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
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GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

MEDIA ARTICLES



APRIL - AUGUST 1989


April 1989

SUNDAY, APRIL 2, 1989

The Washington Post

OUTLOOK

Commentary and Opinion



THE BUSH-FORD TRIO: DICK CHENEY, BRENT SCOWCROFT, JAMES BAKER—BY FORREST GREENE FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Bush's Very Own Ford Foundation

The Cheney-Scowcroft-Baker Team Learned the Same Lessons in the '70s

By David Gergen

IF PERSONAL friendships were the key to conducting a successful foreign policy, George Bush should be lining up soon for a Nobel prize. Not since Harry Truman has any president assembled a team of top advisers so closely knit together by trust, temperament and philosophy as the triumvirate that Bush finally has in place: James Baker at State, Brent Scowcroft at the National Security Council and Dick Cheney at Defense.

These three men share the bond of having fought in the same trenches during the presidency of Gerald Ford. Thus, like Truman's brain trust, they come to their new positions of leadership with a particular frame of reference, shaped in their case, by the post-Watergate period of disorientation and reconstruction. Their shared lessons include:

- *Play as a team.* The backbiting and suspicion that pitted Kissinger vs. Schlesinger, Brezinski vs. Vance etc. warps policy making and erodes presidential power.

- *Govern from the top.* Bureaucratic wrangling slows things down and produces unplanned leaks to the press, making life more difficult.

- *Keep your guard up, especially in foreign affairs.* Detente looked good until we began to take it for granted.

The returning Fordites came in the mid-1970s from the moderate wing of the GOP. Some never found a home under Ronald Reagan. Bush himself served as CIA director under Ford and was long identified with that wing of the party. A growing number of other "Ford people" are signing up with the new administration. But if the moderates are back, the old moderate policies are not. Precisely because of their experiences in the Ford days, the new foreign-policy team under Bush may prove surprisingly more cautious and even hardline than the conservatives under Reagan.

Baker, Scowcroft and Cheney all enjoy reminiscing about their pasts together, and it is clear that one of their attractions in joining Bush was a chance to work with old friends again. In conversations over the past week, both Cheney and Scowcroft recalled that their relationship blossomed when Ford promoted them to top positions on the same day—Cheney to be chief of staff at the age of 34, Scowcroft to be NSC adviser, only a few

doors away in the West Wing.

The two went with Ford to Helsinki and Vladivostok as he negotiated arms control with the Soviets, and they tried to extricate him from his gaffe over Poland in his ill-fated debate with Jimmy Carter. After Ford left office, they remained close as Scowcroft brought Cheney into a series of national-security study groups at Aspen and elsewhere. "I saw him as a coming power in the Republican party, and he was damn smart. . . . Dick's like an old shoe now, and we will get along beautifully in our new positions," says Scowcroft.

It was in those same days that Baker came to know both men. He and Scowcroft linked up on the Ford campaign plane, traveling together during the fall of 1976 when Baker was Ford's campaign manager. Another frequent flyer was Alan Greenspan, then Ford's chief economist and now chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and a continuing confidant of all three men. Baker and Scowcroft quickly developed mutual respect and were allies in the Bush campaigns of 1980 and 1988. "I realized on day one of the 1988 campaign, when Brent began helping out, that George would probably like to have him as NSC adviser if he won the election," says Baker.

From the first, the Bush team members have been trying to stay pals. During the transition, Baker and Scowcroft agreed that Baker would have the lead on foreign policy while Scowcroft and the NSC would have no operational role and Scowcroft himself would be a low-profile "honest broker" within the administration. Along the way they would avoid niggling disagreements over public speeches, television interviews, ambassadorial visits and the like. For Baker, it was a welcome difference from the day that Reagan's new secretary of state, Al Haig, apparently misled by the president about the scope of his duties, came calling with a paper claiming far more turf than the White House wanted to relinquish. Relationships with Haig slid downhill from there.

But if Baker is close to Scowcroft, it is Cheney who is his real buddy—just as Cheney is also closer to Scowcroft. "I'm the guy who named Jim campaign manager for Ford," Cheney proudly remembers. The two became fast friends, so that when Baker was Reagan's chief of staff and Cheney was then in Congress, the two talked frequently, Cheney tipping him off to the latest twists on Capitol Hill. Both love the back woods, and

two years ago Cheney took Baker up into the Wind River Range of his native Wyoming for a week of riding and fishing. They were to go again last summer but Cheney had a mild heart attack and Baker took Bush instead. This summer? The two made plans for an August trip even before Cheney was named to Defense, and last week Cheney penned a private note saying the invitation was "still valid".

To observers such as Steve Hess of Brookings, the three are "uniquely men of good will, a combination that is remarkable in the corridors of power." All three see the others as team players, self-confident and independent-minded but not hungering for power or the camera. All three have also signed up for the long haul, intending to stay for four years and perhaps longer if Bush is still president. Cheney, 48, would still have a career beyond but for Baker, 58, and Scowcroft, 64, these jobs are probably the culmination of their public service. That's why all of them have a special stake in their mutual success.

It may not all be smooth riding, however. Unless they instill a greater sense of urgency in the administration over budget and trade deficits, the world's economic system could one day collapse around them. Foreigners point out that only Scowcroft has the extensive experience in diplomacy normally associated with his job. Like-mindedness also has its own perils: It can stifle healthy disagreement. Scowcroft, for example, has long been eager to discard plans from the Reagan administration to build a rail-based MX missile while Cheney apparently leans toward a rail-garrison. The administration would be better served to have a full-fledged, front-page debate than to smother dissent in order to keep internal peace.

As Scowcroft recognizes, they still face a residue of suspicion, jealousy and backbiting from years of internal struggle between their institutions. Scowcroft and Cheney had ring-side seats for the bitter feuds between Henry Kissinger, Ford's first NSC adviser, and Jim Schlesinger at Defense. "They were two of the best minds in the country, but they just couldn't get along," says one official from those days.

From the Reagan years, Baker has fresh memories of the continuing battles between Caspar Weinberger at Defense and Al Haig and then George Shultz at State. The sniping between Zbigniew Brezinski at NSC and Cyrus Vance at State during the Carter years,

FORD FOUNDATION...

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the distance between LBJ and Dean Rusk, the exasperation of Ike with "Engine Charlie" Wilson at Defense—all those left indelible impressions, too, of disrupted policy making and participants drained of both energy and good will.

The Bush trio hopes to set a pattern of co-operation early on and see it seep down into their bureaucracies. Baker believes the system is already producing benefits: He was able to work closely with Scowcroft and Bush in devising a new Central American plan and then negotiate on Capitol Hill without the plan leaking to the press and possibly derailing. By nature, Baker is also impatient with long bureaucratic wrangling, and he was pleased that he could work out a framework for his first major speech on arms control, delivered recently in Vienna, by asking Scowcroft and Adm. William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to come to his suite for lunch.

The procedural danger is that by working the system from "top down", some good ideas and refinements may be lost from the experts closer to the bottom. Foreign-service officers are openly criticizing Baker already for ignoring them. Baker's defenders say that he will gradually bring them into his circle, but before he went to State, he was urged not to be "captured" by the bureaucracy like Shultz. "Those foreign-service officers ran Shultz on almost every issue, and Baker is right not to allow it," says one high-ranking official.

The more interesting question is whether they will get along as well with the world as they do with each other. Cheney and Scowcroft were both at the Ford White House when detente crumbled as the Soviets built up both their military and their empire. They painfully remember how U.S. soldiers were lifted from rooftops in Saigon and the North Vietnamese obliterated the peace agreements. And Baker has vivid memories of a conservative Ronald Reagan almost pushing

Ford aside for the Republican nomination by attacking detente so sharply that Ford had to drop the word—and almost had to drop Kissinger.

Not surprisingly, all three men—along with Bush—come to office determined not to be swept away by changes in the Kremlin. "You can't look back upon the experience of the 1970s without being a bit skeptical about the prospect of long-term change in the Soviet Union," observes Cheney. In a speech he personally wrote for his Pentagon inauguration, Cheney said, "There are those who want to declare the Cold War ended. . . . But I believe caution is in order." And in a passage Gorbachev must have found striking, Cheney added this test for the Soviets: "To date, there's been no reduction in the strategic systems targeted against the United States."

Reagan and some of his team came to Washington with traditional Cold War views of the Soviets but because they had not personally presided over the souring of detente in the 1970s, they apparently found it easier to change their minds. Persuaded that Gorbachev represented a break with the past (why, he even talked about God), Reagan swung from the pessimism of his "evil empire" speech to the optimism of Reykjavik. Cheney was troubled by the outcome of Reykjavik and has vowed to steer a straighter course.

Whether their caution will encourage the kind of imagination and daring that the times require is a large, unanswered question, one that all of them are now pondering. Certainly, they recognize that the postwar structures are rapidly shifting beneath their feet as the perception of a Soviet threat recedes in public minds and as old partners in Europe and Asia become stiff economic competitors. Bush has said repeatedly that the United States now has major opportunities to reshape the world, and Baker echoes him, "We must not let an opportunity go by from an excess of caution, but it's a line you've got to be able to walk with great care."

None of Bush's top advisers sees himself

as a grand strategist in the Kissinger or Nixon mold, and some critics argue they are not strong conceptualizers, either. "This is a government of incrementalists," says one Republican authority. "Kissinger thought three or four moves ahead; these guys may be two-move players," says another. A few who have dealt directly with him think Bush may be the best foreign-policy thinker, while Scowcroft is given credit for being an excellent judge of others' ideas and Baker is seen as a superb tactician. In truth, it is too early to tell much about their capacities in their new roles.

It won't be long, however, before the press and perhaps foreign governments begin to make judgments, since the administration should soon complete its long-awaited national-security and foreign-policy reviews. Below top levels, officials are already trying to lower expectations, saying that most of the studies are bottom-up summaries of conventional wisdom. One source says that only the studies of the strategic reduction talks and strategic modernization questions (e.g., whether to build a mobile missile) are likely to be significant, and a third study may surface some interesting options on Eastern Europe. But, as Kissinger found during a similar exercise in the Nixon years, the reports are likely to leave all the big questions in the laps of the big players: Bush and his triumvirate.

Friendships do matter. The last time an administration had so many friends at the top saw a burst of creative brilliance, as George Marshall, Henry Stimson, Dean Acheson and others helped Harry Truman erect a system of alliances and policies that kept the peace for 40 years. They had the additional advantage, however, of coming through a great war together. When the war ended, they knew they were living through a hinge point in history, and they were prepared for it.

The Bush advisers know that they, too, are living through a watershed period and they are counting on their friendships to help. Whether they can also summon the wisdom of the Truman years is probably their biggest test.

David Gergen, editor at large of U.S. News & World Report, was special counsel to President Ford.

Calling for a Redesign Of National Security

By RICHARD HALLORAN

WASHINGTON

In the summer of 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb and Communists came to power in China. Taken aback, President Truman asked his advisers on foreign and military policy to reassess American objectives in war and peace. In the spring of 1950, they produced a far-ranging document to guide the deliberations of the National Security Council.

Known as NSC-68, it has governed American foreign and military policies for nearly forty years now. It rejected isolation as appeasement and preventive war as disastrous, and provided the strategic underpinning for the containment of the Soviet Union and China. It led to establishing the nation's first large armed force in peacetime, forging a network of alliances centering on NATO and deploying of American forces around the world. It also argued for enlarging the nuclear arsenal intended to deter adversaries.

President Bush, addressing Congress in February, called for a wide-ranging review of security strategy, recognizing that the world of 1989 is fundamentally different from that of 1973, when American involvement in the Vietnam war ended, let alone that of 1949.

Thus last week, Mikhail S. Gorbachev presided over the freest nationwide Soviet elections since 1917. Just after World War II, the Soviet Union's economy was recovering; today it is stagnant. Japan, crushed in World War II, has become a leading economic competitor and Washington has begun to view economic policy as an equal to traditional foreign and military policy as an element of national security.

The United States is no less concerned today with the containment of communism, but with the Soviet Union's retreat from Afghanistan and other more farflung spots, Washington policy makers have seen signs of flexibility in Soviet policy. To test that flexibility, the Bush Administration last week appealed to Mr. Gorbachev and his ally, Fidel Castro, "to end all aid that supports subversion and destabilization in Central America."

In his address to Congress, Mr. Bush said he had asked for a review of "our national security policies and defense strategies with a view to ensuring compatibility among our commitments, strategies, capabilities and resources."

Known as National Strategy Review 12, it is expected to put President Bush's imprint on national security policy without demolishing earlier strategies.

The Personal Touch

To emphasize the importance of this venture, Mr. Bush personally wrote parts of the marching orders early last month. While he wanted the premises of national security to be re-examined, he wrote: "I don't expect this review to invent a new strategy for a new world."

"It's fairly ambitious," said one official, "but it's intended to produce a disciplined evolution." Mr. Bush has said he will make no decisions or announcements until completion of the review in mid-May, when he expects to begin delivering a series of speeches on the new strategy.

As with NSC-68, an assessment of the Soviet Union's economic and military power is clearly central to National Security Review 12. NSC-68 stated: "We can expect no lasting abatement" of East-West tensions "unless and until a change occurs in the nature of the Soviet system." The question today: Do Mr. Gorbachev's reforms signal the beginning of such a fundamental change?

Similarly, an objective set by NSC-68 was "the gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian boundaries." With Eastern Europe once again restless, should this retraction remain a goal for the United States?

Senior Administration officials have begun to hint at directions the review has taken. Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d said last week that the United States might seek negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at loosening Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney has said the need for stationing forces around the world was being examined.

In many ways, National Security Review 12 has its roots in the Vietnam war, which shattered the American consensus on foreign policy and especially on the use of military power. Each administration since has made minor policy adjustments without acknowledging a need to undertake a broad re-examination of ways to protect national interests.

President Reagan, for instance, early in his first term ordered a study of diplomatic, economic, military and intelligence policies that are subsumed in national security policy. But the State Department, Treasury and other agencies failed to respond.

Late in Mr. Reagan's second term, a Defense Department panel led by Fred C. Ikle, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and Albert Wohlstetter, a defense consultant, produced "Discriminate Deterrence," a study that has since gathered dust.

The latest review is being supervised by President Bush's national security adviser.

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Brent Scowcroft, with the State and Defense Departments, the Treasury and Central Intelligence contributing. R. James Woolsey, a Democrat who was Undersecretary of the Navy in the Carter Administration and a member of several bipartisan commissions, is an adviser. The main topics being examined include Soviet-American relations, arms control, global issues outside relations with the Soviet Union and defense policy.

But the extent to which policy will change in many instances will be shaped by the financial resources available. Mr. Cheney has said he would like to have finished the strategic review before revising the budget to make Mr. Bush's military spending lower than that requested by President Reagan. But with the deadline for the budget coming before that of the strategy review, Mr. Cheney said, "that won't work."

The gap between strategy and money is not new. In an assessment valid in both 1949 and 1989, NSC-68 said: "It is true that the United States armed forces are now stronger than ever before in times of apparent peace; it is also true that there exists a sharp disparity between our actual strength and our commitments."

Journalists Debate the Risks As President Woos the Press

New York
Times
4/2

By MAUREEN DOWD

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 1 — Jessica Lee can remember exactly how it felt, the night she attended a dinner party at the Bushes', to drive her rusty blue Datsun sports car through the iron gates and up the driveway to the White House. "I couldn't get over it, a Washington reporter parking in front of the door," said Ms. Lee, the White House reporter for USA Today.

Like some other journalists who have enjoyed the extraordinary new access that President Bush is allowing in an array of off-the-record private lunches, dinners and chats at the White House, Ms. Lee said the chance to see the Gettysburg Address in the Lincoln Bedroom and other parts of the residential quarters was "thrilling."

She does not fear that such privileged and relaxed sessions with the President will compromise her objectivity. Rather, she said she believes she is getting a fuller picture of Mr. Bush's personality and forging a bond that will help her get more access on future news events.

Old Debate Revived

The President's style of dealing with the press, dramatically different from Ronald Reagan's carefully managed, television-oriented approach, has revived an old debate in journalism circles. Some reporters say such private contacts give them additional insights. But many other journalists and media critics are skeptical, remembering the Camelot days when John F. Kennedy's courtship of reporters seemed to turn many of them into cheerleaders, and the tense days when Lyndon B. Johnson tried to build support for the Vietnam war with intense, personal persuasion of the press corps.

In both cases, many journalists worried afterwards that they may have crossed the line from journalism to advocacy.

Marlin Fitzwater, the President's press secretary, argues that the current post-Watergate crop of reporters are such "competitive, cynical characters" that they could never be turned into advocates. But Bush officials are eager to woo the press anyway, perhaps remembering the lesson of Jimmy Carter, a President who did not court the press and whose image suffered because many journalists did not like him.

Congressional Approach

"George Bush recognizes the press's need to get information and its value to him as a leader of the country," said Mr. Fitzwater. "You tell the press what you're doing and you tell them why and you hope to do it in a such way that they understand and support."

Mr. Bush is reaching out to journalists in the same flattering way he

reached out to Democrats in Congress, using the trappings of his office to try to win them over and make them partners in his conciliatory approach to making policy.

Conceding that he lacks President Reagan's potent screen presence, he has avoided the nationally televised evening press extravaganzas. Instead of using the press as a foil, he is meeting with reporters in frequent spontaneous news conferences, as well as offering invitations to small groups of journalists for private chats, with the contents not to be published or broadcast, hoping that they in turn will present his case in a more positive light.

Just as he impressed members of Congress and their spouses with cocktails on the Truman balcony, he is now offering journalists the tantalizing chance to see how his thinking is evolving on critical foreign and domestic issues.

Some journalists and media experts say this provides an important element of truth and depth for reporting; others say it is dishonest to the public, who never learn the proper context and motivation for the information that then colors the reporting without attribution.

'A Very Heady Wine'

"President Bush is doing what other Presidents, like L.B.J. and John Kennedy did, who believed that if you could get close enough to the press, you'd have them on your side," said Fred Friendly, the director of Columbia University seminars on Media and Society. "It's a very heady wine when a President asks you to have lunch at the White House, and there you are with the fancy dishes and impressive service."

"But what a President is trying to do when he goes off the record is to co-opt somebody. And reporters have to be wary of that."

Mr. Friendly said journalists must beware of the dangerously seductive phrase from a Chief Executive who asks, "If you were President, what would you do?"

He recalled that when he was a CBS News official, he was called to the White House by President Johnson, who put an arm around him and asked his advice on Vietnam.

"He told me that if we didn't stop the Communists where they were, the next thing we knew they would be in San Francisco. He didn't want my advice. That's why he had Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara. He just wanted to get me on his side."

Last Tuesday, Mr. Fitzwater telephoned three reporters who had written about the Middle East and told them the President wanted to have a private lunch Wednesday before his meetings with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel.

The reporters — Thomas L. Friedman, the diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times; Charles Seib, a White House reporter for The Wall Street Journal, and Timothy McNulty,

a White House reporter for The Chicago Tribune — agreed to go to the session but said they did not intend to act as ad hoc foreign policy advisers.

"Marlin said that the President would really like to pick our brains," said Mr. Friedman. "I went because I wanted to pick his brain."

Howell Raines, the Washington bureau chief of The New York Times, said: "We have serious misgivings about this approach. We've told our reporters not to give advice, to avoid expressing opinions that would cast doubt on their objectivity and to withdraw if they feel they are being co-opted or compromised."

Although none of the reporters were able to write an article about the interview, which took place in the President's study and included his Chief of Staff, John H. Sununu, and his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, they said the meeting provided valuable insights.

Mr. McNulty said he did not think the President's motives are "so Machiavellian." Rather, he said, "I think he enjoys the give and take. I got the impression that a lot of discussions at the White House are held that way, that Bush has a family dinner table style of arriving at solutions."

Mr. Fitzwater said the President does not need reporters to give him advice. He merely wants to give them exposure that he thinks would help them do their job. "It is hard for me to imag-

Bush offers a tantalizing chance to see his thinking evolve.

ine a journalism school in America that would tell any reporter not to talk to the President for any reason," Mr. Fitzwater said.

Some journalists argue in favor of discussions with the President or Vice President that are agreed in advance to be all or partly not for publication, called "off the record" or "on background" among journalists. They say that once the session begins, they can then try to obtain an agreement to allow some of the contents back on the record.

R. W. Apple Jr., the chief Washington correspondent of The New York Times, had lunch with the President and three other journalists last week, and asked Mr. Bush if the ground rules could be changed to "background," so that the material could be used without disclosing its source. "If I can't use any of what you say, it's not of much use to my readers," Mr. Apple told Mr. Bush, who indicated that he would leave it up to Mr. Fitzwater. The press secretary agreed to change the rules for that session, but has now decided he wants to keep all such future sessions completely off the record.

Vice President Dan Quayle has begun having his own private sessions with journalists, and Helen Thomas of United Press International, who is the senior member of the White House press corps, went to one such lunch for six reporters on Wednesday. Ms. Thomas openly took notes and pressed until the lunch was put on the record, and Mr. Quayle made news talking about his growing confidence and his impressions of the Soviet Union.

Benjamin C. Bradlee Jr., the executive editor of The Washington Post, said he became fed up during the late 1960's by the proliferation of private sessions by the Administration and told his reporters to refuse to participate. "We struck out boldly," he recalled. "But we were whopped right away."

When no other news organizations followed suit, and with The Post's reporters losing important information, Mr. Bradlee told them to return to the private briefings. He said he regards President Bush's greater accessibility, both on the record and with various other ground rules, "more enlightened" than President Reagan's inaccessibility.

Reagan SDI gets lower priority on Bush budget agenda

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

With military brass eyeing the Strategic Defense Initiative's huge budget and senior officials questioning its potential contribution to U.S. security, the program appears to be taking a back seat in the Bush administration.

Supporters of the missile defense project say recent developments in Pentagon budget deliberations and in a White House review of Washington's strategy and goals have heightened fears that SDI will not retain the priority status accorded it by former President Reagan.

Most immediately, SDI is being squeezed between President Bush's directive that the Defense Department slash \$6.3 billion from its fiscal year 1990 budget request and the perceived urgent need to modernize U.S. land-based nuclear missiles.

After arguing for 10 years about which new missile to build and how to base it, Congress and the administration appear intent on a compromise in which both the 10-warhead MX, carried on rail cars, and the single-warhead Midgetman, will be fielded in the 1990s.

The MX rail program would cost about \$8 billion and Midgetman, formally known as the Small ICBM, between \$25 billion and \$35 billion.

In a tight defense budget, the money is all but certain to come from SDI — for which Mr. Reagan requested \$5.9 billion in 1990 — as

well as from the troubled B-2 "stealth" bomber, the Air Force's Advanced Tactical Fighter aircraft and other weapons projects.

Concerned about just that possibility, the top Republican on the House Armed Services Committee last week urged Mr. Bush and Defense Secretary Dick Cheney to reject the deal unless defense spending is raised to cover the cost of Midgetman.

"The Small ICBM is a good system and our national security would benefit from having it," said Rep. Bill Dickinson, Alabama Republican. "But if the cost of the program is gutting SDI and other programs while defense budgets continue to be reduced, then we are better off with no deal."

"SDI's going to be cut, period" and probably by up to \$2 billion, said an aide to committee chairman Rep. Les Aspin, a prime mover behind the MX-Midgetman compromise.

According to various officials, the administration's strategic review assumes that the primary means to deter nuclear war with the Soviet Union will continue to be offensive weapons.

For top Bush appointees like National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, who is overseeing the review, "the clock stopped in 1975," said one frustrated Pentagon official, referring to the year in which the United States abandoned the small missile defense it was allowed under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. "The

ICBM is king. Long live the ICBM. . . And they suck up all the money."

According to a White House official, concern over the direction that the review might take prompted Vice President Dan Quayle to declare in a March 23 speech that "the Bush administration remains committed to the development and deployment of a viable strategic defense system."

But a senior administration official involved in the review appeared to differ with the vice president.

"SDI may or may not be the salvation of our strategy," this official said recently. "Like every other element of our defense posture," he said, "it ought to stand or fall on its contribution" to deterrence.

One official acknowledged that SDI may be put on the back-burner for a while, but said he is more concerned that avenues for developing anti-missile systems are not cut off in arms proposals to the Soviets.

The project's advocates were enheartened last week when Mr. Cheney said during a television interview that missile defense "would add very significantly to deterrence because of the possibility that it would interfere with any Soviet first strike in major ways. . . And I think it ought to be looked at in those terms."

"It's clear that he has it in mind

that defenses are one of the alternatives," the administration official said.

The defense secretary said the program has made considerable technical progress in recent months. "We've also come up with some ways to achieve that capability at significantly less cost than was originally anticipated," he said.

The latter statement is widely interpreted as a reference to a new anti-missile concept called "Brilliant Pebbles," which has been praised in recent weeks by Mr. Quayle, as well as the former and current directors of the SDI research program.

Existing SDI plans call for space-based missile interceptors that would be housed in colonies of 10 aboard large, complex "garages." Brilliant Pebbles, by contrast, envisions thousands of individual interceptors in orbit, each with computers and sensors sophisticated enough to select and home in on a rising Soviet missile without outside help.

Early prototypes are due to be tested intensively over the next two years and the results could help determine SDI's future.

The administration's review is expected to generate for Mr. Bush a half-dozen options on what to do with SDI.

According to a White House official, one will likely recommend jettisoning the Pentagon's current, \$69 billion "Phase One" plan in favor of research on Brilliant Pebbles and deployment of a ground-based system to defend against accidental missile launches, like that suggested by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn.

While this would cut SDI spending over the next five years from \$40 billion to \$33 billion, the official said, another option for "research only" would cut the program's share of the five-year defense plan in half, to \$20 billion.

Cheney gets on-job training, march through many briefings

By Charlie Schill
Times staff writer

WASHINGTON — Richard B. Cheney, who admits he has a lot to learn about the military, spent his first week as secretary of defense in on-the-job training.

Unlike most of his predecessors, Cheney has not had extensive experience in military affairs and he did not serve in the armed forces. He spent much of his first week at the helm of the Department of Defense in a series of briefings intended to fill gaps in his knowledge.

"Anybody who takes over as defense secretary needs to be brought up to speed on current details of military programs and issues," said a Pentagon official who spoke on condition he not be identified.

"In Cheney's case, it's a matter of starting almost from scratch. The briefings have to deal with the broad implications of issues before we can move onto the nitty-gritty," he said.

Cheney publicly took his oath as defense secretary March 21 in a Pentagon courtyard ceremony attended by President Bush, defense officials and a throng of generals and admirals.

He used the occasion to reaffirm his commitment to reforming the defense procurement system and to maintaining military strength despite recent Soviet offers of force reductions in Europe.

Cheney said the Cold War has not ended and he cautioned against optimists who would respond to Soviet rhetoric with cutbacks in funding and forces for NATO.

"Until we see a significantly lessened military capability on the part of the Soviets, we cannot possibly justify major reductions in our own," Cheney warned.

Here is how Cheney's first few days in office were spent.

The new secretary's day started with a breakfast meeting with Secretary of State James A. Baker III and national security adviser Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft (USAF Ret.) to discuss the current national security strategy review.

The strategy assessment is being managed by the National Security Council staff, with the assistance of officials from DoD and the Department of State. The strategic review, ordered by Bush Feb. 9, is scheduled to be completed by early May.

Cheney attended a 90-minute gathering March 22 with Republican members of Congress to discuss his successor as the party's minority whip in the House. In a close secret-ballot election, Rep. Newt Gingrich of Georgia was chosen.

Cheney also met with Office of Management and Budget Director Richard G. Darman to discuss the continuing effort to trim the defense budget by more than \$2 billion in outlays without cutting military manpower or reducing readiness, according to a senior officer.

Cheney was introduced to strategic-modernization challenges facing the Pentagon during a three-hour briefing. Those issues include whether to continue controversial plans for rail garrisoning of Peacekeeper (MX) missiles, whether to acquire the Small Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (Midgetman) and whether NATO allies politically can support the modernization of U.S. short-range nuclear missiles and artillery rounds in Europe.

Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense-designate Donald J. Atwood received two classified briefings lasting nearly three hours on military operations during the week.

The new secretary of defense also was briefed by Donald J. Rice of Rand Corp. about ongoing studies commissioned by the Pentagon. Rice served in the Pentagon and OMB during the Johnson and Nixon administrations.

Cheney ate lunch with Rep. William L. Dickinson of Alabama, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee, and later met separately with the committee's chairman, Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis.

A committee aide said talk during those meetings focused on pending military legislation. Potential areas of friction between Congress and the Pentagon — including sharing of the defense burden by U.S. allies, overseas troop levels, base-closure efforts and funding for personnel programs — also were discussed.

Cheney also was briefed on the status of an internal review of Pentagon management practices. Directed March 1 by Bush, that review is expected to develop a plan to fully implement the report of the 1986 President's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, also called the Packard Commission.

The review also is to provide recommendations for redefining the role of the Pentagon's acquisition undersecretary, streamlining acquisition management, redefining the role of the policy undersecretary, saving money through management efficiency and reforming the relationship between government and the defense industry.

Following that was a late-afternoon meeting with Rep. Bill Frenzel of Minnesota, a member of the House Republican Policy Committee.

Cheney attended a formal dinner with network television newscasters, including Sam Donaldson and Diane Sawyer of ABC, at the Washington home of movie director

Mike Nichols.

On March 24, he conducted his first news conference as defense secretary. It was followed by a classified operations briefing.

Cheney was scheduled for a four-hour update on Pentagon intelligence operations and a three-hour status briefing on the NSC national security review to close out his first week in the Pentagon.

His first-week schedule also included meetings each evening with Atwood and Adm. William J. Crowe Jr. (USN), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are working on budget-reduction options, the internal management review and the national security study.

Since the Bush administration took office Jan. 20, Crowe's staff primarily has been concerned with supporting the national security review and evaluating the effects that various cost-savings proposals to trim the Pentagon budget would have on combat-readiness.

ESSAY

William Safire

Sununu's 'Different Template'

A WASHINGTON joke is told in politico-economic circles, attributed to Robert Strauss, about the hurried deliberation — or lack of necessary urgency — that characterizes the Bush Administration.

The President is awakened by the sound of puppies crying in the night and goes down to the White House kitchen for a snack of pork rinds and a glass of milk. Unfamiliar with the surroundings in the dark, he bonks his head on the refrigerator and is out cold for three and a half years.

When he opens his eyes in 1992, refreshed after his long rest, he sees the face of White House chief of staff John Sununu peering down at him. Mr. Bush's first words are "How fares the nation?"

"Everything is in great shape," Mr. Sununu reports. "Peace, prosperity without inflation, the kinder-gentler thing doing fine. One of Millie's grandpuppies just had her first litter, and the Post Office is delivering the announcement cards."

The President warily asks for specifics: "How much does it cost to mail a letter from Washington to California?"

"Same as last year," shrugs Sununu, "300 yen."

To discover if such complacency is rampant at the center of power, and to track down the source of a troubling new phrase, I visited Governor Sununu in his West Wing office.

He is, as they say, sharp. When I recalled hours spent in that corner office with a previous occupant, and added wistfully, "Say what you like about Haldeman, nobody ever ran into his motorcades," Mr. Sununu smiled and

replied, "I'll mention that to Cheney." He had caught the obscure allusion to inept Presidential motorcading during the Ford Administration when Dick Cheney was chief of staff.

On the other hand, he is still insecure and wet behind his White House ears. In our interview, which was on foreground, he had his deputy sit in to take notes, sign of a player new to the big leagues and fearful of being misquoted. He had his secretary rush in with a message about being late for a meeting with the President, which he waved off to flatter his visitor but also to impress him with the value of the time being taken up. That hoary heave-ho technique is known to Oval Officiators as "the 10-minute bounce."

Asked about the perception of leisureliness in governance, the near-palindromic aide offered a fresh metaphor to explain the failure to understand the Bush approach: "Ours is a different template."

Translation: You can no longer use the Reagan template on the keyboard of power. (A template in this sense is a plastic instruction sheet cut out to overlay the computer's keys.) The Bush template reflects a different processing system: if you hold down Alt and push F9, you will now get conciliation where you used to get confrontation.

I take this to mean, for example, that the deal made with Speaker Wright to keep the contras fed while giving a policy veto on Nicaragua to Congress would be an unprincipled cave-in on the Reagan template, but is a net pragmatic gain on the Bush template.

