

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 91167
Folder ID Number: 91167-003

Folder Title:
Miscellaneous

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	4

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Summary	Re: [Heads of State Correspondence Summary] (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	✓
02a. Letter	President Bush to President Jacques Delors (2 pp.)	7/27/89	(b)(1)	
02b. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Proposed Message to Jacques Delors, President of the Commission of the European Communities (EC) (1 pp.)	7/26/89	(b)(1)	✓
02c. Memo	Timothy E. Deal/Robert D. Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Proposed Presidential Message to Jacques Delors (1 pp.)	7/25/89	(b)(1)	✓
02d. Cable	Re: Meeting to Support Poland and Hungary: USG [United States Government] Thoughts on Initial Meeting (3 pp.)	7/22/89	(b)(1)	✓
03. Letter	President Oscar Arias Sanchez to Francois Mitterrand (3 pp.)	7/10/89	(b)(1)	
04. Letter	President Oscar Arias Sanchez to Francois Mitterrand (3 pp.)	7/10/89	(b)(1)	
05. Memo	Lawrence S. Eagleburger to POTUS Re: Official Working Visit of President Mitterrand (4 pp.)	5/13/89	(b)(1)	✓
06. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Site Survey for Presidential Trip to Europe (1 pp.)	4/12/89	(b)(1)	✓

Page 1 of 4

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Miscellaneous Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Miscellaneous

Pinksheet Number: cap1371
OA/ID Number: 91167-003
Date Closed: 9/4/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Memo	Robert S. Blackwill and Peter W. Rodman to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Speeches on Europe (2 pp.)	3/22/89	(b)(1)	C
08. Memo	Rudolf V. Perina to Brent Scowcroft Re: NATO Summit Site Survey Trip (2 pp.)	3/13/89	(b)(1)	C
09a. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Visit of French President Mitterrand to Kennebunkport (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
09b. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to Brent Scowcroft Re: Visit of French President Mitterrand to Kennebunkport (2 pp.)	3/25/89	(b)(1)	
09c. Memo	Memorandum from the President Re: Visit of President Mitterrand to Kennebunkport (2 pp.)	4/13/89	(b)(1)	
10a. Memo	James A. Kelly to Brent Scowcroft Re: Tokyo Bilaterals - Further Information (1 pp.)	2/14/89	(b)(1)	C
10b. List	Re: Foreign Attendees for Funeral of Emperor Hirohito (7 pp.)	2/14/89	(b)(1)	C
10c. Agenda	Re: Tokyo Bilateral Meetings (3 pp.)	2/14/89	(b)(1)	C
11a. Report	Re: Commitment to Keep US Troops in Europe (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
11b. Report	Re: Reunification of the Brezhnev Doctrine (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 4

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12. Report	Re: Free Movement of Free People (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
13. Report	Re: Chemical Weapons Proliferation (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
14. Report	Re: Propose a CSCE Summit Meeting (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
15. Report	Re: Initiative for the President's Trips to Europe: European Community (NSC Suggestions) (4 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
16. Report	Re: Possible Presidential Proposal on the Environment for Presentation at the NATO Heads of State Meeting (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
17. Report	Re: Eastern European Economic Initiative (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
18. Report	Re: Economic Outreach to Eastern Europe (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
19. Report	Re: Legislative Exchanges with Eastern Europe (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
20a. Report	Re: Themes for the President's Trip to Europe (2 pp.)	5/26/89	(b)(1)	C
20b. Report	Re: The President Takes Charge of the International Agenda (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
21. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Scope Paper -- Your Bilateral with Chancellor Kohl (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
22a. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft Re: Economic Assistance for Jordan (1 pp.)	7/31/89	(b)(1)	C
22b. Scope Paper	Re: FY90 Food Aid and Agricultural Credits (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
22c. Memo	J. Stapleton Roy to Brent Scowcroft Re: Assistance for Jordan (1 pp.)	7/26/89	(b)(1)	C
22d. Memo	G. Philip Hughes to J. Stapleton Roy and Colonel George P. Cole, Jr. Re: Assistance for Jordan (1 pp.)	7/14/89	(b)(1)	C
22e. Draft Letter	President Bush to King Fahd Re: Department of State Draft Reply (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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UNKNOWN FILE

5944

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1989



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*
SUBJECT: Heads of State Letters

Attached per your request (Tab I) are summaries of the six letters received before and during the President's recent trip to Europe from Heads of State and Government. Also attached (Tabs A-F) are the letter texts. You may wish to simply show the summary to the President.

RECOMMENDATION

That you show the attached summary (Tab I) to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	Summary of Letters
Tab A	Letter from Wojciech Jaruzelski
Tab B	Letter from West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Tab C	Message from Japanese Prime Minister Sousuke Uno
Tab D	Letter from French President Mitterrand
Tab E	Letter from President Arias of Costa Rica
Tab F	Letter from Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso
Tab G	Letter from Greek Prime Minister Tzannetakis
Tab H	Letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 9/4/09

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Letter from Wojciech Jaruzelski, Chairman, Polish Council of State, dated June 30, 1989.

General Jaruzelski wrote before your visit to review the reforms Poland is attempting to implement, outlined Poland's grave economic condition and the need for economic support for the reform program. His letter calls for consideration by the Economic Summit leaders for six groups of measures including, e.g., subsidized food assistance or credit guarantees for food purchases, rapid agreement on an IMF program involving credits of \$2 billion, restructuring of Paris Club debt, reduction of non-guaranteed debt and debt service costs, World Bank and government guaranteed credits for modernization and export-oriented investment, and encouragement of investment in, and management training for, Polish industries in specific sectors.

Letter from West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, dated July 11, 1989.

Chancellor Kohl wrote to give you a read out of his June 22 meeting with South African National Party Leader F.W. de Klerk. Chancellor Kohl assessed that, "though not yet fully experienced in foreign affairs", "de Klerk offers an opportunity of initiating... the long overdue comprehensive dialogue between the South African government and all major political forces of South Africa..." The Chancellor encouraged you to meet with de Klerk.

Message from Japanese Prime Minister Sousuke Uno, dated July 11, 1989.

Prime Minister Uno sent you a message before the Paris Economic Summit to announce that Japan would expand its current capital recycling program from \$30 billion over three years to more than \$65 billion over a five year period. He further announced Japan's decision to increase capital flows to highly indebted countries to which the G-7 Strengthened Debt Strategy is applied, by providing \$4.5 billion in parallel lendings with the IMF and by providing more than \$5.5 billion in untied credits to these countries bilaterally or in conjunction with multilateral development banks.

Letter from French President Mitterrand, dated July 12, 1989.

President Mitterrand replied to your letter of June 6 concerning the CFE initiative explaining his reason for approving the NATO Summit initiative in Brussels and agreeing that the Western nations must develop by September 7 a treaty proposal on conventional disarmament. He made 3 points in connection with the negotiations:

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mm 1/8/2016

- the concept of negotiations should be approved by all participating states and should not include or exclude any particular weapons system because of its nuclear capability;
- France will make its sovereign judgement on the methods for applying agreed reductions to preserve its autonomous strategy; and
- aircraft reductions within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone should not be offset by increases outside the zone.

Letter from President Arias of Costa Rica, dated July 10, 1989.

President Arias wrote to you to urge effective action to prevent the destruction of tropical forests, which, along with their animal inhabitants, are being destroyed faster than at any previous point in history. Linking environmental to economic problems, he advocated debt swaps to finance ecology programs, "an Environmental Rehabilitation and Development Fund" to finance ecological projects in the Third World, reduction of developed countries' agricultural subsidies, and efforts to negotiate global treaties recognizing elements of the environment as "common resources".

Letter from Congolese President Sassou-Nguesso, dated July 13, 1989.

President Sassou-Nguesso wrote to express his satisfaction at what he sees as your commitment to seek better economic relations between the developed and developing countries and to complain about the World Bank's and IMF's conditions as an "obstacle" to an agreement between them and the Congo. He enclosed a copy of his letter to Barber Conable of the World Bank, amplifying his complaints.

Letter from Greek Prime Minister Tsannetakis, dated July 5, 1989.

Prime Minister Tsannetakis wrote to thank you for your greeting at the time of his appointment as Prime Minister.

Letter from Japanese Foreign Minister Mitsuzuka, dated July 4, 1989.

Prime Minister Mitsuzuka wrote to thank you for your hospitality during his Washington visit, express appreciation for your remarks about the global importance of U.S.-Japan relations, and stressed the importance of "cooperation and joint efforts" in tackling bilateral issues.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 27, 1989

Dear Jacques:

I learned with great pleasure that on July 24 Agriculture Ministers of the European Community approved a \$120 million food aid program for Poland. This should help the Poles cope with their severe food shortages. It is also tangible evidence of the Community's intent to honor the commitments made in the Paris Summit's Declaration on East-West Relations.

I greatly appreciate your prompt action in calling a meeting on August 1 to consider ways the Western democracies can work together to further the reform process in Poland and Hungary. The changes taking place there are indeed historic, and by taking the initiative, as you have done, we can do much to ensure that this historic opportunity is not lost.

As you prepare for the meeting and the subsequent session in September, I want to share my thoughts with you about our approach to this important endeavor.

First, we welcome the opportunity to work with the Commission and the Summit Seven countries as true partners in pursuit of democratic change and economic reform in Poland and Hungary. The type of concerted action envisioned in the Paris East-West Declaration should ensure that measures of support are both effective and mutually reinforcing.

Second, in coordinating our economic assistance to these countries, we want to give appropriate attention to the private sector, which can play a critical role in promoting sustained growth and greater international competitiveness.

Clearly, our concerted support may take several forms, but we see real benefits in promoting private sector development.

Third, at a later stage we will want to bring the Poles and Hungarians into our deliberations so that we have an accurate picture of their needs, economic possibilities, and the obstacles they face in gaining full access to our markets. We will then be in a better position to help them develop comprehensive strategies for economic reform and recovery.

We have already communicated some of these ideas to the Commission and our Summit partners, but I wanted you to know of my special interest in these three points, which I believe will have an important bearing on the success of the program upon which we have embarked together.

I wish you every success in next week's meeting. I also hope that you will send me your thoughts as well about how we can make our partnership truly effective and supportive of the heroic efforts of the Polish and Hungarian peoples to transform their societies.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

His Excellency
Jacques Delors
President of the Commission
of the European Communities
Brussels

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

URGENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ PAGES 2

FROM G. PHILIP HUGHES 54.
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRES LTR TO DELORS RE PROMPT ACTION IN SCHEDULING
A MTG OF WESTERN COUNTRIES RE ASSISTANCE LOG # 5837

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO:	DEPT/ROOM NO.	EXTENSION
STATE	MR. J. STAPLETON ROY	EXEC SEC	

REMARKS *** FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING ** SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW ***

URGENT

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 9/4/09

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5837

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

7/27/89

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

July 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: Proposed Message to Jacques Delors, President of
the Commission of the European Communities (EC)

Purpose

To express our appreciation for Jacques Delors' prompt action in scheduling a meeting of Western countries concerning assistance for Poland and Hungary and underscore our objectives for this meeting.

Background

EC Commission President Delors has scheduled a meeting in Brussels on August 1 to carry out the Paris Summit commitment to a program of concerted action for Poland and Hungary. The Commission has invited 23 countries including the Summit Seven, other EC member-states, members of the European Free Trade Association, Australia, and New Zealand. This first meeting has three items on the agenda: (a) food aid for Poland, (b) coordination of economic assistance to Poland and Hungary, and (c) future procedural arrangements. A second, more substantive meeting will follow in late September.

State has already sent an interagency-cleared message (Tab B) to the Summit Seven participants and the EC Commission outlining our objectives for the meeting. We wanted to make clear before that meeting that we see ourselves as full partners in this exercise, that the role of the private sector will be key to Poland's and Hungary's future economic development, and that our concerted efforts should help to promote democratic change and economic reform in the two countries.

I believe that a personal message from you to Delors would demonstrate your continued keen personal interest in this endeavor and also give added weight to State's message about objectives for Brussels.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Jacques Delors at Tab A.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to Delors	cc: Vice President
Tab B	State's Cleared Message	Chief of Staff

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5837

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
July 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: TIMOTHY *TD* DEAL/ROBERT D. *RB* BLACKWILL
SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Message to Jacques Delors

The EC Commission has scheduled the first meeting on Poland and Hungary for August 1 in Brussels. State has already sent an interagency cleared message (Tab B) to the Commission and the Summit Seven participants, outlining our objectives for the meeting.

We believe a personal message from the President to Delors would demonstrate the President's continued interest and personal involvement in the Eastern European exercise and also underscore our intention to be treated as full partners in a program of concerted action, not as honorary members of the EC.

Concurrences: Condi *CR* Rice and Robert *RB* Hutchings

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President
Tab A Letter to Delors
Tab B State's Cleared Message

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2012-1598-MR

MM 11/4/2015

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<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHC #<DTG> 220455Z JUL 89
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<TO>TO RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 0000
RUDKDA/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 0000
EC COLLECTIVE
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000
RUFHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0000

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MEETING TO SUPPORT POLAND AND HUNGARY:
- USG THOUGHTS ON INITIAL MEETING

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 233151
EXDIS - BRUSSELS FOR USEC; PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, EEC, EFIN, PL, HU

SUBJECT: MEETING TO SUPPORT POLAND AND HUNGARY:
- USG THOUGHTS ON INITIAL MEETING

REF: BRUSSELS 9106 (NOTAL)

1. (✓ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. TO SUPPORT EC COMMISSION PREPARATIONS FOR THE INITIAL MEETING ON POLAND AND HUNGARY, ACTION ADDRESSEES SHOULD APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AND THE EC COMMISSION AT A HIGH-LEVEL, MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

3. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

-- THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS THE EC COMMISSION'S ROLE IN FACILITATING THE INITIAL MEETINGS OF NATIONS INTERESTED IN TAKING CONCERTED ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF POLAND'S AND HUNGARY'S DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL AND MARKET ECONOMIC REFORMS.

