reason the president doesn't like the Yalta reference is not only from the political consequences of Yalta and what happened, but there, it was the great powers settling the fate of Europe, and the president said, you know, it's not up to us, it's not up to the Soviet Union to settle Europe. It's up to everybody involved--the Europeans, East and West, the Soviet Union, the United States--all of them, to work on the evolution of Europe.

MR. UTLEY: Tom.

MR. BROKAW: General, I can't help but be struck by the fact that behind you there sits the U.S.S. Belknap where you spent the night.

A lot of arrangements were made for this summit; they came apart last evening when the storms blew in here and the sea kicked up. What was it like out on the Belknap? You're an old Air Force man. The president has spent a lot of time at sea. Was it terribly uncomfortable, and was it a good idea to make these arrangements under these kinds of dicey conditions?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think it was good to make these arrangements. I don't think they interfered with the meetings in any significant way, and yes, it was slightly uncomfortable on

the Belknap last night.

MR. COCHRAN: Can I ask you a question about Fidel Castro. As you know, President Bush feels Castro is responsible for a lot of the turmoil in Central America.

Did Gorbachev indicate he just can't control Castro?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, he did say that he had urged Castro to get along with perestroika, to follow the Eastern European example, but then he said, after all, I believe in self-determination now, so--you know--Mr. Castro can take his own course.

MR. UTLEY: General Scowcroft, thank you very much for coming by and being with us this morning here, in Malta, on MEET THE PRESS. My thanks also to Tom and John.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: On "Meet the Press" today, we're back in Malta in a room of a 16th-century building which used to belong to the Knights of Malta--a rather historic setting for what may turn out to be a very historic summit conference. With me, three of my NBC colleagues--John Cochran, who covers the White House, John Dancy who covers State Department, and Jim Bitterman who covers a lot of Europe where things are happening.

Gentlemen, can we advance the argument that what has happened here in these last two days shows what summit conferences can really accomplish on a personal level, as well as on a substantive level? John?

MR. COCHRAN: I think so. I may be the only one here who is reminded of Watergate.

MR. UTLEY: Well, how did you get to that?

MR. COCHRAN: Remember during the height of Watergate, folks, when Richard Nixon said, "I am a not crook"? Well, we had a serious disagreement here at Malta between the president and Gorbachev over Central America--Gorbachev saying that he doesn't know how these Soviet-made weapons get to the rebels in El Salvador; Gorbachev saying, my Nicaraguan allies, Fidel Castro, tell me they don't know either.

George Bush could have said Gorbachev was lying. Instead, George Bush said, I believe what Gorbachev is telling me, and I believe that the Nicaraguans are lying to Gorbachev. In effect, Bush is saying, You are not a crook, Mikhail Gorbachev. I think it is very important that this was out on the table early on and it removed, I think, what could have been a rather nasty atmosphere.

MR. UTLEY: They've agreed to disagree, John.

MR. DANCY: It gave good atmospherics for the conference. And basically what they have done is, as you say, agreed to disagree. They've just left it sitting there without anybody having to take a position. And now the villains of the piece are the Nicaraguans.

MR. BITTERMAN: You know, John went back to Watergate; I went back to Yalta. We had talked about before the fact was that at Yalta the Russians and the Americans were allies. And the question was asked of Bush at the news conference today, Are you allies? And he said, No, we're not allies yet; but we can learn to cooperate.

But, you know, it does sort of make you wonder about that time when America and the Soviets were allied; and it makes you wonder what kind of things could come out of it if we could come back to that.

MR. DANCY: I was interested by the fact today that the Soviets and Gerasimov particularly tried to drag George Bush kicking and screaming to a declaration that the Cold War was over, and he would not do it. He would not say the words.

MR. UTLEY: He continues to emphasize the importance of NATO, that he is in Brussels right now talking with our allies, will be talking later in the day, that that is still the cornerstone.

MR. DANCY: Yes, but he just--he simply would not say the words, "The Cold War is over," as Gerasimov and many other Soviets have said.

MR. BITTERMAN: There's a lot of vagueness here, too. I mean, both said that they're going to leave the German question to history. I mean, that's not too much participation.

MR. UTLEY: And, see what's happened in East Germany today with the overthrow of the leadership.

MR. DANCY: George Bush wanted a lot of vagueness. You'll recall, he said he didn't want any surprises. And Brent Scowcroft told us that the president was very pleased that there were no surprises here. Gorbachev didn't come here trying to pull a public relations stunt with some sort of arms control proposal.

So from that point of view, I think Bush feels he can also trust Gorbachev more in these talks.

MR. UTLEY: Precisely here, John, didn't we see a change in our president at this Malta summit? In his news conference this afternoon, he was saying to White House journalists, he was saying, I am going to push the bureaucracy to get these arms agreements by next summer in conventional forces.

MR. DANCY: That's how things get done. Ronald Reagan had to do the same thing.

MR. UTLEY: Right. But this is not George Bush being passive George Bush. He's going to go out there and kick some rear ends on the American side, assuming Gorbachev is doing the same thing.

MR. BITTERMAN: The adrenalin was flowing in George Bush today.

MR. DANCY: Wait a minute. Let's wait and see. Let's wait and see exactly what he says. Scowcroft said on "Meet the Press," for example, that the instructions to the foreign ministers and to the experts have been fairly general, only in terms of timetables.

I want to see what specific warhead levels they decide they're going to get down to, how forthcoming the Americans are going to be before we have all these--

MR. BROKAW: You're always bringing up these details, Jonathan.

MR. BITTERMAN: No, but that may be--the timeframe may be enough to get them going because basically negotiators sit, hold

back. They don't want to release anything they don't have to. But given a time frame, then they have to start realizing they have to make compromises. And that's really where an agreement comes from, so--

MR. UTLEY: What's going to be the reaction among the Europeans, Bush's, and NATO's?

MR. BITTERMAN: I think the disarmament questions are the ones that are going to be the most interesting for the Europeans. The German question, I mean, they really have just left unanswered; and it's a real question where it goes from here, especially the developments today.

But the disarmament things I think would be of most interest.

MR. UTLEY: The two leaders spent a lot of time together. Gorbachev obviously has had a certain advantage; he's been in office longer. John, do you feel that Bush--I wouldn't say feels the equal of Gorbachev--he certainly does feel the equal in terms of substance. But in terms of being in harness together, trying to guide events right now, that they really are working together on most of these issues?

MR. COCHRAN: I would say George Bush may feel he is, in fact, leading because Gorbachev is on the defensive. I know that Bush's aides, prior to the summit here in Malta, felt that Gorbachev was almost desperate because of his economic straits in the Soviet Union. And this was a man who clearly wants no trouble with the Americans.

MR. DANCY: Well, I was just simply going to say that this whole thing began to turn over during the Wyoming pre-summit talks between Baker and Shevardnadze. The Americans came away from that with a real feeling that the Soviets were searching for answers, rather than just throwing up stone walls. And that seems to have carried over to these talks.

MR. UTLEY: That was an important turning point.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. Thanks to all of our

colleagues for this lengthy coverage of the Bush-Gorbachev summit here on Malta.

Well, it has been a long morning--indeed, a long day here in Malta. The summit is over; and I suspect with time the colleagues would agree the high winds and rough seas will recede in memory. What will last is the personal contact established here between the two presidents--the new sense of direction and commitment given to relations between the two countries. That is what summit conferences are supposed to do.

George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev can now look forward to their next meeting next year in the United States on dry land. That will be welcomed by everyone.

I'm Garrick Utley. Thank you for being with us this morning, and I hope you'll join us again next week for "Sunday Today" and "Meet the Press."

ANNOUNCER: "Meet the Press" has been sponsored by McDonnell-Douglas, a company of leaders; and ADM, supermarket to the world.

The Road to Malta

A year ago, Bush distrusted Gorbachev. Now he wonders how to help him succeed

BY STROBE TALBOTT

This week's meeting in the Med will bring together the most daring of all Soviet leaders and one of the most cautious American Presidents. Mikhail Gorbachev frequently, and proudly, describes his approach to the world as "radical," while George Bush's favorite word when he talks about foreign policy is prudent. Yet Bush has come a long way in his thinking about the Soviet Union. In a matter of months, his Administration has gone from viewing Gorbachev as a slickly disguised variant of the old red menace to a potential partner in creating a new world order.

This evolution of American official attitudes has been subtle and uneven. It has been couched in caveats, often obscured by ambivalence and articulated, sometimes inarticulately, by a Chief Executive who has no flair for geopolitical grand rhetoric and has a tendency to step on his applause lines. Still, the change on the American side, if it continues, could turn out to be as important as Gorbachev's abandonment of the Leninist plan for winning the zero-sum game of history. The American equivalent of what the Soviets call new political thinking is all the more significant coming from the President of Prudence.

George Bush did not get where he is today by taking chances or questioning conventional wisdom, particularly on the No. 1 life-or-death issue of U.S. foreign policy. As a Congressman, diplomat, Republican Party chairman, Vice President and presidential candidate, he was always the sort of politician who fretted about the consequences of a misstep. For Bush, therefore, slow is better than fast and standing pat is often the safest posture. Once he replaced Ronald Reagan, Bush's instinct was to apply the brakes to the juggernaut of improved U.S.-Soviet relations, to take the turns very cautiously and perhaps even to pull over on the side of the road and study the map for a while.

The Bush Administration was made up of battle-scarred veterans with long memories. They were acutely aware that every President since the end of World War II had learned the hard way the domestic political perils of underestimating the Soviet capacity for producing unpleasant surprises and overestimating the possibility of profound, permanent improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Even Franklin Roosevelt was posthumously excoriated for "giving away" Eastern Europe to Joseph Stalin at Yalta (rhymes with Malta). Harry Truman stood up to Stalin at Potsdam and hung tough over Iran, Berlin and Korea, but he still ended up being pilloried by a couple of junior Senators named Joseph McCarthy and Richard Nixon. It was Nixon who called Truman's Secretary of State the dean of the "cowardly college of Communist containment." Two decades later, the New Nixon's policy of détente ran into a buzz saw of bipartisan anti-Soviet opposition. When a Watergate-wounded Nixon went to see Leonid Brezhnev in the Crimea in 1974, he refused to visit Yalta nearby, lest anyone accuse him of another giveaway. It was all for naught: the traveling White House press gleefully filed stories with the dread dateline.

When Jimmy Carter signed a SALT II treaty in June 1979, he gave Brezhnev a big kiss on the cheek. The treaty was never ratified, largely because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan six months later. In 1980 Republicans used photographs of the signing ceremony with the message to voters YOU TOO CAN KISS OFF JIMMY CARTER.

The Bush Administration includes a number of senior officials of the Nixon–Gerald Ford years, notably Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who were chastened by their earlier experience. They returned to office determined not to repeat the mistake of overselling détente, by that or any other name.

Also, just below the surface of the new Administration was a powerful if muted strain of criticism of the way the U.S. had conducted relations with the U.S.S.R. in the last years of the Reagan presidency. The image of Reagan strolling arm in arm through Red Square with Gorbachev during their 1988 meeting in Moscow had a connotation among many Bush people almost as invidious as that of Carter kissing Brezhnev. George Shultz received much of the blame for letting Reagan succumb to Gorbomania. Partly for that reason Shultz was given close to a bum's rush right after Bush's Inauguration.

The new Administration was uncomfortable with the Reagan legacy in another respect. In the critical and perennially



CYNTHIA JOHNSON

Bush and Lech Walesa in Poland, 1989: a sudden shift in perceptions

After reformers in Poland and Hungary stressed that their survival depended on Gorbachev's, Bush realized that the West had an interest in the success of *perestroika*

controversial field of arms control, Reagan had turned out to be every bit as radical as, and considerably more romantic than, Gorbachev. At their own Malta-like non-summit on neutral ground, at Reykjavík in 1986, Reagan and Gorbachev arced off into the stratosphere of blue-sky nuclear disarmament. They came so close to agreeing on a timetable for the elimination of ballistic missiles that American allies and generals were horrified. So was Reagan's relentlessly prudent Vice President. In Bush's mind and those of his advisers, Reykjavík became a synonym for the risks of free-form encounters between U.S. and Soviet leaders.

The Bush Administration came into office determined to strike what a number of its key officials hoped would be perceived as a tougher, more sober, more traditional posture toward the Soviet Union. Much as they dislike the label, they are, on the whole, moderate Republicans. Scowcroft once even called himself a Rockefeller Republican. Not too long ago, such political animals had been considered an extinct, or at least seriously endangered, species. Even after winning a presidential election, the Bush people felt vulnerable to the vigilant, suspicious, presumably powerful right. Hence they were all the more eager to be seen squinting skeptically at Gorbachev, especially in public, and thus to be staking out a position to the right of the most popular, successful conservative President in modern times. In September Bush reiterated that caution, saying, "I'm like the guy from Missouri."



DAVID HUME KENNERLY

Reagan and Gorbachev in Iceland, 1986: the summit that turned sour

When Reagan and Gorbachev arced off into the stratosphere of blue-sky nuclear disarmament, Reykjavík became a synonym for the risks of free-form summit encounters

The first few months of the "show-me" Administration were dominated by three themes:

▶ The approved questions of the hour were whether Gorbachev was for real, and whether the success of his program was good for the free world. Those were not rhetorical questions; the answer, on both counts, might turn out to be no.

▶ If, however, the answer turned out to be yes—and the Soviets were indeed changing for the better—then the onus was on them to keep changing and to keep making concessions. The U.S. was under no obligation to alter its own behavior or thinking in any way, or to adjust its negotiating positions. After all, it was the U.S.S.R., not the U.S., whose political and economic system was hopelessly sick and whose international behavior had made it a pariah.

▶ The American approach must not be, in any sense, pegged to the fortunes of a particular Soviet leader. The U.S. must not have what one Bush adviser disdained as a "Gorbo-centric" policy. Rather, it should have an approach that would work equally well for a Soviet Union led, say, by Yegor Ligachev, then seen as Gorbachev's principal hard-line opponent.

The surest way to lose influence in the Bush Administration was to wonder out loud whether the U.S. should be "helping" Gorbachev. After all, even if he turned out to be for real, he could die any day. Or he might be overthrown and replaced by retrogrades who would have at their disposal the military wherewithal to engage once again in old thinking and old behavior. Therefore the best posture for the U.S.—the policy of greatest prudence—was to wait and see, to test, to keep American powder dry and to be ready for Ligachev.

The impression of a stand-pat, waiting-for-Yegor policy was reinforced by a presidential "national security policy review." The exercise dragged on for some six months, yielding hundreds of pages of classified bureaucratese and a few leaks in newspaper stories about how the Administration was going to be guided by the underwhelming goal of "status quo plus."

Bush gave a series of five speeches on U.S.-Soviet relations in the spring, but they generally played to yawns and even a few catcalls. Actually, the speeches were better than their reviews. They contained some important watchwords: the U.S., said the President, must move "beyond containment" and seek the "integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations."New slogans can be the beginning of a new policy, especially if they are repeated often enough at the highest level.

Meanwhile, Bush was saying something else over and over again: "I want to do something important, but I don't want to do anything dumb." He said it in closed-door meetings with his staff, in brainstorming sessions with academic experts and in nationally televised interviews. By "something important," he meant a policy that would capitalize on the opportunities presented by Gorbachev's reforms. It was less clear what the President had in mind when he vowed not to do "anything dumb." For several months the implied definition seemed to be anything that would get him in serious trouble with the right wing.

However, by late spring an important shift took place: Bush began to worry more about doing too little than about doing too much. He seemed to be calculating the political price he would pay on both sides of the Atlantic if he appeared not to be moving fast enough to meet Gorbachev halfway.

Secretary of State Baker played a key part in nudging the President toward what both men came to call "engagement" with Gorbachev. Baker made frequent trips to Capitol Hill as well as Western Europe. In both places he found impatience building: When was the Administration going to stop reviewing policy and start really making it again, especially in arms control? Congress was facing the fiscal and political imperatives of the Gramm-Rudman-Gorbachev era. The federal budget deficit was squeezing the resources available for defense spending, and the kinder, gentler Soviet Union made the arms buildup that Bush inherited from Reagan seem increasingly like wretched excess.

Meanwhile, the Americans' most important allies in Europe, the West Germans, were restless about American tactical nuclear missiles stationed on their territory. The U.S. wanted to "modernize" those weapons—a euphemism for replacing old ones with newer ones that had a much longer range—while the West Germans wanted to negotiate away the old ones. Unless Bush could defuse that controversy with a new arms-control initiative, his transatlantic debut at the NATO summit in late May would be a debacle. That prospect concentrated the minds of the Administration on the issue of conventional forces in Europe, the subject of East-West talks that had been limping along for some 15 years. Gorbachev had already breathed new life into those talks by announcing a unilateral cut in the manpower and armor of the Warsaw Pact, but the Western allies were reluctant to match his dramatic gestures.

Then, at the NATO meeting in Brussels, Bush proposed a mutual drawdown in the number of soldiers that both superpowers have stationed in Europe. The proposal was much more than just a highly successful p.r. gambit. Rather than merely fine-tuning the military balance of terror, which had been the purpose and effect of earlier arms-control arrangements, the CFE initiative was intended to be the first step in a process that might lead to fundamental changes in the international political order.

The logic and strategy behind Bush's CFE proposal were that Gorbachev might, over time, be willing to reduce drastically, perhaps someday to eliminate, Soviet garrisons in Eastern Europe. Previous American arms-control proposals had been concerned with diminishing the threat that the Warsaw Pact might invade the NATO nations. By contrast, the CFE initiative was designed to lead to the scaling back of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe—the instrument of Soviet domination there and the root cause of the division of Europe as a whole.

It was the first arms-control proposal to be at least as concerned with ending the cold war as with preventing World War III. In that sense, the CFE proposal anticipated the breaching of the Berlin Wall, the Pentagon's proposed cuts in U.S. defense programs and the other dramatic events of the past month. It was also, at its core, Gorbo-centric: it represented an attempt to respond to the unprecedented willingness of the man now in charge in the Kremlin to address fundamental, previously out-of-bounds issues—not just of how to avert war, but of how to restructure the peace.

In July Bush visited Europe for the second time as President. Solidarity leaders in Poland and reformers in Hungary persuaded him that their survival depended on Gorbachev's. Bush was deeply impressed by the implications for U.S. policy: the West had an interest in the blossoming of independence and democracy in Eastern Europe; the advocates of change there had an interest in the success of *perestroika;* therefore the U.S., too, had an interest in seeing *perestroika* succeed. Bush's long-standing aversion to the idea of an early, informal meeting with Gorbachev dissolved almost overnight. Aboard Air Force One en route back to Washington, he wrote a personal letter to the Soviet leader proposing this week's get-together.


Shortly afterward, Bush's aides, particularly Baker, began talking—first privately, then publicly—about "helping" Gorbachev. They had heard the *H* word from their boss, so the taboo was lifted.

Yet throughout this period, there were constant, escalating reminders of how much trouble Gorbachev faced at home: ethnic unrest, secessionism, economic deterioration, labor strife, an emboldened political opposition. When Eduard Shevardnadze visited the U.S. in September, he seemed preoccupied with domestic issues, especially the Soviet Union's problem with nationalities. A surprising and revealing addition to his entourage was Nikolai Shmelev, an economist who specializes in dire predictions and drastic prescriptions for the Soviet economy.

Gorbachev's mounting troubles have had an ambiguous effect on the thinking of the Bush Administration. The set of questions that drives U.S. policy has gone from "Is Gorbachev for real? And is he good for us?" to "Can he make it? And can we help him?" There is far more inclination in Washington today than even a few months ago to accept the best-case interpretation of what Gorbachev wants, what he represents, and what the U.S.S.R. would look like if he were to succeed in his program. At the same time, however, there is also more objective reason than before to credit the worst-case interpretation of what will happen to him.

Thus, in one curious and ironic respect, the Administration is back to square one. It has traded its skepticism about Gorbachev's intentions for pessimism about his chances. That leaves the Administration, at least in its own eyes, still stuck with a dilemma about what prudent American policy should be. The strong inclination remains to wait and see, to test, to keep its powder dry and to be ready for someone other than Mikhail Sergeyevich.

But in another, immensely important respect, the two men meeting in the Med this week have already transformed the superpower relationship: for the first time since the beginning of the cold war over 40 years ago, the American and Soviet leaderships have a shared interest not just in averting Armageddon but also in achieving the success of important components of Soviet internal and foreign policy. That is already a breakthrough that makes this a landmark year and augurs well for the future. ■



ARTHUR GRACE

Brezhnev and Carter in Vienna, 1979: triumph followed by betrayal

Six months after the SALT II signing ceremony, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, handing Republicans a stinging campaign message: "You too can kiss off Jimmy Carter"

Newsweek _____

Time _____

U.S. News & World Report _____

Auction Week P 17

Date 4 DEC 89

AS RECEIVED

BOWING OUT

BRENT SCOWCROFT is expected to step down as White House national security adviser within the next three months, according to a senior Bush Administration official. Scowcroft, who has tangled at times with Secretary of State James A. Baker, 3rd, over national security policy, is said to be tiring of the job. Scowcroft may be persuaded to take over as director of the Central Intelligence Agency from William H. Webster. Among the possible candidates to replace Scowcroft is Richard L. Armitage, former assistant secretary of Defense for international security affairs in the waning years of the Reagan Administration.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS have become more aggressive during President Gorbachev's program to scale down his military establishment and restructure his economy, CIA Director William H. Webster said last week. The Soviets have stepped up attempts to acquire Western technology because financing their own development work has become more difficult, Webster said. He charged that moves to recruit Americans in embassies and other locations outside the U. S. have increased.

NEW YORK TIMES

DECEMBER 5, 1989 Pg. 35

Bush Wasn't Tough Enough

By Kenneth L. Adelman

WASHINGTON

The "no surprises" summit meeting was surprising in its lack of "new thinking" about the new world unfolding. This summit smacked of summits of the 1970's, with arms control once again raising the highest expectations.

President Bush and his top advisers are now poised to lunge for the capillaries, as they promise gala summertime summit signings, staff-kicking and deadline-setting for three new major accords this year. Secretary of State James Baker heads off next month to Moscow, where he will dive into SS-18 throw weight and other arms control nitpicks.

Rather than rework outdated past proposals, the Bush team should push two big-ticket items of grand historical sweep and significance.

The first is the complete removal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe. This would end the cold war where it began. It need not be reciprocated by all our G.I.s leaving Europe. For sundry reasons, reunification among them, Mikhail Gorbachev may not want all U.S. troops to leave West German soil soon.

The second item to push for is an end to Leonid Brezhnev's legacy of bailouts of Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam and Afghanistan, which would save Mr. Gorbachev $10 billion yearly.

Why should Mr. Gorbachev spend gobs of scarce, hard currency to keep these mostly far away Marxist regimes in power when he smiles as Marxists fall next door? Does he really care more about Fidel Castro's fate than about Erich Honecker's?

Get all Soviet troops out of Europe...

Besides constituting a major diversion, the arms control hype will yield positive harm at worst and dubious benefit at best.

Take the treaty on strategic arms. Aside from horrendous verification woes (some seemingly insolvable), are persistent doubts about whether the agreement helps U.S. strategic stability.

Before joining the Bush Administration as national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft and the ambassador to the Vienna arms talks, R. James Woolsey, wrote that Start could push the U.S. into "a new kind of triad: vulnerability, wishful thinking, and a hair trigger." Not reassuring words, but unfortunately still true.

Or take the conventional-arms accord. While beneficial to NATO when first proposed earlier this year, it has been overtaken by events. If concluded, this accord would legitimize the continued presence in East Europe of some 300,000 Soviet troops beyond the mid-1990's.

This is odd when the Hungarians and Czechs are calling for a complete Soviet troop withdrawal from their countries. Mr. Gorbachev reportedly speaks of removing all his forces in East Europe by the year 2000. So why are we still proposing an accord that legitimizes the Soviet military's presence there indefinitely.

Or take a worldwide ban on chemical weapons. This noble aim is simply unachievable, since verification is impossible.

Mine is not a broadside attack on either arms talks or formal arms accords. But rather than go for agreements without real arms control, without clearly helping security or saving money, we should seek real arms control without agreements.

We should adopt an approach of evolving, parallel policies with the Soviets. Reductions initiated by their side that are below our levels in key categories would be matched by us, and vice-versa. Each side thereby tailors its forces to make them affordable, survivable and sensible.

This is a dynamic approach, one that recognizes rapid changes in Eastern Europe and in economic conditions. The formal number-crunching approach must end in a static formula.

However, formal arms control

...And take a new tack in arms control.

could reduce one severe threat: the wildfire spread of ballistic missiles. Washington and Moscow could jointly open to all nations the intermediate range nuclear forces treaty's ban on ballistic missiles of a range between 300 to 3,400 miles. This verifiable accord could help prevent more than 15 countries from producing ballistic missiles within a decade.

History is already being kind and gentle to President Bush. It is handing him enormous opportunities to usher in a far safer future. □

NEW YORK TIMES
DECEMBER 5, 1989 Pg. D4

U.S. Will Scrutinize a Chinese Deal

By MARTIN TOLCHIN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 4 — The United States plans an interagency investigation of the national security aspects of China's agreement to buy an American company that manufactures metal components for commercial aircraft, Government officials said today.

This would mark only the sixth such inquiry by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, a group made up of sub-Cabinet members from eight agencies. The committee will decide whether to ask President Bush to invoke a year-old law and block the sale.

The committee plans to investigate the sale of the Mamco Manufacturing Company of Seattle to Catic, the Chinese Aerotechnology Import-Export Corporation, an agency of the Chinese Government.

Mamco's chief customer is the Boeing company. Boeing said today that it had no comment on the proposed deal.

Military Use at Issue

The investigation will focus on whether Mamco posseses technologies applicable to military as well as commercial use, Government officials said.

Mamco is privately owned, and its president, Kenneth Keller, declined to disclose sales volume, number of employees or any other aspects of its business. He said the company planned to make an announcement this week concerning its sale, but would not identify the buyer.

The Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations lists the company's sales volume as $10 million a year, and the number of employees as 103. Government sources said Catic had offered about $20 million for it.

Steven Canner, director of the interagency group, declined to comment. "We really can't talk about transactions before us," he said.

But other Government officials familiar with the case said the committee was ending its automatic 30-day review of all pending acquisitions that might involve national security.

600 Acquitisions This Year

Mr. Canner said that the committee had reviewed 170 foreign acquisitions since enactment late last year of the Exon-Florio bill, which authorizes the committee to investigate any questionable acquisitions and make recommendations to the President. There have been 600 foreign acquisitions this year alone, but most have not involved possible questions of national security.

Of the 170 proposed acquisitions, the committee has investigated five. Two companies withdrew their offers after the committee recommended that the President block the sale: the Tokuyama Soda Company of Japan, which had sought to purchase General Ceramics Inc., involved in a nuclear weapons contract using critical technology, and the Lalbhai Company of India, which had sought to purchase the Tachonics Corporation, a subsidiary of the Grumman Corporation. Tachonics manufactures computer chips widely used by the military.

Three other proposals were approved: that of Huels A.G. of West Germany to acquire a division of the Monsanto corporation that manufactures silicon wafers; a Westinghouse joint venture with Swedish and Swiss interests to provide electrical transmission and distribution equipment, and the acquisition of three divisions of Fairchild Communications and Electronics by Matra S.A. of France.

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DEC. 5, 1989
Pg. D4

Hughes Names New President

Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Dec. 4 — The Hughes Aircraft Company said today that it had named D. Kenneth Richardson president and chief operating officer, succeeding Donald H. White, who retired Dec. 1.

Mr. Richardson reports to Malcolm R. Currie, the chairman of Hughes, which is a Los Angeles-based subsidiary of the General Motors Corporation.

Mr. Richardson, who is 58 years old and a 37-year veteran of the aerospace and military-supply company, most recently was executive vice president of operations. Before that he was senior vice president and group president of Hughes's Radar Systems Group.

Mr. Richardson joined Hughes in 1952 as a design engineer. He received his bachelor of science degree in mechanical engineering from Tufts University. He also holds a master of science degree in mechanical engineering from the University of Southern California and an M.B.A. from the University of California at Los Angeles.

WASHINGTON TIMES
DEC. 5, 1989
Pg. 2

China helps Pakistan bypass nuclear ban

KARACHI, Pakistan — The government said yesterday it plans to get around an international embargo by producing its own enriched uranium for a 300-megawatt nuclear power plant it is building with Chinese help.

Munir Ahmed Khan, chairman of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission, told reporters "the first instalment of fuel would come with the reactor" under an agreement signed by Chinese Premier Li Peng here last month. "Subsequently, Pakistan will fabricate the fuel indigenously," Mr. Khan said, "it will be 2.5 to 3 percent enriched."

The reactor, to be built at Chashma in Punjab province, "is the first example of South-South cooperation which has enabled China to emerge as a new supplier of nuclear technology," Mr. Khan said. He suggested this would encourage Western suppliers who have denied technology to Pakistan to reconsider their stand.

In 1977 France canceled a deal for a reprocessing plant as part of an international embargo against Pakistan for allegedly pursuing a bomb-oriented nuclear program.

BUSH SAYS SOVIET UNION SHOULD HELP SPUR DEMOCRATIC CHANGES

President Bush, seeking to disarm criticism from the right, says the U.S. should help spur democratic changes inside the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe despite persistent differences over Soviet aid to leftist regimes in Central America.

Bush was expected tc review the dramatic events unfolding in Europe Wednesday in an Oval Office meeting with Bettino Craxi, the secretary of the Italian Socialist Party.

Meanwhile, the White House denied Tuesday there was any difference in attitudes toward the Soviets between Bush and Vice President Quayle....

Bush, in his first public comments since returning to the White House from Europe Monday, told a GOP fund-raising dinner Tuesday night that "there is no question that progress was made at Malta."

"I look at Malta as a hopeful step in a new relationship, the first step in the next decade and the new world that is taking place each passing day. It's got to be a new world of freedom."

(Christopher Connell, AP)

BACK ON THE JOB, BUSH'S FIRST TASK IS DEALING WITH QUAYLE, THATCHER

President Bush, back at work Tuesday after his weekend summit with Soviet President Gorbachev, was quickly reminded of how delicate a task he faces politically and strategically in advancing closer relations with the Soviet Union.

While Bush showed up at the Oval Office elated over what he and Gorbachev achieved, his first order of business was addressing concerns raised by British Prime Minister Thatcher and Vice President Quayle -- ostensibly his two most loyal supporters -- about issues handled at the summit.

Despite the backing Bush gave over the weekend to Gorbachev's reforms, Quayle told the Washington Post on Monday that the Soviet Union has not gone far enough in its foreign policy to deserve full U.S. commitment....

After attending a national security meeting with Bush and Quayle, National Security Adviser Scowcroft attempted to play down any differences between the President and Vice President.

Acknowledging that there was a difference in "tone" between Quayle's comments and Bush's call for the West to adopt "new thinking" toward the Soviets, Scowcroft pointed out that Bush has also been critical of Soviet support of Nicaragua and Cuba. (Stephen Kurkjian, Boston Globe)

DENT BUSH SAYS U.S. OUGHT TO AID SOVIET REFORM MOVES

esident Bush said Tuesday that as long as the Soviet Union and its ove toward democratic change the U.S. should help them in any an.

a speech to the National Republican Congressional Committee, Bush U.S. should not offer its assistance in "some superior manner" nor t try to exploit the changes that are taking place.

long as these changes, these democratic changes, keep moving he Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, I think the United States be out there trying to help," Bush said. The U.S. should he Soviets on what works and and try to assist them "with we can," he added.

Soviets are not looking for a U.S. bailout, he said. "That's se we don't have the money anyway," he quipped.

(Donna Smith, Reuter)

BUSH SITES SUMMIT FAILURES

White House curbed its Malta summit euphoria and highlighted iet differences Tuesday as it tried to gloss over a split between Bush and British Prime Minister Thatcher on German ion.

e accenting the satisfaction Bush felt in his efforts to thaw with the Kremlin, National Security Adviser Scowcroft said the er leaders failed to reach agreement on regional issues or a new arms reduction plan.

special appearance in the White House briefing room, Scowcroft rters that Bush "is very pleased with his trip and, in his he achieved his objectives, both in Malta (and) with his allies in uring Monday's meeting in Brussels, Belgium.

asked if Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev settled the nearly issues raised by Bush, Scowcroft said, "There were some that t agree to."

ng his meeting with reporters, Scowcroft ticked off a list of which Moscow and Washington remain at odds. Soviet military mic support of Nicaragua and Afghanistan topped the chart.

a very complex period of change, and you can look at some at indicate a very positive direction to that change. You can hers, like, for example, Central America, and say, 'Hey, look, that hasn't changed at all.' And the President pointed to

Summit Remarks Illustrate Quayle's Role As Envoy To The Right

Vice President Quayle's skeptical warning this week about Soviet foreign policy demonstrated anew that he has President Bush's blessing to serve as an ambassador to conservative critics of the Administration, White House officials and other analysts said Tuesday....

While Bush was hailing the "threshold of a new era" in U.S.-Soviet relations, Quayle said that "the new thinking and the real reform is in the area of economics." He added, "I don't think they've changed much in foreign policy" and "you're still dealing with a totalitarian government."

Mitchell Daniels, president of the Hudson Institute and a Republican political strategist close to Quayle, said the Vice President was serving a deliberate purpose in reassuring restive conservatives that Bush did not go too far in making concessions to the Soviets at Malta.

"He's an anchor to windward with regard to the conservative base of the party," Daniels said. "I think conservatives, even the most skeptical, are very pleased and have to be in a good mood watching these events unfold. All that's required to keep them that way is some sense that the President is not getting carried away.

"The Vice President, without any fundamental divergence from the President's policy, served that role," he added.

(David Hoffman, Washington Post, A24)

Dan, Prez Differ On Soviets

A day after telling NATO allies that Mikhail Gorbachev's policy on Eastern Europe "absolutely mandates new thinking" about the Soviets, President Bush picked up a newspaper to discover that Vice President Quayle had a different opinion....

Following the Vice President's (Washington Post) interview, National Security Adviser Scowcroft was dispatched to the White House press room to explain the apparently differing views of Bush and Quayle.

"We have an Administration that is very closely aligned but I think it's probably not possible for people to speak literally with one voice," Scowcroft said.

"There may, from time to time, be a difference of perspective but there is no difference in the substance of the policies we're pursuing," he insisted. (Maureen Santini, New York Daily News, A15)

SUMMIT AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS UNDER FIRE FROM CONSERVATIVES

As President Bush pressed his top aides to accelerate work on a strategic arms reduction treaty, conservatives opened a new drive to slow what they see as a dangerous rush toward an arms control disaster.

Led by Paul Nitze,...the critics charge that Bush was stampeded by world opinion into agreeing with Soviet President Gorbachev in Malta to conclude the START treaty by next year.

"The President showed a lack of understanding on how the negotiations are going by ordering this deadline," Nitze said Tuesday. "That's the reverse of how you negotiate successfully. You try to put the pressure on the other guy.

"I have some experience in these things," said Nitze, who oversaw the crafting of the 1987 IMF Treaty and other U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons negotiations during the past two decades. (David Wood, Newhouse)

-more-

SDI GIVEN LOW PRIORITY AT SUMMIT, AIDES SAY

he SDI, the most contentious issue between the U.S. and the Soviet since 1983 and the one that dominated the Geneva, Reykjavik and gton summits, virtually dropped from view at the Malta summit last nd between President Bush and President Gorbachev, according to articipants.

enior U.S. aides said Tuesday that the issue of strategic defense, still not settled, did not play a major role in discussions at Malta, ting that Moscow has given it a lower priority. Several aides said o their knowledge, Gorbachev never mentioned it....

he shift in the tone and content of the dialogue from contentiousness peration in this and other areas was described by one senior stration official as the most striking aspect of the two days of talks the Soviet luxury liner Maxim Gorky docked at Malta.

(Don Oberdorfer & David Hoffman, Washington Post, A25)

SOVIETS URGED BAN ON SOME NUCLEAR ARMS AT SEA
U.S. Officials Suggest Gorbachev Wants To Spark Debate On Broad Naval Constraints

viet President Gorbachev proposed during his Malta meeting with nt Bush that the two superpowers agree to ban all tactical, or ange, nuclear weapons from surface warships, senior U.S. officials esday.

S. officials believe Gorbachev made the proposal to draw the U.S. broad discussion of naval arms constraints, including potential ons in the number of surface warships.

t Bush, expressing long-held U.S. policy, said he generally oved of superpower naval arms control negotiations, the officials

sh "made it clear that we couldn't negotiate (this) because it enhance our security," a senior official said on condition of ty. The Gorbachev proposal would ban thousands of nuclear s carried by the two navies' surface fleets.

(Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, A25)

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR NAJIBULLAH BLOCKED POLITICAL HEADWAY AT MALTA

e Soviet Union will continue supporting the pro-Moscow leader of stan despite President Bush's insistence at the Malta summit that t Najibullah's ouster would hasten settlement of the war in that , according to U.S. officials.

sh described Najibullah as "unacceptable" to U.S.-backed Moslem s, but Soviet President Gorbachev said he was a national figure gaining popularity in the country, the officials said Tuesday.

sh and Gorbachev were unable to break new ground at their wer summit to end the conflict between government and Moslem n Afghanistan even though the last Soviet troops departed in y.

(Barry Schweid, AP)

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times A-1
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 6 Dec '89

Pentagon readies rescue operation

By Paul Bedard
and Rowan Scarborough
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Military contingency plans have been prepared to free Americans caught in the cross fire of Philippine and rebel troops, according to Bush administration officials who remained hopeful that all the captives would be released and President Corazon Aquino could negotiate a settlement.

As the planning continued last night, government and rebel forces declared a temporary cease-fire and started evacuating Americans and other foreigners from the embattled Makati financial district of Manila. A complete evacuation was expected by midday.

While President Bush remained committed to Mrs. Aquino's efforts, the Pentagon and White House were forming rescue plans that call for the use of American Marines trained in anti-terrorist tactics, administration officials said.

"We don't want to speculate on possible actions or contingency actions" if it becomes necessary to free Americans trapped in Manila hotels, said White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater.

But, he added, "You can be assured that the Pentagon has contingency plans for everything."

At the Pentagon, spokesman Pete Williams said he was not aware of contingency plans to use the military.

"Of course, we're sort of in a funny situation here," Mr. Williams said. "We don't discuss future planning, which obviously would be one of the questions I'm sure you'd all like to go into, but we just don't do that."

Mr. Fitzwater said "there still is a continuing threat" to Americans, despite the Philippine take-back of the two military bases held by the rebels and the surrender of hundreds of mutinous troops.

As the coup attempt by some 3,000 rebel troops reached its height Friday, the administration approved using Air Force F-4 fighters from Clark Air Base outside Manila to pin down rebel planes that had bombed the presidential palace.

The United States also has sent arms and medical supplies to Mrs. Aquino's troops.

But several administration officials said Mr. Bush does not want to increase American involvement — such as sending in the Marines — because it would provide fuel to Mrs. Aquino's opponents. They charge she can't hold power without U.S. support.

Administration officials also suggested that direct American troop involvement in the fighting could undermine negotiations to keep Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station.

Brent Scowcroft, White House national security adviser, said Mrs. Aquino was "trying very hard to get those civilians out of the area and out of danger while she continues cleaning up the points of resistance."

He said Mr. Bush phoned Mrs. Aquino Monday night to "indicate his strong support for democratic government in the Philippines, and to express his concern over the safety of Americans."

Before evacuations began early yesterday, there were some 100,000 Americans in the Philippines, including civilians and military personnel at Clark and Subic.

At Clark, 23,000 active-duty personnel and dependents are on "restricted travel," meaning they can move only between the base and their homes, according to Col. Bud Ross, a base spokesman.

The base is under "increased readiness for threat conditions" and is restricting normal access, Col. Ross said.

Col. Ross said that, despite the rebel uprising, the base went ahead with a scheduled weeklong exercise that has F-4s flying daily sorties. "We're not flying over Manila. But we normally don't fly over there," he said.

An administration official said Mr. Bush and others in the administration were pressing Mrs. Aquino to quickly negotiate an end to the coup attempt — the sixth since she took office in 1986.

The officials also disputed claims that the Manila standoff resembled last month's confinement of Army Green Berets in the San Salvador Sheraton by anti-government rebels. In that case, the White House said American lives were threatened and Army Delta Force commandos were dispatched. The Green Berets escaped unharmed after the rebels fled.

"In the Salvadoran situation, the [rebel group] was going out of its way to go into residences to get innocent civilians and to use them as shields to prevent an army attack. I'm not aware that that's been done in the Philippines," said State Department deputy spokesman Richard Boucher.

An Army intelligence source said yesterday the administration can afford to wait a considerable amount of time as long as the Americans in Manila are not harmed.

The source said any plan to free them would likely involve Delta Force anti-terrorist units stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C., which can be flown to the Philippines via Air Force transports.

The Army also has a special forces unit in Okinawa, Japan, which trains in the Philippines and conducts intelligence-gathering operations there, the source said.

Bush cites summit failures

WT 12-6-89 A1

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The White House curbed its Malta summit euphoria and highlighted U.S.-Soviet differences yesterday as it tried to gloss over a split between President Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on European economic unification.

While accenting the satisfaction Mr. Bush felt in his efforts to thaw relations with the Kremlin, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said the superpower leaders failed to reach agreement on regional issues or a new chemical arms reduction plan.

At a special appearance in the White House briefing room, Mr. Scowcroft told reporters that Mr. Bush "is very pleased with his trip and, in his opinion, he achieved his objectives, both in Malta [and] with his allies in NATO" during Monday's meeting in Brussels, Belgium.

But asked if Mr. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev settled the nearly two dozen issues raised by Mr. Bush, Mr. Scowcroft said, "There were some that they didn't agree to."

During his meeting with reporters, Mr. Scowcroft ticked off a list of issues on which Moscow and Washington remain at odds. Soviet military and economic support of Nicaragua and Afghanistan topped the chart.

"It's a very complex period of change, and you can look at some things that indicate a very positive direction to that change. You can look at others, like, for example, Central America, and say, 'Hey, look, you know, that hasn't changed at all.' And the president pointed that out to Chairman Gorbachev," Mr. Scowcroft said.

Fueling those concerns were reports yesterday that the Soviets have shipped several helicopters to Nicaragua that presumably could be armed and sent to rebels in El Salvador — despite specific Kremlin promises that the shipments have stopped.

"It's all serious," said White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. "Our position remains the same. That is, we're very concerned about it and we believe the Soviet Union has an influence that should be brought to bear on this issue."

Even Mr. Bush said his talk with Mr. Gorbachev "wasn't all sweetness and light," telling reporters Monday that the Soviets must exert their influence and force Cuba and East Europe to stop sending arms to Nicaragua and Marxist rebels in El Salvador.

In addition to filing a protest with Mr. Gorbachev on Nicaragua during the summit, Mr. Bush also objected to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, where it has installed a government, Mr. Scowcroft said.

While refusing to discuss the exchange between the leaders on Afghanistan, Mr. Scowcroft said the two left Malta "still apart on that . . ."

The retired general and close confidant of Mr. Bush also pointed to Mr. Gorbachev's refusal to endorse Washington's proposal to reach an agreement next year to cut the superpowers' chemical weapons to 20 percent of the U.S. stockpile.

The superpower leaders did, however, reach agreement to speed up negotiations on treaties to cut strategic nuclear weapons and conventional arms in Europe — major advances that got top billing in weekend White House news briefings.

Mr. Bush, returning to the Oval Office after the four-day journey, received a standing ovation from his Cabinet, which was summoned to the White House for a briefing on his talks with Mr. Gorbachev.

Mr. Fitzwater said yesterday the nation's taxpayers may feel the impact of the arms reductions after they are made. Asked about the so-called "peace dividend," he said the fiscal 1991 budget probably won't feel the cuts, and suggested waiting for the fiscal 1992-94 budgets.

Vice President Dan Quayle, a conservative skeptic of Moscow, paved the way for the administration's downplaying of Malta when he told The Washington Post there has been little change in Soviet foreign policy despite the string of democratic reforms sweeping Eastern Europe.

A Quayle associate said the vice president was playing a "bad cop" role in the administration's evolving relationship with the Kremlin. Mr. Quayle recently made headlines when he clashed with Secretary of State James A. Baker III over Soviet reforms.

Mr. Scowcroft, however, said there are no policy differences between Mr. Quayle and Mr. Bush, only a conflict in perspective.

"The vice president had his own perspective on the situation. The president has made quite clear where he stands, and that is, he underlines his support for the progess being made in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe toward politcal pluralism and turn toward market economics," Mr. Scowcroft said.

Mr. Quayle, in an interview with Knight-Ridder newspaper editors and reporters, tempered his comments, saying he should have called the Soviet Union an authoritarian, rather than a totalitarian, state.

As the White House tied up the loose ends from the Malta trip, it also set out to clean up confusion over Mr. Bush's remarks Monday in Brussels about support for quick European economic unification.

At a press conference, Mr. Bush called for an "intensified effort" to integrate the European Economic Community — a speeded-up plan adamantly opposed by Mrs. Thatcher.

After hearing that his comments prompted British newspapers to describe a huge rift between Mr. Bush and Mrs. Thatcher, the president early yesterday telephoned Mrs. Thatcher to assure her that the United States had not changed its position, one that is in line with the prime minister's.

"The 'special relationship' is unchanged," Mr. Scowcroft said.

In an address to Parliament describing the phone call, Mrs. Thatcher said, "His views on European integration had not changed in any way, and there is no change in his position, which is one of full support for the completion of the single market in 1992 and for an open and liberal Europe."

Summit Remarks Illustrate Quayle's Role as Envoy to the Right

WP 12-6-89 By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer A24

Vice President Quayle's skeptical warning this week about Soviet foreign policy demonstrated anew that he has President Bush's blessing to serve as an ambassador to conservative critics of the administration, White House officials and other analysts said yesterday.

In an interview Monday with The Washington Post, Quayle said it would be a mistake to interpret the outcome of the Malta summit as a sign that Soviet foreign policy has changed. His remarks contrasted with those of Bush the same day, when the president said Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has displayed "new thinking" in the way he tolerates the reform movements in Eastern Europe and in his willingness to consider large cuts in the size of Soviet armies in Europe.

While Bush was hailing the "threshold of a new era" in U.S.-Soviet relations, Quayle said that "the new thinking and the real reform is in the area of economics." He added, "I don't think they've changed much in foreign policy" and "you're still dealing with a totalitarian government."

Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., president of the Hudson Institute and a Republican political strategist close to Quayle, said the vice president was serving a deliberate purpose in reassuring restive conservatives that Bush did not go too far in making concessions to the Soviets at Malta.

"He's an anchor to windward with regard to the conservative base of the party," Daniels said. "I think conservatives, even the most skeptical, are very pleased and have to be in a good mood watching these events unfold. All that's required to keep them that way is some sense that the president is not getting carried away.

"The vice president, without any fundamental divergence from the president's policy, served that role," he added.

White House officials said Bush is not concerned about Quayle's more pessimistic assessment, even though it appeared to run counter to the upbeat statements Bush and other U.S. officials made about the summit. Bush plans events and speeches this week and next to highlight his claim that the summit improved superpower cooperation.

Yesterday Quayle sought to soften his comments somewhat. He told Knight-Ridder Newspapers he had erred in calling the Soviet Union a "totalitarian" state. "I suppose a better definition of the Soviet Union, rather than a totalitarian state, would be an authoritarian state. Still, a non-free government," he said.

In the past, Bush has often used Quayle, Cabinet members and the White House staff as surrogates. They float ideas and proposals to test the reaction, and they take the heat and criticism so Bush can remain above controversy.

When Bush was vice president, he defined his role as requiring total loyalty to President Ronald Reagan; he avoided any public remarks seeming to differ with Reagan. But he has not demanded the same of Quayle, and the vice president has been willing, within limits, to strike a more conservative tone on such topics as Central America and the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Daniels said Bush has "encouraged the diversity as long as no one doubts who the boss is." He said Bush has not discouraged Quayle from taking such positions because "he wants him to do well and develop his own identity."

Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security adviser, told reporters yesterday that "there is no policy difference" on the Soviets between Bush and Quayle, but rather "a slight difference in perspectives." He noted that Bush had confronted the Soviets about arms shipments to Central America during the summit, an issue also emphasized by Quayle.

"We have an administration that is very closely aligned," Scowcroft said, "but I think it is probably not possible for people to speak literally with one voice." He added, "I don't think there is any confusion" in Gorbachev's mind about the U.S. policy.

However, pessimistic assessments such as Quayle's have in the past caused problems in Gorbachev's view of administration policy. Earlier this year, Quayle and other officials, including Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney and deputy national security adviser Robert Gates, said they had doubts about Gorbachev's reform program. Bush acknowledged at the summit that there had been some "misunderstanding" with the Soviet leader in this period.

WASHINGTON TIMES DEC. 7, 1989 Pg. 5

White House continues to tone down post-Malta euphoria

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Faced with a growing chorus of warnings from conservatives and others suspicious of Soviet good faith, the White House continued yesterday to tone down President Bush's optimistic post-summit claim that the Cold War is ending.

Since Mr. Bush's return from Malta, administration officials — such as Vice President Dan Quayle and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft — have shifted the emphasis of the summit from the warm embrace of the Soviets to the cold reality that many differences remain.

Not unexpectedly, senior administration conservatives have led the effort to prevent unquestioning acceptance of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's promises to change the politics and economy of his country.

"A lot of conservatives have weighed in," an administration official said yesterday. "Everybody's basically happy that we're talking to the Russians, but as to trusting them to do everything they said, there's a lot of caution."

Mr. Quayle, the conservative voice in the White House, said: "It's in the American character to take advantage of opportunities, to drive ahead boldly. But Americans are also cautious and prudent."

Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also added a cautionary note. He said yesterday: "[The Soviet Union] is the single nation on earth that has the capability to destroy the United States. I don't want to sound like a Cold War warrior, but that's just a plain fact of life."

He added, "The Soviets have not done anything to suggest they are planning to cut back their investment in strategic forces."

As the administration expanded efforts to brake the euphoric spin on the summit results, the White House added naval arms control to the list of U.S.-Soviet differences that already includes Central America, Afghanistan and chemical arms reduction.

Mr. Gorbachev pressed the president at Malta on a plan to ban short-range nuclear weapons aboard superpower navies, said White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater. But Mr. Bush nixed the Kremlin leader's plan as "unacceptable to us because the United States is a naval power," Mr. Fitzwater said.

At his post-summit news conference, Mr. Bush said the Malta talks were "not an arms control meeting in the sense of trying to hammer out details. We still have differences with the Soviet Union — he knows it and I know it — as relates to naval forces."

Nonetheless, Mr. Bush proclaimed, "We stand on the threshold of a new era."

Many leaders in Washington remained skeptical and warned the administration not to confuse the radical reforms taking place in Eastern Europe with promised changes in the Soviet Union.

"I think this summit is not the end" of the Cold War, said Rep. Les Aspin, Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. He said such a view "is based on the assumption [East European reform] will stay on track. Clearly it's yet to be proven that will happen. . . ."

Describing the meeting as "kind of an OK summit," Mr. Aspin sharply criticized the one issue on which the administration claimed the most success — strategic and conventional arms control. He characterized as "disingenuous" Mr. Bush's conclusion that a new arms agreement is closer now that he and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev have agreed to expedite the negotiations.

Arizona Republican Sen. John McCain, a conservative on the Armed Services Committee, also warned the administration to continue a hard-line with the Soviets, who he said haven't accepted inside their own borders the reforms sweeping Eastern Europe. "There's still the likelihood we could see a kind of a Tiananmen Square move, a move to repress," he said.

"At some point we may be able to look back and say [the Cold War] was over then. [But] keep your powder dry," advised Ben Wattenberg, a senior fellow of the conservative American Enterprise Institute.

The Human Rights Watch's Cathy Fitzpatrick, angered that Mr. Bush didn't make human rights a main topic of the summit, said: "There's too much good faith about things the Soviets are promising but aren't doing."

"A good deal of prudence is warranted," said Michael Mandelbaum of the moderate Council on Foreign Relations. "This is not the end of the Cold war. But we can see it from here," he said.

Several recent polls side with the cautious path the administration is now walking. The poll in the January edition of American Enterprise, AEI's magazine, shows that Americans are pleased with the prudent approach and continue to view the Soviets as militarily aggressive.

And a Wall Street Journal poll released yesterday found that a majority of Americans aren't willing to declare the Cold War over and are reluctant to see Washington send direct economic aid to the Soviet Union.

WASHINGTON POST DECEMBER 7, 1989 Pg. 2

MARY McGRORY

Custodian of Lost Causes

President Bush was flying so high after Malta he gave the impression he could have made it back across the ocean without Air Force One. But when he got back to Washington, his vice president brought him back to earth in a hurry.

Dan Quayle told The Post's David S. Broder the day that Bush was saluting a "new era" that there is no change in Soviet foreign policy. Bush was persuaded differently, he told us in a Brussels news conference, by the thunderous events in Eastern Europe.

Quayle is still a doubter. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary are "domestic issues," not foreign policy questions, Quayle averred. Mikhail Gorbachev was just cleaning closets in the Evil Empire, it seems.

Quayle's rejection of the "new thinking" that Bush advocates has not gotten him into trouble. Often, when a subordinate treads on a triumph, accounts of his being sent to his room are leaked to the news media.

But Brent Scowcroft, Bush's solemn national security adviser, said at a White House briefing that Quayle was not guilty of heresy, merely "a slight difference in perspective."

Quayle's perspective, of course, is from the right. He probably didn't plan to rain on Bush's parade. When he fell to Soviet-bashing, he was doing his duty, which he sees as comforting the distraught right. Bush had the right in mind when he was briefly petulant in Brussels at being asked whether the Cold War is over. Gorbachev had said it is, but Bush, wishing to spare conservative sensibilities, took the Fifth.

Although Bush puts a high premium on loyalty, he permits doctrinal differences—unthinkable in his own abject vice presidency—because the right wing is in such pain over current events. If Quayle wants to dissent on Malta, it's okay because someone has to persuade conservatives that life is worth living without the Soviets to kick around.

And it's okay, because nobody pays any attention to what he says.

Ordinarily, Quayle's remark might have driven the arms-control community around the bend and set it to fuming that Bush was secretly sliding back into hostility and suspicion of the early Reagan years. But when asked about it at an Arms Control Association meeting that was awash in euphoria, Executive Director Spurgeon Keeny said comfortably, "George Bush crossed the Rubicon in Malta."

Bettino Craxi, Italy's Socialist leader, thinks that Quayle's comment will have no effect in Europe, since "the echo of his statements does not reach Rome."

"It is too bad," he added diplomatically at a meeting at The Post, "because maybe he is saying some wise things."

"Wise things" still evade Quayle. He continues to impress his countrymen with the depth of his vacuity. He has been shopping for a defining issue, but so far the hunt has only made him the custodian of lost causes.

He wants to keep the Cold War going.

He is "Star Wars' " most clamorous booster.

He is a cheerleader for the mission to Mars, which nobody thinks, even with the "peace dividend," will ever take off.

He seems more interested in objects than in people.

Quayle could do anything he likes. He could, for instance, visit job-training centers. His Senate career was rescued from mediocrity by his sponsorship of a sensible bill on job training. But you don't hear him talking about job-training centers. He talks instead about a supersonic transport that will at most affect a handful of overpaid businessmen.

He could get interested in the District, where he has lived for almost a year. It is run by a mayor widely believed to be a drug user. It has the highest homicide rate in the nation. Washington Monthly calls it the "worst-governed city in America." It has all the problems of today—drugs, teenage pregnancy, joblessness, homelessness, despair.

Quayle is not reaching out to anyone, only gadgets. He sees his constituency as the flat-earthers, his only occupation to tell them they are right, which involves making silly statements about foreign policy. They demean him, because they emphasize of how little consequence he is. No one bothers to refute him.

Bush may be perfectly satisfied with Quayle's performance. Bush has already said he wants him on the ticket again in 1992. And presidents get in the habit of thinking that people only hear the statements intended for them. The president thinks that the people who tuned in on his Brussels news conference and heard him salute a new day in world affairs tune out on Quayle saying the exact opposite. But some people listen to everything, and they think what is going on is a tacky and transparent attempt to have it both ways.

And it is strictly bush, and with a capital letter, too.

aiding Marxist rebels here. Police say they discovered a large arms cache in the backyard of Casolo's house. But her arrest led government criticis to charge that the young American was set up by security police, an attempt to justify a crackdown on international aid groups suspected of having pro-rebel sympathies.

Apparently hoping to refute those allegations, authorities have released this videotape purporting to show the pre-dawn raid on Casolo's house. They have also made public copies of a statement allegedly signed by Casolo in which she says she buried tapes of protest songs, human rights reports and other documents in her yard, but she denies any connection with the weapons. In the videotape, Casolo is seen hiding her face.

JENNIFER CASOLO: You don't need my picture. Okay?

TUNNELL: Police say they acted on a tip from this man, whom they describe as an informant and former rebel gun-runner.

The videotape is not conclusive, but it adds to what American officials here have said is a substantial body of evidence against Casolo. It appears to contradict some of Casolo's statements since her arrest.

CASOLO: They showed me arms. I don't know if they found them in my house.

TUNNELL: The Casolo case is emerging as a major test of the Salvadoran justice system. Many of Casolo's supporters do not believe she can receive a fair trial here, but the U.S. Government has not intervened and appears to be willing to let Salvadoran justice run its course.

Doug Tunnell, CBS News, San Salvador.

