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November 1988

Bush taps Baker for State, names transition team

By Ralph Z. Hallow
and Jeremiah O'Leary
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

HOUSTON — President-elect George Bush wasted no time yesterday in making his first Cabinet appointment and announcing key officials who will guide the transition to his administration between now and his inauguration in January.

His first Cabinet appointment — James Baker III as secretary of state — was no surprise. Mr. Bush, holding his first press conference as president-elect, also named his campaign pollster, Robert Teeter, and his vice presidential chief of staff, Craig Fuller, as co-directors of his transition team.

But Mr. Baker is expected to loom large in the transition process, and Mr. Bush acknowledged as much yesterday, saying the former Treasury secretary and White House chief of staff will be his "adviser on key aspects of the transition."

Mr. Bush announced that his White House counsel will be C. Boyden Grey and he said his White House personnel director will be Chase Untermeyer.

Later, en route to Washington aboard Air Force Two, he said he will make more Cabinet appointments "fairly soon, but certainly not before I come back from Florida."

Mr. Bush plans to leave tonight for a four-day fishing holiday in South Florida, where he will stay at the home of friends, then return to Washington on Monday.

He added, "I'm going to be thinking about it, be on the telephone [and] probably have a series of announcements within a couple of weeks." He said the "Nixon Cabinet was all announced in one dramatic announcement ceremony, but I'm not going to do that."

Mr. Bush said his selection of Mr. Baker, a Houston lawyer whose friendship with the

A profile of Baker, likely to be the most powerful member of the Bush Cabinet. A9.

president-elect dates back to the 1960s, had been "personally endorsed" by Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

Asked whether he would keep Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady or Education Secretary Lauro Cavazos — all appointed in recent months — he said, "It could be. I'll have announcements on that later on."

He also said campaign press secretary Sheila Tate would serve in the same post for the transition, but said nothing of his plans for a White House spokesman.

Mr. Grey will serve as counsel to the Bush transition prior to joining the White House staff as general counsel after the inauguration. Mr. Untermeyer will direct the transition's personnel work prior to joining the new administration.

The transition team will have a staff of 400 people and a budget provided by the General Services Administration of \$3.5 million.

The incoming Bush team has the task of sifting through tens of thousands of applications from would-be political appointees vying for jobs in the new administration, the non-career Senior Executive Service and Schedule C positions that are the spoils of victorious campaigns.

The 3,000-plus jobs are mostly well-paying positions at the White House and throughout the executive branch.

White House chief of staff Kenneth Duberstein, Mr. Reagan's transition leader, will preside over a breakfast meeting today of all Cabinet members and agency heads.

Mr. Reagan, saying he expects a "smooth transition of power" to the Bush administration, also appointed national security adviser Colin Powell, deputy chief of staff M.B. Oglesby, White House counsel A.B.

Culvahouse and presidential assistants John Tuck and Danny Crippen to assist Mr. Duberstein.

Meanwhile, speculation about other appointees in the Bush administration began in earnest yesterday as Mr. Bush returned here to meet with Mr. Reagan in the Oval Office.

Republican insiders believe Mr. Bush will rely on a collegial White House team, somewhat on the order of the James Baker-Edwin Meese-Michael Deaver team, which started out in 1981 as the "troika" running Mr. Reagan's administration.

Front-runner for White House chief of staff is believed to be Mr. Fuller, who has held the same post

for Mr. Bush for the past several years.

Former White House deputy chief of staff Richard Darman is considered a likely prospect for director of the Office of Management and Budget and retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft is regarded as a strong possibility for appointment as Mr

Bush's national security adviser.

Gov. John Sununu of New Hampshire is considered high on any list for a senior White House position.

Bush sources involved in the transition said four candidates are under consideration to head the Department of Defense: current Secretary Frank Carlucci, former Sen. John Tower of Texas, former Rep. Jack Edwards of Alabama and Sen. Ted Stevens of Alaska.

Mr. Carlucci, the sources said, may be asked to continue at the Pentagon until his successor is selected.

The leading candidate to replace Mr. Carlucci remains Mr. Tower, who headed the Senate Armed Services Committee before retiring in 1986. Mr. Tower was a constant companion to Mr. Bush and Vice President-elect Dan Quayle during Southern campaign swings. He also was one of the prominent Republicans "spinning" with reporters after the vice presidential and presidential debates.

Mr. Edwards is a favorite of several lawmakers. He was vice chairman of the House Defense Appropriations Committee and is credited for being a smooth negotiator.

Mr. Stevens headed the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee until 1986 when the Republicans lost control of the Senate. The Alaskan, however, is not thought to be interested in the post.

Another brewing battle is over

Mr. Quayle's staff. Bush transition officials want to appoint senior advisers as Mr. Quayle's chief of staff and press secretary, but the Indiana senator is trying to form his own team, according to sources.

Mr. Baker, in an interview last weekend, said Mr. Quayle "should



Bush's National Security Adviser: Inspiring Trust, Shunning the Light

JP
1301
By Henry Allen
Washington Post Staff Writer

Brent Scowcroft: The name alone!

Austere yet hearty, it has become a sort of Washington mantra for these troubled times, or for any other troubled times in the past 20 years: *brentscowcroft, brentscowcroft* . . . Ease back into thoughts of bipartisan commitment. Know the bliss of throw-weight parity. Feel those world tensions relax.

"Brent," you can hear the president saying, when Scowcroft becomes national security adviser in the Bush White House, "I understand you see an opening for us in the Middle East."

Or: "This problem is too important for party politics—let's form a commission under Brent Scowcroft."

Indeed, "Scowcroft" is one of those names that is unimpeachably right when you put the word "commission" after it.

Since he arrived at the Nixon White House as an Air Force colonel and emerged from the Ford White House as a retired lieutenant general,

al, Brent Scowcroft has become one of Washington's permanent fixtures. He headed the Scowcroft Commission that reported to President Reagan on the MX missile. He was Ford's national security adviser. He has been advising presidents

was negotiating the Panama Canal Treaty.) The fact that little of this is true has nothing to do with what the name "Brent Scowcroft" stands for.

Says Henry Kissinger, who has employed him at Kissinger Associates since he left the White House with Ford: "He's the epitome of a type we don't have much of anymore, of men like David Bruce [the late David K.E. Bruce, ambassador to Great Britain], men whose real ambition is to serve their country selflessly."

They are a great tradition. Clifford, Bunker, Bruce, Milton Eisenhower, William Rogers, Paul Nitze, Robert Lovett, Elliot Richardson, Averell Harriman, and so on, men gliding in and out of the corridors of power with the opulent calm of angelfish swimming through an aquarium castle.

Washington could not function without them. They have little partisan agenda, either personal or political. They lack the egotism of a Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski, or the political philosophy of, say, Jeane Kirkpatrick or Ted Sorensen, or the deal-politik of Robert Strauss. They are precise opposites of Oliver North. When they go wrong, they are John Poindexter, but which of them has gone wrong, except for Poindexter (who showed his true colors after the Iran-contra hearings by growing a mustache and getting contact lenses)? It is hard to imagine them

When it is pointed out that these virtues lack one-to-one correlation (as analysts say) with success in Washington, Alsop adds a footnote: "It took Henry." He is referring to Kissinger, who tells people that he spotted Scowcroft as a comer when he saw him stand up to Nixon henchman H.R. Haldeman "with unbelievable tenacity." Unfortunately, Kissinger can't remember what the fight was about, and Scowcroft will claim he's not sure it ever happened.

"He's not the sort of person that anecdotes come to mind about," says R. James Woolsey Jr., a Washington lawyer who, along with MIT's John Deutch, has written articles on strategic issues with Scowcroft.

We trust so much about Brent Scowcroft, and we know so little. We knew about Harriman's past as a rail-

road millionaire and polo player. Dean Acheson and Chip Bohlen were part of the boarding-school old-boy network. With a lot of these guys, there are social position, family money and divorces to judge them by. Scowcroft has had none of these. He has no known enemies, either, a peculiarity that he explains by saying: "If I were to be facetious, I'd say that if you don't do anything, you don't make enemies."

He says this during an hour of conversation at the Kissinger Associates suite on K Street.

It is a suite with plants in rope-coil baskets, the morning newspapers on the waiting room coffee table, roses on the receptionist's desk, and a number of 35-ish streaked blonds who look like they have advanced degrees in something and carry their shoulders a little high.

He comes out of his office to greet you. He has a clerical spareness—5 feet 8 and 130 pounds. There is an American gothic plainness to his big brow, and a wide, oddly vulnerable smile that reveals a gold molar, way

Baltimore Sun

10 November 1983

p. 18

Rumors on Cabinet choices proliferate

By Stephen E. Nordlinger
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — As President elect George Bush arrived back in Washington from his election victory, speculation swept the capital over the selection of his new Cabinet.

Mr. Bush's prompt decision to name James A. Baker III as his secretary of state, a move long anticipated here, sparked talk of who would be the other top players in the new administration. Although rumors came from all sides yesterday, the informed speculation came from the Bush camp, Republicans on Capitol Hill and former members of Republican administrations.

Paul H. O'Neill, chairman and chief executive officer of Alcoa, was being considered to become secretary of defense, according to Bush insiders. The appointment was said to be favored by Mr. Baker, who is already expected to be the most influential figure in the Bush administration after the president.

But there was also strong speculation that the defense post could go to former Texas Sen. John G. Tower, an arms negotiator for President Reagan and an adviser to Mr. Bush on national security matters.

Mr. Baker was said to have expressed reservations about Mr. Tower, who has lobbied intensively for the post but who is regarded as somewhat inflexible on defense issues.

Should Mr. Tower be named because of his continuing ties to Congress, Mr. Bush may select Mr. O'Neill as deputy secretary to manage the department. Mr. O'Neill served as a top official of the Office of Management and Budget in the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Republican sources in Congress said that Treasury Secretary Nicholas F. Brady, who is a close friend of Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker, also has expressed interest in becoming defense secretary.

But the betting is that Mr. Brady, a former Wall Street investment banker, will remain at the Treasury Department.

Richard G. Darman, a protégé of Mr. Baker at the Treasury Department and the White House, was reported by the Bush camp to be in line to be director of the Office of Management and Budget, which could be a key post in the next administration as it searches for ways to reduce the federal deficit.

Michael J. Boskin, a Stanford

University economist and an adviser to Mr. Bush, was expected to become chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

Brent Scowcroft, according to congressional Republicans, is under consideration for the national security adviser's job, a post he held in the Ford administration. But the Bush camp reportedly wants to keep Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell, the current national security adviser, in some capacity in the new administration.

Aside from Mr. Brady, Mr. Bush was also said to be considering keeping three other present Cabinet officials: Attorney General Richard L. Thornburgh, who replaced Edwin W. Meese III this year; Education Secretary Lauro F. Cavazos, a Texan, who is the first Hispanic member of the Cabinet; and Labor Secretary Ann Dore McLaughlin.

John H. Sununu, the retiring governor of New Hampshire who played a pivotal role in rescuing the Bush campaign in February's crucial primary in that state, is reportedly under consideration for a Cabinet post, possibly energy secretary.

William Martin, a former deputy secretary in the Energy Department who serves as an adviser to Mr. Bush, is reportedly also among the candidates to head this department.

Mr. Sununu, regarded as a tough executive, is also said to be in the running to become White House chief of staff, although he lacks Washington experience. This post may go to Craig L. Fuller, Mr. Bush's

current staff chief, although some insiders say that at 37 he may not be close enough in age to Mr. Bush for the working relationship that this job requires.

Republican pollster Robert Teeter was said to be in line to be a White House adviser to Mr. Bush.

M. Peter McPherson, deputy treasury secretary and former head of the Agency for International Development, is reportedly interested in becoming the U.S. trade representative, succeeding Clayton K. Yeutter, who may become secretary of agriculture.

James Burnett, former chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board and currently a member of the panel, has let it be known that he would like to be transportation secretary.

Two names being discussed for the top job in the Interior Department are those of Henry Diamond, a lawyer in environmental practice, and Nathaniel Reed, former assistant secretary of the interior for fish and wildlife and parks. The Bush camp may keep Lee M. Thomas as head of the Environmental Protection Agency.

Sheila Tate, the Bush campaign's press secretary, is keeping her post for the transition, and she appeared to be a good bet to become the first female White House press secretary.

In the last days of the campaign, Mr. Bush said that, if elected, he would name his Cabinet quickly.

Bush Uged to Select Strong Security Adviser

Transition Panel Calls for Clear Set of Rules

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

President-elect Bush should plan to coordinate national security policy through a strong White House national security adviser despite the designation of his close friend, James A. Baker III, as secretary of state, an 80-member group of governmental experts recommended yesterday.

"Jim Baker may be assistant president, but he won't be able to run other people's Cabinet departments," said Robert E. Hunter, a former National Security Council staff official in the Carter administration and cochairman of the project on the Presidential Transition in International Affairs. "It is inevitable that the bureaucracies and the nature of the issues will force these to some kind of coordination in the White House."

Reporting on the lengthy project, which was organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies and involved former officials of seven administrations, Hunter said that "for national security policy, coordination will have to be White House-centered."

The relationship between the secretary of state and the presidential national security adviser, which has been a source of conflict and confusion in most recent administrations, should be subject to "a clear set of procedures" and understandings about division of labor, which should be publicly announced by Bush, according to the study.

The report said the president-elect should "ensure that the national security adviser has a firm strategic grasp of issues, including but ranging beyond classic national security issues, but also ensure that he or she has a devotion to making the system work and to 'fair play.'"

The report said Bush's national

security adviser should chair key National Security Council committees, something that has sometimes been done in the past by the State Department, but that the adviser should have "a passion for anonymity" while the secretary of state remains the spokesman and chief diplomat of U.S. foreign policy.

Baker's prestige, former positions and unusually close relationship with the president-elect—as well as the fact that he was named to his post before any other Cabinet member—suggest that he will have extraordinary clout in the formulation of foreign policy.

Baker is expected to be consulted by Bush in filling other key foreign and defense policy jobs, including that of national security adviser. Reports from some insiders in the Bush campaign suggest that the NSC staff job is likely to be offered to retired lieutenant general Brent Scowcroft, who is widely considered to have been a conspicuous success as national security adviser for President Gerald R. Ford.

Dennis Ross, a Reagan NSC staff official who was foreign policy issues coordinator for the Bush campaign, is considered a leading candidate for the job of deputy national security adviser.

The transition study emphasized the need for the new administration to set priorities early to decide on its immediate initiatives. CSIS President David M. Abshire, co-chairman of the study, said there is a limited "window of opportunity" for Bush to set in motion his international policies before encountering severe economic constraints and conflicts with Congress. Bush "can lose his freedom of action" if the initial opportunities are not seized, according to Abshire.

The study also recommended higher-level coordination of inter-

national economic policies with national security policies, a special "net assessment" of U.S. policies and resources, an early "summit meeting" with congressional leaders on foreign and defense policy, the retaining of William W. Webster at least temporarily as Director of Central Intelligence in the interest of depoliticizing the job and combining the posts of chief U.S. arms negotiator and director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Webster: Not Lobbying to Keep Job

CIA Head Chief Willing to Stay, but Focusing on Smooth Transition

By George Lardner Jr.
Washington Post Staff Writer

CIA Director William H. Webster is "stung" by reports that he is nervously hoping to be kept on by President-elect George Bush, and he is not actively campaigning to remain in his post, a top aide to Webster said yesterday.

Webster, appointed by President Reagan last year at the peak of the Iran-contra scandal, is prepared to stay if Bush wants him, but at this point he is interested primarily in a smooth transition, CIA spokesman Bill Baker said.

"If he is asked to stay on, he will. If not, he is prepared to go back into [private legal] practice," Baker said in a telephone interview.

The election of Bush, a former CIA director, has produced a flurry of speculation that he will want to

name a new director so that he can "put his own stamp on things" at the agency.

Some old CIA hands have also been complaining, sources said, that Webster, a former judge and, Federal Bureau of Investigation director, does not have enough of a world view or comprehensive strategy for a U.S. intelligence chief.

Baker said, however, that Webster, 64, takes pride in what he considers the calming influence he has had on the agency.

"He'd like to be remembered for guiding the agency through troubled times, building smooth relationships with Congress and for the initiatives he's taken," Baker said.

He said those initiatives included internal guidelines for dealing with Congress, "so our people are no longer accused of deception" and are told simply to demur when faced with difficult questions they feel they cannot answer candidly.

Webster, Baker said, has also "strengthened our covert-action review program," elevated the CIA inspector general to "equal footing with the four princes" (the heads of the agency's four directorates), emphasized counterintelligence, stressed objectivity in intelligence assessments and strengthened relationships with foreign countries, having visited 18 during his tenure.

Webster may speak of his tran-

sition situation tonight at a news conference in New Haven, Conn., following a scheduled speech before the Yale Political Union.

According to Baker, he "sort of jokes about it, saying that he feels like a private citizen who's been on loan to government service and the loan's been going on for 20 years."

Webster was neither President Jimmy Carter's first choice as FBI director in 1978 nor was he Reagan's first pick in 1987 following the death of activist CIA Director William Casey.

There have been criticisms since then the agency has lost energy, but Baker suggested this was inevitable in the wake of the Iran-contra affair and a leveling off of the intelligence budget, which he said began in 1986.

"CIA director and FBI director, they're both tough jobs," said Baker, who also served under Webster at the bureau. "You can't hold them without a difference of opinion from some clients and customers. What he [Webster] wants is a smooth transition, not politicizing the agency, but keeping it moving."

This will become even more difficult in the months ahead as the budget shrinks even more, Baker added. "The golden days were over in 1986," Baker said.

"It's a tougher time, to lead an agency when there's not enough money to go around," he said.

Among those who have been mentioned as possible successors to Webster are James Lilley, U.S. ambassador to South Korea and former CIA station chief in Peking when Bush was U.S. envoy to China in the 1970s; former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft; Defense Secretary Frank C. Carlucci;

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Brady... CONTINUED

became Bush's campaign chairman and is now his choice for secretary of state. Brady's appointment long had been expected, and Bush was said by associates to want to make it quickly while announcing other members of the economic team later this week.

