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
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June 1989



Mr. Rio Praaning, Netherlands Atlantic Commission; Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to the President; Jacquelyn K. Davis, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (partly hidden); the Honorable Peter Petersen, Bundestag, Federal Republic of Germany (partly hidden); and H. R. H. Prince Bernhard, The Netherlands (left to right).



The Honorable Ton Frinking (The Netherlands), President, North Atlantic Assembly; Mr. Benoit d'Aboville, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, France; Dr. Hans Rühle, Ministry of Defense, Federal Republic of Germany; Ambassador Rozanne Ridgway, Department of State (speaking); and Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (left to right, at table).

*May State
Publication*

BUSH URGES EAST TO JOIN IN ENDING EUROPEAN DIVISION

A RAZING OF BERLIN WALL

President, in West Germany,
Asks Soviet Bloc for Free
Voting and Pluralism

NYT A1 6-1
BY BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

MAINZ, West Germany, May 31 — President Bush called on the Soviet Union and its allies today to end the division of Europe.

In the major foreign policy speech of his European tour — and an effort to match and counter initiatives by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union — Mr. Bush outlined proposals "to heal Europe's tragic division, to help Europe become whole and free."

"The cold war began with the division of Europe," the President said. "It can only end when Europe is whole. There cannot be a common European home until all within are free to move from room to room." [Excerpts, page A13.]

Elections and Openness

Mr. Bush offered four steps for unifying Europe:

1. The promotion of "free elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe." Mr. Bush called on the political parties of the West "to lend counsel and support to those brave men and women who are trying to form the first truly representative political parties in the East."

2. The tearing down of the Berlin wall. "It must come down," he said.

3. An invitation to Western environmentalists and engineers to share knowledge with those in the East struggling to deal with acid rain and polluted rivers. "America has faced an environmental tragedy in Alaska," Mr. Bush said, adding: "Countries from France to Finland suffered after Chernobyl. Environmental destruction respects no borders."

4. An appeal to the Soviet Union to join in Mr. Bush's new proposals to reduce conventional forces in Europe.

Publicity Courted

His speech, before a group of 3,500 Germans in a flag-draped auditorium in Mainz, was televised throughout West Germany and broadcast live by some American networks. White House officials said Mr. Bush was seeking to reach the widest possible audience in Europe as well as the United States.

White House officials said the speech was intended to serve as the political counterpart to arms initiatives the President offered to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization two days ago.

It was also designed to seize the public relations initiative from Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Bush used Mr. Gorbachev's own words against him, although the speech contained no direct criticism of the Soviet leader. "Glasnost may be a Russian word, but openness is a Western concept," Mr. Bush said. "Bring glasnost to East Berlin," he said at another point.

The President's remarks were framed in such a way that they did not take into account the growing movement of peoples already taking place between East and West in Europe. While West Germans would welcome the destruction of the wall dividing the two parts of Berlin as a symbolic easing of tensions, if the removal of the wall led to a vast influx of people from Eastern Europe into the West, this would cause severe problems for West Europeans already worried about growing numbers of East European refugees in their midst.

He also skirted the issue of German reunification, saying he favored "self-determination for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe," but without saying that he explicitly wanted a merger of the two states. The topic stirs passions in both East and West. Most West Germans favor unification with East Germany, but many other Europeans express concern over such a development.

Mr. Bush called his four proposals "the foundation of our larger vision — a Europe that is free and at peace with itself."

"Let the Soviets know that our goal is not to undermine their legitimate security interests," he said. "Our goal is to convince them, step by step, that their definition of security is obsolete, that their deepest fears are unfounded."

Propping Up Kohl

White House aides said that the President came to Mainz, an old wine port on the Rhine River, at the request of Chancellor Helmut Kohl of West Germany, whose popularity has been falling. Mr. Kohl is from the surrounding state, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Mr. Bush's visit to its capital was meant to stir support for the Chancellor's Christian Democratic Party in city and state elections on June 18.

"Kohl asked us to come, so we did a campaign swing through the Rhineland," an American official said.

The West German Chancellor, in his remarks before Mr. Bush, seemed to echo some of the President's views.

"For the first time since the end of World War II," he said, "we stand a realistic chance of escaping the shadow of the East-West conflict. Soviet policy is now more amenable to compromise, more open to dialogue and cooperation," he said.

After Mr. Bush's speech in Mainz,

the President and his wife, Barbara, joined Mr. Kohl and his wife, Hannelore, for a nearly two-hour trip aboard an excursion cruise ship from Oberwesel to Koblenz.

Mr. Bush called it "an unforgettable day" as he left for London for meetings with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and a visit with Queen Elizabeth II. Earlier in the day in Bonn, the President met privately with Mr. Kohl for more than an hour, and then spoke briefly to several hundred American residents, including schoolchildren, in the backyard of the official residence of the U.S. Ambassador, Vernon A. Walters. Then he flew by helicopter to Mainz, a 40-minute trip.

Mr. Bush's speech, timed for delivery at midday to enable the American television networks to carry it on morning news programs, was enthusiastically applauded by a handpicked audience of Mainz residents.

Open Societies

The President's theme was that demands for democracy in Communist countries, including China, had produced a "ferment" that demanded a response from the leaders of those countries. "The passion for freedom cannot be denied forever," he said.

"The momentum for freedom does not just come from the printed word, the transistor or the television screen," Mr. Bush said. "It comes from the power of a single idea — democracy."

"This one idea is why the Communist world, from Budapest to Beijing, is in ferment," said the President, who plans a visit in July to Hungary and Poland, where steps have been taken toward free and open elections.

"As President, I will continue to do all I can to open the closed societies of the East," Mr. Bush said. "We seek self-determination for all of Germany and all of Eastern Europe. We will not relax. We must not waver. Again, the world has waited long enough."

Although some of Mr. Bush's recent foreign policy speeches have been criticized, even within the White House, as lackluster, today's 30-minute address seemed pointed and finely tuned. The speech was written by Mark Davis, a former aide to then-Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci, who is now on the White House staff, and shaped two days ago in a late-night session in Brussels by Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser; John H. Sununu, the chief of staff; David Demarest, director of White House communications, and several other officials.

Mr. Bush offered a veiled criticism of some German and other West European officials who have criticized his Administration for its tentative response to arms control.

"To those who are impatient with our measured pace in arms reductions," he said, "I respectfully suggest that history teaches us a lesson — that unity and strength are the catalyst and prerequisite to arms control."

New
York
Times
June 1

Bush Vows to Seize Opportunity in Europe

President Returns Home Amid Wide Praise

By Ann Devroy

Washington Post Staff Writer

KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine, June 2—President Bush returned from Europe today, vowing that his administration will seize "this great and historic opportunity to shape the changes that are transforming Europe."

Bush told a flag-waving crowd of about 5,000 that welcomed him at Pease Air Force Base in neighboring New Hampshire that his "mission" following his first visit to Europe as president is to help move toward a reconciliation of East and West "based on shared values."

"The Cold War began with the division of Europe. And it must end with a reconciliation based on shared values where East joins West in a commonwealth of free nations," he said.

Bush won wide praise in Europe for a surprise proposal to negotiate with the Soviet Union an ambitious reduction in troops, weapons and warplanes based in Europe and for his successful efforts to settle a dispute with West Germany over the timing of negotiations to reduce short-range nuclear missile numbers.

Buoyed by Bush's reception in Europe, a stream of senior administration officials eagerly approached reporters on Air Force One to talk—and sometimes gush—over results of the trip. White House chief of staff John H. Sununu, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and aides to Scowcroft and press secretary Marlin Fitzwater joined in the parade.

Robert Blackwill of the National

Security Council called Bush's performance "the most successful presidential visit to Europe since Jack Kennedy's visit of 1961." Fitzwater noted drily that when a summit is successful, "everyone wants to talk."

Scowcroft said that with the conventional arms proposal now on the table, the administration is "beginning to focus" on the talks to reduce long-range nuclear missiles that are due to start June 19. Scowcroft said the process of producing a starting U.S. position "is well along."

After four months of being buffeted by criticism of his slowness and caution in responding to Soviet arms reduction proposals, Bush basked in the glow of praise. He told reporters that he was pleased with the results of his European visit and intended to press forward on his conventional arms proposal. He will report to congressional leaders on the proposal and his trip next week.

Bush said his first priority is "to follow through" on the NATO endorsement of his conventional arms reduction proposal and "try to meet a very ambitious time sequence" of having a detailed plan ready for negotiations by Sept. 7.

The president has called for reaching an agreement with the Soviets in six months to a year, a timetable called optimistic—some say unrealistic—by many other Western leaders.

"So we've got some work to do to make this NATO decision into a reality," he said. "But I'm determined to kick our bureaucracy and the NATO bureaucracy as best I can."

Asked whether he expects to have more respect at home as a result of the summit, Bush asked, "You mean... like the Rodney Dangerfield kind of thing? I've not suffered from a lack of respect."

In his remarks at Pease Air Force Base before he headed to his family compound here for a week-end of rest, the president thanked the hundreds of base employees, schoolchildren and area residents who had been assembled for what he called "the surprise" reception. Then he pulled out a lengthy, prepared speech to report on his trip.

Referring to the foreign policy speeches he gave leading up to this trip, Bush said they set out "a course for the future" that moves beyond containing the Soviet Union toward the goal of a reconciliation between East and West.

The messages of his speeches, and the foundation of his policies, he said, would be support for reform in Eastern Europe, a balanced approach to the Soviets that judges progress on performance and a pledge to "seize every opportunity" to bring the Soviets into the "community of nations."

The outcome of the NATO summit, he said, "showed that we are ready to help shape a new world in this period of historic change."

NATO Arms Discord Seen Resurfacing

Question Remains on Bonn's Accepting Future Nuclear Weapons

By Robert J. McCartney
Washington Post Foreign Service

BONN, June 3—Despite the euphoria over the agreement on short-range nuclear missiles reached at this past week's NATO summit, the compromise sidestepped the critical question of whether West Germany will ever accept the stationing of new nuclear weapons on its soil.

As a result, strains are likely to resurface in the future between the Bonn government and Washington and London over how much of a nuclear deterrent the North Atlantic Treaty Organization needs in Europe, allied officials and other analysts say.

West German public opinion polls indicate and a number of analysts believe that, barring a renewal of the Cold War, it will be politically impossible to install new nuclear weapons here. This raises the question of whether the West, by insisting on keeping some of these missiles, has lost an opportunity to get rid of a vastly larger number of similar Soviet weapons.

Post-summit statements by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher showed that Bonn remains skeptical of the U.S. and British view that short-range nuclear weapons are needed permanently to deter a Warsaw Pact invasion.

The Brussels summit package also committed NATO to what many analysts view as an overly ambitious agenda in East-West negotiations on reducing conventional, or non-nuclear, arms in Europe.

It is widely conceded that it will be very difficult to meet President Bush's six- to 12-month timetable for reaching, within six months to a year, an accord with the Warsaw Pact to reduce troops, tanks, artillery and aircraft. Arms control experts say conventional arms pose the greatest difficulties for negotiators because of the many varieties of such weapons and the problem of verifying that reductions

For the moment, these potential trouble spots have been left in the shadows by the afterglow of the unexpectedly harmonious summit and triumphant visits by Bush to West Germany and Britain. Virtually all of Western Europe was immensely relieved that Bush had reasserted U.S. leadership within the alliance and had demonstrated that NATO's leaders are as capable as Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev of setting far-sighted goals for disarmament.

But a U.S. official, echoing the view of many observers, said the unfinished business left by the summit "could come back to haunt us." He added, "There's certainly a danger that we may have raised expectations too high."

NATO's leaders agreed, at West Germany's insistence, to postpone until 1992 a decision on whether to deploy a new generation of short-range nuclear weapons to replace the alliance's aged, ground-based Lance missiles.

The United States and Britain believe that the alliance must deploy a successor to the Lance, which has a range of 70 miles and will become obsolete in the mid-1990s, to preserve a part of NATO's nuclear deterrent that has helped preserve peace in Europe for more than four decades.