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC-TV
6:30 P.M. DECEMBER 9

U.S.-Chinese Relations

GARRICK UTLEY: When can you bury the past, or should you? Six months after the killings on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the crushing of the democracy movement there, President Bush has sent Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Adviser, on a surprise mission announced only after Scowcroft had arrived in China. There today, the White House official said, "It is time for the two countries to set aside disagreements over the past." Not everyone agrees with that.

Here's Sandy Gilmour.

SANDY GILMOUR: After months of deteriorating Chinese-American relations, President Bush's National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, made it clear he was on a mission of reconciliation.

BRENT SCOWCROFT: My colleagues and I have come here today as friends, to resume our important dialogue.

GILMOUR: Scowcroft said the President had sent him and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to China to brief officials on the Bush-Gorbachev Malta Summit. He said Soviets and Americans have nothing to hide from the Chinese. Then Scowcroft acknowledged differences with the Chinese over last spring's massacre of Chinese students. But the overall tone was "Let's be friends."

SCOWCROFT: We also come today to bring new impetus and vigor to our bilateral relationship and to seek new areas of agreement: economic, political, and strategic.

GILMOUR: Chinese-American relations have been chilly ever since Chinese troops crushed the pro-democracy movement last June, killing hundreds, perhaps thousands. Communist officials have ruthlessly suppressed all democratic activity since then.

Critics say President Bush's response has been mild, with limited economic sanctions, blocked military sales to China, and suspended high-level contacts, which have now resumed.

The Chinese see Scowcroft's visit as a definite thaw. At dinner, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen proposed a toast to American friends and to what he called the resumption of normal Sino-American relations, and also, he said, to President Bush.

Stephen Solarz, a ranking Democratic Congressman, accused President Bush of kowtowing to the Chinese.

REP. STEPHEN SOLARZ: Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger will undoubtedly be welcomed by Deng Xiaoping and by Li Peng, the "Butchers of Beijing."

From Boston, Chinese radical student Wu'er Kaixi said the President has forgotten democratic students.

WU'ER KAIXI: I hope that President Bush can remember what he said. And that is, stand by the young Chinese who stand in front of the tanks.

GILMOUR: An Administration official indicated today's visit was not announced beforehand to keep down speculation and advance criticism. The President has said China is too important to cut off.

PRESIDENT BUSH: There is enormous geopolitical reasons for us to have relations with the People's Republic of China. And yet there is this affront, the Tiananmen Square situation. And so we've got to try now.

GILMOUR: The timing of this extraordinary trip is clearly tied to the Malta Summit and to China's fear of the Soviet Union. An Administration official said, "No one wants China to feel that America and the Soviet Union are out there carving up the world behind China's back."

Sandy Gilmour, NBC News, the White House.

Soviet Political Reform

UTLEY: What is happening in East Germany and the rest of Eastern Europe is contagious. The Soviet Union is not immune. Today, Mikhail Gorbachev said that the Soviet Constitution could be changed, one day, to allow other political parties along with the Communists. He was speaking at a session of the Communist Party's Central Committee. But Gorbachev warned against pushing reforms too far, too fast.

Some critics of reform say it's not going far enough, fast enough.

Here's Peter Kent.

PETER KENT: The Central Committee's closed-door strategy meeting in the Kremlin was held amid speculation of a growing split over the issue of the Communist Party's monopoly of political power here. The second session of the new parliament, which begins Tuesday, is expected to feature passionate debate over Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, which guarantees the party's "leading and guiding role in society."

Pravda, the Communist Party's daily newspaper, follows the Gorbachev line,

A Gamble to Ease Public Anger

WP 12-10-89 A 7

By Molly Moore and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush dispatched two senior officials to Beijing Friday in a risky gamble with twin objectives: repairing relations with China and prodding the U.S. public, outraged by last summer's massacre at Tiananmen Square, toward accepting reconciliation with that nation, administration sources said yesterday.

But the shift from the administration's previous policy—that China must improve its human-rights practices before normal relations could resume with the United States—produced outcries among some members of Congress.

They decry Bush's actions as a willingness to return to "business as usual" before Beijing has addressed what the United States considers major human-rights deficiencies. Several said the visit to Beijing by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger could provoke Congress to impose tough new sanctions against China.

One administration official familiar with Bush's strategy said: "We've broken the ice by going there. We are taking the first step, which kind of shocks our public into it."

The official said Bush recognized his public opinion gamble in making overtures to Beijing and gave his aides "explicit instructions" to tell Chinese leaders that he will expect a signal from them before moving further.

One such signal could be a resolution of the controversy involving astrophysicist Fang Lizhi, a pro-democracy dissident who has been sheltered in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing with his wife since the government's crackdown after the student demonstrations. Chinese authorities have threatened to arrest the couple as counterrevolutionaries.

The surprise visit, announced in a brief statement released at 2 a.m. yesterday, stunned and angered some members of Congress.

"It appears clear that the massacre in Tiananmen Square has made no difference to the administration," said Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), who sponsored legislation, vetoed by Bush, to allow Chinese students to remain in the United States after their visas expired. She added, "The night flight to Beijing . . . makes everything we've said about our disgust

fairs subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs.

"It must be devastating to the students who are either hiding or still hoping for change," said Rep. Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.), a member of the subcommittee. "Chinese officials are certain to be emboldened to know that they can persecute their people and have the benefit of high-level contacts with the United States."

At last weekend's Malta summit, Bush continued to tell Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that there can be better trade relations between the Soviet Union and the United States only after immigration and other human-rights reforms are made part of Soviet law.

The decision to make the high-profile 24-hour visit to the Chinese capital followed indications that Bush was prepared to rescind his hard-line attitude toward restoring normal relations, one administration official said. He cited Bush's veto of Pelosi's Chinese students bill, resumption of work in the United States by Chinese on joint military sales projects and Secretary of State James A. Baker III's meeting with his Chinese counterpart in Paris at the recent conference on Cambodia. Bush, however, also issued an executive order granting visa extensions to Chinese students in the United States.

The White House said the purpose of the visit was "to inform the Chinese leadership of his [Bush's] discussions" with Gorbachev at Malta.

But one informed administration official said the announced mission was just a "good pretext" for the more ambitious effort to restore relations between the two nations.

"We just had a meeting with the Soviet Union; we can't leave the Chinese out of it," the official said. "You can't go ahead with U.S.-Soviet relations leaving the Chinese out of it. We've got to get back speaking to each other."

In the 2 a.m. statement, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said: "The president views China as an important country in world affairs. While he deplores the tragedy at Tiananmen Square last June, China nevertheless remains part of the world around us."

Administration officials said the Scowcroft-Eagleburger mission was worked out through efforts of the Chinese ambassador in Washington and James R. Lilley, U.S. ambassador to Beijing, well before their visit.

U.S. Envoys Visit China to Improve Ties

WP 12-10-89 By Daniel Southerland A1
Washington Post Foreign Service

BEIJING, Dec. 9—U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, arriving in Beijing on a surprise visit today, told the Chinese leadership the Bush administration wants to bring "new impetus and vigor" into Sino-U.S. relations and overcome the deterioration that had occurred since Chinese troops crushed a democracy movement in June.

The visit by Bush's assistant for national security affairs, who was accompanied by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, broke a six-month ban by Washington on high-level U.S. contacts with China. Bush imposed the ban in early June in the wake of the army's suppression of the movement and the killing of hundreds of civilians.

The Scowcroft trip, which was warmly received by the Chinese leadership, represented an American concession to China, because Beijing has consistently insisted that it was up to the United States to take the first step in repairing the breach in relations. Scowcroft's visit is likely to prompt Japan and West European nations also to reopen high-level contacts with China and to reassess sanctions imposed on this country following the army massacre of demonstrators, a Western diplomat said.

The visit came as a surprise partly because China has ignored suggestions from Western nations that it ease its continuing crackdown on dissent or that it show more concern for victims of the massacre around Tiananmen Square. Authorities recently started a new wave of investigations of suspected pro-democracy activists, according to Chinese sources.

The visit can also be seen in part as an attempt to bolster the position of "moderates" within the Chinese leadership who want to improve Sino-U.S. relations.

Scowcroft and Eagleburger arrived this afternoon aboard a special plane and almost immediately began talks with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen.

[They met Sunday with senior leader Deng Xiaoping, who agreed that Sino-U.S. ties must be improved "for world peace and stability," the Associated Press reported. Scowcroft and Eagleburger also met Premier Li Peng and Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin. They were to leave Beijing Sunday, the AP said.]

Both Scowcroft and Qian made positive, conciliatory-sounding statements in toasts delivered at a dinner tonight hosted by Qian at the state guesthouse in Beijing.

Scowcroft, in his toast, said he had been instructed by Bush to come to Beijing to brief the Chinese leadership about his recent summit meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta. But Scowcroft added that "we also come today to bring new impetus and vigor into our bilateral relationship and seek areas of agreement—economic, political and strategic."

"My colleagues and I," he said at the start of his toast, "have come here today as friends to resume our important dialogue on international questions of vital interest to both our nations."

Scowcroft called for "bold measures" to overcome the deterioration that has occurred in Sino-U.S. relations, while noting some of the tensions in the relationship.

"Speaking as a friend," he said, "I would not be honest if I did not acknowledge that we have profound areas of disagreement—on the events at Tiananmen, on the sweeping changes in Eastern Europe. We see your complaints about us in the pages of People's Daily."

Scowcroft said the path ahead for the two nations "will not be smooth" but that they should work to remove irritants, isolate for another time areas of disagreement and "outline broad areas where agreement is possible."

"In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces," he said.

He concluded the toast, which was vigorously applauded by Chinese leaders, by saying, "We extend our hand in friendship and hope you will do the same."

Qian, in his toast, said that important differences between the United States and China cannot obliterate the two nations' "major common interests." He called for "increased contact and better communication" between the two nations.

Qian referred to Scowcroft as "an old friend" whose visit would help to overcome differences between the United States and China. Qian's toast was the most positive public statement made by a senior Chinese official concerning the United States in months.

In dispatching Scowcroft, Bush appeared to be taking the advice of former president Richard Nixon, who visited here in October and proposed a series of steps aimed at improving Sino-U.S. relations, including one calling on Bush to consider resuming high-level contacts with Beijing.

Most U.S. Embassy officials in Beijing appeared to have had little notice of Scowcroft's arrival, and some seemed surprised to learn he was in Beijing even after he arrived.

The ban on high-level U.S. contacts with China had been broken twice previously, when Secretary of State James A. Baker III met with Qian in Paris and at the United Nations, exceptions ostensibly made so the two sides could discuss important international issues.

Western nations halted government loans and suspended the delivery of military equipment to China following the army crackdown in June. But Bush has opposed further sanctions and urged Congress to leave decision-making on China in his hands.

China has accused the United States and other Western nations of attempting to subvert China's socialist system.

An added source of tension is the U.S. Embassy's sheltering of China's most wanted dissident, Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist who fled to the mission amid the June crackdown.

contending that abolishing the single-party system would not promote reform.

The party paper does not mention that the parliament in the Soviet Republic of Lithuania abolished its Article 6 this week, legalizing a multiparty system, a move that the parliament of the neighboring Baltic state of Estonia is expected to follow later this month.

In Moscow today, a meeting of reformist members of the Soviet parliament plotting their strategy. Human rights activist Andre Sakharov has called for a two-hour general strike on Monday to increase pressure for an end to Communist exclusivity. But most speakers rejected strike action as too drastic for now.

"We should use the political machinery available to us," this reformer said.

But that doesn't mean Mikhail Gorbachev's off the hook. Gorbachev will come under great pressure in parliament next week. He'll have to explain why it's all right for Communists in East Germany and Czechoslovakia to lose their monolithic control of government, but not acceptable, as Gorbachev still maintains, for a multiparty system here.

Peter Kent, NBC News, Moscow.

ABC WORLD NEWS SATURDAY ABC-TV
6:30 P.M. DECEMBER 9

Pre-empted by local programming.

ABC WORLD NEWS SUNDAY ABC-TV
6:30 P.M. DECEMBER 10

U.S.-Chinese Relations

FORREST SAWYER: For the first time since the Chinese Army crushed the pro-democracy movement last June, a high-level U.S. delegation has traveled to Beijing to meet with China's senior leaders. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft told Deng Xiaoping the Bush Administration wants to work with him.

The Administration is calling the visit an exception to the ban on such contacts, but critics are already accusing the President of caving in to Communist hard-liners.

David Ensor has more.

DAVID ENSOR: General Scowcroft's visit to China clearly delighted Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders, who have complained bitterly about U.S. sanctions imposed after they crushed China's pro-democracy movement. But the decision to send Scowcroft left the Bush Administration with some explaining to do. The President waved off questions this morning, leaving it to his Secretary of State.

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER: I don't think that the American people would want to see their government compound the tragedy that happened in Tiananmen Square. And it is our judgment, it is the President's judgment and the Administration's judgment that that's what might happen if we seek to isolate China from the rest of the international community.

ENSOR: Critics charge that by dropping its demand that

China clean up its human rights record before relations could be improved, the Bush Administration is kowtowing to Beijing.

REP. SOLARZ: It makes a mockery of the Administration's own policy of suspending high-level meetings with the Chinese.

MERLE GOLDMAN [Boston Unviersity]: It's a double standard. It's contradictory. It's inconsistent. And it makes America look very, in some ways, almost weak, because we're doing what the regime wants us to do. And this is not a particularly good regime, that we want to do what they tell us to do.

ENSOR: Administration officials knew the Scowcroft trip would be controversial, but they believe an improved relationship with China would help stabilize the region and give the U.S. added diplomatic leverage with Soviet bloc nations.

BRENT SCOWCROFT [toast]: To the great Chinese people and to U.S.-Chinese friendship.

ENSOR: Administration officials say now that President Bush has made the first move, as demanded by China, it's up to the Chinese leadership next to make some gesture on human rights as a signal that they want the dialogue with the U.S. to go further.

David Ensor, ABC News, Washington.

Soviet Political Reform

SAWYER: The challenge to the supremacy of the Communist Party is also taking place inside the Soviet Union. But Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze says the government will try to use persuasion, not military force, to control rebellious Soviet republics. Shevardnadze today acknowledged that Communist Party control is being widely debated in the Soviet Union and said, quote, "It is for the people to decide."

The Soviets face the strongest attack on Communist control from the Baltic republics. The Lithuanian parliament has already voted to legalize a multiparty system. Rick Inderfurth reports the rest of the Soviet Union is also raising a challenge.

RICK INDERFURTH: Soviet citizens went to the polls in the Baltic Republics of Estonia and Latvia, kicking off a new round of elections that could transform the Soviet Union from a one-party state to a multiparty system, whether they call it that or not. Communist Party candidates in the two republics are expected to get trounced by a grass-roots movement known as the Popular Front.

In Moscow, several thousand people took part in a demonstration marking Human Rights Day. But that wasn't their only concern. "Down with the party's monopoly of power," this man shouted. "Get rid of Article 6," said this sign, referring to the provision in the Soviet Constitution which guarantees that monopoly.

Across the city, another demonstration. This one sponsored by the radical Democratic Union and without a permit from authorities. Signs read, "Communism, the Plague of the 20th Century." Lenin, the father of the Soviet state, received this treatment [picture torn up]. When the protesters refused to leave, the police moved in.

NETWORK NEWS SUMMARY

(Monday Evening, December 11)

CHINA/SCOWCROFT TRIP

CBS's Dan Rather: President Bush defended himself today against criticism that he has capitulated to China's Deng Xiaoping. The criticism came after Mr. Bush secretly sent a top-level mission to help China's communist leaders over the weekend. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger suddenly turned up in Beijing. They exchanged warm greetings and encouraging words with the leading hardliners of Chinese Communism. To some, this represented a reversal of the President's own stated policies and undercut the U.S. commitment to human rights. The President insisted late today the mission was not meant to normalize relations with China.

CBS's Bruce Morton: Congressional leaders attacked the Scowcroft-Eagleburger visit as a betrayal of American values, of human rights, especially when those rights are making headlines in Eastern Europe.
(Sen. Nunn: "It's a particularly bad time for us to be sending a signal to China that we care less about the human rights in China.")
(Rep. Pelosi, D-Cal: "A life in Asia is as important as a life in Europe.")
(Sen. Mitchell: "The President now kowtows to that government in a most unseemly and embarrassing and unfortunate way.")
After the massacre last June in Tiananmen Square, President Bush announced a ban on high-level contacts with China. This weekend's visit ended that.
(Scowcroft toast: "And to U.S.-Chinese friendship.")
(Li Lu, student leader: "They are so hurried to mend relations, even when the blood of China's students hasn't yet dried.")
Presumably, other restrictions on credit and trade may be eased too. Some China watchers think that's wise.
(Thomas Robinson of American Enterprise Institute: "And I think we are trying to say that, look, here's a good chance for us to talk about this situation. So I think that, yes, they do pay a great deal of attention to what we say and do.")
But China has never voiced any regrets. A Chinese diplomat rewrites history in today's Washington Post. There was no massacre, he claims; only 36 students died -- a number no foreign observer of the massacre accepts.
(Doak Barnett, of Johns Hopkins: "If the U.S. keeps trying to punish China for something that took place six months ago, it is likely to reinforce hardliners in China and encourage what we don't want in China.")
Chinese students here say just the opposite: a softer U.S. stance will strengthen the elderly hardliners in Beijing.
(Hai Ching Zhao, student leader: "All they say, they say look, we just have to be tough...and then they'll give in.")
The Beijing regime can lie about the past, be pleased about the visiting Americans. But Congress may have the last word. In January, it's expected to override President Bush's veto of a bill allowing Chinese students to stay here. That will infuriate Beijing and turn U.S.-Chinese relations sour again.

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CBS's Wyatt Andrews: The President today was unrepentent about extending his hand to China, arguing that, human rights abuses or not, the U.S. cannot ignore a country of 1 billion people.
(President: "I don't want to see that China remains totally isolated. I don't want to take any further steps that are going to hurt the Chinese people.")
The White House made no claim today that the Scowcroft visit produced concrete progress on any human rights issue. Things may be in the works, one official said, but nothing yet. The only progress the President claimed was a Chinese promise not to sell missiles in the Middle East.
(President: "In my view, it's a very sound development.")
But not much of a development. According to the State Department, the Chinese gave essentially the same assurances more than two weeks ago. The Administration stressed that it has not normalized relations with China and that sanctions remain in place. But officials admitted that Scowcroft gave the Chinese a huge propaganda lift by toasting the leadership publicly. It is an act of faith with the President that breaking the ice with China now will earn a human rights payoff in the future. It has become one of Mr. Bush's most consistent diplomatic tactics: to give ground first, then hope that gift-giving grows contagious. (CBS-Lead)

NBC's Tom Brokaw: President Bush today defended his decision to send his National Security Adviser and the number-two man in the State Department to Beijing this weekend for high-level talks just six months after the Tiananmen Square massacre. NBC's John Cochran reports now the surprise mission has triggered some very sharp criticism.

John Cochran: National Security Adviser Scowcroft returned from China today to find that most of Washington thinks his boss made a colossal mistake by sending one of his closest aides.
(TV Coverage: Car entering White House grounds; Scowcroft enters White House.)
The image of Scowcroft toasting Chinese leaders has set off a round of anguished cries from Democrats, who have tried to take the moral high ground by accusing President Bush of giving in to the men who ordered the Tiananmen Square massacre.
(TV Coverage: Scowcroft toasting at a state dinner in Beijing).
(Sen. Mitchell: "The President now kowtows to that government in a most unseemly and embarrassing and unfortunate way.")
Some Republicans were unhappy, too.
(Sen. McConnell: "I would say that as the first senator to endorse George Bush, and one of those closest to him, this is the wrong message at the wrong time.")
The President fought back by telling editorial writers he has not lifted sanctions he imposed on China six months ago.
(President: "I would say to those who are out there churning around, saying that we have normalized relations with China, that they simply do not know what they are talking about."
Chinese students in Boston watched Bush defending his mission to Beijing, but they were not impressed.
(Chinese student: "It's dangerous to Chinese people and it certainly will hurt the democracy movement in China.")
Former Secretary of State Kissinger and Richard Nixon urged Bush last month to renew high-level contacts with Beijing.

CHINA TRIP DEFENDED BY BUSH
President Seeking 'Common Ground' With Beijing Leaders

President Bush Monday justified his decision to send a high-level mission to China on grounds that he wants to prevent China from remaining "totally isolated" following the Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators last June.

Facing a wave of criticism from Congress, Bush said he is "looking for ways to find common ground" with the Beijing regime and expressed hope that he could improve relations that were strained by the bloody crackdown in which hundreds were killed and wounded.

"I realize the difficulty of this relationship, but I don't want to make it any worse," Bush told a group of group of editorial writers at the White House. "I'd like to think it would improve. We have contacts with countries that have egregious records on human rights."

Bush, who reluctantly imposed sanctions on China last summer, said Sino-American relations had not been returned to normal in the wake of the visit by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. Other officials said, however, that the mission was clearly designed to move the countries toward more normalized relations.

(David Hoffman & Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, A1)

Bush Defends Decision To Send Aides To China As Democrats Blast It

President Bush strongly defended Monday his decision to send two top aides on a surprise rapprochement mission to China, but Democrats blasted the visit as "embarrassing kowtowing" and HUD Secretary Kemp said he was "troubled" by the trip.

Bush said the weekend trip to Beijing by National Security Adviser Scowcroft and Assistant Secretary of State Eagleburger was already paying dividends: The Chinese said Monday that they would not sell missiles to any country in the Middle East.

"I do not want to isolate the Chinese people," Bush said at a meeting with about 100 editorial-page editors in the Executive Office Building. "I don't want to hurt the Chinese people."

However, critics said that did not excuse Bush from sending his emissaries to China in the wake of the June massacre in Tiananmen Square. Democratic leaders also revived Monday their criticism of Bush's veto of a bill that would have extended the U.S. visas of Chinese students who fear persecution if they return home.

"I condemn the President's veto of the Chinese students bill and this weekend's embarrassing kowtowing to the Chinese government," said Sen. Mitchell. "Those actions make a mockery of our profession of concern for human rights and are inconsistent with America's stated ideals."

(John Mashek & Michael Kranish, Boston Globe)

Bush Defends China Overture

President Bush, defending his weekend overture to China, said Monday he has not normalized relations with Beijing, and those who say he has "simply do not know what they are talking about."

Meeting with 85 newspaper editorial page editors, Bush said China responded to his initiative by saying they would no longer sell missiles to Middle Eastern countries, indicating a desire to regain contact with the U.S. that was suspended following the bloody repression of pro-democracy demonstrations last June.

"I do not want to isolate the Chinese people," said Bush. "I don't want to take any further steps that are going to hurt the Chinese people.... I am going to keep looking for ways to find common ground."

Congressional Democrats, however, were quick to criticize the weekend visit to China by National Security Adviser Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger, who flew secretly to Beijing Friday.

Sen. Mitchell said the mission was an "embarrassing kowtowing" to Beijing, and Rep. Gephardt said "standing up for our principles is always the best policy."

Bush's desire for resuming contact with China also drew indirect criticism from Jack Kemp.

"It would be no secret that I am troubled," Kemp told reporters at a luncheon Monday, declining to elaborate. (Benjamin Shore, Copley)

Bush Defends China Visit as Hill Ire Grows

President Bush Monday defended his decision to send his national security adviser to Beijing, while the Senate majority leader lambasted him for signaling that teh U.S. might be forgiving if the Soviets used tanks to quash democracy demonstrations in Eastern Europe.

"Those out there churning around saying we have normalized relations with China] simply do not know what they are talking about," Mr. Bush said, as criticism mounted that the U.S. moved too quickly this weekend to extend its hand to the Chinese after the Juna massacre of democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.

Mr. Bush said the weekend trip to Beijing by National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was not an attempt to normalize relations but to ensure that China does not remain "totally isolated."

(Peter Almond & Chris Harvey, Washington Times, A1)

Bush Seeks 'Common Ground" With China

President Bush, acknowledging a shift in his cold-shoulder policy toward China, vowed Monday to search for more "common ground" with the People's Republic.

"I realize the difficulty with this relationship. But I don't want to make it any worse," Bush told newspaper editorial writers at the White House. In his first public comments about a high-level U.S. mission to China this past weekend, Bush stopped short of saying he'll withdraw the limited military and economic sanctions he imposed after June's Tiananmen Square massacre.

Asked if there are steps the Chinese government could take to get the penalties removed, Bush said, "Yes. But I'm not going to detail them." Bush hailed as "a good sign" China's announcement that it no longer will sell missiles to Middle East countries.

(Jessica Lee, USA Today, 4A)

Hill Democrats Condemn Bush Initiative to China

Democratic congressional leaders Monday sharply criticized President Bush's decision to initiate high-level talks with Chinese leaders six months after the Beijing government crushed a pro-democracy movement.

House and Senate leaders said the weekend talks between Chinese leaders and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger compromise the nation's commitment to democracy and send forth a confusing signal about American support for the political changes sweeping Eastern Europe....

"There are times when what America stands for and believes in is more important than economic or geopolitical considerations," said Sen. Mitchell. "This is one of those times."

Mitchell, in some of his sharpest criticism to date of Bush's foreign policy initiatives, accused the President of an "embarrassing kowtowing to the Chinese government."

(Tom Kenworthy & Kenneth J. Cooper, Washington Post, A22)

U.S.-SINO TIES SEEN LIKELY TO IMPROVE

BEIJING -- U.S. National Security Adviser Scowcroft's surprise weekend mission to Beijing will eventually be seen as the end to a sharp deterioration in U.S.-Sino relations that resulted from the Chinese army's supression of a democracy movement last June, Asian and Western diplomats said Monday....

The only tangible evidence so far is at least a temporary halt to Chinese attacks on the United States, which imposed sanctions on Beijing to protest the army crackdown. China in recent months has portrayed the U.S. as an international villain attempting to subvert China's socialist system.

But the diplomats predicted that both the United States and China will make other concessions, resulting from Scowcroft's still largely secret talks here which may only become evident months from now.

The diplomats predicted, for example, that China may move more rapidly to lift martial law in Beijing...and offer a new deal to foreign investors.

These could prove to be only cosmetic gestures. But one diplomat said the Chinese might also be more willing to cooperate with the U.S. on more substantive issues, such as limiting Chinese weapons sales to the Middle East....

The still influential Deng [Xiaoping] asked Scowcroft to "tell President Bush there is a retired old man in the Orient, who is concerned about an improvement and development of Sino-U.S. relations."

This was taken in Beijing as a signal not just to Bush but also to Chinese hardliners that Deng has softened his anger toward the U.S. over the sanctions and intends to press for Chinese action to improve relations. (Daniel Southerland, news analysis, Washington Post, A20)

NEW LOOSENING OF RESTRICTIONS ON CHINA SEEN
Technology, Loan Sanctions May be Eased

In the wake of the mission to Beijing by President Bush's national security adviser, the Administration is preparing to grant further concessions to China soon, easing the impact of some of the sanctions imposed in June.

According to knowledgable U.S. officials and Washington diplomats, Mr. Bush is expected to clear the way within the next two weeks for satellites made by the Hughes Aircraft Co. to be launched in China. The export of the satellites would be the first to any communist country.

One U.S. official said that a decision was "imminent." An Australian diplomat said that he expected the Bush Administration to approve the export to China by the end of the week. (Jim Mann, Baltimore Sun, A1)

PRESIDENTS SAY CONTRA AID SHOULD BE USED FOR DEMOBILIZATION

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica -- Central American presidents agreed Tuesday that all aid to the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan rebels called Contras should be used for the disbandment of the rebels and for their repatriation to Nicaragua or third countries.

At the end of a two-day summit, the presidents also called on leftist guerrillas in El Salvador to publicly renounce all forms of violent action that affected the civilian population. (Reuter)

BUSH HOPEFUL OF COLOMBIA DRUG SUMMIT

President Bush said Monday "I'm very hopeful" a drug summit will be held in cocaine-ravaged Colombia, where a U.S. advance team this week is to help prepare a tentative agenda.

Bush said although he will weigh security concerns before making a final decision, he doesn't want to pull out and thus possibly undermine Colombia's "courageous president," Virgilio Barco, who has helped lead the drug war.

"I will listen to the experts; I will not do anything imprudent," Bush said during a press conference with newspaper editorial writers from around the country. Drawing laughter, he added, "No one has ever accused me of being too daring." ...

"I don't want to be the one who sends the signal that no one should go to Colombia because they can't be protected," Bush said, adding that "I don't want to undermine" Barco.

The White House has said that the Secret Service has concluded that Bush could be adequately protected in Colombia, but that it would continue to monitor the situation. (Thomas Ferraro, UPI)

Hume continues: In case they missed the point, Scowcroft's Friday dinner toast left no doubt.
(Scowcroft: "My colleagues and I have come here today to resume our important dialogue.")
On Capitol Hill, Mr. Bush's opposition denounced the President's move as a cave-in to the men behind the Tiananmen Square massacre.
(Sen. Mitchell: "The President now kowtows to that government in the most unseemly and embarrassing and unfortunate way.")
The President did say Scowcroft had gotten the Chinese to promise not to send missiles to the Mideast, but he did not pretend that was the reason for the mission. Rather, the trip seems to have flowed from Mr. Bush's own deep affinity for China and its leaders. That feeling dates from his own days as emissary there and it seems more powerful than any outrage he or the American people might feel about last summer's bloodshed in Beijing. (ABC-5)

BULGARIA

Jennings: We begin with another challenging week for Mikhail Gorbachev.... At home, his leadership faces a brand new challenge when the Soviet Parliament convenes tomorrow. And today Mr. Gorbachev had to witness another communist party -- in Bulgaria, this time -- being forced to give up its lock on power. And while he is surely the catalyst for so much change in Eastern Europe, it is getting a bit close to home. In Bulgaria, the Communist Party could simply no longer ignore where history was headed.

ABC's Mike Lee reports from Sofia that at a press conference, the Communist Party spokesman signaled the end of 45 years of communist rule with these words:
(Spokesman: "Free and democratic elections to be held next year.")
And it was announced the Communists have agreed to give up their constitutional guarantee of a monopoly on power. The party has also agreed to work toward eliminating food lines and shortages of other basic goods by adopting a Western-style market economy. Word spread that protest groups have been invited to face-to-face talks with Communist Party leaders and promised a direct role in carrying out reforms. (CBS-4, NBC-2, ABC-Lead)

GERMANY

Jennings reports in both East and West Germany, there was a lot of talk about the future of the two Germanys. Reunification was the theme of tonight's mass demonstration in Leipzig -- some demonstrators calling for reunification and others just as vehemently opposed. Secretary Baker, who arrived in West Berlin, is expected to ask Chancellor Kohl to tone down his call for reunification. Also in Berlin today, the first meeting since 1971 of the four powers which have controlled the city since World War II. The ambassadors of the U.S., Soviet Union, France and Great Britain said after the meeting they had agreed on the importance of stability.
(CBS-3, NBC-3, ABC-3)

Cochran continues: The White House said democratic victories in Eastern Europe also convinced Bush that the time was ripe to send a delegation to China. Bush's critics say now is the worst time.
(Sen. Nunn: "I think that it's a particularly bad time for us to be sending a signal to China that we care less about the human rights in China."
Bush offered a new defense for sending Scowcroft.
(President: "...I was very pleased today, in the wake of General Scowcroft's visit, to notice that the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that they would not sell missiles to any Middle East countries.")
But a White House official admitted that China merely restated its old policy on missiles. The official said Bush was trying to set up a smokescreen to counter criticism of his mission to China.

Brokaw: The President was asked whether he thought that renewing ties with China would send the wrong signal to the Soviet Union, that the Soviets could now crack down on the reform that has been sweeping through Eastern Europe. The President said he was not concerned about that at all. (NBC-Lead)

ABC's Peter Jennings: You may have noticed or you may have not, which is perhaps what the Administration would have preferred, but there's been a shift in White House policy on high-level contacts with China. It was accentuated in a surprise visit to Beijing over the weekend by two of the President's most senior aides. And anticipating a lot of criticism for Mr. Bush, he got it.

ABC's Brit Hume: National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft slipped quietly back into the White House today, his surprise visit to China complete. Reporters had been forbidden to cover his arrival at the airport.
(TV Coverage: Car enters White House grounds; Scowcroft walks into West Wing.)
In an exchange with editorial writers this afternoon, the President insisted relations with China are not back to normal and that U.S. economic sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen Square massacre remain in force.
(President: "I realize the difficulty of this relationship. But I don't want to make it any worse, like to think it would improve. China is a billion-plus people. They have a strategic position in the world that remains important to us.")
Earlier, presidential spokesman Fitzwater acknowledged the Scowcroft visit was the result of changes elsewhere in the world, especially Europe, not changes in China's human rights policies. But as recently as last month, six months after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the President still insisted it was up to the Chinese to make the first move to restore relations with the U.S.
(President: "The Chinese still feel that we tied the knot and thus should untie it. I don't feel that way.")
But when Scowcroft appeared in Beijing, that position had changed and that Chinese leaders seemed to know it.
(Deng, through translator: "I believe this move of yours is a very important move.")

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The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor 3
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 11 Dec '89

US Security Adviser Meets Deng, Seeks to Improve Sino-US Relations

BEIJING

THE United States National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, on his country's most senior mission to Beijing since a bloody June crackdown, yesterday told Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping that Washington wanted to work with him.

Mr. Scowcroft was given a warm greeting by the 85-year-old Deng, who hailed the visit as one of great importance in restoring badly damaged Sino-US ties.

"I believe this visit of yours is a very important one," said Mr. Deng during a meeting in Beijing's Great Hall of the People.

"In spite of the disputes and differences between us, after all, Sino-US relations have to be improved. This is something that is necessary for world peace and stability."

Scowcroft agreed, adding: "We are interested in working with you to promote that."

In June, President Bush slapped a ban on high level contacts with Beijing in retaliation for the Chinese Army's crushing of a pro-democracy campaign with a heavy loss of life.

The purpose of the surprise visit by Scowcroft, accompanied by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, was to brief Chinese leaders on the US-Soviet summit in Malta which ended one week ago.

The military crackdown and the ousting of reform-minded Communist leaders in June have pushed Sino-US relations to their lowest point since diplomatic links were forged in 1979.

In addition to halting senior contacts with China, Washington has banned military cooperation and cut government credits.

Beijing frequently has accused the US of orchestrating opposition to it and trying to undermine the Communist Party's rule.

Also China has repeatedly lashed out at the US for harboring leading dissident Fang Lizhi, who took refuge in the American embassy in Beijing shortly after the June military crackdown.

It was not immediately known if Mr. Fang, a physicist, was a topic of discussion after reporters were asked to leave the meeting room in the Great Hall.

But Deng expressed hope for a quick solution to the strained ties between the two countries.

– Reuters

A Soviet Missile Mystery

Newsweek 35
Time
U.S. News & World Report

Date 11 Dec '89

Was Moscow meddling in Central America on the eve of the summit—or was it someone else?

MALTA SUMMIT

When the White House first drew up its agenda for the summit, Central America was not high on the list. Unlike his predecessor, George Bush has tried to quiet tensions in the region. Then came the Nov. 25 crash in El Salvador of a twin-engined Cessna. Its flight path suggested Nicaraguan origin. Its cargo: Soviet-designed arms, including shoulder-launched SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles, apparently bound for the leftist FMLN rebels. The shipment would have meant a dramatic escalation of firepower for the rebels, now battling government forces throughout the capital city of San Salvador. Such missiles could have neutralized the government's air advantage—much as U.S.-supplied Stinger missiles allowed the mujahedin rebels to weaken Soviet air power in the Afghan civil war. What's more, the apparent shipment took place after Soviet assurances of a cutoff in the arms flow to El Salvador. "We're pissed—major," said a senior White House official. "This is the most serious regional issue between us."

It proved to be the most intractable, too. On Tuesday Secretary James Baker summoned the Soviet ambassador to the United States, Yuri Dubinin, to his office. "Either the Nicaraguans are lying to you or you're lying to us," he snapped. "I'd prefer to believe the former." Bush took the same line at Malta, and Mikhail Gorbachev repeated earlier Soviet denials of involvement. "We told the president we have a firm declaration from Nicaragua that there were no supplies using the famous planes," the Soviet leader said after the summit. "The president didn't agree with this."

But was Moscow really behind the missile shipment and the recent intensification of the 10-year-old civil war in Salvador? Some Bush aides believe that Gorbachev will continue to meddle in Third World trouble spots as Soviet leaders of the past have done. They say Gorbachev may have agreed to intensify the war in El Salvador to mollify Politburo hard-liners who worry about "pulling the plug everywhere in the world." Comparing the money Moscow spends in Central America with the trouble for the United States that results, it's a good investment.

But the prevailing view about the abortive missile shipment is that the Cubans and Nicaraguans were "freelancing"—supplying arms to the FMLN against the Soviets' wishes. According to this theory, Fidel Castro and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega dislike the reform trends sweeping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself, and are striking out on their own. "The Cubans have always had the view that Latin America is their backyard," says William LeoGrande, a Latin America expert at American University. "They don't take orders from the Soviets when it comes to Latin America."

There is evidence that Castro and Ortega were indeed operating behind Gorbachev's back. According to U.S. intelligence sources, Nicaragua has been able to stockpile huge supplies of arms from past Soviet-bloc shipments—including as many as 300 SAM-7s. When Moscow cut off direct resupply early this year, Cuba doubled its shipments. Further supplies arrived from North Korea, East Germany and Bulgaria. The Soviets vetoed FMLN requests for SAMs as recently as July 1988,. Last week the French newspaper Le Monde reported that the Soviets were livid about the missile incident. According to the report, the Soviet ambassador to Nicaragua summoned top Sandinista officials and the Cuban ambassador to a meeting in Managua and ordered them to stop shipping arms. The U.S. State Department was unable to confirm this report. Gorbachev may have told his Latin American allies to pull back, national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft said after the summit, "but if he has said it, it hasn't stuck."

Historic breakthrough: But the bigger question is how much weight any such request would have. "The superpowers have less control over these situations than people think," says one senior intelligence official. "They can exert certain pressures but they can't make things happen overnight. Look at Panama." Cuba and Nicaragua have always been the middlemen for arms flowing into El Salvador. And, say U.S. intelligence sources, Ortega's brother, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, is personally directing the arms resupply of the FMLN. "Do we control the damn death squads and all those crazies in El Salvador?" asks another senior U.S. aide. "Does the United States control the Israelis?"

In any case, some experts believe it would be a mistake to pressure the Russians to change their Central American policy as a condition of the United States' supporting *perestroika*. Compared with the historic breakup of the communist empire, they say, the internal affairs of Nicaragua and El Salvador are small potatoes. "Let's suppose the Soviets *are* dabbling in Central America," says Mark Falcoff, a Latin America analyst at the American Enterprise Institute. "Would we really want to sacrifice everything else we're accomplishing in U.S.-Soviet relations to that?" One thing seems certain: Central America will continue to cause headaches for both world leaders.

DOUGLAS WALLER *in Washington with* CHARLES LANE *in San Salvador*

BAKER OUTLINES GOALS OF MISSION TO BEIJING
Resolving Human Rights Differences, Forestalling Isolation, Briefing On Summit Cited

Secretary of State Baker said Sunday that a high-level U.S. delegation was sent to Beijing this weekend in an effort to resolve bilateral differences over human rights and to keep China from slipping into international isolation.

Baker said that the surprise visit by National Security Adviser Scowcroft, six months after the bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, was intended to give Chinese leaders a "readout" of the recent Malta summit between President Bush and President Gorbachev in the hope of resuming strategic dialogue with Beijing.

But he said that Scowcroft used the meeting to reiterate continuing U.S. concerns over the Chinese military assault in Tiananmen Square last June and to press for political moderation by Beijing "if we're going to preserve this relationship and if we're going to be able to move it in the direction from whence it came."

Acknowledging continued U.S. public outrage over the massacre and demands by Congress for stronger U.S. reprisals, Baker said, "I don't think the American people would want to see their government compound the tragedy that happened in Tiananmen Square."

"And it is our judgement...that that's what might happened if we seek to isolate China from the rest of the international community," he said on ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley."

(Michael Weisskopf, Washington Post, A25)

White House Denies 'Kowtowing' To China

The Bush Administration denied it had "kowtowed" to China by sending a delegation to Beijing, and said the surprise overture was designed to improve relations and avoid additional tragedy.

Secretary of State Baker said Sunday that while President Bush deplores the bloody crackdown against democracy demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square last spring, he wants to ease tensions -- and expects hard-line Beijing to show some movement.

CNN, quoting unidentified Administration officials, reported that a major reason for the weekend trip was to try to persuade China not to sell ballistic missiles to Syria or Libya.

Baker, while not denying or confirming the report, said, "This is a good example why it is important to talk. We have had discussions (in the past) with the Chinese government about missile proliferation, which is something that does seriously concern us." (Thomas Ferraro, UPI)

Beijing Meeting Triggers A Furor

Members of Congress and experts on East Asia were shocked and divided by President Bush's surpirse decision to send two high-level officials to Beijing to build bridges only six months after the Tiananmen Square massacre.

"I don't think anyone saw this coming," said Merle Goldman, professor of Chinese history at Boston University, a critic of the decision.

"It's so contrary to what we're doing in Eastern Europe by supporting the protesters," she said. "Now we're in a position of supporting people who cracked down on their protesters."

But others praised the weekend visit to the Chinese capital by National Security Adviser Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger, saying relations with China were too important to be damaged irreparably by the government's crackdown on pro-democracy student protesters. (Dawn Weyrich & James Dorsey, Washington Times, A1)

Bush's Aide's Surprise Visit To Beijing May Help To End China's Isolation

The surprise weekend visit to Beijing by National Security Adviser Scowcroft is likely to go a long way toward bringing China out of its international isolation.

Scowcroft's 25-hour visit to Beijing is a breakthrough in Sino-U.S. relations, which have been severely strained since June 4, when Chinese troops bloodily suppressed a pro-democracy movement.

Bush is calculating that his surprise dispatch of Scowcroft to China will begin preparing American public opinion for a thaw in relations with Beijing. But the move could easily backfire and only cause further complications and recriminations.

Administration officials said that the move to reopen high-level communication with China was made because Bush has concluded that continued isolation of Chinese leaders would only exacerbate their clampdown on dissent. Bush "is of the view that we shouldn't compound that tragedy by seeking to isolate China from the international community," Secretary of State Baker said Sunday on ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley." (Wall Street Journal, A10)

DENG MEETS WITH U.S. DELEGATION IN BEIJING

BEIJING -- Senior leader Deng Xiaoping told visiting U.S. National Security Adviser Scowcroft Sunday that "it is the common desire" of both China and the U.S. to end disputes that have strained relations since June, when the Chinese army smashed a student-led democracy movement.

Scowcroft, who was accompanied by Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger, also held talks with other Chinese leaders before ending a 25-hour surprise visit to Beijing, during which both countries said they were willing to take measures to overcome their differences and restore good relations. The measures were not publicly specified by either side.

"Because we share common desires and common needs, I think in the end we can find a solution," the 85-year-old Deng said at the morning meeting in the Great Hall of the People.

The statements that Deng and other Chinese leaders made to Scowcroft on relations with the U.S. were the most positive since the People's Liberation Army killed hundreds of civilians in its suppression of the democracy movement June 3-4 and President Bush imposed sanctions on Beijing to protest the assault.

(Daniel Southerland, Washington Post, A1)

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NETWORK NEWS SUMMARY

(Sunday Evening, December 10)

Note: The CBS Evening News was preempted.

CHINA/SCOWCROFT TRIP

ABC's Forrest Sawyer: For the first time since the Chinese army crushed a pro-democracy movement last June, a high-level U.S. delegation has traveled to Beijing to meet with China's senior leaders. National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft told Deng Xiaoping the Bush Administration wants to work with him. The Administration is calling the visit an exception to the ban on such contacts. But critics are already accusing the President of caving in to communist hardliners.

ABC's David Ensor reports General Scowcroft's visit to China clearly delighted Deng and other Chinese leaders who have complained bitterly about U.S. sanctions. But the decision to send Scowcroft left the Bush Administration with some explaining to do. The President waved off questions this morning, leaving it to his Secretary of State.
(TV Coverage of President leaving church, waving off question.)
(Secretary Baker: "I don't think that the American people want to see their government compound the tragedy in Tiananmen Square. And it is our judgement, it is the President's judgement, it is the Administration's judgement, that that's what might happen if we seek to isolate China from the rest of the international community.")
Critics charge that by dropping its demand that China clean up its human rights record before relations can be improved, the Administration is kowtowing to Beijing.
(TV Coverage of soldiers holding prisoners, pulling their arms back behind them.)
(Rep. Solarz: "It makes a mockery of the Administration's own policy of suspending high level meetings with the Chinese.")
(Merle Goldman, Boston University professor: "It's a double standard, it's contradictory, inconsistent, and it makes America look very, in some ways, almost weak. Because we're doing what the regime wants us to do, and this is not a particularly good regime that we want to do what they tell us to do.")
Administration officials knew the Scowcroft trip would be controversial, but they believe an improved relationship with China would help stabilize the region and give the U.S. added diplomatic leverage with Soviet bloc nations.
(Scowcroft, toasting Chinese leaders: "To the great Chinese people and to U.S.-Chinese friendship.")
Administration officials say now that President Bush has made the first move, as demanded by China, it's up to the Chinese leadership next to make some gesture on human rights as a signal that they want the dialogue with the U.S. to go further. (ABC-Lead)

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GOP TO HIT TICKET-SPLITS, WEAK DEMOCRATS IN 1992

Republicans, who have been the minority in the House since 1952, have a two-stage game plan to wrest control from the Democrats.

They acknowledge they have no chance in 1990 to win control of the House, where they now trail 259 to 176.

But they look forward to a series of changes -- some political, some demographic -- that they think will give them an opportunity for 1992.

Democrats doubt this plan will work, but some acknowledge their opponents could be on to something.

The Republican plan involves convincing voters who have supported GOP presidential candidates that voting for Democrats for Congress nullifies their presidential vote. It also means targeting the party's resources to GOP candidates running against the most vulnerable Democratic incumbents.

Ed Rollins, who runs the National Republican Congressional Committee, explains the GOP problem:

"We've never made quite the proper case in a presidential campaign how voting for George Bush and a Democratic Congress creates a conflict: That Democrats in Congress are going to block George Bush's initiatives. We've got to make voters focus on the fact that congressmen matter. That a congressman does more than ensure your garbage is taken out."

(Peter Brown, Washington Times, A3)

BUSH CALLS CHRISTMAS 1989 'MOMENT TO BE REMEMBERED'

President Bush says new openings for democracy and peace around the world make this Christmans "a moment to be remembered."

"For 40 years the world has known only a grim and joyless peace, hard and cold," the President said Sunday. "But now, everywhere, you see signs of a warmer, more hopeful peace, like a candle which flickers in the distance. It beckons, encourages, causes a bright glow in the world's darkest corners."

Bush spoke on stage at the end of the taping of an NBC television special. "Christmas in Washington," that will air Dec. 18....

"Christmas in 1989 will be a moment to be remembered, a moment of new faith and freedom, new hope for peace," said the President, sporting a red and green tie. (AP)

EDITOR'S NOTES: "Dukakis OKs Bill Banning Assault Rifles," by AP, appears in the Washington Times, A4.

"More Republican Lobbying Of HUD Is Disclosed," by Philip Shenon, appears in the New York Times, A21.

"Job Growth Is Slowing, U.S. Data Show," by Hilary Stout, appears in the Wall Street Journal, A2.

-end of A-section-

NBC's Mary Alice Williams: While Communism yields to the forces of change in Eastern Europe, the old ways remain in China. Six months after pro-democracy demonstrators were slaughtered in Tiananmen Square, President Bush's National Security Advisor met in Beijing with the man who ordered that massacre. Secretary Baker defended that visit, while Senate sources say they were told the main purpose of Brent Scowcroft's trip was to tell China to stop selling missiles in the Mideast.

NBC's Sandy Gilmour: Scowcroft was warmly greeted by the aging Deng, the man who ordered the crackdown on the pro-democracy movement last June.
(TV Coverage of Deng greeting Scowcroft.)
Deng, who considers himself a friend of President Bush, said Chinese-American relations have to be improved; it is necessary for world peace and stability. Scowcroft said, we are interested in working with you to promote that. Secretary Baker was asked today if China's missile sales to Third World countries was a major reason for the Scowcroft trip.
(Secretary Baker: "We have had discussions. This is a good example of why it's important to talk. We have had discussions with the Chinese government about missile proliferation.")
Administration officials said Scowcroft raised concerns about human rights in China, but there was no indication the Chinese agreed to reforms or other actions in return for renewed American friendliness.
(Doak Barnett, China specialist: "It remains to be seen, however, what the response of the Chinese actually will be and whether our relations really improve very much is now going to depend on the Chinese side.")
This morning, leaving church, the President refused to comment on the Scowcroft trip.
(TV Coverage: President leaving church without taking questions.)
Secretary Baker denied bowing to China's demands.
(Baker: "We're not kowtowing to the Chinese.")
Baker said Mr. Bush deplored the massacre of last June.
(Baker: "He doesn't want to compound that tragedy by taking action which would force China into isolation, force it out of the international community, if you will.")
The Chinese Communists continue to crack down on moves toward democracy. Every criticism from the U.S. has been met by scathing demands by China to quit interfering. Meantime, the fate of dissident Fang Lizhi remains uncertain. Secretary Baker called the situation sensitive and said it was being worked on very quietly.
The President's overture to China follows his veto of a bill which would have permitted the 40,000 Chinese students in America, many of whom are active in the pro-democracy movement, to stay in the U.S. an extra year. Mr. Bush has since extended their visas by executive action, but members of Congress are furious.
(Rep. Gephardt: "The President just ought to stand up for what's right and not cave in to some geopolitical argument of Dr. Kissinger or Richard Nixon.")
The White House says it is not lifting the sanctions against China, including the ban on military sales. An official says the Scowcroft visit is just a first step which must now be matched by China.

(NBC-9)

CHINA/DALAI LAMA

Williams reports the Dalai Lama, accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway, accused China of stepping up repression in his country. The Dalai Lama said the Nobel prize will help advance the goal of independence in Tibet because, he said, now more people will know about the fate of his country. And he accused China of practicing genocide against his people. (NBC-10)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Williams: Today is Human Rights Day the world over. Tonight, we track some of the battles still to be won and some of the victories, large and small, that have resulted from individual acts of conscience and collective acts of courage. Perhaps nowhere is victory more heartfelt than in the Eastern bloc. We begin in Czechoslovakia. A new government today, the first non-communist government there in more than 40 years.

NBC's Rick Davis reports the new government has 10 Communists, 11 non-Communists. The Communist president resigned. The Cabinet will serve until new elections, sometime next year. But the Communist Party is still a force in the nation, and a Havel presidency is far from certain. In a bizarre turnaround, some Communists now want Alexander Dubcek. But today the champ was Havel.
(TV Coverage of streets filled with people cheering Havel.)
(ABC-2, NBC-Lead)

BULGARIA

Williams reports more than 50,000 people rallied in the bitter cold and snow in Sofia. They chanted "Democracy" in defiance of the Communists.
(ABC-3, NBC-3)

EAST GERMANY

Williams reports that in East Germany tens of thousands of protesters in a number of cities rallied for human rights and democratic reforms. And the new Communist Party chief said he wants a clear separation of party and government functions. (NBC-4)

SOVIET DISSIDENCE

Sawyer reports Foreign Minister Shevardnadze says the government will try to use persuasion, not military force, to control rebellious Soviet republics. He acknowledged today that Communist Party control is being widely debated in the Soviet Union and said, "It is for the people to decide."

ABC's Rick Inderfurth reports that in Moscow several thousand people took part in a demonstration marking human rights day, but that wasn't their only concern. "Down with the party's monopoly of power," one man shouted. "Get rid of Article 6," said a sign, referring to the provision in the Soviet constitution which guarantees that monopoly.

ABC -- THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Moderator: David Brinkley. Panel: Sam Donaldson, George Will. Guests: Secretary Baker, Gen. John Galvin, Supreme Commander of the NATO forces in Europe.

Brinkley: Two high officials in our government, Deputy Secretary Eagleburger and National Security assistant Scowcroft, have been to China.... First time we've had any high-level meeting with China since the Tiananmen Square massacre last spring. What brought this about?

Baker: Well, it's not really the first time we had high-level dealings with China --

Brinkley: -- First time you've let us know about it.

Baker: No, that's really not true.... It is the first time we've had high-level United States officials go to the People's Republic of China. I think the President was of the view that it is important that we give the Chinese government a read-out on the results of the meetings with the Soviets in Malta.... I think it's important to remember that we have engaged in strategic consultations with the Chinese government even when our bilateral relations have not been the very best.... And another purpose, of course, was to seek to improve the relationship to the extent that that could be done. The President, as you well know, has spoken to this, so have others of us in the Administration, [and he] deplores the tragedy of Tiananmen Square. But he's of the view that we shouldn't run the risk of compounding that tragedy by trying to isolate China from the international community. And that if we were to isolate China, we might compound that tragedy. And that's not to say that there are not a host of differences between these two governments. There are. We still have sanctions in place against China. But unless we are willing to talk and try and resolve these problems, we're not going to be able to preserve this relationship which is so very important to both countries and to move the relationship forward.

Will: Did they raise the case of Fang Lizhi, the dissident who's now living in our embassy?

Baker: I would be willing to bet you that that came up one way or another during the discussions because this is a source of irritation between the two governments.

Donaldson: You say it came up. Are they going to release Fang Lizhi, allow him to leave the country if he wishes, without arrest?

Baker: This is a matter that is very sensitive between the two countries. It's being worked on and worked on very quietly and I really don't want to say any more about it.

Donaldson: At the time of the Tiananmen Square massacre..., the United States took a position that until China improved her human rights situation and stopped this, we were going to withdraw most of our contacts.... But in fact, now we've sent a delegation there. General Scowcroft in a toast said we want to be your friends and hope you feel the same. We've made them pay no price whatsoever, have we?

PHILIPPINES

Williams reports President Aquino asked the Philippine Congress to broaden her emergency powers. She was met with protests outside the presidential palace where more than 1,000 people denounced the bill, which would give her powers to ban strikes, seize firearms and shutdown businesses. A leader of the rally charged Aquino with fascism worse than that practiced by Ferdinand Marcos. (NBC-8)

ABORTION/AIDS PROTESTS

Sawyer reports dozens of abortion rights and AIDS activists lay down in the aisles of the famed St. Patrick's Cathedral. John Cardinal O'Connor was forced to stop his sermon while police carried the demonstrators out on stretchers. Meanwhile, 4,500 more protesters, angry about the Catholic Church's prohibitions against abortion and the use of condoms, marched in front of nearby Rockefeller Center. (ABC-8)

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Baker: The President is very anxious to have this drug summit. It is something that he called for. Whether or not he goes to the particular location and place and at the particular time is a matter for the security people to decide.

Brinkley: The Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has just said on the air that you and he had a one-hour talk the other day...about Central America. What did you learn? What did he say?

Baker: ...It went into a bit more detail on points that we have made before, that they need to do a little bit more leaning on their clients in Central America to stop these weapons from going to the FMLN.

Will: How much and in what way is the United States committed to preserving the Aquino government from extra-legal overthrow?

Baker: The United States is totally, absolutely and completely committed to the Aquino government as a government that was elected in a free, fair and open election.... We are committed at least to the extent that you saw that commitment expressed objectively during the course of this last coup attempt. Now then, we're committed economically as well. We're committed politically. There,...the President committed us very briefly, and to a limited extent, militarily.... The extent of our military commitment is something that the Commander in Chief will decide in a case-by-case basis.

Guest: Gen. John Galvin.

Will: Now that it looks as though it would be very difficult for the Soviet Union to count on its allies in Eastern Europe, even to allow free passage, let alone to join an attack, can we not now radically, and can you give a numerical value, change the number of American forces in Europe?

Galvin: I think that we will see a drop in U.S. forces. I do think that ought to be a part of the arms control agreements, and so far it looks as if it will be. And I think that if we can get on with the agreements in Vienna, that will be great. That will also probably trigger additional agreements where we could go lower....

Donaldson: For a long time Soviet and Eastern bloc forces were poised for an attack. That was their whole strategy, and their positioning was something that reflected that. Is that still the case, or have they gone on the defensive now?

Galvin: They are beginning to make moves with their doctrine.... But at the same time, the Soviets are reorganizing and re-equipping and modernizing, and it's a little bit difficult to tell what the residual force there will look like....

PANEL DISCUSSION -- Hodding Carter joins.

On Gen. Scowcroft's trip to China:

Will: On the one hand, there are a billion of them, and therefore they are important and one wants to keep in touch with them.

Will continues: On the other hand, there is a powerful and a correct argument to be made that what is happening in Eastern Europe and elsewhere is the result of the United States under both parties for 40 years keeping the pressure off, and therefore it looks as though we are not applying to China the lessons of the Cold War, which is that pressure works in forcing eventual change.

Donaldson: Everything is in timing, and I think the timing is too soon. Eventually, obviously, we've got to repair relations with China. But I think China has to do something to help in this regard....

Carter: It's really too bad, because China gets to play its American card precisely the moment we didn't have to be played at all. We always play China, because we saw them as a necessary counterweight in a three-handed game. At the very moment that that counterweight isn't necessary, we go over there acting as though we still have to make some kind of bow, some kind of deal.

Donaldson: ...After the Malta summit, George Bush gets out there and, I believe correctly, talks about a new era in U.S.-Soviet relations.... And then we go to China, to try to say to Gorbachev, "We're not patsies for you, we still have the Chinese in our pocket, we hope."

