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
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GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

MEDIA ARTICLES



JANUARY - MARCH 1989

January 1989

Bush Selections Signal Focus on Foreign Policy

By ELAINE SCIOLINO

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 16 — New Presidents have usually lodged their closest confidants in politically sensitive domestic jobs, notably that of Attorney General.

By choosing James A. Baker 3d, his friend of 32 years and most-trusted political adviser, as Secretary of State, Mr. Bush is signaling that foreign rather than domestic policy is likely to be the centerpiece of his administration. He is also showing that he wants Mr. Baker, who is schooled in Washington power politics, to graduate to the ul-

the international stage with Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the astute and charming Kremlin leader whose approval rating with the American public rivals that of Mr. Reagan's.

Mr. Bush, a problem-solver rather than a visionary thinker, a man who projected no far-ranging agenda in his successful Presidential campaign, has assembled a foreign policy brain trust composed of Reagan-era holdovers, experienced hands from the period dominated by Henry A. Kissinger, and friends with links to Congress and to Texas. Ambitious and talented bureaucrats all, they see the world as Washington has seen it for four decades, through the prism of the familiar East-West power game.

Contrasting Appraisals

"This administration will be closely integrated and coherent, a parallel-minded team," commented Brent Scowcroft, the new national security adviser, in an interview the other day.

But a cooler reaction came from another quarter. "Warmed-over milk," a senior official, himself a veteran of several administrations, remarked when asked to characterize the Bush team. "Having around a lot of old guys who grew up in a slightly different world isn't necessarily good."

Charles William Maynes, the editor of Foreign Policy, a quarterly journal, was more charitable, describing the team as "Ford II, sensibly conservative."

Of course, an integrated team is the goal of every administration. This one may achieve it, especially given the close friendship between Mr. Scow-

croft and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who has been chosen for the key position of Deputy Secretary of State. Both have long been associated with Mr. Kissinger and are principals in his consulting firm. They are so close they often communicate in garbled Serbo-Croatian. Peter W. Rodman, another Kissinger man who has worked closely in government with Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger, will also help to give the National Security Council staff the kind of depth and firepower it needs.

But many Washington wise men think there is at least the possibility of the sort of conflict between the State Department and the White House that has plagued many past governments.

Mr. Baker may be a novice, but he is a talented one, a man who may harbor Presidential ambitions of his own, and he will have an apt teacher in Mr. Eagleburger. Mr. Scowcroft, an outstanding student of foreign policy, will have a forceful No. 2 in Robert M. Gates, who is moving over from the Central Intelligence Agency. Much remains to be seen, however, about how things will work. John G. Tower, the Defense Secretary-designate, has been recuperating from surgery and has not yet made his views known in detail to his colleagues. And Mr. Baker has decided to wait until after his hearings to name most of his senior aides, people who will inevitably help color the new administration's policies.

For all the lack of new faces, there have been early signals of divergence from the Reagan Administration. In last year's campaign, for example, Mr. Bush said the Cold War was not yet over, putting some distance between himself and his boss as well as his boss's British soul-mate, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Early this month, when Mr. Reagan accepted a Soviet proposal to convene a human rights conference in Moscow, Bush advisers expressed polite, but firm, reservations. A Bush administration would never have handed the Soviets such an easy diplomatic victory, several such advisers have said. "We were skeptical, reluctant, we argued that it was premature and we didn't want to be locked in," said one prominent member of the group. "But it wasn't our decision." On policy matters, Mr. Baker and others appear to have thrown off the shackles of the Reagan epoch, if shackles they are, before it has ended.

Mr. Baker has told lawmakers on Capitol Hill that United States support for the anti-Communist rebels in Nicaragua — the contras — has been "a failure." And he has described as a strategic blunder the Reagan Administration's use of sanctions in an effort to drive Panama's controversial leader, Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, from power.

It is widely expected, on yet another front, that the Bush administration will try to improve the political environment in the Middle East before it starts worrying about a peace

timate power game of East-West relations.

Most foreign policy experts here regard the Baker appointment as a sign of Mr. Bush's confidence in his friend's adaptability and in the President-elect's own ability to direct his administration's foreign policy.

An Imposing Challenge

Together, Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker — longtime friends who share Ivy League backgrounds, a love of tennis and an instinct for moderation — face an imposing challenge: they must protect American strategic interests while seizing what may well be a once-in-a-century opportunity to reshape East-West relations.

They and a handful of key associates also face the challenge of demonstrating that Mr. Bush can hold his own on

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Bush Staff Structure: Much Like Reagan's

President-elect George Bush has borrowed a White House structure from President Reagan and filled it with a senior staff that reflects Bush's priorities, including a new position to carry out his "thousand points of light" campaign and a top issues adviser who is a specialist on the savings and loan industry crisis.

A senior Bush adviser, speaking on condition he not be named, said the president-elect has tentatively approved keeping the twin domestic issues forums used by Reagan—a domestic policy council and economic council. The official said that Attorney General Dick Thornburgh would head the domestic policy council and Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady the economic council.

Meanwhile, incoming White House chief of staff John H. Sununu announced the appointment of 15 senior officials, largely filling out Bush's White House staff except for people under national security adviser **Brent Scowcroft**. The appointments include some longtime Bush aides as well as holdovers from the Reagan White House.

Among those named assistant to the president, the highest White House staff rank, is Richard Breen, a former Bush staff member who is a partner in the law firm Baker & Botts here and who is considered an expert on the turmoil in the savings and loan industry. Breen was staff director of the 1984 Task Group on Regulation of Financial Services, which studied the issue of banking regulation. He also worked informally on Bush's presidential campaign, advising Sununu on the Republican platform and helping Bush in debate preparation.

Sununu also announced the appointment of Gregg Petersmeyer, senior vice president and director of General Atlantic Energy Corp. in Denver, to the new post of deputy assistant to the president for national service. Known as the "thousand points of light man" by some Bush aides, his job will be to carry out Bush's campaign pledge to set up a foundation to encourage young people and others to volunteer their services to the poor.

Sununu, in an interview yesterday, said "I think we have good people" joining Bush's staff, although

some other Republicans have described the staff as lacking stature. Sununu said he rejects criticism from others that the new staff is low-key and lacks Washington experience.

The senior Bush adviser said Bush has largely adopted the White House organization chart used by Reagan. This includes the two policy councils (a third, the National Security Council, is set by law) and similar White House offices such as domestic policy, public liaison, communications, political affairs and others. One difference is that Bush will have three public liaison officials—one for economic groups, one for constituencies and one for what he called "heritage" or ethnic groups.

Sununu will head the Legislative Strategy Group, another idea held over from the Reagan years, the official said.

The official acknowledged that the Bush White House will bear a strong resemblance to Reagan's but said "the difference is mostly in style" in that Bush wants to be "more flexible" in dealing with subordinates. "This is the starting point," he said of the staff organization.

Other staff aides named yesterday include:

- Roger B. Porter, as assistant to the president for economic and domestic policy. Porter, a professor at Harvard, was involved in policy development under Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Reagan, and was considered pragmatic and not particularly ideological.

- Stephen M. Studdert, as assistant for special activities and initiatives, or what some in the transition are calling the "super advance man" job. Studdert, executive director of the inaugural, was involved in the Reagan White House and the last three Republican presidential campaigns in planning and executing major events.

- John Keller, a deputy to Studdert. He will direct the presidential advance office. Currently Bush's advance chief, he was responsible for the vice president's surprise appearance on a Polish church balcony with Solidarity leader Lech Walesa.

- Jim Wray, a deputy assistant and director of the political office.

Wray, Bush's national political field director, served previously in the RNC political operation. Wray is considered a solid politician, but the political center of the Bush administration will not be at the White House, as it was for Reagan, but at the Republican National Committee, where Bush campaign manager Lee Atwater will preside.

- David M. Carney, deputy director of the political office. Carney is one of the main figures Sununu brought to Washington with him. He has been on Sununu's personal staff in New Hampshire since 1982 and worked in Sununu's gubernatorial campaign and his unsuccessful Senate campaign.

- James P. Pinkerton, a deputy assistant for policy planning. He is director of policy development for the transition and directed research in the campaign. His job has been called a sort of roving policy quick-fixer, reporting to Porter.

- Bobbie Green Kilberg, deputy assistant for public liaison. The post has been downgraded from its stature in the Reagan White House, but the appointment of Kilberg symbolizes that moderate Republican women will have roles in the Bush White House. A candidate for the

Virginia state Senate in 1986, Kilberg, a lawyer, has long been involved in Republican politics and most recently was vice president and general counsel to a Republican think tank.

In addition, Sununu named Hector Irastorza as deputy director of the office of administration. He had been in charge of Bush's scheduling operation in his vice presidential office and had been director of special projects there.

John P. Schmitz was named deputy White House counsel. He has served in the same post in Bush's vice presidential operation.

By David Hoffman and Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writers

Reagan Budget to Promote 2 Percent Increase in Defense Spending

By MYRON STRUCK
Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — President Reagan's ninth and final federal budget will include \$4.5 billion for continued funding of the Strategic Defense Initiative, a plethora of new multiyear funding proposals and a big option for President-elect Bush: whether to build the Midgetman strategic missile or continue the MX missile program, Pentagon sources said.

The Reagan budget will be unveiled to members of Congress beginning Wednesday, to the press on Saturday and to the public on Jan. 9. It is designed to promote a 2 percent increase in spending after factoring for projected inflation of 4 percent.

As of last Friday, the Air Force appeared to have come out best with a projected 4 percent budget increase, with the Navy flat and the Army expected to take a 4 percent reduction.

On Dec. 13, Pentagon spokesman Dan Howard said that the 1990 portion of the 1990-91 biennial budget will total \$305.6 billion for defense budget authority, up from \$290.3 billion in 1989.

The Reagan spending plan will be little more than a departure point for formulation of the 1990 defense budget. Bush and John Tower, his designated defense secretary, are expected to set up a budget assessment team at the Pentagon to fine tune the work of outgoing Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci. Transition papers have been prepared by each Pentagon agency and office, and Tower associate Richard Billmire has been immersed in discussions with current policymakers on Pentagon staffing and critical defense issues that must be addressed during the first few months of 1989.

Many in Congress want a no-growth defense budget, and the fledgling Bush administration may comply. The big-ticket

options available to Bush include scaling back the Strategic Defense Initiative by as much as half and reducing the scope of the Army's family of new tactical vehicles, which have tentatively been scheduled for a multiyear funding proposal.

Bush also must deal with requirements of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced-budget act, to reduce the federal deficit to \$100 billion in 1990. Some analysts foresee a Reagan budget next week with a deficit of \$137 billion.

Instructions governing the Reagan defense budget state that "although some force structure reductions were made and future plans were scaled back, the brunt of accommodating the top-line fiscal reductions of the recent past has primarily been borne by the investment or acquisition accounts, most notably the RDT&E [research, development, testing and engineering] and procurement appropriations, which affect readiness, modernization and sustainability."

Complicating the defense situation is the view of some Democrats that rampant defense spending during the early Reagan years jacked up the military budget by 42 percent above inflation but reduced domestic spending 22 percent below inflation. The National Economic Commission, a high-level advisory committee on national economic policy, said in an October report, "Defense Budget Overview," that defense funding had risen 37 percent "after adjustments for inflation" since 1980.

A special Nov. 28 report, "The FY90 Budget Landscape" by the Democratic Study Group (DSG), a research arm of liberal and moderate House members, contends that a \$100 million cut in 1990 appropriations for Air Force aircraft procurement would produce on average about \$7 million in 1990 outlay savings and a \$100 million Navy shipbuilding cut would save just \$3 million in 1990 outlays.

Nonetheless, cutting defense procurement and research and development funding can make a substantial dent in the federal deficit over a five-year period if other short-term reductions can be found, the DSG says. Its report recommends that military and civilian employee pay at DoD may have to be frozen in concert with level spending. The goal: save \$45 billion over the next five years.

A no-growth budget would trim \$100 billion from programs over the next five years, according to documents.

To put it in perspective, DSG contends that imposing a 5 percent defense cut would save only \$8.9 billion in 1990 outlays — the only figure that is significant in ascertaining the reductions necessary under Gramm-Rudman rules.

If the budget proves as inflexible as its critics say for short-term savings, other remedies may have to be found. For example, Bush's reliance on retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, his new national security adviser, may translate into a decision to scale back the carrier force and eliminate such aging craft as the USS Coral Sea and the USS Midway, two World War II vintage ships.

In addition, the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the USS Enterprise, faces a refueling of its eight nuclear power plants and refitting that could cost \$1 billion. All three ships may have to be shelved as cost-saving devices. Scowcroft advocated scaling back carrier forces in his "American Agenda" report, co-authored by former Navy assistant secretary R. James Woolsey.

To save money, Carlucci is promoting a multiyear funding plan of more than two dozen programs. But a Pentagon insider said the proposal has the tendency to limit the future options for the military when international stress-points change.

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Scowcroft, At Your Service



Bush's National
Security Adviser:
Inspiring Trust,
Shunning the Light

By Henry Allen
Washington Post Staff Writer

Brent Scowcroft: The name alone!

Austere yet hearty, it has become a sort of Washington mantra for these troubled times, or for any other troubled times in the past 20 years: *brentscowcroft*, *brentscowcroft* . . . Ease back into thoughts of bipartisan commitment. Know the bliss of throw-weight parity. Feel those world tensions relax.

"Brent," you can hear the president saying, when Scowcroft becomes national security adviser in the Bush White House, "I understand you see an opening for us in the Middle East."

Or: "This problem is too important for party politics—let's form a commission under Brent Scowcroft."

Indeed, "Scowcroft" is one of those names that is unimpeachably right when you put the word "commission" after it.

Since he arrived at the Nixon White House as an Air Force colonel and emerged from the Ford White House as a retired lieutenant general, Brent Scowcroft has become one of Washington's permanent fixtures. He headed the Scowcroft Commis-

PRESIDENT... CONTINUED

ten statement by the president.

Likewise, President Jimmy Carter, while in office, twice gave videotaped testimony, once as a government witness in the perjury and gambling trial of a Georgia state senator, and a second time before a federal grand jury investigating allegations that fugitive financier Robert Vesco sought to bribe members of the Carter administration.

Nixon, after leaving office, was scheduled to testify at the 1974 Watergate cover-up trial of his former aides, but was suffering from phlebitis and the trial proceeded without him. Six years later, Nixon voluntarily complied with a subpoena to testify at the conspiracy trial of two former FBI agents.

In the current case, legal experts said there will be a heavy burden on North's lawyers to show why they need the testimony.

In the Watergate tapes case, said R. Stan Mortenson, one of Nixon's

lawyers, "what the court clearly said was, if the president has relevant evidence, then the criminal justice system and the need for evidence in criminal cases will overcome any privilege . . . but that it's not something to be lightly undertaken . . ."

Justice Department officials have argued that Bush, who will have been sworn in as president by the time the North trial begins, cannot be hauled into court, away from his presidential duties. They said that Reagan, although he will be out of office by then, will still have knowledge of sensitive national security information and the right to assert executive privilege.

The Watergate tapes case, in which the court emphasized that it was not dealing with a claim of privilege based on national security grounds, offers "a fairly strong precedent" for fighting the subpoenas, one department official said.

As to Reagan, the official said, "I think the claim for this former pres-

ident in light of the timing [so close to his departure from office] is still very powerful and so the distinction between a President Bush and former president Reagan is not going to be, in my judgment, constitutionally significant," the official said.

But other legal experts said that, particularly with regard to Reagan, if North can show a need to question the former president—who has already answered written questions submitted by independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh—the subpoena could be upheld.

The president, "like any other witness, can refuse to divulge national security information unless ordered by the court," said Alan B. Morrison of Public Citizen Litigation Group.

But Morrison said, "My tentative view is that [claim of privilege] would be overruled. Looking at *U.S. v. Nixon* [the tapes case] and the 6th Amendment right to call witnesses in your behalf, assuming that conversations were material to the defense, I think it would be very hard to keep that out."

Subpoenaing the President: Not Without Precedent



By Ruth Marcus
Washington Post Staff Writer

When Aaron Burr stood trial for treason in 1807, he employed an unprecedented tactic: subpoenaing the president of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, under whom Burr had served four years as vice president.

Burr sought to have Jefferson appear in court and testify about a letter written to the president by one of Burr's alleged coconspirators. Chief Justice John Marshall, presiding over the trial, declared that the president, unlike a king, was subject to the law. Eventually, Jefferson finessed the matter. He refused to appear but provided a certified copy of the letter, with sensitive parts deleted, and insisted he was doing so voluntarily.

Now, lawyers for former White House aide Oliver L. North are employing a similar tactic. On Friday, they served on the Justice Depart-

ment subpoenas seeking the testimony of President Reagan and President-elect George Bush at North's trial, scheduled to start Jan. 31.

The administration is expected to contest the subpoenas. Administration lawyers—citing the Jefferson example—have argued that no sitting president has ever testified in court in a criminal trial. "Jefferson made it very clear that he thought it was improper to bring presidents into a trial proceeding, and that precedent has been followed in every other case that I know of," said one Justice Department official.

Between 1807 and now, however, the issue has never been squarely decided.

In 1974, the Supreme Court, in the Watergate tapes case, ruled 8 to 0 that President Richard M. Nixon had to comply with the special prosecutor's subpoena to turn over the White House tapes.

In an opinion by then-Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, the court re-

jected Nixon's claim that the doctrine of separation of powers and the need for confidential government communications gave him absolute privilege to refuse to release the tapes. The court ruled that the need for the evidence in the Watergate case outweighed the "presumptive privilege" protecting disclosure of presidential communications.

"The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial," the court said.

The tapes case, however, did not involve a subpoena seeking the president's appearance in court.

In 1975, President Gerald R. Ford gave a videotaped deposition as a defense witness—later played in court—in the trial of Lynette (Squeaky) Fromme, who was convicted of attempting to assassinate Ford. Administration lawyers lost a bid to have the court accept a writ-


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low-cost housing, stalled during the Reagan years, is high on some lawmakers' agendas, along with help for first-time homebuyers. Congress may also try to hold Bush to his campaign commitment to help the homeless.

Environment: Long-stalled efforts to extend the Clean Air Act and provide new curbs on acid rain are expected to get a push from the election of Sen. George J. Mitchell (D-Maine), a leader in the fight against acid rain, as senate majority leader. Last year's long, hot summer may help too. Billions of dollars worth of funds to clean up nuclear weapons plant sites will have to compete with costs of rebuilding the plants themselves.

Judiciary: Bush has 35 judgeships to fill, in what could be a major test of wills with Congress if his nominees are perceived to have a far-right ideological orientation. The stakes will get even higher if, as expected, a vacancy opens on the Supreme Court in the next four years. Abortion could be an issue in any Supreme Court nomination.

Miscellaneous: Congress will have to grapple with funding for the proposed manned space station, initial plans for the superconducting supercollider to be located in Texas, continued controversy over drug testing, possible revival of the Fairness Doctrine for broadcasting, and revision of the Hatch Act governing political activities by government workers. Also, immigration law changes, a proposed waiting period for gun



purchases and the Senate trial of U.S. District Court Judge Alcee L. Hastings of Florida, who was impeached last year by the House for financial improprieties.

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sion that reported to President Reagan on the MX missile. He was Ford's national security adviser. He has been advising presidents almost half as long as Clark Clifford has, which is to say forever.

A fixture, but not a power broker, not a position jockey, not one of the grandees who rule over anxious archipelagoes of newspaper quotations and the smiles of maitres d'. Instead, he is one of those people who appear at committee hearings, receptions, dinner parties and speeches with the air of longtime house guests, always grateful and deferring, but utterly sure of themselves among those who merely come and go. You know nothing about him, you trust everything about him.

There is a real Brent Scowcroft, of course—more about him in a moment—but after all these years he has become a prisoner of his own self-effacement. Mention the name "Brent Scowcroft," and people talk about a type. They use phrases like "old hand," "the wise men," and "the Establishment." It becomes easy to imagine him in one of those houses on Foxhall Road that looks like it should have a combination dial on the front door instead of a doorknob. One thinks too of pin stripes, and narrow Balmoral-cut shoes in hard, thin leather, like blackjacks. (Ellsworth Bunker wore these when he was negotiating the Panama Canal Treaty.) The fact that little of this is true has nothing to do with what the name "Brent Scowcroft" stands for.

Says Henry Kissinger, who has employed him at Kissinger Associates since he left the White House with Ford: "He's the epitome of a type we don't have much of anymore, of men like David Bruce [the late David K.E. Bruce, ambassador to Great Britain], men whose real ambition is to serve their country selflessly."

They are a great tradition. Clifford, Bunker, Bruce, Milton Eisenhower, William Rogers, Paul Nitze, Robert Lovett, Elliot Richardson, Averell Harriman, and so on, men gliding in and out of the corridors of power with the opulent calm of angelfish swimming through an aquarium castle.

Washington could not function without them. They have little partisan agenda, either personal or political. They lack the egotism of a Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski, or the political philosophy of, say, Jeane

Kirkpatrick or Ted Sorensen, or the deal-politik of Robert Strauss. They are precise opposites of Oliver North. When they go wrong, they are John Poindexter, but which of them has gone wrong, except for Poindexter (who showed his true colors after the Iran-contra hearings by growing a mustache and getting contact lenses)? It is hard to imagine them winning an election, or coming to your house for dinner or being little boys. They get trundled through the city like images of saints on medieval feast days while we toss garlands at them in the form of commission chairmanships, briefing papers, memos—until finally they come to rest in Washington's mind, become fixed in the manner of statues that traffic circles get named after, with columnists perched on their shoulders like pigeons, cooing and squabbling.