The chief of staff "had a little chat with" Boyden Gray about the way the President's counsel, shut out of that Baker-Sununu-Scowcroft project, objected publicly. I think Mr. Gray was right in trying to stop an evisceration of Presidential power, but Mr. Sununu disagrees.

He was not trapped by what was artfully presented as a linguistic question. The phrase *enhanced rescission* is being whispered in the corridors of power. Sounds like a tricky euphemism; what does it mean?

"It's an alternative to the line-item veto," he said, suggesting Bob Dole as the best source about that, I presume to avoid letting it appear to be an executive initiative.

The power to impound — to not spend — funds appropriated by Congress was taken away from a weakened President in 1974; Mr. Reagan's counterattack, the line-item veto, never had a chance of passage. That leaves a middle ground of "rescission," or getting Congress to agree to rescind parts of appropriations, to be "enhanced" by making unnecessary the current affirmative legislative action.

The upshot would be a substantial giveback of executive authority, as evidence that the Tower appointment precedent and the contra-veto usurpation were not waves of the future. It would show, too, that the Bush White House was effectively at work behind the scenes, progressing without grandstanding.

Will Mr. Sununu and budgeteer Dick Darman win this for President Bush? I don't see how, if their standard becomes a white feather on a flapping doormat, but for my different template, I am willing to plunk down about 300 yen. □

At the Gridiron, The Wig and The Wags

The First Lady's April Fool Joke Highlights the Annual Dinner

~p 413 D1

By Martha Sherrill
Washington Post Staff Writer

Barbara Bush did it without a troupe of professional gag writers, without two weeks of preparation and rehearsal, without having to step on stage. Saturday night at the annual Gridiron dinner—that lovefest of low blows between the press and politicians—she made her own kind of April Fool's joke.

She showed up wearing a reddish blond wig. She wore it all night. She left wearing it. She never let on it was a joke.

There was a certain amount of confusion.

Arriving at the dinner, the first lady sat down at the enormously long head table. The 40 other people sitting there leaned forward—

all at once, someone said—to get a better look. Only at the bitter end of the evening—when George Bush stood up to give his remarks—was there any reference to it. “Luckily,” said the president, “Barbara has not reacted in the slightest to all the comments about her gray hair.”

Still, people kept talking.

“It wasn’t a red wig,” said one observer—a man. “It was copper.”

“It wasn’t copper,” said PL 3’ Judy Woodruff. “It was strawberry-blondish.”

“I thought it was supposed to be Nancy Reagan hair,” said one publisher.

“Our table spent the whole night trying to figure out whether it was a wig or a dye job,” said a columnist.

“It was great. She looked awful,” said speechwriter Landon Parvin—the jokemeister famous for scripting Nancy Reagan’s triumphant “Second-Hand Clothes” gig at the Gridiron in 1982. “It looked like she had Millie on her head.”



From top, Ron Brown, James Baker and Doug Williams at the Gridiron Club's annual dinner.

Such a Civilized Event

Every spring about this time, these natural enemies—the press and public figures—get together at the Capital Hilton. It has something to do with symbiosis. They roast each other in skits and speeches with baby bromides and newsy jokes. “Singe but never burn” is a club motto.

Even so . . . “That was rough!” said Redskins quarterback Doug Williams, after his first Gridiron. “I’ve never seen so many potshots taken at politicians in all my life. Playing football is a lot easier than sitting in there.”

“I thought I got off a lot lighter than I usually do,” said Republican National Committee Chairman Lee Atwater—a favorite target along with Dan Quayle, Jim Wright and John Tower. “So I’m delighted.”

Vice President Quayle took hits all evening. According to one observer, President Bush never laughed at the Quayle jokes, but looked into his lap instead. “I wish they wouldn’t pick on Quayle,” said Eugene McCarthy afterward. “It’s kind of sad.”

Quayle was the subject of a skit, in which a Richard Nixon character sings to him (to the tune of “I Believe in You”):

You’ve got the cool, clear eyes of a seeker of wisdom and truth,

You’re not the intellectual midget you seemed in your youth . . .

You’re not the dim bulb I had been led to believe I would see.

Are you an airhead dilettante lightweight? You sure could fool me.

Who, What, When

This slap-shtick has been going on for some time. Saturday night’s was

the 104th annual Gridiron dinner, to which the 60 members of the Gridiron Club (referred to as “journalism’s elite”) invite bigwigs from the government, corporate America and the media to put on white tie and ditch their spouses at home. It was a stag thing until 1975. Now some of the spouses are men.

There were 630 members and guests there this year. And they were mostly Very Important. The head table ran the width of the ballroom—to accommodate all the prestige. It accommodated the president and the vice president. Barbara Bush. Marilyn Quayle. Ron Brown. Jim Wright. Dick Cheney. Dick Thornburgh. James Baker. Marlin Fitzwater. Tom Foley. Brent Scowcroft. Dick Darman. William Sessions. Alan Greenspan. And not quite a majority of Supreme Court justices.

In the center of all this sat Gridiron President Lawrence M. O’Rourke, of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

The “working press” is never invited to the Gridiron—another tradition. Somehow it winds up in the paper anyway.

Quayle Shoot

After being the butt of others’ jokes, Quayle got up and made fun of himself. This is how others—Nancy Reagan, Don Regan—helped humanize themselves. (Sometimes the effects wear off immediately.) This is what the Gridiron is all about. Humanness. Humble pie. Total—but tender—humiliation.

“The president has been so supportive of me,” said Quayle. “The other day he called me into the Oval Office and said, ‘I know you’ve had

something that will show the nation what faith I have in you, in your maturity and sense of responsibility . . . Would you like a puppy?”

Of Secretary of State James Baker, the vice president said: “I owe him so much. During the campaign he took me under his wing—and kept me there.”

A John Tower joke came as a surprise, and won the evening’s biggest laugh. “I do wish the Democrats would have given John Tower the benefit of the doubt. John frequently did innocent things that were misunderstood.” Quayle then told a story about Tower sunbathing on a hotel roof in the Caribbean, while on a fact-finding mission.

“Seeing no one around, he stripped to the buff and lay down, modestly putting a towel over his behind . . . Suddenly the hotel manager burst up on the roof, yelling, ‘Senator, you must come down at once. This is indecent.’

“‘What do you mean?’” Quayle said Tower replied. “‘I’m covered with a towel.’

“‘But senator, you’re lying on our dining room skylight.’”

Quayle later became serious. He invoked the name of his grandfather, Indiana publisher Eugene Pulliam—which reminded everyone he is a newspaperman twice-removed. “He

came to these Gridirons quite often . . . He certainly enjoyed them. And carrying on the tradition, I’ve enjoyed the evening too.”

“He had that debate look,” said one journalist afterward, “like a guy who’d just been punched.”

Ron Brown, Your Turn

The other party was represented by new Democratic National Committee Chairman Ron Brown. “Tonight I was looking forward to this dinner,” Brown began. “I arrive here feeling good about myself, resplendent in this white tie, proud of my accomplishments. And I see [columnist] Bob Novak at the door. He walks up to me with a big smile on his face, and then hands me his coat and a quarter . . .

“Frankly I was a little offended,” he continued. “At least [former DNC chairman Robert] Strauss gave me a dollar.”

He spoke of the Reagans. “And, frankly, tonight I miss Nancy and Ronald Reagan. For eight years, they set a standard for entertainment, storytelling and amusement that will be difficult to match,” he said. “And they also did a great job here at the Gridiron . . .

“To tell the truth,” said Brown. “I’m more comfortable now that the amateurs are back in charge.”

Wash
Post
Apr 3

Mr. President

"This is the largest white-tie group I've seen," said George Bush, "since those coming-out parties in Iowa . . .

"People say I'm indecisive," he said, "but I don't know about that.

"People say I lack political courage," he continued. "But don't forget, I went right into the heart of Amish country and told them: *Just Say No.*"

What people said about Bush after the event was that he looked relaxed during his speech—which went over well. He didn't seem too haunted by the ghost of the Gridiron pro.

"Let's face it," Bush said, "if I was funnier than Ronald Reagan, I would have won in 1980. And he'd be up here tonight trying to laugh away the Bush deficit."

The line everyone remembered was this: "We know the NRA's position," Bush said. "Guns don't kill people—grapes do."

Like everyone else, he had to comment about the puppies. He said he was glad one of them was a boy. "Now Congress will have to be more specific when they refer to that SOB in the White House."

About the Soviet elections, he said: "I had a feeling Yeltsin would win—once I saw his opponent on television riding around in a tank."

At the end he got serious—with one final yuk-yuk. "Laughter is part of the magic of America—the magic of our politics and our press. A year from now—gosh, a week from now—you'll have all sorts of new material," Bush said to the crowd. "I wish you happy hunting. I wish you laughter in your work. And I promise to do my part . . . Remember Pearl Harbor."

Who Writes This Stuff?

The campy skits are written by the Gridiron members—after all, print journalists are professional writers. The president's jokes this year were

conjured by Bush himself and his in-house staff—the first draft reportedly written by new White House speechwriter Edward McNally.

The day before the dinner, DNC's Mike McCurry said that "the usual suspects have been scrounging the earth to come up with ideas" for Ron Brown's speech. "Ron actually has a good sense of humor—so most of it's up to him."

"He knows what's funny," press secretary Dave Beckwith said on Thursday of Quayle, who had most of his speech penned by a professional. "In fact, he wrote a couple jokes himself this afternoon."

Landon Parvin admits the Gridiron isn't an easy gig. "It's tough. I've seen people really be awful. You can't try out your material—like in a comedy club, the way comedians do. You open and close in the same night—and in front of a very powerful audience."

At Marion Barry's Expense

The mayor—who did not attend the Gridiron this year—managed to get a few dishonorable mentions. A Marion Barry character—wearing an angel's wings and white robes—sang (to the tune of "Granada"):

Why must I make news with the room that I choose

At Ramada?

I can't make a stop without finding some cop

At Ramada.

Forget all those topics involving the tropics,

And pour me a subpoena colada.

Even the president couldn't resist.

"I'm worried about the situation in D.C.," said Bush. "You'd think the White House would be safe from crime. But last night Barbara was headed out the door to walk Millie, looked back and said: 'Cover me.'"

Special correspondent Cristina del Sesto contributed to this report.

NY 4/4 A1

Bush Takes Mubarak Out to the Ball Game

By MAUREEN DOWD

Special to The New York Times

BALTIMORE, April 3 — The two Presidents sat in the sky box, watching the baseball game with their Orioles caps, their hot dogs, their pickles, their horseradish, their Cokes in Orioles plastic souvenir cups, their player lineup sheet on White House stationery, their little white binoculars and a black secure phone.

The announcer at Memorial Stadium came on the loudspeaker to say there were some celebrities in attendance for the season opener between the Baltimore Orioles and the Boston Red Sox. There was Ted Williams, the rock star Joan Jett and, the an-

nouncer boomed, there was "the President of Egypt — Mubarak." Although the name Williams got a roar from the crowd, the name Mubarak provoked only silent wonderment.

Hosni Mubarak tried on his Orioles cap for the Egyptian journalists — who seemed befuddled at being whisked to Baltimore to watch men in costume hitting balls with bats — and was asked by American reporters how he was enjoying his first baseball game.

"Very good teacher," he said, smiling at President Bush. Over the paper plates and a cut-glass relish tray, the captain of the 1948 Yale baseball team was explaining some of the fine points of the American pastime to his guest.

"Of course," Mr. Mubarak said, pointing to Mr. Bush, "he was the captain of the biggest team in the United States."

President Bush grinned. "That's what I told him," he confessed.

The two leaders — sitting in a box with Egyptian officials, Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d; the director of the Office of Management and Budget, Richard G. Darman; the White House chief of staff, John H. Sununu; Mr. Williams, and the baseball commissioner, A. Bartlett Giamatti — mixed light talk about the game with serious foreign policy discussion.

It was unclear who was running things back in Washington since so many of the President's advisers and aides had felt the need to accompany him on this important mission. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Secretary of State Baker each flew over in their own helicopters, and the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and Marlin Fitzwater, the President's spokesman, and several other top aides were all on hand as well.

President Bush had a hard time explaining the game to his guest at first because the first run was not scored

until the fourth inning. But at one point the Orioles got a runner to second, and pointing to him Mr. Bush explained to the Egyptian President, who said he had seen baseball on television but never in person, that the player had a chance of scoring by going all the way around the bases and reaching home.

(As it turned out, the Orioles did a bit more running around the bases, and won, 5-4, in 11 innings, 6 innings after the Presidential party left.)

As a crowd of 54,000 cheered, Mr. Bush had opened the game by running out onto the field in his shirt-sleeves — and black and orange tie in honor of the Orioles' colors — to throw out the first pitch.

The President, who keeps his old first baseman's mitt from Yale inside

his desk drawer in the Oval Office and says he still gets the itch to throw, looked eager today as he stepped up to the mound. At Yale, Mr. Bush was known as good field, erratic bat. "He bats right-handed, he throws left," the announcer said. "He's the 41st President of the United States."

The ball arced up and to the right, a little high and outside, and the Oriole catcher Mickey Tettleton snagged it over his right shoulder with little effort.

When the reporters went up the sky box later to quiz the President on how he thought he had performed, they mentioned that it looked a little high and outside. "High and outside," he repeated, with mock umbrage, insisting that the catcher "caught it before it started breaking."

The Man Who Got the Pentagon's Attention

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 4 — The Monday morning after he surprised and angered the officer corps by slapping down the Air Force Chief of Staff in public for discussing policy with members of Congress, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney gathered the Pentagon's top civilian officials in his third-floor conference room.

He exuded, some of them said, an air of satisfaction about his dramatic show of power. In his clipped, just-the-facts style, Mr. Cheney said that he had since met with Gen. Larry D. Welch and that they had reached an "understanding."

"He was very polite, but firm, and he clearly felt he had gotten his political mileage out of that move," one of the officials recalled. "It was a premeditated shot and it served its purpose."

It was also only one of several occasions, albeit the most dramatic, in the 17 days since Mr. Cheney took office in which he has moved to assert control over the Pentagon's vast bureaucracy. "It set a tone for the way the new boss is going to operate," is the way one official put it.

So far, the "tone" has mixed Mr. Cheney's much-advertised drive and political instinct with a steely-management style. "I don't feel like I'm engaged in any kind of struggle with anyone for control of the department," he said today while reflecting with a group of reporters about the rebuke to General Welch. But, he added, "It's necessary from time to time to lay down markers so people know what to expect of them."

People who have worked with Mr. Cheney before know what that means. As Secretary of Defense he is demonstrating the same abhorrence of "leaks" and penchant for inner-circle councils that were his earmarks as chief of staff to President Ford and as a senior Republican on the House Intelligence Committee.

Mr. Cheney personally takes care of contacts between the Pentagon and the White House, speeding across the Potomac River almost daily to meet with President Bush or Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser. He fits in easily. A close relationship with Mr. Scowcroft dates back to the Ford days, when Mr. Scowcroft was national security adviser; Mr. Cheney is a fly-fishing partner of James A. Baker 3d, the Secretary of State, and encouraged him to buy a ranch in Wyoming last year.

"Obviously Baker is going to protect his own interests and Cheney will protect his," said a Pentagon official who knows both. "But it's not going to be a feud like Caspar Weinberger and George Shultz."

The 48-year-old Secretary's schedule is packed. Today, as on most days, he was at work by 7 A.M., and had 20 events, including a Rose Garden ceremony and a National Security Council meeting, on a schedule that would not get him home until about 10:30 P.M.

This frantic pace is not simply a matter of style; Mr. Cheney is under

pressure to cut \$6.3 billion out of the 1990 military budget, initiate management reforms promised by Mr. Bush and begin his diplomatic role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Lower-level staff members are largely barred from Mr. Cheney's convocations, which are limited to the principal players in the decision at hand; he made his initial choices for top Pentagon jobs in tight secrecy, allowing only two or three subordinates into the process, and typically, he brought in people he knew. One appointment that has caused particular comment in the officer corps is that of a trusted Congressional aide, David S. Addington, whom Mr. Cheney has given the office next door to his. To do so, Mr. Cheney moved out a uniformed officer, and revived the post of Special Assistant, vacant in the Reagan Administration.

In some ways, the appointments reflect exactly what the incident with General Welch did: Mr. Cheney's keen awareness that the exercise of his statutory authority over the De-

fense Department will depend greatly on his subordinates and on his relationships with the military, the White House and Congress.

On March 24 when he saw The Washington Post, in which General Welch was quoted as saying he had talked to influential Congressmen about the controversy over the MX and Midgetman nuclear missiles, the Secretary seized the moment. Expecting to be asked about General Welch at his first news conference, he decided to respond firmly.

Later in the day, he drove the new ground rules home, calling General Welch into his office and saying that he would not allow the generals to "get out in front" on matters of policy, even though discussions like the one General Welch had were common. But Mr. Cheney also told the general that the matter was closed, officials said.

So far, the reviews are mixed.

"He's got our attention now," said a senior officer about the public rebuke of the general. Like some others, the officer gave Mr. Cheney credit for

self-confidence.

"He came into the building with a squeaky clean, nice guy, personable image," said another officer. "Now in the back of everybody's minds is the thought that we better think things through with this guy."

But many uniformed officers were incensed. Their anger cooled by the end of last week, but a sense of distrust lingered, and they complained that Mr. Cheney, the outsider, had violated a rule of behavior. "Praise in public, chastise in private," said one officer.

On the same day that he chastised General Welch, Mr. Cheney issued a curious memorandum that said it was illegal to pass sensitive information to contractors, spy on military suppliers, or use government information "for private gain."

All very obvious, but also part of "setting the tone."

"Unlike with Welch, the memo was not inspired by an incident," a Pentagon official said. "It was to make the point that Cheney wants to have an above-board operation, that he's here and serious."

ESSAY | William Safire

'You Tell Him This'

WASHINGTON
Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, sent this invitation to Egypt's President, Hosni Mubarak: Stay an extra day in Washington and let us meet in President Bush's office. The Egyptian refused.

Mr. Bush, who had been asked by Israel to facilitate these talks, did nothing to bring the Israeli and Arab leaders together. Instead, he damaged his credibility as mediator by calling for "the end of the occupation" of territories Israel considers vital to its security.

Why did Mr. Bush gratuitously insult Israel's elected leader by announcing his conclusion before Mr. Shamir could even make his case?

At a reception for Mr. Mubarak in the home of the Vice President, I put that to Brent Scowcroft, our national security adviser. He would say only, "We did not intend to make news."

If that is true, then the State Department aide who drafted the statement, the N.S.C., which cleared it, and the President who spoke the blunt words did not consider as newsworthy a U.S. call for Israel to get out of the West Bank. Such ignorance of a change of position would reveal incredible ineptitude at all levels.

I think the statement was not a mistake, but was a Bush-Baker calculation, more heavy-handed than even-handed, to pressure Israel and placate the P.L.O. Many in the diplomatic press corps swallowed State Department protestations that nothing was new, but Barry Schweid of the A.P. and Tom Friedman of The New York Times put that major change in their leads.

The Egyptian Ambassador, Raouf el-Reedy, spotted me at the fruit-kebab table and motioned me over to meet his boss. I cheerfully identified myself as a right-wing pro-Israeli hawk and asked Mr. Mubarak why he had refused to meet Mr. Shamir in the Oval Office.

"I once offered to go to Jerusalem," said President Mubarak animatedly, "and he issued the invitation, but then he started talking about his three 'no's,' so how could I go? What would be the public opinion?"

He left out the part about conditioning his visit on Israeli acceptance of an international conference, but my concern was this week's snub: What would have been the harm in meeting in Washington, since both were in town?

"To talk about what?" he counter-queried.

Free elections on the West Bank and Gaza, for a starter.

"Free?" He made a skeptical face.

It's not for the press to negotiate for anybody, but since he was asking, I threw in the compromise being bruited

about: free elections under some sort of international supervision.

As if he had been waiting for that precise formulation, The President of Egypt leaned forward and put his finger on my chest. "You tell him this. You tell him if he is willing to have elections under international supervision, I'll help."

How much will he help?

"I'll help to the maximum."

As God, and the V.P., our national security adviser, the Egyptian Ambassador and our nail-nibbling Chief of Protocol are my witnesses, that's what the man said. It's a good bet that's also what Mr. Mubarak said privately to Mr. Bush and Mr. Quayle.

Let us now review the state of play. Israel can be expected to hedge its free-elections proposal with restrictions, among them: not until the intifada violence stops; no P.L.O. candidates; the first stage only for municipal offices, and the polls supervised by

Israelis with invited observers.

This opening position will be frowned on by Egypt as "not enough," dismissed by ABC News as "warmed-over Camp David" and denounced by Yasir Arafat, who worries about losing his authority to freely elected local Palestinian leaders.

However, the Shamir offer provides running room for mediators — even those who impose settlement terms before negotiations begin.

The intifada could cool it without agreeing to ice it; non-P.L.O. candidates could proclaim their P.L.O. affection; the municipal officers could have a territories-wide function; and while the Zionism-is-racism U.N. would hardly be disinterested, supervision by a few countries with democratic experience would be acceptable.

Now watch how the bash-Israel crowd tries to turn "free elections" into dirty words. Not "new"? Nothing could be newer to most Arabs than a secret ballot. Arab regimes do not tolerate elections that offer genuine choices; they do not want West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to lead the way because democracy is contagious.

But President Mubarak says to tell Mr. Shamir he is ready to "help to the maximum" to conduct such elections under international supervision. Message passed. Worth following up. □

conflicts of interest. This was the point where the bid by former Senator John Tower to become Secretary of Defense encountered problems. His disclosure that he advised contractors on arms control issues soon after leaving his post as arms control negotiator was a significant factor in his rejection by the Senate.

Mr. Scowcroft, as national security adviser, is not subject to the confirmation process. He told the White House he had to disclose only the name of Kissinger Associates, not the specific clients he worked with, because he was merely a consultant to the firm.

Indeed, when he described his positions in his financial disclosure statement, filed on Feb. 21, Mr. Scowcroft put down "consultant" but did not mention that he was also a vice chairman. He finally disclosed the position in a third amendment to his filing on March 17, one day after a reporter asked him why he had not reported it.

Kissinger Implied Wider Role

In an interview last January, however, Mr. Kissinger gave the impression that Mr. Scowcroft's work for clients was more direct than that of a consultant. "We divided them up," he said of his clients, through an informal arrangement among Mr. Eagleburger, Mr. Scowcroft and himself.

Gary Davis, general counsel of the Office of Government Ethics, said it was unclear whether this additional information about Mr. Scowcroft's position would have required him to disclose the names of the clients he worked with.

Mr. Scowcroft's public disclosure form indicates that he will disqualify himself from specific matters involving companies he holds stock in and former clients such as Kissinger Associates, but not from matters involving the firm's clients.

Mr. Eagleburger agreed, on the other hand, to disqualify himself for one year from any matter involving the clients he dealt with, and under Senate pressure he adopted the same standard for a few other, confidentially disclosed foreign clients.

Differing disclosure practices were an issue addressed broadly by President Bush's ethics commission, which called for more uniformity across all arms of the Government.

Scowcroft's Stake

Adjustment Made On Stock Sale

The Bush ethics commission also addressed the severing of financial ties between incoming Government officials and their previous employers, an issue also pertinent to Mr. Scowcroft.

On March 8, the day after Mr. Eagleburger informed Congress about his \$440,000 severance arrangement, Mr. Scowcroft filed a second amendment to his financial disclosure statement. The new amendment showed, for the first time, that Mr. Scowcroft owned one share of stock in Kissinger Associates. He said in the statement that he had "arranged to sell in the very near future" the share for a price between \$80,001 and \$100,000.

In two separate interviews in March, Mr. Kissinger said the share had been bought back. He later explained that he had valued the share by using an outside investor's previous offer for a stake in the privately held firm as a benchmark. Mr. Kissinger said that Mr. Scowcroft's share was then valued as if it were equal to 1 percent of the company, or one out of 100 shares.

Error on Size of Holding

According to the company's latest annual report, however, Mr. Scowcroft does not own one-hundredth of Kissinger Associates, but one nine-hundredth, since the firm has 900 shares outstanding.

Government officials are prohibited from accepting gifts of more than nominal value from anyone who could be significantly affected by their actions. If the stock purchase deal were intended to be an indirect severance payment, it would have had to have been disclosed as such and approved by Government attorneys.

When Mr. Kissinger was questioned further about the transaction, Mr. Masin, the attorney, responded, "A subsequent review of the documents, however, determined that rather than 1 percent, General Scowcroft owns one share of Kissinger Associates."

Mr. Masin added that this resulted from an "honest mistake of recollection" and that no money had yet changed hands before the transaction was revised.

"Proper disclosure of the transaction will be made by General Scowcroft at the appropriate time," he said.

INTERVIEWS

sea power

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A Visit with the Watchstanders

Interview with Secretary of the Navy William L. Ball III

Sea Power Editor in Chief James D. Hessman and Contributing Editor Vincent C. Thomas recently met with Secretary of the Navy William L. Ball III in his offices at the Pentagon to discuss the state of today's Navy; Thomas met again with the SecNav in Key West, Fla., and accompanied him on a visit to the Navy's PHM [patrol hydrofoil missileship] squadron there. Following is the text of the interrupted two-site interview (completed, it should be noted, prior to final Senate action on the nomination of former Sen. John Tower to be secretary of defense).

SEA POWER: Do you have any guidance yet on what cuts you will have to take as a result of President's Bush stated goal of allowing only zero growth, plus inflation, in the defense budget?

BALL: We got our official word today, in the wake of the president's speech, that we need to find an additional amount somewhere between \$2.0 and \$2.2 billion in FY 1990. These are outlays, overall Navy. If you sit back and look at how the preparation of the FY 1990 budget went, we won more than our share of fights within the Pentagon on budget issues. And we had a pretty good package that went to the Hill.

Of course, we sort of knew at the time that we might have to re-open the issue. We don't look forward to doing that, but now we have to bite that bullet.

But it is so much better to have to face it now rather than in the middle of the fiscal year . . .

BALL: What worries us is that Congress has not spoken yet, and we don't know where we are going to end up. Given the strong words in the president's speech, I feel that there will be strong support for the services and for the Department of Defense from the White House for holding the line at where the president now has gone—to



Secretary of the Navy William L. Ball III, shown here accompanied by French and American officers and other dignitaries, was a principal guest of honor at the Aisne-Marne American Military Cemetery in France, where he spoke at a Memorial Day service last year commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Belleau Wood. 6-26 July 1918.

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development. One of the most valuable attributes of this program is that it uncovers potential problem areas prior to the commitment of large investments. It is the Navy's primary means of transitioning new high-payoff concepts into weapon systems, and because of its importance it will continue to grow over the next several years.

Although the ATD program was allocated only 25 percent of the overall advanced technology development account, the success of the program has convinced us to apply the ATD principles to other programs, consolidated under a single manager. Our goal is for 50 percent of the program to consist of technology transition ATDs by FY 1991. This includes need-driven project selection, closed-ended tasks, and up-front transition planning. In essence, we select the highest payoff programs for demonstration, review them annually for a vote of confidence, and get them into full-scale engineering in three to five years.

Aggregate Gains From IR&D

Independent research and development (IR&D) also has provided significant benefits to the Navy. Virtually every Navy system has at least some of its roots in IR&D. The IR&D effort, which encourages contractors to mount their own research and development programs, not only allows a considerable hedging of the Navy R&D investment, but also ensures a competent "marketplace" when the Navy acquires systems.

Although there is no "free lunch," the IR&D effort more than pays for itself. Industry is allowed to use a modest share of its overhead costs to fund the program. In the aggregate, industry recovers about \$600 million from the Navy, and for that we gain access to nearly \$5 billion of military-relevant technology.

Looking at the IR&D program from a broader perspective, a recent study on IR&D found that, on the margin, for each dollar increase in DOD IR&D invested, longer-term IR&D funding increased by two dollars. The DOD contributes about 40 cents of each IR&D dollar; but 95 percent of the IR&D effort addresses DOD needs. From any point of view, IR&D is cost-effective and well leveraged.

The Navy, in conjunction with the other services, OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), and industry, has been exploring new initiatives to make IR&D more efficient and even more cost-effective. The Navy's technical community has been tasked to increase its interaction with the industry IR&D effort. Since the technical evaluation process is the principal method of data exchange, its emphasis will be increased, both in quality and frequency. In a related effort, Navy planning data will be more accessible to industry.

The services are under increasing pressure to upgrade test and evaluation of weapons and systems. As we look to the future, we can see that our facilities will be hard pressed to fully test advanced stealth, counterstealth, and ASW weapon systems and complex battle group arrangements. We have a master plan to upgrade existing T&E facilities, but we need to be more bold in execution. There are, however, management approaches that can assist us in alleviating the situation. For example, modeling and simulation may offer a more practical way to forecast potential operational capability in the earliest stages of the acquisition process. To reduce or eliminate inter- and intra-service duplication, and that between R&D and training facilities, sharing facilities among

the services, or establishing computer linkage between similar ranges, could well provide more effective and efficient testing as well as training.

The Navy plays an active role in international armaments cooperation. Meaningful collaboration with our allies in developing systems that meet common requirements is becoming increasingly important as weapon needs expand, costs increase, and funding shrinks.

For any number of reasons, there are certain areas of technology in which the United States does not excel. Working with our allies helps offset the resultant disadvantages. But there are other reasons for cooperating in the development and acquisition of systems and equipment: the elimination of duplicative R&D, for example; enhanced interoperability and standardization; economies of scale; and accelerated availability dates of the systems and equipment needed.

The Navy is for all of those reasons aggressively pursuing cooperative programs with our allies. Among the avenues followed are:

- Senior national representative (SNR) meetings between the director of research, development, test, and evaluation and allied counterparts which provide the forum to focus international multi-lateral and bilateral collaborative programs.
- Synergistic data exchange agreements with foreign governments that provide for the sharing of data and technology. Currently, 300 of these agreements are in effect.
- The NATO cooperative R&D program, established by section 1103 of the FY 1986 DOD Authorization Act, to encourage cooperative projects between the United States and one or more allies to develop new conventional defense equipment and munitions and modify existing military equipment to meet U.S. and allied requirements. Since program inception, the Navy has been involved in 22 cooperative projects totaling \$324 million in U.S. and allied funding.
- Foreign weapons evaluation (FWE) and NATO comparative test programs, which assess foreign weapons systems and technologies to determine their potential for U.S. service use. Some 59 funded projects were included in the FY 1988 program, at a cost of \$25.1 million. It is estimated that if the Navy had to develop similar systems unilaterally, it would have cost over \$1.4 billion in FY 1988 dollars.

We plan to increase Navy and Marine Corps involvement in international cooperative programs. International cooperation will ensure access to and sharing of allied technological developments to build the most operationally capable and cost-effective weapons systems needed by the United States and our allies.

The nation—and the Navy—relies on a forward-deployed strategy; our national as well as our economic interests require it. We also know that if we are called upon to go "head to head" with our primary adversary we will be outnumbered. Future Navy RDT&E strategy and plans must take into account the "first to fight" global and regional responsibilities of our naval forces, the nation's critical need to develop and produce significantly more effective weapon systems, and our quantitative manpower limit vis-a-vis that of our potential adversaries. We must ensure that the future does not find us with too many programs and too few dollars. In a time of declining resources we must have the courage to push the very best ideas, while understanding the risk, to ensure that the needs of our future naval forces are met. Our research and development program is the key to our future. ■

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a zero real growth, and nothing less. But, like it always is, it still will be a struggle.

How is this going to impinge upon what you certainly consider a vital aspect of naval operations—the floor of 15 carriers? Will you be able to maintain that number of battle groups?

BALL: With this number I am confident, yes. This is an issue that will be joined this year, no matter what changes are put to the budget itself. It is clear that we will have that amendment [an amendment to reduce the number of carrier battle groups] again, as we did last year, in the Senate. It may be drawn a little differently, but it may affect [the aircraft carriers USS] *Midway* [CV-41] and [USS] *Coral Sea* [CV-43], and it may affect others.