On American commitment to President Aquino:

Will: ...Secretary Baker's language was interesting. Absolute, total commitment....

Donaldson: ...I think it's fine to be committed.... But within a country, if people want to rise up in rebellion against their government, it's not our business to go in and say, "Oh no, not you." The problem is, Mrs. Aquino isn't strong enough, apparently, to keep these forces in check, in which case she's going to have to fall.

Carter: ...The problem for Mrs. Aquino is a problem in Central Europe right now.... She comes into office being given a husk of a country by a failed dictatorship. We have an absolute obligation to help her in the same way, I think, we have to help Central Europe.... The U.S. economic and political assistance, and frankly, if we can give that overlay of stability, like the overflight at the moment of insurrection, sure. But American troops, no.

On the Colombian drug summit:

Donaldson: Any time we now withdraw our seeming support, I think we weaken Barcos' hand. So I think President Bush ought to go.

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Arafat: Again you are speaking about...Egyptians. What about the Palestinians? Why are you neglecting the Palestinians? ...Six million Palestinians. We are human beings. Nobody has the right to speak by our name.

Utley: Are you saying the United States, President Bush and Secretary Baker, are ignoring the PLO in this affair?

Arafat: It is clear that they are ignoring completely the Palestinian people and their leadership.

Friedman: So they are wasting their time?

Arafat: You can ask them. But not to forget that when they accept open dialogue with the PLO, they had accepted this according to Shultz's declaration that the PLO is representing the Palestinian people. With whom have they now opened a dialogue in Tunisia, and for what? I'm sure that President Bush and his excellency, also, Mr. Baker, will fulfill their promise to continue the peace process to implement real peace...for all of us, for the Palestinian children and the Israeli children.

Utley: ...In the last year, there have been a number of contacts, talks between the United States and your organization, the PLO. Do you think that these talks have been useful to the PLO and to the situation in the Middle East?

Arafat: No doubt. Although it is going very slowly....

Friedman: On that point, if we could just ask you..., what would a final peace settlement from your point of view look like? Where would the Palestinians be, where would the Israelis be, and what would relations between them be like?

Arafat: According to United Nations --

Friedman: No, according to you.

Arafat: I am not like Shamir, refusing the international legality and the United Nations resolutions.... What had been accepted by us, and they were urging us to accept it, 242. What is the meaning of 242? Territories for peace.... And now Shamir is refusing peace for territories.... Can the American Administration accept this dialogue from Shamir, which is completely against...the United Nations resolutions and international legality?

Novak: Can you assure the world, or can you tell the world that you would like a Palestinian state which is demilitarized, and does not pose a military threat to Israel?

Arafat: What we had agreed upon, that peace, real peace.... We want to live in peace with all our neighbors, including the Israelis.

Utley: A few days ago in Washington, one of your top aides and advisers, Khaled al Hassan, spoke and said if there were one day a Palestinian state, within five minutes of the creation of this Palestinian state, it would seek a confederation with Jordan. Do you agree with that?

Arafat: That is clear, but it is not only my opinion or his opinion. This is the PNC resolution, had been accepted in three sessions of our PNC, our parliament, to establish confederation with Jordan....

DISCUSSION SEGMENT

On Arafat:

Utley: Tom, you've interviewed [Arafat]. You know him. What was it? What was he doing?

Friedman: ...The thing to watch there is not what he says but what he does. And what he's done is to allow Egypt to go forward. Where I think he really fell down, though, in my opinion, would be in answer to the question: What is your vision for peace?

Novak: I think what he hurt was the conception of the Americans who watch the program. He had an opportunity to come over as forthcoming, as cooperative. Instead he gave a lot of stale propaganda.

Utley: Now, Yasser Arafat has sent a letter to the White House to President Bush about these negotiations. What does the letter say, or what does it indicate?

Novak: This letter...has no relationship to this ranting and raving we heard on television. It is very friendly. It indicates that they want to make a deal.

On the Scowcroft trip to China:

Utley: Brent Scowcroft has gone [to China].... Your reaction?

Friedman: I certainly think it was a surprise to a lot of people, and a very odd signal. I mean what it sort of tells us is that the statute of limitations on massacres seems to be about six months for this Administration. If I were Gorbachev now sitting in the Kremlin, I would say, well, I can do just about whatever I want in the Baltics; just about whatever I want in Eastern Europe....

Novak: I'll tell you what this signal is.... I think George Bush is uncomfortable with the students in Tiananmen Square. I think he's uncomfortable with the students in Wenceslas Square in Prague. I think that's very unfortunate.... There were all signs that Gen. Scowcroft was kowtowing to the Chinese.

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Baker Outlines Goals of

Resolving Human Rights Differences, Forestalling

Mission to Beijing

Isolation, Briefing on Summit Cited

WP 12-11-89 A25

By Michael Weisskopf
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State James A. Baker III said yesterday that a high-level U.S. delegation was sent to Beijing this weekend in an effort to resolve bilateral differences over human rights and to keep China from slipping into international isolation.

Baker said that the surprise visit by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, six months after the bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, was intended to give Chinese leaders a "readout" of the recent Malta summit between President Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the hope of resuming strategic dialogue with Beijing.

But he said that Scowcroft used the meeting to reiterate continuing U.S. concerns over the Chinese military assault in Tiananmen Square last June and to press for political moderation by Beijing "if we're going to preserve this relationship and if we're going to be able to move it in the direction from whence it came."

Acknowledging continued U.S. public outrage over the massacre and demands by Congress for stronger U.S. reprisals, Baker said, "I don't think the American people would want to see their government compound the tragedy that happened in Tiananmen Square."

"And it is our judgment . . . that that's what might happen if we seek to isolate China from the rest of the international community," he said on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley."

Baker's rationale for the visit after a six-month ban on such high-level U.S. contacts with China reflects the cautious, deliberate stance of President Bush—often at odds with U.S. allies in Europe and a bipartisan bloc in Congress—in response to the massacre and the communist regime's subsequent roundup of pro-democracy activists.

While Bush has condemned the Tiananmen assault and has imposed sanctions from a ban on U.S. military sales to suspending U.S. support for $1.3 billion in international bank loans to China, each step followed congressional demands for stronger action. In recent weeks, moreover, he has vetoed bills that called for tougher sanctions and extended stays of Chinese exchange students here. Bush, however, isssued an executive order allowing the students to stay.

According to U.S. experts on China, the president's response appears designed to preserve what he considers an important strategic relationship with Beijing while recognizing the human rights strain that runs deep in U.S. foreign policy.

Although Beijing was initially seen as an important U.S. strategic ally against the Soviet Union, Lieberthal said that had Scowcroft not briefed the Chinese on Malta, Moscow, which is trying to strengthen its relations with Beijing, would have been the only one to do so.

Baker, in his television appearance yesterday, called the Sino-American relationship "very important" in geopolitical and geostrategic terms, adding that "we wanted to try and find ways to preserve it."

But Baker emphasized that the Scowcroft mission was also intended to "raise the human rights concerns that we have." Indicating that Washington's interest in repairing ties is not unconditional, he said that China's leaders were told that "they're going to have to help us" if the two countries are to restore good relations.

Although human rights have long been a crucial component of U.S. policy in places such as Central America and the Soviet Union, only recently has the issue surfaced in Sino-American relations because of longstanding bipartisan support first to contain China and, after President Richard M. Nixon's historic opening in 1972, to befriend it.

But with the growth of extensive strategic, commercial and cultural ties in the past decade, Congress has grown increasingly critical of China for its draconian birth control policies, occupation of Tibet and, most important, the Tiananmen Square massacre.

How best to advance U.S. human rights concerns in a proud, ultra-sensitive country like China is a matter of great dispute among China experts in and out of the government.

One view, apparently shared by Bush, is that the most effective course is to "nudge, not bludgeon" Chinese leaders into liberalizing their political structure, according to A. Doak Barnett, professor emeritus of Chinese studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Barnett said that outside pressure has proved to be "counterproductive" in dealing with Beijing, pushing China further into hard-line isolation. For example, U.S. containment policies of the 1950s and 1960s fostered Mao's radicalism.

Subtle diplomatic pressures also seem prudent today because of the ongoing power struggle in China, said Robert A. Scalapino, director of East Asian studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He said a two-pronged policy of quietly pushing for reforms while signaling no intent to isolate or hurt China would serve U.S. interests if conservative hard-liners or moderates emerge on top.

Other Sinologists said they believe that sending high-level U.S. officials for talks in Beijing helps to legitimize a regime responsible for shooting down hundreds of its citizens.

The China Mission

WP 12-11-89
A14

PERHAPS THE Bush administration has a better explanation of its surprise bow to the Chinese government that just a few months back massacred hundreds of demonstrators in Beijing than that which it was offering yesterday. We truly hope it does. For what it was offering yesterday were mainly perfunctory and unconvincing statements that it of course takes human rights violations seriously—statements put in such a way as absolutely to signal their relatively low priority in the administration's hierarchy of concerns—and an utterly misleading suggestion that the only choice for the American government lay between yielding abjectly to an unrepentant Beijing and going back to a sort of pre-recognition breakdown of all relations. This of course is not the choice.

So the questions that cry out to be answered are these: Did the Chinese give something in return for what they got, which was a breach of the administration's pledge that no high-level visits would be undertaken (and presumably that no high-level professions of admiration and solidarity would be made) until the Chinese take steps to undo the damage they did in June? Or will it be a limited "show" reciprocation, such as, for example, China's relenting in its torment of a couple of famous victims, while proceeding with its remorseless search for and persecution of those who dared to demonstrate in the name of democratic freedoms?

On its face, the announcement made it look as if Mr. Bush had merely sent his emissaries to China to indicate to the people responsible for the crime that the United States is getting ready to let bygones be bygones. He appeared, in fact, to be all but apologizing to the Chinese government for the American sanctions still in place, and has surely undermined our ability to argue to friends and allies that they should keep the pressure on China. Last summer this country said that any improvement in relations would have to depend on a demonstration of greater respect for human rights in China. That is why it is so crucial to find out what if anything the Chinese did to demonstrate such respect. The alternative is to concede that after six months the administration is backing down and explaining to the Chinese that it was only kidding.

What a message this would be to send at this moment to the Soviets, and to those Communist hard-liners in Eastern Europe who still command armies and police forces and must be toying with the option of violently repressing the pro-democracy uprisings there. Until now the United States has given valuable support to the democratic movements in Eastern Europe by letting the world know that armed repression would immediately be answered by broad and exceedingly costly economic sanctions. Does the mission to China add, "but on the other hand, after a few months, maybe not"?

Incredibly, Mr. Bush's emissary, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, is reported to have said to his Chinese hosts in a formal toast at a state dinner in Beijing, "In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces." Just what does that mean? That the Chinese who massacred the students and the U.S. government that imposed sanctions were merely victims of a misunderstanding and of malevolent prodding from troublemakers in each of their realms? That the Bush administration and the Beijing government that perpetrated the massacre are on the same side in this matter, both having been pushed into their apparent conflict by these "negative forces" at home? In fact the statement sounded exactly like the kind of specious reasoning Gen. Scowcroft and others have rightly rejected over the years when it came to giving in to the Soviets in pressure politics and negotiations on grounds that the differences at issue were merely the handiwork of "cold warriors" on both sides.

There haven't been many massacres here, by the way, raising Chinese protests. The negative forces in China are Communist officials, bitterly anti-American and prepared to shed any amount of blood to preserve the party's power and their own families' interests.

Mr. Bush appears to be bending his policy to meet Chinese demands because the Chinese refuse to bend. The government there remains adamant in its insistence that, first of all, nothing except a politically inspired outbreak of street hooliganism happened in Beijing last June and beyond that, the way it treats its people is nobody's business but its own. The Chinese official position is accurately conveyed in a communication from Chen Defu of the Chinese Embassy, printed on the opposite page.

The president should not be making placatory concessions to a repressive and bloodstained Chinese government. Is there a better explanation than the one the public has been given so far?

WASHINGTON TIMES

News/Opinion

DEC. 12, 1989 Pg. 1

Bush defends China visit as Hill ire grows

By Peter Almond
and Chris Harvey
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush yesterday defended his decision to send his national security adviser to Beijing, while the Senate majority leader lambasted him for signaling that the United States might be forgiving if the Soviets used tanks to quash democracy demonstrations in Eastern Europe.

"Those out there churning around saying we have normalized relations [with China] simply do not know what they are talking about," Mr. Bush said, as criticism mounted that the United States moved too quickly this weekend to extend its hand to the Chinese after the June massacre of democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square.

Mr. Bush said the weekend trip to Beijing by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was not an attempt to normalize relations but to ensure that China does not remain "totally isolated."

He added, in a meeting with editorial page editors from around the country, that trade sanctions imposed June 5 against the Chinese are still in place, and "I think the Chinese know they still have to address themselves to the problems that were inherent in this [Tiananmen Square] episode."

Mr. Bush noted: "We have contacts with countries that have egregious records on human rights, and so I'm going to keep looking for ways to find common ground" with the Chinese.

Capitol Hill Democrats would not be appeased by Mr. Bush's explanation for the hastily called trip.

They declared angrily in a series of press conferences yesterday that the Beijing trip sent the wrong message at the wrong time — particularly to other communist countries.

"If the Soviets reverse course and unleash their tanks in East Germany and Poland, in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will the president send his emissaries to Moscow to tell them we want to do business as usual?" asked Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, a Maine Democrat.

"Or are there two standards, one for the Chinese and another for the Russians and everyone else?" Mr. Mitchell asked.

"As long as the Soviet Union knows that we are not sending a signal of 'total normalization,' I think there is no risk" of Soviets using tanks to crack down on demonstrators, Mr. Bush responded.

Mikhail Tsypkin, a Soviet-East European expert at the U.S. Naval War College in Monterey, Calif., agreed that was an unlikely consequence.

He said the Warsaw Pact countries have come so far with political reforms that they are unlikely to be encouraged to crack down because of signals from high-level U.S. contacts with China.

"With every passing day, a crackdown is becoming less and less a possibility," Mr. Tsypkin said. "The communists are being separated from the military forces in country after country."

Mr. Mitchell said the meetings with the Chinese — prior to changes in human rights policies there — represented "kowtowing" to the communist leaders. He said it was ironic that the visit took place on International Human Rights Day.

"There are times when what America stands for and believes in is more important than economic or geopolitical considerations," Mr. Mitchell said. "This is one of those times."

Rep. Stephen Solarz, New York Democrat and chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asian and Pacific affairs, lashed out at the mission for being "entirely misguided" and "bereft of strategic logic or moral justification."

And House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt of Missouri said: "At a time when America's bipartisan commitment to freedom is bearing fruit in Eastern Europe, the last thing he [the president] should be doing is wavering in our commitment to freedom."

Congressional Republican leaders yesterday were silent on the issue, but Sen. Mitch McConnell Jr., Kentucky Republican, called a news conference to express his views.

"It's not appropriate for our leaders to be sitting down with the Chinese and toasting that government a mere six months after these acts of repression," Mr. McConnell said.

He said that, at a minimum, the U.S. officials also should have met with Chinese dissidents, along with Communist officials. Such a meeting would have signaled that the United States still sympathizes with the freedom movement, Mr. McConnell said.

Mr. Bush yesterday took care to note that a new Chinese Foreign Ministry statement was released in the wake of the meeting, declaring that China would not sell intermediate-range missiles to Middle Eastern nations. He said one of the purposes of Mr. Scowcroft's visit was to discourage the Chinese from selling M-9 intermediate-range missiles to Syria.

According to Arab and congressional reports, a Chinese-Syrian sales agreement had been signed, but no deliveries made. The ground-launched missile with a 375-mile range is capable of reaching 10 countries in the Middle East, including Israel.

"Foreign news services said that China is preparing to sell M-9 missiles to Syria. This report is groundless," Chinese national television news yesterday quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying. "Except for Saudia Arabia, where a small number of mid-range missiles were sold, China has never sold, nor is planning to sell, missiles to any Middle East country."

"If the only reward [of the meetings] is a restatement of a 2-year-old promise, it hardly seems worth the effort," Mr. Mitchell said.

He and others on Capitol Hill said repeatedly yesterday the administration should have waited until human rights violations in China were rectified before sending representatives there.

Conditions must be improved for arrested students and workers, for dissidents and for the Tibetan people, said Sen. Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island Democrat and Foreign Relations Committee chairman. He said martial law should be lifted and arms supplies halted to the Marxist Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

Mr. Mitchell predicted Congress would move swiftly in January to override Mr. Bush's pocket veto of legislation that would have mandated protections for Chinese students in the United States.

Mr. Solarz said he also expected speedy congressional passage of a bill expanding trade sanctions against the Chinese government. The sanctions bill was passed this year by the House and Senate, but final passage was sidelined during the closing days of the session by "parliamentary squabbles," he said.

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wp 12-12-89 A2

Patting the Dragon

Murderous and unrepentant China is the Willie Horton of nations, and George Bush has just given it a furlough. No one knows why: He got where he is today by insisting that laxity towards lawbreakers is the mark of someone bearing the dread L-word.

Not since Ronald Reagan's erstwhile national security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, in the company of former White House aide Oliver L. North, set out in search of "moderates" in another unlikely country, Iran, has there been such an inexplicable and indefensible foreign mission. President Bush's team, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, had no Bible or cake in their luggage nor any purpose that could qualify as rational.

At least the McFarlane-North expedition had in mind some sort of a quo for the quid of arms they brought. But Bush seems to have hoped only to be forgiven for having criticized the mass murder in Tiananmen Square. The Chinese, who have been alternately sulking and breathing fire since the United States imposed sanctions and canceled high-level meetings, agreed to be mollified. The dragon let itself be patted by suitably lofty emissaries.

The world opened its Sunday newspaper to see Scowcroft toasting the Chinese foreign minister and urging that bygones be bygones.

It seemed as if we were apologizing to the Chinese not just for having taken formal exception to the bloody suppression of the pro-democracy movement but also because Congress recently passed a law to permit Chinese students an indefinite stay here. Bush vetoed the bill, and promised an executive order to accomplish the same end. Strenuous efforts to override the veto are being made by House Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (D-Mo.).

The idea that China's freedom fighters will feel they have lost their last friend does not seem to have occurred to Bush. He is sentimental about China. Generations of American missionaries have produced vast sympathy for the Chinese, contrasting them favorably with the sneaky, acquisitive Japanese. Pearl Buck and Henry Luce, among others, convinced us they were a noble, enduring heathen in need of Western teaching.

Their heartless emperors were succeeded by bloodthirsty commissars, but as a country we are dazzled by its size and numbers. White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said with a straight face during a painful briefing that we need to be friends with China because it is a world power with a billion people, an argument that was fiercely rejected by the Republicans for 25 years.

Bush, on the basis of 13 months as chief of the liaison office in Beijing, regards himself as an old China hand. Others look to the country and see slaughterers; he sees old friends. When he visited them last spring, and sought to see human rights activist Fang Lizhi, they laughed in his face. He didn't mind. He knows the dragon is moody.

Some blame Richard Nixon, who wants to preserve his opening to China as the diplomatic event of the century, for Bush's weird and daffy move. But Roger Morris, Nixon's biographer, says the former president was much more straightforward when he first visited Beijing and "had, and this is a strange word to use in connection with him, an integrity."

Morris, who worked at the Nixon White House with Scowcroft and Eagleburger, two of Henry A. Kissinger's acolytes, calls the trip "shameful."

There is, of course, the chilling possibility that something was cooked up at Malta between Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev about the future of Cambodia. It is the Chinese who are insisting on a Khmer Rouge role in the government. Bush may have wanted to be the first with the good news.

The only possible beneficiary is Gorbachev, who may not have to listen to Bush's lectures on human rights anymore. Gorbachev, who has turned himself inside out trying to please—rewriting history, apologizing for past crimes—can't even get restrictive trade legislation amended, while the Chinese, who angrily told us to mind our own business when Bush's mild reproaches were first received, are being told by Scowcroft that China and the United States must "seek new areas of agreement—economic, political and strategic."

After 11 months in office, we have finally learned what Bush really cares about. His stated passion for education, the environment and the routing-out of drugs have paled as he tears about the country and the world. But China is the country of his heart. For China, he will risk everything: his reputation for "prudence," his popularity in the polls—Americans disapprove of citizens being shot in public squares—his relations with Congress.

Prudent? Timid? Forget it. This, it seems, is one wild and crazy guy.

U.S.-China Ties Seen Likely to Improve

Scowcroft Trip Could Lead to Concessions by Washington and Beijing

WP 12-12-89 A20

By Daniel Southerland
Washington Post Foreign Service

BEIJING, Dec. 11—U.S. national security adviser Brent Scowcroft's surprise weekend mission to Beijing will eventually be seen as the end to a sharp deterioration in U.S.-China relations that resulted from the Chinese army's suppression of a democracy movement last June, Asian and Western diplomats said today.

"I think it will improve relations and get things back on track," said a veteran Asian diplomat.

The only tangible result so far is at least a temporary halt to Chinese attacks on the United States, which imposed sanctions on Beijing to protest the army crackdown. China in recent months has portrayed the United States as an international villain attempting to subvert China's socialist system.

NEWS ANALYSIS

But the diplomats predicted that both the United States and China will make other concessions, resulting from Scowcroft's still largely secret talks here which may only become evident months from now.

The diplomats predicted, for example, that China may move more rapidly to lift martial law in Beijing—imposed last May during the demonstrations for democracy—and offer a new deal to foreign investors.

These could prove to be only cosmetic gestures. But one diplomat said the Chinese might also be more willing to cooperate with the United States on more substantive issues, such as limiting Chinese weapons sales to the Middle East.

The United States has been concerned about possible sales by the Chinese of medium-range M-9 missiles to Syria. Diplomats have said the Chinese have been discussing such sales with Syria for some time without yet making a deal.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry chose today—the day after Scowcroft left Beijing—to dismiss as "utterly groundless" a foreign press report about an alleged Chinese plan to sell missiles to Syria.

What the Chinese will not do, diplomats said, is declare an amnesty for organizers of this past spring's democracy movement or admit that the army suppression of the movement, which resulted in the massacre of hundreds of civilians in Beijing, was a tragedy. All indications are that an unpublicized but widespread crackdown on dissent has continued here.

Both Western and Asian diplomats agreed that the modest sanctions imposed on China by Western nations and Japan have not had the desired effect of moderating China's position on human rights and dissidents.

Instead, some Western diplomats in Beijing have reported to their home governments, the sanctions have caused some of China's conservative leaders to retreat into an isolationist and xenophobic stance against the West. These diplomats have argued for a renewal of high-level contacts, along the lines of the Scowcroft visit, and for a resumption of government loans to China.

Diplomats said that what the Chinese most want from the West at the moment is a renewal of World Bank loans to China worth more than $750 million, which were suspended following the army crackdown.

"I can imagine a situation where the Chinese say to the Americans, 'Look, we haven't sold any missiles to Syria yet, but we need cash and you stopped the World Bank loans,' " said one diplomat.

If all or even part of the World Bank loans are resumed, then commercial banks, most of which have been taking a wait-and-see approach to China since June, are also expected to resume lending.

Meanwhile, Scowcroft may have already achieved the aim, some diplomats said, of bolstering "moderate" officials within the Chinese establishment who have argued for compromise rather than conflict with the United States. Diplomats said such officials can be found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Communist Party's international liaison department.

Scowcroft, in a toast here Saturday, pointed to the fact that some influential Chinese would like to disrupt Sino-American relations. "In both our societies, there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation," he said.

The diplomats said that visits to China by former president Richard Nixon, in October, and former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, in November, laid the groundwork for the Scowcroft visit by engaging China's leadership in a dialogue about strategic and international issues.

Similarly, Scowcroft apparently talked to Communist Party leaders in language they understand—the language of power politics and an international balance of power.

For example, both sides seemed to agree that Chinese influence in Asia is needed to counterbalance the growing influence of Japan.

"The Scowcroft trip assuages a latent Chinese fear that events in Eastern Europe will now downgrade everything," said an Asian diplomat. "Scowcroft has signaled that the Chinese place in the world hasn't been downgraded."

If nothing else, the Scowcroft visit allowed the aging senior leader Deng Xiaoping, now ostensibly retired, to cast a heavily weighted vote in favor of improved Sino-U.S. relations.

Deng, 85, one of the principal advocates of China's opening to the United States nearly two decades ago, set the tone for the Chinese side by stating that the improvement of U.S.-China relations was necessary for world peace. Deng also indicated that China is depending on President Bush's influence to restrain the U.S. Congress—which has taken a harder line toward the Chinese crackdown on dissent than the White House—and move relations forward.

With seeming modesty, the still influential Deng asked Scowcroft to "tell President Bush there is a retired old man in China in the Orient, who is concerned about an improvement and development of Sino-American relations."

This was taken in Beijing as a signal not just to Bush but also to Chinese hard-liners that Deng has softened his anger toward the United States over the sanctions and intends to press for Chinese action to improve relations.

ON MY MIND | A. M. Rosenthal

Betrayal in Beijing

These have been days of joy and light for all who now march in the streets for freedom and all who live in its grace.

For those who fought tyranny in China but were ground down by the Communist regime, this has been a time of hope that the era of liberation would bring their own freedom closer.

But overnight and in stealth the Bush Administration betrayed that hope and those who hold it.

Without advance notice to Americans or their representatives in Congress, the Administration sent two top officials to placate, dicker with and thus strengthen the thin, wicked top layer of Communist officials who massacred their own people just six months ago.

This was a clandestinely made reversal of a publicly announced policy of world importance — that the United States would end high-level relations with the Chinese Government to show its support for the people of China.

Examine the timing.

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft, head of the National Security Council, were sent to Beijing when Congress, opposed to the appeasement of the Chinese Communists, was between sessions and will not meet again until Jan. 23.

The journey was not announced until the middle of the American night on a weekend. That prevented advance discussion and over the first critical days allowed the Administration to dominate media "reaction."

The explanation given by Mr. Bush after the act, that he did not want to "isolate" the Chinese people, was not respectful of American intelligence. It was not the people who were isolated but their despotic Government.

Beijing, naturally enough, was triumphant about the American turnaround. The Communist regime's goal was to show the people it was strong and secure enough to make the mighty United States kowtow, go back on its word and make a political pilgrimage to Beijing.

But why did the Bush Administration break its promise that there would be no high-level dealings unless Beijing changed?

Why did it, by this reversal, make clear to freedom fighters everywhere, in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as China, that the word of the United States was not to be relied upon — not for more than six months anyway?

Perhaps the Beijing regime will throw a bone or two to the U.S. Mr. Bush says Beijing will hold up delivery of missiles sold in the Middle East. That will allow eager American commercial satellite launchers to shovel more dollars into China, which can still use the money to make more missiles to sell elsewhere.

But will bones from Beijing erase the world's memory of American toasts to the killers of Tiananmen Square? American statements were made in Beijing implying that the massacre was just an incident to leap over and that the United States and Communist China had too much in common to allow unspecified "negative forces" in both countries to interfere. What forces? Chinese students? Members of Congress?

What strategic interests made this journey in the dark necessary now? The revolution sweeping Eastern Europe and heading into the Soviet Union has eliminated Communist China as a lever to be used against Moscow — if it ever existed outside the imaginations of American geopoliticians.

How long do U.S. promises last?

What made it necessary to kiss Deng Xiaoping's bloodied hand when the Dalai Lama was receiving one of the world's highest honors? What a hideous irony — the United States sidling up to the jailers of imprisoned, brutalized Tibet the day the Dalai Lama received the Nobel Peace Prize for his struggles against them.

No great mystery. President Bush is deeply affected by his personal and political ties with China, where he was envoy under President Nixon. Like others in that Administration, he was part of the "opening" of China; it was a high point in their lives.

These men, in or out of office, now are not flexible enough, or do not care enough, to see it is time for a clean, new policy supporting Chinese freedom, not the dying Chinese despots with whom they once did business.

If there were a massacre in Prague or Leipzig or Kiev, would our envoys be sent six months later on a journey in the dark to embrace the killers? If not, are the lives of Chinese fighters less dear?

The Administration has shown its answer to that question. Now there is only the hope that Congress will rebel against appeasement of Beijing and try to save American honor, at least part of it. □

A Trip to China: Why the Secrecy?

WP 12-12-89 A25

The following are excerpts from a transcript of yesterday's White House briefing by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater in which he deals with questions regarding the administration's weekend mission to China:

Q: And one other question. Why was this trip kept so secret? Why, you know—

Fitzwater: It wasn't kept secret. It was unorthodox in the time of announcement because the—[laughter]—

Q: Well they were there before it was announced.

Q: Your nose is growing.

Fitzwater: Although I—I'm thinking—it worked so well, I'm thinking of doing it again, however.

The timing of the announcement was that the Chinese asked that we not announce it until they arrived in China. We told them we had to announce it, and they agreed on that timing, which was 2 in the morning, moved up a little bit.

Q: No, no, no—

Q: They demanded that you not announce it until they arrived, and we acceded in that demand?

Fitzwater: That's exactly right.

Q: But why?

Q: Why?

Q: Yeah, why?

Fitzwater: Because—

Q: I mean, they're our guys, aren't they?

Fitzwater: —because from our point of view, the mission and the trip were important, and not the announcement. And if that was important to them, we were willing to—

Q: But who cares when it's announced? I mean, since when do we take our timing cues from the Chinese?

Fitzwater: That's—you're exactly right. We didn't care, so if that's when they wanted to announce it, that was fine with us.

Q: Did they explain why they didn't want it announced beforehand?

Fitzwater: No, I don't know that.

Q: And then—

Fitzwater: And the speech, of course, by Gen. Scowcroft, was on television and broadcast to all the world, so there's nothing secret there. There's nothing secret about any of this. The only weird thing is it was at 2 in the morning, and we simply acceded to their wishes.

Q: But Marlin—

Q: Usually these things are announced before people leave, not after they arrive. [Laughter]

Fitzwater: What?

Q: The Baltimore Colts eventually showed up in Indianapolis, and everybody knew it once they got there, but the fact of the matter is, they slinked out of town. [Laughter].

Fitzwater: Well, we normally don't announce staff travels at all, so the fact that there was any announcement of it was out of the norm— [groans from the press]—and I have no excuse for the 2 in the morning, other than Gen. Scowcroft—

Q: Marlin, you hold news conferences to announce presidential—

Fitzwater: —other than Gen. Scowcroft agreed to it.

. . . .

Q: Marlin, the Chinese do appear to be using, giving this great publicity internally, which would suggest that perhaps they're using it as a propaganda weapon internally to justify their repression. Is that a source of concern?

Fitzwater: I don't know. Oh, a source of concern? I don't think we can control that. As a country that promotes freedom of the press in all instances, I don't think we can dictate how they deal with their press.

. . . .

Q: Marlin, isn't there a danger that this might be misread internally, inside China, by those who would still work for democracy and democratic changes inside China? The sight of senior American officials toasting—in Beijing—toasting their leaders, who only a few months ago ordered the bloodshed?

Fitzwater: We hope not. Leo?

Q: How do you address that concern, though, Marlin? I mean, how do you—

Fitzwater: Well, you're asking me to address an amorphous concern—the only way you can address it is say that's not our intention, that's not our point. And we hope that that's not the way it's seen.

U.S. to Loosen China Sanctions

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
L.A. TIMES, A-1
Date 12 DEC 1989

■ **Diplomacy:** Bush is expected to clear the way for the Chinese to launch American-made satellites.

By JIM MANN, TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON—In the wake of the mission to Beijing by President Bush's national security adviser, the Administration is preparing to grant further concessions to China soon, easing the impact of some of the sanctions imposed last June.

According to knowledgeable U.S. officials and Washington diplomats, Bush is expected to clear the way within the next two weeks for satellites made by the Hughes Aircraft Co. to be launched in China. The export of the U.S.-made satellites would be the first to any Communist country.

One U.S. official said a decision on the export of the satellites is "imminent." An Australian diplomat said he expects the Bush Administration to approve the exports to China by the end of this week.

Last June, after the Chinese army killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing, Bush banned the sale or export to China of goods that have possible military uses. U.S. permission for the satellite deal has been held up since then.

U.S. sources say Bush may also give U.S. approval by early next year for a resumption of some World Bank loans to China and for a continuation of loans from the U.S. Export-Import Bank to China.

The Administration hopes that the Chinese leadership will reciprocate with concessions of its own, the sources said.

Brent Scowcroft, Bush's national security adviser, and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger "went over [to China] in the belief that steps by both sides have to be taken in parallel," said one U.S. official. He acknowledged that "we may not know for a few weeks" how much the Chinese leadership is willing to change its own policies in the aftermath of the American officials' visit.

In exchange for American concessions, U.S. officials say, the two Bush Administration officials sought an end to China's anti-American propaganda and its jamming of the Voice of America, a continuation of student exchange programs between China and the United States and renewed pledges that China will not sell its M-9 short-range missiles in the Middle East.

In addition, these sources said, Scowcroft and Eagleburger sought an easing of the political climate inside China, such as a lifting of martial law in Beijing and a settlement of the dispute between China and the United States over Fang Lizhi, China's leading dissident. Fang remains in the American Embassy in Beijing, where he was granted refuge after the Chinese army crushed pro-democracy demonstrations last June.

One knowledgeable U.S. official said the secretive mission to Beijing was motivated by the Administration's general desire to mend fences with China.

"You know this White House and Scowcroft and the way they think of China's strategic importance," he said.

He rejected allegations that the timing of the trip was prompted by U.S. concerns over Chinese missile sales in the Middle East. In recent weeks, there have been reports that China may have concluded a deal to sell M-9 missiles to Syria.

"Scowcroft didn't go because of missiles," said this source. "In drawing up agendas, sure, we had missiles in there. But that was not what triggered the trip. What triggered the trip was the hope that we could reverse the momentum of the relationship. And the hope was that Malta was the logical time to do it."

Bush Administration officials explained that one purpose of Scowcroft's mission to Beijing was to brief Chinese officials on the talks in Malta between Bush and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev the previous weekend.

For six months, Los Angeles-based Hughes Aircraft has been seeking final approval from the Administration to sell two of its communications satellites, one to an Australian state-owned company called Aussat and the other to a Hong Kong consortium called Asiasat. Both of these satellites would then be launched on Chinese rockets in China's Sichuan province.

The Hong Kong group's satellite is supposed to be launched next April. Officials for Hughes and for the Australian government have been telling the Administration they must have a final decision this month on whether they will be able to go ahead with their satellite deal.

"We would like to know by Dec. 22 what we need to do when we come back to work after the first of next year," a Hughes spokesman said Monday. "I would hope that a decision would be forthcoming in the not-too-distant future."

The Australian government has been lobbying the Bush Administration to clear the way for the export of the satellites. Australian officials say their country will save about $200 million if the Aussat satellite is launched in China rather than another country.

"Indications have already been positive that the Administration

appreciated the importance of the Aussat project to the Australian economy, and that when the domestic political atmosphere was such that the Bush Administration could move, it would," said an Australian diplomat Monday. "I'm optimistic they'll announce a decision to issue a license this week."

Asked Monday whether Scowcroft had discussed the satellite deal last weekend in Beijing, the Australian diplomat replied: "I'd prefer not to comment."

There have been signs that last year the Reagan Administration and Chinese leaders worked out a general deal in which the United States would allow the export of the satellites to China in exchange for China's promises not to export M-9 missiles to the Middle East.

The Times ported in July, 1988, that Chir had concluded a deal to sell suc missiles to Syria. Two months later, after a meeting with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, then-Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci announced he had received "assurances" that China would act with restraint in its sales of weapons to other countries. The Reagan Administration gave the first, general U.S. approval for the satellite deal with China two days later.

This fall, after the Bush Administration held up final action on the export of the satellites, U.S. officials said there were new fears that China might be selling its M-9 missiles in the Middle East.

Bush hinted Monday that over the weekend, Chinese officials once again promised not to sell these short-range missiles.

"I was very pleased today, in the wake of Gen. Scowcroft's visit, to notice that the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that they would not sell missiles to any Middle East countries," the President said. "That subject was raised by Gen. Scowcroft."

One China specialist, Harry Harding of the Brookings Institution, said Monday that a renewed pledge by China not to sell missiles in the Middle East "is hardly a concession" because Chinese leaders have given the same promises in the past. "How many times do we get that concession?" Harding asked.

China Trip Defended By Bush

President Seeking 'Common Ground' With Beijing Leaders

WP 12-12-89 A1

By David Hoffman
and Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush yesterday justified his decision to send a high-level mission to China on grounds that he wants to prevent China from remaining "totally isolated" following the Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators last June.

Facing a wave of criticism from Congress, Bush said he is "looking for ways to find common ground" with the Beijing regime and expressed hope that he could improve relations that were strained by the bloody crackdown in which hundreds were killed and wounded.

"I realize the difficulty of this relationship, but I don't want to make it any worse," Bush told a group of newspaper editorial writers at the White House. "I'd like to think it would improve. We have contacts with countries that have egregious records on human rights."

Bush, who reluctantly imposed sanctions on China last summer, said Sino-American relations had not been returned to normal in the wake of the visit by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger. Other officials said, however, that the mission was clearly designed to move the countries toward more normalized relations.

Bush ordered the weekend visit even though he had no evidence that the Chinese leadership has eased its repressive internal policies, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater acknowledged. Rather, the president was motivated by events in "the rest of the world," he said.

After receiving a report on the talks from Scowcroft yesterday, Bush cited approvingly a fresh statement issued by the Chinese Foreign Ministry that it would not sell missiles in the Middle East. Calling this "a very sound development," Bush described the statement as an "instant response" to Scowcroft's visit.

Scowcroft had raised the missile issue in Beijing, but did not receive such assurances from the Chinese leaders, officials said. Bush made his comments after being shown a news report on the Chinese statement once Scowcroft returned. China has made similar promises in the past that have met with skepticism from the United States.

Sources said the administration is bracing for a period of sharp criticism in the wake of the overture to China. The sources described it as an intense, personal gamble by the president that China's leaders will respond to his gesture in the near future. "There may be a certain amount of cat and mouse about this," said a senior official, but he added that there is an "expectation" that the Chinese will respond in the next month or two.

The sources said Bush, who was U.S. envoy to Beijing in 1974-75, was determined to go ahead with the effort even through some senior advisers feared a backlash at home. The sources said Bush originally planned to send Scowcroft alone to Beijing, immediately after the Malta summit, but decided to wait until the allies were briefed first.

The sources said former president Richard M. Nixon and former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, both of whom visited China recently, served as important channels leading up to the Bush overture.

The sources said Scowcroft made it clear to the Chinese leaders that Bush needed some kind of positive response from them—in part to quell the criticism at home. Scowcroft's agenda at the meetings, the sources said, included discussion about human rights and the aftermath of Tiananmen Square; U.S. concerns over the export of Chinese M-9 medium-range ballistic missiles; the unsettled situation in Cambodia; U.S.

Officials described Scowcroft as reluctant to discuss his mission out of fear that any detailed disclosure about the talks would harm the prospects for a positive response.

When Bush was asked if he could identify positive steps China could take, he responded, "Yes, but I'm not going to detail them for you."

> ***"I'd like to think that they will redress some of the grievances that continue to exist."***
>
> —President Bush

Questioned yesterday whether the China visit would "send the wrong signal to the Kremlin" about internal repression, Bush said, "I have no concern about that at all," adding that the United States is "properly positioned" as being "in favor of human rights and against totalitarian oppression."

China, he said, "is a billion-plus people. They have a strategic position in the world that is important to us. And I'd like to think that they will redress some of the grievances that continue to exist." Bush said he would be "very careful" not to signal that he is undertaking "total normalization" with Beijing.

Last June, Bush had insisted that he wanted to preserve the relationship with China, but he also spoke sympathetically about the pro-democracy demonstrators. Recalling the lone student who stood in front of Chinese military tanks, Bush said then, "All I can say to him, wherever he might be, or to people around the world is we are and we must stand with him. And that's the

Bush prepares to let China have satellites

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES 12-13-89 A1

Three U.S. communications satellites destined for launch by China are "normal commercial exports" and should not have been targets of a ban on munitions shipments after the Tiananmen Square massacre, the White House said yesterday.

Although President Bush's emissary to Beijing last weekend received no direct assurance that China would refrain from selling M-9 Silkworm missiles to Middle East nations, the administration appears to have accepted China's latest public declaration to that effect — and to be prepared to give the go-ahead to the satellite deal.

Defining the satellites as "normal commercial exports" rather than "munitions" removes the final obstacle to reactivating their export licenses under a deal that gives the Chinese lucrative rights to launch them from its spaceport in Zichiang.

"The president suspended the export of military weapons and defense articles to the Peoples Republic of China, but did not intend to disrupt normal civilian commercial relations," White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said yesterday. "No decision has been made on those satellites, but it is possible."

Although several officials close to the deal indicated approval was due as soon as this week, Mr. Fitzwater emphasized yesterday that no final decision had been made to reactivate export licenses for Hughes Aircraft to ship the satellites, which would be the first allowed into any communist nation.

The deadline for the Hughes deal is said by an administration source to be Friday.

The satellite arrangement would be the first tangible result of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft's weekend trip to talk with Chinese leaders, a visit that drew considerable criticism Monday from Democratic congressional leaders, as well as some Republicans.

China's Foreign Ministry announced Monday that it will not sell missiles in the Middle East — a pledge Mr. Bush praised, although similar assurances in the past were violated.

"I was very pleased, in the wake of Gen. Scowcroft's visit, to notice that the Chinese Foreign Ministry stated that they would not sell missiles to any Middle East countries," Mr. Bush said in an interview with editorial writers Monday. "For this to have been raised now, and then having this instant response, I view that as good."

It was understood that no direct assurance was given to Mr. Scowcroft, but that the White House was accepting the statement made through the media, an action not unusual in U.S.-China relations.

When asked why he believes the Chinese assurances despite the presence of Silkworm missiles in Iran and reports of a deal last summer to sell missiles to Syria, Mr. Bush said only, "If they prove not to be telling the truth, that wouldn't be good."

Yesterday, the Chinese government called reports of sales to Syria "groundless" and a Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "Except for Saudi Arabia, where a small number of mid-range missiles were sold, China has never sold, nor is planning to sell, missiles to any Middle East country."

Once in orbit, the satellites would relay signals for their owners' clients and would not serve China.

China would launch the commercial U.S.-built satellites for Australian and Hong Kong interests in deals that would save those customers about $200 million per launch.

An Australian diplomat who requested anonymity said, "I'm optimistic they'll announce a decision to issue a license this week." However, embassy spokesman Brett Bayly said yesterday they are hoping for a decision "on time" but have been given no indication it is forthcoming.

Don O'Neal, a spokesman for Hughes, said yesterday that the satellites include two new HS-601s to be launched in 1991 and 1992 for Australia's government-owned Aussat and the old Westar VI, refurbished after being recovered from an erratic orbit and sold to a British-Chinese consortium in Hong Kong.

That consortium, Asiasat, was to launch its satellite in April 1990 and must receive a license by Dec. 22 to make its deadline, said Mr. O'Neal, who added that Chinese personnel would have no access to the satellites except to launch them on a Long March 3 rocket from Zichiang. Hughes technicians would assemble the satellites at the launch site, where China Great Wall Industries would provide the rocket. Launch preparations would take at least three months, the spokesman said.

Once in orbit, the satellites would relay signals for television, telephone, computers and cellular telephones for their owners' clients and would not serve China.

While in China, Mr. Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger reportedly sought other concessions from China, including lifting of martial law and settlement of the dispute over dissident Fang Lizhi.

Mr. Fitzwater would not discuss any point raised during the talks but said yesterday that Mr. Lizhi was still in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, where he took refuge in early June.

The spokesman noted that all items on the Munitions Control List were included under the June sanctions and said, "We recognize that some items captured in the suspension here have civilian applications and fall under the category of normal commercial exports." He specifically confirmed the satellites are in that category.

He added, "The manufacturer of these satellites, Hughes Aircraft, has informed us that it needs licensing decisions on these exports relatively soon in order to meet the manufacturing and delivery timetables and allow the launches to proceed on schedule."

But a congressional official familiar with the issue complained the administration is planning to base its approval of the Hughes satellite license on Chinese press statements, not on formal diplomatic assurances, that Beijing will not sell M-9s to Syria.

An administration source added that the Chinese news agency Xinhua used identical language in denying the Syrian missile deal Nov. 23.

According to U.S. government officials, the U.S. defense attache in Beijing first reported in January that the Chinese had rejected a Syrian proposal to purchase M-9 intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

Then, after President Bush's visit to China in February, missile negotiations between Syria and China resumed and led to the signing of an agreement between the two countries on May 18, the officials said.

Meanwhile, Pentagon officials yesterday confirmed that Chinese military officers and engineers have already returned here to continue work with the New York-based Grumman Corp. on an avionics upgrade for the Chinese F-8 fighter. But spokesman Pete Williams said no deliveries in the $502 million contract to China have been made.

Mr. Williams said the Chinese have a number of items that remain undelivered under three other U.S. military contracts suspended by the administration since the massacre in Tiananman Square: two AN/TPQ 37 counter-artillery radars; several items related to a large-caliber artillery modernization program, and everything covered under a contract for Mk 46 submarine torpedos and launchers.

• *Bill Gertz and Peter Almond contributed to this report.*

Bush Is Right on China

NYT 12-13-89 A31

By Michel Oksenberg

ANN ARBOR, Mich.

As a centrist Democrat who advocates policies that advance our national values and our national interest, I am troubled by the eagerness of many fellow Democrats to score debating points off President Bush's China policy.

The President is accused of being a wimp, this time for dispatching his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger, to Beijing to "kowtow" before the Chinese.

In reality, President Bush's sending of the Scowcroft mission was an act of courageous leadership that his critics on other days claim he never exhibits.

The President decided to endure the predictable condemnations from the left and right. Further, he knew that dialogue at high levels in Beijing rarely leads to public agreements and that the results come out slowly. In the meantime, critics will point to the absence of immediate gains to prove the exercise was futile.

The principal reason that George Bush has given for Mr. Scowcroft's trip is persuasive: to maintain official contact with the leadership that is slipping into a position of dangerous isolation.

Governments throughout the world, including our own, appropriately and immediately responded to the brutality and callousness of China's leaders last June by condemning the gross violation of human rights, by ceasing high-level contacts and applying an array of costly economic sanctions that mostly still remain in effect. Foreign investment, scientific exchanges and tourism have all dropped precipitously.

The cumulative impact of these justifiable measures is taking hold. They have placed the hard-bitten and stubborn leaders in Beijing in a bind. But the measures also are creating a siege mentality.

It seems prudent in this context to do exactly what George Bush has done: To probe and to ascertain whether the pressure is inducing any flexibility and to discourage Deng Xiaoping and his associates from sinking into the totally isolationist and antiforeign posture that has all too often characterized China in this century.

While the events in China since June 1 are deeply abhorrent to us, the situation could easily become worse: even more oppression at home and a troublesome and recalcitrant China abroad. That is what the Administration is attempting to prevent, recognizing that additional pressure and continued absence of dialogue only increase the danger.

The continued tranquility and prosperity of East Asia depends upon China's constructive engagement in the region. In Indochina, Beijing has an indispensible role in influencing the Khmer Rouge and in forging a viable coalition government to bring peace to Cambodia.

China's arms sales policies obviously concern the U.S., especially in the Middle East. As China's foreign currency reserves drop, it is important to obtain renewed assurances that revenue shortfalls will not be remedied through weapons sales.

Finally, as the Soviet-American relationship undergoes fundamental change, it is important that both Washington and Moscow — not just Moscow through its improved channels with Beijing — inform the top leaders of China of what transpired in Malta.

The burden is now on Beijing to help the Administration. Rather than directing fire at George Bush, bipartisan pressure should now be exerted on Beijing for what measures it now will undertake to halt continued deterioration in China-American relations.

Beijing should be urged to grant amnesty to demonstrators, acknowledge that the events of June were a tragedy, release an even incomplete list of the names of those killed in June, diminish the pointed criticisms of foreign ideas and influence and halt the oppressive climate that now pervades many universities and research institutes. These measures would begin to alleviate the quiet anger among the populace and make Beijing a somewhat more comfortable place for foreigners.

To signal an interest in joining President Bush's effort to keep the relationship alive, the Chinese could also take such steps as stopping the jamming of the Voice of America, allowing the dissident physicist Fang Lizhi and his wife to go abroad, resuming the Fulbright program and renewing negotiations over establishing a Peace Corps presence.

Unfortunately, since the June tragedy, Democrats have been swift to criticize but have offered no plausible alternative to the President's China policy. Instead, they have tended to indulge in the rhetoric of moral indignation, to treat the Chinese leaders as pariahs in world affairs and to advocate sanctions that our Asian allies are unlikely to sustain and that will therefore separate us from them on a key issue.

Not a single leading Democrat has seen fit to go to China to express his or her views directly. We have a right to expect more from a party that properly condemned the Reagan Administration for failing to have adequate contact with top Soviet leaders during his first five years in office, while Democrats boldly paraded to Moscow to plead the cause of human rights directly to Soviet leaders.

The result is that China policy has again become a partisan issue, as it was in the 1950's and 1960's. The President and moderate Republicans are defending a constructive relationship with the most populous nation on earth, while Democrats are drifting toward what appears to be a willingness to risk isolating China's Government and to court its animosity. This is bad politics and an abdication of statesmanship.

The American people are unlikely to support for long a policy that treats the leaders of China as the enemy and isolates them in world affairs. In terms of statesmanship, the U.S. tried to isolate China for 20 years, following the 1949 revolution. Its efforts ended in failure.

A centrist policy demands both strong condemnation for China's human rights violations and an un-

Democrats' cheap shots undermine courageous realpolitik.

Michel Oksenberg, professor of political science at the University of Michigan, served on the Carter Administation's National Security Council staff.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Bush's Bow to Beijing . . .

While Europe's Communist world rushes pell-mell toward democracy, President Bush's high-level mission to Beijing looked more like a groveling gift to China's bloodstained octogenarians than a device to promote congressionally demanded political reform, still distant six months after the Tiananmen Square massacre.

That threatens to unleash upon the president what one administration insider called "a steamroller" when Capitol Hill opens for business again next month.

At the very least, the president's veto 10 days ago of the bill giving safe harbor in the United States to thousands of Chinese students will be overridden by a unanimous or near-unanimous vote. And the steamroller may force new sanctions on Beijing, exactly what the president does not want.

The seeming apostasy of Bush's tolerance for continuing police sweeps and trials of pro-democracy Chinese students and workers is summed up in the intentionally outrageous remark of a U.S. China strategist that mirrors much political feeling in both parties: Will the president now send national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to comfort Erich Honecker, the jailed East German Communist leader?

No payoff for the Bush-ordered Beijing mission has been announced as we write this, but to make the president's mission worthwhile, the payoff—if there is any—must at the very least be an end to Chinese jamming of the Voice of America and London's BBC.

The Chinese people know hardly anything of the terminal illness of communism in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria or even Poland and Hungary. Knowledge of those miracles in Eastern Europe and parallel movements toward independence of the Baltic states is ruthlessly barred from the Chinese people.

The reason seems obvious. The pro-democracy movement that reached its visible peak last June is still very much alive, though temporarily invisible. Turning up the Voice and the BBC to full volume so that the Chinese people could know how communism perished in Europe would not enhance the future of the Communist Party of China, nor ensure the continuing invisibility of the pro-democracy movement.

So opening the airwaves might be a fair first step to warrant Bush's reopening of the U.S.-China dialogue. The only known Chinese chip pocketed by Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger in Beijing appears to be a renewed Chinese pledge to stop selling ballistic missiles to Middle Eastern states. The promise was first made more than a year ago to then-defense secretary Frank Carlucci.

Not all politicians are lined up against the president's decision to send two of his highest diplomatic officials on a mission that started so secretly it was announced at 2 a.m. Saturday. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), a conservative with a strong human rights record, told us the president "cannot just stand on Mt. Olympus when it comes to the huge and important country of China." A high-level mission, he said, was necessary to calm possible Chinese fears that the Malta summit would lead to the United States and Soviet Union "ganging up" on China.

But Hyde was in the minority. Ray Cline, a longtime intelligence specialist on China and Asia, credited Bush with having a "serious purpose" in his new approach and with being "right" to protect delicate intelligence sharing between Washington and Beijing. But, he said, the high-level visit "would be perceived as kow-towing . . . too damn polite".

The political outcry against the Beijing mission will create pressures on the president to come up with chips that may not even be on the table. To Deng Xiaoping and his aging cohorts, fighting for their power and authority, the core objective has always been control of the masses inside China, and that excludes worry about the U.S. Congress.

That now becomes Bush's problem. Unjamming the radios, ending martial law, freeing jailed students or easing military pressure on tragic Tibet all threaten the core objective of internal control.

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Richard Cohen WP 12-13-89 A25

. . . It Was Burlesque

We should count ourselves lucky that national security adviser Brent Scowcroft is not a historian. If he were, we might be reading about the "events at" My Lai or the unfortunate occurrence at Babi Yar—infamous massacres both. In his toast in Beijing this weekend, Scowcroft called the massacre of several hundred Chinese students last spring "the events at Tiananmen."

Words matter, and Scowcroft's were groveling and undignified. Worse, they were un-American (a loathsome word that should be used sparingly). Scowcroft's toast, in which he also referred to American outrage at the massacre as "negative forces," in no way expressed what the American people feel about the killing of innocents. Moral indignation is not a "negative force." It happens to be one of our finest attributes.

As unexpected as the Scowcroft-Eagleburger mission was, two aspects of it are familiar. The first is surprise. The new opening to China was not announced until Scowcroft's plane was on the ground. This was also the case with the Malta summit, which was precededed by numerous White House statements that no summit was in the offing, and really none need be. With that, George Bush was off to Malta.

Second, the trip was a deep, dark secret, known only to few administration insiders. This too is characteristic of Bush. Not even Defense Secretary Dick Cheney knew in advance about the Malta summit. When Bush listens only to his own advice, he is much like the lawyer who defends himself: he has a fool for a client.

Possibly Henry Kissinger knew of the trip. This is because both Scowcroft and his traveling companion, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, once worked for Kissinger. Their former employer, along with Richard Nixon, has a soft spot when it comes to China. Both Nixon and Kissinger have recently been there.

But the administration's double standard toward China is as mysterious as the recent high-level trip. For its showing a certain antipathy toward democracy, we make war on Nicaragua. For its murdering students in prime time, we make nice with China. The Nicaraguans promise elections, but that is not enough to mollify us. The Chinese promise nothing and for that we all but fall on our knees in gratitude.

Like an old man with a showgirl the Bush administration cannot see China for what it is. It was only with the utmost reluctance that Bush imposed sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Square massacre. It was done in the manner of a parent punishing a child: left unsaid, but nonetheless suggested, was the phrase "This will hurt me more than it hurts you." The administration's pain was so great that the president recently vetoed a bill allowing Chinese students to stay in this country, providing sanctuary only through the back door of executive action. It feared angering Beijing.

Why? First, don't underestimate Kissinger's influence. He is only a recent convert to the belief that Mikhail Gorbachev is a genuine reformer with staying power. Before waking and smelling the coffee, Kissinger was warning that Gorbachev was skating on the thinnest of ice. What we needed is what we always needed: the China card. This is precisely the thinking that sent Nixon to China in 1973, a trip advanced by Kissinger.

Creeping Kissingerism has permeated the White House. The only explanation for why Bush dispatched Scowcroft and Eagleburger is that China is still held in high regard as an anti-Soviet card. The implications of that are plain: for all its talk, for all the pronouncements after the Malta summit, the Bush administration retains a vestigial suspicion that Russia remains Russia. After Malta, Bush refrained from saying the Cold War was over. Now, out of the mouth of Scowcroft, we know the president thinks it isn't.

Prudence is a good thing, and indeed, no one can know what will happen in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But the events of this fall proclaim that if the Cold War is not over, it is at least ending. In terms of cards, that means China has gone from an ace in the hole to about a deuce. It is not unimportant, it is just not so important that we need humiliate ourselves to jolly the Chinese leadership. Nixon in China was made into an opera. Scowcroft in China is burlesque.

Bush Sent Key Aide on Private Mission to China

wp 12-13-89 By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer A31

President Bush sent a trusted aide, White House personnel director Chase Untermeyer, on a private mission to touch base with old friends in China last weekend while national security adviser Brent Scowcroft was meeting with Chinese leaders.

Untermeyer flew to Beijing with Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, according to a White House official. Once in China, he privately visited with two of Bush's Chinese friends from his days as U.S. envoy in Beijing in 1974-75.

The official said Untermeyer's purpose was to gain for Bush an assessment from his friends of the situation in China since the crackdown on pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square last June. Untermeyer spoke with the two men who had known Bush and then returned to Washington to give Bush a personal report, the official said.

"It wasn't a policy session," said the official. "It was getting a pulse of the people."

The identity of the two friends could not be learned, and the White House official did not disclose the nature of their advice. However, the official said one of the friends was a mid-level government official, the other not in the government.

Untermeyer, a former assistant secretary of the Navy who has known Bush since Bush's 1966 campaign for Congress, was selected because he is close to Bush and it was believed the Chinese friends would be willing to confide in him.

"... It was getting a pulse of the people."
— a White House official

Bush has tapped Untermeyer for sensitive tasks before; he was given responsibility for transition preparation prior to last fall's general election.

The trip illustrates Bush's penchant for using unconventional means to gather information, particularly in foreign policy. He has often called friends and acquaintances who are not in high-level posts for a reading on controversial and delicate matters, such as the hostage crisis last summer in Lebanon.