"A career staff officer, Scowcroft was known for his businesslike approach to crises large and small." —Neil Sheehan in "A Bright Shining Lie."

"... pliable technicians like Scowcroft..." —Robert Hartmann in "Palace Politics."

"Speech writers had drafted a departure statement attacking the conference. Brent Scowcroft substituted a more neutral statement." —William G. Hyland in "Mortal Rivals."

"... a tribute to Scowcroft's subtlety and finesse." —Kissinger in "Years of Upheaval."

Joseph Alsop, the journalist, art historian and lifelong Establishmentarian, said recently: "Brent is a quiet fellow. He's a very good man, with common sense and integrity."

When it is pointed out that these virtues lack one-to-one correlation (as analysts say) with success in Washington, Alsop adds a footnote: "It took Henry." He is referring to Kissinger, who tells people that he spotted Scowcroft as a comer when he saw him stand up to Nixon henchman H.R. Haldeman "with unbelievable tenacity." Unfortunately, Kissinger can't remember what the fight was about, and Scowcroft will claim he's not sure it ever happened.

"He's not the sort of person that anecdotes come to mind about," says R. James Woolsey Jr., a Washington lawyer who, along with MIT's John Deutch, has written articles on strategic issues with Scowcroft.

We trust so much about Brent Scowcroft, and we know so little. We knew about Harriman's past as a railroad millionaire and polo player. Dean Acheson and Chip Bohlen were

part of the boarding-school old-boy network. With a lot of these guys, there are social position, family money and divorces to judge them by. Scowcroft has had none of these. He has no known enemies, either, a peculiarity that he explains by saying: "If I were to be facetious, I'd say that if you don't do anything, you don't make enemies."

He says this during an hour of conversation at the Kissinger Associates suite on K Street.

It is a suite with plants in rope-coil baskets, the morning newspapers on the waiting room coffee table, roses on the receptionist's desk, and a number of 35-ish streaked blonds who look like they have advanced degrees in something and carry their shoulders a little high.

He comes out of his office to greet you. He has a clerical spareness—5 feet 8 and 130 pounds. There is an American gothic plainness to his big brow, and a wide, oddly vulnerable smile that reveals a gold molar, way back in there. He looks like a hardware clerk who ended up owning the store. He looks like Bob Cratchit about 20 years after the end of "A Christmas Carol."

He is 63. He has brown eyes. He has thinning hair of no particular color. He sticks his hand out, revealing a watch with a calculator. His handshake makes his hand feel bigger than it is. He wears a gray pin-striped suit, a shirt whose collar is too large, and black loafers—clothes with a self-conscious air that implies he might still think of them as "civilian clothes," even 13 years after retiring from the Air Force.

Everything about him seems a little self-conscious, in fact, deliberate but not opportunistic, the cautious, cheerful egalitarianism that Americans are taught to practice by both philosophy and fistfights. You have been told by everyone who knows him that he is a very nice guy, and you see why.

When he offers a chair, he does it with the nonproprietary air of someone suggesting a park bench you might find comfortable. It's easy to suspect that he long ago learned to eschew the little turf-dances of human encounter. There is also the modesty of a kid who grew up quite small and very, very smart in a place like Ogden, Utah.

He smiles a lot. Things amuse him.

"In several points in my career, I worked for extremely demanding bosses whose philosophy was that to get the best work out of people, you

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scare them to death. Out of that, I developed a different management philosophy," he says.

He talks in a quiet nasal voice that goes slowly enough that notes can be taken in longhand. Sometimes his hands make tidy parentheses. Sometimes he puts his palms three or four inches apart, tilts them onto a diagonal and moves them in parallel circles, as if he is sanding something on two sides at once. "The first boss like that I had was a General Yudin at the Pentagon. He had a reputation as a giant-killer. He was a lot like Henry Kissinger—extremely demanding. I myself respond to co-option. Probably it's my personality too. I don't very often get really angry. On occasion, I do. How do you really elicit the most out of people? Make them feel good."

He is the youngest child of a wholesale grocer. He grew up with two older sisters. "They used to beat up on me so I wouldn't be a sissy," he says.

Scowcroft is an English name, he says. He doesn't know where Brent comes from. "I asked my mother once, but she said she'd forgotten."

He was raised as a Mormon. "I still like to think of myself as a Mormon, although I'll drink a glass of wine and I drink coffee to keep going sometimes."

He learned to play the piano. He still plays once in a while—popular standards such as "Smoke Gets in Your Eyes."

He had no nicknames, except "Scow."

He ran dashes on the track team in high school. He still runs, a three-mile course four or five nights a week in his neighborhood. He runs it in 20 to 21 minutes. It is remarked that this is quick, and in response, Scowcroft points out twice that the course might not really be three miles, "I only measured it with my car's odometer, which could be wrong." He went to West Point. "I wanted to go to West Point because I wanted to go to West Point, and I had ever since I was 12 years old."

He was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1947 after graduating "87th out of 330 or 340." He got his wings as a fighter pilot the next year. "I liked to fly. When I got into it, fighters were the most exciting." Shortly afterward, he crashed in a

P51 Mustang. He fractured three vertebrae and spent two years in the hospital.

He eventually flew again, but by then he had a master's degree in international relations from Columbia and he was teaching Russian history at West Point. He learned Serbo-Croatian, and was assistant air attaché at our embassy in Yugoslavia from 1959 to 1961. He taught political science at the Air Force Academy. In 1967, he got his doctorate in international relations from Columbia. In 1968 he went to the Pentagon to serve in a series of national security posts. In 1971, he became military aide to President Nixon. Soon Kissinger, who was national security adviser, chose him as a deputy, and put him in the office next to his—an office notable for being narrower and shorter than it was tall. When Kissinger became secretary of state under Ford, Scowcroft took Kissinger's job, the same job he'll have under Bush.

He was known as a brilliant coordinator, a bringer-together of big egos, a man concerned with results rather than philosophy. Some White House staffers actually complained that his briefings weren't long enough.

He says: "I don't have a quick, innovative mind. I don't automatically think of good new ideas. What I do better is pick out good ideas from bad ideas. But I don't have an original mind. I think there is enormous satisfaction in being involved in something bigger than you are, in feeling that, however small, you're doing something that makes a difference. Maybe that's what power is all about, I don't know. You can't say I don't have an ego. It is comforting to be doing things that make a difference. In the end, it's the job that's more important."

He likes the idea of doing a job he's done before. He says: "My friends tell me, 'Maybe you'll get it right this time.'"

He has no friends outside the policy world, he says. "By now, all my friends are pretty much business-oriented."

He lives not on Foxhall Road but in Bethesda, in a center-hall brick colonial close enough to Massachusetts Avenue that you can hear the buses. It needs some roof work. There are two bird feeders with squirrel guards. It is the kind of

house your father-in-law wants you to buy.

"Modest," he says, either proudly or wryly or both. This is as close to a boast as he will come.

His wife of 37 years, Marian, is housebound with diabetes. His daughter Karen is a lawyer in New York. He owns two Chryslers, one from 1986 and one from 1972, a supremely ugly thing he calls "the tank."

Last novel read? "The Hunt for Red October."

Hobby? Skiing in Colorado or Utah at an upper intermediate level.

Preferred epitaph? "He Served With Distinction."

Amusements? He watches the Redskins, and thinks they lost games this year because "they seem to have trouble playing as a team. When they do, like in the Super Bowl, it's wonderful!"

And here his eyes flash and the smile goes huge again, the smile of a country boy who never learned better than to look so vulnerable in front of strangers.

He is enough of a country boy and a westerner, in fact, that he makes a certain point of saying that "since I left Utah I have spent the bulk of my time on the East Coast." And what emerges from discussion of his career is the image of a man who knows precisely how confident he is now because he remembers when he wasn't, and he remembers learning after he came to Washington that everyone fouls up, no matter how pin-striped, calm, well-combed and established.

But is he one of the wise men? Is he a member of whatever mysterious congeries and brotherhood it is that we call "the Establishment"? At the very least, people who aren't members say Brent Scowcroft is.

"It's probably right," he says. "Yeah, I think so."

He purses his lips and thinks about this. Is he suppressing a smile? Being puckish? After all, it is said that no member of the Establishment would admit either the existence of an establishment or his membership in it. Whatever he is thinking here, it seems to give him satisfaction.

A photographer asks to take his picture. He wants Scowcroft to pose. Will this be the revelation that has been so elusive? The view of what

Admiral sees pilot bonus as good start

By Jack Dorsey
Staff writer

NORFOLK — The admiral who next year will take over management of the Navy's air forces worldwide says that although new incentive bonuses may help retain Navy pilots, more flight time would keep them even more satisfied.

"The bonuses will keep some people, but most will admit the bonus is a bribe," said Vice Adm. Richard M. Dunleavy, commander of the Atlantic Fleet Naval Air Force, with headquarters in Hampton Roads.

"The way to keep pilots in the Navy is to fly them and fly them hard," he said.

In a continuing effort to retain more Navy and Air Force pilots, the Pentagon will launch a \$31 million program Jan. 1 that offers up to \$12,000 in annual bonuses to pilots in certain categories. The bonus is twice what the Navy has offered up to now.

Typically, a Navy lieutenant with six years' experience who is on continuous flight status earns about \$29,000 annually in base pay and up to \$4,800 in flight pay. With other

special compensation, such as housing allowances, his salary is about \$35,000.

Defense officials predict that the demand for new pilots in commercial aviation will continue at between 4,000 and 7,000 a year well into the 1990s. The military needs to remain competitive with airlines to prevent high pilot losses and persistent shortages that jeopardize combat readiness, officials contend.

Dunleavy, who manages a \$1.6 billion budget to keep nine aircraft carriers and nearly 1,800 aircraft fueled and ready, said in an interview last week that while the bonuses may be one tool for retaining the aviators, it is not the only answer.

"We are not flying the guys enough," said the three-star admiral. "They get bored and think it will be nicer on the outside. But they soon find out it is not. . . . Of course, they have more home life overall, but (flying commercial airliners) is not as exciting as flying a Navy jet off the aircraft carrier. They become bus drivers."

Current funding allows each Navy pilot to fly an average of 25 hours per month, when 30 hours is desirable, Dunleavy said.

Disparities result. For example, he said, a P-3 Orion patrol plane pilot, who must fly 12-hour hops to hunt submarines, frequently averages 42 hours of flight time a month. But tactical air pilots flying the Navy's new F/A-18 Hornets average 18 hours a month, far too few to keep them proficient.

"Here is a guy we have given a highly sophisticated aircraft . . . probably one of the finest aircraft ever bought in the Navy. Yet we fund this kid the way we funded the F-4 guy and the A-7 guy even though the aircraft is more complex. I say he needs 30 hours a month. That's what he needs to be very, very good."

The F-4 Phantom, a fighter, and the A-7 Corsair, a light attack bomber, were replaced by the F/A-18, which performs the roles of both.

Dunleavy, who will become assistant chief of naval operations for air warfare in the spring, said one of his goals in his new job will be to "keep the pressure on" to get more flying hours. But in an austere budget year that may result in a scant 2 percent real growth in the defense budget, Dunleavy's battle for more flying hours is bound to be largely uphill.

Members of his staff said increasing flying hours from 25 to 30 per month per pilot would cost \$90 million just for the Atlantic Fleet aviators. The price includes fuel and maintenance.

In daily conferences, Dunleavy said, he and his counterpart in the Pacific Fleet, Vice Adm. John H. Fetterman Jr., discuss how to finance more flying hours.

"It is a huge amount of money," Dunleavy said. "But you have to fly the kid to make him good and you have to fly him more to make him very, very good, which is what you want."

"Some people think these kids fly around and do nothing. . . . Well, these kids are working hard. Flying is fun, but it's also work. You are working hard for 1.7 hours, pulling 7 G's (seven times the acceleration of gravity) in the F/A-18, flying air-to-air and air-to-ground missions, putting missiles up tailpipes and bombs on the ground."

"It's like a ball team. You have to practice over and over again. It's a lot of hard work, and you have to be very good."

For Dunleavy, a non-pilot who was a flight officer in an A-6 Intruder during the Vietnam War, the new aviation bonus system causes other problems. "I'm concerned how it will affect those who don't get the bonus," he said.

The new bonus system targets different skills. Pilots flying an electronic countermeasures EA-6B Prowler or an A-6 Intruder medium attack bomber will receive \$12,000 bonuses, but a non-pilot naval flight officer, or NFO, in the Prowler will receive only \$4,000.

Likewise, the pilot of an E-2C Hawkeye radar plane is eligible for an \$11,000 bonus and his NFO receives \$4,000. Bonuses of \$10,000 are being offered to the pilots of F-14 Tomcat fighters, F/A-18s, S-3 Vikings and A-7 Corsairs. The NFO in an F-14 receives \$4,000.

"Do I agree with that?" Dunleavy asked. "Well, I don't like it because sooner or later I will be flying with the guy over here and he is getting \$12,000 more than I am as an NFO, and we're both going down the same catapult."

That issue is one Dunleavy said he plans to tackle once he gets to Washington.

Another is the congressionally mandated use of more civilians in shore-based Navy jobs. That policy is causing an imbalance in sea-shore rotation and leading to more time at sea for the sailor, Dunleavy said.

Congress "doesn't understand that these sailors need to come to shore," he said. "It's a problem in the future that's coming to a head with the machinist's mates, boiler technicians and electronics technicians. Instead of having three years of sea duty and three years of shore duty, they will be spending five years at sea and three years ashore. Sailors love to go to sea, but they like to come home once in a while to see their bride and kids."

It is becoming rare, Dunleavy said, to see a petty officer first class or chief petty officer at an aviation training command because of the increased civilian manning at those facilities.

In addition, the Navy may be losing the special relationship between the pilot and the sailor who maintained the plane because of civilian manning, he said.

"You could look that kid in the eye and know exactly that (the aircraft) was right," Dunleavy said. "But nowadays our kids are not going to establish that bond" with the pilots they serve, he said, until they get to the ship or shore base.

SCOWCROFT . . . CONTINUED

the inner Brent Scowcroft wants the world to see as the outer Brent Scowcroft, the secret dream beneath this apotheosis of American ordinariness? Don't we all practice our camera faces in the mirror, or, in despair at our vanity, give up the effort and face cameras with a horrible slack-jawed bleakness?

He turns to pose. His face changes not at all, not a twitch.

He walks his guest to the door. Another hearty handshake.

Once out of sight, he begins to revert to type in your mind. You think to yourself: What a nice guy. And: If meritocracies had Houses of Lords, the Brent Scowcrofts would be in them.

In a few years, or four or eight or whatever, when he leaves government again, you figure he'll move into that realm where you see him at his godchildren's book signings, and young journalists will ask, is he still around? And the answer is yes, it's always yes. Permanent fixtures never die. There are rumors of one problem or another, and then someone says, "I saw him in the Georgetown Safeway the other day and he looked fine to me." He may write his memoirs. He plans to, in fact. It is unlikely that anyone will write his biography, but he will be enshrined in 10,000 indexes.

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CIA Aide Acts to Lift Reprimand

Veteran Officer Was First to Warn of Possible Diversion to Aid Contras

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Charles Allen, the first person to warn his CIA superiors about the possibility that profits from U.S. arms sales to Iran were being diverted to aid the Nicaraguan rebels, is appealing a reprimand last year for not being "fully cooperative" with a December 1986 agency investigation.

The reprimand, which was not made public and came as a surprise to some of Allen's former colleagues and congressional investigators, made Allen ineligible for promotions or awards for two years unless approved by CIA Director William H. Webster, who imposed the penalty.

Washington attorney R. James Woolsey said Allen, a Central Intelligence Agency veteran, wants to have the reprimand expunged from his record. "We are in the final stages of preparing his appeal to Judge Webster," Woolsey said, "and I believe . . . once he is fully aware of all the details in the way the inspector general investigation was conducted, he will conclude Mr. Allen was fully cooperative."

Thomas Polgar, one of the Senate Iran-contra investigating panel's top analysts and a former CIA associate director, said last week that "it is astonishing that he would be reprimanded. That comes as a surprise to me."

Another former CIA official, who was familiar with the congressional Iran-contra inquiries, described Allen as a "straightforward" person who had "acted professionally and ethically in a tough situation." He said Webster "had tried to spread the blame around and had missed some [people] altogether."

On Oct. 1, 1986, Allen reported his view about a possible diversion to Robert M. Gates, No. 2 at the CIA. This was almost two months before the diversion became public. At that time Gates encouraged Allen to put the information in a memo for then-CIA Director William J. Casey. Allen wrote two additional memos, with more data about a possible diversion, to Casey in late October and early November.

Gates later told Congress that he thought Allen's evidence was "flim-

sy" and not firm enough to be told to Congress when Casey appeared before the intelligence committees on Nov. 21, 1986. Two days later, National Security Council aide Oliver L. North's "diversion memo" was found in his files by aides to Attorney General Edwin Meese III.

The diversion of profits from U.S. arms sales to Iran to aid the Nicaraguan contras was announced by Meese on Nov. 25, along with the firing of North and the resignation of national security adviser John M. Poindexter. At that time, Meese said no one in the U.S. government had known of the diversion except for North, Poindexter and former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane.

Gates, whose nomination to succeed Casey as CIA director was withdrawn after controversy about Gates' role in the Iran-contra affair, was named last week by President-elect George Bush to be deputy national security adviser in the new administration.

Allen was among the few CIA officials who took part in a behind-the-scenes battle in late November 1986 to have Gates change Casey's draft testimony for Congress because it misrepresented the CIA's knowledge of the November 1985 shipment by Israel of U.S.-made Hawk antiaircraft missiles to Iran.

Gates supervised the preparation of Casey's testimony, which was to be the first detailed administration report to Congress on the affair. The draft said at one point that no one at the CIA knew about Hawks being part of the 1985 shipment at the time the agency gave assistance to the operation.

In the days before Casey's scheduled Nov. 21 Capitol Hill appearance, Allen, along with former CIA general counsel Stanley Sporkin and CIA lawyer Bernard Makowska, worked to find specific documents that proved CIA officials had knowledge of the shipment of missiles to Iran in November 1985. Casey's statement was thereafter modified and Gates later testified he had not been involved in a White House attempt to cover up the 1985 shipment.

Polgar said Allen's appeal of his reprimand may reopen questions about the manner in which the CIA under Webster has dealt with alle-

gations about other agency personnel involved in the Iran-contra investigation.

Webster's actions last December stemmed from a review by a special counsel of congressional and other inquiries conducted before February 1987. The congressional committees in early 1988 began releasing 27 volumes of depositions including testimony by more than 20 CIA officers.

When Webster announced on Dec. 17, 1987, that he was disciplining seven CIA employees involved in the Iran-contra affair, none was identified by name. Other sources, however, identified most of those involved.

Two, Joseph F. Fernandez and Robert Atkins, were dismissed for aiding the contras when it was prohibited by law. Another, Alan D. Fiers, former chief of the agency's Central American task force, was charged with not telling Congress about his knowledge of CIA aid to the contras. He later retired. Duane R. (Dewey) Clarridge, chief of the agency's counterterrorism unit, who aided the November 1985 shipment, was demoted and reprimanded; he also retired.

Allen was among others cited for failing to cooperate with the CIA inspector general's investigation.

Allen was the agency's national intelligence officer for counterterrorism when he was chosen in late 1985 by Casey to work with North on the covert arms sales.

Allen initially raised questions with North in May 1986, when the Iranians were complaining about the high price of the weapons. He had already heard arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar suggest that profits could be used to help other operations, including North's support for the contras fighting the government of Nicaragua.

Allen raised his first doubts with Robert J. Kerr, then-deputy director for intelligence and Allen's boss. He and Kerr, who last week was selected by Bush to replace Gates as No. 2 at the CIA, went to Gates with the suspicions that the arms sales might be generating funds for unknown activities.

Gates, according to Kerr and Allen, showed no interest. Gates told investigators he could not recall the incident.

Closer ties urged between CIA, policy-makers

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — The White House must greatly improve its understanding and use of U.S. intelligence resources and involve the CIA

more closely in its policy-making process as it faces daunting foreign challenges in the next decade, according to two authorities.

Robert M. Gates, a top CIA official just named to be deputy national security adviser in the Bush administration, dismisses a traditionalist view that intelligence officers' independence could be jeopardized through too close association with policy-making. They might, in that view, become advocates instead of objective analyzers of foreign developments.

Mr. Gates said: "Contrary to the view of those who are apprehensive over a close relationship between policy-makers and intelligence, it is not close enough."

Now deputy director of the CIA, Mr. Gates has strong ideas about what causes presidents to be dissatisfied with intelligence agencies and how presidents should spend more time directing the agencies' efforts so that they get useful information.

As deputy to **Brent Scowcroft** in the Bush White House, Mr. Gates presumably will be in a good position to push reforms and remove obstacles to a useful flow of information between policy-makers and intelligence producers.

His position seems to be strongly supported by **Anne Armstrong**, chairwoman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and mid-1970s ambassador to Britain.

