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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91167
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush (6 pp.)	11/28	(b)(1)	C
02. Memcon	Re: First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union (6 pp.)	12/2/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Malta, Sunday (13 pp.)	12/3/89	(b)(1)	
04. Memcon	Re: Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union (2 pp.)	12/3/89	(b)(1)	
05. Cable	The White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	12/8/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Draft Demarche	Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev Re: Demarche to Soviet Union (3 pp.)	12/20/89	(b)(1)	
07. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany (6 pp.)	12/12/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Handwritten Notes	Re: Baker/Cheney (1 pp.)	12/26	(b)(1)	

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Collection:

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Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1374
OA/ID Number: 91167-006
Date Closed: 9/8/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09a. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Florence E. Gantt Re: General Scowcroft's Notes for the One-on-One with President Mitterand at St. Martin on December 16 (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
09b. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (3 pp.)	12/16/89	(b)(1)	S
10. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	1/5/90	(b)(1)	
11a. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in 1990 (3 pp.)	1/13/90	(b)(1)	S
11b. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S. - Soviet Relations in 1990 (1 pp.)	1/9/90	(b)(1)	S
12. Handwritten Notes	Re: CFE Meeting with President (2 pp.)	1/15/90	(b)(1)	
13a. Handwritten Notes	Re: Bob Gates - Memcons (12 pp.)	1/16/92	(b)(1)	
13b. Memo	James A. Baker, III for the President Re: US Troop Levels in Europe (2 pp.)	1/16/90	(b)(1)	S
13c. Talking Points	Re: What Might Be Said on CFE in the State of the Union Message (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
14. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush Re: [Unofficial Translation] (3 pp.)	1/17/90	(b)(1)	
15. Handwritten Notes	Re: Jaruzelski Phone Call (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
16. Handwritten Notes	Re: Handwritten Notes 89 (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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28 Nov 89

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989 - June 1990
Box 5-2

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BB

S/S #

044276

C


MESSAGE NO _____ CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 1
FROM: ROBERT KIMMITT P 642-1598 7208 NS
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (TRANSLATION)
ICW LETTER DUBININ TO KIMMITT ON 11/28/89

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	BOB GATES VIA WHSITRM		
	ZeLiKow		
	Kanter		
	Nahley		
	Blackwill		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/8/09

S/S Officer: 

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I am grateful to you for your letter of September 23, 1989, in which you underscore the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States have a special responsibility to play a decisive role in advancing the multilateral process of prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. I would like to tell you at the outset that I fully and sincerely support such an approach.

In order to promptly achieve a universal ban on chemical weapons I propose, just as in the case of Vienna talks, to express ourselves in favor of setting a deadline for finalizing the convention, through a joint appeal to the participants in the Conference on Disarmament, to finalize the text of the convention by 1990-1991 at latest.

It is in the context of the determination stated by our two countries in Wyoming to persist in achieving chemical weapons prohibition and elimination of all its stockpiles that we approach the specific ideas, which you, Mr. President, have put forward in your letter as well as at the UN.

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United States
of America
Washington, D.C.

TREAT AS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0839-MR
4/10/13 MM

You've been writing about the readiness of the United States to eliminate over 98% of its CW stockpiles during the period of 8 years after the convention comes into effect, provided that the Soviet Union is to be one of the state signatories to that convention. As regards the Soviet Union participation in the convention, I give you a completely unequivocally positive answer. The Soviet Union has already stated that it is ready to be among the original parties to the convention.

It would be nice, if the United States were to make a similar announcement, and still better if we were to make such announcement jointly, for instance, at our forthcoming meeting in 1990. In turn, that would push other states to take no less a definite stance with regard to participating in the convention.

As to the issue of complete destruction of CW under the future convention, it seems to me that we should adhere to the agreement reached at the multinational negotiations, mostly due to the initiative of the USSR and United States, on their unconditional 100 per cent destruction within the 10 year period after the coming into force of the convention. It is on the principles of complete destruction of CW stockpiles and production facilities in this time-frame that the joint Soviet-US proposals on the order of destruction of such stockpiles and facilities have been drafted and then adopted in Wyoming. The right to retain any stockpiles, however minimal, would signify the perpetuating of a threat of CW use, would provide, as a matter of fact, ground for any state to renounce under various pretexts the complete destruction of chemical weapons.

As to the participation in the convention of all CW capable states, the Soviet Union, like the United States, attaches priority significance to this question.

We believe that it has been resolved to a great extent by the special Soviet-US agreement on the categories of states which should be original parties to the convention, and now it seems to be possible to get down to discussing a specific plan of action with a view to involving as parties to the convention such states that pose a potential threat in terms of CW. Naturally, what is required here is a flexible approach, taking into account diverse conditions existing in each given region of the world.

You have also proposed a radical reduction of the CW stockpiles of the USSR and the United States while the multilateral talks in Geneva are still underway. I think that our two countries, given their special responsibility in the area of CW disarmament, could move even further and without waiting for a convention to be concluded, undertake an entire package of reciprocal and mutually interrelated obligations.

First. To halt completely any CW production. It is a natural and relatively easy first step to take toward the future convention. It would enable to considerably reinforce our political impact on those who are possibly engaged in their own CW production or are planning to do so.

I must frankly say that the recent reports to the effect that the United States intends to continue the CW production even after the coming into force of the convention have given rise to our serious concern. It is with a certain degree of mistrust that we have treated these reports because such US actions would directly contradict the already existing agreements worked out mostly through the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States. Moreover, you made no mention of this approach in your letter either. Any permission to produce

chemical weapons in the framework of the convention would push other states, one way or the other, to initiate its production in order to retain the right to continue it after the coming into force of the convention. It would inevitably lead to a point where the proliferation of chemical weapons would become politically and legally admissible.

Second. To radically reduce and - what is even better to completely destroy the chemical weapons of the USSR and the US. The Soviet Union intends to start destruction of its stockpiles prior to the conclusion of the convention, and we like the idea of the USSR and the US moving along this road on parallel courses. We had to convert our first pilot CW destruction plant built near Chapaevsk, into a training center as requested by the public, and now in order to have an idea of our real possibilities for destroying the stockpiles, we must complete the draft comprehensive program for CW destruction in the USSR to be submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Consideration of such a complex and multifaceted issue in the Supreme Soviet as well as implementation of the decisions to be adopted will obviously take some time.

With a view to ensuring the best possible preparation for CW destruction, including solutions to complex ecological question, it might be possible to build on cooperation between our two countries concerning the methods of CW destruction, operating respective facilities, elaboration of suitable verification procedures, etc. and formalize a special bilateral agreement to that effect.

In order to avoid any apprehensions on the part of the participants in the talks to the effect that the reciprocal steps of the USSR and the US are conceived

as a substitute for a multilateral convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it would be possible to declare that the agreement on reduction and, time permitting, destruction of US and Soviet chemical weapons will come into force at the moment of the signing of the convention itself.

Third. Under no circumstances chemical weapons should be used. Unlike the USSR and the US the overwhelming majority of countries have no reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol enabling the use of CW in retaliation. The mutual renunciation by the USSR and the US of their reservations would make a tangible contribution to the process of strengthening intolerance toward chemical weapons. Establishing an absolute and verifiable ban on the use of chemical weapons through effective UN procedures would lessen the incentives for acquiring chemical weapons by states.

Fourth. We resolutely believe that the discontinuation of CW production, their destruction and non-use must be verified in the strictest possible manner in the framework of both convention and the range of steps which the USSR and the US could implement prior to its conclusion.