The White House official said Untermeyer did not meet with Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist and dissident whom the Chinese government accused of inciting the Tiananmen Square protests. He and his wife, Li Shuxian, have lived in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing since June 5.

Bush has said that he had only sporadic contacts with the senior Chinese leadership during his service there, but that he met many other people in China and revisited some of them last February when he was in Beijing.

Bush Gamble In China Trip

He Attempts Boldness In Area of Expertise

NYT 12-13-89 A1

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12 — Hunkering down against growing criticism of President Bush's diplomatic overture to Beijing, Administration officials said today that the surprise weekend mission was a "calculated gamble" taken by a President who considers himself his own China expert.

News Analysis

By breaking with his usual caution and making a risky first move toward improving relations with China, Administration officials said Mr. Bush was counting on a quick reciprocal gesture that would demonstrate the Chinese interest in improving relations and redressing American outrage at the violent crackdown on dissent there in June.

If the relationship with China did not improve, Administration officials said, Mr. Bush feared that he would lose any hope of Chinese cooperation on issues like arms control and in regional conflicts like the one in Cambodia. With the power balance in Eastern Europe uncertain, officials said, Mr. Bush was anxious not to cede ground to the Soviet Union in Asia, a geopolitical aim that still seems valid to the President despite the easing of superpower rivalries.

Old Republican Skills

In a larger strategic sense, Administration officials said Mr. Bush was anxious not to let China slip into political isolation. The China relationship also carries a powerful political symbolism for a White House that includes top officials who were personally involved in an earlier Republican Administration's opening to China.

Administration officials said they were confident that Beijing would respond to Mr. Bush's overture, and that his envoys had told the Chinese that some reciprocity was essential in order to take any more steps toward normal relations. But they refused to say what the Administration expected, or even what it wanted, in return.

Indeed, there were indications today that the White House was considering another conciliatory move — lifting the suspension on the shipment to China of three communications satellites held up when Mr. Bush banned arms exports to protest the June crackdown in Tiananmen Square in Beijing.

The China overture, which was conducted with even more secrecy than usual in the security-obsessed Bush White House, also marked a triumph for the diplomatic school that views China as a special case that cannot be treated with standards applied to other countries and that China's leadership responds to subtle diplomacy, not censure and sanction.

Mr. Bush, who was United States envoy to China in the mid-1970's, has long espoused this view, Administration officials said.

President Under Attack

But the trip to Beijing by Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State, put Mr. Bush on the political defensive less than two weeks after winning plaudits for the Malta summit.

Although the Administration insisted that such a parallel should not be drawn, Congressional critics saw the China move as a contradiction of American policy in Eastern Europe, where Mr. Bush has been encouraging popular democratic movements while urging Western governments not to interfere. Such criticism continued to mount today on Capitol Hill, even though Congress is officially on vacation. Democrats had been slow over the weekend to seize on Mr. Bush's initiative.

The House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Trade scheduled a hearing Wednesday afternoon on the trip to China, and invited Mr. Eagleburger to appear. The State Department said he was unlikely to attend.

Some Congressional Democrats were threatening to revive legislation that would codify and strengthen trade and political sanctions against the Chinese government.

Representative Nancy Pelosi, Democrat of California, said one of Congress' first orders of business when it reconvenes next month will be an attempt to override Mr. Bush's veto of her bill permitting Chinese students to remain in the United States indefinitely if they fear retaliation at home. Mr. Bush said he did not want to put into law administrative steps he had already taken to permit the Chinese students to stay in this country.

Representative Pelosi said efforts for an override vote gained momentum as a result of the weekend visit to China, which ended Mr. Bush's own ban on high-level meetings between Chinese and American officials. She called the trip "a slap in the face to the forces of democracy."

The primary issue that lawmakers want to discuss, aides said, was how the decision was made to try an overture to China at a time when Beijing's leaders seem unrepentant about the crackdown in Tienanmen Square and when there is no clear evidence of an impending change in policy.

Some Congressional Democrats also said they wanted to know more about the roles of former President Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, in arranging the weekend visit. Both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger, who opened relations with Beijing in the 1970's, visited there recently. Then they met with Mr. Bush and said the United States should take steps to improve relations.

The Kissinger Connection

Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger both have close ties to Mr. Kissinger, having worked in his international consulting firm before joining the Bush Administration.

Administration officials said the choice of Mr. Scowcroft, a top White House aide, was intended to underscore the President's interest in the mission and that Mr. Eagleburger was chosen because his rank is higher than that of Richard H. Solomon, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, who was not brought into the planning for the trip.

The officials sought to diminish the role played by either Mr. Kissinger or Mr. Nixon. They said the decision was almost entirely Mr. Bush's own idea, born out of his background in Chinese affairs, although they acknowledged that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger had "some bearing" on the decision.

The big remaining question, according to Congressional and Administration officials, is what the Chinese will do in response to Mr. Bush's move. Mr. Scowcroft, Administration officials said, made it very clear that some gesture was needed.

"He didn't have a laundry list," an official said. But he added, "Scowcroft said that the visit itself should indicate our interest and that we now need something specific from China. He warned the Chinese about the domestic political situation and that Congress would be a problem and said we need some kind of movement from China before we can go any further."

PATRICK BUCHANAN

Crawling back to the Great Hall

WJ 12-13-89 A1

As U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger executed their kowtows before the 85-year-old regent of the Middle Kingdom, Deng Xiaoping played his role perfectly.

"Deng was jovial as ever," one U.S. official confided to The New York Times, "but seemed to have some difficulty focusing on people. While he usually looks people directly in the face, his eyes sort of glazed over Scowcroft."

And why should he not be contemptuous of these Americans, who, with all their bombast about freedom and human rights, needed but six months, after that night of terror in Tiananmen Square, to come crawling back to the Great Hall of the People?

"In both our societies," Mr. Scowcroft said in his oleaginous toast, "there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces." Then, to sustained applause, he concluded, "We extend the hand of friendship and hope you will do the same."



Brent Scowcroft

Among those "negative forces," are millions who voted for Mr. Bush expecting something better than the unbuttoned embrace of a tyrant whose tanks ran over the bodies of college students who had offended him by building a crude replica of our Statue of Liberty.

Secretary of State James Baker and Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater now describe what happened last June as a "tragedy." Orwell's observation comes to mind: "In our time, political speech and writing are largely the defense of the indefensible."

What happened last June was not a tragedy; it was a massacre, and damned bloody atrocity ordered by a regime that holds power only as a legacy from the greatest mass murderer of the 20th century, Mao Tsetung, whose crystal sarcophagus yet sits in the place of honor in the very square where freedom died a bloody death.

How to defend this renewal of "friendship"?

Well, it is privately argued, in a world where Moscow remains a great nuclear power and strategic threat, America and China need one another. Even though we have our "disagreements," as the great men like to put it, we collaborated in Afghanistan, and Beijing gives us critical intelligence on Soviet missile tests, in return for U.S. military aid.

But why must secret collaboration with such a regime mean we call them "friends"?

An argument can be made that the superintendent of the Chicago police would have been right to pay off Bugs Moran in the '20s, for information to convict Al Capone. That is the real world. But, even in the real world, there is no need to invite Moran over to celebrate Thanksgiving with the family, and toast him as a "friend."

Americans are supposed to stand for something in this world; that something is freedom, human dignity and human rights. Our country was a beacon to those students; many had studied here; we were the model of what they, in their way, wanted to bring to China. That their Statue of Democracy was modeled on our own Statue of Liberty was an immense tribute to the United States. And they went to their deaths, that terrible night in Tiananmen Square, standing up for the things for which we Americans have always stood. The ones still alive, in prison and penal colonies, what must they think of us, as they read about how the two ex-partners from Kissinger Associates came to toast the men who ordered the tanks to run them down?

Even in terms of cold pragmatism, this was a mistake.

America may well need a relationship with China. But what is China? Is it these old men, desperately clinging to power with their cold and clammy hands? Or, is it the millions of young people, now silent, who gathered in Tiananmen Square? As the statues of Lenin and Stalin fall all over Europe, can anyone think Deng Xiaoping is the wave of the future?

The true tragedy here is that Mr. Bush has elected to play the inside game of balance-of-power politics, of Big Power diplomacy, when the whole world is passing it by.

Even the casual student of history can see we are living in revolutionary times. The monstrous edifice of communism, built by Lenin, Stalin and Mao, and their lesser epigones, Ho, Castro and Ortega, is cracking and crumbling. The place in history that beckons Mr. Bush is to be the president who presided over the global collapse of the communist empire, and the global triumph of freedom.

In a matter of weeks, we have seen them trundled off to the graveyards of history: Kadar, Honecker, Jakes, Zhivkov, Husak, Krenz; One day they will be followed by Deng, Castro, Ortega, and, yes, Gorbachev, who is a transition figure from communism to freedom. For it is not simply Stalinism that the people of Europe are casting off. It is "socialism with a human face" as well. In the Baltic republics and Russia, the clamor is not for glasnost or perestroika, but freedom and democracy. Why cut deals with the losers, when we are on the winning side of history?

And what is the signal sent to Mr. Gorbachev? Go ahead, send your tanks into Lithuania, and you will face but six months probation for human rights violation; after which, the Americans will be coming over to call you "friend," and to disparage those "negative forces" back in the United States, who simply cannot see the big picture.

So what do we do about China?

WJ
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George Bush has been ambuscaded by pundits who accuse him of inconsistency in dealing with the People's Republic of China. His critics point out that in the past month Mr. Bush has 1) punished China by vetoing a foreign aid appropriations bill that would have given money to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, an organization that has provided "educational" support for China's population-control efforts, even though those efforts include such barbaric activities as forced abortion and infanticide; 2) tried to mollify the government in Beijing by vetoing a bill that would have granted political asylum to Chinese students in the United States and to Chinese citizens fleeing China's birth-control policies; and 3) dispatched National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger for a meeting last weekend with top Chinese officials.

It's not too difficult to deride the inconsistency of these approaches, and liberal critics have taken to using the schoolmarmish verb "to kowtow" in describing Mr. Bush's behavior. Yet while name-calling is easy, actual policy in this case is more difficult. Mr. Bush wants to maintain some sort of contact with China, knowing that prospects for significant political or economic liberalization will remain dim for the foreseeable future and that the United States can do little to alter that fact. Ultimately, the Chinese people will have to follow the lead of the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, East Germans and even Bulgarians. They will have to rise up and assert their own rights to freedom.

Members of Congress have vowed angrily to push through another bill granting asylum to Chinese students and population-policy dissidents. That's a good idea. They also want to step up economic sanctions against China, which is silly. Sanctions give politicians a feeling of moral superiority, but they almost never stimulate reform.

U.S. policymakers ought to resign themselves to the fact that China will remain backward for years to come, regardless of what we do. Instead of using political gimmicks, the administration and Congress should identify principles to guide our dealings with Beijing and provide support wherever possible for the kind of liberalization we seek.

For instance, the administration could reward political and economic liberalization through closer economic interaction. It could withhold financial aid for programs and practices we consider reprehensible. It could punish policies that directly harm U.S. interests, such as arms sales to terrorist groups or countries, by cutting off cooperation in defense and intelligence activities. Certainly, it should ensure the free flow of information through U.S. broadcasting and avoid giving the appearance that it wants to placate the Castroite gerontocracy that rules in Beijing.

These aren't terribly original guidelines and they won't ensure quick progress in China. But they will provide a basis for working firmly with a power that has no history or tradition of liberal democracy — an approach that certainly seems more promising than the legislative tantrum that Congress and the president's critics advocate.

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times A-1
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 14 Dec '89

Iraq gets Chinese aid on A-bomb

By James M. Dorsey
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Eight years after its budding nuclear capability was destroyed in an Israeli air raid, Iraq is again trying to build a nuclear bomb — this time with important technological assistance from China, according to a respected British newsletter and Western intelligence sources.

The Chinese support focuses on helping Iraq to build high-speed centrifuges that would be used to produce the weapons-grade uranium needed to fuel a bomb, according to intelligence sources and Middle East Markets, a newsletter published by The Financial Times of London.

Most sources suggest Iraq is still several years from producing a nuclear device. But the revelation comes just one week after Iraq successfully test-launched a three-stage, 48-ton rocket.

The Iraqi Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization said last week that Iraq had also developed two other surface-to-surface missiles with a range of more than 1,240 miles.

The reports of China's involvement come amid growing criticism of President Bush's decision to send a high-level delegation to China — the first such move since brutal repression of the pro-democracy movement in June — and increasing U.S. concern about the quickening arms race in the Middle East.

"The political significance may be perhaps greater than the technology that was transferred," said Leonard S. Spector, an expert on nuclear proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

On Monday, Mr. Bush said his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger had won assurances during a weekend visit to Beijing that China would not sell missiles in the Middle East.

White House spokesman Bill Marlow declined this week to say whether the American officials had discussed China's nuclear cooperation with Iraq during their talks with Chinese officials.

Rosemary Gallant, an economist in the Commerce Department's China Office, said a 1985 U.S.-Chinese agreement on nuclear cooperation was on hold because the administration had failed to certify that China is not involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Iraq was close to completion of a French-built nuclear reactor near its capital, Baghdad, when an Israeli bombing raid destroyed the facility in June 1981. Israel said the plant was to be used to produce nuclear bombs for use against the Jewish state.

The Baghdad government has recently approached France about rebuilding the facility, and the newsletter said it has accelerated its efforts to build a bomb since the end of its Gulf War against Iran.

"Iraq is trying to rebuild its capability," said a source close to Israel. "The Iraqis have been searching high and low to get expertise from various countries."

Middle East Markets quoted Western officials as saying a network of Iraqi and other companies in Europe was procuring equipment and technical expertise for Iraq's nuclear project.

"Some of the equipment is needed to enrich uranium to make it suitable for a nuclear bomb; other equipment is related to designing and manufacturing the bomb itself," it said.

The newsletter said Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium were being made at the Tuwaitha industrial complex, south of Baghdad, and at Iraq's Saad 16 missile complex near the northern city of Mosul.

Because it is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iraq must permit inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency into its plants, but the inspectors have access only to limited parts of the facilities, Middle East Markets said.

It said Iraq was trying to produce the highly refined uranium needed for a nuclear bomb through a system in which the fuel is first gassified and then spun at extremely high speed in a series of centrifuges that separate out the heaviest isotopes.

China is providing assistance in the construction of highly sophisticated and hard-to-build magnets that are needed to stabilize the centrifuges, the newsletter and other sources said.

Iraq solicited Chinese support only after it failed to obtain the magnets from the British, who "have done more than any other country to clean up their act in policing proliferation activities," according to one source.

Middle East Markets said identical magnets are used on centrifuges by Urenco, a British-Dutch-West German consortium that produces low-enriched uranium for power plants.

It said China supplied similar magnets to Pakistan, which is also thought to have a nuclear capability, for use in its centrifuge plant at Kahuta near the capital of Islamabad.

The newsletter said a Dr. Taaqi was in charge of the centrifuge project and that the overall responsibility for the development of a bomb appeared to be in the hands of Jaafar Jaafar, a former official of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Organization.

"The procurement network comes under Al Amn Al Khas, the special security organization, which comes directly under the office of President Saddam Hussein," the newsletter said.

Experts said the magnets were essential to the Iraqi project, but it was not clear, even with them, whether the country could assemble all the other technology necessary to make a bomb.

"Whether they are critical one will only know when one sees a mushroom cloud above northern Iraq," said Anthony Cordesman, an expert on Middle East arms proliferation on the staff of Sen. John McCain, Republican of Arizona.

Mr. Cordesman said he could not confirm the details provided by Middle East Markets.

CONTINUED

Zalman Khalilzadeh, senior political scientist at the Rand Corp., said Iraq was encouraged in its nuclear project by its progress in developing a satellite-launching rocket and its success in producing weapons.

The latter could have implications for the production of hydrogen fluoride, which is needed to produce uranium hexafluoride, the gas from which enriched uranium would be obtained in the centrifuges. The newsletter said hydrogen fluoride might be produced at Iraq's Al Qaim phosphate plant on the border with Syria.

Mr. Khalilzadeh also said Saudi Arabia has agreed to finance the rebuilding of the Iraqi reactor destroyed in 1981 but that Iraq had yet to conclude an agreement with France, which built the previous facility.

Eagleburger snub of panel invitation miffs House host

By Chris Harvey
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A Foreign Affairs Committee hearing briefly erupted into a verbal sparring match yesterday after Rep. Sam Gejdenson accused the president's emissaries of "bowing and scraping to the butchers of Beijing," then of snubbing Congress by refusing to answer questions on Capitol Hill.

"The leader of the free world sent two of his top-ranking officials 6,000 miles [last weekend] to apologize to the Chinese government — to apologize for being offended by the savage squelching of those who courageously sought basic freedoms in Tiananmen Square," accused Mr. Gejdenson, Connecticut Democrat and chairman of the subcommittee on international economic policy and trade.

Yet President Bush was unwilling yesterday to send them "two miles from Foggy Bottom" to Capitol Hill to answer questions, Mr. Gejdenson said. "The president continues to keep this entire episode under wraps."

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, who traveled to China last weekend with National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, was invited to testify at yesterday's hearing but did not show or send an administration representative. An Eagleburger spokesman told committee staffers he could not attend because he was acting secretary of state, with James A. Baker III out of town. "He's got a full docket," White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk said.

Mr. Gejdenson told the subcommittee staff to display Mr. Eagleburger's unclaimed nameplate at the witness table, until the first speaker was called to testify.

Rep. Jim Leach, Iowa Republican and ranking member of the Asian and Pacific affairs subcommittee, lashed out at Mr. Gejdenson for his tactics and his rhetoric. Mr. Leach said he could never recall an instance where the nameplate was left out during a committee hearing to signify a "shadow witness. . . . It is a bit impolite," he said through clenched teeth.

To describe the trip as an effort by the administration to offer "apologies" for supporting pro-democracy demonstrations in China was overstating the case, Mr. Leach said.

Mr. Gejdenson said he would have preferred to issue subpoenas to elicit testimony, but instead showed restraint.

The hearing, partisan politics aside, offered conflicting opinions from China scholars and a Chinese graduate student on the wisdom of the administration trip — just six months after the Chinese government killed hundreds of demonstrators at Tiananmen Square to quell their protests.

Mr. Bush said Monday the trip was not intended to try to normalize relations, but to ensure that China does not remain "totally isolated." He said he still intends to pressure the government to rectify human rights violations, which include the imposition of martial law, and the imprisonment and murder of demonstrators.

Minxin Pei, a graduate student from China attending Harvard University, said the trip "shocked" his countrymen and amounted to an "act of repentance" by the United States. "This policy degrades Chinese people," he said.

Chinese hard-liners would "use this visit as an example that — in dealing with the United States — bluffing, threats, propaganda offensives and even blackmail are more effective and successful than accommodations and concessions," Mr. Pei said. He said eight demonstrators were executed publicly just three days before the U.S. officials arrived in Beijing.

Merle Goldman, a Boston University professor, also criticized the trip. "My impression is his [President Bush's] vision is shortsighted," she said. "He's looking backwards."

But professor A. Doak Barnett of Johns Hopkins University supported the president's decision to "try to reopen a dialogue with China's leaders," though he criticized the secrecy of the trip.

MARY MCGRORY

WP 12-14-89 A2

'Old Hatreds' in Asia Policy

For Roger Morris, who served in Richard Nixon's National Security Council, current events in Asia are easy to explain. The same people who brought us the invasion of Cambodia—over which he and two young NSC compatriots resigned in 1970—have just brought us the surprise trip to China, and toasts to the butchers of Tiananmen Square.

"It's the same cast," says Morris, who was here to promote the first volume of his three-volume investigative biography of Nixon. "Scowcroft, Eagleburger in Beijing, Kissinger and Nixon in the wings," he says, likening Bush national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger to Nixon and his secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger.

It's also the same mindset, the geopolitical kind that would not be caught dead doing anything for human beings.

Morris, William Watt and Anthony Lake, who were privy to the plans for the invasion, submitted their resignations two days before Nixon's April 30 "pitiful helpless giant" speech announcing the Cambodian "incursion." Alexander M. Haig Jr., who was then Kissinger's deputy, held the letter, lest "it upset Henry," who like everyone else in the Nixon White House was paranoid about "opposition within the government."

"Nixon did it strictly for machismo reasons," says Morris. "He wasn't going to be pushed around the way [President Lyndon] Johnson was."

Morris anticipates that Bush, a product of the Kissinger-Nixon school, will now sell Cambodia down the river again, using the Kissinger premise of facing the "geopolitical realities." The Paris conference on a "comprehensive settlement" failed utterly, because our horse in Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, indulged in bizarre and destructive behavior. Sihanouk wants the genocidal Khmer Rouge in a coalition government because his Chinese masters insist on it.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III, showing his stuff on realpolitik, told a congressional committee that "we accept the Khmer Rouge as a fact of life."

"Here is a situation," Morris points out, where we have no national interest . . . . We have a chance to do the honorable and decent thing. But no one says, 'We are free to do the right thing.' "

The most glaring obstacle to a Cambodian settlement is that those who are planning it are members of the old boy network that swallowed the bitter pill of defeat in Vietnam. They cannot accept the only machinery in place in Cambodia, the Hun Sen regime, because the Vietnamese put him in power.

For years, the United States has insisted that the real problem in Cambodia was the presence of Vietnamese troops. Now that the Vietnamese withdrawal has been accomplished to the satisfaction of the Defense Intelligence Agency, among others, State keeps insisting that the withdrawal must be "certified." To admit that Hanoi has kept a promise is something that is beyond the people who tried to bomb it off the face of the earth.

"The whole situation reeks of old hatreds," said a congressional aide.

Rep. Chester G. Atkins (D-Mass.), who has a large concentration of Cambodians in his district, has the same view, that the dead hand of the past is on Cambodia's neck, and that the old boy network, as is its wont, is trying to impose geopolitical strategies on a human tragedy that requires only common sense and common humanity.

Atkins favors a "piecemeal" rather than a "comprehensive" solution. He would start with the elimination of the Khmer Rouge from the scene. He would begin massive humanitarian aid. We prefer to send arms. Not only have we refused to give help, we prevent other nations from doing so.

"We are selling fighters to Beijing, but we won't let Oxfam into Phnom Penh with food," says Atkins.

The most reprehensible aspect of the administration policy is its collusion with the Khmer Rouge to whitewash the history of the holocaust. Although the United States said the proper things about the abhorrent Khmer Rouge slaughter of millions of innocent Cambodians, it refused to endorse an official conference statement pledging that Cambodia "will never return to the genocidal policies of the past."

The Bush administration also declines to join any effort to try former Cambodian leader Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge killers.

It's all of a piece. Brent Scowcroft goes to Beijing and calls the massacre in Tiananmen Square an "event" that should be overlooked. In Cambodia we encourage the return of butchers. It's an attitude that comes from looking at countries—and people—as "dispensable," the Kleenex school of foreign policy.

William F. Buckley Jr.

The Osculation Reservation

Henry Kissinger made it clear, some time after the event, that he was not responsible for the "atmospherics" of President Nixon's visit to China in 1972. For those whose memory is so beneficent as to have forgotten what happened, at the first evening's banquet, Nixon, carried away by the *Gemuetlichkeit,* went around his host's table and toasted every one of the beasts at the table. This happened while the Cultural Revolution was at full fury and when the current strongman in China, Deng Xiaoping, was in one of Mao's jails.

And now we see, in the very first shots of President Bush's overture to China, a picture of Gen. Brent Scowcroft, accompanied by Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, raising his champagne glass in a toast to the Chinese leaders who triumphed over the best instincts of their young students, shooting them down and executing the students' leaders as the hard-liners initiated a great seizure of economic and intellectual recidivism, uprooting the free farmers and doing away with every trace of intellectual freedom.

This is not an argument against the Scowcroft mission. Cool thought approved retrospectively the fact of Nixon's going to China, though not his conduct while in China, even as cool thought approves the notion that we should have a solid, working relationship with China. The question has always been: how to do this, without relenting on our moral evaluation of what happened on June 4 in Tiananmen Square. If Scowcroft had gone to China, made his concessions in formal circumstances and had kept at bay any photographers if he felt it necessary to exchange toasts, we'd have come closer to communicating the duality of our position on the China we need to consort with and the China that shoots young freedom-seeking men and women.

It was not surprising, under the circumstances, that Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), who is chairman of the subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which deals with Asia, should have criticized the Scowcroft mission. But the impression conveyed by television—of two old pals greeting each other as they might at a college reunion—fortifies criticism that is not earned.

The American public is correctly confused by such conduct. References crop up about Jimmy Carter having been the first American president to put human rights into our foreign policy (by the way, incorrect). Yet it was Carter who visited in Poland and spoke effusively about the Communist leadership there, not entirely the fault of his translator. And it was Carter who greeted Ceausescu of Romania, the one remaining totalitarian dictator in East Europe, as though he were running the Vatican. Bush ought to know what a difference it can make. He had a tough time of it when, during the campaign, he was reminded of his effusiveness when he visited Manila as the guest of Ferdinand Marcos.

Well, the step is taken, China is back in our orbit, and it is left primarily to Chinese students studying in America, not to American officials, to criticize the leadership of China. But it is time to resubmit to the Republican Party a plank proposed in 1984 in this space, "No American president should physically embrace any world leader responsible for the death and torture and/or imprisonment of more than .01 percent of his people." For short, the Osculation Reservation.

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CAL THOMAS WT 12-14-89 P1

Making haste with amnesty

By sending a high-ranking delegation to Beijing, President Bush has engaged in what the Chinese call the kowtow: "to show obsequious deference; to kneel and touch the forehead to the ground in token homage, worship or deep respect."

Well, perhaps National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger didn't kneel, but their glowing toasts to the Chinese leadership, a little more than six months after the massacre at Tiananmen Square, in which 5,000 or more civilians may have been killed, were undoubtedly perceived as such by Chinese minds.

"We believe it is important that we not exhaust ourselves in placing blame for problems that exist," said Mr. Scowcroft at a dinner held by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Mr. Scowcroft said he had come to "bring new impetus and vigor into our bilateral relationship and seek new areas of agreement. ... We came to reduce the negative influence of irritants in the relationship."

Yes, mowing down thousands of students can certainly be irritating, particularly if one is on the receiving end of the gunfire or is a grieving relative of one of the dead.

Has our government so soon forgotten that our outrage against what happened last June in Beijing was well-founded? Time magazine's book, "Massacre in Beijing," reminds us what it was like: "Children were killed holding hands with their mothers. A 9-year-old boy was shot seven or eight times in the back, and his parents placed his corpse on a truck and drove through the streets of northwest Beijing ... The cadavers of five students [at the pro-democracy Political Science and Law College of China] who had been crushed by APCs (armored personnel carriers) after leaving Tiananmen Square ... were packed in ice and carried in grisly pomp from university to university in northeastern Beijing.

"Workers were shot bicycling to factories, old people died in their apartments as bullets thudded into the building. Students were crushed ... by APCs roaring along Changan."

"These are the children of China," a Chinese physician told a Western reporter. "I will be the last to leave." If he was, said a Time editor, "he almost certainly suffered the fate of several Chinese doctors in the square, who were bayoneted or shot to death as the 27th Army advanced."

If President Bush thinks sending a delegation to Beijing now will change the way China behaves, he is sadly mistaken.

Who could fault the Chinese leaders for believing that such a trip means it makes no difference to Americans that people were slaughtered in Tiananmen Square? They can interpret Mr. Scowcroft's visit as personal vindication for their behavior. It tells the Chinese government it does not need to change; the United States can always be brought around.

Nien Cheng, author of "Life and Death in Shanghai," who survived Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution, but whose sister was killed by marauding Red Guards, informs me that a relative who has recently arrived in Washington told her that people are still being arrested in China on suspicion of participating in the pro-democracy demonstrations. "Some are also being released in exchange for lists of names of people they've seen in the demonstrations. They must sign a pledge never to participate again in a demonstration against the government," she says.

In view of the continuing repression, she says for America to take the first step toward rebuilding relations with the Chinese sends the wrong message.

Perhaps agreements were reached and deals struck by former President Richard M. Nixon on his recent trip to Beijing. Perhaps astrophysicist Fang Li Zhi and his wife will be allowed out of their refuge in the American Embassy as a result of Mr. Scowcroft's American kowtow.

Even so, why does a "tough on crime" president like Mr. Bush appear ready to grant amnesty to the Beijing government just six months after it committed mass murder? It is too much to accept, and Congress ought to refuse to lift American sanctions until the Chinese do a little kowtowing of their own.

Kissinger Says He Had No Role in China Mission

Critics 'Trying to Blacken My Reputation'

~P 12-14-89 A52

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger said yesterday that he would not have advised President Bush to send two former employees of Kissinger Associates, his consulting firm, on a secret mission to China to initiate a change of policy "with which I'm partly identified."

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger made the trip to China last weekend to conduct the first extensive high-level meetings with Chinese officials since the massacre of student protesters in Tiananmen Square last June. Before they joined the Bush administration, Eagleburger was president and Scowcroft Washington representative of Kissinger Associates, a successful consulting firm whose clients include companies that have extensive economic ties to China.

Kissinger has been a critic of the sanctions the United States imposed in response to the Tiananmen massacre, and has repeatedly called for preserving a special Sino-American relationship despite differences between the two countries.

Kissinger said yesterday in a telephone interview that he was "wise enough" in the ways of Washington to realize that adding Eagleburger to a mission led by Scowcroft would permit critics to question whether the former secretary of state and his business interests had too much influence over the Bush administration's controversial China initiative.

"I was astonished that [Eagleburger] was sent," Kissinger said.

He expressed approval of Bush's decision to send a high-level mission to Beijing, but added that he had not recommended such a mission and did not know it was under consideration until Scowcroft called "about two hours before his airplane was ready to go." Kissinger was in Europe at the time and said he looked on Scowcroft's call "as a courtesy" so he would not be taken by surprise if a reporter asked him about it later.

"Because two former associates went to China, critics of [the Bush policy] are trying to blacken my reputation," he said. He expressed particular anger at an article published by The Wall Street Journal in September which first laid out Kissinger's extensive business ties to China and raised questions about whether his commercial interests colored his policy views.



HENRY A. KISSINGER
. . . opposed U.S. sanctions on China

Kissinger yesterday described as "McCarthyism" any linking of his views on China to his business interests.

Several Kissinger acquaintances said yesterday that such accusations were unfair. Winston Lord, a former Kissinger deputy and U.S. ambassador to China during the Reagan administration, said that although he and others disagree with Kissinger's current views on China, "no one can question his motives."

"[Kissinger] would not need a cent to take the same positions," Lord said. He pointed out that Kissinger believes strongly in maintaining U.S.-China relations, which he helped open up in 1972. "He believes in standing by old friends," Lord added, pointing out Kissinger's earlier defense of the late Shah of Iran, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and his Chinese friends led by Deng Xiaoping, the former head of its government.

Kissinger is involved in a variety of ventures that have business ties to China and that inevitably benefit from Kissinger's unique, highly publicized activities on the international scene.

Kissinger Associates has clients in the United States and abroad that currently have or would like to have business activities in China. The client list is kept secret, but some company names were made public when Eagleburger was up for confirmation by the Senate. Clients such as Coca-Cola Co. and the H.J. Heinz Co. do business with China and, according to one competitive consultant, an official of one of those companies told him that Kissinger is retained "for his help in China."

On his frequent trips to China, Kissinger often is accompanied by persons with whom he has a business relationship.

In early November, when he traveled to Beijing for four days of meetings with China's top officials, Kissinger brought along Judith Hope, a Washington lawyer with whom he serves on the Union Pacific Corp. board of directors. Also part of the Kissinger group was Maurice R. (Hank) Greenburg, chairman of the board of American International Group (AIG), a large international insurance corporation which has been doing business in China since 1919. Kissinger is chairman of AIG's international advisory board.

Kissinger said this trip, which came at the invitation of the Chinese government, was like others he regularly takes to all parts of the world as "someone interested in foreign policy."

"It is the way I keep myself informed, stay in touch with old acquaintances. I don't need an ulterior motive," he said.

Hope said yesterday Kissinger asked her before she went if she had any business interests or clients in China. When she said there were none, he replied, "That's good." Greenburg has a joint venture in China, the Chinese America Insurance Co, and several other investments.

Greenburg yesterday said it was "an unfair allegation" that Kissinger used the trip to to promote business ventures. "There were no business discussions," he said of the meetings he attended but, "when economic questions were raised," he and Kissinger did promote the idea that U.S. investments needed an open door policy to come into China and continued economic reform.

Greenburg also said that when he met Deng at the small luncheon given Kissinger and his guests Nov. 10, it was the first time he had met the Chinese leader.

Kissinger was supposed to come to Beijing in October as guest of the Chinese government's chief investment bank, the China International Trust & Investment Corp. (CITIC). He was to speak at CITIC's commercial conference designed "to stimulate foreign investment," Kissinger said. But Kissinger canceled that visit as his response to Tiananmen Square and the U.S. reaction to it, he said yesterday

CITIC and Kissinger are involved in a business activity called China Ventures, a Delaware-registered limited partnership to make investments in China. Its existence was disclosed in The Wall Street Journal article in September. The Journal described Kissinger as chairman of the board and chief executive officer of the general partnership which was to make investments in China with CITIC.

Kissinger said yesterday that China Ventures was started in December 1988, just as Scowcroft and Eagleburger were leaving the firm to join the Bush administration. It would hav been publicly unveiled last June, but the announcement was canceled and no investments made after the Tiananmen Square incidents, Kissinger said.

"Our board next meets in late February or early March," he said, "and we will see" whether the partnership goes forward.

In 1988, Kissinger made two trips to China that had business implications. He went once as a member of Chase Manhattan Bank's international advisory board which was holding its meeting in Beijing. Kissinger and Chase's board chairman, David Rockefeller, then met with Deng Xiaoping.

That same year Kissinger led a group of top U.S. executives to Beijing for meetings with Chinese officials where both sides exchanged complaints about their economic relations, according to Kissinger and Lord, who was then ambassador.

On the last day of his latest visit, Nov. 10, Kissinger met with Deng Xiaoping, who had just resigned his last official position, the chairmanship of military commission.

After some banter about retirement, Deng said, "You are no longer U.S. secretary of state, but you are still busy with international affairs."

"Also as a private citizen," Kissinger said he replied.

On Nov. 13, soon after his return to this country, Kissinger went to the White House for dinner with Bush, Vice President Quayle, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, chief of staff John H. Sununu and Scowcroft. On this occasion, Kissinger said yesterday, he reported on what the Chinese leaders had told him, and made recommendations about U.S. sanctions against China, which he declined to describe.

Scowcroft Warned China of New Hill Sanctions

U.S. Emissaries Stressed Need for Action by Beijing, Sources Say

By Don Oberdorfer
and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft warned China's leaders last weekend that if they failed to take positive steps soon to repair relations with Washington, President Bush may be powerless to stop a new wave of nearly unanimous votes for sanctions after Congress returns Jan. 23, administration sources said yesterday.

The Chinese promised to respond to Scowcroft's appeal through diplomatic channels, according to a U.S. account of the Beijing meetings, and some administration officials are optimistic about the likelihood of important steps by the Chinese.

But there is agreement among senior officials that no commitments were made by the Chinese leaders, and they said that none were made by Scowcroft on behalf of the United State.

The Scowcroft mission, undertaken at the personal initiative of Bush, was intended to explore a way to stop the erosion of Sino-American relations, which were rocked by the Tiananmen Square massacres last June. But at the same time, administration officials conceded in a series of interviews, the furor that the Scowcroft trip touched off in the United States this week could bring a new crisis for Bush's China policy.

Thus the mission that began in darkness at Andrews Air Force Base at 2:15 a.m. last Friday could be a precipitating event toward either substantial improvement or dramatic new deterioration in Sino-American relations. For this reason the Scowcroft trip ranks as among the boldest—and riskiest—initiatives that Bush has taken in the first year of his presidency.

The origins of the Bush initiative go back, in a real sense, to the Beijing trips of Henry A. Kissinger and Richard M. Nixon in 1971-2 that ended more than a decade of hostility between the two nations, and to Bush's service as chief of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing in 1974-5. Because of his unusual familiarity and strong interest, Bush has been personally involved in formulating the restrained administration reaction to the bloody crackdown.

According to an account provided by administration officials, for many weeks Bush has been pondering ways to change the tone and substance of the bitter dialogue between Washington and Beijing. This inclination was reinforced by separate dinner meetings with Nixon Nov. 5 and with Kissinger Nov. 13 after they returned from their respective trips to China.

Both Nixon and Kissinger reported, an official said, that the Chinese leaders seemed uncomfortable with their intransigent positions and interested in exploring new directions. Abundant reports also reached Bush from the Central Intelligence Agency and elsewhere of power struggles inside the secretive Chinese leadership. Administration sources said it seemed to Bush that it was not helpful for China to be isolated at a time when an anti-Western faction was struggling to turn China inward, while others battled to maintain and advance the openings to the rest of the world.

Bush's Dec. 2-3 summit meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev provided the pretext for resumption of direct communication at a high level, previously banned by Bush after the June crackdown. Since the U.S.-China connection was restored in 1972, American administrations have briefed the Chinese on top-level U.S. meetings with the Soviet Union, the other pole of the U.S.-Soviet-China strategic triangle.

More than a week before the Malta summit, administration sources said, Scowcroft informed the new Chinese ambassador here, Zhu Qizhen, of Bush's desire to brief Beijing about the sessions with Gorbachev. There were high-level discussions of sending Scowcroft, along with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, to Beijing before the Malta summit or sending Scowcroft to China direct from Malta but this proved to be impractical.

Work on the Scowcroft mission began immediately after Bush's return from Malta on Monday night, Dec. 4. By Wednesday afternoon agreement had been reached with Beijing on details of the trip.

Although a few members of Congress were notified as Scowcroft and Eagleburger were flying to Beijing last Friday, the trip was kept secret until the U.S. team landed at Beijing about 2 a.m. Saturday, Washington time, when White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater telephoned the news to U.S. press associations.

"They [the Chinese] wanted to hold it until the arrival in Beijing and we didn't care," said an informed official who conceded, in retrospect, that the middle-of-the-night disclosure generated a politically damaging aura of intrigue and stealth. Another contributing factor to the furor was the first television and newspaper photographs of Scowcroft from Beijing, cordially clinking wine glasses with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at a state banquet. "They do their thing the way they want to do it, and we go along with it," said an official in explaining why the White House did not insist on a business-only set of meetings.

In 25 hours in Beijing, Scowcroft and Eagleburger had separate meetings with senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li Peng, the three top Chinese leaders, as well as other high officials.

Scowcroft was very explicit about the political difficulties facing Bush, according to a U.S. account of the

SCOWCROFT...
CONTINUED

meetings. Scowcroft cited the 403-0 vote in the House and voice vote in the Senate to extend the visas of Chinese students in the United States over Beijing's objection, and said that in the U.S. constitutional system, the president is almost powerless to stop such legislative unanimity.

What the Chinese do at home is an internal question, Scowcroft conceded, but added that if Bush is to change the direction of the relationship he must have help. To take positive U.S. steps without steps from Beijing is beyond the president's powers, the national security adviser maintained, according to this account. He also said that if nothing positive is done before Congress returns Jan. 23, there is a strong possibility of additional legislation that could bring another negative spiral in Sino-American relations.

Scowcroft listed a series of Chinese actions that could be helpful, according to an administration source, including lifting of martial law, the cessation of jamming of Voice of America broadcasts and permission for a new VOA correspondent to come to Beijing, a halt to intermediate-range missile sales—especially in the Middle East—and resolution of the case of human rights activist Fang Lizhi, who has been in refuge in the U.S. Embassy since the June crackdown.

On Monday, after Scowcroft left Beijing, the Foreign Ministry issued an unusually specific statement, which it said was in response to a press report, that except for the 1987 medium-range missile sale to Saudi Arabia, "China has never sold, nor is planning to sell missiles to any Middle East country." On Wednesday, the Foreign Ministry approved the accreditation of a new VOA correspondent. But there was no private message to Washington about these steps, an administration official said, and no connection was made in Beijing between them and the Scowcroft trip.

Bigger moves than these will be needed to assuage U.S. public and political opinion, administration officials said, especially in light of the domestic firestorm the Scowcroft mission touched off.

"It was my idea, my suggestion," said Bush last Monday of the controversial mission. Privately, he is reported to be serene about taking the political and diplomatic gamble.

Despite all the criticism, Bush has told friends, "I know I'm doing the right thing," whether his initiative fails or succeeds.

DAYTON DAILY NEWS

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Hard to keep perestroika warm as the Russian winter comes on


Mikhail Gorbachev told President Bush that the ultimate test of Mr. Gorbachev's leadership will be getting consumer goods into the hands of his people.

Mr. Gorbachev's immediate challenge — aside from keeping the Communist Party from flying apart in ethnic and ideological rivalries — is to get his people through the winter. The 1917 Russian Revolution started in February, when people were hungry.

It's politically hard for central planners and local bureaucrats to let loose of their old authority, especially when people want contradictory outcomes. Mr. Gorvachev said people could start up small capitalist firms. When the entrepreneurs started up their businesses, they raised prices on some goods and services. Many people in this supposed egalitarian society saw this as sinful. So prices in some cases were fixed by local authorities. Back to Square One.

Along with the benefits of a more market-oriented economy come some real drawbacks to those used to having their lives managed centrally in a market ruled by politics. Market forces would cause some industries to close. Lazy, unproductive workers would be fired. Ending subsidies and de-controlling prices, so that the economy makes sense, might cause inflation and strain the poor.

The United States is not a major player in Soviet economic reforms, but can offer investment and favorable trade relationships, as President Bush said he would.



Mikhail Gorbachev

The Soviet Union doesn't have many manufactured goods to export, but it has some enterprises that the United States ought to see if it can tap into. For example, this could be the time to re-evaluate cooperative space missions and projects.

ANDREI SAKHAROV, SYMBOL OF SOVIET DISSIDENCE, DEAD AT 68

Andrei Sakharov, the physicist who helped develop the Soviet Union's hydrogen bomb and later won the Nobel Peace Prize as an international symbol of human rights, died at age 68, his relatives reported.

Sakharov, who was elected to the Soviet Parliament under President Gorbachev and became one of its leading voices, died in his sleep in Moscow, relatives said. (AP)

White House Calls Sakharov Historical Figure

The White House on Thursday called Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov a historical figure and praised his efforts for greater human rights.

The nuclear physicist and human rights campaigner died of a heart attack, a relative in Moscow said.

"Andrei Sakharov is a historical figure who will be long remembered for his human rights efforts in the Soviet Union. His voice was an important dimension in the contemporary changes under way in Soviet society," the White House said in a statement. (Reuter)

BUSH, MITTERRAND SET TO REVIEW EAST BLOC TUMULT AT SUMMIT

The political upheaval in Eastern Europe and Western steps to support the democracy drive shape up as the main topics for Saturday's summit between President Bush and French President Mitterrand on the Caribbean island of St. Martin.

Bush and Mitterrand, who have met four times in the past nine months, are scheduled to meet alone for an hour, continue discussions over lunch with aides and conclude their half-day summit with joint press conferences....

U.S. officials said Bush and Mitterrand would also discuss Western efforts to provide economic aid to struggling East European countries and to bolster Gorbachev's campaign to reshape the Soviet Union.

(Gene Gibbons, Reuter)

Tropics May Warm Bush-Mitterrand Link

President Bush leaves snowy Washington Friday for a one-day hop to sunny St. Martin in pursuit of even warmer relations with French President Mitterrand, who seeks tighter links between Europe and the U.S.

In meeting for the sixth time this year with Mr. Mitterrand...Mr. Bush further enhances the French president's role as chief spokesman for Europe....

White House officials say they hope Mr. Bush's close relations with Mr. Mitterrand will continue after he leaves the EC presidency next month, but they insist he is not displacing British Prime Minister Thatcher and the Bush-Thatcher "special relationship."

Both the White House and Elysee Palace call the Bush-Mitterrand friendship a good personal and working relationship, but the French add that it is "without passion." In private, the French say Mr. Bush listens, takes their opininions into account and consults on everything, a major change from Ronald Reagan. (Frank Murray, Washington Times, A4)

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U.S. PLANS TO GROUND AIR FLEET THAT CAN DIRECT NUCLEAR WAR

The Pentagon plans to halt the round-the-clock flights of an airborne command post that for three decades has has been a grim symbol of America's constant preparation to wage nuclear war even if the President and other political leaders were killed in a surprise attack, Pentagon officials said Thursday.

The plan, part of a Defense Department effort to adjust its forces in a changing world, reflects the improved relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union and the belief that the threat of a surprise nuclear attack is diminishing.

Since 1961 the Air Force has continuously kept aloft, on a rotating basis, a fleet of planes collectively referred to as "Looking Glass." Instead, Pentagon documents propose that the planes be shifted "to continuous ground alert with specified number of sorties per week."

A Defense Department official said the Pentagon recommendation needed the approval of President Bush. One official said the decision on "Looking Class" has not drawn strong objections.

(Michael Gordon, New York Times, A1)

SCOWCROFT WARNED CHINA OF NEW HILL SANCTIONS

U.S. Emissaries Stressed Need For Action By Beijing, Sources Say

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Thus the mission that began in darkness at Andrews Air Force Base at 2:15 a.m. last Friday could be a precipitating event toward either substantial improvement or dramatic new deterioration in Sino-American relations. For this reason the Scowcroft trips ranks among the boldest -- and riskiest -- initiatives that Bush has taken in the first year of his presidency. (Don Oberdorfer & David Hoffman, Washington Post, A1)

BUSH CALMS CRITICS ON RIGHT

President Bush headed off criticism of his China initiative among conservative leaders Thursday by promising not to normalize relations and telling them there is more at stake than has been revealed.

"I recognize that without all the cards on the table it's hard for you to be able to see what we're up to," Mr. Bush said during a meeting with about two dozen leaders from conservative organizations.

"I know we have differences, and I want you to know that we're not going to normalize relations. We're not into normalizing things or anything like that," Mr. Bush told the leaders, according to a White House official who declined to be named....

Since [Scowcroft and Eagleburger] returned...the Chinese have promised not to sell M-9 missiles to Middle East nations and agreed to admit a new Voice of America correspondent to Beijing.

China thanked Mr. Bush Thursday for sending the envoys to Beijing and suggested a solution was possible for Fang Lizhi, the pro-democracy dissident taking refuge in the American Embassy.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Jin Guihua, in a weekly briefing devoid of the anti-American rhetoric common in recent months, also said he hoped U.S.-China ties...could be normalized soon.

But Mr. Jin declined to say whether China would make any concessions or change its policies as a result of the weekend visit by Mr. Scowcroft. (Frank Murray, Washington Times, A1)

U.S. CONCERNED BY REPORT OF IRAQ DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPON

The U.S. is concerned by reports that Iraq may be developing a nuclear weapon, but has no confirmation that China may be helping in the process, a State Department spokesman said Thursday.

"We view with concern any reports on the proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies," spokesman Richard Boucher said at a briefing in response to questions about a British newsletter's account of Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program.

The British-based MidEast Markets newsletter said Iraq is trying to build a nuclear bomb with Chinese help and has established a network of companies in Europe to procure equipment and expertise.

Boucher said he had seen the report about the Iraqi weapons program, but added, "We do not have any information that China is helping Iraq to develop a nuclear weapon." (Reuter)

CHINA, SOVIET UNION TO HOLD HIGH-LEVEL TALKS NEXT WEEK

BEIJING -- China and the Soviet Union are planning high-level talks next week that are expected to address their shifting relations with the U.S. and a brewing ideological dispute over the demise of communism in Eastern Europe.

A Soviet Embassy spokesman said Thursday that Valentin Falin, head of the Communist Party Central Committee's foreign affairs department, would lead the Soviet delegation to Beijing.

Western diplomats say they view the visit as balancing a controversial mission to Beijing last weekend by President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, who in effect ended a U.S. ban on high-level contacts with China since it crushed student-led demonstrations for democracy last June. (Reuter, Washington Post A49)

ISRAEL PLANS BEIJING CENTER TO AID SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY

BEIJING -- Israel is seeking to establish its first formal foothold in China -- an academic center in the Chinese capital to promote scientific and technological contacts between the two countries, academic sources said Wednesday.

To avoid antagonizing Arab nations, the Chinese government has consistently rejected formal relations with Israel. But the two nations have developed informal trade and scientific ties. A breakthrough occurred three months ago, when China opened a permanent travel office in Tel Aviv. The academic center in Beijing is to be headed by members of Israel's National Academy of Sciences. The Israelis believe they can boost China's stagnating farm production. In the absence of diplomatic relations, the center is considered likely to pursue other Israeli interests in China. (Daniel Southerland, Washington Post, A39)

SOVIET AIDE WILL VISIT NATO
Shevardnadze Trip Illustrates Relaxation In East-West Tensions

BRUSSELS -- Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze next week will visit the headquarters here of NATO, founded 40 years ago to parry the Soviet military threat in Europe.

Announcement of Shevardnadze's impending visit -- the first by a Soviet foreign minister -- came as the 16 NATO foreign ministers began discussions on how the Western military alliance should evolve to deal with the changing situation in the Soviet Union and its six East European allies in the Warsaw Pact....

On Tuesday, Secretary Baker made detailed proposals in West Berlin for enhancing NATO's role as a political forum for dealing with its former adversaries. Much of the discussion among the ministers here Thursday involved Baker's suggestions, U.S. and other participants said.

"The crucial question will be to coordinate the future evolution of NATO and the future evolution of the Warsaw Pact," Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis declared.

In that context, Shevardnadze's expected visit, although played down by a senior U.S. officials as "no big deal," was interpreted here as an important signal that Soviet thinking coincides with Baker's on the need to shift the alliances from a military to a political track.

(John Goshko & Edward Cody, Washington Post, A1)

PRAGUE SEEKS TALKS ON SOVIET TROOPS
Official Calls 1968 Accord 'Invalid'

PRAGUE -- Czechoslovakia's new foreign minister said today that a 1968 agreement allowing Soviet troops to be stationed here was "invalid" because it was made under pressure, and he called for talks with Moscow that could lead to their withdrawal.

"I believe we shall soon be able to arrive at common conclusions and common understandings," Foreign Minister Dienstbier said during the first press conference by a cabinet minister since the government was formed five days ago.

It was the clearest call yet by a Czechoslovak leader for removal of about 75,000 Soviet troops stationed here "temporarily" under the 1968 accord and a further indication of changes sweeping through Eastern Europe as the Soviets and the Western alliance redefine their security relationships. (Stuart Auerbach, Washington Post, A45)

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China Must Soon Show Some Good Intentions If Bush Is to Be Able to Defend Resuming Talks

By GERALD F. SEIB
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON – Unless China soon ends martial law, exonerates dissident Fang Lizhi or makes some other high-profile move on human rights, President Bush's high-risk overture to China probably will boomerang.

Lawmakers and analysts of all political stripes say such a gesture of good intentions from China is essential for President Bush to be able to defend his controversial strategy of resuming high-level talks with Beijing.

Otherwise, Congress seems certain to reconvene on Jan. 23 with a burst of rhetoric blasting China and a renewed passion for imposing mandatory sanctions against Beijing for its crackdown on pro-democracy dissidents. That would produce a result that is exactly opposite of the gradual warming in U.S.-Sino ties Mr. Bush is trying to foster.

"In order for the Congress not to be up in arms when they come back Jan. 23, the Chinese need to do something," says Sen. Nancy Kassebaum, a Kansas Republican who is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. Adds Rep. Jim Leach, an Iowa Republican who has staunchly defended Mr. Bush's China overture: "China is brooking a very stern congressional reaction unless there is movement on the home front." Without Chinese reciprocity, he adds, the Bush administration may face "a very counterproductive cycle in U.S.-Chinese relations."

A minimal requirement would be a resolution of the case of Mr. Fang, the dissident Chinese scientist who is in hiding in the U.S. embassy in Beijing to avoid arrest. His case has become a lightning rod for U.S. anger over Chinese suppression of pro-democracy forces. At a briefing for reporters in Beijing yesterday, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman didn't offer any concessions on the Fang matter but suggested China might be open to negotiations by saying that "to resolve this problem requires the efforts of both sides."

White House aides acknowledge that, having given China's leaders a present by sending national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to Beijing last weekend, Mr. Bush now needs something in return to show that his gamble is succeeding. Administration officials say they hope the Chinese are savvy enough to understand that they need to make a gesture quickly.

The administration is keeping mum on whether Mr. Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger extracted any promises of changes from Chinese leaders during their talks in Beijing. But senior aides say the two officials returned appearing confident that China will take steps to vindicate Mr. Bush's move.

China Sanctions Approved By Congress*

- Suspend Overseas Private Investment Corp. financing for China ventures
- Halt U.S. exports of arms to China
- Suspend shipments of crime-control equipment
- Block exports of satellites for launch by China
- Limit cooperation on nuclear matters
- Halt efforts to liberalize controls on sensitive exports to China

*President Bush has imposed similar sanctions on his own authority, but last month vetoed legislation that would have made these sanctions legally mandatory.

The premise of Mr. Bush's opening to China's leaders just six months after they sent tanks into Tiananmen Square to crush pro-democracy demonstrators is that the U.S. must re-establish a working relationship with Beijing before it can become a force for reform. "In order to be able to influence change ... the president felt clearly that this country had to retain its credibility and try to recreate a relationship that would allow whatever pressures we put on to be credible," says White House Chief of Staff John Sununu.

But the president may well find himself caught between congressional clamoring for immediate results and Beijing's reluctance to admit that any liberalizing moves it makes are a result of U.S. pressure. "I'm doubtful myself that there's going to be direct linkage between any Chinese gesture and what the president did," says Gerrit Gong, a China specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who until recently was a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador to China. "The Chinese don't want to be seen as having been coerced into acting."

A Bust

Both liberals and conservatives in the U.S., though, will be arguing that if Mr. Bush can't show that he pushed China into some liberalizing measures, his move will be a bust. "For the Chinese to have been challenged by the United States to alter policies and then to take no action is going to make a bad situation worse," says Rep. Robert Torricelli (D., N.J.), a member of the House Asian Affairs subcommittee.

Thus, one ironic effect of Mr. Bush's move is that if China doesn't respond, lawmakers now will be more inclined to register anger with China's recalcitrance than they would have been otherwise.

China has made two modest moves in recent days that might represent the beginnings of a response to Mr. Bush's overture. It announced that it will stop sales of ballistic missiles to the Middle East. This, though, merely repeats a pledge that it has made before. And it announced that it will allow the Voice of America radio network to send a correspondent to Beijing to replace one booted out in anger over VOA's reporting of the Tiananmen crackdown.

But those moves don't address the concerns about internal repression that are at the heart of U.S. anger. The highest-profile move China could make to vindicate Mr. Bush's strategy and assuage congressional anger would be to drop its pursuit of Mr. Fang, China's most prominent dissident. An astrophysicist who has been accused of fomenting the pro-democracy protests in Beijing last summer, Mr. Fang has become the leading international symbol of China's reform movement.

Important Symbol

But while Mr. Fang is an important symbol, it doesn't appear that freedom for him alone would be sufficient to soothe concerns on Capitol Hill. Instead, lawmakers say they are more interested in a broader move: an end to martial law in Beijing. "Lifting of martial law is one of the most visible" actions China could take, says Sen. Kassebaum.

Rep. Stephen Solarz (D., N.Y.), chairman of the House Asian Affairs subcommittee, also urges the Chinese to halt the execution of those convicted of crimes related to the pro-democracy movement, release political prisoners and cease the exiling of students to jobs in China's countryside.

In addition, China would please the U.S. by halting its supply of arms to the Khmer Rouge forces struggling for power in Cambodia, and by halting the jamming of VOA broadcasts into China.

Without some of these moves, lawmakers are sure to quickly override Mr. Bush's veto of a bill guaranteeing a safe haven in the U.S. to Chinese students.

Sanctions Bill

And lawmakers say there would be a drive to pass again a bill imposing economic and military sanctions. Congress earlier this year approved such sanctions—including a suspension of arms sales, a suspension of U.S. financing for investments, a halt to nuclear cooperation and a provision urging opposition to new World Bank loans—but Mr. Bush vetoed the legislation containing the sanctions.

Mr. Bush actually has imposed essentially the same sanctions on his own authority, but the legislation would make them legally mandatory and more difficult to lift. The administration would prefer to avoid mandated sanctions because Mr. Bush would like more freedom than the law would allow to begin easing penalties if Beijing makes liberalizing changes. Administration officials say, for instance, that the next step they are prepared to consider would be an end to U.S. opposition to new World Bank loans; Japan is pressuring the U.S. to take such a step.

But such moves may be politically impossible unless Chinese leaders soothe congressional anger. "They've got to act and they've got to make a judgment quickly, or they'll get quite a slap in the face from Congress," says Rep. Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.), a senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Nien Cheng WP 12-15-89 A25

A Distasteful but Necessary Mission

Only assurances not to support Taiwan independence could calm the Chinese.

The news that President Bush sent national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing shocked me. Are we to forgive and forget only six months after the massacre? Such a high-level mission directly contravenes the ban the president imposed. I could not understand it, but I believed then as I do now that there must be a good reason, perhaps even an urgent one, for the president to take such a step and risk being misunderstood by the American people, who I know have been on the side of the Chinese students from the very beginning.


