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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	President Bush to President Mikhail Gorbachev (1 pp.)	1/13/89	(b)(1)	
02a. Meeting Notes	Henry Kissinger Re: Meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin (2 pp.)	1/16/89	(b)(1)	
02b. Memcon	Re: Henry A. Kissinger and Alexander Yakovlev (8 pp.)	1/16/89	(b)(1)	
02c. Meeting Notes	Henry Kissinger Re: Meeting with Gorbachev (3 pp.)	1/17/89	(b)(1)	
02d. Meeting Notes	Henry Kissinger Re: Dinner with Dobrynin (2 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
03. Letter	Mikhail Gorbachev to Vice President George Bush (1 pp.)	1/18/89	(b)(1)	
04. Memo	Memorandum for the Record Re: President's National Security Briefing (3 pp.)	2/1/89	(b)(1)	TS
05. Memo	Memorandum for the Record Re: President's National Security Briefing (1 pp.)	3/10/89	(b)(1)	TS
06a. Note	President Bush to Jim Baker Re: Hand Carried by Bob Gates (1 pp.)	5/7/89	(b)(1)	

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Pinksheet Number: cap1372
OA/ID Number: 91167-004
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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06b. Handwritten Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/7/89	(b)(1)	
07. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Robert Gates Re: [No Subject] (1 pp.)	5/10/89	(b)(1)	S
08. Handwritten Notes	Re: Mitterrand/NATO Summit (2 pp.)	5/15/89	(b)(1)	
09a. Handwritten Notes	Re: 22 May [Gang of 8] (3 pp.)	5/22	(b)(1)	
09b. Handwritten Notes	Re: 22 May Meeting of Defense (2 pp.)	5/22	(b)(1)	
10a. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	
10b. Cable	Re: Delivery of Message from the President to Chairman Gorbachev (2 pp.)	5/24/89	(b)(1)	S
11. Handwritten Notes	Re: START - 13 June (4 pp.)	6/13	(b)(1)	
12. Handwritten Notes	Re: Presidential Phone Calls with Helmut Kohl (6 pp.)	6/15/89	(b)(1)	
13a. Handwritten Notes	Re: We will also be moving... (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13b. Talking Points	Re: Talking Points Eastern Europe (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
14. Handwritten Notes	Re: Eastern Europe (4 pp.)	5/29/89	(b)(1)	
15a. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (4 pp.)	6/20/89	(b)(1)	
15b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: President's Letter to Gorbachev (2 pp.)	6/19/89	(b)(1)	S
15c. Memo	Condoleezza Rice to Brent Scowcroft Re: Letter to Gorbachev on the Eve of the Resumption the START Talks (2 pp.)	6/16/89	(b)(1)	S
16. Handwritten Notes	Re: Democratic Congress (4 pp.)	6/26/89	(b)(1)	
17. Letter	President Bush to Chairman Gorbachev (3 pp.)	7/21/89	(b)(1)	
18a. Note	Bob Blackwill to Bob Gates (1 pp.)	8/1/89	(b)(1)	
18b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (18 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	S
19. Letter	Chairman Gorbachev to President Bush Re: [Unofficial Translation] (4 pp.)	8/6/89	(b)(1)	

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
20. Draft Memcon	Re: President's Meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh (4 pp.)	8/11/89	(b)(1)	S
21. Handwritten Memcon	Re: President/Bessmertnykh (+ Eagleburger) (3 pp.)	8/13/89	(b)(1)	
22. Report	Re: The Soviet leadership has (3 pp.)	8/25/89	(b)(1)	

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Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2



THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1989

President Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of
the USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow

Dear President Gorbachev:

I am taking advantage of Henry Kissinger's travel to Moscow to send you this personal note.

At the outset I want to tell you of my deep appreciation for the attention given my son and grandson during their recent mission to Armenia. Seeing that terrible tragedy firsthand was a deeply moving experience for them both; they came away with a great respect for the strength and dedication of the people who are now seeking to rebuild from the disaster.

May I also underscore the comments I made to you at the time of your visit to the United Nations last year. As I explained at that time, my new national security team and I will need time to reflect on the range of issues -- particularly those relating to arms control -- central to our bilateral relationship, and to formulate our own thoughts on how best to move that relationship forward. Our purpose is to assure a sound and coherent American approach; it is in no way an attempt to delay or reverse the positive progress that has marked the past year or two.

I am very serious about moving our relationship forward for the benefit of both our countries and world peace. I believe it is important to lift our dialogue -- especially between the two of us -- beyond the details of arms control proposals to the issues of the larger political relationship we should want to create.

I am determined to do everything I can to construct and solidify a sound and solid relationship. I am looking forward to maintaining personal contact with you as we deal with the common tasks we have before us.

Sincerely,

George Bush

Gorbachev (Dobrynin) 1704- June 1990
Henry Kissinger Box 5-2

Meeting with Anatoly Dobrynin - January 16, 1989
9:30 - 11:30 hrs.

A

Dobrynin received me in an office in the Kremlin in the suite of the President of the USSR. He welcomed me extremely warmly. He had been extremely pleased by Scowcroft's phone call. Gorbachev would receive me but it would help if Bush's letter could be studied ahead of time. I gave Dobrynin a copy and said I would turn the original over myself.

Dobrynin asked what Washington understood by a political dialogue. I said that the best I could do was to give him substantially the same analysis I had made to the President-elect about conditions in Central Europe. One possible topic would be to explore whether political control and security guarantees could be separated. Dobrynin asked whether we were willing to reduce American troops in Europe. Cautioning him that the Bush administration had not yet formulated precise policies, I expressed the personal opinion that as part of a general political agreement some reductions could be envisaged. The zero option was however totally out of the question.

Dobrynin asked about arms control talks. I pointed out that the new Administration needed time to review its position especially with respect to weapons such as mobiles. It was also interested in conventional arms control.

Dobrynin then turned to Afghanistan. I said that in my personal view we could agree to no solutions that kept the Najibullah government in place in the cities. This is why a cease fire as proposed by Gorbachev at the UN had been rejected. However, the US had no interest in using Afghanistan as a base for hostile acts against the USSR. But in any real political discussion the Soviet Union had to accept the same restraint with respect to Nicaragua. Dobrynin replied that Gorbachev had offered to stop sending arms to Nicaragua if the US ceased supplying arms to Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras. I said this was an absurd suggestion, as it implied that the Soviet Union had equal political and security interests in Central America.

There was a general discussion of other issues: Ethiopia, economic relations, Europe.

Dobrynin then returned to the problem of a channel. He said Gorbachev was eager to establish a system of truly confidential communication with the President. He thought it important to have an opportunity to "open his heart" and hoped Bush would do the same. The foreign policy of the two countries could then

January 16

-2-

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be coordinated or at least harmonized. He analyzed various ideas. He did not think it could work via the ambassadors because it would be difficult to keep the required secrecy. On the Soviet side he would be the contact. He would get back to me after I had spoken to Gorbachev.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Henry A. Kissinger
Alexander Yakovlev
January 16, 1989, 4:00-6:45.

Initial conversation was about Yakovlev's alleged anti-Americanism, which he supposedly acquired while a student at Columbia. Yakovlev denied this, saying that he had learned much at Columbia, especially from the students, who had befriended him, and defended him on occasion, against Ukrainian nationalists. He did, however, believe that the average American had stereotypes about the Soviet Union; as an example, he related his experience on a visit to a farm in Iowa. The wife of the farmer was surprised at Yakovlev's fondness for children, because she thought that the Soviets had communal wives and communal children.

By way of introduction, Kissinger recalled that Yakovlev had said to him at a social gathering that if they had been in office at the same time they could have had some interesting conversations. Kissinger noted that he had recently met with the President-elect and his key advisors to discuss Kissinger's trip to the Soviet Union. He said he had two general subjects he wished to raise: foreign policy and perestroika.

He believed that the Administration wanted to make a major effort with the Soviet Union so that they could both look back in four years and say that they had made a significant difference, not just in adjusting numbers of weapons but politically as well. In this connection, he had discussed some ideas with the President-elect which he would repeat here. But Kissinger did not claim that the President-elect necessarily agrees with every last point.

The first question was how to start to give substance to symbolism of the recent improvement of relations. The new Administration will start immediately to study the situation and will be interested to find a way to start a dialogue that will lead to a broad understanding.

Yakovlev responded that personally he thought it would be important to strengthen elements of continuity of policy, even in words; during their luncheon with Gorbachev both Reagan and Bush had said they wanted to maintain good relations, and Gorbachev had replied that it was important to say just that to the world.

