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NEWSWEEK

1 MAY 1989

Pg. 7

Behind Bush's MX Decision

President George Bush's expected decision to back a compromise plan to build big MX and smaller Midgetman strategic missiles is a vic-

tory for National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, eager to show the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he is an ally, pushed their plan to deploy only the rail-mobile, multiwarhead MX (cost: \$5.6 billion) rather

than the road-mobile, single-warhead Midgetman (cost: \$17 billion-\$27 billion). Scowcroft, an early backer of Midgetman, was sensitive to congressional support for that weapon; he urged Bush to choose a two-track plan. Besides, top admin-

istration officials say, they are seriously considering a proposal for the upcoming START talks to ban both the MX and its Soviet equivalent, the SS-24. If verification of mobile missiles is difficult, they reason, uncounted single-warhead missiles are less worrisome.

Where's the Passion Now for Iran-Contra Reforms?

By ALLAN E. GOODMAN

Once upon a time the American public was told that the Iran-Contra affair was an aberration. "Never again," was the assurance by the President, the independent review board chaired by former Sen. John Tower and the joint congressional committee investigating the scandal.

There were some of us who disagreed with this finding and believed that strong action was required to regulate and oversee the use of covert action and secret diplomacy. However, as public concern about the scandal waned—Ronald Reagan was fond of saying that it didn't matter at all to the folks living beyond the Washington Beltway—the pressure for reform lost much of its momentum.

The most far-reaching and significant reform was the proposed amendment to the National Security Act requiring that the congressional intelligence oversight committees be given prior notice of virtually all covert actions. In fast-breaking and rare circumstances in which the President determines that Congress cannot be informed in advance, the change in the law would require that Congress be notified no later than 48 hours after an operation had been approved.

Vigorously opposed by the CIA, these requirements would have assured that Congress received the timely notice of planned covert action operations that was missing in the Iran-Contra affair. After passing the Senate by a vote of 71-19 in March, 1988, and being favorably reported out of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in June, the amendment was taken off the calendar for a vote in the House in September and—as a gesture of bipartisanship by the leadership of the House—shelved when Congress reconvened in January.

Speaker Jim Wright's reasons for doing so were political. He apparently thought that he lacked the votes to pass the amendment over a presidential veto and that his own alleged breach of security in discussing U.S. covert actions in Central America at a press conference last in September had weakened the argument that Congress could be trusted to keep secrets.

But whatever motivated the Speaker's decision, the fact remains that under

present laws and executive orders, Congress still has no way to make sure that it is kept fully and currently informed of covert action plans.

Another cause of the Iran-Contra affair was the tendency of the President's assistant for national security affairs and the assistants to that official (i.e., the NSC staff) to implement and manage policy.

The Tower Commission recommended that these tendencies should be vigorously resisted. But the commission also recommended that the national security adviser, and not the secretaries of state or defense, should chair the top-level interdepartment committees that formulate and decide national security policy. President Bush's national security adviser, Gen. Brent Scowcroft, was a member of the Tower Commission and has done precisely what was recommended.

The problem is that the line between chairing such committees and advocating policy is easy to breach. Moreover, such advocacy often leads to a desire to at least manage, if not implement, the course of action selected.

By putting the national security adviser in charge of the meeting, President Bush virtually invites Scowcroft to take over when the inevitable disputes between the secretaries of state and defense threaten to stymie U.S. policy.

Of course, it can be argued that any system for making decisions in any organization can be flawed if the people who participate in it lack integrity. The principal finding of both the Tower Commission and the joint congressional committee was that the Iran-Contra affair resulted from the failure of individuals to observe the law.

True, Oliver L. North is awaiting a jury's verdict, and former National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter is soon to go to trial. But the government has had to drop the most serious charges against North due to the fear that to prove its case, sensitive national security information might have to be revealed.

The government also opposed the right of North's defense attorneys to require former President Reagan to testify. Consequently, the public will never really know if North was acting alone and without the approval of higher authority. So even if North is found guilty of the charges against him, he will be seen by many as a scapegoat.

Thus, it is highly questionable that the North trial will act as a deterrent to gung-ho officials in the future bent on using covert action as an alternative means of conducting U.S. foreign policy.

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The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____
L.A. TIMES P7, I PG. 7
Date **2 MAY 89**

Allan E. Goodman, associate dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, is co-author with Bruce Berkowitz of "Strategic Intelligence for American National Security" (Princeton University Press, 1989).

Cheney Remarks on Soviet Future Ruffle the White House's Feathers

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 1 — President Bush dissociated himself today from remarks by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney about Soviet reform, the second time in a week that the White House has indicated chagrin over comments from the outspoken Pentagon chief.

Mr. Bush was plainly disturbed by Mr. Cheney's prediction over the weekend that the Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, would fail in his efforts at political and economic overhauls and be replaced by a more traditional, anti-Western leader. The President as well as officials at the White House and State Department tried today to control the damage, saying, in effect, this is not what the United States believes.

Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, said Mr. Cheney's remarks in a television interview were merely "personal observations" and did not reflect the views of the Bush Administration, which has adopted a public posture applauding Mr. Gorbachev's plans for reform.

'His Personal Observations'

"I don't know what his motivation was," Mr. Fitzwater said. "It looks like it was just a question that came up in the interview when he offered his personal observations. I'm sure it wasn't part of any grand strategy." He said Mr. Bush had not talked to Mr. Cheney about the matter.

Dan Howard, the Pentagon spokesman, said Mr. Cheney was aware of the remarks by the President and others, and added, "The President has the final word."

White House and other Administration officials said Mr. Cheney's views about Mr. Gorbachev, while perhaps too blunt and too public, mirrored the belief by some ranking officials that the Bush Administration must respond more cautiously to changes in the Soviet Union than some European allies have done.

"The notion that Dick Cheney is off the reservation and not thinking

New Uprising Victims: Suspected Arab Informers

By SABRA CHARTRAND
Special to The New York Times

JERUSALEM, May 1 — A Palestinian shopkeeper suspected of being an informant for Israel was stabbed to death by hooded youths today, bringing the number of accused collaborators killed by fellow Arabs in the occupied territories to six in the last week.

A leaflet issued recently by the uprising's underground leadership called for "settling accounts" and told Palestinians to punish fellow Arabs for cooperating with the Israeli authorities.

A Defense Ministry study of the period through mid-March said that "since the beginning of the uprising, about 960 Arab against Arab attacks have occurred in the territories, and 33 local residents have been murdered."

On Friday, Foreign Minister Moshe Arens met with the United States Ambassador, William Brown, to "try and explain that we are facing a dangerous phenomenon that might prevent free elections or free thought in the territories," Mr. Arens's spokesman, Alon Liel, said. "This phenomenon on the eve of possible elections is very disturbing because it might prevent the emergence of candidates who have moderate views," he added.

Proposed Elections

Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir has proposed that Palestinian elections be held in the occupied territories, and Israeli officials say they fear that Arab militants could sabotage such elections by continuing to kill other Arabs believed to be cooperating with Israel.

The Foreign Ministry has "decided to inform not only the American Ambassador, but every foreign guest we have here," Mr. Liel said. The issue was raised during the visit of Italy's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister last week. Even before the meeting between Mr. Arens and Mr. Brown, United States consular officials, who routinely spend much of their time in the occupied territories, had begun investigating the collaborator killings, a consulate official said today.

On Saturday, arsonists attacked the home of the 74-year-old Israeli-appointed Mayor of El Bireh in the West Bank. The Mayor, Hassan al-Tawil, who was nearly stabbed to death last June after ignoring orders by the uprising's leaders to resign, initially said he was giving in to the threats and attacks. But on Sunday, after a meeting with the Israeli military governor, Mr. Tawil reconsidered and said he had "decided to continue to serve as Mayor."

Suspicious of Collaboration

Although Foreign Ministry officials cannot prove a direct tie between the increased violence and the election proposal that Mr. Shamir made three weeks ago, one said, "It so happens that the month after Mr. Shamir's suggestion is also the month of the most Palestinian-Palestinian violence, and it might be more than coincidence."

Palestinians themselves, however,

argue that the killings to date have focused on Arabs believed to have spied on their neighbors. Their cases were taken up by underground tribunals administered by one of several political and religious movements that are running the uprising. But although none of those suspected of collaborating were killed for advocating concessions to Israel, Palestinians admit that this does not mean it will not happen.

While Arabs stress that very few residents of the Gaza Strip or West Bank support Israeli-run elections, they also acknowledge that even those who might back the Israeli initiative are unlikely to do so for fear of being killed by militants.

Widespread Support Reported

In fact, the vast majority of Palestinians tacitly approve of the new system for eliminating informants, said a Gaza Strip journalist who made a study of collaborator killings. "Everyone feels comfortable with the popular committees taking responsibility for suspected collaborators," said the journalist, who did not want to be identified.

In Gaza, where the uprising is largely

administered by the Muslim fundamentalist Islamic Resistance Movement, the underground committees also go after drug dealers and prostitutes. Without offering any proof, Palestinians assert that the Israelis use drugs, sex and money to blackmail Arabs into becoming informants.

Once drafted into such work, Palestinians are charged with reporting on their neighbors' activities, visitors, family problems, and even what they eat, the Gaza journalist said.

"That way, when they arrest someone, they can say we know everything about you, we know that on Monday at 12 you bought potatoes, tomatoes and apples," he added. "It sounds silly, but it shocks the person who hears it, and then the Israelis tell them, 'We already know everything, so if you lie, we'll know that too.'"

Threatening Notes

As soon as such informants are identified, the underground committees begin collecting information about their activities. Young men are assigned to watch their movements. Eventually, when enough information is amassed,

warnings are sent.

"Threatening notes are sent to the suspect's home, once, twice, maybe three times, and then, if he doesn't stop, he's beaten, and they may break some of his bones; it's called deterring him," the Palestinian journalist said.

A senior Israeli Government official said today that the journalist's description of the process for dealing with suspected collaborators was generally correct.

If threats and beatings do not work, the suspect is abducted, interrogated and the case against him is examined, the journalist said.

In the Gaza Strip, a committee of judges hears the information, including statements of witnesses who assert that they suffered at the hands of the suspected collaborator. But in the West Bank, where the uprising's leadership is affiliated with the Palestine Liberation Organization, files that include information against suspected collaborators are sent abroad for a P.L.O. committee to judge, the journalist said. The verdict and sentence are then sent back to the occupied territories for local leaders to carry out.

Cheney...

through what he's saying is ridiculous," said a White House official. "He knew what he was saying. He's saying, 'It's prudent to be cautious.' He's worried about some of the euphoria in Western Europe about Gorbachev spilling over here. He's worried about the defense budget and people demanding cuts because of Gorbachev. He's saying, 'Let's be careful.'"

Signs of Division on Policy

In fact, one White House official said, signs of division seem to be emerging within the Administration over the American response to Mr. Gorbachev. Adopting a wary line toward the Soviet leader are top officials like Brent Scowcroft, the White House national security adviser; Robert M. Gates, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency who is now Mr. Scowcroft's deputy, and Vice President Dan Quayle.

Adopting a more conciliatory approach, one White House official said, are Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d and John H. Sununu, the White House chief of staff.

On April 23 Mr. Cheney, a respected former Wyoming Congressman and House whip, surprised the White House by disclosing on television that the Administration planned to ask for less money for the missile defense shield than President Reagan had sought. Moreover, Mr. Cheney announced that he planned to delay production of the new Stealth bomber as part of a retrenchment to cut military spending.

While his comments on the budget left some White House aides merely surprised, the Defense Secretary's reaction to Mr. Gorbachev's moves in the Soviet Union disturbed some officials in the White House and the State Department. Some White House aides said Mr. Cheney's outspoken, even provocative, style, was a carryover from his days as a lawmaker and he had not yet made the transition, at least in terms of speaking his mind,

'He offered his personal observations,' Fitzwater says.

from a lawmaker to a Cabinet secretary who must fall in line like a good trooper.

Mr. Bush, speaking today at the annual meeting of the United States Chamber of Commerce in Constitution Hall, did not mention Mr. Cheney but went out of his way to praise Mr. Gorbachev. "Even the Socialist world is beginning to see that Socialism isn't just another economic system — it's the death of economics. And there is a new breeze blowing."

"You know, I made clear to Mr. Gorbachev, up there in New York — Governor's Island — when we met, that we wanted to see perestroika succeed and likewise we want to see success for the economic reforms in China," the President said, recalling his meeting with the Soviet leader in New York last December.

"Whenever in the world there is economic reform, the United States should be hoping that reform succeeds," Mr. Bush said. "Economic reform with its emphasis on incentive and market economics leads to more freedom."

Defense Secretary's Remarks

Mr. Cheney, in an interview Saturday on the Cable News Network program "Evans & Novak," said of Mr. Gorbachev: "If I had to guess today, I would guess that he would ultimately fail; that is to say, that he will not be able to reform the Soviet economy to turn it into an efficient, modern society. And that when that happens, he's likely to be replaced by somebody who will be far more hostile than he's been in terms of his attitude towards the West."

Last Tuesday, Mr. Cheney made somewhat similar remarks in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. He predicted "a very real likelihood" that Mr. Gorbachev's reform plans would fail and that the Soviet leader may either be forced to change course or hand over power.

On Sunday, Mr. Bush only told reporters aboard Air Force One that "we want perestroika to succeed." And Mr. Sununu, on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," said of Mr. Cheney's comments, "I don't think that's the President's view."

Mr. Bush went further in his speech today, saying that reform efforts in the Soviet Union, China and other Socialist countries were part of "an exciting trend and, in my view it will continue."

Administration officials said Mr. Cheney was not disturbed by the reaction to his comments. Officials said he had not been reprimanded by the White House, but would probably have no more comment for a while on Mr. Gorbachev.

Quayle Meets Sihanouk to Back Him

By STEVEN ERLANGER

Special to The New York Times

JAKARTA, Indonesia, May 1 — Vice President Dan Quayle met here today with Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the leader of the Cambodian coalition opposed to the Vietnamese-backed Government in Phnom Penh, to show American support for the Prince before his negotiations with the Cambodian Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister, Hun Sen, arrived today bearing gifts for the Prince: a new name for the country, a new flag and some constitutional changes, all approved in Phnom Penh over the weekend, to soften the Communist nature of the Government and make it more attractive for the Prince to abandon his Khmer Rouge coalition partners and return to Phnom Penh as head of state.

The talks, for which Indonesia will act as host, are to begin on Tuesday.

A White House official said today that Mr. Quayle asked the Prince whether the Communist Khmer Rouge guerrilla group had to be included in any future coalition government. More than one million Cambodians died under the rule of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1979.

China's Role Cited

Asked by Mr. Quayle if there were "any way to keep them out," the Prince said it was necessary to have the Khmer Rouge as part of a coalition government "unless somehow China

could be convinced to abandon their support for the Khmer Rouge, in which case it was possible," the official said. "In other words," the official told reporters, "as long as China insists and is interested in the Khmer Rouge being part of the coalition," Prince Sihanouk "could not or would not fight that."

When the Khmer Rouge were in power, China was their foremost ally. After they were ousted by a Vietnamese invasion in December 1978, China helped resurrect them to harry the Vietnamese, who installed Mr. Hun Sen, himself a defector from the Khmer Rouge.

On April 5, Vietnam announced it would withdraw the rest of its troops from Cambodia by the end of September, a decision that has stepped up the pace of negotiations. Mr. Hun Sen has been eager to persuade Prince Sihanouk, who ruled the country before a 1970 coup, to return as head of state, which would give the Phnom Penh Government legitimacy.

Arms Aid Considered

The Prince, who insists he is negotiating for the entire opposition coalition, first demands the dissolution of Mr. Hun Sen's "illegitimate regime." And while the Prince has been tempted to abandon the Khmer Rouge, for whom he has little love, they are by far the largest part of the military opposition to the Vietnamese. He also fears offending the Chinese, who have not only been his hosts but whose good will is

important to Cambodia in the future.

The United States, which Mr. Quayle said is still undergoing a policy review on Cambodia, is seriously considering providing arms to the non-Communist forces, though not to the Khmer Rouge. The American Government currently provides a small amount of military help in transport, uniforms and medicine to the non-Communist forces. "Lethal aid is an option we're considering," Mr. Quayle said in an impromptu interview this evening. "We have the option of doing it overtly or covertly."

At the Jakarta airport today, Mr. Hun Sen announced that a special constitutional conference in Phnom Penh over the weekend had decided to change the name of the country from

the People's Republic of Kampuchea to the more ideologically neutral State of Cambodia. "Kampuchea" is a rendering of the country's name in English that has been preferred by the current Government over "Cambodia."

Mr. Hun Sen also displayed the new flag, which instead of being socialist red with the five towers of Angkor Wat in the middle, is now half red and half blue, the colors of the Sihanoukist flag, while maintaining the lotus-shaped towers that symbolize the country's past greatness. He also said the Constitution had been amended to abolish the death penalty, to allow private ownership of businesses and land and to protect religion. He said the changes were intended to promote "national and political reconciliation."

At a news conference in Phnom Penh Saturday, the text of which was made public today, Mr. Hun Sen said he would not dismantle his Government, which is the main barrier to a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. He said he hoped Prince Sihanouk would return to Cambodia soon.

Beltway Bushology

Maybe in at least one respect the United States and the Soviet Union really are converging. While Mikhail Gorbachev has been acknowledged as a skilled user of the Western media to convey his politics, the Western media are now applying to their coverage of George Bush's White House the arcane skills of Kremlinology. On Saturday Pentagon chief Dick Cheney said he thought Gorbachev would likely fail. This remark set the Bushologists on fire.

Is this what the United States believes? they asked. One analysis promptly noted that Mr. Bush in a speech Monday not only praised Mr. Gorbachev but "did not mention Mr. Cheney." It was reported that a "division" seemed to be emerging within the administration around Soviet policy, with Mr. Cheney's instinctive wariness shared by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy Robert Gates, and Vice President Dan Quayle. The Beltway Tarot cards further reveal that Jim Baker and John Sununu are the Conciliators.

For his part, President Bush, in the somewhat cryptic sentence structure he sometimes employs, said in his Monday speech: "You know, I made clear to Mr. Gorbachev, up there in New York—Governor's Island—when we met, that we wanted to see perestroika succeed and likewise we want to see success for the economic reforms in China."

* * *

We suppose there isn't much that can be done about the fact that in our time American policy begins and ends with single sentences uttered on weekend talk shows. Still, some old hands persist in believing in the face of virtually no news coverage of what they say that issues such as the Gorbachev reforms are better articulated in a thought-out speech. Robert Gates, the deputy NSC adviser and a key contributor to the administration's policies toward the Soviet Union, gave such a speech on April 1. It deserved more attention than it got, in no small part because Mr. Gates's memory of Soviet affairs extends beyond Mr. Gorbachev's most recent speech.

Mr. Gates makes a point that others have also noted but that most analysts seem intent on forgetting: Mr. Gorbachev's predecessors tried most of this.

Newspapers during Khrushchev's years published thousands of complaints about the bureaucrats. Later, the Liberman reforms were going to make the economy answer to "profit-

ability." There would be private agricultural plots. Mr. Gorbachev in his famous U.N. speech promised to demobilize 500,000 Soviet soldiers, but over two years Khrushchev actually cut conventional forces by 1.8 million men. As to Soviet relaxation in Europe, Austria was freed from Soviet occupation in 1955.

But all those would-be reformers of the past now are gone. Khrushchev was deposed in 1964, to be followed by Brezhnev and his colleague Kosygin, then Chernenko and Andropov.

As to the recurring question—Should the West help Mr. Gorbachev?—it is a nonissue. The West has *always* helped Soviet leaders. Henry Ford built an auto plant for the Bolsheviks. During Stalin's time, Metropolitan-Vickers built Soviet power plants. A Western firm built the Dnepr dam. Americans such as Armand Hammer and Dwayne Andreas have been pitching in for years. Western governments in the early 1980s financed a gas pipeline into Europe. And yesterday George Bush approved a decision to subsidize yet another huge wheat sale to the Soviet Union.

The more relevant question to ask about Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues is the one history demands that we ask: Can we trust them? Prudent and sensible Westerners have kept this question squarely before them since at least 1814, when Metternich at the Congress of Vienna dealt warily with Czar Alexander I, an earlier proponent of Western liberal reform for Russia.

The idea, in any event, that the West can in some large way "help" Mr. Gorbachev change a nation of 270 million diverse people occupying 8.6 million square miles reflects more than the usual amount of reformist hubris. He will have to overcome the odds against his success largely on his own, and the West will have to show about the same degree of patience and skepticism it is exhibiting about Communist China. Which is exactly what President Bush suggested.

We doubt that any serious Western official believes it is in our interests to consciously make internal Soviet reform more difficult than it already is. If Mr. Gorbachev passes into history, he may well be replaced by someone who believes that the Soviet Union more properly needs military, not political, reform. National security officials such as Messrs. Cheney and Gates are expected to think and even talk about that possibility now, not the day after it happens.

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The New York Times _____
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal A 18
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 3 May 89

Bush's NATO Line

Cautious Missile Policy Seems Stodgy To a World Galvanized by Gorbachev

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5 — A single question dominates conversation these days, here and in capitals abroad, among those who follow foreign affairs: Why is President Bush taking so hard a line on short-range missiles?

True, the President's opposition to negotiations with the Soviet Union over such weapons, at least without a prior decision to modernize the obsolescent

American Lance missiles, would have seemed a conventional enough position for a Republican conservative, or even a moderate, only a year or two back. But the entire international climate has changed in a relatively few months.

The whirlwind diplomacy of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, has not only created change but also whetted the world's appetite for more. And in that context, Mr. Bush's careful policy planning looks timid, stodgy, even retrograde to critics in the United States and especially in Europe.

In response, the President and his advisers assert that the Soviet Union is changing precisely because Ronald Reagan was tough. To get more change, they say, the United States needs to stay tough. Some of the more conservative officials, like Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, also assert that no concessions should be made because Mr. Gorbachev may not survive.

Need for 'Solidarity'

Just how unpopular that line is among the allies — not only West Germany but a number of other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — could be seen in the capital today. On Mr. Bush's home ground, two experienced allied leaders, the Prime Ministers of Canada and Norway, prodded the President to do more, lest the NATO summit in Brussels later this month turn into a debacle rather than a celebration of the alliance's first 40 years.

A compromise solution may ultimately be found; Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway said in an interview on Thursday that she remained optimistic about that. But the difficulties that remain were evident in the failure of Mr. Bush's latest effort to work something out with Helmut Kohl, the West German Chancellor.

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada took a diplomatic approach at a morning meeting with a small group of American reporters, speaking of the need for "solidarity" among the alliance members. But he also talked eloquently of the opportunities for a far more peaceful world that he said Mr. Gorbachev had presented to the West, and he added: "The response to that kind of openness has to be reciprocity."

Dr. Brundtland said bluntly in a speech to the National Press Club that "no issue and no weapons system," including short-range missiles, should be excluded from talks with the Soviet Union, but that any negotiations should run in tandem with discussions designed to produce "progress in reducing the Soviet superiority in conventional forces."

Pushing Kohl Too Far

Her position resembled that of Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and of other influential Democrats.

Dr. Brundtland specifically rejected the central argument of the Bush Administration, endorsed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain, that if talks on short-range missiles ever started there would be irresistible pressure to ban the weapons altogether. It shows a real lack of faith in NATO, she said, when "we ought to be more self-confident about our own ability to decide and handle the issues."

For the Europeans and for some Americans, Mr. Bush's tactics are difficult to fathom, especially if viewed entirely in a foreign-policy context.

Surely he does not think Lance and other short-term missiles are so important that he will risk the destruction of an already weakened Government in Bonn, a ranking European said this week; pushing Mr. Kohl any more could further the interests of the already resurgent German left, and bring "the Reds and the Greens" — the Communists and the environmentalists — into power.

Administration officials say they do not think that will happen but what they really mean is that they have even bigger fish to fry than the Germans.

The domestic political context provides a bit of additional clarity. Two points are worth mentioning here:

There are within the Bush Administration and elsewhere within the Republican Party not a few people who disliked Mr. Reagan's intermediate nuclear forces agreement with the Soviets and want to stop the momentum of disarmament there for the moment.

And many of the players vividly remember 1975 and 1976.

In those days, President Bush was Director of Central Intelligence. James A. Baker 3d, now Secretary of State, was chairman of President Ford's reelection campaign. Mr. Cheney was the White House chief of staff, and Brent Scowcroft, then as now, was national security adviser. Détente was the watchword of American relations with the Soviet Union, having been inherited from the Nixon era.

Mr. Reagan ambushed Mr. Ford from the right, denouncing détente and calling for rearmament and confrontation. He very nearly wrested the Republican Presidential nomination from the incumbent, an episode that left its mark, to a greater or lesser degree, on all the people in the Ford inner circle. It would be astonishing if they were not now wary of extending themselves too far too quickly toward far-ranging rapprochement with the new Soviet regime.

But there is a real danger, in the view of many who have watched the current dispute unfold, that habits of mind formed more than a decade ago may prove unsuited to the mercurial new world that Mr. Gorbachev has created. That is the main reason why Germany has recruited more allies in the current fight than the far more powerful United States has managed to win to its position.

Soviet Watchers Now Say Gorbachev Is 'for Real'

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 7 — Two years ago, when a group of 20 Washington-based experts on the Soviet Union started gathering for a bimonthly discussion about Mikhail S. Gorbachev, only a tiny minority said they thought the Soviet leader was "for real."

"We started with a great deal of skepticism," recalled Dimitri K. Simes, one of the leaders of the discussion group, which included Brent Scowcroft and Dick Cheney before they joined the Government as national security adviser and Secretary of Defense, respectively. "There was a very powerful feeling that Gorbachev was more style than substance. Now everyone agrees: Gorbachev is for real."

What happened to the discussion group, held at the office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is typical of a transition in thinking among long-time Soviet watchers.

"Today, the debate is not about whether he is for real, but about whether he will succeed, whether we can, or should, help him, and, most of all, whether even if he disappears tomorrow the reforms that he has initiated can ever be rolled back," said Charles William Maynes, editor of the magazine *Foreign Policy*.

No Policy, No Excitement

As Mr. Gorbachev is increasingly accepted as a man dedicated to reshaping East-West relations, attention has shifted to the pace and scope with which the Bush Administration is responding to him — something that will become even clearer on Wednesday when Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d holds his first ministerial meeting in Moscow with Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Mr. Gorbachev himself.

There appears to be broad understanding in Washington for the Bush Administration's desire to undertake a review of policies toward Moscow before it proceeds with any initiatives. Few Kremlin watchers are prepared to argue categorically that the Administration has missed the boat — yet.

"At this point I am still not ready to be critical of their pace," Mr. Simes said. "But if nothing has changed a year from now, I would begin to worry. What is missing now is music — a sense that we may once again be present at the creation."

"On the other hand," he added, "one of the realities is that the Soviets have generated a certain responsiveness in Western Europe and elsewhere. For us to appear both passive and impassive to Gorbachev is a problem. One needs to strike a balance between caution before making fundamental changes in policy and a visible degree of understanding and responsiveness to the changes going on in the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration may have erred too much toward the first."

Why No Enthusiasm

Experts cite several reasons for the apparent lack of enthusiasm in the Administration. One school contends that President Bush, Mr. Cheney, Mr. Baker and Mr. Scowcroft believe in their hearts, but have never said so publicly, that Ronald Reagan had become too taken with Mr. Gorbachev.

"The Bush people feel that the Reagan foreign policy had become too starry eyed, too credulous about Gorbachev, that it had done this somersault from extreme hostility to thinking that there could be a fundamental change in the Soviet-American relationship," argued Robert W. Tucker of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. "Bush, Baker and Scowcroft want to go slow out of fear that they might unleash a flood tide of positive public opinion toward Gorbachev that will overwhelm them."

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Hopes and Realities

Some have wondered whether Mr. Cheney, when he recently said he did not think Mr. Gorbachev would succeed, was engaging in wishful thinking. After all, it is the Soviet leader's success in raising hopes that the East-West status quo can be changed that is at the root of the mounting tensions between the Administration and some of its allies, particularly Bonn.

The Administration "has correctly understood that one needs a degree of caution in dealing with the Soviet Union," said James A. Schlesinger, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. "You don't want to allow hopes to run ahead of realities."

*New York
Times
5/4/89*

U.S. still eating Cheney's words

By Thomas J. Breen
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Only a few days before crucial meetings in Moscow, the Bush administration again gave Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform efforts a vote of confidence yesterday in an obvious bid to limit the damage of a prediction by Defense Secretary Richard Cheney that perestroika would fail.

"The president has said, and I have said, that we have no wish to see perestroika fail. . . . To the contrary, we would very much like it to succeed," Secretary of State James A. Baker III said yesterday.

His remarks dovetailed with weeklong efforts by the administration to downplay Mr. Cheney's prediction that Mr. Gorbachev's sweeping changes are likely to fail. Such a notion clearly would damage the atmosphere for the meetings with the Soviets, scheduled for midweek.

To limit that damage, Mr. Baker, in a speech punctuated by optimism yesterday, called perestroika a "process that promises to change Soviet international behavior towards diplomatic solutions and problem solving rather than the use of force or intimidation."

Mr. Baker is scheduled to leave for Moscow on Monday for top-level meetings with Soviet officials, including Mr. Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. And his comments yesterday at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington were seen by diplomats and analysts as a clear attempt to assure the Soviets that Washington stands behind their reform efforts.

In surprisingly strong language that reportedly deeply perturbed President Bush, Mr. Cheney said Saturday in an interview on Cable News Network: "If I had to guess today, I would guess that he [Mr. Gorbachev] would ultimately fail: That is to say that he will not be able to reform the Soviet economy to turn it into an efficient, modern society. And when that happens, he's likely to be replaced by somebody who will be far more hostile than he's been in terms of his attitude towards the West."

Almost immediately after the outspoken Mr. Cheney made his remarks, the administration embraced a damage-control posture, with Mr. Bush proclaiming on Monday, "You know, I made clear to Mr. Gorbachev, up there in New York — Governor's Island — when we met,

that we wanted to see perestroika succeed and likewise we want to see success for the economic reforms in China."

As an added indication that the administration was peeved by Mr. Cheney's remarks, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, said at a Monday press briefing, "I don't know what his motivation was."

Mr. Baker, in his remarks yesterday, didn't mention Mr. Cheney by name but appeared to be sending him a message when he said: "There are some who say that we need not do much of anything because trends are favorable to us. Their counsel is to sit tight and await Soviet concessions. I am not of this school. . . . Our foreign policy must be based on an understanding of change in the Soviet Union, but it cannot wholly rely on that change to produce the results we want."

But the administration — despite its attempt yesterday to present a united front on Soviet policy as the Moscow meetings approach — nonetheless appears to be deeply divided over how to handle the Soviets, according to several analysts and diplomats.

In addition to Mr. Cheney, Vice President Dan Quayle and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft are said to be highly skeptical about both perestroika and the Soviets' sincerity and are adopting a passive "wait and see" attitude, according to several administration sources.

On the other side are the president himself, Mr. Baker and White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, who favor a pragmatic but cautious approach toward the Soviets that responds aggressively to continuing Soviet reforms, the sources said.

"It's not a full-scale fight in the White House, but a few sparks certainly will fly before the final approach toward the Soviets is made public," one well-placed congressional source said yesterday. The source is familiar with a broad inter-agency policy review on many issues that the administration says will be completed sometime in the next few weeks.

The agenda for next week's Moscow meetings has not been unveiled, but Moscow's continuing military support for Nicaragua is certain to be a priority item for the United States.

For weeks, the administration has been working behind the scenes to persuade Moscow to slash or drop its military support for the Sandinista government.

Soviet Watchers Now Say Gorbachev Is 'for Real'

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 7 — Two years ago, when a group of 20 Washington-based experts on the Soviet Union started gathering for a bimonthly discussion about Mikhail S. Gorbachev, only a tiny minority said they thought the Soviet leader was "for real."

"We started with a great deal of skepticism," recalled Dimitri K. Simes, one of the leaders of the discussion group, which included Brent Scowcroft and Dick Cheney before they joined the Government as national security adviser and Secretary of Defense, respectively. "There was a very powerful feeling that Gorbachev was more style than substance. Now everyone agrees: Gorbachev is for real."

What happened to the discussion group, held at the office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is typical of a transition in thinking among long-time Soviet watchers.

"Today, the debate is not about whether he is for real, but about whether he will succeed, whether we can, or should, help him, and, most of all, whether even if he disappears tomorrow the reforms that he has initiated can ever be rolled back," said Charles William Maynes, editor of the magazine Foreign Policy.

No Policy, No Excitement

As Mr. Gorbachev is increasingly accepted as a man dedicated to reshaping East-West relations, attention has shifted to the pace and scope with which the Bush Administration is responding to him — something that will become even clearer on Wednesday when Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d holds his first ministerial meeting in Moscow with Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze and Mr. Gorbachev himself.

There appears to be broad understanding in Washington for the Bush Administration's desire to undertake a review of policies toward Moscow be-

The lack of White House excitement is called surprising.

fore it proceeds with any initiatives. Few Kremlin watchers are prepared to argue categorically that the Administration has missed the boat — yet.

"At this point I am still not ready to be critical of their pace," Mr. Simes said. "But if nothing has changed a year from now, I would begin to worry. What is missing now is music — a sense that we may once again be present at the creation."

Indeed, what seems to concern many Soviet experts in Washington is not so much the fact that the Bush Administration seems to lack a clear-cut policy at this stage, but rather that it lacks any clear-cut excitement, any sense of opportunity, deriving from the seemingly revolutionary changes Mr. Gorbachev has initiated. The Administration seems to relate the question of how to respond to Mr. Gorbachev more as burden than a rare chance.

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The next question, the experts say, is: Will he succeed?

"On the other hand," he added, "one of the realities is that the Soviets have generated a certain responsiveness in Western Europe and elsewhere. For us to appear both passive and impassive to Gorbachev is a problem. One needs to strike a balance between caution before making fundamental changes in policy and a visible degree of understanding and responsiveness to the changes going on in the Soviet Union. The Bush Administration may have erred too much toward the first."

Why No Enthusiasm

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The Washington Post _____
The New York Times **A 12** _____
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The Wall Street Journal _____
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New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
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CONTINUED

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With surveys showing Americans more concerned about drugs, the environment and competition from Japan than any threat from the Soviet Union, the Administration may find itself increasingly pressed to act.

Richard Nuccio, coordinator of such research at the Roosevelt Center For American Policy Studies in Washington, said the surveys indicated that while Mr. Bush, Mr. Scowcroft, Mr. Baker and Mr. Cheney seem to be responding to Mr. Gorbachev in terms of their own experiences, and the cycles in Soviet-American relations that they have lived through since World War II, while the public seems to be digesting him straight.

"There is a gap between the Washington debate and the public debate," Mr. Nuccio said. "This idea of hanging tough and waiting for the Soviets to make more concessions sounds reasonable until you look at the public mood. Gorbachev is clearly talking over Bush's head."

This may explain why Robert Legvold, director of the W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union at Columbia University and a frequent adviser to administrations, says he is not really concerned about Mr. Bush's pace.

"I think what we have in Washington today is a highly competent leadership with no vision, but it is a highly competent leadership with no vision in historic times," Mr. Legvold said. "Therefore, it is going to be pushed along by these times. I would have hoped that we would have led these times. But we are not going to resist them — that is the critical point. You watch — when Baker begins his meetings with Shevardnadze, the times will push him. Only a comatose administration would fail to respond to this moment."

Bush's First Foreign Crisis

An angry disagreement with West Germany over nuclear weapons threatens to divide NATO

These days, even Russians get a warmer welcome. When two West German cabinet ministers arrived at the State Department for an urgent meeting last week, they found the atmosphere was "icy," as one of them described it later. The Germans were kept waiting for 15 minutes. When they were ushered into the Henry Clay Room to meet their American counterparts, there was no grip-and-grin photo session. Instead, after perfunctory handshakes, Secretary of State James Baker started off by telling his guests: "We are deeply disappointed in your attitude."

George Bush's first foreign-policy crisis sneaked up on him from an unexpected quarter. The immediate cause was almost mundane: a dispute with West Germany over the nuts and bolts of arms control. But the unprecedented upshot was that Bonn, long a docile junior partner in NATO, defied Washington on an issue that now threatens to divide the entire Western Alliance. The Germans, like many other West Europeans, are beguiled by Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking." His call for a "common European home" and his flashy unilateral gestures—including the promise to withdraw some troops and tanks from Eastern Europe—convince many Westerners that the Soviet military threat has ended (box, page 18). Washington takes a much less rosy view of Gorbachev, but so far Bush has offered no vision to match the Soviet leader's. With a crucial NATO summit coming up at the end of May, the president and his advisers are still groping for a grand design.

The NATO crisis began when West German Chancellor Hel-

mut Kohl was panicked by his domestic political problems. Hoping to shore up his left flank, he demanded immediate East-West negotiations over short-range nuclear forces (SNF)—the missiles, bombs and artillery shells that constitute NATO's on-site deterrent against an attack by the superior conventional forces of the Soviet bloc. Despite angry exhortations from Washington and London, several of the allies sided with West Germany. The administration knows that SNF will have to be negotiated eventually; U.S. officials even hinted last week that they might ultimately agree to cut all the way to zero. But Washington insists that the Warsaw Pact



BOB McNEELY—SIPA

The president wants new arms first and negotiations later


The Last Nuclear Weapons in Europe

The 1987 INF treaty left Europe littered with other land-based weapons systems, including short-range nuclear forces (SNF), with ranges of 300 miles or less. Whenever SNF negotiations begin, Moscow also will want to talk about nuclear-capable tactical aircraft and the independent French nuclear arsenal, which includes intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

NATO		Number		Range			
				IN MILES			
	Lance short-range missile	88 launchers	70		Scud short-range missile	661 launchers	185
	Pluton short-range missile*	32 launchers	75		Frog short-range missile	658 launchers	43
	SSBS-S3 intermediate-range missile*	18 launchers	2,175		SS-21 short-range missile	289 launchers	75
	Artillery pieces (nuclear capable)	2,924	9-19		Artillery pieces (nuclear capable)	5,598	8-17
	Nuclear-capable NATO tactical aircraft	1,382			Nuclear-capable tactical aircraft	2,349	

*FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES (NOT PART OF NATO'S MILITARY COMMAND)
SOURCES: NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, PRAVDA

IB OHLSSON—NEWSWEEK



REGIS BOSSU—SYGMA

A question of when to modernize: A Lance missile and its crew in West Germany

must give up its conventional advantage first. If Kohl has his way, Western Europe could be stripped of its battlefield nuclear forces—and its best bargaining chip—before attaining nonnuclear parity. And that could trigger an American backlash leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

At a NATO meeting in Brussels two weeks ago, the administration tried to avert a confrontation with Kohl. Washington wants to modernize the Lance missile, extending its range from 70 to 280 miles. But the Americans agreed not to press Bonn for a commitment to deploy the new Lance. In return, they thought the Germans had promised not to ask for early negotiations with Moscow on SNF. But Kohl's conservative coalition currently looks like a loser in national elections scheduled for December 1990. Since most Germans don't want nuclear weapons on their territory, Kohl stood to gain from pushing for disarmament. The day after the Brussels compromise, he told Bush he wanted early SNF talks and was sending Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg

off to Washington to argue for his case.

The administration was taken by surprise. "This has become the contemporary German political style," said a senior official. "Kohl says everything is fine until he panics at the last minute, and Genscher is devious." The German emissaries got nowhere in their frosty meeting with Baker, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Bush's national-security adviser, Brent Scowcroft. "We must not fall into this dangerous trap," Cheney warned in a speech that he left the meeting to deliver. "One of the Kremlin's primary goals remains the denuclearization of Europe."

Third zero: Facing a similar dilemma a decade ago, NATO employed a two-track strategy that eventually led to the INF treaty, which eliminated all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces. On one track, Washington negotiated with Moscow, while on the other, the allies began to deploy a new generation of medium-range missiles. The pressure paid off with what is known as the "two zeros": a treaty banning two classes of medium-range weapons. But if SNF talks lead to the third



POLY-PRESS

The chancellor wants talks with Moscow right away

and final zero, as many experts expect, NATO's entire defensive strategy would have to change, since there would no longer be any nuclear weapons available on the ground in Europe. "The reason why NATO decided to employ nuclear weapons in the first place was because of the enormous Warsaw Pact conventional advantage," says a senior U.S. official. "If that can be eliminated through the conventional-force talks in Vienna, then maybe the circumstances arise in which NATO can contemplate changing its fundamental strategy."

But first Washington wants to modernize the Lance to match recent upgrading of comparable Soviet weapons. By itself, modernization could lead to cuts in the Western arsenal. U.S. Gen. John Galvin, the NATO commander, has put forth a new plan to reduce the alliance's inventory of tactical nuclear weapons by about one quarter once modernization begins to produce "greater precision and greater efficiency."

Whether modernization will happen is anyone's guess. West Germany can block the process by refusing to allow deployment of new weapons. But the Americans can thwart Bonn's desire for early SNF talks, since it is Washington that would have to negotiate with Moscow. The United States and Britain are adamantly opposed to SNF talks at this time. France is on the fence, while several of the other allies back

West Germany. A compromise is possible. "We want to modernize now and negotiate later; the Germans want to negotiate now and modernize later," says a U.S. diplomat in Bonn. "The two positions are bridgeable." But so far neither side shows signs of backing down.

At the NATO summit four weeks from now, Bush will have some explaining to do. As his drawn-out review of foreign-policy options nears its conclusion, his advisers

are trying to pull together an overall strategy to match Gorbachev's bold maneuvers in Europe. One idea under consideration is to counter the Soviet call for a "common European home" by celebrating "common Western values" and daring the Soviet leader to adopt them. Administration officials still have not settled, however, on specific initiatives that might put some meat on the thematic bones. So far, officials say they have no clear signals from the presi-

dent, and no sign that his cold-war views have altered much. "I don't think George has ever thought deeply about what he wants Europe to look like at the end of four years," says an occasional adviser to the president. But change is coming to Europe; the question is whether Bush will lead it or follow it.

RUSSELL WATSON with JOHN BARRY and MARGARET GARRARD WARNER in Washington, MICHAEL MEYER in Bonn and bureau reports

The Postwar World Order Is Fading

BY KENNETH AUCHINCLOSS

Ronald Reagan, people say, restored American prestige in the world. George Bush faces a much tougher task: to transform it.

That's the lesson of the gentlemanly spat now under way between the Americans and the British on one side, and the Germans on the other, about short-range nuclear weapons. On the face of it, it's just one more of those NATO squalls that spring up from time to time and then blow themselves out in gusts of op-ed articles and eddies of procrastination. But this one is different. What the Germans are telling us—and it's a mistake to think that it all stems from Helmut Kohl's political problems back home—is that the days of military buildup in Europe are over. And there is a larger implication: the NATO alliance, although it's

not fundamentally tattered or torn, is simply not as important as it once was. The postwar order of Europe—the division between East and West—is fast breaking down, and the institutions erected to preserve it are beginning to look outdated.

It's still possible to argue that this perception is wildly premature, that the incipient reforms in East Europe and the Soviet Union could be undone by economic failure or political reaction or both, that the West would be crazy to let down its guard just because the other side is waving the white flag of *perestroika*. But in many quarters of Europe, at least, that attitude is looking increasingly fusty.