The vice president said he had not discussed with Brady the savings and loan industry crisis, which by some estimates could require a government infusion of \$50 billion or more to protect federally insured depositors. "I expect we'll sit down and do that fairly soon," Bush said.

The vice president praised his friend, saying Brady "brings to his office an extraordinary knowledge of financial markets" because of his position on Wall Street. Bush also noted Brady had served an appointed term in the U.S. Senate and been a member of several key commissions, including the Kissinger commission on Central America; the Packard commission on defense reforms; and most recently the panel that investigated the 1987 stock market plunge.

Brady refused to comment on the recent slide in the dollar. In prepared remarks, he said he would help Bush try to

sustain the economic recovery and praised Bush as a man who "brings enormous optimism to the job that lies ahead."

Bush is expected to announce other Cabinet appointments soon and has indicated he wants to let his selections for top jobs largely fill their own departments.

Quayle's attendance at the Bush-Kohl meeting was one of several events on the vice president-elect's stepped-up schedule. He also had several meetings with conservative activists and planned to join Bush and others last night at the National Literacy Honors black-tie dinner.

Report Hits U.S. Intelligence as 'Insufficient'

By ROBIN WRIGHT,
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—In a sharply critical assessment of U.S. capabilities, a new report issued Wednesday charged that American intelligence is "insufficient" to meet national security needs in the next decade and called for significant reforms.

The grim assessment carries particular weight because it came not from outside analysts but largely from leading figures in the top U.S. intelligence bodies. Among the contributors were Robert Gates, deputy CIA director, and James Geer, the FBI's top intelligence official.

The report, "Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s," released by the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, culminates 10 years of analysis by an independent panel of policy-makers and academics.

Intelligence community insiders are predicting that its recommendations will have an impact on the policies and appointments of President-elect George Bush, who will be the first President to have served as chief of U.S. intelligence.

It already has been endorsed by three former national security advisers, including retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who is reportedly being considered for that post or the top CIA job in the Bush Administration; Sen. David L. Boren (D-Okla.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; and former President Richard M. Nixon.

The report calls for reform and modernization of espionage and analysis capabilities, creation of a new counterintelligence body and increased use of covert action.

"The missions and procedures in American intelligence were basically set into being in the 1950s and 1960s," said Roy Godson, a Georgetown University government professor and editor of the report.

"We're saying that that's not good enough for the 1990s. American intelligence as presently con-

stituted will not be up to the challenges of the 1990s."

The report also warns that the United States may soon face the prospect of limiting the scope of its intelligence operations.

"In a period of declining resources, as the 1990s are sure to be, we can't defend against every threat," Godson said in an interview.

The report comes at a time of growing controversy within the intelligence community because of a series of unprecedented setbacks, which the report links to growing U.S. weaknesses.

'Decade of the Spy'

Over the last decade, more than 60 Americans employed by U.S. intelligence units have been caught spying for foreign governments. The so-called "decade of the spy" occurred in large part because of inadequate coordination of counterintelligence among the more than half dozen major U.S. intelligence agencies, the report said.

"In personnel security, we spend most of our money doing background checks on people who are entering government. But people get recruited not before they get into sensitive jobs, but after," said Kenneth deGraffenreid, senior director of intelligence programs at the White House between 1981 and 1987 and a contributor to the report.

He cited the case of Edward Lee Howard, a fired former Soviet specialist at the CIA who defected to Moscow. "Even though relations between the FBI and CIA were closer than they'd ever been, he escaped largely because the two weren't talking enough," he said.

The report calls for the creation of a new body or interagency committee to monitor counterintelligence in this nation and overseas.

Another weakness was revealed when secret listening devices were discovered in the new U.S. Embas-

sy in Moscow, which led to reassessments of Soviet espionage technology. The report claims that Soviet spy technology now equals or, for the first time, exceeds that of the United States.

While stressing that American technical capabilities must be improved, the report predicted that technology will play a less important role in espionage in the next decade.

Missile Photos Cited

"The machines that see and hear things were very good for us in the 1960s and 1970s when the basic concern was the Soviet military," Godson said, specifically citing Soviet missile silos photographed by satellites.

"But now we are going to be concerned with technology that is not seeable at all, such as bioengineering or chemical warfare."

The report calls for more innovative use of human resources and recruitment of more specialists. In too many areas, "generalist case officers usually operate under thin cover," which often limits their contacts and knowledge, and contributes to the discovery of their identities, the report said.

Under the current system, the problems in anticipating international events may only get worse, Godson said. "We're about to face a collection problem," he noted, because of the new issues that are diverting resources, such as narcotics, terrorism and arms control monitoring.

Because the 1990s are likely to be "a period of declining resources," it also calls for the Bush Administration and the new Congress to establish specific intelligence priorities.

In what is almost certain to spark controversy, the report says that the covert action must be used increasingly as "a regular instrument of statecraft."

Bush Narrowing Field For Top Cabinet Posts

By MAUREEN DOWD
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 16 — President-elect Bush began to narrow the field for remaining Cabinet posts and senior White House staff positions today as the director of his transition to the White House tried to counter the impression that intense jockeying for positions had rent the Bush team into factions.

As he accelerated what his aides termed "a friendly takeover," Mr. Bush met today with Margaret Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, and Andrei D. Sakharov, the Soviet physicist and human rights campaigner. The President-elect planned to see Mrs. Thatcher again Thursday morning, when he will be the host at a breakfast for her at his official Vice-Presidential residence.

Mr. Bush will receive lists recommending from three to nine candidates for each Cabinet position over the next few days. He will then decide on a case-by-case basis whether he wants to interview prospects personally.

His transition co-directors, Robert Teeter and Craig L. Fuller, said he was looking at foreign policy and economic jobs now, but would move on quickly to other areas. Out of 12 department heads still open, speculation has centered on four influential posts: Defense Secretary, national security adviser, budget director and Attorney General.

Bush Firmly in Charge

The transition chiefs said at a briefing this morning that they would meet with Mr. Bush daily to review names for two or three Cabinet jobs each day. The process, Mr. Teeter said, is designed to help Mr. Bush feel "totally familiar with the issues facing these departments" so that "he knows exactly the kind of people he wants."

So far, Mr. Bush has been piecing his Administration together in a deliberate, highly centralized and secretive manner, making it clear that he will be the one who is firmly in charge of each final decision.

His aides said Mr. Bush has not yet addressed the question of the kind of policy structure he wants.

The transition directors announced a staff that included Michael Farren as transition deputy director; Tom Collamore, liaison to the Office of the Vice President and a co-director of the executive secretariat; David Demarest, director of public affairs; Fred Fielding, director of the Office of the Vice President-Elect and First Lady; C. Boyden Gray, transition counsel; Janet Mullins, director of Congressional rela-

tions; Jim Pinkerton, director of policy development; David Ryder, director of the Office of Management; Kathleen Shanahan, office of the Vice President liaison, and Chase Untermeyer, director of personnel.

Pledge for Transition Team

Mr. Fuller said Mr. Bush had asked the members of his transition staff to sign a pledge that is intended to prevent conflicts of interest and stop unauthorized disclosures to the press. The pledge requires all staff members of the transition team to "hold in confidence any non-public information provided" in the course of their duties and to disqualify themselves from any transition matter that appears to be a financial conflict of interest.

So far, Mr. Bush has named two of his closest friends and advisers — James A. Baker 3d and Nicholas F. Brady — as his choices for Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury, respectively. The President-elect has also decided on John H. Sununu, the outgoing Governor of New Hampshire, as his chief of staff, according to aides. And now he is trying to figure out a way to keep Mr. Teeter and Mr. Fuller in a Bush administration.

Mr. Fuller has fought hard for the chief of staff's job and was described by one friend as "not a happy camper." Mr. Bush also rejected the notion of a "troika," consisting of Mr. Sununu, Mr. Fuller and Mr. Teeter, that would have run White House operations, similar to the three officials in President Reagan's first term. The three officials were Mr. Baker, Edwin Meese 3d and Michael K. Deaver.

There was some talk that Mr. Fuller might be offered a high-level White House staff job or that the 37-year-old aide, who is a licensed pilot, might be considered to head the Transportation Department or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

'They'll Hear From Me'

Asked about the Sununu selection at the briefing this morning, Mr. Fuller said that he had asked Mr. Bush what to say to the press and that the Vice President's comment had been, "Just let them know that when I'm ready to make an announcement, they'll hear from me on this."

Mr. Fuller said he was not opposed to Mr. Sununu's appointment. "There's no one standing here who's opposed to John Sununu having a major role in this administration," he said, as he stood next to Mr. Teeter.

Mr. Teeter, it was thought, might stay on as a top deputy to Mr. Sununu, or he might return to Michigan and open another polling and consulting business. Although he had reportedly been interested in the troika concept, he signaled today that he was wearying of the Washington power struggle when he said he had not "addressed" the question of whether he would stay on in a White House run by Mr. Sununu. "As you know, I've been looking forward to going back to Michigan, and I'll look forward to it again, only on January 20th instead of November 8th."

At a news conference today in Concord, N.H., Governor Sununu would say only that he had had "discussions" with the Vice President about the chief of staff job. "A request isn't a formal request until the tall, thin guy sings," Mr. Sununu said.

For the Defense Secretary's job, former Senator John G. Tower of Texas is still considered the leading contender, although there is concern among some Bush aides that his strong relationships with Congress would provide him with a base that might give him enough power to promote his own agenda when it goes against the administration's policy.

Although Mr. Baker has denied that he is trying to block Mr. Tower's appointment, some Republicans close to Mr. Bush express strong doubt that Mr. Baker would support the choice of the conservative Mr. Tower. "If you've got a strong Secretary of State, as Baker would be, it's fairly easy to be dominant in relation to the national security adviser," a Republican official said. "But if you've got a strong Secretary of Defense then you can have problems. That guy can really run a separate policy."

Richard Burt, the United States Ambassador to West Germany, is being considered for the National Security Council job, but at the moment the leading candidate seems to be Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force lieutenant general, who held the post in the Ford Administration. But there is concern among some senior Bush aides that Mr. Scowcroft is so skilled in the ways of the bureaucracy that he could emerge as a serious rival to Mr. Baker.

Richard G. Darman, the former Deputy Treasury Secretary who is now an investment banker, is favored for the top spot at the Office of Management and Budget.

Mr. Bush is considering retaining Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, but other names under consideration include William D. Ruckelshaus, who has twice been administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

Scant Prospects Seen for Swift START Treaty

Reagan Leaves Bush 'Solid Foundation,' but President-Elect's Emphasis May 'Not Be the Same'

By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and the Soviet Union concluded six years of negotiations on a treaty reducing strategic nuclear arms yesterday with a commitment to keep trying but with scant prospects for a quick deal under the administration of President-elect George Bush.

President Reagan marked the occasion with a written assertion at the White House that "we leave the next administration a solid foundation upon which to build," although "major areas of disagree-

ment remain" after 11 negotiating sessions.

On Tuesday, chief U.S. negotiator Max M. Kampelman said he had been "authorized" to say that Bush "is fully committed to the process under way" in Geneva, and supportive of "our basic objectives." But nothing he said quieted widespread doubts that Bush will work aggressively for an early agreement, or support every provision in the U.S. version of the massive, draft texts exchanged by the negotiators at their closing meeting.

The questions arise in part because of Bush's campaign promise to intensify work on a treaty reducing non-nuclear, or conventional, arms, implying it would have a higher priority than completion of the strategic accord. Senior Reagan administration officials have predicted that at least five and probably 10 more years of negotiation may be needed to reach a conventional accord.

Dennis Ross, a foreign policy adviser to Bush during the campaign who is expected to be appointed to

the National Security Council staff, has said the two agreements would be pursued "in tandem" although not formally linked. Another senior adviser, who asked not to be named, said "if Bush could start from scratch, he would want to get a conventional agreement first, but the political problems would now be too severe to simply put START [the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] on the shelf."

"The emphasis on the agreement [under Bush] will not be the same" as under Reagan, the adviser said.

In a move signifying some anxiety about Bush's views, a group of legislators from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is expected today to approve a resolution calling on the United States "to proceed without delay—and without linkage to conventional arms-control negotiation—to finalize, ratify and implement a START treaty based on the framework negotiated by the Reagan administration."

The resolution was approved yesterday by the military committee of the North Atlantic Assembly at a meeting in Hamburg. It was sponsored by U.S. Sen. Joseph R. Biden (D-Del.) and Sir Geoffrey Johnson-Smith, a member of the Conservative Party in the British Parliament.

Additional questions about prospects for a quick strategic accord under Bush arise because several top campaign advisers, such as former White House national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, have expressed "misgivings" about provisions in the treaty that have tentatively been agreed to.

Scowcroft told reporters during the campaign, for example, that he did not like a rule that land- and sea-based nuclear missiles should be counted as carrying whatever number of warheads the respective governments state, rather than the maximum number used in flight tests. Scowcroft believes the provision raises a possibility that one side could quickly add new warheads to missiles with reasonable assurance of their effectiveness.

Scowcroft and other Bush advisers also predicted during the campaign, however, that Bush would be

more willing than Reagan to pursue a compromise with the Soviets on one of the major obstacles to a strategic accord—the Soviet demand for constraints on testing and development of U.S. ballistic missile defenses under the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars," program.

Bush told reporters Monday that "I have indicated nothing to give [the Soviets] hope . . . on that question, because my position on SDI is stated, and it is . . . not changeable." But a senior adviser reiterated yesterday that "Bush certainly doesn't feel the way Reagan does about SDI" and that as president, he will be highly attuned to the stress the program's rapid budget growth has placed on other areas of the military budget.

Bush has backed a "broad" or permissive reading of the 1972 Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that was advanced by Reagan but rejected by the Soviets and Congress. However, Scowcroft told reporters during the campaign that Bush also believed the treaty "has been useful to the United States and remains useful." Scowcroft also expressed the view that because of advances in technology since it was signed, the treaty "probably needs some updating."

Bush's views on other key obstacles to a strategic arms accord have not been laid out by his advisers or transition team. These include substantial disputes over the permitted number of land-based ballistic missiles, and air-launched or sea-based cruise missiles. The sides also disagree about modernization of existing land-based missiles, and construction of a Soviet radar near the city of Krasnoyarsk in eastern Siberia.

NEWS
ANALYSIS

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS
7:00 P.M.

NBC-TV
NOVEMBER 23

National Security Adviser Named

TOM BROKAW: Another name was added today to the Bush White House staff, Brent Scowcroft, a close associate of Henry Kissinger. Bush today named him National Security Adviser, a job that he also held under Gerald Ford. Bush described the retired Air Force General as a good friend, and more.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: He will be an honest broker. He will convey to me exactly the feelings of the Cabinet members that are involved in international affairs, national security affairs. He will bring those together. But because of his tremendous experience, obviously, he will convey to me, unvarnished, his own view on policy matters of tremendous importance.

Unrest in the Soviet Union

BROKAW: Many of the people in the Soviet Union continue to speak out. This was one of the worst days of Soviet unrest since last spring. Two Southern republics were hit hard by protest. In Azerbaijan, three soldiers were killed, 126 people were injured in riots involving Azerbaijanis and Armenians. In a neighboring republic, Georgia, the parliament defied the Kremlin by voting to put its own stamp on proposed changes in the Soviet constitution. The Georgian parliament was backed by an estimated 200,000 people who gathered outside.

ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT
6:30 P.M.

ABC-TV
NOVEMBER 23

National Security Adviser Named

PETER JENNINGS: Vice President Bush has made another strong political statement today about the kind of political apparatus he'll feel comfortable with as President: pragmatic, professional, and ideologically pretty much in the middle of the road. The clue today is in the man Mr. Bush has chosen to be his National Security Adviser. It's a very big job. He's a former Air Force General who has done the job before.

Here's ABC's Jim Wooten.

JIM WOOTEN: They go back a long way, this President-elect and this once and future National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: A man with whom I have worked in various capacities in the past, a man for whom I have extraordinarily high regard.

WOOTEN: That high regard is fairly unanimous within the Republican foreign policy establishment. In Nixon's White House, Scowcroft was Henry Kissinger's deputy. Under Ford, he became the National Security Adviser, while Bush ran the CIA.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: I worked with Brent -- maybe I should put it this way: I worked for Brent when I was the Director of Central Intelligence.

WOOTEN: Last year Scowcroft served on the panel that investigated the National Security Council's role in the Iran-Contra scandal. The Vice President said today that Scowcroft will be a coordina-

Tower doesn't get the job, Mr. Bush may well turn to someone with both Pentagon and defense industry experience. Heading the list, Martin Marietta's top executive, Norman Augustine.

Bob Zelnick, ABC News.

Unrest in the Soviet Union

JENNINGS: In the Soviet Union, a new outbreak of violence between ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanis has left three Soviet soldiers dead and another 126 people injured in the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan. Reports from the region say authorities have been trying to restore order for six days.

It is the worst flare-up of violence in the area since early spring.

CBS EVENING NEWS
6:30 P.M.

CBS-TV
NOVEMBER 23

National Security Adviser Named

DAN RATHER: President-elect George Bush did the expected, in one way; again today. He named Brent Scowcroft to be his National Security Adviser in the White House. Among many other government jobs, Scowcroft served on the panel President Reagan appointed to look into the weapons-for-Iran wheeling and dealing.

CBS News national affairs correspondent Lesley Stahl reports on what the Bush-Quayle team wants the public to believe is behind Scowcroft's appointment as National Security Adviser, a job he's held before.

LESLEY STAHL: On national security policy, George Bush is

making it clear he's no Ronald Reagan, that the days of carte blanche spending on fancy new weapons systems are over. By choosing Brent Scowcroft as his National Security Adviser, Mr. Bush is siding with the pragmatists over the ideologues.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: He knows, too, the importance of approaching our foreign and national security policy on a bipartisan basis.

STAHL: Scowcroft's job: get along with Congress and keep an eye on the bottom line.

BRENT SCOWCROFT: There's no question that we have serious problems with the defense budget.