Kissinger said that this will certainly happen.

Yakovlev continued: the second point was that Bush had mentioned the ecology and chemical weapons as issues to address

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early; now there had been the Paris meeting on chemical weapons, but there could be something more if the Administration had ideas on the ecology. Senator Gore, before the election, had proposed a conference on ecology.

Kissinger said that as the new Administration reviewed policy there were two issues: first there were the strategic issues and arms control. As the Administration had yet to define its defense budget it could not finally decide on issues in START negotiations; for example, what to do about mobile missiles. Until that was decided, it was difficult to decide how to handle the Soviet SS-24 and SS-25 in the negotiations. The Soviet Union should not exercise pressure to speed up the process.

The second issue to be reviewed was the relationship between nuclear and conventional weapons and arms control. In part this was because in the past conventional arms control had not been stressed enough and had not been studied for concrete ideas. For example, equality of numbers of forces did not necessarily guarantee security; victories had been won with inferior numbers in the past. Moreover, there were other aspects of special importance: the difference between the US and the USSR in the distances that they each withdrew their forces and how quickly they could be returned; how quickly disbanded forces could be remobilized.

Thus this involved the future of Europe. If military dispositions change on both sides, it means that a fluid situation will develop. This could be dangerous if it occurred without discussion of political evolution.

In short, the most important issue was that the two sides had not had a serious discussion of the political relationship. The Soviet Union was settling Afghanistan, but the issue would not disappear; the situation will continue even after Soviet withdrawal. The Soviets had been helpful in settling Angola, but that issue, too, would continue to have a life of its own. And, of course, we were deeply concerned about Nicaragua.

Then there were the other issues, such as ecology, that Yakovlev had mentioned. Kissinger believed that rapid progress was possible on this, but on the other questions did Yakovlev have any ideas how to give them content?

Yakovlev replied that he understood that the new Administration would want to take some time to study issues including the strategic talks, and would want to look around. The Soviet Union would be patient. But still the two sides had to find

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ways to point out that the relationship was continuing, so as not to scare world opinion, lest people believe there is a danger that process will stop. To be clear, we agree that we have to go deeper into strategic and, above all, political issues.

But the fourth issue is the economic relationship. The Soviet Union does not need that much technology and frankly the Soviet Union does not have the money to buy it. But he thinks that the question is also a psychological one; the two sides have some distance to go, because of the obstacles that we put in the way in the past.

The old style was to exchange insults; i.e., Jackson-Vanik amendment; it did not have an economic impact on the USSR but did have a psychological impact.

The Soviet leaders now get letters saying that they are engaging in revisionism; people complain that they (the leaders) are going against the principles of socialism. Critics say that we, the Soviet side, stopped anti-American statements, but the Americans have not stopped their anti-Soviet campaign. We are criticised at party meetings, also, that we are "selling out" to the Americans. He, Yakovlev, had been attacked personally as a "Mason" whose name was Epstein (sic). Kissinger must understand this is because he had been accused of ridiculous things in his country.

But the period we have is a serious one. The reason is that new questions are arising and people ask what are we waiting for? The outside world is asking the same. So we must continue to build mutual relations but to consider the effect of politics within our own communities and of political issues between our countries.

Kissinger agreed that the problem was psychological as well as political. For example, he had been critical of the Reagan Administration on occasion because he found it difficult to believe that the personal friendship between a man of Reagan's background and a man of Gorbachev's background as a life-long member of the communist party could become the principal basis for settling our differences. The only reliable basis was national interest; and it would be precarious if put purely on a personal basis. Kissinger said that he did not believe that the Soviets had specific plans for world domination, though one could interpret some policies in that way. It could be argued that Gorbachev had two objectives: first, to take away from the US and the West the image of a common enemy, on the calculation that the alliances would fall apart, and, second, to delegitimize nuclear weapons beginning with the INF treaty. This is creating a new situation in Germany, in that the Germans feel

betrayed; then a nationalism will develop -- in both the East and West side of Germany. (Yakovlev nodded vigorously at this remark.) While the Soviets cannot be blamed for accepting the zero option, to put it on top of the political situation and then to start stressing conventional arms control -- where will it all lead? That is the question: for example, what does it mean when you say you will adopt "defensive" positions after some divisions are withdrawn? Where will the divisions go? We would like clarity on your unilateral acts. Meanwhile, in Germany there is a new trend toward nationalism; for us this will be embarrassing for 5 years, but for the Soviet Union it will be a problem for 50 years. Germany's unfulfilled goals are in the East, not in the West.

All of this could also create a situation in Eastern Europe that would become explosive; thus, the Soviets may see some trend or face some challenge and have to demonstrate that they are still powerful in Eastern Europe. At that point American opinion would react and conclude that the Soviets had always been devils.

Therefore we should begin a political discussion of the evolution in Europe (and elsewhere). We cannot stop history, but we can prevent events from blowing up. An evolution must be possible but it should be understood. We are not interested in securing our position on your back, not interested in creating new problems. But we will defend our vital interests in Afghanistan, for example; we are not seeking a permanent position or to make it a permanent challenge. You have legitimate security interests on your borders; the reverse is true in Central America. That could be the basis for a discussion: i.e., who can do what to whom; it could lead to some formal agreements, or understanding, but some issues cannot be formal.

If this discussion can occur, then when you have arms control it has a political context.

In sum, this is the kind of thinking that exists in the new group in Washington.

In addition, if both of us look around the world we can see new power centers emerging; neither of us can win anything permanent from the other. But we can exhaust ourselves against each other, and only the new centers would benefit. But if we can approach issues together, then when heads of government meet they can have a strategic review, while documents prepared at lower levels can be consummated.

We do not want a situation in which Europe blows up, but neither did the Great Powers before World War I; each contributed to that crisis, because no one knew what the limits

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were.

Yakovlev: we are ready for detailed discussions; while our interests may not be the same, we can approach common problems "normally"; and above all we must not let different interests drive us to a military confrontation. As for the geopolitical process, this has started. The Soviets are leaving Afghanistan; we have talked hours and hours with the Cubans in this very room about Angola. And we are having discussions with the Ethiopians. You, the US, could use your influence with your friends to calm down others (meaning Somalia). These discussions can include other areas, including Europe.

Kissinger: this (Ethiopia) could be the subject of a quiet discussion.

Yakovlev: yes, I agree that we need to work on both the political and psychological. I mentioned our past history of relations, marked by suspicions (anecdote of Metternich's death: when Talleyrand was informed, he commented, 'I wonder what the old fox meant by that?') The point is how to change?

I (Yakovlev) have attended the five meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev; I read all of Reagan's statements before he took office and after, and we had concluded that we could never come to terms, but we were mistaken. There is another Reagan, who does not use the language of 5 years ago.

Kissinger: yes, but we have to move from here to political content. In four years we could say that there could be qualitative changes. (In light of perestroika) what could the outside world do about the Soviet situation?

Yakovlev: I still think we should strengthen the general atmosphere, to eliminate the stereotypes; trading helps both, not just communism. What has happened at Vienna (conference on CSCE) is alright.

Kissinger: Let me make a philosophical point. In our country, the US, we have no real tradition of a foreign policy based on national interests. We have thought other countries were either devils or angels. The result has been a great fluctuation. On the other hand, Russia has never lived in equilibrium with its neighbors. Russia was either invaded, or expanded outward to gain security. Thus both of our countries need to find a way to live with each other in equilibrium, without the US seeking to destroy the Soviet Union in its national borders, and without the Soviets seeking absolute security. The Soviets could possibly gain an advantage, and so could the US, but neither side can defeat the other without the

other side noticing. The net result would be both sides would be exhausted and others would benefit.

In short, this relationship should be the subject of a serious dialogue, and then arms control could be solved more quickly. I have discussed these views with our senior people in the next Administration and they are ready for a dialogue in good faith.

Kissinger: Finally, I have one question: what is the message I should carry back?

Yakovlev: I read in your book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and recall parts about the status quo. That is important; we have common interests in maintaining the status quo and to approach the changes life brings seriously and honestly.

Kissinger: I agree, but it is difficult to put it that way in the US.

Yakovlev: When bilateral relations improve, we have expectations and hopes; for example, I think about the possibility of no nuclear weapons. But then there would still be terrorism and local fires, so that is why we have to maintain the status quo.

Kissinger: It is not possible to eliminate nuclear weapons but we could achieve a situation in which the danger of nuclear confrontation was more remote.

The problem is that part of the world is in evolution. Take the situation in Poland. We have no anti-Soviet interest in Poland, but can we separate the political evolution for security interests. In that case, we could recognize what things threaten security and how could they be avoided, while the political evolution continues.