But the Bonn government is not sure that it wants or needs a replacement for the Lance, and its views are crucial because almost all such missiles are deployed on West German soil at the front line of the East-West military confrontation in Europe. Many analysts say the strong tide of pro-disarmament sentiment in West German public opinion will prevent NATO from ever stationing any new short-range nuclear weapons, or those with ranges of less than 300 miles, on German soil.

The unresolved differences over short-range nuclear arms were evident this week in contradictory interpretations of the summit accord.

The United States and Britain agreed to delay making a commit-

ment to modernize the Lance in return for several promises from Bonn that Washington and London view as guaranteeing that short-range nuclear missiles might be reduced, but not completely eliminated, in future East-West negotiations on such weapons.

Both Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said in post-summit news conferences in Brussels that the accord ruled out a "zero solution," or scrapping of all short-range nuclear missiles.

But Kohl and Genscher, in addresses to parliament on Thursday, pointed to several loopholes that left open the possibility that all such missiles could someday be scrapped.

Kohl referred to a phrase in the summit document, inserted at U.S. and British insistence, that ground-based, nuclear missiles will be needed in Europe "as far as can be foreseen." The chancellor told parliament, "Given the general trend of developments today between the East and the West, 'foreseeable' can mean a relatively limited period of time."

Genscher, NATO's most prominent disarmament advocate, went even further than Kohl. He pointed to a phrase in the summit document, included at his insistence, saying a decision on replacing the Lance would be made "in the light of overall security developments."

Genscher told parliament that West Germany would work "to shape developments so that there will be no compulsion for a follow-on system," which is NATO jargon for a Lance replacement.

Given West Germany's reluctance to modernize the Lance, some western arms control experts have suggested that Washington and London should have given up fighting Bonn over the issue and proposed to the Soviets to get rid of all the Lances in exchange for scrapping all Soviet short-range nuclear missiles. Such a deal would have left

NEWS
ANALYSIS


Prisoners of the Past?

Bush aides remain suspicious of Soviet behavior

Once before, it seemed as if the cold war might be ending. Arms-control talks were underway, and the super-power leaders were talking about cooperation rather than confrontation. But to three men huddled afterhours in a West Wing office in President Gerald Ford's White House back in 1976—chief of staff Richard Cheney, national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft and re-election campaign deputy chairman James Baker—the omens were less promising. They saw the Soviets taking advantage of America's post-Watergate, post-Vietnam debility to foment trouble in the Third World. Meanwhile, across the Potomac, a fourth member of Ford's team—CIA Director George Bush—was presiding over a radical, almost alarmist new analysis of the Soviets' nuclear-weapons buildup. By the end of the decade, the Soviets had invaded Afghanistan and triggered a conservative backlash in the United States.

Today, with hopes for East-West cohabitation higher than ever, these same four men are the architects of American foreign policy—Bush as president, Scowcroft as national-security adviser, Cheney as Defense secretary and Baker as secretary of State. They remain deeply affected by their experience in the 1970s. Unlike the policymakers of the immediate postwar era who were bold, sometimes even visionary, the modern national-security establishment is cautious. Bush, Scowcroft and Co. follow a rule that the 1970s drove home: in a time of uncertainty, better safe than sorry.

As the administration's national-security traffic cop, Scowcroft has the job of sifting through the ideas that bubble up from the bureaucracy. He's an honest broker, but so far he and his team have smothered adventurous thinking. "Any idea that's suggested, they can think of pitfalls for it," said a frustrated U.S. official. An Air Force general who rose through the ranks as a bureaucrat and analyst, Scowcroft once taught Russian history at West Point. "Brent knows the history of Soviet reforms. It's been a series of summers followed by Russian winters," said a Scowcroft friend. As a former aide to Presidents Nixon and Ford and to Henry Kissinger, he helped bring



'A very competitive man.' At the Coast Guard commencement

LARRY DOWNING—NEWSWEEK

about the SALT II agreement, but he ultimately felt burned by détente. "We are going to have a basically antagonistic relationship as far into the future as any of us can reasonably see," he said in mid-1984. Said a friend, "Nobody who lived through the enthusiasm of '72-73, then saw it sour, can get carried away by it now."

Defense Secretary Cheney, the only ideological conservative on the four-man Bush team, was schooled in foreign policy by Scowcroft and Ford and by years on the House intelligence committee. A firm supporter of America's defense buildup, Cheney has a classic military mind-set. "Dick doesn't care about [Soviet leader Mikhail] Gorbachev's intentions; he distrusts the Soviets' military capabilities," explains a colleague, "just the way your feelings for your infant son are irrelevant if he's facing you with a loaded gun in his hand."

Baker is the most activist of the four, and the most sensitive to European political concerns. But he's also new to the field, and his geopolitical antennae are not yet fully attuned. Baker did insist, against the advice of the State Department bureaucracy, that the United States not press West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to immediately modernize short-range nuclear forces (SNF). But Baker didn't anticipate that German political pressures would induce Kohl to double-cross him and insist on immediate SNF negotiations with the Soviets.

Baker was also flummoxed during his first visit to Moscow by Gorbachev's splashy, if insubstantive, announcement of cuts in Soviet short-range systems. Looking ahead to the NATO summit, insiders say Baker proposed that the United States unveil a unilateral SNF cut of its own—in nuclear artillery shells—but he didn't push the idea over the Pentagon's objections. Baker isn't a table pounder, and friends say he doesn't want to get so far out front that he causes trouble for Bush by drawing conservative fire, as he sometimes did under Ronald Reagan.

Practiced harangues: Though Bush himself isn't guided by strong ideological convictions, his formative experience was with communist hard-liners. As U.N. ambassador in 1971-72, Bush had to deal with the practiced harangues of his Soviet counterpart, Yakov Malik. As envoy to China in 1974-75, Bush was frustrated by Beijing's inaccessible officialdom. When he was CIA director in 1976, the intelligence data that crossed his desk portrayed an aggressive Soviet threat, conditioning Bush against embracing Reaganesque romantic notions about Gorbachev.

Bold steps don't come easily to Bush, an incrementalist who prefers refining the policies of others. "It's up to the president to step in and say, 'This is the truth, or my version of it,'" says former national-security adviser Robert McFarlane. "If not, the process runs him." Domestic politics can prompt him to act, however. In 1983, with voters anxious for some arms-control process, Vice President Bush urged Reagan to make an overture to the Soviets. But there's no groundswell among Americans demanding that Bush match Gorbachev's dramatic gestures.

Bush isn't oblivious to criticism of his cautious approach. He has reportedly complained that his advisers have been slow to suggest creative responses to Gorbachev, and last week at a Coast Guard Academy speech, praised the Soviet leader for his "forthcoming" approach to arms control. At this week's 40th-anniversary NATO summit in Brussels, Bush was expected to bring proposed concessions in the conventional arms-reductions talks that would have the effect of a 10 percent cut in U.S. forces in Western Europe. "Bush is a very competitive man," said a top U.S. official. "He's not likely to want to be left behind by history." But neither is he likely to shed easily the lessons of his own cold-war history.

MARGARET GARRARD WARNER in Washington

Bush Suspends Military Sales to China

President Rejects Calls From Congress for More Severe Action

By David Hoffman and Helen Dewar
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush suspended military sales to China yesterday, and warned Chinese leaders that "it's not going to be business as usual" following their bloody confrontation with pro-democracy demonstrators.

Accusing the Chinese army of "brutally suppressing popular and peaceful demonstrations" in attacks that have left hundreds dead, the president said he wanted to "signal" the military that "we want to see restraint."

Bush rejected calls from Congress for more severe action, including the withdrawal of the U.S. ambassador in Beijing. He said he also has ruled out for now imposing economic sanctions because "I don't want to hurt the Chinese people." But he said he was reserving the option to take more severe action if there is more violence.

At a hastily called White House news conference that followed a weekend of demands from Capitol Hill for strong action against Beijing, Bush also announced suspension of military exchanges with Chi-

na and U.S. aid to humanitarian efforts to help victims of the violence. In addition, he said the United States will view sympathetically requests from Chinese students wishing to remain here.

Later, Bush told a Cabinet meeting that he is concerned that Chinese authorities will move next against the university campuses. The State Department urged American students to leave the campuses and gather in Beijing hotels. Another warning against travel to China was issued, and Americans in the city were urged to remain off

the streets. Several U.S. companies with operations in China also evacuated their employees.

Key Democratic and Republican members of Congress hailed Bush's response, although several urged stronger sanctions and Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) said he would move today to force a Senate vote on suspending trade and other Sino-American ties if the bloodshed continues. But some lawmakers of both parties cautioned against any immediate action beyond the steps taken by Bush, urging that additional sanctions be held in reserve to deter further use of military force.

Bush stressed his sympathy and support for the demonstrators, citing what he said was the vivid image of a single student stopping a tank in its tracks. He declared that

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BUSH... from Pg. 1

the pro-democracy movement in China is "inexorable" and "the genie will not be put back in the bottle." To dramatize the president's support for the students, the White House invited on short notice some Chinese graduate students who are supporting the demonstrators to meet with the president.

But Bush repeatedly defended what he described as a "prudent" response, arguing that the events in China called for "a reasoned, careful action that takes into account both our long-term interests and recognition of a complex internal situation in China."

"I don't want to see a total break in this relationship, and I will not encourage a total break in this relationship," said Bush, who served as special envoy to China in 1975. "When you see these kids struggling for democracy and freedom, this would be a bad time for the United States to withdraw and pull back and leave them to the devices of a leadership that might decide to crack down further."

Administration sources said Bush's decision to take limited actions was made early yesterday after a weekend of consultations with Secretary of State James A. Baker III, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, U.S. Ambassador to China James Lilley and others. Bush spoke to Lilley on Sunday evening and met with Baker and others early yesterday to review the options that had been produced by an inter-agency group over the weekend.

One senior official who asked not to be identified said all of Bush's advisers agreed that the administration should have a more definitive reaction than the statement issued when the violence first erupted on Saturday "so we wouldn't seem to be dragged along by the Hill."

This official said the situation remains in flux. The military "is not united, so you've got to be very careful about how tough you come down, for example in cutting off all military contacts. We don't know what is going to happen. A lot of people think there's going to be a major civil war."

Baker told a Cabinet meeting the United States could not yet confirm reports that Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping is ailing or has died.

Officials said the suspension of military sales to China is relatively small but would have symbolic importance. At stake are about \$600 million in weapons sales, about 10 percent of which have been shipped and the remainder of which will be suspended. An avionics upgrade of the Chinese Air Force F-7 air defense interceptor, valued at \$500 million, is under development and was to be shipped in 1990 but will be suspended. Also involved are artillery locating radars, surface ship anti-submarine torpedoes, and the modernization of large-caliber artillery ammunition.

Bush said he did not know why the Chinese leaders had decided to try to crush the demonstrations, nor did he understand the shifting power struggle. "It's too obscure, it's too beclouded to say," he said. Asked whether China's leaders will

care about U.S. actions now, Bush said China "has historically been less than totally interested in what other countries think of their performance."

"You just have to look back to the Middle Kingdom syndrome," he said. "And you look back in history when outsiders, including the United States, were viewed as quote, barbarians, unquote."

Most of the steps taken by Bush yesterday had been urged by lawmakers over the weekend. While some had criticized his initial response as overly cautious, they were solid and swift in their endorsement of his moves yesterday.

Senate Majority Whip Alan Cranston (D-Calif.), who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific affairs, said he would give the president an "A+" for his handling of the crisis, including avoiding what he called "extreme steps that wouldn't contribute to a resolution (of) the problem."

Rep. Stephen J. Solarz (D-N.Y.), chairman of the comparable subcommittee in the House, also praised Bush's action as "a very good first step" but said he still feels the U.S. ambassador to China should be recalled temporarily for consultations. Solarz said the United States should also make clear it will suspend all high-technology transfers if the suppression continues.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) endorsed the suspension of military sales and said "we will need to watch developments there carefully to determine what additional measures are necessary."