Ticking off tough challenges ahead, from terrorism to change in the Soviet Union, she said: "Intelligence will have to become much more a part of the policy process than it has been so far."

Mr. Gates and Mrs. Armstrong set forth their views on modernizing intelligence and policy relationships in lengthy articles in the current *Washington Quarterly*, a publication of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

These appeared as President-elect George Bush was organizing his national security team and, at first blush, was seeming to accord the Central Intelligence Agency a less influential status than that urged by the two authors.

William H. Webster will remain as director of central intelligence, attending Cabinet meetings but not having Cabinet rank. The CIA, Mr. Bush has said, "will have no function in policy at all" except to carry out certain covert operations as provided by law.

An authoritative interpreter of that statement said, however, that Mr. Bush did not foreclose the CIA from being in the policy-making

Closer ties...CONTINUED

process: He simply ruled out the tailoring of intelligence to suit the views and proposals of the CIA director as was done when the late William J. Casey was the director.

In that connection, Mrs. Armstrong described the Iran-contra affair as one in which the interagency policy process broke down and a small group (Oliver North's) took control.

"In some decisive respects," she said, "the problem in the Iran initiative was not the close relationship between the intelligence community and policy-makers; rather, it was its absence."

With demanding tasks in reaching and policing arms control agreements and dealing with a kaleidoscopic world scene of "confusing and diverse pieces," Mrs. Armstrong argued, as Mr. Gates did, for more presidential attention to intelligence.

In his close view of four presidencies, Mr. Gates found mostly negative White House perceptions of intelligence and sought to prescribe remedies through better knowledge of what the nation's massive intelligence apparatus can and cannot do.

"What the hell do those clowns do out there in Langley?" President Richard M. Nixon asked in 1970 — the clowns being the CIA and Langley, Va., being their headquarters.

Mr. Nixon, as Mr. Gates related it,

was annoyed by a CIA misjudgment on planned Soviet missile deployments.

President Jimmy Carter, dismayed by wrong predictions on the Iranian revolution, expressed dissatisfaction "with the quality of our political intelligence." He was also upset early in his administration when the CIA upgraded its estimates of North Korean military strength just when he was planning to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea — a plan he had to abandon.

"Policy-makers usually learn the hard way," Mr. Gates said, "that, although intelligence can tell them a great deal, it only rarely — and usually in cases involving military forces — can make day-to-day decisions simpler and less risky."

Mrs. Armstrong said CIA predictions on the Iranian revolution missed the mark because they did not pay enough attention to the shah's dependence on what the United States might do to prop him up. It had helped him stay in power in the past.

"Perhaps the optimistic intelligence estimates assumed that it would do so again," she said. "If so, this most important assumption (which turned out to be wrong) was not made explicit enough."

There was, in short, a gap between policy-makers and intelligence analysts that led to a wrong prediction and an unhappy president.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

The Editorial Notebook

Who Makes Foreign Policy?

Gelb 1.3.89

White House officials are upset about a Times story reporting that President Bush has put the national security adviser at the heart of the foreign affairs decision-making process. The officials understandably don't want to start a war with the State Department and the Pentagon. But they shouldn't be surprised at the consternation; there are few touchier relationships than that between the security adviser and the Secretary of State.

Not many rivalries have been as destructive of U.S. interests abroad as those between Henry Kissinger and William Rogers in the Nixon Administration, and Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski under President Carter.

In two decades, only two pairs have worked well together: Lieut. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, the current security adviser, who also held that post under President Ford, and Secretary of State Kissinger; and Lieut. Gen. Colin Powell, Mr. Reagan's top security aide, and George Shultz.

The main reason for their success was that neither general made himself into a public spokesman or a diplomatic conduit. For purposes of official contact with the outside world, the Administration spoke with more or less one voice — the Secretary of State's.

That's why it was surprising two Sundays ago when General Scowcroft appeared on a talk show, something he never did when he held the job before. His answers carried the weight of a cabinet officer, and then some. His words will be compared microscopically with subsequent utterances by Secretary of State Baker. General Scowcroft would not have put himself into this position unless President Bush wanted him to play a more public role.

There are, however, high prices to be paid for such a role. Diplomats will do more than the normal amount of

It Is Worrisome To Delegate Heavily To a Security Adviser

rushing to consult with the security adviser and his staff, and get even more confused than usual.

Likewise, everyone will take cues about power from the President's organization charts. That accounts for the concern when Mr. Bush

issued a directive making General Scowcroft chairman of a Policy Committee including the Secretaries of State and Defense.

No President has ever formally lodged such across-the-board power in his security adviser. Mr. Reagan tried half-heartedly in mid-1987, but that effort never got off the ground. Though George Shultz regularly attended informal meetings in General Powell's White House office, he refused to accept the general's formal chairmanship.

No one doubts General Scowcroft's integrity or good will, nor Mr. Bush's right to organize his staff as he pleases. It makes eminent sense for the President to insist on making and coordinating foreign policy, assisted by his security adviser. The White House is the only place where varied bureaucratic claims can be adjudicated and from which rival bureaucracies will accept final direction.

But it's another matter for the President seemingly to delegate policy-making authority to his White House staff. An activist President like George Bush and an experienced aide like Brent Scowcroft undoubtedly prefer the concentration of power in the White House and feel they can make this new arrangement work. It may well be that Secretary Baker likes the idea as well, since it could free him to assist the President in non-foreign fields. But the built-in tension between the two senior foreign policy officials is high; it will take the greatest care to insure that the new system meant to lessen conflict and confusion does not increase them.

LESLIE H. GELB

BAKER SAID TO PICK A KISSINGER MAN

The Choice of Eagleburger for Deputy Secretary of State Is a Pragmatic Signal

By ELAINE SCIOLINO
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 4 — James A. Baker 3d, the Secretary of State-designate, has offered the job of Deputy Secretary to Lawrence S. Eagleburger, colleagues of both men said today. Mr. Eagleburger is a career diplomat long associated with Henry A. Kissinger.

The selection of Mr. Eagleburger, who is said to have accepted the post, is widely viewed as reflecting Mr. Baker's intention to rely on pragmatists who have broad foreign policy backgrounds and years of experience in office.

Mr. Eagleburger and Brent Scowcroft, President-elect George Bush's choice for national security adviser, were aides to Mr. Kissinger during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Their return to senior positions in Washington is likely to antagonize some on the right.

Mr. Eagleburger is now president of Kissinger Associates, the consulting firm founded by the former Secretary of State. A Foreign Service officer he served for 27 years, retiring in 1984 as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, generally regarded as the department's third-ranking post.

The choice of Mr. Eagleburger comes at a time of nervousness among senior career Foreign Service officers, who are anxiously awaiting news of Mr. Baker's personnel plans to know where they will fit in.

'In Great Shape'

Mr. Eagleburger has told friends that he has accepted the deputy post, currently held by John C. Whitehead, the Wall Street investment banker who is returning to New York. Although Mr. Eagleburger, who is 58 years old, smokes, suffers from emphysema and is overweight, he has assured his friends that he is "in great shape."

Among other officials under consideration for senior positions within the Department are Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Ambassador to Indonesia, and Ro-

zanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, who are both in the running for Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Aides to Mr. Bush say that the President-elect will appoint Donald P. Gregg, who has served as the Vice President's national security adviser, as Ambassador to South Korea. Mr. Gregg's appointment has been the subject of debate among Mr. Bush's inner circle because of concern that his role in the Iran-contra affair could lead to a divisive Senate confirmation hearing.

But Mr. Bush is convinced that Mr. Gregg has already answered all relevant questions about his involvement and could survive the toughest questioning.

Others prominently mentioned as ambassadorial nominees are: Henry Catto, a former ambassador to El Salvador and a Republican contributor; Vernon A. Walters, American representative at the United Nations in the Reagan Administration, and Barber B. Conable Jr., president of the World Bank and a former Republican member of the House of Representatives from upstate New York.

'Nothing to It'

Mr. Conable's spokesman at the World Bank denied that the official, a longtime confidant of Mr. Bush, was under consideration.

"There's nothing to it," said the spokesman, Peter Riddleberger. "He hasn't been offered it. He has said nothing that indicates he intends to do anything except to stay here until 1991." That is when Mr. Conable's contract with the international lending agency expires.

Mr. Baker has also tentatively selected three of his aides for major positions, including Dennis B. Ross, the senior foreign policy adviser during the election campaign, as Director of Policy Planning, and Robert Zoellick, top domestic issues adviser in the campaign, as State Department counselor.

Margaret D. Tutwiler, a member of the transition team, is expected to become Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. But unlike Charles E. Redman, who currently holds the job, she may not conduct the State Department briefings every day.

Ms. Tutwiler, who has emerged as a de facto spokeswoman for Mr. Baker, declined comment on the selection of Mr. Eagleburger and the other possible appointments.

"We simply have no comment on any personnel decisions that President-elect Bush and Secretary-designate Baker might or might not have made or are considering," she said.

Now Hunting for Votes

Mr. Baker, who returned from a two-week hunting vacation in Texas on Tuesday, has resumed preparing for his Senate confirmation hearings, which begin on Jan. 17 and is wooing members of Congress.

He is also meeting with the current Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries of State to discuss policy issues but has not sought their advice on personnel matters, according to department officials. And he has caused considerable nervousness within the State Department by failing to assure a number of senior career officers that desirable appointments await them.

"There's not a lot of human contact back and forth yet," a veteran official said. "They seem to be holding to themselves."

In contrast, Mr. Baker — determined to improve the relationship between the State Department and Capitol Hill — has impressed several Senators by visiting them in their offices unaccompanied by staff members, taking his own notes and focusing on details of policy issues as he prepares for confirmation hearings.

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Jim Hoagland

A Key Role for Scowcroft

LONDON—The passing of the flame at Foggy Bottom from George Shultz to Jim Baker on Jan. 20 marks more than a personal handing over of command. The agenda and center of American foreign policy-making also are shifting in this new year.

Shultz ends 6½ years as secretary of state having surprised everyone, including himself, with what he has and has not done. He leaves office with an unexpectedly long list of East-West and arms control accomplishments and a strong friendship with Israel as his Middle East legacy. In international economics and trade, where he was expected to have made his mark, he leaves behind no footprints at all.

If Moscow's favorite saying about unexpected developments is, "It is no accident," the Washington phrase is, "It wasn't planned this way." That phrase covers Shultz's stewardship over American foreign policy.

It began with the emergency transplant of Shultz for Alexander Haig during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Shultz lunched at The Washington Post soon after the change and explained that he was going to delegate a lot of the big-picture political problems to others. He would carve out a lot of time to concentrate on and improve American relations with major trading partners like Canada.

Somebody has to worry about Canada and the soft-wood trade, I recall him saying in great earnestness that day. A secretary of state who devotes most of his time to the Middle East will not have time for anything else; once you get into a problem like the Middle East in an intensive way, it just keeps coming back all the time.

It sounded like a reasonable and sincere proposition for a man who was an economist, ex-secretary both of Treasury and Labor, and former director of the White House's Office of Management and Budget.

Not long after that lunch, however, Shultz disappeared into the Middle East maw. The quick search he embarked upon for a lasting Israeli-Lebanese peace treaty turned out to be protracted and fruitless. The experience left him permanently embittered toward the Arabs and newly sympathetic to the Israelis, who had originally been suspicious of Shultz because of his ties to U.S. business firms with interests in the Arab world.

Then came Mikhail Gorbachev. Shultz became fascinated with guiding Ronald Reagan into and through a sea change in U.S.-Soviet relations. Canada and soft wood, and large financial issues such as Third World debt, were left to others.

Chief among those others was Treasury Secretary Jim Baker, who now gets a chance to reverse Shultz's order of things. There are clear signals that Baker will pay lip service to being a big-picture man and actually concentrate on trade and financial issues from his perch at State, at least initially. This in any event is what Baker has indicated to at least one American businessman to whom he is close.

Another tip-off is the arrival of Robert M. Gates, a Soviet specialist from the Central Intelligence Agency, at the White House to be chief deputy to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. President-elect George Bush appears to want Soviet-U.S. relations run out of the White House and coordinated with a serious review, which Scowcroft will head, of U.S. strategic arms programs.

Shultz's approach to Soviet-U.S. relations was political, based to a great extent on his trust and sympathy for Gorbachev and for Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. If Scowcroft does replace Shultz as the principal U.S. architect of East-West relations, as I suspect, strategic considerations will get higher priority and be integrated more tightly into the next round of superpower bargaining. That is a change to be welcomed.

Scowcroft's experience as an Air Force general and as national security adviser in the Ford administration gives him an enormous head start over Baker and over John Tower at Defense. Scowcroft has already mastered substance and bureaucratic form that Baker and Tower, and their deputies, may spend months learning. He is ready to begin describing and

designing the changes that are needed in U.S. defense spending and force posture, and then integrating those changes into a negotiating strategy.

This is why the next big shoe to drop in the foreign policy transition is one of the most important in determining where initiatives will be developed in the Bush years. Baker can muscle into the East-West strategic game at this stage only by naming as deputy secretary of state a policy heavyweight like Lawrence Eagleburger or William Hyland (if Baker does not have his predecessors' hang-up about ex-Kissinger aides).

There is an alternative that should tempt Baker: choose for top policy posts people with strong backgrounds in Asia. It is an area that Shultz left alone and an area obviously crucial to mapping out new trade and financial options for America. Given the State Department's depth in talented Asia specialists and Scowcroft's strong position on Soviet affairs, it is a division of labor that makes sense.

Sununu Seen Likely To Dominate Little-Known White House Staff

George Bush's anointed White House chief of staff John H. Sununu, hardly the pussycat of his self-description, has hired most of a White House staff that it appears he'll dominate.

Other than Sununu, 49, and national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, 63, the senior aides named so far are men and women in their 30s and early 40s who heretofore have shown the passion for anonymity that by tradition, White House aides should aspire to but rarely attain. Three owe their jobs directly to Bush—personnel chief Chase G. Untermeyer, press secretary Marlin Fitzwater and counsel C. Boyden Gray. Cabinet secretary-designate David Q. Bates Jr. is a longtime Bush personal aide. But the rest owe their jobs mostly or wholly to Sununu.

Sununu's sole rival on the horizon is Robert M. Teeter, who is fast becoming the Bushmen's Hamlet. Teeter, Bush's campaign pollster, weeks ago was offered a spot as deputy chief of staff and counselor to the President, in charge of domestic policy making. Every week he is described as on the verge of deciding whether to say yes, and every week he stays silent.

Why isn't clear. Associates say his indecision is genuine, that his family is horrified at the prospect of moving from Michigan (where until recently he owned a polling firm) to the wilds of Washington. But some smell a ruse. Teeter, a transition official suggested, figures the longer he withholds his answer, the more leverage he'll build.

If that's his game, it has backfired. Teeter's indecision, whether heartfelt or crafty, has damaged his position if he accepts, insiders say. The aides

named in Teeter's absence will owe him nothing.

If he signs on, Teeter might play a role much like Edwin Meese III did in the original Reagan White House. Two offices—domestic policy and communications (which includes speechwriting and public liaison)—would report to him and the rest to Sununu. This would enable him to think great thoughts and write the accompanying lyrics while Sununu's aides decide whether to effect them. That puts Sununu in the role of James A. Baker III, President Reagan's first chief of staff, who swiftly bested Meese for staff preeminence.

Should Teeter remain a Michigander, the whole caboodle (except Scowcroft's shop) will go to Sununu.

As chief of staff, Sununu is unlikely to be boring. The strong-willed conservative, who finished six years as New Hampshire's governor on Jan. 5, isn't

known for suffering fools gladly—in Washington, an essential. In New Hampshire, Sununu has exhibited "a low tolerance for those who mask incompetence with bureaucratic rhetoric," said former New Hampshire Attorney General Thomas D. Rath, who has known Sununu for 15 years. Sununu likes to delegate and also to follow up, Rath said. He "works well from paper," he said. "The best way to deal with him is to write a memo. You're sure it'll get read."

But on important matters, Sununu likes to deal face-to-face, according to David M. Carney, his deputy chief of staff and top political aide in New Hampshire. He is a man of high energy who doesn't like his time wasted. In meetings and conversation, "he gets right to the point," Carney said.

In the White House, Sununu is expected to rely heavily on two deputies—Andrew H. Card Jr. and James W. Cicconi. Card, 41, a former Massachusetts legislator, will be deputy to the chief of staff and is expected to handle the runoff from Sununu's presumably enormous workload. A former Reagan aide, Card served Bush's campaign by sharpening the daggers thrown at Michael S. Dukakis. But he's considered good with people. "When Sununu bloodies somebody, they'll meet with Card for five minutes and feel OK," a transition official said. "His favorite line is, 'I care.'"

Cicconi, 36, a longtime Baker aide, has been named staff secretary, putting him in charge of the Oval Office paper flow. Cicconi, lawyerly in demeanor as well as professionally (in the Washington office of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, a Dallas law firm) also will preside over the President's sched-

uling—a break with past practice.

As secretary to the Cabinet, Bates will have the Cabinet's Domestic Policy Council and Economic Policy Council—sometimes important in Reagan's tenure—reporting to him. But Bates, a Houston native who served in the Reagan Commerce and Treasury Departments, may find his influence curbed by the fact that the several Cabinet members who are personally close to Bush may deal with the President directly.

J. Bonnie Newman, 43, is being brought from New Hampshire by Sununu to become assistant to the President for operations. She'll administer the nitty-gritty of the White House—notably, distributing White House staff perquisites. A former congressional aide and assistant Commerce secretary, she is now president of an industry group called New England Council Inc.

Frederick D. McClure, a former Reagan White House lobbyist who's now Texas Air Corp.'s Washington lobbyist, will be assistant to the President for legislative affairs. And David F. Demarest, 37, a protégé of former Labor Secretary Bill Brock, will be communications director.

Edward M. Rogers Jr., 30, formerly White House political director and deputy to Bush's campaign manager, has been named as Sununu's executive assistant.

Edith (Ede) Holiday will be named as assistant to the President for intergovernmental and political affairs, a Bush aide said. Her departure from her post as assistant Treasury secretary for public affairs and public liaison is said to have angered Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady.—Burt Solomon

Bitter Ideological Split in Party Seen Closing

Conservatives Quiet on Bush's Selection of Kissinger Allies

By DOYLE McMANUS, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Thirteen years ago, when then-Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger appeared at the Republican National Convention, many of Ronald Reagan's delegates stood up and booed at the man they considered an unwelcome symbol of foreign policy moderation. And eight years ago, when Reagan first entered the White House, Kissinger and many of his former aides were pointedly passed over when foreign policy appointments were made.

But times have changed. Two of the most important foreign policy jobs in the new Bush Administration have gone to former "Kissinger men," with more reportedly to come. There has been hardly a peep of protest from the GOP's right wing. And Kissinger himself, who sometimes criticized Reagan's leadership in a tone approaching contempt, has nothing but compliments for the abilities of George Bush.

"I'm very enthusiastic about the new Administration," the former secretary of state said in a recent telephone interview. "Very, very enthusiastic."

Worked for Kissinger

Bush's choice for national security adviser, **Brent Scowcroft**, and deputy secretary of state, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, are not only former Kissinger aides; for the last five years they also have both been officers of Kissinger Associates, Kissinger's private consulting firm.

Several other Kissinger acolytes are also in line for top jobs under Secretary of State-designate James A. Baker III, according to Reagan Administration officials and Bush transition aides: William G. Hyland, now editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, John D. Negroponte, a National Security Council aide, and Winston Lord, the U.S. ambassador to China.

In years past, a mere mention of their names would have prompted dire warnings from Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and other conservative stalwarts that Reagan's foreign policy legacy was in danger of being sabotaged. But a call last week to Helms' office produced only a private word of disparagement from an aide about "the Kissinger-Rockefeller types," a reference to Kissinger's original political patron, the late Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller.

Instead, the return of the Kissin-

ger men—and the broad applause their reappointments have drawn—suggest that the bitter ideological differences which often divided not only the Republican Party but also the Reagan Cabinet as well are largely over.

"What we're seeing, ironically, is a turn to competence rather than ideology," said another former Kissinger aide, Helmut Sonnenfeldt (borrowing a line from Bush's opponent, Massachusetts Gov. Michael S. Dukakis, in the presidential campaign).

"The appointments, for the most part, have gone to the center of the spectrum," he said. "What it says is that Bush is going to be that kind of President, and Baker is going to be that kind of secretary of state. . . . You'll be getting professional people, pragmatic people."

"A triumph of competence over ideology," echoed Kenneth L. Adelman, Reagan's former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "It's a more standard Republican lot than the Reagan Administration started with, more the country club Republican set . . . a vanilla crowd."

"It's hard to find in this group what the drive will be, what the message will be," Adelman added. "The Reagan Administration had SDI [the Strategic Defense Initiative], the Reagan Doctrine [of aid to anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua and elsewhere], the mission of revitalizing American strength. What are these guys going to do?"

But even Adelman agrees that the time is ripe for a more centrist approach. "This is a very different time from 1980," he said. "Then the strategic momentum was with the Soviet Union, and the United States had to find a way to turn that around. Now everything's coming up roses, and what we have to do is stay on a steady path."

Conservative Views

To be sure, Bush has not deserted the conservative tenets of Reagan's foreign policy. The President-elect still supports SDI, aid for the Contras and the use of U.S. military power in the Persian Gulf and other trouble spots.