As to our possible joint contribution to the process of multilateral negotiations, I think there is a need for it, now, above all, with a view to finalizing a solution to the entire range of verification problems. In this connection I'd like to propose that our two countries come out with a joint initiative on challenge inspections.

The important contribution that you, Mr. President, made in raising this issue at the negotiations has been now appreciated on its merits in the Soviet Union. Its discussion showed that it may be adequately resolved,

provided all states accept the concept of "continuous" or "open invitation for inspection" which would provide for a possibility to conduct such inspections by the international inspectorate at the request of any party to the convention, at any time, at any point or facility of the other party within the most limited time-frame, without any exceptions and the right to refusal. Our joint initiative on this basis would become a most significant contribution to the successful completion of the negotiations on the convention.

In conclusion I'd like to express my conviction that through joint efforts we will succeed, already in the near future, to attain our common objective - introduction of a complete global ban on CW. I would be interested to know your considerations in reaction concerning this priority question.

With sincere respect.

M. GORBACHEV

November 28, 1989

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)

1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: First Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
General Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 2, 1989, 12:00 - 1:00 pm
AND PLACE: Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta

Chairman Gorbachev: I have three points. I already referred to Central America especially Cuba. I recall a letter to you after Cuba. My talks in Cuba weren't simple. Castro expressed caution about our policy -- I explained our aims were good. I said as for our internal affairs we are doing what we want. What you do is your business. He asked me, in effect, to help normalize U.S.-Cuban relations. (S/SEN)

Recently, the Cuban Chief of Staff visited the Soviet Union. He talked to Yazov and said some things, I say this for the first time in the most private way. If Castro found out (S/SEN)

The President: I understand. It will stay with me. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I think perhaps we would think how to do it. Some contacts. We could participate but that is not necessary. I can say that Castro understands that the world is changing dramatically but he has his own sense of dignity and pride. Even raising this possibility was not easy for him. (S/SEN)

The President: What is he saying? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: His very words, "Find a way to make the President aware of my interest in normalization." It is on the basis of that remark that I made my comment. (S/SEN)

The President: Let's put all our cards on the table about Castro. Our allies can't see why we care about Central America. It just isn't a gut issue for them. For the political left in the U.S., it isn't a gut issue. But for the fledgling democracies in Latin America and the U.S. right it is a gut issue. Castro is like a sea anchor as you move forward and the Western Hemisphere moves. He is against all this -- Eastern Europe and the Western Hemisphere. (S/SEN)

Publicly Latin Americans will not criticize a colleague. But Arias' call was a clear indication that Castro is now totally isolated. There is another major Castro problem -- the emigres (in Florida) who have strong emotions about this last dictator. We have had feelers from Castro but never with an indication of a willingness to change. (S)

Switching to Nicaragua, you said Ortega had nothing to do with [ILLEGIBLE]. I am inclined to agree though I didn't use to think so. But I am convinced that they are exporting revolution. They are sending weapons. I don't care what they have told you, they are supporting the FMLN. I am now convinced there is a new shipment of helos going from the Soviet Union to Nicaragua. I don't question Shevardnadze's word on this. (S/SEN)

Chairman Gorbachev: There were U.S. rockets too. (S)

The President: I see a solution as in a verifiable election -- free and open -- and that if Ortega loses he doesn't try to cling to power. If it is a free election, we will abide by the results. (S/SEN)

The only other open cancer is Panama, but there is no feeling that the Soviet Union wants Noriega to succeed. He is a terrible problem for us. I asked the Attorney General if our indictments were strong ones. I am seeking for him to get out. This is quite confidential. He said these are good indictments and given feelings on drugs in the U.S., I can't drop the indictments. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Let me tell you how your steps are perceived in the Soviet Union. People ask are there no barrier to the U.S. action in independent countries? The U.S. passes judgement and executes that judgement. (S)

The President: There is no military operation against Colombia, but if we are asked for help against the scourge of drugs, we will help. (S)

Then I would like to mention the Philippines. (S)

I was surprised at your Philippines reaction. Aquino is democratically elected and asked for our help to prevent the palace from being bombed by the rebels. It never occurred to me that this would cause problems in the Soviet Union, though I probably would have done it anyway. But that notion never occurred to me. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: In the Soviet Union some are saying the Brezhnev doctrine is being replaced by the Bush doctrine. (S)

The President: I want to understand. Here is a democracy saying that it needs help against rebels. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I agree she is democratically elected. It depends on the context. In Eastern Europe there are governments, legitimately elected, that are now being replaced. The question is in Eastern Europe it is prohibited for Soviet troops to intervene. All now is interrelated. Some now are ~~seeing~~ ^{feeling} that we are not performing our duty to our friends. But we have not been asked. (S)

The President: In Eastern Europe, change is peaceful and encouraged by you. In the Philippines, there is a Colonel trying to shoot his way into power. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I agree -- peaceful change is the way. Our position is non-interference. The process of change can be painful but we believe in non-interference. Colonels can be found everywhere to do those jobs. (S)

The President: If we can stick with the notion of peaceful change, better relations will occur between the Soviet Union and the U.S. I would never give advice to a senior office holder like you. I can accept your criticism, but not on this issue, in this circumstance. Aquino is struggling to bring democracy. I would hope your criticism could be muted. I can accept it but I think that your criticism would cut the wrong way. (S)

I appreciate your explanation in the Philippines. One more comment on Latin America. I don't want to sound like a broken record. Let me express U.S. public opinion on you yourself. There is strong support for perestroika and for establishing pluralistic answers in Eastern Europe -- strong support. But I think people see support for Castro -- almost -- speaking frankly -- as an embarrassment. He is against the causes you are advocating. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: That is pluralism (laughs). (U)

The President: I wish we could find a way. You are spending billions into the pipeline and getting nothing for it, and it does interfere with our overall relationship. The way you have handled it is clear. Castro doesn't just do what you say. (S)

Just to end it -- anything we can do to cut support for Cuba and Nicaragua so we are not on opposite sides. Chile is moving in the right direction -- not toward the U.S. but toward democracy and I don't want these others to get in the way of what I want to do with the Soviet Union. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: The most important thing is that we have no plan for Latin America -- no bridges, no bridgeheads. That is not our policy -- you have it from me. {NEXT LINE ILLEGIBLE}

I am moving toward democracy. Of course they are fledgling and the road ahead will be difficult. We are satisfied with that -- as you -- but we will not interfere. (S)

With Cuba, yes, we have a long relationship -- responding to the economic blockade. We seek to put it on a more normal basis, especially economic. We are trading with Cuba and that meets our need -- sugar, citrus, nickel -- but it is much more to Cuba's advantage. For example, we sell oil to Cuba on a market clearing basis which we could sell for much more. But Cuba is independent with its own view and we don't want to interfere. (S)

I mention Castro's signal because I think it shows Castro sees his interest lies in changing his relations with the U.S. and others. So please give it some thought. If you have something to share with us or something we can pass on. We can note we have had a frank conversation and understand each other better. (S)

The President: We have had feelers from him. But if he could do something in human rights. I will think carefully on it. I will let you know so we don't get disconnected on this. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: We could say that to him about human rights. (S)

The President: He won't even let the U.N. in to see. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I haven't finished (laughs). (U)

The President: Neither have I. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: O.K. (U)

The President: O.K. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Let me address Eastern Europe. I have three points. (S)