What I hope we can do is not put the focus on force structure per se, which Congress tends to do, but in the case of naval forces look at what the force structure supports, how it fits into the deterrent, and in the case specifically of carriers how they serve as instruments of the president's diplomacy—and what you can do with a force of 15 versus what you can do with a smaller force. I was very glad that in his confirmation hearing Senator [John] Tower had a chance to speak to that. He knows and understands that issue far better than most.

You have seen no indication thus far, with President Bush coming in, and with [Lt. Gen.] Brent Scowcroft [USAF, Ret.] as the new national security advisor, that the commitments to which the Navy very likely will have to respond are being diminished at all?

BALL: They have made it clear that there will be a top-to-bottom review of strategy and objectives, and that everything will be on the table. But there have been no indications given yet that the commitments given to the Navy will decrease at all.

In the past, when such reviews have been undertaken, very often the Navy's commitments have increased. And certainly one can argue that, given developments of the last four or five years—prior to the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty—and the way in which international forces have changed and international disputes have changed, there is a greater need, not a lesser need, for the ability to display the capacity to project power into many of these troubled regions. That would argue for more emphasis, not less, on naval aviation and on our submarine programs. And more emphasis on the kinds of R&D [research and development] that we need to stay ahead of the threat of the 1990s—air, surface, and subsurface.

I can't prejudice what this strategy review will yield. But I am confident that it will focus on those kinds of issues, and marry up those issues with what the president's objectives are going to be.

Do you have any further information to impart now about the status of the Navy budget?

BALL: We have moved another step in the budget review. We now have the numbers across the five-year defense plan, and those numbers total some \$22 billion [in new reduction] over five years.

That means you are going to have to take quite a whack . . .

BALL: That means it is *not* a cosmetic reduction. But that is not a final figure. What we will do now is provide the acting secretary of defense, Mr. Taft [William Howard Taft IV], specific proposals for how we would take such a reduction. Those proposals are due to him toward the end of the month. But I also have talked with Senator Tower and gotten his perspective on that—and he, of course, will get briefed by Mr. Taft. Then the process moves on to the White House and the Office of Management and Budget. So before the budget is in final form, there will be a lot of give and take.

Are you going to have to address that overall reduction when you make your first appearance before Congress [in March]?

BALL: I am sure the House Appropriations Committee will want to know the justification for what budget we have and, in as much detail as we can provide, how we are going to take a reduction down to the new numbers we have been given. The Department of the Navy program was at about 1.4 percent real growth in FY 1990 in the budget that was submitted to Congress by President Reagan. These new numbers will take us down below that, and we will be below the level of zero real growth.

Does that mean you are likely to have to cut your ship and aircraft procurement programs?

BALL: Well, everything is on the table. Of course, the five-year shipbuilding program we have in the budget already has had some changes to it. We had to take two Los Angeles class [SSN-688 nuclear-powered attack] submarines out, which we did not want to do, and had to defer an amphibious ship for a year. But I want to see how we can make this kind of reduction minimizing impact on the shipbuilding program and on the aircraft plan.

We have, after several months of hard work, sent to Congress a long-term aircraft-procurement program, with the Navy and Marine Corps in agreement about what our long-term plans are going to be. This is the first time we ever have had that kind of coordinated Navy-Marine Corps aircraft acquisition plan setting forth our requirements and our program as to how we are going to get there.

That indicates the MV-22 [tilt-rotor Osprey] and the AV-8B [Harrier V/STOL (vertical short takeoff and landing) jumpjet] are solidly fenced into that program?

BALL: Correct. We have two programs, the ATA [advanced tactical aircraft] and the MV-22, on the verge of entering into production, plus the LRAACA [long-range air-ASW-capable aircraft] program . . .

Are you happy with the ATA, or would you rather have gone along with a variation of the A-6 [Intruder attack aircraft]?

BALL: I am convinced that to deal with the sophisticated threats we see emerging, not just in the Soviet Union but in the air-defense capabilities a number of other countries are investing in—look at what the Libyans have assembled in the way of an air-defense capability—we need

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the technology of the ATA program. We have looked at that technology very carefully and with a lot of research, and it has proven that it is a system with capabilities that we have to have if we are going to maintain the power-projection capabilities that we have in the fleet today.

Nothing, I think, is more central to the future of naval aviation than that investment. It is a steep investment, and up front it is a tremendous cost to us getting ready to produce the airplane. But it is worth it because it is so central to what capabilities we know we are going to have to have. We have a team that thus far has made good progress—the McDonnell-Douglas/General Dynamics team that has been assembled and that won the development contract.

But that program has caused us to go without some things that we would like to have.

Aren't you going to be short a good many combat aircraft, given the fact that you have had to slip from what you hoped, three or four years ago, to get in the outyears, and that you now are going to project that slippage still further? In FY 1990 you are asking for only about 46 percent of what you forecast in FY 1987 you were going to get funded in FY 1990. How much is that kind of slippage going to hamper the Navy's capability?

BALL: In our study we acknowledge a shortage in our medium attack aircraft. Now, that doesn't mean we are short in the numbers of aircraft we will need to flesh out 15 carrier decks with 13 active wings and two reserve wings, plus the Marine Corps medium attack squadrons. Where we will have a shortage, though, is when we add up all of our total requirements for all purposes, including training, R&D, expected attrition, et cetera. We have a shortage that will emerge—we don't have it now—in the mid-1990s, and there are some things we are going to have to do to adjust to that. We had considered the A-6F [Intruder attack aircraft upgrade] program, but were unsuccessful in getting it through Congress. The A-6G program was considered and a package was assembled and submitted within the Defense Department for review. It didn't succeed, either. But it was a program that would have filled this gap in medium attack aircraft prior to the full introduction of the ATA, which under the current plan requires us to rely on older A-6Es and do some things to update them through the SWIP [system weapon improvement program] underway now.

But we have to assume a certain risk in dealing with that shortage in the mid-1990s. I can't fault DOD officials for not giving us our day in court, for we had a thorough debate about that capability and what this particular proposal would bring to our medium-attack capability. However, I was firm in not wanting to make any sacrifices in the A-12 investment.

At the same time we will continue with the F-14D [Tomcat fighter upgrade] program, which is holding up pretty well. We have a plan now for a combination of new production and a re-manufacture of F-14s that will be supported by Congress. We also have proposed a continuation of the EA-6B [Prowler electronic warfare aircraft] through re-manufacture and a continuation of the other production lines for tactical aircraft at rates that

are short of maximum efficient rates—but, nonetheless, rates that we think we can sustain in budget review. The one area where we have had to accept a shortage for the mid-1990 time frame is in medium attack.

Do you have a concern over the steady decline in the ability to procure enough ships and aircraft, and then Congress saying: "You have gotten by for five years without procuring what you say you need, and don't seem to be in any great trouble. Therefore, we are simply not going to fund in the future those things you think you need to bring yourselves back up to a certain level."?

BALL: The five-year defense program that was prepared in 1987 I think was put together at a time when it was abundantly clear that the climate on Capitol Hill for further increases in defense spending already was eroding.

When I took office, we already were in the process at the White House of realizing, having just gone through budget summit negotiations, that Congress was going to continue to seek reductions in defense spending. Out of the overall defense budget we lost \$33 billion in the 1987 budget summit. And I had to participate at the table during the summit negotiations with Secretary Carlucci, then-Secretary of the Treasury Baker, and OMB Director Miller. I saw clearly what we were up against in the debate over defense spending versus domestic spending. And the administration was trying to seek not cuts, but reduced increases in certain domestic programs—Medicare and other domestic entitlement programs. In Washington, you know, when we talk about budget cuts that means something quite different from what a fellow outside the Beltway means when he talks about budget cuts. Most taxpayers think that when you cut the budget you spend less than you did the year before. But that is not the case in Washington, where a budget cut means you spend less than you would have spent had you continued the budget increase that was built in to the entitlement program. So there was a hue and cry in 1987, and there is with this budget, as to budget cuts in domestic and social programs. But they are not budget cuts at all—they are recommended changes in the rate of increase. The budget for Medicare, for instance, continues to go up, but the proposals on the table are to reduce the amount of increase. The Department of the Navy budget in FY 1990, I want to point out, will be—for the first time in our country's history—less than the amount of money spent on Medicare.

Turning from hardware to people, how are these reductions which you know you are going to have to somehow make—\$22 billion over five years—going to affect people, with regard to the programs you need to keep aviators in, to make sure you have the re-enlistment bonuses you need to keep top-flight technicians in, et cetera? Will there be some real hardships coming up?

BALL: If we manage it properly it will not affect the things that are important to our people. If we do a good job of planning this budget change, and absorbing these reductions, if we do it right, we will avoid impacting on people and the programs that are necessary for our retention and recruiting efforts.

But let me say this: The Navy in the past has shown

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all too frequently in times of budget cuts that it has moved to absorb budget cuts in areas that did affect people adversely. And, if there is one thing that I have already told our budget reviewers I want to avoid, it is a repetition of past mistakes.

The accounts that seem inevitably to emerge as candidates for reduction during times of budget constraints are accounts that do relate directly to readiness and people. We are benefiting now from the highest levels of readiness we have seen in the fleet since World War II . . .

You have had a chance to see that first hand in a number of places, have you not?

BALL: I have made an effort to get around in the fleet and see many different aspects of the force at work on a deployed basis at sea, and have urged members of Congress to do that, too. Not just go visit our ships alongside the pier or visit our shore installations, but get out and see our people at work at sea. We have set up programs to fly members to the Sixth Fleet [in the Mediterranean], and to other places where ships and aircraft are operating at sea, because we want them to see how our sailors and Marines are doing the job.

I gather you visited one carrier that at that time had almost the highest degree of readiness ever attained in peacetime . . .

BALL: I went aboard the [carrier USS] *Forrestal* [CV-59] when she was deployed in the North Arabian Sea, and the carrier wing aboard had a phenomenal record of readiness. That was a tremendous tribute to the people in the wing, and also to the logistical and supply effort, which perhaps was unmatched for a short period of time, that we were able to maintain for those units in the Persian Gulf and in the North Arabian Sea.

But let me say that there are no easy cuts in making this \$33 billion reduction in the FY 1988-89 program. We already have had to squeeze the shore establishment. We have had to cut back on certain types of modernization programs for ships and aircraft. We have had to take a tuck here and there where in the past we have had more generous levels of funding. Having done that, it is especially tough to look for further efficiencies, but I think we can do it and maintain a balanced program.

And let me say one more thing that is very important: The president knows how tough it is going to be, and spoke to that in his State of the Union address. He knows it is not easy to provide more defense for less money, but he also knows that we can always be more efficient, always drive a tougher bargain with our contractors, always reduce the overhead, cut the layers of oversight and excessive management that actually inhibit efficiency. We know that under his leadership we can do more, and we will do that.

The Navy has initiated, and you certainly have followed up on, a number of management programs that have streamlined the procurement process. And you are inaugurating total quality management training. How extensive is that program, and how do you think it is going to affect what the Navy is doing in procurement? Also, how can those efforts be better

publicized—right now no one knows very much about some of these initiatives?

BALL: You are right. We have initiated a lot of things that have not gotten public recognition from the media or Congress. Beginning in the early 1980s the Navy undertook some major changes in the acquisition system. I guess the most fundamental change was the degree of competition we sought across the board in all of our programs, and the savings we gained from that, in ship construction and aircraft procurement across the board, still are paying us a big dividend today.

We have worked hard to streamline the acquisition process, and although the "Ill Wind" revelations [the so-called "Pentagon procurement scandals"] have resulted in a lot of criticism from Congress, those critics don't realize what we have done to address that problem in advance of these allegations. Indeed, one of the things we did was to set up a fraud-awareness program under the Naval Investigative Service [NIS] to teach people working in the acquisition field how to detect fraud, how to find it, and what the symptoms were.

Has that program borne any positive dividends so far?

BALL: It has. I guess the biggest positive dividend is that a person who had gone through that training was, because of the information gained in that program, able to contact NIS and provide the first lead that has led to the investigation—which is still underway, but which clearly is going to identify fraudulent activities that we have to root out.

The president is totally supportive of an aggressive, tough, zero-tolerance program to counter the kind of waste and fraud that has plagued defense procurement since 1776. And we have plenty of history of abuses that have occurred in the past.

The president looks at it, I think, in exactly the right way: It is a disservice to our men and women in uniform whenever unscrupulous individuals or companies try to take advantage of the government and try to provide less than the very best that our money can buy. We are just not going to put up with second-rate efforts on the part of contractors, managers, and those who are charged with buying the best equipment for our sailors and Marines.

The president spoke during his visit to the [aircraft carrier USS] *America* [CV-66] of being on board a submarine during World War II. The submarine, which was under a depth charge attack, had rescued him after he had been shot down. He spoke in a very poignant way of how, while sitting in that submarine as a naval aviator, he hoped that those who had put that submarine together were as concerned about its survivability, and the integrity of that hull, as he was when he was riding out that attack.

And that said it all! We need to instill in the industry team, in the thousands of people who are a part of the acquisition system, that kind of sense of responsibility. I think we have the right idea and the right approach among the vast majority of those who are participants in the defense acquisition business. But the task is to root out that small number of people who still would seek personal gain.

It is amazing how quickly a couple of bad apples can

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ruin a whole barrel in this business. But no one ever goes back and points out the kinds of things you have just talked about, which is a tragedy.

Going back to the fact that you have been in this business for some years now—albeit from another perspective for quite a while—you saw the turnaround in the early 1980s from the horror stories of the late 1970s with regard to readiness, to overhauls being delayed, to maintenance not being accomplished, to people leaving the Navy at a great rate. You saw the Navy come back. Are you concerned that you might well see a recurrence of that kind of thing because of the current delays in overhauls, the lack of maintenance, spare-parts budgets being cut, et cetera? Is the potential there for a return to that kind of thing unless you can make sure Congress understands the problem?

BALL: Let me answer that in three ways. First, I draw on my experience as a division officer in the early 1970s—1970-1971—aboard a DDG [guided missile destroyer], when I saw a ship struggling to maintain the level of readiness expected of it with a severe shortage of spare parts, with morale problems in the crew because of a shortage of funds for PCS [permanent change of station; PCS funds pay for transfers from one duty station to another], for those things that are basic to our way of life in the Navy. And I saw how the penalties we pay over the long term when we shortchange those things vastly outweigh the savings that the headquarters thinks we are getting in the near term. So now that I have a chance to see things from a different perspective, I am determined we are going to avoid those kinds of mistakes that create long-term costs for us, that create morale and readiness problems.

However, we have constrained parts of the budget that affect readiness and sustainability in preparing this budget for FY 1990 and 1991, and there is just not much more we can do to be more efficient there, because when you cut those things any further it creates long-term problems. It is my vivid recollection of the trials that we had at sea on deck in 1970 and 1971 that remind me daily of the need to avoid those mistakes.

Have the pipelines for spares, and for weapons in particular—which were almost to the full point before the Navy started backsliding two or three years ago—started to empty now? Are you going to have a hard time maintaining the levels which you think you must have for really outstanding readiness? I see you are not buying as many Tomahawk, Standard, and Trident missiles, for example.

BALL: Let me say two things. With regard to the purchases that provide us with sustainability—that is, the percentage of missiles in the bins, ammunition in the bins, et cetera—we have set our goals and have made a lot of progress in buying the quantities that we should. We are now to the point where in many cases, and especially in many categories of missiles, we are close to but just short of our objective. Our plan now is to try to buy out that objective in a shorter period of time and maintain the efficiencies of a high production rate, and then, wherever we have attained that goal, shut down that production line.

It worries me that there will be more and more pres-

sure as the budget is constrained to re-open some of those decisions and to stretch procurements over a longer period of time.

That, of course, drives up unit costs, and we should avoid it. It may be that in some cases we can't avoid it, because if it comes down to stretching out a procurement line or shortchanging readiness and personnel, then we are going to have to look for a way to stretch.

I think we have to protect the readiness of the force, we have to protect what we talked about earlier, the things that are important to our people, and then seek to be efficient in the acquisition of sustainability items as best we can.

Now, on spares—aviation spares in particular—we tightened down the screws on those accounts in 1987 and 1988, and now really have to assess carefully the impact of that. I intend to lay that out before Congress, because we do have high readiness levels in the fleet today, and there is no secret how we got there. We have invested a lot in the maintenance programs at the naval aviation depots [NADEPs] and through competition have improved the efficiency of our aircraft maintenance programs.

But the great dividend we have received has been in readiness, and there is no significant sum of money that we can take out of that program without paying a heavy price.

There was a very interesting statistic that Admiral Dunn [Vice Adm. Robert Dunn, assistant chief of naval operations (air warfare)] cited a couple of years ago, the fact that the S-3 [Viking ASW aircraft] went up from a readiness rate of some 36 percent to above 70 percent simply because adequate spare parts finally were available—and for no other reason.

BALL: In FY 1988 we achieved our goal of 73 percent mission-capable for aircraft. Funding cuts in FY 1988 to FY 1991 will cause the rate to decrease somewhat, but, in general, that is a level we have to protect.

But there are no short cuts to readiness—it takes hard work, and we simply must fund those elements we have to have. Now, we can always look for more efficient ways to provide logistical support and to achieve our maintenance objective. I visited [Naval Air Station] North Island, [in Coronado, Calif.] and the air rework depot there, and it has just won a competition for intermediate maintenance on the F-14. That exercise demonstrated to the civilian managers at that facility that by really hustling and finding ways to cut costs during the competition they went through that they could be more efficient. That was a healthy exercise, and we have to continue to do that sort of thing.

Our productivity improvements in shipyards and NADEPs and all of our other maintenance facilities are very important and are going to continue to pay a dividend as long as our leadership in the facilities maintenance and engineering business aggressively continues to pursue cost-cutting moves.

Would it be a correct assumption that over the last three to four years there has been an upsurge in efficiency in the shore establishment, too, with regard to the kind of thing you have just talked about?

BALL: Yes. In our shipyards, our NADEPs, and in our training establishment, I think we have wrung a lot of

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unnecessary overhead and inefficiency out of those systems. I have seen aggressive managers and leaders really go after those goals, and we have had tough competitions like that at North Island.

I also will cite the competition that Charleston Naval Shipyard [S.C.] won for some SSN [nuclear-powered attack submarine] overhauls. In Charleston we saw how man hours required for overhaul of our submarines were significantly reduced, with a sizable savings over some of the recent overhauls performed in Charleston. Admiral Hines [Rear Adm. Dean H. Hines, now deputy commander for industrial and facility management, Naval Sea Systems Command], then at Charleston and now at NAVSEA, drove those efficiencies into the program there at Charleston. And it showed that, even with as significant a mission and as large a workload as they maintained down there, there still are ways to root out inefficiency if people at all levels are vigilant.

In your tours through the fleet, and going back to your own experiences as a division officer, have you encountered others in that position today who say: "Mr. Secretary, I am concerned now about what I see with regard to morale, because we are not likely to get all the things we think we need to maintain our readiness"? Is that type of problem coming back, or are we still at an acceptable level before there is a sharp downturn?

BALL: Morale is, of course, a function of command and leadership. And I have been very pleased to see that in most of the places I have been it has been very, very good. I make an effort to get down into the spaces, visit with the chiefs, get onto the mess decks, and ask a lot of questions and see how things stand on the deck plates . . .

You certainly can learn a lot in a hurry in the chiefs' mess, can't you?

BALL: You sure can! And I like to go down to main control and talk with the engineers and visit with the watchstanders. It is a great tribute to the kind of leadership we have in the senior enlisted grades right now that the morale, the determination, and the professionalism of our watchstanders and those who are doing the jobs down there are remarkable.

We have learned the hard way, and certainly know where some of the danger signs are. And I keep my eye on those. Every month, every quarter, we get reports on retention, on readiness, from the fleet commanders, and look at all of the key indicators. But the best indicator, of course, is to get out and talk to our people . . .

Is retention starting to slide?

BALL: It has been tough, but in the last month we had a good month for recruiting and retention. We met our recruiting goal in January for the first time in several months. And our retention held well in the last quarter of 1988—we met our first-term retention goal. The numbers that you get, though, in terms of meeting your first- and second-term re-enlistment goals, don't always show you whether you are keeping those top sailors and Marines, or where your attrition is.

That is something I speak to our commanders a great

deal about, because the retention program has to have daily command attention. Nothing is higher on a commanding officer's agenda. As the economy has continued to be strong, it has become increasingly tough to keep the technical rates in. But we know what the things are that drive our sailors out of the Navy. And the people in Washington who are aware of those things, no matter how many good decisions they make, they can't substitute for the effectiveness of a commanding officer and executive officer who know how important it is to keep retention high.

Earlier today, before you came aboard [the patrol hydrofoil missileship] *Taurus* [PHM-3], I had the opportunity to discuss the impact of deployments with the ship's cook. He commented that, with this ship, "I'm out a lot, but I am back in without long deployments." That comment says a lot about the view toward long deployments. But if you lose a couple of carriers, you are back into that cycle of longer deployments all over again. That must be of great concern to you.

BALL: Well, it is. When the CNO [chief of naval operations] set a six-month "cap" on the time away from home on deployments, which he has fought hard to maintain, we were able to convince some, but not all, in Congress why that is important.

At my confirmation hearing, I was asked about carrier force levels, and that aspect of operations I immediately spoke to. We don't see any lessening of the commitments the Navy is asked to meet around the world with our carrier battle groups. The program we have now will enable us to meet commitments and still keep deployment periods capped at six months. That's about the most we can go. Again, I have pointed out some of the horror stories of the past—when [the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier] *Dwight D. Eisenhower* [CVN-69] made that 247-day Indian Ocean deployment in 1980 with only five days in port—and I have asked how many sailors who made that deployment still are in the Navy. I'll bet that there are not many.

So when you compute the cost to the Navy of that deployment, in order to do it right you would have to compute how much investment went down the tube in the form of highly trained, skilled people who bagged it when they finally got back home. We know what those penalties are, and know what we have to do to avoid paying those penalties.

Our force structure, as it is now, enables us to meet those commitments that we have on the horizon. To those who would suggest that we have to shrink the force structure, we have to put the question of what commitments we should drop in what areas of the world, and where we have to diminish our presence.

Are you concerned over the increasing need to ensure that the ever-growing number of members of Congress who have had little or no military service really understand and appreciate this problem?

BALL: I am concerned about that, and know that congressional leaders who are veterans of the armed forces are very concerned about it.

And they speak to it very often. I meet once a month for breakfast with a little group at the Capitol which we call "Our Former Navy Members." We invite all senators

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and congressmen who have served in the Navy to have breakfast with the CNO and me. There are no holds barred, we put everything on the table, talk to them about what we are doing in the Navy today, and about some of our problems, and respond to all their questions. And we have some new members of Congress who, I hope, will be joining that group. We have one Naval Academy graduate who is joining Congress—from Rhode Island—Ron Machtley. Also a Medal of Honor winner, Senator [Bob] Kerrey, from Nebraska, who was a SEAL [member of a Sea-Air-Land team], and two or three others.

Unfortunately, we lost Bill Chappell [D-Fla., a former naval aviator who chaired the Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee] after a close election . . .

We gather, though, that Congressman Murtha [Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), who succeeded Chappell as chairman] will be a fine successor . . .

BALL: I agree. I called on Congressman Murtha about a month ago and went over some of the big issues that we see coming at us.

I have gained the impression that, in the last three or four years, anyway, the Navy's whole program has been better put together and better articulated than it had been earlier. Is that a reasonably safe assumption? You have watched it from three different vantage points—Capitol Hill, then the White House, and now the Pentagon—over that period of time . . .

BALL: In the last three years there has been a growing awareness in Congress among key members as to not just what the role of naval forces would be in a global war with the Soviet Union, but also of what we do on a daily basis around the world to deter regional conflicts, to support the president's foreign policy, and to serve as a precision instrument of diplomacy. And you can't understand that unless you work at it and go see it working first hand, whether it is the Sixth Fleet, the Seventh Fleet [in the Western Pacific], or wherever we have forces at work.

I think we have done a good job of making more people aware of this, both in the public generally and on Capitol Hill. But we have to keep working hard at it, because unquestionably it is a tremendous asset to the president, and to the country. The Navy—as I point out every chance I get—in 1978 could not have done what the Navy of 1988 did.

One question often is put to me by members of the press: "What on earth has been accomplished as a result of the Reagan military buildup?" It's easy to learn what has been accomplished if you dig a little bit. You can look at the readiness statistics, look at retention, look at the numbers of ships that have joined the fleet. But the best way to do it is to get aboard a ship, especially a deployed ship that is out there meeting a commitment and doing a job.

Have you been able to effectively use the fact that the Navy probably would have lost the *Stark* and the *Roberts* [guided missile frigates damaged while assigned to duty in the Persian Gulf] had you not had

the high-caliber people you have aboard those ships?

BALL: A lot of key members of Congress—and especially Congressman Murtha—who have looked closely at those two incidents have become almost evangelical in talking to their colleagues on exactly that point. Mr. Murtha visited *Samuel B. Roberts* within just a few days of her hitting that mine in the Persian Gulf. He was so impressed with what he saw that he has been back to that ship twice. Most recently he went to Bath Iron Works [where *Roberts* is being repaired and made ready for sea] and checked on the progress of the repair work.

The crews of those two ships, although they have been acclaimed and have gotten some attention, have yet to receive, in terms of public recognition, the real credit they deserve.

I went to Guantanamo Bay [Cuba] and observed the refresher training program down there, and took former Senator Howard Baker, who then was President Reagan's chief of staff, with me because I wanted to show him what it is that we do there. We visited with the damage-control instructors and I met with petty officer first class Perkins—I missed his first name—who had been the senior damage-control instructor when *Roberts* had gone through training down there. He was a big strapping guy, a "sailor of the year" at the Fleet Training Group, a very impressive man.

Three weeks later I had been invited by Congresswoman Lloyd [Marilyn Lloyd (D-Tenn.)] to speak at Armed Forces Day in Chattanooga, and I asked my people to find out where Perkins was; we learned that he since had been transferred to Norfolk. It turned out that he was in Chattanooga visiting his family, so I had him come to the luncheon, had him stand up before about 300 people, and described what he had done in teaching damage control to the crew of *Samuel B. Roberts* and how he had tangibly contributed to the saving of that ship. He got an ovation that lasted several minutes and just about brought the roof down.

So there really may be more public recognition than we had thought. What we still have to do, though, is convince Congress that that intangible advantage we have at sea today, that edge in readiness that emanates from every space aboard ship, is of inestimable value to the Navy. Also, that if we are not very careful that will be one of the first advantages that will start to deteriorate, and that nothing is more important to every commanding officer, executive officer, leading chief, and department head than maintaining that edge.

That concern goes all the way to the CNO's desk and to mine, and we have to worry about it to make sure that what we are doing at our level protects that advantage.

Isn't one of the things that is likely to cause that edge to deteriorate the fact that the proposed pay increases over the next five years are going to be less than the rate of inflation during the last two years?

BALL: There is no question that we must get comparability of pay back on the table and get Congress to address it. We had it in 1981 and 1982, when we got a couple of good pay raises in a row. But it has eroded since that time.

Every study that has been done since then has shown the extent of that erosion, and also has shown that a bandaid approach is not going to suffice over the long

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haul. We must show Congress what disparities exist and what they will do to the force.

Are you asked many questions on that subject during your visits?

BALL: I am when I'm out with the fleet, and I expect to be. Because that subject is on the minds of a lot of people. We put a lot of emphasis on professional satisfaction, but we can't expect to continue the improvements we have made in the quality of life that Navy families are able to enjoy unless we do something about the pay comparability issue. And unless we get Congress to understand the extent of the problem.

I think that most members who serve on our committees are aware that pay comparability has eroded between the military and civilian sectors, but I don't believe they are fully aware of the extent of that erosion.

You have done a lot with regard to the roles of women in the Navy. How do you look at the future in that respect? And how far can you go with regard to billets of greater responsibility for women—command assignments, et cetera?

BALL: We have made a lot of progress. I don't see any limit on the contribution of women to the readiness of our forces. The constraints we have in place now are based on the law . . .

Which is not likely to change?

BALL: Which is not likely to change. But the "risk" rule that has been established by the Secretary of Defense has enabled us to be more flexible in the assignment of women to ships.

Of course, we have underway now a program to prepare to assign women to combat logistics force ships. That will break new ground for the Navy. I have been aboard tenders and other ships where we have had women in the work spaces. I have talked with great big, tough machinist mates on tenders who have female sailors working right there in the spaces with them, and have asked them what the performances of the women were like, and I have yet to hear any criticism of the way in which women have performed. Their abilities enhance tremendously the capabilities of our work force across the board. That is attributable, I think, to the quality that we are able to recruit and keep in the Navy—it has been extraordinary. Further, I believe that the current generation from which we are drawing our people doesn't have some of the problems that my generation, and yours, might have had in the work place.

It is different now, and our senior supervisory people have in some ways a different kind of management challenge. But so far the results have been all positive.

Your first lady CO, Commander [Deborah Sue] Gernes, gets her command in the last quarter of the year?

BALL: I think that is correct. I have met her, aboard [the destroyer tender USS] *Cape Cod* [AD 43], where she is executive officer; she is a most impressive officer, and I believe she will make a fine CO.

Does Congress understand that when you get the [Ae-

gis guided missile destroyer] *Arleigh Burke* [DDG-51] class and ships of that caliber in place, you may be able to reduce the size of the fleet—and, therefore, that you need to continue the present emphasis on getting enough advanced-technology ships like that built now, in order to make it possible?

BALL: We will have, with the Ticonderoga class [CG-47 Aegis guided missile cruisers] and the *Arleigh Burke* class, invested in those platforms such a broad capability, and the multi-mission capacity of those ships is an order of magnitude beyond any previous generation. Frankly, the leap from the DDG-2 class and the CG-26 class [earlier classes of guided missile destroyers and cruisers] to the DDG-51 and the CG-47 is a greater leap than any previous leap in Navy ship construction from one class to another. That was brought about by phenomenal technological improvements in electronics, sensors, processors, weapons, et cetera. That will enable us to invest more capability in smaller numbers of ships.

Our *Surface Combatant Force Requirements* study showed us how a planned force of 224 surface combatants of these newer types will be able to handle the future threat. It would take over 400 ships of our existing classes to handle the same threat. But that will not enable us to alter the world's geography, so we still know we are going to have to be prepared to meet commitments in those areas where we have vital interests at stake. And, though we may be able to compose battle groups that have greater capability with fewer ships, we still are going to have to put those battle groups forward if we are going to maintain the forward strategy. So I don't look for any dramatic restructuring in the overall composition of the Navy.

Is Congress relating to the need for Navy capability the steady decline in the number of bases from which our forces can operate overseas?

BALL: Not enough. That affects every aspect of military planning. It affects every aspect of planning the overall force structure for each branch of the armed forces.

And we emphasize it time and time again. We cite the number of bases worldwide in World War II, which was something on the order of 1,800. And now we are down to 38. That is one major factor that doesn't get enough attention.

The second, and equally important, major factor is that, in those countries where we *do* have installations, the international political climate is much changed. And there is frequently such a lot of political baggage that these countries, even though they may be friendly toward U.S. interests, may feel they cannot afford a U.S. military operation on or from their soil when it involves regional tensions. A classic case is the Persian Gulf, where in moderate Gulf states we have some good friends. We have worked hard and worked well with the Kuwaitis, the Saudis, the Bahrainis, the U.A.E., Qatar, Oman—all of those Gulf states—and yet there were clear political sensitivities that arose during that operation where we had to respect their wishes not to do certain things ashore, and to keep certain capabilities afloat that would have been more convenient and more easily maintained ashore.

That is a good example of the fact that, had we not

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had enough naval forces to do that job, it wouldn't have gotten done. We had to be creative and do some things a little differently. We had to have minesweepers over there supported by a mother ship, and aboard those two mobile barges we used we put significant elements of force in terms of operating units there. We had Army helicopters, SEAL units, and other Army, Marine, and Navy units operating out of those mobile barges. Certainly this is not the sort of thing you would do unless you had no other options.

So it is not just the bases, but also the political climate in those countries where we have existing bases—countries where we have good ties and may even be providing tremendous amounts of assistance. Nevertheless, political factors may force us to look for other ways of doing business, and that inevitably always means naval forces, naval aviation, and the ability to move, to enter, to do the job, and to withdraw.