-- IN ADDITION, THE U.S. WELCOMES THE OPPORTUNITY TO WORK IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE EC, JAPAN AND CANADA, IN PURSUIT OF COMMON LONG-TERM OBJECTIVES IN EASTERN EUROPE.

-- OUR APPROACH IS BASED ON THE SUMMIT DECLARATION. IN CONCEPTUAL TERMS, THE U.S. ENVISIONS SUSTAINED EFFORTS TO COORDINATE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO POLAND AND HUNGARY, WITH EMPHASIS AS APPROPRIATE ON PRIVATE AND ENTREPRENEURIAL SECTORS. WE SHOULD SEEK TO ENSURE RESOURCES ARE SUFFICIENT AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WELL-CRAFTED TO PROVIDE REAL SUPPORT, TO AVOID REDUNDANCY AND TO ASSURE APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY.

-- WE ENVISION A POSSIBLE DIVISION OF LABOR ON SOME TOPICS. FOR EXAMPLE, VARIOUS NATIONS MAY FOCUS ON PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, MANAGERIAL TRAINING, INVESTMENT PROGRAMS, PRIVATIZATION, FOOD AID, AND SO ON.

-- WE ALSO ENVISION WORKING WITH THE POLES AND THE HUNGARIANS TO HELP THEM DEVELOP COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIES FOR ECONOMIC REFORMS AND RECOVERY.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN POLAND, CONCERTED ACTION SHOULD HELP MANAGE COMPASSIONATELY THE PROCESS OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE.

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12/31/2012 MM

-- POLAND'S AND HUNGARY'S SITUATIONS ARE DIFFERENT, AND OUR EFFORTS SHOULD REFLECT THIS.

-- THE U.S. STRONGLY BELIEVES THE MEETING TO BE CHAIRED BY THE EC COMMISSION SHOULD NOT TRY TO COORDINATE OR NEGOTIATE POSITIONS IN THE IMF, IBRD OR PARIS CLUB, NOR TO SUPPLANT EXISTING INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE BODIES. HOWEVER, THE GROUP SHOULD BE INFORMED ON A REGULAR BASIS REGARDING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PARIS CLUB, IMF AND IBRD.

-- INTERESTED COUNTRIES SHOULD WORK WITH THESE MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE OUR MEASURES OF SUPPORT MORE EFFECTIVE AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING.

-- IT IS IMPORTANT TO KEEP IN MIND THAT WHILE AN EARLY CONCLUSION TO NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE IMF AND POLAND IS DESIRABLE, THE FUND MUST REQUIRE A STRONG, COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM AS A CONDITION FOR ITS SUPPORT IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH DEFECTS IN THE POLISH ECONOMY.

4. INITIAL MEETING.

-- THE USG SUPPORTS THE CURRENT EC PROPOSAL FOR AN INITIAL MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON JULY 31 OR AUGUST 1. FOR SCHEDULING PURPOSES, THE U.S. PREFERS AUGUST 1.

-- THE U.S. SUGGESTS THAT REPRESENTATION TO THIS MEETING BE AT ABOUT THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEVEL. THE U.S. TEAM LIKELY WILL CONSIST OF A DELEGATION HEAD FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND REPRESENTATIVES FROM AID, TREASURY AND, POSSIBLY, USDA.

-- THE U.S. ALSO SUPPORTS INITIAL EC COMMISSION THINKING ABOUT THE ELEMENTS OF THE AGENDA, AS FOLLOWS:

O FOOD AID. WE SUGGEST SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT ONGOING AND NEW BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PROGRAMS, AND ABOUT POLISH NEEDS, BOTH IMMEDIATE AND MEDIUM-TERM. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD EXAMINE HOW THE FOOD AID COULD SUPPORT A TRANSITION TO ACHIEVE THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S STATED OBJECTIVE OF INTRODUCING MARKET PRICING.

O BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION. WE SUGGEST SHARING INFORMATION ABOUT THE FULL RANGE OF CURRENT AND ANTICIPATED ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT PROGRAMS, AND DISCUSS HOW THESE CAN BE COORDINATED TO AVOID DUPLICATION OR TO FILL GAPS. A BRIEFING, WRITTEN OR ORAL, BY THE FUND, BANK AND PARIS CLUB ON THE STATUS OF POLAND AND HUNGARY MIGHT BE HELPFUL. THE U.S. WILL OUTLINE DETAILS OF ITS PLANS FOR 100 MILLION DOLLARS AND 25 MILLION DOLLARS ENTERPRISE FUNDS FOR POLAND AND HUNGARY, AND FOR THE OTHER INITIATIVES ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT.

O AGENDA AND MANDATE FOR THE EXPANDED SEPTEMBER MEETING.

-- WE AGREE WITH THE EC COMMISSION THAT THE UPCOMING MEETING SHOULD INCLUDE PREPARATIONS FOR THE SEPTEMBER MEETING.

-- IT MAY BE, HOWEVER, THAT SUCH PREPARATIONS COULD BE BETTER MANAGED IN A SMALLER SETTING THAN THE FULL PLENARY IN JULY/AUGUST 1. WE SUGGEST CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A SMALLER GROUP, INCLUDING THE SUMMIT SEVEN, THAT WOULD WORK OUT ON THE MARGINS OF THE INITIAL MEETING AND AFTER, AN AGENDA AND MANDATE.

-- WE BELIEVE THE SEPTEMBER MEETING SHOULD BE BOTH BROADER IN PARTICIPATION AND MORE SENIOR IN REPRESENTATION, I.E., AT THE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER OR UNDERSECRETARY LEVEL.

-- THE SEPTEMBER MEETING AGENDA SHOULD INCLUDE MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF POLAND'S AND HUNGARY'S OVERALL ECONOMIC SITUATIONS, INCLUDING ANY EMERGENCY NEEDS (FOOD FOR POLAND) AND THE SHAPE OF LONGER-TERM ECONOMIC SUPPORT. THE MEETING SHOULD CONSIDER HOW TO RELATE SUCH SUPPORT TO POLAND'S AND HUNGARY'S ECONOMIC REFORM AND

STABILIZATION EFFORTS. WE SHOULD EVALUATE BOTH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT (PRESIDENT JARUZELSKI AND LECH WALESA HAVE MADE DETAILED DEMARCHES TO SOME OF OUR GOVERNMENTS.) WE SHOULD ALSO DISCUSS FURTHER STEPS THAT INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS COULD TAKE AS REFORM PROGRESSES IN POLAND AND HUNGARY.

-- THE SEPTEMBER MEETING SHOULD CONSIDER THE MEANS AND TIMING OF APPROACHING THE POLISH AND HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENTS. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT FORSEE A NEED TO INVITE POLISH OR HUNGARIAN REPRESENTATIVES TO THE JULY/AUGUST OR SEPTEMBER MEETINGS.

-- THE SEPTEMBER MEETING SHOULD INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES FROM APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WHO COULD PROVIDE BRIEFINGS AND REPORT ON THE STATUS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH POLISH AND HUNGARIAN OFFICIALS.

-- THE PARTICIPATION OF THESE INSTITUTIONS WOULD BE ONLY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE MEMBER STATES. THE GOAL IS NOT TO NEGOTIATE POSITIONS WITH THE INSTITUTIONS OR TO ADVISE THEM ON ELEMENTS OF THEIR PROGRAMS OR RESCHEDULING TERMS.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, THE U.S. NOTES THE SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE'S SUPPORT FOR "AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE IMF AND POLAND" AND ITS SUPPORT IN THE PARIS CLUB FOR THE "RESCHEDULING OF POLISH DEBT EXPEDITIOUSLY AND IN A FLEXIBLE AND FORTHCOMING MANNER." WE ALSO NOTE THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT MADE IN POLAND TO "ENCOURAGE THE WORLD BANK TO MOVE AHEAD WITH 325 MILLION DOLS IN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE LOANS TO HELP POLISH AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY."

-- WE MAY CONVEY ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS IN COMING DAYS.

BAKER

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 3151<STOR> 890722025346 MSG000238388026
<TOR>890722030857

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Date: 7-28-39

MEMORANDUM FOR:

State Secretariat
Department of StateDOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

To: Jaques Delors

From: President

Date: 7-27-39

Subject: Ltr fm Pres to Delors Re: Assistance to Poland
& HungaryACTION REQUESTED:

_____	Draft reply for:	_____	Pres signature
		_____	White House Staff
		_____	Other _____
_____	Direct reply	_____	Furnish info copy
XXX _____	Dispatch		
_____	Recommendations/Comments		
_____	Appropriate handling		
_____	Information (FYI: ONLY)		
_____	Translation		
_____	Other _____		

DUE DATE: ASAPCOMMENTS:


for George Van Eron
Director
NSC Secretariat

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

#5888 1. R 6
2 BS
DATE: June 30, 1989

NOTE FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Not a Advisor
Sen

The President has reviewed the attached, and it is forwarded to you for your:

information



action



APNSA Has Seen

Thank you.

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
(x-2702)

cc: Chief of Staff

5888

From the desk of
George Bush

Brent

FYD

cc Sumner

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Thursday, June 29, 1989
9:55 am

~~Patty:~~

Sin

Trammell Crow called and asked for the message to be passed to the President that he is going to Shanghai in August, but wanted the President to know that he is available to go ANYTIME -- he could go before August if the President wishes.

Bridget

Trammell Crow: (214) 979-5112

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

July 22, 1989

Dear Trammell:

I enjoyed very much talking to you the other day. I was especially interested to hear that you are planning a trip to China in the very near future. I do hope you will have the opportunity in your discussions to explain to your Chinese counterparts the American view of the recent events in China and my strong interest in preserving the very important U.S.-China relationship.

Hope you have a good trip. Do call me when you get back.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "George Bush".

Mr. Trammell Crow
Trammell Crow Company
4500 Preston Road
Dallas, Texas 75205



Embajada de Costa Rica

PARIS, FRANCIA

5756

Paris, le 13 Juillet 1989

CHRON FILE

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Veuillez trouver ci-joint une lettre que le Président de la République du Costa Rica, Monsieur Oscar Arias Sanchez, Prix Nobel de la Paix 1987, envoie par télécopie à votre Président, Monsieur Georges Bush.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de la faire parvenir à son illustre destinataire.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, à l'assurance de ma très haute considération.



Enrique CASTILLO
Ambassadeur

S.Exc. Monsieur Walter J.P. CURLEY
Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire
des Etats Unis d'Amérique

P A R I S

Presidenta
República de Costa Rica

10 July 1989

Dear Mr. President:

On behalf of the people and the government of Costa Rica, permit me this opportunity to congratulate you for the vision and determination to make global environmental issues a priority on your agenda at this critical moment in human history.

Two years ago, the leaders of the G7 nations offered invaluable support to the Central American peace initiative. Today, I ask you to devote your attention another to set of urgent problems, this time common to all developing nations: the threat of tropical deforestation, and the need to redirect the development strategies of developing nations toward a sustainable course. The destruction of tropical forests, home to nearly two-thirds of all existing animal and plant species, is proceeding at an unprecedented rate. Today species are being extinguished thousands of times faster than in any previous evolutionary period. Today, however, we are also presented with an unique opportunity to reverse this trend. Appropriate economic incentives to tropical developing countries could support a massive biomass buildup on a global scale. Such an increase in biomass is increasingly recognized as the most effective way to curtail the potential impact of global climatic change.

Costa Rica, along with the vast majority of developing countries, will experience the disappearance of our remaining unprotected forests before the end of the century unless effective actions are taken to protect these resources. Economic pressures are forcing our rural populations onto a path of destructive short term exploitation of biomass resources, such as forests, wetlands, and grasslands. Such exploitation is expanding ecological destruction, increasing pressures for climatic change, and limiting the development options of future generations. In most cases, however, there is still hope. It is possible to reverse this trend and impede destruction, by an active fostering of biomass buildup which will create new development opportunities.

The growing of plants on an unprecedented worldwide scale is the most effective action that can be undertaken to reduce impact on global climatic change and to preserve biological diversity. Because of the biological diversity harbored in many developing nations, we have a crucial role to play in this strategy. Such a strategy would encourage stewardship of land and water resources and promote the re-greening of the planet.

During my term of office, Costa Rica has embarked -- with considerable economic and social sacrifice -- on a number of important initiatives to protect our unique natural environment. We are encouraging reforestation by means of innovative mechanisms, such as debt for nature swaps, and we are promoting integrated management of protected areas with special consideration of the needs of the human populations inside these areas.

With grants from the governments of the Netherlands and Sweden, as well as the cooperation of many private organizations, Costa Rica has purchased to date nearly 5% of its commercial debt and converted it to local currency. Converted debt is then used to fund maintenance and buildup of our biomass resources, through integrated management of protected areas and reforestation projects carried out in conjunction with peasant organizations. This incentive system has proved an effective and imaginative way to address forest destruction.

These experiences have taught us that the destructive cycle in which most developing countries are trapped can be broken. By reducing economic pressures and creating appropriate incentives, developing countries can embark on a path of sustainable development without imposing undue hardship on the poorest sectors of the population. However, as long as terms of trade for the developing world keep deteriorating and developing nations continue to be net exporters of capital, the majority of people in the developing world will be forced to continue spiralling downward into misery and poverty. One example of unfair and unproductive terms of trade are the agricultural subsidies within the industrialized nations. At a combined total of over one hundred billion dollars per year, these subsidies reduce opportunities for farmers in developing countries, thus discouraging the very people whose support is needed to implement environmentally sound agricultural policies at the grassroots level.