If the Germans are right, then the consequences for the United States are profound. For the last half century

American influence in the world has been based primarily on its military power. Yes, American technological and economic capacity, American cultural ingenuity, American powers of social resilience have all been impressive. But the main reason why the United States has earned an enormous degree of deference is that it keeps the key to the Western arsenal.

It is fashionable, just now, to suppose that American influence is declining for economic reasons, that its chronic trade imbalance in recent years signals a lack of competitiveness that must inevitably sap its power. Yale professor Paul Kennedy has scored a success with a book tracing the decline of great powers to their tendency to take on greater military commitments than their economies can sustain. In fact, the real problem for the United States in the next decade may well turn out to be not economic but political: it may be able to afford a huge military establishment, but that military muscle will not count for as much. In a world less worried about war, the owner of the arsenal cannot expect the old deference.

German Influence: Western Europe is now excited about the economic unification due at the end of 1992. If by then the importance of NATO is thought to have diminished, what will be the United States' point of influence over a revitalized continent? West Germany is pushing forward with commercial projects in Poland and Hungary, the

most Westward-looking of the East European states, and, of course, it has elaborate trade ties with East Germany. If the Soviet Union is loosening its hold upon the satellites, will Germany re-establish its sphere of influence in Central Europe, which was ruptured by World Wars I and II? (One oddity of America's current preoccupation with Japan is that German economic expansion is correspondingly overlooked.) These are questions of critical importance, and what brings them to the fore is the fading of the world's postwar configuration.

George Bush has been much criticized for taking too long with his reappraisal of American policy toward the Soviet Union. With such enormous issues at stake, taking a little extra time may not be such a bad idea (particularly since Gorbachev, for his own reasons, is being driven to make unilateral concessions).

Dreary work: And we should not expect American diplomatic moves, after the reappraisal, to be particularly dramatic. For the West Germans have seized the exciting forward position on the Western side. It falls to the Americans—and the British—to do the dreary work of restraining them. The Americans are right that it would be foolhardy to negotiate with the Soviets over short-range nuclear missiles before achieving major cuts in conventional arms. But the Germans are right that profound changes are under way in the world, and Washington had better have some ideas of how to adjust to them if America is to sustain its influence.



UPI—BETTMANN NEWSPHOTOS

America cannot expect the old deference: Berlin airlift, 1948

National security, Ford vintage

Former president lauds Scowcroft, Baker, Cheney

John W. Mashek
White Staff

WASHINGTON — As former President Gerald Ford sees it, the national security arm of the White House will not be subverted by an illegal or runaway operation under President Bush because retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft is running the shop.

Following the conviction of Oliver North, the government now will proceed to prosecute John Poindexter, a predecessor of Scowcroft's, in its case against members of the Reagan administration's national security team.

"Brent understands fully that the NSC is intended to be an independent think tank for the president and not a place to conduct field operations," Ford said in a telephone interview with *The Boston Globe*. "He will not be a captive of the bureaucracy either the State Department or the Defense Department."

The former president admits to a bias toward Scowcroft, a 61-year-old retired Air Force general who became a key foreign policy player in the Nixon White House under the stewardship of Henry Kissinger. Later, after Ford assumed power, Scowcroft was elevated to NSC adviser.

Some critics have questioned Scowcroft's judgment because of his closeness to Kissinger, with whom he worked as a high-priced private consultant when both of them were out of government and charging big fees to clients for foreign policy advice.

But Ford, Nixon's successor for 28 months from August 1974 to January 1977, attested that Bush's national security troika—Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and NSC adviser Scowcroft—is the same high-level



GERALD FORD
A sense of déjà vu

team that served his presidency and his presidential campaign.

In the Ford era, Baker was a hotshot political operative in Texas who moved from the Commerce Department to eventually manage Ford's 1976 campaign, which came from 30 points behind in the polls to a razor-thin loss to Jimmy Carter. Cheney was the bright, workaholic staffer who eventually served as White House chief of staff. And Scowcroft was the near-reclusive NSC adviser who kept his name out of the newspapers and his face off television screens.

"The proper role for the head of the NSC, after all, is that he shouldn't be on TV all the time," Ford said about the importance of a behind-the-scenes operator as NSC chief.

Other foreign policy specialists emphasize the problem of having an overly ambitious figure in the post. Kissinger was frequently battling the defense and state secretaries as

his prestige increased. Under Carter, NSC adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski ran into serious conflicts with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which led to some false starts on policy in Carter's term.

If the past is prologue, Bush will not have to worry about Scowcroft's ego getting in the way of public policy. "He's going to make sure the president has a wide range of options to choose from," said Cheney. "He has no agenda of his own."

Scowcroft is not always shy about making his presence known. When former Texas Sen. John Tower's nomination as secretary of defense was buried by the Senate, Scowcroft was the favored successor of several top Bush advisers outside government. But Scowcroft wanted to stay put in the NSC and with the concurrence of Baker, he lobbied for old friend Cheney, the House minority whip from Wyoming. The rest is history: Cheney was chosen, confirmed within a week by the Senate and the Tower embarrassment was short-lived.

As one of the three members of the Tower Commission, which investigated the Iran contra affair for President Reagan in 1987, Scowcroft was the quiet partner. While Tower and former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie were out front, Scowcroft remained largely in the background.

If there is a word to describe Scowcroft, judicious may be the most appropriate. He is tough but doesn't take chances. He is friendly but not a backslapper. In advising Bush, he is more likely to recommend a cautious approach on relations with the Soviet Union while urging a renewed comity with US allies in Europe.

Unlike the Ford period, when advisers seemed to be dealing with a new foreign, domestic or political crisis every day, Scowcroft has the luxury of time now to look ahead under Bush. "Looking into the future... doing some serious planning," is the way Scowcroft likes to work, said a close friend.

Bush, Aides Reviewing U.S. Options

By Ann Devroy and
John M. Goshko
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush and his top national security advisers are weighing a list of options, including a military show of force that stops short of invasion, if the handpicked presidential candidate of Panamanian military leader Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega is declared the winner of the election there, administration officials said last night.

Officials said Bush, in one of a series of meetings on the situation over the last several days, met yesterday afternoon with top advisers on a winnowed-down list of U.S. policy options in Panama in the aftermath of the controversial election. The president, the officials said, will make no final decisions until he gets a firsthand report from U.S. election observers.

Bush is to meet this morning with the delegation he sent to Panama on Saturday to monitor the election, but White House and other officials pointed to strong statements by several observers, including the two U.S. senators from Florida, that the election was fraudulent.

A senior administration official said the president plans to "be prepared to announce a plan with regard to Panama"

after his meeting with the delegation if the election results have been announced. He said the military aspects will be announced, but perhaps not immediately, so Bush can talk first with congressional leaders if he goes that route.

A senior White House official said that while an invasion option had been part of an early debate, "Everyone opposes that. It has not been a serious option."

Officials strongly cautioned against assuming that any of the more aggressive options available, such as toppling Noriega by force, would be implemented unless there were grave threats, which are not now apparent, to Americans in Panama or to the canal.

Administration officials acknowledged that a number of U.S. military contingency plans were put on the table during National Security Council meetings, but suggested that the administration is now focusing on limited actions that center on transporting additional military personnel to U.S. facilities in Panama. One official noted, "Under the Canal Treaty, the U.S. has the right to protect U.S. interests and U.S. citizens in the Canal Zone."

One likely move, officials said, would be to fly more U.S. servicemen to Panama as a show of force, but keep them at U.S. bases in the politically polarized country.

At the State Department, officials who have been reviewing all U.S.

Jim Hoagland

The NATO Crisis Is Reagan's Doing

PARIS—Ronald Reagan reportedly fears that his successor is mishandling the West Germans and frittering away the Reagan legacy of improved East-West relations. This is one dart President Bush does not deserve. The NATO crisis is not of Bush's making: it was created and left behind by none other than Reagan and his secretary of state, George Shultz.

The disclosure of Reagan's concern about Bush comes from *The Post's* Lou Cannon, who over the years has chronicled the thinking of Reagan and his inner circle from the state house in Sacramento to the White House and now back to California.

Cannon disclosed in a column over the weekend that Reagan is telling friends that Bush has created a "needless crisis" with Bonn. Cannon's experience and deep knowledge of the former president and his friends make it highly unlikely that this report would be either inaccurate or circumstantial.

The disclosure offers confirmation from the Reagan camp of reports that have percolated through Washington since the inauguration: that

the Bush-Reagan personal relationship has gone sour, paralleling the more open rift that has developed between Shultz and Bush's secretary of state, Jim Baker, over arms control and dealing with the Soviets.

Reagan's reported comments are not just ungracious. They are flat wrong. The Bush White House did not provoke a needless crisis with Bonn, as America's newest elder statesman argues by proxy. Instead, the Bush team has been trying to moderate a dispute that became inevitable when Reagan signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty at the Washington summit in December 1987.

Reagan's memory seems to have failed him at a convenient moment. The NATO crisis goes back to the spring of 1987, when Shultz flew from Moscow to Brussels to advise NATO's foreign ministers to accept the "double zero" deal he had just been offered by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev offered to do away with Soviet SS-20 and other medium-range nuclear rockets in return for NATO's agreement to pull out the

highly effective Pershing 2 and ground-launched Cruise missiles deployed in Europe in 1983. The coalition government in Bonn, which had to overcome strong opposition to get the Euromissiles deployed, also had to agree to losing 72 older Pershing 1A missiles with U.S. nuclear warheads.

Shultz's strong "suggestion" that NATO accept the deal and accept it fast stunned Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Union in West Germany. Shultz was arguing that the alliance should get rid of all missiles in Europe capable of hitting Soviet territory and then build a negotiating "firebreak" around all remaining missiles with a range of less than 300 miles. This was met by CDU protests that a strategy of refusing to negotiate on short-range missiles and nuclear artillery was politically unsustainable in West Germany. The German public would conclude that the "firebreak" was intended to keep a nuclear war confined to German territory.

Kohl at first resisted the Shultz proposal and was supported by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. But faced with the twin pressures

of a general election and appeals from Reagan and Shultz, the Iron Lady caved. She made it clear to Kohl that he had to do the same. Kohl emerged from the experience bruised and privately telling political associates that the double-zero battle "is the last time I will be outflanked on arms control by an American administration."

Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and some of the other key figures on the Bush foreign policy team were painfully aware of the German sensitivity on short-range missiles. They had serious doubts about the INF Treaty precisely because it made Soviet pressure to negotiate away the remaining nuclear weapons on German territory inevitable and perhaps irresistible. But Shultz brushed such concerns aside, setting in motion the transatlantic dispute that Reagan now blames on Bush and which Scowcroft and Baker have to manage.

That is, a smoldering fire was left behind, and Kohl and his politically adroit foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, have just poured gasoline on it. With their coalition plummeting in the polls, Kohl and Genscher pulled out the missile

issue to dramatize the growing German sense that the era of limited sovereignty that began with defeat in World War II is now ending. When Baker backed off pushing Bonn for a decision on deploying a modernized Lance missile, Genscher would not take yes for an answer. He provoked a politically profitable row with Washington by insisting on a commitment to short-range negotiations with the Soviets now.

As an opening position, Bush could only reject Genscher's demand on early negotiations and then work toward a papering-over compromise for the 40th anniversary NATO celebration in Brussels. And, having cashed in the immediate political gains of cocking a snoot at Uncle Sam, the Germans are now ready for a compromise based on a working group to design future negotiations.

But the underlying tensions will remain and resurface after the Brussels celebration. Bush will need to work the NATO account constantly during his presidency. It will be easier for him if Ronald Reagan will get his thumb out of his successor's eye.

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^BC-SCOWCROFT _ Attn. national editors

^NSC's Scowcroft a quiet man who likes staying in the background

By John W. Mashek

Boston Globe

WASHINGTON _ As former President Gerald Ford sees it, the national security arm of the White House will not be subverted by an illegal or runaway operation under President Bush because retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft is running the shop.

Following the conviction of Oliver North, the government now will proceed to prosecute John Poindexter, a predecessor of Scowcroft's, in its case against members of the Reagan administration's national security team.

"Brent understands fully that the NSC was intended to be an independent think tank for the president and not a place to conduct field operations," Ford said in a telephone interview with the Boston Globe. "He also will not be a captive of the bureaucracy at either the State Department or the Defense Department."

The former president admits to a bias toward Scowcroft, a 61-year-old retired Air Force general who became a key foreign policy player in the Nixon White House under the stewardship of Henry Kissinger. Later, after Ford assumed power, Scowcroft was elevated to NSC adviser.

Some critics have questioned Scowcroft's judgment because of his closeness to Kissinger, with whom he worked as a high-priced private consultant when both of them were out of government and charging big fees to clients for foreign policy advice.

But Ford, Nixon's successor for 28 months from August 1974 to January 1977, exulted that Bush's national security troika of Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and NSC adviser Scowcroft is the same high-level team that served his presidency and his presidential campaign.

In the Ford era, Baker was a hot-shot political operative in Texas who moved from the Commerce Department to eventually manage Ford's 1976 campaign, which came from 30 points behind in the polls to a razor-thin loss to Jimmy Carter. Cheney was the bright, workaholic staffer who eventually served as White House chief of staff. And Scowcroft was the near-reclusive NSC adviser who kept his name out of the newspapers and his face off television screens.

"The proper role for the head of the NSC, after all, is that he shouldn't be on TV all the time," Ford said about the importance of a behind-the-scenes operator as NSC chief.

Other foreign policy specialists emphasize the problem of having an overly ambitious figure in the post. Kissinger was frequently battling the defense and state secretaries as his prestige increased. Under Carter, NSC adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski ran into serious conflicts with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, which led to some false starts on policy in Carter's term.

If the past is prologue, Bush will not have to worry about Scowcroft's ego getting in the way of public policy. "He's going to make sure the president has a wide range of options to choose from," said Cheney. "He has no agenda of his own."

Scowcroft is not always shy about making his presence known. When former Texas Sen. John Tower's nomination as secretary of defense was buried by the Senate, Scowcroft was the favored successor of several top Bush advisers outside government. But Scowcroft wanted to stay put in the NSC, and with the concurrence of Baker, he lobbied for old friend Cheney, the House minority whip from Wyoming. The rest is history: Cheney was chosen, confirmed within a week by the Senate and the Tower embarrassment was short-lived.

As one of the three members of the Tower Commission, which investigated the Iran-Contra affair for President Reagan in 1987, Scowcroft was the quiet partner. While Tower and former Secretary of State Edmund Muskie were out front, Scowcroft remained largely in the background.

If there is a word to describe Scowcroft, judicious may be the most appropriate. He is tough but doesn't take chances. He is friendly but not a backslapper. In advising Bush, he is more likely to recommend a cautious approach on relations with the Soviet Union while urging a renewed comity with U.S. allies in Europe.

Unlike the Ford period, when advisers seemed to be dealing with a new foreign, domestic or political crisis every day, Scowcroft has the luxury of time now to look ahead under Bush. "Looking into the future ... doing some serious planning," is the way Scowcroft likes to work, said a close friend.

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THE BOSTON GLOBE TUESDAY, MAY 9, 1989


Nation



RICHARD CHENEY
Worked his way up



JAMES A. BAKER 3d
Managed Ford's 1976 campaign



BRENT SCOWCROFT
Low profile in Ford years

Bush Blowing a Chance To Help End the Cold War



WASHINGTON — Through bureaucratic sloth and unreasoning caution, the Bush administration is blowing a chance to speed the end of the Cold War.

In his meeting today with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Secretary of State James A. Baker III will try to play catch-up with a 3-yard, cloud-of-dust line plunge. This hurts, not because of the public-relations whipping — though there's that — but because it slows progress toward peace.

President Bush's free ride on policy lethargy will end soon. After all, he bragged he'd be ready on Day One. Mr. Baker was his first appointment, followed by a veteran security adviser in Brent Scowcroft.

But instead of grasping the opportunities presented by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, they bogged down in an endless strategic review and Mr. Baker's mistrust of the policy people at State.

Only now are we ready to resume strategic-disarmament talks. We put a grudging, unrealistic proposal on the conventional arms ta-

ble at Vienna. We rebuffed West Germany on negotiating short-range missiles. That spat is particularly lamentable. As John F. Kennedy said, never negotiate from fear but never fear to negotiate.

Mr. Bush's people seem to fear the absence of a Soviet threat more than they did the threat itself.

Experts from all over the spectrum disagree. Paul Nitze, arms guru for President Reagan, says negotiate. So do Sen. Sam Nunn, former CIA director William Colby and even Lawrence Korb, assistant defense secretary under Mr. Reagan.

George Kennan, daddy of containment, calls the Soviet military threat history. Gen. Andy Goodpaster, ex-commander of NATO, favors offering conventional force ceilings at half NATO's present strength, including combat airplanes which thus far we refuse to discuss.

To get realistic about conventional arms, we're going to have to refute our own mythology.

For years, we've exaggerated the bogey-man. True the Warsaw Pact has a big edge in tanks, vehi-

cles and artillery, but how many know our troops actually outnumber their's on the vital central front, if you include the French, and that we are well ahead in tactical aircraft?

Apparently pique as much as an overdose of caution keeps us from negotiating on short-range missiles. Mr. Bush's people feel West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl reneged on a deal.

Mr. Kohl is graceless and politically about as nimble as an ox. Nevertheless, he's been a staunch friend and is in deep trouble. Forcing him to accept new Lance missiles without the cover of a negotiation would sign his political death warrant.

Instead of blanching in fear each time Mr. Gorbachev moves, we ought to propose across-the-board arms cuts plus more far-reaching ideas for cooperation on environment and terrorism than Mr. Baker will toss today to Mr. Shevardnadze.

Sure, as Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney says, Mr. Gorbachev may get shipped to Siberia in favor of someone more menacing. At times the Bush team seems almost to hope so.

But it's also true that the Soviet Union, even under Leonid I. Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin, has been consistently true to its treaties. Even if it breaks some in the future, the more progress we can make now, the safer the planet.

Mr. Gorbachev is ready to deal on two key points no other Soviet leader has been willing to touch: imbalance in arms cuts and realistic verification measures.

We need to tie these down while the tying's good. Given world opinion, they'll be murder for the next guy to untie. □

Mr. Fain is a columnist for Cox News Service.

Options . . .

options for dealing with Panama said last night that the situation was still too confused to make definitive judgments about what might be an appropriate response.

"It all depends on what's happening on the ground, and that is changing minute by minute," said one official, who asked not to be identified. "We don't know yet how the voting will play out. Will Noriega claim victory? Will he annul the election? How will the populace respond? Until there are some answers to these questions, we can't do much more than watch events."

As Bush discussed options with Vice President Quayle, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, CIA Director William H. Webster and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, two senators who had been among the U.S. observers of the election called for the administration to consider using military force if Noriega's candidate, Carlos Duque, claims to have won.

Sens. Bob Graham (D) and Connie Mack III (R) of Florida made their appeal after arriving in Miami with Mayor Xavier Suarez.

"I believe the United States should now consider the use of force in Panama," Graham said at an airport news conference. "Economic sanctions have had almost no effect on Noriega and the people who keep him in power."

Mack said that if Duque is declared the winner, he intends to introduce legislation this week to ab-

rogate the Panama Canal treaties, which call for giving control of the waterway to Panama at the end of the century. "One of the mistakes we made last year," Mack said, "was taking the use of military force off the table."

The State Department issued a statement last night that said: "We are deeply concerned by evidence pouring in of electoral fraud on the part of the pro-Noriega forces. The leader of the presidential observer delegation, Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), stated he saw 'fraud and manipulation' by Colina, the pro-Noriega political coalition, and that he cannot justify saying there was 'a just and fair election.'"

"He also said he was impressed by the Panamanian people's 'desire for democracy.' European parliamentarians have been reported as stating that 127,000 ballots have been destroyed."

"The opposition held a demonstration . . . in which [4,000 to 5,000] people . . . were met by a regime show of force which included water cannons, 'doberman' special riot police and armed regime civilian supporters . . . Sporadic gunfire has occurred in the areas in which U.S. Embassy personnel live. No injuries have been reported."

Administration officials said Scowcroft spoke yesterday with Murtha and with former president Jimmy Carter, one of the heads of the international delegation.

Staff writer George C. Wilson contributed to this report.

The Washington Post A-21
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 10 MAY 89

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Is Bush Being Taken in by Gorbachev?

New suspicions surrounding Soviet military intentions are raising disturbing questions about President Bush's exuberant hopes for the "success" of Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika revolution.

Administration sources, defending the president's distress when Defense Secretary Dick Cheney predicted Gorbachev would probably fail, insist that Bush too is suspicious about Gorbachev's goals. In discussing Gorbachev's perestroika, they claim, Bush only wants to accentuate the positive, so the world will accord him no less credibility as peacemaker than it accords Gorbachev. Secretary of State James A. Baker III shares this view.

But for Bush and the West he leads, critics believe the risks of a policy toward Gorbachev that is based on any illusion or self-deception would be disastrous, possibly hastening the West's disarming. At the instant Cheney was being put down for his candor, new and distressing intelligence was under study here and in London that could cast serious doubt over Gorbachev's professions to be the world's peacemaker.

These intelligence reports fall into related categories of Soviet deception. In the case of London, the new defense White Paper published May 2 charges Gorbachev's military establishment with hiding the production of vastly higher amounts of biological and chemical weapons than admitted, behind a curtain of "secrecy and evasiveness."

In Washington, an intelligence report restricted to the highest levels states that the disputed Soviet radar in Gornel, identified by the United States 17 months ago as a violation of the ABM treaty, has not been dismantled as promised. Two on-site "inspectors" dispatched by Bush's National Security Council staff reported back in March, with photography, that three specific dismantling operations agreed to by Gorbachev's men had been ignored.

Neither Cheney nor British Defense Minister George Younger makes any claim of connivance by Gorbachev or even that the busy Soviet leader is aware of alleged sins charged to his military leaders. But the performance of the Soviet military during the dramatic unfolding of Gorbachev's perestroika and its accompanying "openness" of society, is viewed by backers of Cheney as highly pertinent to Gorbachev's real plans for the future.

In his book "Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform," soon to be published by Cornell University Press, the highly regarded Swedish economist Anders Aslund quotes Gorbachev as saying in 1984, before he became Communist Party boss: "Only an intensive, highly developed economy can safeguard a reinforcement of [our] country's position on the international stage. . . ." Less than a year later, after achieving power, Gorbachev is quoted by Aslund as saying that "facing the aggressive policy and threat of imperialism, it is necessary to strengthen the defense power of the Motherland persistently and not allow military superiority over us."

Cheney's first responsibility is U.S. national security. Baker's is diplomacy, which probably accounts for the fact that

it was Baker who first telephoned the president to inform him that Cheney had forecast Gorbachev's probable failure in a CNN interview on April 29. Presumably Baker was concerned about the effect in Moscow, just before his arrival there, of such a chilling and seemingly unfriendly appraisal, no matter how accurate.

The president quickly obliged Baker with what one high administration official called his "slightly frenzied reaction" to Cheney in which Bush cast the Gorbachev revolution as a seminal transformation the United States hoped would succeed. U.S. hope anticipates U.S. help.

But in doing so, the president could hardly have been unaware that Robert Gates, once the CIA's top Soviet expert and now Bush's deputy national security adviser, had made a devastatingly candid speech on April 1 about the "implications for the West" in Gorbachev's revolution.

Gates said that Gorbachev is clearly changing some parts of the Soviet system, but warned that short Western memories could do great harm. "We

cannot ignore Soviet history or . . . the cyclical turn to reform, 'détente' and foreign assistance each time the system has hovered on the brink of catastrophe."

He quoted an editorial in the respected French newspaper *Le Monde*: "One cannot minimize the scope of this reform. By every available measure, it is without doubt of the first importance . . . it will have major consequences if it runs its course. Gradually, the entire Soviet system of planning will be overturned." Sadly, Gates noted, that editorial was written in December 1964, during an earlier period of reform that was later crushed.

One experienced Bush adviser believes the president's correct posture at a time of such dramatic events in the Soviet Union is hands-off. That means, he told us privately, showering praise when Gorbachev complies with treaties, reduces military spending, moves out of Central America and frees Eastern Europe. At other times, silence would be golden.

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INTERNATIONAL NEWS

U.S., BONN SEEN NEARING COMPROMISE Settlement Possible Before NATO Meets

BONN -- West Germany and the U.S. appeared to move closer today to a compromise that might defuse a controversy between the allies over the fate of short-range nuclear missiles in Europe before a NATO summit meeting later this month....

Meanwhile, President Bush, under pressure from his allies and Congress, signaled his desire to take a more conciliatory approach in reaching a compromise with the Germans. "I'm always willing to negotiate," he told reporters after a White House meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney....

White House officials said Bush has not changed his fundamental opposition to new talks with Moscow on short-range nuclear arms, a position he reiterated in a private meeting Thursday with Mulroney. The President appealed to Mulroney to help in the search for a compromise, White House aides said. (Robert McCartney, Washington Post, A19)

BAKER, IN MOSCOW TALKS, TO ASK CONCILIATORY ACTION

Secretary of State Baker said yesterday he will challenge Soviet leaders in the Kremlin next week to back up their "new thinking" with more conciliatory action, under a U.S. policy of "testing Moscow across the board." ...

A senior State Department official said Baker's address to the Center for Strategic and International Studies was "certainly consistent" with the results of the Bush administration's nearly completed review of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

In the address, Baker balanced praise and support for Gorbachev's policies with a recitation of several areas where he said the Soviets are displaying "old thoughts and old actions" that trouble Washington.

(Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post, A21)

U.S. STILL EATING CHENEY'S WORDS

Only a few days before crucial meetings in Moscow, the Bush administration again gave Soviet leader Gorbachev's reform effort a vote of confidence yesterday in an obvious bid to limit the damage of a prediction by Defense Secretary Cheney that perestroika would fail.

"The President has said, and I have said, that we have no wish to see perestroika fail...To the contrary, we would very much like it to succeed," Secretary of State Baker said yesterday....

Baker, in his remarks yesterday, didn't mention Cheney by name but appeared to be sending him a message when he said: "There are some of us who say that we need not do much of anything because trends are favorable to us.... I am not of this school...." ...

But the administration...nonetheless appears to be deeply divided over how to handle the Soviets, according to several analysts and diplomats.

In addition to Cheney, Vice President Quayle and National Security Adviser Gen. Scowcroft are said to be highly skeptical about both perestroika and the Soviets' sincerity and are adopting a passive "wait and see" attitude, according to several administration sources.

(Thomas Breen, Washington Times, A9)

Bush's Trap On Panama

Can He Avoid Label Of a Gringo Meddler?

By R. W. APPLE JR.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Bush's effort to win international support for the ouster of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, the Panamanian military leader, is an attempt to turn a crippling liability into a diplomatic asset.

News Because of the long-festering resentment over past instances of United States imperialism in Latin America, many of the things that Mr. Bush might do to weaken the Panamanian leader, like sending more American troops to Panama or even invading, are nearly impossible. However benign in intent, they would look to most Latin American capitals like gringo interference.

Analysis So the White House is trying to persuade the very Latin Americans who resent the United States' throwing its weight around to throw their own around.

Suggestions Are Asked

In addition, senior White House officials say, Mr. Bush has solicited suggestions for appropriate American action from regional leaders, and he has also asked for ideas on Capitol Hill. Congressional leaders expect to meet with Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, and other Administration aides this week, perhaps as soon as Thursday morning, to discuss what steps come next.

At a briefing tonight, Marlin Fitzwater, the White House press secretary, said the President was seeking "Latin American unity in facing the blatant attempts at intimidation now being conducted by the Noriega regime." He also said Mr. Bush "condemns the violence now under way in Panama."

The President gets high marks from most experts on Central America and most politicians for his restraint so far in a situation that might invite self-defeating jingoism. But the injury inflicted by the police today on Guillermo Endara, the opposition presidential candidate in the disputed Panamanian election on Sunday, may make it harder for Mr. Bush to continue that restraint.

"This incident is very troubling,"

said Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum, a Kansas Republican who sits on the Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs. "Push is coming to shove a little bit here. It's going to turn up the emotional temperature and tempt some of our hot-heads here in Washington to advocate a much harder line."

Mr. Bush said on Tuesday that he would withhold discussion of options for American action until later. That was an exercise in the use of ambiguous diplomatic menace; the Administration clearly hopes that a threat not spelled out will have an effect without stirring the kind of resentment that always results in Central and South American when Washington issues ultimatums.

The Pentagon's Advice

From a slightly different perspective, the Pentagon has counseled against using even a show of force as a tool of statecraft in this particular instance, although the Pentagon and others think quick steps should be taken to protect dependents of Americans based in Panama. The Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that if more troops were sent and General Noriega called Mr. Bush's bluff, the President would have to invade or back down, neither a very inviting prospect.

But the fact is that Mr. Bush has few real options. General Noriega has not been notably weakened by economic sanctions because his economic base lies in the illicit drug traffic, not in conventional commerce; he will not be notably weakened by his poor electoral showing, because his base is not democratic. If this week's events are any guide, his hold on the army is as strong as ever, and as long as that remains true he will be very difficult to dislodge.

The best hope probably lies in the possibility that other Latin American countries will speak out against, and even work against, General Noriega, as Peru and Venezuela have already done after widespread vote fraud.

Rating the Possibilities

Robert Hunter of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a leading Washington research organization, put the matter in these blunt terms: "The best solution is for the Latin Americans to do it. The next best is for us to do it with them. Absolutely the worst is for us to do it by ourselves."

Very best of all, in the view of Representative Michael DeWine, an Ohio Republican with a special interest in Latin America, would be for Panama's close neighbors in Central America to take the lead in demanding that he relinquish power.

Ambler Moss, the United States Ambassador to Panama from 1978 to 1982, suggested that there was a precedent for Latin American action in 1979, when the Organization of American

States "meddled heavily," as he said, in Nicaragua and played a key role in the ouster of that country's ruler at the time, Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Mr. Moss, now dean of the School of International Studies at the University of Miami in Florida, added, "The old rule still applies: It's all right for Latin Americans to intervene, but it's not all right for gringos."

Mr. Bush has adopted tactics that differ sharply from those of the Reagan Administration, which tried to force General Noriega from office with sanctions and threats that it was unwilling to back up. And he is doing so when there is an elected alternative to General Noriega — the opposition slate that all observers agree won the election — that did not exist last year.

"Last time we got into this backward," Mr. Hunter said. "Reagan didn't have an answer to the drug issue — who does? — so he found it useful to point a finger at Noriega, a drug kingpin who always lives up to his evil reputation. Trouble is, no one figured out what we would do if Noriega refused to go. So Bush inherited this problem, and I salute him for his calm approach this far. He's smart to try not to get himself stuck to this tar baby."

Abrogation of Pacts Urged

Florida's two senators, Connie Mack, a Republican, and Bob Graham, a Democrat, have called on Mr. Bush to abrogate the 1977 treaties under which the United States will turn over control

'Push is coming to shove a little bit here.'

of the canal to Panama in 1999. But most people on Capitol Hill fear that would not only offend all Latin America but also help General Noriega regain the domestic backing he has largely lost.

"They hate Noriega in Panama, but abrogate the treaty and they'd build monuments to him in every village," said Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, who heads the Western Hemisphere subcommittee.

It is a devilish problem — a problem made no simpler by the fact, as Mr. Moss put it, that "Noriega is no lone wolf, like Trujillo or Marcos or Papa Doc, so if you get rid of him you still have to deal with the rest of the corrupt officers who will fight not to lose their place at the trough."

In simpler days, Panama would have been a likely target for covert action — some sizable bribes, perhaps, or some assassinations or abductions; but that is hard if not impossible to pull off in a post-Watergate, post-contra world.

US seeks to divide Panama army

Bush wants to detach Noriega from his power base, says Tim Coone

IF THE opposition in Panama is unhappy with the blatant attempted fraud of last Sunday's elections, so are the Panamanian Defence Forces (PDF).

As the strongest institution in Panama and thus the ultimate arbiter of power, the PDF has a key role to play in any resolution of the post-electoral crisis. Their unhappiness stems from the fact that the PDF's commander-in-chief General Manuel Antonio Noriega is seen as the problem.

Instead of legitimising his position as the real power behind civilian rule in Panama, Sunday's electoral fiasco has instead brought international opprobrium crashing down on his head, which in turn reflects upon the PDF. The imminent abandonment of Panama by Latin American leaders is particularly damaging for the image of the PDF.

Thus the position the officer corps adopts in the coming days will be crucial.

Until the signing of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty, the PDF was primarily a para-military police force, responsible for law and order and with only a minor role in national defence. The primary role has been played by the troops of US Southern Command (Southcom) based in Panama. How-

THE PANAMANIAN DEFENCE FORCE	
(US Southern Command forces in brackets)	
TOTAL:	7,300 (12,900)
ARMY:	6,000 (10,200)
	3 battalions including Special Forces unit
NAVY:	900 (450)
	6 inshore patrol vessels, 4 landing craft
	and one transport
AIR FORCE:	400 (2,250)
	No combat aircraft or armed helicopters;
	1 reconnaissance squadron,
	1 Search and Rescue squadron.
SOURCE: IIS	

ever under the treaty, the PDF must in 1999 assume responsibility for the defence of the canal when the US withdraws.

As long as the PDF can be seen to be capable of fulfilling that role and of guaranteeing the canal's neutrality, there is little likelihood that there will any serious pressure in the US for a revocation of the Treaty before 1999, despite Gen Noriega's claims that this is the US intention.

By creating political instability and polarising the PDF, Gen Noriega is creating the very threat he claims to be defending Panama against. Several US Congressmen in the delegation to Panama want action to revoke certain articles of the 1977 Treaty.

As the PDF grows in strength as it assumes responsibility for canal defence,

career opportunities are on the horizon for middle-ranking and junior officers.

To any rational military officer in the PDF, including even the most adamant nationalists, the present crisis can only mean a threat to careers, with at worst the possibility of a US invasion, the inevitable defeat and destruction of the PDF, and the death of many of its members. The question facing PDF leaders is whether General Noriega's insistence on clinging to power is a threat to the entire institution.

The secretive nature of the PDF, and the ability of Gen Noriega to sniff out any whiff of rebellion (he was PDF intelligence chief for 11 years) makes it difficult to assess the possibility of a coup. Diplomats say a coup is unlikely.

External military and diplomatic pressure and concilia-

tory gestures by the political opposition seem intended to divide the PDF from its commander-in-chief. The past two years of crisis with the US have shown that Gen Noriega is adept at brinkmanship.

If the military bluff is called, Gen Noriega will consolidate himself in power and gain prestige among nationalists.

General Fred Woerner, the head of US Southern Command, who would command any US invasion of Panama, advocates judicious use of military force and will be the first to urge caution with his political and military superiors in Washington. However, in a speech to the House Appropriations Committee in February 1988 he said: "Democratisation in Latin America secures our southern flank and is the best defence against totalitarian inroads in (the) hemisphere. Dictatorship, civilian or military, provides fertile ground for Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries by weakening civilian leadership and in many cases, corrupting the very guardian of security - a nation's armed forces".

After this week's events in Panama, if Gen Woerner has met any leaders of the PDF he has most likely repeated that statement with more than usual emphasis.

Steady in Panama

WASHINGTON
POST

MAY 12, 1989
Pg. 22

PRESIDENT BUSH is dispatching a couple of thousand additional troops to Panama and thinning out the 40,000 American civilians on the ground. This suggests, both to Americans hopeful of a quick surgical solution and to Latins leery of anything suggesting an American military intervention, a military track. Yet plainly the president is a good distance from going that way. He has an immediate grave responsibility to protect the resident Americans, many of them exposed to Panamanian bullying; that is the mission he has announced for the new troops. The treaties that the United States and Panama signed a decade ago oblige him to ensure the efficient operation of the canal. Many experts believe that the vulnerability of the great waterway and the integration of Americans in the life of the country make military action against the regime an extremely risky prospect.

American policy remains centered on the diplomatic track. Gen. Noriega has made his own perverse contribution by going on from the bald theft of the election to vicious attacks and kidnapping of opposition figures. He has all but isolated himself in international opinion, and, with Latin governments, the United States is hunting for

effective forums in which to apply diplomatic pressure on him to turn the government of Panama back to the people. It is a fact of hemispheric life that any premature American military move would probably induce most of the Latins to relax their pressure and join Gen. Noriega in denouncing American "intervention" instead.

The first foreign policy crisis of the Bush administration finds the president moving cautiously and on a broad front, by diplomatic and political consultations and by military preparations, to establish a position from which later, harder choices might be made. These choices include not only various military and economic measures but such political ones as hemispheric recognition of opposition leader Guillermo Endara as the legitimate ruler of Panama. Meanwhile, Gen. Noriega is proceeding with a confidence bordering on arrogance that he will be able to make his personal will stick. It is an entirely unsought and unwelcome confrontation for the United States but, thanks to Gen. Noriega, an unavoidable one. It will require from the president a clear sense of the American stake in protecting U.S. citizens and properties, and a steady hand.

Bush Condemns Attack On Panama Opposition

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 10 — President Bush today condemned attacks on political opposition leaders and their supporters in Panama, and the White House said the violence showed that Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega "does not have the interests of the Panamanian people at heart."

The White House gave no indication of what steps, if any, Mr. Bush would take to deal with the crisis in Panama or to persuade General Noriega to surrender power.

Responding to the violence, the United States Southern Command upgraded its alert for American military personnel in Panama. It said servicemen and their dependents should not go into public areas except on essential business, and it advised them to monitor the military radio network closely because "major civil disturbances" were occurring.

The previous alert, issued last week, simply advised military personnel to "decrease visibility" because "some civil disturbance activity is probable." The United States armed services have about 11,000 people in Panama.

The White House, meanwhile, received reports that five American citizens were picked up by the Panamanian authorities. By early evening, officials said, three of them had been released.

A Congressional Rebuff

Mr. Bush has a regularly scheduled meeting on Thursday with Congressional leaders from both parties, and Panama is likely to dominate the discussion, a White House official said tonight. If Mr. Bush has made a decision about how to proceed in Panama, "he will talk to them about it," the official said.

At the White House this evening, President Bush met for more than an hour in the Oval Office with senior Administration officials to discuss the options for the United States in Panama.

Among those present at the meeting were Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger; Defense Secretary Dick Cheney; Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Brent Scowcroft, the President's national security adviser, and Bernard W. Aronson, who has been nominated but not confirmed for the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

Other Government officials said today that Congressional committees had recently rejected a request by Mr. Bush for \$20 million in covert aid to Panamanian opposition groups. The of-

ficials said that members of Congress were troubled by what they saw as the Administration's lack of a coherent strategy for dealing with the Noriega regime.

Despite the rebuff, the Administration went ahead with a \$10 million covert program, financing part of it with money from a contingency fund that can be used without specific Congressional approval.

Members of Congress maintained that any covert program should be part of a coordinated long-term policy in Panama. They were skeptical that the \$20 million could be spent effectively in advance of the presidential election held Sunday in Panama.

Congressional intelligence, appropriations and armed services committees all became involved in discussions of the Bush Administration's hastily assembled proposal for covert aid to the Panamanian opposition.

Charge of Too Little, Too Late

Senator David L. Boren, the Oklahoma Democrat who is chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, declined to discuss details of the covert operation. But he said he had been concerned about the Administration's initial difficulties in focusing on the problems in Panama.

"It is only in the last two weeks that the Administration has begun to do what should have been done earlier," he said. Mr. Bush sent a team of observers to monitor the voting in Panama, and the Administration has made numerous efforts to document and publicize fraud in the election, which turned into a referendum on General Noriega.

The United States expressed fresh concern tonight after receiving reports of a new crackdown on the opposition, including an attack on the presidential candidate of the opposition, Guillermo Endara, by paramilitary squads as Mr. Endara and other protesters were complaining that the Panamanian Government had stolen the election.

Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, said tonight: "President Bush condemns the violence now under way in Panama. General Noriega has thwarted the desire of the Panamanian people for democracy by conducting a fraudulent election. He has now escalated this to include violence against opposition leaders, including Mr. Endara."

"This action underscores that General Noriega does not have the interests of the Panamanian people at heart," Mr. Fitzwater said.

The Washington Post

The New York Times

The Washington Times

The Wall Street Journal

The Christian Science Monitor

New York Daily News

USA Today

The Chicago Tribune

Date 11 MAY 1989

Trying to Avoid Unilateral Action

Earlier today Administration officials said that they wanted to refrain from unilateral action and that they hoped that a multinational effort led by Latin American countries would persuade the Panamanian strongman to step down.

But the officials said their preference for diplomacy might be put aside if violence posed a threat to Americans in Panama, to the operation of the Panama Canal, or to Panamanian opposition leaders.

Under instructions from the White House, American diplomats began an intensive campaign today to persuade Latin American countries to denounce the election as a fraud.

Mr. Fitzwater said that Mr. Bush called several Latin leaders today and urged them to show "unity in facing the blatant attempts at intimidation now being conducted by the Noriega regime."

The United States' efforts had some success at a meeting here of the permanent council of the Organization of American States. Without waiting for final results of the election to be announced, representatives of several countries, including Peru and El Salvador, declared that General Noriega should respect the will of the people as expressed in the election Sunday.

At the meeting, William T. Pryce, the American representative, said, "It is hard to understand how anyone could doubt that the dictator Noriega is stealing the election after a resounding defeat by the democratic opposition."

A Panamanian delegate to the O.A.S., Soraya Cano, said the American charges were "unfounded accusations," and she asserted that the United States was manipulating information to undermine the Government of Panama.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 11, 1989

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

The Briefing Room

4:21 P.M. EDT

Q I wonder what specific incident -- injury or threat to Americans has led the President to take this action to send a brigade there?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think it's precautionary as much as anything else. There were some Americans held briefly yesterday. They have been released. But in view of the treatment of the opposition candidates, and indeed in view of the cases of harassment over the past few months in which we've been very patient, it's a prudent step to take.

Q Sir, Mr. Bush referred several times to our Treaty rights. Tell us just exactly what that means, and we can do and can't do down there --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, one of the important Treaty rights that he is referring to is the right of unimpeded travel for official convoys and troops throughout the country. That is one on which we will --

Q The last time we sent troops down there it was 1300 troops in April, and they were mainly -- defensive purposes to defend the perimeters. What are these troops? Are they offensive combat troops?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: They are combat troops. They are there to protect American lives, and if necessary, to protect the Panama Canal.

Q Where are these troops coming from, and what does this do to the Panamanian people? I don't see how it has any relation -- sending troops to the bases down there -- would have any effect on getting rid of Noriega?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm not sure it does. One of the units is from the West Coast, the other is from the East Coast. You'd have to ask the Pentagon the particular designation of the troops.

Q The President said that one of the purposes decided for taking troops is to restore democracy. Which of these steps is designed to do anything to restore democracy, and how do we succeed in doing that?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I don't remember the President saying the troops are there to restore democracy. They're there --

Q No, he said that was one of the purposes --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That is one of our goals, of course, to let the Panamanian people have the fruits of the democratic

MORE

process which they exercised the other day overwhelmingly and have now been denied.