The rights to use air space represent another problem. Look what we had to do in the Yom Kippur war, for example, in terms of our resupply of Israel and the routes we had to fly.

And, of course, it was the Navy that steered those airlifters into Israel and provided the cover and the protection for those flights.

But you asked if Congress understands all of these factors enough, and the answer is decidedly "no." I think that the CNO, the [Marine Corps] commandant, the secretary of defense, all the others in the national security process, and I all have to keep that issue visible and high on the list of concerns.

Are you concerned about the increasing sophistication of weapons, not only in the hands of the Soviets but in the hands of the people of many other nations around the world?

BALL: Yes, I am concerned about the dispersion of high-technology weapons to so-called Third World countries. For instance, we talked earlier about the acquisition of sophisticated air-defense capability by the Libyans, and that really is the tip of the iceberg. Because, technology being what it is, the aggressive efforts on the part of certain countries to acquire Western technology for military purposes means that the era of handling a Third World dispute and implementing U.S. diplomacy by puttering around in a gunboat with a .50-caliber machine gun on the bow are forever gone.

That inevitably affects our ability to deal with contingencies short of global war. There was a very good study done by [former CNO] Admiral [James L.] Holloway, and Dr. [Fred] Ikle, and others, which addressed

this point in detail. I think it is something we have to speak with Congress more about. But it reinforces what we already know—namely, that we can't put forces to sea that aren't first rate. We can't skimp on the quality of ships, aircraft, and weapons systems. And we know we will encounter more sophisticated threats in certain regions of the world that heretofore have not had high-level technology weapons.

From this viewpoint it seems that your job, being secretary of the Navy, is more challenging and fascinating than it has ever been . . .

BALL: I think that is a pretty fair statement! There are plenty of problems coming at us, and the budget is tight and getting tighter. But we have tremendous assets. And we never before have had, I think, in the things that are going for us the kind of people we have on deck who are smart enough to look for better ways to do things and who take the kinds of initiatives that help us to be more efficient and smarter in the way we do business.


We are a huge organization, and if we don't have that kind of initiative in each and every work space we are not going to be as efficient as we should be.

Second, we have a commander in chief who is a naval aviator and a combat veteran of World War II, and who understands the role that our people play. He has spoken twice now just in the short period of time he has been in office to audiences of Navy and Marine Corps people—first on the *America*, where he gave a strong message and sounded his support for our people. And I think he made it clear to all of us what the challenges are that we face.

Then, last week, I hosted a reception in honor of newly selected Navy rear admirals and Marine Corps brigadier generals, and he came by and spoke to those officers and their wives and congratulated them on being selected as the Navy and Marine Corps leaders of the future. And he gave them a very strong message of support and encouragement.

So he pays attention not only to what we need as a force, but also to our people. He has served, and understands the sacrifices our people and their families make. That is a tremendous asset to all of us.

Mr. Secretary, I think we probably should end this interview on that very positive note. Thank you very much for your time, both here [in Key West] and in Washington. We appreciate everything you're doing for the Navy and Marine Corps, and I'm sure you know the Navy League is always ready to help in any way we can.



U.S. Is Urged to Respond to Soviet Initiatives

By R. W. APPLE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 6 — As startling actions and proposals by the Soviet Union and some of its allies spread around the world, pressures are mounting on the Bush Administration to abandon its passive posture and respond to Moscow's initiatives.

Each new front-page development — radical economic change in Hungary, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, new ideas on Central America, elections in the Soviet Union itself — produces fresh calls for an imaginative American response, and this week the calls have reached a crescendo.

The promise of free elections in Poland, in particular, seems to set before the Administration a platterful of insistent questions, most of them centering on the American response to the Polish economic crisis. So far, however, Washington has said next to nothing about whether it will be willing to forgive debt or make fresh loans or pave the way for major new investment.

Pressure for bolder American undertakings is coming from scholars like George F. Kennan, father of the containment policy in the 1950's; from career Foreign Service officers who are arguing within the bureaucracy that the United States is in danger of missing a historic opportunity; from key Democrats in Congress, and from major allies.

President Bush and his main foreign-policy associates, Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d and Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, have made it plain from the day they took office that they intended to take their time. They say they have no interest in spectacular early breakthroughs. What they want, they insist, is slow, lasting progress based on careful negotiation.

Publicly, the Administration routinely explains its lack of substantive response to Soviet initiatives by pointing to its comprehensive review of foreign policy, for which the President has set a mid-May deadline, so he can digest the findings and discuss them with NATO leaders on his trip to Western Europe in May and June.

Privately, senior officials assert that

there is no need to rush in any case. They argue that Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, has no choice but to continue the process of liberalization, regardless of what the United States does in the short term. One policy maker commented this week that "all this is being driven by Soviet internal politics, not by what we might decide."

But outside the top ranks of the Administration, experts here are asking how long Washington can successfully play the tortoise to Moscow's hare.

"This is a very, very cautious Administration, despite Bush's and Scowcroft's long experience in foreign relations," said Representative Lee H. Hamilton, Democrat of Indiana, a ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

"But my sense is that we've reached the point where we need to stop reflecting and start acting," he said. "We have to get at it — respond to their proposals, test their intentions, advance our own proposals, keep the guard up, be wary but make a start."

Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat of Rhode Island, who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said he

thought the Administration "should be much more responsive" than it has been so far. He raised the possibility that sluggish responses by Mr. Bush might hurt Mr. Gorbachev, arguing that "if he isn't able to show results, the vote of confidence represented by the Soviet voting may just fade away."

Asked why he thought the Administration was moving so slowly, Mr. Pell said it was "partly the slowness of the bureaucracy in producing the policy review, which is just what they tell us."

But he also suspected, he said, "that there is a worry on the Administration's part that what is happening with the Russians isn't permanent, that it might be reversed, and so they don't want to get overcommitted."

On the other hand, Mr. Pell said he welcomed signs that Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker would move carefully with regard to Poland. As important as it is to provide help to Eastern Europe, the Senator said, "you must not give the impression that your interest lies in exploiting weaknesses."

Mr. Kennan, who testified on Tuesday before Mr. Pell's committee, said the United States "should not allow these initiatives from the Soviet side, when they are of an encouraging nature, to go unrecognized by us."

"We should certainly not think it incumbent on us to respond positively immediately to every one of these initiatives," the former Ambassador to Moscow continued. "But each of them ought to be explored in discussions with our Soviet counterparts to find out exactly what they have in mind and to measure that against our own requirements and our own interests."

At the moment, few such explorations are under way. A senior Congressional arms-control expert said, for example, that he had "no real idea" where the Administration was putting its emphasis — whether on the nuclear arms negotiations, like the Reagan Administration, or on conventional-forces reductions, or on something else.

A key debate, insiders said, centers on the question of potential American influence on Mr. Gorbachev's present and future courses of action. One camp argues that American influence is marginal, the other that what the United States does matters a lot.

"Where we end up, I have no idea," another foreign-policy professional said. "But unless we see signs of instability in Eastern Europe, unless something blows up somewhere, then I don't think there's all that much urgency. I just hope that the important people really are thinking hard and not just putting up a smoke screen by telling us that they're thinking."

Demonstrations And a Dinner Peace Pledge

The White House Hosts Israel's Shamir

wp 4-7 C1

By Carla Hall
and Martha Sherrill
Washington Post Staff Writers

At dusk, dueling demonstrations in front of the White House—one pro-Palestinian, one pro-Israeli—symbolized the as yet unresolved conflict that would be on the minds of everyone at dinner last night.

As the limousine carrying Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and his wife Shulamit arrived, the chants of the demonstrators echoed up to the North Portico, where President and Barbara Bush stood waiting to receive their guests.

Inside, both the president and Shamir pledged their commitment to peace. In his toast to the Israeli leader, Bush said that while they may

disagree on policy, "the U.S. commitment to the security of Israel remains unshakable."

And Shamir himself said of the Israelis, "We pray for peace three times a day. We despise war and violence." But against increasing pressure and suggestions now even by Bush that Israel return the occupied land, Shamir added, "But we cannot permit our abhorrence of war to be used against us by terrorists and dictators who would force us to submit to their demands."

During the brief interlude between dinner and the entertainment when guests mingle with their hosts over coffee and liqueurs, President Bush was casual and chatty, banter-

See SHAMIR, C2, Col. 1

ing gamely with reporters, though not on matters of substance.

When asked about Oliver North's statements about Bush at the North trial yesterday, Bush replied, "What did he say?" A reporter explained that North had essentially called Bush an emissary. Bush said, "I'll tell you what I'm going to say—no comment."

Asked what he thought of Shamir's opinion of his positions, Bush said, "I refer you to his departing statement. That's what I would go by." He said there was some hope that the Middle East leaders would meet together at the White House, but Mubarak rejected the request.

Bush and Shamir spent much of the day together—first in discussions and later on a tour of the Air and Space Museum, where they watched the movie "To Fly."

Sometime between the tour and getting into his tuxedo, the president had taken off to the Hill for the impromptu racquetball game. One presidential press aide mused as Bush greeted his guests, "He must have just gotten out of the shower."

Standing for their portrait outside the White House, Bush—formally clad—and Shamir—in a dark suit—were silent. Barbara Bush, wearing a long black lace dress by Arnold Scaasi and her usual pearls, gestured warmly to Shulamit Shamir, who also wore black—a combination of lace and velvet.

Marilyn Quayle was in a not-talking-to-the-press mood. But she was thrilled to share the admission that her plaid taffeta skirt was 15 years old.

At the end of the evening national security adviser Brent Scowcroft strolled out with Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher and his wife Georgette. They caught actress Audrey Hepburn in conversation momentarily before Scowcroft and Georgette Mosbacher, chummily holding hands, said their goodbyes.

Lee Atwater, the guitar-playing chairman of the Republican National

Committee, said right before heading in to the entertainment, "I've got about two acts I've got to get in here." He refused to divulge what they were.

Following the dinner of smoked trout, herbed bow ties, chicken rosemary turban of spinach and strawberry sorbet bombe, piano vocalist Michael Carney—whom Bush described as "my friend of long standing"—performed dusty oldies with singer Colleen Casey in the East Room, quizzing the audi-

Hepburn swept in wearing a black satin strapless dress with a pearl-studded black velvet bolero. She confessed to a certain amount of pleasant befuddlement at her invitation to the dinner.

"Yes, I was surprised," she said, stopping to talk to reporters at the entrance to the East Wing. Asked what she'd been up to lately, Hepburn launched enthusiastically into a discussion of her work for UNICEF.

"We leave on Wednesday for the Sudan . . . there's quite a lot of work to be done—and it all has to be done in one month—before the rains come," she said, referring to disbursement of food and medication.

She went on at some length, until her longtime boyfriend, Robert Wolders, slipped a hand about her wraithlike waist and said with a laugh, "Can we eat now?"

Bob Hope and his wife Dolores came in a clump with Atwater, wearing a red cummerbund and red bow tie, and his wife Sally, in bright emerald green satin.

Atwater wasn't the only man trying to make a colorful sartorial statement. Sen. Rudy Boschwitz (R-Minn.) turned up in a loud multicolored cummerbund and black bow tie.

Hope—of course—is no stranger to White House dinners. "I go back to FDR," he said.

The guest list for last night's White House dinner:

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Shulamit Shamir
Moshe Arad, ambassador of Israel, and Rivka Arad
Benjamin Netanyahu, deputy foreign minister
Elyakim Rubenstein, cabinet secretary
Yosef H. Ben-Aharon, director general of the prime minister's office
Avisezer Pezner, media adviser to the prime minister
Brigadier General Azriel Nevo, military secretary to the prime minister
Zvi Harry Horowitz, adviser to the prime minister of diaspora affairs
Aryeh Mekeel, political adviser to the prime minister
Joseph Achmeir, director of the prime minister's bureau
Oded Eran, deputy chief of mission, and Miti Eran
President Bush and Barbara Bush
Vice President Quayle and Marilyn Quayle

Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) and Joyce Murtha
Joseph V. Reed Jr., chief of protocol
Seymour Reich, chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, and Helen Reich
Daniel Ross, director of policy planning, State Department
Sara Deborah Ross
Pete Rozelle, commissioner, National Football League, and Carrie Rozelle
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president, Union of American Hebrew Congregations, and Rhos Schindler
Gen. Brent Scowcroft, assistant to the president for national security affairs
Bernard Shaw, anchor, Cable News Network, and Linda She
Jacob Stein, former chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, and Jean Stein
John Sununu, chief of staff to the president
Dick Thornburgh, attorney general, and Virginia Thornburgh
Ben Wagshal, Wagshal Delicatessen, and Lillian Wagshal
Byron White, Supreme Court justice, and Marion White
Gordon Zacks, chairman, National Republican Jewish Coalition, and Carol Zacks

SDI on the Defense

STRATEGIC defense as a means of preventing nuclear warfare may yet survive the change in administrations, but not without a struggle.

Six years after former President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative, the idea of using space-based defenses that could make atomic weapons obsolete is still being debated.

Although President Bush has declared his overall support for SDI, he wants to put his own imprint on the U.S. nuclear doctrine. His national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, has been publicly skeptical about switching to defensive systems as a primary deterrent to nuclear war.

SDI backers are encouraged by the posture taken by Vice President Dan Quayle, who was a strong missile defense advocate in

the Senate. In an SDI anniversary speech, Quayle reaffirmed the administration's intention to continue research and begin deployment of a missile defense system at some point.

Comments by the new secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, raise questions about how much money the president is willing to commit to SDI, however. A strategic review of U.S. defense and foreign policy ordered by Bush is supposed to provide guidance for budgetary decisions.

It's not likely that Bush will lock horns, as Reagan did, with Democrats in Congress who are cool to SDI. One possible new approach is called "Brilliant Pebbles."

Instead of SDI's huge satellites, the new concept calls for thousands of small orbiting missile interceptors equipped with

sensors and targeting computers. The system could be activated to track and destroy missiles in their "boost" phase.

Quayle calls the idea promising because it could be deployed earlier and at much less cost than SDI. High Frontier, the organization that pioneered the SDI concept, is ready to mount a strong lobbying effort in behalf of "Brilliant Pebbles."

Not only does the United States need to have a strategy that would make the Soviet Union think twice about launching a first strike attack, but one that also would afford protection from intentional or accidental launches by the growing number of Third World nuclear nations.

The sooner the president and Congress can agree on the best system, the better prospects will be for a safer world.

NBC News

MEET THE PRESS

Sunday, April 9, 1989

GUEST:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

National Security Adviser

MODERATOR:

Garrick Utley - NBC News

PANEL:

John Cochran - NBC News

Elizabeth Drew - The New Yorker

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(Sundays: 202/885-4200)

MR. UTLEY: On "Meet the Press" today, from Gorbachev, to the Middle East, to Central America, what does the Bush administration do next? Our guest is Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser. If you are interested in and involved with what is happening around the world, this was a week to make your head spin. Gorbachev in Cuba, Shamir and Mubarak here in Washington. In Poland, the promise of a free election. And, now, amid all of this activity, the direction of the Bush administration's foreign policy, particularly towards the Soviet Union is beginning

SCOWCROFT...CONTINUED

to emerge. We want to talk about that with General Scowcroft this morning on "Meet the Press," and joining me today are Elizabeth Drew of The New Yorker and John Cochran who is NBC's chief White House correspondent.

General Scowcroft, we're now getting the leaks, if you will on what this foreign policy review is all about. You, of course, have overseen it. And one of the first indications to come out today is that there's no real change planned for our relationship with the Soviet Union, no indication that you and the president want to seize this opening, this initiative of Gorbachev's. Why?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the articles that you saw in the press this morning were premature. The studies are still under way. They have not been completed. And, so, we haven't made any final decisions on policy. We have initial results from the study by the bureaucratic interagency process and it's probably not surprising that the future looks a lot like the present in a sort of a straight line projection, but we're not there yet.

MR. UTLEY: But some people are calling this here in Washington, in foreign policy circles, quote, status quo plus. Do you think that that's the way to approach the current relationship with the Soviet Union or do you not think that we have to show more initiative, take some risks, go for this apparent opening?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh, I think there are two aspects to that and one is that a major power like the United States ought not to make sharp dramatic changes in policy. We've had a fairly consistent policy now through Democratic and Republican administrations for 40 years. Now, that's the one half. The other half is that the post-war period, the post World War II--the cold war period is beginning to change rapidly. A lot of things are happening. And it's important now, perhaps for the first administration in a long time, to look out ahead, to look toward the end of the century, to say where do we want to be, what would we like the world to see, What would we like East-West relations to be like there and to try to work from here toward that.

MR. UTLEY: The president as part of this review has asked for a personal assessment of Gorbachev, the man. What do you think that assessment is going to show us? Is he for real? Is he going to last?

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh, I think there's no question that he's for real and that he is a dynamic, modern--in the sense of understanding, especially communications--and dedicated to changing the Soviet Union. But the--what is in doubt is what--the character of that change and what his motivation for change is, and there there's a major question mark.

MRS. DREW: I'd like to follow up on that and learn more about your thinking on that specific point. In a program earlier this year, you expressed some skepticism about his long-range ambition, saying that he wanted to straighten out the Soviet economy or improve it, make trouble for the Western alliance. So, do you think basically there's been no change in the Soviet Union's long-range international aggressiveness and ambitions?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think the evidence so far is mixed. There are cases, for example, of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but that could simply be a recognition of realities. There's been some useful move in Angola, but certainly SWAPO, massive SWAPO incursion into Namibia over the last few days could have not have happened without Soviet knowledge at least, whether or not they played a role in it. Certainly, in Central America we have what the president called clear evidence of old thinking not new thinking. So, I think it's too early to assess how much he is really dedicated to substantive change.

MRS. DREW: Do you think it might be the case that in the end he's not really different from his predecessors, in an international respect?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think he is different in the sense that he is very, very skillful. There's no question about that and he knows how to take advantage of media, how to package things in an appealing way, and he definitely does want to make change in the Soviet Union.

MR. COCHRAN: But, General, this was a very odd week for Gorbachev. He went to Cuba, he had nothing new to say about Central America. We expected some sort of initiative there. He went to London, met with Margaret Thatcher, made a couple of cracks about we should not modernize our nuclear forces, our tactical nuclear forces in Europe, but it was almost as a passing reference. He also seemed somewhat put out with your administration, the president for not moving quickly enough on the policy review regarding Moscow. Is he sort of retrenching? Is he so worried about domestic affairs that he simply isn't concentrated on foreign

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policy? This was a very lackluster performance by him this past week.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, certainly, his domestic problems are massive and I think that one can anticipate, you know, a period of some stability in international relations, because he does want to concentrate on it. But he had a difficult time in Cuba. He has major differences with Castro on glasnost, on perestroika, on the levels of aid and so on, so maybe this was more in the way of a damage limitation visit, but certainly there wasn't anything new. As a matter of fact, it was discouraging to hear his pronouncements. And in London he announced with great fanfare a cessation of production of highly enriched uranium as if it were something new. We stopped that, I believe, in 1964.

MR. UTLEY: General, let's get down to another very important specific in our relationship with the Soviet Union, SDI or Star Wars. We're familiar with the debate over it. The Russians want us to stop it, not go ahead with deployment. The Bush administration has to decide what to do. Do you favor or do you see the deployment of SDI in the foreseeable future or as Secretary of Defense Cheney said, has it been oversold?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I think it's premature to say precisely what I favor. But I--it's no longer possible simply to talk about SDI as if it were a single issue out there. There are many forms of SDI, from trying to reach the president--President Reagan's initial vision of making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete down to the OWPS (phonetic) the minimum sort of shield to prevent--against actual--

MR. UTLEY: Where do you stand? Do you support a minimum shield?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think strategic defense is here to stay and I think we need vigorously to pursue it. I'm not prepared to say exactly where down this whole spectrum of things we ought to go, from continuing research to full deployment.

MR. UTLEY: Let me just try once more. In other words, you do not see it being deployed in the foreseeable future?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, I wouldn't say--no, that's not--that's not correct--I would not--

MRS. DREW: I would like to ask you a kind of big picture question, given what's going on in the Soviet Union, they had elections; obviously they weren't our idea of free elections, but some very astonishing things happened. Given the Polish government's agreement with solidarity and their promise of elections, given

SCOWCROFT...CONTINUED

the loosening of the reigns of some governments in Eastern Europe, do you think we might begin to conclude that communism doesn't work?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think we might be prepared to conclude that. I think what we're seeing now is evidence, you know, that the West has won. Now, the battle's not over, but it seems to me that, you know, we're no longer worried about communism sweeping Western Europe as we were 35 years ago. It's a failed political system, as we concede by the concessions to at least some democratic procedures. It's failed as an economic system and they're borrowing market economics, to try to get their economic system going again.

So, there's no question that we have every reason to look back on the past 40 years and say we've been successful.

MRS. DREW: But I'm still not sure what you were saying earlier that I--it seemed to me you were saying that given all that, you still don't think that their international ambitions have changed.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm not sure that they have and it seems to me that we--this is a period where we have to be very prudent and cautious and not throw away the kinds of strength and determination that have brought us as far as we have before we can be absolutely certain what's ahead.

MR. COCHRAN: General, let me focus on a decision the president's going to have to make in the next couple of weeks, that is to say, whether to go with the MX mobile missiles or the Midgetman mobile missiles, the Midgetman being single warhead, MX being multiple warhead. Without getting into all that arcana of nuclear technology, if taxpayers knew what the Midgetman costs, they'd be much more interested in the Midgetman missile. You happen to be for it. You think it would survive a Soviet nuclear attack better because it can be moved around more easily. I know you're probably not going to announce the decision today, but do you think there is the money to pay for this very expensive Midgetman?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, there has been no decision and one of our fundamental problems is in a period of severe pressure on the defense budget there is, we must really analyze closely our strategic priorities in terms of an overall concept and we can't do everything we'd like. And one of the things we're looking at now is a concept that would help us rank the kinds of things that we--that are highest priority.

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MR. COCHRAN: It's feasible though that you could pay for the Midgetman?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh, yes, at the cost of other things, yes.

MR. UTLEY: Let's just call a pause right here for a moment right here. We'll have more questions for Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser, in just a moment as "Meet the Press" continues.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: Continuing here on "Meet the Press" this morning, Elizabeth Drew, John Cochran and I are talking with Brent Scowcroft, the president's national security adviser.

Turning to a bit of recent history, the Iran/contra affair. At the Oliver North trial, as you are aware, sir, there is some new information that emerged this week about efforts by your boss, George Bush, and Ronald Reagan to get aid to the contras through Honduras by giving Honduras assistance, a quid pro quo arrangement, which would be in violation or was in violation of the Boland amendment. Now, you were on the commission, the Tower commission, which investigated that whole affair. When you saw this information appear in court, government information, did you feel that you were misled or that your inquiry was limited because you were not given that information at that time?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, I want to be very careful here. The information that we got on the Tower board was included in our report. And I think it speaks for itself. This information that is out now in the trial--you know, first of all, I wasn't in the government at the time.

MR. UTLEY: I understand, you were part of the board that conducted the inquiry.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That's right. But in 1985, for example, it was a very troubled period down there and there were incursions by the Sandinista regime into Honduras. And the Reagan administration announced accelerated aid and so on to meet those incursions and it's my recollection the vice president went down there to reassure the Hondurans. And I think one has to look at it in that kind of context.

MR. UTLEY: But the indication in this evidence submitted by the government, again, and attested to by the government, is that Mr. Bush, as vice president, did go down, did talk to the

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Honduran president, that part of this arrangement was a quid pro quo, which was in violation of the Boland amendment. Were you aware of that at the time of your inquiry?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think--have to be very careful here. There's a trial under way on that--

MR. UTLEY: We're not talking about the trial. I understand that. We recognize that.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: No, no, I understand.

MR. UTLEY: We're talking about your investigation, which is now history.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, there's a difference between what was submitted at the trial and the documentary evidence in and of itself, and I think I better not say any farther than that, but I go back to the statement that I just made about what the facts were.

MR. COCHRAN: Sir, are you saying that in fact there was no quid pro quo. It seemed to me that the--what you were saying is we sent--the Reagan administration send economic and military aid to Honduras to stave off a possible Nicaraguan invasion rather than to help the contras. Is that your point?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: What I'm saying, in 1985, there were Nicaraguan incursions across the border and we did accelerate aid there and I--you know, this is all in the newspapers.

MRS. DREW: Wasn't that because the contras were there?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: The Nicaraguan incursions?

MRS. DREW: Yes.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Oh, oh, yes, I wouldn't--I wouldn't disagree with that.

MRS. DREW: So, it was all part of the contra policy?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Yes, but that's not the basic question as I understand it.

MR. COCHRAN: But you're saying there was no quid pro quo? This was not a way of laundering money to the contras?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm not going to say any more than I've said. I think there are real problems with going further.

MRS. DREW: Let me ask you another one about President Reagan's role. He told the Tower commission, on which you served, that he didn't know about, had no role in, getting money and help from third countries. And it has now come out in the court that he did. So, didn't he mislead you?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: That--that's a tough question,

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Elizabeth. I don't remember on that particular one exactly what the president told us. And I just honestly don't remember. You remember the Tower board spent the bulk of its time on the Iranian part rather than on the contra part, because the Tower board was not making a legal investigation. What we were charged with--with what--was what went wrong with the system and what ought to be done. So, we were not--we were not looking at culpability in any of these issues. We were trying to find out what happened, and there the focus was really on Iran.

MR. UTLEY: Well, General, let me ask you another question. You are now--about today--you are the national security adviser, would you consider, under any circumstances, any time, at the White House, in your present post, to carry out the kind of an arrangement which apparently--and, indeed, was carried out at that time, in 1984 and 1985, where corners were clearly cut in violation of the Boland amendment--understanding the pressures that people were under at that time--but would you envisage the possibility of doing that under any circumstances?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Let me under--let me answer that this way. What we have in the contra affair was a constitutional confrontation between a president who had a policy he firmly believed was in the national interest and a Congress that either was objected to or did not agree with that policy. And we were seeing is the unfolding of that constitutional controversy. The president used the instruments that he had. The Congress used the instruments it had. Now, I think we have to bend over backwards to insure that laws on the books are obeyed and I can assure you that that will be the case.

MR. COCHRAN: Are you convinced that George Bush did nothing improper or illegal in 1985?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'd say--you know, I'm going to let--let our report stand on that one.

MR. COCHRAN: Well, sir, you've got a pretty good reputation in this town. Most people would expect you to walk out of the White House just like that, if you thought you were associated with a president who had done something improper or illegal or had in any way misled the Congress. Can we assume by the fact that you're staying in this White House that you think that--as--the president has a clean bill of health on this?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I'm still there.

MR. COCHRAN: So the assumption's correct?

SCOWCROFT...CONTINUED

MRS. DREW: Let me ask you about the Middle East, which I am sure you might welcome at this point. The administration seemed to embrace Mr. Shamir's proposal for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. But, of course, the whole question is in the details, who can participate in the elections and so on. Does the administration think that Shamir is ready with a detailed program for these elections, that you can support and that Arab nations would consider a real election?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: I think we have taken only the very first, very tiny steps into a very very difficult problem. The United States can't make peace in the Middle East. All we can help is the parties, to bring them together, to build on points of congruence, or even areas where they may be close together. And the possibility of elections to bring about some kind of a dialogue, which at the present time is wholly absent, is one way to proceed. Now--

MRS. DREW: But do you have a conception of how this will evolve stage by stage and where you want to get and where you want them to get? Do you have a plan?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, we have a conception as to-- as to how it might work, of course. But it will depend in the end on the parties themselves each making some compromises to make such--such a process work. And I think it's premature to say whether this will be a successful avenue.

MR. COCHRAN: Could I ask you about the Soviet sub which sank off the coast of Norway. Are you satisfied there's no nuclear radiation hazard from this sub?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: As far as we can tell, there is none and the indications that we have received from the Soviet Union is that there is none.

MR. COCHRAN: Very quickly, in the Pan Am 103 crash, the bombing, the FBI director says eventually you're going to find out who's responsible. You seem to be getting very close. Are you very close and does it point to this Palestinian terrorist group based out of Damascus?

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: Well, there's been--just an absolutely marvelous amount of detective work gone on. We have learned more than I ever would image we would, but we're not there yet.

MR. UTLEY: With that news, General, thank you very much. We have to pause. Thank you for being with us today on

SCOWCROFT...CONTINUED

"Meet the Press." Elizabeth Drew, John Cochran and I will be back in just a moment with some personal observations as "Meet the Press" continues.

(Announcements)

MR. UTLEY: Talking with Brent Scowcroft this morning, the president's national security adviser, of course, one of the main stories is this long awaited policy review on America's relationship with the world, specifically the Soviet Union, which is now starting to emerge like a big iceberg and many people are going to say it's a victory for bureaucratic inertia. It's middle of the roadism carried to an extreme. Is that fair?

MRS. DREW: Well, General Scowcroft said that it is not complete. And he was quite candid, I thought, in saying that if you have an interagency review of the extant by extant bureaucracies, you're not going to get very much original thinking. So, I don't think we can really judge it until we see the real results. But there is a danger when you have interagency reviews that everybody sort of compromises and works things out and original thinking doesn't emerge.

MR. COCHRAN: Yes, but I think foreign policy in this administration is going to be threshed out in meetings between the president, between the Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney; between the Secretary of State, Jim Baker; and, Brent Scowcroft, those four people--not always all four of them in the room at the same time--that's what's going to decide, not these interagency reviews. And after all these are all very cautious men who thought that Ronald Reagan had much too romantic a view of the Soviets, that sometimes he was too anti-Soviet, sometimes too pro-Soviet. These are much more cautious people.

MR. UTLEY: Okay, let's talk about George Bush's personality. How cautious is he, because in the end it is the president's decision, isn't it?

MR. COCHRAN: Very.

MR. UTLEY: Is he the kind of a guy who will go for an apparent opening, who will take a risk?

MRS. DREW: It's not clear and I think in light of what John was saying the question is why are we having this interagency review, if, in fact, the decisions are going to be made by the top guys. They say these reviews will be finished by May, that's really six months after an election. One wonders what they've

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been doing. But Bush is not necessarily a bold person and we have to wait and see what kind of advice he gets.

MR. COCHRAN: He's also being helped by the fact that Gorbachev is not being particularly bold lately, as we were saying earlier in the program. This was a very surprisingly poor performance by Gorbachev this past week. And I don't know if it's because he's distracted--that's the main theory going around--that he's distracted by problems back at home. That he's simply not focussing on foreign policy. This makes it easier for this administration to, if you will, sit back and wait until the president goes to Europe at the end of May and then spell out his policy.

MR. UTLEY: Then the action may really begin. John, Elizabeth, thank you very much for being with me this morning here on "Meet the Press."

If there was a picture, an image from this past week that sticks in the mind, it is from Havana. Mikhail Gorbachev and Fidel Castro together. There was Gorbachev looking towards the future, embracing change. And there was Castro clearly a prisoner of his past and, yes, his own rhetoric. It was one of those moments, which defined what is happening in the communist world and in ours. It is a time to make decisions. Many people who are impressed by what Gorbachev is doing or are concerned about it or both are watching as President Bush decides how to respond to the Soviet initiatives. What is interesting, though, is that some conservatives in this country are not waiting to present their new thinking. For example, last week on this program, Congressman Newt Gingrich, a bona fide member of the Republic Party's right wing was asked how he would review deep reductions in Pentagon spending if the Gramm-Rudman budget cuts have to be implemented. Gingrich, who is a self-described hawk said, "The fact is with Gorbachev and what is happening in the Soviet Union, we can look at fundamental reforms of the defense department. I am very willing to cut defense spending rather than raise taxes if those are our choices." Well, that could turn out to be a key to how George Bush responds to Mikhail Gorbachev. If the president does not have to keep looking over his shoulder at all his conservative critics, that proverbial window of opportunity between the White House and the Kremlin could become an open door.

I'm Garrick Utley. I hope you'll join us this evening for NBC Nightly News and, again, next week for "Sunday Today," and "Meet the Press."

NATO'S

DILEMMA

By Charles W. Corddry

The shift from nuclear to conventional armament poses a problem in maintaining balance.

Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, having seen the futility of threats and bluster, has found a better way to provoke divisions in the Western alliance. He is waging a peace offensive.

"I . . . think he's interested in making trouble within the Western alliance," President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, has said, "and I think he believes the best way to do it is a peace offensive."