- (1) The direction of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is such as to bring us closer -- that is important. (S)
- (2) What I dislike is when some U.S. politicians say unity of Europe should be on the basis of Western values. We have long been accused of exporting ideology. That is what is now being proposed by some -- not you. (S)
- (3) Mr. Kohl is in too much of a hurry on the German question. That is not good. I worry that this could be part of his pre-election game and not because of a strategic outlook. There are some differences in view in West Germany, within the coalition, and with the SPD. We should let Kohl know that his approach could damage things. (S)

For example, would a united Germany be outside alliances or within NATO? Answer is premature and we shouldn't put it forth -- should let it run its natural course. You and I are not responsible for the division of Germany. Let history decide what should happen. We need an understanding on this. (S)

The President: I think Kohl feels an enormous emotional response to what has happened -- as does Genscher. There is some politics in his three part program and some emotional outpouring. I think he knows his allies -- after they support right of the German people to reunify, have some private reservations about reunification. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Yes I know -- and they have let me know. Unlike they and you -- I am saying there are two states, mandated by history. So let history decide the outcome. Kohl assures me he will abide by understandings made in Bonn. Now he says he wants to talk on the phone and Genscher is coming. I think this is an ? particular prudence. (S)

The President: I agree and we will do nothing to recklessly try to speed up reunification. When you talk to Kohl, I think you will see he agrees. But his rhetoric, you must understand, is emotional and possibly some politics, but mostly emotion. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: It is good that things have [ILLEGIBLE] (U)

The President: The most conservative Americans salute how you have handled this issue. They are now looking back into history. I will be timid -- that is how in a nutshell they describe my refusal to jump up and down at the Wall. This is no time for grandstanding -- a step that looks good but could prove reckless. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: The times we live in are of great responsibility -- great opportunity but great responsibility. (S)

The President: I would like to spend some time on one other point at some time. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I have one other point as well -- later. A point which you carefully avoided. (S)

The President: Yes, I was hoping to avoid it. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: I once said something -- You used a word that means "a test" to see if we could solve mutual problems. (S)

The President: Afghanistan is more important to you than to us. I was wrong about what would happen after Soviet troops left. Let's discuss it. (S)

The President: Let me not blind side you. You may not want to discuss it. But I would like to know your views concerning the sensitive area of the Baltics. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: Yes, we will. (U)

Sunday

G Yesterday I responded briefly to your
pol-mil proposals

S.U. will under no circumstances
start a war.

- No longer regards US as adversary
 - will be prepared to state publicly
- We seek verifiable mutual security
- Continue A.C.
 - Go beyond arms race + develop new sophisticated weapons.
- Our mil. have begun to cooperate
- We have adopted a defensive doctrine
 - In Central Europe our presence assuming defensive posture
 - Tanks & bridging equip being reduced
 - Strike a/cft being replaced by intercept a/cft on front lines
- US has had flexible resp. strategy
 - In past that made sense
 - Since it recs. there is no more threat we wonder why US not changing its strategy
- Comprehensive Concept has shown no change as yet.
- Negotiating process
 - Both sides have tremendous mil power.
 - We are now talking to do something about it

(2)

One of 3 components of mil power
that is naval focus, ~~are~~ outside
AC process

- VS is emotional about it + we
realize VS is a seapower.

- ~~They~~ have a naval tradition + industry

- Back in 50's, SU was surrounded, esp
by naval bases. 500,000 men, naval
ships + vast airt. (1500 airt) + 15 airt
carriers - deployed around SU.
- Vienna talks will reduce land confrontation
 - Prospects good for steel. AC
- we have right to expect that
naval threat to us will be reduced
 - hot talk - and we will be taking
realistic positions in those talks
 - we realize you have other
threats to meet
 - But we also have right to
deal w/ threats from oceans
- Gen'l comments (not negot) on A
 - 3 items
 - Come to grips + get clarity on relation
but START + ABM treaty
 - Talking into act Shervel
proposals in Vienna
 - Counting rules for ABM +
heavy bombers
 - US counting rules would leave

(3)

not w/ 6000 but see 5000 warheads

- We believe a actual loads should be 5000

- SKM (plus others I would discuss here)

By a time of Summit, as you well know all major ~~for~~ issues resolved for treaty before end of 90

- Geo & Afro had interesting discussions
- ~~naval forces~~
- Submarines are verifiable & covered in START

- The rest - SKM's & other too many should ~~be~~ be eliminated.

- ~~As~~ Down presenting Geo & Afro idea as my own.

- ie complete elimination of naval nuclear except subs.

- Vienna - 3 issues

1) Reducing arms and personnel

- Propose reduction to 1.3 mil ~~each~~ - reduction of 1 mil

- Nato hasn't responded to proposed diff agreements

- Personnel as well as forces must be reduced

2) Reductions of stationed forces.

- Propose reduction to 200,000

- Your proposal is that only US/50 forces be reduced

- That is unfair

(4)

- 3) Acft. Proposal is 4700 ~~est~~ ^{est} a.
But separate limit for interceptors
- Movement slow & nothing new suggested on either side
 - Next Ministerial should address these issues
 - Open skies - we support & will participate in Ottawa
 - Propose also open seas & open spaces & open lines.
 - We looking forward to peace & i. i. mid postures must be change
 - The fewer & upris the less chance one will shoot.
 - Your observed proposal deserves serious consideration
 - Agree that goal is zero but movement phase by phase
 - US will cease bombing

P (anti prof)

G we agree completely. You reduce rapidly that will give us a moral force to deal w/ prof.

- That is all I have on the. Unless you must move, let's turn to perestroika & E.Euro.
E.Euro

P Just a few comments

(5)

- Rapidity of change + Sov reaction to it
- German reun.
 - We can't disappoint reun.
 - We realize it highly sensitive statement. subject & have acted w/ restraint.
- Have sent delegation to Poland - not to cause dip w/ SC but to help
- we well aware of CSCE language on borders.
- Those just a few inter-stater comments
- ✓ You are as much a part & involved in EE as we.
- Something fundamental is happening in both E + W Eur
- E can help that in WE will also transform political structure - creating a new super structure (power) in Euro
 - we accept that as part of common Euro house
- FM's should give consideration to this idea.
- we should continue Helsinki process & not destroy what has been done.
- That is why I propose CSCE II
 - To add, add to this new phase.

(6)

- We should also modify other organs such as NATO + WP which should become more political.
- also econ organ - incl. CONFECON legislatures.
- But unity of E & W should not be on basis of "western values." That is X of ideology.
- We should not force differences or seek to turn them to one side's advantage.
- This evolution may not always be smooth.
- We must use this process which is underway to bring E & W together.
- we need common understanding
 - + I think we have it
- This process will keep unfolding + we want common understanding
 - + frequent consultations.

P Discussion of Western values

- Glasnost is one (then describes)
- I want to know what goes on in by Western values.

G Right of every nation to determine its internal affairs - or change it - w/o interference.

P I don't think we differ - self deter, openness, etc. We do not value by Western values imposition for September 6th.

①

G We don't think one single ^{model} ~~model~~ should be imposed.
(Discussion ending in Gen'l agreement
- Govt say why use "Western";
says they are universal values.
You also say change in SC results
from Western strength - that
bad formulation

P Let's try to avoid words which upset
you & us.

G We are agreeing & endorsing
those things which used to divide us
- Let's call it new relationships

B Suppose we said demo-values

G Sure - demo & humane
values.

P Good conversation

G Very important one.

Let's discuss regional piers

- What should we do in N.E

- We have pushed Arafat as far as
we can. Should move while he
still alive.