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) described Bush's move as "the least we can do" and said he was "inclined to support additional sanctions" but reserved judgment pending a committee hearing on the China crisis Wednesday.

Helms, ranking Republican on the panel, praised Bush's suspension of military transactions but said he would push today to amend a pending appropriations bill to include standby authority to impose high-technology export controls, suspend trade incentives and require the United States to vote against international loans to China if the violence continues. "While it would take unanimous consent for consideration of the proposal, Helms dared any senator to object to it."

While he would not rule out further sanctions, Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.), another member of the foreign relations panel, said he thought the president was "uniquely qualified" to map strategy on the

issue. Sen. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.) said he thought further sanctions at this time might be counterproductive.

U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, meanwhile, said the fallout from the Chinese crackdown on its students "will be quite adverse" and could impact negotiations for Beijing to join the compact that polices world trade, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The Chinese government's attack on the students "has caused people to have tremendous doubts about their earlier stated opinions with respect to China's forward momentum, its liberalization." It has affected all of our thinking," she told a luncheon meeting with reporters.

"Clearly when you have death, violence, killing going on, it takes center stage and quiet, sensible discussions on trade have to take second stage."

Since Sunday, many of the U.S. companies operating in China have either evacuated their employees or ordered them to follow State Department advisories to avoid large gatherings and to stay indoors whenever possible.

International Business Machines Corp. sent more than 50 employees and their families to Hong Kong after the violence began, while Chrysler Corp. flew the eight Americans who manage the company's Beijing Jeep plant to Tokyo.

Two-thirds of the Chrysler plant's 4,500 Chinese employees showed up for work the morning after the killings in Tiananmen Square and managers from Chrysler's Chinese partner are running the plant, a Chrysler spokeswoman said.

Meanwhile, Johnson & Johnson was taking steps to move approximately a dozen employees out of a plant in Xian, in western China, and a construction site in Shanghai, while the resident manager of Bechtel Group Inc.'s Beijing office sent his family home to Australia and moved his company's operations to Shenzhen, near Hong Kong, according to company spokesmen.

In Shanghai, one of the two American managers of Foxboro Co.'s plant was "sitting tight," according to Gerald Gleason, vice president of the company, which makes electrical controls used by industry. The second American had been on a business trip outside China when the violence began, and his wife and three children are attempting to leave the country to join him, Gleason said.

Staff writers Stuart Auerbach, Graeme Browning and Don Oberdorfer contributed to this report.

As feuding begins in China's army,

By Robert Benjamin

Western analysts yesterday focused on rising factionalism within China's army and on a key faction believed to be headed by China's president and linked by family ties, as the first reports of possible armed clashes between Chinese army units came from Beijing.

Much of the speculation among China scholars over the last few weeks has centered on a power struggle between moderate leaders aligned with Communist Party chief Zhao Ziyang and hard-liners led by Deng Xiaoping, the nation's paramount leader for more than a decade, and Premier Li Peng.

But some analysts said yesterday that the violent move over the weekend by some People's Liberation Army units against the student pro-democracy movement may reflect a power shift toward Yang Shangkun, the country's 82-year-old, conservative president, and toward some top military leaders tied to him.

"We may have been looking at the wrong game," said June Teufel Dreyer, a University of Miami political scientist and author of a recent book on Chinese defense policy. "Yang and his connections have turned out to be very important."

As a vice chairman and the secretary general of the Communist

Party's Central Military Commission, Mr. Yang recently "has been running the military on a day-to-day basis" instead of Mr. Deng, the commission's chairman, she said.

Moreover, Mr. Yang's younger brother, Yang Baibing, heads one of three PLA departments, the general political department. And Chi Haotian, who has been chief of the general staff — one of the other two PLA departments — since 1987, is believed to have risen to power because of Mr. Yang's influence, Ms. Dreyer said.

Mr. Chi also is rumored to be Mr. Yang's son-in-law, and he reportedly was the political commissar of the 27th Army — the army believed to have carried out much of the killing in Beijing Sunday.

"If you have the guy who directs the military commission allied with the commission's genuine head, plus two of the three department heads in the army, then you have a powerful phalanx that clearly has some leverage," Ms. Dreyer said.

One possible faction opposing that headed by Mr. Yang may be comprised of some Beijing-area commanders, including those of the 38th Army, who earlier had refused to obey the government's orders to crack down on the student protesters and who reportedly are angered by the blood bath that ensued.

The China scholars also cau-

regional factions within the army could surface in the form of any number of military groups that may prove impossible to sort out as they collide around the country.

"There's definitely an increasing possibility of armed civil war," said Harlan W. Jencks, a research associate at the University of California at Berkeley. "In a sense, an armed actual battle between parts of the PLA might be the only way that the army now can retrieve its lost reputation among the people."

"This is the most dangerous moment that China has faced since ... the Cultural Revolution in 1967," Mr. Jencks said, when main PLA forces were called upon to suppress Red Guard groups in bloody struggles around the country and to put down a revolt led by a regional PLA commander in the city of Wuhan.

"My greatest fear is that China will break up into another warlord era," he said, referring to the decades prior to the founding of the Communist state in 1949. "China is so big and diverse that that could happen, particularly when there is no unified voice at the center. A bad policy enforced by a unified army is in the long run better for China than an army that disintegrates and starts shooting at each other."

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Civil War For Army?

Crackdown Order Tests Its Loyalty

By BERNARD E. TRAINOR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 5 — American military specialists say a serious rift has developed within the Chinese armed forces as a result of the Beijing Government's crackdown on the students over the weekend.

An Administration official confirmed reports of an armed clash on the outskirts of Beijing between units of the People's Liberation Army, which was said to involve shooting between soldiers of the 16th and 27th Armies.

Senator William Cohen, Republican of Maine and Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, today painted a grim picture of the situation in Beijing, saying, "It is citizen against citizen and army against army."

Both the 16th and 27th Armies were brought into Beijing to break up the demonstrations after the 38th Army, which is stationed in Beijing, refused to use armed force against the students. Soldiers of the 16th Army are said to have joined the Beijing garrison in its refusal to break up the demonstration with force. But the 27th Army, reportedly commanded by a nephew of President Yang Shangkun, opened fire on the students over the weekend and now occupies Tiananmen square and much of downtown Beijing with armored forces.

TRAINOR...Pg. 10

NEW YORK TIMES

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Pg. 16

An Army With Its Own Grievances

By FOX BUTTERFIELD

Special to The New York Times

BOSTON, June 5 — American experts on the Chinese Army say its morale has been badly affected over the last year by the same problems of inflation and corruption that have created widespread dissatisfaction among the public with the Communist Government.

In addition, the specialists say, many of the younger army officers are relatively well-educated people from China's cities, unlike their senior officers, who came from peasant families with little schooling.

As a result, many junior officers are sympathetic to the demands of the pro-democracy demonstrators in Beijing, the experts believe.

Harvey Nelson, a professor at the University of South Florida, said that on a trip to China last month a veteran army officer told him, "many field-grade officers have been infected by the democracy movement."

This split between younger and older officers raises the prospect of a serious breakdown in discipline in the People's Liberation Army, Mr. Nelson said, with some military units rebelling against others. Mr. Nelson has written extensively about the Chinese Army.

Harlan Jencks, a research associate at the University of California at Berkeley, said, "There is a grave danger that the P.L.A. will start shooting at each other. This is threatening the existence of the People's Republic."

Mr. Jencks said television pictures of the troops occupying Tiananmen Square indicated they were among the best-armed units in China. Some of the tanks used in the crackdown, for example, are of the T-69 type, a brand new model with an Israeli-made 105-millimeter gun and a laser site.

So far, only a very few of the T-69 tanks have been manufactured, said Mr. Jencks, who is regarded as a leading authority on the Chinese military. They are advanced versions of the T-59, which was based on the old Soviet-made T-54.

In addition, he said, the helicopters used in reconnaissance over Tiananmen Square and for the dropping of leaflets on demonstrators before the shootings began last weekend are new French-made craft that had not been seen publicly in China before. A special army unit was created to fly the helicopters, known by the code name Gazelle.

"This shows what a mess the Government is in because it goes against everything the P.L.A. has been trying to work for in the past few years," Mr.

Jencks said. "They have been told to get out of politics and to become more professional and modernized."

Under Mao Zedong, the army had been highly politicized, being heavily involved in Communist Party factional battles and had fallen far behind world standards in equipment and training.

Jeanne Kirkpatrick

The Cold War Isn't Over

Criticized at home and abroad for lack of vision and purpose in his foreign policy, George Bush delighted allies when he finally defined his approach as "moving beyond containment to seek to integrate the Soviets into the community of nations, to help them share the rewards of international cooperation."

In case anyone missed the point, a National Security Council aide elaborated. He described the president's doctrine as "a radical conceptual departure for American policy in the postwar period toward the Soviet Union." Bush and his briefers think they are taking a position unprecedented since World War II, moving not only beyond containment, but beyond the "cycles of conflict and cooperation" that have characterized U.S.-Soviet relations, and toward permanent integration of the Soviet Union into the international system.

These views clearly place the president among those who believe the Cold War either is over or is about to be over and among those who believe that internal reforms in the Soviet Union have so transformed that government that Soviet rulers will prove willing to forgo dreams and policies of expansion to join in preserving a stable international order.

Of course, the search for a stable world order has been a principal goal of U.S. policy since World War II. Initially, the United States believed the United Nations could stabilize relations among countries. The Cold War developed when the Soviet Union showed itself more interested in expanding its power than in living within the rules of the U.N. charter. That preference led Joseph Stalin to consolidate Soviet power in Eastern Europe, to support a coup in Czechoslovakia and eventually to divide Europe. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and U.S. rearmament followed. NATO and the Warsaw Pact institutionalized the Cold War relations between East and West.

It is altogether natural, therefore, that discussions of arms reductions by NATO and the Warsaw Pact should accompany a widespread feeling that the Cold War is finally behind us.

But it is much too soon to know

whether this optimistic analysis will turn out to be true. Bush and such close advisers as Brent Scowcroft, Larry Eagleburger and Bob Gates are fully aware that there have been other times when "enemies seemed less inimical and allies less allied, [when] economic agreements with adversaries began to take shape while economic disputes with allies became acute," as the brilliant French intellectual Raymond Aron once described the situation. These men know, too, that the earlier period of *détente* was followed by years of unparalleled global Soviet expansion.

It is true that Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms have already been more sweeping than those of Nikita Khrushchev and that these reforms are political as well as economic. It is also true that the problems in Soviet society are more serious today than at any time since World War II.

It is these trends in internal affairs that make even seasoned observers such as Bush, Scowcroft, Eagleburger and Gates somewhat sanguine about the likely course of Soviet development.

But realists must also face the fact that "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy has been far less impressive than "new thinking" about domestic affairs. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* magazine, Sovietologist Michael Mandelbaum noted: "The threat of Soviet aggression against Western Europe is credible be-

cause it has already taken place—and continues to the present—against Eastern Europe. Ending the Cold War requires ending the Soviet threat to Western Europe, which requires ending Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe, which means allowing the people of that part of the world to decide freely how to govern themselves."

The Cold War developed in Europe in response to the use of Soviet troops to deny self-determination to the people of Eastern Europe. It will be over when the Soviet government renounces the use of force to impose governments and foreign policies of its own choosing on other European states. Until then, neither the United States nor Western Europe can prudently move very far "beyond containment."

The current challenge to all of us was nearly perfectly described by Aron, who said:

"Are the Western European states able and willing to establish closer ties with the other half of the old continent while remaining an integral part of the transnational Atlantic society? Undoubtedly they are. Can they have and do they want a Europe unified 'from the Atlantic to the Urals'? Most certainly not. Politically, a Europe of this kind, without the United States and with the Soviet Union, would lead to what may be called a Finlandization of Europe."

It is worth recalling that Raymond Aron wrote this paragraph in 1973.