"The center of gravity has shifted a bit, but not that much," argued a Bush aide. "Ronald Reagan's appointments went way up into the

90 percents on a conservative scale. George Bush's appointments have maybe scaled back from 90 to 85. They're still conservatives."

But Bush's style has been noticeably different from Reagan's already, even before his inauguration. His rhetoric has been less fiery; "He has a less emotional approach to the issues," noted Sonnenfeldt. And his attitude toward Congress has been more conciliatory, both Democrats and Republicans say.

And the most ideological conservatives, the ones who struggled to keep the Reagan Administration's anti-Soviet foreign policy "pure," are noticeably absent from the lists of rumored appointees.

"Part of it is that the Reaganites just aren't available any more. They've done their bit in government, and now they're out doing other things," the Bush aide said.

The Bush Administration still faces some internal foreign policy debates. On Nicaragua, for example, the President-elect has spoken strongly in favor of renewed U.S. military aid to the Contras in an attempt to push the leftist regime toward internal democracy. But some members of Congress have said that Baker seems skeptical about how effective the battered Contras can be; and associates say Eagleburger, like Kissinger, has long believed that the center of U.S. concern in Central America should be the threat of growing Soviet influence in the region rather than the quest for parliamentary democracy.

As for Kissinger, Bush aides say he may be asked to head special commissions on foreign policy problems, as he did for Reagan on Central America in 1983-1984. Asked about a possible role for him as a special negotiator in the Middle East or elsewhere, though, they sound uncertain.

"People would spend most of their time worrying about whether Henry was walking away with the store," said one.

In any case, Kissinger himself says he is quite delighted to see his friends walk away with the Administration's best jobs, and quite happy to remain in private life with the best contacts in Washington.

"I probably shouldn't say this," he mused. "But there probably isn't a job there that I really want."

Power Struggle Keeps Top Pentagon Posts From Being Filled

By MYRON STRUCK
Defense News Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — A high-level struggle between the inner circle of advisers to President-elect George Bush and John Tower, his nominee for defense secretary, has stalled the selection of a new management team at the Pentagon, knowledgeable administration officials and congressional sources say.

Over the past month, at least three senior corporate managers have turned down Bush's offers or inquiries concerning the deputy defense secretary position, stalling announcements of additional top personnel at the Pentagon.

The sources say Bush has asked Norman Augustine, the outspoken president of Martin Marietta Corp. and Paul O'Neill, the president of the Aluminum Corp. of America, and at least one other corporate official, to take the deputy post so far.

But two sources say that the administration has settled on Robert Kirk, chairman and chief executive officer of Allied-Signal Corp., and a longtime friend of Tower from the days when Kirk was with LTV Aerospace and Defense Corp. in Dallas, from 1977 to 1986.

A spokesman for Kirk says "he is under review, and you can understand that this is a sensitive

time." Kirk, who turned 60 last Wednesday, was in the process of moving into a new Washington home on Friday, and out of telephone contact.

Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Bush's pick for national security adviser, said last Tuesday, "we are continuing to review personnel for the high levels at the Pentagon so we can find candidates who are acceptable to everyone."

At this point Tower, who underwent unexpected surgery to remove polyps from his colon in late December and again last Thursday, is refusing interviews. His key staffer, Richard Billmire, has set up shop in the office of the undersecretary of defense for policy and has been meeting with senior officials at the Pentagon on Tower's behalf beginning the transition.

In the behind-the-scenes jockeying for deputy secretary, sources said the candidates who have turned down the job did so on the grounds they did not want to work with Tower. An associate of Augustine said recently that discussions with the aerospace executive never reached the point where Bush specifically asked Augustine to join government after Augustine made it clear that he was not interested in working with Tower.

While Kirk, the current front-

runner for the position, is described as a Tower admirer, the deal is far from set with the now increasingly tedious background check from the FBI apparently under way.

The Kirk associate said "he has a strong sense of service, and has said that it's time to give something back to the government after years of working in the private sector."

"There seems to be a turf struggle over who gets to do what," said Lawrence Korb, a former assistant secretary of defense for manpower, installations and logistics, who is known to have opposed Tower's selection on both ideological and managerial grounds.

"Little can be done if they can't get anyone to accept the top jobs," adds Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. "I think we've just got to wait a while."

Playing into the debate from the days when Tower's name was first rumored to have been Bush's selection for the position was the fear, or hope, that he would bring with him a team of managers who had worked with him on Capitol Hill. Tower served on the Senate Armed Services Committee throughout his four-term Senate career, and from 1981 to 1985 was the panel's chairman.

That team would include:

■ William Ball III, the current Navy Secretary who worked with Tower from 1975 to 1983 on the Armed Services Committee before joining the Reagan White House as a congressional liaison official.

■ James McGovern, the acting Air Force Secretary, who was Tower's general counsel on the Armed Services Committee. He would be nominated Air Force Secretary.

■ Rhett Dawson, now a senior administrative manager in the Reagan White House, who was staff director and chief counsel on the Armed Services Committee, would become general counsel.

■ Michael Stone, undersecretary of the Army, who has not

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from Pg. 7

tary of the Army, who has not worked with Tower, is believed to be his pick for Army Secretary, replacing John Marsh, a former Democratic congressman from Virginia who has held the post throughout the Reagan administration. Stone worked at the Agency for International Development.

tracies of the weapons acquisition process.

Two other top-level policy making positions are being played as jokers in a high stakes poker game: the position of undersecretary for policy and undersecretary for acquisition.

In the policy post, Tower, a knowledgeable source said, is pressing for the addition of Alton Keel, another former Senate Armed Services Committee aide who is now the U.S. ambassador to NATO. Keel has high-level managerial experience after spending five years as the associate director of the Office of Management and Budget for national security and international affairs.

Several sources said a leading contender is Edward Luttwak, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who is being backed by a coalition of congressional and Reagan-allied Republicans.

With the Operation III Wind investigation into illegalities by government officials and consultants unfolding, the second position that has moved to center stage is that of undersecretary for acquisition, a post now held by Robert Costello.

Costello's chances of retaining his position are enhanced by Tower's willingness to carry this undersecretary's game plan to Bush for review, the source said, paired with the fact that virtually no one is talking about specific candidates as a Costello successor.

R. James Woolsey, a former undersecretary of the Navy, who has worked with Scowcroft on an "American Agenda" report on defense issues, said the delay in selecting the highest level of players is weakening the ability of the new team to come out of the box fighting.

opment early in the Reagan administration, and previously — from 1973 to 1982 — was the president of Sterling Vineyards in Napa Valley, Calif.

While the credentials for the four top Tower players show both experience and expertise, Bush and other close advisors, including Secretary of State-designate James Baker, have pressed for an experienced manager for the No. 2 position to help manage the in-

Scapegoating?

Brent Scowcroft, new White House national-security adviser, thinks allegations of waste, fraud and abuse by military contractors are overstated. "Industry tends to be the scapegoat... for the Pentagon and for the Congress," Scowcroft says next week in a Fox TV special on defense. "It's an easy way out to blame [industry] for the kinds of problems... by and large created within the government."

Wednesday, January 11, 1989 -- A-6

BUSH TO NAME PRINCIPAL DOMESTIC ADVISER

WASHINGTON -- President-elect Bush on Wednesday will name Roger Porter, a Harvard government and business professor with extensive White House experience, to be his principal domestic adviser, transition sources said Tuesday night.

Porter, an influential domestic policy aide under Presidents Ford and Reagan, will be the domestic counterpart to Brent Scowcroft, who was selected as Bush's national security adviser.

A Harvard faculty member since 1977, Porter has focused his teaching and research on issues such as those he will wrestle with daily, including the management of federal policy development and the formulation of domestic and international economic policy.

...The transition sources said Porter will also be one of Bush's top economic advisers.
(Walter Robinson, Boston Globe)

Thursday, January 12, 1989 -- A-8

BUSH STAFF STRUCTURE: MUCH LIKE REAGAN'S

President-elect Bush has borrowed a White House structure from President Reagan and filled it with a senior staff that reflects Bush's priorities, including a new position to carry out his "thousand points of light" campaign and a top issues adviser who is a specialist on the savings and loan crisis.

A senior Bush adviser, speaking on condition he not be named, said the President-elect has tentatively approved keeping the twin domestic issues forums used by Reagan -- a domestic policy council and economic council. The official said that Attorney General Thornburgh would head the domestic policy council and Treasury Secretary Brady the economic council.

Meanwhile, incoming White House chief of staff John Sununu announced the appointment of 15 senior officials, largely filling out Bush's White House staff except for people under national security adviser Brent Scowcroft....

Among those named assistant to the president, the highest White House staff rank, is Richard Breeden...who is considered an expert on the turmoil in the savings and loan industry....

Sununu also announced the appointment of Gregg Petersmeyer, senior vice president and director of General Atlantic Energy Corp. in Denver, to the new post of deputy assistant to the president for national service....

(David Hoffman & Ann Devroy, Washington Post, A14)

Bush Budget Aide Hints at Willingness to Accept Deep Cuts in Defense, Worrying Pentagon Brass

By ANDY PASZTOR

And JOHN E. YANG

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

WASHINGTON — Richard Darman, President-elect Bush's choice to be budget director, is privately passing the word on Capitol Hill that he is so intent on reducing the deficit without raising taxes that he would accept the deep, automatic spending cuts mandated by the Gramm-Rudman law.

The hope is that this will calm Wall Street and world-wide credit markets worried that nothing will be done about the U.S. budget deficit in view of Mr. Bush's promise not to raise taxes.

But the prospect of automatic cuts certainly doesn't calm the brass across the Potomac River in the Pentagon. They say that the across-the-board cuts—projected to take around \$15 billion out of Pentagon outlays and as much as \$30 billion out of Pentagon budget authority, which determines future spending—would gut the nation's defense.

Outgoing Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, whose bitter opposition helped stave off Gramm-Rudman cuts during the last budget battle, says that invoking them now "would be devastating for the Pentagon," requiring the armed forces "to get rid of people and lay up ships."

Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bush's national security adviser, reportedly has expressed concern to the president-elect over the prospect of such major reductions.

Thus some lawmakers and defense officials suspect that Mr. Darman, who acknowledges that he isn't espousing established Bush administration policy in this area, merely wants to stake out the strongest possible negotiating position to fight anticipated Democratic tax-increase proposals. Even so, few people relish the thought of calling his bluff.

"That would be the biggest defense cut in the post-Vietnam era, at a time when we're negotiating with the Soviets," contends House Budget Committee Chairman

Leon Panetta (D., Calif.). "Neither the administration nor the Congress would find that tolerable."

Gramm-Rudman was designed to take a disproportionately larger bite out of defense spending than non-defense spending. Under the law, half the automatic cuts needed to bring the deficit down to the targeted level would have to come from defense spending, even though defense represents only about 27% of the current federal budget. In addition, such social programs as Social Security, Medicaid and food stamps are exempt and cuts in some health programs, including Medicare, would be limited.

The mandated cuts would force the Air Force to cannibalize jet fighters for spare parts, some Navy ships still in their prime probably would be mothballed or restricted to port, and spending levels for training pilots, sailors and infantry troops would be cut substantially, according to Pentagon and congressional budget analysts.

More pessimistic projections call for taking out of active service 200 or so tactical fighters and strategic bombers, along with curtailed operations of some Navy aircraft-carrier groups. Once the deficit-reduction law kicks in, neither Congress nor the military has much flexibility to insulate specific defense program areas from cutbacks.

Given such a scenario, congressional budget analysts predict that the Navy would slash acquisition of new training aircraft. Various missile programs affecting all the services likely would receive big hits because they generally aren't protected by multiyear production contracts.

Mr. Bush almost certainly would exercise his right under the law to exempt from mandatory cuts pay and other benefits for personnel in uniform, which account for roughly 25% of the Pentagon's annual budget. However, that would make reductions even deeper in other areas.

If Mr. Darman's gambit results in

Gramm-Rudman cuts, it could wreak havoc with new, supersecret weapons programs, defense and congressional budget officials say, probably prompting paring back of multibillion-dollar contracts for radar-eluding bombers and scaling back production of a new generation of guided-missile destroyers. These officials worry that nuclear-missile submarines expected to form the core of U.S. military security through the 1990s also could be affected.

"It would be bad for both Democrats and Republicans, for the White House and Congress," says Sen. Bennett Johnston (D., La.), a senior member of the Senate Budget Committee. "It is absolutely Russian roulette to predict who comes out on the top of the heap" in such a scenario, he adds.

Many officials think Mr. Darman's play could be checked if high-ranking military officers and former Sen. John Tower, Mr. Bush's nominee to head the Defense Department, decide to launch a counteroffensive. Some Pentagon officials argue that no matter how committed the Bush administration is to keeping its vow of "no new taxes," it couldn't stomach the chaos and plummeting military morale that would be created by indiscriminate Gramm-Rudman reductions.

On the other hand, some top Republicans believe that Mr. Darman's stance would give the Bush administration leverage in anticipated budget negotiations with Congress. "The weakest point of Reagan summity [on the budget in 1987] was the almost-certain belief that, in the end, they would not accept" the automatic cuts, argues Ohio Rep. Willis Gradison, a senior Republican on the House Budget Committee. "It weakened their hand."

But, given the severity of the potential defense cuts, the ultimate decision "wouldn't be made by Dick Darman, it would have to be made by the president," Rep. Gradison emphasizes.

So, even if the Gramm-Rudman automatic cuts aren't triggered this time triggered if the Office of Management and Budget projects in August that the budget deficit for fiscal 1990, which begins Oct. 1, an impending budget crisis for the military will be more than \$10 billion bigger than the Gramm-Rudman law's target of \$100 billion.

Even accepting the Reagan administration's optimistic fiscal 1990 deficit projection of \$126.9 billion, that would mean a

\$13.5 billion cut from current Pentagon spending. The Congressional Budget Office forecasts a deficit of \$141 billion, which would require a \$20.5 billion Pentagon spending cut.

When relatively small automatic cuts under Gramm-Rudman took effect in 1986, Pentagon budget planners were able to cushion the jolt by shifting money among different accounts. But that is likely to be more difficult this time, primarily because the growth in military spending has been scaled back significantly in the intervening years. And Democrats in Congress are likely to fight attempts to protect such controversial projects as the Strategic Defense Initiative, President Reagan's cherished space-based anti-missile research program.

The Pentagon's \$296 billion current budget may be larger than the gross national product of all but seven countries in the non-communist world, but only about 10% of that is true discretionary spending.

The rest is taken up with military pay, operation and maintenance costs, and defense weapons-procurement money obligated in prior years, none of which can be cut without a great deal of anguish.

So, even if the Gramm-Rudman automatic cuts aren't triggered this time around, Bush supporters such as former Navy Secretary John Lehman worry about an impending budget crisis for the military. "Whether it comes through Gramm-Rudman or through congressional action, we're going to see those kinds of cut-

backs," predicts Mr. Lehman, "and there will be a rapid disintegration of the readiness of our forces."

Anticipated naming of Atwood to Pentagon staff expected to aid planning

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — President-elect George Bush's choice of a General Motors executive, Donald Atwood Jr., for the Pentagon's all-important No. 2 post is expected to break a logjam that has slowed defense planning at a time of major budget, congressional and foreign issues.

Since the long-delayed selection of John G. Tower as defense secretary-designate on Dec. 16, the administration that takes power Friday has announced no other appointments to the world's largest enterprise, the U.S. military establishment.

The transition is "slow getting off the ground," a current high-ranking official said from his Pentagon vantage point. There has been no formal mechanism for planning budget revisions, arms control positions and responses to changes in Soviet strategy, Bush sources acknowledge.

By all accounts, however, the president-elect is about to announce the choice of Mr. Atwood, 64, General Motors' vice chairman, as deputy defense secretary, as reported earlier by the *New York Times*.

In that post, the experienced industrial manager and engineer

would run the Pentagon's day-to-day operations, especially including the supervision and reform of multibillion-dollar arms purchasing programs.

The selection of a man with industry credentials to complement Mr. Tower as policy-maker was seen as particularly important in light of acknowledged waste in procurement practices and of buying scandals now under investigation.

Mr. Atwood's selection was expected to clear the way for announcement of other top job choices, including retention of some officials in their present posts. That in turn would put the transition and attention to major issues on a faster track.

Numerous sources said the possible lineup in Mr. Tower's Pentagon included:

Rhett Dawson as Army secretary or Defense Department general counsel. Mr. Dawson was once on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, of which Mr. Tower later was chairman, and was staff director for the Packard Commission, which proposed Pentagon reforms now to be enforced. He currently is a White House official.

William L. Ball III to remain as Navy secretary. A former White House liaison official with Congress, he, too, has long known former Tex-

as Senator Tower.

James F. McGovern to remain as Air Force secretary. He was chief of the Senate Armed Services Committee staff when Mr. Tower was committee chairman.

Paul D. Wolfowitz, now ambassador to Indonesia and assistant secretary of state for East Asia at the time of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos' fall, to be undersecretary of defense for policy.

An official also mentioned for undersecretary was Alton Keel, now U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and a former Senate staff aide to Mr. Tower.

There also were reports yesterday that the present deputy defense secretary, William H. Taft IV, might succeed Mr. Keel in the NATO post in Brussels, Belgium.

Besides the slow assembling of a national security team, a main factor delaying transition work has been Mr. Tower's hospitalization for surgery in Dallas — now behind him.

That, and secretary of state-designate James A. Baker III's need to prepare intensively for Senate confirmation hearings, have left the new national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, more or less alone in reviewing interagency national security planning.

All such planning, and relevant presidential decision directives, are customarily reviewed closely by incoming administrations.

The new one must decide whether to accept President Reagan's proposed \$315.2 billion defense budget for fiscal 1990, representing a \$6 billion increase after adjusting for inflation. It can cut or rearrange programs, or confront congressional Democrats with such choices.

Its planning in this regard can have impact on arms control issues and a major influence on the larger question of responses to new moves in Moscow.

So far this planning is in embryonic stages, sources say. Given the inexorable schedule of congressional examinations, especially of budgetary plans, time is running short.

Bush Team Plans Early Review of Military, Arms-Talks Policy

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The first order of business for the incoming Bush administration in U.S.-Soviet relations is expected to be a high-level review of military and arms issues that will take a new look at U.S. negotiating positions in superpower arms talks, according to officials close to President-elect George Bush.

The policy review has been urged by incoming White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and publicly endorsed by Bush.

It could take a month or two, if a "minimal" study of U.S. military programs and arms control positions is authorized. It could take a year if a "maximal" long-range evaluation of the U.S. strategic posture and objectives is authorized, according to a senior official of the new administration who asked not to be quoted by name.

With the Bush administration set to assume the reins of government on Friday, this source said there has yet been no serious consideration among top officials of the objectives and extent of the review process, despite growing speculation and concern about it among career U.S. officials and allied governments.

"The right-wing slogan is no longer 'slam the Soviets' but now it is 'review forever,'" said a career official familiar with the undercur-

rents of discussion and expectation in the field of Soviet policy. An article in last Wednesday's Baltimore Sun, which is believed to have been based on a background interview with Scowcroft, suggested that the continuation of substantive strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets might be delayed as long as a year while the Bush administration formulates its policies.

A source familiar with Scowcroft's thinking, asked to comment on the Baltimore Sun account, said that any estimate of the date for resuming arms control talks is premature.

What seems to be clear, from the comments of Bush and Scowcroft, is the basic concept that a high-level review encompassing decisions on U.S. strategic military forces is a necessary step toward the formation of positions on remaining issues in the strategic nuclear arms negotiations. Foremost among the military decisions is the future of land-based U.S. missiles such as the MX or the proposed Midgetman mobile missile.

A review that is done inside the administration by National Security Council, Defense, State Department and other administration staffers might be completed a month after it is authorized, said a senior official of the incoming administration. If this "minimal review" were to tackle seriously the question of what a national security consensus

or coalition in Congress would accept, it probably would take at least six weeks to two months, the official said.

At the other end of the spectrum would be a longer-range, more intensive study of basic U.S. objectives in the nuclear and conventional forces field. Such a study would include issues such as the most desirable balance of forces of various kinds between the two superpowers and their allies, fundamental U.S. objectives in Europe and the relationships of separate negotiations in nuclear, conventional and chemical

Thursday, January 19, 1989 -- A-10

BAKER PLEDGES NO REPEAT OF IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL

Secretary of State-designate James Baker pledged Wednesday there will be no repeat in the Bush administration of the free-wheeling covert operations that marked the Iran-contra scandal.

Baker, at his confirmation hearing, told senators that he, President-elect Bush and incoming national security adviser Brent Scowcroft have "specifically discussed" that "breakdown."

...He said Bush has roughly 25 years in government, much of it in foreign and national security affairs. "We're going to make the system work the way the system should work," said Baker.

...After six hours of discussion on Tuesday and nearly five hours Wednesday, the Senate committee was ready to endorse Baker unanimously in time for full Senate confirmation before Bush's inauguration Friday.

Baker, sometimes ad-libbing, sometimes referring to briefing papers, indicated that Bush will largely follow Reagan Administration policies.

(Walter Friedenberg, Scripps Howard)

The Unsinkable Kissinger Bobs Back

By Garry Wills

EVANSTON, Ill. Looming behind the Bush cabinet is the improbable but inescapable figure of Henry A. Kissinger.