Yakovlev: I agree we could separate the two.

Kissinger: Our people are ready to discuss this seriously.

Yakovlev: But it is necessary not to increase agitation.

Kissinger: In Poland, preventing agitation also means refraining from suppression by the Soviet Union, while maintaining security requirements in the military field.

Yakovlev: If we get rid of all foreign troops there could be new evolution.

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Kissinger: More likely that there would be small garrisons of foreign troops, stationary, as a security guarantee.

Yakovlev: Guarantee of security against whom?

Kissinger: You prefer to push our forces out, but that is out of the question. You can reinforce troops quicker than we. All forces from Germany?

You mentioned some mechanism for continuing discussions that could be used with 100 percent confidence.

Yakovlev: Yes, I mentioned this to Gorbachev. If Bush agrees, it is alright.

Kissinger: Our people have not worked out the details but agree to the principle.

II

Kissinger: We admire Gorbachev's courage in tackling these problems of perestroika. We are interested in how they are working, because foreign and domestic are related.

Yakovlev: On perestroika, frankly it is proving much more difficult than we anticipated. We were idealistic; we believed that its support would grow stronger and stronger. But the economy is more imbalanced than we expected. We thought people would welcome democratization and glasnost. But it is not so, many say why change. Recently we have had letters that say what we need is a firm hand. We answer that democracy will mean more power, but that is difficult to prove.

What we need is a good harvest.

Second, we started with new economic activities in management, cost accounting, and what happened? While increasing value of goods, they disappeared. People bought them immediately. There is no scarcity; goods have all been purchased, even expensive goods such as jewelry.

This of course was aggravated by rumors of price reforms. We could produce more goods, but our approach is to put more into investment. We have put money into machine building, for example. As we increase, and shift more and more to cost-accounting, then taken together we believe that this will produce results.

Kissinger: But there must be 10,000 officials who are

opposed to reforms, or at least are not eager to eliminate their jobs.

Yakovlev: Yes, but politically we want to make the Supreme Soviet an important control body, to check on results, to protect society from errors.

Kissinger: But this will reduce the power of the Central Committee?

Yakovlev: Yes, this will mean a reduction in Central Committee organizations, but in reality they will have more importance because now the minister can no longer say it was the center's fault, and now they will be independent.

As for price reforms, it is impossible to continue with prices based on arbitrary social categories. Prices must reflect the cost of production, but people are opposed to new prices. We have tried to explain that they will get back the extra cost in availability of goods, that they will not lose in the long run, but they do not believe it.

Kissinger: And now they have the Chinese experience as an example of problems.

Yakovlev: Yes. And now many are opposed to price reforms; even Arbatov who was originally for it is now opposed. You can ask him. Now they argue that cost of production must be reduced first so that prices will not rise much.

Our managers will be given more authority, but they do not know what to do with it. Some of our economists are poorly informed. A leading economist told me he knew nothing of the US Federal Reserve system, for example. But we are sending managers abroad for training, including to the US. When we do institute price reform, then they will have to deal in a free market, so they must be ready.

Meeting with Gorbachev - January 17, 1989
12:00-1:20 pm

B

Gorbachev received me in the office in the Kremlin familiar to me from Brezhnev's day. However the huge conference table has been replaced by a normal oval-shaped table seating perhaps eight. The telephone console looking like an organ near the desk has given way to a normal-sized telephone.

In the presence of some television reporters Gorbachev greeted me warmly though he seemed less ebullient than at his first meeting two years ago or even during his visit to the United States. I handed him the Presidential letter which he put aside, having obviously read the copy I had left with Dobrynin the day before.

Gorbachev said that he eagerly welcomed a confidential dialogue with the new Administration. He took the fact that the President-elect had approached him even before the inauguration as a sign of good faith and serious commitment to a dialogue. There were new forces at large in the world. Despite many changes, the United States and the Soviet Union still had the principal responsibility for preserving the peace. The two sides in conflict could only exhaust each other, not make permanent gains from each other.

Gorbachev joked that at Governor's Island Reagan had offered to be the conscience of Bush. I said that Bush needed no outside impetus to seek a stable peace. However, while Reagan had laid the foundation, the new Administration would have to work with Gorbachev to put up the structure and furnish it. This could only be done on the basis of reciprocity and concreteness, not a general atmosphere.

Gorbachev said he had taken my point to Dobrynin regarding START. There would be no Soviet pressure. However, he thought the political dialogue could begin earlier - as far as he was concerned as early as March. He was prepared to send Dobrynin to the United States or receive Scowcroft in Moscow. Or an emissary could come if Scowcroft was unavailable. A note should be sent via the Soviet UN Ambassador, preferably from Scowcroft, although in order to preserve the privacy of the channel it would be best if the outside envelope were from me. The Soviets would then announce Dobrynin's visit. On the Soviet side only the fewest people would know of the channel: at this point only Yakovlev, Dobrynin and himself, although he would tell Shevardnadze in his capacity as Politburo member when he returned from Vienna. I told him that on the US side to the best

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of my knowledge only the President-elect, Baker, Scowcroft and Sununu were as yet involved.

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Gorbachev then reviewed a number of international problems, especially the European situation along the lines of the meeting with Yakovlev (see attached). I summed up my concern about the European situation, especially Germany and Eastern Europe.

Gorbachev replied: "I have thought about what you said to Dobrynin and Yakovlev. My view is that we should both keep an eye on Germany and by that I mean both Germanies. We must not do anything to unsettle Europe into a crisis." As for Eastern Europe his view was as follows: life brings certain changes which no one can stop and that applied as well to Eastern Europe. But both sides should be careful not to threaten each other's security. That was the spirit in which he would approach the dialogue.

He recalled that the President-elect had expressed concerns about the environment on Governor's Island. He was prepared to move ahead on cooperative efforts immediately, though he realized that was not the heart of the President-elect's message.

// Let's
move soon
no downside

He also stressed the need for better economic cooperation.

He then dictated the following oral message to the President-elect: "I am ready to begin an exchange of views taking into account the need to harmonize our policies on international matters. I greatly appreciate the message especially that a confidential channel has been opened even at this early stage. Please convey to Mr. Bush my very warm regards. Tell him that he can count not only on my understanding of the considerations you have put forward but on my very warm cooperation. He can rely on me."

As I got up to leave Gorbachev grew pensive. He said "I lead a strange country. I am trying to take my people in a direction they do not understand and many do not want to go. When I became General Secretary I thought that by now perestroika would be completed. Instead the economic reform has only just begun. But one thing is sure - whatever happens to perestroika this country will never be the same again."

News
Gov. Isle

I said if I were a historian I would ask how as a product of the old system he could be so determined to change its premises. He replied wistfully: "It was easy to see what

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B

was wrong. What is harder is to find out what works. But I need a long period of peace."

Conclusion: In my view Gorbachev is treading water with perestroika. He is looking to foreign policy as a way out. He will pay a reasonable price to that end.

Dinner with Dobrynin - January 18, 1989
18:30-20:00 hrs.

Dobrynin invited me to dinner at the elegant club for senior officials of the Communist party.

Dobrynin began the conversation by handing me a letter to the President from Gorbachev. In thinking about the conversation Gorbachev had concluded that an oral message was not enough. He therefore asked me to transmit the letter.

As for the channel, Gorbachev was of the view that the political dialogue could start even before the arms control negotiations. I pointed out that the President as well as Baker and Scowcroft would be traveling to Japan during the last part of February. Dobrynin thought the first half of March might be a good time to start the channel. As for procedure, he outlined three options: (1) Scowcroft could come to Moscow; (2) I could return to Moscow; (3) Dobrynin could come to Washington on the pretext of accepting an invitation from Senator Pell in Dobrynin's capacity as a member of the Supreme Soviet.

Clearly Dobrynin preferred the last option. The best way to trigger it would be either a letter from me via the Soviet UN ambassador in a double envelope that Washington was ready to start the political dialogue. Even better would be a letter from Scowcroft to that effect, though in that case the outer envelope should be from me. A third possibility was to send the letter via Kendall who would be visiting the Soviet Union at the end of February. In that case, too, the outer envelope should be from me since much as he liked Kendall he did not want him as political messenger. In each case Dobrynin would then accept the invitation from Pell.

Dobrynin then reviewed once again the substance of the previous discussions to make sure he had understood the points correctly.

He asked specifically whether after Soviet troop withdrawal we would be willing to be helpful in Afghanistan. I replied that it depended on what was meant by helpful. We could not help keep Najibullah in power. I stressed the need for Soviet cooperation on ~~Afghanistan~~ **N I C A R A G U A**.