Q Any Naval units going? Any Naval units going?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, no.

Q Not the America?

Q How do you assess the risk of General Noriega taking some action to provoke a military response by the United States, and thereby making us look as some kind of Yankee gringo in Central America?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, that's pretty hypothetical. I wouldn't want to speculate on Noriega. He is a thug, but he clearly operates with some prudence when he has to.

Q Do you have any notice on the side of the Cuban advisors that are located there in Panama City?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Are we what?

Q Cuban advisors?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Cuban advisors? What about them?

Q How many are there in Panama City?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I don't know that there are any.

Q To follow up on the goals there, how is it that these various steps which are all geared toward protecting Americans and in general enforcing our treaty rights -- how are they going to get rid of Noriega, which has been the goal that's been stated over and over, when he has been able to --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: The goal has been stated over and over?

Q Yes, by administration officials throughout this whole thing, is that we want Noriega out.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, of course we do.

Q And he has hung out for a whole year against the sanctions that were imposed, the economic sanctions. What here that's announced today is going to advance --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: One of the things we're trying to demonstrate to General Noriega is that this is not business as usual and will not be business as usual. The sanctions will remain. We will not have normal contacts with the Cuban government, and so on. So it's a variety of -- the measures we're taking are for a variety of purposes.

Q Do you expect him to step down because of the measures taken here today?

Q General, in '79 the OAS was instrumental in toppling Somoza by in effect delegitimizing him. Is this government going to press the OAS for similar action against Noriega?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: The President has been in close consultation with a number of his Latin American colleagues. They are acting on their own to the steps they feel that they can take. There is -- I would guess there's universal disapproval of what Noriega has done, and the countries are responding in their own individual ways. There may be an OAS meeting as early as Monday. There are efforts to get an OAS resolution. We don't know exactly

MORE

what that will be right now.

Q What would you like? You're a member of OAS. What would you like OAS to do?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We would like to see -- certainly, the election results recognized for what they are, which was a victory by Mr. Endara.

Q You said that Mr. Noriega operates with some prudence when he has to. If he continues to do that, what is the likelihood that there would be some conflict down there?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't want to speculate on that. As I say, we will abide by the Treaty, we will insist on the Treaty rights.

Q Well, any time you send thousands of troops down there, that gets people excited, and they wonder about the possibility of military conflict. You're saying that Mr. Noriega uses prudence when he has to. And as long as he continues to do that, does that mean that the prospects for some kind of armed conflict are slim?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: As I say, that's basically up to him.

Q General, has Secretary Baker protested to Gorbachev or the Soviet Union -- TASS' support for the -- Noriega's election results?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, he hasn't. Well, I don't know. I can't answer that. I don't know, but I can assure you that we will let the Soviets know our feelings about that.

Q In your conversations, do you think that the Latin American leaders will support if you take further steps, or not? I mean, would they support if you take further steps than the ones you have taken now?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, we have informed most of them that we plan to take some measures. We have not asked specifically for their support of them. But there are -- as the President says, there are now -- I think it's nine Latin American countries that have recognized the electoral victory of Endara.

Q A follow-up, please. Have you talked to the government of Mexico at all? Have you been in contact with Mexico?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes.

Q What has been their response?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I don't want to talk about the particular response of particular countries.

Q Is that because you're getting objections from some people, General, that do not find it universal?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No. These are diplomatic communications that we've had, and I don't think it's right to reveal without their acquiescence exactly what the character of those conversations are.

Q Without being specific, then, can you tell us, are you hearing any objections from the people you're talking to?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Objections to what?

Q To the actions you've communicated to them that you're going to take?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We have heard nothing.

Q General, Noriega has been particularly immune to moral suasion in any case. What practical steps are underway that would persuade him to get out -- practical steps aside from moral suasion?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We can always hope he will see the error of his ways, and we are looking at ways to help convince him to recognize the will of the Panamanian people.

Q How worried are you that, by sending troops, you get a diplomatic reaction from Latin America to the extent of "There go the bullying Yanks again," and it will undercut your credibility in attacking Noriega?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Not very.

Q Why not?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Because I think the sense of outrage at the particularly egregious activities of Noriega has mitigated what is a kind of instinctive Latin American reaction to moves by the United States.

Q General, on the question of economic sanctions, have you made a tentative decision that the economic sanctions were already cutting deep enough and that anything further would be punitive to Americans as well as Panamanians?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, the President has said he wouldn't rule out further actions if the circumstances dictated it. One of the problems with economic sanctions is that they're hard to pinpoint on particular things that they're designed to do, and of course, a lot of innocent people do suffer.

Q General, do you expect the troops to be there indefinitely? What orders are they under and whose command are they operating under?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I don't know how long they'll be there.

Q General, could you give us an idea what sort of time frame you're looking at for resolution of this?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I can't.

Q If it's status quo two weeks from now --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I can't.

Q -- is that --

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: We're responding to a new situation in Panama and how long we'll be there and under what circumstances will depend on how the situation develops.

Q Is it acceptable if Mr. Noriega is still in power a month from now?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I don't see why not.

Q General, is it true that General Noriega was once on the payroll of the United States?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Not to my knowledge.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

Bush Orders More Troops to Panama

Efforts to Isolate Noriega With Diplomacy Continue

By Ann Devroy and Molly Moore
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Bush dispatched a brigade of combat troops to U.S. bases in Panama yesterday and prepared to evacuate American civilians as the administration continued diplomatic efforts to encourage Latin American nations to condemn and isolate Panamanian military ruler Manuel Antonio Noriega.

In addressing the first foreign policy crisis of his presidency, Bush said the United States "will not recognize nor accommodate with a regime that holds power through force and violence"

The unilateral U.S. steps that Bush announced in response to the election crisis in the strategic Central American country were described as efforts to protect American citizens and property and U.S. rights under the Panama Canal Treaties. The 1,881 new troops will join 11,100 U.S. troops already stationed at American bases in Panama. The troop move was described as a defensive measure, not an effort to overthrow Noriega.

Airlifts of some troops were expected to begin last night from Travis Air Force Base, Calif. The first troops were drawn from an Army light infantry division at Fort Ord., Calif. They were to be flown by Air Force C141 transports to Howard Air Force Base, outside Panama City.

Defense Department officials said it will take several days before all the extra men and equipment, including

200 support vehicles, arrive. Many of the units will take artillery batteries, armored personnel carriers, mortar carriers and other armored vehicles, Pentagon officials said.

In other moves, Bush said U.S. Ambassador Arthur Davis would be withdrawn from the embassy in Panama City, and most of the embassy staff removed; government employees and their dependents will be moved onto secure bases or U.S.-controlled housing or transported out of the country, and U.S. businessmen have been "encouraged" to move their families out of the country.

There are about 51,300 Americans in Panama, including some 21,000 business people and retirees. About 200 U.S. firms operate there. Pentagon officials said the 3,081 military dependents who live off-base will be evacuated first, followed by about 13,600 other military dependents.

"I am worried about the lives of American citizens and I will do what is necessary to protect them," Bush said during a brief appearance in the White House press room to announce his response to the continuing turmoil in Panama, "but we will not be intimidated by the bullying tactics, brutal though they may be, of the dictator Noriega."

His moves were generally well received by congressional leaders, who were briefed by Bush at a

morning White House meeting. However, some of the leaders expressed caution about introducing new U.S. troops into a country where U.S. forces already outnumber those of Noriega.

The troops arriving in Panama, Bush said, will be there to protect Americans, but he added, "I do not rule out further steps in the future." Officials pointed out that securing the safety of U.S. civilians would be a prudent prelude to any effective military action.

The president made a strong appeal to the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), the military whose loyalty to Noriega ensures his hold on the country, to side instead with "the people of Panama" who voted overwhelmingly against the general's candidates in Sunday's election. Asked if he was calling on the PDF to join in a coup, Bush sidestepped the question. "I've asserted what my interest is at this point. It is democracy in Panama, it is protection of the life of Americans"

While U.S. policy remains that Noriega must step aside, Bush answered a curt "no" when asked if his administration would drop the federal drug indictments against Noriega to encourage him to leave the country. Noriega's status, he said, is a matter to be settled between him and the Panamanian people.

Bush cast his decisions in the context of siding with the Panamanian people and democracy against Noriega and dictatorship. Noriega's regime, Bush said, "first tried to steal the election through massive fraud and intimidation," and now has nullified an election clearly lost.

"The crisis in Panama," Bush said, "is a conflict between Noriega and the people of Panama," and he added that the United States "seconds" several Latin American democracies that have condemned Noriega's actions. Bush has telephoned several heads of government in the region in the last few days to encourage joint condemnation and to emphasize, officials said, that the regional leaders, not the United States, must take the lead.

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft at a news briefing after the president spoke stressed that the dispatch of troops was "a precautionary, prudent step" that should not be viewed as a potential invasion force.

Asked what the troops might do to halt Noriega's alleged election fraud, Scowcroft replied, "I don't remember the president saying the troops are there to restore democracy"

DIPLOMACY...Pg. 12

racy.... It's precautionary as much as anything else...."

Asserting that the United States wants to make Noriega "see the error of his ways," Scowcroft said the effort to "help convince him" will be confined for now to keeping economic sanctions in place and to working with Latin American democracies in the Organization of American States (OAS) to pressure him to step aside.

Officials said the administration considered, then rejected, some further economic steps against Noriega.

Other U.S. officials and diplomatic sources said Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Peres has taken the lead in trying to muster the 16 votes required to convene an extraordinary meeting of foreign ministers of the 32-nation OAS that

would be aimed at declaring opposition presidential candidate Guillermo Endara the winner of the election.

On Capitol Hill, reaction was supportive. But Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, while saying he supported Bush's decision to withdraw dependents, maintain sanctions and support regional diplomacy, cautioned that "increasing our troop strength could provide a convenient pretext for Noriega to take further repressive actions. Such a step could also make it difficult for other Latin American governments to support the U.S."

Bush's moves were hailed even by some of the strongest liberal critics of Reagan administration policies toward Central America, including Panama.

In a rare joint statement, House Speaker Jim Wright (D-Tex.),

House Majority Leader Thomas S. Foley (D-Wash.), House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.), Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-Maine) and Senate Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.) expressed support.

In separate appearances, liberal Democratic senators who have sharply criticized U.S. policies toward Central America in the past, including Majority Whip Alan Cranston (Calif.), Christopher J. Dodd (Conn.) and John F. Kerry (Mass.) endorsed the president's actions in unequivocal terms.

The U.S. Southern Command headquarters in Panama yesterday ordered 2,160 service members and dependents who live off base to move onto the 10 U.S. military installations in Panama. It also recommended that 1,685 "noncommand-sponsored" military dependents in Panama without official

support move onto military

Staff writer John M. Goshko contributed to this report.

U.S. Troops To Go Slowly Into Panama

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 11 — The United States armed force ordered into Panama by President Bush today will be relatively small and will move slowly into Panama over the next three weeks, apparently as the result of a compromise between the Defense and State Departments.

Officials said the State Department had urged a show of military force intended to weaken the Panamanian leader, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, and perhaps even to persuade him to give up power. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been reluctant to take military action when political objectives were not clear. Officials said the chiefs were supported by Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney.

The Joint Chiefs, officials said, were concerned that a show of military force not tempt General Noriega to take hostages from among the 40,000 American civilians who live in Panama. They include 14,000 dependents of the American forces there, plus employees of the Panama Canal Commission, diplomats and other United States Government employees, businessmen, retirees and tourists.

Phased Deployment

The President said he had ordered a brigade-sized unit to deploy to Panama to reinforce 10,300 American troops already there and to protect American lives. About 1,700 soldiers and 165 marines are being sent, which is less than the 3,000 troops in a brigade.

They will be sent in phases, Pentagon officials said. The first elements of a light infantry battalion of 890 soldiers will be flown to Panama from Fort Ord, Calif., on Friday, while a battalion of mechanized infantry from Fort Polk, La., will take two to three weeks to get there by ship.

The phased deployment, officials said, was chosen because American bases in Panama are small and could handle the influx better if it came slowly. In addition, the battalion being sent by ship could be turned around if the tension in Panama eased.

The deployment of two battalions, plus a command element and medical, signal and supply detachments instead of the three battalions and supporting units in a brigade, appeared to be a

compromise made to accommodate the concerns of the Defense Department and specifically the Joint Chiefs.

In his announcement, President Bush was careful to avoid threatening Panama and justified the dispatch of troops as a measure to protect Americans. "I have a profound obligation as Commander in Chief of the armed forces and as President, and that is to protect American lives," the President said. "And I'm going to do what is prudent and necessary to do this."

The President's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, pointed out to reporters that Americans in Panama had been repeatedly harassed and that the treatment of opposition candidates justified the deployment. Supporters of General Noriega assaulted those candidates several times Wednesday.

Troop Movements

At the Pentagon, the chief spokesman, J. Daniel Howard, said that 890 soldiers from the Seventh Infantry Division at Fort Ord, Calif., would be flown by Military Airlift Command C-141's in 55 flights from nearby Travis

Air Force Base to Howard Air Force Base in Panama. That includes an infantry battalion and an attached battery of artillery.

Where they would go from there was not disclosed, but the Army's Fort Kobbe is next door; an infantry battalion, a combat aviation battalion equipped with helicopters and an engineer battalion are stationed there now. It will take several days to a week to move all the soldiers to Panama.

In addition, 100 officers and soldiers from a brigade headquarters in the Seventh Infantry Division will be flown to Panama to assume control over this deployment. It will operate under the command of the United States Southern Command with headquarters in Quarry Heights.

From Camp Lejeune, N.C., a company of 165 marines from the Second Division will also be flown to Panama. They are equipped with 18 light armored vehicles.

From the Fifth Infantry Division at Fort Polk, La., will go 726 soldiers in a reduced mechanized battalion.

Bush Urges Soviets To Broaden Reforms

Arms Offers Sidestepped in Major Speech

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

COLLEGE STATION, Tex., May 12—President Bush declared today that the post-World War II policy of containment had successfully forced the Soviet Union into dramatic internal reforms, and he challenged Moscow to take further steps toward openness and democratization that he said would be rewarded by the West.

Following a four-month foreign policy review, Bush said in his first major address on U.S.-Soviet relations that "now it is time to move beyond containment" and to "seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations."

"As the Soviet Union itself moves toward greater openness and democratization—as they meet the challenge of responsible international behavior—we will match their steps with steps of our own," Bush said in a commencement address here at Texas A&M University, which has a long military tradition.

The speech suggested an emerging Bush policy of responding to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's many initiatives by setting up a series of tests and by challenging Gorbachev to go still further in his reforms. "Mr. Gorbachev, don't stop now," Bush urged.

Although Bush said he is offering "a new policy for the 1990s" that "recognizes the full scope of change taking place around the world and in the Soviet Union," his speech offered no new responses to Gorbachev's many arms-control initiatives and little that was new. At a time when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies appear eager to find new ways to exploit changes in Soviet policies and attitudes, Bush chose instead to challenge the Soviets to pass a new series of tests.

Specifically, Bush did not address Gorbachev's latest surprise offer of cuts in short-range nuclear missiles and conventional arms in Europe, an offer that seems certain to deepen divisions in the NATO alliance in advance of its summit this month.

A senior Bush administration official said this approach reflects a decision that the United States should not respond with concessions to Gorbachev now—even though the Soviet leader is scoring points on the world stage with his initiatives—but should hold firm and see how many more concessions Gorbachev is willing to make.

Bush offered the Soviets two proposals for improved relations. Borrowing from the 1955 "open skies" proposal of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bush called for the United States and Soviet Union to allow unarmed surveillance flights over each other's territory as well as the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Bush also announced that if the Soviet Union codifies its emigration laws "in accord with international standards and implement its new laws faithfully," he would work with Congress on a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment that ties U.S. trade concessions to Soviet emigration policy, opening the way to giving Most Favored Nation trade status to Moscow.

Bush also delivered a warning that paralleled recent comments by Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney and deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates. The Soviets, he said, have promised "a more cooperative relationship before, only to reverse course and return to militarism." And, he added, "We must not forget that the Soviet Union has acquired awesome military capabilities." Cheney recently predicted Gorbachev's reforms will fail, and Gates urged caution, given the historical cycles in which reform efforts have been followed by retreat and confrontation.

Bush said renewed superpower cooperation "must be earned" and "must be based on deeds. We look for enduring, ingrained economic and political change" in the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Bush said "we hope" that Gorbachev's changes will "break with the cycles of the past." He declared, "Let no one doubt our sincere desire to see *perestroika* continue and succeed."

The president issued a series of challenges to Gorbachev. He called on the Soviets to pull away from "terrorist nations" like Libya. He called for cuts in Soviet forces in Europe to "less threatening levels." He urged Moscow to allow "self-determination for all the nations of Eastern and Central Europe." And he called for a "specific abandonment of the Brezhnev doctrine. In short, tear down the Iron Curtain."

In addition, Bush called for "practical—not merely rhetorical—steps" toward resolving regional conflicts. He asked the Soviets to "achieve a lasting political pluralism and respect for human rights." He appealed to Gorbachev to "join with us in addressing pressing global problems," including drugs and the environment. He said the Soviet Union should respect the "integrity" of China and return the Northern Territories to Japan.

U.S. Steps Up Its Anti-Noriega Drive

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 12 — President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, said today that the United States had begun consulting foreign governments to see whether any would accept Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama if he could be persuaded to give up power.

On the plane flying President Bush from Washington to Texas for a speech, General Scowcroft declined to tell reporters which countries he had in mind. Efforts last year by the Reagan Administration to persuade the Panamanian leader to leave were in vain, and few nations have expressed interest in giving him haven.

Even so, General Scowcroft's statement was seen as evidence of President Bush's determination to drive General Noriega from office and possibly an indication that he expected ultimately to be successful.

As the first fresh troops sent by the President to Panama arrived there, Administration officials fanned out in an effort to increase the international pressures on the Panamanian leader to quit.

'He's a Gangster'

Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger used unusually strong language to describe General Noriega, saying "the United States has made it clear, and will continue to make it clear, that as far as we're concerned, he's a gangster and ought to leave."

Mr. Eagleburger, interviewed on the NBC News program "Today," said, "We're working with our friends in the hemisphere and in Europe to try to get them to agree that they should condemn this election and this fraud." He was referring to the election last Sunday, which international observers said opponents of General Noriega won handily. The general has declared the results null.

Mr. Eagleburger said about 10 Latin American governments had spoken against General Noriega. "I think it's fairly clear that there is a fairly good, strong reaction within the hemisphere against what went on in that election," he said.

State Department officials indicated

that the Bush Administration hoped that the Organization of American States, the group that links the United States with Latin American and Caribbean countries, would take the lead in persuading General Noriega to relinquish power. O.A.S. representatives meeting here today approved a Venezuelan resolution calling their foreign ministers to meet here Wednesday to discuss Panama.

Criticism From Moscow

Similarly, General Scowcroft, interviewed on the CBS News program "This Morning," said he thought General Noriega might try to sabotage the Panama Canal, even though that would hurt Panama's income.

"Noriega has demonstrated that he is a thug and would stop at nothing," General Scowcroft said.

Although no Latin American government has indicated that it would be

mainly vital to American commerce and to the movement of American warships between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

While alluding to American interests in protecting access to the canal, President Bush emphasized the safety of 40,000 American civilians and 10,300 American troops in Panama today. The troops are there to defend the canal and the rest are dependents, employees of the commission operating the canal, businessmen and people who have retired near the former Canal Zone.

A State Department spokesman, Richard Boucher, said in a news briefing that the focus of American diplomatic activity "is on the O.A.S., and Venezuela is taking the lead there." He also noted that the State Department had issued an advisory warning Americans not to travel to Panama.

The warning said the unsettled conditions and the reduction of American Embassy personnel in Panama complicated efforts to provide protective and consular services. Dependents of Americans were advised to leave Panama, and passengers on ships going through the canal were asked to stay on their ships.

Bipartisan political support for the President's measures continued. Representative Thomas S. Foley, the majority leader, contrasted the backing for the President on Panama with the opposition he has drawn on policy toward Nicaragua.

"The difference here, I think, is that the United States has treaty rights with Panama," Mr. Foley, a Democrat from the state of Washington, said on the CNN program "Daywatch." "Noriega has proven himself to be an international outlaw."

Mr. Foley raised the prospect that Mr. Bush's plan could lead to military intervention. He said that the steps announced Thursday might not work and that deposing General Noriega might require "direct physical intervention."

But he added: "I don't think that's going to happen without one or two things occurring first, either threats to Americans, harm to Americans, interruption of the canal, or violations of treaty rights that would justify American intervention."

willing to join the United States in military action against General Noriega, General Scowcroft said, "We're very comfortable with the general sense of outrage about what General Noriega has been doing."

General Scowcroft, a retired Air Force officer, said that the Soviet Union had not been consulted about the moves announced Thursday and that he was not surprised that Moscow had accused the United States of interfering in Panama. "That's a little bit of the old Soviet diplomacy," he said.

More Than 10,000 U.S. Troops

Underlying the Administration's anxiety over Panama were long-standing strategic, economic and political concerns dating back to the American construction of the Panama Canal early in this century. The canal re-

Bush

On the major existing superpower arms-control talks, Bush repeated broad goals he has articulated, including limiting strategic nuclear weapons, reducing conventional or nonnuclear forces in Europe and leaving the United States the "option" to deploy missile defense systems, improving verification provisions in existing nuclear-testing treaties and achievement of a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons.

The speech did not address many related defense issues still under review in a separate administration study, nor did it touch on Bush's decision to build both MX and the Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles. High-ranking administration officials have said some key decisions, such as on the MX and Midgetman, are being made independent of the policy reviews.

On today's "open skies" proposal, Bush suggested starting negotiations with Moscow and the allies on unarmed surveillance flights. Aides said the idea was to demonstrate openness and contribute to building confidence, but that such flights would only slightly enhance U.S. intelligence gathering capability, which relies heavily on satellites.

For the most part, the Bush address hewed to the outlines of policy established in the Reagan administration. But there were some shifts. For example, Reagan had justified his rearmament program as designed in part to pressure the weak Soviet economy, a goal Bush repudiated in his speech. Also, while Reagan clung to the Strategic Defense Initiative, Bush, who has already approved sharp budget cuts in the program, said his goal is only to "preserve our options" to deploy "advanced defenses when they are ready."

"Make no mistake, a new breeze is blowing across the steppes and cities of the Soviet Union," Bush said. "Why not then let this spirit of openness grow, let more barriers come down. Open emigration, open debate, open airwaves—let openness come to mean the publication and sale of banned books and newspapers in the Soviet Union . . . Let openness come to mean nothing less than the free exchange of people, books and ideas between East and West."

While Bush ignored the latest Soviet offer of cuts in short-range nuclear missiles and conventional arms, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft criticized the Soviet proposals. Scowcroft called the initiative "an obvious ploy" to increase pressure on NATO.

Bush Plan Predates Satellites

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush reached back 34 years yesterday to find an arms-control challenge for the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, embracing a proposal conceived in the age before spy satellites.

In his speech at Texas A&M University, Bush proposed negotiations to allow flights by unarmed surveillance aircraft over the territory of the superpowers and their allies, an idea he said was derived from the "Open Skies" proposal of President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955.

The idea was born before the advent of sophisticated U.S. reconnaissance satellites, when the West had scant knowledge of Soviet military activities. The impetus was Eisenhower's knowledge that the secret U2 spy plane would soon begin flying over Soviet territory and could do so in greater safety if the Soviets accepted the idea in advance.

The proposal was never accepted, however, and the 1960 downing of a U2 over Soviet territory forced the United States to cancel the flights and develop a combination of powerful sensors ringing Soviet territory and satellites capable of peering down or eavesdropping on Soviet military activities from the safety of space.

Some of the satellites now being deployed by the United States use radar to penetrate the heavy cloud cover that obscures much of the Soviet Union, giving them a capa-

BUSH ON 'OPEN SKIES': MUCH LIKE IKE

"I propose . . . that we take a practical step, that we [and the Soviet Union] . . . provide within our countries . . . ample facilities for aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures you choose and take them to your own country to study, you to provide exactly the same facilities for us and we to make these examinations"

Dwight D. Eisenhower, July 21, 1955

"Thirty-four years ago, President Eisenhower met in Geneva with Soviet leaders He proposed a plan called "Open Skies" Let us again explore that proposal, but on a broader, more intrusive and radical basis—one which I would hope would include allies on both sides Such surveillance flights, complementing satellites, would provide regular scrutiny for both sides."

President Bush, yesterday



THE WASHINGTON POST

bility similar to low-flying planes, officials said.

The Soviet Union's rejection of Eisenhower's proposal nonetheless figured prominently in speeches by President Ronald Reagan in 1982, 1983 and 1985 that were critical of the Soviet Union, and led to Reagan's "Open World" proposal for

improved U.S.-Soviet cultural exchanges.

"Eisenhower's suggestion tested Soviet readiness to open their society. The Kremlin failed that test," Bush said. "Let us again explore that proposal, but on a broader, more intrusive, and radical basis—one which I hope would include al-

PLAN...
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lies on both sides."

Bush's idea, according to a two-page White House news release, is to consult with allies and eventually negotiate an agreement specifying "who will provide the aircraft, safety and security restrictions, how often flights would occur, what support the country being overflown might be asked to provide" and other details.

The statement said the United States has long "taken the lead in proposing and negotiating" similar agreements aimed at increasing openness and reducing the risk of war.

However, it did not list as one of several examples an accord reached between 35 members of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1986, which provides for a limited number of such inspection flights by unarmed aircraft to monitor large-scale troop maneuvers.

Unlike that accord, Bush's proposal would not be tied to any specific military purpose, an administration official explained yesterday. It "would not be of great military or intelligence significance, since we have such sophisticated satellites. Rather, the idea is being raised as a way of showing openness on both sides."

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft told reporters traveling with Bush that "it's a specific move opening up the kind of tightness, secrecy, close-hold sort of atmosphere. . . . Symbolically, it is very important."

He added that "we haven't had any reaction from the Soviets that I know of." State Department officials said the Soviet Embassy called yesterday afternoon to obtain details, but little additional information was available.

The officials described the revival of the 1955 proposal as a "top-down" rather than a "bottom-up" idea, originating in the White House

and winning little enthusiasm at the State Department or elsewhere in the government.

White House officials said in turn that it was backed by Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who discussed the idea during recent meetings with Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III.

Mulroney hailed the proposal yesterday and said in a written statement that "we suggested that Mr. Bush consider it as an initiative for the NATO alliance." He added that such an agreement "could provide major benefits in the verification of arms control. . . especially for states which do not possess satellite monitoring capabilities."

Officials said that NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives have recently expressed interest in expanding the accord that allows up to three inspections from aircraft each year of military maneuvers in various countries. Under a complex formula worked out in lengthy negotiations, the planes are flown by the country in which the maneuvers are held, but photographs are taken by officials of the country that requested the inspection.

Jonathan Dean, a former U.S. negotiator who is now an arms-control adviser to the Union of Concerned Scientists, said Bush's proposal was "rather vague, but should be supported."

Dean said he has urged the administration to propose up to 150 helicopter and aircraft flights per year over Soviet territory, as a means of monitoring the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops and military equipment in Eastern Europe that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced in December.

Dean said that similar flights could be allowed over Western Europe and that the added inspections would help reassure both countries about compliance with an eventual agreement reducing conventional forces in Europe.

Staff writer David Hoffman and researcher Michelle Hall contributed to this report.

BUSH VOICES HOPE ON SOVIET CHANGE, BUT WITH CAUTION MAJOR POLICY TALK

Revives Eisenhower Plan for Open Surveillance by Unarmed Planes

By MAUREEN DOWD

Special to The New York Times

COLLEGE STATION, Tex., May 12 — In a long-awaited speech on Soviet-American policy, President Bush said today that the United States was ready to welcome the Soviet Union "back into the world order." But he cautioned that Moscow still had to earn the right to a new and warmer relationship with Western nations.

In an address that was to sum up a months-long Administration study of East-West relations, Mr. Bush broke little new ground, more or less adhering to policy lines forged by the Reagan Administration.

In an apparent move to capture European attention, Mr. Bush resurrected a 34-year-old "open skies" proposal first made by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, under which NATO and Warsaw Pact countries would allow surveillance planes from the other side to fly over their territory.

2 Days of Diplomacy

Mr. Bush's speech and the arms initiative announced on Thursday by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, came in two days of public diplomacy intended to sway opinion in Western Europe. [News analysis, page 7.]

On the question of when the Administration would be willing to allow the Soviet Union to benefit from normal tariff treatment with the United States, he cautiously said that the Administration would not be ready to do so until a new law allowing free emigration is put into practice in the Soviet Union.

Some American Jewish groups, impressed by the rise in Jewish emigration, have said they would be willing to support trade benefits now. Under legislation passed in 1974 and known as

the Jackson-Vanik amendment, trade benefits are linked to liberal emigration policies in the Soviet Union.

Speaking to the graduating class at Texas A & M University, Mr. Bush said that as the Soviets move toward greater openness at home and "responsible" behavior abroad, "we will match their steps with steps of our own."

Bush Notes Soviet Changes

Mr. Bush acknowledged, more than he has in the past, the notable changes that have occurred since Mr. Gorbachev took over as Soviet leader in 1985. "Who would have imagined a Soviet leader who canvasses the sidewalks of Moscow and also Washington, D.C.?" the President said.

But the skepticism that Mr. Bush has shown toward the Soviets colored the speech, which reflected the results of the three-month review of East-West policy.

"A new relationship cannot simply be declared by Moscow, or bestowed by others," he said. "It must be earned because promises are never enough. The Soviet Union has promised a more cooperative relationship before, only to reverse course and return to militarism."

"Soviet foreign policy has been almost seasonal — warmth before cold, thaw before freeze," he said. "We seek a friendship that knows no season of suspicion, no chill of distrust."

As a test of Soviet intentions, Mr. Bush proposed sharing the skies to "show the world the meaning of the concept of openness."

He suggested reviving the "open skies" plan, developed by President Eisenhower after the death of Stalin.

The plan, which was never implemented because of the Cold War atmosphere of the 1950's, would have allowed unarmed surveillance aircraft from the United States and the Soviet Union to fly over the territory of the other country.

'Intrusive and Radical' Plan

The plan was proposed before the development of reconnaissance satellites, which with their powerful cameras make old-fashioned photo reconnaissance planes less important for intelligence.

The Washington Post
The New York Times A 1
The Washington Times
The Wall Street Journal
The Christian Science Monitor
New York Daily News
USA Today
The Chicago Tribune

Date 13 MAY 1989

But regular surveillance planes are useful for detecting certain troop movements and for ferreting out by low-flying flights targets hidden from the satellites.

Mr. Bush suggested exploring the proposal on a "more intrusive and radical basis" to "complement satellites." The new plan would encompass allies of the United States and the Soviet Union and Mr. Bush said he hoped interested countries would meet soon to work out details.

"This would open up military activities to regular scrutiny and, as President Eisenhower put it, 'convince the world that we are lessening danger and relaxing tension,'" the President said.

Stealing of Technology

Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, told reporters traveling to Texas on Air Force One that the plan was mostly of symbolic value in this age of satellite surveillance.

He said that airplanes would have some advantage over satellites below cloud cover, but that "symbolically, it's very important" to show that the two countries were abandoning their traditional secrecy.

On emigration, Mr. Bush said that if the Soviet Union codified its laws in accordance with international standards, he would work with Congress for a temporary waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, paving the way to extending Most Favored Nation trading status to Moscow.

He also said that the Soviet Union should stop stealing technology from the West and end its "discriminatory treatment" of American companies.

The President added many cautionary notes. "But the national security of America and our allies is not predicated on hope," he said. "It must be based on deeds."

"We must not forget that the Soviet Union has acquired awesome military capabilities. That was a fact of life for my predecessors. And that's always been a fact of life for our allies. And that is a fact of life for me today as President of the United States."

The President did not mention Mr. Gorbachev's decision to cut 500 weapons from the Warsaw Pact's short-range nuclear arsenal of about 10,000 short-range nuclear bombs and short-range warheads and artillery shells, or his proposal to open negotiations on eliminating all short-range nuclear weapons.

CATHOLIC CHURCH IN PANAMA ASSAILS NORIEGA BRUTALITY

MORAL RIGHT QUESTIONED

Bishops Call on Soldiers and Paramilitary Units Not to Use Arms on Civilians

By LINDSEY GRUSON

Special to The New York Times

PANAMA, May 12 — Panama's Roman Catholic Church today released a blistering attack on the Government of Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, questioning its moral authority to govern and inviting the military to disobey repressive orders.

The statement by the church, which has great influence in this predominantly Catholic country, was released as the first of some 2,000 troops dispatched by President Bush to reinforce American bases arrived here from the United States. At the same time, hundreds of military dependents evacuated their homes, taking refuge on American bases in Panama.

"I didn't want to uproot our family," the wife of a senior American Embassy official said as she packed a few keepsakes. "I'm not scared for myself, but when the violence hits so close to home you don't have a choice."

[In Washington, where Panama's political crisis has caused alarm because of its implications for the Panama Canal, President Bush's national security adviser said the United States had begun consulting foreign governments to see whether any would accept General Noriega if he could be persuaded to give up power. Page 5.]

A Call to the Military

In the tense and violent atmosphere that has surrounded disputed presidential elections on Sunday, the Church has begun criticizing General Noriega's Government for the first time in the country's 18-month crisis. In its statement today, it accused the Government of hanging on to power with brutal repression and suggested that the 15,000-member armed forces and associated paramilitary groups ignore repressive orders.

"To our military brothers, who have

the force of arms, not to utilize them against unarmed people whose only weapon is its firm desire to live in dignity and peace," the church said in its statement. It was signed by the 10 bishops of the Panamanian Episcopal Conference.

The bishops, who ordered their statement to be read aloud this Sunday at all Masses, stopped just short of calling for General Noriega's ouster. But they accused his regime of trying to steal the opposition electoral victory with violence and "trying to frustrate popular will." They explicitly questioned the Government's moral right to remain in power.

"What moral justification could there be to beat and shoot men and women who have not committed any crime except to peacefully reclaim their human rights?" the church asked. "What moral right could there be to terrorize the population with hoards fed by hate and false nationalism that neither recognizes nor respects the individual and the rights of other Panamanians?"

Encouraging the Opposition

The church's statement appeared intended to revitalize and encourage the opposition after the presidential election, which independent monitors say the opposition won by 3 to 1 but the Government annulled on Wednesday night. The opposition has been uncertain about what tactics to use to topple a regime that is willing to govern, according to the Church, through violent repression.

"It's a stalemate," a senior adviser to the church said shortly after the statement was released.

While the opposition enjoys overwhelming support, according to independent observers, its ability to overthrow General Noriega is widely questioned. But many Western diplomats say the election has provided impetus for the opposition coalition. They say it has unified the disparate groups and broadened their appeal to include formerly apathetic segments of the society, like many of the poor.

A Brutal Crackdown

In recent days, the regime has tried to intimidate the opposition with an increasingly brutal crackdown.

Independent human rights monitors report several killings in the last week, dozens of disappearances and more than a hundred arrests on a variety of vague charges. Priests in outlying areas have reported that paramilitary squads in rural areas have taken over several towns, beating opposition members and ransacking their houses.

In an interview today, Benjamin Colamarco, the commander of the paramilitary groups, said the squads, known as Dignity Battalions, had been called up and put on alert. He said they were patrolling the Costa Rican border and other rural areas but denied they had participated in any brutality or crackdown.

In one of many signs of growing polarization across the country and friction in the pro-Government coalition, which spans a political spectrum from far-right militarists to Communists, Mr. Colamarco and other senior pro-Government officials today rejected calls from some colleagues to negotiate with the opposition candidates. They also insisted that General Noriega's future would not be discussed in any talks, a precondition for the opposition.

The Government has also cracked down in the capital. Although few troops were on the streets today, riot police were stationed in strategic positions around the city. In recent days, they have quickly broken up opposition protests with tear gas and high-powered water cannons, which shoot acid-laced streams.

Soldiers and armed men in civilian

clothes Wednesday attacked the three leading opposition candidates with steel pipes as they rode through the city in a protest caravan. The presidential candidate, Guillermo Endara, remained hospitalized today for observation after receiving a deep gash on the head and suffering a concussion. His doctors reported he was in good condition and that he would be released Monday.

The opposition's junior vice-presidential candidates, Guillermo (Billy) Ford, was released from the hospital today and visited Mr. Endara with the senior vice presidential candidate, Ricardo Arias Calderón. After the visit, Mr. Ford, a political newcomer who has emerged as the opposition's most dynamic figure, vowed to continue the struggle against General Noriega.

"I will reinitiate the fight tomorrow," the spokesman for the opposition quoted Mr. Ford as telling his colleagues. But the opposition did not provide any details about his plans.

Several hundred American diplomatic and military families on Thursday packed up emergency supplies of clothing and a few mementos to seek refuge on American military bases.

Surprise in the Andes

As democracy was being mugged in Panama, it was showing surprising resilience this week in Bolivia, a country once synonymous with instability. An orderly presidential vote produced no majority winner, so the final selection will again be made by the congress when it convenes in August. Strikingly, the front-runners are Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, the architect of a tough economic stabilization plan, and former President Hugo Banzer, who endorses it. Running third is the left-of-center Jaime Paz Zamora, who accepts the need for spending restraint, though he cavils at specific programs.

A fairly fought campaign and the prospect of a second constitutional transition represent real achievements in a country where governments rarely lasted more than a year. A deeper source of stability has been the land reform program of the 1950's. Giving peasants title has helped immunize Bolivia from insurgencies bleeding its neighbors.

Most Bolivians now appear to approve an austerity program that has slashed subsidies, simplified taxes, cut budget deficits and tamed an inflation rate that soared to 24,000 percent in 1985. But there's a catch. Bolivia's stability is hostage to Argentina's financial chaos and the good sense of for-

eign creditors. There's a way Washington can help.

The austerity program is Bolivia's half of an innovative bargain to reduce a crushing foreign debt. The Europeans did their share by providing fuel for Bolivia to buy back at 11 cents on the dollar some \$600 million in principal owed to commercial banks. This gave Bolivia breathing space as President Victor Paz Estenssoro braked a cycle of boom and stagnation, productive mainly of military debtors. And now stability is threatened from an unexpected quarter: Argentina.

Racked by hyperinflation, and on the eve of a contentious election, Argentina has ceased paying Bolivia for natural gas. Argentina owes \$200 million — a large chunk of Bolivia's total income. This comes in the midst of Bolivia's loan renegotiations with some banks squeezing so hard as to endanger this recuperating patient.

Bolivian officials are heading to Washington in search of a bridge loan of \$100 million. This would be repayable in August after Bolivia seats a new President and would cover the shortfall from Argentina. For the Bush Administration not to do so would cruelly reward a country coping manfully with crushing problems in a democratic way.

Bush Message to Gorbachev

Was Deliberately Vague

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

STARKVILLE, Miss., May 13—If Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was looking to President Bush's maiden speech on superpower relations for specific clues to the direction of U.S. policy toward Moscow, he did not find them. Because Bush intentionally did not provide them, aides said.

Rather, Bush revealed what may become the trademark of his early approach to the rapidly unfolding events in the Eastern bloc. Bush wants to "test" cautiously Gorbachev's reforms and dramatic proposals for arms reductions. He does not feel compelled at this early point to compete toe-to-toe with Gorbachev on the world stage.

He seems prepared to wait for any improvements in the expanding U.S.-Soviet relationship that may come, including more concessions from Moscow, but he does not share the eagerness of many in Europe to seize the moment with Gorbachev.

This cautious approach was described by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft in explaining Bush's address Friday at Texas A&M University, which Scowcroft said was "not designed" to attract "catchy headlines." Rather, he said, the point was to call attention to the potential for gradually shifting from post-World War II containment to cooperation with Moscow in the years ahead.

"It's a hard thing to do. And none of our proposals are going to be that traumatic," Scowcroft said. "You don't turn a great nation like the U.S. around quickly. We're talk-

ing about modifications of direction"

Bush's address, while challenging Gorbachev to meet a long list of tests for democratization and openness, offered no major initiatives or incentives. A senior official said the speech was "intentionally vague" on what rewards the West will offer if the Soviets meet the tests.

While remaining cautious in his rhetoric, Bush has simultaneously encouraged an expansion of the relationship with Moscow on a more practical level. He and Secretary of State James A. Baker III have started to broaden the range of issues being discussed—adding drugs, terrorism and the environment, among other things, to the superpower agenda. And Bush promised Friday to waive temporarily the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which links U.S. trade concessions to Soviet emigration policies, if the Soviets make permanent changes in their emigration laws.

But in terms of imaginative, sweeping gestures to counter Gorbachev, Bush is reticent. One reason may be the lessons Bush and his top advisers drew from the experience with President Ronald Reagan on arms-control issues. Both Bush and Scowcroft have been critical of the more splashy and "romantic" visions of Reagan, such as eliminating all nuclear ballistic missiles or creating a space shield to make nuclear weapons obsolete. They seem determined to take a more "prudent" and conventional approach, regardless of the points Gorbachev is scoring in Western European public opinion.

According to Scowcroft's public commentary during the Reagan years, the former president, caught up in a "spirit of enthusiastic confusion and mixed purposes," was overly tempted to bargain away the strategy of nuclear deterrence. In the view of Scowcroft and others, such grand ideas have often led to mischief. In a lengthy New York Times magazine essay, Scowcroft and two associates wrote in 1987: "It is time to stop and regroup."

Bush has already begun pulling back on Reagan's dream of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Bush hardly mentioned the vision in his speech that was so fervently advanced by his mentor. Bush, who has approved budget cuts and a refocusing of the program, said his goal now is to "preserve our options to deploy advanced defenses when they're ready."

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The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

Date 14 MAY 81

Another reason for Bush's caution in the speech is the calculation that Gorbachev may fail and the United States must be prepared should a successor revert to confrontation. This thesis was advanced recently by deputy national security adviser Robert M. Gates, a Soviet analyst and former deputy CIA director, and has strong support among some elements of the administration.

In a recent speech, Gates declared that "we must proceed with care and prudence because we are dealing with a system where the roots of oppression, aggression and secrecy are deep." He warned that "we cannot ignore the cyclical turn to reform, detente and foreign assistance each time the [Soviet] system has faced catastrophe."

Gates described Gorbachev as

letting his political reforms outpace the results of his economic restructuring. "He is pulling all the levers of change in a society and culture that historically has resisted change The outcome is by no means clear, and prolonged turbulence seems certain."

The senior official noted that Bush, in urging that the superpowers look "beyond containment," refrained from saying the United States is abandoning containment.

Raymond L. Garthoff, a specialist on the Soviet Union and author of a study on U.S.-Soviet relations, said he was puzzled that Bush in his speech did not offer Gorbachev more in the way of U.S. incentives to continue his effort.

"It looks as though rather than coming up with any major new initiative in arms control or otherwise which would call for some real change on our own part in exchange for greater sacrifice and change [by the Soviets]—there isn't any of that," he said.

CONTINUED

Garthoff said he didn't think Bush's testing of Gorbachev is an effective way of bringing about further Soviet reforms. "There may have been occasions in the past" when it would be a good idea, "but it seems singularly inappropriate in the case of Gorbachev at this juncture, when he's already taken as many steps as he has.