Collider backers push image of national benefit

BY ASHLEY CHESHIRE
Fort Worth Star-Telegram Dallas Bureau

DALLAS — Denied an important backer with the resignation of House Speaker Jim Wright, supporters of the Superconducting Super Collider are working to sell it as a project that benefits the whole country, an Energy Department official said yesterday.

Right now "it's a 50-50 proposition," said Deputy Secretary Henson Moore.

In related remarks made in Fort Worth yesterday, Rep. Steve Bartlett, R-Dallas, concurred that there is anti-Texas resistance in Congress, but he predicted the 1990 money for the super collider will pass by a narrow margin.

"My sense is with the leadership of (Rep.) Joe Barton, we have turned the corner and we now have the votes to fund it in the (House) Appropriations Committee," Bartlett said.

Moore said the House appropriations subcommittee studying financing for the \$6 billion project is expected to make its recommendation for fiscal year 1990 within the month.

If more than \$200 million is approved by this session of Congress, Moore said, construction on the Ellis County site 35 miles southeast of Fort Worth could begin by fall.

"We really can't compromise beyond the \$200 to \$250 million range," he said. "That's saying, 'Research it to death, but don't build it.'"

Moore said accepting a minimal amount in 1990 to free up part of the \$1 billion pledged by the state of Texas is not being considered.

"We (Congress) have got to go first," Moore said.

The Bush administration, Moore said, remains firmly behind its proposal of \$250 million for start-up financing — \$160 million for construction in 1990 and \$90 million toward research.

"The president is a strong supporter of full funding, and we expect to get that funding," said Moore.

ships put on a colorful early morning show at the same former Navy yard where many earlier German Navy sister ships, built in Bath, Maine, were dry-docked and fitted out.

The long gray column of warships, whose rails were lined with sailors in dress whites, timed their arrival and their salute to this nation — and "Old Ironsides" — exactly at 8 a.m. — when the Stars and Stripes is raised on that venerable vessel.

With the black, red and gold colors of West Germany snapping in the soft southerly breeze, and with each ship bearing a coat of arms of a namesake German state or person, they seemed to enter Boston through a golden arch — a masterpiece of the fireboat Firefighter whose


joked at the sight. They counted, "one, two, three..." a total of 11 cannon retorts — the correct salute for their commodore.

The salute was triggered by Glad Tidings' owner, Boston University professor Keating Willcox, who later said: "I go through 1,000 rounds of shells a year saluting visiting ships. It's a maritime tradition, and they appreciate it."

The ships will be open to visitors as follows:

Today and Thursday at the Navy Yard, Charlestown: Rommel and Niedersachsen, 12:30 to 4 p.m.

Today, tomorrow and Thursday at Black Falcon Terminal, South Boston, Schleswig-Holstein and Koln 12:30 to 4 p.m.



Staff writer Steve Zuckerman contributed to this report

How Bush Triumphed

WP 6-5-89 41
Right after President Bush bolted from a mid-May National Security Council meeting with the complaint that he was learning nothing new, he began to demonstrate a tactical skill that even ardent admirers were despairing of ever seeing in him.

The subject before the NSC was the one that had confused and almost bedamned the young Bush presidency: Mikhail Gorbachev, helped by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was driving a stake into NATO's heart on the eve of its 40th anniversary summit.

Bush's unreported NSC walkout displayed the frustration eating away at him. For weeks he listened as the national security bureaucrats, ordered to produce new policy to meet the Gorbachev threat, got stuck on old concepts. Learning nothing, he stalked out. Within days he had formulated new tactics to deflect Gorbachev and, for now at least, move NATO to higher ground. His main collaborators: Secretary of State James A. Baker III, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

Whether the Brussels summit really did make the glorious and lasting history that so many sudden admirers of the president are proclaiming will not be answered any time soon. The United States got far from everything it wanted. Administration insiders know—and privately admit—that future modernization of the Lance short-range missile, desired by the United States, almost surely will not happen now.

Nor does there seem much chance of meeting the ridiculously accelerated time table of conventional arms reductions set by Bush. The full extent of British and French complaints about inclusion of their warplanes in conventional arms cuts is not yet half realized. Hidden problems in the rosy Brussels communiqué abound, headed by the familiar puzzle of verifying cuts in troops, tanks and artillery.

But at this stage of the Bush presidency and considering Gorbachev's impact on Western Europe, what's politically significant is that the president revealed previously hidden tactical prowess. He showed it by drafting a policy, acceptable to all NATO allies, that slows to a halt Gorbachev's peace offensive in Western Europe and salvaged a potential NATO-destroying summit.

The president's tactical approach to Brussels had three elements:

First, it used Soviet conventional

disarmament proposals that Gorbachev handed Baker in Moscow last month as the foundation for the far more dramatic U.S. plan. That moved NATO off the slippery slope of bickering whether to negotiate the reduction of short-range nuclear missiles.

Second, it isolated Genscher, who was described privately by a senior presidential adviser one week before the summit as the only key player in the Western alliance who "does not want an agreement."

Third, it built up West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, as distinct

from coalition partner Genscher, without wounding British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Kohl, his political future on the line, naturally cooperated. It was the chancellor who quietly suggested after hours of wrangling over the missile issue in Brussels that the heads of government go to dinner and turn the question over to the foreign ministers.

That was key to the Bush-Baker tactic for achieving a short-range agreement by delaying negotiations on withdrawing the missiles and putting the dramatic conventional arms

cuts first. This tactic opened at least a chance for modernization of the Lance.

Once the heads of government walked out, the most fascinating duel of the summit began: the worldly, experienced Genscher, with 15 years as foreign minister under his belt, against the steely-eyed Texas dealmaker Baker, whose silky smoothness is familiar to Washington but still untested on the diplomatic circuit.

Baker smooched, flattered and beguiled Genscher, waiting him out for hours until all the other ministers

were safely in the secretary's camp. The German finally caved. When the deal was struck, Bush had the words he needed, and Kohl could point to Genscher as the fall guy who accepted the U.S. language. That gave the chancellor a needed political escape hatch back home.

Bush's triumph was the first taste of tactical success as president. It was an essential win in what was merely the opening skirmish in the great struggle against Mikhail Gorbachev for the heart and soul of Europe.

Wash
Post
Jun 8

U.S. Shift On Arms Is Unlikely

Superpowers Reopen Negotiations Monday

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Bush administration is unlikely to propose new initiatives that could produce an early accord with the Soviet Union on reductions in strategic nuclear arms, according to informed U.S. officials.

President Bush and his advisers will conclude their deliberations this week on several potential changes to the arms control position of the Reagan administration in preparation for the reopening of superpower negotiations in Geneva on Monday.

The officials said, however, that none of the changes under consideration would help bridge the principal gaps left between the two sides when negotiations recessed last November. The changes instead are being crafted to provide what officials call a "Bush stamp" to the talks without actually abandoning key Reagan administration goals.

"We'll have a 'status quo-plus' approach to the established issues," said one official, noting that no senior policymakers have advocated compromise on key U.S.-Soviet disputes involving sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, and that most also opposed any shift in the U.S. position on missile defenses.

Bush administration policymakers have instead advocated waiting to see whether the Soviet position on these issues in the strategic arms reduction talks (START) will change.

"It is unrealistic to think a new administration would come in and [abandon] a lot of positions in the first round" of negotiations, a senior official said. "We want to see for ourselves what the other side has to say first."

Some experts had predicted that senior Bush appointees would press for abandonment of the Reagan administration's position that sea-launched cruise missiles cannot be verifiably limited by a new treaty or that highly realistic missile defense tests can be conducted under a permissive reading of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

For example, before becoming Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft wrote of "the wisdom of a ban or limits" on the un-piloted, subsonic cruise missiles. Scowcroft also joined others in describing Reagan's permissive ABM Treaty interpretation as "implausible."

While not ruling out some last-minute initiatives in these areas, one official said "generally . . . [we are] not looking hard at what we might offer Nobody is saying we are almost at the point of finishing the accord and should make a big push."

Officials described the White House as being leery of moving quickly toward agreement partly because of continued congressional bickering over the proposed deployment of mobile, land-based nuclear missiles, a key issue in the U.S.-Soviet talks.

Scowcroft and Secretary of State James A. Baker III are also said to be reluctant to confront conservative supporters of the Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars" missile defense program, with a more restrictive arms proposal in the same year that Bush sharply scaled back the program's proposed budget.

Some officials favor emphasizing reductions in conventional, or non-nuclear, arms, on which Bush proposed a partial U.S. compromise

two weeks ago. Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz remarked several days later, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that "for the first time, conventional arms control has been moved to the top of the arms control agenda where it properly belongs."

Officials also said Bush has so far been unwilling to override those military officials who are unenthusiastic about the prospects of sharp, near-term reductions in current strategic nuclear forces. Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the same committee on April 14, for example, that "my emotions have gone up and down throughout START and we seem to almost reach agreement . . . but there are questions that linger."

"I heard a man say once, 'It's like horsemeat. The more you chew the bigger it gets.' And I think that the verification questions that remain on START and the [sea-launched cruise missile] . . . question, for example, the more you chew them, the bigger they get," Crowe said.

He added at a hearing on May 3 that "I personally think it's going to be protracted and agonizing."

Spurgeon Keeny, executive di-

U.S. Shift . . .

rector of the private Arms Control Association, criticized the administration for not moving on the key disputed issues. "The START agreement is the most important aspect of U.S.-Soviet relations, and there is at present no constraint, except the ABM Treaty, on strategic systems," he said. "It's a great opportunity that's being missed."

The officials said the administration is considering several lesser initiatives in the negotiations aimed at reducing the average number of nuclear warheads atop U.S. and Soviet missiles and thus to diminish the possibility of preemptive attack.

One idea—supported by some officials in the State Department but opposed by the Pentagon—is to modify a proposed ban on mobile missiles, allowing a limited number with single warheads. The Soviets would still have to eliminate the multiple-warhead SS-24 first deployed on rail cars in 1987, and the United States would be barred from similar deployments of the MX missile in 1992, even though Bush recently backed the MX rail-basing plan.

Related ideas would limit the overall number of warheads that are grouped atop ballistic missiles, or establish a maximum ratio of

warheads to missiles. However, some officials have argued against such limits on grounds that they would likely pinch the United States more than the Soviet Union, which already averages fewer warheads atop each missile.

Another idea said to be gaining White House favor is a ban on so-called "depressed trajectory" missile tests, which could eventually allow swifter missile attack. Although no such tests are being prepared, the idea has recently won support from the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officials said.

Meanwhile, the administration yesterday stepped up its campaign to win Senate confirmation of Richard Burt as chief U.S. negotiator at the talks. Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) agreed after hearing pleas from Baker and Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) to try to schedule a floor vote later this week, a spokesman said.

A report last week by the State Department inspector general did not support assertions by Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) that the agency had seriously mishandled Burt's government security clearances.

U.S. Shift . . .

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Jewish Group May Back Lifting Soviet Trade Curbs

Support Conditioned on Freer Emigration

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

The National Conference on Soviet Jewry, after an exhaustive six-month assessment, declared yesterday that it will support an easing of trade restrictions with the Soviet Union once President Bush receives "appropriate assurances" of Soviet intentions to resolve several remaining impediments to free emigration for Soviet Jews.

The decision appears to be most significant because the conference, the main U.S. Jewish group concerned with the issue, has decided not to insist on the prior publication of a new Soviet emigration law, as Bush has demanded, before supporting a waiver of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment, which placed restrictions on bilateral trade as a way to force a free flow of emigrants.

Both the administration and Congress have been waiting for a signal from American Jewish groups, particularly the National Conference, on their attitude toward restoring trade on a temporary basis to the Soviet Union's "most favored nation" trade status and trade credits before moving to act themselves.

Various proposals have called for an initial one-year waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment that ended the trade status and credits to the Soviet Union 15 years ago. The law allows for an initial waiver of up to 18 months.