Dobrynin added to the agenda Soviet concern about Japanese rearmament and US support for it. He also repeated Soviet historic distrust of China. "In 30 years they will be a nightmare", he said. I did not comment.

January 18

-2-

P.8--

Coming back to the European concept Dobrynin mused whether perhaps Eastern Europe should form an economic unit to deal with the EEC in the framework I had outlined.

The atmosphere was boisterously cordial.

*Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989- June 1990
Box 5-2*

To The Vice President of the United States
George Bush

Moscow, January 18, 1989

Dear Mr. Bush,

I thank you for the message sent via Mr. Kissinger. I value this message. I value the fact that you sent it at such an early time, even before assuming the office of President. I, like you, attribute great importance to a personal and confidential dialogue with you.

We are ready to begin a corresponding exchange of views which takes into account the necessity of deliberating on the perspectives, character and mechanism of our cooperation in the interests of strengthening and developing our bilateral relations and maximum harmonization of the policies of our two countries in solving international problems.

I think that the context of our entire conversation with Mr. Kissinger, which he will describe, will make clear to you the meaning of what I convey when I say that you can count not only on understanding, but also on cooperation, from our side.

With respect,

M. Gorbachev

Translation 1/24/89
NSC: Rudy Perina

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	Memorandum for the Record Re: President's National Security Briefing (3 pp.)	2/1/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [1]

Date Closed: 9/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91167-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Memo	Memorandum for the Record Re: President's National Security Briefing (1 pp.)	3/10/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [1]

Date Closed: 9/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91167-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

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Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989- June 1990
Box 5-2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DATE: 5-7-89

FROM THE PRESIDENT *CM*

TO:

Jim Baker

hand carried by Bob Gates.

Jim,
Given the fact that gorbachev's latest letter was not reflected in my reply to him, you might want to hand him the handwritten note. I think it would show him we are being promptly responsive.

Have a great trip.

GB

Mr. Gates —

Attached are
the signed
Presidential
letter, handwritten
note for Gorbachev,
and informal
note for Baker.

WHSR
5/7/89



THE PRESIDENT

Sunday
May 7, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman,

I have just read your
most recent letter.
Secretary Baker will be
fully prepared to discuss all
the subjects raised in that
letter - for example Cuba,

5/7/89

via etc -

I have a feeling
contacts between
Shaker and Minister Sherevna
continued contact between
if we will lead to the
as we both want,

Respectfully, Cap Bush



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
VIA BACK CHANNEL

May 10, 1989

FOR: ROBERT GATES
AmEmbassy Moscow

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
The White House

TO BE DELIVERED EYES ONLY FOR ADDRESSEE AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
AND BEFORE DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW.

1. Panama situation is heating up rapidly. Noriega is now putting out the word he has won the election and this afternoon he beat up the opposition candidates. We have continued to work with Gonzalez and Perez, hoping now to get at least some vocal support and conceivably even concerted action. The President is having a Leadership meeting Thursday morning to consult on the measures against Noriega. At the request of Gonzalez we will not execute the package before Thursday afternoon.

2. I am glad to see that the intelligence old boy network is still operating.

3. Will you inform us of arrangements for announcing resumption of START. Currently the President has a sentence in the A&M speech about it. Also, anything else relevant to the speech.

* 4. The President wants to send Deng Xiaoping a cable outlining your discussions in Moscow. How about drafting something suitable and cabling it to me Thursday evening or Friday morning at the earliest so that we can get it to Deng before Gorbachev arrives in Beijing.

5. By separate cable we will be sending you what I hope is the penultimate draft of the A&M speech.

6. Where are you when I need you? Regards.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2009-1027-MR
SCS 4/22/13

P

VP

Sec State

Sec Def

BS

JS

Hans

Wolfowitz

Eagleburger

Rob

Mitterand/NATO Summit

Mitterand - SNF

Unit. at Summit

New relationship

BS - Troop cuts in US/Sov NATO

P - decoupling?

BS - brand new proposal - not sorted out
accept Sov proposal.

JB - can't pick only what you like

BS - personnel cut a big proposal problem

DC - problem is commitment to 10 div 2x10

BS - stockpile equip. deact. men. Bomb chg commit.

focus on US+sov troops + Sov proposal - personnel

BH - Buy all equip except planes; can't verify manpower

Could accept - BS proposal

P - need to seize offense - dramatic reduction

DC - loose coalition - Alliance - US the rock.

Troop proposal unhinge Alliance. UK + F go crazy.

BS - Some merit to argument.

on SNF - everyone but us + UK

~~DELE~~: This proposal - no ally enthusiastic Over time realize merits, times chg. Can't hold present chg. Tell us they have to do more.

BS - a way to sustain presence in Eur.

P - we cut in half (troops) - meet us at this level.

JB - 2590? - same as BS.

P proposal unrealistic

DC - Polit, to get out front - make big move not well thought out

JB - Pick up w. equip, aircraft. P's proposal

→ JS - equal everything.

BH - problem - forward defense. Pull back at certain levels.

P - premise - up ag 31 div?

BH - trade a little space for time

JB - pick up his 435 million, but equal #5 of Russian + Americans?

Pick up 8 on Tanks, IFVs, arty. Propose on planes, personnel.
US + Sov only SNF too

Bob Gates Memcons 89-92

Box 5-3

P
S/State
S/Def
JS
BS
PW
RG

22 May

DC - much beyond 20% big problems.

manpower a real problem

146,000 combat, rest infrastructure

no models for anything other than forward defense

rec: 15% afc

15% helos

of people fall out from equip reductions,
set ceiling 305 → 275 ceiling, US
stationed personnel, Sovs come to same
level.

BS - manpower fallout - 10,000

we - get you up to 20,000

P - real oppor. to lighten our burden, do something sound
Test 8. Not just respond to him.

JB - Other day - US + Sov man. 25% below present level
15% doable, you said

20-25% - below combat troops

BS - 25% combat - Sovs same level 275,000

DC - After 2 yrs to get CFE, we back down a proposal

JB - offer as proposal to the Alliance Phase II
Submit as rec. to Alliance.

rec: Arty, APC, Tank - all reductions - 8 levels

reduce afc, helos - 25% below current w/ all levels
reduce ^{US-Sov} troop strength (25% below US level) levels

BS Not Phase II. Accept Sov #s.

JB - 15% equip. ~ 25% manpower. P. US-Sov. proposal
takes pressure off alliance

WC - elim. surprise attack

but full mob - 1 - 1.4 → 1 - 1.3

BS - have done no harm.

WC - put aside Phase I

Phase II - 15% in all categories

JB - key all to 15% - low polit. adv.

JS - Phase II - US vs. Sov only 25% ~~add~~ from
US level in equip., 25% combat troops -
challenge Sovs to meet levels

BS - not a good deal

Phase I - Sovs must come down

PW - Push Phase I to concl - lock up 3

bilaterally do other 3 - timely. faster - part of Phase II

JB

1 - reduce Sov troops - step forward for Alliance?

WC - NATO not logical. Don't want US troops out.

JB - APCs, Tanks, Art. - 15% below NATO levels ATTU
A/C - 15% (easier US - Sov) (omit - all) ^{govt} _{party}

all. ^{combat} US level - (both?)

Manpower - 25% ^{parity} ~~help~~ US combat personnel ^{stationed forces}
US - Sov ceiling 275,000 personnel

BS - A/C - US/Sov unless they want to add to all proposed
20% combat people.

JB - Do A/C alliance wide only manpower US-Sov

BS - CFB - 3 Sovs - 5 (at ^{any} man) Instead of Part II -
respond to their req.

JS - accept Sov 3, #3, then present as comple.
proposal - a/c + margins.

we - all counterproposal to NAC -

to - CFE proposal

JB - SNF - US plans on taking out more arty?

DC - only w. POTL, TASM - depends on moderniz.

DC DA
BS BO
WC RG
PW
SA
AK

22 May

Atty at Defense

Prefer weapons cuts to personnel cuts; backtracking on 15% manpower

BS - 25% of combat units?

Sovs reduce to our level + 25%. (stationed forces)

of 305,000; 146,000 combat

BS - don't weaken capacity to reinforce (infrastructure)

25% goes to heart of CFE, Alliance strategy.

25% aircraft - too many 1st line afc

BS - improves sit re. surprise attack, men broadly marginal improvement.

sets stage for broader ATTU manpower.
maintain US force for longer terms

Europeans can make no reductions.