"To suggest that he still needs to go through some indefinite series of steps from his side before we decide to do anything on the dance floor as well makes it an odd invitation to dance," he said. "To pick up on Ronald Reagan's comment: It takes two to tango."

AFTER THE COLD WAR

The old order was tense—but stable. Is George Bush ready to wage peace against Gorbachev's 'new thinking'?

The cold war is over. Or so goes today's conventional wisdom. Not since the end of World War II have U.S.-Soviet relations been so relaxed. Peace is breaking out in Third World trouble spots, democracy is struggling to be reborn in Eastern Europe and the superpowers are talking about cutting their nuclear arsenals by a third. Even the Iron Curtain is lifting: just last week East-bloc troops began tearing down the barbed wire on the Austro-Hungarian border. But before the cold war can safely be interred, the leaders of both East and West must answer a deceptively simple question: what next?

The postwar order was nerve-racking. It pitted nuclear superpowers against each other at the edge of oblivion. Yet it was also strangely stable. The East-West confrontation spawned small, mean wars in the Third World, but there was no ultimate showdown. Meanwhile, united by a common threat of Soviet expansion, the West and Japan rebuilt and prospered. Now Mikhail Gorbachev is shaking the foundations of the postwar order. His "new thinking" and his promise of a nuclear-free "common European home" may lure some Western allies across the line into neutralism. Others may succumb to old nationalist animos-



PETER TURNLEY FOR NEWSWEEK

Matching wits: President Bush and top foreign-policy advisers Scowcroft, Cheney and Baker are looking for ways to counter Gorbachev diplomacy



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CHINE NOUVELLE—SIPA

1950

The cold war spawns a regional conflict: Communist soldiers of the Korean People's Army in combat

ities—the same ones that cast the world into war twice so far in this century. It is not at all certain that Gorbachev—or more to the point, his successors—can be trusted to stick to peaceful intentions. Is the so-called post-postwar era a double negative: does it bode more conflict?

Watersheds demand visionary leaders. Unreflective by nature, George Bush is an incrementalist, more reactive than assertive. A creature of the old foreign-policy establishment, he is better cast as caretaker than creator. Will he miss a historic opportunity to wage peace?

In 1962, former U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson remarked that Britain “has lost an empire and has not yet found a role.” In the post-postwar era, the same quandary faces America. For 40 years it had an unambiguous foreign policy: containment, the arrest of communism wherever and whenever it appeared. The means was a network of alliances around the world, undergirded by U.S. armed forces. The East-West standoff was global, played out from Central America to Southeast Asia. Now, as communism loses its appeal and economic power rivals military power as the measure of global status, new problems are beginning to emerge. These put the onus on the Bush administration to rethink America's global place and purpose. What should U.S. policy be now that the Red Menace is giving way to the drug threat and Japan's economic nationalism? Idealism has always been an animating force in American policy. Should more pragmatic concerns, like economic development, occupy a larger space in policymakers' portfolios?

The Bush administration was supposed to answer these questions with a broad strategic review. But the long-awaited reviews, still in the final drafting stages, are reportedly little more than rehashes of the status quo. Meanwhile, Washington finds itself embroiled in a dispute with the West German government over short-range nuclear weapons; the Bush administration re-

gards them as essential for security, while the Germans see them as instruments of their own destruction. The squabble not only heightened tensions between Washington and Bonn, but also divided the U.S. foreign-policy establishment—provoking a farewell blast from Reagan administration arms negotiator Paul Nitze, one of the architects of the cold war, and carping from younger leaders like Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Both men called the administration's approach wrong; Nitze said the allies had reason to call it “crazy.”

Gorbachev at least has a plan of action. By soothing Europe with peace overtures, he hopes to win concessions on both trade and technology. And next week he travels to Beijing for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 24 years. There, he will seek a de-escalation of tensions on the border between the two coun-

tries. This will help reduce the Kremlin's bloated military budget and also reassure the Chinese that he has no encircling designs as he reaches out to Japan for investment and technology.

Washington watches this diplomatic dance transfixed—and seemingly paralyzed. This week, when Secretary of State James Baker travels to Moscow to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, he is expected to accomplish little more than set a date for resuming the strategic arms talks. President Bush will give a much-heralded speech at the 40th anniversary of NATO late this month, yet few White House watchers anticipate any bold initiatives. Bush's advisers are not likely to give him inspiration. Both national-security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Defense Secretary Richard Cheney are cold warriors who remain deeply suspicious of the Kremlin and believe that Ronald Reagan embraced Gorbachev too warmly. The politically sensitive Baker sees most clearly the need to forge some kind of U.S. initiative or lose the contest for European hearts and minds. But as a neophyte at foreign policy, Baker is not expected to produce geopolitical vision.

For now, all the United States seems to offer its allies is the bleak prospect of “status quo plus”: an endless cycle of politically agonizing decisions to “improve” nuclear weapons whose use would be suicidal. Once, Washington could virtually dictate NATO strategy. Today American policymakers are forced to try to accommodate European public opinion—so far, with notable lack of success. Just a few weeks ago Washington thought it had worked out a compromise deal with Bonn: the Americans would not push to modernize the Lance short-range nuclear missile until after the German elections in 1990, and in return the Germans would not push for negotiations to cut down short-range nuclear forces (SNF). Then two weeks ago, to save his political skin, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl welshed on the deal and began demanding SNF negotiations with the Soviets. Kohl's move has infuriated the Bush administration and left a splintered NATO groping for a compromise before its late May summit.

The short-range missiles at issue are of no real military use, most experts agree. In war games, NATO gets wiped out faster if its forces use short-range nuclear weapons than if they use conventional ones instead. So why fight to keep them? Because if the

Germans succeed in ridding themselves of nukes, they will break the essential Faustian bargain of the Western Alliance. Three decades ago the United States agreed both to station troops in Europe and to launch its ICBM's if the Red Army tried to overrun the Continent. In return, the Germans agreed to house U.S. troops and nuclear weapons. If the Germans now refuse to bear nuclear risk, they may lose America's nuclear guarantee. American politicians would almost certainly agitate to bring the boys home. Without American protection, Europe would be vulnerable to the Soviets' superiority in conventional forces.

There is, many argue, a way out of this nuclear bind: Bush must make Gorbachev match rhetoric with action. Let the Soviets draw down Warsaw Pact forces until they are equal to NATO's; if Gorbachev is serious about creating a "common European home," he should give up the wherewithal to kick the door in.

But would the Soviets make such a deal? And if they did, would they honor it? Having been invaded by Napoleon and Hitler, Russia will be understandably reluctant to jettison the *cordon sanitaire* on its western front. Conservative skeptics advance a "breathing space" theory: that Gorbachev wants time to revive the Soviet economy sufficiently to relaunch Russian expansionism. Lulling the West, they say, is a Soviet ploy that dates back to Lenin. A newly aggressive Russia would not be the only risk to peace in a post-cold-war world. Transitions are notoriously unstable. The various national tribes of Europe have been hating one another for millennia. History-minded geopoliticians like Henry Kissinger remember how the crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire led to World War I. Could the breakup of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe lead to World War III? German nationalism started World War II. Germans today are talking about reunification. The thought of a united Germany once again dominating Central Europe is frightening to Western neighbors and Russia alike. With perils like these, it is easy to understand why U.S. policymakers are not racing to dismantle the existing order.

But standing pat is no answer, either. As the current flap with Germany clearly shows, the political pressure to accommodate Gorbachev is too great for elected officials in Europe to ignore. That doesn't mean that Europe should rush into Gorbachev's arms. Rather the goal should be an ordered transition to a new political balance in Europe. What would the new order look like?

■ **Butter for guns:** Fortunately, mutual security is not the only glue that binds. Economic ties could replace military ones in post-1992 Europe as the old trade barriers are gradually let down. A United



GILLHAUSEN—STERN—BLACK STAR

1956


Moscow's cordon sanitaire:
Hungarians try to topple the
Stalinists, but Soviet tanks
crush the rebellion

States of Europe remains a (largely French) pipe dream, but a Single-Market Europe is a real possibility. In the East, some countries like Poland and Hungary are likely to gravitate toward the freedom of the West, with neutral Austria as a model. Others, like Bulgaria and Romania, are likely to stay in the Soviet orbit, or at least lean toward Moscow.

■ **Demilitarized zones:** How to reassure paranoid Russia, stripped of its satrapies to the West, that its oft-invaded borders will remain secure? A NATO-Warsaw Pact treaty could guarantee that in return for Soviet troop withdrawals from East Europe, the region will remain neutral and demilitarized. The biggest confidence-building step would be a guarantee that Germany remains divided for at least another half century.

■ **A 'build-down' of forces:** The political restructuring of Europe will take years, if not decades. A NATO-Warsaw Pact treaty would require the consent of some dozen countries, some of which will be more willing to disarm than others. In the meantime, there are short-term steps that the two blocs can take. One idea currently favored by top Pentagon planners is a mutual "build-down" that would keep equipment stored in Europe, but withdraw almost all frontline troops to the United States and Soviet Union. Since it would take the Soviets at least 30 days to reinsert their forces into Eastern Europe, Washington would have enough time to sea-lift American troops back to Europe in a crisis. Pentagon planners believe there is a six-month "window of opportunity" to persuade Gorbachev to begin taking these steps, since he has to prepare his next Five Year Plan for military investment by January 1990. The Politburo has been considering diversions of major resources from military technology to the starved civilian sector. A serious offer from the West could help make up its mind.

The United States, for its part, can still powerfully influence decision-making in European capitals. Partly by force of habit, partly because no other country ranks as first among equals,



FLIP SCHULKE—BLACK STAR

1961

Before the 'common European home':
To stem the westward
flood of East Germans, Nikita
Khrushchev built the Berlin wall

Europe still looks to Washington for leadership and guidance. Americans are not likely to abandon their moral crusading for human rights and freedom in the East bloc—nor should they. The United States would almost certainly play the role of guarantor in any major peace treaty between East and West. Ironically, America could end up guaranteeing Russia's security against a revived Germany. It is doubtful that the United States would maintain its garrison of 324,000 troops in Europe, but it is worth remembering that the men who created the Western Alliance never dreamed that a U.S. Army would still be stationed in Europe 40 years later.

Their hope was to make Western Europe self-sufficient—and go home. Europe may rid its soil of nuclear weapons, but it will almost

surely want to remain under America's nuclear umbrella. Trimming the bloated nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers will long remain a focus of global attention. In recent years, arms control has taken on a talismanic quality, as if it were the true—indeed the only—measure of progress in East-West relations. In fact, arms control is a worthy but somewhat narrow cause. The dream of a nonnuclear world is fantasy; the nation that hides the bomb in caves would always hold the edge of terror.

Ironically, arms control can be dangerous. If one side is left with too few weapons—or weapons that are too vulnerable—the temptation is to use them or lose them. Bush administration strategists are considering an effort to nudge the Soviets away from a fixation

Bonn's Ostpolitik for the '90s



ARNE DEDERT—AP

'Good lord, of course': Thatcher calls on Kohl to discuss NATO's policy on nuclear forces

Remember the German Question? It's back. Nearly half a century after the end of World War II, leaders of the NATO alliance are pondering a revival of Germany's old role as the fulcrum of power in Central Europe. Doubts about Bonn's political intentions are showing up in ways large and small. They underlie the controversy over short-range nuclear missiles. They color the remarks of a U.S. ambassador in Eastern Europe; eying West German economic and political ties throughout the region, he warns of the dangers of Teutonic hegemony. Britain's Margaret Thatcher recently wound up a day of talks with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and was asked whether the federal republic would remain in NATO. "Good lord, of course," the prime minister replied. But it was significant that the question was raised at all.

If West Germany is now the first of the allies to exploit the subsiding of the cold war, it is due to history and geography as well as economics. It's no coincidence that Bonn, for the first time in years, invoked fundamental "German interests" in breaking with Washington over the deployment of battlefield missiles that might decimate the country in wartime. After decades of guilt-driven reticence, the federal republic is groping toward a more assertive role.

Bonn's post-cold-war agenda differs markedly from Washington's. The disagreement goes far beyond missiles. Already Bonn has responded to the new political calculus in Central

Europe. "The Ostpolitik of the '70s has given way to an Ostpolitik for the '90s," says Theo Sommer, editor in chief of *Die Zeit*. "The goal then was to create openings to the East. Now we have more openings than we know what to do with, and the challenge is how best to exploit them." That means more commercial dealings, more negotiations on everything from debt to arms control. "We must hold Gorbachev to his word," says Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

So far, at least as the West Germans see it, the United States has been ungenerous in both word and deed. Bonn worries that whatever "solution" for Eastern Europe emerges from the Bush camp, it will be little more than a public-relations ploy. Hearing rumors of a U.S. arms-control plan designed to "blow Gorbachev away," one West German diplomat said: "We don't want to 'blow Gorbachev away.' We want to encourage him and accelerate the pace of change."

U.S. misgivings: Meanwhile, German banks have taken the lead in making new loans to Moscow. Its businessmen are combing Eastern Europe: West German ventures, though still modest, outnumber those of all other Western countries combined. While no more than 20 American firms are involved in Hungarian joint ventures, the Germans have entered more than 200. Nor are the contacts exclusively private. Last year when the Hungarian government sought to borrow some \$600 million from a West German bank consortium, it was told "no"—until Bonn gave a government guaranty.

All too often, it seems, Washington views such developments with misgivings. There's grumbling about technology transfers. There are doubts about "underwriting" communist regimes. Almost always there are worries that the Germans are getting too far out in front. For Bonn, that's a sore point. "Washington's attitudes can be frustrating," says an aide to Kohl. "We hear this talk about West Germany 'cutting its moorings to the West.' But the fact is that the East Europeans are looking to us." The grouching about Bonn's perceived waywardness does have a subtext, however. A senior official in the West German Foreign Ministry, speaking with unusual candor, acknowledged that the federal republic aims not only to shape Western policy toward the East, but to dominate it. "It is, I suppose, our historic sphere of influence," he said delicately.

Would that be a bad thing? German history doesn't ideally cast Bonn for the role. On the other hand, no other NATO country seems better suited. As far as the alliance's relations with Eastern Europe are concerned, says a U.S. diplomat in Bonn, "we could do worse than pass the baton to the West Germans." The best way of keeping the alliance together may be in letting other members have a larger say in its direction.

MICHAEL MEYER in Bonn



1962

**At the edge of oblivion:
President Kennedy's men huddle
outside the White House during
the Cuban missile crisis**

with cutting nuclear arsenals in half to looking at the issue of stability. One approach: to get rid of big multiple-warhead missiles, like the U.S. MX and Soviet SS-24, that would be the likely tools of an overwhelming surprise attack.

Around the globe, the practical effect of America's containment policy and communist expansionism was conflict: in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Central America. Now that the Soviets seem less aggressively meddling, perhaps Washington and Moscow could join in a more constructive role. Instead of starting fires in the Third World, the two superpowers could work together to put them out. With Vietnam withdrawing from Cambodia, both America and the U.S.S.R. are trying to keep the murderous Khmer Rouge out of power. Keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East was once American policy; now the United States wants Moscow to pressure the Syrians to stop harboring Palestinian terrorists. The proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles means that conflict could directly threaten the Soviet Union. "The missiles can't hit us, but they can hit you," a senior U.S. official recently told his Soviet counterpart.

It would be naive to think Washington and Moscow can paper over all their regional differences. The Soviets still spend almost \$1 billion a year to help fortify Nicaragua in Central America. By the same token, U.S. Secretary of State Baker is expected to resist Soviet demands to bring about a political settlement of the Afghan war when he visits Moscow this week. Washington would just as soon let the Afghan rebels and the Soviet-backed Kabul government slug it out. A wiser approach might be to agree with the Soviets that both stop supplying arms.

But increasingly, the United States and the U.S.S.R. have common interests. In the post-

postwar era, the geopolitical axis may change: the world will no longer be split between East and West, but between North and South—between haves and have-nots, the First and Third Worlds. At the same time, both East and West have common interests in certain "transnational" issues: environmental protection, the prevention of terrorism, nonproliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles in the Third World.

Even in a world where there are no longer two superpowers but instead a half-dozen great powers, the United States would have the greatest burden to carry. Even though its military power may gradually diminish, America still has an important political role to play. In that case, U.S. policymakers will have to show more finesse than they did in the days when brute force could guarantee Washington the last word. "We have to use our wits now as well as our brawn," says a top State Department official.

Perhaps the best model is 19th-century Britain. Queen Victoria's empire managed a balance-of-power standoff on continental Europe with shrewd diplomacy while its sea power guaranteed access to markets. The United States is still a maritime power, witness its successful effort to keep the Persian Gulf open to shipping during the Iran-Iraq war. Japan may rule the world's markets, but U.S. warships guard the sea lanes between Japan and the Middle East oil. America would be foolish to turn over that military responsibility to Japan. Certainly none of Japan's neighbors wants to see the Rising Sun rearm to resurrect the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere of 1942. Japan could more usefully provide resources for Third World development.

In the next century, economic might may count for more than military might. If so, Japan is already a superpower. It is entirely possible that the United States will spend the first part of the next century on a new containment policy: containing Japanese economic imperialism. In its nationalist zeal to build vast trade surpluses, Japan threatens to disrupt the global economic system. Japan's closed markets hurt not only Europe and the United States but also developing countries that are desperate for trade to pay off their debts. How to respond to Japan's voracity is sure to be a consuming political debate for America in the years ahead.

The choices are not easy: retaliate with sanctions and trade barriers, and Washington risks a protectionist trade war that could throw the world into depression. If America cuts Japan off from its markets, the Japanese may respond by cozying up to the Soviets.

In the end, trade wars can ruin economies and cost jobs, but they do not destroy cities and cost lives. It is better to fight with tariffs and taxes than bombs and missiles. With care, the world can be led from an era in which Armageddon beckons to an age in which victory is measured at the bottom line. If that transition can be made peacefully, the new giants like Germany and Japan can thank the old ones, for the East-West standoff of the last 40 years allowed countries to develop and then to compete in the marketplace rather than on the battlefield. When the cold war is truly over, its greatest legacy will be simply that it never turned hot.


JOHN BARRY,
MARGARET GARRARD WARNER
and EVAN THOMAS



ART GREENSPAN—AP

1968


**Mean wars in the Third World:
America intervenes in Vietnam and
finds itself unable to defeat
Hanoi's communist forces**



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Ollie: Guilty, With Regrets

Oliver North pleaded that he was only a pawn in the Iran-contra scandal, and the jury trying him agreed—but said he was guilty anyway on three of the 12 counts. Jurors said North's bosses left him out in the cold, and a NEWSWEEK Poll found 51 percent favoring a pardon. **National Affairs: Page 32**



Still a hero—with clay feet



A postwar quandary: Bush and his top foreign-policy advisers

After the Cold War

The cold war is over. Or so goes the conventional wisdom. But before the world relaxes, its leaders must answer a simple question: what next? The East-West confrontation was nerve-racking, pitting the superpowers against each other at the edge of oblivion. But it was also stable. Small wars broke out in

the Third World, but never the ultimate showdown. Now Gorbachev is shaking the foundations of the postwar order with his "new thinking" about global diplomacy, while Washington stands by in seeming uncertainty. Will George Bush miss a historic chance to wage peace? **Special Report: Page 20**



Studying how weightlessness affects personal relationships

Spaceshrinks

Space travel has always been a fast and furious affair dominated by hard-nosed sky jocks. But with NASA planning for flights of six months or longer,

what used to be the Right Stuff is all wrong. The astronauts of tomorrow will be selected on the basis of their "sensitivity" toward others and trained by psychologists to cope with the "interpersonal" problems peculiar to space. **Lifestyle: Page 66**

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Special Report

After the cold war (the cover) 20
Bonn's Ostpolitik for the '90s 24
How to deal with Gorbachev 29

National Affairs

North: the hero's clay feet 32
Judge Gesell on the bench 36
An aide's past haunts Wright 38
Debating the Central Park rape 40

International

Burma's "money tree" of drugs 42
China's students win round one 44
Cambodia: compromising with Sihanouk 45
H-bomb overboard 45
The return of the Peronists 48
Arafat: pardon my French 48

Business

California's car-insurance revolt 50
The battle for Madison Ave. 52
The Feds strike again 52
Seeking respect at the Shack 53
Massage in the office 53
Why Japan won't slow down 56
Robert J. Samuelson 57

Society

Science: The unseen garden 58
Education: Using schools fully 60
Ideas: Sovietologists' surprise 62
Holocaust: why the Jews? 64
Technology: Fusion fever cools 65
News Media: Opus at an end? 65

Lifestyle

The Mind: The long haul in space 66
Trends: Glass, steel, sunlight 69
Family: "Sesame" birth day 71
Television: Crime wave gets real 72
Fashion: From schlock to chic 73

The Arts

Theater: Send in the clown 76
Books: A corner on cocaine 78
"Sisters in Crime"
Sizing up the Goldwyn touch
"On the Golden Porch"
Art: A Benton bash 81

Departments

Periscope 6
My Turn 10
The Mail 12
Perspectives 17
Newsmakers 83
Transition 84
Meg Greenfield 86

Cover: Illustration by Rafal Olbinski.

Gardens of Knowledge

The term "botanical gardens" conjures an image of lush oases where matrons stroll among the camellias. But today such places also serve as premier research institutions where scientists are learning about evolution and preserving endangered plants that could be useful in the battle against AIDS. **Society: Page 58**

Finding nature's secrets



Anyone can compare apples to oranges and come out looking good. Take a look at apples to apples.

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Bush to pursue freedom trend in East bloc cautiously

Excerpts of an interview with President Bush by Arnaud de Borchgrave, editor-in-chief of The Washington Times; also in attendance were White House Chief of Staff John Sununu and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft.

Q: Moving beyond containment of the Soviet Union, as you put it last Friday, and after having won the titanic struggle between freedom and tyranny since World War II, what kind of a vision, to be specific, do you have for Europe? Would it be a continent in which the East European nations would be free but neutral like Finland, along with a gradually reunified Germany and a dismantling of the two rival military blocs?

A: Well, I spelled out in the speech how I saw it in the shorter run than that, with barriers coming down, the Berlin Wall coming down, a much freer interchange between East and West on trade, and certainly the coming and going of people — freer interchange. And obviously, I would like to see the whole trend toward democratization continued, and I would add to the word "democratization" freedom. And I think we're seeing some fascinating steps in Poland today that wouldn't have been possible 10 years ago, or even five. And I think we're seeing the same trends in Hungary, particularly on the economic side. And who knows when the rest of [Eastern] Europe will come along, to come that far and maybe further.

So if one was going to have a vision and one was going to have a dream of what one would like to see, it would clearly say more freedom, more democracy. As I said in the speech, the Brezhnev era and the Brezhnev Doctrine should be dead, and we ought to go beyond that now, fulfilling the democratic aspirations of people wherever they are. And that's one reason I want to see perestroika and glasnost succeed.

Q: But don't we have a great opportunity for some new thinking of our own, Mr. President, for example a plan that could solve the German problem and remove the East European albatross from Moscow's neck? Wouldn't that strike a responsive chord with Gorbachev, though not necessarily with his successor? So why not lock the present leadership into some new geopolitical architecture that Gorbachev's successor would not be able to undo?

A: I think that's what we're trying to do. Poland, for example — that's what I was talking about in that speech I gave in Hamtramck, and there we sent a strong signal, not just to Poland, but to other countries, that if you make some changes we're going to be ready to meet you. The policy of differentiation, in my view, is a very valid policy, and it is a much better chance to encourage the fulfillment of the broader vision, which is democratization and freedom of all peoples and countries.

So I think there is a trend working here that could lead to the kinds of things you refer to, but I think we go step by step.

Q: You said "dismantle the Brezhnev Doctrine," Mr. President, but the Hungarian leaders tell us that the Soviet leaders have told them that it's dead and buried. We've seen the legalization of Solidarity and Hungary's non-communist bodies discussing new ground rules for elections, etc. . . . So how many more litmus tests do they have to pass?

A: Well, they have to pass the tests of permitting these freedoms to continue. And so, yes, I welcome [the fact] they haven't intervened in Poland, but Poland is just beginning in its steps down democracy's path. And so I would simply look at it on a case-by-case basis, encouraging those who are far behind the power curve to come forward now. And . . . I'm glad that Gorbachev appears to be permitting more self-determination, or at least more innovation by these individual countries.

One worries that there might be a point beyond which he won't be willing to go, and therefore I think the United States ought to be reasonably cautious in our approach to Mr. Gorbachev. When they said the other day — when [Foreign Minister Eduard] Shevardnadze talked about . . . maybe having to do more intermediate nuclear force weapons, for example, which would clearly violate, in our view, the INF treaty, I'm saying to myself, "Hey, hey, maybe it's right to be prudent here as we go along." I thought that was not a good sign. There have been other signs that are good.

But I'm not going to be deterred from what I think is the proper path. I think it's forward-looking, but I think it's coupled with a certain sense of caution.

Q: You don't think it's worth discussing with Mr. Gorbachev at the summit a plan that would ease their burdens in Eastern Europe while reassuring them about their legitimate security interests there?

A: Well, we might well do that, but I think one has to be ready to discuss a lot of regional issues. They have not wanted to consider [Eastern Europe] a regional issue . . . for the historic reasons we're all familiar with. If we approached it with how we might help you ease your burdens, that might be quite different than if you went in there with some hot rhetoric about undoing their [Warsaw] Pact relationships.

Q: Getting back to the possibility of "Finlandizing" Eastern Europe, wouldn't this reassure the Soviets about their legitimate security interests in Eastern Europe but at the same time liberate Eastern Europe?

A: Oh, we would have no problem reassuring them about their security interests, but I think you just approach it on a cautious step-by-step basis, and I would be a little cautious as to how far one expects to go in terms of our continuing commitment to freedom and free elections and the whole freedom of the press, and these fundamental ingredients as far as our commitment to those go, it's there and it's strong, and it should stay strong.

But I don't think one wants to swing so far that one encourages reckless steps by some in these countries and then we end up like we did in Hungary in 1956. And so it's prudence and knowing where we want to be — and where we want to be is as much freedom and democracy as is possible, and I feel quite optimistic about all of that.

I think some of this is because of the — not all of it, but some of it — because of the failure of the Soviet system itself, and they've got their hands full.

Q: Talking about the failure of the Soviet system, if the objective is, as you said, to integrate the Soviet Union into the community of nations, the global economic order, presumably that means a convertible ruble, membership in GATT, . . . to what degree do you feel it's incumbent upon the Western nations to help

BUSH...CONTINUED

bring this about?

A: I would like to enlist the support of all the Western nations, and I think most of them would agree with that objective and that goal. But ... if you were going to ask me a question, Arnaud, and say, Do you think the ruble will be fully convertible tomorrow, or in the short-run future? I'd say no. I don't have reason to — I couldn't back up an affirmative answer to that question. Would it be someday necessary for reintegration to have a fully convertible currency? The answer is clearly yes. And the whole world economic order would decree yes. It's not just the United States, it's convertibility to all kinds of currency.

Q: My question is to what degree do you feel it's incumbent upon Western nations to help bring this about?

A: I'd like to see them help bring it about, but I'd also like to see them help bring it about with their eyes open. I think we are correct in insisting on certain constraints on the highest technology going to the Soviet Union, or technology that could diminish our advantage in certain categories that relate to defense. I think it's a question of trade, a question of exhortation in terms of human rights, a question of cooperation in terms of impressing upon the Soviets the need to do something about regional tensions. And it's cooperation — it's a solid, united alliance in terms of our arms control policies.

Q: Putting high-tech aside, the Soviets nevertheless must not only produce the goods their people desperately need but also of such quality they can compete on world markets. Do you think they can do this on their own, or that they should be given a helping hand?

A: If the Soviets ever adopted the view that they have nothing to fear from us in terms of a first strike, they could divert an awful lot more of their GNP into the kind of productive purposes that you're talking about. And I think it's incumbent upon us to convince them, not through unilateral arms reductions on our side but through dialogue and concerted diplomatic effort, that they have nothing to fear from the West in terms of a first strike. I believe the Soviets, even the younger ones, still have that vivid recollection of Leningrad and Stalingrad and that world war in which they lost 20 million lives. It's so ingrained into their military, and the people themselves, that they're suspicious of intentions of the United States. I don't think they can point to a single thing that would give credibility to the fact that they should have any fear of strike from the United States or an attack from the United States, or from our allies. But I think they still do harbor these concerns. And every time I talk to them they say, "You don't know what it's like to lose 20 million people and to have your soil invaded. You're different. You're halfway across the world here." And I say we're different, but we fought for our beliefs and our principles. So I want to see us do the best we can to have that atmosphere such that they know they don't have to continue this massive — what is it — 15 percent of GNP now? It was 17. I don't know what it is now — a tremendous percentage of their gross national product on arms.

Q: With our refusal to negotiate on SNF [strategic nuclear forces], we give the appearance of being bogged down in nuclear theology which the European allies increasingly think of as mythology. The Soviets can barely cope with Eastern Europe, let alone think about invading and absorbing Western Europe. So, why not set as a new geopolitical objective the erasing of the artificial East-West division of Europe in grand negotiation?

A: I think it's too early for that. But I'd like to see the countries on the Eastern side of the divide go forward

with more democratization. And then, when we see more evidence of lightening up from Moscow on these countries, we can act accordingly. But I think any president of the United States would be naive in moving so swiftly that you woke up and found yourself snookered. And we're not going to do that on SNF.

I have an obligation to see that, in my judgment, our troops are protected in the very best way. And this flexible response, this ability to protect them with these short-range weapons is important, particularly given the enormous conventional force imbalance. I'm not saying there will never be any discussion of short-range nuclear forces. And I think you're right; world opinion says, well, why don't you negotiate?

We know what we want. We've got an imbalance in conventional forces — let them do something about that. Let them demonstrate the good faith that Gorbachev is getting credit for. And as long as we have these tremendous conventional force imbalances, I, as president, can go on insisting that the alliance have that kind of flexible response that comes from these short-range nuclear weapons. So they want to talk about a triple zero, I don't. The United States and the alliance will stay together on this point.

Q: I am merely suggesting that being against any negotiations in a day and age when everyone is negotiating about everything appears to be against apple pie and motherhood.

A: It is, it is. And people say to me, "How come you don't talk to Castro, how come you don't talk to Ortega?" They all know what it will take to discuss these things with me. And we are talking to the Soviets. I don't want to put them in the same category as Castro and Ortega and Gadhafi. So we'll continue to talk. ... I am not going to have these American troops over there without at least going to bed at night thinking we're going to be doing everything that's necessary in case some trouble broke out to protect them.

Q: How much longer can a U.S. president be expected to ask taxpayers to spend \$150 billion a year on NATO-related defense against the world's most improbable scenario — a classic Soviet invasion of Western Europe?

A: As long as his troops are outdone by the Soviets to the degree they are.

Q: You feel there's a danger of invasion?

A: No, I didn't say that. You say how long can one do it, and I say as long as there's an unacceptable imbalance. And any president who didn't want to have the alliance strong and protected, I think, is making a naive mistake.

So we're not going to make the unilateral cuts now.

Q: What about total withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from the continent now that the European Community in 1992, with a population of 320 million and a GNP of \$4.4 trillion, will act as a magnet for East European countries increasingly free of Soviet control?

A: It might be time to give some thought to how we can reduce along with the Soviets, provided we not leave our allies in an imbalance and provided one side not be able to respond more rapidly than the other in case something did break out. So I think this is an exciting time for new thinking and for seeing how real this change is, and we're going to have good discussions with the Soviets. But I go back to this warning by Shevardnadze the other day — saying if we don't get it our way, we break the INF treaty. I think he said that — though he didn't put it in those terms. And if he said that, I think we need to be cautious.

Q: Georgi Arbatov said three years ago we're going to do a terrible thing to you — we're going to deprive you of an enemy. Doesn't that give us an opportunity to

BUSH...CONTINUED

seize the high ground?

A: Yes, it does, and that's exactly what we're trying to do in our talks with them. Incidentally, Jim Baker felt the talks were far better than the press stories, which were dominated by Gorbachev's call to do that which, for the most part, we did years ago.

Q: Wouldn't it have been much simpler to say thank you for reducing your short-range nukes by 500 but that's the equivalent, percentage wise, of four of our 88 Lance missiles.

A: That's right. And we've taken out how many tactical nuclear weapons already? Two thousand is the figure that comes to mind. I don't think the reporting was particularly good. We read that Gorbachev once again has stolen the high ground. We're so euphoric when he says something, even though this leaves them with such an advantage. So I'm simply not going to respond. I'd love to move forward with the Soviets, but you know, because he makes a proposal that we've already fulfilled, or that he'll unilaterally reduce to levels still far above what we've got, I don't consider that anything other than interesting. I don't consider it driving any decision I'd make as president of the United States.

Q: Would you agree that the Soviet empire is splintering from its outer edges to its inner core and that perestroika is the Soviet equivalent of Chapter 11, and should that mean that we just let matters take their course?

A: No, we're going to move forward with the Soviet Union and, as I said in the speech, as we feel comfortable so to do. We're doing things on the trade front, but I'm not going to suggest we're suddenly presented with a totally democratic country. There's a lot of things they must do to demonstrate their openness and their reforms. I view the reforms of their political system and all of that as their business. But we have certain objective standards in terms of human rights that start with the exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union — and perhaps others who are persecuted there. We simply want to see results. Arnaud, we ought to be doing this. Moving prudently, not making bold proposals. I've spelled out a broad goal for the reintegration of the Soviet Union into the family of nations, and they ought to get the message. We don't want them to fail. We want them to succeed. Dick Cheney wants them to succeed. But I don't think you formulate a foreign policy or a defense policy based on what we want. You formulate it on the realities. So let the critics fire away. Let some of these editorial guys shoot away and say we ought to be doing a lot more. I'm just not going to be persuaded by that. It's not stubbornness, it's realism.

Q: When you say we want perestroika and glasnost to succeed, does that mean you want to help Gorbachev renovate his system, strengthen it?

A: With our eyes wide open. I want to do more trade with them, but I also want to make sure it's in the interests of the United States; do more arms control with them, but I want to be sure it's in the interests of the alliance. We're not going to make it so it's unilateral in order to encourage this. We have too grave a responsibility to keep our eyes open each step of the way.

Q: You don't expect them to go the route of a Western-style democracy?

A: No, not totally, but I was encouraged to see them have some of these hotly contested elections — and the next thing we know Roger Ailes will be over there. And that will be good for the side he goes over to support.

But I'm serious. We want to encourage that. Well, if

you say you would like the dream of the day, that they have total democracy and the freedoms we take for granted, I say absolutely. But am I going to base my policies as of today? No.

Q: Dick Cheney said on a recent talk show that down the road we could see the reunification of the two Germanies, beginning perhaps as you said with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. Is that roughly how you're thinking?

A: I'd love to see it. Anybody who looks back over his shoulder and then looks at the present and sees a country ripped asunder by division, a people asunder by political division, should say if you can get reunification on a proper basis, fine. I'm not suggesting that's going to happen immediately because [East Germany] seems to be behind Gorbachev's power curve, to say nothing of Bonn's power curve.

Q: You made Soviet assistance to Nicaragua a litmus test for improved relations with Moscow. Any movements? Why do you think Gorbachev thinks it's important to go on spending \$1 billion a year on a basket-case Marxist regime?

A: I think it's linked in some degree to the past. Present Soviet support is a bit of a hangover from this strong support for this faithful friend Fidel Castro. But if you were to start today, I would doubt that Mr. Gorbachev would put half a billion or a billion each year into Nicaragua. Even Europe is understanding now that the Sandinistas have denied their people the democracy over which the revolution was fought. So I would give Gorbachev this much credit. If he were starting today, I do not believe he would tell the boys in the Politburo, "Let's start spending a billion dollars on Nicaragua." So the answer is we've got to encourage him to get out of that business and do it on the basis of this whole move toward openness that is taking place in his own country.

Q: Any sign of movement?

A: Well, there could be. I'm not going to give up on it. I think it's very important and I would simply use this interview to reiterate my call to the Soviet Union to decouple [from Nicaragua]. I was very impressed with the Western Europeans the other day who pledged far less money to the Sandinistas than had been anticipated.

Q: It was still \$50 million.

A: In my view they shouldn't be doing it at all. There are a lot of countries down there that are democratic and deserve the support. I'm not saluting the fact that it was \$50 million instead of the \$150 million [Ortega] asked for. But I am saying that's progress. And we're going to continue to work with our friends in Europe to make them understand what the problem is. I had a long talk with Brian Mulroney about this, and I'm convinced we're going to make progress.

Q: Why are you seemingly more exercised about Noriega, who has not threatened canal operations, than about Ortega's Marxist regime that has been undermining U.S. interests throughout the area?

A: I'm not seemingly more, but you've had a cataclysmic event. You've had an election that was stolen right from under the eyes of the people. Under the eyes of the world. And you have another difference. You have 40,000 American citizens and quite a few American troops and the interests of the canal. Those ingredients are different than those you have in Nicaragua. In terms of abuse of human rights, there is a great similarity.

Philip Geyelin

A Promising Panama Policy

WASHINGTON POST
MAY 16, 1989
Pg. 21

Panama's political agony is awful to behold. But look at it this way: it was already awful before last week's electoral atrocities. It was also idle to expect a happy ending to Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega's odious rule. Brutish, crooked, drug-dealing despots do not easily accept early retirement at the hands of a democratic process.

By this reckoning, then, a case can be made that the Panamanian people came out ahead as a consequence of Noriega's ham-handed vote rigging. What they lost—an honest count—was never in the cards. What they gained goes beyond the general heightening of international sympathy and support. It goes specifically to U.S. policy. Out of the crucible of crisis, the Bush administration seems to have forged a bipartisan consensus on how to deal with Noriega in what looks like a reasonably principled, practical, coherent way.

Will it work? Almost certainly not as simply as President Bush made it sound in Saturday's hip-shooting session with reporters traveling on Air Force One. Few experts would count on the Panamanian Defense Forces, whose officer corps is packed with people no less thuggish than Noriega, to take their instructions from George Bush and throw Noriega out. Even fewer would agree with the president that it's just a question of removing "one man."

But the new Bush policy might work if it is given time—which is what the president apparently is prepared to do, judging from his rather more carefully considered formal statement last Thursday. Wisely, he took care not to raise the kind of extravagant expectations that characterized the Reagan administration's wobbly efforts to bring

down Noriega early last year. In March 1988, for example, assistant secretary of state Elliott Abrams had Noriega holding onto power "by his fingertips."

By May, it was clear that economic sanctions had done much more damage to the Panamanians than to Noriega. A variety of hare-brained schemes to remove Noriega by force had been bruited about and discarded. Attempts to bargain for his departure had collapsed. The level of bipartisanship was nicely reflected by New York's Democratic Sen. Alfonse D'Amato: the Reagan approach, he said, was like "setting your hair on fire and trying to put it out with a hammer."

The Bush approach, by vivid contrast, is almost a model of reasonable accommodation to inter-agency conflicts, partisan differences in Congress and the sensitivities of Latin American friends. True, the president couldn't resist a bracing swig of Old Jingo—the dispatch of American troops that has been a traditional fixture of U.S. policy in Central American crises and is still the resort of choice of the president's conservative constituency.

It's a close question whether adding 1,882 troops to the almost 11,000 already in Panama sends a sobering signal to Noriega or plays into his hands by reviving bitter memories, even among our best Latin friends, of "Yanqui imperialism." It is still less clear how the troop deployments contribute much, other than psychologically, to the accomplishment of what was presented as a strictly limited military mission: safeguarding the 50,000 or so U.S. citizens in Panama and defending the canal. But never mind; as administration officials were quick to emphasize, this is not the real hard stuff of old-fashioned military intervention.

More important, to the extent that the troop

movements gratify gunboat diplomatists on the political right, they made it easier for Bush to introduce into U.S. policy for Panama some vital elements that have been sadly missing through the Reagan years—elementary things, really, such as a decent regard for Panamanian sovereignty and national pride, genuine encouragement for what the president called "regional diplomacy" and, perhaps most important, strict U.S. commitment "to the integrity of the Panama Canal treaties."

The crisis in Panama is "a conflict between Noriega and the people of Panama," Bush said, getting off on the right foot. Again, he had his priorities straight when the first of his seven "steps" in pursuit of U.S. objectives was a flat statement of "strong" support for "initiatives taken by governments in this hemisphere to address this crisis." Specifically, he tossed the ball to the Organization of American States.

Now you could argue that this is fine talk but that the Panamanians are powerless and the OAS is notorious for empty posturing—good field, no hit. We will know soon enough when the organization meets this week whether it is any readier now than it has been in the past to live up to its treaty obligations. If it fails once again, there are other groupings available. If all collective action fails, those options will at least have been tried and tested and found wanting should a real need arise for unilateral U.S. action to protect its citizens and its security interests in the Panama Canal. It is this sense of lawful and orderly procedure that makes the Bush policy for Panama such a promising departure from the past.

TIME

MAY 22, 1989

Pg. 43

Noriega's Goon Squad

Members of the gang that carried out the bloody attack on Panama's opposition leaders last week did not try to hide their identities. In fact, they wore T-shirts advertising themselves as members of Batallón Dignidad, or the Dignity Battalion. It is one of at least 20 paramilitary squads, with a total membership estimated at 7,000 to 10,000, that were founded last year ostensibly to help block a Yanqui invasion that Manuel Antonio Noriega insisted was imminent. According to Bush Administration officials, the squads were created with help from a small group of Cuban advisers in Panama and modeled on similar militias formed by Fidel Castro shortly after the Cuban revolution. In addition to Dignity, there are the Christopher

Columbus Battalion, the St. Michael the Archangel Battalion and the Latin Liberation Battalion.

Battalion members receive military training from Panama Defense Force instructors, including practice in shooting and hand-to-hand combat. Authorities claim that recruits, who are promised a gun and modest stipend, come mainly from lower middle-class and rural backgrounds. But govern-

ment critics contend that the squads include convicted criminals released early from jail in exchange for signing up. Members of the Panama Defense Force also reportedly belong; opposition politicians say they have photographs of one man changing from his army fatigues into a Dignity shirt. And diplomats in Panama City insist they have proof that the Battalion member who clubbed vice-presidential candidate Guillermo Ford last week is a sergeant in the PDF.



On the attack in Panama City

Somebody Tell Bush We've Won the Cold War

By ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR.

Let's carry ourselves back to the beginning of the decade. Let's imagine for a moment that this is the summer of 1980, a few months after the Soviet Union had sent the Red Army into Afghanistan. And let's suppose that a clairvoyant appeared among us and uttered the following prophecy.

"Before this decade is over, the Soviet Union will admit failure in Afghanistan and pull out its troops. The Soviet leadership will admit that its system of economic planning has failed too, and it will begin to adopt the incentives and disciplines of the free market. Arthur Koestler's 'Darkness at Noon,' George Orwell's '1984,' even Robert Conquest's 'The Great Terror,' will be translated into Russian and published in Moscow. There will be debate on Soviet television, investigative reporting in the newspapers and free elections. My friends, you will be able to turn on your television in New York and watch political rallies in Russia in which candidates inveigh against the status quo. Sakharov will be out of disgrace, an honored member of the People's Congress, free to criticize at home and to travel abroad."