National Conference Chairman Rosalynn S. Cardin called the decision "an historic day" in the life of the organization and its cause. "This is a very sensitive issue for us. The discussion was fraught with emotion because we recognize we're talking about human lives," she said. Cardin said the group realized that there were still "major impediments to free emigration" and that a new Soviet emigration law would not be debated before September by the new People's Congress.

But, she said, "We felt that we needed to move forward to encourage free emigration for Soviet Jews, recognizing that major changes have taken place in the Soviet

Union . . . [and] that we need to encourage the Soviet Union to continue in what is a positive thing."

Cardin said that of 80 persons who debated the conference's statement on the Jackson-Vanik amendment, 52 had been qualified to vote and of these only three opposed it and one abstained. The council's board of governors has close to 100 members, she said.

Cardin said a delegation would meet today with White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft to discuss the National Conference's new position on the waiver issue.

In a May 18 Texas speech, Bush said he was prepared to work with Congress on a temporary waiver of the amendment "should the Soviet Union codify its emigration laws in accord with international standards and implement its new laws faithfully."

The conference's board of governors agreed yesterday, however, to support the waiver provided only that "the president receives appropriate assurances from Soviet authorities of significant progress" on four issues.

Those include a sustained level of emigration, changes in the "state secrets" law banning Soviet citizens from emigration on national security grounds, progress on exit permits for long-term refuseniks and the end of documented assurances by would-be Jewish emigrants that the Soviet Union will not face financial burdens from family members left behind.

Cardin said criteria for the assurances the conference sought were contained in the Jackson-Vanik amendment relating to the removal of "unreasonable impediments" on persons wishing to emigrate in order for the president to issue a waiver.

She said the National Conference had not yet received any word from the administration that it has received any assurances from the Soviet Union about the four issues.

But she said it is possible Soviet emigration will exceed 54,000 this year; the previous peak year was 1979, when 51,320 Soviet Jews left.

ile Plan in Peril, inistration Warned

Jelen Dewar
in Post Staff Writer

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Sam Nunn (D-Ga.)
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Nunn said. "A very
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is this week on a

U.S. negotiating position for U.S.-
Soviet talks on strategic force re-
ductions that are due to resume
Monday, Nunn said chances for the
plan's approval by Congress would
be improved by a negotiating strat-
egy to allow the single-warhead
Midgetman while banning the mo-
bile 10-warhead MX and its SS-24
Soviet counterpart.

Nunn's warning came in remarks
to the Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, a think tank affiliated with
the Fletcher School of Law and Di-
plomacy at Tufts University that
has been hearing similar assess-
ments from other congressional
leaders about prospects for the MX-
Midgetman plan.

House Armed Services Commit-
tee Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.),
who spoke earlier to the group, also
warned that the plan appears
doomed unless President Bush can
marshal more support with "argu-
ments only a president can make."
While it is not clear where the votes
are in the House, Aspin said yester-
day, "clearly the potential is there
that one or both of the systems
could lose" if the administration
does not come more forcefully to
the rescue of the two-missile plan.

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The Pentagon | Andrew Rosenthal

A 'Guide for the Perplexed' on missiles:

Personalities, economics and expediency

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 13 — What to do about the nation's land-based missile forces? And whose missile is it anyway?

For years, it seemed well established that the mobile MX missile was the weapon of choice of the White House and the Pentagon, supported by Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress. This was the situation even though the MX was born under President Jimmy Carter.

As for the Midgetman, it was so strongly supported by Democrats on Capitol Hill that its detractors have taken to calling it "the Congressman." This was true even though the Midgetman was the brainchild of Brent Scowcroft, a Republican working for President Ronald Reagan.

Now, said one Congressional aide, "It's like the old saw about two babies who got switched in the maternity ward. Somehow these missiles got switched in their cradles and reversed their parentage."

In fact, the custody battle is even more intricate than that.

In one corner, arguing for buying the MX and killing the Midgetman, are liberal Democrats like Representative Barney Frank of Massachusetts, conservative Democrats like Charles W. Stenholm of Texas, fiercely partisan Republicans like Representative Vin Weber of Minnesota and Dick Cheney, the Secretary of Defense.

"We are taking the Dick Cheney position, if you can believe that," said an amused Mr. Frank.

In the other corner, favoring development of both systems, are President Bush, Mr. Scowcroft, now his national security adviser, and Adm. William J. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Somewhere in the middle, are Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.

Mr. Aspin and Mr. Nunn are themselves supporting a political compromise worked out by the Bush Administration under which the Pentagon would put the MX missile on railroad cars and also continue developing the truck-borne Midgetman.

One chapter in a Guide for the Perplexed on the future of the nation's missile forces might be titled "Personal Politics."

Mr. Frank said he was not crazy

about either missile but liked "Aspin's compromise" even less. Liberals were willing to support the Midgetman, Mr. Frank said, on the understanding that the MX would stay in its silos and not be put on railroad cars.

"Instead, Aspin decides to support going mobile on the MX fully," Mr. Frank said. "He decided to make a deal with Bush instead of us."

Another heading would be "Economics."

"In my judgment, it's fundamen-

tally about money," said Representative Martin Olav Sabo of Minnesota's Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party and a member of Mr. Frank's coalition. "The rail garrison for MX doesn't make much sense, but that is what is likely to happen, so why pay for another program?"

And, of course, there is the chapter titled "Expediency."

Although Mr. Frank and the other Democrats said they are not particularly interested in promoting the MX, but only in ditching the Midgetman, that is precisely what has drawn some conservatives to the alliance, since helping Democrats defeat the Bush-Aspin compromise makes the MX the missile of choice, if only by default.

Mr. Aspin has taken to painting the controversy as "a test of the President's leadership."

It may also be, say lawmakers who have not yet chosen their corners, a test of how important partisan affiliations will be at a time when everyone seems to agree that the military budget has to be cut and the only question is how.

"The problem is that the Midgetman never really had the support of the majority of Democrats, who would rather have no missile at all," said one leading Congressional Democrat. "We have been able to keep Midgetman alive through sleight-of-hand amendments, but we've run out the string."

Tehran Transition

Rafsanjani's Emerging As an Iran Leader Gives Moderates Some Hope

But Dealing With Followers Of Khomeini and Building Economy Won't Be Easy

North vs. South in the Capital

By GERALDINE BROOKS and TONY HORWITZ
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

TEHRAN, Iran—At a late-night party in a leafy northern suburb, the women leave their chadors at the door.

Free of their cover-all veils, they toss blond-streaked perms and sip bathtub alcohol. The party conversation quickly turns to the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. "I have waited years for this moment, to see if things change," says a 39-year-old engineer. "You cannot spend your whole life behind closed curtains, drinking bad vodka and listening to low-volume Madonna."

Across town, in a poor neighborhood, Shaaban Rohani spends the same evening in a mosque, in mourning. The 28-year-old fruit merchant, whose shop is decked in black crepe and portraits of the dead imam, has an opposite vision of post-Khomeini Iran.

"Nothing will change," says Mr. Rohani, who wears the black shirt and stubbly beard of a devout follower. "The revolution will move forward in the way the imam has said."

Promises to Keep

Such are the conflicting expectations that Iran's new leaders must reconcile as the country moves out of the shadow of Ayatollah Khomeini. For 10 years, his fierce charisma held Iran together, stoking the revolution with rhetoric. Now, the lesser figures who replace him must do what he never had to: deliver on the promise of a better life.

To succeed, they will need to roll back the revolution's excesses while convincing the masses that the radical Khomeini legacy isn't being betrayed.

Iran, in mourning, is calm: An initial panic that cleared food-store shelves and drove the black-market dollar rate up 30% has subsided. For now, factions have submerged their differences to achieve an orderly transfer of power, with the seemingly moderate figure of Parliament Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani emerging as the leading political force.

But many Iranians worry that this unity will prove fragile. "I am frightened of tomorrow," says a computer-science student who threw Molotov cocktails at the shah's troops but who came to despise the ayatollah. "If we are very lucky, Rafsanjani will be able to change things gradually." If not, "we will hear the voice of the gun in the street."

The schisms in Iranian society are reflected in the geography of its capital city, home to about 10 million of Iran's 53 million people. Tehran's north is a European-style expanse of tree-shaded boulevards dotted with Mercedes showrooms, high-walled villas and pricey boutiques. Here, Islamic dress often consists of a floral headscarf and knee-length jacket thrown over lace stockings and high-heeled shoes.

The south is a smoggy sprawl of close-packed houses, mosques, refineries and factories. Women in tent-like black chadors glide past the ubiquitous shrines to the war dead—gladiola-decked portraits joined now by pictures of the dead imam. Last week, buses rolled through these streets picking up mourners on their way to the ayatollah's grave.

Iran's government needs both the devout and the disaffected. From the ideologically ardent, it draws the enforcers of revolutionary discipline and the power to mount mass spectacles of Islamic frenzy such as those occurring during an official 40 days of mourning.

At the same time, it is to the small middle class that the clerics must look for the managerial and technical skills to resuscitate Iran's groaning economy. But if the regime goes too far in easing the restrictions that irk the middle class, it risks triggering a backlash.

"The new leaders will always be vulnerable to someone standing up and saying, 'The imam would never have done this,'" says a Western ambassador in Tehran.

In life, Ayatollah Khomeini's edicts possessed almost papal infallibility. When he decreed that a ruinous war must go on, it did, and when he abruptly ended a ban on the playing of musical instruments and chess, more conservative mullahs could say little. In death, he is being elevated to sainthood. Shreds of his prayer rug have become holy relics, and his grave has been covered with huge containers to stop a scramble for handfuls of sacred soil.

Neither his successor spiritual guide and head of state, Ali Khamenei, nor Mr. Rafsanjani commands anything like that level of veneration. Newly minted slogans appearing around town—"obeying Khamenei is the same as obeying Khomeini"—reflect the regime's insecurity. Mr. Khamenei's picture also has begun appearing in office windows and mosque fronts, beside that of the dead ayatollah.

Because he was a second-tier cleric,

U.S. Offers New Plan to Help Smooth Arms Talks

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 15 — The Joint Chiefs of Staff have suggested a new approach for counting air-launched cruise missiles that could help close the gap between Washington and Moscow on the issue, Administration officials said today.

The Joint Chiefs' approach was disclosed as President Bush convened a meeting of the National Security Council today to discuss initiatives that the United States may present when the strategic arms talks resume on Monday in Geneva.

Administration officials said President Bush had decided against any fundamental changes in the United States negotiating stand, though some important modifications may be made. Most of the positions taken by the Reagan Administration have been reconfirmed by Mr. Bush, officials said.

The Administration has been weighing new measures on land-based missiles, like abandoning a Reagan Administration proposal to ban mobile missiles.

Ban on Mobile Missiles

But key participants at the National Security Council meeting today were said to oppose abandoning the ban on mobile missiles before further consultations with Congress and additional examination of verification questions.

The new suggestion by the Joint Chiefs on air-launched cruise missiles addresses one of the thorny issues in the negotiations.

Moscow has insisted that each strategic bomber be counted as having the maximum number of cruise missiles that it can carry. The Reagan Administration, in contrast, contended that only loose limits should be set on air-launched cruise missiles, asserting that relatively slow cruise missiles are less threatening than faster ballistic missiles.

Under the Reagan Administration approach, different types of bombers would be counted as carrying a specific number of cruise missiles even though they might actually carry more of the weapons.

No Formal Decisions

But Administration officials said that under the Joint Chiefs' proposal, each bomber would be counted as carrying the number of cruise missiles that it is equipped with. Such an approach would appear to move the United States toward the Soviet position, though some significant differ-

ences over these weapons would remain.

A senior Administration said no formal decisions were made at the National Security Council meeting. The official said some strategic arms issues now before the Administration might not be made before the talks resume on Monday.

No major changes are expected at this time in the Bush Administration's stand on space-based anti-missile systems and sea-launched cruise missiles, two major points of dispute between Washington and Moscow in the arms negotiations.

The National Security Council meeting today followed a lengthy review of strategic arms issues during which Bush Administration has considered a host of proposals. Ideas under discussion by Administration specialists have range from modest changes to the American negotiating stance to a far-reaching suggestion to ban all land-based missiles with multiple warheads over 15 years.