Reliability Factor

Though Gorbachev's announced cuts in troops, weapons and military spending must be taken seriously, as must the proclaimed switch to a "defensive" military doctrine, they are still mostly in the realm of promise rather than implementation.

Giving himself two years to reduce his forces, he has built in plenty of time for reversal if Western responses are not to his liking, and, of course, if his faltering domestic restructuring program would allow such a reversal. As he told a visiting delegation in mid-January, the new doctrine of reasonable "sufficiency" of arms for defensive purposes is dynamic. What is sufficient, he said, "will depend on how the Western side conducts itself."

The Soviet leader's steady stream of seemingly conciliatory gestures and arms control proposals has had the effect seen by Gen. Scowcroft of making trouble for the alliance and slowing progress toward both nuclear and conventional goals. NATO, in brief, is cast in one of its bickering moods.

The contrast between Gorbachev's approach and that of his rigid predecessors, and a perception of earnestness about arms control, have made him a very popular figure with European publics. The result is more

pressure to reduce, or anyhow not to increase, arms budgets and to undertake reciprocal cuts in forces.

By a year ago, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had decided, according to news reports, that "The Russians bear was easier to deal with when it looked more like a bear than it does now . . . the nicer the Russians get, the more dangerous they are."

The once-accepted need to modernize tactical nuclear weapons, those with ranges under 300 miles, is now vigorously contested in West Germany, which seems to want to negotiate them down, or away, simultaneously with negotiations for conventional-arms reductions.

The NATO military command, under U.S. Army Gen. John R. Galvin, is in fact preparing proposals for significant cuts in the arsenal of shortest range battlefield nuclear arms. But the general is quite explicit that such reductions must be contingent on development of an improved ground-launched Lance missile with a reach of about 250 miles and a new air-to-ground missile.

In the field of conventional arms, Gorbachev's announced plan to cut 500,000 men and 10,000 tanks over two years brought predictable urges in Europe to reciprocate. Yet by a very general estimate, the effect of Moscow's action would be to reduce its overall force advantage from 3-to-1 to 2-to-1, which might well leave Soviet commanders with the potential of mobilizing a 3- or 4-to-1 advantage at specific points of attack. (Much would depend here on the promptness of NATO political leaders' response to warning and the Soviet's success, or lack of it, in moving reinforcements from the USSR.)

**The Key:
Arms Control Agreements**

As argued by Sen. William S. Cohen (Maine), who is vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, and other critics, unilateral cuts by the West could simply restore the Soviet-previous force ratio. Possibly worse, it would lower the density — combat units and firepower — of defending forces.

The conclusion that flows general from analysis of the Gorbachev maneuvers is that reductions in Western forces should be carried out only in the context of verifiable arms control agreements. Optimists, like Jonathan Dean, a former U.S. negotiator, believe the West can "get much more from the Soviets" — beyond their announced plans — because of Moscow's concern for domestic restructuring and better economic relations with Europe.

The fact is, however, that all historical experience indicates that negotiation of a conventional arms agreement will be a long drawn-out process. The West does not have a fully developed position. And the Bush Administration is in the midst of a full-scale review of national security policy, covering defense requirements, arms control goals and budgets.

Higher Costs

By any judgment, meanwhile, NATO has deficiencies and vulnerabilities that demand attention. There are piles of studies on what fixes are needed to achieve what results, accordingly, a wide range of estimated costs.

The lowest estimate came in a Presidential campaign last year. Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis advocated a U.S. capability to defeat the Soviet Union in a conventional war and estimated necessary upgrading of the U.S. would cost \$3 billion over four years.

Apart from the implicit risk

Bush Advised to Hold Steady On Nation's Foreign Policy

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

Three classified reports, presented to President Bush last week as part of a lengthy review of U.S. foreign policy, have recommended no major new initiatives toward Europe or the Soviet Union, offering no support for dramatic arms cuts or sharply expanded economic cooperation with the East, U.S. officials have disclosed.

The reports, prepared by an interagency committee and discussed with Bush at meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) on Tuesday and Wednesday, determined instead that the administration should closely follow current policies, largely developed during Ronald Reagan's presidency, toward Eastern and Western Europe and toward the government of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the officials said.

The officials could point only to the possible elimination of some U.S. trade tariffs and other economic measures involving Poland, in response to Polish endorsement of free and open elections, as a specific new initiative supported by the reports.

The foreign affairs review that developed the three reports has occupied hundreds of senior bureaucrats throughout the government and tied the administration's hands on many pressing policy issues since Bush became president 79 days ago.

The reports covering the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Western Europe are considered among the most important of dozens of papers distilled from the review covering most regions of the world, U.S. military policy and arms control.

A White House official indicated the three were part of only a handful reviewed so far by a special committee chaired by Robert M. Gates, the deputy national security adviser, and approved for submission to Bush and other members of the NSC.

Bush responded to the three reports by asking for some supplementary information, the officials said, but appeared to accept their conclusions and did not ask that they be redrafted. On Friday, he publicly brushed aside criticism by Gorbachev that the slow pace of the reviews was threatening the momentum behind improving East-West relations.

"We'll be ready to react when we feel like reacting" to proposals made by Gorbachev, Bush said.

While some senior officials expressed frustration with what they described as the three reports' complacent view of the nation's present role in world affairs, others praised the process that produced them and the reports themselves for helping to "educate" Bush and his new appointees on emerging problems in European and Soviet relations and for creating "a paper trail" that might be used in creative policy-making many months from now.

"There is just a hell of a lot of inertia behind the business-as-usual approach," one official sighed in explaining the absence of new ideas.

On a dozen or so controversial topics, the officials said, the reports urge a cautious, moderate U.S. approach that one described as "the lowest common denominator" acceptable both to Bush's conservative and more liberal advisers.

At the same time, they stressed that the closed, interagency meetings on the reports were not as raucous as those conducted during Reagan's presidency, and that the results reflected a broader and probably more lasting consensus in the government's senior ranks.

A senior official said, for example, that the roughly 30-page report on the Soviet Union urged that U.S. policy "should not be designed either to help or hurt" Gorbachev.

Others explained that this recommendation was intended to sidestep a dispute between some State Department officials, who believe the United States can help bring

about lasting Soviet political reforms through enhanced economic cooperation, and some Pentagon officials, who prefer to turn current Soviet troubles to U.S. strategic advantage.

"The consensus is that we should make assertive challenges to the Soviets to put into effect their new thinking on a broad range of issues," one official said, noting that these would largely consist of those raised under Reagan, such as human rights, emigration, regional issues and arms control. "We'll have more ambitious goals within the existing framework."

This prescription was said to be based on an assessment that Gorbachev would likely remain powerful for at least the next three to five years, but that he would also be preoccupied by internal economic difficulties.

The report was skeptical, however, that U.S.-Soviet trade can or should be dramatically increased, partly because of wide economic differences and what one official described as "their inability to make sufficiently profitable deals."

Only officials at the Commerce Department—apparently not including Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher—supported calls by some prominent business and Jewish leaders for a waiver of Jackson-Vanik trade restrictions with the Soviet Union, the officials said.

The officials said the issue would instead continue to be "reviewed" while a careful assessment was made of interest on Capitol Hill.

Other officials said the roughly 25-page report on Western Europe did not support growing calls in some member-nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for dramatic reductions in NATO forces, in concert with larger cuts in Warsaw Pact forces.

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The report indicated that the West probably needs to develop a new proposal on conventional arms cuts that has more political appeal than last month's cautious call for 5 to 10 percent reductions in three types of armaments, they added.

But they said the report also reflected the administration's skepticism that negotiated cuts on the order of 40 to 50 percent, as urged last week by retired general Andrew J. Goodpaster and also endorsed by Gorbachev as a long-term goal, would serve U.S. security interests. The Joint Chiefs of Staffs were described as being particularly opposed to consideration of such deep cuts.

The report also takes a middle road on the issue of European economic integration in 1992, urging cautious U.S. support combined with vigilant opposition to trade barriers, officials said.

A similar report on Eastern Europe did not embrace a controversial formula advanced by former secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger, in which the United States would provide assurances to the Soviet Union that increasing democratization in those Soviet allies would not be answered by new Western challenges to Soviet security.

Indications last month that such a plan was under consideration by the administration brought substantial, private protests from West European governments and questions from Hungary. Their concern was that any U.S.-Soviet deal could interfere with the democratic reforms under way in the region.

The report lumps Hungary and Poland in one grouping, with the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in another, and supports the familiar Bush policy of "differentiation," or support for those nations taking the greatest steps toward democratic reform.

Several officials said a likely decision to grant Poland and possibly Hungary a "generalized system of preferences" designation, lifting tariffs for certain trade goods, was "consistent" with the report's recommendations. Other economic concessions such as loan guarantees are said to be under consideration, although it was not clear whether these were expressly suggested by the report.

All three reports were developed by interagency groups known as "policy coordinating committees" that were chaired by Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne L. Ridgway. A holdover from the Reagan administration, Ridgway is a career foreign service officer with long experience in European and Soviet affairs, including service as ambassador to East Germany and Finland, who plans to retire from the State Department in June.

A separate report on U.S. military policy, being prepared by a committee chaired by former ambassador Paul D. Wolfowitz, is less than half-completed, the officials said. Only an initial chapter on military threats to the United States during the next decade is considered finished.

Officials described the chapter as acknowledging that the Soviets are taking concrete steps to diminish both their "threat image" and their actual military forces. "The consensus is that the threat of attack on short-warning time is particularly reduced."

It also predicts a continuation of the Soviets' withdrawal from involvement in Third World conflicts, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, and notes that the Soviets' current economic troubles will bar "aggressive military policies or meddling for some time," a senior official said.

"It says, in short, that their threat to us will decline, no matter what we do," the official added. "It also predicts they will place a higher priority on relations with the United States than with other countries."

The chapter also notes that many new military threats, such as ballistic missile proliferation, "do not involve the Soviet Union directly," another official said.

The implications of these new developments for U.S. military policy have not been decided by the Wolfowitz committee. But several officials complained last week that preliminary drafts of other chapters of the report sought only to justify continuing current U.S. military policies and programs.

Officials said a key report on arms control, to be prepared by a committee chaired by NSC senior staff member Arnold Kanter, was also in early stages of preparation. They attributed the delay in part to the wrenching battle over the John G. Tower's unsuccessful nomination as secretary of defense.

Staff writer David Hoffman contributed to this report.

Life After 'Containment' —Muddling Through

By David Ignatius

FOR ROUGHLY 40 YEARS, the United States has embraced a global strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union known as "containment." Now, the Bush administration is preparing to move to a slightly altered strategy, one that might best be described as "hedging your bets."

"Hedging" may not sound very exciting, and it certainly won't mobilize the armies of the West for the ideological battles of the 21st century. But it's probably a fair summary of what's emerging from the administration's broad examination of U.S. strategy, known in the bureaucracy as the "National Security Review," or NSR.

The administration's strategic review comes at an appropriate time. Just last week, the architect of containment, George F. Kennan, declared the old strategy obsolete.

"What we are witnessing today in Russia is the break-up of much, if not all, of the system of power by which that country has been held together and governed since 1917," Kennan told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. "Whatever reasons there may once have been for regarding the Soviet Union primarily as a possible, if not probable, military opponent, the time for that sort of thing has clearly passed."

It falls to George Bush to offer an alternative approach. But for several reasons, the Bush administration isn't likely to match the bold vision that characterized postwar American policy. The first reason is that the times are so different: We're now in a period of uncertainty and transition, rather than one like the late '40s, when we faced a clear threat from an expansionist enemy. The second reason is the cautious, compromising personality of George Bush himself. He's no Mikhail Gorbachev, and that may be just as well. One risk-taking, visionary leader may be all the world can handle at any one time.

The review process isn't completed yet, but officials who are taking part see some outlines beginning to emerge. In assessing U.S.-Soviet affairs, the administration has concluded that it's unsure whether Mikhail Gorbachev will succeed or fail—and it wants to be

ready for both possibilities. In defense policy, the Bush team is wary of any grandiose version of Star Wars, but it may adopt a modest, ground-based scheme of strategic defense that can be deployed without violating the ABM Treaty. The common theme in both instances is an administration seeking to hedge its bets.

"There is a new centrist, prudent consensus emerging in Washington that keeps conservative Democrats together with Republicans," says one high-level administration official who has been involved in the policy review. The price of this consensus, this official fears, may be that it produces "flat and uninteresting" options.

The best test of whether the Bush administration is serious about "new thinking" will probably come in defense. The challenge there is to look at the vast military establishment that was created to support the Cold War strategy of containment and decide how much is really needed today. But it's not yet clear that the review process will allow that kind of fundamental critique. As one official involved in the review says, "There is a huge momentum for the policies of the past."

Overseeing the review are national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and his deputy, Bob Gates. They will be aided by Washington attorney R. James Woolsey, who is taking a leave of absence from his law practice. Starting this week, Woolsey will begin reading what are expected to total more than a dozen NSR studies—on everything from Afghanistan to arms control. About half are already completed.

This sort of grand bureaucratic exercise is beloved by new administrations. It produces stacks of impressive-looking NSC documents that reassure officials that they do indeed have policies on the major issues. And it distracts the bureaucracy itself for several crucial months, freeing top-level officials to take hold of their agencies and departments. Indeed, some veterans remember that Henry Kissinger ordered a similar across-the-board review when he became national security adviser in 1969—mainly to keep the bureaucrats out of his hair.

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The Bush administration has already followed another bureaucratic tradition by renaming the various interagency groups that are part of the national-security process. ("Process" is a favorite word in NSC-land, as in "The NSDD is hung up at the NFIB because of a process problem.")

Gone are the IGs (interagency groups) and SIGs (senior interagency groups) of the Reagan years. In their place are the PCCs (short for policy-coordinating committees) and above that, the DC (deputies committee), staffed by deputy secretaries and undersecretaries. The idea, presumably, is that committees with new names may not be quite so prone to pettifoggery and turf battles as the old ones were.

Some officials doubt the elaborate NSR process will be where the real action is. The new buzzword in the administration is "off-line" discussion of key issues—that is, moving them out of the PCC and DC apparatus and into the hands of Scowcroft, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Secretary of State James Baker.

One person who clearly is paying attention to the NSR process—and anxiously awaiting its completion—is Mikhail Gorbachev. He complained last Thursday in London about the "prolonged" review of U.S.-Soviet relations and the administration's "hesitation" in developing policy. His spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov elaborated: "We understand that the new administration needs time to develop policy But I think the new administration tries to please everybody, and that's not easy."

Details about some aspects of the Bush review can be found elsewhere in today's *Washington Post*. Here's a brief summary of some of the issues the administration has been debating—and the key problems:

■ **The Soviet Union.** Agnosticism about Gorbachev appears to be a major theme of Bush review. "The focus was on the internal phenomenon," says one knowledgeable administration official. "Where will it lead? How secure is it? There was a non-euphoric assessment, and all sorts of questions. You have to assume that he's in power, that he'll survive. But you have to recognize the vulnerabilities. And you have to question how far he'll go."

The Bush administration may in fact be more skeptical toward Gorbachev than was Reagan's. Indeed, some Bush officials privately argue that Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz caught a mild case of Gorby-mania during their last two years in office and began to feel they had a stake in the Soviet leader's success.

"This team is more cautious," says one official. That caution will protect the administration from the "downside" risk if Gorbachev should fail; but it may also limit the "upside" benefit if Gorbachev succeeds. (The Bush group, skeptical to the core, isn't even sure that it's in America's long-term interest that Gorbachev succeed.)

One specific U.S.-Soviet recommendation: The Bush administration has decided to add a fifth category—"global issues," such as drugs, environmental issues and terrorism—to the traditional superpower agenda of arms control, regional issues, bilateral issues and human rights.

■ **Eastern Europe.** "Differentiation, plus carrots" is how one official summarizes the policy. By that he means that the Bush administration wants to continue the Reagan policy of differentiating among the Warsaw Pact countries and offering special benefits to those that show independence from Moscow. The administration's problem is that because of the budget crunch, it doesn't have many carrots to offer.

An early test will be Poland, which last week announced a broad reform program that brings it close to multiparty democracy. The Catholic Church and the Solidarity trade union are sure to appeal to the Bush administration for help. How we respond will help shape Poland's future, and that of the rest of Eastern Europe. The Bush administration may be able to do little more than encourage private investment.

Secretary of State Baker has dropped a tantalizing hint of a more ambitious policy that would seek negotiations with Europe to end the Yalta division of Europe and loosen Moscow's control over the Warsaw Pact countries. He told *The New York Times* last month that the idea was "worthy of consideration because it is a novel approach."

■ **Western Europe.** Officials say the real issue hasn't yet been resolved: Can the

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United States learn to love a stronger and more unified Europe?

One focus for this debate has been the interagency dickering over how the United States should respond to the planned 1992 integration of the European Community. Some officials at the Treasury and Commerce department are said to see EC-'92 as the enemy, because it's likely to make Europe a tougher and more protectionist trading partner. Others at the State Department and the NSC see this stronger post-1992 Europe as a potential strategic advantage for the United States.

Another contentious issue has been whether European countries should cooperate more closely on defense, through what's known in bureaucratese as the "European pillar." Traditionalists at the State Department and the Pentagon, who fear that any basic change in NATO may lead to its unraveling, are wary of the European pillar. Modernizers favor it, on the grounds that it will make Europe stronger militarily—which, after all, is NATO's purpose in the first place. The modernizers hope they can count Scowcroft among their band, but the returns aren't in yet.

"The U.S. can't be seen as defending the status quo in Europe," warns one official. "We need to be seen as promoting change."

■ **Middle East.** Senior Bush administration officials have written so many policy papers and op-ed pieces on the Middle East over the years that the danger here may be too much strategy rather than too little.

The Reagan years demonstrate that all the well-crafted peace plans in the world aren't much use if the Arabs and Israelis aren't ready to talk—and if the president of the United States isn't prepared to commit his personal prestige to breaking the deadlock.

"You can see a strategy emerging" after last week's meetings with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, says one official. Officials say this approach has been outlined in a review paper and was discussed at an NSC meeting last week. Key details include confidence-building measures and mutual de-escalation on the ground, leading toward elections in the West Bank and Gaza.

■ **Defense.** NSR 12, dealing with defense issues, involves the thorniest issues of all. That's partly because of budget pressures, and partly because decisions about strategic and conventional forces are linked to arms-control policy. According to several officials involved in the review, defense is the area where creative thinking is most needed—and where the bureaucratic obstacles are biggest.

The challenge, in the simplest sense, is to decide how much of our global military machine we really need in this era of greatly reduced tensions with the Soviet Union. The American military is now organized as if war with the Soviet Union is imminent. The Army has 28 combat divisions and 22 combat brigades "capable of projecting prompt, sustained military power anywhere in the world," according to this year's Army posture statement. The Navy boasts that it is "a symbol of U.S. involvement in the global arena" and "capable of winning a global war." That translates into a Navy insistence on 15 carrier battle groups, four battleship battle groups and 100 attack submarines!

The 1989 Navy posture statement dismisses the possibility that the nation could conceivably make do with less: "One question often asked is, 'Why 15 deployable carrier battle groups? Couldn't you get by with fewer carriers?' The answer, quite simply, is no"

That's an example of the resistance the Bush administration will face to innovations such as those proposed by Scowcroft and Woolsey in a paper prepared last fall for a group called American Agenda. The two officials suggested moving "a larger number of units from active to reserve" status. They proposed relying "more heavily on smaller ships or submarines, carrying very accurate conventional cruise missiles, rather than on aircraft carrier battle groups" And they suggested greater use of unmanned aircraft.

The generals and admirals aren't going to like any of that, and it remains to be seen whether Scowcroft and Woolsey will actually use the grand bureaucratic machine known as the National Security Review to push their innovative ideas.

David Ignatius is editor of the Outlook section. Post researcher Lynda Edwards contributed to this article.

BUSH URGED TO FIND A MIDDLE COURSE ON SOVIET CHANGES

REACTIONS TO GORBACHEV

Official Study Recommends Cooperation on Regional Issues and Terrorism

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 8 — Administration experts have advised President Bush to steer a middle course between a skeptical approach toward the policies of Mikhail S. Gorbachev and responding with bold foreign policy initiatives of its own, Administration officials said today.

The recommended approach, called "status-quo plus" by Government specialists, is outlined in a classified analysis commissioned by President Bush as part of the Administration's broad review of American-Soviet policy.

The analysis — prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Pentagon and the staff of the National Security Council — concludes that the process of change in the Soviet Union is likely to continue throughout the Bush Administration even if Mikhail S. Gorbachev was replaced by another Soviet leader, officials said.

High-Level Skepticism

Mr. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, his national security adviser, and Robert M. Gates, the deputy security adviser, have tended to take a skeptical stance toward Moscow in their public comments. At the same time, some experts have complained that this approach is too cautious at a time of momentous change in the Soviet Union and could cost the Administration what they see as a critical opportunity to transform American-Soviet relations.

"The real debate in the Administration will be between the two centrist positions — the stand-pat school and the seize-the-opportunity school," said Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin and chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Administration specialists say the classified analysis submitted to the White House tries to strike a balance between these two approaches.

Anti-Terrorism Stressed

The analysis advises the President to take advantage of the changes in Soviet domestic and foreign policy by carefully seeking to broaden the dialogue between the superpowers on regional issues to include such regions as the Horn of Africa. It also recommends giving more prominence to joint efforts to combat terrorism and the spread of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, among other initiatives.

Administration specialists define the approach as an "evolution" of the current United States policy toward Moscow, which they say has been successful. But the analysis is likely to disappoint critics who favor more dramatic moves to improve relations.

It is not known what Mr. Bush thinks of the study, which is about 30 pages long.

One senior Administration official who supports the review said it was unclear how influential the study would be, adding that policy decisions were more likely to be thrashed out among Mr. Bush and small circle of high-level advisers.

"The analysis presented to the N.S.C. could be a valuable tool," another official said. "But the vision in there is not articulated very strongly, and there are plenty of caveats and what-ifs in there. Until that vision is there and somebody is pushing from the top very strongly, it is not clear whether we will really take advantage of the opportunities."

Final decisions on what policies to adopt on American-Soviet relations will be made by Mr. Bush and his top aides. But some of the initiatives discussed in the study have already been taken up by the Administration.

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, for instance, broached the idea of American-Soviet cooperation on terrorism in his meeting last month in Vienna with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

Mr. Baker also announced in Vienna that the United States would explore the idea of speeding up the withdrawal of chemical weapons from West Germany, a idea developed during the review.

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The Christian Science Monitor

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In addition, the Administration has pressed Moscow to cut off arms deliveries to Nicaragua, which is discussed in the classified review.

Administration officials involved in the analysis said Soviet willingness to cut arms supplies to Managua represented an opportunity to test Moscow's intention to cooperate in regional settlements in the third world.

The study of Soviet policy, known as National Security Review 3, is but one of several policy reviews ordered by Mr. Bush as soon as he took office to "insure compatibility among our commitments, strategies, capabilities and resources."

Complaints About Pace

Soviet officials have complained about the slow pace of the Administration's review, which has delayed a resumption of the talks to cut long-range nuclear arms. But Mr. Bush has defended the need for a careful review as a foundation for policy decisions.

While the review of Soviet policy is well advanced, other assessments are proceeding slowly.

Senior Administration officials reviewing arms control policy met for the first time on Wednesday — one month before Mr. Baker is to go to Moscow to discuss the resumption of the strategic arms talks.

The arms control review, formally called National Security Review 14, focuses on strategic arms questions. Issues to be considered in the review include whether to modify or abandon the proposed limit on nuclear delivery systems, whether to ban mobile missiles with multiple warheads and whether to adjust the American proposal for counting cruise missiles launched by airplanes.

A parallel review on military issues known as National Security Review 12 is being overseen by Paul D. Wolfowitz, Mr. Bush's choice to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. But Administration officials report that the review is proceeding slowly.

Analysis in Two Parts

The classified analysis submitted to the White House consists of two main parts: an analysis of trends in the Soviet Union and a section on American policy toward Moscow. The first

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draft of the section on Soviet trends was prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency while the first draft on American policy toward Moscow was prepared by the State Department. Comments were solicited by other agencies and the report was completed last month.

The analysis of Soviet trends asserts that there is a better than even chance that Mr. Gorbachev will endure as the Soviet leader. It acknowledges that the political and economic changes made since he took office are substantial but notes that it will take decades to carry out some important changes, particularly in the economy.

The study argues that Moscow's preoccupation with political and economic change will probably continue through Mr. Bush's term in office, even if Mr. Gorbachev is replaced by another Soviet leader. But officials concede that Mr. Gorbachev's departure could affect the pace and scope of the changes.

The study says there is broad support for the view that change is needed to help the Soviet Union modernize its economy and society. Even if Mr. Gorbachev is replaced, Moscow will face pressures to divert resources to civilian needs from military activities.

Soviet Intentions Unknown

The analysis sidesteps the question of what Moscow's ultimate intentions may be, suggesting that they cannot be known now.

It says the changes may be carried out for tactical reasons to gain a "breathing space" to strengthen the Soviet system and thus prepare for further competition with the West. Or it may represent more fundamental political and economic changes in the direction of a pluralistic society.

Critics of the "status-quo plus" approach say that it underestimates the importance of Mr. Gorbachev's role, is too sanguine about the inevitability of change in Mr. Gorbachev's absence and is too cautious in advocating moves to take advantage of immediate opportunities to improve American-Soviet relations.

But defenders of the approach argue that it provides a basis for undertaking initiatives, albeit cautiously, in the face of uncertainties as to Mr. Gorbachev's future.

"Our argument is that we should not base policy on whether Gorbachev will survive or not," an Administration official said. "We should base it on U.S. interests. Since we don't have to be too worried about Gorbachev's survivability, we do not have to shrink from putting forth initiatives."

Some Administration officials, such as Mr. Gates, the deputy security adviser, have publicly presented a somewhat different analysis that questions the breadth of support in the Soviet Union for far-reaching change.

Horn of Africa Cited

The "status-quo plus" approach says that the United States should seek to broaden the agenda of regional issues to include such disputes as the fighting between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Horn of Africa.

It recommends that the United States give more prominence to joint efforts to combat terrorism by sharing information and asking Moscow to put pressure on client states to stop supporting terrorist groups and to combat the spread of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.

The report notes that strong differences remain to be resolved within the Administration on trade. Some Commerce Department officials favor a more liberal trade policy, but the Pentagon strongly opposes increased trade. Officials say the predominant view in the Administration favors a gradual liberalization in trade.

Washington should continue to press for human rights improvement in the Soviet Union, the report says.

The analysis, though advocating a cautious process of advancing initiatives, projects a long-term goal in which there would be a truce in the military competition between the superpowers.

Woerner, Bush will discuss missiles

By Thomas J. Breen
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner meets with President Bush in Washington later this week amid a continuing dispute between West Germany and the United States over whether to modernize short-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Mr. Woerner, a former West German defense minister, is expected to seek a compromise from Washington that would give the green light for modernization but not set a date for production and deployment.

The United States and most other NATO members, including Britain and France, consider modernization of the Lance missile key to the security of Western Europe.

But West Germany repeatedly shifts away from that view and opposes immediate modernization of the short-range Lance. Most of the Lances are based in West Germany and, if used, would fall on West German soil.

But some diplomats and analysts believe the West Germans would accept the updating of the missiles if there were no firm dates for production and deployment.

In confirming Mr. Woerner's trip,

State Department spokesman Richard Boucher would say only that the talks will focus on "the alliance, NATO's plans [and] issues before NATO."

But other administration officials and foreign diplomats said Mr. Woerner clearly was coming here with high hopes of resolving the dispute before the crucial May 29-30 NATO summit in Brussels. There the 16 NATO countries will lay out strategies for continued disarmament and dealing with rapid changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The NATO leader wants all the allies to enter the summit with a united front, according to one foreign diplomat.

Since February, when West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl shocked his NATO allies by shifting his stance and hinting strongly that the modernization of the missiles should be postponed until 1991 or 1992, the issue has dominated private talks between alliance partners, according to diplomats and analysts.

Opposition to the modernization of the Lance missiles — considered the backbone of the short-range nuclear forces arsenal — strikes at the heart of the 40-year-old NATO pact, in the view of most of West Ger-

many's allies including the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

West Germany's opposition to the modernization comes as the West German public increasingly opposes any increase in nuclear weapons.

At the same time the West German government has been pushing hard to ensure good relations with the United States despite the missile flap.

One German official, Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer, was sent to Washington last week to smooth some of those ruffled diplomatic feathers.

"I wish to make it unequivocally clear that the Germans ... are firmly embedded in the community of Western democracies," she said in a public speech. "They [the Germans] are not drifting eastward. In actual fact, it is the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, and Eastern Europe, that are opening up to the West."

During his Washington trip later this week, NATO's Mr. Woerner is scheduled to meet with Vice President Dan Quayle, Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Defense Secretary Richard B. Cheney, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and members of Congress.

In '61 We Had a President Who Didn't Just Stand There

Washington.

IT HAPPENED 28 years ago next Monday: A U.S.-financed brigade of expatriate Cubans was dumped into swamps on the south shore of Matanzas province and effi-

By Ernest B. Furgurson

ciently mopped up by Fidel Castro's army. Thus ended the first great foreign-policy initiative of the Kennedy administration.

We will profit by remembering the Bay of Pigs in these first months of the Bush administration.

John Kennedy became president with the promise to "get this country moving again" — that youth and vigor would replace the Chamber of Commerce satisfaction of the Eisenhower Fifties. The Kennedy crew was led by men who fought World

War II, eager to take over from those who managed it. They would be tough and smart. They would never be accused of just standing there instead of doing something.

Kennedy inherited from Eisenhower the plan to overthrow Castro with Cubans who had fled the revolution. Some of the president's advisers opposed it, but it was just the kind of action he had implied in his inaugural address. It would make a statement to America and the world. He adopted it, and less than three months after his inauguration, the CIA-trained expatriates went ashore.

The operation was a disaster. It led directly to Nikita Khrushchev's insertion of missiles into Cuba the following year, which came close to disaster of another magnitude. If Kennedy had taken his time to plan a new foreign policy, he might have avoided all that.

Now, almost three decades later, we have another new president. He

ran on a platform of continuity rather than change. He was in on foreign policy, deeper than he has admitted, for eight years as vice president. Presumably he could make bold moves immediately, without appointing committees to restudy the world.

Instead, Mr. Bush has been cautious. His secretary of state, Jim Baker, is a negotiator instead of a blusterer. Rather than challenging Congress to another showdown over contra aid — and probably losing again — he worked out a Nicaragua deal that quietly abandons Mr. Reagan's war there.

But in great-power relations, matters of East and West, bombs and missiles, the president has hinted no new departures. In domestic affairs, events have forced him to take a stand here and blow with the wind there. Not in affairs abroad.

Many of my opinionating colleagues, itchy politicians and indeed Mr. Gorbachev himself have urged Mr. Bush to do something quick, and stop just standing there.

His friends are concerned that the president's low profile allows the peripatetic Soviet leader to win the world public-relations contest. They wanted Mr. Bush to do something splashy to compete with Mr. Gorbachev's TV extravaganza in Cuba. The president's ostensible ally, the chronically indignant Sen. Orrin Hatch, warns that the Democrats are likely to move into the foreign-policy vacuum if Mr. Bush insists on more "passive pragmatism."

He needs to enunciate a message ... What's his agenda? ... Who is George Bush, anyway? ... What does he stand for? ... When the president doesn't create news, doesn't offer the networks lively sound bites, coverage runs to that kind of analysis and speculation. But he seems unconcerned, because the popularity polls say he's right.

Even the polls don't convince

friends who remind him of Jimmy Carter. Mr. Carter, too, had high early ratings. They plummeted when he couldn't explain where he wanted to go. Mr. Bush should do what Mr. Reagan did, his worried well-wishers say: use his popularity now, before it disappears, to get the country moving toward his major goals.

But he clearly isn't going to head out without a map. Mr. Bush isn't Ronald Reagan. Jim Baker isn't Alexander Haig. The current national-security adviser, the infinitely careful Brent Scowcroft, isn't Richard Allen. George Bush isn't Jimmy Carter, either. Nor is he Jack Kennedy.