In 1980 we would have thought that if such things ever came to pass, the Cold War would be over, communism would be in decline, democracy would have triumphed, and we would be entering a new epoch in history.

Now the inconceivable has occurred. Mr. Gorbachev has wrought what only a few years ago we would have seen as a series of miracles. And this confronts us with what is for governments the most painful of necessities—fresh thought and new policies. So naturally we downgrade the significance of the Gorbachev revolution and fall back into the comfortable platitudes of the old Cold War.

One has the impression that our new president, a man of unimpeachable good will, is the prisoner of a bunch of foreign policy hacks whose idea is to meet every new problem with old clichés. The tone of Mr. Bush's speech at Texas A & M University on Friday was one of doubt and caution, with its emphasis on "deeds"—as if Mr. Gorbachev had not already done things that would have been regarded as unimaginable a decade ago—and its laying down of new "tests" to be passed before the Kremlin can "earn" a better relationship.

I doubt that it is useful for one great power to lay down tests for another great power to pass. How would we like it if Mr. Gorbachev laid down tests for us? Nor do Mr. Bush's five new tests seem nearly so consequential as those Mr. Gorbachev has

already passed on his own. And if he passes the new tests? Then, the President says, "we will match their steps with steps of our own."

And what are the steps with which we plan to match the steps taken by the man who is reversing the course of Bolshevik history? We will dust off President Eisenhower's old Open Skies proposal for reciprocal overflights (Mr. Bush noted that "the Kremlin failed that test" in 1955)—a fine idea a third of a century ago but superfluous in an age of satellite surveillance. And we will provide a "temporary waiver" of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, holding out the prospect of most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union. One hardly feels that the U.S. government is rising to a historic challenge.

Comparing President Bush's Texas A&M speech with President Kennedy's American University speech of 1963, one sees a fundamental difference in approach. President Kennedy began by saying, "We must re-examine our own attitude [toward the Soviet Union]—as individuals and as a Nation—for our attitude is as essential as theirs." The notion that our own attitude might be less than perfect and could be profitably reexamined is wholly absent from the Texas A&M speech.

At least the speech did put to rest the strange thought floated the other day by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney that he doesn't expect Mr. Gorbachev to last and, because "somebody who will be far more hostile" may replace him, we should be in no hurry to deal with him. Actually, when you think about it, Mr. Cheney advanced an argument for reaching agreements with the Soviet Union while Mr. Gorbachev is still around, not an argument against agreements with Mr. Gorbachev. The prospect of hostile leadership should spur us on to institutionalize arms control arrangements while there is still time.

The president also tacitly rejected another idea still muttered in some official circles and loudly proclaimed elsewhere—that the Soviet Union remains a nation "bent on world conquest"; that perestroika will only make the Soviet Union more efficient and dangerous than ever before; and

that therefore it is not in the American interest that perestroika succeed.

This is a hopelessly mechanical assessment, devoid of any comprehension of the dynamics of history. Mr. Gorbachev's reforms have already brought many changes in their wake—changes that reverberate throughout Soviet society and the Soviet mind. If perestroika and glasnost prevail, the Soviet Union will no doubt be a stronger country. But it will also be a very different country—and a communist country, by the classical definition, in name only. Glasnost, to put it simply, means the end of Soviet totalitarianism.

Communism today is a burnt-out case. Democracy—the polity based on choice—has indeed won the political argument, and the free market has won the economic argument. Half a century ago the Soviet Union exerted a certain magnetic attraction

on the west. Today the magnetic attraction runs powerfully in the opposite direction. I doubt that any sane person in Western Europe today envies the quality of life in the Soviet Union.

The collapse of the communist appeal and the triumph of the democratic appeal bear heavily on the administration's foolish quarrel with West Germany about battlefield nuclear weapons. If there is a crisis in NATO, most Europeans feel that it is caused not by Bonn's waywardness but by Washington's insistence on defunct ideas. Many Americans—including conservatives like Paul Nitze and Irving Kristol—agree.

Why are we so afraid to negotiate? One German view, as Adm. Elmar Schmahling, chief of the Federal Armed Forces Office for Studies and Exercises, writes in the current issue of World Policy Review, is that America does "not really want a quick reduction of the military confrontation in Western Europe, because it would mean a less pliable West Germany."

We offer other reasons. We say that, if we begin negotiations, we would not be able to resist pressure to eliminate battlefield nuclear weapons altogether. That is really a shaming reason. As Paul Nitze says, "To enter into negotiations does not mean that you have to concur in the other

The Washington Post _____
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The Wall Street Journal **A-18**
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
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The Chicago Tribune _____

Date **17 MAY 89**

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side's demands. We have had 20 years of experience in demonstrating the reverse." Moreover, the elimination of battlefield nuclear weapons in exchange for conventional-force reductions would not be such a bad deal.

The foreign policy hacks would respond that battlefield nuclear weapons are essential to prevent a Soviet invasion of Central Europe; or that the reduction of tactical nuclear power would invite the Finlandization of Western Europe. One wonders which decade they are living in. Anyone who thinks that an invasion of Western Europe is high on the list of Mr. Gorbachev's priorities should have his head examined.

And anyone who thinks that the prosperous democratic countries of the European Community are likely to succumb to the magnetism of so shabby and grim a country as the Soviet Union and move into the Soviet orbit should see the gritty new Soviet film "Little Vera," a fascinating by-product of glasnost. Finlandization is what is happening in Eastern Europe: that is, the democratization of economics and politics combined with an acceptance of Soviet leadership in foreign policy. Finlandization is not going to happen in Western Europe.

"I believe," Jeanne Kirkpatrick writes, "that Americans should enjoy rather than fear the changes under way in Eastern and Western Europe." She is right. Let us stop trivializing these historic transformations by running on about "public relations" battles and by calling every Soviet initiative "an obvious ploy . . . designed principally to create problems within the alliance," as National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft called the unilateral Soviet reduction of its short-range nuclear arms. Such shallow reactions will only guarantee American setbacks in what is not a public relations battle but a momentous political challenge.

We stand at a great turning point in history. The U.S. should provide leadership commensurate with the occasion. Think what Wilson or FDR or Eisenhower or Kennedy would have done with this opportunity! Even Ronald Reagan had the imagination and instinct to see that the world is changing (and signals of discontent with the new administration's old fogeyness are now being emitted from the former President's California retreat). George Bush deserves better counsel. It is not too late to seize the opportunity.

Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer professor of the humanities at the City University of New York and a winner of Pulitzer Prizes in history and biography.

William F. Buckley Jr.

Noriega the Treaty Violator

You can't get much more provocative than George Bush & Co. have got in their war of words against Gen. Manuel Noriega. Brent Scowcroft said of the regime in Panama that it is being run by a gangster. And Mr. Bush invited the people of Panama, using their own devices, to replace the regime.

We have avoided a military confrontation in Panama for pretty good reasons. The first of these is superficially understood by Americans who know that U.S. intervention in Latin America is all but universally deplored by Latin Americans. Americans who have lived there know the special intensity of the feeling.

To avoid a damaging backlash, it requires that a challenge to American responsibilities should be judged both

grave and reasonable. Such a challenge brought on the landing of the Marines in the Dominican Republic in 1965, done by President Johnson when he feared a military move there that might have had the effect of doing to the Dominican Republic what was done to Cuba—namely, satellization by the Soviet Union. When it came to a vote of the Organization of American States, only Mexico, which in foreign policy has been fellow-traveling since the defeat of the Loyalists in Spain, refused to condone the American move.

The difficulty the Bush administration now faces is that it has honed all of its rhetoric on the theme of the anti-democratic character of Gen. Noriega. In the recent season, Latin America has been gung-ho for democ-

racy, but this enthusiasm is not universal and may in any event prove as episodic as Bolivian democracy (Bolivia watchers await with ceremonial interest the day when they can celebrate the 50th military coup since Bolivia's independence). Latin Americans do not want U.S. Marines to land in Panama to instruct Panamanians on how to enforce a democratic polity.

But there are reasons for sending troops to depose Noriega that are unrelated to our preference for political democracy, and these have to do with the Panama Canal Treaties. Article IX of the first treaty denies to Panama any right under any circumstances to "interfere" with U.S. rights to protect the canal and personnel necessary to administer the canal. Article III obliges Panama to

provide police and other protections, and Article VIII specifies that U.S. installations within Panama "shall be inviolable."

Now *The Army Times*, beginning last April, has patiently chronicled a 13-month campaign of violations by the government of Panama of its obligations under the treaty. Eight thousand workers responsible for the operation of the canal and 25,000 U.S. residents have in diverse ways been harassed. The *Army Times* estimates at well over 1,000 the violations by Noriega's Panama Defense Force of rights that the treaty obliges it to respect. William Gianelli, the chairman of the Panama Canal Commission, said last March that the commission may be unable to guarantee

unimpeded passage to ships using the canal.

It would be quite mistaken to abrogate the treaty in reaction to these infractions: nothing would more quickly propel the three-quarters of the Panamanian community that dislikes Noriega to return to his fold. But to assert our own rights under the treaty by bringing down the tyrant recently rejected by his own people would be intervention in the form of an assertion of rights guaranteed by the treaty's sponsors. Gen. Omar Torrijos, the dead tyrant revered by the Panamanians for negotiating the treaty, said of it on one occasion that "we are agreeing to a treaty of neutrality which places us under the protection of the Pentagon."

It is at this point that the Bush

administration should consider a better use for Jimmy Carter than to send him down as a redundant witness to the corruption of the electoral process. Jimmy Carter negotiated the treaty and is held in great respect in the area for having done so. It is entirely appropriate that he should call for the removal of the Panamanian impostor who has committed acts of aggression in violation of the explicit commitments of the Panama Canal Treaty.

We need a better springboard for action than any we can get from our differentiated calls for democracy (why didn't we insist on it in Paraguay?). Mr. Carter can render us useful service, and this is the perfect time to hear from him.

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U.S. Offers to On Battlefield Arms, But With Stiff Terms

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 19 — The United States is willing to hold negotiations with the Soviet Union on reducing short-range nuclear missiles in Europe, provided some stiff conditions are met, Western officials said today.

The American offer, which could resolve the dispute over nuclear short-range missiles that has divided the Western alliance, would require an agreement to reduce conventional arms, and actual reductions in such weapons, before talks begin on short-range missiles. In addition, the West would rule out the elimination of the missiles, among other conditions.

The dispute over short-range missiles flared up last month when Bonn insisted that talks be opened soon on reducing the weapons, which would generally be used against targets in East Germany.

The Bush Administration initially strongly rebuffed Bonn's request, arguing that such talks would create strong public pressure to negotiate a ban on the weapons. Such a ban, the Administration argued, would further Moscow's aim of "denuclearizing" Europe and leave the Soviets at an advantage.

The American position was conveyed to the West German Defense Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, who completed talks here today with top American officials.

Mr. Stoltenberg said shortly before leaving that Bonn and Washington were moving toward a compromise over the short-range missile issue.

Mr. Stoltenberg said Bonn and Washington were moving toward a "rapprochement," who added that important details, including the exact conditions that would have to be met before short-range missile talks are held, still need to be worked out.

Further consultations also need to be carried out with other NATO nations, including Britain, which today reiterated

its opposition to American-Soviet talks on short-range nuclear missiles.

"We have opposed such talks and we see no reason to change our position," said a senior British official, who indicated that Washington and London had held high-level consultations on the issue in recent days.

An American official said securing British consent to such talks "is going to be a real problem."

Mr. Stoltenberg was careful to avoid a detailed discussion of the issues that remain to be resolved in his comments today. While indicating that Bonn and Washington were moving to bridge their difference, he stressed that "work still needs to be done."

'Explicit Conditions'

A State Department spokesman said that American and West German officials exchanged papers during the two days of talks. The West Germans presented a paper on Thursday. The Americans made changes and returned the paper to the Germans shortly before Mr. Stoltenberg departed for Bonn today.

The State Department spokesman said that the American proposal outlines "a number of explicit conditions that must be met before it is appropriate to consider negotiations."

"We have received no response yet. As far as we know there is no agreement," the spokesman said.

Mr. Stoltenberg plans to meet with Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on

Sunday to discuss the elements of a possible compromise on the issue. Mr. Genscher has been the strongest advocate in the West German coalition Government for talks on short-range nuclear missiles. West German officials say they hope that an agreement can be reached by early next week on the key conditions for such negotiations.

Stance Under Reagan

President Bush met today with Defense Secretary Dick Cheney; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William J. Crowe Jr.; the White House national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and others to discuss the NATO summit meeting at the end of this month and other issues.

The Bush Administration's new stand on short-range missile talks appears to be somewhat more flexible than the position initially emphasized by Administration officials. The Bush Administration initially responded to the West German insistence on talks by declaring that holding such talks would be a mistake.

But the latest stand by the Administration is generally consistent with the position taken by Reagan Administration officials when the issue of negotiating reductions in short-range nuclear missiles first arose two years ago.

In 1987, Reagan Administration officials told reporters that the United States would be willing to hold negotiations on short-range missiles after agreements reducing conventional arms and banning chemical weapons.

U.S. Eyes Three Nations For Unfair-Trading List

Japan, India and Brazil May Be Cited

By Stuart Auerbach
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush's top economic advisers are homing in on three countries, including Japan, to be named as "unfair" traders, but they are likely to omit South Korea and the European Community from the list of nations facing possible sanctions, administration sources said yesterday.

But the sources emphasized that the Cabinet-level Economic Policy Council still is sharply divided over how to handle the trade law's requirement that the nations be singled out. A list of options is still being prepared for presentation to Bush next week.

U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills is expected to announce by next Thursday the countries and trade practices the administration considers unfair under the so-called "Super 301" provision of the law.

Administration sources said South Korea so far escaped being named during the deliberations because of a series of last-minute market liberalizing moves and a feeling that the fragile democracy there would be harmed if Seoul was singled out.

"If Korea's concessions are as good as advertised, they are a strong argument for the architecture of the Super 301 and for an assertive U.S. trade policy," said William T. Archey, international vice president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

It was unclear why the 12-nation EC is not likely to be on the list, although the Europeans have taken an aggressive attitude against the trade law—threatening to challenge it under international trade rules and declaring that they would not negotiate under the gun of possible retaliation.

Sources said the economic council is likely to propose a list of options

that would include defying Congress by doing nothing—being pushed by Michael Boskin, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and Richard G. Darman, director of the Office of Management and Budget—or drawing up a list of countries so large it would render the Super 301 process meaningless.

But administration officials said the options with the broadest support among the advisers would target three countries: Japan, for its barriers to imports of U.S. satellites and supercomputers to the government and for lumber standards that effectively limit sales of American-made plywood; India, for its restrictions on foreign investment and bans on foreign insurance; and Brazil, for its licensing requirements on foreign trade.

Sources said a majority of the Economic Policy Council appears to be coalescing around naming the three countries and the six unfair trade practices, although there is still some support for listing the practices in a way that would not single out sensitive allies.

In the Cabinet debates, Secretary of State James A. Baker III and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft have emphasized the importance of retaining Japan as a strong ally and noted that overly tough actions could undermine U.S. security interests. Japan also is seen as being of crucial importance in financing the U.S. budget deficit by purchasing Treasury bonds.

One administration source said senior officials—including Brady, Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher and White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu—now are trying to package the list in a way that provides the

maximum domestic gain for Bush while causing the least political pain among overseas trading partners.

Japan, paralyzed by a political scandal that has forced the resignation of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, appears resigned to being targeted under the provision, though there have been calls in Tokyo for trade retaliation if Japan is named.

South Korea appears to have escaped being put on the list through a series of major concessions made recently. These moves eliminated most of the trade barriers Washington has been complaining about, and included liberalizing foreign investment rules and eliminating import barriers.

Chinese Americans, Students React With Pride, Concern to Protests Hundreds to Rally in Support at Dupont Circle

By Evelyn Hsu
Washington Post Staff Writer

For days, architect Alfred H. Liu has read the newspapers and watched television news reports on student demonstrations in China with a mixture of hope and dread.

Liu, who designed the Chinatown arch that symbolizes the friendship between the District of Columbia and its sister city Beijing, said he hopes that demands for more democracy in China might be met.

But he expressed fears that events would get out of hand, leading to the chaos of another Cultural Revolution or to a conservative backlash and a military crackdown that appeared imminent yesterday.

"China cannot afford it," Liu, 47, said in an interview this week.

His comments were echoed by other members of the Washington area's Chinese American community, a diverse group of about 30,000 that is spread around the Capital Beltway and includes longtime residents, recent immigrants, young professionals and students from Taiwan and China.

Those interviewed said they had watched with mounting interest as 1 million demonstrators or more at a time gathered in Beijing's main square. They were united in their concern for the students and sympathetic to their wishes for greater democracy and freedom of expression. All expressed wonderment and some worry at what might happen next.

"I think the demonstrations have been good," said Margaret P. Chao, 37, a lawyer. "I don't think communism is right for China. I'd like to see China as a democracy and I think [the students] do, too."

"I think it's a very good movement," said Jeannie Zhong, 28, a waitress at a restaurant in D.C.'s Chinatown who immigrated to the United States from China three years ago.

In China, "lots of people who work in government are very greedy. They take money and they don't do anything. The people's living costs are rising. That's why even workers . . . are joining in the demonstrations," she said.

Yesterday, as troops began to enter Beijing, worry grew for the fate of the students.

"I'm keeping my fingers crossed," said Nien Cheng, a Northwest Washington resident and the author of "Life and Death in Shanghai," an account of her imprisonment of more than six years during China's violent Cultural Revolution.

"I'm worried about the students," Cheng said. "I hope it's just to frighten them, not to open fire."

For Cheng, these recent demonstrations provided a sweet moment. During the Cultural Revolution her daughter died, and Cheng suffered hunger, illness and imprisonment at the hands of the radical youths called the Red Guards.

"The Red Guards were just wild. They burned books. They set China back," she said. "Now 23 years later, a new generation has emerged. These student demonstrators are so well-organized and disciplined. They want to move China forward. That's very encouraging to someone like me."

The turmoil in China was not reflected at the Chinese Embassy on Connecticut Avenue NW yesterday. It was quiet and the street empty of crowds. An embassy employee said, "Everybody is watching TV."

That may change this morning when hundreds of Chinese students are expected to gather in front of the embassy and at noon at Dupont Circle to protest the threatened military crackdown in Beijing. The protest is being organized by the Association of Chinese Students and Scholars in the U.S.

"The demonstration is to support the students back home and to demand democracy and freedom for all Chinese people," said Xiao Ping Yuan, 29, a graduate student at the University of Maryland's College Park campus.

Protest organizer William Zhang said, "China must go in the direction of economic reforms," and added that Chinese students in the United States "are very concerned about the possibility of bloodshed" in China.

Students from Taiwan also are watching the events in China with great interest. "We want to support the students. We are impressed by their bravery," said Alexander C. Huang, a doctoral candidate at George Washington University and a member of the Republic of China Student Association of Greater Washington. The group represents some students from Taiwan.

Others support the student demonstrations but with a special twist to their reasoning.

"We would like China to be democratic so we can sit down and resolve the problems between Taiwan and China," said Jason J. Huang, chairman of the Washington chapter of the Taiwanese Association of America. The group advocates allowing the people of Taiwan to choose whether they want to reunite with China, a view that puts them in opposition to policies of the ruling Nationalist government of Taiwan and its claim to represent all of China.

Montgomery County resident Kung-Lee Wang was in Beijing last month as the student demonstrations began.

Wang, 63, a trade and marketing consultant who travels to China often, said the student protests "struck a sympathetic chord" among the Chinese people who are frustrated with rising food prices and official corruption. "No matter what happens, this is a turning point," Wang said yesterday.

Upon his return from China, Wang joined with about 100 other Chinese Americans across the country in signing a letter asking that the Chinese government listen to the demonstrators.

"The patriotism of these Chinese youths has moved us profoundly . . . their bold action and rational requests have won much admiration from all of us," said the letter addressed to Han Xu, China's ambassador to the United States.

Staff writer Karlyn Barker contributed to this report.

Panama Crisis an Early Test . . .

It's remarkable that George Bush got a honeymoon at all, after the tenor of last year's election campaign. But Washington, charmed by Bush's ingratiating bipartisanship and (in Congress's case) transfixed by problems of its own, bestowed one. So did the rest of the world, largely because Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev's own grand plans also entail flagons of charm.

Then came Manuel A. Noriega. The Panamanian dictator's brazen annulment of his nation's May 7 presidential election demanded that Bush react swiftly to a crisis almost entirely beyond his control and offered everyone else a first chance to judge whether he is as deft in making foreign policy as he's long asserted. "The whole world was watching," Bush said of Noriega on May 11 while describing his Administration's countermeasures. But it was true of Bush as well. For his decision making entailed striking a series of delicate balances both on the ground in Panama and politically at home.

In the West Wing, an electricity pervaded the air on May 10-11 as Bush and his advisers, in a swirl of meetings, crystallized their decisions. This culminated what press secretary Marlin Fitzwater described as a "very methodical and structured process" that had started at least two weeks earlier, when election fraud seemed in prospect. National security adviser Brent Scowcroft played the crucial role, a senior White House aide said—coordinating the National Security Council process that thrashed through the policy options and "being the person the President relied on to see he had up-to-the-minute information." Also deeply involved were deputy secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger (on behalf of Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who was in touch by telephone from Moscow), Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and White House chief of staff John H. Sununu, who is "listened to," the aide said. "Scowcroft respects him." CIA director William H. Webster, Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., Vice President Dan Quayle and Bernard W. Aronson—nominated but not yet confirmed as assistant secretary of State for interAmerican affairs—were also on hand.

Bush faced an age-old diplomatic quandary: what to do when there's nothing to do but you have to do something. The Administration never seriously considered doing nothing. "Doing nothing in the face of public beatings and blatant fraud?" an aide asked incredulously, referring to Noriega's attempt to fix the outcome of the election—in which the opposition was widely believed to have trounced Noriega's candidate—and then having the opposition's leaders beaten.

"We could not have stood by and watched this thievery by this thug and not done something," Eagleburger said on ABC's *This Week with David Brinkley* on May 14. Had Bush done so after having repeatedly called for free and fair elections and having dispatched a U.S. delegation to stand watch, it "would have seemed that in the U.S., no one was minding the store," said Peter Hakim, staff director at Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based group of North and South American business and government leaders.


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*White House
Notebook*

BY BURT SOLOMON

would swiftly bring Noriega's downfall. Economic sanctions, which President Reagan imposed a year ago and Bush has now continued, have pretty well spared Noriega but diffusely injured Panamanians, notably the middle class, the backbone of Noriega's opposition. But stronger measures such as military intervention could easily boomerang by infuriating Latin American governments or—the worst outcome—prompting sabotage of the strategically vital Panama Canal or threats to the 51,305 Americans living near it. Congressional officials suggested to Bush at least twice that he pursue a military option (when he met on May 9 with the delegation of observers headed by Rep. John P. Murtha, D-Pa., and in a May 11 session with congressional leaders), but neither time did he respond. A Bush aide said he "heard nothing within the White House or the Administration" to suggest that military intervention was a live possibility. The real choice, Hakim surmised, was whether to dispatch a symbolic contingent of troops or one large enough to intimate impending military action.

Politically, Bush's decision entailed tiptoeing through a minefield. Besides being part of an Administration that impotently sought Noriega's ouster after he was indicted on federal drug-trafficking charges in Florida early last year, Bush has his own prickly history with the strongman. During last year's campaign, Bush was dogged by charges that he had learned of Noriega's alleged drug involvement earlier than he'd admitted. Democratic presidential nominee Michael S. Dukakis repeatedly raised the issue, while press accounts sketched the 20-year Bush-Noriega relationship. *The New*



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
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... Of Bush Foreign Policy Skills

York Times reported "several occasions" over the years when Bush was "confronted with evidence [of] Gen. Noriega's misconduct," and a vice presidential aide acknowledged that Bush, while CIA director in 1976, had met with Noriega, who had long supplied information to the CIA. It also was disclosed that Noriega in 1985-86 had hired Stuart K. Spencer, a longtime Reagan adviser who supervised Quayle's vice presidential campaign, as an adviser and Washington lobbyist. This pitter-patter of charges didn't wound Bush last year but conceivably still could, especially if questions about his role in the Iran-contra affair keep growing.

For Bush, Panama poses a political danger of another sort: It's been a proven source of passion among conservative activists, who don't perfectly trust him as one of their own. Conservatives' surprisingly stiff challenge to ratification of the Panama Canal treaties signed by President Carter in 1977 signified their arrival on the national political scene. Those passions are mostly spent. "I'm not sure conservatives want to go back and refight that battle," because they've gone on to others since then, said Bill Rhatigan, who supervised publicity for the anti-treaties campaign and now is senior vice president of the Susan Davis Cos., a Washington-based public relations firm. Conservatives harbor "a kind of I-told-you-so feeling" about the treaties, William H. Kling, director of the Free Congress Center for Foreign Policy, said, but "I haven't heard any conservatives today saying we ought to be slapping leather and going in" to upend Noriega militarily.

For Bush, this eases the political risks but doesn't erase them. Among conservatives, there remains "a surprising passion out there" over Panama, American Conservative Union executive director Daniel L. Casey said. Activist Howard J. Phillips is trying to mobilize conservatives to abrogate the treaties, which Sen. Connie Mack III, R-Fla.—a member of Bush's election-watching delegation—already favors. This effort isn't likely to go far, absent a threat to the canal or Americans' safety. But the peculiar sight of Jimmy Carter—long a butt for Republican blame—dispensing advice at Bush's right hand (having co-chaired his own delegation of observers) suggests the delicacy of Bush's political task.

That there were no good options didn't mean, after all, that one of them wasn't least bad—and there are indications that Bush found it. Arriving at decisions in his advisers' presence after debates described as light on discord, Bush plotted a diplomatic course of speaking loudly while carrying a small stick and wiggling a heftier one in reserve.

The gentlemanly President, who'd said only nice things


about his adversaries since the night he was elected, heaped contempt on Panama's strongman, calling on Panamanians to overthrow "this man and a handful of these Doberman thugs." He also announced a package of measured moves—dispatching nearly 2,000 troops to Panama, recalling the U.S. ambassador, ordering American civilians to safety and seeking to enlist Latin American democratic leaders to press Noriega to quit. At the same time, he carefully reiterated U.S. adherence to the treaties, which are to turn the canal over to Panama in 1999, while refusing to drop Noriega's drug indictments.

By themselves, Administration officials acknowledged, these steps won't bring Noriega down. ("We can always hope he will see the error of his ways," Scowcroft told reporters.) They are hoping instead to orchestrate international sentiment to gradually increase the pressure on Noriega to quit.

There's a chance this might work. "He made all the right moves," Hakim said of Bush. Sending a brigade's worth of troops provides some psychological protection to Americans there, he said, and a warning to Panama's leaders to show restraint, which in turn could calm the situation so that diplomacy can proceed. A stronger response, he noted, might have undone the other key piece of Bush's plan—pursuit of the sort of multilateral diplomacy that Dukakis championed last year. That could affect Panama's political dynamics "to some degree," Hakim said, recalling the region's role in ousting Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza in 1979.

Politically, too, Bush seems to have struck a golden mean. His policy on Panama drew precious little criticism on Capitol Hill. Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, D-Conn., chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs, reported "virtual unanimity" for Bush's stance. A *USA Today* opinion poll found that 56 per cent of the public adjudged Bush "about right" in his moves, while smaller, equally sized groups thought he'd done too much (18 per cent) or too little (17 per cent).

It was hardly the first time in Bush's long career or young presidency that he's evidenced a talent for balancing competing interests. In deciding between the MX and Midgetman missiles by choosing both or in altering his position on assault weapons after the political calculus shifted, Bush seemed instinctively to tend toward a political vector sum of everyone's desires. To Bush's fortune, the politically judicious decision on Panama also perhaps was the best. Should an irascible dictator's shenanigans change that, though, a placating President's next policy dilemma may be trickier. □



Homecoming for a Queen

White House Welcomes Jordan's King Hussein and Former Washingtonian Noor

By Lois Romano
and Martha Sherrill
Washington Post Staff Writers

The sparkle and glamor of royalty touched the Bush White House for the first time yesterday evening, when King Hussein of Jordan floated through the North Portico with his American-born queen, Noor. It's been nearly three years since this royal couple set foot in the Grand House on Pennsylvania Avenue and, of course, there was no hint of an earlier strain.

"War must give way to peace," said George Bush in a warm toast after a dinner in Hussein's honor. "This visit today by the king of Jor-

dan comes at a crucial moment in your region's history," Bush continued. "I think the king summed it up well today when he told me that 'the time is right.' Let me assure you, sir, that we can sense an urgency to the quest for peace now. Our task is to use that urgency to seize the moment . . .

"Let's reduce suspicion and prepare the way for negotiations which will lead to the comprehensive settlement that everybody wants," he said. "I will work with you, sir . . . to finalize a peace that is so secure that not a single child will know the horrors of battle."

The monarch's reply expressed an equally strong commitment to

peace. "It is clear that the kinder, gentler America of which you have spoken begins in this house," Hussein said. "As I assured you this morning, Jordan will cooperate closely with the United States to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace. We will support you in all your endeavors.

"And God willing, it will be our contribution for a better future for generations to come on both sides."

Hussein arrived here on Monday, the third Middle East leader in three weeks to come through Washington for Arab-Israeli peace strategy talks. Although Hussein's involvement is considered crucial to Middle East peace, he has resisted an official trip

to Washington until now because he reportedly has been disturbed with the United States' actions—or lack of—in the region's conflict.

But all seemed smoothed over early yesterday as the king and George Bush posed for photos and talked publicly of progress. After the serious matters were dispensed with in the morning and everyone finished praising each other, Bush treated his guest to a tour of Mount Vernon in what has become the president's "Let's do Washington" approach to foreign visitors. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak got to go to a baseball game earlier in the month, and Israeli Prime Minister

W

White House Dinner for Hussein ...

Yitzhak Shamir was squired to the Air & Space Museum for a screening of the acclaimed movie "To Fly."

The president and Barbara Bush also hosted a formal dinner for each of the Middle East leaders. Like the events in honor of Mubarak and Shamir, last night's affair was billed as a "working dinner" rather than a more ceremonial state dinner. But of the three, this was the most glittery, in large part because of the presence of Queen Noor. The former Lisa Halaby has long been a social and sentimental favorite of Washington, her home town. Members of her family—her father and her mother, who are divorced, as well as her sister and brother—were included on the guest list last night, as in the past.

The Husseins arrived at the White House at about 7:15, she in a striking navy chiffon gown, he in a tux. Her honey-colored hair was coiffed into a tall French twist. The 37-year-old willowy queen towered nearly a head over her husband. The cameras seemed fixated on her.

The 120 guests, dressed for a regal occasion, were invited to dinner at the White House at 7 p.m. but began straggling through the side-door East Wing entrance at 7:15 and kept arriving until as late as 7:45. Some never made it to the proper entrance at all. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and his wife Jill seemed a little harried as they arrived at the North Portico (the front door) at 7:40.

The affair took place on Passover, which could have kept Jews from at-

tending. According to Anna Perez, Barbara Bush's press secretary, the date was selected to accommodate Hussein. The only guest to request a special meal, Perez said, was Mstislav Rostropovich, in observance of the Russian Orthodox Lent.

Movie director George Lucas turned up on the arm of Queen Noor's sister, Alexa Halaby. There was some buzzing on the White House Lawn afterward that they are currently an item.

Lucas, asked what his connection to Jordan is, replied, "Because we just finished filming a movie there—'Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade.'"

Chicago Bears coach Mike Ditka—in a silvery bow tie and terrific tan—arrived with his wife Diana and spent time talking to reporters about the new International Football League. "It'll be a great opportunity for them to learn about the game," he said, referring to the world of people out there unfamiliar with American-style football. He had traveled in Europe before and played there. He said, "I think they enjoyed what they saw, but I don't think they understood it."

Pearl Bailey, in a black lace dress and her Presidential Medal of Freedom, walked in with a huge smile and described one of her necklaces—a diamond pendant that was given to her by Anwar Sadat. It is inscribed with "Walk with God" in Arabic.

Once inside, the guests sat under twinkling chandeliers in the State Dining Room and ate salmon and duckling from Nancy Reagan's very red china. After dinner everyone was ushered into the East Room for a concert. National Symphony Orchestra music director and cellist Rostropovich performed with pianist Lambert Orkis.

The guest list for last night's White House dinner for the king of Jordan:

King Hussein bin Talal and Queen Noor al-Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 Prince Abdullah Hussein
 Prime Minister Zaid Rifai and Muna Rifai
 Field Marshal Shari Shaker and Nawzat Shaker
 Adnan Odeh, political adviser to King Hussein
 Amer Khamash, private adviser to King Hussein
 Marwan Kasim, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs
 Abdullah Salah, representative of Jordan to the United Nations, and Fadwa Salah
 Hussein A. Hammami, ambassador of Jordan, and Silvana Hammami
 Noor Izziddin
 Lillian Aronow, president, Mason D'Etre
 Donald J. Atwood, deputy secretary of defense-designate, and Sue Atwood
 Pearl Bailey, singer, and Louis Bellson
 James A. Baker, secretary of state, and Susan Baker
 Sam Barmieh, chairman of American Intertrade Group Inc., and Nida Barmieh
 Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) and Jill Biden
 Randall Brooks, actress
 Marvin P. Bush and Margaret Bush
 Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and Rose Cochran
 Fred Cooper, of Atlanta, and Helen Cooper
 Ben Crenshaw, golfer, and Julie Crenshaw
 Mike Ditka, coach of the Chicago Bears, and Diana Ditka
 Richard M. Fairbanks III, attorney, and Ann Fairbanks
 Edwin J. Feulner Jr., president, Heritage Foundation, and Linda Feulner
 Philip L. Geyelin, columnist, The Washington Post, and Sherry Geyelin
 Ed R. Haggard, of Dallas, and Patty Haggard
 Alexa Halaby, sister of Queen Noor
 Christian Halaby, brother of Queen Noor, and Betsy Halaby
 Doris Halaby, mother of Queen Noor
 Najme E. Halaby, father of Queen Noor, and Allison Halaby
 Paul Mare, acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs

Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) and LaVerne Rostenkowski
 Mstislav Rostropovich, music director, National Symphony Orchestra
 Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the president for national security affairs
 John R. Silber, president of Boston University, and Kathryn Silber
 Jackson T. Stephens, Little Rock, Ark., and Mary Anne Stephens
 Roscoe S. Suddarth, ambassador to Jordan, and daughter Anne V. Suddarth
 Joseph Sullivan, Bomont Industries, and Eileen Sullivan
 John H. Sununu, chief of staff to the president, and Nancy Sununu
 Prince Talal, nephew of King Hussein
 Richard N. Viets, former ambassador to Jordan, and daughter Alexandra Viets
 James D. Watkins, secretary of energy, and Sheila Watkins
 William H. Webster, director of central intelligence
 C. David Welch, director, Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, National Security Council, and Gretchen Welch
 John F. Welch, chairman, General Electric Co., and Jane Welch

Ray L. Hunt, chairman, Hunt Consolidated Inc., and Nancy Ann Hunt
 Tom Kean, governor of New Jersey, and Deborah Kean
 Anthony M. Kennedy, Supreme Court justice, and Mary Kennedy
 Baine P. Kerr, Houston, and Mildred Kerr
 Nemir Kirdar and Nada Kirdar
 Jay Kislak, Kislak Co., and Jean Kislak
 George Lucas, film director and producer
 Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.)
 Robert C. Macauley, Americares, and Leila Macauley
 Wales Madden III, Amarillo, Tex., and Abbie Madden
 Rep. Joseph M. McDade (R-Pa.) and Sarah McDade
 Keith McNamara, Columbus, Ohio, and Mary Lou McNamara
 Rep. Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.) and Corinne Michel
 Willie Morris, author
 William R. Neale, Indianapolis, and Carolyn Neale
 Constance B. Newman, director-designate, Office of Personnel Management
 Mike Nichols, director, and Diane Sawyer, ABC-TV correspondent
 David Peake, Houston, and Ann Peake
 Scott Pierce, Rye, N.Y., and Jan Pierce
 George Pillsbury, Minneapolis, and Sally Pillsbury
 Vice President Dan Quayle and Marilyn Quayle
 Joseph V. Reed Jr., chief of protocol, and Marie Reed
 Marion G. (Pat) Robertson, Christian Broadcasting Network, and Dede Robertson

White House Dinner for Hussein ...

Yitzhak Shamir was squired to the Air & Space Museum for a screening of the acclaimed movie "To Fly."

The president and Barbara Bush also hosted a formal dinner for each of the Middle East leaders. Like the events in honor of Mubarak and Shamir, last night's affair was billed as a "working dinner" rather than a more ceremonial state dinner. But of the three, this was the most glittery, in large part because of the presence of Queen Noor. The former Lisa Halaby has long been a social and sentimental favorite of Washington, her home town. Members of her family—her father and her mother, who are divorced, as well as her sister and brother—were included on the guest list last night, as in the past.

The Husseins arrived at the White House at about 7:15, she in a striking navy chiffon gown, he in a tux. Her honey-colored hair was coiffed into a tall French twist. The 37-year-old willowy queen towered nearly a head over her husband. The cameras seemed fixated on her.

The 120 guests, dressed for a regal occasion, were invited to dinner at the White House at 7 p.m. but began straggling through the side-door East Wing entrance at 7:15 and kept arriving until as late as 7:45. Some never made it to the proper entrance at all. Sen. Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and his wife Jill seemed a little harried as they arrived at the North Portico (the front door) at 7:40.

The affair took place on Passover, which could have kept Jews from at-

tending. According to Anna Perez, Barbara Bush's press secretary, the date was selected to accommodate Hussein. The only guest to request a special meal, Perez said, was Mstislav Rostropovich, in observance of the Russian Orthodox Lent.

Movie director George Lucas turned up on the arm of Queen Noor's sister, Alexa Halaby. There was some buzzing on the White House Lawn afterward that they are currently an item.

Lucas, asked what his connection to Jordan is, replied, "Because we just finished filming a movie there—'Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade.'"

Chicago Bears coach Mike Ditka—in a silvery bow tie and terrific tan—arrived with his wife Diana and spent time talking to reporters about the new International Football League. "It'll be a great opportunity for them to learn about the game," he said, referring to the world of people out there unfamiliar with American-style football. He had traveled in Europe before and played there. He said, "I think they enjoyed what they saw, but I don't think they understood it."

Pearl Bailey, in a black lace dress and her Presidential Medal of Freedom, walked in with a huge smile and described one of her necklaces—a diamond pendant that was given to her by Anwar Sadat. It is inscribed with "Walk with God" in Arabic.

Once inside, the guests sat under twinkling chandeliers in the State Dining Room and ate salmon and duckling from Nancy Reagan's very red china. After dinner everyone was ushered into the East Room for a concert. National Symphony Orchestra music director and cellist Rostropovich performed with pianist Lambert Orkis.

The guest list for last night's White House dinner for the king of Jordan:

King Hussein bin Talal and Queen Noor al-Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
 Prince Abdullah Hussein
 Prime Minister Zaid Rifai and Muna Rifai
 Field Marshal Shari Zaid Shaker and Nawzat Shaker
 Adnan Odeh, political adviser to King Hussein
 Amer Khamash, private adviser to King Hussein
 Marwan Kasim, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs
 Abdullah Saleh, representative of Jordan to the United Nations, and Fadwa Saleh
 Hussein A. Hammami, ambassador of Jordan, and Silvana Hammami
 Noor Izziddin
 Lillian Aronow, president, Maison D'Etre
 Donald J. Atwood, deputy secretary of defense-designate, and Sue Atwood
 Pearl Bailey, singer, and Louis Bellson
 James A. Baker, secretary of state, and Susan Baker
 Sam Bamveh, chairman of American Intertrade Group Inc., and Nida Bamveh
 Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.) and Jill Biden
 Randall Brooks, actress
 Marvin P. Bush and Margaret Bush
 Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and Rose Cochran
 Fred Cooper, of Atlanta, and Helen Cooper
 Ben Crenshaw, golfer, and Julie Crenshaw
 Mike Ditka, coach of the Chicago Bears, and Diana Ditka
 Richard M. Fairbanks III, attorney, and Ann Fairbanks
 Edwin J. Feulner Jr., president, Heritage Foundation, and Linda Feulner
 Philip L. Geyelin, columnist, The Washington Post, and Sherry Geyelin
 Ed R. Haggard, of Dallas, and Patty Haggard
 Alexa Halaby, sister of Queen Noor
 Christian Halaby, brother of Queen Noor, and Betsy Halaby
 Doris Halaby, mother of Queen Noor
 Naim E. Halaby, father of Queen Noor, and Allison Halaby
 Paul Hare, acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs

Rep. Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) and LaVerne Rostenkowski
 Mstislav Rostropovich, music director, National Symphony Orchestra

Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the president for national security affairs

John R. Silber, president of Boston University, and Kathryn Silber

Jackson T. Stephens, Little Rock, Ark., and Mary Anne Stephens

Roscoe S. Suddarth, ambassador to Jordan, and daughter Anne V. Suddarth

Joseph Sullivan, Bomont Industries, and Eileen Sullivan
 John H. Sununu, chief of staff to the president, and Nancy Sununu

Prince Talal, nephew of King Hussein
 Richard N. Viets, former ambassador to Jordan, and daughter Alexandra Viets

James D. Watkins, secretary of energy, and Sheila Watkins
 William H. Webster, director of central intelligence

C. David Welch, director, Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, National Security Council, and Gretchen Welch

John F. Welch, chairman, General Electric Co., and Jane Welch

Ray L. Hunt, chairman, Hunt Consolidated Inc., and Nancy Ann Hunt

Tom Kean, governor of New Jersey, and Deborah Kean
 Anthony M. Kennedy, Supreme Court justice, and Mary Kennedy

Barnie P. Kerr, Houston, and Mildred Kerr
 Nemir Kirdar and Nada Kirdar

Jay Kislak, Kislak Co., and Jean Kislak
 George Lucas, film director and producer

Sen. Richard G. Lugar (R-Ind.)
 Robert C. Macauley, Americas, and Lela Macauley

Wales Madden III, Amarillo, Tex., and Abbie Madden
 Rep. Joseph M. McDade (R-Pa.) and Sarah McDade

Keith McNamara, Columbus, Ohio, and Mary Lou McNamara
 Rep. Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.) and Connie Michel

Willie Morris, author
 William R. Neale, Indianapolis, and Carolyn Neale

Constance B. Newman, director-designate, Office of Personnel Management
 Mike Nichols, director, and Diane Sawyer, ABC-TV correspondent

David Peake, Houston, and Ann Peake
 Scott Pierce, Rye, N.Y., and Jan Pierce

George Pillsbury, Minneapolis, and Sally Pillsbury
 Vice President Dan Quayle and Marilyn Quayle

Joseph V. Reed Jr., chief of protocol, and Marie Reed
 Marion G. (Pat) Robertson, Christian Broadcasting Network, and Dede Robertson

BAKER SAYS WORRY ABOUT CHINA RISES

Asserts U.S. Wants Freedom
and Democracy but Does
Not Want Instability

By BERNARD WEINRAUB
Special to The New York Times

KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine, May 20
— Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d said today that the Bush Administration was increasingly concerned about China's political crisis.