Strategic Arms Treaty

A senior Administration official said today that the United States had no timetable for finishing a strategic arms treaty, which was largely completed during the Reagan Administration. In contrast, President Bush has said that he hopes a new agreement on cutting conventional arms can be completed within a year.

Officials noted that key decisions in the deliberations on conventional arms, which produced a surprise proposal at the NATO summit meeting last month, had been confined to a few senior Administration officials. The same pattern may apply on strategic arms, they said.

Whether to propose new measures on land-based missiles, the Soviet Union's strong suit in strategic forces, has been a focus of Administration deliberations. Ideas under consideration have included deeper limits on Soviet SS-18 missiles and lifting the ban on single-warhead mobile missiles while prohibiting multiple-warhead versions.

Pentagon officials have been reluctant to lift the ban on mobile missiles until it is clear if Congress will support the program to put MX missiles on rail cars and to develop a new single-warhead mobile Midgetman missiles. Before he took office, Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, was sharply critical of the ban, arguing that it blocked the United States from fielding less vulnerable weapons.

The Washington Post

The New York Times

The Washington Times

The Wall Street Journal

The Christian Science Monitor

New York Daily News

USA Today

The Chicago Tribune

Date 16 JUN 1989

On another issue, officials said the Joint Chiefs had differed with civilian Pentagon officials over whether to limit missiles that are not deployed. The chiefs have reportedly opposed limits on undeployed missiles, arguing that the United States has many such weapons used as spares and for training, among other purposes. Civilian Pentagon officials favor strict limit on such weapons to guard against possible Soviet cheating.

By the Numbers

Newsweek _____

Time _____

U.S. News & World Report _____

NATION P 835

Date 19 June 89

After complaining in absurdly shrill voices for months that the Soviet Union is engaged in public relations and not in serious arms control projects, the Bush Administration has retreated before the Soviet peace offensive. The proposals presented by President Bush at the NATO meeting in Brussels drop previous U.S. objections to reciprocal cuts in troop levels and in numbers of aircraft and helicopters. Bush, incorporating standing agreements in principle between NATO

and the Warsaw Pact to reduce armor and artillery, now agrees to a 10 percent drop in U.S. troop strength in Europe in return for a cut of more than 50 percent in Soviet forces. The two sides are each to reduce their aircraft and helicopter fleets by 15 percent — and all of this is to be accomplished by 1992 or 1993. François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher were loud in their reservations. Thatcher openly scoffed at the unrealistically early target date. True to the norms of hypocrisy that govern these matters, they nevertheless proclaimed Bush a great leader.

To generate these proposals, Bush had to keep his own sclerotic bureaucracy out of the discussion. The moderniza-

tion of the Lance missiles in Germany, only weeks ago declared by the White House to be the sine qua non of the survival of our civilization, has quite disappeared from the agenda. It is entirely unclear why national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy, the glasnostophobe C.I.A. officer Robert Gates, do not resign; these are the measures, after all, they warned us against. Meanwhile, the French have explicitly refused to include their aircraft in the NATO totals. Their planes carry their own nuclear weapons, and they strenuously disbelieve the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee of Europe. So do the British, and the objections of these nations may well be welcome to many in the U.S. national security apparatus. They can regret British and French obduracy publicly but privately rejoice at the possibility of blocking negotiations with the Soviet Union indefinitely.

Meanwhile, the NATO allies have agreed to a statement that postpones resolution of the deep conflict between the Germans (and some of the other continentals) and the Americans and British on short-range nuclear weapons in Germany. Negotiations on partial reductions of these (the Germans seek, ultimately, total elimination) will begin only if progress is made on the cuts in troops and conventional weapons. Since the deadlines for these are unrealistic, the re-emergence of controversy sooner rather than later is inevitable. Mikhail Gorbachev is due in Bonn on June 12, right before the European elections of June 18. He will surely appeal to German and European opinion in terms that will make the agreement look as untenable as it is. (In a moment of candor, Bush termed it "blah blah.") The German opposition depicted Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher as national lions before Brussels but Atlanticist lambs after it.

The real problem with the Bush initiative is its unreflective and spasmodic character. Bush has no idea of what to do about the larger pattern of East-West relations, what to say to the Soviet-bloc states (apart from derisive injunctions like his comment to Poland to submit to the dictates of the International Monetary Fund) or what to seek in place of arrangements that are now all-too-visibly outdated and actually dissolving. After shouting for decades that East-West relations are not matters of arms alone, Bush and that large segment of our ruling elite he represents can speak only the language of numbers. His remark that Gorbachev might welcome troop reductions to assist him in his budgetary difficulties, moreover, qualifies as a superb example of what the psychoanalysts term projection. Our own unmet social needs accumulate, with potentially explosive consequences, while the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department desperately point to military threats that they are now forced, piecemeal, to deny.

Bush's minimal capitulation to reality is a triumph for public opinion in the Western democracies, including our own — but, measured against the demands and possibilities of the hour, it is a pathetically limited one.

Nevertheless, Bush may have learned something. German President Richard von Weizsäcker explained to him what he had meant by declaring, "We are not a great power, but we are not anyone's plaything, either." He talked, that is, about

denuclearization in a new Europe. Since von Weizsäcker expressed views Bush does not usually hear, Americans as well as Europeans may eventually profit from his pedagogy.

White House Promotes the Environment As a Top Foreign-Policy Consideration

WASHINGTON INSIGHT

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON—When a group of environmentalists met President Bush at the White House this month to talk about his new clean-air bill, they asserted that the environment is a mushrooming political issue in the U.S.

Not just in the U.S., Mr. Bush replied. The president, just back from a trip to Europe, said he found the environment coming on like a "freight train" as an international political issue as well.

Mr. Bush is scrambling to catch that freight train—and for good reason. As a foreign policy issue, the environment poses enormous risks and opportunities for the Bush administration.

If the U.S. falls behind others on international environmental issues, as it sometimes has, it could do great damage to its credibility among West Europeans. More than just a public relations problem, U.S. failure to take the lead could weaken the Western alliance.

Combustible Mixture

In this era of warming relations with the Soviet Union, Europeans already are cooling toward the traditional U.S.-led Western military alliance. Particularly in West Germany, concern about the environment and opposition to the military and to nuclear weapons are forming a politically combustible mixture.

In West Germany, "low-level flying and noise pollution from military aircraft and tanks rolling across farmlands [on training exercises], and nuclear power plants producing energy all get mixed together," says Robert Hunter, director of European studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

But the environment also presents an opportunity for the U.S. to exercise a new kind of leadership in the post-Cold War era. Mr. Bush took one step in this direction recently when he proposed that the U.S. and its allies build closer ties to countries in Eastern Europe by offering expertise on protecting the environment.

He could go further. Environmental concerns are growing rapidly in the Soviet Union; Soviet officials say Mr. Bush could build good will fast by proposing similar environmental cooperation with Moscow,

which is confronting basic environmental problems the U.S. tackled in the 1970s.

"If you're talking about public sentiment in the Soviet Union, I think a major American initiative on ecology would be even more important than an American initiative on arms control," says Andrei Kortunov, chief of the international security section of the Soviet Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada.

Mr. Kortunov says Soviet officials opposed to more openness toward the West are using the environmental issue to their advantage. He says they argue that "Western industries are trying to get into the Soviet Union the most ecologically damaging production processes and to turn the Soviet Union into the garbage dump of the planet."

The Bush administration has signaled that it is interested in working with the Soviets on environmental protection. Secretary of State James Baker has added a category of concerns called "transnational issues" to the agenda for all high-level U.S.-Soviet talks, and has declared that the environment is one such issue.

Mr. Bush has urged aides to consider the environment a foreign-policy issue. While talking with Environmental Protection Agency chief William Reilly after one of the administration's early Cabinet meetings, for instance, Mr. Bush called over National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and told him to pay attention to the environment when conducting national-security business.

Foot Dragging

But at times, the administration has been slow to take the lead on international environmental issues. It dragged its feet in deciding to call for a ban on production of chlorofluorocarbons, which are believed to harm the earth's ozone layer, only to endorse such a ban after the European Community called for it.

Similarly, the White House convened an international workshop on global warming only after critics charged that the president was backing away from a campaign promise to sponsor such gatherings.

The administration may need to appear more eager if it wants to catch the environmental freight train Mr. Bush cited in his chat with environmentalists. As the president himself noted in a speech last week, concern about the environment is "universal."

tively mild rebuke from Moscow. America's ambassador in Budapest, Mark Palmer, plans to bring FIDESZ together with President Bush during his visit here July 11 to 13.

The Bush visit is being eagerly anticipated by Hungary's Communist regime. It is facing multiparty elections within a year. An internal division could dethrone its chief, Karoly Grosz, even before the autumn congress. In the aftermath of the funeral Washington has decided to offer 5-year, instead of 2-year terms of most-favored-nation trade status to the country and to grant certain investment insurance for U.S. corporations doing business here.

That alone won't rescue the country's economy. Hungary must pay 120% of its export income to service its foreign debt. The standard of living is deteriorating. In the capital one now sees the poor rummaging in garbage bins for food. Headlines tell of 28,000 people competing for fewer than 900 flats offered by the Budapest housing authority. The country needs fundamental changes, such as absolute property rights and a price reform that frees rather than arbitrarily inflates prices. That is being avoided because it would create political heat that a weakling authoritarian regime could not survive.

The nascent opposition still faces its own difficulties. The nine alternative movements that have begun a dialogue with the party on how to hold the elections have difficulty agreeing among themselves. They lack the organization, program and candidates to be able to stage a Solidarity-type challenge. Nevertheless, the political gains Hungary has achieved in the last 12 months are nothing short of astonishing. This past weekend Hungarians regained their national pride.

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President Says Satisfaction Outweighs Job's Frustration

By MAUREEN DOWD

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 26 — Others may have stooped under the weight of the Presidency, what Thomas Jefferson called the "splendid misery" of wrestling with the world's problems. But President Bush, in sardonic, humorous and reflective remarks underscoring how much his confidence has blossomed since the election, said today that the satisfactions of his first five months in office had far surpassed the frustrations.

In what might be taken as an unintentional parody of his predecessor's reliance on cue cards, the President greeted reporters for an interview with a display of mock nerves, shuffling the papers on his desk in an agitated manner, as though he was not prepared to answer questions without his briefing material. Then he pushed the papers aside and grinned mischievously at the assembled group, including the White House chief of staff, John H. Sununu, and the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft.

Indeed, Mr. Bush's demeanor these days is so loose that it is hard to reconcile it with his often shrill and defen-

The office that aged others seems to be acting as a tonic.

sive persona during the campaign. If he was once easily hurt or sent into a fit by unkind commentary about his candidacy, he now seems infused with so much confidence that he was willing to let most criticism of his Presidency slide.

Jokes and Karate Chops

At one moment, speaking of a news story that had nettled him, the President smacked his desk with the side of his hand — "Karate chop!" he barked — in humorously suggesting a punishment for the offending reporter.

In another instance, he initiated a joke about the disjointed speaking style that has become a staple in parodies on television shows like "Saturday Night Live."

Talking about a visit last week to a New York home for abandoned and homeless young people, he said he had talked to his drug adviser, William J. Bennett, over the weekend "about the Covenant House thing." Interrupting himself for a moment, he pointed at a reporter's notebook and ordered dryly: "Cancel the word 'thing.'" With a lofty tone, he changed it to "the Covenant House visit" and picked up the sentence where he had left off.

Although Mr. Bush is an intensely competitive sportsman who has an edgy relationship with political rivals, he affected a breezy generosity toward his Soviet adversary, Mikhail S. Gorbachev.

"I think we're in a good wavelength in terms of the chemistry," he said about the United States and the Soviet Union, "and I hope it's true."

He was equally equable about Iran, remarking: "They can call us 'The Great Satan' and that's fine. That's their view."