He must have been displaying his deftest footwork of late to George Bush's people. Not only did Mr. Kissinger show up on the transition team, but two top officers in the new administration — Brent Scowcroft, who will be the President's national security adviser, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who will be Deputy Secretary of State — are being taken from his consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, stocked with the most trustworthy subordinates from his days in office.

Since he entered politics as Nelson A. Rockefeller's left-hand man, Henry Kissinger has always been a suspect item to the right. After he found more acceptable patronage under Richard Nixon, Mr. Kissinger still represented all those things that conservatives found trickiest in Dick's treatment even of them — the opening to China, détente, the antiballistic missile treaty, SALT I.

When the hapless Gerald R. Ford inherited the White House after Watergate, and Mr. Kissinger became the acting president for foreign affairs, hostility on the right became so shrill that Mr. Ford purged "détente" from his Administration's vocabulary. Mr. Ford kept Henry hidden during most of the 1976 Republican National Convention, and even allowed a renunciation of Mr. Kissinger in the Reagan platform.

Thus, when Ronald Reagan was nominated for the Presidency four years later, Mr. Kissinger could expect little honor from his former vilifiers. But he had been laboring to ingratiate himself with the right during the Carter years, denouncing his former achievements. At the convention that nominated Mr. Reagan, Mr. Kis-

singer tried to reinsert himself in the Government by securing the Vice Presidential nomination for his stalking horse, Mr. Ford. According to Karl Marx's formula, he seemed to be replaying as farce all the back channel shuffling that took him to China.

But the White House proved harder to reach than the Great Wall. Mr. Kissinger had to settle, in the Reagan years, for sniping at negotiations with the Soviets from his new perch on the right. Like Paul H. Nitze, the veteran arms negotiator, he seems to consider arms control a snare and delusion unless he is himself doing the snaring and deluding. Two Kissinger

Op-Ed articles frightened Alexander M. Haig Jr., then the Secretary of State, out of trying to set up meetings with the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei A. Gromyko.

On human rights as a foreign policy concern, Mr. Kissinger took the hard, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick line when he headed Mr. Reagan's National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. There was still resistance to him among conservatives; but William F. Buckley Jr. said that was unfair, since Mr. Kissinger had taken positions "substantially to the right of the positions taken by George Bush."

But all this toadying to former critics seemed doomed to failure if Mr. Bush won. Bob Dole, Jack Kemp, Albert M. Gore Jr. — any of them should have been more receptive to his "expertise" than Mr. Bush, a man who has real foreign policy experience himself, much of it made unhappy because of Mr. Kissinger.

It was Mr. Kissinger who kept Mr. Bush in the dark while the latter tried, as chief delegate to the United Nations, to keep Taiwan seated in the General Assembly. Mr. Bush was not informed of the trip Mr. Kissinger took to woo the People's Republic of China, with the result, as Mr. Bush puts it in his autobiography, that "we were saying one thing in New York and doing another in Washington."

When Mr. Bush was appointed the liaison officer to China, Mr. Kissinger tried to discourage him from doing anything substantial and made it clear "China policy was to be handled only by him and his closest aides," as Mr. Bush wrote. Mr. Bush saw Chairman Mao only when Mr. Kissinger arrived for one of his imperial-scale visits, one of the few things Mr. Bush allows himself to mock in his determinedly polite autobiography.

So the odds were against Mr. Kissinger's playing an important role in the Bush administration. But that is just the sort of bind that calls for the Kissinger prestidigitation. Who expected Nelson Rockefeller's man to show up at the Hotel Pierre as part of Mr. Nixon's transition team in 1968? Mr. Kissinger did not quite insert Mr. Ford (and therefore himself) into the second spot on the Reagan ticket, but the sheer nerviness of the attempt was breathtaking.

Given the recent configuration of Republican politics — Mr. Bush to the right of Mr. Reagan on Soviet policy, and Mr. Kissinger to the right of Mr. Bush — James A. Baker 3d, Mr. Bush's choice as Secretary of State, may be sending a signal of toughness by recruiting Kissingerites. But there is always the chance that Mr. Kissinger, back in influence, will "do a Nitze." And right-wing suspicions outlive almost every other political fungus in Washington.

The Kissinger people have been dodging along behind him in such complicated patterns over the years that they are bound to recross their steps wherever they move. Besides, for the principal himself, deft as he is at slipping out from under one protective arm and under another, that duck-and-move puts the face down where elbows fly thickest. Mr. Kissinger may ultimately, by sheer effrontery of maneuver, be unsinkable; but he has proved in the past that even he is partially submersible. □

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'Keynote is caution' as Bush team sets policy toward Soviets

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President-elect Bush takes office today facing more pressing national security decisions than any recent predecessor, but he will move carefully in reshaping defense policies, according to top transition officials.

"The keynote of everything is caution," said one knowledgeable official, who spoke on condition he not be identified. "You're going to find Bush almost more cautious than Reagan in dealing with the Soviet Union."

At the core of that caution, according to this official and others, is a strong desire by Mr. Bush and his national security team to put U.S. defense priorities in order, thereby ensuring that chances to modernize the nation's armed forces are not traded away at the arms talks table.

Representatives of the new administration have been spreading the word, publicly and privately, that Mr. Bush plans as his first step after taking office an intensive review of current U.S. strategy in a broad range of areas affecting national security.

Only then, aides say, will the "Big Four"—Mr. Bush, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Secretary of State-designate James Baker III and Secretary of Defense-designate John Tower—begin making decisions on specific topics.

These include whether and how to tinker with President Reagan's final Pentagon budget proposal, which programs to emphasize in modernizing U.S. nuclear weapons, and how to finish negotiating the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty cutting those weapons.

Also on the agenda is whether Mr. Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative should continue on its present course—deployment of an initial space-based missile defense in about 10 years—be relegated to long-term research, or redirected toward a limited, ground-based system useful only in protecting military facilities or deflecting an accidental missile launch.

While Mr. Bush stressed again yesterday his intent to conduct a thorough-going policy review, legislators are pressuring the new president to explain his position on everything from the Stealth bomber to the limited anti-missile system. Eight reports to Congress on these and other topics are due during Mr. Bush's first 60 days in office.

One such report, due Feb. 15, requires Mr. Bush to decide whether he will spend \$350 million in an escrow account on developing the train-carried version of the 10-warhead MX missile or the smaller, more expensive "Midgetman" missile carried on trucks.

The choice has huge implications not only for the Pentagon budget, but for the U.S. stance at the START talks.

"It's going to be difficult for them to reach that [decision]" by that early date, said Alton Frye, Washington director of the Council on Foreign Relations and member of the Annapolis Group, a bipartisan nuclear weapons study panel. But he added, "Perhaps they can."

The panel released a study Tuesday that found a bipartisan consensus among the 125 lawmakers and foreign policy analysts it interviewed that completing the START treaty should be Mr. Bush's highest foreign policy priority. The survey reflected support for wrapping up the pact more quickly than Mr. Bush apparently intends.

The president-elect announced in December that he would delay resumption of the negotiations beyond the Feb. 15 date recommended by the Reagan administration in order to review current U.S. proposals on the table in Geneva. The treaty would limit both superpowers to 6,000 nuclear warheads on 1,600 land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and manned bombers.

"I think the Soviets understand that my intention is not to drag my feet, but to simply do a prudent reassessment," Mr. Bush said yesterday in an interview with wire service reporters. "And in terms of how long, I don't think we really know yet. I don't feel inclined to adopt a timetable."

Mr. Frye said that of all domestic and foreign issues confronting the new administration, START represents the best opportunity for an early policy success.

Mr. Frye acknowledged that the Bush team is walking a "fine line" in reviewing previous policies while at the same time not wanting to appear unwilling to make progress on arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations in general.

William Schneider, a former undersecretary of state who has informally advised Mr. Bush on defense matters, said, "I don't have any sense that Bush is going to take a long time for a review."

The incoming administration is focusing on the implications of an expected long-term decline in the growth of military spending. But, Mr. Schneider said, "I haven't seen any indication that Bush is going to send up a budget amendment that will greatly change the Reagan budget proposal in the aggregate."

Transition officials said the review of U.S. strategy has been under way for some time, with what the first official called "extensive discussions" between Gen. Scowcroft and Mr. Tower.

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ABC NEWS

THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY

Sunday, January 22, 1989

GUESTS:

LT. GEN BRENT SCOWCROFT
National Security Adviser

SENATOR SAM NUNN (D-Ga.)
Chairman, Armed Services Committee

INTERVIEWED BY: **David Brinkley - ABC News**
 George F. Will - ABC News Analyst
 Sam Donaldson - ABC News

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MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Nunn, thanks for coming in. Pleased to have you.

SENATOR NUNN: Glad to be here, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: Here with us in the studio are George Will of ABC NEWS, and Sam Donaldson, ABC NEWS correspondent. Now, senator, as chairman of the Armed Services Committee you will be the first place to know about this, do you expect in view of the Russians change in behavior or change in promises pressure to reduce the armed services, reduce the spending?

SENATOR NUNN: I think it was already there, because of the fiscal situation we're in. But I believe that the Gorbachev rhetoric--and so far, the forces have not been reduced; we need to keep that mind--will lead to more pressures in this country but especially in Europe.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, the Europeans seem to be more intent on that than we are. Why is that, do you know?

SENATOR NUNN: I don't know. But I think that's the first challenge of the president is to try to produce a cohesive and united alliance with some vision of where we're going in the future. We came out of World War II with goals and with cohesion. Stalin made NATO. Gorbachev may unmake NATO if we are not alert as to what our future holds, and if we're not certain that the forces have been reduced before we start relaxing in the alliance.

MR. WILL: On that subject you've said that the Europeans and our, to some extent, nuclear allergy grows more intense every year. Yet there's no corresponding willingness to pay the steep budgetary price to increase conventional forces so that we can lower the nuclear threshold.

Isn't that going to get much worse, and hasn't it become much worse under Mr. Gorbachev?

SENATOR NUNN: It's getting worse in Europe particularly. I don't think in this country it is. But not only because of Gorbachev but because of the INF treaty. And I voted for that

treaty, but it had a downside. The downside is that the weapons we have left in Europe are essentially short range weapons. And if they ever have to be fired, God forbid, they would hit on German soil.

So that has understandably caused great sensitivity in Germany. This is one of the real challenges for the next administration and for the alliance.

MR. WILL: But aren't we in a kind of box? Because the Soviet Union can read our budget. And it knows there's a Gramm-Rudman trigger and a severe downward pressure on defense, which is--means downward pressure on the ability to strengthen conventional forces.

What option do we have? Can't they just wait us out?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, George, the thing we need to keep in mind is, if you look at, what with the United States and all of our allies spend each year just on conventional forces, weigh it against what the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact spend each year, we have outspent them for the last 35 years.

So it's not a matter simply of money; it's a matter of taking the money and making sure we cut out the duplication wherever we can. And I think we've got to start talking about specialization in NATO. We all try to play all the instruments in the orchestra instead of having the instruments that we play best be emphasized. That's what we've got to do: make the money go further, and also try to increase the funding if we can.

MR. WILL: Our next guest here in that chair in a few minutes is Brent Scowcroft, who has accused the Reagan administration of eight years of near total confusion, he said, on the question of vulnerability of ICBMS. Last week sitting in that chair Frank Carlucci, the outgoing secretary of defense, seemed to speak of Midgetman as a bargaining chip, something we would go ahead with, just as we went ahead with the intermediate range missiles in Europe so we could get rid of them.

Is that your view?

SENATOR NUNN: My view is almost the opposite. I come closer to the Scowcroft view. I would much prefer that we concentrate on a smaller missile that can be moved around that truly is mobile and survivable.

I think the name of the game in the future is going to be survivability. And to put missiles in silos, fixed silos, and to put a lot of warheads on them so they become more lucrative targets, is not the way to go.

I'd rather concentrate on doing away with MIRV missiles on land, if possible, with some kind of tradeoff between the 24 of the Soviets and the MX of ours.

MR. WILL: How can people advocate a 50 percent reduction of warheads and not have mobile missiles. Doesn't mobility--isn't that required by this fewer number of targets?

SENATOR NUNN: Absolutely. The fewer targets you have, the more you have to make them survivable. And I think that's why our proposal, which is still on the table in Geneva now, which must be reviewed by the new administration to eliminate all mobility on both sides doesn't make sense in the age we live in.

MR. BRINKLEY: Let me interrupt here for a second. For those who are not experts, describe the Midgetman. What does it do?

SENATOR NUNN: It's essentially a single warhead missile. The MX has 10 warheads. The Midgetman is smaller and can be moved more readily. We hope we can make it affordable; that's the challenge--

MR. BRINKLEY: You can put it on a railroad car or something and move it around?

SENATOR NUNN: Any missile that is smaller inherently is more mobile in terms of its abilities--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, let me just nail down your view. It is that you would prefer Midgetman on trucks rather than MXs on railcars, is that it?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, we don't know how we're going to base the Midgetman. That's one of the options. But there are

many other options. We've got to find an affordable way.

The Midgetman costs more per warhead because, obviously, if you put 10 warheads on one missile you have economy. But the survivability of the Midgetman is more.

So surviving warheads is what I hope the Bush administration concentrates on rather than simply warheads to begin with

MR. DONALDSON: All right, let's look at other weapons systems: The B-2, the Stealth bomber, what do we do there?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I think we built the wrong bomber, and now we're in a dilemma. Because the B-2 is a quantum jump in capability, but the B-1's already built.

I would first not spend any more money on the B-1, because I think that's sort of walking on the rug, or running on the rug. Second, we've got to make sure we don't go into production on the B-2 until we've ironed out all the technical problems.

And third, we've got to find a way to produce the B-2 in sufficient numbers per year so that we don't have an astronomical cost per unit. If we continue the road of stretching everything, we won't be able to do that

MR. DONALDSON: Why not just go ahead with the Stealth, and leapfrog the B-2?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, the B-2 is the Stealth.

MR. DONALDSON: Oh, that's right; same designation.

SENATOR NUNN: The B-2 is the Stealth, and the B-1 is the one we already have built. I felt that when President Carter cancelled the B-1, it should have been built, and when President Reagan built the B-1, it should have been cancelled

MR. DONALDSON: Now, what about SDI? You're an opponent of SDI spending, are you not

SENATOR NUNN: No, I'm not an opponent. I'm for a prudent, reasonable research program, a vigorous program, 10, 15 percent a year I've supported, in terms of increase. But when they start coming in with 40 percent to 50 percent, 80 percent increase per year in SDI, when they start describing it as something

that's going to allow us to eliminate all nuclear weapons, I say, wait a minute, stop the train, I want to get off.

That's not the kind of program supported by technology. That's a theology, not a technology

MR. DONALDSON: Well, is it your view that General Scowcroft and you are about in the same place on this, because you have just said something that has come out of his lips in other words, but the same thought?

SENATOR NUNN: Brent Scowcroft and I think alike on a lot of things. You might have a hard time getting an argument between us. I think he's one of the best appointments that Bush has made.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, he's going to be here, but not at the same time you are. So we don't have to do that

MR. DONALDSON: Let me--

MR. BRINKLEY: All right, go ahead

MR. DONALDSON: Let me just ask about John Tower. You'll be holding confirmation hearings on him to be secretary of defense. Going to give him a tough time?

SENATOR NUNN: I think John's well qualified, and I think he can certainly do the job. We're going to ask him some tough questions, because that's our role; that's part of the advice and consent.

We'll wait until the hearing's over to make our final judgment, but I think he is well qualified, and I consider him a friend.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you expect him to be confirmed?

SENATOR NUNN: At this point I do. We believe he's qualified. We are checking into a lot of allegations floating around. We are checking into the conflict of interest. And I think that we'll have to await the final outcome.

MR. DONALDSON: Do you think the allegations that came up that President Bush says he's satisfied are groundless concerning John Tower's personal life are ones that you will also examine?

SENATOR NUNN: We certainly are examining those now, and I hope that when we get through we'll be able to say that we agree with President Bush.

MR. BRINKLEY: George, you've got about 30 seconds.

MR. WILL: You have said that Mr. Gorbachev's proposals for unilateral reductions leave a lot of questions unanswered: where will the reductions be, where will the redeployed forces go. And one question you raise is, what will happen to the hot production lines currently turning out modern tanks at the rate--

SENATOR NUNN: Exactly.

MR. WILL: --of 3,400 a year. What is your expectation? And when will we know whether the rhetoric at the UN translates into something like closing tank production lines?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I think it'll take us a couple of years to really follow and monitor what Gorbachev has stated. The unusual thing is, he's given us enough specifics so that we really can check to see if his deeds match his words.

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Nunn, thank you. Thanks very much for coming.

SENATOR NUNN: Thank you.

MR. BRINKLEY: Happy to have you as always. Coming next, General Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to President Bush. In a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: General Scowcroft, thanks for coming. Pleased to have you.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Good morning, David.

MR. BRINKLEY: Congratulations on your new appointment, by the way.

Now, this of course is subject to change, as we know more of it: As of today, give me your personal assessment of Gorbachev's peace offensive, or whatever you like to call it.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I believe first of all that it represents a recognition on his part that he badly needs a period of stability,

if not definite improvement in the relationship so he can face the awesome problem he has at home of trying to restructure that economy.

That's his basic objective. I think also he's interested in making trouble within the western alliance, and I think he believes the best way to do it is a peace offensive, rather than to bluster the way some of his predecessors have.

MR. BRINKLEY: You say a quiet period. That suggests that when the quiet period is over, he'll be back to where he has been all along.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I believe until we have better evidence to the contrary, we ought to operate on that expectation

MR. DONALDSON: To use the phrase, you're saying that the Cold War is not necessarily over?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: The Cold War--I think the Cold War is not over. There may be, in the saying, light at the end of the tunnel. But I think it depends partly on how we behave, whether the light is the sun or an incoming locomotive.

MR. DONALDSON: Let's go ahead with your view of the START talks. You want to go a little slower, and you've questioned the advisability of reducing nuclear warheads to 50 percent for the long range missiles.

How do you think the START talks will play out in the next several months or years?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, it's hard to say, because of course we do initially have to review what has gone on before, and in light of our own strategic concepts and objectives, evaluate what we want to do-

MR. DONALDSON: You mean everything comes to a halt now while the income administration reviews this? How long will that review take?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: The world doesn't come to a halt. But I think it would be irresponsible for us not to seriously review where we are in the light of the strategic concepts which we have

developed, and then decide where it is we want to go.

MR. DONALDSON: So what about my question then: What do you think about the START talks?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I think the START talks will resume as soon as we can prudently do so. We're not trying to slow down or delay, but we want to make sure that they are in fact in accord with exactly the way we want to proceed

MR. DONALDSON: But you strongly suggest, General, that when they resume they will do so with modifications to the U.S. proposals?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't want to predict how they will resume. There may be modifications, or may not be modifications.

But they're going to be our START talks, our proposals, and we have to make sure that in fact they are ours, and we're comfortable with them.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, you're not for a 50 percent reduction in warheads, are you?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I'm not against a 50 percent reduction in warheads. But I think a reduction in warheads, in and of itself, doesn't deal with the problem facing us.

MR. WILL: Senator Nunn was just talking about that, saying that there probably is a case to be made for mobility in general, but mobility in conjunction with a 50 percent reduction of warheads, meaning a smaller number of targets for the Soviet Union to target, is required.

What is your position now with regard to the question of the Midgetman?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I think, first of all, 50 percent reduction, if we don't do anything, does mean that our forces are somewhat more at risk; it takes a lesser proportion of the Soviet force to destroy them. So that it makes the issue of mobility more important, or survivability.

One of the best ways to get survivability is through a Midgetman or some comparable program. Because not only can you

move them around more flexibly; they are less attractive targets--

MR. WILL: Do you consider the rail-mobile MX a comparable program? Or is it not sufficiently comparably mobile?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm speaking only personally. It is not comparable. They do the same kinds of things. They're not comparable in the sense of the amount of warning they require in order to produce survivability.

MR. WILL: Now the logic to what you're saying is that a modification that we want to make immediately in the position in the arms talks is to withdraw the proposal for a comprehensive ban on mobility.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I believe that that is prudent only if the United States intends to go forward with a mobile system. And I think that's a part of the review that we need to make.

There are issues relating to force structure and modernization that impact directly on some of the major issues still open at START.

MR. WILL: You're the national security adviser to a president who is committed to no new taxes; who is committed to a flexible freeze; who is committed to keeping--to use the language of his inaugural address--the wallet thin.

Now, given that, and given the fact that Mr. Darman has been indicating for tactical purposes or otherwise, we know not, that the administration may be ready to have the trigger pulled, the automatic across-the-board sequesters under Gramm-Rudman, with half of the cuts then have to come from defense.

Can you be equable about that prospect as national security adviser?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, of course not. As Dick Darman said before, I also can read the president's lips. I think we have to be a lot smarter than we've been before.

And Senator Nunn described some of the things for example we can do in the alliance. We spend a lot of money; we don't spend it as wisely as we could

MR. DONALDSON: Let me just--

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I think that's true of the Pentagon as well.

MR. WILL: But are we not in danger of having our defense policy driven, and our procurement shaped, and deployments influenced unduly, by the politics of the 1988 election campaign, and the vow--flat vow--not to have new taxes?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We have a president who is dedicated, first of all, to no new taxes; secondly, to a strong defense.