"I don't think it would be in the best interests of the United States for us to see significant instability in the People's Republic of China, just like I don't think it's in the best interests of the United States for us to see significant instability in the Soviet," Mr. Baker said at a news conference here.

"At the same time, we support democracy, we support freedom of speech, we support freedom of assembly," Mr. Baker said in the first detailed response by a ranking Administration official to events in China.

Mr. Baker made his comments after meetings between President Bush and President François Mitterrand at the Bush family compound. They were joined by the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas.

Mr. Baker told reporters that the events in China were discussed by the French and American Presidents. The Secretary of State, calling the events in China unclear, said: "I think we should be expressing our support for freedom of speech and assembly. I don't think we should be seen in any way as somehow inciting to riot."

Regrettable Restriction

Mr. Baker called the restriction of news coverage in China regrettable and said: "We wish it had not been done. We continue to urge restraint in the situation overall."

Asked to explain the turmoil in China, Mr. Baker, who met Chinese leaders several months ago in Beijing, said that "reform has to proceed apace."

"It's important that political opening up and economic opening up proceed apace to the extent that that is possible," he added. "And what may be happening here is that the economic reforms in China got out a little bit ahead of the political reforms."

He said: "Certain processes are irreversible. When people taste the fruits of freedom it's not our view that you can reverse that process."

Mr. Baker made his comments hours after the White House also urged restraint by the Chinese Government and the demonstrators. But the White House added it was evident that "the hunger for change remains strong" in China.

Martin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, said in a statement this morning that the United States remained "hopeful that a dialogue between the Government and the students is possible."

In the last few days the White House reaction to events in China has been deliberately low-key, with officials saying privately that the situation there seemed too fluid and uncertain to reach conclusions. Last night, the White House issued its first statement, urging caution by both sides.

President Bush has been briefed regularly on the situation, and officials said he had also watched television news coverage.

Mr. Bush, who is spending the weekend at his family compound here, was briefed this morning by Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, on the events in China.

In his statement, Mr. Fitzwater said: "The situation remains uncertain in China. Both sides have exercised restraint and we urge restraint to continue. The United States stands for freedom of speech and freedom of assembly, and President Bush commented yesterday on the inexorable march of democracy in China."

"The demonstrations of the last few days indicate that the hunger for change remains strong. We remain hopeful that a dialogue between the Government and the students is possible."

Army's Cry: 'We Are People's Soldiers'

By SHERYL WUDUNN

Special to The New York Times

BEIJING, May 20 — When a small convoy of military trucks used to launch tear gas and to spray water on rioters rolled through eastern Beijing early this morning, the soldiers met their first unexpected challenge. An old woman street cleaner rushed up and lay down on the road in front of the trucks.

Several hundred students immediately dashed toward the convoy, and the soldiers found themselves surrounded by Beijing residents who showered them with questions about why they wanted to repress a democratic movement, but who also gave them breakfast: bread, Coca-Cola and popsicles.

"We absolutely won't repress the people," an officer told the crowd. "We are the people's soldiers." And then the soldiers, so moved that several were crying quietly, drove back the way they had come.

In an awakening of sorts, the Chinese people are tapping the only weapon they can to defend themselves and their struggle for democracy against the tens of thousands of military troops ordered by the Government to move into the city: what many residents were calling "people power."

Martial law in some sectors of Beijing went into effect at 10 A.M. today. But by late tonight none of the special troops that have been brought in from outside Beijing had made much progress into the city. All over the capital, China's "desperados" and "kamikazes" — as they call themselves — were emerging from their silence and standing up for the university students who continued to fast for democracy.

"We have towels for tear gas and

maybe buckets of cement to make road blocks, but besides that, we come just as we are — people," said Kong Lingqi, a 39-year-old worker at Capital Iron and Steel Company.

Mr. Kong and the people around him

in the Haidian district of Beijing were preparing for the coming of the troops, whom they said were based about seven miles away. They were hoping

that every inch of the seven miles would be lined with people prepared to use their bodies to block the convoy of military trucks.

Residents tried to block soldiers not only with their bodies, but also with persuasion. They tried to engage soldiers in discussions about the democracy movement, and often they found that the troops had no idea at all of their cause. At least some of the troops said they had been told by their leaders not to read recent newspapers or watch television news.

Massing of People on Roads

Flush with exuberance, crowds have massed along roads they think the troops may use to approach Tiananmen Square, the nation's political center. When five military helicopters encircled the area above Tiananmen Square today, thousands of fists went up in the air and angry shouts rose against the Government.

The crowd swelled at many intersections, and the hum of the crowd's voices rose into shrill shouts every so often when someone believed he had spotted the troops.

"We will lie beneath the wheels," said Wang Gang, a 30-year-old leader of a new workers organization whose members have taken an oath to risk their lives for the students. These 300 "desperados," as they call themselves, wear white bandannas to distinguish themselves from the 400 "deputies" who wear red bandannas and take fewer risks because they have families to protect.

"We are not afraid of guns or bullets," Mr. Wang said. "But we are not allowed to smash glasses, flatten the trucks' tires or beat the drivers."

Mr. Wang, a sweater factory designer who has spent most of the last few days at Tiananmen Square, spent this morning planning where the men in his organization should be placed.

Similar volunteer groups have sprung up all over the capital as angry residents form neighborhood teams that link up with others to protect the area from soldiers.

Spontaneous Teams

Often these teams form spontaneously. In the predawn hours today in the southern suburbs of Beijing, 48 armed personnel carriers and 17 trucks holding about 850 policemen found their path impeded by a truck driver who parked his large vehicle right in front of them and then ran around the neighborhood to get the help of neighbors, witnesses said.

"I'll never come again," a lieutenant in the convoy was quoted as saying. "I'll never touch a hair of a student's head."

When troops parked three supply trucks near the Beijing Steel Institute, students drained the gas from the tanks and deflated the tires of the trucks.

This evening, people were out on the streets discussing the political state of affairs and waiting for the troops to come.

In the Xizhimen district, thousands of people crowded around the train station because they had heard that the soldiers may be forced to come in by train since they were having difficulty entering by truck or tank.

"We are waiting here," said a film worker, Wu Jianping, "because we hear there are tens of thousands of troops coming in by train."

MITTERRAND IN U.S. FOR TALKS ON NATO

He Stays at Bush's Estate in Maine to Discuss Dispute on Nuclear Missiles

By **BERNARD WEINRAUB**

Special to The New York Times

KENNEBUNKPORT, Maine, May 20

— President Bush today welcomed President François Mitterrand for informal talks on the dispute over short-range nuclear missiles that has divided the Western alliance.

Mr. Mitterrand and his wife, Danielle, arrived by helicopter at the Bush family compound on Walker's Point overlooking the Atlantic. The two flew here from Pease Air Force Base near Portsmouth, N.H.

"I view this meeting with your President as very important to bilateral relations, which are very strong but also, too, very important to the alliance," Mr. Bush told French reporters moments before Mr. Mitterrand arrived. The President said he looked forward to refurbishing an already strong relationship with the French.

Under clear, brilliant skies with a strong breeze fluttering off the Atlantic, Mr. Bush welcomed the French President warmly, exclaiming "Bienvenue" as Mr. Mitterrand stepped off the helicopter and shaking his hand profusely.

How It Started

American and French officials said before the meeting that the dispute in the alliance over whether to agree to negotiations with the Soviet Union on short-range nuclear missiles in Europe would be a prime topic.

Western officials have said the Bush Administration is willing to have such talks if certain conditions are met.

The dispute erupted last month when West Germany insisted that talks start soon on reducing the weapons, which have a range of less than 300 miles. NATO's would generally be used against targets in East Germany.

Initially, the United States argued strongly against such talks, saying negotiations might lead to pressures for an overall ban on the weapons. The United States, supported by Britain, said such a ban would result in the exposure of Europe to overwhelming Soviet bloc superiority in conventional forces.

The dispute has threatened to overshadow the meeting of heads of government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels on May 29 and 30. Allied leaders had voiced concern that the meeting, on the 40th anniversary of the alliance, could turn sour unless a compromise is reached.

The French Stand

On Thursday, shortly before Mr. Mitterrand left for Canada, he offered his own compromise by saying he opposed the elimination of short-range nuclear missiles in Central Europe but insisting that NATO did not have to make a decision about replacing its battlefield missiles until 1992. Mr. Mitterrand did not address the issue of West Germany's demand for negotiations on the short-range missiles.

Mr. Mitterrand was met at the United States Air Force base by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, who joined him on the 20-minute helicopter ride to Kennebunkport, a coastal town crammed with American and French officials and journalists as well as tourists.

The American flag and French tricolor draped hotel entrances and store fronts in the quaint town that has been the summer home of the Bush family since 1902. The estate was built by the President's maternal grandfather, George Herbert Walker, and is known as Walker's Point.

Mr. Bush was casually dressed in a blue blazer, gray slacks, navy blue sport shirt, a navy-and-white striped tie and brown walking shoes. Mr. Mitterrand was more formally dressed in a light gray business suit.

The French President was accompanied by Foreign Minister Roland Dumas; the French Ambassador to the United States, Emmanuel de Margerie, and Hubert Vedrine, the Government spokesman.

An Elaborate Dinner

Joining President Bush were Secretary of State Baker; John H. Sununu, the White House chief of staff; Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser; Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, and the designated Ambassador to France, Walter Curley.

Mr. Bush, Mr. Mitterrand and their aides met until midafternoon, speaking through interpreters. Their luncheon menu included corn chowder, pita bread, Oriental chicken salad, corn muffins and pecan pie à la mode.

Tonight, the two leaders were joined by their wives and several members of the Bush family, including the President's daughter, Doro Bush LeBlond, and his sister, Nancy Ellis.

Their dinner was elaborate: broiled marinated shrimp, Cheddar cheese puffs, steamed Maine lobster, salad, charcoal broiled swordfish with dill sauce, vegetables, rolls and flan with berries. The wine was a 1986 Talbot chardonnay.

The Mitterrands spent the night on the estate at the small cottage of President Bush's mother. On Sunday, Mr. Bush and Mr. Mitterrand will fly to Boston to receive honorary degrees and speak at commencement ceremonies at Boston University.

New U.S. Terms Would Delay Cuts by NATO

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 20 — The Bush Administration's efforts to resolve NATO's dispute over short-range nuclear missiles entered a new phase on Friday after the American agreement to hold negotiations on reducing the weapons if tough conditions are met, Administration officials said today.

By agreeing in principle to American-Soviet negotiations on short-range missiles, the Bush Administration shifted from its adamant objections to such talks.

But the Administration's conditions for holding the talks, some of which

were disclosed today by Western officials, would delay any negotiated reductions in short-range missiles for years.

One Administration condition specifies that negotiated reductions in short-range missiles cannot be carried out until an East-West agreement to cut conventional arms in Europe is signed and fully implemented, according to Western diplomats.

Moscow has said that it would like to complete and implement a conventional-arms agreement by 1997. Some American officials say that under the most optimistic set of circumstances, it will take about five years to negotiate

conventional-arms cuts and to carry them out.

The Bush Administration's conditions for holding talks on short-range nuclear missiles were outlined in a paper provided to the West German Defense Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, on Friday and are the subject of intense discussion with the Western alliance.

Western officials familiar with the Administration's new stance said it specifies the following conditions:

¶ American and Soviet negotiations to reduce short-range nuclear missiles cannot begin until a separate East-West accord is reached to cut conven-

tional arms in Europe and actual reductions in conventional arms have begun.

¶ If the negotiations to reduce short-range missiles succeed, the reductions in such weapons will not be carried out until the conventional arms agreement is fully implemented.

¶ The West would rule out the elimination of the short-range missiles.

In agreeing to talks on short-range missiles, the Administration is also seeking a NATO endorsement of the American research and development program to develop a successor to the aging Lance missiles in West Germany.

But the United States has accepted Bonn's position that a formal NATO decision to begin production of the weapon not be taken before 1992.

A further element of the Administra-

tion's new stand reiterates the earlier call by NATO for Moscow to make unilateral cuts in its large force of short-range missiles. But such unilateral Soviet cuts are not a condition for beginning talks on short-range nuclear missiles under the Administration's plan, Western officials said.

Moscow's Short-Range Missiles

The United States has 88 Lance missile launchers in Germany and about 700 Lance missiles, according to Western experts. According to NATO estimates, Moscow has about 1,600 launchers for its short-range missiles.

Western estimates of the number of Soviet short-range missiles vary considerably. Experts have estimated that the Soviet Union has between 3,000 and 6,000 short-range missiles that are armed with nuclear, chemical and con-

ventional warheads.

The Bush Administration's new stand is intended to form a basis for compromise on the divisive issue of short-range missiles at the NATO summit meeting in Brussels at the end of the month.

In recent weeks, the Bush Administration's refusal to agree to the principle of such talks has left it increasingly isolated, as most NATO nations and some Congressional leaders urged the Administration to agree to such talks.

But American officials are now involved in intense triangular diplomacy in an effort to bridge the gap between Britain's hard-line opposition to talks on short-range missile and its insistence that NATO affirm the need to replace the Lance with new missiles and West Germany's advocacy of negotiations on short-range missiles.

HUME: That may not be a thunderous welcome for the Gorbachev offer, but it's a far cry from the snide response given his last offer of a token cut in nuclear missiles in Europe. It's a sign the President doesn't want to go into the NATO summit this weekend with Gorbachev looking like a peacemaker and him looking like a naysayer.

Brit Hume, ABC News, the White House.

CBS EVENING NEWS
6:30 P.M.

CBS-TV
MAY 24

Reaction to Troop Cut Proposal

DAN RATHER: President Bush played defense again today. He tried to play down Mikhail Gorbachev's newest arms control offensive, a Soviet proposal for reducing conventional forces in Europe. This is the latest Gorbachev attempt at controlling the agenda with crowd-pleasing proposals. It comes as President Bush heads to the NATO summit in Europe next week to meet with leaders of the Western Alliance, which is split over how to react to the changing face of Communism in Europe.

CBS News White House correspondent Lesley Stahl has more on the cold water and cold war talk coming from the Bush side.

LESLEY STAHL: In his last foreign policy speech before next week's NATO summit meeting in Europe, Mr. Bush found himself reacting to yet another Gorbachev arms control proposal, this one to cut troops and tanks in Eastern Europe. Mr. Bush said it gives him

hope, but it's not enough.

PRESIDENT BUSH: We welcome those steps because, if implemented, they will help reduce the threat of surprise attack.

These reductions alone, even if implemented, are not enough to eliminate the significant numerical superiority that the Soviet Union enjoys right now.

STAHL: While more positive than in the past, the President clings to his underlying skepticism, a far cry from the trusting Ronald Reagan.

Compare the tone of Mr. Bush's reaction to Gorbachev's latest proposal to that of Reagan's chief arms control negotiator.

PAUL NITZE: It's extraordinary the degree of movement that the Soviets have made, bit by bit, to the point where their proposal is almost identical with ours.

STAHL: Why does the Bush Administration appear to be more negative? When detente crumbled in the 1970s, Mr. Bush and his top advisers, then working for Gerald Ford, felt a personal sense of betrayal. Richard Cheney was Ford's Chief of Staff, Brent Scowcroft his National Security Adviser, James Baker his campaign manager, and George Bush his CIA Director. Today that same group is the Bush brain trust.

DAVID GERGEN: I think they felt scalded by what happened in the mid-1970s under Jerry Ford. And they've come out of that insistent that we should be cautious, skeptical toward the Soviets. They, fundamentally, question whether the Soviet Union is capable of basic change.

SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER: We think it's important to look for deeds, rather than just

their message to other cities.

LAURENCE: Some soldiers are guarding government buildings in Beijing, while thousands of others remain in temporary camps on the outskirts. It is not clear yet whether the army will throw its support to the hard-line government faction led by Premier Li Peng, or the moderates behind Communist Party chief Zhao Ziyang.

Wan Li, one of the key players in the political struggle, cut short his visit to Washington to return to China. He is believed to support Zhao Ziyang. As head of the National Congress, Wan Li will attend a crucial meeting of the Communist Party Politburo, expected Thursday or Friday.

Foreign television networks were allowed to send out TV pictures by satellite for 16 hours before the government reimposed a satellite blackout.

At Tiananmen Square, the twelfth day of the occupation passed peacefully. China's Red Cross issued an urgent appeal to students to leave, warning of the danger of an epidemic. It also urged the government not to punish the students for staging the sit-in.

It was also announced that criminal activity in Beijing has declined sharply since the protest started, while courtesy and politeness have become more common than usual.

And through it all, everyone waits and wonders what will happen next.

John Laurence, ABC News, Beijing.

Reaction to Troop Cut Proposal

JENNINGS: With one eye on the situation in China, President Bush flew to New

London, Connecticut today for a commencement address at the Coast Guard Academy. One eye on China, but his preoccupation was the Soviet Union and the latest proposal from the Soviet Union for reducing conventional weapons in Europe.

Here's ABC's Brit Hume.

BRIT HUME: The President came to deliver one of a set of graduation addresses intended to put forth his basic foreign policy. But the Soviets' new offer for conventional force reductions in Europe had kept the President up last night changing his speech to keep it from sounding negative.

The Soviet offer came close to NATO's own formula for achieving mutual reductions in tanks, artillery, and personnel carriers. For example, NATO proposes that no single country be permitted more than 12,000 tanks. The Soviets proposed a limit per country of 14,000 tanks, remarkably close to the NATO position, especially since the Warsaw Pact countries have most of the tanks, and would therefore have to make most of the cuts.

At the State Department today, a positive response.

MARGARET TUTWILLER: We view this as a serious and substantial proposal that is being received as such.

HUME: The President did not mention it directly, but his speech was upbeat about disarmament talks with the Soviets.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Through negotiation, we can now transform the military landscape of Europe.

The issues are complex, stakes are very high. But the Soviets are now being forthcoming. And we hope to achieve the reductions that we seek.

words.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CHENEY:
The Soviet Union is the only
nation in the world that can
threaten our very existence.

BRENT SCOWCROFT: You know,
I don't think we ought to
oversell what's happening.

PRESIDENT BUSH: We're
looking for reality, versus
rhetoric.

STAHL: The Administration's
putdowns of Gorbachev, inclu-
ding calling him a "drugstore
cowboy," have troubled the
allies Mr. Bush will meet with
next week.

PETER JENKINS [The Indepen-
dent of London]: What it makes
it look like to Europeans is
that Americans have, or this
Administration has a psycholo-
gical vested interest in the
cold war, and it wants to keep
it going. They don't seem to
be measuring up to history.

STAHL: The White House said
today the President is trying
to appear more positive. But
National Security Adviser
Scowcroft said, "It's just a
matter of appearance. The
attitude toward Gorbachev has
not changed."

Lesley Stahl, CBS News, the
White House.

Bush: Soviets 'Forthcoming' On Arms Cuts

Policy Speech Marks More Positive Tone

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

NEW LONDON, Conn., May 24—President Bush, seeking to present a more positive approach to the Soviet Union, said today that Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has been "forthcoming" in new proposals to reduce conventional, or nonnuclear, forces in Europe.

But in a speech reflecting the deep caution toward the Soviets still being urged on him by some of his senior advisers, Bush also called on Gorbachev to fulfill earlier promises, such as restructuring the Warsaw Pact military forces from offensive to defensive deployments, and challenged him to open the Soviet defense budget to the public.

"The U.S.S.R. has said that it is willing to abandon its age-old reliance on offensive strategy," Bush said. "It's time to begin."

In a commencement address at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy here, the president predicted that "through negotiation, we can now transform the military landscape of Europe." He added, "Let me emphasize, our aim is nothing less than removing war as an option in Europe."

Bush did not respond in detail to the latest Gorbachev offer, made Tuesday at the Vienna talks on reducing conventional weapons, for sweeping reductions in its military forces in Europe. But other administration officials reacted positively. White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater called it a "serious proposal" that includes "important

concessions" and is "a very promising development."

Bush, who has been criticized for his cautious approach to sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and China, also declared in the speech, which he revised extensively late Tuesday night and early today, that the United States "will do all it can to encourage" those fighting for democracy.

"We live in a time when we are witnessing the end of an idea—the final chapter of the communist experiment," Bush said. "Communism is now recognized—even by many within the communist world itself—as a failed system, one that promised economic prosperity but failed to deliver the goods, a system that built a wall between the people and their political aspirations."

Fitzwater said Bush and his staff worked on major revisions to the speech until midnight Tuesday and again this morning because Bush was dissatisfied with the initial draft. Other White House officials said Bush has been trying to inject a more positive tone into the series of five foreign policy addresses that concluded today. An earlier speech on U.S.-Soviet relations drew sharp protests from Moscow.

National security adviser Brent Scowcroft said that if there was a change in tone in the address, it was because Bush "felt he appeared too negative before, so he's trying to appear more positive now."

Bush used the speech to reiterate his goal to "move beyond containment" of the Soviet Union and integrate the Soviets "into the community of nations." But he offered no new U.S. proposals for reaching this goal.

Gorbachev, in his proposal in Vienna, accepted two key principles previously rejected by the Soviet Union that were sought by the West. One is a rule specifying the maximum forces to be maintained in Europe by any country and the other an overall limit on the arsenal that any nation can station outside its territory.

In Washington, U.S. officials noted that the proposed Soviet limit on maximum forces that could be stationed outside its territory could require the withdrawal of 235,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe in addition to the 50,000 troops being withdrawn as part of a unilateral reduction announced last December.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimates that the Soviets have 635,000 troops in Eastern Europe, and U.S. officials said the proposed Soviet limit would bar the deployment of more than 350,000 troops in that region.

The proposed Soviet limits also would require the withdrawal of roughly 710 helicopters from Eastern Europe, or 54 percent of the force estimated by DIA, and 700 tanks beyond those being eliminated unilaterally before 1991, according to U.S. analysts.

Bush, while not specifically addressing the latest offer from Moscow, praised the unilateral reductions that Gorbachev announced at the United Nations last December: a half-million overall troop cut in Soviet ground forces.

White House officials acknowledged that Bush created some confusion by responding to Gorbachev's 5-month-old proposals, rather than his latest call for conventional arms reductions.

Adding to the confusion was the last-minute revisions to the text; some Bush aides traveling with the president did not have copies and were at a loss to explain what he meant. At one point during the address, the TelePrompTer, which scrolls the text in front of Bush, apparently broke down. Bush stumbled to a halt. After a long pause he said, "The text is going crazy on this machine here." He then found his place and continued.

"For more than 40 years, the Warsaw Pact's massive advantage in conventional forces has cast a shadow over Europe," Bush said. Gorbachev's unilateral proposals "give us hope that we can now redress that imbalance," he added.

"We welcome those steps because, if implemented, they will help reduce the threat of surprise attack," Bush said. "And they confirm what we've said all along—that Soviet military power far exceeds the levels needed to defend the legitimate security interests of the U.S.S.R."

"And we must keep in mind that these reductions alone—even if implemented—are not enough to eliminate the significant numerical superiority that the Soviet Union enjoys right now."

Staff writers Ann Devroy and R. Jeffery Smith contributed to this report.

Bush's Stance on Soviets Gives Him Political Trouble at Home, Abroad

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—President Bush's slow-and-careful course in dealing with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is leading the president toward some heavy political turbulence.

Mr. Bush leaves tomorrow for his maiden presidential voyage to Europe and a high-profile summit meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. His immediate task will be to paper over a messy spat with West Germany, which wants him to launch into quick negotiations with the Soviets to cut short-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

The president's broader task is even more difficult. He must mollify increasingly restive Western European allies, who want him to be bolder and quicker in responding to Mr. Gorbachev's proposals for arms cuts and other broad changes in East-West relations.

As he prepared to depart, Mr. Bush tried yesterday to reassure allies that he intends to "seize every—and I mean every—opportunity" to build a better relationship with the Soviets. In a commencement speech at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Mr. Bush welcomed a new Soviet proposal to cut conventional forces in Europe and said that "through negotiations, we can now transform the military landscape of Europe." His aides acknowledged that he chose his words in an effort to avoid appearing "too negative" toward the Soviets.

Pressure Building

As the White House realizes, restiveness about Mr. Bush's cautious approach hasn't been limited to Western Europe. Similar pressure for more action is building on the political left and right in the U.S.

Influential Democrats in Congress are beginning to grumble that Mr. Bush is losing the immediate public-relations battle with the Soviets. Worse, they say, he is running the risk of squandering a historic opportunity to ease Cold War tensions.

"I think Bush is not articulating where most Americans are with respect to responding to the Gorbachev initiatives," says Rep. Lee Hamilton (D., Ind.), a senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. "He's behind the curve, I guess I would put it."

More surprisingly, conservatives, who are generally pleased that Mr. Bush has shown skepticism and resolve toward the Soviets, also are beginning to press for a more aggressive U.S. strategy. They don't want Mr. Bush to react to Mr. Gorbachev by offering concessions, of course. Rather, they call for more moves to ratchet up pressure on the Kremlin to make more fundamental changes in its system.

'Common Feeling'

"Our view is that he should be seizing the initiative to help transform the Soviet Union, by making the kind of aid, trade and technology they are obviously eager to get contingent on fundamental change," says Frank Gaffney, a former Pentagon official who currently is a conservative analyst at the Center for Security Policy. Mr. Gaffney says that, despite their different prescriptions for action, there is a "common feeling" among liberals and conservatives that "the U.S. isn't served by a passive strategy."

Those who applaud Mr. Bush's cautious approach say such a course is simply destined to attract criticism. Mr. Bush has shown that he's "prudent and knowledgeable, and he isn't stampeded by the right or the left," says William Hyland, editor of Foreign Affairs magazine and a Soviet analyst who has occasionally advised Mr. Bush. But, Mr. Hyland adds, "he's going to be criticized for it, because there's an overwhelming desire from all outside critics for more action."

In any event, there is little reason to think Mr. Bush is about to sharply alter his course. He is an inherently cautious man who has succeeded in life mostly by taking carefully considered steps rather than risky gambits.

For instance, when he was beaten badly in the Iowa caucuses last year and his political future hung in the balance, many wanted him to jettison some of his campaign staff and break more cleanly from President Reagan. Instead, Mr. Bush called his top advisers together for a low-key pep talk, pulled even closer to President Reagan—and proceeded to win the crucial New Hampshire primary.

Today, Mr. Bush's closest White House advisers are unusually knowledgeable in Soviet affairs—but also notably cautious. National security adviser Brent Scowcroft is a longtime Soviet scholar who is on a first-name basis with many top Soviets, and his deputy Robert Gates is a Sovietologist from the intelligence community with broad knowledge of Soviet history and language. But their experiences with the Soviets also have left Mr. Bush and these aides inherently skeptical.

They argue that in the current climate of ferment and uncertainty in the Soviet bloc, the West can't know whether Mr. Gorbachev will succeed. Therefore, they say, the U.S. can't risk making security concessions in the mere hope he will.

More broadly, the Bush team has concluded that the demands for openness and democratic reforms coursing through the Soviet Union and China indicate that historic trends are moving in the direction of the U.S. Administration aides believe that a flurry of concessions from Washington isn't necessary to keep the powerful trend moving ahead.

"We live in a time where we are witnessing the end of an idea, the final chapter of the Communist experiment," Mr. Bush said yesterday. "Communism is now recognized even within the Communist world itself as a failed system, one that promised economic prosperity but failed to deliver the goods."

The trans-Atlantic debate over the wisdom of this Bush approach is being played out largely in the argument with West Germany over whether to negotiate cuts in short-range nuclear weapons—an argument that still threatens to badly mar the NATO summit in Brussels next Monday and Tuesday.

Short-range nuclear forces include missiles and artillery shells that weren't eliminated by the 1987 intermediate-range arms treaty. The U.S. has, on its own, cut its stockpile of such weapons by 2,400 during the past decade, down to roughly 4,000. But NATO long has steered clear of negotiations over the arms, because they are needed to offset the Warsaw Pact's big superiority in conventional weapons.

Several weeks ago, though, the West German government caved in to domestic political pressure and insisted that the U.S. quickly open negotiations with the Soviets to cut those arms. The Bush administration balked. Meanwhile, Mr. Gorbachev tried to grab the initiative by making a showy but militarily insignificant announcement that he was removing 500 of the Warsaw Pact's 10,000 short-range weapons and by pressing for talks.

Now the Bush administration has agreed to consider talks, but it insists that cuts first be made in Soviet conventional arms and that the West declare that short-range arms wouldn't be eliminated entirely. Though the revised U.S. position is considered wise by most analysts, West Germany is balking at the conditions.

Even if Mr. Bush finds the diplomatic skills to paper over the dispute on this trip, it's unlikely he'll be able to resolve the broader problem of getting the West to unite behind a defense strategy in the face of the crafty Mr. Gorbachev. "What we're facing is a much longer-range problem," says Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

FSX Locks on Target

A top Bush aide has blasted a congressional power grab, saying it "established an unacceptable precedent infringing on the President's constitutional authority with respect to the conduct of negotiations with foreign powers and . . . significantly compromises the President's ability to exercise effectively his foreign affairs powers under the Constitution." That sure sounds like White House Counsel Boyden Gray, who drew his separation-of-powers sword some weeks ago to rail against the deal that gave four congressional committees veto power over future humanitarian aid for the Contras.

But it's not Mr. Gray. These are the words of the man who made the Contra deal, Secretary of State James Baker. It looks like the separation-of-powers advocates have gained a powerful supporter.

Mr. Baker is fuming about a resolution the Senate passed last week and the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved in a slightly less onerous version on Tuesday that could require renegotiation of the agreement to coproduce FSX fighters for Japan. The Tokyo-bashing protectionists didn't have the votes to kill the \$6 billion project, so they decided to extract their now standard pound of flesh from the presidency itself.

Senator Robert Byrd has a resolution dictating the White House's marching orders: that it renegotiate so that 40% of the FSX work goes to U.S. contractors, that certain technologies can't be transferred and that the Japanese never can sell any FSXs or major parts. The Constitution, of course, set out a different procedure. The President has the power to negotiate agreements with foreign governments, which the Senate can only approve or disapprove later.

The Byrd resolution also tries to tell President Bush how to run his branch of government by basically re-

quiring him to heed the advice of the Japanese-bashing Commerce Department. Mr. Baker wrote, "These provisions are highly inappropriate and constitute a disturbing intrusion by Congress into Executive Branch management." White House sources say a veto is likely unless the House-Senate conference drops the executive-smashing provisions.

More is at stake here than fending off a burgeoning alliance between congressional protectionists and Commerce or even than antagonizing our Japanese allies. The fight is for the soul of this administration and indeed the future relevancy of the White House. Congress has spent the 1980s slicing up the executive branch until no one knows who's in charge anymore. President Reagan swallowed special prosecutors, the Boland amendments and Senator Byrd's rider to the INF Treaty giving the Senate new powers to interpret treaties. So it is good news indeed that Secretary Baker, aided by State Department Legal Adviser Abraham Sofaer, apparently has decided to join Counselor Gray in an effort to ensure that George Bush doesn't also leave the presidency weaker than he found it.

Meanwhile, the White House is girding to fight Congress's next effort at usurpation. Senator Pat Moynihan has rammed through the Foreign Relations Committee a provision that would make it a felony for a President or his aides to negotiate with foreign countries any foreign policies that Congress has not itself previously approved. Aside from the roaring unconstitutionality of any such law, this is a guarantee of foreign-policy paralysis. But apparently that's a small price to pay for Senator Moynihan's contribution to the spurious quid-pro-quo attack on President Bush arising from the Iran-Contra affair.

The new Washington law partnership of Gray, Baker & Sofaer has formed just in time.

PRESIDENT WISHES GORBACHEV WELL ON SOVIET CHANGE

WELCOMES PLAN ON ARMS

Bush, in Foreign Policy Talk, Says U.S. Should Stress Moscow's World Role

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

NEW LONDON, Conn., May 24 — In his most positive assessment so far of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's policies, President Bush said today that he wanted the economic and political changes to succeed and welcomed recent Soviet arms control proposals.

Noting that American policy toward the Soviet Union had been marked for years by "containment," to check expansionism, Mr. Bush said that now, as a result of the changes taking place in Moscow, American goals would be focused on "integrating the Soviet Union into the community of nations."

Mr. Bush made the last of four foreign policy speeches intended to express his vision of United States relations abroad. He said he believed that as a result of conciliatory attitudes in Moscow, the the superpowers "can now transform the military landscape of Europe" through negotiations.

'Issues Are Complex'

"The issues are complex," Mr. Bush told the graduating class of the United States Coast Guard Academy on a wind-blown field beside the Thames River. "Stakes are very high. But the Soviets are now being forthcoming and we hope to achieve the reductions we seek." [Excerpts, page A8.]

As Mr. Bush spoke here, Administration officials said Moscow had embraced the basic framework of the Western position for cutting conventional arms in Europe even as the two sides remained far apart on the separate issue of short-range nuclear missiles. [Page A9.]

"Let me emphasize," Mr. Bush told the 164 graduating cadets and their families, "our aim is nothing less than removing war as an option in Europe."

On the Soviet Union, he told the graduates that they were entering "into an exciting world where the opportunity for peace, world peace, lasting peace, has never been better."

"Our goal — integrating the Soviet Union into the community of nations — is every bit as ambitious as containment was at its time, and it holds tremendous promise for international stability," the President said.

It was Mr. Bush's most glowing comments to date on United States-Soviet relations, and followed three speeches in recent weeks in which Mr. Bush expressed caution, even suspicion, of Mr. Gorbachev's motives and policies.

At one point last week the White House deplored Soviet arms control proposals as "public relations gambits," and Mr. Bush's spokesman, Martin Fitzwater, described Mr. Gorbachev as a "drugstore cowboy," a slang implying fraudulence.

What has taken place in recent days, officials say, is the realization by Mr. Bush himself that he is losing the international public relations war with Mr. Gorbachev and that he is facing a potentially divisive North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Brussels next week over the issue of short-range missiles — and needs to offer European allies a portrait of himself as a forceful but flexible leader able to match Mr. Gorbachev.

The previous speeches on East-West policy have been criticized, even within the Administration, as failing to respond to Mr. Gorbachev's initiatives and offering a relatively weak response to the political, military and economic proposals advanced by the Soviet leader.

Asked About Assessment

Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, who accompanied Mr. Bush to Connecticut, was asked whether the President's speech today indicates a change in the Administration's assessments of the Soviet's arms control proposals.

"No, it's a matter of appearance," Mr. Scowcroft said.

Mr. Scowcroft added, "The President felt he appeared too negative before, so he's trying to appear more positive now."

Mr. Scowcroft said that "if the Soviets do what they have promised in reducing their conventional forces, 'it would make a measurable difference in their ability to launch a surprise attack.'"

On another matter, Mr. Scowcroft said it appeared unlikely that the United States and West Germany would agree on the short-range missile issue before next week's summit meeting — an issue in which the Bonn Government is seeking early negotiations with Moscow in short-range nuclear missiles.

The United States opposes the talks on the ground that it would lead to the ban on all the weapons while the Soviet retain a significant edge on conventional arms in Europe. "Time is running out," Mr. Scowcroft said.

"Through negotiation we can now transform the military landscape of Europe," Mr. Bush said in his speech. "As we move forward we must be realistic. Transformations of this magnitude will not happen overnight. If we are to reach our goals, a great deal is required of us, our allies — and of the Soviet Union. But we can succeed."

He added that the "unilateral reductions that President Gorbachev has promised" in Europe gives the United States "hope" that the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe be redressed. "We welcome these steps because, if implemented, they will help reduce the threat of surprise attack," Mr. Bush said.

Administration officials said that Moscow proposed on Tuesday major reductions of its forces in Europe, including cuts in more than one million troops and more than 17,000 tanks, 27,000 armored personnel carriers and 24,000 artillery pieces beyond the cuts announced by Mr. Gorbachev at the United Nations last December.

By all accounts, the Soviet proposal caught Mr. Bush by surprise. Late Tuesday he scrapped his prepared speech to be delivered here and worked on his address until late in the evening and early this morning.

Mr. Bush's fourth foreign policy speech coincided with an interview, made public by the White House today, given by Mr. Bush to four European reporters. The interview conducted Tuesday was intended for European audiences in view of the Brussels meeting on Monday and Tuesday.

Through the interview, Mr. Bush expressed both admiration as well as reservations about Mr. Gorbachev's motives and tactics.

MOSCOW SUPPORTS U.S. ON TROOP CUTS

But the Two Sides Are Apart on Short-Range Missiles — Talks to Pick Up

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 24 — Moscow has embraced the basic framework of the Western position for cutting conventional arms in Europe even as the two sides remain far apart on the separate issue of short-range nuclear missiles, Administration officials said today.

Soviet-bloc officials said on Tuesday that Moscow would sharply reduce its military forces in Eastern Europe under a new conventional arms accord, as the West has demanded.

This would be done by limiting the forces that any one country could have in Europe and by restricting the forces that could be stationed on foreign territory. The latest Soviet limits proposed in these areas generally parallel the ceilings specified by the West.

White House Lauds Proposal

"The Soviets have provided details in a meaningful way at the negotiating table," said Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman. "It is a serious proposal and we look forward to the negotiations."

The newest Soviet move follows on the heels of other promising moves by the Soviet bloc. During the recent trip to Moscow by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, for example, Soviet officials specified limits on tanks and armored troop carriers that mirrored the ceilings proposed by the West.

Administration specialists said that these, and other steps proposed by Moscow, suggest that the two sides now agree about much of the basic structure of a new pact to cut conventional arms.

To be sure, Western and Soviet-bloc nations still differ over some important details, such as whether to include anti-tank weapons and the precise nature of some cuts to be made.

Progress in Talks Noted

Western and Soviet-bloc nations are still at odds over the overall scope of the agreement. The West wants to limit the accord to tanks, artillery and armored troops carriers aircraft. The West has rejected Moscow's demand that aircraft and troops be included in the conventional arms talks.

But the general view within the Administration is that the conventional arms talks, which began in March, are making remarkably good progress.

The conventional arms talks began on an auspicious note when Western nations and the Soviet-bloc unveiled proposals that agreed on several important principles. The areas of agreement include setting equal limits on key weapons, the general size of reductions and the need for intensive verification measures.

Under both sides' approaches, Moscow would make huge reductions in the number of its tanks, artillery and armored troops carriers, areas of great Soviet advantage. The West would make only modest cuts in these areas.

The differences appeared to narrow further during Mr. Baker's trip to Moscow when the Kremlin specified overall weapon ceilings to apply to each military bloc.

Moving Toward the West

Moscow also embraced the general idea of establishing weapon ceilings for specific geographic areas, as suggested by the West.

With its latest proposals, disclosed on Tuesday in Vienna, Moscow moved again toward the Western position, in effect accepting new limits on its military presence in Europe.

The West had proposed that no single country should be allowed to have more than 30 percent of the total weapons held in each category by both military blocs.

For example, under the NATO plan, there would be 40,000 tanks in Europe. Each side would have 20,000 tanks. Of those, no more than 12,000 could belong to any one nation.

The Soviet Union has now proposed similar limits of about 35 to 40 percent. Under the Soviet plan, for example, each military bloc would be limited to 20,000 tanks, of which no more than 14,000 could belong to any one country. The Soviet Union has 37,000 tanks in Europe, according to NATO.

The West has also proposed specific limits on the number of weapons that could be deployed on foreign soil. On Tuesday, Soviet-bloc officials proposed similar limits.

Difference in Limits

Under the West's proposal, for example, the maximum number of tanks stationed on foreign soil would be 3,200 tanks. The limit proposed by the Soviet-bloc is 4,500.

Moscow now has about 10,000 tanks in Eastern European nations. The unilateral cuts announced by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, would reduce the number of Soviet tanks in Eastern Europe to about 5,000 tanks, American experts say.

The experts noted that technical problems remain. While the Western limits on weapons on foreign soil do not include war reserve stocks, the Soviet-bloc limits cover stored equipment. But American officials say that the Soviet-bloc proposal represents a promising basis for an agreement.

ESSAY | William Safire

Free the Baltics

In light of the decennial eruption that threatens Communism in China, the newly elected delegates to this week's Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow are hard pressed by a challenge to Communist rule much closer to home: a courageous independence movement is sweeping the Baltic States.

Last November, Estonia's legislature passed a law asserting its right to veto Kremlin decisions and its people's right to private property. Moscow promptly declared that heresy invalid, but last week — defying a commission set up to delimit autonomy in Soviet republics — the Parliament of Lithuania went even further, declaring itself not only economically autonomous but "sovereign."

This breathtaking defiance of Soviet rule has gone largely unremarked in the West, but Moscow is profoundly concerned. The Kremlin directed a legal academician to warn in Pravda this week that such "complete separation" from Moscow rule provided justification for a crack-down by unidentified hard-liners "who long to turn the screw" and call for "a firm hand." The Kremlin's threat is palpable: "sovereignty" — the assertion of not only cultural autonomy but national freedom — will trigger a harsh Soviet response.

In the United States, the don't-make-waves set wants us to button our lip on internal turmoil within Communist countries, lest we encourage demonstrations that elicit violent repression. "Restraint on both sides" is urged when the only side threatening violence is a central tyranny.

Pusillanimous evenhandedness is uncalled for in this case because the Baltic challenge is not a Soviet "internal affair." The Baltic States are free and independent nations that were illegally awarded to Stalin by Hitler; the U.S. and many other democracies have never recognized the 1939 Molotov-von Ribbentrop pact.

Our sustained policy of non-recognition has active diplomatic expression. The legitimate former Governments of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia have legations in the U.S., supported by funds here denied the puppet regime a half-century ago. U.S. diplomats in the Soviet Union have always refused to meet the Baltic Communist usurpers; Baltic affairs are dealt with in our State Department's Eastern European section, and are pointedly not part of "Soviet Affairs."

I put a probe into State yesterday and received this official response: "The United States does not recognize the forcible incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union which occurred in 1940. The Baltic peoples have

never accepted the loss of their freedom and liberty. We strongly support their peaceful efforts to regain control over their own destiny."

So far, so firm; but follow-up questions about reaction to the startling reassertion of sovereignty get only a bland "we are watching developments with interest and sympathy," and official comment on the ominous warning in Pravda degenerates into terminal fudge-factory dithering: "That, too, is part of change and adjustment to change."

That is what is said when you have not decided what to do. President

Bush can do plenty, but his Administration has failed to focus on this crucial test of Soviet imperial intentions.

Centrifugalism in the Baltic States is not the same as the yearning for freedom in Soviet Georgia, or Armenia, or even the Ukraine. Because the first uprisings in Georgia and Armenia were crushed in what we recognize to be the Soviet Union, a case (a weak case) is made for limiting our reaction to hand-wringing and discreet cluck-clucking at Soviet brutality in those Soviet Socialist republics.

But the push for freedom in the Baltics has a different base in law. Our official position is that these are occupied lands; we should show at least as much concern for the well-being of their nonviolent citizenry as we do for the rock-throwers in what we call the "occupied" West Bank. (We can hope that newspapers will dateline future reports from "Soviet-occupied Riga.")