Sitting in the airy Oval Office with paintings of fisherman on the wall and a table behind him crowded with photographs of the Bush family at play, the President said he felt no pressure to compete with his charismatic and shrewd counterpart in the Soviet Union as far as relationships with Germany, Iran or any other country. "There's nothing to be gained by trying to go one-up, if somebody sees Gorbachev having had a successful visit to Germany," he said. "What's important in that connection is, does that have any adverse effect on the interest of the United States? And the answer is clearly no."

'Not Immune to World Opinion'

On the other hand, he confided that he was pleased to be deemed the winner of a round in what is seen as the superpower competition for global leadership.

He said he gloated a bit over the rave reviews he received for his performance at the NATO summit in Brussels last month. "Now I've got to confess, that when the Director of U.S.I.A. sent the polls over after our visit, and they showed strong support for what I had done in NATO, or what the United States had done, I immediately called

Scowcroft and Sununu and said, 'You know, hey, look at all this,'" the President said. "I'm not immune to world opinion."

He had clearly given some thought to the matter of why a job that has aged so many of his predecessors seems to be acting as a tonic for him. He joked that he has been passing "the Milton Pitts test," a count of how much gray the longtime White House barber finds when he cuts the President's hair.

"I feel more comfortable in the job," Mr. Bush said. "And I feel more aware of why it might age the President, because there's just an accumulation of problems. You start in and there's two or three. A month later, there's six or seven."

Insistence on Collegiality

The President said he believes that his collegial approach to management is making his job easier. Recalling his experiences in past Republican Administrations, he said contention between top officials had often, resulted from built-in personal differences.

"And that makes it extraordinarily hard for the President," he said, adding that then the chief executive is forced to "choose between your friend, Joe, and your friend, Mary."

"We have had reasonable men and women sitting down reasonably to work out a trade or a tariff decision, or work out a foreign policy move or to advise the President on what he ought to be thinking about in China or whatever," he said, talking about himself in the third person.

"And the way the system is working has made the Milton Pitts test easier to pass, because nobody likes to go home at night worrying, 'How the hell am I going to decide this between Secretary A and Secretary B?'" he said. But, he said, egos being what they are, "We've had to do some of that."

No Test by Fire

Mr. Bush does not brag that his high ratings in polls are the result of his own personal popularity. He acknowledges that he has been lucky so far.

"We've been blessed so far with a reasonably good economy, we haven't

Chemical weapons destruction to be taught in Md.

By Ellen L. James

General Physics Corp., the Columbia-based engineering service company, was awarded a \$35 million U.S. Army contract yesterday to build and operate a center for training personnel in how to destroy chemical weapons.

Construction on the center, to be located at Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Harford County, is expected to start this summer.

The contract is part of the Army's "demilitarization program" and will involve the destruction of chemical weapons that are no longer part of the Army stockpile. Operators and technicians from across the country will be trained at the Aberdeen facility, scheduled to be completed by September 1995.

"We're very pleased with the contract," said David Roth, General Physics senior vice president, noting that "it provides for significant revenues for a long period of time."

About a quarter of the General Physics' revenue now comes from

defense contracts, Mr. Roth said.

The new contract includes the construction of classrooms, laboratories and simulation facilities, said Mr. Roth. No actual chemical weapons will be involved in the training process, he said.

The Army is considering a number of sites for actual destruction of the weapons, "but only one — in Utah — has been definitely decided upon," said Mr. Roth.

He said it is unclear at this point exactly when the training center will open or how many people will be trained there.

General Physics, which employs 2,000 people, provides engineering services and operations support to both industrial and military clients. In 1988 it registered \$5.3 million in net income on revenue of \$121 million, Mr. Roth noted.

Representative Benjamin L. Cardin, D-Md.-3rd, who announced the contract yesterday, applauded the Army program "as a first step toward responsibly resolving the [chemical weapons] problem."

No actual weapons will be involved in the training process, a spokesman said.

PRESIDENT... CONTINUED

had to face turmoil there," he said. "There are no kids that are dying in war, and I think that would be something that would certainly age a President. I still feel aged just thinking about the hostages and people held against their will or kids killed on the Iowa or something of this nature."

But he said that he and the country have been fortunate to have a period of relative calm in domestic and international affairs. "I haven't been tested by

He said he still has "a little bounce in my step" because he has been able to get out enough and stay on the phone enough to feel he is keeping in touch with the outside world. But some of his excursions, he said, have left him frustrated. He said that he was discouraged by his visit with homeless young people in New York and that that it will be harder than he once thought to curb drug use and save the children suffering in the inner cities.

"But," he added, "we're going to make an all-out effort."

The word the President said best captures his feeling, five months into the job, is the same word he used when

PRESIDENT...
CONTINUED

had to face turmoil there," he said. "There are no kids that are dying in war, and I think that would be something that would certainly age a President. I still feel aged just thinking about the hostages and people held against their will or kids killed on the Iowa or something of this nature."

But he said that he and the country have been fortunate to have a period of relative calm in domestic and international affairs. "I haven't been tested by the fire that inevitably will come," he observed.

He said he still has "a little bounce in my step" because he has been able to get out enough and stay on the phone enough to feel he is keeping in touch with the outside world. But some of his excursions, he said, have left him frustrated. He said that he was discouraged by his visit with homeless young people in New York and that that it will be harder than he once thought to curb drug use and save the children suffering in the inner cities.

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The word the President said best captures his feeling, five months into the job, is the same word he used when he first took office. There is, he said, "a lot of wonder, still."

THE BACKBONE OF HIDDEN GOVERNMENT

EVE PELL

Secret presidential decrees have propelled America into some of the most dramatic and controversial events of the past four decades: In Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Lebanon and Grenada, men and women have fought and died as a result of them. Yet most Americans are unaware of National Security Decision Directives, perhaps the most powerful and hidden tool of the Oval Office. During his eight years in office, Ronald Reagan issued approximately 300 of these N.S.D.D.s; George Bush has already begun his own series.

It was an N.S.D.D. that allotted millions for the Central Intelligence Agency to start arming and training *contra* soldiers. An N.S.D.D. led to a U.S.-sponsored car bombing in Beirut that killed eighty civilians in an ill-fated attempt to assassinate a Moslem fundamentalist leader. An N.S.D.D. authorized the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Another forced millions of U.S. government employees and contractors to sign secrecy agreements. According to a report in *The Washington Post*, an N.S.D.D. pushed NASA into a rush schedule for the space shuttle, contributing to the Challenger disaster in 1986.

Those who watched the Iran/*contra* hearings heard about executive orders and presidential findings. But N.S.D.D.s are different: Unlike executive orders, which are listed in the Federal Register, or presidential findings, which are made known to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, N.S.D.D.s do not have to be revealed to any other branch of govern-

ment. Moreover, the degree of secrecy is staggering: Of the directives issued by President Reagan, fewer than fifty have been declassified in whole or in part by the National Security Council, which unilaterally decides which N.S.D.D.s are to be made public.

Newsweek

Time

U.S. News & World Report

NATION P 833

Date 30 June 89

The precise legal nature of N.S.D.D.s is shadowy. The National Security Act of 1947, written at the outset of the cold war, grants implicit authority to Presidents to issue papers on national security; the right to issue policy directives has always been assumed to be one of the inherent powers of the presidency. Over the years these directives have evolved from broad statements to specific decrees that, according to a recent General Accounting Office report, can establish national policy and authorize the commitment of Federal resources. Unless they are canceled or modified, N.S.D.D.s are understood to continue in force from one administration to the next. After a decree is signed, N.S.C. staff members send implementing directives to Federal agencies for its execution [see the sampler, page 850].

A few Reagan Administration N.S.D.D.s have been declassified in response to requests by Representative Jack Brooks, made through the Library of Congress, and by Jeffrey Richelson, consultant to the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. Others have been leaked to reporters. In all, they cover such topics as nuclear weapons deployment, Central America, Star Wars, classified information, arms sales, civil defense, food aid, summit meetings and the Iran-Iraq war. But the most powerful part of this story remains hidden—buried in the more than 200 N.S.D.D.s whose very subject matter is still concealed.

Is there a plan to void the Constitution in the event of large anti-Administration demonstrations? Are old military bases being considered as detention camps for political dissidents and undocumented aliens? During the past eight years, press reports have suggested that such actions were authorized by a still-secret N.S.D.D. Have laws or executive orders or publicly announced policies been undermined? Who selects the personnel to carry out these orders? What expenditures of taxpayer dollars do they mandate? Until the secret N.S.D.D.s are declassified, we simply will not know.

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Earlier national security directives have gone by different names, but their power has been no less extraordinary. President John F. Kennedy's National Security Action Memorandum 31 set in motion the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba; Johnson's N.S.A.M. 273 widened the war in Southeast Asia by authorizing military incursions fifty kilometers into Laos. Truman's N.S.C. 68, issued in 1950 and kept secret for twenty-five years, opened the gates for breaches of law in the name of national security. "The integrity of our system will not be jeopardized by any measures, covert or overt, violent or non-violent, which serve the purposes of frustrating the Kremlin design," it said. It recommended "operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries."

Notwithstanding the far-reaching use of presidential directives in the past, historian Anna Nelson of Tulane University believes the Reagan Administration was extraordinary in its abuse of the process. "The original N.S.C. documents were broad policy papers, with agency implementation," she said. "Some of [Reagan's] N.S.D.D.s are action documents bypassing even normal agency channels, let alone the Congress. The arrogance of this arrangement is incredible."

In the Reagan Administration, N.S.D.D.s appear to have been the backbone of hidden government. Ostensibly they are merely internal memorandums from the President to the officers of his administration. Some of them seem to be no more than that: the declassified N.S.D.D.s on preparations for summit meetings, for example. More often, however, N.S.D.D.s appear to have been issued to evade Congressional scrutiny and public debate. Worse, N.S.D.D.s have

ordered actions contrary to the government's stated public policies and, on occasion, infringed on basic American liberties.

During his tenure as national security adviser, John Poindexter issued an order implementing N.S.D.D. 145, intended to limit access to what the government labeled "sensitive but unclassified" information existing in private and governmental computer data bases. (The elusive concept of "sensitive but unclassified" was never clearly defined.) Even before Poindexter's order was signed, government agents descended on the companies that put out popular commercial data bases like Lexis, Nexis and Dialog, asking for lists of their subscribers. The F.B.I. even subpoenaed the library at the State University of New York at Buffalo for information about a data base search by a foreign student.

After receiving protests about these actions from librarians and companies that compile data bases, Congress debated a proposal to override N.S.D.D. 145. That debate revealed how impenetrable the world of N.S.D.D.s has become. While testifying before a Congressional committee, N.S.C. member Kenneth de Graffenreid, who was in charge of the interagency group that drafted the N.S.D.D., suffered a lapse of memory: He could not recall any of the people with whom he had worked for eighteen months on N.S.D.D. 145. He had promised not to discuss his work on the N.S.C., he said. Poindexter, his boss at the time, took the Fifth Amendment before the legislators and refused to discuss the directive at all.

One former N.S.C. employee was not so reticent. Constantine Menges, who left the C.I.A. to work at the National Security Council from 1981 to 1983, described the drafting of the N.S.D.D. ordering the invasion of Grenada

in his book *Inside the National Security Council*. After the execution of Maurice Bishop, the Grenadian leader, Menges, believing the Soviet Union intended to use Grenada to harbor missile-launching submarines, convinced national security adviser Robert McFarlane to call a meeting of the top-secret Crisis Preplanning Group. On October 20, 1983, Poindexter, Langhorne Motley from the State Department, Oliver North, Duane Clarridge from the C.I.A., Menges and officials from the Defense Department gathered in a high-tech operations center in the Executive Office Building, next to the White House. After other high-level discussions, North and Menges drafted an N.S.D.D. ordering the invasion. Copies were sent to President Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz and McFarlane, who were all in Georgia for a weekend of golf. On October 23, the day of the Marine barracks bombing in Beirut, Reagan signed the N.S.D.D. and the military moved into action—all without consulting Congress.