As the president has explained, high-level contact is important with China. This is especially so at the present moment when the hard-liners in the leadership are trying to take China back to the days of secretiveness and isolation. Before Richard Nixon's trip to China in 1972, there were many missed opportunities for the United States to influence events, because there was no meaningful official contact. For years, the Chinese Communist Party, always suspicious of foreign powers, had no real understanding of American policy, and the leadership assumed the worst. Fear accentuated paranoia. The Chinese people suffered.

Right now, high level contact is the only way to get an important message to the ears of Deng Xiaoping, who remains the person to make decisions, though officially retired. Isolated in the seclusion of Chungnanhai and handicapped by failing health, Deng cannot be reached otherwise. I can't help remembering the final years of Mao Zedong, when he depended so much on his wife for information, with disastrous results. To explain American policy, to exercise persuasion or to get Deng's agreement, we needed to send a high level delegation. This is even more so, if the president wanted Deng to make a concession. America must give him a lot of face, not only to win him to our point of view, but also to enable him to convince the other octogenarian leaders.

It is too early to judge whether the president was right to break his own ban of high-level contact. If Scowcroft's mission succeeded in resolving some of the thorny problems facing the two governments, then the trip was worthwhile. The Chinese proverb says: "If you want to get the tiger cub, you must go into the tiger's cave." To achieve an objective, it is worthwhile to take a risk.

There is the problem of Fang Lizhi, the astrophysicist, and his wife, Li Shuxian, who took refuge in the U.S. Embassy at the time of the massacre. A warrant was issued for their arrest, and they were accused of being "counterrevolutionary instigators." That the Fangs are out of reach of the Chinese government and under the protection of the U.S. Embassy is intolerable to the Chinese leaders. Their inability to carry out the arrest made them lose face and encourages other Chinese to turn to foreign embassies for protection. In anger and frustration, they accused the United States of "interfering in the internal affairs of China." To the Communist leaders this situation is more of an insult than economic sanctions.

Handing the Fangs over to the Chinese government to be put in prison or shot is, of course, out of question. But their continued residence in the embassy is an embarrassment and a stumbling block to the normal function of diplomacy. A way out of the impasse must be found. Any solution must be agreed upon by Deng personally. No lesser Chinese leader could decide such a delicate issue. To get Deng to compromise, a delegation representing the president had to be sent.



AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Taiwan has just carried out its first democratic election with full participation by opposition parties. Although the Kuomintang remains in control, the Democratic Progressive Party, which advocates Taiwan independence, made impressive gains, displacing the Kuomintang in many important local and municipal administrations. This unexpected development greatly alarmed the Beijing leadership. Communist Party-backed newspapers in Hong Kong and elsewhere have published many articles either accusing the Kuomintang of condoning the Taiwan independence movement or encouraging the Democratic Progressive Party. Some even hinted at a possible coup attempt by the Democratic Progressive Party to seize control of Taiwan.

> *"There is simply no other alternative if we want to get things done."*

U.S. congressmen and senators are alleged to be sympathetic to Taiwan independence. Recent escapees from China with government connections talked of military preparations for an invasion of Taiwan, a pre-emptive strike to keep Taiwan a part of China.

Military action would strengthen the power of the man who directs the campaign. China's punish-Vietnam campaign of 1979 consolidated Deng's position at the moment he resumed power. A military campaign would greatly benefit hard-liners with a strong military background. But they cannot give the order to attack without Deng's approval. A military campaign would also unite the people and divert their attention from economic difficulties. To the leaders in their 80s, taking Taiwan by force would realize a dream they have cherished for over 40 years. And they believe they can do it, too, because they have carefully built up a submarine fleet and a large air force precisely for such a purpose.

Only a timely warning by the U.S. government could prevent bloodshed and preserve peace in the Taiwan strait. Only an assurance by the United States government not to support the Taiwan independence movement could calm the Communist leaders and convince them the status quo is the best for all concerned.

There are other reasons for high-level contact. For instance, China is a nuclear power with a sizable arsenal of weapons. It cannot be left out of an effective arms control agreement.

The American people and their representatives in Congress have a keen sense of justice and have compassion for the Chinese people. They were deeply saddened and revolted by the massacre of innocent students and civilians in Beijing and elsewhere in China. They would rather not have anything to do with a government that butchered its young. But there are many practical reasons why the president must keep in contact with the present Chinese leadership no matter how distasteful such contact is for himself and the American people. There is simply no other alternative if we want to get things done. By maintaining contact, the president cannot right the wrong that has already been done, but he may be able to prevent that gang of power-mad old men in Beijing from inflicting more madness on the Chinese people and the civilized world.

The writer is author of "Life and Death in Shanghai," a memoir.

Scowcroft Warned China of New Hill Sanctions

U.S. Emissaries Stressed Need for Action by Beijing, Sources Say

WP 12-15-89 A1

By Don Oberdorfer
and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft warned China's leaders last weekend that if they failed to take positive steps soon to repair relations with Washington, President Bush may be powerless to stop a new wave of nearly unanimous votes for sanctions after Congress returns Jan. 23, administration sources said yesterday.

The Chinese promised to respond to Scowcroft's appeal through diplomatic channels, according to a U.S. account of the Beijing meetings, and some administration officials are optimistic about the likelihood of important steps by the Chinese.

But there is agreement among senior officials that no commitments were made by the Chinese leaders, and they said that none were made by Scowcroft on behalf of the United States.

The Scowcroft mission, undertaken at the personal initiative of Bush, was intended to explore a way to stop the erosion of Sino-American relations, which were rocked by the Tiananmen Square massacres last June. But at the same time, administration officials conceded in a series of interviews, the furor that the Scowcroft trip touched off in the United States this week could bring a new crisis for Bush's China policy.

Thus the mission that began in darkness at Andrews Air Force Base at 2:15 a.m. last Friday could be a precipitating event toward either substantial improvement or dramatic new deterioration in Sino-American relations. For this reason the Scowcroft trip ranks as among the boldest—and riskiest—initiatives that Bush has taken in the first year of his presidency.

The origins of the Bush initiative go back, in a real sense, to the Beijing trips of Henry A. Kissinger and Richard M. Nixon in 1971-2 that ended more than a decade of hostility between the two nations, and to Bush's service as chief of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing in 1974-5. Because of his unusual familiarity and strong interest, Bush has been personally involved in formulating the restrained administration reaction to the bloody crackdown.

According to an account provided by administration officials, for many weeks Bush has been pondering ways to change the tone and substance of the bitter dialogue between Washington and Beijing. This inclination was reinforced by separate dinner meetings with Nixon Nov. 5 and with Kissinger Nov. 13 after they returned from their respective trips to China.

Both Nixon and Kissinger reported, an official said, that the Chinese leaders seemed uncomfortable with their intransigent positions and interested in exploring new directions. Abundant reports also reached Bush from the Central Intelligence Agency and elsewhere of power struggles inside the secretive Chinese leadership. Administration sources said it seemed to Bush that it was not helpful for China to be isolated at a time when an anti-Western faction was struggling to turn China inward, while others battled to maintain and advance the openings to the rest of the world.

Bush's Dec. 2-3 summit meeting with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev provided the pretext for resumption of direct communication at a high level, previously banned by Bush after the June crackdown. Since the U.S.-China connection was restored in 1972, American administrations have briefed the Chinese on top-level U.S. meetings with the Soviet Union, the other pole of the U.S.-Soviet-China strategic triangle.

More than a week before the Malta summit, administration sources said, Scowcroft informed the new Chinese ambassador here, Zhu Qizhen, of Bush's desire to brief Beijing about the sessions with Gorbachev. There were high-level discussions of sending Scowcroft, along with Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, to Beijing before the Malta summit or sending Scowcroft to China direct from Malta but this proved to be impractical.

Work on the Scowcroft mission began immediately after Bush's return from Malta on Monday night, Dec. 4. By Wednesday afternoon agreement had been reached with Beijing on details of the trip.

Although a few members of Congress were notified as Scowcroft and Eagleburger were flying to Beijing last Friday, the trip was kept secret until the U.S. team landed at Beijing about 2 a.m. Saturday, Washington time, when White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater telephoned the news to U.S. press associations.

"They [the Chinese] wanted to hold it until the arrival in Beijing and we didn't care," said an informed official who conceded, in retrospect, that the middle-of-the-night disclosure generated a politically damaging aura of intrigue and stealth. Another contributing factor to the furor was the first television and newspaper photographs of Scowcroft from Beijing, cordially clinking wine glasses with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at a state banquet. "They do their thing the way they want to do it, and we go along with it," said an official in explaining why the White House did not insist on a business-only set of meetings.

In 25 hours in Beijing, Scowcroft and Eagleburger had separate meetings with senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li Peng, the three top Chinese leaders, as well as other high officials.

Scowcroft was very explicit about the political difficulties facing Bush, according to a U.S. account of the meetings. Scowcroft cited the 403-Q vote in the House and voice vote in the Senate to extend the visas of Chinese students in the United States over Beijing's objection, and said that in the U.S. constitutional system, the president is almost powerless to stop such legislative unanimity.

What the Chinese do at home is an internal question, Scowcroft conceded, but added that if Bush is to change the direction of the relationship he must have help. To take positive U.S. steps without steps from Beijing is beyond the president's powers, the national security adviser maintained, according to this account. He also said that if nothing positive is done before Congress returns Jan. 23, there is a strong possibility of additional legislation that could bring another negative spiral in Sino-American relations.

Scowcroft listed a series of Chinese actions that could be helpful, according to an administration source, including lifting of martial law, the cessation of jamming of Voice of America broadcasts and permission for a new VOA correspondent to come to Beijing, a halt to intermediate-range missile sales—especially in the Middle East—and resolution of the case of human rights activist Fang Lizhi, who has been in refuge in the U.S. Embassy since the June crackdown.

On Monday, after Scowcroft left Beijing, the Foreign Ministry issued an unusually specific statement, which it said was in response to a press report, that except for the 1987 medium-range missile sale to Saudi Arabia, "China has never sold, nor is planning to sell missiles to any Middle East country." On Wednesday, the Foreign Ministry approved the accreditation of a new VOA correspondent. But there was no private message to Washington about these steps, an administration official said, and no connection was made in Beijing between them and the Scowcroft trip.

Bigger moves than these will be needed to assuage U.S. public and political opinion, administration officials said, especially in light of the domestic firestorm the Scowcroft mission touched off.

"It was my idea, my suggestion," said Bush last Monday of the controversial mission. Privately, he is reported to be serene about taking the political and diplomatic gamble. Despite all the criticism, Bush has told friends, "I know I'm doing the right thing," whether his initiative fails or succeeds.

Bush calms critics on right

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

12-15-89 A

President Bush headed off criticism of his China initiative among conservative leaders yesterday by promising not to normalize relations and telling them there is more at stake than has been revealed.

"I recognize that without all the cards on the table it's hard for you to be able to see what we're up to," Mr. Bush said during a meeting with about two dozen leaders from conservative organizations.

"I know we have differences, and I want you to know we're not going to normalize relations. We're not into normalizing things or anything like that," Mr. Bush told the leaders, according to a White House official who declined to be named.

The comment came during an opening statement that participants felt was intended to pre-empt objections he expected to hear. There were no subsequent questions or criticisms raised on China during the half-hour session.

Mr. Bush and his emissaries, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, have refused even to say what issues were raised and have been adamant about not reporting the outcomes.

Since they returned, however, the Chinese have promised not to sell M-9 missiles to Middle East nations and agreed to admit a new Voice of America correspondent to Beijing.

China thanked Mr. Bush yesterday for sending the envoys to Beijing and suggested a solution was possible for Fang Lizhi, the pro-democracy dissident taking refuge in the U.S. Embassy.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Jin Guihua, in a weekly briefing devoid of the anti-American rhetoric common in recent months, also said he hoped U.S.-China ties — badly strained by the June military crackdown on pro-democracy dissent, in which hundreds of protesters were killed — could be normalized soon.

But Mr. Jin declined to say whether China would make any concessions or change its policies as a result of the weekend visit by Mr. Scowcroft, the first senior U.S. official to visit China since Mr. Bush banned high-level exchanges in June.

Several participants in yesterday's White House meeting read Mr. Bush's comments as heralding some major development that will vindicate his secrecy and any embarrassment at making the first step to patch up differences after the Tiananmen Square killings.

"Bush has asked us pointedly: 'Give me the benefit of the doubt. I know things that you don't know,' " said Paul M. Weyrich, president of the Free Congress Foundation, who had not met with Mr. Bush since his opposition to the president's nomination of John Tower as defense secretary last winter.

"If the principles are right and if in fact there is some improvement, then looking back at it I don't think anybody's going to object," Mr. Weyrich said.

"I'm willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, if in due course it doesn't come out right, there will be the inevitable political price to pay for having made a bad gamble," he said.

Other participants agreed with that assessment, including one White House official who declined to be identified.

Mr. Bush "did seem to insinuate that there is some payoff there that is not apparent," said one conservative leader who attended. "He made it sound like we weren't going to do anything additional for China but that as a result of this trip they were going to do something that was favorable for foreign policy interests or something domestically that would go down well."

Another one of the conservative participants said the president might be stating the obvious. "I would be shocked if there weren't more going on than met the eye. There had to be some sort of payoff," he said.

Democratic congressmen have sharply criticized the Scowcroft-Eagleburger visit, accusing Mr. Bush of "kowtowing" to Chinese leaders responsible for the bloody quelling of the Tiananmen protest movement.

In Beijing, Mr. Jin said yesterday: "The Chinese government sets great store by the Sino-U.S. relations and believes that, with joint efforts, China and the United States will be entirely able to overcome the existing difficulties and restore to normal soon their relations and even push them to further development."

Asked about Mr. Fang, an astrophysicist and social reformer who took sanctuary in the U.S. Embassy with his wife after troops crushed the student movement in June, Mr. Jin said, "That's a sensitive question involving China's sovereignty law and norms of international law."

In a statement suggesting China was open to negotiations on Mr. Fang, he added, "To resolve this problem requires the efforts of both sides."

On previous occasions, the Foreign Ministry always has stated that the university professor and his wife, Li Shuxian, are counterrevolutionary criminals wanted by Chinese police and has demanded that the United States hand them over immediately.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman also stressed several times that, although differences remain, "under the current circumstances, where the international situation is undergoing the most profound changes since the end of World War II, the constant exchange of contacts between China and the United States is both necessary and beneficial."

• *This article is based in part on wire service reports.*

National Journal DEC. 16, 1989 Pg. 3036

New Challenges for CIA

The dizzying pace of change in the Soviet Bloc will test the intelligence community at the same time that director William H. Webster faces challenges of his own.

BY DAVID C. MORRISON

With the world seeming to be spinning into historical overdrive, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William H. Webster said in an interview, "I don't think that the intelligence community, in my memory, has ever been so challenged."

The pace and scope of global events as we forge into the 1990s is dizzying, indeed. For decades, the CIA and its 11 sister agencies in the so-called U.S. intelligence community have devoted themselves almost entirely to poking their fingers into cracks in that apparent gray monolith, the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Now, those cracks are yawning into gaping fissures. And, while the torrent of data flowing the CIA's way is unprecedented, so, too, is the unpredictability of the careering course of change.

No less challenging to the spy agencies will be the monumental task of monitoring the nuclear, conventional and chemical arms treaties that are now at the top of the superpowers' diplomatic in box.

The CIA's own in box, meanwhile, is crammed as never before with ticklish transnational issues—narcotics, terrorism, proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and missiles, regional conflicts and shifting economic power centers. To top it all off, the intelligence budget is coming under the most intense downward pressure in more than a decade.

"I think we're up to it," Webster said of these challenges confronting the intelligence community over which he presides. But Webster also faces a personal challenge. When he was sworn in as the nation's 14th DCI and CIA director in May 1987, his chief charge was to calm congressional tempers upset by the cowboy tenure of his predecessor, William J. Casey, who retired fatally ill with a brain tumor that February, just as the Iran-contra scandal was unfolding.

Webster played a similarly ameliorative role at the FBI when the U.S. Court of Appeals judge from St. Louis became its director in 1978. Subsequent revelations about FBI surveillance of dissident groups and about charges of racial discrimination in the bureau may have tarnished the record of Webster's tenure at the FBI. But, by all accounts, he has succeeded in his key task at the CIA.

"Mr. Casey had left the agency embroiled in the Iran-contra controversy, a situation where there could have been a real reaction against it," said Sen. David L. Boren, D-Okla., chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence. "Webster came in and restored public confidence in the agency. No one, not his harshest critics, would question his personal integrity or devotion to the rule of law."

And Webster has harsh critics. Their gripes, made public through anonymous quotes, reached a crescendo after the failed Oct. 3 coup in Panama. Some of this covert criticism, sources say, comes from White House chief of staff John H. Sununu and Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who are apparently unhappy with the quality of intelligence coming their way.

Other nodes of discontent can be found in Congress, notwithstanding the oft-heard complaint that Webster is too cozy with lawmakers. The basic brief against Webster is that despite nine years of membership in the intelligence community as FBI director, he came to the CIA's Langley (Va.) headquarters a stranger to foreign policy. Some critics accuse him of being too much the socialite and too slow in climbing the learning curve. Some also feel that he has distanced himself too far from the policy-making role that Casey,

San Antonio Light DEC. 27, 1989 Pg. B-6

Defense rivalry must stop

As the Defense Department budget shrinks in response to the improving climate of superpower relations and the unraveling of the Soviet Union's satellite system in Eastern Europe, intense internecine warfare already has erupted among the different branches of the U.S. military over the available bucks.

That is evidenced in the reaction of Marine Corps planners to Army plans to trim down and tailor its forces. The Marine Corps contends that the Army would be trespassing upon its mission and attempting to do something that the Marine Corps can do better.

By 1995, Army personnel would be reduced from 764,000 to 630,000. About 70,000 of the 220,000 troops now stationed in Europe would be brought home. More emphasis would be placed on airborne, air assault and light infantry divisions, effectively transforming the Army into a contingency force capable of being deployed worldwide.

Far be it from mere civilians to decide which point of view is the more correct militarily. But it doesn't take a general to figure out that the real quarrel is about how the reduced Defense Department pie will be sliced.

Over the years, interservice rivalry has bedeviled defense budgeting. With the cutbacks that are coming, however, the separate branches may be forced to take a more comprehensive view of national security needs and learn to fit their plans into the big picture.

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most believe, embraced too heartily. What the doctor asked for in a DCI in 1987, Webster skeptics contend, may not be what is required in 1990.

"He is a nice, nice man," a congressional intelligence overseer said. "Was he the right person after Iran-contra? Probably. But is he an intellectually curious person, involved with international affairs and having at his grasp a changing international environment? No. Does he have a drive for protecting the prerogatives of the agency, like Casey? No. I find him living off his reputation."

Others dismiss these complaints. Three former DCIs interviewed said that constant criticism is unavoidably a part of the job description. "It's totally unfair to report on the fact that somebody is unhappy," argued William E. Colby, who was DCI from 1973-76. "Somebody will always be unhappy."


A Senate Intelligence Committee aide said of Webster: "I think he does present a mixed picture; there are some things he does quite well and other things not so well. But it's in the eye of the beholder how prepared he is. You obviously had someone who did not have a professional background in international affairs and has had to learn what U.S. foreign policy objectives are. But over time, he has become much more familiar with those issues."

Asked how Webster's reputation has fared on the community grapevine, 35-year CIA veteran David D. Whipple, executive director of the 3,500-member Association of Former Intelligence Officers, said: "I don't get a negative buzz. I get, sometimes, impatience on the part of people working in the agency because there is not a willingness to plunge ahead quite as fast sometimes."

Though Webster "is less likely to enter into what could be called controversial operations," Whipple added, "I think this is on orders from above; the Administration would like to avoid the bad publicity that comes from what we call flaps. So I don't think one could really cudgel Judge Webster for fulfilling a different role than Casey."

Georgetown University professor Roy Godson, editor of *Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s* (Lexington Books, 1989) and a friendly critic of the agency from the Right, agrees. "I wish he would do more, but I think he's getting a bum rap," Godson said. "He's a fairly open-minded person. He's willing to listen; not all of his predecessors were as open."

After the flap over the Panama coup, President Bush said he had "complete confidence" in Webster. By all accounts, Bush recalls bitterly the premature end of his own one-year stint as DCI in January 1977 when President Carter refused to keep him on. In 1981, President Reagan, in turn, dismissed Carter's DCI, Stansfield Turner. Eager to break an emerging cycle of partisan CIA appointments, Bush said last December when he tapped Webster to stay on that his tenure was "open-ended."



Save for Supreme Court Justices, no one in Washington has lifetime tenure. And so a steady stream of speculation has Bush dumping Webster after a "decent interval," maybe early next year. The names floated most often as putative successors are those of James R. Lilley, a former CIA official and now ambassador to China; national security adviser Brent Scowcroft; and former deputy DCI and Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci III.

Webster, while dismissing the sniping in his direction, denies that he is clinging desperately to his job. *(For excerpts from the Webster interview, see pp. 3038-39.)*

"Throughout my career in public service, I've gone where I've been asked to go, and I've always been ready to return to the private sector when I wasn't needed," he said. "It's up to the President. I think the President is looking over a longer stretch. And he is going to make changes—possibly [in my job], possibly others.

"I certainly expect to do one more good thing while I'm young enough to do it," the 65-year-old Webster said. "But these are things that I take one day at a time."

CRAFTING CONSENSUS

Popular imagination usually focuses on the CIA's covert activities, such as its not-really-so-secret projects to aid antigovernment insurgencies in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. These operations, in fact, account for only 3 per cent of the intelligence community's budget.

The brunt of the U.S. spy effort is devoted to the much less controversial and far more tedious task of collecting information on areas and issues of interest and then analyzing and converting it into finished "product" of use to policy makers.

More than any other activity, generating 100 or so big-issue national intelligence estimates (NIEs) every year involves the entire intelligence community. Several times during the interview, Webster said that what he is most proud of in his 30 months as DCI is the way that "the various agencies within the community are pulling together."

A manifestation of this common effort is the proliferation of "fusion centers" designed to bring community assets, both operational and analytical, collectively to bear on key problem areas. Casey had set up a DCI Counterterrorist Center in early 1986. Webster followed suit in April 1988 with a DCI Counterintelligence Center that focuses on stemming espionage losses. Last April, he also weighed in with a DCI Counternarcotics Center.

A high degree of community cooperation is also apparent in the product being churned out, sources say. According to Senate Intelligence Committee vice chairman William S. Cohen, R-Maine, few violently opposing views are turning up as dissenting footnotes to the NIEs. "There seemed to be more of that when Bill Casey was there," Cohen said. *(See NJ, 5/9/87, p. 1110.)*

The day before he was interviewed, Webster said, he had reviewed three "big" NIEs. "One of my groups here at the agency came in with a long footnote. They were just raising the issue, not trying to change [anyone's] mind. Everybody gets heard. But that shrank down to two paragraphs, and it got in place. We had one [NIE] with no footnotes, and it was an important one."

Webster does not "involve himself in the depth of issues" the way former DCI

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CIA...CONTINUED

James R. Schlesinger did, said an analyst recently retired from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. But neither does Webster impose his views on an estimate the way Turner did, the former analyst added.

"Webster likes a more consensual approach," he said. "He'll hear out everybody's views and craft a consensus. When there's a blowout, he'll send it back to the agencies to work it out."

The current calm in the intelligence community, sources suggested, may be laid to the personalities of the key players. Just as Webster is less activist than Casey was, so, too, are Vice Adm. William O. Studeman, the head of the National Security Agency, and Army Lt. Gen. Harold E. Soyster, the Defense Intelligence Agency director, more low-key than their predecessors, Army Lt. Gen. William E. Odom and Air Force Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Perroots.

As for the quality of the community's product, assessments, not surprisingly, are mixed. Intelligence on arms control and Soviet strategic weaponry, narcotics trafficking, Central America and "warnings and indications"—the regular tracking of Soviet military activity—came in for praise.

Singled out for complaint, however, was intelligence on Afghanistan, where the agency has been providing substantial military assistance to Mujahedeen guerrillas who are locked in a protracted and bloody war of attrition with the Soviet-backed government. "The agency still tries to wax very optimistic about the Mujahedeen's chances," a congressional aide said. "These guys are so committed to the 'Muj' that they are still indulging in wishful thinking."

Rep. Dave McCurdy, D-Okla., who chairs the Permanent Select Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation, said that "the product has generally been good, [and] it's improving in many areas."

Webster has formed special units to examine new conditions in the Soviet Union, such as a task force on ethnic unrest. But on precisely this main story of the day—political upheaval in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—the CIA "tends to be behind events, rather than forecasting events," McCurdy said, an accusation others echo.

"I think [Soviet President Mikhail S.] Gorbachev was misread, and I think there is a very, very cautious conservative leaning within the analysis when it comes to other leaders," McCurdy complained.

"The intelligence community now faces a very difficult job in writing about the Soviet Union because the President's deputy national security adviser [Robert M. Gates] has a pretty definite view, and he comes from the intelligence community," suggested former CIA official Allan E. Goodman, associate dean of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Gates, who was Casey's and Webster's deputy DCI, holds hard-line views on the prospects for change in the Soviet Union.

To challenge that view "is much, much harder," Goodman said, "because you are writing for a top policy maker that really has formed a set of judgments based on access to what the CIA already has."

Other observers view the complaint that the CIA is soft-peddling events in the Soviet Bloc as Monday-morning quarterbacking. "I think it's awfully easy for someone to sit back and follow a line that you hear directed at the President himself that something is too timid and not bold enough," Sen. Cohen said. "Few people have been able to predict with any credibility or accuracy the events that have unfolded in Europe, or the pace of those events."

DATA, NOT ADVICE

Casey, who had managed Reagan's 1980 presidential campaign, was the first DCI to sit on the Cabinet. That let him play a more vigorous policy role than CIA directors typically play. Webster, by contrast, hews firmly to a view that a DCI has no business making policy decisions.

In this, he is nicely in tune with his boss, former DCI Bush. In his autobiography, *Looking Forward* (Bantam Books, 1987), Bush wrote: "The CIA director should go out of his way to avoid even the appearance of getting involved in policy making. The agency's sole duty, outlined in its 1947 charter, is to furnish intelligence data to the President and other policy makers."

As he did when he was Vice President, Bush gets an intelligence briefing every morning from 8-8:15 from one of six CIA briefers. (In past presidencies, this task was often arrogated by the National Security Council staff.) Sununu, Scowcroft and Gates usually also attend these sessions.

An early draft of the President's Daily Brief is delivered to Webster for his review at home every night at ten. Early the next day, on his way to Langley or the White House, Webster studies new cables that have come in. He recently rescheduled his morning staff meeting so that he could attend more White House intelligence briefings, which he now does as often as four times a week. The briefer usually answers Bush's routine questions, though Webster might raise other issues at the end of the formal briefing.

Webster took great pains to stress that he does not "get up and walk out whenever anybody said 'policy,' " as a recent news account stated. "That is absolutely not the case," he said. "It is very hard to have a line that is so finely drawn. The burden on me is to try not to step across it more than I need to emphasize the intelligence."

Webster noted a "tendency in a fast-breaking situation to focus on current developments without a sufficient estimate of where it is going to go. A decision like getting into the [Persian] Gulf or doing something in Panama or some other part of the world requires a little longer look, and I think that intelligence can provide a contribution. But I haven't heard anybody suggest that in doing that, I've been arguing policy."

Others argue, however, that Webster has defined the policy perimeter too narrowly. "There is a fine line here," a Senate aide said. "But Judge Webster seems to have shrunk the position that other DCIs have taken in the process. That's a question mark for me."

Intelligence expert Godson argued that

Jane's DEFENCE weekly

JAN. 6, 1990

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US MH-47E rolled out

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Rollout of the United States Army's MH-47E special operations aircraft has taken place at Boeing Helipoters, Philadelphia.

The US Army awarded Boeing Helicopters a contract in late 1987 to fabricate a single MH-47E prototype from an Army Chinook partially modernised to the CH-47D configuration.

Boeing said an additional 50 production MH-47Es are needed to support army special operations missions.

MH-47E first flight is set for March and prototype delivery to the army is planned for November.

CIA...CONTINUED

more can and should be done to make "the intelligence analysis much more policy-relevant without bringing the analysts into the policy-making process." NIEs and the President's Daily Brief, he suggested, "tend to be too 'empirical-descriptive' and don't tell the policy makers what their opportunities are to affect events abroad."

A related criticism pertains to Webster's role in "fast-breaking situations." During the abortive October coup against Panamanian strongman Manuel A. Noriega, in which the Administration's allegedly bumbling performance drew much partisan fire, Webster was on a five-day, three-country trip to Europe. The CIA also was reportedly not consulted during White House sessions on the coup.

In the wake of the controversy over the attempted coup in Panama, it was decided that the National Security Council's Deputies Committee, of which deputy DCI Richard J. Kerr is a member, will be convened whenever such crises erupt in the future.

And, on Nov. 21, when Salvadoran guerrillas had a team of Green Berets pinned down in a hotel in San Salvador, Webster canceled an appearance at the Naval War College to mind the intelligence shop. Then, on Dec. 1, Philippine President Corazon C. Aquino requested U.S. assistance to stave off a coup attempt as Bush was winging his way to the superpower summit in Malta. Webster, an official said, "stayed up most of that night in his office in continual, secure electronic contact" with Vice President Dan Quayle's crisis management team at the White House.

MENDING FENCES

Not counting his ties to his President, a DCI's most crucial institutional relationship is the one he forms with Congress. That relationship was badly strained, to put it mildly, at the time Webster came aboard in 1987.

Congress's loss of confidence in the CIA, caused by "the many unanswered questions because of Bill Casey's final illness and death," House Intelligence Committee vice chairman Henry J. Hyde, R-Ill., said, was "exacerbated by certain witnesses' . . . evading and avoiding answering questions to provide information that Congress had a right to know."

Webster, besides firing two CIA officials and demoting or reprimanding five others who were involved in the Iran-contra affair—a housecleaning some critics said wasn't thorough enough—set new ground rules for CIA testimony: All questions from Members of Congress are to be answered fully and honestly. If the official testifying fears he is wading into covert quicksand, he is to kick the inquiries upstairs to Webster's office.

"The key here is trust," Webster said. "My view is that truth builds trust. And that requires a level of candor with the oversight committees [so] they won't install a whole range of checkpoints that make it much more difficult for us to do our work."

This *glasnost* policy has improved relations on Capitol Hill. Which is not to say that Webster lacks critics there. Some of them regarded it as very bad form for an agency whose logo might be a pair of zipped lips when Webster had deputy DCI Kerr and operations director Richard F. Stolz sell his and the agency's performance to reporters in reaction to a critical *Washington Post* story.

And when Webster in early November talked to a *Post* reporter about a Justice Department memorandum interpreting a 1976 executive order banning U.S. involvement in assassinations, that "really pissed a lot of people off up here because we had asked for [the memorandum] and not yet received it," a House aide said. "No DCI ought to be yapping about something publicly before he'd made sure that Members of Congress got what they requested."

And again, in the most widespread criticism of Webster, some Members also rap his intellectual acuity and his grasp of the subject matter. "As much as Bill Casey and I fought and had problems, the guy had an intellectual grasp," said a Member who scornfully recalled a breakfast meeting this year at which Webster provided "faulty information" that had been refuted by a Cable News Network report earlier that morning.

"If you covered a subject that Casey had a profound interest in, he lost his mumble," this Member added. "With Webster, you don't have a mumble, you have more of a fog."

By no means everyone in Congress shares that harsh view. But Webster has had conflicts even with his fans in dealing with legislative hangovers from the Iran-contra binge. *(See NJ, 4/16/88, p. 1009.)*

He has adamantly opposed a bill mandating notification of Congress within 48 hours of all covert activities, for instance. That measure was approved by the Senate last year but stalled out in the House. Cohen spent most of this year negotiating a written pledge from Bush that notification would be made "within a few days." But the House Intelligence Committee rejected that deal and seems determined to seek a legislative solution next year.

And Webster was run over by a legislative steamroller in the form of an amendment, signed into law on Nov. 30, creating a statutory CIA inspector general (IG). Unlike the current IG setup at the CIA, the new official will require Senate confirmation and will report to Congress as well as to the director.

Though every major executive agency has one, Webster said a statutory IG was unnecessary and would discourage other countries' intelligence officers from cooperating with the CIA. Advocates in Congress say the bill has safeguards to bar disclosures and will do no harm.

Some House Members further argue that Webster might have averted legislation had he not stonewalled on supplying that chamber's intelligence panel with copies of his IG's reports. "I hope he has a better understanding of foreign governments than he does of our own," a House critic said.

But members of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has had better access to the agency's IG's reports, said that Webster's stance had not affected the legislative outcome one way or the other.

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CIA...

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Though the new era of superpower relations might seem to foretell the same sort of drawdown of forces at the CIA that is now under heated debate at the Pentagon, intelligence mavens make a seemingly counterintuitive counterargument.

"We need to do a lot more to anticipate much better what's going to happen in the Soviet Union," former DCI Turner said. "While we're all delighted with what is going on today, nobody is confident that they know what is going to happen a year from today, much less 10."

Richard M. Helms, who served as the DCI from 1965-73, said, "The politicians may be saying, 'Why should you have money for intelligence when there are less tensions?' " But, Helms added, "I think it's quite possible that out of all this era of change in Eastern Europe, the world will be less stable."

If nothing else, the comparative torrent of data on Soviet affairs unleashed by *glasnost* vastly boosts the CIA's analytical chores. Webster also noted elliptically that the recent overthrow of Eastern European governments has shut down some CIA channels. "You try to be in a position to collect intelligence no matter who's on top of the heap," he said. But "you have these relationships ongoing. If you have a major change or upheaval, then you have to look to other ways of knowing what's going on."

Whether fewer arms demand more spies or not, the expectation is universal that the intelligence budget will be jammed into the same fiscal vise now constricting defense spending.


From about $10.5 billion in the mid-1970s, the budget for intelligence—including spy satellites, the National Security Agency's electronic eavesdropping empire, the FBI's counterespionage efforts, tactical military intelligence and CIA operations and analysis—has grown to roughly $28 billion in fiscal 1990. Most of that growth came in fiscal 1981-85, when intelligence spending jumped even faster than military spending did.

When Pentagon spending leveled off and began declining in fiscal 1986, spending for intelligence kept growing, although at a much slower rate than earlier in the decade. That was so even though most of the intelligence budget is hidden inside the Defense Department budget.

But with Pentagon spending in full retreat, intelligence will be hard-pressed to hold its own, especially as long as it is a subset of Defense.

"I have been arguing since last spring, when I saw this coming, that you should break the [intelligence] budget out separately and release the total figure," said Bobby Ray Inman, who capped a career in defense intelligence with a stint as deputy DCI from 1981-82.

"I think if the public found out that we're spending 8-10 per cent of the national defense budget on intelligence, they wouldn't be upset at all," Inman said. "But as long as you continue to do [it as it is done now], you'll get tremendous pressure from the [Pentagon] comptroller and the services that everyone take a fair share of cuts."



The staffing of the Bush Administration gives intelligence advocates hope that the espionage infrastructure will not be forced to take its share of cuts. Bush, after all, is the first President to have been a DCI. (As CIA chief, Bush had pushed for a $500 million add-on for new satellites and listening posts.) And Defense Secretary Dick Cheney had long service on the House Intelligence Committee and enthusiastically supported the intelligence buildup.

Another ameliorative factor, if the scuffling for pork on Capitol Hill grows especially nasty, may be that several influential Members, such as McCurdy and Cohen, serve on both the Armed Services and Intelligence Committees.

The coming era of stringency promises also to spark fiscal conflict between elements of the intelligence budget. In reviewing the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Boren and Cohen decided that the U.S. space reconnaissance capability was barely adequate to monitor compliance with INF, much less with subsequent arms treaties.

After the Pentagon refused to pony up the money, the Senators went to Reagan and said they would not support INF unless he agreed to a reported $10 billion-$15 billion program to deploy as many as six Lacrosse radar-imaging satellites through the mid-1990s. Bush signed on to that deal this year.

Arms control verification is something of a motherhood issue for Congress. But so, too, is human-collected intelligence (known in the spy trade as "HUMINT") and data analysis, which could be squeezed into a corner by costly technical collection efforts in a slimmer over-all budget. Webster is credited with beginning a program of beefing up the CIA's HUMINT capabilities, but it is also acknowledged that it takes time to recruit and adequately train new agents and analysts.

"One has to ask whether we risk putting too much up [in space] and not having a capability to absorb that data, in which case you could wind up worse off than you were before," said intelligence expert Jeffrey T. Richelson, author of *The U.S. Intelligence Community* (Ballinger Publishing Co., 1989).

Webster said he is working on the fiscal issues as best he can, given the constraints. "I have put together a community budget that takes into account the aspirations of all of the members," he said. But the community "also has to face the fact . . . that in some cases, we aren't going to be able to do the things that we wanted to do and may even have to cut back on some of the others."

"I am guardedly optimistic that we will be able to hold our own in this environment," said Boren, a vociferous advocate of steady intelligence spending. "Webster, just as he stepped into office at a very critical time, when there was a great need to restore confidence after Iran-contra, he is now again stepping into a year that will be just as critical," Boren said, "because he will be the lead person making this case, to ensure that we don't allow our intelligence capability to go downhill just when it's facing its greatest challenge." □

F.A.S. *PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT*
(Federation Of American Scientists)

DECEMBER 1989

Pg. 1

Hotspots

SECRET US WAR IN CAMBODIA

The US is waging a secret war in Cambodia against the Hun Sen government—knowing full well that none other than the genocidal Khmer Rouge are likely to be the ultimate beneficiaries.

Even as White House officials shed crocodile tears over signs of the growing military strength of the Khmer Rouge, they are continuing to use US financial and intelligence resources to weaken the Vietnamese-installed Hun Sen government, the only faction capable of preventing a military takeover by the Khmer Rouge.

And the Administration is pressuring Thailand to refrain from pulling the rug out from under the war itself, something that Thailand—as the main conduit of arms to all the resistance forces—is uniquely able to do.

According to well-informed sources, the non-communist resistance—composed of forces loyal to Prince Norodom Sihanouk and to a former prime minister, Son Sann—has a joint military command that makes requests for weapons, material and aid through Thai operatives and agents of the Central Intelligence Agency on the Thai border.

CIA in Cambodian Working Group

Those requests are taken to the Cambodian Working Group, a highly secret unit in Bangkok that coordinates every move of the non-communist resistance. Working with the group are CIA operatives from the US embassy in Bangkok and officials from the highest levels of the Thai, Malaysian and Singaporean governments.

The Working Group is the conduit for lethal, material, and financial aid to the non-communist resistance, except for that coming from China. It reviews battle plans, approves specific weapons, disburses direct cash payments and reimburses resistance leaders. While Thailand and Malaysia train the resistance and Thailand provides logistical support, Singapore provides the weapons through a quasi-private weapons company in Singapore. And the US pays for virtually everything.

For example, a "general offensive" launched last month by the non-communist resistance was carefully planned and organized by the Working Group with highly secret "need to know" rules giving everyone plausible deniability. The US pays $24 million annually to support the resistance, and the Son Sann group is getting $150,000 a month for operating expenses alone.

Newspaper reports even suggest that CIA operatives are providing intelligence assistance from US reconnaissance satellites to the non-communist resistance.

Now that these non-communist resistance are beginning to fight, there can be no denying that US support for them is helping the Khmer Rouge, albeit indirectly, by forcing the Hun Sen government to cope with three battle fronts rather than one.

Meanwhile, the US government is intervening in Thai politics by backing its hard-line foreign minister, Siddhi Savetsila, against its prime minister, Chatchai Choonhavan, to keep the war going. Secret details on Thai involvement in the war shed new light on the importance of supporting the peaceful initiatives of the Thai prime minister, whose visit to the US, originally planned for this week, has been deferred.

Through a large Thai intelligence entity called 838, the Cambodian guerrillas receive weapons, food and other support. These officers are integrated into the daily life of the resistance bases. They provide weapons and material that are stored in secret warehouses well inside Thailand, and monitor everything.

Weapons for the Khmer Rouge are sent to Thailand by China, and Khmer Rouge leaders are given full freedom to travel from their jungle bases in Thailand to offices in Bangkok to deal with securing them.

Thailand Could Stop the War

Thus, Thailand has the ability to stop the war and, indeed, to determine the winner. Under these circumstances, Thailand could, by gradually reducing support, weaken the Khmer Rouge enough to prevent them from taking over Cambodia once again. This is exactly what the Thai prime minister wants to do.

And why doesn't he? One major reason is that Washington currently finds his initiatives unacceptable. He is, after all, arguing for a step-by-step settlement that would relieve pressure on the Hun Sen government.

The Administration, which says it opposes Khmer Rouge involvement in a future Cambodian government, also says—startlingly—that it will go along with such involvement so long as Prince Sihanouk insists on it. The prince, in turn, had already said he would insist on including the Khmer Rouge as long as the Chinese insist on it—leaving the US, in effect, following the Chinese line.

In accordance with this convoluted policy, the US Embassy in Bangkok is happy about the recent success of the non-communist resistance, which puts further pressure on Hun Sen to accept the unacceptable—a coalition with the Khmer Rouge. And it regularly protests any peace initiatives by the Thai prime minister.

So the irony is exquisite. We are redoubling our efforts to overthrow Hun Sen even while we announce that such a result would produce a Khmer Rouge takeover. Hun Sen is supposed to save us from this contradiction by organizing a wholly implausible, four-party coalition government with the Khmer Rouge.

From every objective point of view, we are allied with the genocidal Khmer Rouge. —*Jeremy J. Stone* □

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WASHINGTON TIMES DEC. 18, 1989 Pg. 1

Marines stand by, frustrated

By Peter Almond
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

U.S. Marines in Panama expressed anger and frustration yesterday over the killing of one of their number and were infuriated by Panamian claims that it was American troops who provoked the shootings.

As they and thousands of others went on "Delta" alert at bases throughout Panama, the Marine Corps spirit for revenge competed with practical and diplomatic cautions being exercised by senior officials.

"A lot of people here want us to do something," said one Marine in a telephone interview from Rodman Naval Base in Panama.

And, alluding to a failure to take action during the failed coup against Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega on Oct. 3, the Marine, who asked not to be identified, said: "I know we can't start bombing PDF [Panamanian Defense Forces] headquarters, but people feel that Washington ought to do something real this time. They can't let the PDF get away with this."

Whatever action is taken, restrictions on an already-cramped lifestyle in Panama are now feared inevitable by many of the 12,000 troops there, according to military officials.

"I don't think anybody's going downtown for a while — not unless they have to," said the Marine, bemoaning a steady loss of liberty caused by the deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Panamanian governments.

Tours of duty there have already been cut to a maximum of 12 months for the vast majority assigned to Panama without their families. Virtually no Defense Department families now live off-base, and military life revolves almost exclusively around the base.

For several months U.S. troops have been living under "Personnel Military Limitation Charlie," according to a Southern Command spokesman in Panama. This allows troops to go into Panama City and other civilian centers in civilian clothes but orders them out of specific areas and locations and requires they exercise caution.

"For us [Marines] it means we really don't go into town," said one Panama-based Marine. "Off duty we just go over to Balboa [a U.S. base] next door. Or you can go over to Howard [Air Base], where they've got a lot more facilities.

"I know a couple of people [Marines] who've been here awhile and decided to go into a place downtown. They said they wouldn't do it again. They said it scared them. Just being out there knowing you are in a different world, under different rules.

MARINES...Pg. 6

NEW YORK TIMES DEC. 16, 1989 Pg. 1

President Rejects Plan to Ground Nuclear Airborne Command Post

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 — President Bush today rejected a recommendation by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to halt the round-the-clock flights of an airborne command post that could be used to wage a nuclear war, Administration officials said.

Mr. Cheney had endorsed a proposal by the Air Force's Strategic Air Command that the planes be kept on the ground some of the time because of the military's belief that there is a reduced risk of a surprise Soviet nuclear attack.

The Defense Department's recommendation was to have been formally transmitted to the White House today as part of Mr. Cheney's budget request for the fiscal year 1991. But after the White House learned of it in The New York Times this morning, the President rejected it, Administration officials said.

Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, called Mr. Cheney this morning to veto the proposal, objecting to its "symbolism," Administration officials said.

White House officials did not explain why Mr. Bush differed with the judgment of civilian and military officials in the Pentagon that continuous flights were no longer necessary.

But the White House apparently felt that ending the round-the-clock flights might create a public perception that the United States was moving too fast to cut military capabilities.

The President's rapid move to preserve the flights, and his use of Mr. Scowcroft to deliver the message to Secretary Cheney, appeared to represent an assertion of White House authority over Pentagon planning and reinforced Mr. Scowcroft's power as a Presidential adviser.

It is not unknown for the White House to reverse planning recommendations by the Defense Department; earlier this year, for example, it rejected Mr. Cheney's recommendation to kill the Midgetman missile. But the disclosures about the airborne command post made Mr. Bush's decision something of a public rebuke for his Defense Secretary and for the Air Force.

After the telephone conversation with Mr. Scowcroft, Mr. Cheney, talking to reporters, said of the command-post plan, "I do not propose to go forward with it." He made no mention of the White House objection or of his earlier decision to support the Air Force proposal.

Bruce G. Blair, an expert on nuclear command systems at the Brookings Institution, a Washington research center, said the Strategic Air Command "does not consider surprise attack to be a plausible threat in peacetime, not only because of the improvement in su-

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NEW YORK TIMES DEC. 18, 1989 Pg. 8

Excerpts From U.S. Account Of Officer's Death in Panama

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 — Following are excerpts from a statement issued today by the Defense Department concerning the killing of the United States officer in Panama:

Members of the Panamanian Defense Forces opened fire on a car carrying four U.S. military officers last night, killing one American serviceman and injuring another. A third U.S. military officer, who witnessed the event, was detained and beaten by the P.D.F.

The four off-duty officers left the U.S. Army base at Forst Clayton last night, unarmed and in civilian clothing, and drove in a privately owned car, heading for dinner in a popular downtown Panama City restaurant. On their way downtown, they got lost and unintentionally drove onto Avenue A, near the Panama Defense Force's headquarters, instead of Fourth of July Avenue, which connects U.S. military bases.

At 9:05 last night, Panama time, they came to a P.D.F. roadblock and were stopped by about five uniformed members of the P.D.F. A crowd of 30 to 40 civilians, spotting the U.S. license plates, swarmed toward the car. The P.D.F. members reached through the open car windows, tugging at the servicemen's clothes and seat belts, and opened some of the car doors in an attempt to pull the Americans from their car.

The few cars ahead of the Americans at the roadblock were waved on, and one of the U.S. officers asked in Spanish why the Americans were being singled out. No answer was given. The driver of the car saw that the P.D.F. weapons ... had been loaded and aimed at the Americans. Fearing for their safety, they closed the window and drove away, past the roadblock.

As the car sped away, P.D.F. soldiers opened fire on the Americans. One of the U.S. officers was wounded and another was grazed at the ankle by a bullet. The car drove to Gorgas Army Hospital, about five blocks from the U.S. Southern Command Headquarters at Quarry Heights, where the wounded officer died about 15 minutes after arriving.

The names of the victims have not yet been released, pending notification of their next of kin.

A U.S. Navy lieutenant and his wife had been stopped in their car about half an hour before the four officers arrived, at the same checkpoint on Avenue A. They got lost after dining out while heading home to the U.S. Naval Station at Rodman, on the west bank of the Panama Canal near Howard Air Force Base. P.D.F. soldiers stopped their car, asked for their identification cards, and told them to pull over to the side of the street until their identification was checked.

While waiting in the car, the couple saw four Americans arrive and later witnessed the P.D.F. soldiers raise their weapons and aim at the officers' car as it started to speed away. The couple said the P.D.F. then began to fire at the officers' car.

After the shooting, the P.D.F. members returned to the waiting Navy officer and his wife. They took the couple to a nearby P.D.F. office, blindfolded them with masking tape, and drove them in the back of a pickup truck to another location, which the Navy officer believed to be the P.D.F. headquarters. The couple was interrogated for about four hours.

During the questioning, the Naval officer was repeatedly beaten and kicked in the groin and head. He was told he would be killed if he did not provide information on his duties and his unit. His wife was slammed against a wall with such force that her head was cut. After standing at the wall for half an hour, with her arms above her head, she collapsed onto the floor. She was also sexually threatened by the P.D.F. soldiers.

Four hours after they were stopped, the Naval officer and his wife were escorted by the P.D.F. to Fourth of July Avenue three blocks away and released. They arrived at the Naval Security office at Rodman about 2:15 A.M. Sunday, where they provided statements.

CURRENT NEWS

EARLY BIRD

MONDAY, December 18, 1989

BALTIMORE SUN DEC. 18, 1989 Pg. 1

U.S. levels new charges at Panama

Witnesses to killing reportedly beaten

By Sara Fritz
Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — A U.S. Navy lieutenant was beaten and his wife was sexually threatened by Panamanian soldiers late Saturday night after they witnessed the fatal shooting of another U.S. military officer in Panama City, Bush administration officials said yesterday.

The violence prompted President Bush and other administration officials to quickly review a variety of possible actions by the United States to protect U.S. lives in Panama against what they consider provocations by the forces of Panamanian dictator Manuel A. Noriega.

Yesterday, the president received frequent briefings on the situation in Panama, and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney huddled with his advisers at the Pentagon.

U.S. forces in Panama were placed on alert to guard against further actions by the Panamanian military, but there was no indication that Bush was considering military retaliation.

U.S. officials refused to discuss what options were being considered.

Mr. Cheney blamed General Noriega for the slaying of the U.S. officer and called for all of those responsible to be brought to justice. He issued a statement after his Pentagon meetings saying that the Panamanian leader's brutality against his own people had "created an atmosphere in which Panamanian Defense Forces feel free to fire on unarmed Americans."

The shooting came closely on the heels of a declaration Friday by General Noriega's rubber-stamp legislature that Panama was "in a state of war" with the United States, but it did not appear to U.S. policy-makers that the Panamanian soldiers were acting under orders. Administration officials instead characterized the incident as part of a steady escalation in the harassment of Americans in Panama over the past two years.

"We are extremely concerned that a climate of aggression has developed that puts American lives at risk," State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutweiler said.

The identities of the slain officer and the couple who were reported assaulted were withheld.

In a statement released last night, Pentagon officials said the victim and three other U.S. military officers were fired upon as they drove away from a confrontation with soldiers at a checkpoint near the headquarters of General Noriega's Panama Defense Forces. A second officer was "grazed" in the ankle, it said.

CHARGES...Pg. 6

WASHINGTON POST
DEC. 18, 1989 Pg. 1

U.S. Assails Panama in Killing of GI

Account of Shooting Denounced as False

By William Branigin
Washington Post Foreign Service

MEXICO CITY, Dec. 17—The U.S. military's Panama-based Southern Command accused the government of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega today of engaging in a "disinformation campaign" after it blamed four American officers for a shooting incident last night in which one of them was killed by a Panamanian soldier.

In a communique issued at 4 a.m., seven hours after the incident took place, the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) said the men broke through PDF checkpoints in their

KILLING...Pg. 6

WASHINGTON POST DEC. 17, 1989 Pg. 1

U.S. Military in Europe Being Reshaped

Cheney Is Presented With Options for Eventually Halving Troop Levels

By Patrick E. Tyler and Molly Moore
Washington Post Staff Writers

Top Pentagon officials have recommended to Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney a new set of options for reshaping U.S. armed forces in Europe with a goal of eventually cutting troop levels in half if Soviet reductions continue for several years.

Cutting the current force of 305,000 U.S. ground and air forces in Europe to 150,000 would represent a "political min-

deficit reduction at home, defense officials familiar with new option papers said.

The proposals also recommend that the United States for the first time consider cutting back its naval commitment to defend the North Atlantic sea lanes in order to reinforce Europe from America in wartime, according to knowledgeable sources.

Senior defense planners also have concluded that the Soviet Union can no longer count on the armies of its Eastern European allies to act in concert with Soviet forces in any hostilities, according to the

ments in Eastern Europe, amount to a fundamental redefinition of Western security needs. The senior Pentagon planners began presenting their view of U.S. armed forces for the next century last week in the first of nine marathon sessions with Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin L. Powell, military service chiefs and civilian service secretaries. Cheney chaired six hours of discussion Tuesday and Wednesday. The sessions will resume Monday and then adjourn until January.

Unworthy Of America

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
BARRE TIMES-ARGUS (VT)
Date 17 DEC. 1989

President Bush has just launched a morally bankrupt foreign policy in China unworthy of the American people or this nation's democratic form of government. Hoping that dividends for peace and new understanding will be paid later by China's still-entrenched and brutally hardline leaders, he has sent U.S. envoys hat-in-hand to the orchestrators of last June's massacre of unarmed students in Bejiing's Tianenman Square.

The president's men, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, dined, toasted and resumed informal relations with that leadership last weekend. The President says not to worry, that this does not mean a resumption of formal relations, even as others in his administration admit privately this is precisely the plan.

President Bush's words are a thin disguise for an old, often-discredited view: Ends justify the means. It is the same twisted notion of how to run American foreign policy that gave us the secret war in Laos; secret CIA-led actions against legitimate governments; Watergate; and, most recently, the Iran-Contra scandal. The means in those cases were subversion of the Constitution, lawbreaking and coups that later came home to roost. The ends did not justify the means then and don't seem likely to do so in China now. Nothing short of an end to the rule of the Tianenmen Square leaders seems likely to bring relief, no matter how many favors President Bush and other "old China hands" may choose to do for their old friends.

In hindsight, it probably shouldn't surprise us that President Bush has gone this route. It's just one more excursion down the slippery slope of amoral and sometimes immoral policymaking practiced by former President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the two men who paved the way for the Bush China plan several weeks ago.

It may even pay some dividends. But at what price? The turning of a blind eye by America to the deaths of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of unarmed Chinese? These were people whose only crime was to protest peacefully the corruption of the very leaders Scowcroft and Eagleburger toasted in Bejiing. Executions were reportedly continuing even as Bush's envoys and the Chinese leaders talked.

To their credit, many in Congress aren't buying what the administration is doing. Blindsided by the President when he sent his envoys to China in secret just after Congress had recessed for the holidays, many lawmakers have lost no time voicing their concerns.

But there is another danger here, besides the gash Bush has inflicted on America's human rights credibility. There is the danger that Congress, so incensed by Bush's action, will successfully take control of foreign policy itself. Foreign policy made in secret and without concern for moral principles by a President and an unaccountable few is wrong. But the better way is not to have foreign policy made by an unwieldy Congress either. Power-sharing and mutual trust between the two branches of government is needed.

Without vigorous fence-mending with Congress and a reversal of this fiasco-in-the-making, Bush may end up with the worst of both worlds: A China policy that is morally bankrupt and doesn't work.

Bush Gives China Time To Respond to Overture

President, Mitterrand Hold Talks at Resort

WP 12-17-89 A20

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

ANSE MARCEL, St. Martin, Dec. 16—President Bush said today there have been a "couple of indications" that China will respond positively to his recent overture for better relations, but cautioned that "time is required" before Beijing's full response can be judged.

At a joint news conference at this French Caribbean island resort after several hours of talks with French President Francois Mitterrand, Bush said he had "no second thoughts at all" about sending National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing on a surprise mission last weekend.

The trip produced sharp criticism at home that Bush had moved too hastily to improve relations with a government that sent the army to crush a student-led democracy movement last June at the cost of hundreds of civilian lives, and that has been unrepentant about the massacre.

A Bush administration source said the United States and China have had discussions about which countries might accept Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi and his wife, Li Shuxian, who took refuge in the U. S. Embassy at the time of the June crackdown in Beijing.

According to the source, China's leaders have said they would not release Fang to the United States or to France, both nations where Chinese student dissidents are active. But, the source said, the United States "wants to get him out of there" and the search is continuing for a compromise.

According to the source, the discussions about a possible release of Fang were sparked by private talks that former secretary of state Henry Kissinger held in Beijing last month, and that were followed up by Scowcroft.

Bush did not specify what positive moves China has made so far in reaction to the Scowcroft visit. Earlier this week, he cited China's "instant response" in reiterating earlier pledges not to export new medium-range missiles to the Middle East. Today he was guarded, saying that "I initiated" the mission "and I'm not going to go further, except to say I hope it will have positive results."

"And you've already seen an indication—a couple of indications of that," he added. "But this is a billion-plus people and I do not want to hurt the billion-plus people further. And I think we've made the right step, and only time will tell how this leadership in China views this mission."

The White House has said U.S. sanctions imposed after the massacre would remain in effect, and Bush said today he would not yet recommend that other nations relax their sanctions. "I think they've got to wait and see how matters evolve," he said. "That's what we're doing, and I think it's prudent."

Administration officials have said that China must respond to the Scowcroft mission before Congress goes into session next month, or face the prospect of a new round of congressional sanctions.

Reporting on their talks today, Bush and Mitterrand suggested they were in general agreement on the West's approach to the collapse of hard-line Communist governments in Eastern Europe.

Bush said he is "open-minded" on a proposal to convene a new 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, initiated by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and endorsed by Mitterrand. In turn, Mitterrand praised the suggestion by Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization be given added political responsibilities in the shaping of Europe's future.

On the question of German reunification, both leaders took a conciliatory position when asked if West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl was moving too rapidly.

"No," Bush said simply. Mitterrand acknowledged past differences with Kohl but said, "I don't have any particular complaints." He also said Kohl reassured him this week that he was not setting a timetable for reunification. Both leaders suggested they would not favor a rapid move toward reunification.

Although Bush reiterated his opposition to immediate cuts in defense spending, he raised the prospect of deep cuts in nuclear and conventional arsenals once current negotiations are complete. If treaties are reached limiting strategic, chemical and conventional arms, he said, "That should not be the end. We should move beyond those."