STAHL: Scowcroft. He learned the Washington power game as a protege of Henry Kissinger. He was Gerald Ford's National Security Adviser when George Bush ran the CIA.

With his reputation as a moderate, it didn't take long for the Reagan conservatives to complain.

PAUL WEYRICH: He is a very, very strong opponent of SDI in the form that Ronald Reagan conceived it. And I'm very sorry to see the appointment.

SENATOR SAM NUNN: Brent probably displays too much common sense to make everybody happy. He's guilty of treating SDI as a technology, rather than a theology.

STAHL: Congressional sources say that Mr. Bush named Scowcroft before choosing a Defense Secretary to show that he wants the White House to keep a firm grip on defense policy and spending.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: The need to keep America strong has got to be a part of it. But I would also say a willingness to

take a fresh, tough look, in these times of budgetary crunch, at the Defense Department.

LAWRENCE KORB: I think he's trying to say he's going to go back more toward what was considered the mainstream before Ronald Reagan came in.

STAHL: And another departure from the Reagan style.

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Keep me informed.

REPORTER: Post-midnight interruptions?

VICE PRESIDENT BUSH: Yeah. Wake me up. Wake me. Shake me and wake me.

Selection of Defense Secretary

STAHL: As for Defense Secretary, friends of leading candidate John Tower deny reports that he's been offered the post with conditions, or that he's negotiating for the job. Other sources say Mr. Bush is still interviewing candidates and hopes to make his decision next week.

Lesley Stahl, CBS News, Washington.

Illegal Shipments to Iran

RATHER: CBS News has learned of another secret pipeline reportedly used for smuggling military equipment from the United States to Iran. This time, illegal shipment of U.S. aircraft parts. The suspected go-between? The national airline of Ireland.

CBS News correspondent Rita Braver has the exclusive details on this still unfolding investigation.

RITA BRAVER: CBS News, has learned that Aer Lingus, the Irish national airline, is now under investigation by a federal grand jury on charges of illegally shipping millions of dollars worth of American aircraft parts to Iran. Sources say that many of the

parts were for C-130s purchased when U.S. relations with Iran were good.

The planes were crucial to the Iranian forces in the war with Iraq and used for many functions, including supplying troops in the field and refueling jet fighters in midair. Since 1979, when U.S. hostages were seized at the embassy in Teheran, it's been illegal to sell American-made aircraft parts to Iran.

Law enforcement sources say Aer Lingus made a huge profit in the operation, ordering parts for its own civilian version of the C-130, transporting the goods to London, and then illegally transshipping them to Iran.

The operation allegedly went on from 1981 to 1987 and was discovered earlier this year through evidence seized by U.S. Customs agents in Miami during an investigation of another aircraft firm.

Aer Lingus confirmed the investigation but would not comment. The Irish Embassy acknowledged that, although the airline is not government-owned, the Irish Ambassador visited the State Department last month to advise of his government's official concern about the case.

If charged and convicted, Aer Lingus could face millions of dollars in fines.

Sources say the State Department has some reservations about charging the national airline of such a close ally. But so far, indictment is expected.

Justice Department officials admit that the case has embarrassing diplomatic implications when the Reagan Administration itself sold arms to the Ayatollah in the Iran-Contra affair.

Rita Braver, CBS News, at the Justice Department.

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Los Angeles Times

BUSH: Scowcroft Picked for Security Post

DAVID LAUTER
JAMES GERSTENZANG,
nes Staff Writers

WASHINGTON—President George Bush, reinforcing a pattern of appointing seasoned Washington insiders to top jobs in his new Administration, Wednesday named Brent Scowcroft for a top engagement as national security adviser, a post he held in the last R. Ford Administration.

At the same time, Bush aides announced that the President-elect plans to replace about 90% of the political appointees who currently hold Administration posts, most of whom had expected that their Republican credentials would help them to keep their jobs.

"We're not trying to set off a firestorm," said Bush transition director Craig Fuller, but "our first priority is to bring new people in."

Plans to Reassure Allies

These developments fit the tone of the campaign amid continuity that Bush tried to set since the election. On the one hand, he has tried to emphasize that the government after 1988 will be truly his and not merely a third-term Reagan Administration. At the same time, he sought to reassure U.S. allies of a nervous world financial market that the government will be run by senior, experienced hands. Bush's senior appointments seem to signal his recognition that having been elected along with a largely Democratic Congress, he must move away from Reagan's confrontational approach to legislative branch if his Administration is to prosper. Scowcroft, as A. Baker III as secretary of defense, Nicholas F. Brady as Treasury secretary, Richard G. Darman as budget director and John H. Sununu as chief of staff are all relatively conservative men known for their political skills rather than for their sharp ideological

but Sununu, the governor of New Hampshire, are longtime Washington insiders with close connections and broad respect on Capitol Hill. Scowcroft, a 63-year-old former Air Force lieutenant colonel, served on the national

Continued from Page 1

security staff as a deputy to Henry A. Kissinger in the Richard M. Nixon Administration before taking over under Ford in 1975 and 1976.

In filling some of these same posts, Reagan, in his first term, installed men like Alexander M. Haig Jr. at the State Department, Donald T. Regan at Treasury and David A. Stockman as budget director—men who were far more ideologically motivated and more skilled at attacking the opposition than negotiating with it.

Bush transition officials hope that his nominees may be able to work together without as many of the sharp personal conflicts that plagued that early Reagan Administration team. In the national security post, for example, Bush made clear that Scowcroft will be an influential, but subordinate, member of his foreign policy group.

Baker, as secretary of state, will be the Administration's "chief spokesman" on foreign policy, Bush said at a press conference after announcing Scowcroft's appointment. Scowcroft "will be an honest broker," he said, who will "convey to me exactly the feelings of the Cabinet members."

"Because of his tremendous experience, obviously, he will convey to me, unvarnished, his own view on policy matters," Bush added, but the job will be to "coordinate the

development" of policy and "not [to be] a policy-maker."

And Bush said he expects Scowcroft to wake him in the event of a major international incident. In at least one celebrated case—the U.S. clash with Libyan jets off Libya's coast in 1981—then-White House counselor Edwin Meese III let the President sleep through the night before telling him of the engagement. Bush made clear that he will operate under a different rule.

"Shake me and wake me," he said, laughing.

According to one source familiar with the selection process, Bush decided to move quickly on the announcement of Scowcroft to cut short a lobbying campaign for the national security job by Richard R. Burt, the U.S. ambassador to West Germany and former assistant secretary of state.

Bush clearly is enjoying the job of shaping the government, a task he sought for more than a decade and he seems to be feeling little pressure. Asked, for example, at the press conference about his feelings for those who are waiting to hear about their futures, Bush responded: "There is a hurtful human side when a decision hasn't been made, and so I do worry about it. But I'm less tense about that kind of thing than I used to be."

Others in the government, however, are growing more tense. At a senior staff meeting earlier this

week, one Cabinet officer instructed his aides to encourage non-career people in the department not to have high hopes of remaining on the job, one source said.

And, at the Pentagon, where about 218 political appointees have been asked for their resignations, "I would imagine they would all be swept away," one senior civil servant said. "... Bush owes a lot of debts to a lot of people different from Reagan."

The bureaucratic ability to survive, however, could slow Bush efforts. Although tightening Civil Service rules has closed some of the loopholes political appointees once employed to save their jobs when administrations changed, the bureaucracy has many hiding places and many officials have powerful political allies who can help them.

Bush, responding to a question at the press conference, said he does have firm ideas about what he wants for one as-of-yet unfilled post, secretary of defense. He said he is seeking an official who can "manage that department ... [and] institute the reforms that I talked about in the campaign" to improve how the Pentagon spends its vast budget. The new secretary will need "a willingness to take a fresh, tough look in these times of budgetary crunch at the Defense Department."

Opponents of the most wide

mentioned candidate for the defense job, former Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.), have charged that he lacks managerial experience and may be lukewarm on reform programs. Bush, however, also stressed the importance of "experience" and "an ability to get along with the Congress," both strong suits for Tower, who served four terms in the Senate.

On other posts, one key Bush aide confirmed that Robert Mos-

bacher, a longtime friend and fundraiser for the President-elect, "looks in pretty good shape" to be named secretary of commerce. He also confirmed that Bush will not ask Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell, whom Scowcroft will be replacing, to give up his military career for a civilian job. Powell is expected to assume a senior Army command that is a stepping stone to chief of staff.

Powell would be the Army's highest ranking black officer. As

for potential women appointees, Peace Corps Director Loretta M. Ruppe has been actively seeking a post within the Administration, possibly as a counselor to the President. And Labor Secretary Ann Dore McLaughlin has been seeking to keep her job, something the senior Bush aide indicated probably would not happen.

Staff writers Ronald J. Ostrow and Paul Houston and John M. Broder contributed to this story.

Thursday, November 24, 1988 / Part I 23

Please see BUSH, Page 23

Foreign Policy Experts Welcome Scowcroft Back to Old Job

By DOYLE McMANUS, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON—Almost two years ago, as a member of the presidential commission that investigated the Iran-Contra scandal, Brent Scowcroft examined Ronald Reagan's National Security Council staff—and told friends bluntly that he was “appalled” at what he found.

The President's foreign policy machinery had failed completely at one of its most important tasks, to warn Reagan when policies were going astray, Scowcroft complained. “There should have been bells ringing, lights flashing,” he said later.

Now Scowcroft, who served as President Gerald R. Ford's national security adviser in 1975-77, has been asked to run the NSC again, and he rides into the White House with universal praise from Washington's foreign policy Establishment.

“I admire him enormously,” said former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

“He's as comfortable as an old shoe and as smart as they come,” said former Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie.

Scowcroft's outward style is self-effacing; he has never sought attention in the press or visibility on the Washington social circuit. But his extensive foreign policy experience and what Kissinger

called “understated tenacity” may make him a strong counterweight to George Bush's secretary of state designate, James A. Baker III.

“He's a man with strong views,” said Kissinger, who first hired Scowcroft on the NSC staff during the Administration of Richard M. Nixon. “He did not hesitate to disagree with me when he felt it was justified. . . . And I can think of two or three times when he actually prevailed.”

Other Scowcroft friends said that his experience as national security adviser during Kissinger's reign as a powerful secretary of state should help him work with Baker, who has long been President-elect Bush's closest political adviser.

Anticipates No Problems

“He's so skillful in understanding the bureaucratic process in Washington that if there is a way to avoid a confrontation and still achieve the objective, Scowcroft will find it,” predicted a longtime friend who asked not to be identified.

“I'm very comfortable with Jim Baker, whom I've known for a number of years, and I just don't anticipate any problems at all,” Scowcroft told reporters Wednesday.

“I have worked with strong secretaries of state before,” he

added dryly.

In an interview earlier this month, Scowcroft said that he believes the national security adviser should operate “offstage . . . [not] center stage.” But he has also emphasized that the adviser “is not simply the manager of the process. . . . He, himself, should be an important source of advice to the President.”

“With Brent's appointment, there's a lot of strength being accumulated on the White House staff,” said Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the Brookings Institution, another former Kissinger aide. “Brent is low profile, but he's obviously very knowledgeable. This means Bush will have plenty of in-house talent available in foreign policy.”

Scowcroft's views on arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations appear already to have made a mark on Bush, whom he advised during the presidential campaign. Scowcroft has quietly criticized some of President Reagan's more optimistic pronouncements on U.S.-Soviet relations; Bush, too, has been more skeptical about Soviet intentions than Reagan.

There are some points of apparent disagreement, however. Scowcroft initially opposed last year's intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement with the Soviet Union, arguing that it would weaken the

U.S. commitment to defending Europe; Bush supported the treaty. And Scowcroft has been discreetly skeptical about the Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan's effort to devise a system to defend the United States against nuclear attack. Asked on Wednesday whether Scowcroft's appointment signaled a pullback from Reagan's aims for the program, Bush replied: “Not at all.”

Scowcroft, 63, brings unusually deep expertise and experience to the role of assistant to the President for national security affairs, the White House aide charged with acting as an honest broker among members of the Cabinet and the President's closest daily adviser on foreign policy matters.

Born in Ogden, Utah, Scowcroft was graduated from West Point in 1947 and rose rapidly through the Air Force, mostly in academic and foreign policy positions. He received a Ph.D. in international relations at Columbia University, taught Russian history and politics at West Point and the Air Force Academy and served as an attache at the U.S. Embassy in Yugoslavia. He speaks Russian and Serbo-Croatian.

In 1971, Scowcroft, then a colonel, was named military aide to President Nixon, and accompanied Nixon on his historic visit to China.

He soon came to the attention of Kissinger, who was impressed by Scowcroft's intelligence, hard work and willingness to work impossible hours. “He sometimes worked so hard that he looked like a walking cadaver,” Sonnenfeldt recalled. “And he had a very high boiling point; he almost never got rattled.”

Kissinger named Scowcroft deputy national security adviser in 1973, and relied on him heavily during whirlwind rounds of diplomacy in the Middle East.

Served Ford, Carter

Scowcroft succeeded Kissinger as national security adviser in 1975, and served in the job for the last 14 months of the Administration of President Gerald R. Ford. After Jimmy Carter's inauguration in 1977, he served on Carter's advisory committee on arms control, which helped formulate U.S. positions during the negotiations that produced the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1979.

In 1981, the new Administration of Ronald Reagan entered office both opposed to SALT II and suspicious of Kissinger and his proteges; Scowcroft and other former Kissinger aides were offered no senior jobs. But by 1983, Reagan's men decided that they needed Scowcroft's help in building a national consensus in favor of mod-

ernizing U.S. nuclear weapons, and named him chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces.

Scowcroft served on the commission named by Reagan and headed by former Texas Sen. John Tower to investigate the Iran-Contra affair in 1986-87. As the only member of the three-man panel who had served on the NSC staff, he was unsparing in his criticism of the breakdown of controls within the White House that led to Reagan's secret sales of weapons to Iran and the diversion of profits to the Nicaraguan rebels.

An official who was present said that Scowcroft confronted Reagan directly and bluntly with the board's finding that the White House had attempted to swap weapons for the U.S. hostages in Beirut, despite Reagan's protestations to the contrary.

“Mr. President,” Scowcroft said emphatically, “there were occasions when the aircraft loaded with weapons was sitting on the runway, waiting for word that the hostages had been freed.” Reagan was surprised and shaken, the official said.

“He's remarkable because he is both a gentle and a tough person,” said Dr. Wesley Posvar, chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh and a Scowcroft friend for more than 40 years.

Staff writers John M. Broder, Norman Kempster and Robin Wright contributed to this story.

Brent Scowcroft's Several Strengths

George Bush said yesterday that he wanted an "honest broker" in the sensitive job of national security adviser. He not only defined the adviser's proper role but has named the best candidate on his short list. Brent Scowcroft's most obvious strength is that he filled the same job capably from 1975 to 1977.

His less obvious strength is that he inspires trust — the essential trait for a staff officer who must relay swiftly and accurately the differing views of the three dozen agencies now involved in foreign affairs.

As Mr. Bush surely learned while Vice President, when the national security adviser pushes his own agenda instead of preserving the President's choices, policy lurches out of control. The Iran-contra scandal turned on the abuse of power by a security adviser.

Trust among the President's senior aides is shattered when a security adviser is believed to have his thumb on the scale, a thought that arose during the White House years of Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

A retired Air Force general, Mr. Scowcroft is the quintessential "inside" man, more concerned with assuring all sides a fair hearing than in competing for the limelight. He earned the trust of Democrats as an arms control adviser to Jimmy

Carter, and took on the most thankless of chores for Ronald Reagan — heading the commission that tried to settle the argument over basing the MX missile.

He will be a worthy successor to the level-headed Colin Powell, who for two years kept peace between State, Defense, the C.I.A. and other agencies. This comparative harmony promoted the President's twilight accomplishments in arms control, the Persian Gulf and southern Africa.

All national security advisers suffer the problem of a grandiose title. In fact, the job was created to bridge the bureaucratic breach opened in 1947 when the State, War and Navy departments ceased to be in the same convenient building adjoining the White House. Meanwhile, with war and cold war, foreign affairs came to be the concern of many other agencies as well, ranging from Commerce to Agriculture.

Hence the new job with the fancy title: Presidents needed someone to coordinate and manage security policy. Mr. Scowcroft earned his stripes as a policy manager when he won agreement for the 1983 compromise on land-based missiles. Now the incoming Bush administration has to adjust that compromise, too ambitious in the face of new strategic and fiscal realities. No broker is more honest or more qualified than Mr. Scowcroft.

NEW YORK TIMES, 11/24/88, p. 88

SCOWCROFT CHOSEN BY BUSH TO BECOME TOP SECURITY AIDE

JOB FOR TOWER REVIEWED

Aides Say Factors Involving the Ex-Senator's Selection Include Personal Life

By BERNARD WEINRAUB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23 — President-elect Bush today selected as his national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, an arms control specialist widely regarded as a cerebral, low-key centrist.

At the same time, Bush associates said the President-elect was taking a second look at his expected choice of former Senator John G. Tower of Texas to be Secretary of Defense.

The appointment of Mr. Scowcroft, who served as national security adviser under President Ford, was announced by the President-elect in a quickly called news conference at the Old Executive Office Building before Mr. Bush left for a Thanksgiving weekend in Kennebunkport, Me.

'A Trusted Friend'

Mr. Bush warmly praised the appointee as "a trusted friend" who "understands the White House, the military, the State Department, the way the Hill works and the intelligence community as well." [Transcript of news conference, page B12.]

The President-elect made clear that he saw Mr. Scowcroft, a 63-year-old retired Air Force general, as an "honest broker" who will "convey to me, unvarnished, his own views on policy matters" as well as the views of Cabinet members involved in foreign policy and national security.

But Mr. Bush emphasized that James A. Baker 3d, the newly designated Secretary of State, "will be the chief spokesman, obviously, on foreign policy matters." In recent Administrations, strong national security advisers, like Henry A. Kissinger, have clashed over responsibilities and policies with Secretaries of State.