Mr. Bush, consistent with U.S. policy of a half-century, should make plain to Mr. Gorbachev that it is hypocritical to denounce Stalin's crimes while perpetuating them. The occupation of the Baltic States is an indisputable international crime that should be redressed right now.

In concert with the leading democracies, the U.S. President should invite the non-governmental leaders of the Baltic independence movements to be honored observers at the economic summit meeting this summer, and publicly plan now to receive them in Western capitals. By making them famous, we increase their strength.

A great struggle has begun; if our place is on the sidelines, we can at least get off the bench and cheer. □

What East-West Policy?

President Bush yesterday delivered his fourth, final, flat and flimsy speech on East-West relations. What explains the chasm between this vacuity and the substantial ability and experience of Mr. Bush and his senior advisers?

The most that can be said of yesterday's offering is that Mr. Bush welcomes the latest dramatic proposal by Mikhail Gorbachev for a new European military balance, based on hugely disproportionate Soviet cuts in arms and men. That's certainly an improvement on recent White House statements virtually condemning the Soviet leader for saying he'll stop sending arms to Nicaragua and reduce battlefield nuclear weapons by 500.

It must be exceedingly difficult to be visionary when, week after week, the other side concedes much of what the West has been demanding for decades. But politics takes place in hearts as well as minds. And while democracy and free enterprise, as Mr. Bush says, have won the day as ideas, people around the world are finding new spiritual homes in Moscow. Chinese students hail Mr. Gorbachev as a symbol of hope; Germans lionize him as a man who can shape a nuclear-free Europe.

Mr. Bush now responds by proclaiming that the West needs "a dynamic and adaptable strategy." And what does that consist of? Among other things, he says, it means building a new mobile Midgetman missile and making the MX "Peacekeeper" missile immobile as well. That's hardly the stuff to inspire the students in Tiananmen Square and German leaders in the Bundestag.

Mr. Bush also called for more negotiations and more Soviet concessions, and he repeated thoughts from earlier speeches: He would reward Eastern European countries moving toward economic reform with aid. He wants to go beyond the old containment policy and bring Moscow into the family of nations. But Mr. Gorbachev's personality should not seduce the West into complacency, and Mr. Gorbachev's revolution is far from complete. So the President urges step-by-step diplomacy.

All are perfectly sensible platitudes, but they do not a plausible policy make. As even many policy experts in the Bush Administration realize, the ti-

midity of their superiors has become exceedingly costly — in terms of sympathies turning elsewhere and possible opportunities sliding away. The emptiness of the policy simply does not square with the quality of the senior people writing the words.

Few Presidents have been better prepared than George Bush to manage foreign policy. Very few have had better support. At the National Security Council he has Brent Scowcroft, Robert Gates and Robert Blackwill. At the State Department sit James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger and Reginald Bartholomew. At the Pentagon he can look to Dick Cheney and Adm. William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. These are men of exceptional political skills, with backgrounds in high-level policy making and intelligence.

So what's holding Mr. Bush and his team back?

They are said to fear that Mr. Gorbachev might not be around much longer and will be succeeded by hard-liners. But thus far he has capped each crisis by eliminating opponents. And even if Mr. Gorbachev were to depart, the Soviet Union's problems are the Soviet Union's problems; Mr. Gorbachev or his successors will have to face them in similar ways.

The senior policy makers know the depth of those problems and are said to hope that standing pat will force Moscow into further unilateral concessions. But no political leader, no matter how strong, can long survive failure to gain tangible returns. And in America's own self-interest, there are many areas where it makes sense to move now and free resources for other problems.

Mr. Bush and his aides are also said to worry about appearing too eager to work with Mr. Gorbachev. Their fear is that such eagerness might inflame right-wingers and encourage Europeans and Americans to lower their guard prematurely. But these are exaggerated concerns. What of the costs of the present do-nothing policy?

Mr. Bush and his key advisers are moderates. For most situations, that's a virtue. But in present circumstances, seeing different sides to every argument has become stifling. Their very moderation tends to blind them to the vast changes unfolding around the world, and to the power of language and bold goals.

Japan Cited By Bush as Unfair Trader

*Brazil, India on List;
Tokyo 'Disappointed'*

By Stuart Auerbach
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush, invoking a tough new trade law, yesterday singled out Japan and two other countries for maintaining a pattern of unfair trade barriers that are harmful to American exporters.

Underscoring the importance of reducing Japan's large and growing trade surplus with the United States, Bush also authorized sweeping negotiations aimed at changing Japan's "major structural barriers to imports," said U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, who made the announcement.

These negotiations, which were suggested by Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, would extend far beyond usual trade barriers to include Japan's high savings rate, complex distribution system and alleged anti-competitive business practices.

Named with Japan were Brazil and India, two countries that have been very active in blocking U.S. objectives in international trade talks.

All three nations face intensified trade negotiations that could lead to retaliation if they fail to mend their ways within three years.

Administration and congressional sources suggested that Brazil and India may have been placed on the list to provide some cover for Japan, which has repeatedly told the administration that being fingered as an unfair trading nation would make it hard to work with other industrial-

ized nations to coordinate their economic policies.

Japanese Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga emphasized those points in a statement released last night, in which he called the Bush decision "regrettable" and said it could cause "some domestic backlash in Japan, which will make the resolution of the various problems even more difficult."

"In light of the good faith efforts that have been made [by Japan to ease the trade imbalance] the government of Japan and the Japanese people are greatly disappointed by this one-sided decision," he said.

"I hope there is no backlash. This exercise is not meant to be offensive," replied Hills.

In a statement released this morning, Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno said the United States is attempting "to turn attention away from the main cause of the trade imbalance" between the two countries, by which he meant the U.S. budget deficit. Washington Post correspondent Margaret Shapiro reported from Tokyo.

Uno defended the Japanese market as being "very much an open one" and said the Japanese practices and customs cited by the United States are not that different from practices used to restrain some imports in the United States.

Japanese officials also have said that the U.S. trade law under which Japan was named violates the international General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and that if the United States imposes sanctions on Japan based on the law, Tokyo might appeal the move to GATT panels.

The naming of the countries—in effect branding them as unfair traders—had taken on an immense symbolic importance around the world, bringing dozens of nations to Washington to try to argue their way off the list.

One of the countries that succeeded was South Korea, a country that Hills praised last night for its last-minute agreement to end trade barriers in key sectors.

Bush's decision to cite Japan as a country with a pattern of barriers and trade-distorting practices won plaudits from Republican and Democrats on Capitol Hill.

"This is a positive step toward dismantling foreign trade barriers that adversely affect U.S. interests," said House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.).

"I feel very positive about it," said Sen. John C. Danforth (R-Mo.).

Administration sources said that phone calls over the past two days from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) and Danforth helped persuade Bush to target Japan for the intensified negotiations and possible sanctions under the new trade law.

Further, administration officials told the president that a country like South Korea, which had made politically difficult concessions to keep from being named, would be angered if Japan were not listed, White House sources said.

The president had been under heavy pressure from within his administration, with key advisers divided over whether to take strong action against Japan or to go easy because of its role as the United States' foremost Pacific ally and its importance as the financier of the massive U.S. budget deficit.

That debate was carried out over three long Cabinet-level meetings—one in front of Bush—that saw Hills, Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher and Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter lined up against National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Office of Management and Budget Director Richard Darman and Michael Boskin, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers.

The Baker-Darman faction recommended listing a number of trade barriers, but said Bush should not name Japan in a way that would embarrass its government, which has been paralyzed recently by a political scandal.

While Bush named Japan as a priority country for its trade barriers, the administration sootpedaled that point in its public statements and press releases.

Unfair Traders . . .

Hills cited Japan for three specific trade barriers: its restrictions on government purchases of supercomputers and satellites, "which ban foreign suppliers," and its technical barriers to sales of forest products, "which impose unnecessary obstacles to imports."

Brazil was named for its web of import bans and restrictive licenses that impede foreign sales, while India was named for its limits on foreign investment and the closure of its insurance market to foreign companies.

Hills said these six practices "are among the most important" barriers to U.S. sales overseas and their elimination "is likely to have significant potential to increase U.S. exports."

Japanese restrictions on government purchases of satellites and supercomputers long have been a sore point between the two countries. Japanese government agencies have not bought American communications, weather and other satellites even though they are among the best in the world.

Although Japanese companies now threaten U.S. dominance in supercomputers, American manufacturers have complained for years that they were shut out of lucrative sales to the government and state-supported universities to give domestic manufacturers a chance to keep up.

Besides naming Japan, Brazil and India for the priority negotiations under the so-called Super 301 provision of the trade law, Hills put eight nations on "a priority watch list" for their reluctance to protect patented products from piracy. These nations are Brazil, India, South Korea, Mexico, China, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan and Thailand.

Japan Cited By Bush as Unfair Trader

*Brazil, India on List;
Tokyo 'Disappointed'*

By Stuart Auerbach
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Bush, invoking a tough new trade law, yesterday singled out Japan and two other countries for maintaining a pattern of unfair trade barriers that are harmful to American exporters.

Underscoring the importance of reducing Japan's large and growing trade surplus with the United States, Bush also authorized sweeping negotiations aimed at changing Japan's "major structural barriers to imports," said U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills, who made the announcement.

These negotiations, which were suggested by Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, would extend far beyond usual trade barriers to include Japan's high savings rate, complex distribution system and alleged anti-competitive business practices.

Named with Japan were Brazil and India, two countries that have been very active in blocking U.S. objectives in international trade talks.

All three nations face intensified trade negotiations that could lead to retaliation if they fail to mend their ways within three years.

Administration and congressional sources suggested that Brazil and India may have been placed on the list to provide some cover for Japan, which has repeatedly told the administration that being fingered as an unfair trading nation would make it hard to work with other industrial-

ized nations to coordinate their economic policies.

Japanese Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga emphasized those points in a statement released last night, in which he called the Bush decision "regrettable" and said it could cause "some domestic backlash in Japan, which will make the resolution of the various problems even more difficult."

"In light of the good faith efforts that have been made [by Japan to ease the trade imbalance] the government of Japan and the Japanese people are greatly disappointed by this one-sided decision," he said.

"I hope there is no backlash. This exercise is not meant to be offensive," replied Hills.

In a statement released this morning, Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno said the United States is attempting "to turn attention away from the main cause of the trade imbalance" between the two countries, by which he meant the U.S. budget deficit. Washington Post correspondent Margaret Shapiro reported from Tokyo.

Uno defended the Japanese market as being "very much an open one" and said the Japanese practices and customs cited by the United States are not that different from practices used to restrain some imports in the United States.

Japanese officials also have said that the U.S. trade law under which Japan was named violates the international General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and that if the United States imposes sanctions on Japan based on the law, Tokyo might appeal the move to GATT panels.

The naming of the countries—in effect branding them as unfair traders—had taken on an immense symbolic importance around the world, bringing dozens of nations to Washington to try to argue their way off the list.

One of the countries that succeeded was South Korea, a country that Hills praised last night for its last-minute agreement to end trade barriers in key sectors.

Bush's decision to cite Japan as a country with a pattern of barriers and trade-distorting practices won plaudits from Republican and Democrats on Capitol Hill.

"This is a positive step toward dismantling foreign trade barriers that adversely affect U.S. interests," said House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.).

"I feel very positive about it," said Sen. John C. Danforth (R-Mo.).

Administration sources said that phone calls over the past two days

from Senate Finance Committee Chairman Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) and Danforth helped persuade Bush to target Japan for the intensified negotiations and possible sanctions under the new trade law.

Further, administration officials told the president that a country like South Korea, which had made politically difficult concessions to keep from being named, would be angered if Japan were not listed, White House sources said.

The president had been under heavy pressure from within his administration, with key advisers divided over whether to take strong action against Japan or to go easy because of its role as the United States' foremost Pacific ally and its importance as the financier of the massive U.S. budget deficit.

That debate was carried out over three long Cabinet-level meetings—one in front of Bush—that saw Hills, Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher and Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter lined up against National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Office of Management and Budget Director Richard Darman and Michael Boskin, chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers.

The Baker-Darman faction recommended listing a number of trade barriers, but said Bush should not name Japan in a way that would embarrass its government, which has been paralyzed recently by a political scandal.

While Bush named Japan as a priority country for its trade barriers, the administration sootpedaled that point in its public statements and press releases.

Bush to reduce U.S. troops in Europe by 10%

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush plans to announce at the NATO summit next week that he will unilaterally slash U.S. troop strength in Europe by 10 percent, pulling out as many as 34,000 troops.

Although details still were being worked out yesterday, the basic decision was made last weekend in Kennebunkport, Maine, during meetings among Mr. Bush, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and other advisers, according to a source involved in the process.

White House officials did not deny the scenario, and several hinted broadly at an upcoming blockbuster response to recent Soviet initiatives

on troops and weapons.

The only on-the-record response to the report came from White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, who said: "The president expects to have a wide-ranging discussion with the allies at the 40th anniversary of NATO. Any specific proposal which he has to make would be made to the allies in Brussels."

Mr. Bush's dramatic action — most likely at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on Tuesday — could go a long way toward recapturing the world-opinion initiative from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, who is scheduled to visit Bonn on June 16.

Mr. Gorbachev's arms control initiatives recently have dominated the headlines, while his growing support in Western Europe has complicated U.S. strategy in its battle to retain NATO's nuclear equalizer, an issue that divides NATO as it celebrates its 40th anniversary.

"There is a sense that he's stealing the show and we're doing nothing," a senior administration official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told several reporters yesterday.

A Pentagon official said a major U.S. troop withdrawal in Europe would be "an absolute shock." He said the only U.S. force reductions budgeted in Europe through the next fiscal year were 3,000 of the 7,000 troops involved in intermediate nuclear forces missile programs being eliminated under the 1987 superpower INF treaty.

The decision to make the cuts was preceded by a bitter debate within the administration earlier this week, according to an arms control specialist familiar with the discussions.

"There's [been] a hell of a fight going on on it, a lot of blood being spilled," he said.

The source, who requested anonymity, said "part of the initiative" was proposed as a budget-cutting move by Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman William Crowe, who attended the Kennebunkport meeting.

The source argued that the United States should have waited to announce troop cuts until the Soviet Union had actually implemented Mr. Gorbachev's December promise to demobilize 50,000 troops and dismantle 5,300 tanks in Central Europe.

He also said the cuts to be announced by Mr. Bush "sort of undermine the NATO conventional [arms talks] proposal," which would set limits on tanks, artillery and armored vehicles.

One administration official aware of the White House plan said the cuts it proposes would not hurt if the personnel removed from Europe were in administrative and support billets.

"I'm quite sure it's doable," this official said. "I'm quite sure it can be done and it can be done without too much change in overall combat fighting power."

Bringing home 10 percent of the 340,000 U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine forces, and their estimated 300,000 dependents, would help reduce one of the top-dollar personnel items in the Defense Department's tight budget.

The Warsaw Pact has 3.1 million troops in Europe by NATO's estimate; 2.5 million by the Soviets' own count.

Under one version of the plan, only Army forces would be involved, holding the reduction to the neighborhood of 20,000 troops and their families.

Either move would mean little to the military balance of power in Europe, since NATO already is heavily outnumbered and outgunned by the Warsaw Pact.

But a U.S. troop withdrawal would politically undercut West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and hurt that country's economy at a time when the Bonn government is at loggerheads with Washington over the status of battlefield nuclear weapons there.

There are state elections in Mr. Kohl's home state in early June, and the European Parliamentary election June 15 is being looked at partly as a referendum on the future of a European-based nuclear deterrent.

Officials left no doubt that Mr. Bush, who leaves this morning for a week's visit to Brussels, Rome, Bonn and London, would have a dramatic response to Mr. Gorbachev's recent arms proposals.

"I think you're going to see a response by NATO, by the president, in Europe in the next week that is constructive and keeps this moving in a direction that establishes a longer lasting peace in Europe," White House Chief of Staff John

Sununu said on CBS' "This Morning."

"Wait and see," said another senior administration official when asked if Mr. Bush would take a page from Mr. Gorbachev's book.

One senior official said yesterday the short-range nuclear forces standoff is stalled on "matters of principle" — timing of negotiations and resistance to entering talks that could lead to total removal of the missiles, a "zero" option — and will not be settled by Tuesday.

"I won't say we're 15 minutes from closure on it," the official said, saying the emphasis has shifted to "looking forward" and insisting the situation has no deadline.

An overt attempt by Mr. Bush to be "positive" toward Mr. Gorbachev's many overtures was reinforced yesterday as Mr. Sununu and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft went on morning talk shows to continue the theme.

Egypt Out of the Box

IT never seemed logical, or right, or even in the Arab world's self-interest, to have Egypt stuck in the penalty box for a decade. Especially as its "transgression" was the boldest and most significant step in recent years toward peace in the turbulent Middle East.

So it's with relief and hope that we watch Egypt resume its proper place within the Arab League, signaled by President Hosni Mubarak's presence at the Arab summit in Morocco this week. It's doubly heartening that Egypt was invited back into the Arab fold without temporizing on its commitment to peaceful relations with Israel and to a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian question.

Egypt was suspended from the league in 1979 after signing a peace treaty with Israel. In the last few years, though, pressure has built to readmit Egypt, as nearly all the Arab states, spurred by diplomatic and economic considerations, individually restored relations with Cairo.

King Hassan II of Morocco brokered the Egyptian homecoming by calling the Arab summit and rounding up approval for the invitation to Mr. Mubarak.

As the most populous Arab state, and with the prestige de-

rived from its historical attainments, Egypt can be expected quickly to take a leadership role in Arab affairs, including the two issues on the summit agenda: Palestinian self-determination and the disintegration of Lebanon.

On both issues, Mubarak sounded a constructive note at Casablanca. He strongly supported the Palestinians' aspiration to statehood, though he called - in defiance of Syrian and Libyan intransigence - for a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the issue along the lines of Palestine Liberation Organization proposals, which include acceptance of Israel's right to exist in security. (Mubarak helped midwife the PLO outreach late last year).

And on Lebanon, the Egyptian President urged Arab unity to end the bloodshed, pointedly calling for the withdrawal of foreign - i.e., Israeli and Syrian - troops.

Egypt's return to the Arab League doesn't mean that the resolution of the Palestinian or Lebanese crises is in sight. Yet it restores a kind of natural order to intra-Arab relations and marks an increased willingness of many Arab states to move away from diplomatic orthodoxy and to search for more flexible routes toward Mideast peace.

Bush Looking Anew for Ways To Assert U.S. Leadership

Four-Month Policy Review Produced Little

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

Frustrated by the failure of a four-month policy review to produce any major initiatives for dealing with the challenges posed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, President Bush and his senior advisers have started a new search for ways to assert creative U.S. leadership in a fast-changing world, according to high-level administration sources.

The White House had planned that the framework of a new strategy for dealing with Moscow would be in place before Bush departed today for Europe, where allied leaders are gathering to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Instead, after delivering a series of inconclusive speeches, Bush has become impatient with the advice he has been given, while the advisers who gave it are caught up in a sharp debate over how best to seize the initiative in a world bedazzled by Gorbachev, these sources said. While some officials have advocated a more active engagement with Moscow on many fronts, others have urged caution and suggested that Gorbachev should be given a "time out" to cope with his enormous problems at home, the sources said.

Bush insisted at a news conference last weekend that he remains satisfied with the "cautious" and "prudent" pace of his response to Gorbachev.

But privately, according to administration sources, Bush has been

restless and impatient with the process. Although he has not been specific, Bush has told advisers that he needs new and "creative" ideas for dealing with the extraordinary events unfolding in the Soviet Union, the sources said. Bush's impatience appeared to boil over this week when, in an unusual and spontaneous action, he personally rewrote two major foreign policy speeches at the last minute.

"He's saying, 'Where's the beef?'" one foreign policy aide said. Another senior official added, "His impatience is with the substance—it's not public relations. He's saying, 'I want to be able to shape the changes.' There is a risk of action, but some people only focus on the risks of action and not the risks of inaction."

Now, the sources said, Bush is turning to a new, relatively small group to formulate these ideas with Secretary of State James A. Baker III spearheading the effort on foreign policy and Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney on military issues.

A group of their subordinates is already at work redrafting most of Bush's speeches for the Europe trip, officials said.

The policy review did produce an overall goal for Bush's approach to Moscow, which he has described as "integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations" and going "beyond containment," the post-World War II policy of seeking to isolate and check Moscow. However, with the exception of several minor proposals, such as resurrecting President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "Open Skies" concept or providing economic incentives to Poland, Bush has been unable to say precisely how he intends to reach this goal.

"If we find a way, if I can think of a good proposal that'll move the world towards a more lasting peace, we'll be out front with that," Bush said in an interview this week with four Western European journalists.

But so far, Bush has displayed an abundance of caution toward the fast-paced events in the Soviet Union. At first, he and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft commissioned the lengthy strategic reviews. During the four months they were under way, Bush refused to comment on his policy or respond to Gorbachev's initiatives. Lamented one high-ranking official of the time-consuming reports, "They just grew like Topsy."

Meanwhile, Bush's top advisers have expressed markedly differing views on how to respond to Gorbachev. Baker has been a leading advocate of expanding contacts with Moscow on a wide range of issues, from arms control to drugs and terrorism. One official described Baker's approach as building many bridges to the Soviets that will help lock in or "institutionalize" Gorbachev's reforms.

Baker, in a speech May 4, said, "There are some who say that we don't need to do much of anything because trends are so favorable to us. Their counsel is to sit tight and await Soviet concessions. I don't happen to be of this school. I don't think we can be passive in the face of these great strategic changes . . ."

But other advisers, such as Cheney and deputy national secu-

Bush...

rity adviser Robert M. Gates, have urged Bush to take a cautious approach, sources said. They have concluded that Gorbachev's domestic reforms are already failing, and warned that the Soviet leader's survival is not assured.

Cheney created a stir when he suggested this publicly in a recent television interview that accurately reflected the view of some Bush advisers. Gates has warned against the historical cycles of Soviet reform and retreat. Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary of defense for policy, told Congress recently that "virtually all" Gorbachev's political and economic reforms "could be reversed" and that Soviet foreign policy "continues to challenge U.S. interests around the world."

Bush seems to have embraced all the differing views; he has been both positive and cautious. In his address at Texas A&M University, he spoke of "our sincere desire" to see Gorbachev's reforms succeed, but he warned that "the Soviet Union has promised a more cooperative relationship before, only to reverse course and return to militarism." This dual message has run through the recent speeches, even as he personally redrafted them, trying to inject a more positive tone.

In February, Bush invited a group of specialists on the Soviet Union to his family compound in Kennebunkport, Maine, and in recent interviews several took note of Bush's cautious approach.

"The policy I'm hearing about isn't like the man I met," said Edward A. Hewett III of the Brookings Institution. "The man I met had a little more vision and was less frightened of the Soviets than the policy that's come out," which he described as "pabulum." He added, "I think the president is better than his policy. He's going to have to get a hold of his bureaucracy and do what Gorbachev has done You're going to have to take risks."

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, praised Bush's initial caution. "I would argue that the motivations of Soviet policy are such that it operates independent of our blandishments or even threats," he said. "So it is not inappropriate to allow Gorbachev to make changes that he must from his own self-interest make."

Pfaltzgraff said Bush lacks the credentials as a hard-liner that former president Ronald Reagan brought to office, and so Bush may be more constrained than his predecessor. "The president who called the Soviet Union an Evil Empire and who had long established his credentials in this regard could perhaps swing more widely in the other direction than Bush can," he said. "What we are likely to get from Bush for the next four years is a more balanced and cautious policy."

Adam B. Ulam, professor of history at Harvard, said Gorbachev's domestic reforms may be irreversible, but his foreign policy remains in flux and Bush should try more aggressively to influence it. "There is a great sort of uncertainty about what to do," he noted. "It's a completely new ball game and we still haven't discovered any way to deal with the ball game."

Bush initially gave his advisers two basic instructions for his approach to Moscow. One was that he did not feel the need to compete with Gorbachev in a public relations

battle. The other was that he wanted "creative new initiatives" that would help the U.S. manage and cope with the sweeping military, political and economic changes that Gorbachev has set in motion.

The sources, including five senior-level advisers who were interviewed on condition of anonymity, quoted Bush as reminding them that one of the most important tests of his presidency will be how he responds to the historic shifts now taking place in the communist bloc.

But for a number of reasons, the early months of the Bush presidency did not produce options for dealing with the Soviet Union that Bush found satisfactory, the sources said.

"You're asking people who have been in the bureaucracy for 20 years to come up with new ideas—and they can't," said the foreign policy aide. "You're asking a president who basically succeeded himself to come up with new ideas—he won't."

Bush...

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BUSH IS OPTIMISTIC ON VISIT TO ITALY

As NATO Summit Approaches, He Speaks of Challenges And Opportunities

By **BERNARD WEINRAUB**

Special to The New York Times

ROME, May 26 — President Bush arrived here tonight for the start of a weeklong European trip, emphasizing that "new challenges and unparalleled opportunities" face the Western alliance in view of Soviet initiatives.

Continuing his upbeat approach to East-West relations after weeks of expressing caution and wariness about the Soviet President, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Mr. Bush began his first trip to Europe as President with a message of welcome to the political and economic changes taking place in the Soviet Union and some European nations.

"We welcome the political and economic liberalization that has taken place so far in the Soviet Union and in some countries of Eastern Europe," Mr. Bush said at Andrews Air Force Base this morning, shortly before boarding Air Force One for the eight-hour flight to Rome. "We watch hoping more changes will follow."

On arriving in Rome, Mr. Bush made no mention of the nagging and divisive dispute between Washington and Bonn over short-range nuclear missiles, which began last month when the West German Government defied the United States and demanded that the Atlantic alliance open negotiations with the East on reducing such weapons, most of which are stationed in the two Germanys.

Unity and Openness Stressed

Arriving in the evening chill at Ciampino Airport, Mr. Bush paid warm tribute to American-Italian friendship and addressed the same themes of European unity and American openness toward Soviet change that the President had cited in recent foreign-policy speeches.

"We are prepared to move beyond containment, toward policy that works to bring the Soviet Union into the community of nations," Mr. Bush said. "We will be actively engaged in Eastern Europe, in promoting measures to encourage political and economic liberalization in Poland."

An Upbeat Message

He added that the drive toward European unity — by 1992 the European Community plans a single, integrated market — "and the trans-Atlantic partnership reinforce each other."

Because Mr. Bush and his senior aides are plainly concerned about domestic and European criticisms that the Administration has been lackluster in his response to many of Mr. Gorbachev's arms control proposals, the President's initial message to the Europeans was upbeat.

On his departure, Mr. Bush said that, in celebrating the 40th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization next week in Brussels, he wanted to pay tribute to NATO's strength and emphasize American commitment to the alliance.

"The importance of the alliance and its democratic underpinnings is the message I now take to Europe," Mr. Bush said moments before leaving Washington. "NATO has been a success by any measure. But success breeds its own challenges. Today, dramatic changes are taking place East and West. For us, those changes bring new challenges and unparalleled opportunities."

The President was accompanied by senior aides, including Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d; Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, and John H. Sununu, the White House chief of staff. Mr. Bush's wife, Barbara, joined him on the trip.

Mr. Bush will spend two days in Italy before flying to Brussels, where the summit meeting will be held on Monday and Tuesday. Mr. Bush will also visit Bonn and London before returning to the United States.

In Rome, the President will meet with Pope John Paul II and President Francesco Cossiga. On Sunday, Mr. Bush will fly to Nettuno, 38 miles south of Rome, to celebrate Memorial Day at an American military cemetery where more than 7,000 servicemen killed in Italy during World War II are buried. The cemetery is just east of the Anzio beachhead where allied troops landed in January 1944.

Bonn Reported Split on NATO Arms

By SERGE SCHMEMANN

Special to The New York Times

BONN, May 26 — West German politicians said today that the governing coalition was torn by a bitter struggle over its stand on short-range nuclear weapons. Chancellor Helmut Kohl emerged so politically isolated, they said, that a compromise with Washington at the NATO summit meeting was no longer considered feasible.

The officials broadly substantiated reports in two major West German newspapers that tempers raged so high that the notion of breaking up the coalition was breached. One of the papers, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, said it took Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, head of the Free Democrats two days to convince a wavering Mr. Kohl, who leads the Christian Democrats, that it was better "to let the summit end in open dissension than for the Germans to crawl on their knees."

The officials, who have been close to the debate, said that as a result the West Germans no longer expected the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to produce the "comprehensive concept" for the alliance that was to have been the centerpiece of the 40th anniversary gathering in Brussels.

Instead, the Germans said they hoped that President Bush would produce sufficiently dramatic initiatives on nonnuclear subjects, like reductions in troops and conventional arms, to overshadow the differences on short-range nuclear weapons and enable the allies to rally round in a demonstration of unity.

Papering Over Differences

In general, Bonn seemed to take pains to paper over the differences with Washington before President Bush's first visit to Bonn next week.

A Government statement described Mr. Bush as "knowledgeable on and a friend of the Federal Republic of Germany," and said his relationship with Mr. Kohl was "close and confidential, a result of many years of friendship."

The last-minute dispute within Mr. Kohl's coalition rose over an American proposal handed to Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg of the Christian Democrats in Washington last week. In it, Washington agreed for the first time to the principle of talks on short-range weapons, but put off any reduction until a conventional arms agreement was signed and carried out. Washington also demanded that Bonn forswear total elimination of the weapons.

On Arms Reductions

The proposal was made as a response to Bonn's demand last month, in defiance of Washington, that NATO enter into early talks with Moscow on reducing short-range weapons. Washington had opposed talks, and in fact intended to upgrade the missiles.

The dispute escalated into a test of wills between Washington and a newly assertive Bonn. But as the summit meeting approached, Mr. Kohl reportedly grew anxious about the dispute, especially after it grew from an argument about details to a test of NATO.

According to similar reports in *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and another newspaper, *Stuttgarter*, Mr. Genscher made it clear that he would not remain in the coalition if the American proposals, which he considered a "mockery," were accepted. Mr. Kohl cannot effectively rule in Germany without the coalition help of the Free Democrats.

Mr. Genscher and his party categorically denied any such threats, but politicians said the Foreign Minister left no doubt of his determination. Bonn's assertive stand on short-range missiles was seen as a triumph for him, and he made clear he would not let it slide.

Thoroughly Boxed In

In the end, the officials said, Mr. Kohl was thoroughly boxed in. On one side was Mr. Genscher's implicit threat to topple the coalition, on the other were staunch supporters of the policy within Mr. Kohl's own party, led by Alfred Dregger, the Christian Democratic whip in Parliament.

On another was President Richard von Weizsäcker, who in a major speech

on Thursday effectively aligned himself with Mr. Genscher's foreign policy and boldly declared that West Germany would not be anyone's "plaything."

Finally there were public opinion polls, the last of which found that 89.1 percent of those questioned opposed new American short-range weapons.

The triumph was tangible as members of Mr. Genscher's Free Democratic Party prepared for a party meeting in Cologne on Saturday. Among other things, the party is prepared to declare itself in favor of the eventual elimination of all short-range nuclear weapons and nuclear artillery shells from Europe.

Opposed by Washington

This position, known as the "third zero," has been strongly opposed by Washington and London, who express fear that it would generate pressure for the denuclearization of Europe and thus give added weight to the Soviet

Union's large land army. Part of Washington's last proposal to Bonn, in fact, included a formal rejection of the "third zero."

The draft of the Free Democratic statement, by contrast, declares that if the "security situation" in Europe permits — meaning if conventional arms are sufficiently reduced to eliminate the risk of a Soviet invasion — "the eventual full elimination of all land-based short-range weapons and nuclear artillery munitions should not be excluded."

The statement, which is certain of passage, further calls for "drastic reductions" of the strategic arms of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the reduction of conventional forces by both sides down to half the current level in NATO. The latter proposal goes considerably beyond the current NATO position.

The liberal Free Democrats have always taken positions somewhat to the left of the Christian Democratic Government, but Mr. Genscher's increasingly dominant role in Bonn gave the statement greater weight.

In a passage apparently aimed directly at Mr. Kohl and reflecting last week's dispute, the Free Democrats declare that the Government position on short-range weapons, as it was agreed to last month, "will not be placed into question by anyone in the coalition."

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ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, May 28, 1989

GUESTS:

REP. NEWT GINGRICH (R-Ga.)
House Minority Whip

REP. DAVID BONIOR (D-Mich.)
Chief Deputy Majority Whip

BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Adviser

SENATOR SAM NUNN (D-Ga.)
Chairman, Armed Services Committee

VOLKER RUHE
Member, West German Parliament

INTERVIEWED BY:

David Brinkley - ABC News

George F. Will - ABC News Analyst

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MR. BRINKLEY: Rep. Gingrich, Republican, Georgia, and Rep. Bonior, Democrat of Michigan, thank you both for coming in today. Pleased to have you.

Here in the studio are George Will and Sam Donaldson, both of ABC NEWS.

Now, tell us, what is going on in the House? Is there some kind of guerrilla warfare, trying to get this member or that member? What's happened?

REP. GINGRICH: Well, I personally filed charged against Jim Wright, so maybe I ought to frame my version of what's going on.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's why I asked you.

REP. GINGRICH: I think that we have fairly clearcut ethics rules. I think that in the case of the Speaker, when you have a Democrat investigation, Mr. Phelan, he reports on 116 violations; the committee votes 69 of them. You have an additional four areas being investigated by the committee, not counting the charge that the Speaker leaked secrets about Nicaragua.

You have a pretty clear case. And here's a guy who has real problems. In the case of Coelho, I don't know what happened. I was, I think, as surprised as anybody else, when we got word that he was going to resign.

MR. BRINKLEY: How about you?

REP. GINGRICH: I think there's a huge difference between a smear and a scandal. In my case you have Bill Alexander of Arkansas filing charges largely in retaliation. If you read the morning papers today, you have Beryl Anthony saying, we're going to get Gingrich. He's going to pay for doing this.

MR. BRINKLEY: That's what I want to know: Are you out to try to get each other? Is that's what's happening in the House?

REP. GINGRICH: No, I think for the first time in a very long time you have people willing to draw a line and say, if you cross this line, if you do things that are in fact wrong, you ought to be held accountable.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Bonior?

MR. BONIOR: Well, I think we're about doing the business of the House. It's important that we get on with the business of the country. We have procedures on ethics, and of course, the ethics committee has looked at the Speaker. They will be looking at some improprieties alleged on Mr. Gingrich. And we will proceed, and I hope and I suspect that Mr. Gingrich will get at least as fair treatment as others have received recently.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, wait a moment. You're saying you're going to get Gingrich, then?

MR. BONIOR: No, I'm not saying that. I'm saying that the procedures of the House--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, at least as fair treatment as others. The Speaker's going to resign. Coelho's resigned. You want him to resign?

MR. BONIOR: No, I want the procedures of the House to work, and I want the House to take on the business at hand, which is important business. We have lots of things to do, minimum wage, on the S&L crisis, and we've done some very important things already this Congress.

MR. DONALDSON: Are you going to be the whip?

MR. BONIOR: I'm going to be a candidate for the whip position. We have lots of talent in the House of Representatives and in the Democratic Party. And there'll be some fine people running for these leadership positions.

And if my aspirations fit into the needs of the party and of the caucus, then I will be elected. If not, then we will move on with the candidates that we choose.

MR. DONALDSON: Just one more: Foley's going to be the Speaker, and Gephardt's going to be majority leader; is that it?

MR. BONIOR: Well, we know that Tony Coelho has said that he will resign. So there will be a contest for that position of whip.

Now, the Speaker is struggling this weekend on what

decision he in fact will make with regard to his future. If in fact he decides to step aside, I would assume that Tom Foley will emerge as the new majority leader. He's a man of immense integrity, of vision, of insight. And he will in fact be a fine speaker if it comes to that.

There will be a candidate race for the majority leader.

MR. DONALDSON: Yes, but I'm asking for the winners. I mean, we know there'll be a race.

MR. BONIOR: I'm not a Svengali. I don't have a crystal ball. But I can tell you that Mr. Gephardt will be a very tough person to beat for majority leader if that position is open.

MR. WILL: Mr. Bonior, a moment ago Mr. Gingrich said the lines are clear, and some people have crossed them. Other people in Congress say the problem today, and it makes people nervous, terminally nervous, is that the lines seem to be blurry or moving.

What's your diagnosis?

MR. BONIOR: Well, they are blurry, and they are moving. And it's important for us in the House of Representatives, and in the Senate in general, to look closely at our ethics.

We have an appointed group of people, Republicans and Democrats, who are put together in a task force who are reviewing all the rules and regulations of the House. And we have a task force dealing with campaign reform.

We've got to get on with addressing those important issues. But beyond that I think we have to move on and deal with those other important issues that I talked about.

MR. WILL: But what's caused this now? I mean, why this kind of firestorm? About four years ago, the sleaze factor, alleged, of the Reagan administration was a big subject among Democrats. Do they regret this now? I mean, is it just a fire that's consuming people indiscriminately? What's in the atmosphere that's bringing this on?

MR. BONIOR: Well, I think that's a good question. And

I don't mean to be disrespectful, but I think it's one that the press ought to be asking themselves.

We will look at ourselves institutionally, because we have to deal with the questions of ethics that are important to us. We cannot continue in politics to have character assassination. It will erode the foundation of democracy.

But I think it's also happening for your--

MR. BRINKLEY: Isn't that happening now?

MR. BONIOR: Well, I think it's important for your institution, if I just could finish for one second, to look internally and seeing how you are indeed covering this issue, and if you're giving fair balance to what in fact is happening in a very positive way in the Congress, and what is happening, as you perceive it, in a negative fashion.

MR. WILL: Mr. Gingrich, address that, and you can put on, if you will, your partisan robes, and say, is this more unfair that what was done to Ed Meese for example?

REP. GINGRICH: No, I don't think you need to put on partisan robes. I think if you look at what's happening in the House, you have to ask yourself some questions about what standards you want to apply, and what should be reasonable standards.

Let's stay with the Wright case, because there you've got public documents, you've got public information from an investigator who's a Democrat by background.

You know when Mr. Phelan reports on 116 counts, and some of them are multiple counts for the same offense, you can dismiss half of them, and you're still at 58. And you have to ask yourself, is there a standard to be second in line to be president, to be Speaker of the House, or isn't there?

Now, the lines aren't changing. I mean, the enforcement is. And frankly part of the reason enforcement is that I have spent 11 years talking about ethics. I moved to expel a member when I was a freshman, a convicted felon who was voting while out on appeal, Charles Diggs (phonetic). And I took the then-radical

position that if you're a convicted felon, you probably shouldn't vote on the law.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, people being--prosecuted isn't the word--now for things that used to be taken for granted, that used to be routine?

REP. GINGRICH: Of course they are. If you read the Path to Power by Caro, and you look at Lyndon Johnson's career, which is, I think, frankly, part of House Speaker Wright grew up in the atmosphere of the Texas of that era, of course we have tougher standards.

But let me give you a parallel example. Nobody 40 years ago would have suggested a young woman could have walked through Central Park. I mean, they just sort of understood, at 10:00 o'clock at night, women don't walk through Central Park. We now have a standard that says that by God in America you ought to be able to walk through Central Park and not be assaulted.

Well, 40 years ago in Georgia, politicians routinely took cash and they gave cash. It was the routine. Herman Talmidge ended his career because the world had changes and the rules were different.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, they've done that in Maryland. I mean, Spiro Agnew took cash.

REP. GINGRICH: And he was driven from the vice presidency.

MR. DONALDSON: The problem, Mr. Gingrich, your critics maintain, the problem with you is, you're not applying these kinds of standards and this holier-than-thou attitude across the board; you apply it to the Democrats.

I can cite you instance after instance in the Congressional Record where you've said that the Democratic Party is the problem. The Democrats are the ones who do the sleaze.

REP. GINGRICH: It is the Democrats--

MR. DONALDSON: So why should we trust you be even-handed?

REP. GINGRICH: Well, let me be--I don't think you

should trust me, and you don't, Sam. It's not the job of the news media to trust anybody in politics.

MR. DONALDSON: No, I don't mean me or David Brinkley or George Will.

REP. GINGRICH: Let me give you a couple of statistics. First of all, they have been in power for 35 years. There's a tendency, if you're going to be corrupted, for the party in power, not the party in opposition, to be the object of more things.

Second, there have been 35 ethics cases in the '80s. Thirty were Democrats. That's a 6 to 1 ratio. That's ethics case, bipartisan, looking at it.

Third, it is the Democratic--

MR. BRINKLEY: Three is all you can do. Our time is about up. I want to get Mr. Bonior--

MR. DONALDSON: Richard Nixon was a Republican. Spiro Agnew was a Republican.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Bonior, I'll give you the last word. Our time is almost up.

MR. BONIOR: Let me say that lest we leave this show with the impression that there aren't fine people in Congress, we have some wonderful people who are doing tremendous work in the Congress. I'm just very proud to serve with my colleagues, and they are serving this society in a very fine and decent fashion.

Republicans and Democrats alike who have given much of their lives to be serving their people and their constituency. So I'm very proud that I'm a part of that.

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Bonior, thank you. Mr. Gingrich, thank you. Thanks for being with us. Pleasure to have you.

We'll be back with the news from Europe and the NATO meeting and President Bush in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Gen. Scowcroft in Rome, thank you very much for staying over to talk with us today. You're on your way to Brussels for the NATO meeting, right?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I am, David, and it's nice to talk with you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, thank you. Now, it seems to us here--give me your view--it seems to us that the NATO countries in Western Europe are more eager to disarm than we are.

What do you think?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, that's probably a fair statement, that they're a little more complacent about the course of events and their perpetuation than we are.

But I don't think it's a substantial difference. And it depends very much on the different members of the alliance.

MR. WILL: General Scowcroft, one of the points of contention between the United States and its NATO allies concerns the modernization of short range missiles.

Why would it not be in the United States interest to press for a worldwide ban on such missiles, given the fact that the Soviet Union has many more of them than we have, and the fact that they give them to unreliable clients such as Syria?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I think the basic problem, George, is this, and that is, that the alliance depends on nuclear deterrence as an important part of its overall deterrence. And to get rid of those weapons would be to undermine that part of the NATO strategy.

In addition those missiles are there in part to make up for the conventional imbalance that has existed since the foundation of NATO. So it doesn't make any sense to start talking about reduction, much less elimination of those systems, as long as there is this conventional imbalance.

MR. WILL: Mr. Scowcroft, we would still have, if we got rid of the 88 Lance launchers in Europe, we would still have a great many--thousands, in fact--nuclear weapons, including artillery shells.

Is it our position that, given the fact that no conceivable ban on artillery shells can be verifiable, that they are there for the foreseeable future?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I believe, if I understood your question, George, we would be prepared to reduce some artillery shells after we proceed with the modernization of the NATO short-range nuclear forces, but not before.

MR. WILL: I guess what I'm asking is this: There can be no denuclearized Europe because a ban on nuclear artillery shells would be completely unverifiable: is that a fair statement of the facts?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, I think there's no question that a ban on artillery would be unverifiable. And then there would be nuclear weapons in Europe.

But those short--the artillery shells, however, having to be up very near the border, as they are, run the risk of being overrun in a lightning attack. And therefore, we prefer longer range systems that can be set back from the border somewhat.