Asked about the decision this week in the Soviet Union to continue relying on central economic planning, Bush said he had not seen anything "that negates my hopes for doing business with the Soviet Union" along the lines he and Gorbachev talked about at Malta earlier this month. At the summit, Bush offered economic incentives to the Soviet president and urged him to adopt a more free-market approach.

Bush and Mitterrand, who spent about three hours together, engaged in light banter over whether Bush had forsaken the "special relationship" that former president Ronald Reagan had built with Britain's Margaret Thatcher, in order to build one instead with Mitterrand.

"Put it this way: there's not supposed to be any rivalry of this nature," Bush said. Responded Mitterrand, "I mean, there is room for several friendships in life."

White House officials said the meeting here was set because Mitterrand wanted to respond to Bush for hosting him at his Kennebunkport, Maine, home last May.



SADAYUKI MIKAMI—AP

Why didn't Deng have his own summit offshore? *Scowcroft in Beijing*

The View From the Forbidden City

BY WINSTON LORD

Last week Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft went to Beijing to brief Deng Xiaoping about the Malta summit—the first high-level U.S.-China contact since the Tiananmen massacre. Winston Lord, former U.S. ambassador to China who has known Deng for 15 years, speculates on Deng's thoughts:

The Americans were coming. Deng lit a Panda cigarette and sighed. Why hadn't he staged his own summits offshore—with no dissidents spoiling banquets and no students disrupting meetings?

Some comrades thought the summit smacked of a growing U.S.-Soviet condominium—carving up Europe, trading Central America for Afghanistan, swapping aid for human rights, pressuring China. They forgot the contradictions between the superpowers. Besides, the Europeans were getting stronger; German reunification was inevitable. Then both the Americans and the Russians would have their hands full, just as China would with Japan.

Gorbachev would soon be gone. He'd granted liberties but given people nothing to buy—not like China. He was alienating his generals. Overthrowing his allies. Embracing the pope. Tolerating rebellion by nationalities. The way to handle minorities was the way China handled Tibetans.

Gorbachev was setting a bad example. Who would've thought China would be more threatened by Moscow's policies within its empire than by its adventurism beyond it? China had centuries of experience dealing with pressures along its borders, but had none resisting the Voice of America, BBC and fax machines.

Well, some strongman would soon oust Gorbachev and squash the chaos. Then the human-rights zealots in America would make sure the superpowers clashed again. Uncle Sam might again appreciate China's importance.

Bush still did. So did Nixon and Kissinger. How could Americans understand China? Their history was less than one dynasty. Their population equaled three provinces. America was fertile; China, mostly rock and sand. It faced Mexico, Canada and two oceans; not Russia, India, Vietnam, Korea and Japan. What did Americans know of warlords and chaos?

Let America keep its democracy. There were more murders in one day there than in one year here; more people sleeping on the streets of New York than Beijing; more American children lost on drugs than Chinese who ever slept in opium dens.

So spare him American lectures. In 10 years he had lifted the nation from the madness of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese now ate rice instead of husks; peasants lived in brick houses, not mud huts; workers watched TV rather than make babies.

And should he throw all this away to satisfy pampered students waving Western slogans and building insulting statues? Better to shed a little blood than yield power. The party knew best. There'll be no Chinese Solidarity! Look at Eastern Europe—by summer there would be no European Communist parties. The only sensible leaders left were Ceausescu, Castro and Kim.

Only rice: If only China did not need dollars and computers or the far barbarian to balance the near barbarians. He had told his comrades to expect flies when windows were open, but even he underestimated Western contamination. We must let in Westerners bent on making money but shut out those bent on making trouble. And it was time to stop sending Chinese youth abroad. Had his people forgotten they never had freedom and didn't need it? Chinese live by rice alone.

Deng was distracted by his two cats, Mao-mao and Mandate. One was black, the other white. They were now too old to catch mice and there were whispers that Deng resembled one and had lost the other. Ignoring them, the old man called for his granddaughter.

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U.S. Condemns Violence in Panama

2 Incidents Involving Officers Portrayed as Product of Noriega's Rule

By Tom Kenworthy
and Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writers

The White House and the Pentagon yesterday condemned the killing of a U.S. military officer by Panamanian troops and the detention and beating of another U.S. officer, portraying the Saturday night incidents as an outgrowth of the repressive rule of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega.

President Bush and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney were briefed on the incidents yesterday, but there was no immediate indication whether the United States would take any actions in response to the shooting beyond placing U.S. military operations in Panama on enhanced alert.

"We deplore this act of violence," White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk said. "We are presently looking into the circumstances of this incident."

Cheney, in a statement issued by the Pentagon, charged that Noriega had created an atmosphere of "lawlessness" in which the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) "feel free to fire on unarmed Americans."

"Ultimately, it is General Noriega himself who has encouraged this kind of lawlessness," said Cheney. "His own conduct sets an example of cruelty and brutality. The lack of discipline and control in the Panama Defense Forces is further evidence that Panama is a country without a government."

The Pentagon statement detailed events that led to the fatal shooting of an officer described by sources as a Marine lieutenant, as well as a previously unreported incident in which a Navy officer and his wife were detained by the PDF for four hours. The Pentagon charged that the officer was repeatedly beaten and kicked in the groin and head, and his wife slammed against a wall and sexually threatened.

According to the Pentagon account, the dead officer was one of four unarmed U.S. servicemen traveling in a private car to a dinner at a Panama City restaurant. After they took a wrong turn, their car was halted at a roadblock manned by five or six members of the PDF. Fearing they would be harmed by the PDF and a crowd of 30 or 40 civilians, the Pentagon said, the servicemen drove away, and the PDF soldiers opened fire. One officer was wounded and died shortly at a military hospital, and another was grazed on the ankle by a bullet.

The Pentagon said the shooting was witnessed by the Navy officer and his wife, who had been stopped at the same checkpoint about a half-hour before. The couple was detained, blindfolded, driven to an undisclosed location and interrogated for about four hours, the Pentagon said. The officer was threatened with death if he did not reveal information on his unit, the Pentagon said.

Bush administration officials did not establish any link between the incidents and Friday's declaration by the Panama National Assembly that the Central American nation is in a "state of war" with the United States and that Noriega was the supreme leader of Panama.

However, Popadiuk said, "the Noriega regime is isolated both domestically and internationally and has been using force and intimidation to thwart the will of the Panamanian people. Acts such as those last evening are the consequences of the regime."

Cheney also said the confrontations with U.S. military officers were a natural outgrowth of Noriega's iron-fisted rule.

"We've seen General Noriega brutalize the people of Panama, crack down on his own civilian and military alike after the last coup attempt, designate himself as the leader of the country, and declare a state of war with the United States," said Cheney. "These actions have created an atmosphere in which Panamanian defense forces feel free to fire on unarmed Americans. We fully expect that those responsible will be brought to justice."

Saturday night's fatal shooting was the most serious of a series of recent confrontations between members of the 12,000-man U.S. military contingent in Panama and Panamanian soldiers loyal to Noriega. The incident prompted the Southern Command to put U.S. forces on their second-highest level of alert, and a curfew was imposed on U.S. personnel.

Bush was briefed on the incident Saturday night by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and was being kept abreast of developments, administration officials said. The president, attending church services in Arlington yesterday, did not respond to reporters' shouted questions about the shooting.

WASHINGTON POST DEC. 16, 89 Pg.1

U.S. Military Given Foreign Arrest Powers

By Michael Isikoff
and Patrick E. Tyler
Washington Post Staff Writers

The Bush administration has concluded that U.S. military forces have the legal authority to arrest drug traffickers, international terrorists and other fugitives overseas, administration officials said yesterday.

The administration's position, which could substantially expand the Pentagon's role in the international drug war, is based on a Nov. 3 legal opinion requested by the White House and issued by the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel.

The opinion concludes that the Posse Comitatus Act, a 111-year-old law that strictly forbids the "Army" from arresting criminal suspects or from conducting other law enforcement operations, does not apply outside U.S. borders, officials said.

This means units such as the Delta hostage rescue team, Green Berets or other Special Forces could be used to apprehend accused international drug traffickers, including Panamanian Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, even without the consent of the host country, administration officials said.

The Justice Department ruling, entitled "The Extra-territorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus Act," opens the door to a potentially wide range of military actions overseas that could be designated as "law enforcement" operations and therefore would not require congressional consultation. Key members of Congress and congressional aides said yesterday they had not been notified of the opinion or of any change in policy governing the use of the miltary overseas.

The new authority also could complicate U.S. anti-drug efforts in Latin America and stir up a wave of anti-American nationalism. Officials of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and other Latin nations where the most-wanted drug traffickers reside, have agreed to the presence of U.S. law enforcement agents for some time, but have adamantly opposed the introduction of U.S. military forces within their borders for counter-narcotics operations.

The Nov. 3 ruling was closely held by senior administration officials, but Justice Department spokesman David Runkel confirmed its existence yesterday in response to inquiries from The Washington Post. "I want to emphasize that this is a legal determination only. The role that the military might play, if any, is something to be decided at the highest levels of the government."

But other administration officials said they viewed the opinion as a

against other drug smugglers.

But the Pentagon's involvement in the operation raised new questions about the scope of its authority. Until now, the seizure of international fugitives has been a responsibility of the U.S. Marshals Service and the FBI. But administration officials said the operation to apprehend Escobar was conceived by a National Security Council "working group" on Panama and was done under "national command authority," which refers to the chain of command that flows from the president to the secretary of defense.

Subsequently, U.S. officials confronted the same problem in the most recent attempt to oust Noriega, who is under indictment in the United States for drug trafficking. As events unfolded during that coup attempt, the commander of U.S. forces in Panama, Gen. Maxwell Thurman, was urgently seeking a DEA agent to take Noriega into U.S. custody should the coup succeed, an administration official said. But the nearest DEA officer was in Costa Rica.

Thurman then located an FBI agent who was in Panama on an unrelated assignment, the official said, and the FBI agent was standing by when the coup failed.

In the wake of the coup's failure, U.S. military officials expressed concern that the rules and interpretations governing U.S. military behavior in the drug wars were not

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perpower relations but also because the Soviet threat to command aircraft on ground alert has been diminishing since Moscow withdrew missile-firing submarines from our coasts a couple of years ago."

He also said the Strategic Air Command does not like the continuous flights because they place a great demand on the command's generals, who take turns manning the flights about once a week.

The planes, a military version of the Boeing 707, have been kept aloft on a

gressional critics who have complained that spending cuts are being made without a strategy.

"Hogwash — it's simply not true," the Defense Secretary said in a speech here to the Princeton Model Congress, a gathering of high school students.

Sam Nunn, the Georgia Democrat who heads the Senate Armed Services Committee, has questioned whether the Pentagon's budget plans have adequately taken account of new intelligence estimates about the increased warning time of a Soviet attack. American intelligence experts have concluded that the United States would

Easier Said Than Done

Bush and Gorbachev set ambitious goals at Malta, but they left little time for the hard bargaining still to come

BY MICHAEL DUFFY

George Bush normally distrusts "big moments," and this one did not last long. His chummy session with Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta restored momentum to U.S.-Soviet relations and gave a boost to what Bush called his "new thinking" about the changes in the Communist world. Yet the President had barely left his joint press conference with Gorbachev when he encountered serious questions about his plans to encourage *perestroika* and to deliver on his promises in time.

Conservative activists were concerned that Bush had gone too far in pledging to help Gorbachev economically. Military experts doubted that treaties to cut nuclear warheads and European force levels could be completed by next June, or anytime next year. The President promised to "kick our bureaucracy and push it as fast as I possibly can" to meet the deadlines. Yet despite the smiles in Malta, the obstacles to arms control are more than bureaucratic; the two leaders did little to resolve fundamental disagreements.

Until recently Bush was a member of the conservative chorus warning that a bad arms-control deal was worse than no deal at all, as critics reminded him. "Setting an arbitrary time frame for arms-control treaties to be completed and signed is not wise," said Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Even the Soviets were flashing warning signs. Armed forces Chief of Staff Mikhail Moiseyev said the Soviet leadership should make no further concessions to the U.S., and noted pointedly that there are still too many disagreements to conclude a strategic-arms treaty by June. Gorbachev and Bush would have to meet again just to hash out these differences, said Moiseyev.

By that measure, the main value of Malta was in fulfilling Bush's stated goal: making a personal connection with Gorbachev. To Bush's relief, Gorbachev played a low-key role, thanking the President for his "prudent and cautious" rhetoric. The two leaders engaged in lengthy chats about "Western values," an expression Bush uses to describe the changes sweeping Eastern Europe. In one 30-minute segment, Gorbachev asked Bush to drop the phrase from speeches, because it implied the changes were a victory for the West. Accordingly, the President has started speaking of "democratic values."

That kind of concession displeases conservatives, who say the Soviets should suffer through their economic and political crises without American assistance. The White House dispatched Vice President Dan Quayle to disarm the hard-liners even before Bush left Europe. Quayle uttered anachronistic noises to the Washington *Post*, including a nostalgic reference to the Soviet Union as a "totalitarian state." If Quayle's partial retraction a few days later—he changed the description to "authoritarian"—seemed to blur the Administration's view even more, that was part of the game. Behind the scenes, White House officials reminded conservatives that the overtures to the Soviets were extremely popular. "The big question is, Can we break 80% in our approval rating?" said a West Wing aide only half jokingly.

Bush played a similar hand at NATO headquarters in Brussels, offering something for everyone. For West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Bush declared, "The task before us . . . is to end the division of Europe and of Germany." For French President François Mitterrand: "Reunification should occur in the context of Germany's continued commitment to NATO." When his support for an "integrated" Europe rattled Britain's Margaret Thatcher, Bush telephoned her later to say



No applause, please: Bush, flanked by Baker

TRADE PROPOSALS

Bush promised to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union if Moscow eases emigration laws. As Soviet trade with the West grows, Bush pledged to expand technical cooperation between the two countries.





BARRY THUMMA—AP

Cheney, must scramble to deliver on the promises he made at the summit

er and

he had not meant to undercut her position. The smooth performance left the Europeans feeling pleased, if perplexed. Quipped a top NATO envoy: "This was the diplomatic equivalent of writing those personal letters we hear about."

Bush used Malta as a pretext for mending fences with the other Communist superpower. He sent National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing for the ostensible purpose of briefing Chinese leaders on his talks with Gorbachev. The real motive, Administration aides conceded, was to resume high-level contacts, which the U.S. suspended after the massacre of students in Tiananmen Square last June.

Given the many mixed signals, it was no wonder the President encountered questions about the heft of his proposals and how he plans to fulfill them:

Economic Aid

Bush's plans to help the Soviet economy—by easing U.S. trade barriers, expanding technical cooperation and speeding joint ventures—are the most easily accomplished. But they are largely symbolic. If Moscow lifts restrictions on emigration, which it has said it will do, the U.S. will be persuaded to grant the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status. That would lower tariffs on Soviet manufactured goods, but it would not change the fact that the U.S.S.R. has relatively little to sell to the U.S. Still, Gorbachev needs every concession he can get. Bush's promise to sponsor "observer status" for the Soviets at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade talks in 1991 will signal the Kremlin's acceptance into the world community and serve as an endorsement for Gorbachev's foreign policy.

Strategic Weapons

Bush had no sooner thrown his weight behind the stalled Strategic Arms Reduction Talks than Gorbachev complicated matters. Earlier this year, the Soviets proposed moving forward on a 50% cut in nuclear warheads without an agreement on hard-to-count sea-launched cruise missiles. At Malta, Gorbachev hinted that he could not sign a START treaty without some kind of understanding about SLCMs. To that, Gorbachev added another gambit: he proposed a ban on short-range nuclear weapons on naval vessels.

Secretary of State James Baker and his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, will take up several easy START issues when they meet in Geneva next month, but not SLCMs. With or without them, Bush acknowledged, his June deadline would be hard to meet.


Conventional Forces in Europe

An old arms-control adage holds, "If you like watching a car rust, you'll love conventional-weapons talks." Negotiations in Vienna have dragged on for 15 years. Although Bush promised last May to complete a CFE deal within a year, he acknowledged in Malta that it would take at least until the end of 1990. That may be why he reversed his long-held but unpopular position that cuts in conventional forces must precede reductions in strategic arms.

Soviet and U.S. officials have essentially agreed to reduce their forces in Europe to 275,000 each. But some NATO allies are dragging their feet on peripheral issues. British and French negotiators are wary of any deal that reduces the size of their independent air forces—so wary, in fact, that

NUCLEAR BALANCE

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed in principle to reduce the number of warheads in their nuclear stockpiles to 6,000 each—nearly a 50% cut. But disputes over cruise missiles and naval forces may stall a deal.



some experts predict that aircraft will have to be taken off the table if Bush is to meet his deadline.

The prospect of inch-by-inch progress in Vienna and Geneva only underscored warnings that there will be no quick "peace dividend" for the overstretched federal budget. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's planned $180 billion in Pentagon cuts through 1995 amount to little more than deletions in the military's wish list. Nuclear-arms control saves little money because it normally results in destruction of hardware that has already been paid for and often requires expensive verification methods. Reducing conventional forces could save money, but not much: defense-budget experts from the Rand Corp. to the Congressional Budget agree that a 50% reduction in U.S. troops in Europe would yield savings of only $6 billion to $7 billion a year. Real savings would not occur unless troops based in the U.S. are demobilized, a politically unappetizing prospect because of its impact on local economies.

Despite these challenges, Bush is still buoyed by an element of good fortune. Gorbachev seems content to let the President move at his own pace. The Soviets and NATO allies support a stabilizing U.S. presence in Europe. And a gradually reduced Soviet threat may enable Bush to squeeze just enough money from the military next year to keep the federal deficit moving downward. Bush recognizes that he is the benefactor of a rare alignment of stars. "I'm a lucky person to be President of our country in these very exciting times," he said last week. But as the ground in Europe continues to shift, he will need more than luck. ***—Reported by Dan Goodgame, Christopher Ogden and Bruce van Voorst/Washington***

The Presidency

Hugh Sidey

A Game of One-on-One

"Actually, I really did put my feet up at one point," George Bush said last week by telephone from the White House. "I did it thinking, 'I'll show 'em I really meant it to be a feet-up meeting.' So I put my feet up on one of those round sofas that were bolted to the deck of the *Gorky*. Gorbachev and I were leaning over toward one another. There were no inhibitions."



DIANA WALKER

"He is a guy quite sure of what he is doing"

The President had been a little tentative going into such a highly charged superpower meeting, when the great Malta storm struck. But the outcome reassured the world and seemed to enhance Bush's presidential stature. His reflections on his eight hours with the Soviet boss came over the telephone line like pages out of a good reporter's notebook.

"Yes, I think I can trust Gorbachev," Bush said. "I looked him in the eye, I appraised him. He was very determined. Yet there was a twinkle. He is a guy quite sure of what he is doing. He has got a political feel. I could tell by the way he was laughing with us. A little wink now and then. He has a wonderful way of communicating with Westerners. I had the feeling that I could bring up any subject at all.

"We had quite an animated discussion about Western values vs. democratic values. I thought they were the same thing. But he interpreted our definition of Western values to mean that we were right and he was wrong. Whereas democratic values are what he has been working for.

"I told him there was one question that always kept coming up. What would happen if trouble developed inside the Soviet Union and they had to use force to put it down? I said I always refused to answer such a hypothetical question, but Americans were asking it. He did not give a direct answer, but he strongly implied, 'Look, I'm going to succeed.' "

The drama of two men in the blustery Mediterranean closing the book on 40 years of animosity is one of the surprises that history deals up in this strange world. "The changes are so monumental. So different. But it did not seem overwhelming when we sat down. Two reasonable people sat down with their staffs. Even the contentious matters were brought up without rancor. When I first met him in Moscow when I was Vice President and brought up human rights, he grew very heated. This time he talked very rationally, not rancorously.

"I had the feeling that the way we clicked off our list of things that we wanted to accomplish didn't exactly disarm him, but it did show him that we were ready to move forward on a lot of things he wanted. He may have been pleased it wasn't going to take hours to drag them out of us.

"There are always invisible barriers that come from the enormous differences between our societies. I am not naive enough to believe that all the problems will be solved. But I told him that I thought the meeting made good sense. I told him that I never had favored this kind of meeting before but that I had changed my mind. I am going to keep the personal part of this going. I'll find ways to contact him in a quiet fashion. I can write. I can call now. I'm not going to become a pen pal, but we can communicate."

To put down any lingering rumors of seasickness or distress on Malta's surging waves, Bush waxed eloquent about the night in the driving storm. "I loved it on the ship. We ate a wonderful dinner and had a good bottle of white wine. I went out on the fantail first, and for a couple of hours I watched those young boys working the anchor chains so skillfully in the high seas, and it was thrilling." That story undoubtedly will be enlarged and enriched as the years go on. Old sailors are just that way. ■

Tiptoeing on Beijing

WP 12-18-89 A14

THERE IS a disconcerting omission in the explanations being offered in Washington to calm the storm swirling around the Scowcroft-Eagleburger mission to Beijing. Missing is any sign that the Bush administration itself felt or still feels outrage over the Chinese massacres and repressions that created the frost in U.S.-Chinese relations.

The Bush emissaries, it is said, presented the administration as essentially powerless to resist expressions of congressional anger in the face of Chinese human rights violations. But little or no effort was reported to project that the administration itself was offended and that its sensibilities had also to be taken into account. Officials apparently do not think they undercut the overall American position on human rights by presenting the administration less as the equally offended partner of Congress than as its politically encumbered rival with its own softer views.

Perhaps it will yet turn out, as the administration plainly hopes, that the Chinese will take positive steps to repair relations with Washington. Gen. Scowcroft is reported to have listed a series of actions that could help stave off the additional American sanctions that he said Congress may impose when it returns next month. The list is said to include lifting martial law, ending the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts, halting missile sales, and resolving the case of Fang Lizhi, the human rights activist who took refuge in the U.S. Embassy during the June crackdown.

If this is the way the list was presented, however, it is regrettably short, incomplete and bloodless. You would not know that China continues to jail, try and execute political prisoners, that it sentences dissenting students to harsh rural exile and that it refuses to amnesty demonstrators for democracy; in short, that China is again going the Stalinist way. These are the sorts of violations that need to be called by their true name and brought to an end.

The administration professes to be conducting some type of enlightened, almost disinterested rescue mission meant to extract China from a harmful and dangerous isolation. But the isolation of China arose not from American overreaction but from Chinese deeds. Is a president who in the past has prided himself on his devotion to bargaining hard with Beijing confirming the regime in the view that crimes against the people pay?

NEW YORK TIMES DEC. 18, 1989 Pg. 7

PANAMA SHOOTING CONDEMNED BY U.S.

Military Response to Death of Soldier Not Barred by Bush Administration

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17 — The Bush Administration said today that the shooting of an unarmed American army officer by Panamanian soldiers on Saturday was part of a pattern of "aggression" by Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega and that Washington would not rule out a military response.

"We are extremely concerned that a climate of aggression has been developing that puts American lives at risk," said the State Department spokeswoman, Margaret D. Tutwiler. "The situation in Panama is being in intensely watched."

Asked if she could rule out a military response to what is being described as the most serious confrontation between American and Panamanian soldiers in 25 years, Miss Tutwiler said, "We don't discuss contingency plans or options. We never rule anything in or out."

A White House spokesman, Roman Popadiuk, added, "The Noriega regime is isolated both domestically and internationally and has been using force and intimidation to thwart the will of the Panamanian people. Acts such as those last evening are the consequences of such a regime."

At this stage it was difficult to tell whether the Bush Administration was doing a bit of saber-rattling to keep General Noriega off balance, or seriously considering some sort of military response. The United States has 12,000 troops stationed in Panama protecting the canal as part of the United States Southern Command. The Southern Command is known to have a variety of contingency plans to deal with provocations against Americans by the Noriega Government.

President Bush was first briefed on the incident late Saturday night by the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and has been receiving regular updates since then, a White House spokesman, Roman Popadiuk, said.

Mr. Bush refused to answer questions on the killing shouted at him by reporters after a church service at a military base in Arlington, Va. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, both went to the Pentagon today to get briefed on the shooting, but then left.

No formal meeting of the National Security Council, which brings together the most senior decision makers in the Administration, was held, but officials said that the Secretaries of Defense and State, the national security adviser and the President were all in contact by telephone throughout the day.

The identity the dead officer was being withheld until his family was notified.

Responding to the incident, Secretary of Defense Cheney said: "We've seen General Noriega brutalize the people of Panama, crack down on his own civilians and military alike after the latest coup attempt, designate himself the leader of the country, and declare a state of war with the United States. These actions have created an atmosphere in which Panamanian Defense Forces feel free to fire on unarmed Americans. We fully expect that those responsible will be brought to justice."

Saturday's shooting took place against a steadily rising spiral of tension between General Noriega's Government and the United States going back to the beginning of 1988 when General Noriega was indicted on Federal drug charges in the United States and the Bush Administration began openly urging his overthrow.

On Oct. 3, rebellious Panamanian officers and enlisted men failed in an attempt to oust General Noriega. The Bush Administration aided the rebels by acceding to their request to block several roads. Earlier, the Administration had imposed economic sanctions on Panama, which were intensified recently when Washington imposed a ban on Panamanian-flag commercial vessels entering American ports.

On Friday, Panama's National Assembly, which is controlled by Noriega loyalists, unanimously declared the country in a "state of war" with the United States and named General Noriega chief of government. Previously he had been Panama's de facto ruler as chief of the Defense Forces.

Earlier in the week, the Southern Command said it had received documents from the Panamanian Defense Forces in which a local municipal official asked the Defense Forces to arrest Gen. Maxwell Thurman, head of the Southern Command, and one of his deputies Gen. Mark Cisneros. The officers were charged with harassment on the grounds that American military exercises near Panama City obstructed transit, damaged roads and disrupted public order.

A Defense Department spokesman, Pete Williams, said on Thursday that the Southern Command had refused to accept the charges and said the United States had a right to conduct exercises in Panama under its treaty rights.

PANAMA, Dec. 17 (AP) — The Panamanian Defense Forces issued a statement today accusing American officers of a provocation without mentioning the American's death on Saturday night.

The Panamanian statement said the officers had "broken through checkpoints and fired at the headquarters building, wounding a soldier and two civilians, including a 1-year-old girl."

and kicked in the groin and head. He was told he would be killed if he did not provide information on his duties and his unit. His wife was slammed against a wall with such force that her head was cut.

"After standing at the wall for half an hour, with her arms above her head, she collapsed onto the floor. She was also sexually threatened by PDF soldiers.

"Four hours after they were stopped, the naval officer and his wife were escorted by the PDF to Fourth of July Avenue three blocks away and released," reaching the Rodman Naval base security office at 2:15 a.m. yesterday.

Yesterday, after meeting with top U.S. and defense officials, Mr. Cheney said Gen. Noriega's actions against the people of Panama and now declaring a state of war with the United States "have created an atmosphere in which Panamanian Defense Forces feel free to fire on unarmed Americans.

"We fully expect that those responsible will be brought to justice.

"Ultimately, it is Gen. Noriega himself who has encouraged this kind of lawlessness. His own conduct sets an example of cruelty and brutality. The lack of discipline and control of the Panamanian Defense Forces is further evidence that Panama is a country without a government," he said.

Neither Mr. Cheney nor other U.S. officials gave any hint of any unilateral U.S. military action against Gen. Noriega.

A congressional source said it was possible that some prominent Republicans might lead efforts to declare the Panama Canal Treaty — turning control of the canal over to the Panamanian government by the year 2,000 — effectively voided by the Panamanians' actions.

"Since this is a security treaty, a declaration of war by one of the parties could revoke the treaty," said one congressional legal expert, who declined to be identified. "There's an obligation here to bring the perpetrators of this killing to justice, one way or another."

Defense officials and others yesterday speculated that recent events — the shooting and beatings, the "state of war" declaration by the National Assembly and the issuance of warrants last week for the arrest of Southern Command Generals Maxwell Thurman and Marc Cisneros for "constant harassment" — may have a combination of causes.


They could have been fueled by last week's killing of Colombian drug kingpin Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha by Colombian forces and reports of increased U.S. efforts against drug dealers. Gen. Noriega is wanted in the United States for drug dealing and reportedly worked closely with Mr. Rodriguez Gacha.

Others said international developments, particularly those in Eastern Europe, could make Gen. Noriega fear he was losing his grip.

"If I was Noriega I would feel very nervous right now," said one congressional official. "His time is up. He needs a war with the U.S. to try to justify himself."

"The Noriega regime is isolated both domestically and internationally and has been using force and intimidation to thwart the will of the Panamanian people. Acts such as those last evening are the consequences of the regime," said White House spokesman Roman Popadiuk.

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Rowland Evans and Robert Novak WP 12-18-89 #15

Secret Information and Private Interests

The sudden appearance in Beijing of two senior U.S. government officials closely associated with Henry A. Kissinger promises to intensify congressional demands for financial disclosure by him and 15 other prominent Americans on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

The China travelers—National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger—both were well-paid officers of Kissinger Associates. Kissinger's global and immensely prosperous consultancy firm for foreign and domestic enterprises does mushrooming business in China, as has been fully documented in the press the past six months.

What makes this a matter of congressional concern is the former secretary of state's membership on PFIAB, which is supposed to advise the president on how to improve U.S. intelligence. Although threatened with a veto by President Bush, financial disclosure legislation that might well have forced Kissinger off the board nearly went to the White House this year. The China furor invigorates that movement.

There is no evidence that Kissinger influenced Scowcroft and Eagleburger on their mission to Beijing. Nor can it be challenged that whether Kissinger gives private advice to the president is entirely up to him and Bush. Rather, at issue is the widespread perception of possible conflict of interest on the part of PFIAB members, of whom Kissinger is by far the most conspicuous.

Do their outside financial and business dealings taint advice they give Bush as members of a board with guaranteed access to the nation's innermost secrets? "When you get to that level," one PFIAB member, ex-White House chief of staff and ex-senator Howard Baker, told us, "it's extremely difficult to connect anyone with conflict of interest." Every other board member we asked agreed. In effect: people at our exalted level are beyond such mundane considerations.

Not so, says a large congressional cross section. Liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans insist that PFIAB members be put under stringent financial disclosure laws. They are backed by former intelligence officials who served both Republican and Democratic presidents. These CIA alumni both resent PFIAB's back-door entree to the Oval Office and charge that access to inside dope is often exploited for private ends.

That access is remarkable. A PFIAB member is entitled to a top secret intelligence briefing on any subject at any time. That raises the question of whether it is possible for a member pursuing private ends to dissociate this secret information from what he has learned via public channels.

All this infuriates Kissinger. He told us he would not join PFIAB today and submit himself to the "outrageous McCarthyite conflict-of-interest charges" raised against him. But, he added, he will not resign now and appear to admit guilt.

Although Kissinger's celebrity makes him the largest target of congressional financial disclosure legislation, he is by no means alone. Ex-Pentagon research chief John Foster was vice president for science and technology for TRW, an arms manufacturer with billions of dollars in deals worldwide, during most of his current PFIAB membership. "Johnny Foster could learn everything and anything he wanted by getting special CIA briefings on any subject at all," an intelligence source told us. The now retired Dr. Foster remains a TRW board member.

At least one member of the present board, former United Nations ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, is meticulous in avoiding corporate relationships threatening a conflict of interest. But it is hard to be sure about many other members. That's the reason for full financial disclosure demanded by bills sponsored by Rep. Tony Beilenson, the liberal Democrat who chairs the House Intelligence Committee, and Sen. Jesse Helms, the conservative ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Separate bills sailed through the Senate and the House this year, but both died in conference committee—partly because of lobbying strings pulled by former Senate Republican leader Baker, partly because of the president's veto threats.

Those threats were presumably based on protection of presidential prerogatives rather than fondness for PFIAB. As an ex-CIA chief, Bush is inclined against second-guessing the intelligence establishment, and was expected to put the board to a quiet death by accepting the routine resignations of its 16 members last January. Instead, he may have inadvertently administered the coup de grace by sending Kissinger's ex-employees to China.

POWDERKEG...

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ernment began paying many farmers with IOU's instead of cash, the farmers started to get mad. There were reports of attacks on state grain buyers. The government became alarmed enough so that this year it has scrounged up cash to pay most of the farmers. To help make up the budgetary shortfall this round, the state has been forcing workers to buy unprecedented quantities of treasury bonds, risking the anger of the cities. "The government is saying we'll have a few frugal years," says one Shanghainese woman, "and the people are saying we have frugal years all the time."

The big question by now is whether the People's Liberation Army—faced with another revolt—might take its cue from Romania. There is no clear answer. Some Western and Eastern military analysts in Asia say there is rumbling within the ranks, some say the army will not turn against the party. From the extreme care the party is taking to woo the army's loyalty, it may be inferred that not all the officers are happy. Someone in the Politburo must believe it's necessary to take the trouble of setting up photo displays in cities across China proclaiming the bravery of soldiers who shoot demonstrators.

Long History of Revolt

If China's Communist Party persists in holding back one-fifth of the world's population, the enormity of the explosion when it comes could be staggering. It is worth recalling that this is a country with a long history of revolt. This century alone has seen the 1911 overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, the protests of 1919 and the late 1920s, the civil war that followed World War II, and the 1949 communist revolution, followed by the tremendous power struggle reflected in the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution.

Conventional wisdom in the West says that China isn't quite clued in to the values of freedom and democracy familiar to Eastern Europe. But recall that when Marxism rolled through the West, China was quick enough to jump on that bandwagon. The Chinese peasants, so often written off as unprepared for such responsibilities as democratic institutions, sure figured out fast what to do with private farm plots once they got them. And this spring, while Eastern Europe was still immersed in its nightmare, China's people were telling the world about the outrages of communism, facing the tanks, and calling for freedom.

Miss Rosett is editorial page editor of The Asian Wall Street Journal.

The Washington Post DEC. 19, 1989 Pg. 23

Winston Lord

Misguided Mission

Since the June massacre in Beijing, Americans have hoisted two banners. One proclaims "sustain indignation"; the other, "preserve bilateral relations."

These principles are not mutually exclusive. Indeed the United States had struck the right balance between condemnation and connection until Gen. Scowcroft's pilgrimage. That mission both erased any pretense of official indignation and weakened the true foundations of Sino-American relations.

The administration's justifications are not persuasive:

■ *Don't isolate the Chinese leaders.* It is they, fearing their own people, who have isolated themselves. Their fixation is with power. Censure may not budge them—although the sharp world reaction to executions may have limited the numbers. But international acquiescence surely reinforces their view that crushing their populace elicits only fleeting outcries, no lasting repercussions.

■ *Directly convey American outrage.* In the Middle Kingdom, dispatching a high-level delegation speaks much louder than any words. Furthermore Scowcroft's public toast expressed as much outrage for the administration's critics as for the perpetrators of the massacre. Judging by the official backgrounding, his private remarks blamed Congress for all the furor. Whatever mild reproaches he may have transmitted were screened out by their media; the Chinese people were treated only to friendly smiles and exchanges.

■ *Maintain contact on international issues.* Senior officials gain access and carry weight. The Chinese reaffirmation that they won't ship intermediate missiles to volatile areas, though recycled, is important; so too is dialogue on Cambodia and Korea. But there are alternative channels unburdened by the awful symbolism of the Scowcroft voyage, such as our ambassadors and high-level meetings in international forums. In any event the Chinese pursue a hard-headed, independent foreign policy based on national interests, not spite over levels of contact.

■ *Weigh the Soviet factor.* While the geopolitical dimension of Sino-American ties remains important, it has evolved from a de facto alliance against the Soviets to the more nuanced realm of multipolar balance. Beijing needs to worry more about fast-moving U.S.-Soviet relations than Washington does about Sino-Soviet relations. Today on top of abiding historical, geopolitical and economic limits to Sino-Soviet rapprochement, add Gorbachev's heresies at home and in Eastern Europe. Their contagion poses a much greater threat to China's

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL DEC. 28, 1989 Pg. 8

The Powderkeg That Is China

By Claudia Rosett

SHANGHAI—Colored lights shine along the waterfront at night here. Couples stroll by the fountains, and across the street in the old Peace Hotel a Chinese jazz band plays. This is the surface calm of China under the resurgent "order" of the Communist Party. In a restaurant down the road, a young Shanghainese woman hints at the anger and yearning behind the facade: "We are so happy for Eastern Europe."

There is little in China itself to be happy about. Almost seven months after the Chinese army silenced the Tiananmen democracy movement, the mood here is one of crushing depression. Arrests of democrats have continued since June. It has become much harder to go study abroad; instead, the state is ordering some students onto the farms. The party has been bombarding the people with lies and such wornout political slogans as "Contribute more to the four modernizations."

Angrier Than Before

The central planners in their zeal to snatch back power lost to the reforms of the 1980s are steering the economy into a nosedive. This can only leave people more desperate. Venture through the Shanghai streets and you'll find bicyclists navigating the rubble around dormant construction sites and fruit vendors unable to sell their rotting wares.

In the spring the people took to the streets not only in Tiananmen Square but in scores of cities, denouncing the Communist Party's lies and corruption and calling for the overthrow of Deng Xiaoping and Premier Li Peng. Today the Chinese people are angrier than before Tiananmen, at least to judge by my December tour of Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Guangzhou and rural areas near the Yellow River south of Beijing. The mood is captured by a Beijing worker who says simply, "I hate this government." When the next volatile moment comes, China is primed to explode.

All it took to touch off the uprising this spring was the death of a relatively liberal deposed party secretary, Hu Yaobang—whose funeral gave protesters their initial excuse to gather in the streets. The party's recourse to martial law and massacre finally stopped the revolt, and has left China's people leery of public displays right now. But it will not be lost on the Chinese public that last week when Romania's dictator, Nicolai Ceausescu, tried the "Chinese solution" of ordering an army assault on demonstrators, the troops finally joined the popular revolt.

For China's communist leaders, the execution of Ceausescu and his wife is a terrifying example. Beijing's top security chief, Qiao Shi, had visited his Romanian comrades just the week before—reaffirming China's ties to the dwindling fellowship of die-hard communist regimes.

One measure of how seriously China's regime views the threat of imminent rebellion at home is its reaction to the events in Romania. Details of the Romanian rebellion reach the Chinese people by way of Voice of America and BBC broadcasts, as well as word of mouth. So China's state-run news has had to script its terse official version, as it has done with the liberation of other Eastern European nations. But making even the barest mention of the Romanian events apparently left China's rulers so nervous that they put their security forces on first-degree alert, according to a dispatch out of Beijing from the Yugoslavian press agency, Tanjug. It's hardly the Romanians that China's tyrants fear.

Beijing's top security chief had visited his Romanian comrades the week before—reaffirming China's ties to the dwindling fellowship of die-hard communist regimes.

The opportunity some Chinese citizens privately say they are waiting for is the death of the party's 85-year-old "retired" leader, Deng Xiaoping, which promises to open a chapter of gut-wrenching uncertainty for China's party. But China's people may not even wait on Mr. Deng's demise. "Wait till next June," says one young man in Shanghai. There were reports this past weekend that students and faculty at Chinese schools, including Beijing University, celebrated the fall of Ceausescu with parties at which they made toasts to liberty and played the song that became the anthem of the Tiananmen Square democracy movement this spring, the Internationale. The South China Post's Willy Wo-Lap Lam reports that for the first time since June a big character poster went up at Beijing University, and was taken down Monday by campus security. It said, "If you see a dog called Ceausescu roaming city streets, please call the nearest public security office."

These may sound like small signs, but in China's vicious political climate they signal a willingness to take enormous risks. No less an authority on the Chinese people than their ruling party itself seems convinced that one flicker of dissent could start a political firestorm. On Dec. 9, police shut down a brief demonstration in Beijing. This threat to the state consisted of six brave men, who unfurled a banner outside a Beijing television station asking, "Why is China so poor?"

China's poverty is, of course, a sensitive matter—especially since the state's current leap back toward central planning is likely to make the Chinese even poorer. One goal has been to cut high inflation by drastically cutting bank credit. But in China's planned economy, where the government controls all financial institutions, credit serves as a powerful political tool. And the scarcer credit is now going mainly to big state projects, at the expense of the small semi-private businesses that have sprung up—especially on the farms—during the reforms of the 1980s. The government's aim is to reassert its control, regardless of the damage to China's economy.

It's a strategy that could backfire. This becomes apparent, for example, in a chat with two farmers in a rural courtyard near Chengdu, in the southwestern province of Sichuan. Their worn faces and frayed blue work clothes attest to their rough life working the fields out front. For much of the past decade their lives had been getting easier, they say, but not lately. There's no more work for relatives in the cities, and they resent the central government's renewed interest in dictating local affairs.

"The freedom to go off and do business is the kind of freedom we're afraid of losing," says the older farmer of the pair. "Farmers should be able to speak up about the policies that affect them," says the other, a middle-aged man with a wry smile. He adds that if farmers get mad enough at the authorities, "We have some ways to resist."

This farmer goes on to explain that China's peasants can protest bad government by refusing to deliver their crop quotas to the state—which buys the grain at artificially low prices to ration cheaply in the cities. He cites as an example his own recent boycott. He grows vegetables and wheat. This year local officials failed to punish a vandal who destroyed his bamboo shoots. So, in protest, he has not gotten around to rendering up his wheat quota. Farmers angry enough to withhold their grain are heralds of revolution in China, where peasants make up 800 million of the 1.1 billion population.

The farmers are already edgy. Last year, when the financially strapped gov-

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leaders than Western "bourgeois liberalization."

The administration forfeited moral reproof to seek improved bilateral ties. But even on its own terms the Scowcroft mission was severely misguided for the long run. Consider each of the key audiences.

- The only group pleased by the visit, the predominant hard-liners in Beijing, will be gone in a few years. They have reinforced their power with images of business as usual. They take satisfaction that once again the foreigner pays tribute. Gratitude is not esteem.
- The closet moderates in and out of government will form the core of leadership with whom we will deal in the future. Far from strengthening their hand, the administration has robbed them of the argument that Chinese repression and xenophobia entail costs. Japan, Europe and others will feel free to follow the Scowcroft trail.
- The despair, disillusionment and anger of other Chinese is widespread. Only the tiny percentage in Western countries understand that the administration's posture does not reflect the American mainstream. The rest must conclude that the blood around Tiananmen Square has truly been scrubbed away.
- The trek to Beijing has shattered the broad consensus in America. For 20 years five presidents of both parties had pursued a balanced policy which garnered overwhelming bipartisan support. Now this secure base is rudely shaken by passionate debate. A backlash may well produce heavier sanctions than those the administration already opposes.

"One does not shore up the long-term foundations for Sino-American relations by appearing weak to China's leaders."

"Are we to believe that Chinese are not like Europeans, that they never had freedom and cannot afford it now because China would be ungovernable . . . ?"

One does not shore up the long-term foundations for Sino-American relations by appearing weak to China's leaders and callous to the Chinese and American people. One does not earn respect abroad by reversing field within months and practicing double standards. One cannot maintain a balanced approach at home by submerging our values and disdaining congressional and public opinion.

The damage done by the mission was compounded by its egregious style. Clinking glasses on worldwide television, Gen. Scowcroft lined up the administration with the Beijing regime against the Chinese and American people: "In both our societies there are voices of those who seek to redirect or frustrate our cooperation. We both must take bold measures to overcome these negative forces."

Two days later, in Berlin, Secretary of State James Baker pronounced: "In their peaceful urgent multitude the peoples of Eastern Europe have held up a mirror to the West and have reflected the enduring power of our own best values . . . true stability requires governments with legitimacy, governments that are based on the consent of the governed."

Let us hope that the administration would hold to these eloquent sentiments longer than six months if there were slaughters in the Tiananmen Squares of Eastern Europe or the Soviet Republics. The Scowcroft mission sends precisely the wrong signals to Gorbachev. Both the Chinese and Eastern European demonstrations have been massive, broadly based and entirely nonviolent. The main difference is that the Chinese people made very modest demands for dialogue with their leadership, while the Eastern Europeans have made very radical demands for the overthrow of theirs.

To be sure, the administration would react strongly over a sustained period to any massacre of



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innocents in Europe—and Gorbachev probably knows this. That is precisely the point. What we have here is not just a double standard but cultural, if not racial, bias—however unintentional and unconscious. Are we to believe that Chinese are not like Europeans, that they never had freedom and cannot afford it now because China would be ungovernable and "stability" is crucial to economic reform?

For years critics complained of a double standard in human rights, one for the Soviet Union, another for China. But there were two legitimate reasons for a more muted approach toward Beijing. First, Chinese society, with glaring exceptions, was generally moving in the right direction while the pre-Gorbachev Soviet Union was not. Second, China posed no threat to the United States and proved helpful on many international issues while the Soviet Union was expanding its arsenals and engaging in adventurism.

With many of these premises now overturned, it is time to shelve the double standard.

The president knew the trip would unleash a huge domestic storm, but acted boldly to stem a downward spiral in Sino-American relations. He is gambling that Beijing will make major concessions before Congress reconvenes. We can anticipate some positive moves, but we should not let Beijing or Washington inflate the significance of cosmetic gestures.

Instead Beijing should:

- Acknowledge that last spring was a tragedy for patriots, not only for soldiers;
- Grant amnesty to demonstrators, not conduct witchhunts;
- Free countless dissidents in jail, not just two in an embassy;
- Remove fears, not just martial law;
- Let in VOA broadcasts, not just an additional broadcaster;
- Welcome without onerous conditions journalists, scholars and Peace Corps volunteers, not just computers and cash;
- Cease intimidation of foreigners and invective against America.

This agenda is not utopian. It merely calls for the status quo ante June.

The regime is unlikely to move significantly on such fronts. If it does, I, for one, would be delighted to modify my verdict on the Scowcroft mission.

In foreign policy there is frequent tension between the imperatives of strategy and morality, between preserving peace and promoting human rights. Happily for the policy-maker these pursuits are often mutually reinforcing, with no difficult tradeoffs. What better example than the glorious panorama of Eastern Europe. Could there possibly be a more profound contribution to peace on the European continent than the realizing of long-suppressed aspirations? In a few short months, enemy armies have dissolved, warning times have multiplied, and a formidable buffer zone has emerged.

The new agenda for American diplomacy thus features the encouragement of freedom in societies moving toward post-Communism. This pursuit dramatically strengthens the prospects for peace as well. Meanwhile the octogenarians in the Forbidden City are in a time warp, finding common cause with the likes of Honecker and Ceausescu, Castro and Kim, while the Chinese people hunger for rights being grasped by peoples on the other side of the globe.

The administration, which strives skillfully to keep up with the times in Europe, was trapped in its own time warp when it launched Gen. Scowcroft. We can hope that Chinese actions in coming weeks will ease the sufferings of the people and thereby Washington's plight. But realistically it will take new leaders for China to catch up with history.

Until that time when we can fully resume cooperation with China, we should restore a measured approach. The choice is not solely between isolation and approbation. Let us conduct necessary business with the Beijing authorities in workmanlike fashion, not with fawning emissaries. Let us calibrate our actions with theirs. Let us maintain productive links where possible with progressive Chinese forces. Above all, to serve American interests as well as values, let us align ourselves with China's future.

The writer was United States ambassador to China from 1985 to 1989. He was special assistant to Henry Kissinger when the latter, as national security adviser, first visited China in 1971, and made many subsequent trips to China with Mr. Kissinger and Presidents Nixon and Ford.

News/Opinion

WASHINGTON POST DECEMBER 19, 1989

White House Reveals Earlier China Mission

Administration Silent on Panama Options

By Ann Devroy and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

The White House announced yesterday that national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who made a controversial visit to China this month, took an earlier, secret trip to Beijing a month after the massacre of pro-democracy students there. The disclosure touched off a fresh round of criticism in Congress.

In a written statement, White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater said the trip last July was undertaken "to personally underscore the United States' shock and concern about the violence" during the crackdown and to "impress upon the Chinese government the seriousness with which this incident was viewed in the United States." When Scowcroft and Eagleburger went to Beijing Dec. 2-3, many critics said President Bush had made a concession to the regime that ordered the bloody crackdown near Tiananmen Square.

Also yesterday, the Bush administration accused Panamanian leader Manuel Antonio Noriega of instituting a pattern of harassment against U.S. soldiers there, but Bush declined to discuss what actions he might take. In Panama, a U.S. officer shot and wounded a Panamanian corporal near an American installation, the second shooting incident in three days between U.S. and Panamanian forces.

The disclosure of a July China mission drew immediate fire on Capitol Hill. Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) said Bush had dispatched Scowcroft on "another midnight mission to meet secretly with the very Chinese leaders who had ordered the bloody suppression" of the pro-democracy movement. Mitchell called for a "full disclosure" of the administration's contacts with the Chinese leadership and said the visits "make a mockery of our profession of concern for human rights . . ."

"If this secret flight was supposed to encourage a change in Chinese policy, then it failed," said Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), sponsor of legislation— vetoed by Bush—to protect Chinese students in the United States. "The fact that the December trip is the second trip casts it into a darker shadow. It wasn't the intial contact. We had intially contacted them and expressed our concern and they said, 'No.' We went anyway."

The White House announced Scowcroft's trip after it was revealed earlier in the day by Cable News Network. Later, in a second briefing, Fitzwater acknowledged Eagleburger had also been on the trip.

Administration officials said Scowcoft and Eagleburger did not tell congressional leaders about the July mission when they gave briefings last week on the more recent visit. The White House and Chinese authorities had announced the recent visit at 2 a.m. as the U.S. officials arrived in Beijing. But, officials said, the July visit was meant to be kept secret. It occurred over the July 4 weekend.

Yesterday, Eagleburger briefed Mitchell on the recent visit, but failed to tell him of the July mission, a Mitchell aide said. The senator only learned of the first trip through news reports, the aide said.

Administration officials have said they are hoping for some positive response to Bush's overtures to head off an expected new round of sanctions against China in January when Congress returns. The new disclosure of a secret trip could complicate the White House effort to hold off additional sanctions.

Officials declined to discuss the agenda of the discussions or length of the July trip, except to say it involved an overnight flight by military aircraft to Beijing, a brief stay, and a return to Washington without further stops. It occurred shortly after the White House, under strong pressure from Congress, had announced on June 20 a series of sanctions against China.

In Senate testimony that day, Secretary of State James A. Baker III said he had recommended to Bush that "we suspend all political-level assistant secretary and above participation in nonmilitary exchanges between the United States and China." He said this would mean cancellation of travel by Cabinet officers such as a July 10 visit planned by Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher.

Baker has subsequently met with high-level Chinese officials in Paris and New York, and the administration has maintained that the ban on high-level "exchanges" was not a ban on "contacts." An official said that what has been outlawed is reciprocal exchanges among high-level delegations.

Before the July trip was revealed

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Baker admits missteps on China

By Timothy J. McNulty
Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—With secrecy still shrouding American contacts with China, Secretary of State James A. Baker III Tuesday made the embarrassing admission that he may have misled Americans about the first time U.S. officials met with Beijing's leaders after the Tiananmen Square massacre of pro-democracy students.

Baker, through a spokesman, said he regretted it.

This month, after two administration officials made a secret trip to Beijing, Baker said, "It's the first time we've had—we've had high-level United States officials go to the People's Republic of China."

But the same two officials had made a secret trip to Beijing last July, and he knew it.

When reporters asked Tuesday if Baker or other officials had lied, the State Department issued a statement on behalf of Baker saying he "felt obligated to protect the secrecy of a mission that the President wished to have classified."

"He regrets that he may have misled some," said deputy spokesman Richard Boucher.

President Bush loves to keep a secret, but administration critics said the confusion it creates may be getting Bush into deep political trouble with Congress and other quarters. The confusion mounted Tuesday.

Baker's statement was the latest of several contradictions created by Bush's announcement 11 days ago of a secret mission to Beijing this month by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger.

That disclosure, combined with the disclosure Monday of an earlier secret mission in July, created intense criticism from Congress and elsewhere of Bush's policy toward China's leaders.

Nonetheless, Bush continued to mend relations with China Tuesday, apparently surprising even the top aides who were defending his secret actions.

In the morning, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the trade and diplomatic sanctions imposed on China after the June Tiananmen Square massacre "are in place. There are no plans to change them at this point."

But in the evening, Bush made another surprise move, approving the sale of three U.S.-built civilian communications satellites to China. The administration also lifted prohibitions on U.S. Export-Import Bank financing of U.S. business activities with China.

Bush is said to hope the overtures to China will encourage its leaders to moderate their repressive policies.

Administration officials said they hope to see some progress, including ending any threat to dissident Fang Lizhi and his wife, who have been given sanctuary in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing since last June.

Meanwhile, even as White House officials defended the latest revelation about the secret trip to China last July, they declared that Bush intends to continue his secret brand of diplomacy.

"There have been trips you don't know about and there will be more," Fitzwater said.

Fitzwater said the secret trips were an important element of the President's approach to Chinese leaders.

"President Bush, in his long dealings with China, has found that face-to-face discussions are important to them. The secrecy was simply because the President felt that that was important to the Chinese to know that this was not public posturing."

White House officials insisted Tuesday that the June 20 ban on "high-level exchanges" with Beijing leaders did not rule out high-level "contacts."

Fitzwater said that an "exchange" involves reciprocating visits by U.S. and Chinese officials, but "we never intended to cut off the ability of the government to communicate with their government."

The China revelations are only the latest example of the President's sense of drama, even smugness in keeping secrets and then springing a surprise.

"Yeah, you just haven't been told," Bush said with a small, satisfied smile some months ago when he announced the surprise summit with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta.

Bush seems to have jeopardized cooperation from Congress. Several weeks ago, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D., Me.), in an interview, complained that too much of the President's bipartisanship has become "a one-way street."

Mitchell on Monday described the trips as "making a mockery of our profession of concern for human rights," and he called for "full disclosure" of the administration's contacts with Beijing "so Americans can fairly judge the wisdom of its China policy."

Rep. Sam Gejdenson (D., Conn.), chairman of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on trade, bluntly complained about being kept in the dark, saying that Bush "misled the American people and the Congress."

Congress may put existing sanctions against China into law, a development which Bush clearly opposes.

One Republican stalwart, Winston Lord, the U.S. ambassador to China from 1985 until early this year, also broke with Bush, writing in the Washington Post Tuesday that Bush's policy "was severely misguided for the long run."

The Scowcroft covert trip to China was just the most recent example of the President's penchant for secrecy. The contacts and timing of the Malta summit were kept secret, not only from the public, but even from CIA Director William Webster and from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, who was talking to Soviet officials at the same time on other matters.

Outside the administraton, Bush and his senior advisers had been telling journalists and congressmen for months that no summit was in the offing.

Then in early October, Bush suddenly announced he had been arranging a "meeting," which he insisted was not a "summit," since mid-July.

Bush seems to have adopted the CIA practice of compartmentalization and a "need to know" handling of information.

Such policies make sense in the intelligence business, but administration officials later acknowledged that it worked against Bush during the abortive coup against Panama's Gen. Manuel Noriega.

At that time, Bush acted as his own analyst, handling the cables himself in the Oval Office and did not include experts with a greater knowledge of the military situation in Panama.

Real Politik

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
BARRE TIMES-ARGUS (VT)
Date 20 DEC 1989

One might define the term "real politik" as politics based on practical considerations rather than on philosophical or theoretical objectives of government. In modern American diplomacy, the term fit the foreign policies of Richard Nixon and his sidekick, Henry Kissinger, to a T. (Kissinger would be happy to hear the review.)

Like that earlier Republican president, and unlike his immediate predecessor in office, Ronald Reagan, President George Bush strives for a real-politik approach to foreign policy.

That is apparent in his recent overtures to the cranky Chinese government, following a visit to Beijing by Nixon who hastened there after the massacre of Tiananmen Square. For public consumption, Bush might at least have scolded the Chinese a little more convincingly for their deplorable abuses of human rights, a moral principle that happens to be the centerpiece of social and political theory upon which the United States was founded. Bush dispensed with that obligation with scanty verbal knuckle-rapping — and only after being pushed to do so by the repugnance expressed throughout the U.S. after the massacre. Privately, however, the president wanted to reassure the Chinese leaders that there was no ill feeling about their handling of the student insurrection.

Negative public opinion in this country has been so overwhelming that, from the perspective of real politik, the Chinese needed reassurance that, in Washington at least, practical people understood the manner in which the uprising was handled.

As President Bush pointed out in his apologia for the Scowcroft mission, China is a nation of a billion people. The adminstration's inconsistency in its concern for human rights, then, is explained in the numbers. You don't treat a nation like Nicaragua, with less than four million population, the same way you treat a world power like the People's Republic of China. It's safe to be morally outraged — and indeed to foster turmoil and bloodshed by supporting the rebellious forces — when the stakes are lower.

But when rebellion occurs in a country like China, the Bush administration believes, a nation armed with the H-bomb and an enormous army gleaned from masses of people, you don't send in the CIA and military advisers to help student rebels; you don't mine harbors or disseminate do-it-yourself manuals on the mixologist's art of the Molotov cocktail. Instead, you buddy up to government leaders in hopes that somehow an alliance can be perpetuated that will help in dealing with the Soviet Union — our traditional foe, despite its change in stripes under Mikhail Gorbachev.

Bush and Nixon both have great personal investments in China, and on appearing to be experts in Chinese affairs. The president, at one time head of the U.S. embassy in Beijing, reflected his confidence in his own expertise by replying to questions during a press conference on the

Scowcroft mission that he had kept his own counsel on this one. Nixon's investment is that improved U.S.-Chinese ties and the gradual opening of trade between the two countries, began with his historic journey to Beijing before his presidency was swamped in the mire of Watergate. It is his greatest lasting legacy, one he would hate to see reversed by the Tiananmen massacre.