CFE attacks asymmetry across the board

BS - US pull out 1 Div? How to work Sov. div. equiv?

How is it bad to get Sov troops in CE down to our level?

Organized combat ground strength - 25%

PW We do it - Sovs come down to our level

BS - good signal to allies, good on merits, good on budget, good on burden-sharing.

Summary

DOD - Hadley approach. no manpower; 15% aircraft ceiling - 275,000. Sors come down to that level

BS - CFE on equip - manpower 10,000 reduction

25% manpower cut - have to w/d more equip than called for in CFE

WE - go to 15% air, time frame compressed, pass of SALT - Phase I. Need more manpower cuts - need to alter defense of NATO what do if fall below 80%

BS - burden-sharing argument - no ^{non-US} NATO cuts.

- Hadley
 - x manpower above 15%
 - Combat strength
- } options

WE - look at 25% combat forces.

AK - Cut 1 div/div. size - ^(air wing) US ceiling (280,000) ^{30000 cut} 25% combat power. Sors come down to that level.

*Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989 - June 1990
Box 5-2*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Secretary of State Baker has reported to me on his meetings in Moscow. I am quite satisfied with the outcome of his visit. I strongly support intensifying our dialogue and cooperation across the full range of issues of mutual interest, including regional issues, bilateral and transnational issues, human rights, and arms control. The resumption of the full array of arms control and arms reduction negotiations is a welcome development.

Mr. Chairman, I wrote you in April to express our condolences over the tragic loss of your Mike-class submarine in the Norwegian Sea and the lives of so many young sailors. In recent weeks we have seen several indications of Soviet interest in obtaining Western assistance in raising the sunken submarine. We have certain capabilities for this kind of mission and, from a purely humanitarian standpoint, I would like to offer our cooperation and assistance should you wish to pursue raising the submarine. I know that you would be sensitive about military technologies associated with the submarine. I respect such sensitivity and arrangements could be made to safeguard your technology.

From our perspective, we have not examined either the cost or the time that would be required to ready our ship for such a mission. However, I can appreciate the concern of the families and the Soviet people for the men lost in the submarine and wish to extend this offer. It is this concern for those young sailors' families that prompts this offer.

Should you have interest in pursuing a cooperative effort to raise the submarine, we would be prepared to begin exploring the feasibility with you.

Sincerely,

Ay Burt

*P.S. This is a personal letter
I will see that it remains
just between us —*

Ay Burt

His Excellency Mikhail Gorbachev
General Secretary of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
The Kremlin
Moscow

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: GATES SCOWCROFT

SIT: PRES^MSG

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<DTG> 241721Z MAY 89

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 13686

NODIS

SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, UR

SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO
- TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV

REF: THE WHITE HOUSE 241208Z MAY 89 (~~SECRET~~
- SENSITIVE EYES-ONLY)

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. I DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO FOREIGN
MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AT 1900 ON MAY 24 (DUE TO THE
ONGOING PROCESS OF FORMING A NEW LEGISLATURE THIS
WEEK, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DELIVER THE LETTER TO
GORBACHEV PERSONALLY, SINCE HE WAS INVOLVED ALL DAY
IN MEETINGS WITH DEPUTIES).

3. SHEVARDNADZE LISTENED CAREFULLY AS THE LETTER WAS
READ, PAYING CLOSE ATTENTION BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT'S
POSITIVE COMMENTS ON SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETINGS IN
MOSCOW, AND TO THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RECOVER
THE MIKE-CLASS SUBMARINE THAT SANK LAST APRIL IN THE
NORWEGIAN SEA. SHEVARDNADZE COMMENTED THAT THE
SOVIET SIDE VERY MUCH VALUED THE SENTIMENTS EXPRESSED
BY THE PRESIDENT. WITH REGARD TO THE PRESIDENT'S
OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUBMARINE AND RECOVER THE
BODIES OF THE SOVIET SAILORS WHO WERE LOST AT SEA,

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1257-MR
2/25/2014 MM

SECRET

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

SHEVARDNADZE SAID THAT OF COURSE A NUMBER OF TECHNICAL MATTERS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. HE OFFERED TO PASS THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON TO CHAIRMAN GORBACHEV IMMEDIATELY, AND SAID THAT AN ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE FORTHCOMING IN A FEW DAYS. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL GRATITUDE TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THIS PROPOSAL, AND NOTED THAT THIS, AS WELL AS THE AID GIVEN BY THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE ARMENIAN TRAGEDY AND A NUMBER OF OTHER DEVELOPMENTS, INDICATED JUST HOW MUCH THE U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAD CHANGED FOR THE BETTER.

4. SHEVARDNADZE ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S OFFER TO HELP RAISE THE SUB NOT BE MADE PUBLIC FOR THE NEXT FEW DAYS, IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE SOVIET SIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE MATTER FULLY AND GET BACK WITH A CONSIDERED REPLY.

5. SHEVARDNADZE MADE OTHER COMMENTS ON THIS WEEK'S POLITICAL EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ON THE SINO-SOVIET SUMMIT WHICH WILL BE REPORTED SEPTELS. MATLOCK

BT

#3686

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SECRET

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Handwritten Notes	Re: START - 13 June (4 pp.)	6/13	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [1]

Date Closed: 9/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91167-004
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Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: 6-15-89 TIME: 7 AM
incoming/outgoing

WITH: Helmut Kohl

SUBJECT: sausage on its way
G. very good shape
more optimistic than October - was
things go for him.

After his election to Pres he has
won territory.

Poland "countries belonging to him"
very close to Jaruzelski's policies
hope things develop there
" " " Hungary too

FOLLOW UP: distance to Brest is 'enormous'
" " E. Berlin.

Disarrayed about China
ME wants settlement for Israel

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: _____ TIME: _____
incoming/outgoing

WITH: Kohl - 7 -

SUBJECT: increase problems for him
fun'ment'ion - Iran worry
' talk about you '
are you friends ?
fun long talk you
clear that - more hope to
establish good contact with
you than IR.
intellectual level - supported
by wife Nice comments on BPB
FOLLOW UP: other ladies - no comments
you're laugh - you know
wants deeper contacts
" " " you personal
to no wedge between us - US
" " " Eue - Nato

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: _____

TIME: _____
incoming/outgoing

WITH: _____

SUBJECT: very euphoric "Not his
intention"

any de-stabilizing danger to USSR

inquiries - seek ways to
establish personal

positive - JAB

more prof. than GS - not
negative in way

FOLLOW UP: _____

at HK move a little
towards him - good basis
for talks

must keep in mind 'mischief'

Not play acting
wants contacts

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: _____ TIME: _____
incoming/outgoing

WITH: _____

SUBJECT: surprising : 12 mon.
no obstacles " yes one
can 'rapid progress'
IAF, wanted it, made 12 months
Request to you " Negot. under way
in Vienna, time-to-time you
could, if suitable, a direct
message to Gorb - very useful

FOLLOW UP: that would signal message in
confidence
"Confidence is key word"
Personal Chemistry very imp. to him

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: _____

TIME: _____
incoming/outgoing

WITH: _____

SUBJECT: _____

he expl. my open :
Crimes of Stalin era
make facts open to public
must bring out truth to light of day.

econ. trouble
very frank in admitting
mis. "four years ahead"

re Germans - his most important message
FOLLOW UP: "new generation come up"
want reasonable arrangements for
system debt.

Berlin? -

weather milder than in October

I'm very satisfied

Presidential Phone Calls



DATE: _____

TIME: _____
incoming/outgoing

WITH: _____

SUBJECT: _____

knows what side we're on
trio to come to improvement
that reasonable

call you about E.C. Smith
preparations for summit.

FOLLOW UP: _____

next - week call him.

eldest son - honors Harv.

Econ. History

#2 MIT.

Bothe Back now -

Smith Vienna U. C
J.P. Morgan - 2 yrs. on job leaving

date? June?

-- We will also be moving ahead with Hungary as that country continues its process of reform. I hope other East European will follow suit. As they do, we will be prepared to respond positively.