Actions to mitigate global environmental problems cannot wait for the advent of a new international economic order. The efforts being made by developing countries would be more effective if unequal exchange were reduced, protectionism decreased and debt renegotiated. Ultimately, new resources are required to deploy workable global strategies as outlined above. As concrete steps to initiate this process, several mechanisms should be established in the short term:

- * Debt for nature swaps should be encouraged by both developed countries and multilateral development banks. These swaps should be expanded from commercial to bilateral obligations, so that old loans requiring foreign exchange could be earmarked in local currency for environmentally sound projects.



* An Environmental Rehabilitation and Development Fund should be created by the industrialized nations. Responsible directly and indirectly for considerable ecological destruction, they have the resources needed to help the developing world implement strategies for sustainable development. Such a fund would enable us to address environmental issues in a mutual, respectful, and constructive manner.

* Policies dealing with agricultural subsidies should be reconsidered, in light of the negative impact that they have on developing country farmers and consequently on the global environment.

* Efforts to negotiate urgent global treaties recognizing as common resources our shared elements --such as the atmosphere, the oceans, and biodiversity -- should be encouraged and expedited.

Once again, I wish to express my gratitude for the support that you have provided to our peace efforts, and for the courage that you display in tackling this new set of challenges. Let us work together to usher in a new era of responsible and creative cooperation among nations, seeking a world of peace among people and with the earth.

Cordially,

Oscar Arias Sánchez

The Honourable
François Mitterand
President
France



Embajada de Costa Rica

PARIS, FRANCIA

→ POL

5756

Paris, le 13 Juillet 1989

CHRON FILE

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Presidente
República de Costa Rica

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Cordially,

Oscar Arias Sánchez

The Honourable
François Mitterand
President
France

CHRON FILE

3626

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NOTE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES

SUBJECT: Mitterrand Visit to
Kennebunkport: One Detail

Following your approval of my memo on the schedule for this visit, I passed our concurrence along to Steve Studdert. One detail has arisen. Apparently in response to the President's request, Ambassador-designate Curley is now included in the small dinner for President Mitterrand on May 20, but not in the other meals and meetings. This seems awkward. Should we expand the meetings and meals by one each on the French and American sides to accommodate Ambassador-designate Curley and Ambassador de Margerie?

[Handwritten signature]

TIME STAMP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: 3626ACTION OFFICER: BASORADUE: 15 MAY

- ☒ Prepare Memo For Scowcroft/Gates
- ☐ Prepare Memo For Cicconi
- ☐ Prepare Memo _____

- ☐ Appropriate Action
- ☐ Prepare Memo for Hughes

to _____

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS*

PHONE* to action officer at ext. 5076

- FYI
- ☐ Basora
- ☐ Beers
- ☐ ☒ Blackwill
- ☐ ☒ Brooks
- ☐ Cabelly
- ☐ Charles
- ☐ Coulson
- ☐ Deal
- ☐ Donley
- ☐ Dyke
- ☐ Ebner
- ☐ Grant
- ☐ Haass
- ☐ Hoffmann
- ☐ Hutchings
- ☐ Jackson
- ☐ LaMagna
- ☐ Kanter

- FYI
- ☐ Lampley
- ☐ Leach
- ☐ Lewis
- ☐ Lowenkron
- ☐ Mahley
- ☐ Mandel
- ☐ McCue
- ☐ Melby
- ☐ Menan
- ☐ Miller
- ☐ Miskel
- ☐ Needels
- ☐ Paal
- ☐ Pacelli
- ☐ Pastorino
- ☐ Popadiuk
- ☐ Porter
- ☐ Rademaker

- FYI
- ☐ Reiss
- ☒ ☐ Rice
- ☐ ☒ Rodman
- ☐ Rostow
- ☐ Salvetti
- ☐ Snider
- ☐ Tahir-Kheli
- ☐ Tobey
- ☐ Welch
- ☐ ☒ Working
- ☒ ☐ Zelikow
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____
- ☐ _____

INFORMATION

- ☒ Hughes
- ☒ Scowcroft (advance)

- ☒ Gates (advance)
- ☒ Secretariat

- ☐ Exec. Sec. Desk
- ☐ _____

COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 9/4/09~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Logged By 27

Return to Secretariat

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Lawrence S. Eagleburger  Acting

SUBJECT: Official Working Visit of President Mitterrand

I. SETTING

- o Relations with the French are generally excellent.
- o Despite some differences on NATO and arms control, security cooperation is generally good and military cooperation is excellent.
- o France maintains a strong military force and modern nuclear weapons but faces strong budget pressures to slow down or abandon programs.
- o Mitterrand is sympathetic to Chancellor Kohl's concerns, and has walked a "balanced" line on SNF, positing a need for NATO to match Soviet modernization, while noting that a decision on the Follow on to Lance (FOTL) can wait a few years. At the same time, he shares our reservations concerning SNF negotiations.
- o Our economic links are stronger than ever but present some problems. We differ greatly on eliminating agricultural subsidies and the French Government is making it more difficult for U.S. companies to buy into French firms.
- o The French economy experienced strong growth (3.3 percent) in 1988. We anticipate more growth (2.8-3.0 percent) in France in 1989 with only moderate inflation. Unemployment exceeding ten percent is a nagging problem. Isolated public sector strikes continue but have not spread to the private sector.
- o Mitterrand dominates the French political scene. He was re-elected in May 1988 by a comfortable margin, and the Socialist government of Prime Minister Rocard (appointed by Mitterrand) is firmly in place, albeit without a legislative majority.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADRDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010-2797-MR
12/16/2011 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

- o This visit comes only nine days before the NATO Summit and less than two months before you go to Paris for the Economic Summit and celebrations of the bicentennial of the French Revolution.

II. OBJECTIVES

- o Encourage Mitterrand to express to Chancellor Kohl his reservations about SNF negotiations and to play a role in forging consensus at the NATO Summit. He will, nevertheless, be reluctant to pressure Kohl.
- o Exchange views on how we can best jointly deal with changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
- o Highlight U.S. objectives for the Economic Summit. Mitterrand may seek U.S. support for a French plan for flood control in Bangladesh. He may also push French proposals on debt relief for the poorest countries and attempt to elicit your support for some broader international effort on environmental issues.
- o As France gets ready for the EC Presidency in July, stress our support for the 1992 European single market and our concern that it not be used to increase European limitations on trade or investment.
- o Tell Mitterrand that we still hope to drop the visa requirement for French visitors. We took the initiative in proposing reciprocal elimination of the visa, but when France agreed we found the Attorney General unwilling to approve it. We are continuing to review the matter.
- o Express concern for any increases in French aid to Nicaragua not conditioned on Nicaraguan steps to democratize and respect human rights. Mitterrand is likely to ask the United States to take a more conciliatory stand with the Sandinistas.
- o Encourage France to publicly call for Noriega to step aside and respect the outcome of the May 7 election; secure French support for OAS efforts to bolster Panamanian democracy.
- o Ask Mitterrand for details about his meeting with PLO leader Arafat, and encourage him to continue urging Arafat to moderate actions as well as words. Mitterrand will probably push strongly for an international conference to move the peace process along.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

- o Exchange views on how the United States and France can work together to maintain momentum toward an acceptable Cambodian settlement.
- o Having close personal involvement in shaping French policy in Lebanon, Mitterrand may ask the U.S. to take a stronger anti-Syrian and pro-Lebanese Christian stance, and to support having the Security Council take up the issue of Lebanon.
- o Mitterrand may seek details on a U.S. support package for Poland. He will go to Warsaw in June for the first French state visit there since martial law was declared.

III. STRATEGY

- o On SNF you should make the case that negotiations would create great pressure for a third zero elimination, which would place France in an uncomfortable position. Mitterrand will use the rationale that France is not a member of NATO's integrated military structure. You will probably not make much headway with Mitterrand, but he may have some ideas for smoothing over differences in the Alliance.
- o Mitterrand shares your cautious approach toward Gorbachev and will welcome an exchange of views on how to best deal with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
- o Mitterrand will appreciate hearing your views on the Economic Summit. He wants the Paris Summit to be a success, and is unlikely to push aggressively any controversial proposals.
- o On the EC single market, you should point out that while your administration favors free trade, there is protectionist pressure from Congress. Point out that to the extent the EC imposes limitations on trade or investment, it will become more difficult for the United States to avoid retaliatory actions which could ultimately hurt our trading system.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

- o On Nicaragua, you should emphasize the failure of the Sandinistas to live up to their promises concerning democratization and human rights. (Both are major French preoccupations in this bicentennial year.) Stress that aid should follow rather than precede progress in these areas. Emphasize that the United States is willing to take steps toward normalizing our relationship but only based on concrete steps by the Sandinistas. These arguments may persuade Mitterrand to back away from any premature increases in aid, other than humanitarian.
- o On Panama, you should ask Mitterrand to embrace the cause of human rights and democracy for Panamanians, to call publicly for Noriega's departure, and to lend his government's support to efforts by Latin American democracies to restore Panama's democratic process.
- o Regarding the Middle East peace process, you should emphasize to Mitterrand that the French could play an important role by encouraging their Arab friends to accept elections as a positive step forward. Mitterrand will tell you that he urged moderation on Arafat. You should emphasize that the time is not yet right for an international Middle East peace conference and that more opportunity should be allowed for Shamir's elections proposal to develop.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT

Revised 4/21 11:00 am

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH

FOR

BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

MAY 28 - 30, 1989

Sunday, May 28, 1989

6:00 pm Arrive Brussels International Airport, Brussels, Belgium.

- * Met by Prime Minister Martens
- * Honor Guard

6:10 pm Depart Airport, accompanied by Prime Minister Martens, en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.

(Drive Time: 25 Minutes)

6:35 pm Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg and proceed inside.

6:40 pm Begin Meeting with Prime Minister Martens. (at airport?)

- * Participants: 6-8 on 6-8

7:25 pm Conclude Meeting with Prime Minister Martens and proceed to Suite.

7:30 pm Arrive Suite for RON.

Monday, May 29, 1989

(8:00 am Quad Ministerial Breakfast - Sec'y Baker) (?)

~~9:10~~ 8:40 am Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO Headquarters.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

8:55
~~8:25~~ am

Arrive NATO Headquarters and proceed to Secretary General's Office.

* Met by NATO Secretary General Woerner

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

9:00
~~8:30~~ am

Arrive Secretary General Woerner's Office for Meeting.

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY

9:30
~~10:00~~ am

Depart Secretary General's Office and proceed to Conference Room 16 Foyer.

9:35
~~10:05~~ am

Arrive Conference Room 16 Foyer for Coffee.

9:45
~~10:15~~ am

Arrive Conference Room 16 for Opening Ceremony.

OPEN PRESS

10:00
~~10:30~~ am

Depart Conference Room 16 and proceed to Conference Room One.

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY (outside Conference Room 16)

10:15
~~10:45~~ am

Arrive Conference Room One for First Working Session.

CLOSED PRESS

12:35 pm

Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Motorcade.

12:40 pm

Depart NATO en route King Baudouin's Downtown Palace.

(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)

1:00 pm

Arrive King Baudouin's Downtown Palace for Lunch.

~~2:05~~ pm
2:35

Depart King Baudouin's Downtown Palace en route NATO Headquarters.

(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)

2:55
~~3:25~~ pm

Arrive NATO and proceed to Conference Room One.

3:00
~~3:00~~ pm

Arrive Conference Room One for Second Working Session.

(Belgian FM Tindemans w host lunch for Minister Palais D'Egm

5:30
~~5:00~~ pm

Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Motorcade.

5:35
~~5:05~~ pm

Depart NATO Headquarters en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

5:50
~~5:20~~ pm

Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg for Private Time.

(Private Time: 1 Hour 25 Minutes)

7:45 pm

Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route Val Duchesse.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

8:00 pm

Arrive Val Duchesse for Working Dinner.

11:00
~~10:30~~ pm

Depart Val Duchesse en route Chateau Stuyvenberg.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

11:15
~~10:45~~ pm

Arrive Chateau Stuyvenberg for RON.

Tuesday, May 30, 1989

8:40 am

Depart Chateau Stuyvenberg en route NATO Headquarters.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

8:55 am

Arrive NATO Headquarters and proceed to Conference Room One.

9:00 am

Arrive Conference Room One for Third Working Session.

11:30 am

Depart Conference Room One and proceed to Holding Room.

11:35 am

Arrive Holding Room.

(Private Time: 50 Minutes)

12:25 pm

Depart Holding Room and proceed to Luns Press Theatre.

12:30 pm

Arrive Luns Press Theatre for Press Conference.

3 dinners
- President/Heads
- Foreign Minister
- Other Sr. Officials

p+9

Statement (?)

3

1:00 pm

Depart Luns Press Theatre and proceed to Motorcade.

1:05 pm

Depart NATO en route Berlaymont.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

1:15 pm

Arrive Berlaymont for Meeting with EC President De Lors.

* Participants: TBD

2:00 pm

Depart Berlaymont en route Brussels American School.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

Statement

2:15 pm

Arrive Brussels American School for Tri-Mission Embassy Community Greeting.

2:50 [?] pm

Depart Brussels American School en route Airport.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

3:00 pm

Arrive Airport and proceed board Air Force One.

3:10 pm

Depart Brussels, Belgium en route Bonn, FRG.

(Flight Time: 1 Hour 5 Minutes)

(Interchange: Yes)

(Time Change: None)

I

7

DRAFT

Revised 4/21 1:00 pm

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH

FOR

ROME, ITALY

MAY 26 - 28, 1989

Friday, May 26, 1989

*Departure
Statement*

6:45 am Depart White House en route Andrews Air Force Base.

(Flight Time: 10 Minutes)

6:55 am Arrive Andrews Air Force Base.