Real-politik has its place in the world. It's dog-eat-dog out there.

But so does diplomacy based on the absolute principles at the center of western-style Democracy. Those principles are not terribly hard to master. One begins with the assumption that governments don't have a right to shoot their own people.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release December 20, 1989

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

President Bush met with his national security advisers Sunday afternoon at 2:30 in the Residence to consider the situation in Panama. They met for approximately 90 minutes. President Bush asked for options and an action plan to achieve four objectives: protect American lives, support democracy, bring the fugitive Manuel Noriega to justice, and protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties.

On Monday, the President maintained his normal schedule of activities. Plans were being made at all levels of the command structure for the operation scheduled to commence at 1:00 Wednesday morning.

On Tuesday afternoon, President Bush met with the Vice President and his national security advisers in the Oval Office at about 3:00 to discuss final plans for the military operation in Panama. The President was briefed on the readiness of all aspects of the plan. General Scowcroft, the President's National Security Adviser, laid out an hour-by-hour plan for the rest of the day and evening prior to the time of launch. That plan included activities of all the Departments and Agencies and all White House Staff in the carrying out of this complex arrangement. The President was satisfied the planning was comprehensive.

The President continued to conduct his normal schedule, including attending the White House Christmas Party Tuesday evening. The President received updates on the status of preparations throughout the evening. General Scowcroft and Governor Sununu visited with the President at several points. Early evening, the President called the Congressional Leadership to discuss the action with them.

The Deputies Committee of the National Security Council was convened at midnight to begin monitoring the operational aspects of the Panama action. They were convened by National Security Council Deputy Director Robert Gates and continued to meet throughout the night and most of the day Wednesday. The Press Office Staff was alerted to prepare for an early morning briefing shortly after 1:00 a.m., and the White House Press Corps was notified accordingly. In addition, the Pentagon pool had been activated earlier in the evening to accompany U.S. forces to Panama.

President Bush arrived in the Oval Office shortly before 1:00 a.m. to monitor the progress throughout the night. He was wearing a dark blue sweater over his shirt and tie. The mood was businesslike, as various members of the President's security team moved in and out of the Oval Office with reports of progress.

As we outlined in Wednesday morning's briefing, the President spent most of the night calling American leaders and Members of

The President was somber throughout the night, worried about the possibility of casualties, and anxious for any word of specific military progress. He watched the White House announcement of the military action on the television in his study. He made notes on 5x7 blue Presidential notepads as he talked to various leaders. He reported to aides that the phone calls were going well, mostly supportive. Everyone the President called was appreciative of his making the effort on this early notification.

The President retired to the Residence at approximately 4:00 in the morning, when it was decided that he would address the American people at 7:00 a.m. The President returned to the Oval Office at approximately 6:30 to review his remarks, and make editorial changes. Because of the time involved, the President was not able to use the teleprompter normally associated with the Presidential statement. The President read from the typewritten print, making notations in the margin only minutes before air time.

After delivering his Address to the Nation, the President remained in the Oval Office for the rest of the day, meeting with diplomatic representatives. All other events previously scheduled for the day were canceled with the exception of the Presentation of Diplomatic Credentials, so that the President could concentrate on the action in Panama. He continues to receive military updates from General Scowcroft, General Powell, Secretary Cheney, and others. Vice President Quayle spent a good deal of time with the President during the day discussing the progress of the operation.

The President received a series of reports on the success of the military in securing various objectives of the pre-planned mission.

At approximately 3:00, the President met with his National Security Advisers to receive an operational update, which we commented upon in a previous press statement. The President's operational briefing was similar to the one given to the press at 5:00 this afternoon by General Kelly in the Pentagon.

This evening the President will again attend the Christmas Party and then retire to the Residence. He is pleased by the military precision and smoothness of the operation. The President has been told by military leaders that this has been one of the most effective and efficiently conducted operations in some time. The President will continue to receive monitored reports throughout the evening on the status of the Panamanian situation.

The President's National Security Advisers who met with him at various times during the last three days included: Vice President Quayle; Secretary of State Baker; Secretary of Defense Cheney; Director of Central Intelligence Bill Webster; General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Brent Scowcroft, the President's National Security Council Adviser; Robert Gates, Deputy National Security Adviser; and Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General of the United States.

# # #

NEW YORK TIMES DEC. 20, 1989 Pg. 1

BUSH ELIMINATES SOME RESTRICTIONS ON BEIJING TRADE

NATIONAL INTEREST CITED

Baker Concedes He Did Not Disclose a Secret Mission to the Chinese in July

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19 — President Bush waived a Congressional ban today on loans to companies that do business with China and also approved the export of three communications satellites that will be launched by the Chinese.

The ban on loans was imposed in a law passed in November as part of Congress's reaction to the Chinese Government's bloody nationwide crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators. Export of the satellites and equipment that could be used for military purposes was blocked by sanctions ordered by Mr. Bush himself in June, immediately after the crackdown.

The decisions, which the White House said were "in the national interest," came as Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d was forced into an embarrassing admission that he "may have misled" the public about how many secret missions Mr. Bush had sent to Beijing.

On Dec. 10, a day after the White House announced that two top officials had gone to Beijing this month in hopes of improving relations with China, Mr. Baker said in a television interview that the trip had been the first by high-level officials since Mr. Bush banned such contacts in the aftermath of the Chinese crackdown.

Mr. Baker never mentioned what the White House acknowledged on Monday — that Brent Scowcroft, the White House national security adviser, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the Deputy Secretary of State, had been in China in July, only weeks after the crushing of political dissent and the announcement of Mr. Bush's ban on high-level meetings.

Two of the three satellites affected by Mr. Bush's order today are being built by Hughes Aircraft for Aussat, an Australian concern that intends to launch them on the Chinese Long March rocket. The other satellite, which would be the first actually put into space, is a refurbished Westar satellite that will be used by Asiasat, a British-Chinese concern based in Hong Kong.

Export licenses for the satellites were suspended when Mr. Bush ordered a halt to the sale of all military equipment to China. The satellites are not for military use, but some of their components, and the devices themselves, were included on the list of proscribed items.

Today, Mr. Bush notified Congress that he was exempting the three satellites from the sanctions.

Noting that the satellites were worth $300 million in business for American firms, Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, said the move was "consistent with the President's expressed determination, in imposing sanctions last June, to maintain commercial relations with China."

In a two-page memo explaining the decision, the White House said the satellites "will be controlled for civil use" after they are launched.

"It is in the national interest of the United States to approve export licenses," the statement said.

The same reasoning was given today for Mr. Bush's decision to waive restrictions on the Export-Import Bank's power to grant loans to American companies that do business in China. The waiver "preserves a level playing field for U.S. business," the White House said. "Additional business activity with China will be considered on a case-by-case basis as part of a continuing review process."

Mr. Bush's decision on the satellites drew immediate criticism from Senator Albert Gore, the Tennessee Democrat who sponsored a law that requires special licenses for the launching of American-made satellites on Chinese rockets.

"The statement that this is in the national interest simply does not hold water," Mr. Gore said in an interview. "He's doing this as a favor to the hardliners in Beijing. This is a fresh insult to the memory of those who died for democracy in Tiananmen Square."

The swift reaction to Mr. Bush's decision on the satellites, and Mr. Baker's predicament about his comments on the secret missions to China, underscored the trouble the Bush Administration has had in dealing with the public disclosure of a previously secret China policy that bears all the trademarks of a President who has turned himself into his own State Department desk officer, military adviser, director of Central Intelligence and, sometimes, Secretary of State.

Mr. Baker's admission also entangled him in the debate over the wisdom of Mr. Bush's attempts at personal diplomacy with the Chinese, something that Mr. Baker appeared to have been avoiding with a series of careful public statements that expressed his support for the President's decisions but repeatedly made it clear that the China overture was "the President's policy."

State Department officials said today that Mr. Baker knew about the first trip, but chose not to disclose it during the television interview.

Margaret D. Tutwiler, Mr. Baker's spokeswoman, said the Secretary "regrets that he may have misled some." She said Mr. Baker felt that "by acknowledging his own direct involvement, it was sufficient to make the point that this was not the first case of high-level contact." Mr. Baker said on the news program that he had met with the Chinese Foreign Minister in Paris and at the United Nations.

Miss Tutwiler said the Secretary had not intentionally lied. She defended Mr. Baker's actions by saying he felt obligated to withhold his knowledge of the earlier trip out of his friendship to Mr. Bush and a feeling that as Secretary of State he could not disclose a classified Presidential mission.

"Secretary Baker does not feel that he lied," she said. "He certainly understands, as we stated, that his statement could have misled some."

State Department officials said Mr. Baker was one of four people, including the President and his two emissaries, who were aware of two trips that were conceived and directed by the tighest possible group of aides, leaving out not only Congress and the State Department bureaucracy but most of Mr. Bush's own White House staff.

The White House disclosed the first trip, which was made in July, on Monday after a report about it on Cable News Network. That began a new round of criticism from some lawmakers and foreign policy analysts. In a sign of some opposition within the Administration itself, officials said today that Mr. Bush had authorized the trips to Beijing even though his Ambassador there, Joseph Lilly, was pessimistic about the possibility of a quick improvement in either China's human rights policies or in the Chinese-American relationship.

Although there was some criticism of the first trip to China by Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Scowcroft, whose own penchant for security has won him the White House nickname Sultan of Se-

TRADE...Pg. 18

USA TODAY
DEC. 21, 1989

Most are longtime friends

Most of **President Bush**'s key advisers on the U.S. invasion of Panama are old friends, with links to each other and Bush stretching to President **Gerald Ford**'s White House:

▶ **National security adviser Brent Scowcroft**: Retired Air Force lieutenant general, experienced in defense, foreign policy issues. Ford's national security adviser; also advised Presidents **Nixon**, **Carter** and **Reagan**. Pragmatist, far more moderate than immediate predecessors, but recently caught flak from Congress for secret China trips at Bush's behest.

▶ **Secretary of State James Baker**: At the White House with Bush much of the night, monitoring the action and calling foreign leaders to advise them of it. Helped run Bush's unsuccessful 1970 Senate campaign. Was Reagan's staff chief, then Treasury secretary; was Bush's top campaign aide. Urbane, patrician. Adjective most often used to describe him: pragmatic.

▶ **Defense Secretary Dick Cheney**: With Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman **Colin Powell** he monitored invasion throughout night in Pentagon's military command center. Said plan was drafted by others before he became Defense secretary in March. Fly-fishes with Baker. Was a senior Republican on House Intelligence Committee when Bush named him Defense chief. Known for steely management style, drive, political instinct.

▶ **Attorney General Dick Thornburgh**: As top U.S. legal officer, he told Bush Tuesday U.S. military forces legally could seize Panamanian Gen. **Manuel Noriega** on drug trafficking charges, based on U.S. and international law. The ex-U.S. attorney was Pennsylvania governor before Reagan tapped him to replace **Edwin Meese** near the end of his tenure; Bush quickly reappointed him. Reputation: tough prosecutor, able adminstrator.

— Sharen Shaw Johnson

China leak White House 'diversion'

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times A-8
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 21 Dec '89

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The White House intentionally leaked word about a presidential adviser's secret trip to China last July to shift press attention from Panama to China in the most daring of several diversions before the attack.

More than anything else, it was a rape threat by Pananamian soldiers to a U.S. naval officer's wife that triggered President Bush's decision to oust "Maximum Leader" Manuel Antonio Noriega, it was learned.

Mr. Bush activated a military plan that had been kept patiently on hold since his inauguration. Mr. Bush's decision to go ahead with "Operation Just Cause" came during a secret 90-minute White House brunch Mr. Bush held with top advisers at 2:30 p.m. Sunday.

Information about National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft's visit to Beijing was leaked at mid-afternoon Monday to Cable News Network, whose broadcast was followed up by other White House press.

On Tuesday, when only one question on Panama was asked during the daily news briefing, Mr. Bush fine-tuned the intervention plan at a 3 p.m. meeting with advisers. Even though the meeting wasn't listed on the official schedule, it was given a cover story: a strategy conference on the military role in drug enforcement.

At some point Mr. Bush obtained agreement that Guillermo Endara and his running mates would assume the offices they won in the May elections annulled by Gen. Noriega. And Mr. Bush decided to apprehend Gen. Noriega rather than just oust him, setting a standard by which the entire operation was judged by some yesterday as a failure.

Meanwhile, critics railed at Mr. Bush for not retaliating after a Marine lieutenant was killed by Panamanian soliders. Mr. Bush expressed "outrage," just as he had done after an attack on opposition candidates in May and Gen. Noriega's violent suppression of a coup attempt in October.

As troops flew toward Panama on Monday and Tuesday night, the man who calls himself "Mr. Cool" on the golf course attended two Christmas parties without a sign of preoccupation or crisis. And Vice President Dan Quayle hosted a holiday party at his house Tuesday evening.

When shooting began at 1 a.m. yesterday, Mr. Bush closeted himself for much of the night in the Oval Office with Mr. Quayle and Secretary of State James Baker, talking to world leaders by phone in a partially successful effort to head off criticism of the intervention.

Mr. Bush spoke to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who backed the action, and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who condemned it. Mr. Quayle called leaders of nations he has visited during his year in office, including El Salvador, Honduras, Venezuela and Costa Rica.

Earlier Tuesday, many of those same leaders in Latin American nations, NATO and Japan received cables spelling out Mr. Bush's case against Gen. Noriega, who has been indicted in U.S. courts as an drug trafficker.

The situation began deteriorating rapidly with the Noriega government's declaration of "a state of war" last Friday. On Saturday, Mr. Bush again called on Gen. Noriega to get out of Panama. Hours later, Marine Lt. Robert Paz was shot to death when he and three other unarmed officers ran a Panama Defense Forces roadblock.

Earlier, at the same checkpoint, the PDF detained a U.S. Naval officer and his wife. He was blindfolded and beaten. She was "sexually harassed" and threatened with rape, the incident that administration officials called the last straw.

"That was enough," Mr. Bush said yesterday in a televised speech at sunrise.

Senior administration sources said Mr. Bush decided at the Sunday brunch that Americans in Panama faced greater risk if he didn't act than if he sent in troops.

Alerts went out Sunday night to military forces involved in the plan, which Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said was in the vault when he took office. "It was one of the first items I was briefed on when I became secretary of defense last spring," he said.

Among those at the Sunday meeting were Messrs. Quayle, Baker, Cheney and Scowcroft, Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu.

After the decision was made, Mr. Bush received an uncorroborated intelligence report that Gen. Noriega "was considering launching an urban commando attack on American citizens," Mr. Baker said.

Most of the same advisers were at Tuesday's 3 p.m. meeting, along with Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and CIA Director William Webster. That session produced the official memo authorizing U.S. military forces to seize Gen. Noriega on drug charges.

On Tuesday evening at about 10 p.m., Mr. Bush personally began notifying House Speaker Thomas Foley and other congressional leaders. Congress and the administration agree that formal notice was not required to the intelligence committees, but Mr. Webster called Sen. William Cohen, senior Republican on the Senate panel, and reportedly made courtesy calls to other intelligence committee leaders.

The resourceful Mr. Sununu tracked Senate Democratic Leader George Mitchell to Mexico City, where he was dining with Mexico's Foreign Minister Fernando Solano Morales and Democratic Sens. Jim Sasser of Tennessee and Paul Sarbanes of Maryland. Mr. Mitchell went to the embassy and spoke to Mr. Bush on a secure phone, then flew

The Washington Post P.C. 11
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 21 Dec 1989

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Webster's CIA Days May Be Numbered

A high-level shuffle in the Bush administration is in the works for January, and it hinges on the resignation of William H. Webster as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Webster is a holdover from the Reagan administration. Our White House sources say that President Bush never intended to keep him on more than a year. Bush wanted to ensure continuity at the CIA and prove a principle he espoused 13 years ago when he was CIA director—that the job should have little to do with who occupies the Oval Office.

According to sources close to Bush, Webster's most likely replacement is Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser.

Scowcroft's replacement might well be James A. Baker III, who would add the duties of national security adviser without giving up his job as secretary of state. Once before, one man held both positions. He was Henry A. Kissinger.

Webster came into the CIA job in March 1987 as a breath of fresh air. The late William J. Casey ran the CIA like a band of outlaw cowboys, and Webster was just the person to polish the agency's image.

But he proved to be more cautious than the CIA wanted. Our CIA sources have complained constantly during Webster's tenure that he was too interested in pleasing Congress to rebuild the trust lost by the CIA's covert involvement in the Iran-contra scandal.

Webster was never Bush's choice for CIA director. Sources close to Bush say that he considered asking for Webster's resignation before the inauguration. But Bush decided he could live with Webster for a year.

Bush was CIA director under President Gerald R. Ford. At first, CIA employees feared he was a political hack, but he let them run the agency and became very popular. And he loved the job, so much so that when Jimmy Carter was elected in 1976, Bush hinted broadly that he wanted to stay. He said the office should have continuity, no matter who was in the White House. Carter replaced him anyway, with Stansfield Turner.

That made it a trifle hypocritical for Bush to replace a GOP appointee when he himself tried to hang on as CIA director in a change of parties.

Scowcroft is the odds-on favorite to replace Webster, but there is less certainty among our sources about who would replace Scowcroft. Besides the possibility of a dual role for Baker, two names being mentioned are Robert M. Gates and Richard L. Armitage.

Gates, the deputy national security adviser, is a former deputy CIA director who could have been appointed director in 1987 if not for his minor involvement in the Iran-contra affair.

Armitage, a former assistant secretary of defense, was nominated by Bush to be secretary of the Army, but he withdrew his name from consideration. He would have faced embarrassing questions at his Senate confirmation hearing about his role in the Iran-contra affair and about his friendship, which we first exposed, with a Vietnamese woman arrested for illegal gambling.

Gates and Armitage may be too controversial to pass the confirmation process for high-level posts, but the national security job does not require congressional approval.

The Washington Post A-31
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 21 DEC 89

'It Will Only Get Worse,' Bush Told Aides

Attacks on U.S. Servicemen Were Key Factor in Decision

By David Hoffman and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers

Several administration officials yesterday said the key factor in President Bush's decision to intervene militarily in Panama was the killing of a Marine lieutenant and the brutal harassment of a Navy officer and his wife in Panama—events officials concluded were part of a pattern that would only escalate.

"This guy is not going to lay off," Bush told his senior advisers on Sunday, referring to Panamanian leader Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega. "It will only get worse."

So Bush decided to launch the biggest American combat operation since the Vietnam War—the sort of military offensive that Bush himself had rejected as imprudent just two months ago. On Oct. 6, after the failed coup attempt against Noriega, Bush said that some people wanted him to "unleash the full military and go in and 'get Noriega.' . . . I suppose you could have gone to general quarters. But that's not prudent and that's not the way I plan to conduct the military or foreign affairs of this country."

Officials said Bush had been told that as many as 70 Americans could die in the operation, so last night's toll of 15 military personnel and one American civilian was far less than had been expected. However, the administration had planned on a swift capture of Noriega, not a sustained combat mission to find him, officials said.

Bush had been stung by criticism that he failed to move quickly enough to aid the plotters who tried to topple Noriega last October, as he had urged the Panama Defense Forces to do. The coup attempt ended suddenly as Bush was considering options to help the effort. At one point later, Bush angrily accused senators of tying his hands in Panama with restrictions on covert action there—a charge that his CIA director, William H. Webster, disputed.

The State Department yesterday disclosed another unexpected twist in the Bush administration's Panama policy. As a presidential candidate, Bush insisted last year that he would not plea-bargain with Noriega, who had been indicted on drug-running charges in Florida. But yesterday the State Department revealed that after the October coup attempt, U.S. officials met with Noriega's lawyer to discuss a deal: Noriega would give up power in Panama, and the United States would not seek his extradition to face trial in this country.

Bush moved, in part, out of what he has called his "enormous frustration" that more than two years of effort had failed to oust Noriega with diplomacy, covert action, economic sanctions and finally a coup attempt from within the Panamanian military.

He was ridiculed during last year's presidential campaign for the Reagan administration's apparent impotence against Noriega. Some of Bush's closest advisers also felt that President Ronald Reagan had erred by threatening Noriega but not acting against him.

A senior administration official said "the straw that broke the camel's back" for Bush was the apparent escalation of injury to and threats against Americans in Panama and Noriega's declaration of a state of war against the United States last week.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III said yesterday that after Bush decided to go ahead with the invasion, U.S. officials received an intelligence report that "Noriega was considering launching an urban commando attack on American citizens in a residential neighborhood." Baker said he could not "prove to you this report was absolutely reliable," but other officials said it was used to reinforce Bush's decision.

After a briefing from administration officials, Sen. John W. Warner (Va.), ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the intelligence report was that "as many as 250" paramilitary operatives were preparing to "attack designated segments of our civilians."

Another factor in Bush's decision, officials said, had been Noriega's declaration of hostility against the United States on Friday. In his statement, Noriega said, according to officials, "We the Panamanian people will sit along the banks of the canal to watch the dead bodies of our enemies pass by." The statement was followed by the violence against Americans over the weekend. Although officials at first played down these incidents, describing them as isolated, they subsequently concluded that because of Noriega's threat, the incidents were ominous.

According to officials, the Navy officer was brutally kicked and beaten at Panamanian military headquarters and his wife was repeatedly threatened with sexual abuse.

CONTINUED

In his address to the nation early yesterday, Bush mentioned this as his motive for deciding on the military action. According to an administration official, just before giving the speech from the Oval Office, Bush wrote in the text after a passage about the harassment and killing, "That was enough."

The military operation was plotted with characteristic secrecy. Only a few senior officials, including Baker, Vice President Quayle, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, Director of Central Intelligence Webster and Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were informed of the plan, officials said. Congressional leaders were informed only as the military operation got underway.

The plan was both supported and personally supervised by Powell, who served as Reagan's last national security adviser. Powell spent all night in the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon coordinating and overseeing the operational forces of the southern commander, Gen. Max Thurman.

Bush decided to go ahead with the invasion on Sunday. According to a written statement provided by White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater, Bush met with his national security advisers Sunday afternoon in the residence for about an hour and a half.

On Monday, Bush was tight-lipped about his plans. When asked in an interview with news service reporters whether he intended to respond to the killing of the Marine lieutenant, Bush said it was an "enormous outrage" and added, "Presidents have options, but they don't discuss what they might be."

Bush held another meeting Tuesday afternoon, Fitzwater said, in which he was given an hour-by-hour review of the planned invasion by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. Bush outwardly tried to carry on a normal schedule, and attended a White House reception for the news media and political friends.

At midnight Tuesday, according to the written account, the so-called Deputies Committee of the National Security Council met to monitor the military operation. Bush arrived back in the Oval Office about 1 a.m., and spent most of the night calling members of Congress and world leaders. Bush watched on television in his study as the invasion was announced to the news media, and he made notes on blue presidential notepads as he called people, Fitzwater said.

After a few hours' sleep, Bush returned to the Oval Office for the 7:40 a.m. nationally televised address.

Officials said Bush was privately disappointed that Noriega had not been captured as of last evening. They said he telephoned Guillermo Endara, winner of the May 7 election, who was sworn in yesterday as Panama's president.

Quayle telephoned the country's first vice president, Ricardo Arias Calderon, and second vice president Guillermo "Billy" Ford. Quayle said he "looked forward to visiting them in a free, liberated Panama," according to spokesman David Beckwith.

Quayle is planning to visit Honduras Jan. 27, and an official said consideration is being given to a Panama visit as well.

Staff researcher Bruce Brown contributed to this report.

Fighting in Panama: Statements in Washington

The President

Excerpts From Bush's News Conference on Central America

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 — Following are excerpts from President Bush's news conference at the White House this afternoon, as provided by the Federal News Service, a transcription company:



The New York Times/Paul Hosefros

President Bush declared the military phase of the Panama operation "pretty well wrapped up." With him at a news conference were John H. Sununu, left, and Brent Scowcroft.

OPENING STATEMENT

. . .

Well, our efforts to support the democratic processes in Panama and to insure continued safety of American citizens is now moving into its second day. I'm gratified by the decision and effect of the precision and the effectiveness of the military forces in achieving their objectives. I'm pleased that the Endara Government is taking charge, and they made several appointments today — starting to govern the country.

The young men and women involved in the exercise have demonstrated the highest standards of courage and excellence in defending America's interest and protecting American life. They have been outstanding. In carrying out the mission of our nation, there has been and they have sustained a tragic loss of life. Military casualties are a burden which a nation must endure and all presidents have to face up to, but which we can never accept.

. . .

This operation is not over, but it's pretty well wrapped up. And we've moved aggressively to neutralize the P.D.F., to provide a stable environment for the freely elected Endara Government — and I mentioned that. It helps to insure the integrity of the Panama Canal and to create an environment that is safe for American citizens.

General Noriega is no longer in power. He no longer commands the instruments of government or the forces of repression that he's used for so long to brutalize the Panamanian people. And we are continuing the efforts to apprehend him, see that he's brought to justice.

I appreciate the support that we've received, strong support from the United States Congress, from our Latin American neighbors, from our allies, from the American people. And it's always difficult to order forces into battle, but that difficulty is mitigated by the moral and personal support that is granted by our friends and allies.

You've received detailed briefings from the Pentagon on the logistical aspects, and I might say that I think Dick Cheney and Colin Powell have done — and ably assisted by others — have done an outstanding job of keeping the American people informed. I wanted you to know that as we move into the days ahead, we will continue to support the Endara Government, to help establish stability in the country, to allow those desires for freedom and democracy to flourish.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

alties. Did you expect them to be so high on both sides? . . . Is it really worth it to send people to their death for this? To get Noriega?

A. We had some estimates, Helen, on the casualties ahead of time, but not in numbers. I mean, it was more general; that, 'Look, Mr. President, no way can you do an operation this large and not have American casualties.' So the Defense Department was very up front with us about that. And every human life is precious, and yet I have to answer, yes, it has been worth it. . . .

The Decision to Use Force

Q. A few months ago, you said your recommendation of the Pentagon — to be sure that we minimized the loss of life on both sides and that we took out the P.D.F., which we did, took it out promptly.

And so I would like to think that what I said some time ago still stands. I'm not sure what's left on the ground in terms of people, but what David Hoffman is referring to is that I said our argument was not with the P.D.F., but with Noriega, and if they would get rid of him and recognize a democratically elected government, we could go back to more normalized relations. We've done that, but we have to see who emerges in the P.D.F. But I would like to repeat here

that we have no continuing ax to grind with

military are satisfied and recommend to the President that they be withdrawn. I want them out of there as soon as possible.

Q. Mr. President, just to follow up, if I could, sir. In the planning of this operation, surely you must have recognized that these actions would be needed and some force would have to be on the ground there for awhile. What estimate did you have, as you undertook this operation, as to how long it would take?

A. Brit, no day — number of day estimate was given to me. I think everyone recognized some of that would depend on when Noriega was brought to justice, some of that dependent on how a restructured P.D.F. behaved.

sending a letter today to the Senate to coordinate with the War Powers Act? They have the ——

A. I don't know whether it goes today, but . . . notification of the Congress will be done in accordance with our policy. This is the last one.

Reaction to Soviet Criticism

Q. Have the Soviets — the Soviets have criticized very sharply this distinction of yours to the point of saying they're going forward and the United States is going backwards. What is your reaction to this?

A. My reaction is I need to get on a wire there — in a telegram or something — explain this to Mr. Gorbachev. It's not alto-

Goal of Capturing Noriega

Q. Mr. President, one of your major objectives was to get Noriega. Are you frustrated that he got away? How long will you keep on chasing him? And are you confident that you'll get him?

A. I've been frustrated that he's been in power this long — extraordinarily frustrated. The good news: He's out of power. The bad news: He has not yet been brought to justice. . . . The good news, though, is that the government's beginning to function, and the man controls no forces, and he's out. But, yes, I won't be satisfied until we see him come to justice.

Q. How long will you keep up your full-scale pursuit?

A. As long as it takes.

The Cost of Human Casualties

Q. Mr. President, you did mention the casualties that were not with the P.D.F., not with the Panamanian people, but with Noriega only. You also said only a month ago that you didn't think it would be prudent to launch a large-scale military operation. What changed your mind, and particularly why did you opt for the maximum use of force in this situation?

A. I think what changed my mind was the events that I cited in briefing the American people on this yesterday: the death of the marine; the brutalizing, really obscene torture of the Navy lieutenant; and the threat of sexual abuse and the terror inflicted on that Navy lieutenant's wife; the declaration of war by Noriega; the fact that our people down there felt that they didn't know where this was going and they weren't sure what all that meant and whether that meant we could guarantee the safety of Americans there. And so I made a decision to move and to move with enough force — this was the need loyal troops who recognize the constitution and the fairness and the legitimacy of his election.

Prospect of Military Occupation

Q. Mr. President, in light of what you've said about the Endara Government getting started, the need for stability, the need for some kind of police action down there, we really are in a kind of an open-ended military occupation there, aren't we, sir?

A. Well, I wouldn't say it's open-ended, except it's open-ended as far as going after Noriega — open-ended in terms of the restoration of order in Panama, cleaning up a few elements — ragtag elements of this so-called Dignity Battalion. If you ever talk about a misnomer, that's it — Dignity Battalion — going after them. The P.D.F. units have pretty — been rolled up. But, we will keep whatever force is necessary there until our

Efforts to Free Americans

Q. Mr. President, what do you know about Americans held against their will, and what are you doing now to free them?

A. I'm looking for help on that because we don't have a count. And if there are a lot of them, we don't know about it. But, I just had a briefing — I don't know whether Cheney's still here.

Q. Well, the Pentagon said, sir, there were 12 open cases.

A. Well, I'll tell you, that included probably those Smithsonian people who have now been released, and I think there may have been 9 or 10 of those. So — but, I'd just have to get Marlin to get back to you.

. . .

Letter on War Powers Act

Q. This is a very mild question. Are you gether surprising that he doesn't understand some of the special arrangements that the United States has in Panama. It's not surprising that he doesn't fully understand that this freely elected man had been deprived of the democracy, and I also need to let him know . . . if they kill an American marine, that's real bad. And if they threaten and brutalize the wife of an American citizen, sexually threatening the lieutenant's wife while kicking him in the groin over and over again, then, Mr. Gorbachev, please understand, this President is going to do something about it.

. . .

Earlier Contacts With China

Q. Mr. President, we now find out that last summer when we thought that your policy was no contact with the Chinese Government, that you sent a high-level delegation there to talk to them. Don't you feel that American people deserve to know that when you say something not's happening, that it's really not happening?

A. Yes, I do think they do, but I didn't say that. I said no high-level exchanges. So, please look at it carefully.

Q. But you didn't tell us that this was happening ——

A. Well, but — no, I feel no obligation to do that. I feel an obligation to keep you informed, but I have an obligation as President to conduct the foreign policy of this country the way I see fit, reporting under the law to the United States Congress. You could say, "How come you didn't tell me that you were going down to invade the — send in those troops down into Panama?" Because I didn't want to take a chance the information would get out. That is the responsibility of a President, and I will continue to exercise it while having 37 press conferences next year.

Q. Does that mean all kinds of other secret diplomatic missions going on around that we have no idea?

A. Maybe not of that magnitude, but there's a lot going on. There's a lot of going on that, in the conduct of the foreign policy or a debate within the U.S. Government, has to be sorted out without the spotlight of the news. There has to be that way. The whole opening to China would never have happened . . . if Kissinger hadn't undertaken that mission. It would have fallen apart. So you have to use your own judgment.

And you've got your job, and that is to find out absolutely everything you can — careful, I'm sure — most of you are about legitimate national security concerns; but I have mine. And that is to conduct the foreign policy of this country the way I think best. If the American people don't like it, I expect they'll get somebody else to take my job, but I'm going to keep doing it, and we've had a very open Administration — very.

But once in a while, if I go to try to set up a meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, we've got people here who scream, who say, "You should have told us that the day you wrote the letter to him." I don't agree with that, and I was elected so I'm going to keep on trying to do this with an openness — I hope, a new openness — but also, the right of a President to conduct his business — in this case of Panama, to safeguard the lives of American kids.

And the other one — to go and see what happens. I know how China works — see what we can do, make a representation of how strongly we feel against human rights abuse, but see what it's going to take to go forward.

Thank you all.

The Pentagon

Excerpts From Briefings on the Military Action in Panama

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21 — Following are excerpts from briefings on the Panama invasion given this afternoon at the Pentagon by the Defense Department spokesman, Pete Williams, and by Lieut. Gen. Thomas W. Kelly and Adm. Ted Sheafer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as provided by the Federal News Service, a transcription company:

THE STATEMENTS

Hunt for Noriega

WILLIAMS. Let me just give you a brief overview of where we stand as of today at noon. As General Kelly and Admiral Sheafer and the Secretary and the Chairman all said yesterday, the President and Secretary Baker, the organized resistance by the P.D.F., by the Panamanian Defense Forces, has ceased at this point, so the objective for today is to support President Endara, rather, in his efforts to establish a lawful Panamanian government. To support that objective, U.S. forces are moving into Panama City to help establish order.

. . .

The search for General Noriega continues, as you know. There have been a large number of sightings, and they're all being looked at. The department is investigating those reports and exploiting information that is developing from a variety of sources. And for obvious intelligence reasons, we can't go into detail on all those sources.

. . .

The Casualties

In terms of Americans who are held against their will, we are investigating each of those reports as quickly as possible, and as quickly as we can make forces available for that. We've had about a dozen such reports. Three of them are still considered actively being pursued, and that includes the Smithsonian employees from San Blas Island, it includes Jon Meyersohn, the CBS News producer. We take them all very seriously. And we will continue to provide details on the resolution of those situations as they become available.

As for the latest casualty figures, 19 killed in action, 117 wounded, and 1 missing. Now, I would caution you, as always, that these figures are subject to change — we do our best. But, I can only report those to you that we have confirmed at this point.

. . .

The Day's Objectives

Our objectives for today are primarily threefold. One is to continue to support the establishment of a democratic government in Panama. Second, to move into Panama City and restore order there, where most of the disorder appears to be. And the third one is to continue to track Mr. Noriega in an effort to capture him.

Yesterday, we had a situation with the radio station that was operating. That is no longer operating — it's off the air.

We had some individuals at the Marriott Hotel who felt threatened. Last night, the 82d Airborne went and secured them and actually, today, evacuated them from the Marriott Hotel. And they are en route to Tocumen Airport. To the best of our knowledge, none of them are injured. There were a total, when we got there, of 29 U.S. civilians and an additional 35 foreign nationals. I would assume most of them are Panamanian.

. . .

The Reinforcements

As far as people in Panama City who are armed, both Dignity Battalions and some Panama Defense Force individuals, they are in that city. We are moving in today to get them.

The reinforcements have all arrived in Panama — the major reinforcements. We'll constantly have little things going in and out.

But the 7th Infantry Division closed this morning, and the 16th M.P. Brigade closed this morning, so both of them are available to the Commander. He is very interested, of course, in both of those units, but the 16th M.P. Brigade will give him a command and control capability to perform some police functions in Panama City insofar as rounding people up and disarming them are concerned.

. . .

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. General, what specifically are you doing about the missing Americans?

KELLY. We are trying to find out where all of them are. We have a lot of reports. Some of the reports will prove to be true; some will prove not to be true. The primary mission for the forces we're moving into Panama City today is to find and protect the lives of Americans. You know, we may have reports of 20, 30, 40 or some number who are being held against their will or are in a place where they feel threatened. The fact is there are thousands of Americans in Panama City, and we've got to be concerned about all of them.

. . .

Q. General, could you describe in a little more detail the situation on the streets of Panama City right now? Is there sniper fire? Are there firefights going on right now?

KELLY. There is some shooting going on in Panama City. As a matter of fact, when the Airborne went to the hotel, the Marriott Hotel, to get the individuals out of there, there was some shooting from the roofs, there were some people who were clad in black who looked like they might have been. . . the Panamanian Special Forces. We do know that there are Dignity Battalion people in Panama City who are armed in the streets. Interestingly, the people down there, the individuals down there, got a phone call from Noriega's brother-in-law. I don't have his name. Do you have his name?

Q. General, we understand that the Nicaraguan and Cuban embassies have been surrounded by U.S. forces. Is that correct, and if so, why?

KELLY. The Nicaraguan and Cuban embassies are under surveillance by U.S. forces, they have not been surrounded by U.S. forces. The reason for that, of course, is that's a place where Noriega might elect to go and one of our top priorities is catching Mr. Noriega.

Q. Do you believe he may be there now?

KELLY. I do not. Do you, Ted?

SHEAFER. No, we have no good reason to believe that he's in either place.

. . .

Q. General, given the situation, how long do you think United States forces are going to stay in Panama?

KELLY. As I said yesterday, I don't think this is a long-term operation for the reinforcements. I don't think they'll be there months or years, but we don't have time lines. They will probably be there a period of time. They'll be there long enough to get the job done.

Q. General, how are you spreading the word about the bounty on Noriega in Panama and have you had any nibbles for that bounty yet? . . .

SHEAFER. We've had lots of nibbles. . . . part of the problem is, in trying to track Noriega is when the award was announced, suddenly the number of reports on his location has gone up dramatically. A lot of it turns out to be very bogus.

Q. General, do you have any breakdown on the American dead and wounded, how many from gunshot wounds and how many from helicopter crashes or jump injuries?

KELLY. I do not.

. . .

Q. Admiral, do you believe that Noriega is commanding any sort of a force now, or is he operating by himself, or do you have any — any ——

SHEAFER. I wouldn't want to go into very many details, but no, we don't think he is effectively commanding anything at this time.

BOUNTY FOR NORIEGA

"Part of the problem is, in trying to track Noriega is when the award was announced, suddenly the number of reports on his location has gone up dramatically."

ADM. TED SHEAFER

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune
AP
Date 22DEC89

WASHINGTON TODAY: He's Talkative But Secretive, Open But Closed
By MIKE FEINSILBER
Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON (AP) - George Bush, the most public of presidents, is surely among the most private of presidents, too. He meets anyone and travels anywhere yet he acts alone, surprising the world - and his own closest advisers.

He is his own secretary of state, his own director of Central Intelligence, his own China expert, his own national security adviser.

He is such a product of government - the House, the Republican National Committee, the CIA, the United Nations, the embassy in Beijing, the vice presidency - that he does not need advice from the professionals who surround him. He was there first.

``George Bush is very comfortable with himself,'' says Clemson University political scientist Charles Dunn, an observer of presidents. ``He has a good sense of person, of who he is. He is not awed by the Oval Office or by the press.''

Moreover, says Dunn, secrecy has worked for Bush. ``He has thrived by exceeding, at least modestly, the level of expectations for himself,'' Dunn says.

Bush says that's the way he is, take it or get someone else.

``You've got your job,'' he told reporters Thursday afternoon. ``... But I have mine. And that is to conduct the foreign policy of this country the way I think best. If the American people don't like it, I expect they'll get somebody else to take my job.''

``Bush doesn't like handlers,'' says Fred Greenstein of Princeton University. ``He's going to do it his way.''

Bush's tendency to look inward showed up even before he won office.

His most important political decision was the choice of a running mate. He made the selection of Dan Quayle by himself and kept it to himself.

Last June, he decided to propose a summit conference to Mikhail Gorbachev in December and kept it under his hat.

He sent Brent Scowcroft off to China and had it announced at 2 a.m. on a Sunday morning, astonishing even the China experts on his team.

Later it came out that Scowcroft made a similar trip in July when Bush was publicly isolating China for the terror at Tiananmen Square.

When reporters complained Thursday that he had misled them, Bush at first fell back on a seeming technicality. ``I said no `high level exchanges' (had taken place. So please look at it carefully,'' he told reporters.

Questioned further about his decision to keep the secret, he

said, ``I have an obligation as president to conduct the foreign policy of this country the way I see fit.''

Without asking the CIA for advice, Bush decided in October to sit out an attempted coup against Panama's Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega.

Then, in maximum possible secrecy, on Sunday afternoon he decided to commit armed forces to the biggest U.S. military operation since Vietnam.

Yet this keep-a-secret president is among the most talkative of presidents. He conducts so many news conferences that reporters run out of questions.

Someone who counted up early this month determined that Bush had held 105 one-on-one meetings with presidents, prime ministers and kings. Those he hasn't seen, he's telephoned. If he hasn't, he will.

Greenstein, chairman of Princeton's politics department, says he sees another aspect in Bush - an occasional ``spasm of impulsiveness.''

He cites Bush's ``hotdogging at Malta'' - his decision to ride a cutter through rough seas - and his determination to attend a hemispheric drug summit in Colombia, where drug producers have put a $30 million price on his head.

Other presidents have been secretive, and as Bush pointed out they have to be when planning a military operation. The public understands.

Some secrets are political. Harry Truman called a special session of Congress from the rostrum of the 1948 Democratic National Convention without telling anyone beforehand. Lyndon Johnson astonished his closest advisers by tacking his announcement that he would not seek re-election in 1968 to the end of a Sunday night television speech on Vietnam.

Bush, even while flying to the Republican convention in 1988, didn't tell most of his political advisers that he had chosen a little-known senator as his running mate. When he made the announcement upon landing, jaws dropped.

Presidential secrecy can be risky, says Greenstein, but so can consultation.

``Students of decision making say that solitary decision-makers are likely to miss some facet of the problem; they're bound to have some blind spots,'' he says.

On the other hand, he says, ``like-minded people can become isolated,'' locking out of the process all who are likely to disagree while reassuring one another of their astuteness.

Dunn agrees to this extent: presidents who want support when their decisions go sour had better confide in advisers in advance.

He cites an adage: ``If you want me with you on the landing, make sure I'm with you on the takeoff.''

EDITOR'S NOTE: Mike Feinsilber has been covering events in Washington for 20 years.

AP-NY-12-22-89 0055EST+

Bush Defends Sending Secret Mission to China

WP 12-22-89 A27

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush yesterday defended his decision to send a secret mission to China after the administration announced it had broken off contacts with Beijing, saying that if the "American people don't like it, I expect they'll get somebody else to take my job."

At a news conference, Bush also altered the public explanation of why he dispatched national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger to Beijing over the July 4 weekend, less than a month after the bloody Tiananmen Square massacre of student protesters.

"I know how China works," Bush said, adding that the objective of the secret Scowcroft-Eagleburger mission was to "see what we can do, make a representation of how strongly we feel against the human-rights abuse, but see what it's going to take to go forward."

After CNN uncovered the July mission this week, the White House confirmed it and said its purpose was to protest the crackdown to the Chinese. No mention was made of talks aimed at resuming normal relations with China.

The July meeting between the senior U.S. officials and Chinese leaders took place even though the administration had announced only days before that it was ending all "exchanges" with Chinese leaders because of the bloodshed in Tiananmen Square. A second trip to China, also by Scowcroft and Eagleburger, was made over the Dec. 2-3 weekend and was announced as it began, creating a storm of controversy.

Bush seized on the administration's now standard explanation that the news media misunderstood the announcement of an end to high-level exchanges with China in retaliation for the crackdown. The announcement was widely interpreted as an end to "contacts" between senior officials of the two countries, an impression the White House never sought to alter until this week.

Bush said he never told the public all contacts with high government officials in China were being cut off. "I said high-level exchanges," Bush noted, and added a vigorous defense of his right to conduct aspects of foreign policy in secret.

"I feel no obligation to do that," Bush said when asked if the public should have been told that his aides were meeting with the Chinese. "I have an obligation as president to conduct the foreign policy of this country the way I see fit," he said.

The president said the conduct of foreign policy and internal administration debates over policy have "to be sorted out without the spotlight of the news."

"I feel an obligation to keep you informed" and to report to Congress, but only on aspects of foreign policy that he believes should be revealed, Bush said. The president drew a parallel between the invasion of Panama on Wednesday with the secret mission to China, suggesting both were secrets the press had wanted to publicize before the events took place.

Bush compared last July's secret China mission to the 1972 secret mission to China of then-national security adviser Henry A. Kissinger as examples of secret diplomacy that led to American foreign policy successes.

"The whole opening to China would never have happened if Kissinger hadn't undertaken that mission," Bush said. In defending his efforts to resume U.S. relations with China despite the crackdown and repression against pro-democracy forces, Bush has said it is not in the strategic interests of the United States for China to remain isolated.

INVASION...CONTINUED

decided to attack Panama.

Noriega's declaration of a "state of war," the killing of a Marine on Saturday and the brutal interrogation of a Navy lieutenant and his wife were fresh on Bush's mind. He felt responsible for the 35,000 Americans living in Panama.

From the beginning, catching Noriega was the focus of Bush's plan, said White House officials.

Though the President has denied it, military teams went in before the strike to try to find the general. They staked out his beach house, a mountain retreat and other "safe houses."

John Bushnell, the senior American diplomat in Panama at the time of the invasion, told reporters that U.S. forces attacked several Noriega hideouts as the invasion began. Defense officials said four Navy Seals were killed when they stormed Noriega's private Learjet at an airport outside Panama City.

Noriega, a former chief of Panamanian intelligence, may have been able to evade capture because of tips he received either from Soviet or Cuban intelligence, defense officials said. He may also have been aided by former U.S. intelligence operatives now working for him, they said.

With the adrenalin rush of the invasion subsiding, White House officials say they are troubled by the ambivalence of the Panamanian people at their rescue. There is concern also that the first steps of Guillermo Endara's new government have been weak.

"Frankly, we assumed you'd have more of an Eastern European situation where people were so happy to see a despot out of power that there would be an enormous show of popular support for a democratically elected alternative," said a White House official.

"Instead, you have anti-American sentiment, disorder created by the power vacuum and a government off to a very slow start, both in terms of internal support and support from other countries," the official added. "This probably would not have happened if we got Noriega."

Though the attack is being depicted as a sign of a new, daring Bush, administration officials say it was in keeping with his reputation for caution.

"We as a government bent over backwards to avoid having to take military action," said Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. "I think the record is replete with the patience and forbearance of the United States government in this instance.

"When it reached the point where it was clear that Gen. Noriega had created an environment in which his troops felt free to terrorize and brutalize Americans who had every legitimate and lawful right to be in Panama, that was a fundamentally different set of circumstances," he added.

A White House official said the decision to use "maximum force" was, at heart, cautious. It guaranteed military success, though American involvement might drag on.

Bush discarded a minimum-force option that would have had a commando team nab or kill Noriega, said the official. That carried a greater risk of total failure and could have generated even more foreign condemnation. If Noriega got away, he would have also been free to retaliate against Americans in Panama.

As U.S. troops scour the country for Noriega, and pockets of resistance flare up, administration officials emphasized that the invasion plan itself was becoming a thing of the past. The United States must now deal with the situation as it evolves — a situation it created, but doesn't totally control.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER DEC. 23, 1989 Pg. F1

Plans laid, President moved quickly

By Jack Nelson
Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON — George Bush, accompanied by only a tiny handful of senior advisers, broke away from a small pre-Christmas brunch at the White House last Sunday to make the loneliest decision of his presidency: To order a military assault on the regime of Panamanian strongman Manuel A. Noriega.

As Bush and his aides huddled, U.S. intelligence showed that the outlook for capturing Noriega was chancy at best, and the loss of American and Panamanian lives almost certain. But senior aides said that the President did not hesitate.

"Enough is enough," Bush declared.

The decision, which aides said was highly personal, reflected Bush's determination not to allow the Noriega regime, which had been tainted by drug-dealing and increasingly violent acts against Americans, to remain in power, regardless of the costs.

From the outset of the highly secret, 30-minute meeting, Bush made it clear that what he wanted was not a "surgical strike" against Noriega personally but a full-scale attack on the entire Noriega regime and the Panama Defense Forces, which had kept him in power despite two years of U.S. pressure and plotting.

"The President was saying, 'We don't want to do it piecemeal,'" one official said.

Among the small group attending Sunday's meeting were Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Vice President Quayle.

The meeting came just at the end of a holiday brunch that Bush and his wife, Barbara, had hosted for a group of administration officials and their spouses, including



PLANS. . . CONTINUED

Quayle and his wife, Marilyn.

A Department of Defense official said Bush "had to make a fundamental decision: Did we want to have enough people needed for such an operation in place and jeopardize Noriega finding out? Or did we want to risk an operation that failed because of insufficient troops and equipment? That, too, might have failed to get Noriega. . . ."

There was never any question about which option the President wanted, aides said.

One factor in Bush's decision to opt for maximum force instead of a surgical strike, according to members of Congress who were briefed on the operation by administration officials, was intelligence reports that Noriega had a 250-member paramilitary unit poised to attack what Sen. John W. Warner (R., Va.) described as "a designated segment of Americans in their housing units."

Such intelligence reports were unconfirmed but had to be taken seriously, Secretary of State Baker said.

•

Bush was described by one top official as "deeply disturbed" by recent events in Panama, including the killing of a U.S. Marine officer, the abuse of a U.S. naval officer and his wife, and Noriega's increasingly bellicose statements, including his declaration of "a state of war" against the United States.

"The scuttlebutt I hear is that the sexual abuse of the Navy officer's wife sent Bush up the wall," said former Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams.

Last Saturday night, Panama Defense Forces soldiers fired on a car carrying four U.S. military officers, killing one and wounding another. After the shooting, PDF soldiers also repeatedly beat and kicked a naval officer and abused his wife.

Although concern was expressed within the administration about the possible loss of life and the potential for Americans to be taken hostage, once Bush had decided, officials moved quickly to execute a detailed contingency plan that had been developed weeks earlier.

•

Weeks ago, members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees were told that a new invasion plan had been adopted and that the administration was simply waiting for an opportunity to put it into effect.

Some key members of Congress were surprised when the administration failed to move immediately after the Panamanian legislature, on Dec. 15, declared itself to be in a state of war with the United States.

Bush's decision, a tightly guarded secret in Washington, was kept even from Republican congressional leaders until about 10 p.m. Tuesday — just hours before the assault began.

Even some senior officials involved in the operation did not learn of the decision until Monday morning, when they were told with the instruction to keep the matter in utmost secrecy.

John H. Sununu, White House chief of staff, learned of the decision at his regular meeting at 8:15 a.m. Monday with Bush, Quayle and Scowcroft.

That meeting usually lasts only 30 minutes. Monday, it lasted about an hour and 15 minutes.

And it was during the course of Monday morning that Bush and his aides fleshed out decisions on the details of implementing the contingency plan — when and where the invasion would take place.

Outwardly, Bush and other officials in on the plan took pains to go about most of their business to avoid an atmosphere of crisis.

The President called a meeting for 2 p.m. Tuesday that he billed as a session to discuss "the use of the military in the war on drugs," said one source, and it was at that meeting that several senior officials learned for the first time that the military assault would be launched.

Tuesday night, Bush and his wife hosted a Christmas party at the White House for staff members, and the President stayed until 9 p.m.

Also, Cheney attended a round of holiday parties and social events Tuesday night and did not return to the Pentagon until around 10 p.m. Just before midnight, Cheney joined Gen. Powell in the Pentagon's Current Situation Room, a windowless chamber filled with communications gear and computer-generated maps that is used for monitoring military crises.


There, the two remained in continuous contact with the operation through the night, using an open line to Gen. Maxwell Thurman, the Southern Command's senior officer, and his operational planning staff.

About 10 p.m. Tuesday, Bush and Quayle began telephoning congressional leaders and informing them of the impending attack.

About 11 p.m., Bush and Quayle began telephoning leaders of other countries. The President reportedly called President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico and several European leaders.

Quayle telephoned Latin American leaders he has met on recent overseas trips, according to an official who said that one Latin American head of state, whom he declined to identify, told the vice president that Noriega "was asking for it."

Meetings of administration officials, including a special "deputies committee" established to handle international crises, continued throughout Tuesday night and Wednesday.



The Washington Post
The New York Times A9
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 24 DEC 1989

The President

Doing the Inevitable

Bush Reportedly Felt That Noriega 'Was Thumbing His Nose at Him'

By MAUREEN DOWD
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23 — President Bush offered no high-flown reflections and did no last-minute agonizing as he made the decision to invade Panama last Sunday, officials who were with him at the time say.

"Let's do it," he said, as he looked somberly at the top advisers sitting in a circle in the office of his White House residence.

Even before this, advisers said in a series of interviews this week, there had been a sense of inevitability around the White House for the last two months, since the Administration had been criticized for an ineffectual response to the failed Panamanian coup attempt on Oct. 3.

"We suspected that the President felt after the coup that sooner or later we would have to do this," a senior White House adviser said.

Another counselor with close White House ties agreed that, while Mr. Bush did not believe that he had erred by not ordering a major American involvement in October, he also felt that the Panamanian military leader, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, "was thumbing his nose at him." The President felt that General Noriega was getting more and more abusive and that at some point he would have to be dealt with, the counselor said.

Moreover, advisers said, Mr. Bush felt that he and his foreign policy team had been unfairly depicted in the press and Congress as lethargic and indecisive.

So the picture that emerges of the President at the moment of his biggest foreign policy gamble is that of a chief executive prepared by personal inclination and outside pressures to strike.

Characteristically, it was made in secret with a handful of trusted officials, in a time frame that allowed him to feel that he had properly sorted out his options. And it reflected the President's competitive side, his ability to come up with the big play when his back is against the wall.

"It was revealing because it showed Bush's caution and delay in making decisions and it also showed his willingness to finally pull the trigger," a top Administration official said.

Mr. Bush's advisers clearly were trying to show the President in the best light this week. But even in their partisan accounts one theme seems strikingly clear: This was a massive military action staged largely on the basis of Mr. Bush's visceral feelings about the Panamanian leader and a conviction that diplomatic means had been exhausted.

As he sat in his office in the residence last Sunday afternoon, wearing a blue blazer and gray slacks that he had donned for an earlier White House brunch for family and close friends, the President asked a few questions of Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Gen. Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

They sat beneath Mr. Bush's favorite painting, "The Peacemakers," depicting President Lincoln and his generals meeting near the end of a war that was the bloodiest in American history, with a hopeful rainbow in the distance.

"The President," recalled one of the men who was there, basically said, 'Look, here are my objectives: I want to get Noriega. I want to be able to have Endara and Calderón and Ford establish themselves as leaders of a democratically established government. I want to, as a result of that, insure the safety of American lives. How can I do that?' "

As he listened to the complex plans and examined the charts outlining a military attack, Mr. Bush asked at one point why the military could not simply conduct a surgical strike and remove General Noriega without going to large-scale combat.

An Unrealistic Option

His military advisers, who had been refining invasion plans for weeks, told him it was not a realistic option. If the strike did not work and you failed to get the elusive general, you achieved nothing, they argued, but if you went into Panama with full force, you achieved the objective of taking him out of power even if you did not catch him.

And, General Powell stressed, it could take a while to catch him, given his dexterity with fake mortorcades and fake helicopter movements to cover his tracks.

The President said he understood. But he returned several times to the potential for casualities among American soldiers and Panamanian civilians in an operation that would be concentrated in densely populated urban areas.

"I think he wanted to assure himself that the plan was practical and had a good chance of success," an adviser said. "He was concerned that it was such a complex movement and that we'd be trying to move military troops around in an urban area with a lot of gunfire."

In the end, after an hour and a half of dicussion of logistics, the room grew quiet and the President looked down and then up. He said he felt that if they did not stop him, the pushing and shoving with the Panamanian dictator would only intensify. "It will only get worse," he said, adding that they should go ahead.

An added factor was the poisonous chemistry between Mr. Bush and General Noriega, who knew each other from their mutual connection with the Central Intelligence Agency and from a personal meeting in 1983, when Mr. Bush visited Panama as Vice President.

In the 1988 Presdential campaign, General Noriega's name became shorthand for doubts about Mr. Bush's judgment, since Mr. Bush was criticized by the Democrats for not taking a more active role in limiting United States dealings with the Panamanian while at the C.I.A.

General Noriega seemed to be the same sort of treacherous irritant for Mr. Bush that Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran was for President Carter and the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, was for President Reagan.

Mr. Bush's decision to move against the adversary whose tactics and thinking were partly shaped, just as the President's were, by his C.I.A. training, repeated a familiar pattern with this President.

'Best When His Dander Is Up'

His supporters said the decision showed that, as Mr. Bush's former speechwriter, Christopher Buckley put, it, "George Bush is at his best when his dander is up." His critics said the decision showed that, by waiting until he was prodded, Mr. Bush would always create complications for himself.

"Panama was not as clean for George Bush as Grenada was for Ronald Reagan," said Geoffrey Garin, a Democratic consultant. "Reagan was the master of the moment. Bush always seems to be pushed by events."

"If we see a picture of Noriega laughing on the beach someday, it will be the functional equivalent for George Bush of the crashed helicopters in the desert for Jimmy Carter," he said.

"The mission was the right thing to do, but if Noriega gets away, what people will remember is that it didn't work quite right."

At 3 P.M. on Tuesday, the President called the inner circle into the Oval Office to determine who would do what as "the zero hour," as one adviser called the 1 A.M. invasion time, approached.

This time, the Director of Central Intelligence, William H. Webster, and Attorney General Dick Thornburgh joined the group from Sunday: Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d; Vice President Dan Quayle; John H. Sununu, the White House chief of staff; Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser; his deputy, Robert M. Gates; Defense Secretary Cheney; General Powell; Lieut. Gen. Thomas W. Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs; and Marlin Fitzwater, the White House press secretary.


'Time Lines' Handed Out

Mr. Scowcroft gave everyone their "time lines," pieces of paper listing tasks to be done from 6 P.M. to 1 A.M.