-- I very much appreciate the remarks of Prime Minister Brundage and Chancellor Kohl. The events taking place in Eastern Europe are exciting and unprecedented. ~~It~~ What a victory for our values and our solidarity as an alliance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS
~~ISSUE PAPER~~
EASTERN EUROPE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1257-MR

MM 3/29/2016

THE EAST BLOC - BECOMING MORE DIVERSE - I

- Poland is now attempting to implement the historic Roundtable accords reached last April. Campaigning has begun in earnest for the June elections to the Polish parliament leading to the possibility of actual opposition/Communist party power-sharing.
- In Hungary, political reform efforts continue apace as the country appears to be moving toward a multi-party system. Reformers appear ^{to be} in the ascendancy, but the Party leadership is badly divided.
- The bad economic situation in both countries, however, poses a great challenge to the reform process.
- The conservative regimes in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the GDR in varying degrees reject perestroika and glasnost. Pressures for change are building from below, particularly in Czechoslovakia. Romania is becoming more repressive and relations with the Warsaw Pact Allies, especially with Hungary, are worsening.
- The Soviets appear willing to let Eastern European countries undertake reform at their own pace. The limits are not clear. The Soviets seem interested most of all in stability and creating a more efficient economic relationship with Eastern European countries.

WESTERN RESPONSE - OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE VALUES AND INTERESTS

- Last December NATO ministers adopted a general approach to developments in Eastern Europe stressing complementarity of individual policies that encourage political and economic liberalization in the region.
- In April 17 Hamtramck speech outlining the U.S. response to Poland's Roundtable agreement, ~~President Bush~~ confirmed that the U.S. will actively support political and economic liberalization in Eastern Europe but stressed that U.S. assistance and better bilateral relations will be conditional upon each country's international posture and internal practices, including political and economic liberalization.
- Conditional upon Polish performance, ^I ~~the Administration~~ ~~has~~ decided to consider substantial rescheduling of Poland's official debt in the Paris Club context and support negotiations on an IMF stand-by program as well as seek legislation for GSP and OPIC and help facilitate various private business and exchange agreements and programs for Poland.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

Handwritten notes 1989
5-3

NIGHT Need
Tomorrow 6-19-89

RE: E. Europe
5-29-89

Differentiation

Bulgaria

It has been said
we want perestroika to fail
Not so

It has been said we
want glasnost fail -
not so

Mr. Gorb said some
elements want it fail - it can
never go back

market economies - but
must have
unbearing of market
forces

with that goes respect
for private ownership
and, inevitably,
political returns -

"Beyond Containment"

agree with Norway's
P.M. on change
inevitability of further
change

Kohl - reversible

Yes there is change but let's challenge for more

with Sovs

1. open skies - a proposal
2. open ledgers -
3. on site inspection -

salute fortnight position
of Charellon

Kohl

Picture is worth
a thousand words

PRC pix in Hungary-Poland

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1984- June 1990
Box 5-2

DIANE Edwards
4729

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As we resume negotiations at the Nuclear and Space Talks, I have been giving considerable thought to the challenges before us and would like to share my views with you. It is my hope that we can have frequent and personal exchanges between the two of us on this and other subjects, exchanges that will be as free as possible from ritualistic formulations. We bear enormous -- and mutual -- responsibility to take advantage of the promise of these extraordinary times to improve international security. Direct and substantive communication between us is essential in building the kind of relationship between our countries that I believe we both seek.

One of our most pressing concerns is to reduce the risk of war and the Nuclear and Space Talks are an essential component of efforts to do so. Dedicated Soviet and American negotiators have worked painstakingly over the past few years to forge understandings and agreements on a number of issues. I was supportive of that process as Vice President and remain so today. As Secretary Baker noted when he met with you in May, while we reserve the right to make changes in our position and introduce new ideas, the United States believes that the accomplishments thus far provide a firm foundation for the conclusion of an agreement.

It is imperative that we work in these negotiations to remove any incentive to attack first. Vulnerable systems with short time of flight are particularly troubling in this regard. We must also minimize the concentration of warheads on vulnerable systems, since they increase the incentives for attack.

You and I have both directed the modernization of our strategic forces in order to improve their survivability. But arms control gives us an opportunity, working together, to push the evolution of both arsenals toward more stable systems and to introduce predictability into military planning so that we can slow the pace of military competition. We must work to insure that the forces that remain after an agreement are survivable.

I am also concerned about the verification challenge before us. The introduction of mobile land-based systems has improved survivability but, at the same time, made verification extremely difficult. Traditional means of monitoring are insufficient and even with intrusive inspection, confidence in monitoring may not be high. This problem is exacerbated when mobile systems are MIRVed, because undetected missiles carry so many warheads. We need to cooperate more intensively and creatively to address this problem.

Toward this end, I believe that the two sides should try, as a part of our effort in START, to agree on and begin implementing as soon as possible some verification and stability measures drawn from proposals that both sides have advanced in START or in other contexts.

The measures we are proposing do not constitute a comprehensive verification regime and I understand that either side may choose to alter or augment them in the context of a final START agreement on the basis of experience gained. The objective is to reach agreement promptly in as many specific areas as possible so that we can set in place concrete verification measures and gain practical experience that will help the negotiations.

Specifically, the United States will propose:

- (1) Immediate establishment of perimeter/portal monitoring of certain ICBM production facilities along the lines described in the U.S. START proposal.
- (2) Prompt exchange of data. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on a reciprocal basis would begin to exchange numbers for the agreed categories in the Memorandum of Understanding which are now blank. We can also begin to conduct familiarization visits to learn more about the forces, operations, practices and procedures that would be subject to inspections.
- (3) Cessation of ballistic missile telemetry encryption and data denial.
- (4) Ballistic missile reentry-vehicle inspection. Each side would demonstrate its reentry-vehicle inspection procedures on one of its missiles chosen by the other side.
- (5) Demonstration of the U.S. concept for tagging ballistic missiles and the Soviet concept of registration in order to facilitate technical exchanges on promising approaches.

In addition, I believe that we can benefit by agreeing to two additional measures that, while not a part of the START treaty, would enhance strategic stability.

- (1) Following on your suggestion to Secretary Baker, the United States is prepared to address the problem of short-time-of-flight (depressed trajectory) SLBMs.
- (2) The United States suggests that the two countries implement the proposal to notify the largest strategic exercise each year that was discussed in an exchange of letters between then-Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Minister of Defense Yazov.

I am confident that if we can reach agreement and implement measures such as these, it would facilitate early agreement on the START treaty.

Finally, let me note that I remain committed to preserving U.S. options for development and deployment of strategic defenses when they are ready. We believe that defenses can enhance mutual security and stability, particularly when introduced at a measured pace and in a cooperative manner. Although I know you have disagreed with this view in the past, I hope that you will rethink your position and that we can continue to discuss the subject between the two of us. We need to narrow the conceptual gap that now divides us on this issue.

The United States will work hard to find creative approaches to address the problems outlined above. An agreement that contributes to a stable environment at the strategic nuclear level will enhance our joint security, that of our allies and of the international system as a whole. Personal communication between us will help bridge our differences.

Sincerely, *with respect* -

George Bush

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4729

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6/20/89
100 01 20 11 00

June 19, 1989

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2009-1028-MR
SCS 3/22/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BSC*
SUBJECT: President's Letter to Gorbachev

Purpose

To explore the U.S. START position with Gorbachev and to preview the verification and stability measures that we will table in Geneva.

Background

The letter is intended to serve several purposes. It is a fairly detailed analysis of the requirements for reducing the risk of war and thus establishes communication between you and the General Secretary at a serious, conceptual level. This is particularly important if we intend, during this process, to introduce new wrinkles and departures in our START negotiating position.

The Soviet system can absorb new ideas much better than at the time of the Carter SALT II proposal of March 1977 which the Soviets rejected publicly and violently. But we need to lay the ground work, step by step, for any departure. Gorbachev seems willing to confront the General Staff and demand breakthrough proposals when he is personally convinced of the wisdom of doing so. Through a series of exchanges between you and Gorbachev, we should seek to convince him of the wisdom of a change in emphasis at START from reductions for their own sake to reducing the risk of war.

The letter also lays out several of our concerns with the evolution of the START agreement thus far while trying to allay Soviet fears that we intend to start over. The letter tells Gorbachev that you believe that any agreement must promote the evolution of the arsenals in directions that enhance stability. The letter reiterates your commitment to strategic defenses that enhance deterrence.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Finally, the letter lays out in some detail the verification and stability measures that we will table in Geneva. It tells Gorbachev that these measures are intended to expedite the START process.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Mikhail Gorbachev attached at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to Mikhail Gorbachev

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

4729

June 16, 1989

6/17/89
1305

Brent -- This is on
first effort at a
more personal tone
in the President's
letters to Gorbachev.
Bob Blackwill

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*
SUBJECT: Letter to Gorbachev on the Eve of the Resumption
the START Talks

We have drafted a Presidential letter to Gorbachev for delivery when the START Talks resume. Your memorandum to the President at Tab II tells him that a letter to Gorbachev has several purposes. First, the letter, which is a fairly detailed analysis of the requirements for reducing the risk of war, establishes communication between the President and the General Secretary at a serious, conceptual level. This is particularly important if we intend, during this process, to introduce new wrinkles and departures in our position.