MR. WILL: But do they not conflict?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Of course. Of course they conflict. What I'm saying is, it is not an impossible job to improve the way we spend our money.

MR. DONALDSON: Let's look at one of the potential savings: Star Wars, the SDI program. At what level of funding do you think that ought to go forward?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: That's one of the things in this review that you seem to worry about that needs to be done. And that is--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, I'm not worrying about it. I have every confidence you'll make that review.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: What is our overall strategic concept? What is it we're trying to do? And how does strategic defense, especially in a period of--of relatively fixed budgets, how does that fit in to a very fixed pie?

If you have this increasing wedge of SDI expenditures, out of what other budget accounts is that money going to come? And that is what we're about--

MR. DONALDSON: Well, General, you on the record as an opponent of any early effort to deploy Star Wars. You've said that you see no possibility of a shield anytime within this century.

Why do you suggest now that it all comes from a review?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Sam, I have not been an opponent. I have been an opponent of moving forward with a massive program until we understand clearly how it fits in to what we are trying

to do.

MR. BRINKLEY: General, I need to interrupt briefly at this point. We'll be back with more questions for Gen. Scowcroft in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: General, there are indeed other places in the world than the Soviet Union. And I'd like to ask you about some of them. But first, one point on this: The West Europeans, Germans and others, seem to be a good deal more receptive to Gorbachev's peace offensive than we are. Why is that, do you know?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I believe they're probably more susceptible to wishful thinking than we are. They are more under the gun of bad U.S.-Soviet relations, of threatened conflict, and so on.

But I think--first of all, I think one of our--one of the major issues for the United States to deal with is U.S.--is U.S.-European relations over the next administration.

And that is not only arms control. Although there, it seems to me, what we need to do is to try to lift our sights beyond efforts just to improve the stability of the balance, although that is very important, to the kind of Europe that we would like to see by the end of the century, for example; and how arms control, and how our efforts, can contribute to that kind of a Europe.

We do have a chance now to look forward, not simply maybe to try to stave off disaster.

MR. BRINKLEY: Now let's look at some other places. What about these poison gas plants in Libya and Iraq? I'm not asking you what your policy is going to be, because you wouldn't tell me if--you wouldn't tell me anyway.

But what is your view of this? Should the world sit idly by and let this spread all over these Third World countries?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: They are a terrible problem. And it is a problem akin in its scope to that of nuclear proliferation. Because these weapons, especially in city attacks, and population

attacks, can be every bit as devastating as nuclear weapons.

And they are much harder to control, because the plants to produce them are, in many cases, like pharmaceutical plants, like insecticide plants.

It's a terrible problem

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, now, being as specific as you can, what should we do about it?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We have to try--and I'm not sanguine--to see what in fact we can do about banning chemical weapons. It is extremely difficult to do, and impossible I suspect to do, with the kinds of verification that we're talking about

MR. DONALDSON: Well, General, as you know, the Israelis took out Baghdad's nuclear plant just before it came to the point where it might be a real menace, so that they can be taken out.

Would you advise us or someone to do the same thing with Gaddafi's gas plant?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I would simply say that these are a very, very serious problem for the whole world. And--and we will treat it as a serious problem.

MR. DONALDSON: Well, which would be more serious: using force to destroy those plants, or allowing them to come to the point where they're in production?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Sometime one has to make a choice between undesirable alternatives

MR. DONALDSON: Well, but what would be the choice?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, I'm not about to make that choice now

MR. DONALDSON: Let me ask another question on the Mideast. There are reports this morning that there's a lot of effort underway by people in the region to have an early meeting take place between income Secretary of State James Baker and Yasser Arafat.

Would that be a good idea?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I think, you know, meeting is less than

what it is the two sides, or the region, is trying to accomplish. And we already have established discussions with Chairman Arafat. And it seems to me we ought to explore and probe what he sees as the evolution of events.

After all, what has happened in our changed policy toward Arafat is not a new United States initiative. The chairman could have had this at any time since 1975; that he decided to do what he finally did.

Now it seems to me we find out what it is he has in mind

MR. DONALDSON: So you're saying that now that we do have this new discussion underway, you point out that because Arafat has moved--we haven't--that it would be all right, in fact, desirable, for our new secretary of state to meet with him?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I wouldn't say it's necessarily desirable at any particular time for the secretary of state to meet

MR. DONALDSON: But okay?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: It seems to me--it seems to me that--that the important thing is to try and probe and find out what Arafat has in mind, and how sincere in fact this conversion is. I think there are ways to do it

MR. DONALDSON: General, I'm asking about--I'm asking about a specific possibility. And can you give me a specific answer? Are you saying it would be okay for Jim Baker to meet with him?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: I think it would be premature to meet at such a high level until we have a better indication of where Mr. Arafat may be going.

MR. WILL: Secretary Baker said in his confirmation hearings that Central America will be the most immediately pressing problem confronting the Bush administration.

With regard to Nicaragua, that would cease to be such a pressing problem if the Soviet Union moderates its military aid to the region. Would you say it would be an aim of the Bush administration to tell Gorbachev that cuts in Central Europe and the

Central European front are all very well, but it's the flow of arms into this region that's killing people right now.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: You should not be surprised if that were not an element of our discussion with the Soviet Union.

MR. WILL: Where else in Central America do you see problems? Let's look first at El Salvador. Are you sanguine, to use your word a moment ago, about democracy in El Salvador over the next six months?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: No, I'm not. I'm not sanguine. It seems to me we've had a whole cycle now in El Salvador, and the situation may be more akin in 1981 again than 1985 at the height of Duarte's very skillful administration of that country.

MR. WILL: Well, for all the talk about bipartisanship, Central America has been the most divisive issue in American foreign policy for two or three years now.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes, it has.

MR. WILL: Why do you expect that to end when the question comes up, as you intimate it may, of increasing American aid to El Salvador?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Because I think at one point in August of 1987 the divisiveness did at least for a time come together, and the Arias plan grew from that.

Now, it didn't work. One of the reasons it didn't work is at the time the negotiations started, we relieved the pressure on the Sandinista regime by stopping support to the contras.

MR. BRINKLEY: In his inaugural address, the president said--referred to hostages, and said: Goodwill begets goodwill. Was that a message sent special delivery to Teheran?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: It was a message to wherever it could be potentially effective.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, it's only applicable in a few places, including Iran. So.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Well, it is--it was sent to wherever it might be applicable.

MR. BRINKLEY: All right, thank you

MR. DONALDSON: The president has sent a message to black Americans, clearly, that he wants to have better contact with their concerns. And of course one of their concerns is our policy toward South Africa. Now will we change that policy from the Reagan policy to put more pressure on the white minority government of South Africa to stop oppressing the black majority?

GEN. SCOWCROFT: We will certainly review that policy as well. Although I think it's important to point out that the Reagan administration's policy in southern Africa has begun to bear some fruit. And what we may be seeing is the first halting steps toward a significant change in that region of the world

MR. DONALDSON: So constructive engagement should continue? That's the policy.

MR. BRINKLEY: Sam, our time's up. Sorry. Thank you. General, thanks very much for coming. Pleasure to have you.

GEN. SCOWCROFT: Pleasure to be here.

MR. BRINKLEY: Good luck for the next four years.

Bush Sends Signals to Congress, Hostage Holders

President Announces Invitation to Lawmakers to Meet About Budget, Foreign Policy

By Ann Devroy
Washington Post Staff Writer

In a frenetic day filled with friends, family, celebration and a touch of work, President Bush yesterday invited congressional leaders to the White House on Tuesday for their first talks on the budget and foreign policy and sent a fresh signal that the release of nine Americans being held hostage would be met with gestures of good will by the United States.

On his first full day in office, the new president was a whirlwind of movement. Before 8 a.m., people outside the White House saw a window slide open and the president stick his head out and invite them into what he called "the people's house."

By 9, Bush had taken his first look at the Oval Office, where he read a good-wishes note from former president Ronald Reagan written on note paper headlined "Don't Let the Turkeys Get You Down," and had held his first, semiformal news conference as president.

Among the news conference revelations was that the president was awake before 6 tending to a sick grandchild, Ellie LeBlond, the 2-year-old who starred in one of Bush's campaign commercials. "Pumped a half a Tylenol into her and she's looking good," Bush said. "Ate two pancakes; what you'd call a rapid recovery."

Bush said that he has not gotten the White House floor plan down yet. "I got lost in the White House yesterday evening when we came in, trying to find a couple of kids' rooms," he said, calling the family quarters there "unbelievable."

Throughout the day, people gathered along the White House fence got glimpses of the president, his children or grandchildren playing on the lawn, waving from the Truman Balcony, inspecting the tennis courts or leading scrambling reporters on a half-running walk across the South Lawn after a voice in the press room announced, "President on the lawn. President on the lawn. Open coverage."

At midday, about 220 members of the Bush family poured into the White House for lunch, where they joined the 23 who had spent the night.

Bush's schedule also included a morning briefing from national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and White House chief of staff John H. Sununu. Most of the White House senior staff was officially commissioned yesterday and began settling into their offices. Bush also made midday remarks to a group of Republicans who helped raise money or worked on the \$25 million inauguration. Another evening of partying last night and a prayer service today will officially end the festivities.

Bush's transition planners had said his first few days in office will be devoted to "setting a tone," not making proposals or detailed legislative plans. To that end, the president yesterday continued to emphasize a bipartisan approach to Congress.

In his news conference, Bush reiterated the "extended hand" theme of his inaugural address in telling reporters he has invited congressional leaders to the White House

Tuesday to discuss the budget and what he called "my determination" to build bipartisanship into the conduct of foreign policy.

"We're thinking of a meeting that will say to those who have shown the most interest in that in Congress, 'Look, we're ready,'" he said. "The president has unique responsibilities under the Constitution for foreign policy and for the national security. But we want, through con-

sultation, to have Congress in as much as possible on the takeoff."

Bush cited a letter he received while still a candidate from Sens. David L. Boren (D-Okla.) and John C. Danforth (R-Mo.) calling for more extensive consultations with Congress on foreign policy and a return to the pattern of leaders of both parties helping to fashion foreign policy that was the norm in the years between World War II and the Vietnam war.

"I wrote them back and said, 'Okay, let's talk about it,'" he said.

Asked whether his reference in his inaugural address to the hostages that "good will begets good will" was a hint of movement or change of policy toward the nine Americans being held in the Middle East, Bush said he hopes the remarks were "heard around the world," adding that there are "rumors that countries want to have improved relations with the United States"

Bush said he could not "finger any one country for holding Americans hostage against their will," but that "people have in the past facilitated the release of our citizens, and I'd love to see that happen again. And I won't forget it."

The president added that he does not intend to "escalate the currency of holding Americans hostage" and said no concessions will be made to free hostages.

Bush also said that he received a letter of congratulations Friday from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev that he described as "very generous . . . pledging to work for

Bush Foreign Policy

SAM DONALDSON: The man President Bush will see first thing each morning for a briefing on the state of the world, his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, today displayed a far more cautious attitude toward U.S.-Soviet relations than was prevalent in official Washington in the last days of the Reagan Administration.

Details on Scowcroft's views from Steve Shepard.

STEVE SHEPARD: Among the President's first duties will be setting a tone with the Soviets. Today on ABC's This Week with David Brinkley, new National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft made it clear that he is wary of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and suspicious of his motives.

BRENT SCOWCROFT: He's interested in making trouble within the Western alliance, and I think he believes the best way to do it is a peace offensive, rather than to bluster the way some of his predecessors have.

SHEPARD: Scowcroft also left no doubt that U.S.-Soviet competition will continue to be tough.

SCOWCROFT: I think the Cold War is not over. There may be, in the saying, light at the end of the tunnel. But I think it depends partly on how we behave whether the light is the sun or an incoming locomotive.

SHEPARD: But the Soviets are just one of a whole series of pressing foreign policy problems that require early decisions by the new President. Among them is what to do with the PLO. Some Middle Eastern sources have hinted that Yasser Arafat may soon meet with Secretary of State-designate Baker. Scowcroft doesn't think much of the idea.

SCOWCROFT: I think it would be premature to meet at such a high level until we have a better indication of where Mr. Arafat may be going.

SHEPARD: Mr. Bush must also decide some important strategic questions, such as whether to build more MX missiles or go with the smaller mobile Midgetman. Security Adviser Scowcroft clearly favors the Midgetman, and he's supported

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by a key Democrat.

SENATOR SAM NUNN: I would much prefer that we concentrate on a smaller missile that can be moved around, that truly is mobile and survivable. I think the name of the game in the future is going to be survivability.

SHEPARD: George Bush brings an impressive foreign policy resume to the White House. The question now is, can he translate all that experience into some lasting accomplishments.

Steve Shepard, ABC News, Washington.

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GORBACHEV SEEN AS TRYING TO BUY TIME FOR REFORM
Scowcroft Offers Guarded Assessment of Soviet Peace Initiatives

In a guarded assessment of the recent Soviet peace initiatives, national security adviser Brent Scowcroft said Sunday that...Mikhail Gorbachev is seeking to buy time for his domestic reforms while "making trouble" for the Western alliance.

"I think the Cold War is not over," Scowcroft said of the recent Gorbachev proposal for conventional force reductions in Europe, which the Soviets said last week will include the withdrawal of some tactical nuclear weapons as well.

"There may be, in the saying, light at the end of the tunnel," Scowcroft said, "But I think it depends partly on how we behave, whether the light is the sun or an incoming locomotive."

Scowcroft said Gorbachev "badly needs a period of stability, if not definite improvement in the relationship so he can face the awesome problem he has at home.... I also think he's interested in making trouble within the Western alliance, and I think he believes the best way to do it is a peace offensive, rather than to bluster the way some of his predecessors have,"

Scowcroft's remarks in an interview on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley" underscored the cautious approach President Bush appears to be taking toward the recent Soviet initiatives.

(David Hoffman, Washington Post, A9)

Reforming the Pentagon

People have been getting rich by cheating on army and navy supplies since before ships had sails. Today's artful dodgers of defense seem to thrive in two extreme circumstances:

—When there is so much money for arms that nobody notices a few dollars disappearing into someone's pocket.

—When there is so little that suppliers will lie, cheat and steal for information that they need to land new contracts.

Scraping crumbs off defense contracts may be too commonplace for any President to stop entirely, but President Bush can slow it down with changes in defense decision-making that would at the same time improve national security.

Bush inherits the blueprint for such change from President Reagan, who responded to it more than two years ago with far more admiration than action. The report came from Reagan's Blue-Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, appointed during a flood of cases involving the Pentagon's paying of \$600 for toilet seats and \$900 for cargo-plane coffee pots.

With David Packard—a California industrialist and former undersecretary of defense—at its helm, the commission bypassed supply and went directly to the heart of American defense planning. Existing procedure in which the Pentagon sets defense objectives, figures out what it will cost to achieve them and sends the package around to the White House should work the other way around, the commission said.

The correct first step, the commission said, would have the National Security Council and the President decide what the nation's national-security goals should be and estimate their fair share of federal income. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would draft strategy within the White House framework—warning the President, of course, if the original plan might leave defense too thin here and there.

One reason Congress keeps sticking its nose into the fine print of Pentagon budgets—micro-managing, as it is called in Washington—is that Congress knows that the planning process works backwards and that defense budgets may not be

even loosely joined to reality.

In a recent speech Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said Americans are wrong if they assume that Washington sets defense policy by choosing among alternative military structures. They are, he says, also wrong to suppose that defense planning includes figuring how America's allies might help, comparing the cost of different ways of putting defense forces together and how the cost might "affect the economy and the other things we'd like to do in this nation."

Congress might well be less interested in picking defense budgets apart if it knew that the commission's approach was in effect and that the dollar amounts had some meaning.

Putting the White House back in charge of national security would not by itself stop cheating on defense contracts, but it could reduce the incentive. The nation probably would buy fewer weapon systems that it did not really need, and the opportunities for "goldplating"—pushing performance criteria, and costs, far beyond reason—would diminish.

The Packard commission dealt with the little picture in as much detail as the big picture. It said that the way to get a professional job of buying supplies was to hire professional buyers. Layers of stifling regulations designed to substitute for true market forces, which cannot be done, leave too little room for judgment, the commission said. In that atmosphere government cannot expect to keep professional buyers, and regulation alone will not prevent second-rate executives from making mistakes.

Now may be the chance of a generation for such profound change in the way American goes about deciding where it is threatened in the world and how it should meet the threats. Bush's national-security adviser, retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, was on the commission and would not have to send out for details about what it meant. There would be resistance from the Pentagon, but that would be the case even with trifling change.

Bush has more than enough challenges, more than enough things to do in his first week on the job. But none are more crucial than getting back to the basics of the Packard commission report.

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By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

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The pledge will be part of Bush's initial budget blueprint, he said, and will remain "as long as the climate of this country is appropriate for that commitment to stay in place."

Scowcroft, asked if the no-new-taxes pledge and a commitment to a strong defense are conflicting goals, replied, "Of course. Of course they conflict." Bush has maintained he could have both goals.

"We have a president who is dedicated, first of all, to no new taxes; secondly, to a strong defense," Scowcroft said.

Scowcroft suggested, as he has before, that he would favor a mobile missile, such as the single-warhead Midgetman, over the 10-warhead MX missile, which he said is not comparable, even if the MX is based on mobile rail cars. He said the ultimate test is how many warheads survive a strike and "one of the best ways to get survivability is

through a Midgetman or some comparable program." He noted that survivability becomes more important if the superpowers agree to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals by 50 percent.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) said on the same program, "I would much prefer to concentrate" on a mobile missile. He said the U.S.-proposed ban on mobile missiles in the Geneva arms talks "doesn't make sense in the age we live in." Scowcroft said this would be examined in the policy review he is conducting for Bush.

Scowcroft ruled out as "premature" any meeting between Secretary of State-designate James A. Baker III and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat. There were several Arab newspaper reports yesterday that such a meeting was possible.

interfaith "National Prayer Service" yesterday at the National Cathedral. Joined by First Lady Barbara Bush, Vice President Quayle and Marilyn Quayle, and about 3,200 worshipers, Bush heard the Rev. John T. Walker, Episcopal bishop of Washington, speak of "a nation united in the person of our president. He is our symbol of unity."

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Holding Down Fort for Bush's Team

By ROBERT PEAR
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 22 — In the hiatus from Inauguration Day to the confirmation of President Bush's nominees, midlevel officials and career civil servants have inherited legal authority to run the show at many Government agencies.

These temporary custodians of power, little known in Washington or anywhere else, have inherited perquisites like chauffeur-driven limousines to which they would not normally be entitled. They took charge when most of former President Ronald Reagan's Cabinet resigned on Friday and will stay on until the Senate confirms permanent replacements.

Some appointees, like Brent Scowcroft, the new national security adviser, did not require Senate confirmation and took office with Mr. Bush on Friday. But others, including Cabinet officers, must wait for the "advice and consent" of the Senate.

The acting agency heads may serve for several days or several weeks. So far they have not received instructions from the White House, and none are planning bold initiatives on their own. But in a crisis, they will be on the spot.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz resigned at noon Friday, and so did the Deputy Secretary, John C. Whitehead. If policy collapses, the man to call is Under Secretary Michael H. Armacost, a career Foreign Service officer serving as "Secretary of State ad interim."

Senate aides say Mr. Bush's choice to replace Mr. Shultz, James A. Baker 3d, could be confirmed this week.

At the Pentagon, Frank C. Carlucci 3d had been planning to stay on as Defense Secretary until Feb. 1 so the Senate would have time to act on Mr. Bush's nomination of John G. Tower. But a senior official on the Bush transition team thanked Mr. Carlucci for his service and asked him to leave by Friday. A similar request was made of all other members of the Reagan Cabinet not chosen to continue in the Bush Administration.

William H. Taft 4th, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, is now the Acting Secretary.

Each Presidential transition is a little different. The hasty departure of Reagan appointees puts pressure on the Senate to move quickly in confirming Mr. Bush's nominees. It also gives the members of Mr. Bush's White House team a free hand to change policy if they want to.

Dennis E. Whitfield, the Acting Secretary of Labor, said this arrangement "assures that you have someone with legal authority to sign documents until the new Secretary is confirmed."

The nomination of Elizabeth Hanford Dole to be Labor Secretary is expected to sail through the Senate. In the meantime, Mr. Whitfield, the Deputy Secretary, is in charge.

At the Energy Department, the Secretary, John S. Herrington, and his deputy, Joseph F. Salgado, submitted resignations effective at noon Friday. The third-ranking official in the agen-

cy, Under Secretary Donna R. Fitzpatrick, said today that her goal was to "keep the department on an even keel" while she serves as Acting Secretary. James D. Watkins is Mr. Bush's nominee to head the department.

Similarly, at the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary Samuel R. Pierce Jr. has left and Under Secretary Carl D. Covitz has also resigned. So the general counsel, J. Michael Dorsey, a lawyer from Kansas City, Mo., is the Acting Secretary. Former Representative Jack F. Kemp of New York is Mr. Bush's choice for the permanent job.

Dr. Otis R. Bowen, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, has also resigned. He left Under Secretary Dor M. Newman to run the department which pays out more than a billion dollars a day in Social Security, Medicare and other benefits. Mr. Newman will continue in that job until the Senate confirms a successor. Mr. Bush's nominee is Dr. Louis W. Sullivan.