7:00 am Depart Andrews Air Force Base en route Rome, Italy.

(Flight Time: 9 Hours)

(Interchange: Yes)

(Time Change: Ahead 6 Hours)

10:00 pm Arrive Ciampino Airport, Rome, Italy.

*Arrival
Statement (?)*

* Possible Greeting by Prime Minister

10:15 pm Depart Airport en route Macao Barracks LZ.

(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

10:30 pm Arrive Macao Barracks LZ and proceed to Motorcade.

10:35 pm Depart LZ en route Villa Taverna. (Secchia)

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

10:40 pm Arrive Villa Taverna for RON.

Saturday, May 27, 1989

9:05 am Depart Villa Taverna en route Villa Madama.

(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)

9:25 am Arrive Villa Madama for Meeting with Prime Minister De Mita.

* Participants: 3 on 3

10:00 am Conclude Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting.

* Participants: 6-8 on 6-8

11:40 am Depart Villa Madama en route Quirinale Palace.

(Drive Time: 20 Minutes)

12:00 noon Arrive Quirinale Palace for Meeting with President Cossiga.

* Participants: 3 on 3

1:15 pm Begin Lunch hosted by President Cossiga.

NOTE: Mrs. Bush will join the President at this time.

* No Toast

2:45 pm Depart Quirinale Palace en route Villa Taverna.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

3:00 pm Arrive Villa Taverna for Private Time.

(Private Time: 1 Hour 45 Minutes)

4:45 pm Depart Suite and proceed to Reception Room for Reception hosted by President.

5:30 pm Conclude Reception.

5:35 pm Depart Villa Taverna en route Vatican.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

5:50 pm Arrive Vatican, Cortile San Damaso for Brief Ceremony.
5:55 pm Departs Cortile San Damaso and proceeds to Papal Library.
6:00 pm Arrives Papal Library for Private Audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II.
7:00 pm Concludes Private Audience with His Holiness Pope John Paul II.

(poss Brent/
Baker mtg
w/ Casaroli)

Pres / Papal
Statements

7:00 pm Mrs. Bush joins Audience.

7:15 pm Other U.S. Party Members join Audience.

7:35 pm Depart Papal Library and proceed to Sala Clementina.

Secret

7:40 pm Arrive Sala Clementina for American Seminary Greeting.

7:50 pm Depart Sala Clementina and proceed to Holding Room.

* Possible Tour of Chapels for President

7:55 pm Arrive Holding Room.

8:10 pm Depart Holding Room and proceed to Motorcade.

8:15 pm Depart Vatican en route Villa Madama.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

8:30 pm Arrive Villa Madama for Dinner hosted by Prime Minister De Mita.

⊗

* Toast

* Dark Business Suit

10:20 pm Depart Villa Madama en route Villa Taverna.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

10:30 pm Arrive Villa Taverna for RON.

Sunday, May 28, 1989

8:00 am Depart Villa Taverna en route Macao Barracks LZ.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

8:10 am Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.

8:20 am Depart LZ en route Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ.

(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)

8:45 am Arrive Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ and proceed to Motorcade.

8:50 am Depart Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ en route San Francesco Church.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

9:00 am Arrive San Francesco Church for Church Service.

9:55 am Depart San Francesco Church en route Sicily-Rome American Cemetery.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

Statement

10:00 am Arrive Sicily-Rome American Cemetery for Ceremony.

11:00 am Depart Sicily-Rome American Cemetery en route LZ.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

11:10 am Arrive Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ.

11:15 am Depart Nettuno Proving Grounds LZ en route Macao Barracks.

(Flight Time: 25 Minutes)

11:40 am Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.

11:45 am Depart LZ en route Villa Taverna.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

11:50 am Arrive Villa Taverna for Private Time.

(Private Time: 3 Hours 10 Minutes)

Options:

* Private Lunch with Ambassador + De Mita

* American Embassy Community Greeting



3:00 pm Depart Villa Taverna en route Macao Barracks LZ.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

3:05 pm Arrive Macao Barracks LZ.

3:10 pm Depart LZ en route Airport.

(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

3:25 pm Arrive Airport.

3:30 pm Depart Rome, Italy en route Brussels, Belgium.

(Flight Time: 2 Hours 30 Minutes)

(Interchange: Yes)

(Time Change: None)

DRAFT

Revised 4/21 11:30 am

SCHEDULE OF THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH

FOR

LONDON, ENGLAND

MAY 31 - JUNE 1, 1989

Wednesday, May 31, 1989

6:00 pm Arrive Heathrow Airport, London, England.

- * Met by: Prime Minister Thatcher
- * Honor Guard

6:15 pm Depart Airport en route Winfield House.

- * Accompanied by: Prime Minister Thatcher
- (Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

6:30 pm Arrive Winfield House for RON.

Thursday, June 1, 1989

10:15 am Depart Winfield House en route Number 10 Downing Street.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

10:30 am Arrive Number 10 Downing Street for Small Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher.

- * Participants: 1 on 1

11:30 am Conclude Small Meeting and begin Expanded Meeting.

- * Participants: 4-5 on 4-5

12:40 pm Depart Number 10 Downing Street en route Buckingham Palace.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

1

12:50 pm Arrive Buckingham Palace for Lunch with Queen Elizabeth.

* Ceremony

* Participants: 30 - 35

2:30 pm Depart Buckingham Palace en route American Embassy.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

statement

2:35 pm Arrive American Embassy for Community Greeting.

3:00 pm Depart American Embassy en route Winfield House.

(Drive Time: 10 Minutes)

3:10 pm Arrive Winfield House.

3:30 pm (T) Depart Winfield House en route Messing Village LZ.

(Flight Time: 20 Minutes)

3:50 pm (T) Arrive Messing Village LZ.

3:55 pm (T) Depart Messing Village LZ en route Messing Village.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

4:00 pm (T) Arrive Messing Village for Remarks and Walking Tour.

4:40 pm (T) Depart Messing Village en route LZ.

(Drive Time: 5 Minutes)

4:45 pm (T) Arrive LZ.

4:50 pm (T) Depart LZ en route Winfield House LZ.

(Flight Time: 20 Minutes)

5:10 pm (T) Arrive Winfield House for Private Time.

(Private Time: 2 Hours)

7:10 pm Depart Winfield House en route Number 10 Downing Street.

(Drive Time: 15 Minutes)

7:25 pm Arrive Number 10 Downing Street for Dinner.

- * Toast or Speech ?
- * Business Suit
- * Participants: 40 - 45

9:30 pm Depart Number 10 Downing Street en route Heathrow Airport.

(Drive Time: 40 Minutes)

10:10 pm Arrive Heathrow Airport.

10:30 pm Depart London, England en route Pease Air Force Base.

(Flight Time: 7 Hour 15 Minutes)
 (Interchange: Yes)
 (Time Change: Back 5 Hours)

12:45 am Arrive Pease Air Force Base and proceed to board Marine One.

12:50 am Depart Pease Air Force Base en route Kennebunkport, Maine.

(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

1:05 am Arrive Kennebunkport for RON.

DRAFT

Revised 4/21 11:30 am

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(Flight Time: 7 Hour 15 Minutes)
 (Interchange: Yes)
 (Time Change: Back 5 Hours)

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12:50 am Depart Pease Air Force Base en route Kennebunkport, Maine.

(Flight Time: 15 Minutes)

1:05 am Arrive Kennebunkport for RON.

7

III

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

INFORMATION

2589

April 12, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

Natl Sec Advis
has seen

FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*

SUBJECT: Site Survey for Presidential Trip to Europe

I accompanied the Presidential Site Survey Team to Italy, the FRG, and Great Britain to determine the President's schedule in Europe preceding and following the NATO Summit. The two issues that had been outstanding -- the sites for the Memorial Day service and the President's major speech -- were resolved.

Italy, May 26-28. In addition to meetings with Prime Minister De Mita and President Cossiga, the President will helicopter to the Sicily-Rome American Cemetery in Nettuno (east of Anzio) for a Memorial Day Service. The President will meet with the Pope on Saturday, May 27.

FRG, May 30-31. The President will have separate meetings with Chancellor Kohl and President Von Weizsacker. The Germans were pleased to hear that the President would be making a major address in the FRG. Responding to our desire that the speech not be given in Bonn or Berlin, the Germans suggested a site along the Rhine. We agreed on the city of Mainz, a CDU stronghold. The Germans also accepted our suggestion of a ferry ride on the Rhine for the President and Chancellor Kohl, accompanied by a distinguished group of German citizens. We have also suggested that the President meet for an hour with a select group of German students in Bonn. The President's last activity in the FRG would be a brief address to US troops in Main Am Rhein.

Great Britain, May 31-June 2. The British were disappointed that the President would not be making a major address in Britain but accepted our rationale that the speech would have its greatest impact in Germany. As tentatively scheduled, the President would have a lengthy meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher followed by a luncheon with the Royal family. He would then travel to the town of Messing in Sussex, possible ancestral roots of the President.

We raised with the British the idea of the President and Mrs. Bush visiting Locerbie, Scotland to pay their respects to the Scottish victims of PA 103, to make a brief speech in the town square against terrorism, and to present the town of Locerbie with a gift (medal?) for its help in consoling the American victims of the tragedy. British officials were pleased with the idea, and asked whether Prime Minister Thatcher could accompany the President. We said that the decision on the Prime Minister's participation should be left to the British.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/5/24

**National Security Council
The White House**

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
<u>Donley</u> <u>Bob Perito</u>	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>APB</u>	<u>I</u>
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>✓</u>
Philip Hughes	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>E.F. 4/21</u>	<u>K</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>N/R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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A = Action	<u>I = Information</u>	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No further Action
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cc: VP _____ Sununu _____ Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
 (Date/Time)

*Site Survey Report -
 Trip to Europe*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen 1943

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHRON FILE

March 22, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
PETER W. RODMAN *PRM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Speeches on Europe

On an earlier memo by Peter (Tab A) you indicated approval of the idea of major speeches by the President on European issues following completion of the NSR exercises. With a NATO Summit and other events now scheduled or expected, it is time to begin planning for these.

We propose two speeches: one on West-West issues (hailing the NATO 40th anniversary, reaffirming nuclear deterrence, pledging sensitivity to their concerns in U.S.-Soviet arms control, praising EC-92 and the European pillar, etc.) and another on East-West relations (ending the division of Europe through self-determination, democracy, end to Soviet occupation, Western engagement in East Europe's economic progress, etc.).

why?
We propose that these be delivered in April and May before the NATO Summit. As to which should go first, there are competing considerations:

- Peter notes that tradition and symbolism usually call for West-West issues to come before East-West. Also, April is NATO's anniversary. But he doesn't feel strongly.
- Bob notes that the Polish Roundtable accord is likely to be reached by early April and this is the logical occasion for unveiling our new initiatives for Eastern Europe. Waiting a month for a major U.S. policy statement will not be understood.

This does not have to be settled now. In any case, with your approval we will seek to pin down forums with the President's schedulers -- perhaps the ASNE speech scheduled for April 12 or the American Newspaper Publishers (in Chicago) on April 26. (A Chicago venue would be perfect for an East Europe speech, but we might want it earlier than that).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2003-0368-F/1
8/12/2009 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

In addition, we will soon provide you, for your approval, outlines or drafts for such speeches to be passed on to the President's speechwriters.

Nick ^{AL} ~~Easton~~ and Condi ^{CR} Rice concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve our pinning down dates and venues for two major speeches on European issues in April-May.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*A Polish-oriented speech
is fine, but why
do a Euro speech - or
a basic E-W speech
before the NATO summit?
If I were the Euros I
would not be happy*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1648

INFORMATION

March 13, 1989

CHRON FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*

FROM: RUDOLF V. PERINA *RP*

SUBJECT: NATO Summit Site Survey Trip

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

I accompanied Steve Studdert on the March 9-10 site survey trip to Brussels for the NATO Summit. The logistical planning for this Summit should not be difficult since the Embassy and NATO are experienced with high-level visits and the core program is fairly traditional. Deputy Secretary General Guidi outlined the schedule which the international staff will propose to Allied delegations:

Monday, May 29

10:00-10:30	Ceremonial Opening of Summit
10:45-13:00	First Restricted Session
13:00-15:00	Working Lunch at NATO Headquarters
15:00-17:30	Second Restricted Session
19:30	Working Dinner

Tuesday, May 30

9:00-11:30	Third and Final Working Session
12:00	Conclusion of Summit, Press Conferences

The Belgian King will probably invite Summit participants to a lunch, but the inclination at NATO will be politely to regret this social event which cuts into working time.

Apart from the Summit program, there are two issues which were raised during the survey trip:

Memorial Day Event

May 29, the first day of the Summit, is U.S. Memorial Day, and the President will in some way have to mark this. Two options were considered by the survey team. The first was to visit a World War I or World War II cemetery, of which there are many in Belgium. Two members of the survey team stayed in Belgium over the weekend to visit Flanders Field and other possible sites.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

a lecture secretary?

The problem with such an event is that it looks backwards rather than forwards, and German sensitivities must be taken into account. A second option discussed was for the President to helicopter to SHAPE and briefly address U.S. and Allied troops. Either of these events could be done early Monday morning before the opening of the Summit or on Sunday, on the eve of the Summit. Steve Studdert also left open the option that a Memorial Day event might occur elsewhere in Europe prior to the President's arrival in Brussels.

Post-Summit Speech

The second issue raised during the trip was a European address by the President after the NATO Summit which would put forward the U.S. interpretation of Summit developments. Since the Summit itself is an event closed to the press, and since Genscher and other Europeans can be counted on to put their "spin" on the Summit immediately afterwards, a major European address putting forth our interpretation of the Summit is an important follow-up event. (Particularly since Steve Studdert did not want the President committed to a post-Summit press conference at NATO headquarters.) Ambassador Al Keel strongly recommended that a speech be delivered in Brussels before the President's departure, but his thinking on an audience and venue was very vague.