Tower Reassessed

As for Mr. Tower, who has been widely mentioned as the new Defense Secretary, and is still believed to be the front-runner, Bush aides said the President-elect was reassessing the choice for a number of reasons.

An aide to Mr. Bush said that among these was "a sensitivity" to Mr. Tower's personal life, including two divorces, one of which was granted last year to his second wife, Lilla Burt Cummings Tower after she had filed a lawsuit alleging extramarital relationships on his part.

Further, The Atlanta Constitution reported last Sunday that Mr. Tower had converted nearly \$500,000 in leftover campaign contributions to his personal use after he retired in 1985. Such a practice is allowed retiring members of Congress under Federal law, but Mr. Tower's expenditures have come under some criticism. The Constitution reported that they had included personal air travel, banquets and contributions to his alma mater, Southwestern University in Georgetown, Tex.

A spokesman for Mr. Tower said today that it was the Senator's "personal policy not to discuss this matter."

"He's not been offered the job either conditionally or unconditionally," the spokesman said of the Defense Secretary's post. "He's only discussed defense issues in already reported meetings with the Vice President, Jim Baker and John Sununu," the President-elect's chief of staff.

The spokesman also said that reports of "complex and intricate negotiations," in which Mr. Tower was said to be offered the job on condition that he accept a strong manager as his deputy, were "without foundation."

Another aide said that some associates of Mr. Bush, who apparently favors Mr. Tower for the Pentagon job, were pressing the case that the former Senator, who is close to the defense industry, would resist the changes the President-elect seeks in procurement of weapons and the organization of the Pentagon.

One aide said he was convinced that Mr. Bush had not yet made up his mind on the selection, and was weighing "a tricky set of balances." Although Mr. Bush's associates initially urged a strong No. 2 to seek Pentagon reforms, aides said that the President-elect was in a quandary: his yearning to appoint his long-time friend, Mr. Tower, versus the President-elect's desire to pick a Defense Secretary pledged to deficit reduction and reform.

The President-elect, asked by a reporter at the news conference if he would soon put Mr. Tower "out of his misery, one way or the other," replied, "I'm asking you to do that." He said there was "an insatiable curiosity about who's going to staff the Administration," and expressed regret that "people's hopes are up there, and then it doesn't work out."

Mr. Bush said Mr. Scowcroft, whose appointment does not require Senate confirmation, would undertake "a thorough review and analysis on our policy objectives, and then come out with our own objectives." As a priority, Mr. Bush said that his adviser would "have a new look" at arms control, a subject on which Mr. Scowcroft has differed with the Reagan Administration.

"That doesn't mean we're not going to build on the record of this Administration, which I salute," said Mr. Bush. "But we're going to formulate our priorities." This included "trying to move conventional force reductions up to a little higher priority or at least get that going faster if we can," said Mr. Bush.

Mr. Bush said Mr. Scowcroft would "have direct access, day and night." The President-elect added: "I will be the one who takes a keen interest in these matters. I have a lot of ideas. They need to be tempered by his experience and judgment."


Responding to a question, Mr. Bush said that he wanted Mr. Scowcroft to awake him at any time of the night in the event of a foreign policy crisis and that he intended to receive daily morning intelligence briefings from the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Reagan did not tend to become so deeply engaged in policy matters, and on one occasion, when American planes clashed with Libyan fighters, his aides even failed to wake him.

But Mr. Bush said: "Yeah, wake me up. Wake me. Shake me and wake me."

Mr. Scowcroft, a foreign policy adviser to the Bush campaign and vice chairman of Mr. Kissinger's consulting firm, served on the three-member panel, headed by Mr. Tower, that was appointed by President Reagan to investigate the Iran-contra affair. The report largely spared Mr. Bush from blame for the scandal.

Mr. Bush praised "the outstanding performance" of the current national security adviser, Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell, and said that General Powell — who has been mentioned as a possible Army Chief of Staff or chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff — has "a friend in the White House."

Mr. Scowcroft, who also served as an arms control adviser to President Carter and who headed a special commission in 1983 that studied basing the MX missile, said his first task was to "insure a review of the important elements of U.S. national security policy by the President and his new team to ratify those elements on which there will be total continuity, to make whatever adjustments there are, and to be comfortable with where we're going."



The New York Times/Paul Hosefros

President-elect Bush introducing Brent Scowcroft, his choice for national security adviser.

Sentinel of Security

Brent Scowcroft

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23 — In selecting Brent Scowcroft as his national security adviser, President-elect Bush has chosen a highly experienced Washington hand whose independent views on arms control have often put him at odds with Reagan Administration policies.

Man
in the
News

A soft-spoken man with an unassuming manner, Mr. Scowcroft has argued that the United States should proceed slowly in negotiating cuts in strategic arms until the United States comes up with a plan to deploy new nuclear weapons that are less vulnerable to attack.

Mr. Scowcroft, whose appointment does not need Senate approval, is a 63-year-old retired Air Force general. He has argued forcefully for one costly strategic weapon that the Reagan Administration has opposed — the new land-based Midgetman missile, which would be mounted on a special truck difficult for Soviet forces to find and target.

Held Same Post Under Ford

And Mr. Scowcroft is wary of another another long-range nuclear weapon that the Reagan Administration insists is essential. In a sharp departure from Reagan Administration policy, Mr. Scowcroft (the first syllable rhymes with snow) said in a recent interview that the United States should consider banning sea-launched cruise missiles that have nuclear warheads, because he believes the Russians could use such weapons to threaten the United States in vessels off the American coasts.

Mr. Scowcroft, who held the post of national security adviser in the Ford

Administration, has also differed significantly with Reagan Administration policy on the issue of anti-missile defenses.

He has said the United States should be more flexible in the Geneva arms talks on the question of what limits should be placed on tests for "Star Wars," or a space-based missile defense. And he has criticized the Reagan Administration's "broad interpretation" of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty that would allow for an expanded pattern of "Star Wars" tests.

Mr. Scowcroft has favored continued "Star Wars" research while remaining critical of proposals by conservatives to accelerate the Strategic Defense Initiative to develop a comprehensive space-based anti-missile defense system.

In interviews and writings, he has indicated that he is receptive to the idea of deploying limited ground-based antimissile defenses to protect

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Sentinel of Security

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American missiles, but has taken no firm stand on the issue.

In still other disputes with the Reagan Administration, Mr. Scowcroft has criticized the Administration's new accord to ban medium-range and shorter-range missiles. Along with former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, he argued that the United States would have been better off keeping some missiles in Europe as a symbol of American support for the defense of Europe.

In announcing his selection of Mr. Scowcroft, President-elect Bush said his Administration would take a fresh look at the arms control process and seek to elevate the importance of efforts to cut conventional, nonnuclear weapons.

Asked recently for his view on the relationship of the strategic arms talks to new negotiations on limiting conventional arms, Mr. Scowcroft provided a two-part answer.

Mr. Scowcroft said that the strategic arms talks and negotiations on reducing conventional weapons should proceed separately. Some hard-liners, like Senator Dan Quayle, the Vice President-elect, has said a strategic arms treaty should not be completed unless the Soviet Union makes concessions on reducing conventional arms in talks to start next year.

'Problems in the Alliance'

Mr. Scowcroft also said that linking the strategic arms talks and the conventional weapons negotiations "would create problems in the alliance" because countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization generally do not want any delay in concluding a new strategic arms treaty.

But Mr. Scowcroft said he could imagine a scenario in which it might be in the United States' interest to link a possible strategic arms treaty with progress on conventional arms.

If the Soviet Union put forth propagandistic conventional arms proposals designed to "split the alliance," Mr. Scowcroft said, the United States should consider linking the strategic and conventional arms talks. He reasoned that in such a situation Moscow would be blamed by Western European nations for a lack of progress on arms control and that a link could be established without creating friction between the United States and its NATO allies.

Conservatives Concerned

"Linkage that stems out of Soviets' obvious stonewalling or trying to be divisive on conventional arms control is then O.K.," Mr. Scowcroft said.

Mr. Scowcroft's generally moderate stance worries some staunch conservatives, who are slightly appeased by his criticism of the new missile accord and his cautious approach to a new strategic arms treaty.

"The conservatives are concerned about a couple of things, including his apparent lack of enthusiasm for S.D.I.," said James Hackett, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. "He would not be our first choice, but he is acceptable."

Mr. Scowcroft was a member of the presidentially appointed panel, led by Senator John Tower of Texas, that investigated the Iran-contra affair. The panel's report in February 1987 was very critical of President Reagan's management style but exonerated Mr. Bush.

Fighter Pilot in Air Force

Born in Ogden, Utah, on March 19, 1925, Mr. Scowcroft graduated from West Point in 1947 and entered the Air Force, where he became a fighter pilot. He was an assistant air attaché from 1959 to 1961 in Yugoslavia and later received a Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University in 1967.



The New York Times/Michael Geissinger

Mr. Scowcroft has been married for 37 years to the former Marian Horner. They have an adult daughter.

He speaks Russian and Serbo-Croatian and has taught Soviet history at the United States Military Academy and the Air Force Academy.

Mr. Scowcroft's Washington career reached a critical turning point when he became a military assistant to President Nixon, serving from 1972 to 1973. He later became deputy national security adviser under Henry A. Kissinger, serving from 1973 to 1975.

Rare to Return to Same Post

When Mr. Kissinger became Secretary of State, Mr. Scowcroft became national security adviser to President Ford, serving from 1975 until the end of the Ford Administration in January 1977.

Most recently, he was a national security adviser to the Bush campaign and vice chairman in Mr. Kissinger's consulting firm.

It is extremely rare in Washington for people to return to the same top job they held many years before. William D. Ruckelshaus ran the Environmental Protection Agency from 1970 to 1973 and again from 1983 to 1985, but no Cabinet member or national security adviser has held the same post twice.

In Mr. Scowcroft's case, however, he operated largely in Mr. Kissinger's shadow when he was national security adviser under President Ford. This time, he can be expected to play a leading role in the Administration.

Led Presidential Panel

During the Reagan Administration, Mr. Scowcroft was the chairman of a Presidential panel on strategic forces and reportedly exhibited the type of skills he will need as national security adviser.

In consultation with key Congressional moderates, the panel mapped a strategy for deploying MX missiles, developing the Midgetman missile and reforming the administration's approach to arms control.

The panel included several former secretaries of state and defense secretaries and other former high-ranking officials. As chairman of the group, Mr. Scowcroft "was very good at getting people to come to a group judgment without either letting everyone sound off or imposing his own will," said R. James Woolsey, a former Navy Under Secretary and a member of the panel.

Transcript of Bush News Conference on Choice of Scowcroft

Following is a transcript of President-elect Bush's news conference yesterday in Washington, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC Radio News.

OPENING STATEMENT

Well, before leaving for the Thanksgiving holiday, I wanted to announce another very important appointment, an important member of the Bush Administration. Before doing so, though, I want to pay my respects to Gen. Colin Powell. He has been a national security adviser of outstanding performance, an outstanding adviser to the President of the United States. He's won the confidence of the President, the Capitol and all of us with whom he's worked.

Coming in at a difficult time, he strengthened the national security staff, its procedures in many important areas. And most of all, he is a model, as one who fairly and clearly presents the views of the national security community — the entire community — to the President.

And I have great admiration for him, and he and I have spoken at length during the past few days. And while I'm not sure that he knows exactly what he's going to do, I am absolutely confident that his future will be bright and challenging.

As you now know, today's announcement concerns the important position of national security adviser, and I have chosen as my national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, a man with whom I have worked in various capacities in the past, a man for whom I have extraordinarily high regard. Brent is a trusted friend and he understands the White House. He understands the military, the State Department, and the way the Hill works, and the intelligence community as well.

Role in Foreign Policy

He knows too the importance of approaching our foreign and national security policy on a bipartisan basis, and he brings to the White House the respect of many of our nation's leaders on both sides of the aisle. He also has earned the respect of world leaders around the globe, and he's made and will continue to make important contributions to the design of U.S. foreign policy.

I'm going to count on him to coordinate the development of my national security policy. He and I met recently with Jim Baker, our Secretary of State-designate; he agrees — General Scowcroft agrees with Jim Baker and me — that the immediate future offers tremendous challenges and also great opportunity.

I told many young people during the campaign that in my view they had a real chance to grow up in a freer and more peaceful world. To enhance those possibilities I will put together a strong national security team. Now, with Brent Scowcroft at my side in the White House, we've taken a large step in that direction.

We're going to take whatever time is necessary for a thorough review and analysis on our policy initiatives, and then come out with our own strategic objectives, and then move this country forward together for a strong America, determined more than ever to work for peace and freedom, to strengthen our alliances, to help those around the world who need our help, to enhance the quest for human rights around the world and to deal realistically with the Soviet Union and other world powers.

I am optimistic about our foreign policy agenda, I am even more optimistic because Brent Scowcroft has agreed to take on this very important role.

Now what I'll do is take a couple of questions, a few questions, as we've doing, and then I'll be glad to turn this over to a man with whom most of you in this room have dealt. Andrea?

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Mr. Vice President, would you define the role that General Scowcroft will have? Will he report directly to you, or will he report to the chief of staff. Do you envision the Secretary of State as the chief spokesman on foreign policy? There's some confusion as to what a national security adviser is.

A. Well, I think — I have very clearly in mind what a national security adviser is, and I would say that both Colin Powell and Brent Scowcroft before him represent the ideal. He is not a policy-maker in the sense that policy — the Secretary of State will be the chief spokesman, obviously, on foreign policy matters.

He will be an honest broker. He will convey to me exactly the feelings of the Cabinet members that are involved in international affairs, national security affairs, whether it's on the economic side of the House or on the policy side or the defense side. He will bring those together, but because of his tremendous experience, obviously he will convey to me unvarnished his own view on policy matters of tremendous importance.

So I see it as in the — the Scowcroft N.S.C. leadership will be modeled after the Scowcroft N.S.C. leadership. And I think people

around the country, particularly in this room understand what that is. It's an honest broker, and yet it's an honest broker possessed of enormous experience and a person in whose judgment I have confidence.

I worked with Brent — maybe I should put it this way: I worked for Brent — when I was the President's D.C.I., Director of Central Intelligence. Here's an example: Brent Scowcroft made very, very sure that the intelligence community stayed out of the policy business. I was the intelligence officer; General Scowcroft knew that and it was very clear from — that the President, because of this advice and other things, understood that too. So he knows the way the national security community works, and I really go back and say the model will be as he did it — as he did it before.

Is this what they call a follow-up?

Q. No (unintelligible).

A. Yes, oh excuse me. I didn't tell — absolutely. And of course there has to be order in the White House. I mean, he's not going to go charging in there when another meeting might be scheduled, so he'll work closely with the chief of staff.

But a national security adviser has to have direct access, day and night. And I will be one who takes a keen interest in these matters: I have a lot of ideas and they need to be tempered by his experience and judgment, and the same for Jimmy Baker's and the same for whoever we have in the Defense Department and Treasury, of course, is set now. So it makes for — it'll make for a knowledgeable and experienced approach in the White House. Yes, Jim?

Q. Do you consider, Mr. Vice President, that General Powell is now on track to be Army Chief of Staff or chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

A. Well, I would simply say that General Powell and I had a good discussion about the future. I have enormous respect for — for the General, but I just don't know what he — whether he wants to stay in the Army. I expect that the Army would welcome him back. His record as a military officer was just terrific. But I don't — I would be reluctant to intervene in the Army process. But if he wants to know does he have a friend in the White House if he goes back into the Army, not only a friend but an admirer.

Choosing a Defense Secretary

Q. Sir, can you define for us what kind of Secretary of Defense you're looking for and what kind of commitment do you want from

SEYMOUR CRAY SAYS CRAY-3 PROJECT ON SCHEDULE, NO PROBLEMS WITH CHIPS (Minneapolis Star-Tribune)	No Byline	B-20
ACADEMIC PORK BARREL AND THE 100TH CONGRESS (Science & Government Report)	No Byline	B-20
MEMORIES OF THE TASTE OF FREEDOM (Los Angeles Times)	Jean-Paul Kauffmann	B-21
TEXT OF TERRY ANDERSON VIDEOTAPED MESSAGE (Counter- Terrorism)	No Byline	B-22
CURRENTLY ACTIVE GROUPS (Counter-Terrorism)	No Byline	B-23
<u>SECURITY/ESPIONAGE</u>		
SCOPING THE PROBLEMS IN THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY FIELD (Nightwatch)	Sen. Chic Hecht	B-24
WHERE OUR PRIORITIES LIE (Counter-Terrorism)	No Byline	B-27
<u>MILITARY POSTURE</u>		
THE FIREPOWER REVOLUTION (Army)	COL John T. Burke	B-28
A FORMER OFFICER SOUNDS OFF ON HOW ARMY HURTS ITSELF (Chicago Tribune)	David Evans	B-32
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FORMS EURO- APACHE PROGRAM OFFICE (Defense Daily)	No Byline	B-33



tive sign that I don't want greater progress with the Soviet Union. And I will have an opportunity early in December to make that very clear to Mr. Gorbachev.

But what I won't be able to make clear to him is here's our detailed arms control formulation. I want to have a new look. And that doesn't mean we're not going to build on the record of this Administration, which I salute and an Administration of which I have been a part. But we're going to formulate our priorities.

In the campaign I talked about trying to move that conventional force reductions up to a little higher priority, or to at least get that going faster if we can. I think that'd be very good for the alliance, very good for our relationship with the Germans, for example, and certainly good for us at home.

But we've got to spell this out ourselves. We need the time to formulate it. So there will be a signal to the Soviet Union: Look, we want progress to continue but we've got to set our pace. It's a new day, a new Administration.

Let me just take a couple of more and then go peacefully.

Fate of 'Star Wars'

Q. I think General Scowcroft also has expressed some reservations, I believe, about S.D.I. Does his appointment signal any kind of a pullback by you... (unintelligible).

A. Not at all.

Choices for Posts

Q. Were you indicating earlier that you had not yet received the names of what you would consider to be qualified women and black Americans for appointments in your Administration?