Specific accounts like Menges's are rare. According to Harold Relyea of the Congressional Research Service, President Reagan's N.S.D.D.s took shape in various ways. Some began from the mid-level of the bureaucracy as National Security Study Directives (designed to analyze policy options), then worked their way through the N.S.C.'s maze of groups, subgroups and restricted groups, where they were rewritten, and eventually arrived at the Oval Office as the consensus reached by the President's advisers. Others, according to Relyea, stemmed from ad hoc discussions between the President and his advisers, after which a snap decision was made. "N.S.D.D.s reflect an ominous shift in the traditional locus of Federal decision-making. You have players from State and Defense and Justice all sitting around cutting deals," says Scott Armstrong of the National Security Archive. "The N.S.C., the bureaucratic apogee of interagency decision-making, coordinates the agencies—and since the N.S.C. director is not subject to oversight, the process circumvents Congress completely."

Representative Jack Brooks, former chair of the House Government Operations Committee, regards N.S.D.D.s as secret laws. In March 1987 he asked then-national security adviser Frank Carlucci for a list of all N.S.D.D.s issued since 1981. Carlucci refused, calling the request unprecedented, "overbroad and objectionable on legal and constitutional grounds." Speaker of the House Jim Wright, who also sought such a list, protested that "Congress cannot react responsibly to new dictates for national policy set in operation by the executive branch behind closed doors." The Speaker did not get to see the N.S.D.D.s either.

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In an attempt to regain some of Congress's powers, Brooks introduced a bill a year later requiring the White House to notify the Speaker and the President pro tem of the Senate of the existence of new N.S.D.D.s. Testifying at a hearing on the bill, Representative Louis Stokes noted that N.S.D.D.s are "sometimes the only record of secret policy." He asked, "Is the secret policy of the United States the same as the public policy of the United States . . . with respect to very sensitive matters such as terrorism [and] paramilitary covert actions?" Congress, he said, needed to

know. But the bill, introduced late in the last session and lacking widespread support, went nowhere.

When questioned last November, a Reagan White House spokesman claimed that the committees on the Hill were told about N.S.D.D.s on topics that concern them. Not so, say several senior members of Congress. Stokes, Lee Hamilton (chair of the House Iran/contras committee), Senator Claiborne Pell (head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) and several committee staff members insist that they were not informed in the Reagan years. Representative Anthony Beilenson, current chair of the House Intelligence Committee, stated that his fellow committee members have requested N.S.D.D.s from the Reagan White House and have been refused on the ground that the directives are "presidential documents."

Some critics of N.S.D.D.s, like Allan Adler, former legislative counsel of the Washington, D.C., office of the American Civil Liberties Union, argue that the directives themselves are not the danger; rather, it is their misuse by an overzealous President and National Security Council. According to Adler, the Reagan White House "had a pronounced proclivity for using N.S.D.D.s, apparently because it didn't have to make them public." He also complained about the passivity of Congress. "The press and public interest groups are constantly standing up for rights Congress hasn't insisted on for itself. Congress simply seems to want to avoid confrontations with the President over national security issues. Congress has known about some controversial N.S.D.D.s and ignored them." He cites N.S.D.D. 138 on terrorism, 196 on lie detectors and others concerning nuclear war and civil defense.

Some N.S.D.D.s may even have gone into effect without the required presidential signature. Susan Fitzgerald, a research consultant at the Fund for Constitutional Government in Washington, who has collected declassified N.S.D.D.s, notes that many were released without the White House letterhead at the top of the page and without the President's signature at the bottom. This, she speculates, is to conceal the fact that the signatures on some of them would reveal that they had been made by autopen, not by Ronald Reagan's own hand.

Although the Reagan White House insisted that N.S.D.D.s merely constitute confidential instructions from a President to his officers, that argument doesn't wash. Ronald Reagan is home on his ranch, but N.S.D.D. 84 still requires millions of government employees to sign secrecy pledges and N.S.D.D. 196 still mandates random polygraph tests for government employees with access to military secrets. N.S.D.D.s have become the de facto legislative vehicle of the national security state.

Perhaps in twenty years we will learn the contents of Ronald Reagan's secret legacies, the 200-plus N.S.D.D.s whose subject matter is still classified. In the meantime, no one knows what time bombs lie ticking among them. On February 2, George Bush issued N.S.D. 1, officially renaming the President's secret laws National Security Directives. He has already issued at least one since then, on Afghan "freedom fighters." It is secret. □

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An N.S.D.D. Sampler

NUCLEAR WAR

N.S.D.D. 13: NUCLEAR WEAPONS EMPLOYMENT POLICY, fall 1981 (One sentence declassified.)
SUBJECT: "US policy governing the deployment and employment of our nuclear forces and their acquisition."

GENESIS: Convinced that peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union was impossible, hawks in the new Administration insisted that the United States develop the capacity to prevail in a protracted nuclear war.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To maintain dominance over the Soviet Union at any level of escalation.

CONSEQUENCES: This directive superseded Jimmy Carter's Presidential Directive 59 — which some believe included options for limited nuclear strikes. The idea of a winnable nuclear war was one justification for Reagan's \$2.2 trillion arms buildup.

CENTRAL AMERICA

N.S.D.D. 17: DETERRING CUBAN MODELS/COVERT ACTION IN NICARAGUA, 11/23/81 (Classified.)

SUBJECT: The Central Intelligence Agency was given authority to create the *contras* and "work with foreign governments as appropriate" to undermine the Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

GENESIS: In July 1979, when efforts to prevent a Sandinista victory failed, the Carter Administration publicly gave the Nicaraguans economic aid — but also started C.I.A. funding of anti-Sandinista political groups. That fall, exiled Somocistas regrouped with the help of Argentine intelligence and the C.I.A. But it was the Reagan Administration's desire to roll back Communism that gave the *contra* effort impetus.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To interdict alleged flow of arms from Cuban and Nicaraguan sources to the Salvadoran rebels.

CONSEQUENCES: The C.I.A. was given \$19 million to assemble and arm a force of 500 *contras* to join with 1,000 exiles already being trained by Argentina. Dozens of operatives arrived in Honduras; arms shipments from Miami began. The *contra* war was set in motion.

N.S.D.D. 77: MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY RELATIVE TO NATIONAL SECURITY, 1/14/82 (Declassified in full.)

SUBJECT: This directive set up several planning groups to conduct "public diplomacy activities." It

ordered "organizational support for foreign governments and private groups to encourage the growth of democratic political institutions and practices."

GENESIS: The Administration was concerned that U.S. public opinion did not support its Central America policy.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To mobilize international and domestic support for "our national security objectives."

CONSEQUENCES: Created propaganda ministries in the National Security Council, the State Department and the White House that concentrated on, in the words of the N.S.C. staff member in charge of the program, "gluing black hats on the Sandinistas and white hats on UNO (the *contras*' United Nicaraguan Opposition)." Stories were planted in the press; journalists were pressured. The General Accounting Office later found that these activities violated the law banning "covert propaganda" inside the United States.

STAR WARS

N.S.D.D. 85: ELIMINATING THE THREAT FROM BALLISTIC MISSILES, 3/25/83 (Declassified in full.)

SUBJECT: This directive ordered "an intensive effort" to "assess the roles that ballistic missile defense could play in future security strategy" and called for the formulation of specific research and development funding commitments by fiscal year 1985.

GENESIS: After fifteen years of gestation, the invention of the nuclear X-ray laser and other technologies at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory led Edward Teller and others to advocate a space-based antimissile system. Teller and an advisory group from the Heritage Foundation received President Reagan's enthusiastic support.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To "reduce world tensions and enhance stability" and to "decrease our reliance on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons."

CONSEQUENCES: To date, at least \$18 billion has been spent on a project that will cost \$1 trillion to complete, according to the Center for Defense Information. Strategic Defense Initiative officials now admit it to be unworkable as originally planned. A follow-up, N.S.D.D. 119 of 1/6/84, ordered increased research spending but required the program to stay within the limits of the 1972 A.B.M. treaty until 1988.

N.S.D.D. 192, 8/85, and N.S.D.D. 261, 2/87, on S.D.I. and the A.B.M. treaty (Classified.)

SUBJECT: N.S.D.D. 192 re-examined the A.B.M.

treaty's restrictions on space-based weapons, concluding that a looser interpretation was correct in principle. N.S.D.D. 261 acted on that conclusion, ordering U.S. negotiators at Geneva to adopt a "broad" interpretation of the treaty and not consider any proposals limiting S.D.I.

GENESIS: The exotic technologies envisioned in a full-blown Star Wars program would contravene the A.B.M. treaty. In October 1985, Robert McFarlane unexpectedly revealed that a broader interpretation was under consideration. The ensuing furor caused the Administration to delay such a shift, but pressure from those favoring early testing and deployment continued to grow.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To justify Star Wars development within the limits of the A.B.M. treaty.

CONSEQUENCES: Arms negotiations were stymied for several years, until Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to leave unresolved the issue of when and how Star Wars technologies would be tested and deployed. However, this remains a fundamental obstacle to progress on strategic arms reductions.

SPACE

N.S.D.D. 144: NATIONAL SPACE STRATEGY, 8/15/84 (Classified; "fact sheet" released.)

SUBJECT: "NASA's first priority is to make the [space shuttle] fully operational and cost-effective" by 1988, with a goal of twenty-four flights per year. It also called for a permanently manned space station within ten years.

GENESIS: Having upgraded the military's role in space, largely under S.D.I., the Administration sought to boost NASA's civilian programs as well.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To "maintain U.S. space leadership."

CONSEQUENCES: This directive put pressure on NASA to make the shuttle pay for itself while increasing the number and pace of launches. These ambitious goals and the rushed timetable may have contributed to the 1986 Challenger disaster.

SECRECY

N.S.D.D. 84: SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, 3/11/83 (Declassified in full.)

SUBJECT: This directive drastically expanded restrictions on government employees' freedom of speech. Those with access to classified information were required to sign a nondisclosure agreement; those with access to a special category of classified information were made to agree to prepublication review of any

future writings. The use of polygraphs was authorized. **GENESIS:** In early 1983, President Reagan complained publicly that he was "up to [his] keister in leaks," but in fact the question of how to control more tightly bureaucrats' contacts with the news media had been under study from the beginning of his Administration.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To prevent disclosure of information that could damage national security.

CONSEQUENCES: Though the polygraph section of the directive was rescinded due to Congressional opposition, secrecy restrictions were imposed on more than 4 million government employees and contractors in more than fifty executive agencies. Many reporters' contacts were shut down. Government employees' unions and members of Congress sued to protect the rights of whistleblowers, and the Supreme Court recently sent the case back to the district level for review.

TERRORISM

N.S.D.D. 138: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 4/3/84 (Classified.)

SUBJECT: This directive endorsed the principle of pre-emptive strikes and retaliatory raids against terrorists and called on twenty-six Federal agencies to recommend specific measures to combat terrorism.

GENESIS: Oliver North drafted it in the wake of the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, in which 241 died.

OSTENSIBLE PURPOSE: To lessen international terrorism and free U.S. hostages in Lebanon.

CONSEQUENCES: Set up the Terrorist Incident Working Group under North in the N.S.C. Its first major action was the interception and capture of the Achille Lauro hijackers, which gave North's career an important boost. Either N.S.D.D. 138 or a subsequent N.S.D.D. on terrorism authorized the training of three Lebanese units for pre-emptive strikes. When problems arose, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey took that operation "off the books" and enlisted Saudi Arabian help in an attempt to assassinate the head of Hezbollah. A resulting car bombing killed about eighty in Beirut; Sheik Fadlallah, the target, was unhurt.

Caveat: Because N.S.D.D.s are born classified and usually remain that way, this list has been compiled from a variety of published sources, including White House "fact sheets," news reports, Peter Kornbluh's *Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention*, John Prados's *The Presidents' Secret Wars*, Robert Scheer's *With Enough Shovels* and Bob Woodward's *Veil: The Secret Wars of the C.I.A. 1981-1987*.
—E.P.