*Summit the
US does
best place
for this?*

The issue of a post-Summit speech is closely related to where the President would go after Brussels. Steve Studdert indicated that there was some consideration to the President going to Eastern Europe from Brussels. All things considered, we believe the East European stops are better suited to the Economic Summit so as not to dilute emphasis on NATO themes in May. A NATO speech could not be delivered in Eastern Europe, and much of the momentum of the Summit might be lost as the press focuses on Eastern European themes. As regards other possible stops, Bonn might not be well suited for a Summit speech if the SNF issue proves too sensitive. West Berlin could be a good venue for an East-West speech, but Steve Studdert heard some strong reservations from USNATO personnel about making Berlin a stop on grounds that the red-green coalition government will be very new and perhaps not up to the strain of coping with a Presidential visit. (One of the points of contention between the SPD and the Greens is to what degree police should control demonstrators.) We think these are legitimate points, but a visit to Berlin is an important reaffirmation of our commitment to the city and should, in our view, be on the President's itinerary unless there are overriding security concerns.

NO

Steve Studdert seemed to indicate that a visit to Italy prior to the Summit was likely, but that the post-Summit stops were still very open and undecided. We should keep in mind the issues of a Memorial Day event and of a post-Summit speech as we make final decisions on the President's overall itinerary.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1147
Add On II

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES 
SUBJECT: Visit of French President Mitterrand
to Kennebunkport


Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

In response to your question on my March 25 memorandum concerning President Mitterrand's May 20-21 visit to Kennebunkport (Tab A), the attached preliminary schedule, worked out during the advance visit to Walker's Point on Tuesday and Wednesday (Tab B) reflects the latest thinking about the organization of this visit. In formulating this schedule, we have had in mind the President's guidance which he embodied in a memorandum drafted on Air Force One during one of his trips (Tab C).

In our Tuesday and Wednesday discussions with the French Advance Team we found that:

-- the French were entirely on board with the idea of keeping the visit small, private and informal. They consequently planned to restrict both the number of French press and their official travelling entourage arriving at Kennebunkport.

-- The French officials expected to participate in any "set piece" meetings at Walker's Point will be four: Foreign Minister Dumas, Elysee Advisor Attali, Diplomatic Advisor Musitelli, and Elysee Press Spokesman Vedrine.

-- The French are particularly interested in the Press coverage the visit will receive and the image of Mitterrand they will be able to project.

I ask that you review the attached preliminary schedule, noting particularly the suggested attendance at the two meetings and three meals that will occur at Walker's Point, and indicate either your approval or any changes you want.

RECOMMENDATION: That you review the attached schedule at Tab B.

Attachments

Tab A Mar 25 Memo
Tab B Mitterrand's Schedule
Tab C President's Memo

cc: Blackwill, Basora

T
A
B

A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

March 25, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: G. PHILIP HUGHES *Philip*
SUBJECT: Visit of French President Mitterrand to
Kennebunkport

*Yes, where
are we? RD*
*Where does all this
stand now? J.*

The French Embassy in Washington yesterday provided the State Department with some preliminary information about President Mitterrand's ideas for his May 20th visit to Kennebunkport at the President's invitation. In view of the President's initiative to make this visit a personal gesture for President Mitterrand, you may wish to review this information with the President and determine what he would prefer to do in hosting Mitterrand.

According to the information provided by the French Embassy, Mitterrand:

- Plans to arrive, probably at Pease AFB, via the Concorde at approximately 10:00 a.m. on May 20; (He will have spent the night of May 19 in Ottawa.)
- Is contemplating arriving in Kennebunkport at approximately 5:00 p.m. for a working session with the President followed by dinner;
- Is thinking about the possibility of visiting Mount Desert Island, Maine and Acadia National Park during the day of May 20 prior to arriving at Kennebunkport; (The French are contemplating travel to Mount Desert Island by helicopter or small aircraft.)
- Is uncertain whether Mrs. Mitterrand will accompany him;
- Must be at Boston University by 11:00 a.m. on May 21 to receive an honorary degree.

The French have indicated interest in receiving our alternative suggestions about how to spend the day of May 20.

You may wish to explore with the President:

- Whether he has any particular activities in mind to share with President Mitterrand during the day of May 20 in and around Kennebunkport -- boating, fishing, outdoor sports, etc.

- If Mitterrand is strongly interested in the notional visit to Mount Desert Island, whether the President would contemplate serving as his official host and travelling with him or, if not, whom he would designate as an official host for the visit (e.g. Vice President Quayle, Secretary Baker, one of the Bush children, etc.)

To ensure that this visit reflects the President's preferences as fully as possible, it will be important to provide some feed-back to the French promptly before their planning becomes more definite.

John Keller concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you discuss with the President the notional French schedule for President Mitterrand's Kennebunkport visit and determine the President's wishes for entertaining Mitterrand during the visit.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

T
A
B

B

FRENCH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S
VISIT TO KENNEBUNKPORT
MAY 20-21, 1989

5/20

10:30 a.m. President Mitterrand Arrives at Pease AFB
Arrival Ceremony. Greeting by Secretary
Baker and Ambassador Reed. Departure for
Kennebunkport by helicopter.

11:00 a.m. Arrive Kennebunkport.

11:15 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. One-on-One Meeting
Participants:
President Bush President Mitterrand
General Scowcroft Jacques Attali
Interpreter Interpreter

1:00 p.m. - 2:30 p.m. Luncheon
Participants: 10 American officials and
guests, 10 French officials and guests,
4 Bush family or friends, plus 2 Interpreters
(not eating)

3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m. Meeting
Participants:
President Bush President Mitterrand
Secretary Baker Foreign Minister Dumas
Governor Sununu Jacques Attali
General Scowcroft Diplomatic Advisor
Marlin Fitzwater Musitelli
R. Blackwill Press Spokesman Vedrine
(notetaker)
Interpreter Interpreter

4:45 p.m. - 5:30 p.m. Walk in the Woods
Participants:
President Bush President Mitterrand
Interpreter Interpreter
Mrs. Bush (?)

5:30 p.m. - 7:30 p.m. Free Time

7:30 p.m. - 9:30 p.m.

Dinner

Participants:

President Bush
Mrs. Bush
Secretary Baker
Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft
Marlin Fitzwater
Interpreter
(not eating)

President Mitterrand
Foreign Minister Dumas
Jacques Attali
Diplomatic Advisor
Musitelli
Press Spokesman Vedrine
Interpreter
(not eating)

5/21

TBD

Breakfast

Participants:

President Bush
Mrs. Bush
Secretary Baker
Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft
Interpreter

President Mitterrand
Interpreter

T
A
B

C

April 13, 1989

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT

Re: Visit of President Mitterrand to Kennebunkport

Q. How many others can stay with Mitterrand at your Mother's house? (Mitterrand has 4 others he would like to accompany h

A. There is one master bedroom with its own bathroom and head for President Mitterrand. In addition, there are three bedrooms with two beds each, but one bathroom to share. In addition to that, there is one room with its own bath off the kitchen. That room would be perfectly adequate for an aide, for example. My suggestion is that Mother's house could comfortably accommodate four people, in addition to the President, in these four rooms although each of the four rooms has two beds.

Q. Where will Secretary Baker stay?

A. Secretary Baker will stay with Mrs. Bush and me in the big house. In addition to Secretary Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Governor Sununu are welcome to stay in our house. If necessary we can accommodate more. For example, if Walt Curley is confirmed by then, it would be most appropriate for him to stay with us.

In addition to the big house, there is a guest house that has two bedrooms and two baths where visitors would be welcome to stay.

Q. Should Mrs. Baker participate in the visit?

A. If Mrs. Mitterrand does not come, it is not essential that Mrs. Baker be involved, but she would be more than welcome.

Q. Location of the dinner.

A. It is our intention to have Saturday night dinner at our home. We can comfortably accommodate 24, maximum 32 (we may want to include some family -- i.e., Nancy Ellis). If more than that should be included, we should make arrangements to have a large

dinner for the President at Port Lobster (if Mabel is open for business) -- very informal -- or at Noonan's in Cape Porpoise. Port Lobster and Noonan's are very "country" -- very informal, but good atmosphere.

Q. How extensive will the meeting between you and Mitterrand Baker be? Where will the meeting take place?

A. No determination has been made on the meetings between the President and me. I will spend sometime with him one-on-one, with interpreters, and we should set up a somewhat more formal chat in our living room, at which the normal suspects will be lined up.

Q. Will you both use the same chopper to ride to Boston?

A. I am assuming the helipad will be ready right at Walker's Point; and, yes, the President should be invited to accompany.

* * *

Foreign Minister Dumas told me that President Mitterrand likes to go for walks. I would suggest the advance team find a good place to walk, unless it would foul up traffic. A very good walk would be from Walker's Point to Cape Porpoise along the back road, turning right as you go out of our gate. Another thought would be to walk on the beach at Goose Rocks, driving to where the road to Goose Rocks crosses the highway. I would guess the walk from the Clock Farm to the beach and back to the Clock Farm would be about 3-4 miles.

We should not plan to take Mitterrand out in my boat. Perhaps he will understand if I feel compelled to go out to sea while he and Mrs. Bush take a nice, brisk walk.

Inasmuch as this will be at our private home, we should have a meeting soon with Protocol, Advance, NSC, Tim McBride and Casey Healey.

I want both houses to be appropriately staffed for President Mitterrand. Our own stewards, Ariel, Orlando and Sam, should take the lead at our house.

Please furnish me as soon as possible with the time of arrival of the President and our time of departure.

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____

LOG # 1147

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Dep Exec			
Philip Hughes			
Bob Gates			
Brent Scowcroft	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Philip Hughes	<u>2</u>		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>		<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP

Sununu

Other Hughes, Murphy

Should be seen by: _____

Philip Hughes is being pressed by Steve Studdert for schedule to pass to the trench. Philip asked me to bring package to your attention for approval.

NSC/S

Wiemer

Need copies
for GPH
and JAM
Done 5/3/89 / MEN

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____

LOG # 1147

SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

DOCLOG dm AIO 21

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	_____	_____	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Bob Gates	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Brent Scowcroft	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Philip Hughes	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
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A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No further Action

cc: VP Sununu Other Brenda Hilditch

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

*Visit of Pres. Mittermann
to K. Maine*

*Update & the Geneva
will discuss w/ President*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

February 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC STAFF

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

SUBJECT: General Press Guidelines

Relations between the Administration and the press are going to be extremely important. It is important, therefore, that we have a structured coherent approach that the NSC will play in press relations. I will continue the custom of having only the National Security Advisor and his Deputy speak on-the-record with the press. The following guidelines are the ones that I have worked out with the Press Office and that I would expect all NSC staff to follow.

1. Press Contacts/Backgrounders

Queries for the media should be directed to the Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Roman Popadiuk) or his Assistants (Bob Hall and Bill Harlow). Members of the press may reach them on 456-2947 or through the duty press spokesman after hours (reachable through the White House operator 456-1414). There office is located in Room 487 EOB.

That office will recommend and coordinate whatever response is appropriate. That may include arranging meetings with members of the press. Such meetings should be conducted by the appropriate Senior Director "on background" with a member of the Press Office staff sitting in whenever possible. This will serve to protect your interests and to insure that our spokesmen are at least as well informed as the media. Staff members should be careful that reporters not turn encounters at social events into press interviews. In no case are NSC staffers to set up press meetings without Press Office concurrence.

2. Press Guidance

The Press Office will also call upon members of our staff for assistance in preparing press guidances for use by the spokesman at the regular White House press briefings. I urge you to give these requests your full attention. Whatever the spokesman says becomes the President's policy. It is incumbent on all of us to insure that whatever we provide the Press Office is in complete accord with existing policy, that it is factually correct and that it is timely.

3. Announcements/Statements

The NSC staff should arrange inter-agency clearance for all statements and announcements and provide them to my office for final clearance for forwarding to the office of the White House Staff Secretary (Jim Cicconi). A copy of the forwarding memo should be sent to the Press Office for information purposes. Final clearance for use by the spokesman will be given by the White House Staff Secretary's Office. Any statement issued in the name of the President should be in the hands of the Press Office at least 48 hours in advance. Statements issued in the name of the spokesman must be delivered at least 24 hours in advance. These are minimums.

Where statements are made on complex issues, the Press Office may require that the appropriate Senior Director, or his designate, be standing by to back up the spokesman at the briefing. Any explanation provided by an NSC staffer in the Press Briefing Room will be on background.

4. Interviews/Speeches/Op-eds and Other On-the-Record Statements

Proposed speeches or other appearances by Senior Directors and others need clearance by the Press Office. Op-ed pieces and letters to the editor can make a useful contribution to the understanding of certain issues. If you have an idea, discuss it first with me or Bob Gates, and if approved in principle, then with the Press Office. If they agree, that office will coordinate tasking with the Executive Secretary and will handle eventual placement of the piece.

5. High Level Visitors

Any substantial meeting of the President with foreign head of government/state should be preceded by an appropriately cleared announcement several weeks before the meeting. Pre-brief (usually the day before) and readout (immediately following) backgrounders will be arranged by the Press Office, usually employing the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State. Less announced shortly before the event and the NSC control officer responsible will provide a brief written readout for use by the spokesman.

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CHRON FILE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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w/~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

February 14, 1989

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: KARL D. JACKSON *KDJ*

FROM: JAMES A. KELLY *JK*

SUBJECT: Tokyo Bilaterals - Further Information

This responds to your request for further information on bilateral meetings in Tokyo. It amplifies my memorandum of February 7, 1989.