MR. DONALDSON: General, there was a report that the president would propose a reduction unilaterally in U.S. forces in Europe, but that has been knocked down now. So tell us, what will the president propose in that area?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, the president has been thinking a lot about what would be useful to do. And as you say, there's no question he will not propose a unilateral reduction of forces, as he announced that he would not do in his speech last week.

What he will in fact propose we'll wait until the North Atlantic Council meeting tomorrow.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, the president, of course, has been under very severe pressure to match Gorbachev in some sense, to try to regain the initiative that Gorbachev seems to have kept so well.

So are your proposals going to go far enough, or do you just think they'll be a token measure?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I don't think the president feels under any compulsion, Sam, to match Gorbachev. If he does make proposals, they will be designed to advance our interest in improving

a stable balance in Europe, and in moving the alliance forward; not simply to match Gorbachev.

MR. DONALDSON: General, I want to ask you about another area: that's what's happening in China. It appears that the hardliners, Li Peng, and of course, Deng Xiaopeng, the maximum leader, have won the power struggle, if there was one.

Does that please the United States?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think it's not clear exactly what is happening in China. I think the student demonstration was a really remarkable event. I think both sides have responded to it with restraint.

And while there is no question that we are in favor of freedom of assemblage, freedom of speech, and we like to see forward progress, I think we wait to see how this all works out before we say anything definitively.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me ask you about one other area about which we have talked a great deal: Gen. Noriega. He's still in Panama. Are there any plans to try to ease him out? Or are we just now resigned to the fact that Noriega will stay there despite our displeasure?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: What we have done, Sam, is to make it clear to Noriega, both us and the OAS, incidentally, that what he did was absolutely unacceptable and unconscionable, and we've also taken steps to protect American citizens and the Panama Canal.

MR. DONALDSON: But he's still there, general. He's still there.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Of course he's--I didn't say what we're trying to do is get rid of him that way. We think he ought to leave, and we will continue to work especially through our friends in Latin America to convince him that's the thing to do.

MR. WILL: Mr. Scowcroft, it's been reported that the United States will propose, and it will become effective, a substantial reduction on restrictions of technology transfer to the Soviet

Union, making the restrictions in fact almost totally porous.

Will this happen? What would we get in exchange for it? And would this not substantially reduce the pressure on the Soviet Union to devote less resources to the military so as to improve domestic living standards?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, without accepting that anything will or will not be proposed at the NATO summit, I think you're talking about the no-exceptions policy--

MR. WILL: That's right.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: --which in fact was imposed after the Soviets went into Afghanistan as a punitive measure. So that its withdrawal would be to recognize that--that the Soviet Union was out of Afghanistan. But I'm not suggesting that anything will be proposed.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, thank you. Thanks very much for taking the time to talk with us this morning.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Thank you, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, Volker Ruhe, deputy majority leader in the parliament of West Germany. And Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Ruhe in Hamburg, and Senator Nunn in West Berlin, thank you very much for coming in today. Glad to have you.

MR. RUHE: Good morning.

MR. BRINKLEY: Satellite is working at the moment.

SENATOR NUNN: Good morning.

MR. BRINKLEY: At times it has not. If it goes out, you will know what happened. Mr. Ruhe, first, for you, you share the view, I assume, that many Germans seem to hold, the view that President Bush has been too slow in responding to Gorbachev?

MR. RUHE: Well, we understand that he took his time to prepare for the situation. But I think after the summit in Brussels,

it will be better to judge, when we've heard about the latest initiatives from the U.S. president, and we hope that that will bring NATO more into the offensive.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, those in your country who believe he's been too slow, and there are a great many of them, what do they think he should have done?

MR. RUHE: No, there's not this general criticism. You see the lively debate we now have is really how in general NATO should respond to the changing world.

NATO has been a success story. But now especially in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union major changes have begun, and we feel that no routine military decisions should be taken now.

We want some more time to be able to respond politically in order to take all the chances out of this process. And here we have to work for a consensus in NATO.

MR. WILL: Senator Nunn, you've just heard Mr. Scowcroft say that, A, the Lance missile is essential, so the crisis we're having is worth having now; and B, that for the foreseeable future, indeed, as long as there's NATO, there need to be nuclear weapons in Europe, particularly artillery shells.

Do you accept the logic of that argument?

SENATOR NUNN: George, I didn't hear Brent Scowcroft saying exactly that. The question is not simply the Lance missile. The question is a broader one of keeping our nuclear forces modern.

The question also is not simply one of artillery shells. They happen to be the most destabilizing systems we have because they're short-range systems. They would have to hit on German soil. And they also have to be used at the very beginning of a conflict, or they're overrun, or they have to be pulled back with substantial security which weakens our conventional defense.

But let me just add this: I think that we're having a misplaced argument here about nuclear weapons right before the summit. We ought to be talking about the conventional opportunity.

We have an unprecedented opportunity to get Soviet

forces down in Central Europe, to have dramatic reductions in the Soviet Union's ability to conduct a short-warning standing start attack, and to dramatically reduce the overall instability with conventional forces. That should be the number one goal. It would be a very bad mistake for this summit to continue to dwell on nuclear weapons when that argument has to be preceded by the question of conventional reductions.

There also is a direct relationship between conventional reductions and the number and type of nuclear weapons we need. Because we have those nuclear weapons here by the thousands to compensate for significant conventional disadvantage.

MR. WILL: Mr. Ruhe, you and other leaders of the Federal Republic say often that you are elected not just to consider the interests of citizens of the Federal Republic but of all Germans, including some of course who live in a Warsaw Pact country; and therefore, you are very anxious about the presence in Europe of nuclear weapons that would--could only be exploded in German/East German territory. Is not the logic of your position that Germany itself would be, and perhaps NATO, denuclearized?

MR. RUHE: It is right, East Germany is Warsaw Pact, but it is also Germany. And the problem is that we have ended up with a structure of nuclear weapons, land-based, after the double zero treaty, which is in this way not acceptable to us, because almost 100 percent of the remaining Western--the friendly nuclear weapons, one may call them--are, because of their range, could only be used on German soil. That's artillery, and also short-range systems. And also, we're negotiating about intermediate range systems. That has happened. You have negotiated about strategic systems. So how on earth can you explain to anybody that you would ban negotiations on short-range systems, especially if you have this vast Soviet superiority.

I do agree with Sam Nunn that the priority has to go with the conventional arms control talks. They've begun already, and from our point of view, if there is progress, concrete progress

in these talks, we should consider beginning negotiations also in the field of short-range systems which do have a special problem for Germany.

MR. WILL: Is it your view that if Mr. Gorbachev succeeds, that his intentions are sufficiently benign that in the foreseeable future the threat to NATO will be so removed or so diminished that, A, NATO might be superfluous, and B, American troops could come home?

MR. RUHE: No, I don't think so. I think we'll always need the United States in Europe if we want to balance the Soviet Union, what kind of Soviet Union that ever would be. And we need American troops here. I also don't believe that Mr. Gorbachev is benign. I think he has to change dramatically if his country wants to survive.

What is important is that security isn't just got by military decisions. For instance, if a communist leader in Eastern Europe would really be ready to become leader of the opposition, for how many divisions does that account for?

So we must work for political change in Eastern Europe, and that will also give us stability in Europe, but that can only be found together between the Europeans and the Americans.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, Senator Nunn, what is the answer to Mr. Ruhe's challenge to explain why a ban on negotiations at this time doesn't make sense?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, from my perspective, the first thing we need to do is concentrate on conventional forces, and I hope President Bush will shift the argument back to that at the summit conference, and the other leaders will also.

The second question is, if we get conventional reductions of very significant magnitude--and I think that's possible--then how many nuclear weapons do we need?

And the third question is: What kind of residual force do we want in nuclear weapons in Europe after conventional reductions if they occur, and after we modernize our nuclear forces?

So these are the questions the alliance needs to answer. Once we answer those questions, to me it's not a question of when we start negotiations; that's not the important thing. And if that helps West Germany, then certainly we need to reach a consensus on that. But certainly, the content of those negotiations, and when we conclude, certainly we do not want to start removing nuclear systems, except those that are outmoded and unsafe until such time as we have very significant reductions by the Soviet Union in their conventional advantage.

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Nunn--

SENATOR NUNN: But the conventional argument has to precede the nuclear argument.

MR. DONALDSON: Senator Nunn, the president may very well in the next day or two announce that the Afghanistan-imposed ban on high technology transfer to the Soviet Union is being lifted: Would that be a good idea?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, there are all sorts of high technology. There's a lot of it the Soviet Union can already buy from other allies. We have a tighter restriction from the United States point of view than some of the others.

The important thing with something like 60-70 percent of the technology now being made outside the United States, whether we like it or not--and sometimes we don't realize it--the important thing is to have an alliance policy here and protect what we protect well, and then make an alliance decision about how much we're going to let go through. But it's no need in banning the sale of something that's already available over the counter to the Soviets.

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Nunn and Mr. Ruhe, thank you. Thanks for being with us.

MR. RUHE: Thank you.

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Why Bob Gates Is the Eeyore of Sovietology

Bush Needs More Than Nay-Saying on Gorbachev

By David Ignatius

THE BUSH administration's top Sovietologist is probably Robert M. Gates, a former CIA official who now serves as deputy national-security adviser. In a speech last October, Gates tried to explain why he takes such a cautious and skeptical view of the Soviet Union.

"Intelligence looks at the world through a unique and gloomy prism," he observed. "Indeed, it has been said that when an intelligence officer smells flowers, he looks around for a coffin."

Gates certainly has been looking for the coffin in the case of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. With his dour assessments, the NSC official has become to the world of Sovietology what Eeyore is to Pooh Corner—someone capable of finding a dark lining in even the brightest cloud. And he may be the main architect of the Bush administration's cautious, sensible and utterly uninspiring response to Gorbachev.

Whatever the drawbacks of his skeptical approach, Gates has at least been consistent. He's been arguing the same general line since Gorbachev took power four years ago—and the roots of his analytical method can be found in his doctoral dissertation written more than 15 years ago.

Consistency, in fact, may be Gates' biggest problem: He's been contending for so long that Gorbachev's reforms may fail—and that the United States should deal with him warily—that he now has a position to defend. And the longer he sticks to that position, the more he may feel the need to defend it—regardless of conflicting evidence.

Gates is a classic product of the American national-security bureaucracy. He joined the CIA in 1966 and made a name there as a Soviet analyst. In 1974 he moved to the Na-

tional Security Council staff—presided over then, as now, by Brent Scowcroft. He stayed at the NSC during the Carter years, working under Zbigniew Brzezinski, then moved back to the CIA in 1979 as a top aide to Stansfield Turner. Despite the Turner ties, Gates prospered at the agency under William Casey—becoming deputy director for intelligence, then deputy CIA director. He returned to the NSC last January as Scowcroft's deputy.

Though Gates began his career as a Soviet specialist, some of his former colleagues regard him more as an adept bureaucrat than as an analyst. One former CIA official says Gates rose to his recent positions less because of his analytical work than "because of his managerial skills."

Gates' careful analytical style is certainly evident in the 298-page doctoral dissertation he submitted to Georgetown University in 1974. He focused on the works of Soviet sinologists, arguing that what these China-watchers published in Soviet publications from 1958 to 1973 was a "fertile source" of information about the Kremlin's "views and intentions toward China."

That may seem obvious, but Gates made an interesting observation about the ebb and flow of Soviet commentary: Whenever the Kremlin leadership was divided or uncertain about China policy, the China-watchers tended to express a range of conflicting views; when the leadership was agreed on clear policy, the sinologists all sang the same song. Public debate on policy, in other words, was often a sign of high-level confusion.

Similar themes run through some of Gates' more recent statements about Gorbachev's Soviet Union. As he listens to the buzz of conflicting voices in Moscow, Gates has tended to emphasize the importance of opposition to Gorbachev—so that someone who had read only Gates' writings would probably be surprised by how skillfully Gorbachev has outfoxed his rivals.

"Nearly every step that Gorbachev seeks to take toward economic or political change is a struggle," Gates said in a Jan. 19, 1988 speech in Dallas. He argued that by the end of 1987, "Gorbachev was distancing himself from his own radical approach to reform Below the level of the Politburo, support for change—and especially far-reaching change—is even shakier A long competitive struggle with the Soviet Union still lies before us."

Even after Gorbachev successfully outmaneuvered his rivals in a September 1988 Central Committee meeting, Gates was dubious. The Soviet leader had shown "real political muscle," he said in an Oct. 14 speech. "But even in the context of this classic Kremlin political stroke, the limits to Gorbachev's power—or at least the degree of risk he is prepared to accept—are apparent."

"It is by no means certain—and I would say it is doubtful—that Gorbachev can in the end, rejuvenate the system," Gates argued in that Oct. 14 speech. He predicted that Gorbachev would continue to press for arms-control agreements with the West, but he cautioned that the best American response would be to "watch, wait and evaluate." Gates added: "Whether Gorbachev succeeds, fails or just survives, a still long competition and struggle with the Soviet Union lie before us."

Gates has maintained this line, more or less intact, since joining the Bush administration. In an April 1 speech in Brussels (printed in the April 30 Outlook section), he gave a historical explanation for his pessimism. Past Soviet leaders had also tried to reform the system, Gates argued. The fact that they had failed so abysmally should make us skeptical of Gorbachev's chances.

"Our view of the Soviet Union cannot be based on the personalities of its leaders but on the nature of the Soviet system itself," wrote Gates. "The outcome is by no means clear, and prolonged turbulence seems certain."

For Gates, it seems, Gorbachev's glass is always half-empty. That skeptical view has its uses, but even skepticism can become rote and predictable. The challenge for Gates, and for the Bush administration, is to chart a path through the uncertainty that inevitably surrounds a new and unpredictable leader like Gorbachev—and find a way to express America's genuine interest in reduced tensions with the Soviet Union. Even an ex-intelligence analyst should smell the flowers once in a while.

David Ignatius is editor of the Outlook section. Post researcher Lynda Edwards contributed to this article.

Bush Finds Theme of Foreign Policy: 'Beyond Containment'

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

ROME, May 27—President Bush has found the grand theme of his administration's foreign policy in the idea of moving "beyond containment" to a new era of international cooperation with the Soviet Union, according to White House officials accompanying Bush on his first presidential trip to Europe.

Bush broached the concept in his Soviet policy speech at Texas A&M University May 12 and repeated it with growing emphasis in his addresses at Boston University last Sunday, at the Coast Guard Academy on Wednesday, and in his departure remarks in Washington and arrival remarks in Rome Friday. So far, however, the idea has not received the prominence that Bush's aides say it deserves.

At Boston University last Sunday, Bush defined his approach to the Soviet Union as "moving beyond containment, to seek to integrate the Soviets into the community of nations, to help them share the rewards of international cooperation." In a press conference on the same occasion, Bush called the concept "a bold one" and described it as a goal of his administration.

If taken seriously as a U.S. goal, the concept is a striking reversal of the central objective of American policy in the past four decades: to contain the Soviet Union by building military, economic and political barriers and counterpressures to Soviet expansion. His aides say such a sweeping shift—executed in a step-by-step fashion and tightly conditioned on Soviet reciprocity—is precisely what Bush has in mind.

A White House press briefing Thursday morning by a senior member of the National Security Council staff further explained Bush's concept. In that briefing, "beyond containment" was termed "a positive reaction to reform in the

Soviet Union and a radical conceptual departure for American policy in the postwar period toward the U.S.S.R."

The NSC briefer drew a sharp distinction between this concept and the short-lived policy of detente in the early 1970s, which he defined as an attempt to manage superpower competition with "elaborate rules of the game" because of the implicit assumption on both sides that nothing could be done about the root causes of the conflict.

"The president's policy is quite different," the briefer declared. "We want the Soviet Union to become a full partner in the international system and to enjoy the benefits of a system that has supported political freedom and economic prosperity around the world."

"We will of course be prudent, given cycles of cooperation and conflict with the Soviet Union. But this time the Soviet Union may be ready to alter fundamentally its military forces, institutions and international behavior. We and the Soviets, for the first time in the postwar period, can build over time a stable, cooperative and open relationship that will endure, unlike [in] the past."

The same White House official, who accompanied Bush to Europe, said today the concept arose from informal and intimate discussions between the president and several senior foreign policy advisors in the weeks immediately preceding the Texas A&M speech.

At that point the formal interagency review of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union had been completed, with little in the way of major ideas surviving this formal and, in the view of senior administration figures, sterile process.

"The label of status quo plus is a fair way to characterize the result of the policy review," said the NSC official. "But the president had repeatedly said he wanted something more—a way of expressing a long-term vision for U.S.-Soviet relations which is optimistic in character yet recognizes that we have to proceed in a step-by-step way."

As explained by this official, the concept at this point is "a distant strategic objective—like Mt. Kilimanjaro, something you can see in the distance as a goal."

As to specific actions, the official said no operational blueprint has been drawn up for reaching Bush's goal, but he maintained that establishing and enunciating the objective are of fundamental importance. He said many future actions, including some of the changes to be disclosed early next week in U.S. and NATO alliance military policy and in Western economic sanctions against the Soviet Union should be seen in the context of movement toward new relationships with Moscow.

BUSH FINDS THEME . . .

Going "beyond containment" has been discussed with congressional leaders and, in diplomatic channels, with key U.S. allies, the official said.

The concept of containment of the Soviet Union was first spelled out in 1946, in the famous "long telegram" from George F. Kennan, then a senior official in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and made public the following year in an unsigned version of Kennan's article published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

A public declaration of U.S. intention to move "beyond containment and detente" was made on June 15, 1983, by then Secretary of State George P. Shultz in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Shultz declaration, which was quickly forgotten, came in a period of unusually high tension between the United States and the Soviet Union shortly after President Reagan described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire." Dramatic progress in improving U.S.-Soviet relations did not begin until Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Kremlin in March 1985.

Moscow's initial reaction to Bush's plan to welcome the Soviet Union into the commonwealth of nations was less than enthusiastic. After his speech in Texas, the Communist Party newspaper Pravda accused Bush of condescension, saying, "To put it mildly, we are bewildered at the attempts of the president to pose conditions under which the U.S. will work to include the U.S.S.R. in the world community."

Counterpunching Gorbachev


Bush is adjusting his course as he heads for the NATO summit

As Chief of Staff John Sununu was having lunch last week with some senior Republican senators in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, two unexpected guests casually wandered in: President Bush and Vice President Quayle. The conversation quickly switched from domestic politics to foreign policy, specifically Mikhail Gorbachev's latest public-relations maneuver, the planned pullout of 500 short-range warheads from Central Europe. A frustrated Bush testily complained that his side of the story seldom commanded as much attention as Gorbachev's media blitz. The senators, worried about the President's political standing, gave him a forceful message: He was getting clobbered by Gorbachev in the publicity battle and had to do something.

The White House agreed. On the eve of his first real performance on the world stage, the upcoming NATO summit, Bush made a midcourse correction of his fledgling Presidency. Since taking office, Bush has followed a highly deliberate and cautious game plan, and on one level he has stuck to that outline. On Panama, he pushed the Organization of American States (OAS) to take the lead in pressuring Gen. Manuel Noriega to leave. On NATO, his aides met quietly with West German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, searching for a face-saving compromise on the issue of short-range missiles in Europe. But the President also showed that he can be a political street fighter, willing to take on an opponent in a bare-knuckle style not usually associated with a gentleman from Skull and Bones.

Campaignlike tactics. Running the White House, Bush is learning, is not all that different from running a campaign. Style, not just substance, matters. In a campaign, a dose of negative advertising, delivered by surrogates while the candidate maintains his statesmanlike posture, keeps the opposition on the defensive. What the President did last week was to resort to some of the same tactics that proved so effective against Michael Dukakis last year. But with the Soviets, of course, the stakes are higher.

Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft used almost identical words to deride Gorbachev's move as a political ploy designed to fragment the NATO



The patient President. Bush will be at center stage when the allies meet in Brussels

Alliance. At Bush's behest, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater mocked the Soviet leader as a "drugstore cowboy" given to "throwing out one arms-control proposal after another." Meanwhile, the President stayed above the fray, defending his slow-motion style, telling the *Washington Times* that he

would not be "snookered" by Gorbachev into a bidding war for public-approval ratings. "It's not stubbornness," Bush insisted. "It's realism."

Nonetheless, Gorbachev's formidable public-relations skills are having some effect in the United States. In the latest *New York Times*/CBS News poll, only 26

percent of Americans say the Soviet Union represents an immediate military threat to the U.S., down from 64 percent in 1983, and almost two thirds say Gorbachev wants better relations with the United States. In addition, the poll found that two thirds of all Americans favor Gorbachev's proposal to negotiate the elimination of short-range missiles in Europe, a proposal strongly rejected by Bush.

But at the same time, Gorbachev has major problems back home, and his almost desperate search for world approval is driven partly by a need to encourage foreign support for his flagging attempts to restructure the Soviet economy. By the time a divided alliance sits down to debate the divisive missile issue in Brussels, the administration hopes that the double-edged nature of Gorbachev's public-relations offensive will be more clear.

Tough talk; little action. The administration is applying similar hard-nosed tactics to the Panama problem, but with less success so far. Its basic course remains intact: Send troops but avoid a direct confrontation with Noriega by enlisting Latin American leaders to visit Panama and urge the military strongman to depart. But at the same time, the White House wanted to project strength and firmness, partly at least because Republican senators were warning the President that public confidence in his conduct of foreign policy was slipping.

So the President's public-relations staff stage-managed a photo opportunity worthy of the Reagan White House, inviting cameras to the front of "Air Force One" as the President encouraged the Panamanian armed forces to stage a coup against Noriega.

But Bush's tough talk has led to little real action. Noriega has so effectively purged the military that chances of a coup against him remain slim. A general strike in Panama failed to generate much support, and there is little reason to believe that pressure from the OAS will force Noriega to leave. Moreover, Bush's blunt approach is alarming some diplomats, including a former Reagan adviser who said: "I sense a lack of subtlety sometimes. It's like being one note off key."

Bush advisers realize they have few good options in Panama. If the coup does not materialize, they are hoping that Noriega will agree to leave peacefully. To encourage that, the President talked three times each last week to the leaders of Venezuela and Spain, urging them to offer the Panamanian a haven. One senior official hinted that the White House was prepared to do more—economically and militarily—to end the deadlock. "There are some other things in our kit bag that we can bring to bear




CHARLIE ARCHAMBAULT FOR USAMWA

The outsiders. Advisers like pollster Bob Teeter have been pushing the President to step up his rhetoric on the Soviet Union and Panama's Noriega



CHUCK HANITY—USAMWA

Hill confidants. Republican Senator John McCain and others on Capitol Hill worry that Bush is losing the public-relations battle with Gorbachev



CHUCK HANITY—USAMWA

The insiders. Old hands like National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, above, and Secretary of State James Baker share Bush's pragmatic approach

if things keep going along," he said. That kind of talk may be meant more for domestic political consumption. Conservatives have been urging Bush to take a tougher stance.

For example, on Capitol Hill, Senator John McCain warned Bush that he could not back off now, the way Reagan did

last year. "This game has to be played out," said McCain, who visited the White House three times in eight days after observing the Panama elections firsthand. But the Arizona Republican also warned Bush that Congress is unlikely to support direct military action.

Until last week, Bush's approach to the NATO meeting and the issue of short-range missiles was mostly shaped by his policy convictions. They were reiterated in his speech earlier this month at Texas A&M, when he stated that the U.S.'s aim was to "seek the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations," a far cry from the days of the "evil empire." That view reflects the pragmatic view of Bush and his foreign-policy advisers, notably Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Adviser Scowcroft. But in the face of Gorbachev's most recent offensive, the President has been taking tactical advice from outsiders like Bob Teeter, his pollster. These outsiders have joined the members of Congress in urging the President to step up his rhetoric.

This combination of thoughtful negotiation and rhetorical counterpunching seems to be making headway on the thorny issue of short-range missiles in Europe. After weeks of insisting that the United States should immediately enter negotiations with the Soviets to reduce those arms, the West Germans seemed ready to accept a possible compromise: Negotiations could begin, but only after some progress is made in reducing the Soviets' vast superiority in conventional arms. In turn, the U.S. would not insist on modernizing the short-range missiles until a deal is reached. And NATO would agree that total elimination of the missiles would not be the ultimate aim of the talks. That proposal moves closer to the U.S. position, but so far the administration has ruled out any negotiations.

The Bush administration has said that Gorbachev must meet a series of tests to establish his credibility with the West. One example is cutting off military aid to the Sandinistas, as Gorbachev promised Baker in Moscow earlier this month. Another is delivering on his promise late last year to reduce Soviet conventional forces in Europe.

But when Bush arrives in Brussels he will face a series of tests himself. Will he be able to take the lead in finding a compromise that heals the rifts in NATO? And will he succeed in asserting himself as the leader of the Western Alliance? How he meets those tests will help establish his standing with his allies and adversaries alike. ■

by Steven V. Roberts with Kenneth T. Walsh,
Douglas Stanglin and Peter Cary

CHENEY URGES NSC TO DEVELOP NATIONAL SEALIFT POLICY, SUPPORTS PREDECESSORS

Stating that the "decline in our sealift capability continues unabated," Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney is calling for the National Security Council (NSC) to follow through on initiatives begun by Cheney's predecessors to establish a National Sealift Policy. Proponents of maritime industries view the Cheney's April 27 memo to the Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor -- which states that "early action is necessary to develop a policy to coordinate the actions of the many departments and agencies involved in regulating and promoting our maritime industries" -- as a heartening signal that the new Defense Secretary will not ignore the sealift shortfall.

Cheney's memo supports the efforts of former Secretary's of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Frank Carlucci to persuade the NSC to take the lead in addressing the decline in the maritime industry from a national perspective. Most recently, a December 16 memo from Carlucci to the National Security Advisor -- which included a preliminary draft of a National Sealift Policy -- called for the Deputy Assistant to the National Security Advisor to chair an interagency coordinating group responsible for sealift oversight (Inside the Navy, Jan. 16, 1989, p1; and Jan. 30, 1989, pp11-12).

Cheney's memo, though short, clearly endorses the efforts by Weinberger and Carlucci. In addition, his memo accompanies other signs that the Defense Dept. wants the Administration to take the lead in what they contend is a national problem. U.S. Transportation Commander Gen. Duane Cassidy has been a leader in the move to draft a national sealift policy, and most recently Acting-Navy Under Secretary Everett Pyatt testified at a congressional hearing that "we have raised the issue of the declining merchant fleet to the National Security Council via the Secretary of Defense. However, the Navy and the Department of Defense cannot solve this problem alone."

The draft National Sealift Policy forwarded by Carlucci to the NSC includes nine policy guidelines to foster and develop military and sealift resources. Among these are a provision recommending that government agencies rely upon U.S.-flag commercial carriers to provide sealift resources for national security. In addition, the policy calls for federal agencies to promote, through the application of existing laws and regulations -- such as cargo preference laws -- the readiness of the U.S. merchant marine and supporting industries. Implementation of the policy, according to the draft statement, "will be directed by a senior interagency group, operating under the auspices of the National Security Council."

The draft policy statement, though not as strong as many would have liked, nevertheless was considered "a step in the right direction" by maritime industry officials looking to the federal government to provide support to their rapidly declining industry. They view Cheney's memo as an attempt to move beyond Carlucci's statement to actual implementation of a national sealift policy.

Bush Plan: Around the Bureaucracy in 7 Days

Aides Describe Junking of Policy Review in Bid to Trump Gorbachev

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

BRUSSELS, May 29—Deputy National Security advisor Robert M. Gates and Deputy Secretary of State Laurence S. Eagleburger had alighted from an Air Force jet in London last Wednesday at 3 a.m., armed with the outline of President Bush's first major foreign policy initiative, the proposal to reduce conventional arms in Europe that he would unveil at the NATO summit here today.

Over the next 30 hours, in secrecy, the two raced from London to Paris to Rome to Bonn to Brussels to Amsterdam, briefing leaders on the president's proposal and testing reaction.

In Washington the same Wednesday, a frustrated Bush had thrown the White House bureaucracy into

chaos. According to aides, he was handed a major speech to be given at the U.S. Coast Guard graduation that day and he hated it. The text reportedly had the same tone of two previous speeches in a series of five major addresses on foreign policy. It was suspicious of Soviet intentions and dismissive of their proposals.

Bush is said to have told aides he was disappointed with the earlier speeches and the receptions they received. Advisors used such terms as "oatmeal," "junk" and "unpresidential." Bush, working on the text, told aides he wanted this speech to welcome new Soviet proposals for conventional arms reduction that President Mikhail Gorbachev had outlined to Secretary of State James A. Baker III in Moscow two weeks earlier.

After frantic revisions, Bush delivered what one aide called "the speech he wanted." He hailed the Soviet pro-

posals and said Moscow, at last, was "being forthcoming." The new Soviet proposals, he said, meant that through negotiations "we can transform the military landscape of Europe."

The new tone from Bush matched the arms initiative being carried by Gates and Eagleburger around Europe that day. The week-end before, in the idyllic setting of the Bush family compound on the Maine coast, the president, after huddling there with senior aides, had approved the initiative and set in motion the process.

According to senior officials traveling with the president, the genesis of the proposal was not the vaunted foreign policy review, which one official said "hung like a millstone around the president's neck," keeping him from moving on most foreign policy fronts through the first four months of his term.

The review, said one official, "had not produced the initiatives the president wanted. The quality and scope of ideas were poor to mediocre. Unsurprisingly, when the bureaucracy was asked to take on the task, they did not produce much."

Instead, the official said, Bush "decided to do this another way"—eschewing the normal channels and endless review processes of government, and working with only a handful of officials, the proposal was assembled in seven days.

The initiative grew from several sources, senior officials said, including Bush's annoyance with what one advisor called the "trifles" being produced for his international debut at the NATO summit and, more broadly, from the president's pledge during the 1988 campaign—after an early emphasis by his Democratic opponent—to reduce conventional arms. They said the administration was also convinced that Gorbachev, because of a flurry of conventional proposals, was most interested in progress in this area.

But officials said "the turning point" in moving the concept of a proposal to reality came as a result of Baker's sessions with Gorbachev May 10-12. After Gorbachev outlined the broad conventional-arms package he intended to propose, officials said, and Baker discussed them with Bush and National Security advisor Brent Scowcroft, the president decided the Soviet move was substantive and should be matched and trumped.

A senior official said Gorbachev's discussions with Baker "did show an overall thrust in the direction of the NATO proposal, and did indicate a seriousness of intent in terms of his purposes and his general thinking on the matter." When Gorbachev later put his actual proposal on the table in Vienna last Tuesday, it was, as one official put it, "much better than we had imagined possible." By then, Bush's own package was virtually complete.

To get to an actual plan, Bush, an official said, asked Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney to produce a conventional arms proposal "that we could act on at some time, presuming the timing was right."

Officials said Adm. William J. Crowe Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assembled a small task force in the Pentagon to work on the plan. In the office of the defense secretary, civilians worked on a parallel process. In a week, they produced the essential outline of the Bush proposal after what one official called "some struggle."

It was the Defense Department outline, worked over by Baker and Scowcroft, that was presented to Bush in Kennebunkport on May 19, when Bush, Cheney, Baker, Gates, Crowe and White House Chief of Staff John H. Sununu gathered in Maine. Fearing the U.S.-German dispute over short-range missiles would dominate the NATO summit, Bush and his aides also decided that the summit would be the forum for the unveiling of his first major initiative.

By coincidence, French President Francois Mitterrand visited Kennebunkport that weekend. French officials say Bush told Mitterrand he was working on a major proposal but provided no details. When Gates and Eagleburger arrived in Paris, officials said, Mitterrand was out of the country, so instead the pair informed Prime Minister Michel Rocard, along with Mitterrand's aide, Jean Louis Bianco.

Reducing FORCES....

The official cautioned, however, that immediate savings would come largely from reduced training expenses and amount to only \$1 billion. The savings from a smaller payroll would be offset, at the outset, by expenses associated with retirement pay, travel expenses, and decommissioning equipment and military facilities.

The official said it was unlikely that the Warsaw Pact could meet Bush's 1993 deadline for completing the massive demobilization. "The Pact would have to get rid of approximately 39,000 tanks," the official said. "They simply couldn't destroy them fast enough to be finished by then."

The official said the deadline was apparently set to convey a sense of urgency, for political reasons, not as a result of careful analysis about the practical difficulties involved.

The Soviets are expected to have trouble finding adequate housing and civilian jobs for their soldiers by then. A unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops announced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev last December will not be completed until 1991, and has already forced wrenching shifts in an economic system accustomed to rigid, long-term planning.

Enrollment in military schools has been shrunk, the compulsory draft has been curtailed, and educational deferments have been reinstated. Special commissions have been set up to ease what Soviet military officials have termed "a major social problem" caused by the forced retirement of every fifth officer under the unilateral cuts.

Soviet military officials have recently spoken admiringly of U.S. defense contractors' capability to shift quickly from military to civilian programs in keeping with the vagaries of government appropriations.

Gorbachev Plan for Deep Cuts in Forces Sparked Bush's Arms Policy Initiatives

By DAVID LAUTER, Times Staff Writer

BRUSSELS—The Bush Administration spent nearly four months on a slow, cautious analysis of foreign policy and then, in a flurry of meetings, produced one of the biggest U.S. foreign policy initiatives of the decade in barely two weeks.

The impetus, Administration officials said Monday, came early this month, when Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev outlined the latest Soviet arms proposal to Secretary of State James A. Baker III in Moscow.

Administration officials, who had been sharply critical of Gorbachev, now say that the Soviet leader's proposal—offering to make deep cuts in Soviet forces—was a major breakthrough that convinced them he is serious about arms reductions.

In the days following Baker's meeting with Gorbachev, both critics of the Administration and many of its allies fretted that the United States was doing little to respond to

the Soviet peace offensive. In fact, however, the Administration was moving rapidly and in secret to prepare a response.

When Baker returned from Moscow in early May, a senior White House official said Monday, the President directed the Pentagon to prepare a series of options that he could propose at the NATO summit.

A week after Baker's return, as Bush vacationed at his summer retreat in Kennebunkport, Me., his top defense advisers traveled there to outline several ideas.

Baker, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and Undersecretary Paul G. Wolfowitz, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy, Robert M. Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. William J. Crowe Jr. and his vice chairman, Gen. Robert T. Herres, and Chief of Staff John H. Sununu briefed Bush for several hours over lunch in the President's seaside home.

Although no details of the meeting leaked to the public, one effect of the session was noticeable within days. When Bush traveled that Sunday, May 21, to Boston University to deliver a speech on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its relations with the Soviets, his tone toward Gorbachev was far warmer than he and his aides had used only days before.

When Bush returned to Washington, meetings on the proposals continued, Administration officials said. On Tuesday, May 23, with the package taking final shape, the Administration dispatched Gates and Undersecretary of State Laurence S. Eagleburger to Europe to begin briefing the NATO allies.

In Paris, Rome, Bonn, London, Brussels and Amsterdam, Eagleburger and Gates described a series of options that were under consideration, European officials said.

Among them were the proposals that Bush offered Monday and some that would have gone even further, including one option for a 50% reduction of U.S. combat forces in Europe.

So closely held were the deliberations that followed, however, that the NATO officials heard nothing of the reactions to the proposals.

The same day the two left, Soviet officials at the conventional arms reductions talks in Vienna formally

presented the proposal that Gorbachev had outlined to Baker. The proposal accepted many of NATO's ideas for control of non-nuclear weapons and confirmed the Administration in its belief that Gorbachev meant what he said about arms control, an Administration official said.

The next day, Wednesday, May 24, Bush flew to New London, Conn., to speak on East-West relations. Displeased with the tone of his prepared text, Bush tore it up and substituted language that praised Gorbachev's initiatives even more clearly than he had done three days earlier in Boston.

On Thursday, the day before Bush departed for Europe, the President signed off on the final package. That afternoon, when reporters asked if the Administration had any dramatic, last-minute proposal to unveil at the NATO meeting, a senior Administration official smiled enigmatically and said: "Wait and see."

Alton Keel, the U.S. ambassador to NATO, and Stephen Ledogar, the chief U.S. representative to the arms reduction talks in Vienna, were briefed on Bush's proposal only hours before the President described it to a closed meeting of NATO allies in a speech that took roughly twice his allotted 10 minutes and seized center stage at the alliance's 40th anniversary summit.

Arms-cut plan no last-minute deal

Basics of Bush proposal date back to '88 campaign

By Ray Moseley
Chicago Tribune

BONN—President Bush's dramatic initiative on conventional arms reductions may have the look of something cobbled together at the last minute to deal with criticism that he was losing a public relations war with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

But administration officials familiar with the way the proposal was developed insisted Tuesday that was not so.

They said the idea of a U.S. initiative dated back to the early days of the Bush administration. But they said it was given impetus after Secretary of State James A. Baker III held talks with Gorbachev in Moscow on May 11.

American officials said they were confident the proposal, calling for significant troop cuts in Europe and reductions in combat aircraft, has undercut Gorbachev's strategy for his own visit to Bonn, scheduled to start June 12.

They said Gorbachev clearly intended to come to Bonn and exploit U.S.-West German differences over short-range nuclear weapons, an issue that was resolved at the NATO summit after Bush presented his initiative.

"It will be harder for Gorbachev to use the short-range lever on us," one U.S. official said. "The pressure is now on him in the conventional arms talks."

Officials said it was difficult to say precisely when Bush began to formulate his conventional arms strategy. But they noted that a Republican booklet prepared during

last fall's presidential campaign stressed the need for the U.S. to come up with such a proposal.

"The proposal in the booklet was very similar to what we did in Brussels," said one official.

He said Bush, Baker and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft held a White House meeting "at the very beginning of the administration" at which they discussed the need to come up with a NATO proposal in this area.

After that the administration embarked on a foreign policy review. But officials said that was a "separate track" that did not produce the results Bush announced on Monday.

When Baker went to Moscow, officials noted, Gorbachev gave him a detailed Soviet proposal for conventional arms reductions that Gorbachev assured him would be introduced the following day at the Vienna arms talks.

But officials said the Soviets failed to introduce the proposal, and in the days that followed Baker's return from Moscow the Soviets put out a number of negative signals, such as a threat to abrogate the 1987 treaty on elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

Officials said Baker and other administration spokesmen, seeking to send a signal to Moscow, then began stressing that the United States wanted to see deeds, not words, from the Soviet Union.

"But we couldn't get anybody to print it," one official said.

White House press secretary Marlin Fitzwater then decided to use a catchy phrase to draw public attention to the message the ad-

ministration wanted to get across, one official said.

Fitzwater called Gorbachev a "drugstore cowboy," and he got headlines with the remark. But he also received much criticism for his choice of language, which left the impression with many that the administration was taking a sour-grapes attitude to Gorbachev's public relations triumphs.

That was not the message Fitzwater wanted to convey, officials said, and he came to regret his choice of words.

Officials said Bush then appointed a small group of officials to begin drafting a conventional arms proposal. The group consisted of Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gates and some members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"We felt we had to come up with something to test Gorbachev," an official said.

Unexpectedly, the Soviets on May 23 finally got around to introducing at Vienna the arms proposal they had promised to submit on May 12.

"Now they had made a serious proposal, and we felt we could do something as well," one official said.

The final terms of the Bush initiative were adopted, he said, at a meeting at Bush's summer home at Kennebunkport, Me., on May 19, attended by Baker, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. William Crowe and other officials.

The stage was set for the biggest triumph of the Bush presidency.

In Bonn, With Bonhomie

The Bushes and the Kohls, All Smiles After the NATO Summit

By Lois Romano
Washington Post Staff Writer

BONN, May 30—On a chilly German night, the heat of battle seemed nearly forgotten.

After weeks of public bickering over nuclear missiles in Europe, President Bush and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl made their peace only hours before this evening's upbeat state dinner here at the Castle Redoute.

By the end of the effusive toasts, no one would have believed there ever was a problem.

"I am convinced that German-American relations rest on solid foundations . . . even if we disagree on this or that," Kohl said. He went on to give a very long history of the friendship, and then asked, "Is this all now in jeopardy because the Germans are allegedly looking eastwards, lost in romantic dreams, thus alienating themselves from the West?"

"That is a distortion . . . [We] have no intention of altering the unshakable . . . friendship and close cooperation with the United States. . . . We do not vacillate between two worlds."

Bush, clearly feeling triumphant from the reaction to his NATO arms reduction speech, returned the compliment. He referred to the relationship as one "united by the values of faith, family, human rights and democracy."

Then, repeating the gesture he made in Italy, the president announced the elimination of visa requirements for Germans traveling to the United States. Most of the 140 guests sitting in the dining room cheered.

Bush and Kohl had carried on their feud, concerning Germany's demand for East-West talks to reduce short-range nuclear arms, into the NATO summit. The dispute was finally settled at 1 this morning, when Bonn agreed to put off talks with the Soviets until agreement is reached and cuts begin on conventional forces in Europe.

And if there was any residue of bad blood remaining, it was brushed aside for tonight. The president and

Barbara Bush arrived at Redoute shortly after 8. There, at the very place Joseph Haydn met Beethoven, and Mozart debuted his "Magic Flute," these world leaders greeted each other's friends under twinkling crystal chandeliers.

"So good to see you again," boomed West German Economic Minister Helmut Haussman to Bush. "Congratulations on your success."

Barbara Bush enthusiastically introduced people to Hannelore Kohl as they came through the receiving line. And there were other equally enthusiastic guests: one German man stepped out of the receiving line with his own pocket camera to snap a shot of Bush.

Some of the Americans on hand included White House Chief of Staff John Sununu, State Department spokesman Margaret Tutwiler and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft. When Secretary of State James Baker came through the line, Bush—ever the friend—appeared to pick lint off of Baker's shirt.

Barbara and Hannelore both glittered in gold. Mrs. Bush wore a long black gown, overlaid in gold lamé. Mrs. Kohl wore an ankle-length fuchsia dress, also overlaid in gold.

Earlier, shortly before he left Belgium for this stop in Bonn, the president visited the Brussels American School. There, to everyone's amusement, he read a letter from one of the students. "Yo, President Bush, I think you're really cool," he read. "You make all the right decisions. . . . I love your hair."

Meanwhile, Barbara Bush also put in a full day in Belgium. She visited

the historic library at the university in Louvain, telling everyone there that she was a "terrible student."

"I was late bloomer," she joked.

Mrs. Bush only attended Smith College for one year before she met and married George Bush. "She married so quickly and had children, and I think she just meant that it was a while before she had time to broaden her horizons," said a White House aide.

The First Lady was invited to the library at Louvain both because of her longtime interest in literacy and because of America's sentimental connection with the institution.

In 1914, the original Gothic building was almost totally destroyed by World War I bombs, destroying 300,000 documents. Colleges, high schools and libraries throughout the States collected nickels and dimes for its rebuilding. The effort was repeated 30 years later, when the library was once again destroyed by war bombs. "It is with immense gratitude that I welcome you to this library," said Roger Dillemans, the school's director. "It reflects our deep bonds with the United States."

When Mrs. Bush was asked to sign the guest book, she said, "I feel so important, like I'm signing a treaty."

A short time later, on Air Force One en route to Bonn, the First Lady was peppered with questions about her husband's well-received arms address.

Asked whether the president was feeling up, she responded, "When have you ever seen him down?"

Not surprisingly, not a soul answered.