P We think things are moving OK on 1st point
How about reviving F?

Trying to get Pales & F to talk

G Just a couple of words. Present set
more favorable than ever. Could
have not have been working

(8)

Together, For years US tried to go it alone - found that impossible
We prepared to coop positively to settlement - we have been pushing Arafat.
I recog for us no prob. As process under way, we have no prob.
~~Q~~ Here is my worry. Arafat are unifying. if that happens before settlement they may not want our a year involvement that bad.
P Blacchett endorsement of I is gone.
I have move to Lebanon
(US position)

G We are involved. we support Tripartite, Coop w/ France & Syria.
FNI's should consent to develop proper moves to push process
Syria say they will work w/in Tripartite policy

P We should not appear to be dictating settlement (here or anywhere)

G I want Ghaed to speak on 4/28
S we should think about future & stop mutual recrim.

There should be a conference to set up a ^{new} govt & hold elections
Najibullah & c. Shah support this
- Co op with UN Co op under UN

(9)

- Supply of weapons. We ready to stop on reciprocal basis if there is cease fire. ~~But~~ we want free cease fire.
- US has made useful suggestion on Transitional phase. This should be pursued.

G Both sides proceeded from premise civil solution would not work, we got Geneva accord + now we should follow up

P We want resolution. No interest in a hostile regime on S.W. borders.

G Neither we want one ^{which} ~~is~~ considered US an enemy

P The prob is Najibullah's demise.

G You say all Afghan oppose Najibullah but his position getting stronger & more groups are cooperating.

Most of opposition has been talking to Najib.

Loss of Shah influence bad. If Najib goes who would come in? He is mature & that attractive idea

P We don't much like him

G Two realities - opposition & Najib.

[more discussion]

Turn it over to Ministers.

R We proposed that negot take place & at end Najib would leave.

G While negot taking place present
set should stay. If groups
want let Nazi out, that should
be their ~~sub~~ decision. We can't
force him out.
Opposition is falling apart.

Tell press we have discussed ~~Cambodia~~
P We haven't covered ~~Ethiopia~~
G Let's say it is Africa untouched
upon. Also Namibian process.
We could say ~~some~~ some prog
on Horn & we support ~~Namibian~~
process.

1 on 1

P Bibles / Billy Graham
Baltis - what if pre is used
C described what he supposed
he gets a generation
G I have discussed how we rep
a federation. Hoping. Many
prob have arisen. We want
to deal w/ them thru greater
autonomy. If separation would
become dominant, that would
be dramatic ally not & create
images to persuade which
our peoples would not

understand. We lived together
for 50 years & we are integrated
We have 60 mil living
out of their native area
50% of East are now East
over 50% of Latvia are now Russ
with majority with
in Ukraine 50 mil are non-Ukr.

Russians only 30% of population
Our country is that day & separation
bring out strong feelings by a people
(mentioned a Russ in Moldova
not allowed their language)
There has been calming down but
still prob. This is sensitive
issue for us. Hope you understand
~~not~~ our position. This could
bring out all sorts of terrible
forces. If US has no understanding
it would spoil relations w/US
more than anyone else

P But if you are free - you
don't want to - That ~~can~~ would
create a problem. you will
get that question

G We want all to get equal treatment
Fair - If we remove an NVA
from 11-12 we would
lose war, we are committed

to draw process + we hope you
to understand

What happened here is precisely
what we wanted. Very pleased
We can say without compunction
is increasing

There are some in both countries
who don't like what we doing.
But we are right.

Destructive forces should not
be allowed to ~~etc~~ undermine
this. Let me mention some
P what forces

G Sometimes lies are presented in
press, etc. i.e., that Bob told
his friends down river as student
after drinking boat.

P I never heard of this. We have
lots of nuts.

G I know you don't believe

P Visit exactly what I hoped
I didn't respond to call AC but
we want to move forward. But
we must be prudent. We looking
for ways to make further
reduction, esp manpower
in CFE. I must consult
w/NATB

B

new era calls for
new approach

Raisa mentioned foundation
main

Bilateral

Shms

Econ

AC

Baltics

approach
Regional
Candidate
NLE
CA
Environ

H.R.

{ Chem Navent
CFE
START
Testing

*Memoirs/Telecons (Jan-Dec) 1989
Box 5-1*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Second Restricted Bilateral Session with Chairman Gorbachev of Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the USSR
Anatoliy Chernyaev, Aide to Chairman Gorbachev
(Notetaker)
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 3, 1989, 11:45 am - 12:45 pm
AND PLACE: Maxim Gorkii Cruise Liner, Malta

The President: I want to discuss an idea on bibles and a proposal on Billy Graham. (Described the question he is asked about the Baltics). (U) *what if force is used? (Describes what he says when he gets questioning.)*

Chairman Gorbachev: I have discussed how we see a [ILLEGIBLE]. Many problems have arisen. We were ready to deal with them through greater autonomy. If separatism would become dominant, that would be dramatic. I must not create a danger to perestroika. The Soviet peoples would not understand. We lived together for fifty years, we are integrated. We have sixty million living out there in nationality areas. Fifty percent of Estonia are Russians, over 50% of Latvians are now Russian, Lithuanian majority in Lithuania. In the Ukraine, 50 million are non-Ukrainian. Kazakhs are only 30% of the population. Our country is that way and separatism brings out strong feelings by people. (S)

There has been a calming down but still there are problems. This is a sensitive issue for us. I hope you understand our position. This would bring out all sorts of terrible fires. If the U.S. has no understanding it would spoil relations with the U.S. more than anything else. (S)

The President: But if you use force -- you don't want to -- that would create a firestorm. You will get that question. (S)

Chairman Gorbachev: We want all to get equal treatment. If we removed our MVD troops from Nagorno-Karabakh we would have war. We are committed to a democratic process and we hope you understand. (S)

What happened here is precisely what we wanted. We are very pleased. There are some in both countries who don't like what we are doing. But we are right. Destructive forces should not be allowed to undermine this. Let me [ILLEGIBLE] some. (S)

The President What forces? (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: Sometimes lies are presented in the press, etc., i.e. that Gorbachev sold his friends down the river as a student after drinking ^a ~~but~~. [ILLEGIBLE] (S)

The President: I never heard of this. We have a lot of nuts. (U)

Chairman Gorbachev: I know you don't believe it. (U)

The President: The visit is exactly what I hoped. I didn't respond to all arms control but we want to move forward. But we must be prudent. We are looking for ways to make further reductions, especially in manpower in CFE. I must consult with NATO. (S)

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ Gorbachev (Dobrynin) SCOWCROFT
1989-June 1991
Box 5-2

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER COMM OLEARY SIGLER

SIT: COO PRIVACY OUT WHSR OUT

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 080128Z DEC 89

FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

0000

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE, EYES ONLY, TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK, FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT.

I WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I JUST WANTED TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED I AM WITH OUR
PAGE 02 RUEADWWI790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
MEETING IN MALTA. ALTHOUGH THE WEATHER WAS DISAPPOINTING, THE
SUBSTANCE, CANDOR AND ATMOSPHERE OF OUR TALKS MORE THAN FULFILLED
MY EXPECTATIONS. AT A TIME OF GREAT CHANGE AND OPPORTUNITY,
I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT COURSE IN NEARLY ALL ASPECTS OF
THE US-USSR RELATIONSHIP. THERE ARE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, WHICH
WE DISCUSSED FRANKLY, AND WE WILL PURSUE THESE. BECAUSE WE HAD
TO FOREGO ONE OF OUR SESSIONS, THERE ARE SEVERAL ISSUES I WAS
UNABLE TO RAISE WITH YOU. FOR EXAMPLE, I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO
DISCUSS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBCONTINENT, CHINA, AND OTHER ASIAN
ISSUES SUCH AS THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, A MATTER OF GREAT

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

CONCERN TO OUR FRIENDS, THE JAPANESE. I WILL HAVE SECRETARY BAKER PURSUE THESE ISSUES WITH MINISTER SHEVANDNADZE AT THE JANUARY MINISTERIAL.