The Soviet system can absorb new ideas much better than at the time of the Carter proposal of March 1977. But we need to lay the ground work, step by step, for any new departure. Gorbachev is seemingly willing to confront the General Staff and demand breakthrough proposals when he is personally convinced of the wisdom of doing so. He is, himself, the key figure and though he has "civilian" advisors around him, the evidence is that he still turns to the General Staff to assess the impact of proposals on Soviet forces. Through a series of Presidential exchanges we are seeking to convince Gorbachev of the wisdom of a change in emphasis at START from reductions for their own sake to reducing the risk of war.

Secondly, the letter lays out several of our concerns with the evolution of the agreement thus far while trying to allay Soviet fears that we intend to start over. The letter tells Gorbachev that the President believes that any agreement must promote the evolution of the arsenals toward survivable systems, thereby enhancing stability. It notes our continuing concern with vulnerable land-based systems and with the verification problems that land-based mobiles pose.

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PER E.O. 13526
2010-2960-MR
3 8/21/13

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Finally, the letter reiterates the President's commitment to strategic defenses that enhance deterrence.

Some of the language in the letter may need revision if we decide to make new proposals.

Concurrences by: CR for Arnie Kanter and John Gordon.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President. *Review no later than June 19.*

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Letter to Secretary General Gorbachev

Handwritten notes 1989

Box 5-3

Democratic Congress

4/26/89

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- No slowdown on AC
 - Verification
- Don't legis. AC.
- Mobility
 - Why 2 missiles
 - START ban on mobiles
- Start Modernization
 - Don't split a package
 - Cheney has made a
tough decisions
 - The President's prog has
integrity
 - Piecemeal changes
destroy integrity
w/o substituting
new ones

FOTd / SRAM T - Very
important
Please restore funding

Senate START

Observer Gp 4/22/89

- Observer gp role important

- We want to support it

- Your insight is, of course,
at a very outset. Neither
side will have fully
developed their positions

- But let me give
you some background
on our approach

- First, on our philosophy
- Focus more on stability
R of R than reductives

- There are 3 parts to our
scrub of the treaty

- We have reaffirmed
chunks of agreed issues

- We are reviewing open
issues and will take
them up as appropriate
as a negot proceeds.

- We may introduce
new initiatives designed

To enhance our goals
of stability

- In addition - verification
- In parallel
- ~~CBM~~

- This in order to accelerate
- negotiations

- CBM

- PPM

- Data Exchange

- Telemetry

- STOF

- Exercises

- Tagging in missile

Ident.

- Mobile issue

- D+S Position just presented
last full - year report
have not responded

- US position - a ~~clear~~ pledge

followed by freedom of flight

- Plus guarantee of

right to test in space

- Plus ~~unilateral~~ ~~element~~ ~~total~~ ~~test~~ ~~full~~

- Assurance (civilian)
- on # of satellites for testing
- Notice of space-based testing
- No restrictions on testing & deploy ment of space based sensors

Support strat
modernization
program.

- IP needs &
leverage

SENSITIVE
Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 21, 1989

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing this letter to you on my way back from Europe to the United States. My mind is full of the fascinating conversations that I had with people in Hungary and Poland and with the many world leaders gathered in Paris for France's bicentennial.

Let me get quickly to the point of this letter. I would like very much to sit down soon and talk to you, if you are agreeable to the idea. I want to do it without thousands of assistants hovering over our shoulders, without the ever-present briefing papers and certainly without the press yelling at us every 5 minutes about "who's winning," "what agreements have been reached," or "has our meeting succeeded or failed."

Up until now I have felt that a meeting would have to produce major agreements so as not to disappoint the watching world. Now my thinking is changing.

Perhaps it was my visit to Poland and Hungary or perhaps it is what I heard about your recent visits to France and Germany -- whatever the cause -- I just want to reduce the chances there could be misunderstandings between us. I want to get our relationship on a more personal basis. If you agree that an unstructured meeting would be productive, I would make the following suggestion.

Page 2

My suggestion is that you decide, on your own, to come to speak at the U.N. early in the General Assembly session -- perhaps around the end of September (the 27th and 28th of September would be perfect for me, but so would other dates). Immediately following your public announcement that you were coming to the United Nations, I would invite you to come to meet with me for an informal, "no agenda" visit. In my view, it would be preferable to avoid the word "summit" which is, at best, overworked and, at worst, a word whose connotation is one of a momentous happening.

I would propose inviting you to visit me for a day or two of private chats.

There are two alternative ways I would suggest to do this. One way would be for you to fly from New York to Washington where I would meet you at Andrews Air Force Base. We could then go by helicopter to Camp David. There, in a relaxed setting with neckties off, we could talk about any and all subjects. The very nature of the invitation would guard against the danger of "overpromise." I would propose no more than a handful of advisers on each side. I would visualize long chats between you and me alone and, also, good discussions with my Secretary of State, NSC Adviser, and Chief of Staff present, along with their counterparts, of course.

Another option would be for you to visit Barbara and me at our seaside house in Maine. Late September can be very nice there. You could fly to Pease Air Force Base in New Hampshire, about 40 minutes from New York and helicopter another 15 minutes to our home, for the same kind of talks.

Page 3

Camp David perhaps would offer the most privacy, but Maine would offer you a glimpse of our Atlantic sea-coast. It would also give me a chance to take you for a ride in my speed boat and maybe catch a fish.

Perhaps there is some entirely different way more convenient for you, and I would welcome a suggestion. The General Assembly seems to me to provide the ideal cover needed for a "spontaneous" invitation to an unstructured, informal meeting. I do not intend in any way to put you in an awkward position and I will understand completely if, for whatever reason, you do not feel you can respond positively to my suggestion.

General Brent Scowcroft and Secretary Jim Baker, plus my Chief of Staff John Sununu, are the only ones who know of this letter, which I have personally written. I hope I can demonstrate to you that some things need not "leak."

My respects and sincere regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ay Bunker'.

His Excellency
Mikhail Gorbachev
Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Moscow

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 1, 1989

Bob Gates



Bob,

Here are the notes from Brent's meeting
last Saturday with Akhromeyev.

BB

Bob Blackwill

Flare
file up here

"Super
Secretariat"

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18b. Handwritten Memcon	Re: Memorandum of Conversation (18 pp.)	7/29/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: [Copies from Other Files] [1]

Date Closed: 9/4/2009	OA/ID Number: 91167-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

1989
Aug 6 (??)
Gorbachev (Dobrynya)
1984-June 1990 Box 5-2
Unofficial translation

Dear Mr. President,

I have received your letter, conveyed to me by Marshal Akhromeyev. Let me say right away that I welcome your proposal that you and I should meet as early as this September. This confirms beyond any doubt our common interest in greater cooperation between us.

It is, of course, good that you and I have already met and gained some knowledge of each other in both political and human terms. Both of us have already managed to do something to build on the modicum of mutual understanding and trust established before you took office. And yet I cannot escape the feeling that we are not making full use of the opportunities now available in both objective and subjective terms. The least that can be said is that we are not taking advantage of the chance which history has given us, and which the Soviet Union and America did so much to bring about, as speedily as our time demands. The world and both our nations do need a tangibly different quality of Soviet-American cooperation.

I feel that all of this is of concern to you too. That is how I am inclined to interpret your letter.

I like the format of the meeting that you suggest - for the two of us to leave behind the cumbersome retinue of aides and, without haste or protocol ceremony, to talk about everything that we must discuss by virtue of our position.

His Excellency George Bush,
President of the United States
of America
Washington D.C.

I do not think that we should now, as part of preparations for the meeting, try to formulate its agenda. We could talk freely about everything.

It would seem worthwhile to exchange views on the main trends of current world developments, which clash and at the same time adjust to each other. We should speak of the most painful trouble-spots that aggravate the situation in the world and think of how we could help in healing them.

I have no doubt that we shall have to discuss, more specifically than is usually done, the global and so-called transnational problems that are looming before us and that we simply can no longer ignore.

I would like to find some new way of discussing our bilateral relations. You are quite right in saying that we cannot afford misunderstanding in those relations. Still, for all their advances in recent years, something about them is being left unsaid. I think this is because the burden of mistrust and mutual suspicion is still too great. But we shall not be able to put an end to this situation unless we really come to grips with the concept of the balance of interests of the USSR and the USA, unless we understand what is its genuine meaning, where are its limits and what should be the arrangements for its continuous maintenance with due regard for the multiplicity of our countries' internationalties and numerous obligations.