At the Commerce Department, Mr. Reagan's Commerce Secretary, C. William Verity, resigned Thursday night, and Donna F. Tuttle, the Deputy Secretary, who was national chairwoman of Youth for Reagan in 1980, is running the department. Robert A. Mosbacher Sr., the finance chairman of the Bush campaign, has been nominated.

Three of Mr. Reagan's appointees will continue in the Bush Cabinet. They are Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, Education Secretary Lauro F. Cavazos and Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady.

Foreign Policy

Rightist Conservatives Keep Eye on Kissinger

By JEFF GERTH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 23 — For most of the Reagan era Henry A. Kissinger's profile in Washington was low, except sporadically in 1983 when the former Secretary of State headed a Presidential commission on Central America. Seven years ago his New York-based consulting firm, Kissinger Associates, opened offices here.

Now some people, particularly conservatives, are wondering whether Mr. Kissinger and his views will gain higher visibility in the foreign policy chambers of government.

Two principals in the firm have just resigned to assume senior positions in the Bush Administration. Brent Scowcroft, the firm's former vice chairman, is President Bush's national security adviser and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who was president of Kissinger Associates, has been chosen to be Deputy Secretary of State.

Mr. Kissinger himself maintains a window into the intelligence community through his membership on the President's Foreign Intelligence

Advisory Board, whose members have access to highly classified information and advise the President directly on a wide range of intelligence issues.

The Kissinger Shadow Is Seen

Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger both worked in the Government for Mr. Kissinger in the 1970's, but they also subsequently went on to achieve considerable success on their own. Mr. Scowcroft as national security adviser to President Gerald R. Ford and Mr. Eagleburger as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President Ronald Reagan.

Nevertheless, some conservatives see Mr. Kissinger's shadow in the men's reappearance in high positions. The conservatives see increased Kissinger influence and an apparent betrayal of the political movement that put Mr. Reagan in office. While Mr. Kissinger has taken many positions identical to those of conservatives, including a deep-seated suspicion of Communist governments, right-wing conservatives still say he has not gone far enough in opposing those governments.

"To a large degree Kissinger will, in effect, be in charge of foreign affairs behind the scenes and this seems like a betrayal of the political revolution that put Reagan in office," said David Funderburk, a conservative who was for a time President Reagan's Ambassador to Rumania.

Mr. Kissinger, who spoke twice by telephone with a reporter before leaving earlier this month for the Soviet Union, said he found Mr. Funderburk's suggestion mildly amusing, but not true. "My views on foreign policy are well known," he said. "I don't need a conspiracy."

Accommodation Seems the Issue

Conservatives say they distrust him and Mr. Eagleburger because they see the two as too accommodating in their dealings with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

Mr. Kissinger characterized his contribution to the staffing of the new Administration thus far as "marginal" but said he had recently discussed Mr. Eagleburger's possible appointment with James A. Baker 3d, the Secretary of State-designate, and had also had conversations with Mr. Bush.

Mr. Kissinger pointedly put distance between his consulting work for some two dozen multinational corporations and his friendships. "I do not use friends for business; I will not volunteer to call them," he said, referring to Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger, but "if they called and asked my advice" on questions of policy, he said, "I would discuss that with them. We'll have to see how that develops."

Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Eagleburger did not return phone calls from a reporter.

Government-Business Complex

The nexus between politics and business, a perennial Washington topic, is likely to figure in Mr. Eagleburger's Senate confirmation hearings. Conservatives intend to question him about his private business dealings, especially in Yugoslavia, where Mr. Eagleburger served as Ambassador from 1977 to 1981.

Thomas E. Boney Jr., deputy staff director for the Republican members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said Senator Jesse Helms, the North Carolina Republican who is the ranking minority member, intended to examine Mr. Eagleburger's business affairs.

Mr. Helms's interest in Yugoslav business deals is predated by his political differences with Mr. Eagleburger over United States policy toward Eastern Europe, including issues Mr. Helms raised at earlier

Eagleburger confirmation hearings. While he was in the Government Mr. Eagleburger actively promoted bilateral trade between the United States and Yugoslavia, sometimes over the strong objections of other top officials in the Administration.

In early 1985, nine months after he left the State Department, Mr. Eagleburger joined the board of Yugo America Inc., the American company distributor of the Yugo, the automobile that is manufactured by a large Yugoslav company.

Kissinger Associates became paid consultants to Yugo America and its parent company, the Global Motors Corporation, according to Yugo officials and Mr. Kissinger.

A Deal, 'Too Complex,' Fails

Since he left the State Department Mr. Eagleburger has also been a director of the American branch of a Yugoslav financial institution, LBS Bank of New York, owned by Ljubljanska Banka in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia. Mr. Eagleburger has also been a director of the American corporation ITT since 1984.

That year Mr. Eagleburger found himself going back to check with his former State Department colleagues on a possible business deal involving Angola. Mr. Kissinger said. He said Mr. Eagleburger had meetings in the United States that year with a Nigerian businessman concerning the exports of coffee from Angola and oil, possibly from Nigeria.

The United States does not have any diplomatic relations with Angola, but trade between the countries, a

touchy subject for some conservatives, is permitted. Mr. Kissinger said officials at the State Department's African affairs bureau had told Mr. Eagleburger that the proposed business deal was "no problem." But Mr. Kissinger said the deal was never consummated because it was "too complex."

He said "90 percent of our business is giving advice" to corporate clients, with no representation before the United States Government and no discussion of specific business transactions with foreign leaders.

When told of some clients who in interviews had described Mr. Kissinger's dealings with foreign leaders on the clients' behalf and the access to Government officials they thought he offered, the former Secretary of State called those dealings "most unusual."

"They may have a perception of access and I probably do," he said, adding that his conversations with top Government officials have been "mostly a question of information on issues."

Mr. Kissinger has never publicly disclosed the identity of his firm's clients. But a number of corporations have been so identified in news accounts, including the Chase Manhattan Bank, American Express, the General Electric Company of Britain and L. M. Ericsson (Sweden). Their annual fees typically are in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The appointments of Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Scowcroft will provide the first public disclosure of the identity of some of the firm's clients. Mr. Kissinger said he was "very relaxed" about that.

New Government officials must list on financial disclosure statements any source of income over \$5,000 in the last two years, including the names of clients of a firm where they were employed.

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Kissinger's Associates and Gorbachev

As James A. Baker III prepares to take charge of U.S. foreign policy, he appears to be in easy command of an awesome array of strategic concepts and tactical details. He already exercises a calm mastery over foreign affairs.

But sources close to Baker tell us that, privately, he feels insecure about foreign policy. He has deployed two seasoned veterans to protect his flanks—Brent Scowcroft as national security adviser and Lawrence S. Eagleburger as deputy secretary of state.

Both come out of Henry A. Kissinger's shop, a consulting firm called Kissinger Associates. This could mean that Kissinger will be the shadow secretary of state, guiding foreign policy from behind the scenes.

Eagleburger is as cynical and pragmatic as Kissinger. Scowcroft is a modest, conscientious man who shuns the spotlight.

A source who knows both men says they share Kissinger's distrust of the Soviet Union. They suspect that behind Mikhail Gorbachev's amiability could be a move to diminish American influence in Europe. As Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger see it, that could lead to a Europe dominated by the Soviet Union. Then the Soviets could nourish their sick economy by feeding off Western Europe.

Kissinger Associates doesn't regard Gorbachev as a born-again Western liberal, but as a hard-bitten communist who has been forced by a failing economy to adopt western methods.

In the Kissinger view, Gorbachev cannot count on continued public support just because he has reformed and softened the Soviet system. Most

Soviets have adjusted to the communist dictatorship; they have learned to live with it. At this point, they are more concerned about food on the table than about any intangible new freedoms.

To maintain popular support for his reforms, Gorbachev must improve the quality of daily life in the Soviet Union, so he is turning to western ideas for a quick economic fix.

Meanwhile, his reforms are opposed by the entrenched commissars and bureaucrats who support the hard-liners in the Kremlin. Should Gorbachev falter, he would likely be succeeded by a repressive regime that would discard his reforms, crack down on the populace and revive the Cold War.

Kissinger and company believe it would be a mistake for the United States to let down its guard and base its foreign policy on Gorbachev.

They fear the greatest danger could come from Eastern Europe. Now that the Soviets have relaxed their grip on their satellites, they might show too much independence and antagonize the Kremlin.

The views of Kissinger, Scowcroft and Eagleburger add up to a Europe-first policy. But other strategists believe the danger lies in Asia. They point out that national security has three dimensions—military, economic and political. The United States may be a military superpower, but if its economy declines and its people lose confidence in the government, then it would become vulnerable.

Thus, these strategists contend, the real threat to U.S. security is posed by Japanese economic power, not Soviet military power. But with Scowcroft and Eagleburger in positions of influence, Kissinger's view is likely to prevail.

Tower Begins Confirmation Hearings Today

By ANDREW ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — John G. Tower, the Secretary of Defense-designate, begins on Wednesday what may be the most prolonged Senate hearing for an appointee to President Bush's Cabinet.

The latest step in a selection process that has left Mr. Tower behind other nominees in organizing his department will begin with a session before the Senate Armed Services Committee Wednesday afternoon, to be followed by two more public sessions Thursday.

Members of the committee also plan a closed session Thursday morning to delve into Mr. Tower's work as a consultant to military contractors and other information about the former Texas Senator turned up in a Federal Bureau of Investigation background check that was the most exhaustive of any on the Bush Cabinet nominees.

Administration officials said that the panel's chairman, Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, and Senator John W. Warner of Virginia, its ranking Republican, had copies of the F.B.I. check and that it concludes that allegations of drinking and womanizing by Mr. Tower were unsubstantiated.

Congressional aides said a fourth public session has been tentatively

scheduled for next Tuesday to accommodate outside witnesses. So far, the committee has confirmed the appearance of only one such witness, Paul Weyrich, head of the Free Congress Foundation, a conservative research group. Mr. Weyrich said he planned to oppose the nomination, in part because he believes Mr. Tower is not committed to building a defense against missiles.

Mr. Tower has been criticized by more liberal individuals and groups as being too closely connected to the military establishment.

One reason the hearings will be prolonged is that many members of the committee and Mr. Tower are flying to Munich Thursday evening for a week-end conference on military policy. But Congressional aides said Senator Nunn and other senators wanted to make Mr. Tower's hearing as thorough as possible.

Mr. Tower is unlikely to face opposition from the committee, of which he was chairman from 1981 to 1985. But aides said senators wanted to avoid any suggestion that they did not question a former colleague carefully enough.

Aides to some committee members said the Senators had a long list of questions for Mr. Tower, including how he intends to trim the Pentagon's budg-

et, which of two options he favors for modernizing land-based nuclear missiles and how the United States should respond to troop reductions announced by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader.

Mr. Tower was the last of President Bush's top national security official to be designated, an event delayed more than three weeks by the background check. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has already unanimously recommended the confirmation of James A. Baker 3d as Secretary of State, and Brent Stowcroft, the National Security Adviser, was not subject to confirmation.

Administration officials said that Mr. Tower had picked his Deputy Secretary and top policy adviser, but that those choices would not be made public until after Mr. Tower's Senate hearings. They will then have to be confirmed by the Senate also.

The aides said Mr. Tower has been working privately on critical policy and budget decisions and meeting with Mr. Baker and Mr. Stowcroft. They said Mr. Tower and his senior staff would be ready to begin work immediately after their confirmations.

But some Pentagon officials have expressed concern that Mr. Tower will

Scowcroft Names Diplomats and Intelligence Officers to top National Security Posts

By ROBERT PEAR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 24 — President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, has selected a handful of experienced diplomats and intelligence officers to help him coordinate foreign policy and national security affairs for the new Administration.

The new appointees will be special assistants to Mr. Bush and senior members of the staff of the National Security Council. They include Robert D. Blackwill, a former State Department official who will be in charge of European and Soviet affairs at the N.S.C. He started work there on Monday.

Mr. Blackwill, an expert on conventional arms control, served from 1985 to 1987 as the American representative at the Conference on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in central Europe. He joined the Foreign Service in

1967 and held several senior national security positions at the White House and the State Department, where he was the principal deputy assistant secretary for European affairs in 1982 and 1983.

From 1983 to 1985, Mr. Blackwill was associate dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Mr. Scowcroft's top aide for African affairs is David C. Miller Jr., a businessman with the Westinghouse Electric Corporation who served in the Reagan Administration as Ambassador to Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Appointment Causes a Stir

The new chief of intelligence programs for the National Security Council is William W. Working, a former Air Force officer who has 21 years' experience in foreign intelligence. Most recently, he has been director of program and budget for the Intelligence Com-

munity Staff, which coordinates the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department.

His appointment has caused a stir among some intelligence officers because, unlike some of his predecessors, he has had relatively little recent experience in intelligence operations.

Mr. Scowcroft selected a former intelligence officer, Virginia A. Lampley, to be director of legislative affairs for the National Security Council. Ms. Lampley, now an executive with DGA International Inc., a consulting concern in Washington, worked in the Air Force for more than nine years, including six years as an interpreter of aerial reconnaissance photographs.

She was also deputy director of Senate lobbying for the Air Force and got to know Mr. Scowcroft when he was the head of a commission studying the MX missile and other nuclear arms.

Aides to Mr. Bush reported that he was planning to name a computer services company executive, Ivan Selin, to a top position at the State Department, as Under Secretary for Management. Mr. Selin founded American Management Systems Inc. in 1970 and since then has been chairman of the company, which designs computer software for Federal agencies, banks and other big customers.

Selin Holds 2 Doctorates

Mr. Selin, who holds doctorates in electrical engineering and mathematics, came to Washington in 1965 to work in the Defense Department under Robert S. McNamara, who was then Secretary. He stayed there for five years and served as chief Pentagon planner under President Richard M. Nixon. Mr. Selin is chairman of the board of governors of the United Nations Association, a private group that supports the work of international organizations and alliances.

Mr. Bush has already named Robert M. Gates as the deputy national security adviser. Mr. Gates, an expert on the Soviet Union, spent two decades at the C.I.A. and was deputy director of the agency at the end of the Reagan Ad-

ministration.

The White House has not named anyone to replace Robert Pastorino as head of Latin American affairs or William J. Burns as head of Near Eastern affairs at the National Security Council. But Administration officials said that Aaron David Miller, a Middle East expert on the policy planning staff of the State Department, would probably move to the National Security Council to work on Middle East peace negotiations.

An Uncertain Future

Officials of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency said the future of the director, William F. Burns, was uncertain. His colleagues said they expected him to leave the agency because he had heard nothing from Mr. Bush's inner circle.

Mr. Burns has been head of the agency since early 1988. Possible candidates to succeed him include Ronald F. Lehman 2d, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for international security policy; Sidney Graybeal, a principal negotiator of the antiballistic missile treaty, and Richard R. Burt, a former Assistant Secretary of State now serving as Ambassador to West Germany.

Robert D. Hormats, an investment banker, is being considered for the position of Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Administration officials said. Peter W. Rodman, a former director of policy planning at the State Department, is likely to remain in his position as counselor at the National Security Council, they said.

Bush Team Needs to Test the Soviets, Not the Alliance

By ROBERT O'NEILL

OXFORD, England—It is a commonplace observation that the foreign-policy team assembled by President Bush has formidable talent and experience.

The Western alliance that James A. Baker III, Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft, John Tower *et al.* will be dealing with is not in bad shape at the government-to-government level, with one notable exception. The normally harmonious relationship between Washington and Bonn is under severe strain as a result of West German insensitivity regarding the part played by German firms in helping Libya's Col. Moammar Kadhafi achieve a chemical-warfare capability. This unnecessary tension has come right at the time when Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev, through the recent announcement of Soviet tactical nuclear withdrawals from Eastern Europe, has highlighted the Bonn government's disunity on modernization of short-range nuclear systems.

Clearly this is not the time for the Bush Administration to get tough with the Germans on the nuclear issue. On chemical exports the situation is different. Few if any Germans can be proud of helping Kadhafi, and there must be support in the West German government as well as in the public for tightening control over the chemical industry's foreign activities. But on nuclear modernization the West German public is far from supportive, and the government is seriously split. The Bush Administration cannot want to open its record of alliance diplomacy by wounding its best friends on the Rhine. Rather, it must move quickly to overcome public skepticism about alliance policies by regaining some of the initiative from Gorbachev. It would also help to avoid the appearance of being mired in the past through adhering rigidly to plans made in 1987-88 and not giving consideration to the implications of the pending Soviet conventional-force cuts and withdrawals of tactical nuclear systems.

For the new Administration this means a short pause for a considered response to Gorbachev and then a thorough public evaluation of the NATO-Warsaw Pact relationship, preferably delivered by the President. Then should follow a further pause for debate on what has been said before a drawing of conclusions for action, both on modernization and on arms control. Bush could thus exert leadership quickly while avoiding the pitfall of overly hasty action. By midyear the West should be able to see clear lines of advance on both fronts.

Admittedly this is an ambitious time-




table. But to wait much longer could give Gorbachev too much scope and result in a weaker political situation within the alliance, especially in its key members in Central Europe. The West will need to be seen as testing the Soviets—not standing flabbily by, claiming that little really has changed. In the meantime, modernization of the Lance short-range system should continue in the United States, leaving the issue of timing of deployment in Europe and cost-sharing for a more propitious moment.

It is good to hear that the new Administration is conducting a wide-ranging review of relations with the Soviet Union. The process includes, one hopes, not only an evaluation of the changes on the Soviet side but also a frank assessment of the second Reagan Administration's performance in its dealings with the Kremlin. While President Reagan did well in his own special way by responding positively to Gorbachev, the Soviets gained politically by their activism and readiness to discard counterproductive old policies. Now Reagan is gone, and we need to see a more dynamic Western leadership that can both take welcome initiatives in its negotiating strategies and rally public support by being seen to be superior to the competition, not just barely adequate.

To the Europeans the final years of the Reagan presidency were the more tolerable because they had low expectations

after hearing what the President had to say during his first two years in office. The allies are not quite sure what to think about Bush, but they do not think it fair to identify him with the Reagan policies that he so unswervingly supported—particularly in 1981-83. This means that their expectations are high and that they want to see some political action to give the West at least equal prominence in leading the world to a more secure future. If they do not, the alliance will suffer through loss of faith and cohesion.

Bearing in mind the possibility that Gorbachev could fail to reform the Soviet Union and that his new thinking in foreign policy could be displaced by something much more primitive and menacing, the alliance needs to be kept in good condition in times of improving relations with the Soviets just as much as in times of crisis. Yet the more dynamic nature of East-West relations makes it more difficult to do so. It's just as well that there are some talented people around the President to advise him. He, and we collectively throughout the alliance, are going to need them as Gorbachev turns up the heat. Let us hope that they can meet the challenges of the 1990s as well as they met those of the slower and more predictable 1970s.

Robert O'Neill is a professor of history of war at Oxford University and the former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

White House eyes smaller-scale SDI

By Warren Strobel
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The Bush administration is eyeing major changes in the Strategic Defense Initiative program that would shift its focus to developing a smaller missile defense system with far more limited goals.

The scaled-back defense, in one version known as the Accidental Launch Protection System [ALPS],

could knock down a single salvo of nuclear warheads launched in error at the United States. In another scenario, it would preserve the United States' power to retaliate by protecting some nuclear weapons from a Soviet pre-emptive strike.

A limited defense made up of ground-based missile interceptors, which is getting serious consideration in President Bush's review of U.S. defense policies, could result in

quicker deployment of SDI technologies. But it also calls into question the future of former President Reagan's broader plan to render nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete."

"Politically, you're moving from the drawing board to try to get something rolling," said one high-ranking member of the Bush team.

"You're going to see a lot more emphasis on ALPS," he predicted. "Unless you take steps that way [toward deploying SDI weaponry], the Soviets aren't going to take you very seriously."

The limited defense concept also has found support from congressional leaders, who oppose the Reagan administration plan for a much

more extensive "Phase One" missile defense on the grounds that it would be too expensive and there is no proof it would work. Based largely on space-based weapons, Phase One would be designed to eliminate half the warheads in a massive Soviet nuclear attack.

A smaller defense "aimed at defending and protecting the [U.S.] offensive retaliatory capability ... may be something that makes sense," Rep. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said at an SDI seminar last month.

If such a system was found to be in U.S. interests but breached the

SDI...Pg. 10

SDI...from Pg. 1

1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty, "this causes me no particular heartburn," he said. The treaty limits the United States and Soviet Union to 100 interceptors each at a single site.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn proposed a year ago that the United States explore a missile defense system that would provide insurance against an accidental launch, coining the acronym "ALPS."

Proposals like Mr. Nunn's are only one of several potential changes facing the "star wars" program now that Mr. Reagan, its founder, has left office. Air Force Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, SDI's high-profile director since 1984, is retiring next Wednesday.

Conservative advocates of SDI from the Reagan administration have been lobbying to give Mr. Bush an early briefing on the program's status and to present him with a list of options for its future.

A key unanswered question is whether an ALPS-style system, should it go forward, would be an end in itself or merely a stepping-stone to the Phase One plan for a space-based missile defense.

SDI, particularly Phase One, has suffered several setbacks in recent

months as it competes with other projects in the imploding defense budget.

Long-term spending on the program has been trimmed, with "star wars" managers having about \$12 billion less for research between 1990 and 1994 than they planned on just a year ago.