Who is attending? Our all source count reflects representatives of 126 countries, 63 of which are represented by heads of state or heads of government. Our master list is at Tab A.

Who has requested a bilateral meeting? Requests have come in many ways, but we know of requested meetings for representatives of 42 countries. Of those, the following summary applies:

Scheduled	-	2 (France and Japan)
Recommended by NSC staff and State	-	16
Recommended by NSC staff	-	2
Recommended if time and opportunity permit	-	11
Not recommended	-	<u>11</u>
		42

An updated list of requests and recommendations is at Tab B.

Because of the complexity of scheduling, and the need for all remaining bilaterals to be at our President's hotel, an early decision is requested.

Attachments:

Tab A Funeral Attendees
Tab B Recommended Plan

cc: Bob Blackwill
Richard Haass
David Miller
Bob Pastorino
Philip Hughes
Peter Rodman

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2010-1253-MR

MM 4/5/2016

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As of 1000/14 February 1989

FOREIGN ATTENDEES FOR FUNERAL OF EMPEROR HIROHITO

(* indicates entry since first edition)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Representative</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
*Algeria	Rabah Bitat, Speaker of National People's Assembly	Confirmed
Argentina	VP Victor Martinez	Confirmed
Australia	Governor-General William Hayden	Confirmed
Austria	Vice Chancellor/Foreign Minister Alois Mock	Confirmed
*Bahrain	Ali Bin Khalifa, Son of PM	Confirmed
<u>Bangladesh</u>	President Hussain Mohammad Ershad Foreign Minister Humayhun Rashid Chowdhury	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
Belgium ✓	King Baudouin and Queen Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans	Confirmed
Bhutan	King Jigme Singye Wangchuk	Confirmed
Bolivia	H.E. Dr. Arnold Hofman-Bang, Ambassador to Japan	Confirmed
<u>Brazil</u> ✓	President Jose Sarney	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
Brunei	Sultan and Prime Minister Bolkiah Hassanah	Confirmed
*Bulgaria	Peter Tanchev, State Council VP	Confirmed
Cambodia	Prince Ranariddh	Confirmed
*Canada	Mrs. Jeanne Sauve, Governor-General John C. Crosbie, Min. for Intl. Trade	Confirmed
Cape Verde	Foreign Minister Silvino Manuel da Luz	Confirmed
*Central African Republic	Michel Gbezera, Foreign Minister	Confirmed
*Chile	Hernan Errazuriz, Foreign Minister	Confirmed

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<u>China</u>	Foreign Minister Qian Qichen	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Colombia	Ambassador to Japan	Confirmed
*Comoros	Salim Ben Ali, Govenor of the Grand Comoro Island	Confirmed
<u>Costa Rica</u>	Foreign Minister Rodrigo Madrigal	<u>Bilateral request declined.</u>
Cuba	Vice President of the Council of Ministers Jose Ramon Fernandez	Confirmed
<u>Cyprus</u>	President George Vassiliou ?	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Czechoslovakia	Pavol Hrivnak, 1st Dep. Prime Minister	Confirmed
<u>Denmark</u>	Prince Henrik, Prime Minister Poul Schleuter	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Dominican Republic	Vice President Carlos Morales	Confirmed
Ecuador	✓ Ambassador to Japan	Confirmed
<u>Egypt</u>	✓ President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
El Salvador	Ambassador to Japan	Confirmed
*Ethiopia	Prime Minister Firke Selassie	Confirmed
Fiji	✓ President and Mrs. Penaia Ganilau	Confirmed
Finland	✓ President and Mrs. Mauno Koivisto	Confirmed *
<u>France</u>	✓ President Francois Mitterand Foreign Minister Roland Dumas *	<u>Confirmed luncheon bilateral 23 Feb.</u>
<u>FRG</u>	President Richard von Weizsaecker Hans-Dietrich Genscher, FM	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Gambia	President Dawda Kairaba Jawara Foreign Minister Omar Sey	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
GDR	Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Gerlach Deputy Foreign Minister Nier	Confirmed
*Greece	President Christos Sartzetakis	Confirmed

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<u>Ghana</u>	President Jerry John Rawlings	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
Guatemala	Vice President and Mrs. Roberto Carpio	Confirmed
Guinea	Foreign Minister Jean Traore	Confirmed
*Guinea-Bissau	President Joao Bernardo	Confirmed
*Guyana	Hamilton Green, First VP and PM	Confirmed
* <u>Honduras</u>	President and Mrs. Jose Azcona	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Hungary	Bruno Straub, President of the Presidential Council	Confirmed
Iceland	President Vigdis Finnbogadottir	Confirmed
<u>India</u>	President Ramaswamy Iyer Venkataraman Foreign Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Indonesia</u>	President Soeharto	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Iran	Special Advisor to the President Mirusalimu (phonetic)	Confirmed
Iraq	Vice President Taha Muhyi Al-din Ma'ruf	Confirmed
Ireland	President Patrick J. Hillery Foreign Minister Brian Lenihan	Confirmed
<u>Israel</u>	President Chaim Herzog Benjamin Netanyahu, Dep. FM	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Italy</u>	President <u>Francesco Cossiga</u> Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral may be requested.</u>
*Ivory Coast	Camille Alliali, Min. of State	Confirmed
<u>Japan</u>	Host Country	<u>Bilateral with PM Takeshita on 23 Feb.</u>
<u>Jordan</u>	King Hussein	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Kenya</u>	President and Mrs. Daniel Arap Moi Foreign Minister Robert John Ouko	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral expected to be requested.</u>
*Kiribati	VP Teatao Teannaki	Confirmed

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Korea	Prime Minister Kang Young-Hoon Vice Foreign Minister Shin Dong-Won	Confirmed
Kuwait	Saud Muhammad al-'Usaymi, Min. of State for Foreign Affairs	Confirmed
Laos	Foreign Minister Phoun Sipaseuth	Confirmed
Lebanon	Ambassador to Japan	Confirmed
* <u>Lesotho</u>	King Moshoeshoe II	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>Liberia</u>	President Samuel Doe	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
Lichenstein	Prince Hans Adam	Confirmed
*Luxembourg	Grand Duke Jean Grand Duchess Josephine-Charlotte	Confirmed
Madagascar	Foreign Minister A.J. Bemananjara	Confirmed
Malawi	Minister Maxwell Pashane	Confirmed
Malaysia	Deputy Paramount Ruler Azlan Shah Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed	Confirmed. PM's health may affect attendance.
Maldives	President Maumon Abdul Gayoom	Confirmed
*Mali	Oumar Ba, Minister of Justice	Confirmed
*Malta	Vincent Tabone, Foreign Minister	Confirmed
* <u>Marshall Islands</u>	President Amata Kabua	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Mauritania	Mohamed Sidina Sidya, FM	Confirmed
Mauritius	Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Natural Resources Murlidas and Mrs. Dulloo	Confirmed
<u>Mexico</u>	President Carlos Salinas Foreign Minister Solanez	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>Micronesia</u>	President John Haglelgam	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
Monaco	Prince Albert	Confirmed

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Mongolia	Chairman of the People's Great Hural Lodongiyn Rinchir	Confirmed
Morocco	Prince Shidi Mohammed Foreign Minister Abdellatil Filalli	Confirmed
Nepal	Prince Gganendra	Confirmed
*The Netherlands	Foreign Minister van den Broek	Confirmed
New Zealand	Governor General Paul Reeves	Confirmed
<u>Nicaragua</u>	Daniel Ortega, President	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral declined.</u>
Niger	Prime Minister Mamane	Confirmed
* <u>Nigeria</u>	President Ibrahim Babangida	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Norway	Crown Prince Harald	Confirmed
<u>Pakistan</u>	Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Panama	President Manuel Solis Palma	Confirmed
Papua New Guinea	Foreign Minister Michael Somare	Tentative
*Peru	Felipe Valdivieso, Vice FM	Confirmed
<u>Philippines</u>	President Corazon Aquino	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>Poland</u>	Kazimierz Barcikowski, VP of the Council of State	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>Portugal</u>	President Mario Alberto Soares	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
*Romania	Manea Manescu, Vice Chairman of the State Council	Confirmed
Saudi Arabia	Prince Nawwaf	Confirmed
Senegal	Foreign Minister Ibrahima Fall	Confirmed
Seychelles	Minister of National Development Jacques Hodoul	Confirmed

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* <u>Singapore</u>	Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew Deputy Prime Minister Ong Teng Chong	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>Spain</u>	King Juan Carlos I Finance Minister Feldt	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Sri Lanka</u>	Former President and Mrs. Jayewardene Mrs. R. Premadasa (wife of President)	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>Sudan</u>	Prime Minister Sadiq Siddiq al-Mahdi	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>Surinam</u>	Ambassador to the Netherlands	Confirmed
<u>Sweden</u>	King Gustav XVI and Queen	Confirmed
* <u>Swiss Confederation</u>	Rene Felber, Min. for Foreign Affairs	Confirmed
<u>Syria</u>	Deputy Prime Minister (Economic Affairs) Slim Yasin	Confirmed
* <u>Tanzania</u>	Damian Lubuva, Minister of Justice	Confirmed
<u>Thailand</u>	Crown Prince Vajiralongkoun Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Togo</u>	President Gnassingbe Eyadema	Tentative
<u>Tonga</u>	King Tupou IV	
* <u>Tunisia</u>	Prime Minister Hedi Baccouche	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Turkey</u>	Prime Minister Turgut Ozal	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Tuvalu</u>	Governor General Tupua Leupena	Confirmed
<u>UAE</u>	AF Commander Sayed Foreign Minister Abdullah	Confirmed
<u>Uganda</u>	Prime Minister Samson Kisekka	Confirmed
<u>United Kingdom</u>	Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested by FM Howe.</u>
<u>Uruguay</u>	President Sanguinetti	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
* <u>USSR</u>	Anatoly Luk'yanov, 1st Dep. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR	Confirmed

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Igor Rogachev, Deputy FM

*Vatican City	His Eminence Cardinal Silvio Oddi	Confirmed
*Venezuela	Enrique Tejera, FM designate	Confirmed
*Vietnam	Ambassador Vo Van Sung	Confirmed
Western Samoa	Head of State Tanumafili II Malietoa	Confirmed
Yemen	Ambassador to Japan	Confirmed
* <u>Yugoslavia</u>	Stane Dolanc, Member of Collective Federal Presidency	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
<u>Zaire</u>	President Mobutu	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral expected to be requested.</u>
<u>Zambia</u>	President and Mrs. Kenneth Kaunda	Confirmed. <u>Bilateral requested.</u>
Zimbabwe	Vice President Simon Vengai Muzenda	Confirmed
Others		
United Nations	SYG Javier Perez de Cuellar	Confirmed
GATT	Director General Dunkel	Confirmed
OECD	Secretary General Paye	Confirmed
ADB	President Fujioka	Confirmed
*IBRD	<u>Barber B. Conable, President</u>	Confirmed
*EC	Frans Andriessen, Vice President	Confirmed
*ITU	Jean Jipguep, Dep. SYG	Confirmed
*ILO	Tadashi Nakamura, Asst. SYG	Confirmed
*WHO	Hiroshi Nakajima, Director-General	Confirmed
*IMF	Michel Camdessus, Managing Director	Confirmed
*UNESCO	Ambassador Layachi Yaker, Personal Representative of the Dir-General	Confirmed
*UNIDO	Domingo L. Siazon, Jr., Dir-General	Confirmed
Taiwan	Chang Pao-Shu, Senior Advisor to President Lee	Confirmed

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THE PRESIDENT HAS *been*
0535 add-on

February 14, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

TOKYO BILATERAL MEETINGS
Recommended Plan

I. Already scheduled for times outside bilateral hours:

1. Japan; Emperor Akihito, Saturday, February 25, 10:00 a.m.
-- Audience, 10:30 am firm; 10:00 am requested.
2. France; President Mitterrand, Thursday, February 23,
2:00 pm.
-- Luncheon hosted by The President. One hour,
thirty minutes.
3. Japan; Prime Minister Takeshita, Thursday, February 23,
4:00 pm.
-- Thirty-minute meeting; Akasaka Palace.

II. Recommended twenty-minute meetings - Meetings will be on a
thirty-minute schedule. All meetings are recommended by
State Department, except Mexico.

1. Brazil - President Jose Sarney - Interpretation
required.
2. Egypt - President Hosni Mubarak.
3. Indonesia - President Soeharto - Interpretation
required.
4. Israel - President Chaim Herzog
5. Jordan - King Hussein
6. Mexico - President Carlos Salinas
✓ -- Speaks English well, but interpretation required.
NSC staff believes full meeting necessary, even with
forthcoming visit.
7. Pakistan - Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
8. Philippines - President Corazon Aquino
9. Turkey - Prime Minister Turgut Ozal - Interpretation
required.
10. Zaire - President Mobutu - Interpretation required.

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IV. Ten-minute meetings. Meetings would be on a fifteen-minute schedule. All meetings are recommended by State, except King Juan Carlos of Spain.

1. Germany - President Richard von Weizsacker
2. India - President Ramaswamy Venkataraman
3. Kenya - President Daniel Arap Moi
4. Portugal - President Mario Alberto Soares - Interpretation required.
5. Singapore - Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
6. Spain - King Juan Carlos - not recommended by State.
7. Thailand - Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan - Interpretation required.
8. Zambia - President Kenneth Kaunda

Unfulfilled requests. The countries below -- which have requested meetings -- are of slightly lower priority and are not recommended now for individual meetings but should be considered in case of cancellations. If more time was available, these leaders would be scheduled. For some, a greeting at the Prime Minister's reception may be desirable. These are sequenced in rough order of priority.