A. No, we're working with a good list now. Even my son is involved in this project. And I think we're going to have some very good, able representation from the minority community. But I — that whole process is going forward. So it's not a question — it's a question of fitting talented people to the jobs that are coming up. It's not a question of finding names so much, but we are outreaching, as they say.

Two more. Once, twice, and then I'm going peacefully.

Thurmond's Bill

Q. I'll make mine short. Would you, if you were President today, have signed the Thurmond bill were it on your desk?

A. I think I said in the original Thurmond bill, before it went through the whole process, that I would have.

Q. As it now reaches Mr. Reagan?

A. Well, I haven't said that.

Q. That's what I'm asking.

A. But that's what I'm not answering.

Delay on Tower?

Q. On the Tower situation, why has there been such a delay? And also, does Senator Quayle have any say-so in these appointments?

A. May I ask you what do you mean by "delay"? Do you realize, have you not read the propaganda we put out and how fast that we have been fulfilling these key roles? Are

And the Alphabet Soup Thickens

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 23 — When President-elect Bush held a news conference today to announce his choice for national security adviser, he added a new acronym to Washington's alphabet soup of departments, agencies and organizations.

The new word in Mr. Bush's lexicon, Casag (he pronounced it KAY-sag), left many of his staff members as puzzled as the reporters at the conference. After some investigation, and the invention of possible translations that were mostly too sarcastic or ribald to print, the Bush transition staff came up with the real meaning of the acronym.

It stands for Cabinet and Sub-Cabinet Advisory Group, and its members are James A. Baker 3d, the Secretary of State-designate; Nicholas F. Brady, the Treasury Secretary-designate; Gov. John H. Sununu of New Hampshire, the next White House chief of staff; Robert O. Teeter and Craig R. Fuller, the transition co-directors, and, of course, Mr. Bush.

tors, and, of course, Mr. Bush.

Casag even has its own note taker, Chase Untermeyer, the transition office's director of personnel.

'It's Where the Buck Stops'

If Casag's membership roster sounds suspiciously like the senior staff of the transition team, it is because that is basically what it is. But a Bush aide explained that this is the group that has the final say on all major appointments. "It's where the buck stops after the long lists, the short lists, the background checks and all the rest," the aide said.

But why have an acronym?

At first, Bush aides talked about how much more convenient it is to write "Casag" in an appointment diary than "talk to Baker, Brady, Sununu, Teeter and Fuller about the Energy Department."

But then one aide said: "You know how it is. Everything needs an acronym in Washington."

we not entitled to reasonable deliberation, in a process that has resulted in more appointments than any of my predecessors, I think. So I don't — I just can't accept the premise that there's an unreasonable delay.

And I've got to do it at my own pace. I've got to feel comfortable with these — all these appointments. And so if there does seem like a delay, I ask your forbearance because we've got to staff this Administration with people who can work with each other, can work compatibly.

And yes we do, Dan Quayle is consulted on these — what we — we have a — what do you call it, when you have initials add up to something, acronym or something — CASAG, which is a group that gets together and talks about these Cabinet appointments.

But the process goes forward in terms of sub-Cabinet and it'll get much, much more hectic after Thanksgiving. And I don't know that I can sit in on every one of those meetings — or something — or that Dan Quayle can or will. But he's more than welcome at these meetings because I do think he's got some very good judgment on the Hill and on — you've heard me speak about his commitment in retraining, and certainly in defense areas. So we'll —

Q. Are you meeting with Governor Dukakis?

A. No, not that I know of. Maybe —

Q. There's a report, Friday or Saturday, in New Hampshire that you are — (unintelligible)

A. Well, as I said, I think here, the other day... I talked to him on the phone...

Talks With Mexican Leader

Q. The reports would seem to indicate that President-elect Salinas would like to have Cabinet-level discussions with members of your Administration after he's inaugurated.

Do you think that's proper, and did you discuss any of that yesterday?

A. I think it's proper in some cases but not in others. I don't think a Bush secretary, for example, designate, who has not been confirmed by the Senate, should involve himself in those kinds of deliberations. I think in the case of the Treasury, which is a matter of great concern to Mr. Salinas, and to Mexico generally, it would be appropriate if ongoing... take place with, in this case, the... secretary-designate who has also been confirmed by the Senate.

So I would use that as a raw guide but the problems that Mexico faces, and that we face, need to be continually addressed. And one thing about this marvelous Martin Van Buren transition is that it can be, there is an ongoing bureaucracy with whom we are very, very compatible; an Administration of which I am a part.

So, for example, I don't expect it would be inappropriate for Jim Baker, who has... confirmed by the Senate, to start serious negotiations with the new Government. I do think that it's important that Mr. Salinas, as he forms his Government, announces his new Foreign Minister, that that minister have access to the foreign policy establishment in the United States. So that's the way I'd try to draw the line.

Q. So you'd allow Mr. Brady to talk to Mr. Salinas about Mexico's debt problems?

A. Yes, he — already has before Mr. Salinas came into office — concerns him greatly and we'll all be wrestling with trying to be helpful. But — incidentally the meeting yesterday was really good. I'm very much impressed with Mr. Salinas, with his determination to work with the United States. It was very friendly, very frank. I had a couple of — three — one-on-one meetings with... and I'm... I feel that we can work very closely together....

that person to cut the deficit?

A. Well, I'd want somebody to manage that department, to institute the reforms that I talked about in the campaign; to work closely with the national security community that I'm putting together, in terms of arms control; to work compatibly for bipartisan objectives with the Hill. But, Bernie, I haven't sorted it out — you know, that's the broad description and I'm sure I've probably left out parts of it here. But experience has to be a part of it, an ability to get along with the Congress has to be a part of it. Conviction about the need to keep America strong has got to be a part of it. But I would also say a willingness to take a fresh, tough look in these times of budgetary crunch at the Defense Department. And so those are the broad parameters and we will continue to work to put together a team that can accomplish those ends. Yes?

Problems at Security Agency

Q. President Reagan had some problems with the National Security Council staff during the Iran-contra era. Do you feel any further changes are needed in the way it operates, to make sure you don't have similar difficulties?

A. I don't think so. I think, well, crediting General Scowcroft, I think the changes that should have been made were not only recommended by the Scowcroft Commission but have been made.

Unauthorized Disclosures

Q. Back to the Secretary of Defense, I know you've been a little troubled by the leaks coming around. Are you at all troubled by a sense that Senator Tower might be left out there twisting in the wind for another week, another two weeks, whichever way you decide?

A. Well, yes, on a human basis I am, and that is one of the damaging things about leaks. As I said here before, look, I understand the insatiable curiosity about who's going to be staffing this Administration — I understand it — and leading it. And so — but there is a hurtful human side when a decision hasn't been made, and so I do worry about it.

But I'm less tense about that kind of thing than I used to be. I think we've demonstrated that things can be announced without leaks. But that's — I think you put your finger on something that does concern me because there's speculation that I read — leave out the Tower matter right now — that, you know, people's hopes are up there and then they — then it doesn't work out, so there's a human equation that is exacerbated by unauthorized stories.

Q. Just to follow up, are you going to put him out of his misery one way or the other, soon?

A. I'm asking you to do that. Yes, Saul.

Briefings on Intelligence

Q. Can you give us as much detail as to how you're going to receive briefings from Brent Scowcroft, and the D.C.I., on a daily basis? How are you — what are you —

A. Well, what I've said — one of the things that I have valued over the last eight years is sitting with the briefers from the State — from the C.I.A. Every morning I do that. And

then what I have been doing is going over — while the national security adviser briefs the President.

I haven't gotten into the detail of how to do this but I have said, and I will do this, that I will have the briefer, that level of C.I.A., sit with me first thing. And if we can wake up General Scowcroft, why he will be included in this meeting. All I want to ask is that I not be asked to keep up the hours this man has historically kept up. But I will take that briefing, and I think that's a departure from the way other Presidents have worked. But at my side, if he elects to be there for each of those briefings, will be the N.S.C. adviser.

Then, at some — you know, time, later on in the morning, he will come to me with the trouble spots around the world, with a report on initiatives, with — you know, where we stand with negotiations with some arms control objective, or little battles that are brewing in our bureaucracy or whatever it is. I will be kept up to date on events by the national security adviser, in direct face-to-face meetings. And I will personally read that P.D.B. every morning.

Q. Will the D.C.I. be briefing you? And why do you want that sort of separate briefing rather than one that General Scowcroft will brief you.

A. Well, because the intelligence comes every morning fresh from the best that the agency can put together, and other agencies in the community, and I want — I don't want to read unfinished intelligence, I don't want to go off on some tangent based on some rumor. But I want to — I believe that there's an awful lot of people in the Federal Government that know a lot more about it than I do, and I want their — the best that they can offer me.

And I find the people that are selected to brief every day are good, and they have no ax to grind politically. And I just am much more knowledgeable than I would have been if I'd have gotten that second- or third-hand. And I want to continue that. That's why I'm going to do it.

Waking Up the President

Q. Mr. Vice President, you mentioned the long hours General Scowcroft... (unintelligible). What will your orders be to General Scowcroft?

A. Keep me informed.

Q. — on post-midnight...

A. Yes, wake me up.

Q. At any —

A. Wake me. Shake me and wake me. But I don't know how well you know this guy, but there's — he'd do it anyway. That's one of the reasons I'm just delighted he's willing to do this. Yes?

Women and Blacks

Q. Mr. Vice President, as your choices of key positions now shrink down, what about the prospects for Democrats, women, blacks in key posts in your Administration?

A. It's something that must be accomplished and it is — I was very pleased that — with the appointment, for example, fitting into that category — but he wasn't appointed for this reason but fitting into that general area is Barry Cavazos, a Democrat. And so that's — you know, but I don't want tokenism. I want to get the best but I want to be sure

that we are reaching out to those areas, groups, that have been historically underrepresented at high levels of the Federal Government. And I keep saying this to people, and I expect results. Yes?

Choices at Pentagon

Q. Mr. Vice President, how far down in the Defense Department will you actually be appointing people? And how many of those with second tier positions will be appointed directly by the Secretary of Defense?

A. I will want to have the White House, and our whole national security team, have an input on — I don't know how to say this other than key appointments. But here's the way I look at it: a Cabinet secretary has got to feel compatible with the people he's asked to work with. A national security adviser has to feel compatible with the people that report to him.

But a President must know that those people are going to work towards fulfilling the objectives that that President has set out. And so it'll be consultant. And I don't want to say to some secretary, "You've got to use Shirley Smith, or Joe Jones," but I want to know that they're not putting in a team that has a different — not even inferentially — has a different agenda than that which I am determined to carry out. Yes, sir?

Legislation on Ethics

Q. Have you changed your support for the ethics bill, and if not, are you opposing the veto?

A. Well, let's wait and see what the President does on it, but I'll say this: I am going to have an ethics bill and it'll be a strong one. It'll be a fair one. I think there is some recognition that the Thurmond bill was a very good start. There were some changes made in it that I guess nobody's really totally happy with, and there are some problems in it. But we'll see what happens on this one, but if this bill is not signed, I will send up early on an ethics bill. I'm determined to fulfill that general posture that I have taken, in terms of ethics in government.

Q. Well, what changes would you make?

A. Well, let's wait till we see what action is taken and then I'll address myself to that if new legislation is required. Yes?

Dealing With Russians

Q. General Scowcroft has expressed some caution about how fast we should go on arms control with the Soviets, and just caution in general in dealing with the Soviets. Is that caution one reason why you picked him, and are you comfortable with that?

A. I don't think he was reading my lips, but he and I have been in touch for a long time in this and I think we are in agreement that caution is called for. And that doesn't mean there won't be forward progress, because I do think we have a great opportunity.

But what I want to do, and whether it's in arms control or any other bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, is to take enough time to set our course, to be sure that we're all on the same wavelength, to work with Congress to move that whole relationship forward. But if your question is do I share the caution that he has sometimes signaled, the answer is yes. But that should not be taken as a nega-

BUSH

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the security adviser, he said.

But Mr. Bush said his national security adviser would "have direct access, day and night. I will be one who takes a keen interest in these matters. I have a lot of ideas. They need to be tempered by his experience and judgment."

Gen. Scowcroft "has to have direct access, day and night," said Mr. Bush, adding that his new national security adviser has the following orders: "Keep me informed. Wake me up. Shake me and wake me."

Asked if he agreed with Gen. Scowcroft's concerns about arms control negotiations with the Soviets, Mr. Bush said, "He and I have been in touch for a long time in this, and I think we are in agreement that caution is called for."

"What I want to do, and whether it's in arms control or any other bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, is to take enough time to set our course, to be sure that we're all on the same wavelength, to work with Congress to move that whole relationship forward," Mr. Bush said.

He said a higher priority for conventional force reductions "would be very good for the alliance [NATO], very good for our relationship with Germans, for example, and certainly good for us at home."

Gen. Scowcroft told reporters the defense budget is "substantially underfunded" and called it important for the Bush administration to establish "a strategic concept which will help us set the kinds of priorities that need to be made."

He refused to speculate on whether a strategic arms (START) treaty might be concluded in 1989, and called it premature to say whether the administration review of priorities would postpone the scheduled February resumption of START talks.

During yesterday's surprise press conference, Mr. Bush relished the success of making the Scowcroft announcement without a story in the morning papers to steal the show. He chided reporters for continuing to speculate about appointees, particularly the likelihood that former Sen. John Tower of Texas would be secretary of defense.

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Selected by George Bush to be national security adviser



- Born: Ogden, Utah
- Age: 63
- Family: Married with one daughter.
- Education: Graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1947. Obtained masters and a doctoral degree from Columbia University; postgraduate work at Georgetown University.
- Job history and background: Retired three-star Air Force general. National security adviser to President Gerald Ford — 1975-77. Also was military assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser in Ford administration.
- Served as an arms control adviser to President Carter and was a member of a number of blue ribbon commissions, including one appointed by President Reagan to study basing possibilities for the MX missile and another that investigated the Iran-Contra affair.

The Washington Times

Mr. Bush also offered a glimpse into his process for selecting top officeholders when asked about Vice President-elect Dan Quayle's role.

He said Mr. Quayle is consulted, but a group he referred to only as CASAG "gets together and talks about these Cabinet appointments."

The initials stand for Cabinet and Sub-Cabinet Advisory Group, said a transition official, who said its membership, in addition to Mr. Bush, comprises Mr. Baker; Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady; New Hampshire Gov. John Sununu, who is to be White House chief of staff; transition co-directors Craig Fuller and Robert Teeter; and transition personnel director Chase Untermeyer.

Gen. Scowcroft, 63, who served in the Air Force and was a deputy to Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council before succeeding him as NSC chief during the Ford administration, will replace Army Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, who called the choice "superb."

"He is a seasoned professional, and I have the highest regard for him," Gen. Powell said. "He will bring excellent skills and expertise in foreign affairs to the position."

Mr. Bush said he and Gen. Powell spoke "at length" before the appointment, but said he didn't know Gen. Powell's plans for the future. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater later held out the prospect that Gen. Powell might return to Army duty.

"If he wants to know, does he have a friend in the White House if he goes back into the Army? Not only a

friend but an admirer," Mr. Bush said.

Gen. Scowcroft was called upon several times during the Reagan years when a voice from outside the administration was needed.

He headed a commission that crafted the compromise in 1983 credited with keeping President Reagan's MX missile deployment program alive.

Gen. Scowcroft also served on the three-member Tower commission that examined White House involvement in Iran-Contra affair and recommended reorganization of the office he now will head.

The Tower commission, whose third member was former Sen. Edmund Muskie, a Maine Democrat, criticized the Iran arms sales and accused Mr. Reagan of being out of touch with the actions of his staff, but it barely mentioned the vice president.

"He wasn't a player," Gen. Scowcroft told an interviewer. "Given that, we just left him out."

The Tower report said a national security adviser should have direct access to the president but keep a low profile and avoid competition with the secretaries of state and defense.

Asked about changes at NSC since the Tower commission report, Gen. Scowcroft said: "I am very pleased. I think that Gen. Powell and Secretary [Frank] Carlucci before him have left the NSC staff in really excellent condition, and it will be a joy to assume responsibility for the system the way it is operating now."

Bush selects Scowcroft to advise on U.S. security

By Frank J. Murray
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

President-elect George Bush chose retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft as national security adviser yesterday, saying the two share caution about dealing with the Soviet Union, and that his administration will give a "new look" at arms control.

Mr. Bush said he wants to set his own pace and priorities on "arms control or any other bilateral relations," and wants to accelerate conventional force reductions.

"So there will be a signal to the Soviet Union: 'Look, we want progress to continue, but we've got to set our pace,'" he said at a press conference here announcing the Scowcroft appointment.

"It's a new day, a new administration," Mr. Bush said.

The vice president said he personally will advise Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Dec. 7 not to take his comments as a "negative sign" when they and President Reagan meet at a working lunch in New York.

"What I won't be able to make clear to him is, 'Here's our detailed arms control formulation' I want to have a new look, and that doesn't mean we're not going to build on the record of this administration, which I salute."

Mr. Bush called Gen. Scowcroft a "trusted friend" who would function as "an honest broker."

The president-elect said James Baker, named earlier to become secretary of state, will be his chief spokesman on foreign policy and the security adviser will not be a policy-maker.

"He will convey to me exactly the feelings of the Cabinet members that are involved ... [and] he will convey to me, unvarnished, his own view on policy matters of tremendous importance," Mr. Bush said.

Mr. Bush even will take his daily CIA briefings in person, bypassing the practice of filtering them through

THE VIEWS OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

On the 'Broad' Interpretation of the 1972 ABM Treaty

"Regardless of the merits of broad or narrow interpretation, [the Antiballistic Missile Treaty] was presented to the Congress in the narrow interpretation, [and] we have behaved for most of its existence on the narrow interpretation. To me, it's unbefitting for the United States to try to maneuver in that sense [by advancing the broad interpretation]. If we decided that the ABM Treaty is fundamentally constricting to our vital national interests, then we ought to denounce it according to its provisions [allowing for six months' notice of formal withdrawal], not change from a narrow to a broad interpretation."