LET ME SAY A WORD ABOUT THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. ALL OF THE ALLIES WERE QUITE PLEASED WITH THE CONTENT AND TONE OF OUR TALKS IN MALTA. THEY WELCOMED ACCELERATING THE PACE OF KEY ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND OUR EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE FURTHER AREAS OF EAST-WEST COOPERATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY WANT TO REVIEW THE FOUR PRINCIPLES I PRESENTED PAGE 03 RUEADWW1790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF GERMANY. I WILL ASK AMBASSADOR MATLOCK TO PROVIDE THEM TO MR. SHEVARDNADZE.

AGAIN, I BELIEVE THAT OUR MALTA MEETING SETS THE STAGE FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT IN WASHINGTON NEXT JUNE, AND ESTABLISHES A STRONG BASIS FOR COOPERATION IN MANY AREAS AND CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WHERE WE HAVE DIFFERENCES.

ON A VERY PERSONAL BASIS I WAS DELIGHTED TO SEE YOU AGAIN. IN MY VIEW, THE PERSONAL "CHEMISTRY" WAS GOOD AND I HOPE WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT DURING 1990 AND BEYOND.

PLEASE GIVE MY REGARDS TO MRS. GORBACHEV. IT WAS A PLEASURE TO SEE HER IN MALTA.

SINCERELY,
SIGNED
GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

PAGE 04 RUEADWW1790 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

WARM REGARDS, BRENT.

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989 - June 1990
Box 5-2

0100 FINAL
20 December 1989

Demarche to Soviet Union
Ambassador Matlock to Gorbachev

1. Read enclosed Presidential announcement to Gorbachev
2. President asked me personally to brief you on this matter.
3. The President wants you to know that he took this action only after becoming convinced that General Noriega had become increasingly unstable and dangerous and that the American community, which numbers 35,000 people faced increasing violent threats. As you know, a U.S. serviceman was shot to death by PDF forces shortly after General Noriega declared war on the United States and a serviceman's was brutalized and his wife sexually threatened in a separate incident.
4. The United States sees no precedent in this action. Just the opposite. This situation is unique.
5. A democratic election was held May 7th and the results were internationally recognized. The democratic choice was denied through violence and repression.

6. Moreover, General Noriega is an indicted drug trafficker wanted for prosecution in the U.S.
7. In addition, the United States has obligations under the Panama Canal Treaties to safeguard safe passage through the Panama Canal for all nations. Those Treaties have the force of international law.
8. The United States intends to remove its forces as quickly as possible. It also intends to normalize its relations fully with the Endara government. We hope that the Endara government will have peaceful friendly relations with others, including the Soviet Union.
9. We have informed both Managua and Havana that they face absolutely no security threat as a result of this action. We hope you will repeat and reinforce this message.
10. We hope also that Nicaragua does not use this unique action as an excuse to violate its commitment under Esquipulas to go forward with the currently scheduled elections. The United States remains committed to recognize the winner of the election if it is free and fair no matter which party wins. The U.S. also remains fully committed to resolve the conflicts in both Nicaragua and El Salvador under the

Esquipulas Treaties, including the commitments relayed by Secretary Baker to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

-  11. The President hopes that in the spirit of Malta that your government will take no action that will inflame this situation or make it more difficult to resolve this crisis quickly, peacefully, and democratically.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Interpreter

Helmut Kohl, Chancellor of Federal Republic of Germany
?
Interpreter

DATE, TIME December 12, 1989, 8:23 p.m.
AND PLACE: Brussels, Belgium

The President: (Describes no agenda character.) Gorbachev was very accommodating. No emotion like when I first saw him. The most contentious issues were discussed without rancor.

(Sandanista supply issue, as an example.) This could have been shouting match, but it was very calm. Spent much time on German question. ^{Gorb.} ~~Barb~~ said you're in too much of a hurry.

Chancellor Kohl: Can I tell you about today in GDR. Everyone has resigned. There is _____ supposedly running the government. People wanted to know about special privileges for leaders.

That is only the beginning. In Restoch people broke into a factory and found arms. They will now find where the arms were going. (Describes Kreuzhooing, etc.)

I told Gorbachev it was not in my interest to invite things to get out of control. I think Modrow will be new Secretary to Parliament -- then go to meet new GDR leaders. We can't pay the 100 marks any more. It already amounts to 1.8 billion.

(Discusses how East Germans take advantage of it.) It will be phased out at end of the year.

We will help in several ways:

- Big shortage of doctors
- Environmental protection
- Telephone system

Gorbachev said to me he would not stand in way of free, open elections. He has abandoned the old leadership. Hungarians will be OK in 2-3 years. Not so in Poland.

Let me say a word about my 10-point program. First, thank you for your clam reception. I will not do anything reckless. I have not set up a timetable. We are part of Europe and continue as part of EC. I have always planned carefully with Mitterrand. Ten points is not an alternative to what we are doing in the West. That is a precondition to 10 points. The integration of Europe is a precondition for East European change to be effective. Yesterday my colleagues said 10 points OK. Andreotti was most difficult. Everyone in Europe is afraid of two things:

- Germany would drift east -- this is nonsense,

- The real reason is that Germany is developing faster than my colleagues.

Frankly, 62 million prosperous Germans are difficult to tolerate -- add 17 million more and they have big problems. Once GDR has really _____ government, we will set up confederation structures -- _____ 2 _____ states. Phase III is federation -- that is a matter for the future -- can be stretched out. But I can't say that will never happen.

The President: Gorbachev's chief problem is uncertainty. Don't want to say he was ballistic about it, just uneasy. We need a foundation which doesn't _____ him but moves forward.

Chancellor Kohl: That's one reason I will do nothing to disturb the smooth running course. CSCE says borders can be changed by peaceful means. I don't want Gorbachev to feel cornered. I need to meet with him. I don't want to create difficulties. Newspapers write such nonsense. Even HAK mentions two years. Not possible -- economic imbalance is too great.

The President: What is GDR people attitude toward reunification? Are there different parties in West Germany?

Chancellor Kohl: In GDR they are badly informed about the issues. GDR needs time to figure out what they really want. I

need a period of quiet development. One year ago, talk like this would have been crazy. In FRG most people and parties are supportive. The G_____ are opposed. They want army abolished and neutrality. they are against re_____. SPD agreed last Tuesday. Now there is a feud. This is Kohl's victory and theirs is a failed system. Liberals are in favor but angry because it is my success. Never have my people earned so much as now -- now they want entitlement rather than work.

The President: I think the answer is self-determination and then let things work. Then avoid things which would make it impossible for Gorbachev.

Chancellor Kohl: Did he talk about internal developments?

The President: Oh yes. But that was very discouraging.
(Discussed how little Gorbachev knows.) (Western values.)

Chancellor Kohl: We're helping Hungary and Poland. We are carrying the whole burden in Europe. Where is everyone else but you and me? It's going to be a tough winter in Poland.