1. Sudan - Prime Minister Sadiq
2. Nigeria - President Babangida
3. Bangladesh - President Ershad
4. Cyprus - President Vassiliou
5. Tunisia - Prime Minister Baccouche 02a1
- * 6. Denmark - Prime Minister Schluter
7. Uruguay - President Sanguinetti
8. Honduras - President Azcona
9. Marshalls - President Kabua
10. Micronesia - President Haglelgam
11. Italy - President Cossiga - bilateral not requested

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Meeting requested, but not recommended for any meeting:

1. China - Foreign Minister Qian
2. Costa Rica - Foreign Minister Madrigal
3. Gambia - President Jawara
4. Ghana - President Rawlings
5. Lesotho - King Moshoeshoe II
6. Liberia - President Doe
7. Nicaragua - President Ortega
8. Poland - Vice President Barcikowski
9. Sri Lanka - Former President Jaywardene
10. United Kingdom - Foreign Minister Howe *Prince Philip*
11. Yugoslavia - Vice President Stane Dolanc

*Does Royalty
Not Request*

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COMMITMENT TO KEEP US TROOPS IN EUROPE

This seems more appropriate for a Presidential speech than for a separate initiative, which would be more likely to raise questions among the Allies than to provide the desired reassurance.

Such commitments are routinely included in Presidential speeches and (in a slightly different formulation) in NATO communiques. There are a number of different ways such a commitment could be expressed and, under present circumstances, we should be careful what formulation we use. A commitment not to withdraw any US forces over the next ten years would not be credible or particularly desirable. On the other hand, no one anticipates a complete withdrawal of US forces from Europe in this time frame. The commitment should rather emphasize the continuing US commitment to the defense of Europe and the US troop presence as the symbol and reality of that commitment. Specific formulations are best looked at in the context of an actual speech.

RENUNCIATION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE

This also is something that is best done in the context of a speech rather than as a separate initiative. Secretary Baker's March 7 speech in Vienna called on the Soviets to renounce the Brezhnev doctrine; a Presidential speech in Europe would be an appropriate context to repeat this.

It should be noted that the Soviets are claiming that Gorbachev in his December 7 speech to the UNGA did renounce the Brezhnev doctrine. He did not do so explicitly, but his rejection of interference in internal developments, his renunciation of the use of force and his endorsement of the principle of freedom of choice are presumably the passages cited by the Soviets. This does not preclude our pressing for an explicit renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine, however.

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Free Movement of Free People



The Concept

The President should challenge the East to "demolish the guardposts and tear down the barbed wire". Specifically, he should propose in his European speech that all European nations signatory to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agree to an open borders and free flow of information policy. He could call for the abolition of all exit restrictions, and the abolition of all information import restrictions including free access to radio and TV broadcasts. The President should suggest this policy as a Western, perhaps NATO, initiative to be taken up in the CSCE on a high priority basis.

Background

The restrictions Eastern European regimes have placed upon the movement of their peoples and their access to information from the Free World exemplify the unfortunate division of Europe. The Helsinki Final Act signed in 1975 inaugurating the CSCE process made the facilitation of freer movement and contacts of individuals as well freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds aims of the process. These aims have been confirmed and commitments expanded at subsequent CSCE Review Conferences (Madrid in 1983 and Vienna in 1989). There has been progress in the CSCE process and some Eastern European nations have taken some steps to fulfill their commitments, but full compliance has not taken place. Furthermore CSCE documents have not explicitly called for the abolition of travel and information restrictions, although this is clearly a Western aim. The President's proposal would therefore go beyond current CSCE commitments.

Pros

The proposal for open borders and free exchange of information, in its broadest sense, would be an open challenge to the East to put glasnost into practice. It would be the moral equivalent of launching an offensive on the Iron Curtain of Eastern laws and practices that have kept Europe divided for so long. It would convey an image of strong U.S. leadership and would appeal to popular sentiment in East and West. It is also a logical international extension of the President's "thousand points of light" concept. In the European context it would be a key part of the President's vision of a free Europe. In a NATO context, it would be a fitting challenge to the Warsaw Pact on a political, humanitarian plane, and would support our objective of portraying NATO as a community which shares common values not just a military alliance.

The concept of open borders and free exchange of information is not new. It is already well-established in the

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Helsinki CSCE process. But the President's proposal would raise it from the diplomatic trenches of the rather esoteric CSCE, and, by giving it such high level public display, put pressure on the East to respond more quickly and more positively than they have to date. The vehicle for implementing the proposal would necessarily be the CSCE. The President's high profile initiative would accelerate the process.

Cons

The key strengths of the proposal are its popular appeal and do-ability. It is an area where a framework for consultation exists (the CSCE) and where the East is in fact moving in the right direction (with the great exception of Romania). Ironically, however, its greatest weaknesses are also in public relations and the details of implementation.

First of all, even though the proposal would be focused on eliminating exit requirements, the idea of open borders would to the public imply eliminating entrance requirements as well, something the U.S. would simply not be able to do in light of U.S. visa law. The U.S., in fact, would not be able to go as far as the EC has gone in eliminating visa requirements among its membership. Thus the President could appear to be proposing an idea which the U.S. would not be able to fulfill in the public eye and in which the West Europeans have already outdistanced us. On the free flow of information, here too we would have to deal with our own restrictions on information flow in the field of technology transfer.

Another problem would be the NATO aspect of such an announcement. Of course, it would require prior consultation in NATO. However, if the President were to make this proposal as a NATO proposal, it might be perceived as undercutting the CSCE process which has meant a great deal to Europeans--NATO, neutrals, and the East alike--and which has proven effective over time in breaking down barriers in Europe. The European neutrals and non-aligned may balk at responding to what they will see as a NATO-sponsored initiative. The East as well may balk at such an idea issuing forth from an opposing military alliance.

Finally, insofar, as the concept of free movement and exchange of information is already enshrined in the Helsinki process, the U.S. proposal could be criticized as "nothing new". Also, the fact that the only vehicle for European consultation on this issue would be the CSCE, which already works on this subject, could give the President's proposal the image of being nothing more than rhetorical grand-standing.

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Any U.S. proposal indicating that the U.S. would bilaterally discuss this proposal with Europeans, East and West outside the CSCE framework would probably meet with a hail of protest, undercut our own leadership in the CSCE process, and serve to create dissension between the U.S. and the Europeans and the Canadians.

Alternative: A Boost for CSCE

A possible alternative would be for the President to use the NATO summit not to propose specifically open borders and free information exchange but to urge the breaking down of travel and information barriers as a NATO priority within the CSCE process. Such an appeal would please NATO allies but would also resonate in the neutral and non-aligned capitals as well as in the East. It would give a dramatic boost to the CSCE process and focus attention on what has been indeed a highly effective exercise in European cooperation. It would also show that the U.S. is a leader both in NATO and in CSCE. Furthermore, it would serve as a counterpoint to the Soviet habit of making spectacular proposals which die stillborn in the details.

The West has a good vehicle in the CSCE for challenging the East on matters such as freedom of movement; it does not need a new vehicle. What it may need, however, is some high test fuel and a strong driver. A strong Presidential endorsement of the CSCE and a proposal that goes beyond current CSCE commitments could do just that and would indeed generate more popular and press interest than a CSCE meeting itself.

Finally, Presidential emphasis on the CSCE could be a useful way to offset the Soviet "Common European Home" concept which attempts to exclude the U.S. from Europe but which appears so appealing to the European public. CSCE predates and supersedes the "Common Home" concept and enshrines U.S. membership in the community of all European nations. By emphasizing and confirming the CSCE the President would pre-empt the amorphous Soviet "Common Home" idea and confirm America's leadership and permanent participation in Europe's future.

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An IAEA to Control
Chemical Weapons Proliferation

Concept

- Announce at NATO Summit formation of a global regime, based on the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), to halt proliferation chemical weapons.
- Developing countries ("demanders") would commit not to acquire CW.
- Industrialized countries ("suppliers") would permit unhindered chemical exports to all regime members.
- All regime members would permit inspections by the regime organization of their industries to confirm that no commercial chemical production is being diverted to CW production.
- All regime members would deny exports of chemicals and related technology to non-members or members not complying with regime rules.

Objectives

- To combat CW proliferation by:
 - o implementing effective export controls by "suppliers" against CW proliferators; and
 - o creating (1) incentives for nonproliferation and (2) sanctions against proliferators.
 - o identifying those programs which are not legitimate commercial enterprises.

Pros

For chemical weapons, there is no binding international commitment by countries not to acquire -- there is no CW NPT. Therefore, in the absence of an effective CW ban, we have focused our CW nonproliferation efforts on controlling the supply of chemicals and related technologies to certain countries. This is an inherently problematic approach given the large number of suppliers and the fact that most chemicals and technologies used for CW production also have legitimate commercial applications. Since the acquisition of CW is not illegal (the U.S. is committed to acquiring binary CW), we

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cannot develop broadly supported international sanctions against CW proliferators. An IAEA-like regime for CW would shift some of the burden to "demander" countries, making it incumbent upon them to provide evidence that they were not acquiring CW. Although it would be extremely difficult to monitor the \$800 billion global chemical industry, an IAEA-like regime for CW could utilize the chemical industry itself to do some of the work.

Cons

The main problem is that, for a CW-IAEA regime to work, there must be an NPT-like treaty commitment. However, neither the "suppliers" nor the "demanders" are likely to accept a CW NPT. Our allies, the most important "suppliers," would see such a regime as a clear signal that the U.S. had abandoned the goal of a comprehensive CW ban, an objective they all share. The members of the Conference on Disarmament would see the initiative as an assault on the CW ban negotiations underway in Geneva. NNA countries have made abundantly clear that they will not accept an NPT regime for CW; this was one of the main messages enunciated at the Paris CW Conference.

Unlike nuclear weapons, there are no clear bottlenecks in the CW production process. Chemicals, facilities, and technologies for CW production are widely available from dozens of producers, including some members of the NNA (e.g., India, Brazil). And we must consider the impact on U.S. industry, which will bridle at the prospect of being excluded from lucrative exports. Even for Iraq, which has used CW extensively in violation of international law, the U.S. has continued to provide significant chemical technology and facilities, some closely related to CW production.

Another consideration is adherence to the regime by friends and allies who have denied the existence of their own CW programs (e.g., France, Israel, Taiwan). They would be unlikely to want to open their industries up to inspection, in the absence of a global CW ban and the U.S. would be equally reluctant to impose a trade boycott against them. Moreover, the U.S. could become "locked in" to providing CW-related chemicals to members which had met the criteria of the regime, but in fact were still proceeding with clandestine CW programs. Finally, an IAEA-like regime for CW would face the same complicated verification problems that a CW ban faces.

In addition to the substantive arguments above, it is important to note that the NATO summit is an inappropriate forum for announcement of such an initiative. It would be a mistake to give the impression of a regime imposed by the North

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against the South. The relevant body is the Australian Group (AG), which meets again May 9-11. The AG includes several countries which are not members of NATO and does not include Turkey, Norway, or Iceland. The idea could further be advanced at the September government-industry conference in Canberra.

Alternative

We can take steps toward the same ends at the upcoming AG meeting by working to harmonize export policies among members. These steps encourage de facto sanctions against targeted countries (currently Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya) without stirring up opposition to a CW NPT. However, continued emphasis on export controls will not, by itself, delegitimize the acquisition of CW by the "have nots" and no inspection procedures, absent an effective CW ban, are now under consideration.

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IAEA for CW

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Propose a CSCE Summit Meeting

The President would propose a summit meeting of leaders of CSCE member countries for 1990. The Summit would examine the state of the CSCE Vienna Concluding Document's follow-up sessions at midpoint. Its objective would be to focus attention on the role of the CSCE process in European security and stability.

Rationale

In addition to authorizing the beginning of separate talks on conventional forces (CFE) and confidence and security building measures (CSBMs), the CSCE Vienna Concluding Document outlined a series of nine follow-up meetings to examine cooperation on issues ranging from human rights to the environment. As the next CSCE review conference is scheduled to take place in March 1992, a Summit meeting at midpoint in this series would allow us to assess where progress has (and hasn't) been achieved. It could be a useful podium from which to lay down markers regarding Moscow's human rights performance, should such markers be necessary, in advance of a decision on whether to attend the 1991 Moscow human rights conference. A Summit would raise the visibility of the CSCE process and highlight its role in our approach to European security. As Gorbachev proposed last summer that European heads of state meet at Summit level to discuss arms control, our proposal for a CSCE conference would subtly underscore that (a) the U.S. is part of Europe and (b) the East-West dialogue is broader than arms control.

Obstacles

When Gorbachev originally proposed a European Summit to discuss arms control, we and our Allies poured cold water on the idea as both unnecessary and exclusive of NATO's North American partners. Because this idea bears some resemblance to that of Gorbachev, and because the Soviets no doubt would use it to trumpet arms control, we would need to consult with the Allies in advance of a turnabout. CSCE already will have a high profile as a result of follow-on conferences, at which we can underscore regularly our commitment to the CSCE process. The Soviets -- and even some of our Allies -- would press for assessment of CFE (which we consider to be apart from CSCE oversight) at the meeting. While we could challenge the Soviets on human rights at such a Summit, a Summit is not essential as challenges could be made in other venues, either public or private, as circumstances dictate. Moreover, in advance of such a Summit, the Soviets would seek to create a favorable international image, including in the human rights area. This would lessen the receptivity of criticisms of the Soviets at the Summit.

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CSCE Summit

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Initiatives for the President's Trips to Europe:
European Community (NSC Suggestions)

Issues

- o How should the President, while in Europe, deal with the EC on the run up to 1992?
- o Should the President address strengthening the US-EC political dialogue?

The Economic Dialogue and 1992

In the past, the President has met with the President of the European Commission on occasion, but the regular capstone of our dialogue has been an annual ministerial meeting in Brussels between the Secretary of State, accompanied by other cabinet officers, and the Commission President, accompanied by appropriate Commissioners. We have tried to keep the ministerial meetings broad and forward looking.