—Oct. 27, 1987, testimony to House Foreign Affairs Committee

On 'Star Wars'

"Ten years' U.S. adherence to the 'narrow' or traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty would not hamper very seriously what we need to do in SDI [the Strategic Defense Initiative, President Reagan's program to build a comprehensive missile defense]. . . . I don't like the first phase of SDI [advanced by program director Lt. Gen. James A. Abrahamson] because it changes the whole notion of what the program was trying to find out."

—Spring 1988 testimony to the House Democratic Caucus task force on SDI

On ICBMs and Arms Control

"Ever since the 1980 campaign, the world has stood by in bewilderment while the administration has, in a seemingly random pattern, requested funding for both survivable and non-survivable ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] deployments, while at the same time proposing arms-control bans on the survivable ones. . . . By moving a major share of the U.S. strategic forces toward being launched on warning, the Reagan administration's confusion about survivability is consequently moving the world toward greater risk and instability. This is not the purpose of either strategic modernization or arms control."

—With John Deutch and R. James Woolsey, The Washington Post, June 14, 1988

On Arms Agreements

"The purpose of a major strategic arms agreement should not be to implement a slogan, to flatter the ego of an outgoing administration or to require us to bet our whole strategic future on a gamble, such as early SDI deployment. The purpose should be to improve strategic stability—in simplest terms, to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Yet the administration seems committed to measures in the fast-moving strategic arms negotiations that could decrease stability and damage our allies' confidence in our deterrent. . . . Without changes in the two current administration policies that are creating the survivability problem, the United States could well be on the verge of committing itself to a strategic treaty that many moderate members of Congress and thoughtful citizens will reluctantly conclude is clearly contrary to the national interest."

—With John Deutch and R. James Woolsey, The Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1987

On Reykjavik

"Events during the autumn of 1986 have produced greater confusion in American strategic policy than perhaps at any other time in the nuclear age."

—With John Deutch and R. James Woolsey, The New York Times, Jan. 25, 1987

On Reagan Administration Arms Proposals

" . . . If we actually do have a strategic concept that brings order to all the disparate actions and proposals of the administration, of which Reykjavik is a prime example, it would be reassuring to know what it is."

—In The Washington Post, April 20, 1987

On Cruise Missiles

"I'm not convinced that, in the long run, cruise missiles would be advantageous to the United States."

—Spring 1988 testimony to the House Democratic Caucus task force on SDI

Bush Picks Scowcroft As Sec

Question About Tower's Role Is Turned Aside

SCOWCROFT...fm Pg. 1

tional security adviser.

Scowcroft and Tower were co-chairmen of Bush's defense advisory group for the campaign, on which Vice President-elect Dan Quayle and national security affairs transition director Dennis Ross also served.

Ross may become Scowcroft's deputy at the NSC. He has served on President Reagan's NSC staff.

During the Reagan years, Bush became increasingly disenchanted with Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey's handling of intelligence data to influence policy. Bush, a former director of central intelligence, yesterday reiterated his determination to avoid this.

"Brent Scowcroft made very, very sure that the intelligence community stayed out of the policy business," Bush said. "I was the intelligence officer. Gen. Scowcroft knew that, and it was very clear that the president... understood that, too."

Bush repeated that he would depart from the practice of recent presidents and continue to receive direct daily intelligence briefings from CIA officials.

The president-elect joked that Scowcroft will be invited to sit in on the early morning CIA briefings if Scowcroft could be awakened for them. Scowcroft is known in Washington for regularly working 18-hour days.

One of Reagan's early embarrassments in office was when then-White House aide Edwin Meese III failed to wake him with reports of a clash between U.S. and Libyan fighter planes. Bush signaled again yesterday that he intends to display a more engaged management style.

His orders to Scowcroft on handling off-hours emergencies are "shake me and wake me," he said.

Bush has expressed dismay at the foreign policy battles that so often pitted Reagan's Cabinet members against each other. While promising Scowcroft direct access to the Oval Office, he said he wanted his adviser to be an "honest broker" of the views of Cabinet members and others while providing his own views—"unvarnished."

Secretary of State-designate James A. Baker III will be the chief spokesman on foreign policy, Bush

By Judith Havemann
and David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writers

President-elect George Bush yesterday named Brent Scowcroft to be his national security adviser, the job that Scowcroft held under President Gerald R. Ford.

At the same time, Bush turned aside a question about the fate of former senator John G. Tower (R-Tex.), the leading candidate for secretary of defense. Tower is involved in complex negotiations with the Bush transition staff concerning authority to choose other high-ranking Pentagon officials.

Scowcroft is a retired Air Force lieutenant general who advised Presidents Ford, Richard M. Nixon and Jimmy Carter as well as the Reagan administration on a host of national security issues. Widely experienced in defense and foreign policy issues, Scowcroft has frequently expressed strongly held views on arms control and the Strategic Defense Initiative that are at odds with Reagan administration policies. [Related story, Page A25.]

"Brent is a trusted friend and he understands the White House, he understands the military, the State Department, the way the Hill works and the intelligence community as well," Bush said at a news conference.

Scowcroft has been an informal and influential adviser to Bush for some time in a group that has included former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane, former State Department official Lawrence S. Eagleburger and William Hyland, editor of the journal Foreign Affairs and Scowcroft's National Security Council deputy in the Ford White House. Others who have advised Bush include Ambassador to West Germany Richard R. Burt and Ambassador to NATO Alton G. Keel Jr., a former deputy and acting na-

SCOWCROFT...Pg. 2

said.

Bush said he saw little need for changes in National Security Council staff operations. Scowcroft studied the NSC last year as one of three members of a commission headed by Tower that investigated the NSC role in the Iran-contra affair.

Scowcroft concluded at the time: "The problem, at the heart, was one of people, not of process. It was not that the structure was faulty. It is that the structure was not used."

Bush said yesterday, "I think the changes that should have been made were not only recommended by the [Tower] commission, but have been made."

Informed sources said the Scowcroft announcement was a deliberate surprise. Bush's designated chief of staff, New Hampshire Gov.

John H. Sununu, was informed of the choice but did not know the announcement was to be made so quickly, the sources said.

Bush has been increasingly irritated in recent days by newspaper accounts of his planned announcements. Bush alluded to this during his news conference when he said he had "demonstrated that things can be announced without leaks."

Asked about Tower, Bush denied yesterday that there had been any "unreasonable delay" in filling the Pentagon post. "Are we not entitled to reasonable deliberation in a process that has resulted in more appointments than any of my predecessors" at this point in the transition? he asked. "We've got to staff this administration with people who can work with each other, can work

compatibly," he said.

Bush said he worries about the "hurtful human side when a decision hasn't been made... that is exacerbated by unauthorized stories." In response to a question about putting Tower "out of his misery, one way or the other," Bush said to the assembled press corps: "I'm asking you to do that."

The Scowcroft announcement was Bush's ninth appointment to his administration in the two weeks since he was elected. The president-elect has promised to bring in "a brand-new team" from around the country, but in making his major appointments so far, he has turned primarily to Washington veterans. The most conspicuous departure from this pattern was Bush's choice of Sununu as chief of staff.

American missiles, but has taken no firm stand on the issue.

In still other disputes with the Reagan Administration, Mr. Scowcroft has criticized the Administration's new accord to ban medium-range and shorter-range missiles. Along with former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, he argued that the United States would have been better off keeping some missiles in Europe as a symbol of American support for the defense of Europe.

In announcing his selection of Mr. Scowcroft, President-elect Bush said his Administration would take a fresh look at the arms control process and seek to elevate the importance of efforts to cut conventional, nonnuclear weapons.

Asked recently for his view on the relationship of the strategic arms talks to new negotiations on limiting conventional arms, Mr. Scowcroft provided a two-part answer.

Mr. Scowcroft said that the strategic arms talks and negotiations on reducing conventional weapons should proceed separately. Some hard-liners, like Senator Dan Quayle, the Vice President-elect, has said a strategic arms treaty should not be completed unless the Soviet Union makes concessions on reducing conventional arms in talks to start next year.

"Problems in the Alliance"

Mr. Scowcroft also said that linking the strategic arms talks and the conventional weapons negotiations "would create problems in the alliance" because countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization generally do not want any delay in concluding a new strategic arms treaty.

But Mr. Scowcroft said he could imagine a scenario in which it might be in the United States' interest to link a possible strategic arms treaty with progress on conventional arms.

If the Soviet Union put forth propagandistic conventional arms proposals designed to "split the alliance," Mr. Scowcroft said, the United States should consider linking the strategic and conventional arms talks. He reasoned that in such a situation Moscow would be blamed by Western European nations for a lack of progress on arms control and that a link could be established without creating friction between the United States and its NATO allies.

Conservatives Concerned

"Linkage that stems out of Soviets' obvious stonewalling or trying to be divisive on conventional arms control is then O.K.," Mr. Scowcroft said.

Mr. Scowcroft's generally moderate stance worries some staunch conservatives, who are slightly appeased by his criticism of the new missile accord and his cautious approach to a new strategic arms treaty.

"The conservatives are concerned

about a couple of things, including his apparent lack of enthusiasm for S.D.I.," said James Hackett, a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation. "He would not be our first choice, but he is acceptable."

Mr. Scowcroft was a member of the presidentially appointed panel, led by Senator John Tower of Texas, that investigated the Iran-contra affair. The panel's report in February 1987 was very critical of President Reagan's management style but exonerated Mr. Bush.

Fighter Pilot in Air Force

Born in Ogden, Utah, on March 19, 1925, Mr. Scowcroft graduated from West Point in 1947 and entered the Air Force, where he became a fighter pilot. He was an assistant air attaché from 1959 to 1961 in Yugoslavia and later received a Ph.D. in international relations from Columbia University in 1967.

Mr. Scowcroft has been married for 37 years to the former Marian Horner. They have an adult daughter.

He speaks Russian and Serbo-Croatian and has taught Soviet history at the United States Military Academy and the Air Force Academy.

Mr. Scowcroft's Washington career reached a critical turning point when he became a military assistant to President Nixon, serving from 1972 to 1973. He later became deputy national security adviser under Henry A. Kissinger, serving from 1973 to 1975.

Rare to Return to Same Post

When Mr. Kissinger became Secretary of State, Mr. Scowcroft became national security adviser to President Ford, serving from 1975 until the end of the Ford Administration in January 1977.

Most recently, he was a national security adviser to the Bush campaign and vice chairman in Mr. Kissinger's consulting firm.

It is extremely rare in Washington for people to return to the same top job they held many years before. William D. Ruckelshaus ran the Environmental Protection Agency from 1970 to 1973 and again from 1983 to 1985, but no Cabinet member or national security adviser has held the same post twice.

In Mr. Scowcroft's case, however, he operated largely in Mr. Kissinger's shadow when he was national security adviser under President Ford. This time, he can be expected to play a leading role in the Administration.

Led Presidential Panel

During the Reagan Administration, Mr. Scowcroft was the chairman of a Presidential panel on strategic forces and reportedly exhibited the type of skills he will need as national security adviser.

In consultation with key Congressional moderates, the panel mapped a

strategy for deploying MX missiles, developing the Midgetman missile and reforming the administration's approach to arms control.

The panel included several former secretaries of state and defense secretaries and other former high-ranking officials. As chairman of the group, Mr. Scowcroft "was very good at getting people to come to a group judgment without either letting everyone sound off or imposing his own will," said R. James Woolsey, a former Navy Under Secretary and a member of the panel.

Scowcroft's strengths...CONTINUED

White House. Meanwhile, with war and cold war, foreign affairs came to be the concern of many other agencies as well, ranging from Commerce to Agriculture.

Hence the new job with the fancy title: Presidents needed someone to coordinate and manage security policy. Mr. Scowcroft earned his stripes as a policy manager when he won agreement for the 1983 compromise on land-based missiles. Now the incoming Bush administration has to adjust that compromise, too ambitious in the face of new strategic and fiscal realities. No broker is more honest or more qualified than Mr. Scowcroft.

Washington Post 11-24-88

Scowcroft Provides Policy Anchor

Many Views at Odds With Those of Reagan Administration

By Don Oberdorfer
Washington Post Staff Writer

In choosing retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft to be his national security adviser, President-elect George Bush has established the basis for a policy-making system firmly anchored in the White House, in the care of a senior figure who has strong ideas about what needs to be done.

Among the top officials so far named to the Bush administration, Scowcroft's experience in international affairs is rivaled only by that of the president-elect. None of the others, including Bush, has displayed such a conceptual grasp of how the various strands of policy should fit together or expressed themselves in such extensive, often provocative detail on the complex strategic issues facing the United States. Many of Scowcroft's well-publicized views on arms control and the Strategic Defense Initiative

NEWS
ANALYSIS

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

Scowcroft outspoken skeptic of SDI value

By Peter LaBarbera
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, President-elect George Bush's choice for national security adviser, has over the years taken positions sharply at odds with the Reagan administration on nuclear arms control.

But it is Gen. Scowcroft's oft-stated skepticism toward President Reagan's space-based missile defense concept that sets him most apart from the Reagan agenda on strategic issues.

The retired Air Force general in 1985 called on Mr. Reagan to bargain away his Strategic Defense Initiative to defend against enemy nuclear missiles in exchange for deep cuts in multiple-warhead rockets on both sides.

That was heresy to SDI enthusiasts nationwide, who mounted a frantic last-minute campaign prior to Mr. Reagan's Icelandic summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev urging him not to abandon the program.

"We've got to step back and ask what's the most important goal here, and it seems to me defending the country against Soviet attack is most important," said James Hackett, a senior fellow at the conservative Heritage Foundation.

Gen. Scowcroft lost that battle in 1985 when Mr. Reagan did not bargain away SDI. But true to his moderate, cautious reputation, he ended up criticizing as "flawed and unrealizable" Mr. Reagan's arms control vision of eliminating all strategic nuclear weapons by 1996.

Gen. Scowcroft, a national security adviser to President Gerald Ford, also disapproved of the 1987 U.S.-Soviet treaty to ban ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, arguing that it could endanger the U.S. deterrent against a Soviet attack on Western Europe. He ended up endorsing passage of the treaty lest Washington divide its European allies by reneging on it.

Scowcroft...CONTINUED

servative groups like the Heritage Foundation have urged breaking out of the ABM Treaty and beginning space tests as soon as possible.

"We'd like to see the president move out of it," Mr. Hackett said. "The president should announce unlimited testing in space. The Soviets have violated it anyway, so let's go ahead with testing."

Although Gen. Scowcroft does support SDI research, he has argued that in the current era of severe budget constraints, SDI funding would displace the funding needed for a variety of crucial defense programs.

Even if the United States were to build just the single anti-ballistic missile site [containing 100 ABM

launchers] as allowed by the updated ABM Treaty, he writes in a recent paper he co-authored, "[it] would require a very heavy investment of funds and talent."

But Gen. Scowcroft has objected to a major SDI effort on far more than budgetary grounds.

"Effective arms control does not require defense," he told the Los Angeles Times in February 1985.

"There are immense arms control implications [of an SDI system] because it has been difficult enough to negotiate simply strategic offensive weapons agreements. When you throw defense in, it obviously makes it immensely more complicated," he

said.

Mr. Hackett says an aggressive SDI program is justified on its own merits, and that even a partial strategic defense system enhances U.S. nuclear deterrence.

Gen. Scowcroft also opposes linking new strategic arms reduction talks [START] and conventional arms reduction talks with the Soviet Union — a linkage favored by some conservatives — but he leaves open the possibility that linking the two negotiations may be advisable if Moscow advances propagandistic conventional arms proposals designed to split the NATO alliance.

With stances like these, Gen. Scowcroft, a protege of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, has gained a modicum of support among conservatives. But that has not been enough to make up for the distrust many still feel due to his opposition to some key elements of Mr. Reagan's strategic policy.

Gen. Scowcroft has consistently supported a "narrow" interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would restrict the testing of space-based sensors and

weapons favored by SDI supporters. The Reagan administration has called for a "broad" interpretation of the treaty, which it argues the Soviets have violated by constructing the huge Krasnoyarsk radar in Siberia.

The administration, frustrated at Soviet unwillingness to scrap the radar, is considering plans to retaliate, including beginning SDI tests. Con-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



LARS-ERIK NELSON

Nonideology, but competence

WASHINGTON—You could keep the MX missile loaded on trains on military reservations in time of peace; somebody was saying, and then, if a Soviet attack seemed likely, move it out onto the nation's rail system so the Russians couldn't target it. That would eliminate the current vulnerability of the MX as it sits in its siloes.

Not a bad idea, in theory, and in fact,

it's one of the Reagan administration's nuclear options to deal with the Soviet nuclear threat.

Brent Scowcroft quietly shot it down. This took place at an informal symposium a couple of weeks ago, and it exemplifies the way Scowcroft, a former Air Force intelligence officer, operates. He is nonideological, nonconfrontational and intellectually devastating in a soft-spoken way—the

perfect qualities to be President Bush's national security adviser.

Here's his argument against the rail-garrison MX: "To move the MX out into the rail system, you would have to have some kind of strategic warning, and you cannot assume that you will always have strategic warning in advance of a war," Scowcroft said.

"And even if you do have strategic warning, you cannot be sure that you can afford to act upon it. We had all kinds of strategic warning before Pearl Harbor and didn't do anything.

"Now, take the rail-based MX," he continued. "Suppose relations with the Russians deteriorated and war seemed possible. There's the strategic warning. But, at that point, you would

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

As is Scowcroft's view of how to keep the peace: "Most wars, and most decisions to go to war, are irrational acts," he said. "Our job is to make even the nonlogical resort to war less likely."

What was it that Michael Dukakis said about the election? It was not about ideology, but about competence. In putting together his national security team, President Bush has taken this advice to heart.

Secretary of State-designate James Baker is an adroit negotiator. Former Sen. John Tower of Texas, the likely secretary of defense, is reported by his friends to have a hard-headed awareness that the nation must first figure out what it must do to defend itself and then structure its military forces accordingly—not vice versa.

And Scowcroft is both a genuine scholar of military strategy and a highly competent public servant.