The President: And in Soviet Union. Are any of CEC opposed to 10 points?

Chancellor Kohl: Gonzalez very positive. France -- Mitterrand wise. He knows it would be bad to oppose. But he wants it to proceed moderately. Difficult to maintain the current structure

of the European Parliament. But 4th Republican Parliament too strong. Now it is too weak. Benelux is fine. GB is rather reticent.

The President: The understatement of the year!

Chancellor Kohl: Switzerland and Austria OK.

The President: Don't the Dutch resent Hitler?

Chancellor Kohl: Yes, very much. The Nazis were very tough in the Netherlands. They were the worst Nazis from Vience. Neither was governed by an honorable G_____. Thatcher says European Parliament can have no power because Whitehall cannot yield a bit of s_____. Her ideas are simply pre-Churchill. She thinks prewar era has not come to an end. She thinks history is not just -- Germany so rich and GB struggling. W_____ the war but lost an _____ and this _____. She should try to bind the Germans into the EC. (Thatcher and EC.) (French pride.)

Chancellor Kohl: Did he talk AC?

The President: Yes. (Describes)

Chancellor Kohl: Foth?

The President: No. Did Cheney's comments here cause a stir?

Chancellor Kohl: No. Reagan had reputation as hardliner. Toward the end, he changed -- too quickly. Then you were elected -- the VP to RR and the groups under you just c_____. Your visit last spring changed all that. Barbara helped that a lot. These days now will be very important. Your leadership is essential and you will have every support from me.

The President: Describes AC discussions; CFE in 90; START hopefully in 90; chemicals -- Kohl hopes in 90 especially for his election.

Chancellor Kohl: The schedule you outline would be fantastic. Let's work these things closely. If we can do something in CFE, chemicals and START, this would have a big impact on S&E Europe. Nobody now believes that the EE troops would fight -- so the numbers have changed dramatically.

The President: True, but I will still feel better when Soviet divisions pull back.

Chancellor Kohl: But that creates problems for Gorbachev.

Boeker / Henry 12/26

Box 5-3

* Grimm *- ~~Declare emergency to raise \$100 mil~~

- NCND

- Hanti

LSE

- Euro bureau - won't let
attacks into Baltics- Refuses exchanges for mil
people in Czech, Pol & Hung.

- Aid to Soros in Dep Cont?

- Start AC.

- better yellow - no tit for tat

- Build new arms targeted
against C.S.- Don't treat issue on basis
of parity but antagonists

- P speech similar to Sept.

- Revision of ABM Treaty

- VP speech to NATO

Money we need
winning Cold War

- Cut backs (B-2)

- Use money
to secure

Memcons / Telcons (Jan-Dec) 1989
Box 5-1

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR FLORENCE E. GANTT

FROM: ADRIAN A. BASORA *AMB*

SUBJECT: General Scowcroft's Notes for
the One-on-One with Presi-
dent Mitterand at St.
Martin on December 16

I have tried very hard to decipher the General's handwriting, and have gotten only as far as the third page. As you will see from the attached manuscript, the number of blanks that I have had to leave is already considerable. As I look at the remaining pages, I see that the problem becomes even greater as it goes along. I am afraid the only way to put together a reasonable transcript would be for someone more familiar with the General's handwriting than I to do a first draft, as was done with the Cavaco Silva one-on-one transcript.

Many thanks.

Attachments

Tab I General Scowcroft's notes
Tab II Transcribed notes

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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2010-1262-MR
EJ 11/23/15

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Francois Mitterrand, President of France (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, Notetaker

Francois Mitterrand, President

DATE, TIME December 16, 1989, _____

AND PLACE: St. Martin (exact place _____)

President Mitterrand: It will be a small lunch so we will be able to talk freely. (U)

The President: It is wonderful of you to have invited me here.
(U)

President Mitterrand: What is going now in Europe is the biggest event since World War I. We are watching it with wonder. Each day something unexpected happens. The Strasbourg Summit went well. We made clear, well defined progress. We are scheduled to have a completely open market within three years, which is a very short time. We must therefore force our pace. We have moved forward on the internal market in the areas of transportation,

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Declassify on: OADR

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2

telecommunications and insurance. Decisions are needed on the issue of monetary integration and we have set a schedule to deal with them. We have also drafted a charter for our social institutions. On Eastern Europe we agreed to set up a ^{development} developed bank. All can participate. Gorbachev accepted my invitation! The bank will also be a training institution. Training is what is needed most of all. (S)

In Strasbourg we looked at the events unfolding in Eastern Europe, especially in East Germany. Two contrary impulses were evident. The first group were those who think this is natural _____ and ^{cannot} ~~must~~ be prevented. But there are treaties, arrangements, and the Soviet Union. Great Britain, Holland and Denmark are nervous about this big state in the center of Europe. I am not so worried. Let German development take place simultaneously with European development. That way our development development can be ^{intertwined} ~~contained~~. We have lived with Germany for a thousand years and we have survived. We know each other starting with Charles V and the Germanic Empire. We have no inferiority complex but we want no imbalance which could worry Gorbachev. Germany must take a clear stand as to its eastern borders. These are the two contrary trends but (whole sentence unintelligible) this is the dialectic of today. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

3

The President: I would like your views on the two different ways of looking at this. I worry about events in East Germany which could accelerate this and _____ Gorbachev. I also worry about the effect on Poland. But, in the short term, I worry about preventing an event which could push the process too fast. Do you share this concern? (S)

President Mitterrand: Yes. At any time there could be an upheaval. The German Government is pushing too hard. The East German Government is not ready for reunification. And I worry about Poland more than any other country in Eastern Europe. There are three problems: the first involves areas which used to be German. (S)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1-5-90

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the magnificently crafted model of the "Aleksandr Nevsky." It is an ideal gift for me because, as an old navy man, I dearly love the sea.

I am sending along a few pictures which I hope you will enjoy. When I look at them I am reminded of our Malta meeting which, in my view, was a big success.

I am also enclosing a video tape which was prepared for you by a friend of mine who is a U.S. movie producer, Jerry Weintraub. He used some historical footage out of a famous film library. The announcer on this tape, incidentally, is a famous U.S. movie actor, Charlton Heston.

I hope you and Mrs. Gorbacheva have a wonderful New Year. I am convinced that the next year will be one of even greater cooperation and improvement in our relations.

I am determined to follow up on our talk about START and about CFE. The whole world hopes that we can reach agreement on these two treaties.

I also hope we can move ahead in the chemical weapons field. I know you want to ban these weapons and so do I. I still worry about verification, but let's find the way to make real progress in 1990.

I have followed the developments in Europe with keen interest and with a genuine sense of excitement. I note with great interest and admiration the way those who support changes all across Eastern Europe invoke your name in a most favorable way - a well deserved tribute to your own leadership for reform.

Let's vow to stay in close touch during this coming year.

Most sincerely,



His Excellency Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

P.S. That ship model
will always remind me
of Malta and of our
most constructive
and pleasant meeting



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Gorbachev (Dobrynya)
1989 - June 1990
Box 5-2

0307

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1990

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2009-0942-MR

12/1/2014 MM

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations in 1990

This is a rare period in which we can seek to achieve a fundamental shift in the strategic balance, particularly in Europe. The future of the Soviet Union remains cloudy, but it is clearly in our interest to do what we can to prolong the tenure of the reformers -- men who have inadvertently set in motion events that have put long-standing U.S. objectives regarding the Soviet Union well within our reach: freedom for Eastern Europe; a significant reduction of the Soviet military threat to the West; and the demilitarization of Soviet foreign policy in the regions.