Mr. Scowcroft said before the Bush inauguration that the White House review of foreign policy could take up to a year before new initiatives were ready. It won't be that long. The president's impatient friends and critics will find the waiting easier if they take a moment this week to recall the Bay of Pigs.

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Iran-Contra: The Fog Is Lifting

By Scott Armstrong

WASHINGTON

In Watergate, the burglars kept silent until they saw the jail house doors open. In the Iran-contra affair, the first man put on trial has turned in his superiors before the jury has even retired to deliberate.

As is traditional in investigations of elaborate conspiracies, the independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, started prosecuting at the bottom rung of the organizational ladder. Oliver North's defense has elicited evidence that allows prosecutors to climb several rungs up to Cabinet officials and at least one — and perhaps two — Presidents.

In the coming months, the independent counsel will face enormous political and practical pressures to drop his vastly expanded inquiries. If he abandons his course or aborts his mission, he will shortchange the nation and jeopardize the future of all independent counsels.

Mr. Walsh was forced to drop the conspiracy count concerning Mr. North's involvement with other low-level conspirators for fear of disclosing intelligence and covert operations. Yet Judge Gerhard Gesell in effect allowed the defense to put on much of the prosecution's case.

While the judge did not permit Ronald Reagan to be subpoenaed, he allowed the defense to try to show how many of Mr. North's far-ranging and questionable activities were authorized. Had these defense arguments come a year ago, they would have made a straightforward case for the impeachment of the former President.

Common wisdom has held that the North trial would revolve around the arcane and interlocked questions of Mr. North's intent to commit the crimes alleged and the degree of authorization from his superiors. Mr. North's lawyer, Brendan Sullivan, has argued that his client never intended to break any law and was generally authorized by President Reagan within the "seamless web" of covert activities.

Mr. Sullivan also asserts, and such witnesses as the former national security adviser Robert McFarlane confirm, that the deceptions of which Mr. North is still accused were compelled by the need to hide from Congress more serious machinations by the President and his Cabinet. For Mr. North to expose one thread of this "seamless web" would have led inexorably to its center: President Reagan.

In Mr. Sullivan's picture, Mr. North and his superiors — President Reagan, former Secretary of State George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and George Bush as Vice President — intentionally diverted foreign aid and used it as a quid pro quo to gain third country support for the contras. The evidence makes it apparent that President Reagan and key advisers lied to Congress, the Tower Commission, the press and the American people to keep these arrangements secret.

Minutes of a June 25, 1984, National Security Planning Group Meeting reveal a heated debate about whether seeking third country support for the contras would be an impeachable offense. William Casey, the former Director of Central Intelligence, and Mr. Weinberger concluded that as long as the Congressional intelligence oversight committees were informed, third country solicitations were legal.

But Vice President Bush had the final word. Such solicitations, he said, would be all right unless "the United States were to promise to give these third parties something in return, so that some people might interpret this as some kind of an exchange."

According to trial evidence stipulated by Attorney General Richard Thornburgh as accurate, Mr. Bush's warning was ignored. The President did personally approve — with the active involvement of Mr. Bush,

Mr. Shultz and Mr. Weinberger — special aid for Honduras. It was fear of disclosing this quid pro quo that forced Mr. North to lie to Congress, his lawyer has argued.

The trial evidence also disclosed consideration of and, in some instances the approval of, similar arrangements with Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Taiwan, China, Chile, Israel and, for other favors, Saudi Arabia. The conspiracy included passing out foreign aid monies to replenish third country arms and supplies passed through to the contras — a criminal misappropriation of funds specifically earmarked by Congress for other purposes.

The Iran-contra affair thereafter is the story of a cover-up — not just of the diversion of profits from the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran, but of the larger unconstitutionality of having made numerous third country arrangements. Similarly, the Watergate cover-up was as much to hide

the illegal "plumbers" as the break-in at Democratic campaign headquarters — one result of which was the creation of a permanent independent counsel mechanism to deal with such ongoing conspiracies.

Now, in the Iran-contra conspiracy, who will tell us once and for all what happened, to whom, by whom? And if, as many suspect, these actions cannot be legally "authorized" by a President, who will bring the culprits to justice?

Congress is distracted by a debate over whether secret third country arrangements were permitted by the Pell Amendment. Some argue that the amendment's language provides a loophole through which money could have been passed legally to countries that supported the contras, as long as contra support was not the sole reason for the aid. Congress would do better to find out what happened and who was in the loop before specifying the loophole.

Yet only Mr. Walsh can decide whether to take current and former officials to the grand jury to explain their intent and authorization. They could include Mr. Shultz, Mr. Weinberger, John Negroponte (Ambassador-designate to Mexico and former Ambassador to Honduras), Richard Armitage (Secretary of the Army-designate and former Assistant Secretary of Defense), Elliott Abrams (former Assistant Secretary of State) and Donald Gregg (Ambassador-designate to South Korea and former Vice Presidential aide).

In the end, Mr. Walsh may be reluctant to prosecute individuals for actions as complicated and potentially ambiguous as the decisions to give foreign aid, but only his continuing investigation can tell us who was responsible, whether or not it is feasible to indict or prosecute them.

CONTINUED

The purpose of the independent counsel statute is to assure not only the prosecution of public officials but the restoration of public confidence. Mr. Walsh is obliged to investigate further. With sworn testimony on the record about the former President and his Cabinet, Mr. Walsh would be remiss not to take the material to a grand jury.

Mr. Walsh's autonomy has been episodically challenged by Justice Department rulings to withhold necessary classified information. However, Judge Gesell allowed into evidence previously classified details of this secret conspiracy and Mr. Thornburgh did not prevent their disclosure. Mr.

Walsh now has a stronger hand.

If a grand jury chose to return more indictments, the Attorney General would have to rethink his earlier decisions to withhold classified information. So much highly classified information has already come out that any further national security damage is likely to be incremental at worst. And the political damage is already so extensive that the Attorney General has a powerful incentive to clear the air. Mr. Walsh is also obliged to prepare a report detailing what investigations and prosecutions he did and did not pursue, and why. Such reports are normally made public.

These are not his only options. Under the law, the independent counsel may report to Congress. He may refer information about those now awaiting confirmation to new appointments. In the case of potentially impeachable offenses — applicable not only to the President but to any official confirmed by Congress — the independent counsel must refer such information.

But if he is to be truly independent and effective, Mr. Walsh must also assess what the executive branch and Congress have already done to expose wrongdoing. He must look to the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Tower Commission and the Congressional Iran-contra committees.

The Tower Commission — led through its analysis by Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to Presidents Nixon, Ford and now Bush — happily concluded that the National Security Council was a fine organization led astray by a few bad apples. In their haste to clear President Reagan and the N.S.C., Mr. Scowcroft, John Tower and Edmund Muskie harshly condemned John Poindexter, Mr. McFarlane and Mr. North.

While the Tower board may have been misled about the extent of certain contra-related operations, it rubber-stamped an interagency process that institutionalizes private government — covert actions done "off the books" without checks and balances, financed from abroad.

The Senate Intelligence Committee spent most of its energy determining how many times it had been lied to by how many Administration officials. It and other Iran-contra investigating committees were unwilling to probe covert activities or expose to criticism complicit allies, such as Israel or Saudi Arabia. Declaring themselves unable to address, much less redress, American policy toward Central America, committee members allowed the White House once more to blame a few zealots.

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And by defining the issue of the President's role as whether he knew of a diversion of Iran arms sale profits to contra coffers, the committees ignored Presidential authorizations of illegal and unconstitutional activities. They settled for criticizing the logic of ransoming hostages from terrorists with arms.

Nothing in the charter of the independent counsel says that he must explain what an executive commission and several legislative committees could not or would not. When the Watergate committee originally recommended the creation of an independent counsel, however, it understood that only by requiring a formal report on all allegations would such politically charged matters ever be put to rest.

Pardons will certainly not end the matter. To pardon any or all of those implicated would be as unpalatable as Watergate's "Saturday Night Massacre." Unless those pardoned step down and become unimpeachable, pardons would not end Mr. Walsh's obligation to investigate and report any potentially impeachable acts.

The independent counsel's mandate — the restoration of public confidence — requires him to prosecute where necessary and, where prosecution is impossible, inappropriate or undesirable, to explain what happened and why. Independent counsels unearth, expose and explain abuses of power. Should Mr. Walsh be forced to cut back his investigation, he will be — by definition and moral authority — the last "independent" counsel. □

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ROOKIE OF THE YEAR?

Dick Cheney, the new secretary of defense, is not as prepared for the job as Harold Brown (a former Air Force secretary) was in 1977 or Melvin Laird (a veteran of the House defense appropriations subcommittee) in 1969. He was picked because Bush was looking for a quickly confirmable member of Congress to put into place after John Tower's rejection. He seemed the best of the names assembled by Bush's White House advisers—the others were Republican Senators William Cohen, Warren Rudman, Jake Garn, and William Stevens—and besides, he was highly recommended by national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, with whom he'd worked closely in the Ford White House.

Cheney, as they say, has his work cut out for him. The Pentagon is not used to tough management. Caspar Weinberger, in securing funding for a defense buildup that was needed to counter a Soviet threat, simply shoveled the money—\$1.7 trillion—to the services to spend as they wished, and then tried to invent a strategy to explain the results. The Bush administration's challenge is to reverse the process: to devise a strategy first, and then do the spending.

This is not a revolutionary proposal. But it is a more pressing one now than it usually is when made by editorial writers. The reasons are: (a) the budget deficit; (b) Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev is proposing that we radically reduce armaments and promising to change the security environment of the world for the better. We need to take the opportunity he provides to save money on defense spending, but we also need to stay prepared, and keep our alliances intact, in case he can't or won't deliver. And we have to do this in an era of exploding technology and spiraling costs. The task facing Cheney is to cut up to \$300 billion from projected defense spending over the next five years—an amount equal to a full year's Pentagon outlays—and also to build the right weapons for America's defense, not those that fit the services' parochial needs.

Cheney has the intellectual and political tools needed to carry out this charge. To be sure, he has his shortcomings. Sometimes his hard-liner instincts translate into a misguided enthusiasm for new weapons systems. His historically strong and indiscriminating support of the Strategic Defense Initiative could stand rethinking. And he would do well to subdue his excitement about anti-satellite weapons long enough to ponder the virtues of a verifiable anti-satellite weapons treaty. (In both cases, insufficient appreciation of the finer points of deterrence theory seems to be the problem, plus a dose of House minority partisan zeal; now a tight budget and executive responsibility could be the cure.) But for his core responsibilities—shrewdly and toughly managing the Pentagon, and (when a negotiated agreement makes it wise) sensibly cutting NATO's force structure while adapting it to a changing world—Cheney is better qualified than John Tower, or just about anyone else we can think of.

Cheney is one of the most formidable politicians in America. At 34, he was White House chief of staff, and in that role he was almost universally praised for his fairness and decisiveness. He foresaw, when President Ford did not, the 1976 Republican nomination challenge of Ronald Reagan, and organized a successful defense. After Ford's nomination, Cheney arranged the promotion of Ford's delegate hunter, one James Baker III, to be campaign manager; now the two have important work to do together again. Two years after Ford's defeat (which might not have hap-

pened if Ford had heeded Cheney's warnings to admit quickly that he'd erred in declaring Poland free), Cheney became Wyoming's at-large congressman. He moved immediately onto the House leadership track, rising unopposed this year to the position of Republican whip. Had Cheney not suffered a series of heart attacks, it's likely he'd have been Bush's vice president. (He underwent bypass surgery last summer.) Democrats regard him as a hard-line conservative partisan and a shrewd tactician, but they also like him for his refreshing directness; he is one of the few right-wingers to call himself "right wing."

Cheney is not an expert on defense, but neither is he a novice. He's served on several think tank policy panels, including one organized by Brown and Scowcroft last year to review options for strategic weapons modernization. He has a record of clear pronouncements on defense issues—almost invariably, hardest-line—ranging from SDI to support for the Nicaraguan *contras*. He is not a defense intellectual, but he is an intellectual. He completed his course work for a Ph.D. (but got waylaid into government before writing his dissertation), and he has written a book about Congress with his wife, who's director of the National Endowment for the Humanities.

The early signs are that Cheney won't let the Defense Department run him. From talks with Tower and others, he apparently gained the strong conviction that the Pentagon was out of control. He took the earliest opportunity to demonstrate who's boss by chastising the Air Force chief of staff, Gen. Larry D. Welch, for allegedly trying to negotiate a compromise plan on strategic weapons with Congress before the administration had decided what its plans were. (Other witnesses claim Welch was merely taking soundings, not trying to upstage his bosses.) Cheney has also indicated with his first appointments—notably, Richard Armitage as Navy secretary and Paul Wolfowitz as policy undersecretary—that he means to establish strong civilian rule over the building.

To secure true control, however, Cheney will have to finish two major reforms: full implementation of the Packard commission recommendations on procurement, and the creation of civilian management devices in the secretary's office capable of counterbalancing the new centralized power over the military services (under the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1986) in the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Packard commission called for appointment of a new procurement czar in the Pentagon; the job exists, but it does not have czarist powers, nor do subordinate program managers have the power and independence they need to build the most efficient weapons at the cheapest price. As one top administration official put it, "The organization charts have been rearranged, but the culture of the Pentagon hasn't changed."

Moreover, Weinberger downgraded or ignored formerly powerful civilian management tools—the Office of Net Assessment and the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office—which had been used by previous secretaries to gauge the threats faced by the United States and to choose the best weapons to meet those threats. Revitalization of those offices will give Cheney the analytical muscle necessary to stand up to the military services.

The big defense issues for this administration consist of two questions that are subordinate to a third. What should the United States do about European defense, in view of Gorbachev's offers

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to make massive conventional cutbacks? What systems should the United States deploy to ensure a stable strategic deterrent? How should the United States cut the defense budget without harming national security?

What the United States needs most—but hasn't got yet—is a strategy for Europe. Gorbachev clearly has one—a neutralized Germany and a denuclearized Europe. This much is implicit in the Soviet proposals for "armament limitation zones" (with few tanks in much of Germany) and abandonment of short-range nuclear weapons, as well as in the assiduous courting by the Soviets of German financiers. The Soviets also want to be considered part of Europe, and wouldn't mind at all if the United States became increasingly insignificant in the region both militarily and economically.

Gorbachev has stolen a political march on the United States by putting forward a proposal for unilateral withdrawals of 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks from Central Europe, and by proposing a conventional arms control agreement under which tank forces would be reduced to 26,000 on each side—which would involve a reduction from 30,000 by NATO and of 60,000 by the Warsaw Pact. On the surface this sounds like an attractive offer—and it in fact is. Even Pentagon consultant and European defense specialist Phillip Karber, whose hard-line credentials no one doubts, has, after studying the Soviet initiatives, declared that "we face the possibility of a dramatic reversal of the whole cold war structure of military deployments" if the Soviets fulfill their promises of withdrawals.

This is not to say that the agreement is ready for signing. Formidable problems remain, notably that the Soviets want compensating reductions in NATO air power. All told, the NATO counteroffer—reductions to equal levels of 8,000 tanks in Central Europe and 20,000 in all of Europe—may be a better starting point (although, as Karber notes, it has been presented in such a complex formula as to be "politically unintelligible" to the peace-hungry European public). Still, the gap between the two sides seems clearly bridgeable. An agreement that would help both is within reach, and we trust that Cheney's hard-line impulses will merely improve the terms, not block a pact and lose a large opportunity.

Of course, a conventional arms agreement can't (or at least shouldn't) be signed in the absence of a full-blown alliance political strategy. Indications are the administration is inching toward one, in the form of a design for a demilitarized Eastern Europe, but it hasn't said what that future would hold for Western Europe.

On nuclear policy, we hope that the administration is divesting itself of enough of the ideological

baggage of the Reagan years to conduct a straight cost-benefit study of competing systems. Most conspicuously, there is the question of how to keep our ground-based missiles invulnerable and thus preserve deterrence even if the other legs of the nuclear triad should become vulnerable. There is no need for a crash program here, as we are at least years away from seeing our nuclear-armed submarines, say, become vulnerable. But a decision needs to be made, and the program embarked upon, if at a moderate, frugal pace. The choice is between the mobile Midgetman missile (with one or two warheads) favored by Democrats or the ten-warhead mobile MX (favored by Reagan and the Air Force). There are also choices as to the precise means of MX mobility. We have had our own preference for Midgetman, believing that a force of 300 to 500 single-warhead mobile missiles was the deterrent least vulnerable to Soviet attack and therefore the most stabilizing. We've also been deeply skeptical of SDI—another big-ticket item that Cheney will have to grapple with—except as a research program to counter Soviet research and to determine whether strategic defense can in any form be stabilizing and effective. In both of these positions we've been in good company, such as that of Scowcroft and Brown—though not of Cheney, who's favored the rail-mobile MX and SDI. But he's still young.

Finally, on the defense budget, we think the administration would do well to follow the lead of Representative Les Aspin of Wisconsin, who favors cutting first those things that are reversible in case Gorbachev reverses his course or is overthrown, and cutting last that which can't be replaced. That is, first cut the manpower, training, and readiness budgets, leaving existing units intact and continuing to buy major weapons systems currently contracted for; next, thin out or close down military units, starting with those based in the United States; and last, cancel major weapons acquisitions.

Aspin has rightly proposed that big new weapons proposals—an advanced fighter aircraft, new attack submarines and tanks—should be researched, but not put into production until it's clearer how U.S.-Soviet relations will develop. Unfortunately, there is a distinct risk that neither this philosophy nor any other will guide this year's defense budget planning. Cheney plans to produce a revised budget by mid-April, and apparently it's being compiled by Weinbergerish methods: letting the military decide what to cut, just as Weinberger used to let the military decide what to build during the fat years. This may be an excusable way to cope with the short notice of his new responsibilities that Cheney was given. Right away, though, he should start planning for next year. The Pentagon can and should be under control by the 1990s.

WHITE HOUSE WATCH

PEBBLES GO BAM-BAM

By Fred Barnes

One day last July, President Reagan and Vice President Bush gathered in the Situation Room in the White House basement. The room is windowless, low-ceilinged, and secure, used mostly for meetings of the National Security Council and for top-secret discussions. This time Reagan and Bush heard a briefing by Lowell Wood of Livermore National Laboratory and Edward Teller, the father of the hydrogen bomb. The subject was a research breakthrough in the Strategic Defense Initiative, or Star Wars. Teller brought a mock-up of "Brilliant Pebbles," a new anti-missile system. It consists of several thousand small interceptors that would fly in low orbit in space. They would, Teller said, spot Soviet or other missiles as they burst through the clouds in the boost phase, smash into them at high speed, and destroy them. Reagan loved it. Bush asked question after question. He was, said an aide who accompanied him to the briefing, extremely impressed with the answers.

SDI isn't dead yet. True, it has lost its most fervent champion, Reagan, and accumulated other troubles. Money is a big one. In his last budget, Reagan asked for \$5.6 billion for SDI in 1990. President Bush is certain to scale that back, but he'll be lucky to get much more than \$4 billion from Congress in any case. At the Pentagon, the service chiefs are as fond of SDI as they are of peace protests. Even at the White House, there are SDI skeptics, notably Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, and Arnold Kanter, the arms control expert on the NSC staff. But SDI has supporters in the administration, too, particularly Vice President Dan Quayle and John Sununu, the White House chief of staff. And now there's Dick Cheney, the new defense secretary. He backs SDI wholeheartedly and views Brilliant Pebbles as a significant breakthrough that should be pursued.

Bush has never been SDI's noisiest advocate, but he's grown more favorable. When Reagan first renounced the concept of mutual assured destruction in March 1983 and called for rapid development of a missile defense system in space, Bush was lukewarm. He went along for two reasons. Reagan favored it. And Bush figured it would give the United States "a helluva lot more leverage" in arms control talks with the Soviets, an aide said. What he never bought was Reagan's concept

of an astrodome over the entire country, a perfect shield deflecting all nuclear missiles. Still, he defended that theory in public. In 1986 Bush toured Europe with Gen. James Abrahamson, the SDI chief, to fill in NATO leaders on advances in Star Wars research. He hit it off well with Abrahamson, though he'd been warned the general was an SDI zealot. "He ought to be," Bush told an aide. "That's his job. I'll find other people who'll give me the criticism."

Bush did, hearing from Scowcroft, among others. And in the presidential campaign last year, he ran hot and cold on SDI. In a debate with Jack Kemp in Dallas on February 19, 1988, he said he'd only deploy an astrodome. (He didn't mention his doubts about its feasibility.) Short of that, he said he favored only research, not phased deployment of the land-based and space-based parts of SDI. "Premature deployment of something that isn't totally effective would do nothing but cause the Soviets to break out of the ABM Treaty and overwhelm what we've got." Kemp pledged to build and deploy SDI. "It's not that simple, Jack," Bush snapped. He suggested SDI could be bargained away for a new arms control treaty. "I want to reach out for peace and, I'm sorry, I think it's good to be doing that."

At the Republican convention in New Orleans, Bush gave SDI a low priority. His aides even sought, but failed, to soften the platform's strong endorsement of "rapid and certain deployment." Earlier, in Chicago on August 2, he said, "I am committed to deployment of SDI, as soon as feasible, and will determine the exact architecture of the system in my first term, as the technologies are tested and proven. As president, I will not leave America defenseless against ballistic missiles." That meant he favored at least some strategic defense. But then in an interview with Gerald Boyd of the *New York Times* on August 25, he pulled back from deployment, saying that would depend on cost and research.

At the White House, the crucial figure besides Bush in plotting SDI's future is Scowcroft. His skepticism about SDI is profound. But he's a skeptic, not a foe of SDI in all configurations. His main objection to Reagan's vision was not that it wouldn't work, but that it would weaken deterrence and drain funds from other military programs. In a report he and James Woolsey wrote last fall, he warned that the astrodome "if pursued seriously . . . would clearly be the major defense initiative, perhaps the major governmental initiative, of the new administration—in practice forestalling many other courses of action in Defense and otherwise." He wasn't for that. But in interviews, he's spoken favorably of a limited, ground-based missile defense, and he's said Bush likes this approach, too.

Scowcroft's choice as arms control expert on his staff, Kanter, isn't even for this. In a paper published last

September, Kanter said any plan to deploy land-based or space-based defense in the 1990s "should be put on the shelf." According to Kanter, "the weight of argument is against a commitment to early deployment." Rather, the Bush administration should carry on an SDI research and development program at \$2 billion to \$3 billion a year. This may not fly with Bush, however, since it's what Michael Dukakis proposed in the campaign.

Two things happened in 1988 to make Bush more comfortable with SDI. First, word came from then-Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci and Abrahamson that the Reagan astrodome scheme was a dream. The goal in Star Wars—and indeed the position of SDI supporters—quickly changed from a perfect defense to one that would knock out enough missiles to shake Soviet confidence in attacking in the first place. Second, the idea of Brilliant Pebbles arrived. Not only was Bush impressed, but so was Scowcroft when he was briefed on the subject. William Graham, the White House science adviser, practically gushes. Brilliant Pebbles "addresses the problems of cost, weight, and survivability in a direct and simple manner," he says.

In his final report in February as SDI chief, Abrahamson called Brilliant Pebbles an "opportunity . . . for both improved performance and dramatic cost reduction." Its feasibility could be proved in two years, maybe as early as this spring. Deployment would follow in three years, he said. "This could be accomplished for less than \$10 billion." When a new command and control capability is added, "the total research, development, and deployment cost" is \$25 billion, much less than initially envisioned for a space-based system. In fact, Abrahamson said, it would cost "substantially less" than making MX missiles mobile and deploying a new single-warhead missile called Midgetman, a plan favored by Larry Welch, the Air Force chief of staff, and Representative Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Three days after he arrived at the Pentagon, Cheney publicly chastised Welch for concocting an MX-Midgetman deal while the Bush administration is undergoing a review of defense and national security issues. He didn't denounce the deal itself, but in fact he looks askance at it. Cheney is a longtime backer of MX and SDI. One of his first acts as defense secretary was to get a fresh briefing on SDI, including Brilliant Pebbles. At his initial press conference, he brought up SDI without being asked about it. His friend from the House, Representative Jon Kyl of Arizona, sent him a three-page letter arguing that money for Midgetman would have to come out of SDI funds. In April, Cheney will advise Bush on MX, Midgetman, and SDI. Chances are, Brilliant Pebbles will be high on his agenda, and Bush will agree. Scowcroft may object, but his influence won't be enough "to turn Bush around," says a senior White House official.

There's another sign that SDI is alive at the Bush White House. In a speech on March 23, Quayle leaped on the Brilliant Pebbles bandwagon. "Its small size—less than 100 pounds fully fueled, barely a meter in length—adapts it to low-cost launch capability and simplifies the survivability problem," he said. It's afford-

able, and "its use of available, largely demonstrated technologies would facilitate its development significantly. . . . It could revolutionize much of our thinking about strategic defense." He said the Bush administration is committed to SDI deployment. For days before Quayle's speech, the text circulated at the White House. Neither Scowcroft nor Kanter asked Quayle to restrain his enthusiasm for SDI or Brilliant Pebbles. Maybe they knew something.

Bush reportedly drops NSC Latin nominee

By Peter LaBarbera
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President Bush nominated a career diplomat to head Latin American operations at the National Security Council yesterday but withdrew the nomination under fire from conservative Republicans, according to GOP sources close to the NSC.

The nomination of George Jones, a veteran foreign service officer, provoked outrage among Republican Latin America specialists. Mr. Jones has been accused of having worked as a "liberal activist" to undermine Reagan administration policies in Central America.

The president's nomination of Mr. Jones was confirmed by an administration official, but the reported withdrawal could not be confirmed.

The party's Latin specialists had hoped a member of their own ranks would be chosen to fill the NSC position as a counterweight to Bernard Aronson, a Democrat picked to head Latin American affairs at the State Department.

"This guy represents everything that would have been wrong in a Democratic administration in Central America," said one Republican who worked with Mr. Jones. "To have him pop up as the administration's knowledgeable alternative liberal Democrat to Aronson, an unknowledgeable liberal Democrat, is horri-

ble to contemplate."

A GOP Senate aide voiced a sentiment shared by others when he said: "We're starting to wonder who won this election."

Mr. Jones is currently deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Chile. Prior to that, he held the same position in Costa Rica. Reached in Chile yesterday afternoon, he refused to comment. State Department officials said he visited Washington last week.

One State official defended Mr. Jones yesterday. "I would say George Jones fits very much in line with the pragmatic, results-oriented approach of the Bush-[Secretary of State James] Baker foreign policy team," he said.

The official dismissed much of the criticism of Mr. Jones as coming from the "ideological side of the Republican Party." His critics, he said, were upset at his role in carrying out a Chile policy that tilted in recent years toward vocal support for liberal opposition parties seeking to end the military rule of President Augusto Pinochet.

But Republican Latin experts, most of whom were not willing to speak on record, said the move was another sign that Mr. Bush is abandoning Mr. Reagan's approach to Latin America and ignoring candidates from his own party to run policy in the hemisphere.

"Jones is a liberal Democrat — if he's not registered, he is one," said a GOP Latin specialist Friday, when the nomination appeared more certain. "This is a kick in the face to Republicans and people who supported Bush."

"They should put a conservative in there — or at least a known Republican," said another expert with long experience in the region. "To name Jones to this position is to complicate the life of Bernie Aronson and the administration."

The GOP Latin specialists conveyed their concerns to senior foreign policy officials in the administration over the weekend, GOP sources said. Among those reportedly contacted was deputy National Security Advisor Robert Gates.

Constantine Menges, who held the chief Latin American advisory position at NSC under President Reagan, said, "When a Republican is elected president by the American people, he needs to appoint Republican foreign policy experts at key jobs at the NSC in order to make sure he is in charge of foreign policy."

Several Republicans said Mr. Jones had employed "back channel" methods to discredit conservative Reagan officials in Latin America — including former United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and Curtin Winsor, who served as U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica before being ousted after political infighting.

Cheney Urges Bush to Back MX Rail Plan

Midgetman Favored By Hill Is Rejected

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney has told President Bush he favors removing the nation's 50 new MX nuclear missiles from silos and placing them on railroad cars to be shuttled around the countryside in a superpower crisis, senior U.S. officials said yesterday.

Cheney has also told Bush he does not advise spending additional funds now to develop and deploy on trucks a smaller strategic missile, the so-called Midgetman, a scheme with substantial support on Capitol Hill, the officials said.

Cheney met with Bush and senior national security advisers yesterday to discuss the two land-based missiles and the Defense Department's Strategic Defense Initiative before departing last night for a two-day meeting in Brussels with defense ministers from other North Atlantic Treaty Organization members.

Bush made no decision at the meeting, a senior official said last night.

The selection of a deployment plan for U.S. land-based nuclear missiles has been billed by senior officials and Bush as one of the most important actions to be taken at the outset of his presidency.

Up to \$40 billion in Defense Department expenditures during the next decade or so are at stake, and Bush has said a national consensus on the issue is crucial to completion of a new strategic arms treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Bush administration is scheduled to reveal its amendments to the Reagan defense budget, including its decision on the land-based missiles, on Monday when Cheney appears before Congress. Bush must trim \$10 billion from planned military expenditures to meet spending targets.

By declining to support funding toward deployment of the Midget-

man, Cheney essentially embraced the views of the Reagan administration, which last year directed the program's termination by Oct. 1.

But his position set the stage for a possible battle with some of Bush's close advisers, such as national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, who have strongly supported the Midgetman.

Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), the respective chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services committees, have also supported the Midgetman, and threatened to insist on its retention in the defense budget bill.

During the presidential campaign last fall, Bush said that modernization of the land-based missile force was one of his top priorities and that "the real choice now is to find a possible mix between the two [missiles]."

Gen. Larry D. Welch, the Air Force chief of staff, last month also embraced a plan to deploy nuclear missiles aboard both trucks and railroad cars, but was publicly rebuked by Cheney for "free-lancing."

A senior Defense Department official, speaking on condition that he not be identified, explained Cheney's decision by saying that "those who claimed both missiles could be pursued as a reasonable compromise just had not looked at the cost."

The Air Force has said deployment of 50 of the 10-warhead MX missiles aboard railroad cars will cost \$5.4 billion, while deployment of 500 single-warhead Midgetman missiles aboard trucks will cost \$23.55 billion. Another \$10 billion to \$15 billion would be required to staff and maintain the missile-bearing trucks and trains at various military bases.

Those who favor the single-warhead Midgetman over the multiple-warhead MX, including many congressional Democrats, reason that its deployment would diminish Soviet interest in a preemptive attack, since the Soviets would theoretically have to expend at least two warheads to be sure of destroying each U.S. Midgetman warhead.

The officials said Cheney apparently considered, but rejected, trimming the Midgetman costs by placing two warheads atop each missile, and deploying half as many. Aspin and other Midgetman advocates have said this is acceptable, because the missiles' mobility would still make them unattractive targets. The senior defense official said

Cheney "looked first at the strategic necessity [for the Midgetman and MX], next at the budget reality and only later at the [missiles' relative] political popularity."

Until Welch's recent expression of support for deploying both missiles, the Air Force backed only the MX railroad plan as the least expensive method of obtaining missile mobility, an attribute the service's top leadership feels is largely unnecessary to deter a Soviet attack. Consequently, it has been reluctant to trim aircraft development and other traditional programs to fund the Midgetman.

Some officials speculated yesterday that if Cheney's approach is adopted, the Bush administration could confidently rely on Congress to perform the politically difficult task of cutting other programs to fund the Midgetman.

The SDI ballistic missile defense program, funded at roughly \$4 billion a year, is widely seen as a top candidate for such cuts, despite its continuing popularity among conservatives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended continuing "robust research" on SDI, the least expensive of seven alternative options, the officials said.

Bush Pledges Full Cooperation in Probe Of White House Papers on Iran, Contras

By GERALD F. SEIB

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — President Bush pledged "full cooperation" with lawmakers investigating whether White House documents were withheld from the Iran-Contra committee during the Reagan administration, but his vague commitment won't end the controversy.

The president said guidelines for turning over documents had been worked out by the Reagan administration and Congress, and added: "I would see that if any documents are in control of this administration, relevant documents, that we would live assiduously by those guidelines."

But Mr. Bush questioned whether documents actually were withheld, and other White House officials said that relevant documents now are controlled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and archivists rather than by the Bush White House.