The essential role of the national security adviser is to be an intellectual bodyguard. He must protect the President from the wily arguments of the academic sharpies with their madcap

global schemes, the inertia of a bureaucracy that believes it is the true government, and the can-do generals willing to propose or salute lunacies that may provide them a promotion.

Bush has chosen a team likely to spare him the kind of failures of common sense that crippled President Reagan's foreign and defense policies during his first six years in office: the notion that Israel and the Arab nations would join a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union; the strategy that put U.S. Marines on a beach in Beirut, where they were slaughtered; the belief a Soviet masterplot to strangle the Western Hemisphere can be defeated by the Contra army; the insanity of shipping weapons to Iran.

REAGAN MAY HAVE been an especially persuadable man, but clearly he was not protected from these follies by advisers of good sense. Bush is not repeating Reagan's biggest mistake. It is hard to imagine a Jim Baker, Brent Scowcroft or John Tower allowing their President—or their country—to walk off such cliffs.

Competence...CONTINUED

most likely be engaged in the most sensitive negotiations. All the allies, probably all of Congress, would be urging the President not to take any provocative steps—and mobilizing the MX would be a provocative step. It might even provoke the Soviet attack."

That is to say, a military system that is technologically feasible and also seems to work in the computer-model chess games of nuclear warfighting scenarios, very likely would be unusable in a real flesh-and-blood world. This is not a liberal or a conservative argument, or a hawkish one or a dovish one. It is just common sense.



Lynn Martin: A 4th-term, Republican congresswoman from Illinois.



Sheila Tate: Press secretary of President-elect Bush's transition team.



Constance Horner: Director of Office of Personnel Management under Reagan.



Colin Powell: Current national security adviser to Reagan.



Alan Keyes: Ex-State Dept. official, unsuccessful U.S. Senate candidate in Md.

Minorities warily watch Bush picks

By Jean Becker
USA TODAY

Some women's and minority groups aren't as confident as others that President-elect Bush will make room for them in his new White House.

"We're not at all surprised" he hasn't appointed blacks or women, says National Organization for Women chief Molly Yard. "It's par for the course for the Reagan/Bush team."

Black groups are cautiously more optimistic: "I can't imag-

ine he won't name a black to his Cabinet, but I guess it's possible," says James Compton, president of the National Urban League's Chicago chapter.

Among the concerns:

► There are few prominent black Republicans from whom Bush can pick. "This is an opportunity for Bush to bring more blacks into the Republican Party," Compton says.

► NOW fears Bush will be controlled by the right, especially since Attorney General Dick Thornburgh already is

pressing the Supreme Court to overturn the *Roe vs. Wade* decision legalizing abortion.

"I already feel like we're under siege and we haven't even begun," Yard says.

► There's worry nothing will change. "President Reagan acted as if black people didn't exist," says Frank Watkins of the Rainbow Coalition. Bush's Cabinet "must reflect all American people, not just white male Republicans."

► Hopeful groups, 1A

Security adviser is a known quantity

By Leslie Phillips
USA TODAY

Brent Scowcroft already has a model for his new job as President-elect Bush's national security adviser: Himself.

The 63-year-old retired Air Force general served an earlier stint as national security adviser from 1975-77 during the Ford administration.

Back then he worked in the shadow of the dominant Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This time around, he's likely to be far more influential.

In announcing the appointment, which does not have to be confirmed by the Senate, Bush said he was looking for an "honest broker" who will "convey to me exactly the feelings" of the Cabinet as well as his own "unvarnished" views on foreign policy.

Secretary of State James Baker will be chief foreign policy spokesman, but Scowcroft's broad range of experience and close ties with Bush will give him the president's ear.

He has advised the last four presidents on national security issues. Further, he and Bush have been trusted friends since the Ford administration when Bush, as CIA director, reported to Ford through Scowcroft.

Scowcroft also has firm


Resumé National Security

Brent Scowcroft

Duties: Advises president of Cabinet views on international affairs. Salary: \$89,500.

Last job: Co-chairman of President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces.

Qualifications: Retired Air Force lieutenant general, was a national security adviser to Bush campaign; was national security adviser for President Ford; served on Tower Commission probing Iran-contra affair.



Background: B.A., U.S. Military Academy (1947); Ph.D., Columbia U. (1967); professor at the Air Force Academy; military assistant to President Nixon.

Family: Scowcroft, 63, a native of Ogden, Utah, and wife Marian have one daughter.

AP

views on arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations that at times clashed with Reagan administration policy. For example, he tagged as "impossible" Rea-

gan's notion of a space-based missile defense, or "star wars."

"The Scowcroft NSC (National Security Council) leadership will be modeled after the

Bush insiders

President-elect Bush will fill top posts over the next few weeks — Senate action begins in January. So far (✓-filled; □-to be named):

CABINET POSITIONS

- Agriculture
- ✓ Attorney general: Dick Thornburgh
- Commerce
- Defense
- ✓ Education: Lauro Cavazos
- Energy
- Health and Human Services
- Housing, Urban Development
- Interior
- Labor
- ✓ State: James Baker
- ✓ Treasury: Nicholas Brady
- Transportation
- Veterans Affairs

TOP ADVISORY STAFF

- CIA director
- ✓ National security adviser: Brent Scowcroft
- ✓ Office of Management and Budget: Richard Darman
- Ambassador to U.N.
- ✓ Chief of staff: John Sununu


ABOUT THE INSIDERS

Home state: New Hampshire, 1; New Jersey, 1; North Carolina, 1; Pennsylvania, 1; Texas, 2; Utah, 1
Sex: 7 men, 0 women
Minorities: 1 Hispanic

Scowcroft NSC leadership," Bush said. He's "possessed of enormous experience and a person in whose judgment I have confidence."

AP

In tapping Brent Scowcroft to be his national security adviser, George Bush has selected a respected man with vast experience — including a previous tour of duty in the post. He is not expected to take a lead in formulating policy, however, and analysts say the appointment assures Secretary of State-designate James Baker's primacy in foreign affairs policymaking.



'Honest broker' Scowcroft to head NSC

by Donald L. Rheem

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

George Bush's selection of retired Air Force general Brent Scowcroft to be his national security adviser Wednesday met with widespread praise from policy analysts, members of Congress, and others here.

Defense analysts refer to General Scowcroft as a "model" for the position. He listens without taking sides, they say. He will try to facili-

tate national security policy, not make it, those who know him add.

Mr. Bush called the former three-star general a "trusted friend" who has earned great respect from Republicans, Democrats, and "world leaders around the globe."

General Scowcroft, who is considered a moderate on defense issues, served in the same position under President Gerald Ford.

Scowcroft receives virtually universal praise from

members of Congress and top Capitol Hill aides who have worked with him in the past.

"It's an outstanding pick," says Congressman Norman Dicks (D) of Washington, who expressed nothing but praise for the retired general. "Bush couldn't have done better."

Representative Dicks says the President-elect is off to a strong start in his transition. In his appointments of James Baker III as secretary of state and now Scowcroft, Bush has

Congress is ready to work with, the lawmaker adds.

Despite the praise, however, Bush is expected to take some flak from the right wing of his party over the appointment, because of Scowcroft's reputation as a moderate who may be too willing to work with the Democrats.

One of the reasons Scowcroft is so highly regarded is his previous performance as President Ford's national security adviser. Having served

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NSC from page 3

in the position when Henry Kissinger ran the State Department, Scowcroft knows how to work with a powerful secretary.

"Scowcroft is the consummate skillful, intelligent, knowledgeable staff man, not a visionary policy infighter," says Richard K. Betts, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Betts praises the pick and says it cements Mr. Baker's role as the real power in foreign affairs.

"He [Scowcroft] probably will not try to interpose himself between the Cabinet-level officials and the President," Betts says. At the same time, however, "he's not going to pretend he doesn't know anything," the scholar says.

These qualities seemed to rank very highly with Bush. "He will be an honest broker," the President-elect said at the press conference Wednesday. "He will convey to me exactly the feelings of the Cabinet members ... [and] bring those together."

Recognizing Scowcroft's vast experience in military matters, Bush said he also expects the general to convey, "unvarnished, his own view on policy matters." Bush said Scowcroft will have direct "day and night" access to the Oval Office.

"The most amazing thing about this appointment," says Lawrence J. Korb, a former assistant secretary of defense under Reagan, "is that you have for the first time in a new administration someone who has had the job. He is going to walk in there and know how it is done."

The big advantage for the Bush admin-

istration is that they will be able to move very quickly on national security issues and opportunities as they arise.

"You won't have the situation like previous administrations, where it takes a year to get your act together," Mr. Korb says.

Bush said he plans to put together "a strong national security team. Now, with Brent Scowcroft at my side in the White House, we've taken a large step in that direction."

The President-elect said he plans to review the Reagan administration's national security objectives and then come out with a set of his own. He said his policy initiatives will "strengthen our alliances [and our ability] to help those around the world who need our help, to enhance our quest for human rights, and to deal realistically with the Soviet Union."

"Baker at the State Department will be *numero uno*," says Brett, "and the staff operation at the White House will be an efficient, skillful operation but not one taking the lead in defining policy the way it did under Nixon and to some extent under Carter."

Scowcroft has been largely supportive of the Reagan administration's foreign policy initiatives, but he had misgivings over with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the Soviet Union. Even though he opposed the treaty, however, once President Reagan signed it, Scowcroft said he believed it would be a mistake for the Senate not to ratify it. He asserted that, after the United States persuading its European allies to agree to

the treaty's terms, it would "traumatize" them to then turn around and kill the pact in the Senate.

Scowcroft also had problems with Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, which he thought would seriously hamper the efforts of arms negotiators dealing with the Soviet Union. SDI added the need to discuss defensive as well as strategic weapons in arms negotiations, a fact Scowcroft thought would complicate any potential agreement.

General Scowcroft's reputation as a skilled political operative was enhanced, congressional sources say, when he was named in 1982 to head a Reagan task

force looking into options for deploying the MX missile. The general is said to have impressed both sides of the aisle with his ability to listen and effectively mold a consensus. He is credited with moving the commission beyond the MX deployment question to considerations of the entire range of US nuclear forces.

Scowcroft also served on the Tower commission that investigated the Iran-contra scandal, and in 1985 he was appointed to a special commission on defense management that studied Pentagon procurement practices.

As one congressional aide said, "This man is warmed up and ready to go."

Scowcroft choice foretells a new look at arms goals

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

WASHINGTON — President-elect George Bush's choice of Brent Scowcroft as national security adviser foretells a fresh review of U.S. aims in arms control negotiations with Moscow and a skeptical new look at the goal of cutting strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent.

The proposed halving of intercontinental weapons stockpiles reflects President Reagan's urge for deep nuclear cuts, Mr. Scowcroft has said. But there "has been no kind of process" demonstrating how the cuts would make for a more stable military balance between the superpowers and better deter nuclear war.

"Why do we want to play with success?" Mr. Scowcroft has asked, referring to nuclear deterrence strategy of the past 40 years. "The arguments for deep cuts are unpersuasive, [although] I'm not saying they are wrong."

U.S. and Soviet delegates in Geneva have been trying for several years to negotiate an agreement that would cut each side's strategic arsenal to 6,000 nuclear warheads, a 50 percent reduction.

The return of Mr. Scowcroft to the White House — he was President Gerald R. Ford's security adviser — ensures a new assessment of how right or wrong the arguments are and how arms control proposals in general fit into an updated strategic concept for U.S. defense.

Mr. Scowcroft, who will be Mr. Bush's most experienced hand in foreign and military affairs, is one of numerous authorities, including Mr. Ford's secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, who believe a pause and new look at arms control aims are in order.

In the related area of "star wars" defense of the population against missile attacks, the retired Air Force general has been an agnostic. But he thinks that some sort of ground-based version to protect missile and bomber bases may be feasible and necessary.

The presidential transition report handed Mr. Bush last week by former President Jimmy Carter and Mr. Ford warned about the heavy cost of a full-scale pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative — "star wars" — for continent-wide defense. The report's section on that and other security issues was written by Mr. Scowcroft and R. James Woolsey, Mr. Carter's Navy undersecretary.

Such an SDI commitment could

turn into the new administration "major governmental initiative" and if it did, it could forestall "many other courses of action" in defense and elsewhere in government, the report said.

Mr. Scowcroft, a major, if quiet, voice on security matters for 20 years, takes singular advantages to the White House post.

These include long acquaintance with, and the confidence of, Mr. Bush, who directed central intelligence when Mr. Scowcroft served Mr. Ford. He has a considerable leg-up on James A. Baker, the secretary of state-designate, in foreign affairs experience.

Most important, the man who is national security adviser sits in the White House and has constant access to the president.

His job, as Mr. Scowcroft has said, is to supervise preparation of national, as distinct from departmental, security plans; give independent advice on foreign and military policy and try to see that the president's decisions are carried out.

The job often makes the security adviser the broker between contending State and Defense department positions.

In the Carter-Ford report to Mr. Bush, Mr. Scowcroft and Mr. Woolsey wrote that the new president must promptly lay out his approach to arms control — at a time when Moscow is pushing "at least superficially attractive new . . . overtures and proposals."

But before deciding on an arms control approach, they wrote, decisions must first be made on modernizing U.S. nuclear and conventional military forces within a reduced budget.

In his skepticism about deep nuclear cuts, especially when there is not much money to expand non-nuclear forces, Mr. Scowcroft has said the question is "what are we trying to do?"

The answer, he has said, is to make the concept of war deterrence work, which justifies erring "on the up side." Now the question seems to be, "How much can we cut back and have it still work . . . What is it that we're seeking that makes it wise to run the almost undefinable risk of getting there?"

NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER

Bush taps Gen. Scowcroft

A large number of passengers are riding comfortably on an airliner when the pilot's voice comes over the intercom.

"Well, folks, I've got some good news and some bad news," the pilot announces. "The bad news is that we're lost. We really don't know where we're headed. But the good news is that we're making very good time."

Brent Scowcroft, the man George Bush has named to be his national security adviser, tells this story to illustrate his difficulty with the Reagan administration's lack of coherent policy in the strategic areas of arms control, nuclear-force modernization and the defense budget. It has generated plenty of activity, the retired Air Force general notes, but in the rush to re-arm America and achieve arms-control treaties with the Soviet Union it has given precious little attention to fundamental strategic questions.

President-elect Bush's appointments continue to inspire confidence, and none more so than the naming of Lt. Gen. Scowcroft to the key White House position at the National Security Council. Mr. Scowcroft is one of the most cogent strategic thinkers in the country. A protege of Henry Kissinger's, he was a national security adviser to Presidents Nixon and Ford, headed President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces (the so-called "Scowcroft Commission"), and served on the Tower committee that probed the Iran-*contra* affair. Over the past 30 years he has been intimately engaged in the planning and implementation of U.S. strategic policies.

As national security adviser, Mr. Scowcroft will be able to manage the conflict between the State Department's addiction to treaties for treaties' sake and the Pentagon's willy-nilly lust for more and more weapons. While achieving significant accomplishments in the modernization of America's nuclear deterrent, the Reagan administration never bothered to develop a

coherent strategic policy linking strategy with arms control. Each ran down a separate track without intersecting.

The administration often seemed mesmerized by slogans — such as the INF Treaty's promise to "eliminate a whole class of weapons" — while ignoring the linkage of arms control to crucial strategic issues of force structure and the military balance. As Mr. Scowcroft, a critic of the INF Treaty, points out, in arms control the goal should not be reductions for their own sake, but a stable military balance that enhances deterrence.

What has concerned Mr. Scowcroft most about the Reagan administration is its attack on the whole notion of deterrence. President Reagan has a horror of nuclear weapons and has held out the hope of eventually abolishing them, either through strategic defense — so-called "Star Wars" — or arms-control pacts such as INF and the 50 percent reductions of START. In effect, he has held out the vision of a world that cannot exist — a nuclear-free world — and this has undercut popular support for deterrence.

Mr. Scowcroft recognizes that no sane person likes the notion of nuclear deterrence — maintaining peace through the threat of unleashing Armageddon — but he recognizes that, as far as we can measure it, it has worked and that deterrence through conventional weapons has failed miserably at enormous cost in human lives. While missile defenses and arms control both can play a role in the enhancement of deterrence, neither will do away with the necessity of maintaining a nuclear deterrent.

"Arms control will not solve our problems with the Soviet Union," Mr. Scowcroft said recently. "The arms race . . . is a symptom, not the problem. It is the thermometer of our difficulties with the Soviet Union, and one does not cure the disease by breaking the thermometer."

"Agile, Efficient Group"

Under the headline: "A Team of Pragmatists for the President-Elect," correspondent Enrico Franceschini wrote from Washington in leftist La Repubblica Saturday, "It is certainly too early to say whether he will be a good President, but, in the first two weeks after the vote, George Bush has demonstrated that he can be a valid President-elect. His transition team...is composed of an agile and efficient group of 100 people..."

WEST GERMANY: *"Scowcroft"*

Saturday's right-of-center Frankfurter Allgemeine observed, "Scowcroft does not belong to the GOP's right wing. He is a moderate conservative politician, certainly a pragmatist and flexible during negotiations.

"He did not support a rapid deployment of Reagan's SDI project, but rather considered it a possible bargaining chip with the Soviets. Scowcroft maintains a low profile in Washington's arrogant circles. According to Bush, this is the best prerequisite for the position of Security Adviser, because he shouldn't compete with the Secretary of State, but work as an honest broker next to the Oval Office..."

"Scowcroft Will Establish Different Priorities"

Centrist Stuttgarter Zeitung remarked, "The new U.S. Security Adviser will establish different priorities in the arms control agenda than Reagan.

"Scowcroft has criticized the INF Treaty...and would have preferred to keep a few INFs in Western Europe to make discriminate deterrence more credible.

"He is for a reduction of strategic missiles while, at the same time, he suggests the deployment of new, less vulnerable systems..."

"He thinks that the SDI project is unrealistic, but considers SDI research appropriate....There are really plenty of opportunities for Scowcroft to examine new approaches to arms control..."