The principal challenge that you face in U.S.-Soviet relations this year is to engage Gorbachev effectively at a time when he faces mounting chaos at home; declining influence and authority in Eastern Europe; and uncertainty about the future of Russia's traditional nemesis, Germany. Gorbachev's sense of security stems from still powerful Soviet military forces and the conviction -- bordering on faith -- that sophisticated diplomacy can convince his adversaries not to take advantage of him. But there are observable cracks in Moscow's confidence about the fruits of the new foreign policy -- particularly where Germany is concerned -- and that Soviet insecurity is likely to grow.

1990 promises to be another very difficult year for Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership. The Soviet Union's ills are worsening. Problems like whether the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should have a constitutionally guaranteed "leading role" -- precluding fair competition with other parties; whether a command economy can be expected to produce the needed economic turnaround; whether to have private property; whether territory belonging to Azerbaijan should be transferred to Armenia; whether the Baltic states -- and other republics -- should be allowed to secede from the Union and similar issues cannot be resolved through Gorbachev's usual jawboning and equivocation. If they continue to grow worse, they could be his undoing.

Over time, the Soviet population -- while appreciating his role in initiating reform -- has increasingly come to see Gorbachev as ineffective and indecisive. Nationalists from Armenia and

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Azerbaijan to the Baltics regard him as a man without a bottom line and it is Gorbachev, not the nationalists, who has retreated in the face of repeated challenges.

The saving grace for Gorbachev at this time is that he is still regarded by moderate nationalists in the Republics as their best hope for the peaceful achievement of their goal -- total independence. But moderates, to say nothing of extremists, may take Gorbachev's continuing appeasement as weakness, leading them to press even harder (as with the mass demonstrations in Lithuania when Gorbachev visits there.) That in turn will further alarm conservatives, who already see these trends as a threat to the integrity of the Union. Challenges to Gorbachev's power will probably increase markedly in the next year. Within the last two months, Gorbachev has reportedly threatened to resign twice. The first Baltic elections in Lithuania at the end of February and the 28th Party Congress, now scheduled for October 1990, will be crucial tests for him.

Implications for U.S. Policy

The Soviet leadership will be anxious to keep U.S.-Soviet relations moving forward. Gorbachev cannot afford, in the face of mounting failures at home, to have his foreign policy line discredited too. Objectively, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has never had better prospects from our point of view. Your meeting at Malta infused U.S.-Soviet relations with a greater sense of direction -- pointing toward the June Summit. On arms control, human rights and the incipient economic agenda, there is every reason to be optimistic that the progress made in 1989 can be sustained and perhaps Moscow can even be moved to be more sensible on Central America.

But it is, of course, the unraveling of communist power in Eastern Europe that has changed the strategic environment and the face of U.S.-Soviet relations. Soviet domination of Eastern Europe has been the most enduring and most fundamental source of American conflict with Moscow. Thus, our central and overriding objective in 1990 should be to facilitate the continued and graduated withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe.

A preeminent challenge, in this regard, is to help the FRG and the Soviet Union to manage their relationship. If there is a single external issue that might cause Moscow to reassess its course in Eastern Europe, might even bring Gorbachev down, it is the German question. With that much at stake for the United States, we will need to be intensively involved in the increasingly complicated diplomatic environment in Europe which will be ever more preoccupied with the future of Germany.

While we can do little to affect internal Soviet politics, we should do what we can to prolong perestroika as long as Gorbachev continues to tolerate the diminution of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. If Moscow maintains its present course, it will be impossible within a few years for the Soviet Union to do anything

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about the changes in Eastern Europe, short of all out invasion. With this in mind, we need to work hard to insure a successful June U.S.-Soviet Summit -- particularly in arms control and the economic sphere -- which may boost Gorbachev's image at home and thus his staying power.

We must grasp while we can the chance for an early CFE agreement which would bring the conventional military balance into line with the new political realities in Eastern Europe. These reductions will also facilitate the orderly withdrawal of Soviet military power from the territory of its former allies. Rapid progress toward an "Open Skies" accord also would institutionalize Soviet openness on an unprecedented scale.

Finally, it is important that you continue to engage Gorbachev personally while emphasizing that it is the process of perestroika, not the man, on which U.S. policy is based.

As 1990 begins, the uncertainties surrounding the future of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev have only multiplied. At present, Gorbachev appears to be playing for time in the hope that, by some miracle, perestroika will succeed in creating a stable and prosperous Soviet Union. We have clearer and more realistic goals: the liberation of Eastern Europe and the consolidation of pluralist rule throughout the region; and a dramatic reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe and the United States.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0307

January 9, 1990

Lead memo.



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *PB*

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Memorandum on Objectives for U.S.-Soviet Relations
in 1990

The memorandum for the President at Tab I examines the challenges in U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly relating to Europe, in light of continuing Soviet internal difficulties.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President.

Attachment

Tab I Memo to President

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0942-MR

12/1/2014 MM

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CFE Mtg w/P
1/15/90

- No disagreement that reduction to 200,000 will happen barring unforeseen disruptions.
- Real question is how to do it
 - CFE I
 - CFE II
 - Unilateral
- Since the only reason this issue is before us is that I raised it, it is incumbent on me to explain why.
 - The main issue for me is do you get out ahead with a bold ^{creative} move to show you understand what is going on in C could you plan to take advantage of it, or do you plan to hold back, let C long or even C say take C lead and appear to be

Give your ^{what}
attention for
spending
make your
AC clear
process
not a

Responding to others' initiatives

Doing it now lets you set an AC floor under c #'s for Europe.

- Additional cuts lent upset c budget unless you want it to
- Cuts will take 2-5 yrs.

- Walking away from your budget ~~for~~ to show dynamic involvement in c changes taking place isn't bad.

- Delaying risks losing both c initiative and c opportunity to appear bold and confident

- Separating c cuts from

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13a. Handwritten Notes	Re: Bob Gates - Memcons (12 pp.)	1/16/92	(b)(1)	

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
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WHORM Cat.:
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Date Closed: 9/8/2009	OA/ID Number: 91167-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
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P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Troop Levels in Europe

Strategic trends in Eastern Europe and the USSR, our budget projections, and Congressional views all point to US troop levels in Europe by end FY94 substantially below the CFE I 275,000 ceiling. The question is how we respond.

NSC proposes we move now to amend the CFE US-Soviet 275,000 ceiling to 200,000. DOD proposes instead that we indicate publicly that we would expect US force levels to be reduced substantially below the 275,000 by 1994, and make the reductions contingent on future conditions and consultations.

There is merit in both approaches. But I am not certain that either fully advances and protects key objectives:

1. Your commitment to complete CFE I this year.
2. Your continued leadership with the Allies and Congress on European security issues.
3. Your strong commitment to a significant level of US forces in Europe over the long term, which is fundamental for stability and our influence on developments.

An approach combining elements of the DOD and NSC recommendations might better serve these objectives. We would cast it with the Allies and publicly as a "program for European security and stability for the long term" with these key features:

1. Completing CFE I in 1990 is the keystone of our program and we are working with our Allies to resolve the key outstanding issues and speed agreement. (We are working compromises that could be outlined if we can get them agreed here and with the Allies in time.)
2. We and our Allies propose that immediately after CFE I is completed, the CFE participants also agree in 1990 on an "outline of goals for further reductions" for follow-on CFE II negotiations.

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4/8/2013 MM

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-2-

3. These goals would reflect US plans to reduce its forces in Europe to 200,000 at the earliest possible time and in any event by the end of 1994, in consultation with our Allies and assuming strategic trends continue. Our objective is a significant level of forces in Europe for the long term. (Note also that CFE I reductions agreed in 1990 would be completed by 1992-1993 in the Allies' proposal and 1994-1995 in the Soviets'.)

4. We expect the Soviet level of forces in Eastern Europe to go much lower in the same time frame. US and Soviet reductions below the CFE I levels should not be tied together, whether in CFE II or in independent decisions. There are important differences in roles and geography that must be respected, and the will of countries that host outside forces must be decisive.

This "program" sets out specific and concrete US reductions rather than the general and hedged objective in the DOD approach. In our view, the hedged approach will not fly in Congress and will leave the Allies unsure of your bottom line. The program also provides for CFE II which the DOD approach does not; this is important because major Allies want some follow-on negotiations and we can use it to brake Allied unilateral cuts.

The program breaks the linkage between US and Soviet force levels whereas amending that level in CFE I, as the NSC approach suggests, would help tighten it. This is important for our objective of maintaining a significant US level in Europe while getting the Soviets totally out of Eastern Europe. Even more importantly, there is a high risk that moving to amend CFE I, as the NSC approach calls for, will delay agreement in 1990. This approach would avoid that.

Whatever we think or hear about possible Allied and Soviet reactions, dropping the CFE I 275,000 to 200,000 is a major step that could bog us down in a flood of questions, reservations and conditions. If there were some way to assure this did not happen, then this approach could be attractive, though we would still have to find some way to handle the US-Soviet linkage effect. But it is not clear that there is such a way and the program outlined above seems a better way to advance and protect our key objectives.



James A. Baker , III

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~- EYES ONLY

WHAT MIGHT BE SAID ON CFE IN THE
STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

- We have a sound program for European security over the long term.
- Our objectives are:
 - a secure Europe, whole and free, of states living without fear of intimidation or intervention in their internal affairs;
 - a substantially reduced but still significant U.S. military presence, providing a source of stability; and
 - a cohesive NATO Alliance, continuing to provide the framework for Western security.
- A key element of our program for European security is completion of a CFE agreement in 1990.
 - This will make a major contribution to European security.
 - It will result in the removal of over 300,000 Soviet troops from Eastern Europe.
 - It will result in destruction of a large amount of Warsaw Pact military equipment -- the tools of offensive warfare (tanks, artillery, and armored troop carriers).
- We would expect, assuming current trends continue, that U.S. force levels in Europe would by 1994 be reduced substantially below the 275,000 level contained in a CFE agreement.
 - We would complete these reductions only after close consultation with our Allies as to the substance of the reductions and the manner of making them.
 - These consultations would give prudent consideration to the security situation at the time, political developments, and the impact on NATO defense strategy.

~~SECRET~~- EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-0972-MR

6/19/12 MM

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

- Let no one doubt, however, the strength of our continuing commitment to NATO and our European Allies.
- The U.S. will continue to have a significant military presence in Europe.
 - Our presence in Europe serves important U.S. security interests.
 - We will remain in Europe as long as our Allies continue to require it.

~~SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989- June 1990
Box 5-2

Hand delivered
by Don Duberini
1-17-90
Condi has orig.
Unofficial translation

His Excellency
George BUSH
President of the United
States of America
Washington, D.C.

January 17, 1990

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of December 8, transmitted through Ambassador Matlock. I wish to say from the outset that I share your assessment of the Malta meeting. I believe we have every reason to say that it has taken Soviet-American relations to a new level of mutual understanding.

The fact that we, while remaining realists in approaching the issues that divide us, have begun to clear the USSR-US relationship of everything that stands in the way of its normal development, opens up great opportunities, in my view, for bilateral cooperation and for building new international relations based on trust, mutual respect, and a balance of interests.

Of course, a number of issues were not discussed in depth at Malta. Therefore, I support your idea that all issues which are the subject of the Soviet-American dialogue be discussed in the coming months between USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard A. Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State James Baker.

I took note of your information about the US allies' reaction to the Malta talks. At a meeting in Moscow we informed in detail the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member states on the substance of the Soviet-American talks at Malta. Our allies welcomed the results of those talks and expressed their satisfaction with the thoughtfulness and the reasonable approach to the developments in Western and Eastern Europe.

It is my view that the United States and the Soviet Union should continue to conduct business with respect to Europe, which is going through turbulent and profound changes, on the basis of prudence and great responsibility.

As a separate issue, I would like to touch on the question of Panama. I acquainted myself with the arguments conveyed by your Ambassador in Moscow. I must say that I cannot agree with them, as well as with the statement contained in your message of December 26, 1989, to the effect that the US action in Panama is somehow fully consistent with the principles that we discussed at Malta.

Our position of principle is known to you. We reject the use of force in international relations as an instrument of resolving conflict situations. It is in those terms that this question was discussed during the Malta talks. There, we sought to make this principal idea clear to the US side: no objective can serve as a justification of the use of military force. Universality of the politico-diplomatic procedures must be recognized as absolute. To allow for a multitude of interpretations or authorize exceptions here would mean to emasculate the efforts of the international community (and both our countries are playing a prominent role in them) to affirm the primacy of law.

We in the Soviet leadership have begun to reflect on the possible areas of progress to be made at the forthcoming Soviet-American negotiations in 1990. We believe that a more specific determination in this regard could be made as a result of our foreign ministers' meetings on which you and I agreed earlier.

I would like to invite you, Mr. President, to continue our correspondence not only on urgent problems, but on key conceptual issues in the interests of USSR-US rapprochement and enhancing stability in international relations.

I wish to conclude this letter by expressing the hope that the year 1990 will be productive for our relations.

Sincerely,

Mikhail GORBACHEV

Moscow
Kremlin

date = ?

Memcons / Telcons (Jan-Dec) 1989

Box 5-1

Jaruzelski phone call

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3 million in dollars
squirreled away in
mattresses which
would come out if there
were US banks to put it
in.

Jaruzelski is tragic
figure. He needs
rehabilitating but
twice the time

I would invite both
of them & seat them
together. Together they
would represent a
situation well, would
be a good relation in
my mind.

Barbachelet Fritz - Nunn
is not to cause harm

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Let him think there
may be a federation
of nations & enslave-
ment is a thing of
the past.

He must carry out
changes or pay a big
price & changes
will come anyway

EE must move
at its own pace. It
must mature & can't
be rushed. As a de
I would like to get
more, but you are
doing just right.

date = ?

Handwritten notes 89
Box 5-3

2079169 - Southland / Fadhalla

Sov agent pickup - state notified -
8:50 we weren't

Thornburgh on indicting foreign leaders.

No substance w/ Crews

Dont define terrorism

Scheermeier -

- Understand review
- Talk about summit at immediate

Personal relationship

- Priestessika

- No turning back

- we will proceed

- Glad we said we didn't want it to fail

- They are scrambling for evidence

- Operating very ad hoc.

- They are defense because of local needs.

- CW made big splash in Germany.

- They are seeking joint movement.

NE - can we do something jointly

C. Am. - Negative. They will stop if we do.

- Thinks (Baker) there is pressure on regional issues.

end
town house
3rd row

9078 Arlington Blvd

Fairfax outskirts
3 miles past beltway
on SO.
Corrington Intersection
Right
Turn right