Technological breakthroughs and simplification of the Phase One design have slashed its estimated price-tag from \$115 billion to \$69 billion. But even this success is a double-edged sword.

The revised plan approved by senior Defense Department officials delays deployment of the first space-based anti-missile weapons until 1999 or 2000. On that schedule, one official pointed out, the system would not be fully operational until 2003 or even 2005.

Finally, SDI's annual research budget, which shot up between 1985 and 1988, has leveled out, growing from \$3.9 billion last year to little over \$4 billion in this fiscal year. Mr. Reagan requested \$5.9 billion for SDI in his final budget proposal, but even if Mr. Bush does not scale back the figure, Congress is almost certain to do so.

An ALPS system would cost anywhere from \$8 billion to \$25 billion, depending on whether it defended just the nation's heartland or cities on both coasts as well.

During his campaign for the presidency, Mr. Bush at first expressed enthusiasm at the idea of a limited missile defense, but later voiced skepticism.

"Obviously, it's an option that's seriously being looked at," said a second Bush aide involved in the issue. But, he said, a decision on strategic defenses is "premature," because it is linked to other choices about the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and proposals at the Geneva arms control negotiations.

Retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, before his appointment as Mr. Bush's national security adviser, wrote in a presidential transition report that 100 missile interceptors could help defend bases for U.S. nuclear bombers against a surprise attack by missiles launched from Soviet submarines lying just off the U.S. coast.

But far more interceptors would be needed to protect U.S. land-based missiles, Gen. Scowcroft and former Navy Undersecretary R. James Woolsey said in the "American Agenda" report.

While developing a full-scale missile defense "would require a very heavy investment of funds and talent," they wrote, "even a deployment of a limited size ... would be a substantial defense program that would need to be assessed in the context of other major defense needs."

US FOREIGN POLICY

Baker at State: Early Plaudits, But Still Untested

In today's changing world the secretary will have to be innovative as well as pragmatic

By Charlotte Saikowski

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

WASHINGTON

HARDLY anyone has a bad word to say about James Baker III. As the new United States secretary of state takes the diplomatic helm, Washington seems braced for a period of strong, pragmatic foreign-policy making.

Diplomats, lawmakers, and administration officials are all quick to cite Mr. Baker's qualifications: political deftness, vast experience in government, negotiating skill, and closeness to President Bush.

No secretary of state in recent memory begins his leadership in such a favorable environment of respect and admiration.

The generous assessments are not without an underlying concern, however. The unknown question, diplomatic specialists say, is whether Secretary Baker, in addition to his demonstrated capacity for pragmatic problem-solving, has a gift for the creative, innovative initiatives that are seen to be required in today's changing world.

"What is not clear is whether, once he is settled, he will demonstrate a capacity for long-term thinking and conceptualization," says one of Washington's most respected foreign diplomats. "In

the coming years there will be fundamental challenges – both in Europe and Asia – and one hopes George Bush, Jim Baker, and [national security adviser Brent] Scowcroft will be up to these fundamental challenges."

Comments David Newsom, director of Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy: "We're headed into a period when developments in the Soviet Union, shifts in economic power, and concerns about the planet will require major rethinking of our national priorities. I don't see many signs of bold new initiatives."

But, Mr. Newsom adds, the fact that Baker is prone to prob-

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lem-solving and is not burdened by an ideological approach is all to the good.

So far, Baker seems not to have missed a step in his life of public service. As White House chief of staff under President Reagan, he was one of a triumvirate of Reagan aides who helped the President achieve quick political and legislative success in his first term. In addition to his flair for maneuvering Congress, Baker displayed great skill in dealing with the press.

As secretary of the Treasury (1985-88), Baker quickly became a dominant member of the Reagan Cabinet. As Reagan was reeling under the revelations of the Iran-contra scandal, Baker was winning plaudits from European and Japanese leaders for his ambitious plan to lower the value of the dollar and stabilize exchange rates.

A fellow Texan, Baker has ties with George Bush dating back to 1970. He ran Bush's unsuccessful campaign for president in 1980 and took over the faltering presidential campaign in 1988 in time to put Bush over the top by a solid margin. The two are close personally and politically, a fact that gives Baker special entree at the White House and enhances his stature at the State Department, which likes nothing better than an influential secretary of state.

On the face of it, Baker's experience at Treasury should stand him in good stead. International economic problems – the trade deficit, currency stability, world debt, and the coming economic integration of Western Europe – are becoming an integral element of foreign policy. Some diplomatic specialists note that no secretary of state, even when well versed in economics, has proved influential in this field, because the State Department is not the power base for economic policy.

"Like Dean Acheson, George Shultz had a background out of Treasury and everyone had high hopes for him on economic issues," says Charles William Maynes, editor of Foreign Policy magazine. "Yet the economics department under Shultz was very weak."

Still, Baker is expected to staff the department with strong economic officials and to play a major role in this area. Among those under consideration for senior positions is Robert D. Hormats, who is vice-chairman of Goldman Sachs International and has served in the past four administrations.

On general diplomatic issues, Baker is moving very cautiously. Diplomatic experts give him high marks for his smooth performance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during his confirmation hearing. He paved the way for a good reception by calling on individual members of the committee before the hearings began. Having had thorough briefings that helped educate him in unfamiliar areas, he carefully reiterated State Department policies, reassuring US friends and allies abroad and giving himself room to study issues further.

"Nobody knows how he'll perform in office, but there is a sense of comfortableness in the building," a senior State Department official says. "He seems to be quick, serious, and well balanced. So people are reassured he will not go off half-cocked – as did Al Haig."

One major area where the new secretary of state has some boning up to do is arms control, and he has already begun the indoctrination process. Administration officials who have been present at arms control briefings for Baker say he is bright and engaged.

"Shultz tended to sit back and absorb everything without reacting," comments one US arms control official. "Baker was more involved. Obviously there are gaps in his knowledge and he'll have to go through a learning process, but I think he'll be a quick study."

In terms of policy, a major challenge – and question mark – is what the President will do

about the all-important US-Soviet relationship. Baker has echoed Bush's caution and determination to review relations. With General Scowcroft heading up the National Security Council staff and former Henry Kissinger aide Lawrence Eagleburger chosen to be deputy secretary of state, diplomatic experts say, there could be a certain toughening of the US line.

"Not necessarily hard-line," a US official says, "but a fairly cautious approach that is not too negative but reassures the conservative right."

Diplomatic analysts agree that Baker takes over at a time of significant geopolitical changes that call for assertive rather than reactive US policies: the sweeping innovations in the Soviet Union, the rising power of Japan and other countries in East and Southeast Asia (and corresponding relative decline of American power), the growing assertiveness of the European allies, and economic and political turmoil in the Western Hemisphere.

"The question is whether Baker will continue the reactive diplomacy of Shultz, letting Gorbachev set the agenda," Mr. Maynes, a former diplomat, says. "You can argue that with the opportunities that might be there, now is the time for someone who articulates a postwar vision of the future."

Grave foreign policy issues aside, State Department bureaucrats are impressed with Baker's unpretentiousness – a judgment made by the fact that he is often spotted eating in the communal State Department cafeteria.

Scowcroft Names Head Of Middle East Policy

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 27 — President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, has selected a former State Department official to be his top assistant for Middle East and Persian Gulf policy, Administration officials say.

The officials identified the new appointee as Richard N. Haass, a lecturer in public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Officials also said Mr. Bush intends to nominate James R. Lilley to be the American Ambassador to China. Mr. Lilley has been the Ambassador to South Korea since October 1988.

Mr. Haass, 37 years old, will be a special assistant to Mr. Bush and senior director of Near East and South Asian affairs at the National Security Council. He held three State Department posts in the Reagan Administration: deputy for policy in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, special Cyprus coordinator, and director of the office of regional security affairs in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. He was a Bush foreign-policy adviser in the 1988 Presidential campaign.

An Interview With Bush

The deficit is the top priority for the new president

Last week before his Inauguration, George Bush met with NEWSWEEK Editor-in-Chief Richard M. Smith and White House correspondents Thomas M. DeFrank and Ann McDaniel. Excerpts from the interview:

NEWSWEEK: One hundred days from Friday, everybody in the press will be writing the story of Bush's first hundred days. What do you want that story to say?


BUSH: I don't know. I would like to have it written that we made major strides towards getting a grip with Congress on the budget deficit. Whether that will be done in a hundred days, I don't know. I don't feel the success or failure of a Bush presidency demands that that be done in a hundred days. It's plagued various Congresses and our administration and other administrations for a long time. I'd like to think that you might see by then some new foreign-policy initiative. I don't know where or how. I'd like to think that the American people would clearly understand [by] then my commitment to the environment or to education or to ... other causes, even though the resources that we can bring to bear on them are going to be restrictive.

You've signaled that you want to reassess Soviet-American relations. Does this suggest you're a bit wary of Mr. Gorbachev and where he's going?

I want to start by getting a broad assessment of the Soviet Union and where we think it's going to go and what I can do as president to further the process, to further our better relations and yet do it in a prudent way. When you talk to him you sense this dynamism, this ability to communicate with the West and all of that. But we want to build on a common foundation. I don't want to just go rushing off because someone thinks momentum [for improved relations] might be slowed down.

With General Scowcroft at the NSC and Larry Eagleburger at State, you've hired a couple of Kissinger Associates. Is there any role for Dr. Kissinger?

I expect from time to time to be reaching out to him, saying "I need your help, what do you think?" But if you mean like a full-



ARTHUR GRACE—NEWSWEEK

'Getting the vision thing down': Some thoughts going in

time job, no, I would decimate the firm. The firm would crumble ... and I have great respect for the free-enterprise system.

One area where we seem to see a difference between the Bush style and the Reagan style, or Bush emphasis and Reagan emphasis, is in regard to Black America.

I've always felt the need to stand for fair play and against bigotry, and I certainly would like to have an administration that projects that. I'm not sure that that means some [far-] reaching legislative agenda. I will find ways to speak out in terms of the need to eliminate the last vestiges of bigotry ... I hope we can do better on appointments. The problem is some people are going to measure compassion ... by whether you can triple the budget for this account ... or this service program. I won't be able to do that.

Can you understand why many black Americans have felt a sense of estrangement from the Reagan administration for the last eight years?

Well, I don't try to spend any time doing that because for eight years ... I've been a part of an administration, defended it ... and been a beneficiary of its success. So I'm still walking a little bit of a tightrope in that regard, and I would simply say here's what I want to do when I come in.

You've said that after Jan. 20 you might have some things to say on the congressional pay raise

that might be different from what the Reagan administration had to say on that.

I've got to figure out what I'm going to say. It's causing a firestorm, that thing.

Do you think it's excessive?

You've got to balance the good aspects of it with the difficulty the American people have digesting it given the budgetary constraints.

That sounds like you'd endorse a pay raise but one not quite so rich as 50 percent.

That's the way Tom DeFrank would judge what I've just said.

How should we interpret that? As [former secretary of defense] Don Rumsfeld would say, I'm giving you a chance to unravel the flaws in my question.

Yes, but I'm courageously not taking that. You know what the answer to it is? I don't know: that's my answer. Because on the one hand, and then on the other hand. I must say I was a little appalled to read in The Washington Times about the retirement [cost] implications of all of this.

Some of your senior people have said they think part of their job is to educate the vice president. What role do you have in that process?

The best role is going to be exactly the same model that President Reagan had me adopt—identical. There will be some substantive, specific assignments. There will be some overseas work, there will be inclusion in the high policy deliberations, there will be ample private time for the vice president to give me his views. I would expect in return, when I say, "This is the way it's going to be," he'll fully and enthusiastically support the decision whether he made that recommendation or not.

How would you have felt eight years ago if some of Mr. Reagan's aides had said that it was their job to educate you?

I would have been offended deeply. They don't have the guts to put their name on it. To say something like that [about Quayle], I find deeply offensive. I don't like people doing that, and I can't find out who they are. It's your business to find out, to thrive on the sources. It's mine to bitch about it.

Have you thought about what you hope your legacy will be in four or eight years?

A kinder, gentler America as part of a more peaceful, democratic world. [He added, in a humorous aside:] I'm getting this vision thing down pretty good.

Whither SDI?

*John Tower's honesty about its limitations
opens the way for a sensible new policy*

When Secretary of Defense-designate John G. Tower testified before the Senate last week on the "Star Wars" program, an era of delusion came to an official end. It was an era in which former President Ronald Reagan insisted that his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) could shield the nation against nuclear assault.

"I think that's unrealistic," said Mr. Tower. He sounded a bit like the child who shouted about the emperor, "But he has nothing on."

Actually most experts and much of the public already understood what Mr. Tower said: It is not possible to "devise an umbrella" against nuclear incineration. But no one in the Reagan administration would challenge the boss out loud. Having the words out in the open allows the debate to move from fantasy to hard facts. It also allows the country to move on with a more rational approach to arms control.

Mr. Reagan's SDI program proved a two-edged sword. The billions thrown into research helped scare the Soviets back to the negotiating table. They feared a new, costly high-tech arms race, whether or not SDI proved feasible. But the Reagan administration's eagerness to conduct controversial SDI tests in space ended up posing a major obstacle to talks designed to halve the number of long-range nuclear weapons.

Reagan administration officials had insisted on "broadening" the interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which up till then had been understood to ban such tests. The hope was to deploy a partial SDI system in space by the early '90s, whether or not the whole concept worked. This broad interpretation of the ABM treaty had infuriat-

ed prominent senators. The Soviets insisted that the Americans wanted to breach the treaty.

Mr. Tower played down the whole issue last week. He said that any SDI tests needed in "the near future" could be done according to the old rules. President Bush's choice for national security adviser, **Brent Scowcroft**, is known to be dubious about the prospects of SDI in this century. He said in a report last year that the Reagan administration's re-interpretation of the ABM treaty was "implausible."

During the presidential campaign, Mr. Bush supported the broad reading of the ABM treaty. But the Tower testimony, and the choice of Mr. Scowcroft, seem to indicate a change. Bush officials seem focused on a more limited, ground-based anti-missile system rather than on exotic weapons in the skies. Such a system could be begun without breaking the ABM treaty.

Building a system of missile defenses never made sense unless the Soviets agreed to cooperate. Otherwise it would have fallen prey to that old military rule of thumb: There's no defense against which you can't build a more powerful offense.

Now, SDI research can proceed at a sensible pace, while negotiations continue on cutting back nuclear weapons. Ten years from now, if the superpowers have shrunk their nuclear arsenals, and a Soviet pragmatist is still in power, perhaps both nations will agree on building defenses to shield against nuclear accidents or Third World madmen.

Until then, the business at hand should be reducing the huge number of offensive weapons. Mr. Tower's honesty about SDI helps speed that process.

No more Star Wars 'theology'

In his Senate confirmation hearings, John Tower, President Bush's choice for defense secretary, sounded a welcome cautionary note about the Strategic Defense Initiative that Ronald Reagan insisted would throw up a "shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from rain."

Despite continued questions from credible critics about the potential efficacy of what has become known as Star Wars and the acknowledged magnitude of its ultimate cost, the outgoing Reagan administration called for doubling research funds for the project to \$6 billion in its final deficit-plagued budget.

Tower, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, warmed some hearts among his old colleagues by vowing to take a hard look at Star Wars in cutting his budget. "To begin with, I don't believe that we can devise an umbrella that can protect the entire American population from nuclear incineration," he said. "I think that's unrealistic."

Making it clear the Bush administration hadn't worked out its whole Star Wars position, he indicated it would be a lot less enthusiastic about any attempt at full-scale deployment than Ronald Reagan was.

During the campaign, George Bush had said he'd like to develop and deploy some anti-missile system as soon as it was feasible. And there have been reports that his administration is considering a proposal to install ground-based interceptors to protect bombers and long-range missiles. Depending on the basing, that might provide a way to conform with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which permits the superpowers to have 100 such missiles at one site each.

Last fall Brent Scowcroft, since chosen as national security adviser, published an article of advice to whoever became president. In it he expressed doubts about any Star Wars umbrella and suggested its costs would

overburden a new administration, "forestalling many other courses of action in defense and otherwise."

Instead, he offered some support for a land-based system that would conform to the ABM treaty, reducing costs as well as the potential for disputes between Washington and Moscow at arms negotiations.

In his testimony, Tower seemed on similar ground. Asked if he favored the "narrow interpretation" of the ABM treaty, which opponents of Star Wars say prohibits testing space-based weapons, he replied: "A selection between the narrow and the broad view does not have to be made now. Indeed, anything that we might anticipate doing in the near future could be done consistent with the narrow interpretation."

All of this should comfort Sen. Sam Nunn, present chairman of the Armed Services Committee, who has made no bones of his concern about the costs and effectiveness of Star Wars. "In the five years since SDI was launched, the Reagan administration has consistently substituted slogans for objective and technically sound explanations," the Georgia Democrat charged last year. "Too often, SDI has been treated as theology rather than a scientific research program."

No one should hasten to toss away the Star Wars chip for nothing in our negotiations with the Soviet Union. And neither the Bush people nor Sam Nunn has such silly thoughts. The land-based ABM system Scowcroft and Tower appear to be considering and the "limited system for protecting against accidental and unauthorized launches" that Nunn has proposed both are reasonable goals for research.

But with our deficits to deal with and some apparent prospects for more progress in arms-reduction talks, let us hope the days of treating Star Wars as "theology" are behind us.

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Tower and the MADmen

The conventional "spin" on confirmation testimony last week by Secretary of Defense-designate John Tower has been to declare the death of SDI. But what we see instead is the death of MAD—mutual assured destruction, the goofy but enormously influential theory that the way to prevent nuclear war is to leave every nation defenseless against nuclear missiles.

Mr. Tower's stop-the-presses line was that, "I don't believe that we can devise an umbrella that can protect the entire American population from nuclear incineration." But this is a dog-bites-man story. Mr. Tower and his critics were merely beheading a strawman, the so-called perfect defense "Astrodome" of political myth. Ronald Reagan's initial SDI proposal was first of all a moral proposition—a perfect defense would be good, not bad. The details of how close we can come can be thrashed out by technicians. And Mr. Reagan has made his moral point; in the real world a political coalition is building in favor of *deploying* anti-nuclear defenses. The proposals on the table are for limited defenses, of course, but if any kind of nuclear defense is ever deployed, the MADmen will have lost.

Their theology has long held that to be perfectly safe Americans must also be perfectly vulnerable. Defense isn't tolerable. They know this isn't a popular notion, which is why they go to such lengths to disguise their attacks on SDI in jargon about technical impossibility, "nuclear winter," throw weights, dummy warheads and "cost-effectiveness at the margin." But the clear no-defense thread of their argument has expressed itself in arms-control treaties that limit mostly defense. And even, as we saw in the GWEN issue in the Dukakis presidential campaign, in preventing facilities that would allow us to communicate with surviving forces after a nuclear attack.

The MADmen certainly understand that if a limited defense is all right, then why not a bigger one as technology permits? And if a limited defense is all right, then the debate isn't about

defense at all anymore but about engineering. Not about whether to build defenses but about how much and when. MAD goes the way of sun-worship and other primitive superstitions.

Mr. Tower, by the way, also seems to understand this very well. As he put it elsewhere in his testimony, "I happen to believe that SDI is a very high-priority item." SDI is, he added, "an integral part of the total deterrence capability, transitioning gradually from a totally offensive deterrent strategy to a more defensive deterrent." In plainer English, Mr. Tower thinks a U.S. president should have more choices, in the event of a nuclear attack, than simply counting casualties and blowing up the world. He wants more than a MAD world.

Which brings us back to the coalition for some kind of limited deployment, also known as ALPS or LPS. As Mr. Tower put it, "I think there's an element of desirability in terms, for example, of an accidental-launch protection system."

But he's actually coming late to this party. Georgia Democrat Sam Nunn opened the debate a year ago when he urged the U.S. to "seriously explore the development of a limited system for protecting against accidental and unauthorized launches." The idea has since received public encouragement from, among others, the independent Defense Science Board, a bipartisan group of scientists on the White House Science Council, House Armed Services Chairman Les Aspin, and a slew of un-MAD Democrats and Republicans.

Mr. Tower isn't even the first of George Bush's advisers to climb on board. Vice President Dan Quayle and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft are both on record supporting a ground-based ALPS. With Democrat R. James Woolsey, Mr. Scowcroft wrote recently that an ALPS "could afford some protection of a major portion of the U.S. against a small accidental attack" from the Soviets, or "against a future third-country threat such as chemically armed . . . mis-

siles." It all looks to us as if nuclear defense is a long way from dead.

We recognize that some of those now supporting ALPS may have another agenda. They hope support for a ground-based defense will first kill research into space defenses, just as defenses died in the early 1970s with Richard Nixon's arms-control agreements. Then when it comes down to actually paying money for an ALPS, they can kill a ground-based system, too.

But technology has moved a long way in 15 years. By some estimates, an ALPS with 100 or 200 interceptors with current technology would cost less than \$15 billion. Our judgment has always been that deploying a limited defense will build support for a broader one, while also gaining both valuable experience and protection against a lunatic or accidental attack.

Ronald Reagan's SDI vision changed the terms of the West's strategic debate. MAD is no longer gospel. President Bush, with the help of Messrs. Scowcroft, Quayle and Tower, can consolidate that victory and put the high priests of MAD back in the cloisters for good.