"Shaping Up"

Today's right-of-center Die Welt of Bonn said, "The new American administration is shaping up. Thus far, Bush has nominated politicians with a lot of experience, competence and political realism....A policy of flexible and careful pragmatism is emerging..."

SOUTH AFRICA: *"Pragmatic Foreign Policy"*

The opposition Sunday Times remarked, "President-elect George Bush signalled once again this week that he wants a pragmatic foreign policy rather than an ideological one by nominating Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft as his National Security Adviser..."

"Bush is also keen for his foreign policy to be run by the White House and State departments and not by the Central Intelligence Agency..."

"No Respite on Bashing Vice President-Elect"

The opposition Sunday Star wrote, "Is a Bush in the White House worth a Quayle in the back seat? It seems there's been no respite yet from the United States media or public in bashing the unfortunate Vice President-elect.

"Wisecracks about Senator Dan Quayle still flow thick and fast. He's on his way to becoming the most lampooned Veep in history.

"The jokes about the 41-year-old Mr. Quayle center on his being a political lightweight and none too bright, on his fuzzy Vietnam war record, and of course on the worries about his being the traditional heartbeat away from the top job..."

SOUTH KOREA: *"The Ultimate Coordinator"*

Independent Joongang Ilbo's Washington correspondent Han Nam-gyu observed, "The new Bush Administration will probably be characterized by competition among three pivotal figures: James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and White House Chief of Staff Sununu.

"Mr. Bush may be planning to act as the ultimate coordinator of the views of these powerful men whom he will then use to carry out his decisions..."

* * * * *

EAST-WEST RELATIONS--The NATO paper on conventional forces was the lead East-West discussion topic over the weekend. In France the press largely panned Mr. Mitterand's visit to Moscow.

BRITAIN: *"A Hollowness to the Logic"*

In an editorial today, the liberal Guardian said, "NATO has delayed thinking about the future for too long. It can, as it did last week, issue the most knee-knocking account of its conventional forces' inferiority to the Warsaw Pact, swamped two to one, three to one, or even four to one in troops and tanks and aircraft and artillery.

"But there is a hollowness to the logic.

"This dramatic imbalance, it is believed, has existed through far more threatening times. Where is the emotion to restore it now? Is Mr. Manfred Woerner, the Secretary General telling his Bonn friends to spend far more? Of course not. He is preparing the way for next spring's Vienna grind of conventional force reduction negotiations."

USIA/P/M

NATO warned by Scowcroft of strategy, finance problems

By Peter Almond
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization faces tough decisions on strategy and spending in the face of the Soviet Union's "present benign mode," President-elect Bush's national security adviser said last night.

"Unless we can arrive at cooperative decisions which the alliance can hold to under the benign influence of our Soviet interlocutors, we will find ourselves in serious disarray," Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft warned at a conference here.

Issues facing the United States

and its allies, he said, include nuclear modernization, military cost-sharing, loans to Moscow, East-West trade and technology transfer, European economic integration and its consequences for trans-Atlantic trade in 1992.

"One of the basic problems is how to keep our collective wits about us when the Soviets are in their present benign mode," Gen. Scowcroft said. The time has come for "a long and sustained searching and continuous review" of NATO's directions, he said.

He was speaking at a two-day conference marking NATO's 40th anniversary, organized by the Institute

for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Netherlands Atlantic Commission.

Yesterday's discussions indicated clearly that the directions NATO must take now are far from clear.

Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci said "we must not neglect our forces in anticipation of a diminished threat."

But Ton Frinking, president of the Dutch North Atlantic Assembly, said maintaining defense budgets would be difficult, and that if any European or American government thinks there is any choice other than East-West arms agreements, "we are fool-

SCOWCROFT...Pg. 4

SCOWCROFT...fm Pg. 1
ing ourselves."

There was general agreement that NATO's future depends to a large extent on analysis of Soviet directions and intentions.

"In the past few years, all our publics have seen Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev shaking hands, as if they were the best of pals," said Dutch Defense Minister Frits Bolkestein. "Any right-minded person knows that world peace is not achieved by a single handshake. . . . But when the public sees such things on television, it makes it much more difficult for them to accept a growth in the defense budget, as always at the expense of other political wishes.

Mr. Carlucci said the United States may be forced to cut military

forces abroad and reduce deployment of aircraft carriers unless Congress approves a Pentagon budget increase.

"Domestic programs continue to grow at about 8 percent. I see nothing wrong with a 2 percent real growth in our defense budget," he said.

Mr. Carlucci said he has seen no change in Soviet military doctrine, production of weapons or disposition of forward-based forces.

Referring to the draft for next year's Pentagon report, "Soviet Military Power," he took note of the Soviets' latest short-range ballistic missile, the SS-21, and "the deep underground tunneling in the Soviet Union."

Sen. Albert Gore Jr., Tennessee

Democrat and member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said for Americans the big NATO debate for the next few years will be about the "sacrifices" U.S. taxpayers have to make for Europe's defense.

Mr. Carlucci acknowledged that U.S. arguments focused on how much less the Europeans are devoting to defense do not adequately explain the latter's commitments.

A conservative friend, William Waldegrave, a minister of state in the British Foreign Office, said that "simply name-calling about statistics, satisfactory though it is, is not going to see us through."

Sounding a theme picked up throughout the conference, he said that it is "by coaxing the Europeans into developing a self-confident and properly coordinated European de-

fense identity, in the shape of the Western European Union," that the "European pillar" of NATO will be best developed.

Mr. Waldegrave and several other speakers cited the recent coordinated involvement of minesweepers and ships from six NATO countries, through the WEU, in the Persian Gulf, was an example of how the Europeans will increasingly work together on defense.

As for American fears that they may become too integrated, setting up a Fortress Europe with high tariff barriers after the 1992 full economic integration of the European Community, Mr. Waldegrave echoed others by saying "the purpose of 1992 is to remove internal European barriers, not to erect new external ones."

David S. Broder

Choosing People for All Seasons

WP 11/30 P13
George Bush is off to a good start on building his administration. The manner of his choosing, as much as the men he has chosen, suggests that his long apprenticeship has given him the confidence and competence to take over and run the executive branch.

The heart of a presidency lies in managing the economy and national security and establishing a mechanism for ensuring the priority of the president's other objectives over those of competing agendas.

The principal players on Bush's economic team reflect his understanding that this is the place to go for quality and performance. Secretary of Treasury Nicholas Brady, Office of Management and Budget director Richard Darman and chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Michael Boskin have the academic and business credentials and—most important—the political governmental experience to tackle the daunting problems of the budget and trade deficits, Third World debt and a liquidity crisis in the savings and loan industry.

Brady, as a former senator, and Darman, as a key negotiator on the tax programs of the first six Reagan years, have an intimate knowledge of Capitol Hill. That's an absolute essential in an area where negotiations between the president and Congress will determine if progress is to be made.

In national security, the demands are at least as great and the men at least as competent. James A. Baker, as secretary of State, is a newcomer to formal diplomacy. But he studied with the world's leaders for eight years as White House chief of staff and secretary of Treasury. He is a superlative negotiator, and he too has a network of relationships in Congress on which he can draw for both counsel and support.

Brent Scowcroft, as head of the National Security Council staff, returns to a post where his previous tenure—under President Ford—is cited as the model by almost all students of the post. Like Baker and Brady, he has a long personal relationship with Bush.

It is significant that Bush chose to name his secretary of state and his national security adviser before picking his secretary of defense. That reverses Reagan's priority. He put his closest associate, Caspar Weinberger, at the Pentagon, then filled the State Department and NSC jobs with men less linked to him. The result, for the first six years of Reagan's tenure, was a foreign policy dominated by the Pentagon and distorted by an undisciplined NSC. This is a mistake Bush has clearly set out to avoid.

The third area, the battle for priority of other presidential initiatives, is the main work of the White House domestic staff, which is just beginning to take shape. Retiring New Hampshire Gov. John Sununu, as chief of staff, will have the major responsibility for seeing that the departments and agencies heed the President's signals and that Bush's policies and projects are sold skillfully to Congress, the public and key interest and constituency groups. But this is not a one-man job and the full team of White House legislative, public-relations, press and political aides is not yet selected.

Sununu brings both strengths and liabilities with him. Lack of Washington experience has hampered others in filling the role, but it need not be crippling. Another New Hampshire governor, Sherman Adams, functioned well as chief of staff for President Eisenhower—a man, like Bush, with his own intimate knowledge of the ways Washington works.

A governor understands how a political executive must marshal the large, but not infinite, resources of his office to advance his own objectives. As chief of staff, Sununu can help Bush define and achieve those goals—but only if he understands the environment in which he is working.

Washington is a long way from Concord. At home, Sununu shared the compact capitol with a large but poorly staffed legislature and a state administration in which few were willing, or able, to challenge his views. The Democratic political opposition was weak in both numbers and leadership. In that setting, he could command—or coerce—approval of most of his plans. Critics and even some colleagues in Concord describe Sununu as brusque, demanding, opinionated, unyielding and, on occasion, secretive and devious.

But even they acknowledge that in the Sununu years, no one out-thought him, out-worked him or out-organized him. Bush was rescued in New Hampshire last February, after a potentially crippling defeat in Iowa, in large part because Sununu brought all of his abundant energy, intelligence, discipline and guile to bear on the task at hand.

He insisted that Bush hold nothing back. Together, they broke Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole's candidacy like a stick of kindling across their knees.

Dole and his ally, Sen. Warren Rudman of New Hampshire, have spread the word among Republicans on Capitol Hill of the character of the incoming chief of staff, just as Michael Dukakis has let his fellow Democrats know how hardball a character Sununu can be. So Bush needs to surround Sununu with White House staffers who understand the need for two-way communication, not just direction; for negotiation, not just confrontation.

But when the troubled times come, as they inevitably will, it will be no small thing to Bush that he and Sununu have stared down political ruin together in the past—and survived.

Early Deadlines on Arms Issues

Some Scowcroft Positions at Odds With Bush Amid Budget Pinch

W8
43 By R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writer

President-elect George Bush and his national security adviser-designate, Brent Scowcroft, face an unusually large number of military and arms control decisions to be made early next year, each with major financial implications, according to key aides and congressional sources.

Unlike Ronald Reagan in 1980, Bush is under brief, congressionally imposed deadlines to set clear military priorities and stake out positions on potentially controversial issues from a new land-based nuclear missile and the Strategic Defense Initiative to Soviet compliance with arms agreements.

The backdrop for these declarations is Scowcroft's recent estimate that \$300 billion must be slashed immediately from the Defense Department's budget plan for fiscal 1990-94, an amount equivalent to the entire existing annual military budget.

The reason is the spending plan being left behind by Reagan far outstrips the modest budget increases likely to be appropriated by Congress, Scowcroft said in a report written for the recently released "American Agenda" project of former presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald R. Ford. "Considerably greater" cuts will be needed if Congress approves a flat military budget, he said.

"In the absence of some sound strategic concept, [these] cuts . . . from current procurement and [military] force structure plans could be catastrophic for the nation's defense," Scowcroft said. He wrote the report with former Navy undersecretary R. James Woolsey before being designated to be director of the White House national security decision-making apparatus.


Scowcroft has expressed opinions on key issues that are often sharply at odds with Reagan policies, suggesting that the transition to a new Republican administration on Jan. 20 could be unexpectedly abrupt. But some of his views are also at odds with Bush's statements during the presidential campaign, leaving the administration's direction unclear.

The principal issues:

■ **The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).** Bush may face an early decision on SDI, Reagan's cherished effort toward building a comprehensive shield against Soviet ballistic missiles.

Bush said this month that his position favoring the program's continuation "is stated, and it is . . . not changeable." Funded at \$4 billion a year, the program is laying the groundwork for a decision in the early 1990s to proceed with full-scale development of a space weapons system.

But Scowcroft and four other de-



fense experts said in a report last year that "we see virtually no prospect of building a significant and effective shield . . . inside of this century" and that "it remains highly unlikely" that research innovations under Reagan "will alter the fundamental challenges involved."

The so-called Aspen Strategy Group also concluded that although a partial U.S. missile defense "may be more plausible," it probably would not be cost-effective or be capable of surviving a concerted Soviet attack.

The group also called the Reagan administration's reinterpretation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to allow sophisticated SDI tests in space "implausible" and asserted that U.S. adherence to the traditional interpretation "would not seriously hamper" sensible scientific research in the next decade.

Scowcroft's position is sharply at odds with Bush's campaign support for the permissive ABM interpretation, but in basic agreement with the consensus in Congress favoring

MAKING CHOICES

the traditional interpretation. Adoption of Scowcroft's view would again sweep aside a major obstacle to a new U.S.-Soviet strategic arms accord.

Bush has until March 1 to prepare a report for Congress on "the status of planning" for a limited SDI system, and until March 15 to report on the program's overall goals and direction.

■ **A new strategic missile.** "The most important decision that the president will make about strategic forces" is whether and how to deploy a new land-based intercontinental ballistic missile, Scowcroft said in the American Agenda report.

Congress voted in the 1989 defense authorization to require that Bush decide by Feb. 15 whether to spend \$600 million for additional research on a scheme to deploy the 10-warhead MX missile on railroad cars or to divert the funds to preparations for deploying the single-warhead Midgetman missile on trucks.

The question proved enormously controversial under Reagan, with the military pulling for the less costly railroad scheme and the Democratic majority in Congress pressing for the truck idea. Scowcroft has

long preferred the Midgetman, but Bush's campaign advisers said he was leaning toward the rail-based MX.

Both schemes are designed to protect the U.S. land-based nuclear force from attack by increasingly accurate Soviet missiles by providing a mobile alternative to the missiles now based in fixed silos. The force of 500 warheads on rail cars would disperse from military garrisons onto civilian track upon warning of a Soviet attack.

But Scowcroft, like many leading Democrats, complains that the rail cars would be vulnerable to surprise attack, while the faster Midgetman trucks would not be. The difficulty is that the truck scheme may cost up to \$36 billion, while the rail cars would cost \$13.5 billion.

An alternative scheme, suggested in Scowcroft's recent report, calls for periodically shuttling the MX, Midgetman or older Minuteman missiles on trucks from one silo to another over a large area in a "shell game" deployment aimed at hiding their precise location from Soviet spy satellites. Pentagon officials estimate this would cost slightly less than the \$36 billion Midgetman truck deployment.

■ **Cruise missiles and arms talks.** Proceeding with any of the mobile missile schemes while the overall military budget is flat will require canceling other costly weapons programs and reversing the Reagan administration's position at the Geneva talks that mobile missiles must be banned.

But Scowcroft contends it would obviate the deployment of additional nuclear submarines capable of hiding from Soviet satellites and, possibly, any deployment of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles, again disputing a Reagan administration position.

Pentagon officials argue that Soviet compliance with a limit on cruise missiles—unpiloted, subsonic drones—cannot be verified. But Scowcroft appeared to disagree when he wrote of "the wisdom of a ban or limits" on the sea-launched weapons. The Soviets have demanded such limits as another major condition for a new strategic arms accord.

Bush has until March 15 to prepare a detailed report for Congress on the implications of such an accord on U.S. strategic forces in the 1990s.

■ **Other issues.** Bush must also report by Jan. 31 on Soviet compliance with existing arms treaties, and by April 1 on the Pentagon's budget for 1991-95.

In his American Agenda report, Scowcroft suggested trimming the budget by placing active Army units on reserve status, deploying aircraft carriers closer to home, developing more unmanned or drone military aircraft and using more computer simulations in training.

What should the NSC do?

In naming longtime friend and fellow Texan James Baker as secretary of state and former "boss" Brent Scowcroft as national security adviser, George Bush has laid the foundations for a foreign policy decision-making structure that has the virtue of steadfast loyalty to the president and his policies.

Recent history provides abundant evidence that the actual conduct of American foreign policy has taken a direction that the Founders never would have anticipated. A series of bureaucracies, particularly in the Department of State, conducts foreign policy on its own, sometimes without bothering to consult with the president charged with conducting foreign policy. As President Harry Truman once put it, "The difficulty with many career officers in the government is that they regard themselves as the men who really make policy and run the government. They look upon the elected officials as just temporary occupants. Every president in our history has been faced with this problem: How to prevent career men from circumventing presidential policy."

Recent administrations have suffered from an even more novel problem. Political appointees have abridged, circumvented or ignored the policy initiatives of the very presidents who gave them their jobs.

Because of these distortions, would-be "loyalists" on the White House-based National Security Adviser's staff have taken it upon themselves to implement foreign policy. This has worked well when the president and his national security adviser see eye-to-eye, as happened when Henry Kissinger engi-

neered the famous rapprochement with the People's Republic of China without the assistance or knowledge of the State Department. When the president has been less engaged, the results have been less favorable, particularly in the Iran-contra affair.

The ideal function of the National Security Adviser is two-tracked: 1) making sure the president is well-informed about the major security problems facing the nation and receives a range of thoughtful, comprehensive policy options for dealing with those problems, and 2) monitoring the implementation of the president's chosen policy initiatives as they are undertaken by the appropriate organs of the executive branch. The secretaries of state, defense, and treasury, the attorney general, the director of central intelligence and any other executive officers the president deems suitable should participate in discussion leading to a president's ultimate policy decision. Once that decision is made, to the extent that it is achievable through diplomacy, the secretary of state should be responsible for its execution.

Mr. Scowcroft in his previous tenure as National Security Adviser to President Ford showed great capacity for performing that job as it ought to be performed. At that time he had the advantage of working with a secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, with whom he philosophically agreed and who enjoyed the full confidence of the president. Mr. Baker, due to his long friendship with Mr. Bush and his extensive experience in both the White House and the Treasury Department, should be capable of sharing a similar workable partnership with Mr. Scowcroft. Whether or not he will be able to focus the activities of the State Department to serve

the will of the elected government remains to be seen.

But another question entirely is the wisdom of the policies Mr. Bush and his new advisers eventually embrace. So far, the president-elect's national security apparatus is an Inside-the-Beltway troika. Before finalizing his choices for CIA, Defense and related positions, Mr. Bush might want to consider the benefits of widening the intellectual and ideological base of his core group of foreign policy advisers.