In a question-and-answer session with a group of reporters, Mr. Bush declined to talk in any detail about his own role in the Iran-Contra affair, saying he didn't want to interfere with jury deliberations in the trial of former White House aide Oliver North. But Mr. Bush seemed to pledge to talk more openly about his role at the conclusion of the trial.

"I might have something to say on it when the trial is over," Mr. Bush said. But he asserted "my conscience is clear" when asked about a document released at the trial indicating that, as vice president, he served as an emissary promising Honduras expedited U.S. aid in return for that country's military support of the Contras. At the time, Congress prohibited U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan rebels.

On another issue, Mr. Bush said he hasn't yet decided whether to build the mobile MX strategic missile or the smaller Midgetman missile. The choice is one of the biggest defense issues Mr. Bush faces, and he said he will be "prepared very soon to make a decision on it."

A senior White House aide said Defense Secretary Dick Cheney hasn't yet made a formal recommendation on the missile choice to President Bush but will do so "momentarily." At a National Security

Council meeting a few days ago, Mr. Cheney indicated he preferred a rail-carried version of the existing MX missile, a less costly option than building the new Midgetman system. But National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft is a longtime proponent of the Midgetman, and the senior official said the administration is debating whether there is sufficient money in the budget to buy a combination of the two missiles.

The controversy over Iran-Contra documents arose when lawmakers who were on the congressional committee that investigated the scandal voiced concerns that the panel may not have been given access to documents that later surfaced in the North trial. The documents dealt in part with the roles played by Messrs. Bush and Reagan, and with the possibility the White House knowingly violated congressional bans on Contra aid, congressional investigators assert.

White House officials maintain that the thousands of pages of documents related to the affair were handled by the FBI. They say the bureau was given the responsibility of searching the documents and determining whether they were relevant to requests for information from the Iran-Contra committee and the independent counsel, who conducted a separate investigation. And they suggest that any failure to turn over documents was the result of confusion by the FBI or a failure by committee investigators to properly define documents they wanted.

Committee staff members, however, assert that they asked the White House for direct access to the documents, but were refused.

President heads for missile row

By Lionel Barber in Washington

A COLLISION with powerful Congressional Democrats is near for President George Bush over the issue of modernising US strategic forces.

The Defence Department, citing cost concerns, has recommended deploying only one mobile nuclear missile, the multi-warhead MX, and dropping the Democrats' favourite, the single-warhead Midgetman.

Mr Bush said yesterday he was close to a final decision on the mobile missile issue, which has put the White House and Congress at loggerheads for more than 10 years.

Mr Bush's MX decision will affect the US negotiating position in the strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union - soon to resume. Washington proposes banning all mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles,

arguing that the missiles can be hidden easily and so offer opportunities to cheat on arms control treaties.

This week, Mr Richard Cheney, Defence Secretary, urged Mr Bush to authorise removing the existing MX nuclear missiles from their silos and deploying them on railway trucks that could be shuttled around in a time of crisis. The cost is estimated at \$5.4bn.

The Pentagon estimates Midgetman would cost \$25bn, a figure which some suspect is inflated by the US Air Force which backs the MX missile. A cheaper solution - to put two warheads on each Midgetman missile - appears to have been ruled out.

Mr Cheney has argued that the US cannot afford the luxury of both the MX and Midgetman.

A Republican supporter said: "Dick Cheney is saying there is nothing inherently wrong with Midgetman, but this will be the fifth consecutive year of negative real growth in the defence budget. We are already cutting tanks, helicopters, and F-15 fighters - so we just cannot afford another mobile missile."

If Mr Bush sides with Mr Cheney, he faces opposition from two of the most powerful Democrats in Congress: Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the Armed Services Committee chairman, and Mr Les Aspin, House Armed Services Committee head. Both favour the Midgetman which they believe is far less vulnerable to a Soviet strike. Mr Brent Scowcroft, Mr Bush's national security adviser, holds this view but Mr Cheney has calculated that he will remain a broker rather an advocate in the inter-agency debate.

Cutback Seen in Bush Request for 'Star Wars'

By JOHN M. BRODER and MELISSA HEALY, *Times Staff Writers*

WASHINGTON — President Bush will ask Congress for about \$4.7 billion for the "Star Wars" anti-missile program next year, substantially less than the \$5.9 billion President Ronald Reagan requested in his final budget but more than most congressional Democrats have been willing to spend, sources said Friday.

Bush's proposal would accelerate work on ground-based systems of rocket interceptors and continue research on more futuristic space-based weapons, but at a reduced pace from that recommended by Reagan. The current budget contains \$3.9 billion for "Star Wars," formally known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI.

A key component of the Bush "Star Wars" proposal would be development of a weapon known as "brilliant pebbles," swarms of small space-based interceptors designed to knock out Soviet ballistic missiles headed toward the United States.

Because of budget constraints, however, the entire "Star Wars" program will be pushed back about two years, officials said. The earliest possible deployment of any components—probably ground-based—is now set for sometime after the year 2000, they said.

On another major weapons question, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney is struggling to craft a political deal with congressional leaders on which of two land-based nuclear missiles to build, the 10-warhead MX transported on rail cars or the single-warhead Midgetman carried on trucks.

Sources said Friday that the Administration is likely to ask for immediate deployment of the MX on rail cars and, in a compromise with congressional Democrats, to seek funds to continue developing—but not to deploy—the Midgetman.

Cheney had recommended to Bush that Midgetman be killed because of its \$24-billion price. Pulling the existing 50 MX missiles from their silos and placing them

on flatbed rail cars would cost \$5.4 billion, according to the Air Force.

"Star Wars" funding and the choice between the MX and Midgetman have been among the most contentious weapons issues facing the government in recent years.

Reagan, over the objections of Democrats on Capitol Hill, advocated aggressive development of space weapons.

The missile issue has congressional Democrats, who favor the Midgetman, on one side and the White House and the Air Force, which are pushing the big MX missile, on the other. Congressional leaders have threatened to kill the rail-borne MX if funds for the smaller missile are deleted.

Avoided Contra Fight

Bush's approach to both controversies parallels his strategy on another point of friction with Congress—support for the Nicaraguan rebels. He avoided a bruising fight on the Contras early in his Administration by cutting a deal with congressional leaders before announcing a formal policy.

One Administration official, a strong MX advocate, called the proposed missile compromise "pre-emptive surrender." He complained that such deals only embolden congressional Democrats to meddle in executive branch decision-making.

Cheney met with Bush and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft Friday to discuss a plan to keep both missiles alive.

Aide Favors Small Missiles

Scowcroft has long supported small mobile missiles because they present an unattractive target for the Soviet military, which would first have to find them and then expend a large number of warheads to destroy them. He was chairman of a 1983 commission that urged building a mobile single-warhead missile as a means of ensuring the survivability of the nation's land-based missile force.

The national security adviser spoke up forcefully in favor of the Midgetman in a White House meeting on Tuesday. Cheney presented the Defense Department view that the country did not need the small missile and could not afford it.

"We have seen an opening gambit," one Defense Department official said of Cheney's initial MX-only recommendation to the President. "We have not seen the final move."

Cheney himself acknowledged the possibility that his view would not prevail when he said Tuesday: "It may be we come up with some kind of mix out of the options that have been provided."

Also on Friday, Cheney met with the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees and defense appropriations subcommittees to discuss the missile question and his budget priorities. Among the congressional leaders were staunch Midgetman advocates, including Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), Sen. John W. Warner (R-Va.) and Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.).

None of the participants would comment on the session. Officials familiar with the meeting said that Cheney had sounded out the lawmakers on a possible compromise on the missile issue but did not commit the Administration to funding the Midgetman.

A possible compromise that was

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____
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discussed would be to take about \$300 million of the savings from the "Star Wars" cutback and apply it to continued work on the Midgetman, sources said. The program could be kept alive at that funding level for several years, with the cost rising later if the government decided to deploy the missiles, Pentagon officials said.

Rising Costs Cited

But defense experts warned that stretching out weapons programs increases their cost and often produces weapons that are obsolete by the time they are fielded. The Air Force has warned that a decision will have to be made immediately if the Midgetman is to be deployed by the mid-1990s.

Sen. J. James Exon (D-Neb.) said that a compromise linking a rail-mobile MX with a limited Midgetman development program "would be unbeatable I think he could win with this."

But, if Bush does not bend, he said, congressional partisans of the Midgetman are likely to override him and retaliate against the rail-garrison program.

OFFICIALS SAY BUSH WILL BACK A FORCE OF MOBILE MISSILES

MAJOR SECURITY DECISION

President Backs Spending on Multi-Warhead MX and Smaller Midgetman

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 21 — President Bush has decided to proceed with the development of a mixed force of mobile land-based missiles, Administration officials said today.

The force would consist of 10-warhead MX missiles on mobile rail cars, instead of silos where they are now based. The Administration will also proceed with the development of a smaller truck-borne missile, the Midgetman, which can carry one or two warheads.

The decision on land-based missiles was one of the most important national security decisions before the Bush Administration, and it is likely to be further debated in Congress before final budgetary decisions are approved.

Question of Risk

Driving the debate, which has been argued since the Carter Administration, has been concern over the vulnerability of American land-based missiles, housed in concrete silos, to Soviet attack.

Proponents of mobile missiles say they would be less vulnerable to a Soviet attack. Both systems of mobile missiles have supporters, and Mr. Bush's proposal appears in part to be a political compromise.

Mr. Bush's position was disclosed after he met this afternoon to discuss the issue with top aides, including Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and the White House national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Mr. Scowcroft was a strong public advocate of the Midgetman program, before he took office.

Setback for Cheney

The decision to go ahead with both weapons programs runs counter to the advice of Mr. Cheney, who had recommended that Mr. Bush cancel the Midgetman program, which he said was too expensive. He advised instead that the United States move its MX missiles from silos onto rail cars, which would be far less costly.

The decision to proceed with both programs comes at a time when the Pentagon is cutting its spending plans for many weapon systems.

The Administration is expected to announce its position on new land-based missiles next week when Mr. Cheney submits the Administration's military budget to Congress.

Concern in Congress

Under the Administration's plans, the United States force of 50 MX missiles will be taken out of their silos and put on rail cars, officials said tonight. The United States will also continue with the development of a force of Midgetman missiles.

Administration officials would not provide some specific details of Mr. Bush's decision, such as the cost of the program and the exact number of Midgetman missiles that might ultimately be deployed. Final decisions on deployment do not have to be made until development of the missile is completed. Some Pentagon officials suggested that the United States might eventually decide not to follow through with the program.

The Administration decision to proceed with a mixed force of MX missiles and Midgetman missiles follows strong Congressional concerns over Mr. Cheney's recommendation to cancel the Midgetman program.

Senator Sam Nunn, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warned the Administration that Mr. Cheney's recommendation would be a "hard sell" in the Congress. And Representative Les Aspin, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee issued a similar warning.

Supporters of the Midgetman missile, which would be mounted on a truck-like vehicle, argued that the weapon was needed to help improve the United States's capability to retaliate

after a surprise nuclear attack.

Midgetman supporters argued that putting Mr. Cheney's recommendation to put MX missiles on rail cars was not sufficient. This is because the United States would need to have several hours of warning so that it could effectively disperse the rail cars.

In addition, Midgetman supporters argue, that dispersing the rail cars in a crisis could alarm the Soviets and further inflame tensions.

But supporters of Mr. Cheney's view, argued that the United States would likely have advance intelligence warnings of a possible attack. They also noted the United States keeps strategic submarines at sea to guard against the risk of surprise attack and expressed concern over the high cost of the Midgetman.

The Air Force has estimated that it would cost more than \$20 billion to develop a force of 500 Midgetman missiles. This does not include the cost of maintaining and operating missiles.

Backing of State Dept.

The State Department had favored deploying a mixed force of MX missiles on rail cars and Midgetman missiles, arguing that it would improve strategic stability and help the Administration develop a consensus on land-based missiles with the Congress. This, in turn, could improve the prospects for ratification of a new strategic arms agreement.

Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Larry D. Welch, discussed a compromise plan with Congressional leaders last month that called for taking 50 MX missiles out of silos and putting them on rail cars. The United States would also deploy a force of 300 Midgetman missiles on truck-like vehicles under the plan discussed by General Welch.

Mr. Bush's decision followed intense high-level deliberations throughout the day.

Mr. Bush met in the morning with Mr. Cheney; Secretary of State Baker; Mr. Scowcroft and John H. Sununu, the White House Chief of Staff.

Mr. Bush and these senior officials continued their deliberations in the afternoon.

Then Mr. Cheney returned to the White House in the late afternoon where he met again with Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Sununu.

Quayle in the Spotlight: A New Model for No. 2

By MAUREEN DOWD

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 23 — After last November's election, Dan Quayle started shopping at Arthur Adler's, George Bush's favorite men's store, for a tuxedo and some conservative suits. He began describing himself in interviews as a spontaneous sort of person who liked to add off-the-cuff events to his schedule.

He even took to parroting some of Mr. Bush's trademark phrases, like "That's history" and, at the beginning of a response to a question, "Let me help you with that."

But as Vice President Quayle prepares to depart Monday on his second big foreign trip, a 12-day tour of Australia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand, he is doing more than following what Republicans fondly call "the George Bush playbook."

Instead, as Mr. Quayle shapes his persona and is shaped by a cadre of policy and political experts around him, he is creating "the Quayle model" of the office.

A Different No. 1-No. 2 Chemistry

Working for President Reagan, Mr. Bush was a silent, subservient Vice President. A former rival to his chief, Mr. Bush showed his loyalty by staying in the background and never speaking out about things on which he differed from his boss. In his own White House, Mr. Bush is encouraging a different chemistry with the man who has taken his place.

Mr. Quayle's stronger, more conservative rhetoric in speeches on such subjects as human rights, the Soviet Union, Central America and the "imperial" Congress adds a dash of cayenne to the Administration's bland caution. And, the Vice President has also emerged as the most vocal defender of Israel in the Administration's inner circle.

"Quayle brings a bit of an ideological edge that Bush appreciates and knows is good for him," said a White House official.

Mr. Quayle seems to have gone a step too far in comments after the Senate defeat of John G. Tower's nomination for Defense Secretary. He accused the Democrats of McCarthyite tactics even as Mr. Bush was reaching out a conciliatory hand. Mr. Bush distanced himself from that speech, and Quayle aides conceded afterward that a failure in communications between the two offices had left the Vice President out on a rhetorical ledge.

Mr. Quayle pulled his head in as swiftly as a snapping turtle. While he said the Vice President can utter things that the President cannot, he said he does not want to be viewed by Republicans as a showboat or a firebrand.

"There's no wiggle room" for the

agreements on policy, he said in a recent interview, adding that his only latitude was in emphasis.

Mr. Quayle's approach cuts two ways. On the one hand, he is emerging as a No. 2 with his own personality. At the same time, the spotlight throws his strengths and weaknesses into relief.

The Vice President is shoring up his knowledge of foreign policy issues and has surrounded himself with a staff that many inside and outside the White House describe as solid. In public speeches, Mr. Quayle can be forceful at times and at other times he seems timid and hesitant, especially when he deviates from the prepared text.

Preference for Visibility

The Vice President operates with a higher level of visibility than Mr. Bush did, which puts him in a position to rebut the campaign criticism that he lacked Presidential timbre and had a pattern of using his golden-boy charm and family influence to cut corners.

If Mr. Quayle does well, Mr. Bush can appease conservative groups and better justify a selection that continues to be a widely debated mystery in Democratic and Republican circles.

"Bush knew he owed Quayle some rehabilitation because after he was se-

Higher visibility, unlike Bush under Reagan.

lected, with reporters in a frenzy, the Bush organization clamped down and took away the tools that got Quayle to the Senate — his ability to communicate and talk to people directly," said a White House official.

The official was recalling the Bush campaign's effort to silence Mr. Quayle in the face of cascading disclosures at the Republican convention that Mr. Quayle had used family influence to get into the National Guard during the Vietnam War and to get into law school despite mediocre grades.

Why did Mr. Bush select the two-term Indiana Senator? Even Mr. Quayle said that Mr. Bush has never fully explained it to him. The Vice President, with a mock shiver at the thought of finding out, said over a chicken salad lunch in his ornate office that he believed he was chosen for his political views and added that he was just grateful to be there.

Sheila Tate, Mr. Bush's former press secretary, said recently that he told her at a White House dinner that he had

been able to comfort Mr. Quayle about the bad publicity by telling him this: "If you take any bad story written about you and erase in your mind the name Dan Quayle and go back one year and put my name in there, it would read the same. That's exactly the kind of treatment I was getting when I first entered the Presidential campaign."

The President and Vice President lunch together once a week, usually on Thursdays. They meet every morning in a briefing with the national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, and the White House chief of staff, John H. Sununu, and in a second meeting with Mr. Sununu on the day's agenda.

Mr. Quayle has sought friendships with mentors, as he has throughout his career. He has become friendly with Mr. Sununu, who seeks out the Vice President for his opinion on how former Congressional colleagues of Mr. Quayle's are leaning on White House initiatives, and with Richard G. Darman, the director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Mr. Bush, who likes colloquies and consensus governing, encourages Mr. Quayle to attend the Presidential staff's domestic and economic policy planning meetings and to attend strategy sessions in the Oval Office.

"I have the right to go into his office any time I want to," Mr. Quayle told a gathering of newspaper editors recently. "I can have a one-on-one meeting any time."

In the interview in his office, the Vice President went further. "I had hoped for there to be a genuineness and closeness extended to me, but the warmth and the warmth is more than perhaps I had anticipated," he said.

"He treats us as family, as part of the extended Bush family," Mr. Quayle said, adding with a grin, "That's a rather large family, of course."

Bonn's flip-flop threatens NATO

By James Morrison
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

LONDON — West Germany has underlined deep divisions in the Western military alliance as Bonn's foreign and defense ministers meet with President Bush in Washington

NEWS ANALYSIS

today and as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher girds for a showdown with Chancellor Helmut Kohl next week.

Mr. Kohl's governing coalition reversed on Friday a position taken less than 24 hours earlier and decided to call for talks with the Soviet Union on the possible elimination of short-range nuclear missiles.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies officially oppose such talks unless they follow agreement on cutting the Soviet Union's superiority in tanks, planes and other conventional armed forces and chemical weapons.

Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney rejected an April 12 Warsaw Pact proposal to open negotiations to eliminate short-range missiles.

London and Washington consider the short-range missiles a deterrent to all-out war with the Soviet Union.

They have been seeking Bonn's agreement to replacement of 88 Lance missiles based in West Germany as the short-range weapons, developed in the 1960s, approach the end of their useful life.

However, many West Germans, whose country has served as NATO's main staging area and training ground for 40 years, feel the threat of war in Europe is dwindling.

On Thursday, defense ministers of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, meeting in Brussels, Belgium, agreed to endorse the existing NATO position that says the missiles "must be kept up to date where necessary." The statement was seen as papering over NATO disagreements before next month's summit of the leaders of the 16 allies, at which the Bush administration seeks a firm decision on modernization of the missiles.

Mr. Cheney expressed what has now become premature satisfaction with keeping West Germany in line with the NATO position.

"I was pleased to reach as much of an agreement as we did," he told reporters on the flight back to Washington.

But unknown to Mr. Cheney and

Mrs. Thatcher, West Germany's leaders were meeting at about the same time in what was reportedly a stormy session that led to a near break-up of the three-party governing coalition. News of the meeting leaked Friday afternoon, nearly a week before Chancellor Kohl was scheduled to announce Bonn's new position.

Mr. Kohl, whose Christian Democrats had opposed talks on short-range missiles, apparently was forced to reverse himself in order to prevent a walkout by one of his coalition partners, the Free Democrats, led by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Polls and recent local elections show Mr. Kohl's popularity is declining and his chances of winning reelection next year are uncertain. Some observers predict a possible new coalition between the Free Democrats and the anti-NATO Greens which could capitalize on growing anti-nuclear sentiment in West Germany, where Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's so-called "charm" offensive has had its greatest success.

A British Defense Ministry official was quoted here as describing the shift in the German position as an "unqualified triumph for Gorbachev's policy of courting West German public opinion with the aim of splitting the allies on key policy."

Mr. Genscher and the new defense minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, are to meet Mr. Bush, Mr. Cheney, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker III.

The announcement of their trip followed what was described as an "intensive" telephone conversation between Mr. Kohl and President Bush on Friday.

Mrs. Thatcher's aides said over the weekend that she will fly to West Germany next Sunday to confront Mr. Kohl over the U-turn.

She is expected to argue strongly that early negotiations on short-range missiles will undermine NATO's chances of securing cuts in Soviet conventional and chemical forces.

In the United States yesterday, Mr. Cheney re-stated Washington's opposition to negotiating a reduction or elimination of short-range nuclear weapons in an appearance on NBC Television's "Meet the Press."

"We need to have the capacity for flexible response," he said. "Nuclear weapons have been the main offset to overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority for 40 years in Europe..."

"The Soviets have always wanted to denuclearize Europe. That's still their goal and objective. And if we embark now on short-range nuclear force negotiations, there's a very real danger we'd end up in that position."

Future of Euromissiles splits U.S., W. Germany

By Thomas J. Breen
and Peter Almond
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The United States and West Germany failed to reach agreement yesterday after more than five hours of tough negotiations on whether to modernize short-range nuclear weapons in Europe or negotiate with the Soviet Union to scrap them.

The failure to end the split between major NATO allies threatens to disrupt an upcoming summit of Western alliance leaders scheduled in Brussels, Belgium, next month.

In a brief three-page statement after a meeting among Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg at the State Department, Mr.

Baker left no doubt that the two sides failed to agree.

"They [the West Germans] explained their positions, [and] we explained ours," Mr. Baker said. "As a result, we understand their position better, and they understand ours better. We will continue our discussions in an effort to reach an agreement within the alliance."

The brevity and terseness of Mr. Baker's statement "is a clear indication that things went very badly," one foreign diplomat said late yesterday.

But a spokesman for the West German Embassy said that Mr. Genscher, who left Washington for home last night, "felt encouraged by the intense discussion." Mr. Genscher and Defense Minister Stoltenberg are scheduled to meet this morning in Bonn with Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

In almost identical terms, both the State and Defense departments

warned against engaging in new nuclear talks with the Soviets.

State Department spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler said at a noon press briefing, "We think it would be a mistake to engage in arms control negotiations on SNF [short-range nuclear forces]."

Mr. Cheney was even more adamant, calling such talks a "serious mistake."

In a midday speech at Fort McNair, he said "there have been calls for negotiations with Moscow over a third zero option. We must not fall into this dangerous trap. One of the Kremlin's primary goals remains the denuclearization of Europe. Given this goal, and the perilous circumstances that could follow in its train if it is achieved, the alliance [NATO] must maintain the will to resist the call for a third zero."

A triple zero option is arms control jargon for elimination of strategic, intermediate and short-range

missiles from Europe.

The official position of NATO has long been that some nuclear deterrent is indispensable to offset the huge Soviet advantage in men and manpower in Europe — their own home court.

On Friday, however, the Germans dropped a bombshell, calling for talks with the Soviets aimed at the possible elimination of short-range missiles.

The U.S. has argued that the missiles represent a deterrent to all-out war in Europe and should be updated without entering into discussions with the Soviets.

Over the weekend, President Bush talked to the West German chancellor and later to British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to attempt to resolve the crisis. The phone calls were described by several diplomats as "very, very intense."

Mr. Bush yesterday said that Mr. Kohl "knows my view that there must not be any unilateral fait accompli here."

After the weekend phone talk with Mr. Bush, Mr. Kohl dispatched Mr. Genscher and Mr. Stoltenberg to Washington. Mr. Bush, who traveled yesterday to Norfolk for the memorial ceremony for the 47 sailors killed on the USS Iowa, was not available to meet with the Germans.

The issue of modernization of short-range nuclear weapons has divided the alliance seriously since February, when Mr. Kohl switched gears and indicated in an interview that he favored postponement of a decision on modernizing short-range missiles until 1991 or 1992.

The short-range missile, known as the Lance, is the backbone of NATO's nuclear arsenal in Europe. Eighty-eight of the missiles are positioned in West Germany, with the

German public expressing its increasing opposition to modernization and growing desire to negotiate.

The issue seemed at least papered over last Thursday in Brussels when NATO's Nuclear Planning Group issued a statement saying the missiles should be "kept up to date where necessary" but said nothing about producing or deploying a new generation of the weapon.

"I was pleased to reach as much of an agreement as we did," Mr. Cheney told reporters on a flight back to Washington from Brussels.

But the issue erupted only a few hours later when the tripartite Bonn government held a stormy meeting that observers said almost led to a breakup of the coalition. At that point, Mr. Kohl called for talks on eliminating the missiles, a concession to Mr. Genscher's leftist Free Democrats, who have strongly advocated a conciliatory approach to the Soviets.

Splitting the difference . . .

In his first major decision on U.S. nuclear weapons policy, President Bush has mapped a cautious, but promising, two-track strategy. As part of the new administration's review of security policy, Bush has recommended deployment of two different land-based strategic missile systems. But he has signaled a major policy change by insisting that both systems be mobile. The decision to build the Midgetman missile is an important step forward, for it may reduce U.S. reliance on the most illogical weapon of the nuclear age: the destabilizing MX missile.

Splitting the difference between the two missiles—the 10-warhead MX and the one-or two-warhead Midgetman—will fully satisfy neither side in this arcane strategic debate. Although they both recognized the deterrent value of having mobile missiles, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney preferred a plan (first advanced by the Carter administration) to base the MX on railroad cars, while National Security Adviser **Brent Scowcroft** (like many detente-minded congressional Democrats) advocated a deployment of Midgetmen hauled on trucks.


Deploying both the truck-borne Midgetman and rail-based MX risks expensive duplication. But the plan may be the least awkward way for Bush to wriggle out of a nuclear-arms dilemma bequeathed by the Reagan era. Rather than design and build weapons based on a coherent strategic plan, the Reagan Pentagon's you-can-

have-it-all approach to military spending rushed to buy the latest hardware without deciding how to deploy it.

Thus the United States is now saddled with the worst of all possible weapons: the fixed-silo MX. As a Reagan-era commission headed by Scowcroft (then a retired Air Force general) realized, the MX is a missile without a mission: In fixed silos, the mammoth MX is just as vulnerable as its predecessor, the Minuteman; but it is perceived by the Soviet Union as a greater threat to its deterrent force. As an inviting target for a Soviet pre-emptive strike, the MX undermines strategic stability.

Scowcroft has the right idea: Eventually the smaller, less vulnerable Midgetman should become the backbone of the U.S. deterrent, and the MX should be bargained away in exchange for Soviet reductions in the heavy SS-24 missiles. If Mikhail Gorbachev is as sincere as he claims to be about arms negotiations, an MX tradeoff for the SS-24 could be feasible.

Reviving the rail-mobile MX is regrettable: The idea is sure to provoke opposition, as it did during the Carter era. But as an interim step, preparing for the day when deterrence relies on the Midgetman, it is wise to put the MX in a less dangerous basing mode. Now that he has adopted this cautious strategy, President Bush can get on with his most vital task: pursuing an arms-reduction treaty to stabilize the nuclear standoff at a lower level of risk.



Coach Bush's Starting Lineup

By ALBERT R. HUNT

When Darrell Royal, the highly successful University of Texas football coach, was asked on the eve of his team's national championship Cotton Bowl game against Notre Dame in 1970 whether he would change his staid offense, he answered: "We're going to dance with the girl who brung us."

The sideline critics asking President Bush to lay out a more sweeping agenda for the nation or provide more vision—"the vision thing" as Mr. Bush once awkwardly called it—would do well to recall Coach Royal's advice. In the biggest game of his life, George Bush is better off being what he is than trying to be something that he never has been.

After 100 days in office, it's clear that this president doesn't have an overarching sense of where he wants to take the country; he frequently is reactive. But that's exactly the way he was in the many jobs he held before 1988. The Bush campaign last year certainly didn't lay groundwork for any bold moves.

But we've had 41 presidents, and you can count on both hands the number of visionaries—though, unfortunately for the incumbent, one would be his immediate predecessor. But if George Bush isn't any Thomas Jefferson, it's also clear that he's a very decent, rather open man with a strong sense of values, and that he is more self-confident and comfortable than before he got to the Oval Office.

An Impressive Collection

That may be enough to be a pretty good president. More than his recent predecessors, he has surrounded himself with capable men and women who bring diverse talents. So far at least, they have avoided most of the petty back-biting that, without a strong leader, cripples government.

In foreign policy, James Baker at State, Richard Cheney at Defense and Brent Scowcroft at the National Security Council are the most impressive collection of policy makers in decades. Jim Baker is unsurpassed as a political operative, and Brent Scowcroft combines unusual personal integrity and professional competence. Dick Cheney possesses all of these traits.

Moreover, considering the hostility between Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski in the Carter administration or the constant friction between George Shultz

and Caspar Weinberger under Ronald Reagan, the congeniality of this trio is striking. Even when they disagree, as Messrs. Cheney and Scowcroft did on the MX and Midgetman missiles, it's done with a personal and professional civility lacking in earlier administrations.

On the domestic side, the fledgling administration benefits from a rich diversity. There are several idea-generators, principally Jack Kemp at the Department of Housing and Urban Development and drug czar Bill Bennett—perfect types to address seemingly intractable problems. Jack Kemp is throwing out more ideas on urban poverty and unrest than the interceptions he threw during his career as a professional quarterback.

These are balanced by some exceptionally able men of governance, such as At-

More than his recent predecessors, he has surrounded himself with capable men and women who bring diverse talents. So far, they have avoided most petty back-biting.

torney General Richard Thornburgh and Richard Darman, director of the Office of Management and Budget. There have been few public officials in modern times who combine Mr. Darman's knowledge of policy with his sense of politics, an observation that the budget director—a total stranger to self doubt—no doubt believes understates his talents.

And there have been some pleasant surprises. As Alan Murray reported in this newspaper last week, Treasury Secretary Nick Brady, the object of numerous private barbs and invidious comparisons to his predecessor, Jim Baker, is emerging as an unlikely star of the embryonic administration. He's moving ahead in some critical areas, such as the savings and loan crisis and Third World debt, where the much heralded Mr. Baker faltered. Transportation Secretary Sam Skinner already is the designated crisis hitter for this administration, rapidly becoming a real force in this town.

To be sure, the administration has its dimmer lights. Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan's main contribution has been an early junket to Guam and American Samoa. The jury is still out on some newcomers such as Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan.

John Sununu, the White House chief of staff, and the president work comfortably

together; the chip that the former New Hampshire governor sometimes wears on his shoulder is displayed more often when it doesn't much matter, such as with the press, than in the more important councils of government. But in Republican circles on Capitol Hill, concern persists over the political agility of the White House staff, and Mr. Sununu would be well advised to shore his political operations.

Nevertheless, Mr. Sununu—probably the only person in the administration with an IQ higher than Mr. Darman's—is no Donald Regan; he's an includer rather than an excluder.

Of course, the key is how George Bush will react when times get tough, in a crisis. On the domestic side, the sham of a budget accord put together this year will give way to the necessity for some very tough decisions next year, and odds are he'll face a recession sometime in this term.

In foreign policy, the tests could come most anywhere. To the dismay of conservatives, the president will have to deal with the Democratic Congress in all these issues; that's a price of having failed to win any policy mandate last November.

One Important Experience

In such times, we won't be able to count on President Bush to inspire citizens and rally public support. If the first 100 days are any guide, he likely will fumble and falter a little at first as he tries to gather his bearings. Yet, while a compromiser, the president isn't likely to be the patsy that liberals hoped for; on issues ranging from his no-tax-hike pledge this year to loyalty to political supporters, Mr. Bush has shown more resolve than critics expected.

On the other hand, when he does make a decision, the odds also are that it'll be carried out competently by able lieutenants. And, based on one important experience, this is a man who knows how to cut his losses. That was evident after the John Tower debacle—within 24 hours he selected the immensely popular Rep. Cheney and the Tower fiasco was almost forgotten.

The Bush administration seems unlikely to serve as a rallying point for either conservative champions or liberal opponents. Passion will be in as short supply as a bold agenda or a vision.