Mr. Bush finished his afternoon appointments and at 6 P.M. returned to the residence, where he began to call Congressional leaders. At 6:30, wearing a bright red and green Christmas tie, he stood in a receiving line for half at hour at one of a series of White House Christmas parties.


At about 9 P.M., Mr. Bush went upstairs and took charge of the diplomatic end of things, calling the heads of state of Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Argentina, Colombia, Japan, Britain, France, Spain and Canada.

The President arrived back at the Oval Office at 12:30 A.M., still wearing his dress slacks from the party, but with a blue V-necked sweater on over his shirt. He stayed in his small study off the Oval Office, with the television on CNN, continuing to make calls and take notes on a small blue White House pad. He kept track of the reports from the Situation Room, as the Vice President, Mr. Baker, Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Sununu ducked in and out until 4 A.M., when the President went to bed for a couple of hours before his 7 A.M. address to the nation.



FORREST ANDERSON—GAMMA LIAISON

Strongman Deng Xiaoping greeting presidential envoy Scowcroft



ANDERSON—GAMMA LIAISON

Dissident Fang Lizhi earlier this year

Bush the Riverboat Gambler

His China overture risks a congressional backlash unless Beijing responds

This time, by golly, no one would call George Bush timid. Quite the contrary, the President made a rare appearance as Bush the riverboat gambler. By sending a high-level delegation to Beijing to confer with Chinese authorities who only six months earlier had ordered the massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators near Tiananmen Square, Bush knew he would stir up a hurricane of outraged protest. And for what? The slender chance that China would respond with concessions that could begin to melt the ice in U.S. relations with the world's most populous nation.

A week after the return of the envoys, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, the White House is still waiting for that payoff. The Chinese leaders did promise not to sell missiles to Middle Eastern countries. That, however, was merely a repetition of a pledge first made more than a year ago. China also agreed to let a Voice of America reporter into the country for the first time since July. But if those are the only results of the Scowcroft-Eagleburger mission, it will not lower the criticism a decibel.


The criticism may well be the angriest the Bush White House has heard. Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, using an image taken up by many other critics, accused Bush of "embarrassing kowtowing." Others assailed the surreptitious nature of the mission—it was announced in Washington at 2 a.m. Saturday, Dec. 9, after Scowcroft and Eagleburger had already landed in Beijing—and the obsequious nature of Scowcroft's toast at a banquet. Scowcroft addressed the Chinese rulers as "friends," referred oh-so-delicately to "the events at Tiananmen" and described U.S. critics of the massacre as "irritants" to Chinese-American relations.

Administration sources say Scowcroft was blunter with the Chinese in private, telling them that since the U.S. had made the initial move to repair relations, Beijing

Kissinger vs. Nixon



DUCLOS—GAMMA LIAISON



MARKEL—GAMMA LIAISON

Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger each tend to bristle whenever the other receives greater credit for the 1972 U.S. breakthrough to China. Now China seems to have them at odds again.

The new tiff began with a minuet over which man would pay the first high-profile private visit to China since the massacre outside Tiananmen Square. Kissinger had planned to address a Beijing conference on foreign investment in October. But he called off the trip in September after the *Wall Street Journal* published an account of his business deals, which include a $75 million partnership called China Ventures. Three weeks later, Nixon began his excursion to Beijing. After he arrived, an aide released a background paper pointing out that Nixon had no Chinese business interests. Though the document named no names, some people got the impression that Nixon was contrasting himself to Kissinger, who showed up in Beijing the following week with a group of U.S. businessmen.

Both Nixon and Kissinger support Brent Scowcroft's fence-mending expedition to China. But Kissinger said last week that sending Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was a mistake. Dispatching not one, but two former executives of his consulting firm to implement a policy he supports, Kissinger told the Washington *Post,* gives critics an opening "to blacken my reputation."

had better reciprocate, and soon. He gave that demand a sharp twist, blaming the U.S. Congress for the frostiness in Sino-American relations. Says a U.S. official: "Scowcroft made very clear to the Chinese that our Congress is the main problem in the U.S.-China relationship, and that if the relationship is as important to them as it is to President Bush, they need to give a positive response, or a series of them, by the time Congress returns in late January."

Some helpful responses, Administration sources indicate, would include free passage out of China for Fang Lizhi, the dissident astrophysicist who took refuge in the U.S. embassy in Beijing last June and is still there; the lifting of martial law in Beijing and Tibet; Chinese pressure on the murderous Khmer Rouge to allow a political settlement in Cambodia, and amnesty for pro-democracy demonstrators.

If China still appears unresponsive when Congress reconvenes on Jan. 23, the lawmakers might do two things: override Bush's veto of legislation extending the visas of Chinese students who fear persecution if they return home, and enact economic sanctions stricter than those the Administration reluctantly imposed in June. The disclosure last week that the Administration is preparing to loosen the sanctions by allowing export of three communications satellites to be launched by Chinese rockets did nothing to improve the congressional mood.

Why did the normally cautious Bush take such a risk? The President and his aides feared that China was slipping into a mood of angry isolation that would be no help for world stability. Bush, who lived in Beijing as U.S. envoy for 13 months in 1974 and '75, fancies himself an old China hand. He seems to rate preserving the carefully nurtured U.S. strategic relationship with China well above human-rights considerations, which he has always valued below the need for order and stability in world affairs. When former President Richard Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger returned from exploratory trips to China with the news that Beijing wanted closer relations but thought the U.S. should make the first move, Bush judged the time to be right.

Bush still resents being portrayed during the presidential campaign as manipulated by handlers, and he is out to prove that he can move boldly and effectively in foreign affairs. In China he found an area where he thought he could rely on his expertise to act. Explains White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater: "The President knew he would be criticized for this, but he feels strongly that it's in our national interest to improve relations with China. He feels he knows China as well as anybody—and better than his critics in Congress." The next few weeks will tell whether that faith is well founded. —*By George J. Church.*

Reported by Sandra Burton/Beijing and Dan Goodgame/Washington

In a Rage over AIDS

A militant protest group targets the Catholic Church

The shouting erupted as John Cardinal O'Connor began his Sunday-morning sermon in St. Patrick's Cathedral on New York City's Fifth Avenue. "You bigot, O'Connor, you're killing us!" yelled one protester. Others stretched out in the aisles or chained themselves to pews. As police tried vainly to restore order, the Cardinal cut through the din. "Does everybody care to stand and pray?" he asked. In response the parishioners rose and chanted the Lord's Prayer at the top of their voices. As the service went on, police arrested 43 demonstrators, and carried many out on stretchers when they refused to stand. Churchgoers who dodged the chaos in the aisles and made it to the altar to take Communion saw one protester take a wafer from a priest and throw it to the ground.

The sacrilegious scene at St. Patrick's was the latest in a series of increasingly militant demonstrations, many against the Roman Catholic Church, staged by AIDS activists and supported by abortion-rights groups. The New York City protest, in which 4,500 people also rallied noisily outside the cathedral, was largely the work of the Aids Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP). The group claims to have 40 chapters in the U.S. as well as others in Paris, Berlin and London. Another AIDS protest group this month threw red paint on four Catholic churches in Los Angeles and left posters of Archbishop Roger Mahony labeled MURDERER. In San Francisco gay activists smeared handprints in paint and hung posters depicting sex acts in the Cathedral of St. Mary of the Assumption and the archdiocese chancery.

New York City's Cardinal O'Connor is a favorite target of AIDS and abortion-rights protesters. He is among the most outspoken of Catholic bishops in condemning homosexuality and opposing the use of condoms to prevent AIDS. He has also supported the obstructionist tactics of such antiabortion groups as Operation Rescue that block abortion clinics and harass their clients. "It's quite ironic that Cardinal O'Connor is so angry over this act of civil disobedience, when he has espoused a form of it himself," said Ellen Carton, executive director of the New York State branch of the National Abortion Rights Action League. The Cardinal offered an answer as he gave the benediction for the interrupted Mass at St. Patrick's. Said O'Connor: "I must preach what the church preaches, teach what the church teaches."

ACT UP's demonstrations are designed to shock. "We expect tempers to run high," says Jay Blotcher, an ACT UP spokesman. "We target Roman Catholicism because no other religion so energetically tries to influence public policy." Outside four Catholic churches in Los Angeles last week, ACT UP protesters offered free condoms and safe-sex pamphlets to parishioners. Members of the group have occupied drug-company offices to demand lower prices for AIDS medicines, chained themselves to a banister at the New York Stock Exchange, and staged same-sex "kiss-ins" at last year's Democratic and Republican national conventions.



RON HAVIV—SABA

Placards outside, chaos inside, the cathedral

Such tactics, activists contend, are the only way to jolt the public's fickle attention back to the AIDS epidemic. "A lot of the AIDS stories are old news, so we have to be enticing to make reporters cover them," says Pat Christen, executive director of the mainstream San Francisco AIDS Foundation. As for vandalism, ACT UP member Mark Kostopoulos declares, "It's easier to scrape off paint than raise the dead."

But even some ACT UP members felt that breaking up a religious service was going too far. "What happened inside the church is unfortunate," concedes ACT UP spokesman Blotcher. "It weakened our position somewhat." Indeed, the St. Patrick's invasion turned off New York politicians long sympathetic to gay causes. Governor Mario Cuomo termed the disruption "shameful" and Mayor-elect David Dinkins called it "counterproductive." ACT UP's angry protests risk sparking equally angry reactions. —*By Ed Magnuson.*

Reported by Joelle Attinger/New York and Scott Brown/Los Angeles

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times A-1
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 25 Dec 89

U.S. will explore ways to extradite ex-dictator

By Paul Bedard
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush yesterday cheered the surrender of Panamanian Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega to Vatican authorities in Panama City, saying the military strongman's "reign of terror is over."

"The United States will continue to pursue avenues for bringing Gen. Noriega, now located, to justice," White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater told reporters. Gen. Noriega, indicted in Florida on drug and money-laundering charges, is the United States' "most wanted" crime figure.

The news reached Mr. Bush at Camp David just 45 minutes after the president received a Pentagon briefing on the 5-day-old mission. Through his spokesman, Mr. Bush said he was "pleased" and pledged to speed economic aid to the new government of President Guillermo Endara, who won the May election that Gen. Noriega annulled.

"We have been notified by the papal nuncio in Panama City that Gen. Noriega has turned himself in at their embassy. I am pleased that the general is now under the control of diplomatic authorities. His reign of terror is over," Mr. Bush said in a statement read by Mr. Fitzwater.

"As we work to help return law and order to Panama City, and as the government of President Endara begins its work, the demise of Gen. Noriega sends a strong signal that freedom and democracy in Panama are on the rise," Mr. Bush said.

The State Department expressed satisfaction that Gen. Noriega had surrendered but refused to speculate on what steps the United States would take to bring him to trial here.

Officials declared the Panama mission a total success with the surrender of Gen. Noriega, but the future of the ousted strongman remained unclear. International law states that diplomatic missions are safe havens for those seeking asylum.

Since taking office, Mr. Bush has cultivated a close relationship with Pope John Paul II, seeking his advice on U.S. hostages in Lebanon and the movement in Eastern Europe toward democratic rule. Mr. Bush may call on that friendship in the administration's effort to extradite Gen. Noriega.

The Italian news agency ANSA quoted the papal nuncio in Panama City, Monsignor Sebastiano Laboa, as indicating he would not hand over Gen. Noriega to the United States or to the U.S.-installed government in Panama.

In addition, President Endara said he could not extradite Gen. Noriega under Panama's constitution.

Even if he is brought to trial in Florida, some legal experts said, it will be difficult to find an unbiased jury because of negative publicity regarding the general.

Another possible legal problem is that Gen. Noriega could reveal details of his once-friendly relationship with the CIA in open testimony or through classified documents used in his defense against the drug charges.

Nevertheless, Noriega's surrender was a major victory for Mr. Bush, who had been accused by conservatives and liberals alike of being too timid during the Oct. 3 coup attempt staged by rebels within the Panama Defense Forces.

The surrender of Gen. Noriega was relayed by Gen. Maxwell Thurman, commander of U.S. forces in Panama.

Earlier yesterday, Mr. Bush told reporters that while the 26,000 troops in Panama have "more work" to do, "I think most sense a real turnaround."

"I am very pleased with the situation," Mr. Bush said after his Pentagon briefing. "It appears much more stable. The emphasis now is on cleaning the last parts of resistance and seeing that the civilian government takes over." He added that the United States was sending food and medicine.

In a Christmas Eve broadcast to American troops around the world, Mr. Bush said the United States "has the strength to confront tyranny when we must."

"Gen. Noriega is the latest to learn that lesson," he said.

Casualty figures stood yesterday at 24 U.S. servicemen killed, 281 wounded, one missing and two civilian dependents killed, the Pentagon said.

Senior administration officials said there is no deadline for withdrawing the 13,000 troops sent from U.S. bases to join the 13,000 stationed in Panama for "Operation Just Cause."

Mr. Bush said the White House "never put a time frame on it. The military spelled out certain objectives and they've done very, very well."

Secretary of State James A. Baker III said in a television interview: "We really ought not to put a date on it, because then we get into playing the old expectations game. I think the standard should be that we should be there as long as it takes to get the job done."

Defense Secretary Richard Cheney said yesterday that the looting of stores in Panama is "dying out." Pro-Noriega forces, known as "Dignity Battalions," were still "running loose in the streets, but the situation appears to be steadily improving," he said.

Mr. Cheney, who flew to Panama yesterday, said before leaving: "The situation appears to be improving. It's not all over yet. . . . We still have a lot of work to do, but clearly we are in better shape today than at any point since the effort started."

Mr. Bush said the American effort is shifting from military aid to "putting a great deal of proper emphasis on humanitarian aid."

As he spoke, an Air Force C-5 cargo plane left from Charleston, S.C., for Panama carrying 32,000 pounds of emergency medical supplies, the Pentagon said.

CONTINUED

It was the first of what the Pentagon said will be several airlifts of medical supplies to Panama.

The supplies are to be turned over to Mr. Endara's government, the Pentagon said.

Mr. Bush arrived at the Pentagon by helicopter from Camp David at 1:35 p.m. and was briefed by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin Powell, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Navy Secretary Lawrence Garrett and Deputy White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card. Mr. Bush also met with the two Joint Chiefs of Staff officers monitoring Operation Just Cause — Lt. Gen. Tom Kelly and Rear Adm. Ted Sheafer.

Mr. Bush then taped a special Christmas address that was broadcast on Armed Forces Radio.

"In Panama, as in every other such test in our history, Americans put their lives on the line for the basic values of liberty and decency on which our nation is founded," the president said.

"Our hearts and those of every American go out to the families of those who fell. To all those who mourn a husband, a son, a brother, a father or a friend, I can only offer the thanks of a grateful nation. Your loved ones served a noble and just cause with honor and distinction.... Years from now, let it be said that America used her strength for good, and let it be known that she honored her defenders of freedom."

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin praised the U.S. military operation while predicting that new elections in Panama will be necessary.

INDICTMENTS AGAINST NORIEGA

Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's capture would enable U.S. authorities to bring him to trial on charges brought against him in Miami and Tampa, Fla. He could receive up to 145 years in prison and more than $1.1 million in fines if convicted of conspiracy, racketeering, importing drugs and traveling to further the conspiracy charges.

The Miami indictment accuses Gen. Noriega of:

- Accepting a $4.6 million bribe from Colombia's Medellin drug cartel to protect shipments of cocaine, launder money, supply drug laboratories and shield drug traffickers from the law.
- Allowing smugglers to use Panama as a way station for U.S.-bound cocaine.
- Traveling to Havana so Cuban President Fidel Castro could mediate a dispute with the Medellin cartel after Panamanian troops seized a drug laboratory that Gen. Noriega had been paid to protect.
- Using his official positions to provide protection for international criminal narcotics traffickers.
- Arranging for the shipment of cocaine processing chemicals.
- Laundering cartel narcotics proceeds in Panamanian banks.
- Allowing cartel leaders to shift operations to Panama to escape a crackdown in Colombia.

The Tampa indictment accuses Gen. Noriega of:

- Conspiring to import and distribute marijuana.
- Attempting to import more than 1.4 million pounds of marijuana.
- Accepting a $1 million bribe from drug dealers for his authorization to smuggle drugs and launder cash in Panama.

The Washington Times

The Washington Post
The New York Times A1
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 26 DEC 1989

VATICAN IS URGED TO REJECT NORIEGA

Bush Officials Advise Nuncio to 'Walk Him to the Door'

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 25 — Bush Administration officials told the Vatican today that it would be "totally inappropriate" for the Holy See to grant Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega temporary refuge in the residence of the Papal Nuncio in Panama City and suggested that the best solution would be simply to "walk him to the door."

"We would like to have Mr. Noriega in order to return him to the United States for trial," Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said in Panama today when asked what the Administration thought about the fact that General Noriega was seeking asylum from the Vatican. "At this point, the diplomats and the lawyers have taken over, and they are working on the problem. Our objective was, if we could, to capture Mr. Noriega and return him to the United States for trial. That is still our objective."

General Noriega entered the Vatican diplomatic mission in Panama City on Sunday after eluding capture by American troops during the five days since their invasion began, and despite a $1 million bounty put on his head by President Bush.

"We have been in touch with the Vatican since shortly after learning of Noriega's whereabouts," a senior Administration official said. "We have been discussing with Vatican officials in Rome, Washington and Panama City a mutually satisfactory resolution to the situation — which neither we nor the Vatican sought."

Another Administration official said the Vatican informed Washington that it did not grant asylum outside its territory. But it added that it did grant "temporary refuge" to individuals claiming political or religious persecution.

Temporary refuge is not usually given to individuals fleeing criminal prosecution. General Noriega was indicted in 1988 in Florida on charges of involvement in international drug trafficking.

"We are taking the position with the Vatican that any grant of temporary refuge would be totally inappropriate in this case," a senior Administration official said. "Noriega is not a political refugee. We do not want him for his political beliefs. He is a criminal and a drug dealer."

Asked what the Administration would like the Vatican diplomats in Panama City to do, the official replied: "We want them to reject his request for asylum, walk him to the door, take him outside and let him go. We are not asking the Vatican to extradite him, we just want them to let him go. We will take care of the rest."

Administration officials said the Vatican was now considering their arguments. The officials emphasized that they were in discussions with the Vatican, not negotiations, because at this stage the Holy See appears to be considering the entire matter and is not negotiating with, or on behalf of, General Noriega.

Christmas Hinders Talks

Asked when a resolution might be expected, an official said: "Discussions of this nature are difficult at the best of times, but they are particularly difficult at Christmas time."

While the United States was trying to take General Noriega from the Papal Nuncio in Panama City, a Justice Department spokesman, David Runkel, reported tonight that a high-ranking associate of the general, Luis del Cid, had been taken into custody in Panama and was being flown to the United States to be tried on the same drug charges for which the former Panamanian ruler has been indicted.

Mr. del Cid reportedly surrendered to United States troops on the west coast of Panama today and was turned over to an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration. A high-ranking officer of the Panamanian armed forces, Mr. del Cid was the second-most-wanted Panamanian, after General Noriega, the Justice Department official said. Like the ousted Panamanian leader, he is wanted on charges of drug smuggling and money laundering.

The United States does not have an extradition t eaty with Panama, but two weeks ago the Justice Department issued a ruling that the United States can capture fugitives on foreign soil and return them for trial.

U.S. Warning to Vatican

As for the fate of General Noriega, Administration officials are privately cautioning the Vatican that there are more than legal issues involved.

"Noriega's presence in Panama, or any other country other than the United States, represents a continuing threat to the new Panamanian Government," one official said. "The Vatican would be taking a very heavy responsibility on itself if it either gives this man sanctuary or sends him to another country from which he could continue to terrorize his enemies in Panama."

President Bush summoned his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, to Camp David to consider his diplomatic alternatives, while Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d kept in touch by telephone from Houston, where he spent Christmas.

Could Bush Be Embarrassed?

Whether the Bush Administration really wants General Noriega in custody as much as it has professed is a matter of some speculation in Washington.

The Panamanian dictator taunted Mr. Bush during the campaign, saying he had damaging information about him related to the Iran-contra scandal, an accusation at which Mr. Bush scoffed. The general's supporters also asserted that it would be risky for the United States to bring him to trial on drug-trafficking charges because he had so much classified information about American intelligence activities from his years on the payroll of the Central Intelligence Agency — during which time he dealt for a period with Mr. Bush when he served as Director.

"The interesting dimension that can't be answered yet is, what does Noriega know about intelligence and drug-related things that might embarrass Washington or George Bush," Kevin Phillips, the conservative political analyst, said in an interview late last week.

'The Transition Is a Mess'

After a quick start, Bush's team is bogging down

George Bush may yet be "ready on Day One" to be president, but the word around Washington last week was that his much-heralded transition team was in disarray. Bush did lance the bubble of damaging speculation about former senator John Tower by finally naming him secretary of defense. But that sign of progress, delayed until the FBI had completed a microscopic examination of Tower's private life (page 25), was almost outweighed by a widening sense that the Bush team was somehow dithering its way toward Inauguration Day. Despite Bush's extensive background in national-security affairs, skeptics argued that the incoming administration seemed oddly off balance in key areas of the shadow foreign-policy machinery—at the State Department, at Defense and at the National Security Council. "The transition," one Bush adviser conceded, "is a mess."

That seemed like overstatement. Bush announced his major foreign-policy appointments—James A. Baker III for State, Brent Scowcroft for national-security adviser and Tower for Defense—sooner than most recent presidents-elect, thus raising expectations for a speedy liftoff. It is also arguable that Washington's current impatience with Bush stems mainly from the realization that big events—Mikhail Gorbachev's U.N. speech and last week's startling agreement with Yasir Arafat—are moving faster than anyone expected. But the pace of diplomacy is one more reason Bush must push ahead in developing at least the outlines of a foreign policy lest events overwhelm the new administration soon after Inauguration Day.

According to some of Bush's advisers, the president-elect hoped to avoid repeating the near chaos of 1980, when hundreds of Reaganites invaded the federal bureaucracy well in advance of the cabinet appointees who were named to run the departments. The result, in many cases, was disruption because the advance teams picked personnel and policies that the cabinet secretaries later objected to. This time, Bush staffers say, the cabinet appointments were to come first, and each appointee was supposed to form his own team to take over the bureaucracy.

It hasn't worked out that way—and the shortfall is probably most visible in the national-security area. At State, Baker was slow to accept George Shultz's offer of a transition office, and he has not yet named his key deputies. Baker "is very conscious that he isn't secretary of state yet, and very conscious that people in this town are waiting for him to act as if he were," one adviser says. Neither he nor Scowcroft has been willing to comment on any of the policy issues that have arisen since the election. Baker does meet daily with Shultz and scans the cable traffic. But other insiders say Baker has been heavily involved—perhaps too heavily involved—in advising Bush on cabinet appointments elsewhere in government, and that his attention to the affairs of State has suffered as a result.

'Paper-clip pushers': Baker is now on vacation until Jan. 3, and aides say he won't announce his top staff until he returns to Washington. He is said to be leaning toward former under secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger over William Hyland, editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, for the No. 2 post at State. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Pelletreau, now the Reagan administration's designated conduit to the PLO, is vying for State's top Middle East policy job with Ambassador to Egypt Frank Wisner. Dennis Ross, a former NSC staffer who was the Bush campaign's chief foreign-policy adviser, is slated to head the department's policy-planning bureau. In his current role on the Bush staff, however, Ross has come under increasing criticism for the transition's slowness.

Bush & Co. have had at least equal difficulty at the Pentagon and the NSC. In addition to the much-publicized delay in Tower's appointment, the Pentagon transition has been slowed by the search for candidates for two top jobs, Tower's deputy and the under secretary for acquisitions. At the NSC, Bush and Scowcroft are said to be determined to recruit a blue-chip staff capable of reviewing U.S. strategy from top to bottom. Scowcroft "can't afford to have paper-clip pushers in there," says one insider, and the talent search is going slowly. Meanwhile, another source says, Bush's insistence on exhaustive background checks on *all* potential appointees is one of the biggest bottlenecks in the transition. No one disputes the need to recruit able, squeaky-clean nominees. But given the growing list of urgent issues, it may be time to focus on substance as well as process.

JOHN BARRY *with* MARGARET GARRARD WARNER *in Washington*

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today 4A
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 26 Dec 89

Baker regrets his China trip remarks

Secretary of State James Baker said this weekend "I regret" giving a misleading account of official contacts with China after its massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators. On Dec. 10, Baker called national security adviser Brent Scowcroft's and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger's December China trip "the first" since the uprising. A week later the White House disclosed the pair also visited Beijing secretly in July. "I was trying to protect the confidentiality of a classified presidential mission," Baker told NBC's *Meet the Press*. Asked if U.S. officials should mislead the public to protect secrets, he said, "No. . . . I could simply have 'no commented,' which is what I should have done."

papal officials in the mission driveway. But this appeared a lame explanation for the perma- appears to have further infuriated General Thurman, who has become increasingly angry at his positions.

The general arrived in Panama with a fearsome reputation for eral told reporters, the US Army did not come to Panama to obey other people's laws.

USA TODAY DEC. 29, 1989 Pg. 2

Panama action puts general in the limelight

They call him "Mad Max" and he has one of the most difficult and sensitive positions in the U.S. armed forces.

The nickname is supposed to be a compliment to hard-charging U.S. Army Gen. **Maxwell Thurman**, who recently moved from the Pentagon to Panama to head the U.S. Southern Command — more than 12,000 troops and 10 military bases along the Panama Canal.

As commander of the U.S. troops that invaded Panama, Thurman also has been a key negotiator this week in U.S. efforts to bring Gen. **Manuel Noriega** to trial, meeting face to face with church officials outside the Vatican Embassy, where the former Panamanian ruler has taken refuge.

Thurman, a native of High Point, N.C., is a graduate of West Point and a Vietnam veteran. He got his first taste of the international limelight last October, just days after he took over the Southern Command.

Blocks away — literally within view of his headquarters — a group of Panamanian officers failed in an attempt to oust Noriega. The Southern Command's role in the coup attempt is still a matter of public debate in Washington.

Thurman is known to call staff meetings any time of day or night. He succeeded retired Gen. **Fred Woerner**, who had consistently opposed using the military against Noriega.

Thurman is single, and one story making the rounds at the Southern Command is that when asked why he's not married, Thurman said: "If the Army wanted me to have a wife, the Army would have issued me one."

— Juan J. Walte

WIRE NEWS HIGHLIGHTS

FIGHTER CRASHES IN GULF: An Air Force F-15 fighter jet crashed in the Gulf of Mexico yesterday during a mock combat exercise and its pilot was reported missing, said officials at Elgin Air Force Base, Fla. The jet went down about 40 miles southeast of Apalachicola. It was one of two F-15s assigned to the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing at Eglin and was involved in a training exercise against two F-16 fighter jets from Moody Air Force Base in Georgia. The U.S. Coast Guard continued the search for the missing pilot after rescue efforts from the First Special Operation Wing at Hurlburt Field were unsuccessful. The cause of the crash was unknown and the pilot's name was not released, said officials. (UPI)

WIRE NEWS...Pg. 16

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Cold War's end creates new priorities for U.S.

By Nicholas M. Horrock
Chicago Tribune

WASHINGTON—There is a memorable picture of Washington at the end of World War II in which F Street from the Treasury Building east toward the Capitol is a sea of humanity—soldiers, sailors, civilians, kissing, drinking champagne, throwing ticker tape and flowers.

On the day seven weeks ago that the Berlin Wall was pierced, which history may declare the end of the Cold War, American television also transmitted to the world a glimpse of Washington.

It was a decidedly glum President Bush, sitting in his office surrounded by his key advisers, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who looked no cheerier than he did.

For more than four decades, governments in Washington have urged the Soviet Union to cast aside totalitarian government and the states of Eastern Europe to free themselves from Kremlin domination. Now, in a flash, all this seems to be happening.

It should be a time of great joy, the equivalent possibly of the final weary gasp of the Thirty Years' War. But glumness and anxiety are as much in the air these winter weeks as the unseasonable cold and the early snow.

In this city and government shaped by the Cold War, a declaration of peace in so uncertain a war seems itself uncertain and does not give rise to elation.

Part of the muted response comes from a reluctance to break something that may be fragile. Bush has said he does not want the actions of the U.S. to impede a largely peaceful revolution that seems to be moving under its own steam.

Part of it comes from the Bush administration's persistent habit of governing by opinion polls. They have spotted polls that found the events in Eastern Europe more a continuing fascination of the media than the public and read stories about students who weren't clear on what the Berlin Wall was.

But at this center of national government the anxiety is deeper than a question of what should be the immediate response to the collapse of communism.

With the turning of the decade comes new order in the world. Even the most insulated in Washington understand that everything from presidential elections to the job requirements for government service is in for fundamental change.

The central issue is how to reduce the size and cost of national defense and how fast to do it.

Defense spending is not a passive act. It is a response to a threat, and many in Congress and the nation believe the threat of attack from the communist bloc has sharply diminished.

From 1951, when the U.S. took up arms for the Korean War, until the present, the armed forces have never dipped under 2 million men and women. When inflation is taken into account, the government defense costs have consistently hovered just under $300 billion and the portion of the gross national product dedicated to security has run as high as 10 percent in times of tension, such as the Hungarian uprising in 1956.

This constant state of preparedness has seen the prerogatives of the Cold War seep through the American system, making massive military spending an important part of the economy and the federal budget.

Now the deficits are rocketing through the roof. The government recently raised the debt ceiling to $3 trillion and it has to borrow $3 billion to $4 billion a week just to meet operating expenses.

American industry, in part because it has become dependent on defense contracts, has found it is not competitive in world markets. While Japan has concentrated on products it could sell worldwide, the best and brightest firms in the U.S. have concentrated on increasingly complex weapons of war.

This enormous Cold War structure does not reside solely in Washington. It is in the desert valleys outside Los Angeles, the submarine plants along the Thames River in Groton, Conn., and the F-16 plants in Ft. Worth.

Defense dollars pay for many of the sleek houses in Virginia's Tidewater country and sumptuous

PRIORITIES...Pg. 15

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National security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Colin L. Powell have remained on the job in Washington, spokesmen said. In addition, most high-ranking Pentagon officials remained on the job through the Christmas holidays as the events in Panama unfolded and are now taking belated vacations that will extend over the New Year's holiday.

Staff writers Debbie M. Price and Molly Moore and staff researcher Bruce Brown contributed to this report.

WHERE THEY ARE

- **President Bush.** On vacation in Texas.
- **Vice President Quayle.** On vacation in Vail, Colo.
- **White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu.** On vacation in New Hampshire.
- **White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.** On the job.
- **White House deputy assistant for national security affairs Robert M. Gates.** On vacation at undisclosed location.
- **Office of Management and Budget Director Richard G. Darman.** On the job.
- **Secretary of State James A. Baker III.** On vacation in Texas, hunting with Bush.
- **Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger.** On the job.
- **Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney.** On vacation in Wyoming.
- **Deputy Defense Secretary Donald J. Atwood.** On the job.
- **Gen. Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.** On the job.
- **Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter.** On vacation at undisclosed location.
- **Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher.** On vacation in Houston.
- **Education Secretary Lauro F. Cavazos.** On vacation in Texas.
- **Energy Secretary James D. Watkins.** On the job.
- **Health and Human Services Secretary Louis W. Sullivan.** On the job.
- **Housing and Urban Development Secretary Jack Kemp.** On vacation at undisclosed location.
- **Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan Jr.** At work at a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service office in New Mexico.
- **Attorney General Dick Thornburgh.** On vacation in Pennsylvania.
- **Labor Secretary Elizabeth Hanford Dole.** On the job.
- **Transportation Secretary Samuel K. Skinner.** On the job.
- **Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady.** In New Jersey, recovering from hip surgery.
- **Veterans Affairs Secretary Edward J. Derwinski.** On the job.
- **CIA Director William H. Webster.** On the job.
- **FBI Director William S. Sessions.** Visiting FBI facilities in the field.
- **National drug policy director William J. Bennett.** On vacation at undisclosed location.

—Compiled by staff researcher Bruce Brown

WASHINGTON POST 29 DECEMBER 1988 Pg. 5

Deputy CIA Head Chosen For National Security Post

By Ann Devroy and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

President-elect George Bush yesterday named Robert M. Gates, the deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency whose nomination in 1987 to head the CIA foundered because of the Iran-contra scandal, to be deputy national security adviser.

Gates, 45, a veteran of more than 20 years with the CIA, had told associates over the summer that he realized he probably would never achieve his goal of heading the agency, sources said. He had held discussions with Bush associates on a possible White House national security post if the vice president were elected. In the new post, which does not require Senate confirmation, he would be deputy to national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.

Bush's nominee to replace Gates in the No. 2 CIA post is Richard J. Kerr, a veteran of nearly 30 years at the agency who is deputy director for intelligence. Kerr, 53, was described by a former associate as "more the administrator than an intelligence analyst or operations man," thus signaling a lower profile for the agency and reliance on career officers.

In nominating Kerr, Bush praised his "broad and varied background" in the intelligence community and said he was "especially pleased to have someone from within the professional ranks" of the CIA in the post. Kerr started with the CIA in 1960 as a military analyst and has held a string of posts with the agency since. He is considered by colleagues to be a protege of former CIA deputy director John A. McMahon, who resigned in February 1986 after clashing with then-CIA Director William J. Casey over some of his controversial operations.

In designating Gates for the White House post, Bush called him "admirably suited" for the post because he "knows the system, the critical importance of interagency process for presidential decision-making and the details of managing that process." Gates served on the national security council staff from 1974 to 1979, and under Scowcroft during the first two years, when Scowcroft was national security adviser for President Gerald R. Ford.

After returning to the agency, Gates had a meteoric career, rising from assistant to the deputy director in 1979 to deputy director in February 1986. Along the way he served as national intelligence officer assessing the Soviet Union, then deputy director for intelligence.

Gates became deputy upon the resignation of McMahon. Gates had become aware in December 1985 of the covert scheme to ship arms to Iran in exchange for hostages. He assumed a more active role during 1986, protesting to Casey at one point about the delivery of intelligence information to Tehran that was included as part of the arms-for-hostages dealings.

Kerr and another CIA officer, Charles Allen, told congressional investigators in 1987 that they had informed Gates of the possibility of diversion of arms sales profits in early 1986, but Gates told investigators he did not remember that. When the ill-fated operation was about to be disclosed, Gates again was told of possible diversions to aid the Nicaraguan rebels and this time he passed what he later described as "flimsy" evidence to Casey who delivered it to the White House.

When Casey died and Gates was nominated by President Reagan to be the successor, he was supported by the two top members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Chairman David L. Boren (D-Okla.) and Vice Chairman William S. Cohen (R-Maine). But when other committee members during confirmation hearings raised questions about Gates' actions, or lack of them, during the Iran-contra affair, their support did not help Gates.

Gates drew the ire of some members when he described the National Security Council's management of the arms sales to Iran as "primarily a diplomatic activity." Even Cohen criticized him as a man who was "not prepared to lay your career on the line over a matter you did not create."

After two days of hearings it became clear to the Reagan White House that Gates' name would have to be withdrawn in order to avoid a drawn-out fight. Gates was given the opportunity to take the initiative and make the move, which he did, saying that "a prolonged period of uncertainty [over his nomination] would be harmful [to the CIA]."

The Washington Post
The New York Times
The Washington Times A3
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 29 Dec 1989

Bush will station anti-drug force in South America

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

CORPUS CHRISTI, Texas — President Bush has decided to use military ships and planes to blockade South American drug runners, White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater confirmed yesterday.

He denied that Mr. Bush is out of touch with Panama or other world trouble spots despite the fact that no National Security Council advisers accompanied him on his vacation trip, the first time that is known to have occurred.

"We have decided to take certain actions to help countries of Latin America interdict these supply routes," Mr. Fitzwater said in response to a report that a U.S. aircraft carrier group would block air and sea smuggling from Colombia.

Mr. Fitzwater said the decision involves drug smuggling from more than one country.

"While I can't confirm the details, I can say that the objectives, goals and purposes of that activity are essentially correct [in press reports]," Mr. Fitzwater said.

He emphasized that military forces would go on station only with consent of the countries involved.

"Whatever actions we would undertake in this regard would be done in the closest consultation with them [Colombia, Bolivia, Peru and others] and coordination with them," he said during a press briefing in South Texas, where Mr. Bush is on a hunting and fishing trip.

He recalled that in the Sept. 6 speech announcing a national drug policy, the president raised the prospect of using military assets in drug-interdiction efforts.

Last week Mr. Bush received the Pentagon's recommendations during a meeting with Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh and drug czar William Bennett.

"Final plans are now being made," Mr. Fitzwater said.

Reports here quoted an unnamed Pentagon official as saying "We want to make it impossible for any drugs to come out of there by air or sea."

The official was quoted as saying "There are no plans to start blowing people out of the sky. The role would be one of support, and focus on forming a much, much tighter noose."

Mr. Fitzwater brushed off questions about the absence of National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft or his deputy, Robert Gates. He stressed that Mr. Bush continues to receive an extensive written intelligence briefing each morning, although he does not have the usual follow-up discussion with the NSC advisers.

It recently was disclosed that Gen. Scowcroft secretly went to China over the July 4 weekend during a presidential vacation in Maine on which Mr. Gates accompanied Mr. Bush.

BUSH PICKS DEPUTY FOR SECURITY POST

No. 2 Man at C.I.A., Who Is Critical of Soviet Reform, Gets White House Job

By ELAINE SCIOLINO
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28 — President-elect Bush today named Robert M. Gates, a career intelligence officer who is now Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, as his deputy national security adviser.

In a statement issued in Washington, Mr. Bush, who is on vacation in Texas, praised Mr. Gates as a man who "knows the system, the critical importance of the interagency process for Presidential decision-making and the details of the management of that process." He called him "admirably suited for this key position."

By placing in a top White House position someone with intimate knowledge of the C.I.A., Mr. Bush appears to be further signaling his stated intention to have a more direct relationship with the agency than previous Presidents and to increase the role of intelligence in decision-making.

Harsh View of Soviet Union

Moreover, the departure of Mr. Gates from the C.I.A. might signal a less critical attitude within the intelligence community toward the Soviet Union's program of economic and political change. Mr. Gate's harsh assessment of Soviet economic reform is a minority view within the Reagan Administration, including the intelligence community.

Mr. Gates, who holds a doctorate in Russian and Soviet history but has never been to the Soviet Union, rankled Soviet experts at the State Department in October when he said in an important speech that the efforts by the Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, to transform the Soviet economy did not have a good chance of succeeding.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz was so distressed by the tone of the speech that he called Mr. Gates to complain, according to State Department officials.

It is unclear how much Mr. Gates will be involved in policy making in his new job, which in the past has largely embraced management and policy.

The appointment may also enhance Mr. Gates's chances of eventually replacing the current Director of Central Intelligence, William H. Webster, although some people in the foreign policy community have speculated that James Lilley, the United States Ambassador to South Korea who is a close friend of Mr. Bush, might be Mr. Webster's successor.

Mr. Lilley, who was widely thought to be the leading candidate for the job of deputy national security adviser, is to return to Washington next month to join the Bush transition team and presumably take a post in the new Administration.

Speculation Centered om Gregg

Some speculation also centered on Donald P. Gregg, Mr. Bush's national security adviser as Vice President. But some Bush aides indicated that Mr. Bush was reluctant to appoint Mr. Gregg to a visible, high-level position because of allegations that he had more knowledge than has been disclosed of the illegal arms shipments to Nicaraguan rebels.

Mr. Gates's new position is not subject to Senate confirmation.

In February 1987, Mr. Gates, 45 years old, was nominated by President Reagan to replace William J. Casey as Director of Central Intelligence. But the President withdrew the nomination a month later after it became clear that Mr. Gates would face a potentially contentious confirmation battle in the Senate over what he knew about Mr. Casey's role in the Iran-contra affair.

At the time, members of the Senate intelligence committee expressed concern that the C.I.A. might have allowed political considerations to compromise its objectivity at a time when the White House was developing the rationale for selling arms to Iran.

Even some Republican senators suggested that Mr. Gates should resign from the C.I.A. after it became known that he helped Mr. Casey prepare what appeared to be misleading Congressional testimony. Mr. Gates denied at the time that he or the agency tried to cover up participation in the Iran arms deal.

Clear Choice of Scowcroft

But Mr. Gates, who is known by his colleagues as an ambitious man with rigorous standards, was the clear choice of Brent Scowcroft, who will be national security adviser. The two men developed a close working relationship when Mr. Scowcroft served as national security adviser under President Ford and Mr. Gates was a junior member of the National Security Council staff specializing in the Soviet Union and Europe.

Mr. Bush also announced his choice of Richard J. Kerr, 53, a career intelligence officer who is currently Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to replace Mr. Gates. Mr. Kerr's nomination requires approval by the Senate.

NEW YORK TIMES, 12/29/88, p. B-6

A House for Baker

The word on the Washington real estate circuit is that James A. Baker 3d, the Secretary of State-designate, is looking for a new home and has engaged Carolyn Deaver as his agent. Mrs. Deaver, the wife of the former White House deputy chief of staff, Michael K. Deaver, is associated with the Washington firm of Samuel P. Pardoe.

If relations were smoother in the Republican establishment, Mr. Baker, who has been living at 2415 Foxnall Road in a posh part of Northwest Washington, might be able to move only a block away to a house on a 17-acre estate and use it rent free.

The will of the late Gwendolyn Cafritz, a philanthropist who died in November, asks that her landmark Art Moderne house at 2301 Foxhall Road built in 1938, be transformed into the official residence of the United States Secretary of State.

Unfortunately for Mr. Baker, a year before the Cafritz will became known, Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, had tangled with Secretary of State George P. Shultz over the issue of an official Secretary's residence.

The upshot of that was an attachment to the 1987 State Department appropriation bill that says:

"The Department of State shall not solicit or receive funds for the construction, purchase, lease or rental of, nor any gift or bequest of real property or any other property for the purpose of providing living quarters for the Secretary of State."

Mr. Helms has not relented on this position.

At least this impasse leaves Mrs. Deaver in a position to collect a fee on a sale to Mr. Baker. She did not return calls on the subject.

The Cafritz house, worth in excess of $10 million, would provide a Secretary of State with such entertaining amenities as mirrored walls, a large circular skylight, a dance floor that is lighted from below and pale blond wood furniture. It has been compared to a movie set. Mrs. Cafritz, in her days as one of Washington's premier hostesses, received top politicians and visiting royalty in the home.

NEW YORK TIMES, 12/29 88, p. B-7

The Washington Post
The New York Times A1
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 31 Dec 1989

George Bush, First Year: Likes, Dislikes, Surprises

By MAUREEN DOWD
Special to The New York Times

HOUSTON, Dec. 30 — Here is what the country has learned about George Bush in 1989:

He talks funny. He keeps secrets. He enjoys sports that require Abercrombie & Fitch-style rugged wear. His second serve is as weak as a falling leaf. He loves his jet, his telephone and the sound of his title.

He can be swayed by criticism, as he was on gun control, aid to Eastern Europe and reaching out to Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev. And he can remain stubbornly unswayed by criticism, as he was on China. He plays it safe and he gambles.

He enjoys acting goofy. He is devoted to his wife, but loves to get away with "the boys." His principles are unwavering on public service, family and loyalty, but adaptable on nearly everything else. He has had almost as many press conferences his first year in office (32) as Ronald Reagan had in eight years (47), but he remains thin-skinned about even the mildest criticism.

He goes to church nearly every Sunday. He loves to spend time with his grandchildren. Being President, the toughest job in the world, is the most fun he has ever had.

In sum, although he has not shed the prep-school veneer, Mr. Bush is more complex than he seemed during the cartoon-like 1988 campaign. He shows some flaws that were not apparent then. And he does not display some flaws for which he was once disparaged; when shoved, he will shove back.

When Mr. Bush landed in Texas on Wednesday for a hunting and fishing vacation, relaxed in his brown cowboy boots and a Western-style shirt, he seemed ready to take a bow for his first year in office.

'A Bit of a Glow'

He took off his tie with a devil-may-care flourish and waved it at the crowd of squealing spectators. At a barbecue that night with the folks of Beeville, a dusty town 60 miles northwest of Corpus Christi, where Mr. Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d were quail hunting on the ranch of a friend, the President spoke with an understated pride about his first year.

"I must say I'm finishing with a bit of a glow," the President said as he spoke on a stage spruced up with bales of hay.

He was openly relieved that his old nemesis, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, was no longer roaming free and that his gamble to invade Panama seemed to be winning overwhelming support from the American public.

"At times, you have to make a decision, what is in the national interest, what is right, what is the right signal to send to the world," he said.

Expunging the Word 'Wimp'

In recent weeks, the President has gone a long way toward expunging the dread word "wimp" from his political profile, proving that when pushed, he will respond.

Since October, he has ordered American military forces into action on three separate occasions: to liberate a hotel in downtown San Salvador, to support Corazon Aquino's Government in a coup attempt in the Philippines in November, and to overthrow General Noriega two weeks ago.

A couple of months ago, the President became so touchy about being tarred by Democrats and commentators this year with the word "timid" that he gratefully accepted an aide's list of synonyms for the hated adjective. In talking to reporters, Mr. Bush began to insist that he be portrayed with less pejorative synonyms on the list, like "prudent" and "cautious."

Mr. Bush's aides explained that his seemingly tepid responses to the sweep of democracy in Eastern Europe were kept that way because he did not want any rambunctious pep talks to upset the flowering relationship with Mr. Gorbachev.

But many felt that Mr. Bush kept himself too tightly in check. The American people want to see their leader articulate their feelings at big moments in history, as Ronald Reagan was able to do in highly charged situations.

After responding at a news conference in a muted way to the fall of the Berlin wall, President Bush returned to the Oval Office and joked that the reporters and some of his advisers would have been more satisfied if he had acted more excited. He demonstrated that, aides recalled, by jumping up and down and waving his arms and yelling "Who-o-p-e-e!"

Less an Architect Than Witness

Although he has seemed less an architect of world change than a witness, Mr. Bush confessed in Beeville that he found the transformation of Eastern Europe "mind-boggling."

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"What Jim Baker and I are trying to do is to conduct the affairs of the United States in such a way so as to foster change and to foster freedom, but to do it in a prudent way so we do not invite some unforeseen action by some unpredictable party," the President said, as his Secretary of State, also in cowboy boots, stood smiling by his side.

Rating his first year, Mr. Bush conceded he was frustrated on the domestic side, a side he does not enjoy as much as the more glamorous foreign affairs end.

He has been criticized for not having an agenda and for confusing the act of introducing a lot of legislation with the act of governing.

He said he would continue to work on crime and the environment and the deficit and drugs, areas where otherwise cheery opinion polls show public perceptions of his efforts to be declining.

Shedding the Straitjacket

His advisers say that Mr. Bush has not changed gradually in the past year, but that a remarkable metamorphosis in his personality occurred after he was elected President, when he began shedding the straitjacket of loyalty he had imposed on himself as Vice President.

After that initial explosion of personality and plans, Mr. Bush has lavished a lot of energy and enthusiasm on a job that allows him to be in control. But sometimes the pace suggests an old Peter Sellers movie, with Mr. Bush taking all the parts. In many ways, he serves as his own chief of staff, his own Secretary of State, his own scheduler, his own press spokesman and his own intelligence chief.

Although President Bush makes decisions by consensus and allows his Cabinet chiefs to operate with a loose rein, he always makes it clear, as an aide says, "who's calling the shots."

When the President initiates an idea, he points out that it is his, as he did on the Malta summit. He often explains decisions to dubious aides with an impatient or half joking, "If you're so damned smart, why are you doing what you're doing and I'm President of the United States?" In the same way people carry a rabbit's foot for luck, Mr. Bush has faith in his title, feeling that it puts him firmly in charge.

Counselors who worked with both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Bush still marvel at how differently the White House op-

erates with a leader who cringes at the word "handlers."

"With Reagan decisions were made from the bottom up," said one adviser. "With Bush, they are made from the top down. He dominates everything."

Keeping Secrets

At the same time, Mr. Bush's obsession with secrecy, with making plans in a tight circle that compartmentalizes information, has sometimes embarrassed him. His closely held surprise decision to make the junior Senator from Indiana, Dan Quayle, his Vice President is still an unsettling question in political circles about Mr. Bush's judgment.

Mr. Bush, who cherishes his experience with two secret societies, Skull and Bones and the Central Intelligence Agency, is so intent on running the Oval Office like the C.I.A. that he even carves up information within the inner circle, causing Chinese boxes of ambiguity.

Although he had been planning the Malta summit with the Soviets since July, he did not tell his Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, or his Director of Central Intelligence, William H. Webster, before the summit was announced.

And two advisers who knew of the secret summit planning — the White House chief of staff, John H. Sununu, and the press secretary, Marlin Fitzwater — were not told about the first secret mission to China.

By keeping information fragmented, as Newsweek magazine points out in its Jan. 1 issue, the President can be "ill served." "The stormy seas off Malta could have been predicted if Bush had simply asked his advance staff to check about Mediterranean weather in December before making the plans official," the magazine said. "But Bush was too afraid of leaks to ask."

Another problem with Mr. Bush's insistence on operating in a clandestine way is that there is often no one to warn him when he is taking a course goes against the grain of most Americans.

Most Americans rooted for the Chinese students fighting for democracy who were cut down by the army, and many were offended by the Administration's efforts to try to move diplomatic relations back on track quickly.

Even Jack Kemp, the President's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, who said he displays a picture of protesting Chinese students at his office, criticized the Administration's betrayal of the students. "It's no secret I'm troubled," Mr. Kemp said after learning of the December trip to China by Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger

"The problem with secrecy is that you can lose perspective about the image you're conveying," said a senior Administration official who was upset by the pictures of General Scowcroft toasting the Chinese leaders in Beijing. "But with Bush, there will always be things that all of us don't know."

On the Domestic Front

He has not moved as boldly to alter his image of waffling on domestic matters as he has in national security issues. For example, as the Republican Party chief Lee Atwater repositions the party to a less prohibitive stance on abortion, Mr. Bush is not moving.

The President has discussed with his advisers ways that he could move back to his pre-Ronald Reagan stance of favoring Federal money for abortions in cases of rape and incest. But in October, concerned about the reaction among conservatives and afraid of charges of waffling, Mr. Bush vetoed a measure that would have allowed such funding.

Even though his advisers privately explained that Mr. Bush's position was a pragmatic one — How can you prove that the pregnancies were due to rape and incest? — rather than a moral one, the President told Congress starchily that he could not "compound a violent act with the taking of an unborn life."

The President's counselors have cautioned him that no matter how well he does in polls he may never completely get over the image of being ineffectual and flighty. They console themselves by saying that being underestimated is not such a bad thing.

But that is a slight shadow on a first year that the White House regards as a smashing success.

Asked Thursday in Texas if President Bush's intervention in Panama was the test of fire that will cause him to be more respected at home and abroad, Marlin Fitzwater grinned.

"We see him," said the blithe press secretary of the popular President, "as the same bold, visionary, outstanding, strong, macho, strong, whatever, leader he's always been."

The Washington Post
The New York Times A1
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 31 DEC 1989

BUSH SAYS TROOPS ERRED IN SEARCHES AT HOME OF envoy

APOLOGY TO NICARAGUANS

U.S. 'Screw-Up' Is Conceded — All Captured Weapons Reportedly Returned

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 30 — President Bush conceded today that American troops in Panama made a "screw-up" when they searched the Nicaraguan Ambassador's residence in Panama City on Friday, but questioned why the diplomat had weapons "up to his eyeballs" in his house.

Earlier in the day, the State Department announced that the American Embassy in Managua had delivered a note to the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry expressing "regrets" for the entry of American troops into the Nicaraguan diplomatic residence in Panama and saying that all the captured weapons have been returned.

At the same time, though, the department accused the Nicaraguan Government of overreacting to the incident by ordering 20 United States diplomats to leave Nicaragua within 72 hours and by reducing the embassy's support staff to 100 employees from 320.

Motive on Elections Alleged

The State Department said the Sandinista Government was trying to exploit a mistake by American troops in order to reduce the United States' diplomatic presence in Managua and thereby make it more difficult to monitor the fairness of presidential elections in Nicaragua in February. Washington is actively supporting the candidates running in opposition to the ruling Sandinistas.

The Nicaraguan Ambassador to Panama, Antenor Ferrey, said in a news conference in Panama City that about 60 American troops had ordered him, seven Nicaraguan staff members and two Panamanians to leave his residence on Friday while the soldiers searched the house for two hours.

Journalists who toured the residence afterward said it was left in disarray, with clothes emptied from drawers and possessions strewn around the floor.

Ortega Sees 'Delicate Situation'

In a speech broadcast in Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega Saavedra asserted: "This is an act that not only constitutes a serious violation of international agreements and places at risk the lives of Nicaraguans in Panama, but also threatens and places at risk the entire nation of Nicaragua. We are in a very delicate, fragile situation. The presence of U,S. troops in Panama represents the threat of an invasion to any nation in Latin Amierca, but first and foremost to Nicaragua."

Reuters quoted Mr. Ortega as saying, "They acted arrogantly, like Rambos."

In Washington, the lawyer representing the Nicaraguan Government, Paul S. Reichler, dismissed the State Department's allegations as dishonest and ludicrous.

Provocation Seen

Mr. Reichler said that Nicaragua, already jittery over the American invasion of Panama, believed that the entry of United States troops into its ambassadorial residence may have been a deliberate attempt to provoke a violent incident that could justify an invasion of Nicaragua.

He also argued that whether or not any arms were found in the diplomatic residence — which he said was clearly marked with a plaque identifying it as such — does not justify the violation of diplomatic immunity. The quantity of arms discovered, he asserted, was relatively small, probably no more extensive than that maintained for protection at the United States Ambassador's residence.

The White House spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, said President Bush, who was playing golf today in Houston with his national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, was made aware of the entry of American troops into the Nicaraguan diplomatic residence only after it took place. Mr. Fitzwater said the President was not involved in ordering the operation, which he called a purely military decision.

When the President finished his round of golf, he told reporters of the incident, saying, "It's a screw-up." But he wondered aloud why the Nicaraguan Ambassador had the weapons.

"I don't know what they need rocket launchers for in a man's house," Mr. Bush said. The State Department said the arms seized included machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, rifles, bayonets and one anti-tank weapon.

Spokesman Is Repetitive

When Mr. Fitzwater was asked by reporters in Houston whether the President was upset by the way American troops apparently ransacked the residence in search of weapons, he kept repeating: "We support the military. We support the military."

Despite the official expression of regret, Adminstration officials in private did not appear to be at all contrite about the incident. Their attitude seemed to be that the mere fact that even a small cache of weapons was uncovered justified entry — even if it was a mistake and in contravention of diplomatic immunity.

At the same time, because the Bush Administration official feels that the intervention in Panama has been both successful and popular, they evidently prefer to brush off incidents like this as minor glitches that will soon be forgotten.

Nevertheless, the diplomatic violation comes after a separate dispute with the Vatican, created by United States troops' surrounding the Papal Nuncio's residence in Panama City, where the deposed Panamanian dictator, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, has sought asylum.

Rock and Roil

For three days, the soldiers have been blaring rap and rock music, including such songs as "Nowhere to Hide," at the Nuncio's residence, in an attempt to taunt General Noriega, who is said to hate rock and roll. After repeated complaints from the Vatican, American troops finally turned down the volume late Friday afternoon, and turned the music off altogether this morning.

[Reuters reported that Panama's bishops wrote to Pope John Paul II today, recommending that General Noriega be handed over to Panamanian authorities to stand trial, without specifying by which country.]

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The two incidents together raise questions about the degree of control the Administration is exercising over the Unitred States Southern Command, the military headquarters in Panama, and the degree of control that the command is exercising over its troops. Just when the Administration should be savoring what it considers success in Panama, soldiers there keep generating what officials in Washington call the "wrong kind of news."

That may explain why the President went out of his way today to play down any friction with the Vatican.

Bush's Plea

"They don't want troubled relations with us, and we don't want troubled relations with them," the President said. "It's time to cool it on both sides."

In explaining the incident with Nicaraguans, the State Department issued a statement saying that on Friday "reacting to reliable information regarding an arms cache, U.S. troops searched a residence occupied by individuals, some of whom proved to be members of the Nicaraguan diplomatic mission."

Administration officials said the tip came from a Panamanian intelligence source.

"During their search," the statement continued, "the U.S. unit located weapons in excess of normal requirements for defending the residence. The cache included 4 Uzis, 6 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, 12 AK-47's, 3 grenades, 10 Fen rifles, 17 bayonets, an M-1 carbine, a shotgun, 4 rocket-propelled grenade scopes, a light anti-tank weapon, 27 rocket-propelled grenade rounds, and approximately 1,300 rounds of ammunition of various calibers.

U.S. Denies Any Mistreatment

"When it was determined that the residence was that of a Nicaraguan diplomat, the weapons were returned," the statement said. "Nicaraguan claims that the Nicaraguans were mistreated during the search are not accurate."

While diplomats could not assess the full purpose of such an arsenal, they noted that it was not unusual for foreign embassies or ambassadorial residences in Central America — including Washington's — to maintian a broad array of such arms for self-protection.

The State Department went on to say: "Despite the fact that we expressed our regret for the incident to the Nicaraguan Government, and we should remember that this incident involved a substantial weapons cache, the Nicaraguan Government has taken the decision to expel the majority of U.S. personnel assigned to our embassy in Managua and to reduce drastically the number of Nicaraguan employees.

The top American official in Managua, the chargé d'affaires, John Leonard, was not on a list of those expelled provided by the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry.