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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91167
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Folder Title:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Draft Letter	Re: Dear Secretary General (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
02. Draft Message	Re: Informal Message from President Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	9/1/89	(b)(1)	
03. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush Re: [Unofficial Translation] (6 pp.)	9/89	(b)(1)	
04. Draft Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	9/8/89	(b)(1)	
05. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Jaruselski (15 pp.)	9/10/89	(b)(1)	
06. Memcon	Re: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (4 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
07a. Cable	The White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	8/3/89	(b)(1)	S
07b. Cable	The White House to American Embassy Moscow Re: Message from President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
07c. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Moscow, et.al. Re: Presidential Letter to Gorbachev on Afghanistan (2 pp.)	3/15/89	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

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Series: Miscellaneous Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1373
OA/ID Number: 91167-005
Date Closed: 9/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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07d. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Moscow, et.al. Re: Soviet Submarine Accident: Gorbachev Message and the President's Reply (1 pp.)	4/8/89	(b)(1)	C
07e. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Moscow, et.al. Re: President's Letter to Gorbachev on Current Fighting in Lebanon (1 pp.)	4/26/89	(b)(1)	C
07f. Cable	American Embassy Moscow to White House Washington DC Re: Delivery of Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (1 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
07g. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Moscow, et.al. Re: Presidential Message to Gorbachev (1 pp.)	6/7/89	(b)(1)	C
07h. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Moscow, et.al. Re: Response to Fourth of July Message to the President from Gorbachev (2 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	C
07i. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Moscow, et.al. Re: CW - Message from President Bush (2 pp.)	9/23/89	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07j. Cable	Secretary of State Washington DC to American Embassy Moscow Re: Gorbachev Letter to the President (2 pp.)	10/28/89	(b)(1)	S
08a. Note	Dennis B. Ross to General Scowcroft Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	11/2/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Memcon	Re: The Secretary and Eduard Shevardnadze (12 pp.)	9/21/89	(b)(1)	S
08c. Memcon	Re: The Secretary and Eduard Shevardnadze (15 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S
09. Handwritten Telcon	Re: Kohl Call (2 pp.)	10/23/89	(b)(1)	
10. Letter	Re: In view of the... [Unofficial Translation] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11. Handwritten Note	Re: of each country, Justice, China, etc. (2 pp.)	11/13/89	(b)(1)	
12. Cable	Re: Reply to Gorbachev Message on Berlin (3 pp.)	11/15/89	(b)(1)	S
13. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to President Bush (2 pp.)	11/20	(b)(1)	
14. Handwritten Notes	President Bush to President Gorbachev (4 pp.)	11/22/89	(b)(1)	
15. Handwritten Notes	Re: Arms Control Brief for President (3 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	

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EYES

ONLY

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

Sent
via
State
8/30

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I have carefully reviewed your message of August 25. I regret that the proposal I made for an informal meeting in Alaska (or offshore in U.S. and Soviet naval vessels), in conjunction with the viewing of the Valdez oil spill and Soviet participation in the cleanup was not convenient.

From the U. S. viewpoint, your counterproposal for a meeting at an appropriate site in Canada is not suitable because it does not meet our minimum criterion for such a meeting carefully set forth to Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh when he was in Washington. Put briefly, that criterion is that our meeting appears to stem from, or incident to, some other event, in order that it cannot in any way be characterized as a "summit."

For our part, we will continue to try to consider ways in which we might meet in an informal atmosphere of the nature I described in my first letter on this subject. I trust you will do the same. I continue to think such a meeting very desirable but, unfortunately, we perhaps must recognize that it might not, in the end, be possible to find an appropriate scenario.

In the meantime, I suggest that the two Foreign Ministers be in touch in order to reach agreement on acceptable dates for their own meeting.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1029-MR
2/18/2014 MM

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~

September 1, 1989

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989 - June 1990
Box 5-2

Informal Message from President Gorbachev to President Bush

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your informal message of August 30, 1989, and have carefully examined its contents.

I share your view with regard to the desirability of our meeting. As you already know, from the very beginning the idea expressed by you in your letter appealed to me. I continue to believe that this is a good proposal. There is good reason for us to meet and to become more closely acquainted with each other and to discuss, in a broad conceptual way, questions of substantial interest.

I admit that in advancing the Canadian version we hoped that it would be received naturally by the public of the United States and other countries, since it would have been the product of a spontaneous decision by two leaders who would be traveling in regions in their own countries which would be close to each other. I meant to be in the Far East at the time you would be in Alaska.

However, if you feel that this version is not suitable, we will think further how we should deal with the realization of the idea of our meeting. As I understood from your letter, you intend to do the same.

As practical circumstances develop now, this question perhaps should be once again considered and weighed by our Ministers at their forthcoming meeting on the 22d of September. They could, in greater detail and specificity, exchange views with regard to the prospect of a meeting at our level.

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

9/89
incoming

Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I think that the letter you sent me on June 20 opens a new and important stage in our private exchanges. I share your view that direct contacts between us are indispensable, particularly as regards exchanges on the substance of the most important problems whose solution would advance relations between our two countries and strengthen international security.

Negotiations on nuclear and space weapons, with which your letter is concerned, unquestionably require our priority attention both as the essential component in the efforts to reduce the risk of war in general and as assurance of continuity in the historic process of real nuclear disarmament which we started by signing the landmark INF Treaty.

We in the Soviet Union believe--and the round of the Geneva talks which ended in August has confirmed this--that progress achieved thus far provides good groundwork on which to build. Our approaches have quite a lot in common, as has already been recorded in joint documents adopted at summit meetings and in the documents being worked out at the talks. In a word, as you put it, the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement. This is a very important political statement, binding on both sides.

At the same time there are issues of a fundamental nature which remain unresolved, thus impeding the conclusion of a treaty on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. I urge you to focus on their solution. I think that at present the talks have reached a critical point, which requires bold political decisions that would bring them to an early successful completion.

In your letter you address the principles of strategic stability. Indeed, removing incentives for first strike, reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles and giving preference to systems with higher survivability are important guidelines for the NST talks. I am convinced that we must adhere to them both during the talks on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms and at the talks which should follow them to consider even deeper and more radical cuts in the context of strategic stability.

One more general consideration: For a long time the development of the strategic armed forces of our two countries was influenced by geographical and other factors that led to the emergence of significant differences as to their structure. In seeking agreement to reduce strategic offensive arms we, of course, regard with understanding those special features of each side. We must find common denominators which, while taking account of the differences in the structure of our strategic arms, would result in strengthening strategic stability.

His Excellency
Mr. George BUSH
President of the
United States of America

To turn now to some specific issues of the NST talks.

You note in your letter that we are divided by a conceptual gap on the questions of ABM and space. Is there a way out of this situation? I think it can be found if the problem is approached more pragmatically.

The important thing here is to continue to abide by the understanding regarding the ABM Treaty which was reached in December 1987 at the Washington summit, namely to observe the Treaty as signed in 1972.

I wish to propose the following: Let us set aside, for the time being, our conceptual argument about whether the placing of weapons in outer space and the deployment of ABM systems will strengthen strategic stability or have an opposite effect. Let us not make more difficult the already complex NST talk by pressing this issue. We could go back to it at the talks on strategic stability, right after the signing of the treaty on strategic offensive arms. We have already agreed to hold such talks.

We also continue to differ in our understanding of what is prohibited and what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Even though I am convinced that our interpretation is correct, we will evidently fail to make headway if we continue arguing along old lines. The way out, as we see it, would be to attempt to define specifically what can be done within the framework of the ABM Treaty.

The discussion of the question of establishing a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty has also taken on the character of a conceptual debate. In order to facilitate the solution of other issues at the talks we could drop our insistence on our proposal for such a fixed period of non-withdrawal.

The Soviet Foreign Minister and the US Secretary of State could, if the above considerations prove to be acceptable, work out on their basis appropriate instructions for our delegations at the NST talks.

As we understand, difficulties remain in connection with the so-called issue of the Krasnoyarsk radar. On several occasions I offered various solutions which, in our view, could remove the concerns of the US side. Unfortunately, they have failed to reach their goal. In order to clear up completely the path toward the early conclusion of a treaty on strategic offensive arms, we have taken a radical decision--to completely eliminate that facility. We would expect that the US side will reciprocate so as to remove our concerns related to the US radars in Greenland and Great Britain.

As regards the questions related directly to strategic offensive arms, the greatest difficulties concern long-range SLCMs. Breaking the deadlock in this issue is long overdue. This, as I see it, calls for a major political decision to trade off our mutual concerns. This problem should be analyzed jointly once again, among other things from the standpoint of a broader approach to the problem of naval armaments.

A productive dialogue on that problem should begin at long last at the NST talks. Your side is invoking the difficulties of verification. Why not focus at these talks on the problem of verification with regard to nuclear SLCMs, while the problem of limiting them could be solved taking account of the results of the work on verification. Eduard Shevardnadze is prepared to discuss this matter in greater detail with the Secretary of State. And you and I could return to this question, if necessary, at our upcoming meeting.

The problem of ALCMs also remains unresolved although some approaches to its solution began to emerge during the last round. It is obvious that the issues related to ALCMs and heavy bombers must be dealt with as a package. In so doing it is important not to allow the possibility of eroding the ceiling of 6000 warheads. I think that this knot can be untied already in the course of this ministerial meeting.

Finally, the questions of verification. It appears that we can note our common desire to ensure maximum confidence of the two sides that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will be observed. Your idea of testing verification methods prior to its conclusion appears to be useful. At the same time this can hardly be achieved effectively if a selective method is used, under which monitoring the facilities for the production of strategic offensive arms would apply to mobile ICBMs only.

Clearly, under the treaty itself verification will cover all arms falling within the category of strategic offensive arms, and verification obligations must be equal so as to rule out a one-sided approach. Therefore, trial verification measures should be tested with regard to any kind of strategic offensive arms to be covered by the future treaty. This would provide reliable guarantees of compliance.

We advocate a similar approach to the question of data exchange on strategic offensive arms. We are also prepared to accept familiarization visits on the basis of reciprocity.

I believe that an agreement in principle could be reached between our two countries at foreign minister level concerning the preparation of trial verification and stability measures and their implementation as they become ready. In the course of the upcoming round of the NST talks specific parameters and procedures for carrying out such trial measures could be negotiated.

It would seem that an agreement on notifications regarding major strategic force exercises, which is virtually ready, could be signed at this ministerial meeting.

I wish now to address two more problems that deal with the set of nuclear issues.

The first one concerns our nuclear testing talks. It seems to me that our acceptance, at the latest round of the talks, of using the CORTEX method to monitor all nuclear tests above the agreed yield threshold, as the US side had insisted, makes it possible to bring the first stage of these talks to the concluding phase. I hope that our US partners will now look in the same unbiased way at the verification procedures that we propose. If during the ministerial meeting the two sides

recorded their fundamental understanding regarding the verification mechanism, instructions could then be given to our respective delegations at the Geneva talks to complete as soon as possible--in any case before the end of the year--work on the verification protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties and to prepare them for signing at our meeting. I also think that it is time for us to give general consideration to the guidelines for further restrictions on the yield and number of tests, which we are going to set for our delegation as their goal for the second stage of the talks.

The other problem to which I would like to call your attention has to do with the possibility of starting talks to ban the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. Today, as we see it, we have a favorable situation--the United States has actually ceased the production of fresh weapon-grade plutonium while the Soviet Union has adopted a program for phasing out before the year 2000 all the industrial reactors used to produce weapon-grade plutonium. Eduard Shevardnadze will inform the US side about the specific details of the program. I want to point out that we are ready to speed up its implementation in the event of matching reciprocal steps on your part.

In these circumstances our two countries could address in practical terms the problem of a verifiable cessation of the production of weapon-grade fissionable materials. As a first step we could even now instruct our experts to consider jointly the issues related to the mechanism of mutual verification of such a measure. It is our view that the reciprocal cessation of the production of fissionable material not only would help to strengthen predictability in the strategic field, but would also make it possible for both sides to solve--at a much lower cost--a large number of environmental problems involved in the operation of nuclear production complexes.

Another priority issue--and we seem to be of one mind on this-- is the conclusion of a global and effectively verifiable convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We welcome your statement that every effort must be made to achieve such a prohibition. In this, our approaches coincide.

I also wish to note with satisfaction that during the last two rounds of bilateral consultations progress was made toward achieving this goal. I hope that our ministers will be able during their current meeting to sign a memorandum of understanding on a bilateral verification experiment.

We have also decided to take an additional step to accommodate the US position by agreeing to the inclusion of saxitoxin and ricin into the relevant list under the convention.

The multilateral talks on the convention have now entered a crucial phase. At the same time they still seem to lack a sense of purpose. Perhaps this is due to some extent to the fact that there is no agreed date by which the negotiators would seek to complete the preparation of the convention. Why shouldn't our two countries take an initiative here by issuing a joint appeal to conclude the convention as early as 1990 or 1991? Such a time limit seems to be quite realistic.

Mr. President, there is another issue which calls for the personal efforts of the two of us. I am referring to the reduction of conventional armed forces. Actually, both you and I took these talks into our own hands when we proposed the initiatives which are now paving the way to resolving the problems which for decades have poisoned East-West relations. It is precisely those political decisions taken at the highest level that have made it possible for the Vienna talks to take an unprecedented start and make very good headway.

You took a bold step, Mr. President, by proposing that the talks be completed within six to twelve months, which is an unheard-of challenge. Well, we accept it, even though I will say frankly that it will not be easy to do it.

But if you and I want to give effect to those commitments we must work out a kind of strategy for speeding up the Vienna talks. We could perhaps agree between ourselves and with the other participants from NATO and the Warsaw Treaty to convene in the second half of 1990 a summit meeting in order to sign the agreement on conventional arms, to be attended by all the leaders of the European states. I am confident that such a European conference would be unprecedented as regards its results.

To that end we should instruct our foreign ministers to intensify work to find solutions to outstanding issues. Perhaps it will take two or three meetings between our ministers and the ministers from other states concerned which participate in the Vienna talks; meetings not for making speeches but to find solutions to outstanding issues.

For example, why not hold the first such meeting in Vienna early next year to review the principal difficulties holding up the talks?

We have duly appreciated agreement by the United States and other NATO countries to reduce combat aircraft. This is an important step toward accommodating the position of the Warsaw Treaty. But let me say frankly that it fails to address our serious concern regarding air defense aircraft based in the European territory of the Soviet Union and intended only to protect vital facilities against possible air strikes from various directions. They do not have the capability to strike ground targets. Those aircraft are not part of the surprise attack capability. We are prepared to give American experts an opportunity to see for themselves that that is precisely the case. In order to resolve this issue we could agree to set a certain limit for such aircraft, which would not include frontline fighters. Of course, we expect that there should not be any buildup of systems which these aircraft are intended to counter.

In the context of the likely breakthrough at the Vienna talks we believe it is possible even now to begin discussing the question of a gradual removal of the tactical nuclear component from the European military equation. All the more so since we understand that in Brussels the NATO countries gave their agreement in principle to such discussions. I would like to inform you that with due regard for this evolution in NATO's

position, the Soviet Union, as I already said in Strassbourg, is considering the possibility of further major unilateral reductions in its tactical nuclear missiles in Europe.

And now the last point. We welcome your proposal concerning an "open skies" regime which would provide for mutual overflights by unarmed aircraft over the territories of the USSR and the United States and their Warsaw Treaty and NATO allies for the purpose of monitoring their military activities, and we agree to take part in an international conference to discuss issues involved in establishing such a regime.

I think that we are now on the threshold of mutually acceptable agreement. But you and I together will have to cross that threshold. And we can do so if we take into account each other's fundamental concerns.

In closing, Mr. President, I wish to express my willingness for further exchanges on the issues addressed here and the hope that they will advance the cause of peace and security.

Sincerely yours,

M. Gorbachev

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

9/8/89

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your most recent letter concerning our mutual, as yet unfulfilled, interest in meeting together in an informal atmosphere. Our difficulty so far in finding an acceptable scenario has not diminished my desire for such a meeting nor my sense of its value. I am pleased to see from your correspondence that you share my assessment.

As I have explained at the outset of our efforts, my insistence on some sort of "umbrella" occasion as an excuse for a meeting has been to avoid all of the expectations and risks associated with attaching the word "summit" to our meeting. I must now admit that the chances of developing a scenario which would permit a spontaneous get-together appear increasingly remote.

The value of an intimate and informal meeting, however, seems to me to be overriding, and to warrant running a somewhat higher risk in order to make it possible. Accordingly, I would like to propose a direct meeting between us, still described, however, as an informal, private, no-agenda meeting in order that the two of us can exchange views on a variety of issues in a completely unstructured setting.

To do this in a manner which would permit the informality and privacy we both seek, I would like to invite you, at a mutually convenient time this fall, to be my guest at the Presidential retreat at Camp David. You will have your own optimal dates, but I might suggest for your consideration in

October either 6 and 7 or 20 and 21. If October is not convenient, we can, I am sure, find a mutually agreeable time in November. There is a tradition at Camp David that the press is not admitted, and the setting would guarantee complete privacy. I would meet you on your arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, where we could have a brief photo opportunity. We would then helicopter immediately to Camp David, with no further public exposure by either of us other than perhaps brief departure statements as you leave to return home and as I return to Washington. There would be no formal agenda, no communique, no agreements to sign and participation would be limited to our very closest associates.

Each of us would seek to make it impossible for the press to play their usual games of who won, who lost, and who made the most dramatic proposal. In short, you and I could engage in a serious, substantive and unstructured dialogue that would permit us better to understand each other and to establish a closer relationship. I am confident that a meeting of this nature of approximately two days and in such a setting would be extremely beneficial at this time of dramatic global change and challenge. Should you find my proposal attractive, I would, of course, anticipate that the next meeting between us, of whatever character, would take place in the Soviet Union.

I believe we have a mutual interest in an early meeting. I hope that you will find my effort to accommodate that interest while avoiding a summit atmosphere to be acceptable. I look forward to your early reply, as well as to meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on September 21.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

P / Jaruselski 9/10/89

MEMORANDUM / JELKNS (Jan.-Dec.) 1989
Box 5-1

- J (Presents 2 volumes "War in the Pacific"
w/ a picture & writing of P.).
- P Amazing how the stories of the resistance
still resonate
- J As long as a generation who remembers
the war survive
- P I asked a young soldier whether
young people still remember these
things. He said yes.
But I wonder if it is really true
in all E & W - the tragedy of WWII
- J we are concerned about movements
in the Ger
- P You mean Repubs.
- J Yes. There are a lot of displaced persons
now in land areas who lived
in territories now Poland. Not yet
dangerous, but in a future, if
reunification went forward, it
could be a prob
- P We have been very cautious about
reunification. Would like your views.
Reun. could put great pressure on
E & W
- J Maggie T. said in long run perhaps
there would be a federation or something
for all German speaking people. a
massive sort of region - not a
single state, but some loose assoc.

J

part. But western is ~~unpopular~~ ^{unpopular} ~~strong~~ ^{strong} force. We certainly not pushing it.
May I express sincere gratification
in your visit. Your ~~visit~~ ^{visit} was
a big step forward & contributed to ~~progress~~ ^{progress} in Poland. This visit could be
historic - not only restore US - Pol
relations but make them sig. ~~forward~~ ^{forward}.
I ~~do~~ think you have been saying this
& in your arrival remarks. I will
explain everything. I think you
already understand much. I suggest
we cover internal, internal & intl
issues. I would offer you ~~as guest~~ ^{as guest}
to go first.

P

Very happy to be back here. Amazed
& encouraged by ~~changes~~ ^{changes}. World
was watched w/ wonder. I do not
want to ~~complicate~~ ^{complicate} a big job you have
as leader. I don't want w/ ~~super~~ ^{super} but
rhetoric which would complicate your
task. I do not come to make life big
for God or just ~~steamers~~ ^{steamers} F. B. C.
I come to salute & encourage your
~~rep~~ ^{rep} changes, encourage more, but

If you have advice or caution on what would interfere w/ these objectives, let me know. Any I must salute a cooperation of reporters in a Polish people. But I don't want to create trouble. And this not a population contest bet Gorb & me, bet a journalists - to that.

J
I thank you for expressing your intention this way. I realize your rep as head of superpower. Gorb told me when he visited Cor. & Fr he did nothing to engage US interests. I followed what he said while there & he did strike by that. It is encouraging that both of you are willing to rep & show how E-W coop should be conducted. Pleased to hear your endorsement of what we have done & we do plan to go further. This is not just rhetoric. I have reviewed a notes of our last meeting. I said potential were very won - and we are now moving. Currently, Poland has wide spectrum of pluralism - labor, politics, etc. w/in Sejms pluralism is restricted, but far less than originally intended. We have pace & rhythm for further reform - w/o interruption. We have big pol & econ probs. Must be

cautions in conducting this process as
not to injure it. Demo is not just a
tactic for us. As Churchill said "Demo a
poor system, except..." During ~~that~~ Stalin
period, demo was decay-like. We only
45 yrs old. Started ~~out~~ backward w/ great
destruction. Maybe we could have
started earlier. But only when pol & econ
changes go together can real prog be made.
Today's infrastructure: 2 horse legs. -
Parish senate has wide possibilities. Since
it is opposition controlled it will stand big
power, together w/ lower house 1/3 oppos.
even rep. plus sympathizers. Then there is
a new Pres. Our system is triangular.
Balance in Parliament is unstable, ~~to~~ to
prevent dislocation of a state, we need a
as a balancer. His power will be less
that of Fr & Ger/Italy.

P I would ask who will be kept P, but this
would be interference

J I have no secrets there. At road table
it agreed that I should enjoy confidence
of armed forces, executive branch, etc. It
was agreed then that his powers would be
described to do that. It was specifically
agreed that I would be a govt candidate.
But after election, polls were taken
about chances of election / in Senate & lower.

showing opposition would be a vote against me. It would be a ~~for~~ tying war. I decided I must represent conviction & moral consensus. Protection should not be manifest of division but a sound fabric. Since Waller said Kiszczak would do better - he was involved directly in R.T. - I thought he would be a preferable candidate. Unfortunately, Leg's support for Kiszczak is lower than Cerezo suggested & there much sentiment, even in opposition, supporting me. I appeared as a strong candidate. However I have not made final decisions, must analyze actual degree of my support. But this position can't be taken by one who doesn't have confidence of military.

P Is C.P.C. in C of armed forces?

J Yes. It is a delicate issue for us.

P If I could interrupt. I was pleased to get your msg from Gorb in Romania. He asked me if I could like to see a day when we saw troops in E. eu. I ~~said~~ ^{said} yesterday apparently that I was interfering. Then Gorb raised SNF again & I said NATO already decided that. Would you explain to him? It can only ^{help} understanding now.

J Yes, he is concerned. He will like to hear this is linked only to dissolution of blocs, etc. We react there to a C. eu. mod. All & eu.

1022

feel more comfortable w/ 5 or 6 divisions in
F. Ges.

P I didn't want to be contentious. I was looking
far into future.

T We must look at how we develop & expand
There is pluralism in legis, & pol parties
are forming. Solidarity not unified, you
know. There are many wings in it -
a social democratic wing, one more to
right, linked to trade & church factors. It
is a natural process now that political
factors are beginning to operate. There is
developing a principle of politics. Christ party
is no monopoly. 30% only own seats
in Senate. Surprisingly, I think this
not a bad thing. Christ Party ceased really
to be a party & became a formal structure
It lost its dynamism. Only political
competition can revive Christ party.
We are alone in a scientific world in
embarking on a parliamentary game as played
in the West.

WTO - E. for now, at this stage a best
solution would be a grand coalition
govt, composed of all factions. PM should
be member of coalition, but since PM
should be from opposition. We have dig,
probs ahead & we need continually & we can't
have ~~more~~ people w/ skills to take care

if govt should fail. Our tasks will ^{be} ~~be~~ unpleasant - Tough measures needed. Opposi-
in tough position. They are pol party & also
a track union. These are in conflict
right now. We must reform & that means
there must be losers. Hard work must be
rewarded, poor performance punished.

P I remember you told me before about
demands for 3-5 yr maternity leave.
J In US, unions are about 20% of work force.
Here they will control about 80%. This is a
heart of matter. You want competition
& market prices to become stronger, we agree.
In US, there are more goods than people need.
∴ competition. Here, everything produced
is sold. Enterprise is ∴ rich. Private
sector just uses advantage to pay higher
wages. We need market balance so
competition will work. Agric very important
25% of farms are private. They are small - av.
only 5 hectares. 60% bet 2-5 hectares &
producing only for own consumption. So small
farmer can't help himself & larger farmer
helps him out. But Solidarity says all
must remain & ∴ be subsidized. Farmer
gets 3x more for his milk than he pays
in a store price. Same for grain.

P Can't Solidarity realize this must change
J Well know this but are scared - Church

This is important point. West can help.
We need a period when not impose
severe austerity. We need pressure on
farmers to correct this. This means
agri may bump down for a while, we
need to be able to buy commodities to tide
us over. While we are nationally
a economy, we need help. There are 3
stages: ^{1st} present, we need to stabilize &
to prevent market collapse, 2nd 2-3 yrs,
3rd to restructure Polish economy, change
ownership structure, & more. This
will take 10 yrs or so. I have written
a 7 + 2 paper in Paris you will all
support us in this approach.
When a peasant says I don't care about land
I just want to live better, when we nationally
a economy & he lives worse, we have big
pol pressures. This is why we need a
broad front in PM & Cabinet, to prevent
public resistance able to block a necessary
reforms. Econ reform w/o political reform
won't work, but political prog. w/o econ reform
will fail. In a long run this is only thing
which will work. I hope I have illuminated
a bit for you.

Solidarity has called for worker self report
authorities. We gave them too, but powers must
be restricted. The more must be able to work

The workers want max distribution of profits -
we must seek to convert a surplus.

I want to thank you for 8 points in Harrogate.
Our concern is that those points be given concrete
form. I know that can't happen w/o
guarantees that a aid will be used
properly. These are: 1st refers to
eliminated aid to & introduced competition
to 70's repeat can't happen; 2nd IMF
is controlling us; 3rd more & more
with joint ventures helping us to structure
our performance better; 4th democratic
controls incl opposition. We will set up
a centre having day to day supervision so
that distortions will not develop.

We need urgent Trng. GB has offered help
here, as have Ger. We see vast scope for
private sector - w/o restraint so long as it
does not become a pathological factor.

We have agreed on cultural centres. We
would like co-operate in L.A. Want great
flow of tech. I understand COCOM, but even
so there is much more which can be done
Pd. dep. min. def. visiting US. That good. I
won't discuss Church State relations. They
are good.

As for for. relations, as you know we had
a WP meeting last week. We pressed for further
work on AC. Stemed not rather than will come

We expressed support for your Beersels proposal + its schedule. I was talking SNF - that is commercial.

P Please to see Euro support for our time Table. I'm hoping over allies to meet it

J We need strong support for it. We also discussed with exists like now have more pluralism than NATO. Type + range of reform subject of great diff. Pol & Army are out front. Others concerned that not yet out of control in Pol leading to explosion. That, focus can be a letter to taking up reform. If West is interested in Polish type reforms, they should not look at it as purely local, which could be applied elsewhere. We could agree on a date, common Euro home w/ all doors open, etc.

P This is frustrating & frustrating tho that Polish economy has to be confronted w/ their labor demands. We can combat this in interest of competitiveness because serious restructuring. Solidarity has been instrumental in pol reform, but can't stand outside pressing in on econ reform. Maybe I can talk to them in Gdansk. I will talk to some summit on how we can help I will go into more detail this afternoon on specific measures: open external

centers, ^{converted action} ~~(concertation)~~, INF / ~~would have action~~
private enterprise fund for 100 mil, perhaps
capitalize private investment bank, promote
325 mil WB loans, reschedule debt, which
would ~~start~~ ^{defer} 5 bil, environment fund. There are
a few more, but there are most. Some in
labor are talking 10 bil in grants. That
is impossible w/o reforms - you ~~are~~ mention
not only solidarity. There are ~~some~~ ^{many} reasons.
They begin ^{to} ~~begin~~ to ~~united~~ ^{united} each other.

P But if they are in a context...

J Nowhere else is there direct linkage ~~and~~ ^{not}
pol parties & unions.

P GB

J But Thatcher has ~~survived~~ ^{survived} that. Tell her
it was going down hill.

P What you have said about urgent ends seems
We have ~~been~~ ^{been} for using our ~~power~~ ^{power} and can
become more competitive. Only a small part
if that is labor cause it not so strong. There
are ~~rearrangements~~ ^{rearrangements} evidence

I will be talking about this etc. ~~seem~~ ^{seem}.
They had asked that I not get too far out in
front

J I hope you can say we must keep our
feet on ground. Not easy just to admire
US riches. Can get there only thru years
of hard work. Much uncertainty in Ireland.
I hope we will raise it. ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~same~~ ^{same}

P We are very imperfect ourselves. We still have very big problems. Baker & FM enter.

P I understand much better & dig P-Land faces in moving forward. I will point out to opposition & talk ahead & dangers of leaving leaving us - even demands.

J I didn't think on things which make us happy. Today we are sitting at round tables, looking for common language, following parliamentary procedures. We are getting together. I respect Walisa. He has dropped since 8 D. Today he is a partner w/ whom we can search for solutions. The core issues I mentioned are a long list prob.

P When I discuss even reform, I will discuss it not as your crisis but as crisis. I had intended this all along. It will not appear as if you & I are conspiring for now to have a night of Solidarity.

We must not lose sight of a tremendous good thing you have accomplished. The West applauds w/ enthusiasm.

In China, it is sad. E can reform get way out in front of pol reform.

J Reformers must work in 11

P In China they felt they couldn't cope w/ that kind of reform.

J What ~~also~~ remains is their feeling / Cat Chub

P Unfortunately, it does matter now.
Do you others worry about effect of your
repression then

J This is sensitive. Each must make it ~~his~~ own
way. Dictators are def & have lifelimits
Romania & K Kren have advantages in
construction, etc. They control labor money,
we are somewhere in bet. We have
less control & money.

P For a while there was concern in world which
I wanted Gorb to catch a vice. That we were
pulling back from him. You are of his close
friends. We do want him to succeed. Do
want to get into his or your internal
affairs but we do want him to succeed.
I am not here to stick a finger in Gorb's eye
I think we have best system for catching
vice, but that is our system. We
will support reform which makes sense

J There is a belief, prob correct, that E
supports Gorb more than US. E sees
see bigger chance for benefits than
& stability, etc. Hearing you, I am
convinced they are wrong & I will show
this w/ Gorb. He has good feelings about
you, even before your election. w/ you
as P a new set could be created in
world, w/ superpowers coop more & more
& never mind such as AC & ...

between us. You will see in ~~some~~
a that good

P Do noty good even w/o AL?

J Hard frame to say. You a little judge.
Rygh, which looked bad at first, then
not good because each side made its
position clear.

P We thinking about a prospect. We have
completed a review of Baker noty w/ Scher
Baker not just Sec., he is my close friend &
Talking to him is like talking to me.

I don't like to set up noty which could
overpromise a world.

I have enjoyed a number of our talks
would like similar one w/ Gorb. We
on present course. Going back to
on AC. ~~and~~ ~~can~~ ~~propose~~. ~~about~~ ~~so~~
don't miss any signals. There are some
little positive things going (Oil ship,
barricade, etc) CTS had good visit
to SO. Would welcome similar relationship
w/ you.

I setting here in ~~the~~ ~~land~~, looking East
& am comfortable about where we are w/ SC
A lot of early caution can yield more
benefits later.

You looking stable in this. Want you
to know I have no great feelings which
are unrelentant to you. ~~know~~.

J Auss. & Russians are similar in their flamboyance. Gorb told me today that people look at perestroika see problems of these, plus ethnic probs, etc. France found it may appear perestroika but no chance. But from abroad & afar, it has already made a big dig.

I advise Gorb. His parliamentary proceedings were treated fairly, incl criticism. There have been evolutionary changes already. Not possible to reverse it.

B Are you worried that perestroika is already over in SU

J They are ahead, but more in terms of public consciousness than in structure. He is actually moving on both. He is reforming a structure by putting new people in. Letting opposition speak out is essential & creates competitive pressures. You need reserves when you undertake reforms like this because production may go down. We have 2 car factories, but they don't compete. One makes big & other small. We can't buy cars abroad, so we need competition to improve efficiency. (Describes coal mines & subsidizes them).

~~SECRET~~

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
James A. Baker, Secretary of State
John H. Sununu, Chief of Staff
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (notetaker)
Dmitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Alexander Bessmertnykh, First Deputy Foreign Minister
P. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: September 21, 1989, 3:05 p.m. - 3:40 p.m. EDT
The Oval Office

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: It is good that these issues have been intensively discussed. President Gorbachev has reaffirmed the need for an informal meeting -- no agenda, small group. We have discussed all this on several occasions. As for a quick trip to the United States, we believe that would raise many problems, especially with an official trip expected next year. We concluded that would create a mistaken impression. A meeting, in the absence of agreements, would also lead to disappointment in both countries.

President Gorbachev asks you to weigh the possibility of meeting in any third country. President Gorbachev is planning to visit Finland in October and Italy in November (after November 20th). If the President was interested in any other places in Europe, or close to Europe, we could arrange a meeting.

The President: When will President Gorbachev be going to Italy?

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: His visit will begin on November 20. He will be in Finland in October.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0839-MR
4/10/2013 MM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

If that working meeting does not go forward, we should prepare for a real Summit. Given the current state of discussions, there may be an urgent need for major decisions on START, and Summit input will be needed.

If we were to begin working toward a Summit, when should it take place? We should give negotiators time for serious preparation. Perhaps late spring or early summer would be right. If we set that date, we could get two ministerial meetings in before the Summit. Any date later than that would be difficult because we will be holding a Party Congress in October. Holding no Summit at all would be inconsistent with the situation in our relationship.

The President: I am glad we could have this discussion. Just so you hear it from me, let me go back a bit. I have been officially opposed to an informal meeting. But, because of rapid changes around the globe, the problems you face and we face, I have changed my position 180 degrees. The four of us were in Paris, and we heard our allies indicate their desire that I meet with President Gorbachev. We spoke with our allies of the many changes, in China, Eastern Europe, the global environment, and elsewhere. We talked about the possibility that maybe we, in the U.S., should change our minds and favor an informal meeting without an agenda.

If we did, I would have to explain to the press why I changed. But my real concern is that I do not want us to miss anything, to let something fall through the cracks. Today Eastern Europe is important -- not to make decisions -- just to discuss important issues.

We need to get comfortable with each other, so we can talk really frankly -- pick up the phone, for example. My predecessor did not have a close relationship with President Mitterrand. I wanted a better one. He can be a difficult man -- we all can. I invited him to Maine. It was the best darn thing I ever did. Because of this recent step, our relationship is on a completely different plane. The chemistry is different. It could become the same with us. It would be good; I know it.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: This is consistent with what President Gorbachev thinks.

The President: I understand why it won't work, but that is why a meeting connected to the UN General Assembly would have been

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

perfect. The press might otherwise reflect disappointment that no agreements were signed, etc.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: That would have been best, but for the fact that President Gorbachev spoke there last year.

The President: We know, but that is why we thought of Alaska and the environment. We understand why that was not possible. We will regroup and keep thinking about this. I really want to do this. I am convinced it would be a good thing.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: That is why President Gorbachev wanted me to tell you about his two visits in Europe which are already set.

The President: I will think about it. We are not saying no. Please ask President Gorbachev to think further. There has to be some rationale to keep the fact of a meeting from getting out of hand. That was the problem with Spain. There would be no reason for me to go there absent a crisis.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: If some trip you made would coincide with our trips, that would stop the speculation.

The President: Let me ask a logistics question. We thought about this idea for Alaska. How about holding one meeting on our ship and one on yours. Is there some problem in that notion from your perspective?

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: Korea. If we were to meet you in Alaska, North Korea would ask why we did not visit them as well.

The President: Let's keep talking about this until we find an answer.

Secretary Baker: I suggest that we tell the press we have agreed on holding a Summit meeting by next summer.

The President: That would take the pressure off and then, if we could have another meeting, it would be clear it was not a Summit.

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: So we will make an announcement, indicating a time frame for the Summit.

(There was then a discussion which resulted in agreement to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

describe the time frame as before mid-year 1990.)

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze: When would we announce this? I need to call President Gorbachev. We could say we had a good discussion and will be more specific later.

(End of meeting)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Gorbachev (Dobryntu)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

<DIST>
PRT: COMM OLEARY SIGLER
SIT: COQ PRES MSGS WHSR OUT
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 031706Z AUG 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

QQQQ

EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR
MATLOCK.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I WELCOME YOUR RESPONSE TO MY OFFER OF AMERICAN ASSISTANCE WITH
RESPECT TO THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THAT SANK IN THE NORWEGIAN SEA.
AS SUGGESTED IN YOUR NOTE, WE WILL AWAIT FURTHER WORD FROM YOU
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0963 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
ON WHETHER YOU WISH TO PROCEED.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I HAD A VERY VALUABLE MEETING WITH
MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV, A SESSION THAT WAS EXTRAORDINARY FOR THE
CANDOR WITH WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO DISCUSS A WIDE RANGE OF ISSUES.
HE AND I AGREED THAT SUCH A MEETING WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTHINKABLE
ONLY A FEW YEARS AGO. SIMILARLY, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE
SOVIET SHIP VISIT TO NORFOLK LAST WEEK WAS ENORMOUSLY SUCCESSFUL.
SEVERAL TENS OF THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE GATHERED TO HEAR THE MUSICAL
PERFORMANCE BY THE SOVIETS SAILORS, AND THE PEOPLE OF NORFOLK
EXTENDED VERY WARM HOSPITALITY TO THE SHIPS' CREWS. ALL THESE
EVENTS ARE ENCOURAGING SIGNS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

PAGE 03 RUEADWW0963 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT

BT

#0963

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0963 <TOR> 890803131104 MSG000239461864

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MA

<DIST>

PRT: COMM LEBRAS SIGLER

SIT: PRES MSGS WHSR OUT

<PREC> FLASH <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 290825Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~

QQQQ

EYES ONLY EYES ONLY

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR JACK MATLOCK,
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH.

SECSTATE FOR UNDERSECRETARY KIMMIT TO PASS TO SECRETARY BAKER

BEGIN TEXT:

MAY 29, 1989

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE OUTLINED IN RECENT SPEECHES A NEW CONCEPTION OF A STABLE
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
AND COOPERATIVE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP; ONE THAT MOVES BEYOND
CONTAINMENT. ON MAY 24, I EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR
NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE), NOW UNDERWAY
IN VIENNA, IN PROMOTING THIS GOAL.

I WANTED YOU TO KNOW THAT IN ORDER TO BROADEN AND ACCELERATE
NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, I AM PROPOSING
TODAY TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL THAT NATO:

ACCEPT YOUR AGREEMENT TO CEILINGS ON TANKS
(20,000 FOR EACH SIDE) AND ARMORED TROOP
CARRIERS (28,000 FOR EACH SIDE). SEEK EARLY
AGREEMENT WITH THE WARSAW PACT ON A CEILING
FOR ARTILLERY IN THE RANGE BETWEEN 16,500 AND
24,000, USING A COMMONLY AGREED DEFINITION OF
THE EQUIPMENT INVOLVED. ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT
REDUCED WOULD BE DESTROYED.

EXPAND THE CURRENT NATO PROPOSAL TO INCLUDE CUTS
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
OF 15 PERCENT BELOW THE COMBINED TOTAL FOR MEMBERS
OF THE NATO ALLIANCE IN TWO ADDITIONAL
CATEGORIES: HELICOPTERS (ATTACK AND
ASSAULT/TRANSPORT) AND ALL LAND-BASED COMBAT
AIRCRAFT, REGARDLESS OF ROLE OR CONFIGURATION.
ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT CUT WOULD BE DESTROYED.

CUT U.S. STATIONED MANPOWER BY 20 PERCENT AND
PROPOSE A CEILING ON U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND
AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER STATIONED OUTSIDE OF
NATIONAL TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC-TO-THE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR

2/25/2014 MM

URALS ZONE AT THE U.S. RESIDUAL OF 275,000
EACH. WE CALCULATE THAT SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN
EASTERN EUROPE UNDER THIS CEILING WOULD AMOUNT TO
ABOUT 325,000. WITHDRAWN SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN
ON BOTH SIDES WOULD BE DEMOBILIZED.

AGREE TO AN ACCELERATED TIMETABLE FOR REACHING
AND IMPLEMENTING AN AGREEMENT ALONG THESE
LINES. I BELIEVE THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE
PAGE 04 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY
TO REACH SUCH AN AGREEMENT IN SIX MONTHS TO A
YEAR, AND TO ACCOMPLISH THE REDUCTIONS BY 1992
OR 1993.

MUCH REMAINS TO BE DONE IN VIENNA, INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON
VERIFICATION OF OVERALL CEILINGS AND MEASURES TO MONITOR AND
VERIFY FORCE REDUCTIONS AND EQUIPMENT DESTRUCTION. BUT I
BELIEVE THAT OUR NEW PROPOSAL ADDRESSES WHAT WE UNDERSTAND
TO BE YOUR CENTRAL CONCERNS AND SHOULD ALLOW THE NEGOTIATIONS
TO MOVE FORWARD EXPEDITIOUSLY.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

PAGE 05 RUEADWW0584 ~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT.

WARM REGARDS, BRENT SCOWCROFT

DECL: OADR

BT

#0584

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0584 <TOR> 890529043604 MSG000233728564

<DIST>
PRT: COMM
SIT: PRES MSGS
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEADWW <DTG> 241208Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM THE WHITE HOUSE

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

<TEXT>BT
~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY
QQQQ

EMBASSY MOSCOW, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING TO AMBASSADOR MATLOCK.

AMBASSADOR MATLOCK, PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE
FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

SECRETARY OF STATE BAKER HAS REPORTED TO ME ON HIS MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW. I AM QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF HIS VISIT. I
PAGE 02 RUEADWW0374 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
STRONGLY SUPPORT INTENSIFYING OUR DIALOGUE AND COOPERATION
ACROSS THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, INCLUDING
REGIONAL ISSUES, BILATERAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND ARMS
CONTROL. THE RESUMPTION OF THE FULL ARRAY OF ARMS CONTROL
AND ARMS REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS IS A WELCOME DEVELOPMENT.

MR. CHARIMAN, I WROTE YOU IN APRIL TO EXPRESS OUR CONDOLENCES
OVER THE TRAGIC LOSS OF YOUR MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE IN THE
NORWEGIAN SEA AND THE LIVES OF SO MANY YOUNG SAILORS. IN RECENT
WEEKS WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN
OBTAINING WESTERN ASSISTANCE IN RAISING THE SUNKEN SUBMARINE.
WE HAVE CERTAIN CAPABILITIES FOR THIS KIND OF MISSION
AND, FROM A PURELY HUMANITAIRAN STANDPOINT, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER
OUR COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE SHOULD YOU WISH TO PURSUE RAISING
THE SUBMARINE. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD BE SENSITIVE ABOUT MILITARY
TECHNOLOGIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SUBMARINE. I RESPECT SUCH
SENSITIVITY AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE MADE TO SAFEGUARD YOUR
TECHNOLOGY. FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, WE HAVE NOT EXAMINED EITHER
THE COST OR THE TIME THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO READY OUR SHIP
FOR SUCH A MISSION. HOWEVER, I CAN APPRECIATE THE CONCERN OF
PAGE 03 RUEADWW0374 ~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
THE FAMILIES AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE FOR THE MEN LOST IN THE
SUBMARINE AND WISH TO EXTEND THIS OFFER. IT IS THIS CONCERN FOR
THOSE YOUNG SAILORS' FAMILIES THAT PROMPTS THIS OFFER.

SHOULD YOU HAVE INTEREST IN PURSUING A COOPERATIVE EFFORT TO
RAISE THE SUBMARINE, WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO BEGIN EXPLORING
THE FEASIBILITY WITH YOU.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>

SIT: PRES MSGS VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 110952Z MAR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 3978
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 3857

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THANK YOU NOTE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT

UNCLAS STATE 076849

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: KSCA, CASC, TBIO, UR, US, OPDC

SUBJECT: THANK YOU NOTE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
GORBACHEV

REFS: A) STATE 68417, B) MOSCOW 5717, C) FRANKFURT
3556

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING THANK YOU NOTE TO MFA FOR
CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

ON BEHALF OF ALL AMERICANS, I WISH TO EXPRESS MY SINCERE
APPRECIATION FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROVIDED BY
THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT IN OBTAINING A RARE ANTI-SNAKEBITE
SERUM FOR AN AMERICAN VICTIM OF A PAKISTANI PIT VIPER.
I UNDERSTAND THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS ARRANGED A SPECIAL
FLIGHT SO THAT THE SERUM COULD BE EXPEDITIOUSLY
TRANSPORTED FROM TASHKENT TO MOSCOW AND ASSISTED U.S.
EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN COORDINATING ONWARD TRANSPORTATION
OF THE SERUM TO THE U.S. ALTHOUGH THE VICTIM IS STILL IN
SERIOUS CONDITION, HIS CHANCES FOR RECOVERY ARE MUCH
IMPROVED THANKS TO YOUR EFFORTS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,

CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
MOSCOW.

END TEXT. BAKER

BT

#6849

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6849 <TOR> 890311051427 MSG000226905267

<DIST>

PRT: DONLEY HUGHES PERITO

SIT: BLACKWILL HAASS PRES MSGS RICE RODMAN BRANSCUM

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 150321Z MAR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV
- ON AFGHANISTAN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR

2/25/2014 MM

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 080473

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR, AF

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO GORBACHEV

- ON AFGHANISTAN

REF: STATE 054154

1. ~~SECRET~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER ON EXPEDITED BASIS THE
FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN
GORBACHEV ON AFGHANISTAN, RESPONDING TO GORBACHEV'S
REFTEL LETTER ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE CAREFULLY STUDIED YOUR FEBRUARY 17 LETTER ON
AFGHANISTAN. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WELCOME YOUR ORDERLY
AND TIMELY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM THAT
COUNTRY, THUS BRINGING TO AN END A LONG AND UNFORTUNATE
CHAPTER IN AFGHAN HISTORY. A MAJOR STEP TOWARD SETTLE-
MENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN QUESTION HAS THUS BEEN TAKEN.
AS YOUR LETTER INDICATES, WE SHARE A NUMBER OF INTERESTS
IN AFGHANISTAN: AN ATTENUATION OF CIVIL CONFLICT, THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A BROADLY BASED, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT, THE RESTORATION OF ITS STATUS AS A NEUTRAL,
NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY, AND THE FACILITATION OF REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION.

THE AMERICAN OBJECTIVE IS SIMPLY TO ENSURE THAT THE
PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN, WHO HAVE SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY OVER
THE PAST DECADE, HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DETERMINE THEIR
OWN POLITICAL FUTURE FOR THEMSELVES. OUTSIDE POWERS CAN
BEST CONTRIBUTE BY RESISTING THE TEMPTATION TO MANIPULATE
THE PROCESS.

WE HARBOR NO INTENTION OF PROMOTING AN AFGHAN GOVERNMENT
THAT IS HOSTILE TO THE SOVIET UNION. RATHER, WE SUPPORT
THE EMERGENCE OF A GENUINELY INDEPENDENT AND NON-ALIGNED
AFGHANISTAN LIVING IN PEACE WITH ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS.

I WISH ALSO TO ASSURE YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT OUR ACTIONS
WILL REMAIN CONSISTENT WITH THE OBLIGATIONS WE UNDERTOOK
AS A GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS. WE LIKEWISE EXPECT
THE SOVIET UNION TO HONOR THOSE OBLIGATIONS; FOR YOUR
COUNTRY TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD FORFEIT THE VERY
CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL BENEFITS THE WITHDRAWAL HAS EARNED
FOR YOU IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

IN YOUR LETTER YOU SUGGESTED A MORATORIUM ON FURTHER
SUPPLIES TO CONTENDING AFGHAN FACTIONS. FOLLOWING YOUR
GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT A SIMILAR PROPOSAL WE PUT

ON THE TABLE LAST APRIL, WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD EXERCISE RIGHTS TO SUPPORT OUR FRIENDS COMPARABLE TO THOSE WHICH YOU ASSERTED FOR YOURSELF. WE SHALL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE MATERIAL SUPPORT -- INCREASINGLY IN THE FORM OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -- TO OUR FRIENDS IN AFGHANISTAN. AS FORMER SECRETARY SHULTZ NOTED IN GENEVA LAST APRIL, THE CONTENT OF OUR SUPPORT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY RESTRAINT IN SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ITS KABUL CLIENTS. THE RECENT TURNOVER OF MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT BY YOUR GOVERNMENT TO AFGHAN UNITS DURING AND FOLLOWING YOUR WITHDRAWAL DOES NOT INDICATE SUCH RESTRAINT. THIS HAS AFFECTED OUR DECISION TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT.

DURING THE COMING MONTHS AFGHANISTAN WILL REQUIRE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE UNITED STATES, AS ALWAYS, STANDS READY TO CONTRIBUTE GENEROUSLY TO MEET HUMANITARIAN NEEDS. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL CARRY THROUGH EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH YOUR OWN PROMISE TO AID GENEROUSLY REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS THERE. THAT WOULD BE A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT, WHICH THE WORLD WOULD NOTE. THE UN MUST PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN COORDINATING THIS MULTINATIONAL EFFORT. I TRUST THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL ALSO ASSIST UN EFFORTS TO REMOVE LAND MINES AND ANTI-PERSONNEL DEVICES FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE LONG SUFFERING AFGHAN REFUGEES TO RETURN HOME SAFELY AND WITH HONOR.

IN CLOSING, LET ME SAY THAT I SEE THIS AS A VERY IMPORTANT TIME IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. I HOPE THAT OUR COUNTRIES CAN DEVISE COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES TOWARD THE RESIDUAL PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT AFGHANISTAN DURING THE MONTHS AHEAD. THIS WOULD BRING BENEFITS NOT ONLY TO OURSELVES, BUT ALSO TO THE SOUTH ASIAN AREA AS A WHOLE, AND TO THE CAUSE OF WORLD PEACE.

FINALLY, I AM HOPEFUL THAT COOPERATION ON THIS ISSUE WILL SET A STANDARD OF GOODWILL TO WHICH WE CAN LOOK AS WE MOVE FORWARD TO ADDRESS OTHER PROBLEMS BEFORE US.

AGAIN, THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER.

SINCERELY,

(SIGNED) GEORGE BUSH

INSERT TEXT OF HANDWRITTEN POSTSCRIPT FROM PRESIDENT BUSH IN PARA 4 BELOW.

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE

SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF

SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MOSCOW

END TEXT OF LETTER

4. BEGIN TEXT OF HANDWRITTEN POSTSCRIPT FROM PRESIDENT BUSH:

P.S. AS SOON AS JIM BAKER RETURNED FROM HIS TRIP TO EUROPE HE CAME TO THE WHITE HOUSE AND GAVE ME A DETAILED REPORT ON HIS MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE - MOST INTERESTING(

(SIGNED AND UNDERLINED) GB

END TEXT OF POSTSCRIPT.

5. SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BAKER

BT

#0473

<DIST>
PRT: SIT
SIT: PRES MSGS VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 082134Z APR 89
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 5954
INFO RUFHOS/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 4571
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 4286

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: SOVIET SUBMARINE ACCIDENT: GORBACHEV MESSAGE
- AND THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 110232

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPEC, MNUC, ENRG, PHSA, UR, US, NO

SUBJECT: SOVIET SUBMARINE ACCIDENT: GORBACHEV MESSAGE
- AND THE PRESIDENT'S REPLY

1. ☒ ENTIRE TEXT

2. ON APRIL 7 SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ CONVEYED TO UNDER SECRETARY KIMMITT THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO THE PRESIDENT. BEGIN TEXT:
URGENT MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT BUSH ON APRIL 7, 1989 AT 1141 MOSCOW TIME ON BOARD A NUCLEAR-POWERED TORPEDO SUBMARINE LOCATED IN NEUTRAL WATERS IN THE AREA AT A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 180 KILOMETERS SOUTHWEST OF MEDVEZHSKIY ISLAND, A FIRE STARTED IN ONE OF THE COMPARTMENTS. UNFORTUNATELY, DESPITE THE MEASURES TAKEN, THE SUBMARINE COULD NOT BE SAVED. AT 1715 MOSCOW TIME, THE SUBMARINE SANK AT A DEPTH OF OVER 1500 METERS. THE CREW IS BEING HELPED BY SOVIET SHIPS AND VESSELS, WHICH CAME TO THE AREA WHERE THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED. THERE ARE CASUALTIES. THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED TO THE LOSS OF THE SUBMARINE ARE STILL BEING INVESTIGATED. THE REACTOR IS SHUT DOWN. BY THE ASSESSMENT OF SPECIALISTS, A POSSIBILITY OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION IS EXCLUDED. ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNICAL MEASURES ARE BEING WORKED OUT IN VIEW OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED.
END TEXT.

3. ON APRIL 8, THE DEPARTMENT CONVEYED TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY A REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. EMBASSY MAY WISH TO PASS TO THE MFA ON MONDAY, APRIL 10, THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE, WHICH FOLLOWS. BEGIN TEXT:

APRIL 8, 1989
MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV
THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE CONCERNING THE TRAGIC SUBMARINE ACCIDENT YESTERDAY. THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES JOIN WITH ME IN EXTENDING OUR SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES OF THE LOST CREWMEN AND IN HOPING THAT YOUR RESCUE EFFORTS WILL SUCCESSFULLY PREVENT FURTHER LOSS OF LIFE.
END TEXT.

4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER

BT

#0232

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0232 <TOR> 890408174611 MSG000229369571

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
SIT: PRES_MSGS
<DIST>
SIT: MORRISON VAX WELCH
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 260248Z APR 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 7079
INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0544
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 7912

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON CURRENT
FIGHTING IN LEBANON

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 130061

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, MOPS, PINS, PREL, UR, LE, SY, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GORBACHEV ON CURRENT
FIGHTING IN LEBANON

1. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO PRESENT THE TEXT BELOW TO
THE MFA FOR TRANSMITTAL TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. ORIGINAL
WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.

2. BEGIN TEXT:
THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

APRIL 24, 1989

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I AM GRAVELY CONCERNED AT THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE IN
THE SHELLING IN LEBANON, WHERE THE VIOLENCE HAS ESCALATED
BETWEEN GENERAL AOUN'S LEBANESE ARMED FORCES AND THE
LEBANESE MUSLIMS, WITH ACTIVE SYRIAN PARTICIPATION.
THE CIVILIZED WORLD IS UNDERSTANDABLY OUTRAGED THAT SO
MANY INNOCENT LEBANESE ARE SUFFERING. WE HAVE BEEN
CALLING ON ALL PARTICIPANTS IN THE FIGHTING, INCLUDING
GENERAL AOUN AND THE SYRIANS, TO TERMINATE THE FIGHTING
IMMEDIATELY. IN VIEW OF YOUR RELATIONSHIP TO SYRIA, I
BELIEVE IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF YOU WERE TO ADD YOUR
VOICE TO THOSE URGING SYRIA TO AGREE TO AN IMMEDIATE
CEASE-FIRE.

SUCH AN EFFORT ON YOUR PART WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH YOUR
PUBLICLY EXPRESSED POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO ENDING THE
TRAGIC SHEDDING OF INNOCENT BLOOD.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

END TEXT.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. BAKER

BT

#0061

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 0061 <TOR> 890426055138 MSG000230881898

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT
SIT: PRES MSGS
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHMO <DTG> 241721Z MAY 89

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

<TO>TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 13686

NODIS

SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

REF: THE WHITE HOUSE 241208Z MAY 89 (~~SECRET~~
- SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 1900 ON MAY 24 (DUE TO THE
ONGOING PROCESS OF FORMING A NEW LEGISLATURE THIS
WEEK, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DELIVER THE LETTER TO
GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, SINCE HE WAS INVOLVED ALL DAY
IN MEETINGS WITH DEPUTIES).

3. SHEVARDNADZE LISTENED CAREFULLY AS THE LETTER WAS
READ, PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT'S
POSITIVE COMMENTS ON SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW, AND TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RECOVER
THE MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE THAT SANK LAST APRIL IN THE
NORWEGIAN SEA. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THE
SOVIET SIDE VERY MUCH VALUED THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED
BY THE PRESIDENT. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S
OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUBMARINE AND RECOVER THE
BODIES OF THE SOVIET SAILORS WHO WERE LOST AT SEA,
SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT OF COURSE A NUMBER OF
TECHNICAL MATTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION. HE OFFERED TO PASS THE PRESIDENT'S
MESSAGE ON TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, AND
SAID THAT AN ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD
BE FORTHCOMING IN A FEW DAYS. HE EXPRESSED HIS
PERSONAL GRATITUDE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS
PROPOSAL, AND NOTED THAT THIS, AS WELL AS THE AID
GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE ARMENIAN TRAGEDY
AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INDICATED JUST
HOW MUCH THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD CHANGED FOR
THE BETTER.

4. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S
OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUB NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FOR
THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SOVIET SIDE
AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FULLY AND GET
BACK WITH A CONSIDERED REPLY.

5. SHEVARDNADZE MADE OTHER COMMENTS ON THIS WEEK'S
POLITICAL EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ON THE SINO-SOVIET
SUMMIT WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS. MATLOCK

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>
SIT: BLACKWILL PRES MSGS RICE VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 070308Z JUN 89
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 9827
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 5119

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV
-

<TEXT>BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 179123
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, UR, US
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO GORBACHEV
-

REF: MOSCOW 14059

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.

3.
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

DEAR CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV:
PLEASE ACCEPT MY CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR ELECTIXN AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. I WISH YOU SUCCESS IN MEETING THE CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES YOUR NEW POSITION PRESENTS. THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT UNFOLDING IN YOUR COUNTRY HAS GRIPPED THE WORLD'S ATTENTION BECAUSE OF ITS ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE, NOT ONLY FOR YOUR COUNTRY BUT FOR OTHERS AS WELL. I BELIEVE IT ALSO HOLDS GREAT PROMISE FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS. YOU KNOW THAT YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN YOUR EFFORTS TO REFORM AND RESTRUCTURE SOVIET SOCIETY. I HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO BUILD ON THE BETTER, MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE ALREADY ESTABLISHED.

SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BAKER

BT
#9123
<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 9123 <TOR> 890607002214 MSG000234490934

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

<DIST>

PRT: VANERON

SIT: PRES MSGS VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 141700Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2100
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 5645

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE
- PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8915441)

<TEXT>BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 223458

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, UR, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO FOURTH OF JULY MESSAGE TO THE
- PRESIDENT FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8915441)

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.
2. FYI FOR POSTS, FOLLOWING LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV WAS RECEIVED BY THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 3:

ON THE OCCASION OF THE NATIONAL HOLIDAY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INDEPENDENCE DAY, PLEASE ACCEPT, MR. PRESIDENT, MY CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES FOR PROSPERITY AND PEACE FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

I AM CONVINCED THAT CONTINUATION AND INTENSIFICATION OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON THE BASIS OF REALISM, EQUALITY, AND MUTUAL BENEFIT WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE FRAME OF MIND OF THE PEOPLE OF OUR COUNTRIES, AND WOULD PROMOTE A GENERAL MOVE TOWARD A NEW, PEACEFUL PERIOD IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

THE REPEATED EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN US, AS WELL AS OTHER CONTACTS, AND THE TALKS IN MOSCOW IN MAY CONFIRM THE EXISTENCE OF PREREQUISITES FOR FURTHER PROGRESS ALONG THE BASIC LINES OF SUCH COOPERATION. OF COURSE, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AGREEMENTS IN VIENNA AND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE WEAPONS IN GENEVA WOULD BE OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR SAFEGUARDING SECURITY AND REMOVING THE THREAT OF WAR. WE ON OUR PART INTEND TO DO ALL IN OUR POWER TO MAKE THE TALKS SUCCEED.

POSSIBILITIES EXIST FOR PROGRESSING FASTER AND MORE EFFECTIVELY IN THE MATTER OF COOPERATION IN SETTLING REGIONAL PROBLEMS, DEVELOPING BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND THE REST OF THE ISSUES ON THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGENDA. I WISH TO REAFFIRM, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS STEADFASTLY SUPPORTING ALL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

M. GORBACHEV

MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN

JULY 4, 1989

3. FOLLOWING RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH SHOULD BE DELIVERED TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND I THANK YOU FOR THE MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS IN CELEBRATION OF OUR 213TH ANNIVERSARY OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR

2/25/2014 MM

SINCERELY,
GEORGE BUSH
MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV
CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MOSCOW

4. NO RELEASE INTENDED, BUT NO OBJECTION IF SOVIETS WISH
TO DO SO.

5. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

EAGLEBURGER

BT

#3458

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 3458 <TOR> 890714152717 MSG000237742037

<DIST>

SIT: BLACKWILL PRES MSGS RICE VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 290255Z JUL 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3123
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE 5866

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONDOLENCE LETTER
- FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8917168)

<TEXT>BT

UNCLAS STATE 241350

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, UR, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO CONDOLENCE LETTER
- FROM GORBACHEV (S/S 8917168)

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARAGRAPH 3.
2. FYI FOR POSTS, THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV TO PRESIDENT BUSH WAS RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE JULY 24:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WAS DEEPLY MOVED BY A REPORT ABOUT THE PLANE CRASH IN THE UNITED STATES WHICH CAUSED NUMEROUS CASUALTIES. ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE AND MYSELF I ASK YOU TO CONVEY MOST SINCERE CONDOLENCES TO THE FAMILIES AND RELATIVES OF THOSE WHO LOST THEIR LIVES.

SINCERELY,

M. GORBACHEV

MOSCOW, KREMLIN

JULY 21, 1989

END TEXT.

3. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING REPLY FROM THE PRESIDENT TO GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. NO/NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED, BUT THERE IS NO OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE OF SYMPATHY TO THE FAMILIES OF THOSE KILLED IN THE TRAGIC ACCIDENT AT SIOUX CITY AIRPORT.

BOTH OUR NATIONS HAVE SUFFERED TRAGIC LOSSES FROM ACCIDENTS IN RECENT MONTHS. YOUR CONCERN WILL BE APPRECIATED NOT ONLY BY THE FAMILIES OF THOSE WHO WERE LOST IN THE CRASH, BUT BY ALL AMERICANS.

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MOSCOW

END TEXT.

4. LENINGRAD MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
EAGLEBURGER

BT

#1350

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 1350 <TOR> 890729000033 MSG000238982433

<DIST>
PRT: VANERON BRANSCUM
SIT: PRES MSGS DORMINEY RODMAN VAX
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 231931Z SEP 89
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 6701
INFO RUEHCDEBUSDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 7689

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: CW - MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 306804 TOSEC 140041

NODIS

E.O. 12356: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, XG

SUBJECT: CW - MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. BEGIN SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUESTED: FOLLOWING IN
PARA THREE BELOW IS MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO
GORBACHEV RELATING TO CW INITIATIVE WHICH PRESIDENT WILL
ANNOUNCE IN HIS SPEECH TO THE UNGA MONDAY SEPT. 25.
EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER MESSAGE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
MONDAY, SEPT. 25. EMBASSY WILL BE RECEIVING SEPARATELY
TALKING POINTS, FACT SHEET, AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON
THE INITIATIVE.

3. BEGIN TEXT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE:

DEAR PRESIDENT GORBACHEV:

IN MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE, I
EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION FOR THE RICHNESS OF THE
DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON ISSUES OF MUTUAL
IMPORTANCE. I WANT TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY OF MR.
SHEVARDNADZE'S TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES TO EMPHASIZE TO
YOU ONE AREA WHERE I BELIEVE MORE WORK MUST BE DONE.
THIS IS THE ISSUE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

I HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT AS WELL AS THE BILATERAL DISCUSSION
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ON THIS SUBJECT. WHILE
PLEASED WITH THE PROGRESS TO DATE, I AM CONCERNED ABOUT
THE EROSION OF RESTRAINTS IN THE THIRD WORLD ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS USE, AS WELL AS THE EVER GROWING DANGER OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION. I AM CONVINCED THAT WE
MUST REDOUBLE OUR EFFORTS TO MEET THIS THREAT TO THE
SECURITY OF ALL COUNTRIES.

I AM DETERMINED TO DO ALL I CAN TO ACHIEVE A
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON A WORLDWIDE BAN ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS. I KNOW THAT YOU SHARE THIS GOAL HAVING SPOKEN
OF IT PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A BOLD
APPROACH AIMED AT ACCELERATING THE WORK UNDERWAY IN
GENEVA AND BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. TO THAT END I AM
MAKING THE FOLLOWING COMMITMENTS:

-- DESTRUCTION OF MORE THAN 98 PERCENT OF THE U.S.
CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE WITHIN EIGHT YEARS AFTER
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF A CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION,
PROVIDED THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS ONE OF THE
SIGNATORIES.

-- THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THE STOCKPILE OF THE UNITED
STATES WITHIN TEN YEARS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE
CONVENTION, PROVIDED ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES

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PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR

2/25/2014 MA

BECOME SIGNATORIES TO THE CONVENTION BY THE EIGHTH YEAR,
OR TOTAL ELIMINATION WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE TIME WHEN
ALL CHEMICAL WEAPONS-CAPABLE STATES DO BECOME
SIGNATORIES, WHICHEVER IS LATER.

I AM SURE YOU AGREE THAT BOTH OUR COUNTRIES HAVE A
SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO TAKE THE LEAD IN MOVING THE
MULTILATERAL PROCESS FORWARD. ACCORDINGLY, IN ADDITION
TO THE STEPS ABOVE, I AM PROPOSING THAT WHILE THE
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA CONTINUE, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION REDUCE THEIR RESPECTIVE
STOCKPILES TO LESS THAN 20 PERCENT OF THE CURRENT U.S.
LEVEL. AND THAT SUITABLE PROVISIONS BE MADE FOR THE
INSPECTION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION PROCESS.
VERIFICATION OF ANY AGREEMENT, EITHER BILATERAL OR
MULTILATERAL, WILL CONTINUE TO BE A DAUNTING CHALLENGE.
IT WILL REQUIRE OPENNESS AND ACCEPTANCE OF A REGIME THAT
WILL DO JUSTICE TO THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AND
ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF ALL THE SIGNATORIES.

SECRETARY BAKER HAS DISCUSSED MY PROPOSALS IN DETAIL
DURING HIS MEETINGS IN WYOMING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SHEVARDNADZE. I INTEND TO ANNOUNCE THESE STEPS BEFORE
THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

NEGOTIATING A MULTILATERAL, WORLDWIDE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
BAN IS AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE. YET I BELIEVE THAT,
WITH THE COURAGE AND DETERMINATION YOU HAVE SHOWN IN THE
PAST, OUR EFFORTS CAN SUCCEED.

SINCERELY,

END TEXT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE. EAGLEBURGER

BT

#6804

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 6804 <TOR> 890925101027 MSG000244030227

<DIST>
PRT: VANERON
SIT: BENKO PRES MSGS BLACKWILL RICE DORMINEY RODMAN VAX BRANSCUM
<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~ <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 280446Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 345904

NODIS

E.O. 12356:: DECL:OADR

TAGS: UR, US, PARM, PREL

SUBJECT: GORBACHEV LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARA 3 CONTAINS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF AN OCTOBER 18 LETTER TO PRESIDENT BUSH FROM CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV. IT WAS DELIVERED BY CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET'S COUNCIL OF THE UNION YEVGENIY PRIMAKOV DURING AN OCTOBER 26 MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

HIS EXCELLENCY

MR. GEORGE BUSH

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY A SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, MAY I CONVEY TO YOU MY GOOD WISHES AND ALSO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF MY THOUGHTS.

MR. EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE INFORMED ME ABOUT HIS MEETING WITH YOU AND THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS HE HAD WITH SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES BAKER. WE IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ARE QUITE SATISFIED THAT IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO ENTER A NEW PHASE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND ALSO THAT A LARGER MEASURE OF CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND SEVERAL FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN REACHED. IT IS MY HOPE THAT FOLLOWING DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AND VIENNA AS WELL AS FURTHER MINISTERIALS YOU AND I SHALL BE ABLE TO ARRIVE AT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS.

IT WOULD APPEAR THAT OUR NEW ABM-RELATED PROPOSAL OFFERS A CHANCE FOR COMPLETING AGREEMENT ON 50-PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. WE FEEL THAT SOME SOLUTIONS MAY ALSO BE POSSIBLE ON THE ISSUE OF SLCMS AND ALCMS IN SHORT, WE SEEM TO HAVE COME WITHIN REACH OF THE SECOND TREATY IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS BOUND TO BE HIGHLY ACCLAIMED BY THE ENTIRE HUMAN RACE.

SIMILARLY, PROSPECTS NOW LOOK GOOD FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ALSO ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE -- THE TWO AREAS WHERE WE HAVE NOW A BROAD-BASED COINCIDENCE OF APPROACHES. I WISH TO TELL YOU PERSONALLY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE STEPS THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE IN THOSE AREAS, WHICH HAVE PROVED QUITE HELPFUL.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WORK ON THE PROTOCOLS TO

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-2806-MR

12/2/2016 MM

THE 1974 AND 1976 TREATIES STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF BEING COMPLETED BEFORE THE YEAR IS OUT. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT IN THE COURSE OF MY MEETING WITH YOU WE COULD SIGN AND SUBMIT THEM FOR RATIFICATION. THIS WOULD BE VIEWED BY THE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AS A MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT IN OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO ENHANCE UNIVERSAL SECURITY.

WHAT I WISH TO REITERATE MOST FIRMLY IS THAT WE STAND FOR AGREEMENT ON TOTAL CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, ESPECIALLY SINCE VERIFICATION ISSUES NOW APPEAR TO BE MANAGEABLE.

THE STAGE WE HAVE JOINTLY REACHED IN DEALING WITH REGIONAL PROBLEMS IS AN INDICATION OF THE MATURITY AND PRODUCTIVENESS OF THE SOVIET-U.S. DIALOGUE. IN THIS AREA, IN ADDITION TO BROADER UNDERSTANDING, IT HAS PROVED POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP A MEASURE OF COOPERATION ON A COMPROMISE BASIS.

IT IS A GOOD SIGN THAT SOVIET-U.S. TIES BETWEEN GENERAL PUBLIC AND IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE ARE ON THE RISE, AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE INAUGURATION IN MOSCOW A FEW DAYS AGO OF AN IMPRESSIVE EXHIBITION "UNITED STATES-89," WHICH I TOURED LAST WEEK.

I WISH TO THANK YOU FOR THE KIND GREETINGS YOU CONVEYED THROUGH MR. EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE, FOR YOUR WISHES OF SUCCESS TO SOVIET PERESTROYKA. OF COURSE, WE ARE KEENLY FOLLOWING THE REACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE ONGOING TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THERE IS EFFECTIVE RECOGNITION IN WASHINGTON THAT A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF OUR REFORMS WOULD BE COMPATIBLE WITH U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. IF THAT IS THE CASE, OUR TWO COUNTRIES MAY EXPECT BROAD PROSPECTS TO OPEN BEFORE THEM, WHICH IT WILL BE YOUR AND MY TASK TO MAKE A REALITY WITHIN THE NEXT FEW YEARS.

CARRYING THIS MESSAGE TO YOU WILL BE MR. YEVGENI PRIMAKOV, HEAD OF THE VISITING SOVIET PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION, WHICH PLANS TO FAMILIARIZE ITSELF WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, SHARE INFORMATION ON THE CHANGES UNDERWAY IN OUR COUNTRY, AND STRENGTHEN CONTACTS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATORS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. IT IS MY HOPE THAT THE DELEGATION WILL BE ACCORDED A WARM WELCOME IN THE UNITED STATES. WITH PROFOUND RESPECT AND LOOKING FORWARD TO OUR EARLY MEETING.

KREMLIN, MOSCOW

OCTOBER 18, 1989

/SIGNED/MIKHAIL GORBACHEV

END TEXT OF LETTER.

KIMMITT

BT

#5904

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 5904 <TOR> 891028100349 MSG000246881029

<DIST>

PRT: VANERON

SIT: PRES MSGS VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED <OSRI> RUEHC <DTG> 282036Z OCT 89

<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC

<TO>TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 8826
INFO RUEHLN/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD PRIORITY 7361

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: THANK-YOU LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
THE PRESIDENT

<TEXT>BT

UNCLAS STATE 346876

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: THANK-YOU LETTER TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV FROM
THE PRESIDENT

1. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.
2. EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING
THANK-YOU LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT
GORBACHEV AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY. A SIGNED ORIGINAL
WILL FOLLOW. NO RELEASE IS INTENDED, BUT THERE IS NO
OBJECTION IF THE SOVIETS WISH TO DO SO.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE IN THE WAKE OF
THE TRAGIC EARTHQUAKE IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA. THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION NOW HAVE THE SHARED
EXPERIENCE OF GREAT EARTHQUAKES. I KNOW THAT I SPEAK FOR
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN SAYING THAT WE WERE DEEPLY MOVED
BY YOUR MESSAGE AND BY YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE.

THOUGH THE DAMAGE AND LOSS OF LIFE WAS CONSIDERABLE, THE
CLEAN-UP EFFORT IS PROCEEDING WELL. OUR CONCERN NOW IS
TO DO ALL THAT WE CAN TO PREPARE BETTER FOR FUTURE
EARTHQUAKES. AS YOU KNOW, SEISMOLOGISTS ARE MAKING
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES AND
PATTERNS OF MAJOR DISTURBANCES. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF YOUR OFFER OF ASSISTANCE AND ASK YOU TO SEND
A TEAM OF SOVIET SEISMOLOGISTS TO JOIN THE U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY'S EFFORT TO ASSESS THE BAY AREA
EARTHQUAKE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS JOINT EFFORT -- DRAWING
UPON DATA FROM THE ARMENIAN AND BAY AREA EARTHQUAKES --
CAN CONTRIBUTE A GREAT DEAL TO OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE
PHENOMENON.

SINCE WE HAVE RECENTLY SHARED THIS TRAGIC EXPERIENCE, LET
US TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE OUR KNOWLEDGE AND
EXPERTISE IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT FURTHER DISASTERS.
AMBASSADOR MATLOCK WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH THE SOVIET
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF
SUCH A VISIT.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE BUSH

HIS EXCELLENCY

- MIKHAIL GORBACHEV,

- CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

- OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,

- MOSCOW.

21 Sep 89

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989 - June 1990
Box 5-2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIRECTOR, POLICY PLANNING STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1989

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Attached are the one-on-one memcons from the Wyoming Ministerial. The Secretary would appreciate it if you hold them very closely.



Dennis B. Ross

~~SECRET~~/NODIS ATTACHMENT

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PER E.O. 13526
2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: Thursday, September 21, 1989

Time: 6:30pm - 8:30pm

Place: On the Plane to Jackson Hole, Wyoming

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
USSR

Secretary: I am interested in knowing your view and your perspective on what just happened at your plenum. I would really like to get your assessment of what it means and what some of the implications are if that is okay with you.

Shevardnadze: The nationality problems are one of the most sensitive and difficult problems that we face. They need to be understood in their historical setting. Before the October revolution and in the first years after the revolution the people who populated all parts of Russia did not have their own entities. Before the revolution there were no national entities such as the Byelorussia or Azerbaijan. Instead what one saw were provinces sometimes with provincial rights. So one of the slogans or principles that was put forward by Lenin and our party was the principle of self-determination for the people who made up the Russian empire and it was on this principle that we formed the Soviet Union, a union not of provinces but of republics. Initially, the union consisted of the Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Later there was Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and some other republics were formed. In our constitution there was a provision that each republic would be a sovereign state which would delegate some of its rights to the Soviet Union. Such as rights on defense and diplomacy. Under Lenin these were the only two rights that the Union had. Nothing more was delegated to the Union. All those rights remained in the constitution. In practice they were not given. Instead there was great centralization of power. That centralization came not only because of the subjective views of our leaders at the time but because of the difficulty of the conditions in which our country found itself. Centralization was needed if a weak country was to be transformed into a strong one.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2011-0840-MR
2/25/2014 MM

I think it is important to remember that World War I and the Civil War devastated our country. In addition, the economic and political blockade of our country made it that much more important to emphasize centralization. And one also has to realize that people were illiterate and it was important because of that to try to help raise the very low living and cultural standards that existed in most of their republics. As I said to the President we have no intention of negating our entire history. Despite all of our problems, and the problems that existed in our earlier decades, the Soviet Union was able, during a difficult period, to rebuild its national economy, its industrial base, its agricultural base, and its overall cultural standards. But, as I have said, this transformation took place in conditions of great centralization. Though constitutional rights existed that should have enabled the republics to develop independently the reality was that we developed as a unitary state. This served us well during a very difficult period because I can't imagine us going to war without centralization. And maybe there even was some justification after the war to maintain a highly centralized economy. We did after all have to rebuild. But in the 1960s and 70s it's clear that the actual gap between our constitutional rights and the actual practice in the republics was great and was also harmful. It is not surprising that during this period as the intelligentsia grew in each republic that they would want to have rights of greater self-expression. After all, every nation has its writers, its artists and its intellectuals. At that time we misled ourselves into thinking that the nationality problem had been definitively resolved. That was a mistake and it was wrong to think that way. Every nation is a living entity. It grows, it revolves; and it was a mistake to think the nationality problem could be solved once and for all.

We are now developing a new nationality policy but we should have done this 25 years ago. Now we must consider the need for maximum independence of the republics in all areas starting with the economy. We have decided that the republics should have a completely free hand in managing all sectors of their economies with very few exceptions; for example, energy, the railroads, possibly metal and steel and possibly also civil aviation. It is really unreasonable to try to divide these kinds of economic sectors. Also, some branches of the defense sector must belong to the Center. All the rest of the economic sectors should be transferred to the republics with the republics owning and having responsibility for light industry, machine building, construction, education, services, etc. We are now trying to implement the constitutional principle that our republics are sovereign states. We are in the process of searching for a political solution for the relations between

the republics and the Center. If I were to speak from purely a formal standpoint I might tell you that everything seems okay. After all, each republic has its own parliament, can discuss questions relating to the budget of the republic, and other related issues. Also each republic has the attributes of state power. Unfortunately, these attributes are not translated into reality. The truth is all important problems have to be taken to the Center. Now we are going to reverse this process. All these decisions will be sent back to the republics.

Baker: I take it this is what you meant by telling the President that you haven't firmly determined the method for defining completely economic autonomy and political autonomy under your existing system. But that your aim is to grant the republics extensive and real autonomy.

Shevardnadze: Yes. We aim to create greater independence, self-rule and a real autonomy for the republics. It is very important to have a division of functions between the Center and the republics. For example, take the question of property. What belongs to the union, what belongs to the republics. One idea that we have is that there should be some common national or state property.

Baker: Do you mean there should be central government property and property that is owned by the republics?

Shevardnadze: Yes, indeed. We should have federal or union property that can't be managed only by one republic. We should then have republic properties, in effect, creating a situation where there are both union and republic properties or mixed properties. And by the way this should go down to the municipal level as well. I should note that within the republics there will be property that will belong to the cooperatives. And this must really be seen as private property.

Baker: To what extent do you envision that private property will exist within the system.

Shevardnadze: For the time being we would not envision that there would be private property on a large scale. However, the system of cooperatives implies that private property is going to exist. Members of the cooperative become owners of what they produce including the machines or the equipment that is responsible for production.

Baker: When I saw Boris Yeltsin he suggested that the private sector might be equal to about 15 percent of all property. He did not elaborate on that suggestion or observation. I must say that I didn't believe that that was a

particularly productive course to follow. For economic reform to be successful a way must be found to move to an incentive system that enhances competition, markets, etc. I understand that there is incentive built into the cooperative system and I want to talk to you in more detail about some of these economic issues later on. For now I would like to ask you some additional questions on the nationality issues.

I know that it is a sensitive area for you but I have to tell you that we have a problem vis-a-vis the Baltics. You have heard me say we really want the reform effort to succeed and we will do nothing to complicate that process. I have said it publicly that we do not want to see instability in the Soviet Union. But let me also tell you that it has been US policy for over 40 years not to recognize the incorporation of the Baltic republics into the Soviet Union. These Baltic states were independent. Now that policy of 40 years is a difficult one for us to change because after all there remains a very strong public sentiment in our country that identifies with these Baltic states.

We are very conscious of your concern about sovereignty and borders and will do nothing to exacerbate the problem. Nevertheless, as hard as we might try to move our relations forward with you it would be very hard to sustain positive relations if you were to find it necessary to use force in the Baltics. Let me just say to you that a strong reaction by us would be a given. So I am very hopeful that a peaceful way would be found to solve the nationality problem generally and especially in the Baltics. I raise this only so that you will understand the extraordinary pressure on us. I don't raise this to pressure you or to hector you.

Let me add one final point on nationalities. The President and I have both said that your response to the nationality problem to date has been praise-worthy, measured, and responsible. We hope it will continue in that direction. Can I ask one other question on the plenum? How do the political changes that have taken place at the plenum affect the prospects for perestroika?

Shevardnadze: Do you mean the personnel changes?

Baker: Yes.

Shevardnadze: Well, they are not the most important result. The changes are significant but they are not the most important result to emerge from the plenum. The most important result is that we have now produced a platform to propose to all the republics on the nationality question. Now people have

an idea of what we mean by federation. They also have an idea of what we mean by sovereignty within the federation and by the real rights that each republic will have. I can tell you that we had very sharp debates on the issue of language.

Baker: How did you come out on the issue of language?

Shevardnadze: We have made a decision that every republic and its people have a right to have a home language. There will now be an official state language for every republic and that will be the local language. The Russian language will be recognized as the federal language or the language for inter-national communication. In a multinational state like ours, one needs this. It is not unusual to develop in this fashion. India has two national languages. Switzerland has three. So it is not unusual.

Baker: Do you think this satisfies most of the nationality demands?

Shevardnadze: This is a major decision and a very serious decision. The question of language is a central one. In only one republic before was there a constitution that made the local language the official language and that is my native republic of Georgia. In 1978 when the 3rd Soviet constitution proposed removing this provision from the Georgian constitution the population arose and demonstrated and it was decided not to make this change.

As to your concern about the use of violence, let me just say that this is ruled out by us. That would mean an end a perestroika. It would restore what we used to call the dictatorship of the proletariat. We can't reverse our course. We can't go back to the past. In some areas we were compelled to use force but this was only in circumstances where different ethnic groups like the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians were practically engaging in genocide. Here force was required to restore order. In the Baltics, no one intends to use force. As you know, in Georgia force was used and there were tragic consequences. Gorbachev and I were out of the country when that decision was made. That decision was taken by republican authorities. When we came back and saw this we sacked the people responsible. We condemned their decision, and we made it clear that the use of force is inconsistent with our principles. But extremism can produce some unfortunate reactions. Look at a place like Estonia which is a small republic. One-third of the population is Russian speaking. If Estonians insist on something illegal or want to separate from the Soviet Union how will the native Russians react? You know there are separatists in Estonia. They are not the majority but they exist.

Baker: How would a referendum on self-determination in Estonia come out? How, for example, would people vote on whether to stay within the Soviet Union or to choose to leave it?

Shevardnadze: There would probably be differences among ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonians on how to answer this question. But I can tell you that I think complete separation wouldn't be practical from Estonia's interests. After all Estonia's economy is interlaced with the rest of the republics. Let me give you an example. There is a huge factory in Riga that produces radio equipment. That factory has an enormous network of suppliers throughout the rest of the country. In fact this factory is an assembly plant and has 25,000 workers. Separation would mean that the entire system is broken up and it would take a long time to build new economic relations. Similarly Estonia has important long time technical and scientific links to the Soviet establishment. And like many republics Estonia has specialized in certain areas. Estonia is mainly responsible for producing meat, milk, and potatoes. These products are exported to other republics. It must import all its other needs. It imports its grains, its energy, its fuel needs, its raw materials and so forth. One could go ahead and try to build another economic net but it would take them 20 years.

Baker: So you think that because it is impractical the vast majority of those in Estonia and elsewhere in the republic would chose to stay in the Soviet Union?

Shevardnadze: I spent my vacation in the south this year and I visited Georgia. And I talked with many of the Georgian separatists. And at one point I said to them okay let's assume you have your complete freedom and you can do what you want. If you chose to leave the Soviet Union what's going to happen in a week's time? Your metal plants would be stopped because you will need your supplies, your machine building would be stopped because of a lack of supplies and spare parts, your light industry would experience the same stoppage, you will need to get bread from elsewhere, sugar from elsewhere. You eat 40,000 kilograms of butter and 38,000 come from outside, the majority of your oil and natural gas come from outside -- you tell me what is going to happen after separation.

Baker: I understand the impracticality of independence for each republic.

Shevardnadze: You know the Swedes, the Finns and the Danish have very close relations with the Baltic republics. And they have very actively advised against the separatism.

They see it as a complication for them. The current leader of the Estonian Communist Party is a good friend of mine. We worked together in the youth organization and I have stayed in close touch with him over the years. You know he and I have a good and frank relationship and I asked him the same question you asked me. Would the Estonians prefer to leave the Soviet Union or stay. He said that they would not prefer to leave.

Baker: Let me raise two points. First, if it's totally impractical and the majority would choose to stay in any given republic, why not solve the problem by having a referendum? If you grant people the right of self-determination and they can vote on what they want to do, and if the majority vote to stay, then the separatists will no longer have a basis on which to push for separation. Second point: Isn't there a difference between the Baltic republics, which were once independent countries, and the others which were never independent?

Shevardnadze: First, on the question of the referendum, this is a constitutional question. This is a question for the national or union constitution and for each republican constitution. In the current constitutions there are no provisions for referendums. The fact is the union constitution doesn't provide any regulation on how the process of self-determination should take place. The Supreme Soviet has established a commission to develop a new union constitution and there are also commissions set up for the republic constitutions. If these constitutions provide for referendums then there is no reason why the referendum shouldn't take place.

You are raising an important issue and it needs to be addressed. But I would also note that the constitutions must answer the question not only of whether republics have the right to secede, but must also deal with other aspects of self-determination as well. After all, secession is only one aspect of self-determination and our objective is to produce real self-determination for our republics. We still have to determine how best to express the right of self-determination. A referendum is one way to do so. Perhaps in the congress of peoples deputies other ways would be discussed.

As for your point on the Baltic Republics, it is true that they joined the Soviet Union in 1939-40 and this was later than the others. But you might note that the Transcaucas republics were independent for three years after the October revolution. There were separate governments in Baku and in Yerevan. These governments in fact were set up under Kerensky. So, there may not be as much a difference here as you think and, indeed if the Baltics were to leave people, in Transcaucas might say why shouldn't we leave also. Frankly, it is okay for this to be a

part of our open debate. We don't fear to debate. Indeed we have a huge stadium in Moscow and a covered sports arena and people are coming there all the time to demonstrate. And these demonstrations are not banned and they are called by formal and informal groups. Indeed Boris Yeltsin gathers people there twice a week. I am confident that as we debate these issues openly people would come to see the real facts and the consequences of their decisions. I mentioned to the President that as we see politicization of the Soviet Union we are going to have a pluralization of opinion.

Baker: I am glad to hear that the questions being debated in the constitution are such that a discussion on a referendum would be permitted. I really believe that would be the best way to draw the poison out of the nationality problem. Once people have had an opportunity to express themselves through referendum they really wouldn't have a basis on which to complain. Perhaps then much of the agitation and unrest would disappear.

Shevardnadze: For the time being, they are not raising or demanding a referendum. But you are right; this possibility must be considered by the constitutional commission. We couldn't foresee everything in the development of our party platform on nationalities and that is why the Congress and Supreme Soviet established these commissions.

Baker: I would like to offer a comment on Eastern Europe. I hope the way we are approaching events in Eastern Europe is not troublesome to you. We do not desire to stir things up or ferment unrest. We are going to handle relations much the way the President did when he went to Poland and Hungary. We are going to try to assist Poland and Hungary in moving their economies towards more of a free market system. We are going to encourage them to develop private sectors. We would like for our relations with regard to Eastern Europe to be based on the principle of "no surprises." In that connection you told me you were going to Nicaragua. I would like to let you know that there is some chance that I may make a trip to Eastern Europe. Would that cause any problem for you in any way?

Shevardnadze: No. We are happy and pleased to see good relations between you and Poland and Hungary. We would like to see an expansion of this good relations and see them extended to other countries in Eastern Europe. In this connection of expanding ties I suggested to the Iranians that they should develop good relations with you.

Baker: We appreciate what you did in Iran after our meeting in Paris.

Shevardnadze: Let me suggest that on Eastern Europe that an unstable Poland would neither be good for you nor for us. By the same token a rupture of all of Poland's links with the Soviet Union would be suicide. Currently they have a 40 billion ruble debt to us. You surely can't solve their problems by yourself. On the outset we have built relations with Poland, and I might just add confidentially to you that we have given in the last few years 6.5 billion ruble alone, with interest rates of only about 4.8 percent.

Baker: Where do I apply?

Shevardnadze: You could ask the Poles what they pay for their oil and gas from us. Frankly, they don't know what world prices mean. So if you rupture all links, it would be suicide just like it would be suicide for the Baltic states. No one could take Poland under its wing, certainly not Germany. Yes, they could work with Poland, but no one could throw the kind of money at Poland that it really needs. Only we've done that. Only we've wasted our money.

Baker: How much does Hungary owe you?

Shevardnadze: Probably 4.5 billion.

Baker: They do a better job with their economy.

Shevardnadze: Well, they live better. But their per capital debt is actually higher than Poland's by a factor of 1.5. Of course their standards in industry and agriculture are much higher.

Baker: I have understood your views on Eastern Europe and their continued interest in the Warsaw Pact is essential. Do you feel as strongly about as remaining a part of CEMA?

Shevardnadze: I have got a reasonable proposal for you. Let's disband both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Let's release your allies and ours. While NATO exists, the Warsaw Pact also exists. As for CEMA it needs reconstruction. If that organization rebuilt itself into a sufficient organization, it will exist. If it continues working the way it does now it will serve neither our allies nor us. We are working to reform it but will have to see how it does. Could I mention a statement Kohl made at the Congress of his party? If you haven't read it might be worth your reading it.

Baker: I haven't read it but I will. What was its general thrust?

Shevardnadze: Well it is very similar to statements made by German leaders in the 1930s and it created a serious concern for us.

Baker: Did it talk about reunification?

Shevardnadze: Not just that although that is a part of it. No, he spoke in terms of ultimatum and he also said that the Soviet Union is on the verge of crumbling, Eastern Europe is on the verge of crumbling; CEMA is on the verge of crumbling; and the task in the West, Kohl said, was to see what it should be doing under such circumstances.

Baker: You know we always speak about self-determination because it goes to the essence of our philosophy. But we don't want to see instability anywhere in Eastern Europe and certainly not in the GDR. Rather, what we would like to see in Eastern Europe is a Europe that is whole and free, where the divisions have been ended, and all of this is accomplished in a peaceful fashion. I think that is the view of the federal republic as well.

Shevardnadze: We also want to see a common European house. But, it's important to respect existing realities.

Baker: As perestroika advances and gets applied to the GDR perhaps one won't see so many people wanting to leave the GDR. As you know, perestroika has been lagging in the GDR.

Shevardnadze: That's true but it is up to every country to decide how it wants to live.

Baker: When you have thousands of people seeking to leave, however, they obviously are saying something about the system and how it is working.

Shevardnadze: Well that is not always true. We in the Soviet Union are going through a period when we are allowing much greater freedom and yet we are having almost a 100,000 people a year leaving. You know from the standpoint of the freedom of expression we have never had people so good and yet people want to leave. As for the GDR, one has to admit that they have a high standard of living. They have a well-developed social infrastructure. Their housing problem is largely solved. They have day care centers. They produce lots of athletic champions.

Baker: So, how do you explain all of those people leaving?

Shevardnadze: Well it could be a division of families, relatives, that could be playing a part. But, let me say, it is not up to us to solve this problem, it is up to them. If I were in their shoes I'd let everybody who wants to go leave. Of course, it is true that if as many one million people leave that would be a serious problem for Eastern Europe, but I would let them go.

Baker: I've talked before about the importance of your having a new pricing system and making the ruble convertible. After studying the situation more carefully, I am convinced that before you can move on price reform or convertibility, action must be taken to soak up the ruble overhang. When we have our discussion on economic issues I am prepared to go into more detail on how to do that. In so doing, I don't mean to imply that we have all the answers. In fact, the value of my suggestions may be worth the price that you have to pay for them, but we have some new ideas that might be helpful to you I am prepared to go through those with you if it is of interest to you.

Shevardnadze: Moving on price reform is very difficult for us.

Baker: I know that but price reform and convertibility are necessary for opening the door for making the Soviet Union an attractive place for outside investment. When I was at Treasury I use to say that our great economic trump card is that we were open to foreign investment. Some fear foreign investment but it means jobs, technology and output. It also means you are using others' capital to create a better economy. We have some ideas on how you might take a number of steps that will make it possible for you to soak up the ruble overhang as a necessary precursor to doing anything on prices. Secondly, I think that if you are going to make headway on prices and convertibility, you have got to institutionalize a system of competitiveness and incentives. Thirdly you are going to need to create a social safety net that helps cushion the political effects of going to a new pricing system.

Shevardnadze: Well, let's have this discussion. There is a question of what's going on with the US economy also. Currently, US companies are investing less in the US than they are investing elsewhere.

Baker: That is not exactly right. There is not as much investment in the US as we would like to see but our investment is increasing each year. Foreign investment is increasing even faster. One major reason for that is that we have lowered the value of the dollar against other major convertible currencies

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

- 12 -

in the world. We did that to make ourselves more competitive from a trading standpoint that has reduced our trade deficit. In effect, what we have done is make property and businesses in the US cheaper for those with yen or sterling or marks, etc., to buy. What we have really done is create a good investment opportunity for people from the outside.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Memcon	Re: The Secretary and Eduard Shevardnadze (15 pp.)	9/22/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [2]

Date Closed: 9/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91167-005
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Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

12/8/89
3/1/90

Kohl Call MEMBERS/ 14/CONS (YAN-DEC) 1707
Box 5-1 10-23-89

Hungarian party & news
going to Hungary in Dec

Even it is possible

Going to Poland & USSR for 4 days

- Support new govt financially as much as possible
- EC will help in human resources
- Currency reform
- New banking system
- I will do what I can
- Full west & east partners could do more
- Wants to enter new phase w/ Poles

CDR - Sit is dramatic. Progress is
impossible.

- Will Krenz have strength for reform? & courage
- Gorb told me he encouraged him
- Things will turn intense if no reform
- 150,000 people will have fled by Xmas
- Age below 30.
- I don't want to beat things up, but things will be tip if no reform
- In all Western capitals they saying
a German focusing on Ostpolitik & less
interested since West EC, etc.
That is obvious.

Will go to Paris in Jan.

- will publicly discuss subject
- I also fighting left wing in Germany
- w/o strong NATO & support of EC there would not be a European central bank in C/P
- as soon as you can & when you send us to Europe, I hope you will see improvement of chances for AC & reform have been possible only because we have hung together

- We will talk to H. Frost about all these -

* Get Polish memo to P

* Polish talks in Core

- Frankfurt

* Meet w/ Witter and

Meat Hammerize what we doing for Pol.
w/ Teltchick.

**

will call 6-7 Nov

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989 - June 1990

Box 5-2

White House News Summary

Tuesday, November 7, 1989 -- 4

SUMMIT/RAISA (Moscow/Reuter) -- Raisa Gorbachev, watching the Revolution Day parade on Moscow's Red Square Tuesday, said she will go to the Mediterranean for the superpower summit next month if her husband allows.... Asked whether she would accompany [her husband] to his December 2-3 meeting with President Bush..., she replied: "If my husband takes me." She indicated, however, that she did plan to make an official visit to Italy with Gorbachev on November 29-December 1.

IRANIAN ASSETS/STATE DEPT. (UPI) -- The U.S. has agreed to give Iran a portion of that country's assets frozen since the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was overrun by an Iranian mob in 1979, a White House official said Tuesday. The official said an agreement was reached last Friday in The Hague, Netherlands, but he could not say how much was involved.... State Department spokesman Deva Denny said Tuesday the U.S. is "making no deals with anyone about hostages."

ISRAELI ATTACKS/HEZBOLLAH (Jerusalem/AP) -- Israeli air force jets bombed a base of the Shiite Moslem guerrilla group Hezbollah in southeastern Lebanon this morning, the military command announced. "All targets were hit and our planes returned safely to base," the army communique said, saying the targets struck were in Mazraat Ayn Busiwar, 14 miles north of the Israeli border.... An army spokesman, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said several targets were struck in the base.... No reason for the raid was given.

MARCOS PROTESTS (Manila/UPI) -- About 150 supporters of the late Ferdinand Marcos burned a U.S. flag Tuesday during a rally at the American Embassy and demanded the return of the former president's corpse to his homeland. "To the ugly Americans: you kidnapped Marcos alive, bring him back now that he's dead or all Filipinos will curse all Americans," said a placard at the three-hour protest.... The protesters trampled a U.S. flag before setting it ablaze.

Brent - Did
we get our
Raisa - gram
out? GB
537

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989 - June 1990
Box 5-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

November 7, 1989

Dear Raisa:

I have asked General Scowcroft to pass along to you a suggestion that I am very enthusiastic about.

George has decided, and I concur, that the character, location, and the site of the upcoming meeting on board ship makes it inappropriate for me to accompany him to Malta. However, knowing that you will be in Italy with your husband, I wanted to suggest to you that I meet you in Italy.


I have never been to Florence and it occurred to me we could meet in that beautiful city. If Florence doesn't appeal, I would love to meet you in Rome. In either place, we could have good discussions, renew our friendship, and perhaps jointly, in some way, show the concerns that we both feel for some of the world's problems. Your interests in the fine arts and the preservation of historic monuments and mine in expanding literacy could both be accommodated in either location.

THE WHITE HOUSE

2

If for some reason none of this can be worked out, let me assure you I am really looking forward to seeing you in Washington at the "Summit" next year. I have enjoyed our previous meetings.

Most sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Barbara Bush". The signature is written in dark ink and has a fluid, personal style.

Barbara Bush

Mrs. Raisa Maksimovna Gorbachev
The Kremlin
Moscow

11-1 2-81

Dear Mrs. Bush,

I sincerely appreciate your kind letter transmitted through General Scowcroft and the good feelings expressed in it.

It is with great pleasure that I recall our previous meetings. I really very much wanted to meet with you once again, and to talk about the problems that are of interest to both of us, and I feel those may be quite a few. Therefore, it seemed to me that a joint visit to Malta would give us a good opportunity to do so.

As such, our joint trip to Florence would have been a wonderful idea. At one time, I already had an opportunity to see this magnificent city of the world with its enchanting and wondrous richness of artistic treasures. Unfortunately, however, to go to Florence or some other city in Italy after Mikhail Sergeyevich and I would have already completed our visit to that country would not, I feel, look logical. I think you will agree.

Mrs. Barbara BUSH
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Bush, I shall have full understanding, if you will not be able to accompany the President on his trip to Malta. I do believe that you and I shall not fail to avail ourselves of a future opportunity, whenever it presents itself, to renew our direct contacts and conversations

In the meantime, I wish you all the very best. I am confident that you and I share the hope for the success of the forthcoming Soviet-US meeting in Malta.

Sincerely,

Raisa GORBACHEVA

Moscow

November 13, 1989

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1989

Message delivered by
Soviet Amb Yuriy Dubinin
in meeting with General Scowcroft
on Friday, November 10, 1989.

Per Gen Scowcroft's request,
copy faxed to Bob Gates and
copy given to Blackwill/Rice.

Wilma

*Classified
Accur / Sensitive*

*Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989- June 1990
Box 5-2*

In view of the rather extreme situation obtaining at this point in connection with the events in the GDR, its capital and West Berlin, and noting a cardinal and, in my view, a correct and promising nature of the decisions being taken by the new GDR leadership, I have just sent a verbal message to Chancellor Kohl of the FRG about whose contents I deem it necessary to inform you as well.

According to the reports that are reaching us, a rally is going to take place today in West Berlin with the participation of officials from the FRG and West Berlin. Concurrently, another rally is scheduled to be held in the GDR capital. Given the present virtual openness and mass flows of people in both directions, there is a possibility that a chaotic situation may emerge with unforeseeable consequences.

I have urged Chancellor Kohl to take the necessary and most urgent measures to prevent a complication and a destabilization of the situation.

Our Ambassador in Berlin has been instructed to immediately contact representatives of the three powers' administration in West Berlin. I hope that you, for your part, will also issue appropriate instructions to your representative so that developments do not take an undesirable turn.

On the whole, I believe it useful to emphasize the depth and seriousness of the changes presently taking place in the GDR. But when statements are made in the FRG designed to stir up emotions, in the spirit of implacable rejection of the post-war realities, that is, the existence of two German states, then such manifestations of political extremism can only be seen as aimed at undermining the current dynamic processes of democratization and renewal of all aspects of the society's life. And, looking ahead, this can bring about a destabilization of the situation not only in Central Europe, but on a larger scale.

I wish to express the hope for the understanding of all this on your part.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

of each country - Justice,
Chavez, etc.

11/13/89

- HAR - German reunification
unavoidable
- No basis for GDR
 - Danger is we get
maneuvered some
become a advocate
of an East German state
 - GDR may plan to go back
to re-educate Germany re-
unified.
 - They could keep FF
on their side thru
fear of Germany +
Germany by threatening
new exports
 - They must know GDR is
no longer viable
 - They have options

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- Get c 2 Germans out of NATO & W.P.
- Disband both alliances
- New modernization is needed
- Current rules will be reduced.
- Don't go to Malta w/o visible high level consultations.
- Put forward some idea of how we see Euro evolution.
- Americans can't be - for Germans - a obstacle to reunification.

Gorbachev (Dobrynin) 1989 - June 1990

11/15/89
1820

Best -- For your
clearance.

BS Blackall

INITIAL HERE

APV	RS	DRAFT	AV
CLR	1 JF	2 CLK	
	3 PS	4 MB	
	5 JH	6 NSC	
	7 SS	8	

~~SECRET~~

EUR/SOVIAMERSHBOU
11/15/89 76729 SESOVFO 246
EUR:RGHSEITZ

EUR:JFBOBBINS
EUR/CE:PSHOSTAL/AGOODMAN
EUR/EEY:JHOOPE
S/S:

EUR:CMKANNAN
S/P:WBURNS
NSC:
S/S-01

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, BONN IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE LONDON, PARIS IMMEDIATE, USBERLIN PRIORITY,
ENBERLIN PRIORITY, USNATO PRIORITY
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PDIP, UR, US, GE, GC

SUBJECT: REPLY TO GORBACHEV MESSAGE ON BERLIN

REF: A) STATE 363047, B) STATE 364359, C) BONN 36036

1. X - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOR MOSCOW: AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK APPOINTMENT WITH GORBACHEV OR SHEVARDNADZE TO DELIVER PARA 4 TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S REPLY TO THE SOVIET LEADER'S NOVEMBER 30 MESSAGE ON BERLIN (REF A). THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. FOR BONN: EMBASSY MAY INFORM BONN GROUP COLLEAGUES THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS REPLIED TO GORBACHEV ALONG THE LINES OF THE CONSENSUS REPORTED IN REF C, BUT SHOULD NOT DISTRIBUTE THE TEXT. EMBASSY SHOULD INDICATE THAT HE BELIEVE THIS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION WAS EXTREMELY USEFUL, AND THAT HE HOPE ALL ALLIES WILL CONTINUE TO COORDINATE CLOSELY ON THIS SENSITIVE SUBJECT. YOU SHOULD INQUIRE OF

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1031-MR

SL5 5/20/13

~~SECRET~~

Brent -- for your
clearance.

BS Blackwell

~~SECRET~~

2

THE FRENCH REP WHETHER HE HAS RECEIVED ANY FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING PARIS'S RESPONSE TO THE GORBACHEV MESSAGE TO MITTERRAND.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I HAVE READ WITH INTEREST YOUR MESSAGE ON THE DRAMATIC EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BERLIN AND THE GDR THAT WAS CONVEYED TO ME ON NOVEMBER 10. I WELCOME YOUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE DECISIONS BEING TAKEN BY THE NEW LEADERSHIP OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC ARE CORRECT AND PROMISING. THE LIFTING OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS FOR THE POPULATION OF THE GDR REPRESENTS A HISTORIC STEP. I BELIEVE IT WILL MAKE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE GOAL OF CREATING A EUROPE THAT IS WHOLE AND FREE. THIS IS A SUBJECT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING WITH YOU AT OUR MEETING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN NEXT MONTH.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT, DESPITE THE UNDERSTANDABLY HIGH EMOTIONS OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE, THE EVENTS IN RECENT DAYS IN BERLIN HAVE BEEN PEACEFUL. WE SHARE YOUR GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT PUBLIC SAFETY AND ORDER ARE MAINTAINED, CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FOUR POWERS FOR BERLIN. IN FACT, THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES HAVE COOPERATED CLOSELY WITH OUR GERMAN PARTNERS TO HELP ENSURE THAT THIS REMAINS THE CASE. I SUGGEST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVES MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACTS IN THE COMING WEEKS IN THE INTERESTS OF AVOIDING SURPRISES OR THE EMERGENCE OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

IN YOUR LETTER, YOU VOICED CONCERN THAT THE LEADERS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO USE THE TRANSFORMATIONS UNDERWAY TO STIR UP EMOTIONS. AS I SEE IT, THE FRG LEADERSHIP HAS ACTED WITH THE UTMOST RESPONSIBILITY, EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF A DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO CHANGE IN THE GDR AND THE NEED TO AVOID DESTABILIZING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

AS FOR THE APPROACH OF MY OWN GOVERNMENT, LET ME SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE DEPTH AND THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE GDR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO LIFT CONTROLS ON THE TRAVEL OF ITS CITIZENS, AND WE WELCOME ITS EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM -- A COURSE WHICH REFLECTS THE WILL OF THE POPULATION OF THE GDR. I HOPE THAT WE WILL SOON SEE LEGISLATION ENACTED THAT CODIFIES THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, AND THAT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

THE NEW GDR LEADERSHIP WILL WORK WITH OTHER POLITICAL FORCES IN THE COUNTRY TO DEVELOP A PLAN FOR THE HOLDING OF FREE ELECTIONS AT AN EARLY DATE. THESE STEPS WILL NOT ONLY CONTRIBUTE TO THE LONG-TERM STABILITY OF THE SITUATION, BUT THEY COULD LEAD AS WELL TO SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS IN THE GDR'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST.

LET ME ADD THAT I BELIEVE YOUR OWN COMMITMENT TO REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION HAS PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN ENCOURAGING YOUR ALLIES TO EMBARK ON A SIMILAR PATH OF DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING. I AM ENCOURAGED TO SEE THAT THE CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED ITS OWN PLANS TO MODIFY RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL ABROAD, AND THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN BULGARIA HAS TAKEN THE FIRST STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITHIN THAT COUNTRY. I HOPE THAT PRAGUE AND SOFIA WILL BE THE NEXT WARSAW PACT CAPITALS TO FEEL THE INVIGORATING BREEZE OF PERESTROYKA.

THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OF OUR ALLIES ARE UNITED IN THE VIEW THAT PERESTROYKA IS NOT ONLY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND THE OTHER SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, BUT THAT ITS SUCCESS WILL OPEN THE WAY TO BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN WEST AND EAST. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SEEKING UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FROM THE CURRENT PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE GDR AND IN OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES, NOR IS IT OUR WISH TO DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION. WE CONTINUE TO STAND BY ALL OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, IN PARTICULAR TO THE PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL CHANGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION. FROM YOUR OWN STATEMENTS, I TRUST THAT YOU DO THE SAME.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

YY

~~SECRET~~

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1984 - June 1990
Box 5-2

Rec'd from
Baker
11/20

Dear Mr. President,

I think that our agreement to meet in early December was a timely decision. It is viewed that way throughout the world.

We have much to talk about and to discuss, and I am looking forward to a free-flowing and informal conversation, to a meeting without too much protocol.

Our meeting, Mr. President, will be taking place at a time of a new beginning, a clear turning point in the course of world events. A time for us, I think, to take a broad, conceptual view of the role of our two countries in that process and to assess the responsibility which you and I, personally, will have to shoulder.

In this context and, of course, with due regard for the national interests of each of our two countries we shall have to discuss the fundamental aspects of the further development of Soviet-American relations.

What is notable about the current situation is, in my view, the fact, that you and I already can predict the course of the relationship with a great deal of certainty. Surely we can think together about the practical meaning of the new closeness which you, Mr. President, have proclaimed. We can try to formulate an overall concept of Soviet-American relations, which it will be our task to implement in the coming years, at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

Without going into the specific issues of the Soviet-American agenda let me just say that they will probably have to be discussed in one degree or another, most likely with a view to giving an additional impetus at our level to the negotiating process, particularly in Geneva and Vienna.

In the current crucial period some particularly sensitive problems have arisen in the world, which require that big powers such as the Soviet Union and the United States give them special attention and show extraordinary caution and responsibility in assessing and approaching them. We shall probably discuss them too, for it is important not to leave anything unsaid or unclear in that regard.

We will be able, as we agreed, to talk about anything without being constrained by some fixed agenda, with maximum openness and trust and with the hope that our meeting will consolidate the movement "from mutual understanding to mutual action" in the process of Soviet-American dialogue.

See you soon.

Sincerely,

Mikhail Gorbachev

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

CLOSE HOLD
NO COPIES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Nov. 22, 1989

Dear Mr. President,

After talking with Anatoli Dobrynin yesterday it occurred to me that even though we have a "no agenda" meeting you might be interested in some of the topics I would like to cover. What I set out below is not meant in any way to limit our discussions; but here is my list - a non-inclusive list.

- A. Eastern Europe
- B. Regional Differences
Central America, Angola,
Afghanistan, Asia
(Cambodia) + Middle East
- C. The Defense spending
of both our countries -
What effect will
changing times have
on levels of defense spending?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 2 -

D. Your vision and mine
of the World 10 years
from now.

What are the differences when
You say "Common European Home"
& I say "Europe Whole & Free"?

E. Human Rights

F. Arms Control - philosophy
and objectives - treating
this in a broad, general
sense

Of course, you will have your
own priorities. I would like to
hear from you your expectations
for 'perestroika' - where does it
lead down the road?

I want this meeting to be useful
in advancing our mutual under-
standing and in laying the
ground-work for a good
relationship.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 3 -

Success does not mean deals signed, in my view. It means that you and I are frank enough with each other so that our two great countries will not have tensions that arise because we don't know each other's innermost thinking.

I will be working next week to flesh out our side's thinking but there will be no 'December Surprise'.

If however there is some proposal not covered by the list above, I will be prepared to make it.

I am writing this on the eve of our Thanksgiving Day - a day in which all Americans thank God for

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

- 4 -

our blessings

I will give thanks
for the fact that we
are living in times of enormous
promise. I will give thanks
that our 5 kids and
our 11 grandchildren
might just have a real
chance to grow up in a
more peaceful, less scary
world.

I will give thanks
that you are pressing
forward with glasnost
and perestroika; for, you
see, the fate of my
our family and yours
is dependent on perestroika's
success

I look forward to
seeing you - with Respect
Cyril

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Handwritten Notes	Re: Arms Control Brief for President (3 pp.)	11/24/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [2]

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FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
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AR Case #:	MR Case #:
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information