It is clear that mistrust is rooted also in our mutual superarmament, in all that accumulated in the years of the

Cold War. I have been thinking about this for some time now, and I would like to discuss with you how we could together vigorously push forward the process of reducing arms to a level fully consistent with a defensive doctrine. As I see it, this would have a powerful impact on the entire political process and help solve all other problems - economic, cultural, humanitarian, information, legal or any problem. And it would mean a crucial, definitive step toward a new state of the world, toward the world community of the 21st century.

And, of course, you are quite right - we must meet to know each other better. I fully support the spirit of your letter in that regard too.

Now about the dates and venue of our meeting. I agree with the time-frame; the precise dates could be determined.

As for the venue, I am indeed grateful for the invitation to come to your house or to Camp David. But since I am not planning on visiting New York, I regret to say that I shall not be able to enjoy your hospitality. Could we perhaps meet at some halfway point? There has already been such a meeting - and as the ensuing events showed, a productive one.

I think that the most appropriate place, both geopolitical-ly and in terms of relations you and we have with that country, would be Spain. I hope that the King and the Gonzales government would not refuse us. As for the specific venue in Spain, they could suggest one themselves. After all, Spain has islands, too. Please give it some thought, Mr. President.

I agree with you that this exchange of letters - not just its substance but also the fact itself - should be kept as far away as possible from those who need not know. I have told about your letter only a few people personally close to me.

I am sending you this reply with a man whom, as I understand, you know and whom I fully trust. He is Alexander Bessmertnykh, Eduard Shevardnadze's first deputy. You can say to him whatever you want me to know and to keep in mind.

Yours, with respect and trust,

Mikhail Gorbachev

Moscow, August 6, 1989

Memcons / Telcons (Jan-Dec.) 1989
Box 5-1

~~SECRET~~

August 11, 1989

President's Meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh on August 11, 1989

Be: Greetings from Gorbachev and Schevardnadze. Gave Baker the basic proposal but Gorbachev asked me to add some conceptual and organizational additions. He welcomes proposal for meeting.

Reflects common interest. Invited small group of close advisers to discuss. Noted several points in letter: personal, human touch, reduce misunderstandings. He said the latter very important. He has feeling we're not making full use of chances history is presenting. Need a new quality of relationship.

Liked format you proposed. Leave out aids, protocol, etc. No agenda -- talk freely about everything.

But he would like to touch on: trend of world disputes; trouble spots; global/transnational procedures; bilateral -- from maybe new angles. We can't afford misunderstanding. Mistrust is still too great.

Where are the limits of our common interests. Beyond containment is very important concept. Agrees the two Presidents should understand each other better. Already good, but better.

Specifics: Time frame acceptable.

Venue: Didn't plan to come to UN, so didn't want to create artificial site. You solicited different ideas for meeting, and here they are. Suggests Spain, wherever Spanish would propose -- islands perhaps.

This whole idea should be kept to small group on both sides.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-2960-MR
M 1/8/2016

P: I tried to spell out in the letter what I really think. Don't want to elevate world hopes and anticipation. We are on track on Baker-Shevardnadze track and we're heading eventually to a summit. But summits get hyped. Gorbachev is a fascinating figure and collects a lot of press attention. A summit now would hype expectations and could in fact set back relations. Our first meeting should be what we have suggested. No compromising. Free flowing, uninhibited discussions to understand each other. Let's not raise hopes with the danger of crashing them down.

I have in fact been opposed to the kind of meeting I am proposing. I have changed. I now believe on no agenda in meeting. Would not be like ships passing in the night. If we elevate the meeting into a "summit," we get into all the trappings and expectations which is not what I want. Spain won't work. I like Spain, but this is not the way. It doesn't do what I want. My problem with venue is if we do it without the cover of UN, it gets hyped. Then, we might as well go back to our planning for eventual summit. I wish he would look differently at the UN thing. If my speech complicates things, just let him do it. I will back out. (Describes advantage of Mitterrand visit.) I hope we can find a way that meeting is not a summit -- otherwise, let's just go back to the traditional way to get to a summit. I see no other way to do what I think is essential to do. But maybe we could have two such meetings at my home this year; at Gorbachev's vacation home next year.

Baker: The UN avoids having this viewed as a summit.

P: Suppose we got UN Secretary General to make something special of the meeting and especially invite the two superpowers to address the General Assembly.

Baker: I got your point. It is a good one. Gorbachev doesn't mean a summit.

P: We need a sound other reason for meeting, e.g., suppose he was going to Mexico. I could call and ask him to drop by.

Or, he could get an honorary degree.

Be: He also has a drastic problem. People are saying he is traveling too much. He should be staying at home. If he travels to meet you, the people would understand.

Second alternatives:

- 1) UN -- Maybe special something by UNSYG
- 2) Spain --
- 3) UN -- Then in few months you go to his home for visit.

P: Does he have any places to go to in Canada or Mexico?

Be: Maybe Latin America, but far away.

Baker: Could I raise collateral issue? We need to decide whether to go forward on Ministerial.

P: My thought is to have that meeting go forward.

Baker: It would help characterize the heads meeting as something other than summit.

Gorbachev feels Baker-Shevardnadze meetings are the basic channel.

P: That's fine. He said at one point Dubinin would be it, but this is fine.

Be: I must explain in a way which doesn't create misunderstanding.

P: I am reaching out. I have changed my mind. I really want to make this work, but I fear it won't makes me do it this way.

~~SECRET~~

P I understand. Secret entry not possible, let's keep thinking about it & try to figure it out. I will discuss only w/ my top advisers & it will stay confidential.
My prob. w/ Spain is it becomes a secret. Perhaps more for us than you because of our press. (Describes again a prob of symmetry).
We won't give up but continue to work at it.

B We have a security process I will report back.

P I just don't want to be pressed to go faster than we really like on AC, for example. These things need to mature in their own time, not to a secret schedule.

B Perhaps we can prepare our people by talking about entry w/ no schedule, no agenda

S You maybe can do it. Our press would buy it. That's the way it started at Raytheon.

B That's right. Keep a good chance. That is the way

it started out.

S Unless it appears accidental,
our press turns it into
a secret.

P Well let's keep trying. We
will review all possibilities and
stay in touch on it. Please
give my regards to all in
this case + Gov. Gohmert, Deby,
Akronowicz w/whom we had
a great mtg.

Gorbachev (Dobrynin)
1989-June 1990
Box 5-2

8/25/89

The Soviet leadership has reviewed the considerations expressed through Mr. Eagleburger concerning possible organization of a meeting in Alaska during the planned visit there 18-19 September by President Bush. We have studied the basic suggestion concerning a meeting in Valdez or any other suitable place nearby, as well as an alternative related to a possibility to use American and Soviet naval vessels in that area. The discussion of all variants led us to an idea which we are convinced could be, instead of the suggestion expressed by the American side, more acceptable for your and our leader. This idea embodies the spontaneous character of the meeting, and it would not cause many unnecessary questions by the public in your and in our country. It goes without saying that the format of the conversation would be such as we have earlier discussed.

The essence of the idea is to have a meeting in a place not too far from the area which President Bush intends to visit, but located not in the territory of the United States but in the territory of neighboring Canada. If the President of the United States agrees, conversations could be held in Vancouver or, for instance, Calgary. We repeat if the American leadership finds this idea acceptable it could be considered as realistically implemented.

As for the dates of the meeting 18-19 September, which have been relayed to us in the latest communication, they, unfortunately, do not suit us. Very confidentially, I would like to explain that exactly on these days a very important plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party is scheduled. To change collectively approved dates for that meeting is not possible. Therefore it would be preferable for us were the meeting to be held on the 28-29 of September.

We would ask the President and the Secretary of State to consider this idea of ours.

With regard to the Ministerial meeting, the planned convocation of the plenary meeting actually makes it impossible to keep the dates for that meeting. It is impossible for the Minister not to participate in the plenary meeting.

In this connection, we suggest that we determine new dates in the course of the meeting of our leaders in Canada, proceeding from the assumption that it would require, in all probability, some time to prepare that meeting after considering the results of the first thorough discussion between the two leaders of all major aspects of Soviet-American relations. After the main event negotiations at the Ministerial level would require a special meeting.

We note that in your latest proposal there is an idea to hold a meeting between Mr. Baker and Mr. Shevardnadze after the main meeting.

We deeply hope that these considerations of ours will be taken as acceptable, and that thereafter we will be able quickly to work out all necessary technical details related to both meetings.