That may relegate George Bush to the ranks of mediocrity. But Darrell Royal never inspired much passion either. And he won 11 conference and three national championships. He also beat Notre Dame in that Cotton Bowl contest, dancing with the girl who brung him.

Mr. Hunt is the Journal's Washington bureau chief.



President Bush

Wall Street Journal
4-26

Congress-man

To understand why Washington suffers from policy gridlock, look no further than the debate over a new land-based nuclear missile. After a mere 10 years or so of deliberation, Congress is still browbeating a U.S. President into buying a nuclear missile the Pentagon doesn't even want.

The debate re-emerged last week when word leaked that Defense Secretary Richard Cheney had urged President Bush to make that rare thing, a decision. Agreeing with the military chiefs and Reagan administration, Mr. Cheney recommended that the 50 existing MX missiles be redeployed from silos onto rail cars. The idea is to provide more mobility, making them more survivable in the event of a Soviet first strike. This would cost about \$5.4 billion.

Somehow this is just too simple and inexpensive a solution for Congress's military chiefs. "A blow to chances for bipartisanship in national security and more importantly to the chances" for arms control, said Chief Rep. Les Aspin (D., Wis.). "It's going to be very hard to sell over here," chimed in Chief Sam Nunn (D., Ga.). Republican Senator John Warner, Mr. Nunn's Deputy Chief, said ominously that if Mr. Bush took this path Congress just wouldn't spend the money.

The Members, you see, have their own pet missile known as Midgetman. It really should be called Congress-man, because Members of Congress are just about the only people who support it. (Though National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft also supported it for years past.) It's a perfectly good missile, mobile because it'd be based on trucks, and in a world without budgets we might support it. But Midgetman would cost at least \$25

billion to deploy, coming on line two or three years later than a mobile MX. To placate the Hill chiefs, Mr. Bush has decided to build *both*. Wasn't Congress trying to cut defense spending?

Now, we can understand Democratic relief at finally *supporting* a missile. But what Mr. Bush's non-decision doesn't do is advance U.S. nuclear strategy. Congress wants to spend billions on a new missile to solve a relatively small problem: a survivable land-based missile. (We have bombers and submarines that already are survivable, of course.)

But the land-based missile becomes a great problem only if you believe in a world of mutual-assured destruction, or MAD, the notion that to be perfectly safe from Soviet missiles we must be perfectly vulnerable. If you believe in the theology of MAD, you spend billions on a new survivable missile to continue our 40-year nuclear bluff.

Mr. Cheney may understand that we can begin to move to a safer world if we invest instead in strategic defense. Even a modest space-based defense would do much more to enhance deterrence than Midgetman. Earlier this year, outgoing SDI boss James Abrahamson concluded that a system of interceptor-satellites known as Brilliant Pebbles could be deployed for \$25 billion over five years. It's no accident that Mr. Aspin has said that any funding for Midgetman is likely to come from cuts in spending for SDI.

By speaking up after Mr. Cheney's recommendation, the Congressmen hoped to bully Mr. Bush into bending their way. It worked. Mr. Bush has made a non-decision typical of the way Washington now works, a non-decision that lets everyone except the taxpayer claim victory.

The Problems of Policy Reviews

By David D. Newsom

THE Bush administration is now in the midst of an extensive review of US foreign and security policy. Details are being periodically revealed to reporters. The formal conclusions are expected in May.

Not only do people in the United States await the outcome, but so do allies and adversaries in Europe. As one who has in past years participated in policy reviews, I hope the results are worth the anticipation. I am not sanguine that that will be the case.

It is not easy to shift the gears of US policy. The process requires broad consultation – within the executive, the Congress, and with allies. Premature disclosures of conclusions often frustrate the process.

A major policy review in the US government suffers from many handicaps. Each representative of a bureaucratic element tends to look first at the protection of “turf” – those particular responsibilities and powers acquired and maintained by that department or agency.

Budget considerations are equally central. Strategic reviews

are especially vulnerable to decisions made on the basis of the budgets of the respective armed services. A strategy may not be the result of a detached view of what may be best for the United States; instead it is likely to be a compromise in which roles and budgets are preserved for each service on a more or less equal basis.

Because of the fear that conclusions or partial conclusions may leak out prematurely, policy reviews are often confined to a relatively small number of officials. Experts in relevant fields may be consulted only on partial aspects, or they may be shut out altogether.

When a new administration enters office, the primary players will be those who have entered government only after the election. Some, such as Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser, may have prior experience, but that is not the case with all. Those who have been in a former administration may tend to oppose new directions on the grounds that they have been tried before and failed or out of a sense of identification and advocacy for earlier policies. For officials to acknowledge that a new policy direction may be possible or even desirable can be an unwelcome

admission of previous error.

Policy reviews generally start with the preparation of position papers, under a National Security Council directive, and, possibly, in response to certain specific questions posed by a president. Through endless drafts and meetings, the varied assessments and positions are brought closer together in order to present a realistic and coherent set of choices. In that process, however, creative thinking is often discarded in the search for consensus.

The current policy review takes place at a critical time. The diplomatic and strategic initiatives of Mikhail Gorbachev challenge the premises on which this nation's post-World War II policies have been founded. The administration has made it clear that it will not be rushed to respond to the Moscow actions. At the same time, decisions are required on positions for conventional arms talks, strategic arms negotiations, and longer-range budget priorities.

Important shifts in US foreign and strategic policies have rarely come through extensive policy reviews within the bureaucracy. They have come about because presidents have established clear directions, have asked the tough questions, or have given to a small


group the task of developing particular initiative. The policy formation process has taken a relatively short time, thus reducing the opportunities for the premature exposure of conclusions before an administration is ready. The opening to the People's Republic of China, for example, came about through such a process.

Administrations that set out, with some fanfare, to review predecessors' policies raise expectations that, if not met, can lead to disappointment and political embarrassment. In the case of the Bush administration, if no new initiatives result, some will be pleased by a continuation of the policies of the Reagan years, but others will see the administration as devoid of ideas or of the courage to pursue new directions.

Perhaps the Bush administration policy review will prove that past experience is not a guide, and the nation will see new and imaginative responses to the current situation. The experience of one who has been involved in the past suggests it will be a rare accomplishment if that occurs.

■ David D. Newsom is associate dean and director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University.

Popular 'Gorbachev Show' Requires Clever Rejoinder



"Amazing." "Bold." "Innovative."

Vivid words, and when they come from Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), the ear perks up. Careful Sam Nunn usually feels his way through a sentence like a man reaching for a light switch in the dark.

Yet these were the senator's words, and, even more surprisingly, on behalf of a Soviet leader. Mr. Nunn was talking to members of the Commerce Club at an early-morning do yesterday, and his assessment of Mikhail S. Gorbachev was admiring, within its limits.

Sam Nunn is not a fellow who lightly gives away any respect to a Soviet boss. Yet he concedes, and worries, that Mr. Gorbachev, although the Soviet Union is clearly weaker than NATO, has taken the policy initiative away from the West

as if he were the stronger.

The senator notes with some bemusement that the number of tanks the Soviet president has promised to remove from East Europe unilaterally is the same that Mr. Nunn two years ago proposed that NATO negotiate to remove reciprocally.

And Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Nunn says, agreed to concessions in the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty that the U.S. intelligence community predicted he would reject. (Which adds, provocatively, to the growing indications that the INF treaty was an accidental success for the Reagan administration, that the administration went into negotiations only to placate home-front clamors for arms-control action, made demands it felt surely would be spurned and, when they were accepted instead, was stuck with a victory it hadn't wanted.)

As the result of the new Soviet initiatives and flexibility, the Gorbachev show is playing particularly well in West Europe and, Mr. Nunn makes clear, it requires a more sophisticated U.S. rejoinder than has so far been developed. He is hopeful that President Bush's national security

adviser, Brent Scowcroft, can manage the shift.

Someone had better, because absent that, the appearance of dangerous fissures in NATO will become a serious possibility.

Indeed, we have entered an extraordinarily tricky period for U.S. policy and interests overall.

As Mr. Nunn notes, the United States has had remarkable success in its major post-World War II goals. We have contained Soviet expansion. (And nationalist yearnings in East Europe and ethnic ones within the Soviet Union might even drum a small recession.) We have protected access to world markets. We have rebuilt the war-ravaged economies, even of former enemies Japan and Germany. We have created an environment in which democracy and free trade are prevailing; most of the Third World has given up on the Marxist model.

Yet the burden of debt in the Third World threatens to beat back democracy's tentative rise. Mr. Gorbachev has reduced Soviet troops on the Chinese border, eased the Vietnamese out of Cambodia and retreated from Afghanistan — meeting Beijing's conditions for the re-

sumption of close relations. The prospect is for some shift of power to a Chinese-Soviet axis. And the Middle East remains two sticks rubbing together, with the Soviets less mischievous there than in the past but by no means part of any solution yet, either.

What is more, the United States is suddenly flying blind, unable any longer to predict Kremlin behavior with reliability. According to Mr. Nunn, no one in Washington had the foggiest idea what was going on Tuesday in the unexpected meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee. (Mr. Gorbachev was replacing deadwood with more reformers. Many in Washington wrongly suspected the long-supposed counter-revolution instead.)

When the failed Soviet Union and its Kremlin, one of the world's motherlodes of mossbacks, can produce a leader who looks like the wave of the future, something more clever is called for from the West, by way of response, than the rote recitation of familiar and increasing irrelevant cautions. □

Mr. Teepen is editor of *The Constitution's* editorial pages.

SMITH HEMPSTONE

Getting it right at the start

The first 100 days of George Bush's understated presidency have not exactly shaken the very foundations of the known world. And thank Heaven for that.

The 41st president of the United States is by nature a cautious, unpretentious man who shuns the trappings of the imperial presidency. He is not a great orator and he has trouble with what he calls "the vision thing."

Following on the heels of Ronald Reagan, the Great Communicator, Mr. Bush frequently comes across as awkward, ill at ease and inarticulate. Who would not? But can anyone doubt that Mr. Bush is the more intelligent, informed and energetic of the two men?

In any case, the first 100 days of a new administration can show dramatic change only when the new administration and the old are headed by presidents of rival parties. It would hardly have been appropriate for Mr. Bush, having served throughout the previous administration as vice president, to have renounced the Reagan administration and all its works, embarking on new directions and articulating new policies.

When they voted for him, the American people were calling as much for continuity as for change. And that is what Mr. Bush has given them. A time will come for new departures, but change under Mr. Bush is likely to be incremental rather than radical, building on what has gone before.

Lost causes and forlorn hopes are the stuff of best-selling novels, but they do not make for sound public policy. The Bush foreign-policy team — Secretary of State James A. Baker III, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and CIA Director William Webster — are pragmatists rather than crusaders. They understand that half a loaf can be preferable to none, that under some conditions conciliation is wiser than

confrontation and that they must deal with the world as it is, rather than as how they would like it to be.

In this, they make a virtue of necessity, for there is precious little money available to fund great adventures abroad, or to finance grandiose domestic programs. Given the necessity of reducing the budget deficit, the big-spending days are over.

Critics of President Bush and his team maintain that the White House has no agenda, no strategy, no convictions and no vision. Such criticism, while not entirely without foundation, is fundamentally superficial, confusing fanfare with accomplishment.

In their first 100 days in office, Mr. Bush and his White House team have created a plan to rescue the battered savings and loan industry, fashioned a compromise with Congress that at least keeps the Nicaraguan Contras together as a force-in-being until February, worked out an agreement with Congress for reducing the federal budget deficit and produced a revised program for dealing with Third World debt.

They have formulated a program for economic aid to reformist Poland and advocated new measures in the areas of child care, education and ethics. None of this is world-shaking, but neither is it inconsequential.

Much time, energy and political capital was expended by the administration in the unsuccessful attempt to get John Tower confirmed as defense secretary, slowing the filling of other posts. But as the White House team takes shape and gains experience in working together, more productive days surely will come.

It is true that time and the tides wait for no man, that opportunities lost — particularly in respect to policies toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe — may never come again. But it is equally true that ill-conceived initiatives can be counterproductive, and poor planning can produce illusory progress.

In this space on Jan. 20 (Inauguration Day), this observer wrote:

"The motto of the Bush-Baker foreign policy team ought to be *festina lente*: Make haste slowly.

The Washington Post

The New York Times

The Washington Times **F3**

The Wall Street Journal

The Christian Science Monitor

New York Daily News

USA Today

The Chicago Tribune

Date **28 Apr 1989**

"The important thing is to get it right at the start, to decide where they want to end up and to resolve how to get there.

"The second thing to understand at the beginning is that no American administration can solve all the world's problems in four years, or eight.

"The third precept to accept is that not every problem has a solution.

"We must act decisively, lest opportunities be lost. But always, *festina lente*; don't make a mess you can't clean up."

While there are difficult and challenging days ahead, both at home and abroad, Mr. Bush has come to power at a time when regional conflicts around the world are cooling off, and there is relative prosperity and tranquility at home. Few boats are being rocked.

While there is no cause for complacency and plenty of room for improvement (as the president would be the first to recognize), he can afford to take his time defining his aims and formulating his policies. Mr. Bush should move with a combination of due caution and deliberate speed to place his personal stamp on American policy. Most of the problems that exist tomorrow, on his 100th day in office, are likely to be there on his 200th day.

Carping at a president — any president — is a time-honored sport within the Washington Beltway. But a mid-April New York Times/CBS News poll indicates that 61 percent of the American people give Mr. Bush high marks for his performance as president, and that's what counts.

Smith Hempstone is a nationally syndicated columnist.

What isn't getting lost in the shuffle

The man who helps to brief President George Bush on what's going on in the world and helps prepare policy options about what the United States ought to do about it is Robert M. Gates, deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs. His immediate boss is National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. Prior to his White House assignment, Mr. Gates was deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency. His doctoral academic specialty was Russian history.

Mr. Gates is of that school of analysts who believe that ideology, even in the era of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, plays a major role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. For U.S. policy-makers to ignore or to minimize the importance of Marxism-Leninism in the Kremlin's operational code is to shackle policy interpretation to current cultural chic. His views must carry some weight in the White House. In a recent speech he used the pronoun "we" or "our" at least 15 times.

Stimulated by former President Ronald Reagan, the present fashion in thinking about the Soviet Union is that Mr. Gorbachev is a vast improvement over previous Soviet leaders because Mr. Gorbachev has adopted Leninist rather than Stalinist principles as part of his "perestroika" reform program. Mr. Gates publicly disagreed with that interpretation.

President Bush has been the target of domestic critics as well as Gorbachev spokesmen for having shunned, since his inauguration, negotiations with the Soviets.

For anybody to whom Bush-bashing is not a priority, the administration position has been fairly clear: Past U.S. policies vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. need careful review and that takes time. As Secretary of State James A. Baker III put it, "When we're ready to talk, we'll talk."

The time for talk will come next month, May 10-11 in Moscow, especially now that Mr. Gorbachev has visibly strengthened his power by purging 110 senior party officials, 74 of whom were members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The Central Committee, in the

final analysis, can control the Politburo, the top decision-making body. The Central Committee did just that in 1957 when the then-Politburo tried to oust Nikita Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev then convened the entire Central Committee which reversed the Politburo decision and he remained in power until October 1964.

Mr. Gates has laid out a strategy agenda for the May meeting and any subsequent meetings. The strategy was described in a too-little-noticed address he made April 1 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Salient concepts from that 4,000-word speech must be interpreted as reflecting, in whole or part, the thinking of Mr. Bush. Here are some of the highlights of the Gates analysis:

- "We in government, as a rule, spend too little time thinking about and planning for the future. We spend too little time reflecting on history and experience; we neglect strategy for tactics. The Bush administration is trying to resist this. Accordingly, our reviews of the international setting and our policies are focused on the development of long-range strategy."

- "Regardless of the substantial odds against him, we take seriously Gorbachev's determination to modernize the Soviet economy."

- The Soviet system of rule over a 70-year period "has brought to the peoples of the old Russian empire suffering on a scale previously unknown in human history. . . . I believe it essential for us today to understand that this record is not confined to the Stalin era alone, was not the doing of a single demented leader, but covers the entirety of Soviet history, and is the product of the very nature of the system itself."

- "The popular impression of the Brezhnev period, reinforced by Gorbachev, is one of doddering old men presiding ineffectively and incompetently over a stagnating economy. . . . This is Western historical amnesia and Soviet selectivity, if not disinformation."

In the era of "doddering" Leonid Brezhnev, the following events occurred: In 1968 the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia; they attacked China along the Ussuri river, with hints of a nuclear attack to come; they

The Washington Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Washington Times **F-1** _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The Christian Science Monitor _____
 New York Daily News _____
 USA Today _____
 The Chicago Tribune _____

Date **28 Apr 1989**

helped provoke the 1967 Middle East War; in the mid-1970s, they supported Cuban surrogate forces in Angola and Ethiopia; they supplied the wherewithal for North Vietnam's final conquest of South Vietnam; they underwrote the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua; they sold \$12 billion worth of weapons to Libya; they invaded Afghanistan; in 1980-81, they forced imposition of martial law in Poland and suppression of Solidarity and the destruction of the dissident and human rights movements.

"And all this," says Mr. Gates, "took place against the backdrop of the greatest peacetime military build-up in history."

- Mr. Gates said he offered this sketch of Soviet history "to underscore that our view of the Soviet Union cannot be based on the personality of one or another leader, but must be based on the nature of the Soviet system itself. . . . It is the Soviet system itself, and the 70-year continuity we see from leader to leader, from Lenin to Chernenko, and even Gorbachev, that shapes our view of the U.S.S.R."

- "[W]e cannot make long-term decisions and devise strategies affecting freedom and the future that depend on the continued political (or even physical) survival of one man. . . . Unlike any Western or other modern state, politics at the highest level in the Kremlin today are as hidden from public view as in generations past. Much has changed, but more that is fundamental remains the same."

- "[W]hat Gorbachev has set in motion represents a political earthquake. . . . He is a figure of enormous political importance. The forces he has unleashed are powerful, but so are the people and institutions he has antagonized — thus setting in motion a tremendous power struggle and purge no less dramatic for the absence of show trials and terror."

And here is the crucial finding by one of the highest policy-making officials in the Bush administration, one who when he speaks says "we":

"However, elections notwithstanding, Gorbachev's Leninism still means the continued political monopoly of the Communist Party. Gorbachev's dictatorship of the Communist Party remains untouched and untouchable. He seeks still a system based on the same Leninist political principles that guided his predecessors. As he said in 1987, 'We will not retreat an inch from the path of socialism, of Marxism-Leninism.'"

What, then, does Mr. Bush seek from Mr. Gorbachev's U.S.S.R.? Nothing more than a counterrevolution. Or, according to Mr. Gates, a Soviet Union that is pluralistic internally, non-interventionist externally, observes basic human rights, contributes to international stability and tranquility, "and a Soviet Union where these changes are more than an edict from the top and are independent of the views, power and durability of a single individual."

I read the Gates speech as a basic state paper from George Bush to Mikhail Gorbachev.

Unfortunately for world peace, the Soviet response will be a repudiation of Mr. Bush's hopes for a gentler, kinder U.S.S.R.

Arnold Beichman, a Hoover Institution research fellow, is a Washington Times columnist.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Missile Misery

George Bush has privately passed the word to advisers that he will not "submit" to Chancellor Helmut Kohl's call for early negotiations over NATO's short-range missiles, putting the 40-year-old alliance on a collision course and testing the new president's penchant for compromise.

Compromise is not likely this time. Not only is President Bush opposed, but Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft each strongly shares his view. Bush fears that with Mikhail Gorbachev's peace campaign in full stride, negotiations would inevitably lead to the removal of all short-range missiles, undermining NATO's defense strategy.

That points the alliance toward a troubling crisis at its meeting in Brussels at the end of May. What was planned for Bush as NATO's glorious 40th birthday party may become a summit fraught with danger. Gorbachev, catalyst of Kohl's split with Bush, chose this moment to show his strength by expelling

Brezhnevites from the Central Committee and ordering the start of Soviet troop withdrawals from Hungary.

Nobody expects the president's determination to weaken, and it is taken for granted here that the chancellor has his political future too much at stake to reverse position. Convinced that short-range missile negotiations with Moscow are essential to satisfy German voters mesmerized by Gorbachev, Kohl stepped up pleas for talks with the Soviets in a recent speech to the Bundestag.

That followed his dramatic dispatch of Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to Washington earlier this week. Genscher holds the patent on a new policy of much closer ties between Western Europe and Gorbachev's new Soviet Union.

The future of Kohl's conservative party and Genscher's liberal party, the coalition partners that govern West Germany, may rise or fall on two questions. How tough a line will Kohl take against Bush on the missile issue? How soft a line will he take toward Gorbachev, who visits Bonn from June 12 to June 15?

Not for years has the West German government lobbied members of NATO as fervently as Kohl and his top advisers are pressuring France, Italy and lesser allies to reverse the American refusal to open negotiations. This has infuriated Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who is just as opposed to negotiations as Bush.

Believed to be allied with Kohl on the missile issue are Italy, Belgium, Spain, Norway, Denmark and possibly France, which does not want to alienate its German ally. So far, only Britain and Canada support Bush. Even though the United States by itself dwarfs its allies militarily, German pressures worry the Americans.

This crisis began building in February when Kohl leaked that, at the May Brussels meeting, he would oppose any NATO decision to replace the aging Lance missile. Baker, leaving on his first grand tour of Europe as secretary of state, was caught unprepared.

Baker finally and benignly ended up agreeing not to insist on any hard decision on a successor missile to the Lance until after the 1990 West German election. He regarded that as a major concession to the chancellor and thought it would not only satisfy him but would give him enough margin to placate Genscher. Instead, Kohl surprised Washington again by sending Genscher on his overnight trip to Washington to demand that the United States go a big step further and approve negotiations.

Bush administration policy makers privately concede there is plenty of blame to go around as NATO seeks a way out of its missile misery, and the Reagan administration's arms control mania gets a big share. As a private citizen, Scowcroft warned that President Reagan's treaty banning intermediate-range missiles could start a mindless, irreversible antinuclear stampede, cleverly encouraged by Gorbachev. Now Scowcroft and his boss are trying to stop the stampede.

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Kissinger and Friends And Revolving Doors

By JEFF GERTH
with SARAH BARTLETT
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 29 — At a time when Washington is agonizing over how to insure that official responsibilities are adequately separated from private interests, the example of Kissinger Associates Inc. raises some particularly thorny questions.

Until recently, Henry A. Kissinger, a former Secretary of State, and his two senior colleagues, Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, were principals in a unique enterprise. On some days, the three might be found discussing East-West relations with top American and Soviet officials or serving on Government advisory boards. On others, they might be consulting, for substantial fees, for some of the world's largest corporations on behalf of the seven-year-old firm.

The Thorny Questions

Through their close relationships with foreign governments and their extensive knowledge of foreign affairs, they have made a good living by offering geopolitical insight, advice and entree to about 30 leading global companies. Among those willing to pay \$200,000 or more to be clients of Kissinger Associates are ITT, American Express, Anheuser-Busch, Coca-Cola, H. J. Heinz, Fiat, Volvo, L. M. Ericsson, Daewoo and Midland Bank.

In a field as subtle as foreign policy, can people like Mr. Kissinger and his associates wall off what they know of confidential Government discussions from what they can legitimately advise their corporate clients? And when people of their stature help shape Government decisions, can they ignore what they know of their corporate clients' interests?

And finally, is it possible to meet those legitimate concerns without imposing so burdensome a set of requirements that they drive able people away from public service?

The 'Revolving Door'

A number of present and former Government officials, none of whom would allow themselves to be identified, have questions about potential conflicts of interest involving Kissinger Associ-

ates. But many Government officials and clients of the firm have no problem with the multiple roles of its principals and are open in their support.

"I think we're nuts," James D. Robinson 3d, chairman and chief executive of the American Express Company, said of the Senate's questioning of Mr. Eagleburger over his work for Kissinger clients. "It's almost as though we want to find someone who's the least qualified for the job."

The Kissinger group is a prominent instance of a pervasive Washington phenomenon: the "revolving door." Mr. Scowcroft now serves President Bush as national security adviser, a post he had previously held under President Gerald R. Ford, succeeding Mr. Kissinger. And Mr. Eagleburger, who served as Under Secretary of State before becoming president of Kissinger Associates in 1984, recently stepped up to Deputy Secretary, the department's second-ranking position.

The jobs are among the most sensitive and influential in Washington. Mr. Scowcroft now briefs President Bush on pressing diplomatic and military matters, and Mr. Eagleburger helps formulate the Administration's strategy for East-West relations and other leading issues.

The tensions surrounding the revolving-door issue were at the heart of President Bush's ethics commission. He recently adopted most of its recommendations on ways to improve the handling of conflict-of-interest issues.

Particulars of the Debate

Underlying the case of Kissinger Associates are these particulars:

¶ In his financial disclosure statement, Mr. Scowcroft did not list the Kissinger clients he worked with or his positions at the firm. The day after an inquiry by a reporter, he amended the statement to reflect his position as vice chairman.

¶ Mr. Scowcroft belatedly disclosed that he held stock in Kissinger Associates and, according to Mr. Kissinger and public documents, he arranged last month to have Mr. Kissinger buy it back for nine times its estimated worth. Mr. Kissinger subsequently reduced the price to be paid for the stock, but the deal could have been construed as an undisclosed "golden handshake" or gift.

The Washington Post _____
The New York Times A 1
The Washington Times _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The Christian Science Monitor _____
New York Daily News _____
USA Today _____
The Chicago Tribune _____

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¶ Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Scowcroft, as frequent unpaid members of Federal advisory boards, advised President Reagan on arms control issues at the same time that they worked for clients involved in missile systems and missile making. The two men have said there was no conflict, or even an appearance of a conflict, between their Government advice and their private consulting.

Firm's Activities

An Unusual Claim Of Confidentiality

From two discreet, unmarked offices in New York and Washington, more than 20 staff members of Kissinger Associates work on research and analysis for the presentations, mostly oral, that Mr. Kissinger and his colleagues make to their clients. For his efforts, Mr. Eagleburger earned a total of \$674,000 last year, \$214,000 of which was paid by Kent Associates, an affiliate of the company that handles more specific assignments. Mr. Scowcroft made \$293,000 as a consultant to Kissinger Associates.

What exactly do they do for that much money? An executive from H. J. Heinz said that Mr. Kissinger helped provide background and introductions when the company was considering building a baby food factory in China. And an executive at the Swedish bank Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, a former client, attributed its early selloff of Latin American loans to Mr. Kissinger's insights.

Other than a few sparse anecdotes like those, little is known about what Kissinger Associates does for its clients. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee first tried to elicit more information on the firm's activities as part of the confirmation process, Mr. Eagleburger "was adamant in his refusal" to discuss any details, according to a committee staff memorandum. He invoked a confidentiality clause in the firm's contracts that prohibits any discussion of its contractual arrangements unless mandated by law.

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Later, he provided a general description of some of the advice the firm gave most clients. The committee, apparently satisfied, declined to push him for more details, and he was unanimously confirmed. A survey of other international consulting firms found such a restriction prohibition unusual. In an interview, Mr. Kissinger said he has the clause to protect his clients and to insure that they do not abuse their connections with him.

Mr. Kissinger said that he and his colleagues went to great lengths to avoid any conflicts and to keep their policy recommendations separate from their business interests. Neither he nor his associates will work on behalf of any government. Nor, he added, does anyone from the firm lobby American officials on behalf of a client.

Government Role

Kissinger's Window On Intelligence

Mr. Kissinger and his colleagues are not the only consultants to serve on Government commissions or go through Washington's revolving door. Where they differ from other consultants, however, is in the extent to which they maintain other roles. For the last five years, for example, Mr. Kissinger has had a continuing window into the Government's most sensitive information as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, or Pfiab (pronounced PIFF-ee-ab).

The 16-member board is a little-known but powerful group of scientists, business executives and former Government officials that gives independent advice about a wide range of intelligence issues and activities. Some of the board's other prominent members are William French Smith, the former Attorney General, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser in the Carter Administration.

Members of the board must submit confidential lists of their holdings and clients, as lawyers, scientists and other professionals do for many other Government posts. Sometimes, after consultation with Government attorneys, or even voluntarily, board members have stepped down from matters that would have had a financial effect on clients, according to Government officials. The recusal standard applies even if board members advise their clients on different matters from those that are before the board, a Government lawyer said.

'All Sorts of Conflicts'

"There are all sorts of conflicts" on the board, said Anne L. Armstrong, chairman of the board and a former ambassador, but she added: "I'm totally satisfied. It comes down to believing in your board members' integrity."

Mr. Kissinger said he had not recused himself from any matter before the advisory board, nor has he participated in any board matter in which, "to his knowledge, he has a financial interest," said Michael T. Masin, Mr. Kissinger's lawyer.

Asked about the appearance of a conflict, a Government-wide standard, Mr. Masin added: "There is no appearance problem because nobody knows about it, and nobody knows about it because the law requires that Pfiab matters are secret, and the Kissinger confidentiality agreement prohibits people talking about it."

Involvement in Arms Control

Mr. Kissinger said that his principal area of involvement at the intelligence advisory board has been arms control and that he saw no conflict because none of his clients are really involved in arms control matters.

Public records show that some clients of Kissinger Associates are in affected by military matters. For example, one client, the ITT Corporation, a \$9 billion corporation with about 7 percent of its annual business in military contracts, operates various United States missile systems under a \$700 million contract, according to the company's annual reports.

Mr. Eagleburger was an ITT director for the last four years, and told the Senate committee about cost problems with ITT's missile contracts. Asked if Mr. Kissinger was aware of ITT's military work, Mr. Masin said, "Clearly he's not."

Eye on Intelligence Documents

A former Pfiab official, who asked not to be identified because of the board's secrecy pledge, said that Mr. Kissinger, using his authority as a board member, frequently reviewed intelligence documents outside the regular board meetings.

In addition, the former official said he believed that Mr. Kissinger's association with the board gave him benefit because he could not have separated the insights gained from his access to United States intelligence data from his continuing analysis and advice to clients.

Mr. Masin said such a suggestion was "outrageous." Referring to Mr. Kissinger's clients, he added, "I just couldn't imagine anyone being impressed by Pfiab."

Scowcroft at Lockheed

Pentagon Lawyer's Second Thoughts

Hybrid commissions have come to play an increasingly important role in shaping Government policy, according to Government officials. In addition to Pfiab, Mr. Kissinger has worked on a number of other Government advisory

bodies, including a 1983 Presidential commission on strategic forces headed by Mr. Scowcroft.

The principal mandate of that commission was to recommend alternative locations for the MX missile. At the time, Mr. Scowcroft was president of Kissinger Associates as well as a personal consultant on general arms control and military issues for the Lockheed Corporation, Hugh Burns, a Lockheed spokesman, said.

Mr. Scowcroft's ties to Lockheed, a major military contractor, were not publicly known, but were disclosed in a confidential statement to the Pentagon. A Pentagon lawyer who reviewed that statement discussed it on the condition that he not be identified. The lawyer said the Lockheed consultancy was not considered a problem because the company was not likely to be affected by the MX decisions.

Recommendations on Trident

The commission's final report, however, contained a number of other recommendations, including "continued development and the deployment of the Trident II (D-5) missile as rapidly as possible." Lockheed has long been the manager of the Trident missile program, including the D-5.

When asked whether Mr. Scowcroft should have participated in that recommendation, the Pentagon lawyer said, "If I realized they were going into that area I would have asked him to make some decision whether to discontinue his consulting with Lockheed or withdraw from the commission's deliberations in that area."

Mr. Scowcroft declined to respond to written questions about the Lockheed situation or any other matter. He told a reporter in 1986, however, that his work for his only military client, presumably Lockheed, was not a problem because he advised it not about arms but about "the future of arms control and Soviet-American relations." He added that his work on commissions "takes a tremendous amount of time, and it is done gratis for the national interest."

Disclosure Practices

Differences Noted On Ethical Issues

If a certain one of President Bush's ethics proposals is adopted, part-time advisers like Mr. Kissinger could continue to advise the Government even on matters that create potential conflicts. Under the proposal, if part-time advisers were granted a waiver, an occasionally used way to handle conflicts, they would have to disclose the pertinent financial interests, which are not currently required to be made public.

Currently, when people like Mr. Scowcroft enter the Government full-time, fuller disclosure is demanded and greater attention is paid to avoiding

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