The US-EC economic dialogue is intense and predominantly focused on immediate issues. The USTR, Commerce Secretary, and Agriculture Secretary meet frequently with their Commission counterparts both bilaterally when necessary and in the trade quad and other multilateral fora. Secretary Mosbacher, for example, plans a trip to Europe soon. Specific trade negotiations are sometimes settled at the Secretary-Commissioner level by direct personal or telephone contacts.

There is consensus among Washington agencies that we need to pursue 1992 issues across a broad front. Establishing a formal US-EC framework just for "1992" could give the Commission a convenient bottleneck to fend off US concerns and could unnecessarily politicize issues.

The Political Dialogue

European Political Cooperation (EPC) is the coordinating mechanism for EC foreign policy; it is managed by the member state foreign ministries, not by the Commission. The US has a privileged relationship with the EPC, contributing to and receiving reports from their monthly meetings. There are twice-yearly presidency foreign minister visits to Washington and the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs meets twice a year with the EPC troika political directors (under secretary level) -- the troika consists of the current EC Council presidency country along with the preceeding and succeeding countries. The US-EPC dialogue has been confidential and we are able to share information and consult on foreign policy issues frankly and effectively.

Challenges

Elements in Congress have charged that the administration is paying inadequate attention 1992 issues. We do not agree, but should move promptly to correct this impression. The President in any case should make clear that we will safeguard our interests as we continue to encourage European integration.

The President can take advantage of his May trip to Europe to highlight administration attention to 1992 issues and to show support for enhanced US-EC political cooperation. We should be careful, however, not to appear to support Delors' ambitions to enhance the Commission's role in areas where the member states have not yet agreed.

Initiatives

Presidential Statement on 1992.

- The President should, following his meeting with President Delors, specifically address 1992 issues in brief public comments.
- The statement should be positive, pointing out the benefits of the program to EC economic integration and to the world economy and should be put in the context of forty years of US support for European integration.
- The administration's concern about possible drawbacks in the 1992 program should also be covered -- stated in positive terms by asserting US expectations that it will promote free and fair trade, and investment.
- The President should point to his meetings with Commission President Delors in Brussels and in Washington in June to underscore the high level of administration interest in European integration and the 1992 program.
- The President should announce that his administration will give high priority to working with the EC on the full range of economic and political issues; that the top levels of State and USTR are tasked to assure a vigorous and coordinated USG approach to European integration and the 1992 program respectively; that all US agencies will be engaged; and that he expects the newly-named US Ambassador to the EC to play a pivotal role as well.

Presidential Statement on the US-EC Political Cooperation

- During his Mainz speech, the President should emphasize the importance of US-EC cooperation in dealing with regional issues such as Central American and the Middle East, and transnational issues, such as development, debt, terrorism, and the environment.
- He should also stress that the West needs to work together to encourage positive developments in Eastern Europe.
- He should point to positive actions taken by the Community on human rights and regional issues in Lebanon, in Afghanistan, and on the Rushdie affair.

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Possible Presidential Proposal on the Environment
for Presentation at the NATO Heads
of State Meeting

Objective:

An international convention to establish the framework for expediting the provision of emergency assistance in response to natural or environmental disasters.

Background:

Following the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the international community quickly agreed on two international conventions that provided for early notification in the case of a nuclear accident and for emergency assistance. In the case of the emergency assistance convention, the agreement provides for inter alia:

- mechanisms to provide emergency assistance,
- direction and control of that assistance,
- functions of competent national authorities and international agencies,
- reimbursement of costs,
- privileges, immunities and facilities for assisting personnel,
- transit of personnel, equipment, and property,
- and claims and compensation.

These conventions were negotiated in record time (about six weeks) and were promptly ratified by many nations. They proved uncontroversial and have already been utilized in radiological accidents and in the cases of reporting Soviet submarine accidents.

The Proposal:

A convention similar to the nuclear emergency assistance agreement could be negotiated under U.S.-Soviet, NATO-Warsaw Pact, or multilateral auspices. Dr. Frank Press, President of the National Academy of Sciences has advocated just such an agreement. A similar convention could establish a similar framework for emergency assistance in regard to a wide range of natural disasters and environmental accidents, including:

- earthquakes,
- major storms,
- floods and tidal waves,
- major oil spills,
- and toxic chemical releases.

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Strengths and Weaknesses:

A new convention of this type would build on the Chernobyl precedent. There is also recent precedent in East/West assistance. Both we - in the case of the Valdez incident - and the Soviets - in Armenia - have now received assistance in the case of such disasters. Moreover, our NATO allies might have much to gain from such a convention, given their concern about possible environmental damage from industrial facilities in East Bloc nations such as the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Further, this proposal would not require a commitment of resources on a day-to-day basis. On the negative side, some believe this proposal is not significant enough to impress public opinion. It is also not clear it is possible or desirable to limit this to an East/West focus. In addition, some might consider such a convention a drain on Western resources, while the East Bloc would not be willing or able to provide commensurate aid.

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Eastern European Economic Initiative

Setting:

--There is a broad Western consensus to support Eastern European political and economic reform. There is agreement as well that the flow of resources should be market driven and for viable projects. To support these objectives, a number of Western countries are working to improve the climate for greater private sector involvement in Eastern Europe.

--Several have OPIC-type investment agreements in place (e.g., UK-Poland) or under discussion (e.g., France-Poland).

--Several (Switzerland, Norway, the EC) offer GSP to Romania; Austria provides GSP to Hungary. (The generally negative experience with Romania on GSP and "developing country" limitations attached to most European GSP programs make it likely that attempts to expand the program to include other Eastern European countries would meet strong resistance.)

--The FRG may make an additional 100 million Deutschmarks in Hermes export credits available to Poland; trade between the FRG and Poland remains strong despite bilateral debt problems.

--The British are undertaking a management study in Poland.

--Most countries have Joint Economic Councils (e.g., FRG - Romania) although these are not all active.

--The Allies also feel that the West would benefit from increased IMF involvement in economic reform efforts of debt-burdened Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary).

Concept:

--The United States should lead this effort to improve the conditions for the private sector revival upon which Eastern Europe's future economic viability depends.

--At the NATO Summit, the President could outline in general terms his desire for a Western initiative, which would include but not be limited to greater private sector involvement in trade and investment with reforming Eastern European countries (e.g., it could also encompass expansion of people-to-people programs, special private-sector sponsored high school exchanges, etc.).

--The specifics of the initiative would be set out during the President's July trip: e.g., the initiative could include such elements as "Adam Smith" fellowships, NATO-sponsored exchange programs and an Eastern European development bank (see separate papers).

--The President could also indicate that debt proposals now under consideration could be applied to Eastern European countries that meet global reform criteria.

Approach:

--We should alert Allies of our intention to propose a Western economic initiative in advance of the NATO Summit; we should cite their efforts and the President's recent speech on Poland as indicative of the approach that Western countries should take in response to significant political and economic reform in Eastern European countries.

--At the NATO summit, the President could lay the groundwork for his proposals by outlining in general terms to his desire to see contacts develop across a broad political and economic spectrum.

--At that time, he might also wish to indicate that he is working on a general policy initiative along these lines (although this risks undercutting his July announcement).

--The President's NATO statement will be seen by the U.S. business community as an important signal that our interest in promoting private sector ties extends beyond Poland to all reforming countries in the region.

--His NATO statement should be followed up immediately by high level contacts with interested business leaders to build the advance private sector support necessary to give substance to the July speech.

Caveat:

--We should not use the NATO Summit to launch a detailed economic initiative.

--Presented in the NATO context, the Soviets could choose to characterize our desire to see the economic opening of Eastern Europe to the West as a "military" objective.

--Labeling this as a "NATO" initiative would also mean excluding interested neutrals such as Switzerland and the EFTA states (e.g., Austria, the Nordics), who could be important to the long-term success of the effort.

--Whether the initiative would extend to the USSR, and on what terms, remains to be determined.

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ECONOMIC OUTREACH TO EASTERN EUROPE

CONCEPT:

The Economic Outreach program would coordinate a flow of public and private sector resources to Eastern Europe to encourage the development of more market-oriented, democratic societies. While much of the financing for the program would come from non-official sources, some limited official financial participation would be mandatory to convince the private sector of the seriousness of the Western commitment. Further, to launch the program, it would be necessary to have an advance financial commitment from one or more major U.S. firms or business organizations to give the program credibility and as seed money to attract other donors.

In addition, Western governments would be called upon to provide an improved climate for private sector involvement by identifying and removing significant barriers to trade. (For example, EC countries might be asked to accelerate removal of quantitative restrictions on Eastern European manufactured goods and agricultural products; the United States would remove or relax quotas on some textile products.)

The program could spawn a broad range of activities, such as: an Eastern European Investment Bank; Debt for Enterprise Swaps; a coordinated approach to new official lending to Eastern Europe; a Managerial Scholarships program (separate paper); an International Business Roundtable on Eastern Europe, and Marketing and Investment Seminars in Eastern Europe.

o THE EASTERN EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK: The United States and other Western countries would participate in the capitalization and initial management of an investment bank for Eastern Europe. Loans from the bank would be limited to single country projects or joint ventures involving Western partners. Loans would only be granted based on standard Western banking practices, i.e., on commercial terms for projects which appear commercially viable. The establishing organization would provide key management personnel for the bank for its initial period with Eastern European nationals being training to take over management in phases. The bank would be controlled by a Board of Directors. Ex officio seats on the board would be given to Eastern European central bankers and finance ministers. However, effective control of the bank would remain with the countries providing the capitalization.

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o DEBT FOR ENTERPRISE SWAPS: The nascent private sector in Eastern Europe has difficulty obtaining start-up capital. Under this program, Western governments would "swap" official debt to create Private Sector Development Funds in participating countries. The lending government would write off a small portion of officially-guaranteed debt and the debtor government would place a matching amount, in local currency, in a fund to finance domestic private sector investment. Capital would be made available at commercial rates, to Eastern European entrepreneurs.

o COORDINATED OFFICIAL LENDING: Western governments would agree to focus official credit or credit guarantees on projects in Eastern Europe, which promote market-oriented reform or serve consumer welfare, or which generate Eastern export earnings for repayment of debt. (Such criteria are not dissimilar to those used by the World Bank but would represent a major shift for many countries, whose official export credit programs are focussed primarily on export promotion.) There would be an implicit consensus to expand official lending to participating Eastern European countries, or at a minimum not to close off such lending despite existing debt overhangs or arrearages.

o INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE: The private sector would be asked to form a group to coordinate with governments and act as a contact point/magnet for private sector contributions. The group would provide information exchange on doing business in Eastern Europe, establish national subgroups on individual countries, and mount Seminars and Trade/Investment missions for its members. Official government support would be limited to the participation of high-level officials in Roundtable meetings and events and to some enhanced provision of commercial information, e.g., through expansion of government publications, such as US Department of Commerce reports.

CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION:

The Economic Outreach program would be open to Eastern European countries that are attempting to introduce market-oriented economic reforms. Western countries would make clear that meaningful change must come from within the societies and that Western support is only designed to support internal reform efforts. In addition, a country's participation would be dependent upon their compliance with CSCE human rights standards and extension of economic freedoms such as free labor unions and internationally-recognized worker rights, the right to hold property, and to engage in private enterprise. Political criteria (e.g., conclusion of major arms reduction agreements) could also be included to maximize U.S. Congressional support.

LAUNCHING THE OUTREACH PROGRAM:

- o The President would propose the plan, outlining its elements and announcing an amount of money already pledged by one or more private sector participants.
- o He would also announce that the administration would seek legislation to remove trade barriers, e.g., textile quotas, or to seek access to specific USG programs such as the General System of Preferences (GSP) or Overseas Private Investment Insurance (OPIC) for reforming Eastern European economies.

STRENGTHS:

- o US Leadership Role: The campaign would assert U.S. leadership in Western efforts to promote positive change in Eastern Europe. It would provide an economic incentive for Eastern Europe countries to participate fully in reform efforts.
- o Synergy: There is a strong desire on the part of Western governments to see economic reforms take hold in Eastern Europe. Many Western governments are already working to support reform efforts in countries, such as Poland and Hungary. This program would provide a platform for additional efforts, helping to channel resources effectively.
- o Private Sector Role: The program recognizes the importance of both foreign and indigenous private sector involvement in economic restructuring. It encourages greater private sector participation at a time when management, technology and resource flows are most needed.
- o Balance: The program provides an economic element to our approach to Eastern Europe. It complements and supports efforts in the areas of arms control and human rights.
- o European stability: By assisting the Eastern Europeans to "catch up" with their Western neighbors, expanding trade and investment ties and encouraging broader contacts across the East-West divide, we provide a better underpinning for longterm regional political stability.

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WEAKNESSES:

o Potential to undermine US policy: We treat Eastern European countries on an individual basis. This permits us to encourage reform (e.g., in Poland) and to build individual country links to the West. A "Western" program to address problems in Eastern Europe could encourage an "Eastern" response, leading to an increased "Eastern Bloc" outlook.

o CEMA: Strengthening the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) to coordinate Eastern European development has been a longterm Soviet goal and one which is directly opposed to Western interests. A coordinated Western approach to Eastern Europe runs the risk of doing for the Soviets what they have failed to do themselves, i.e., create greater incentives for intra-CEMA economic cooperation, strengthening internal economic ties and intra - CEMA dependency. This is especially true of proposed cross-border institutions, such as the Eastern European Development Bank.

o Soviet reaction: If excluded, the Soviet Union could interpret the initiative either as an aggressive propaganda move or as a frontal attack on Soviet leadership in Eastern Europe. If the program is extended to permit possible Soviet participation, we face difficulties in establishing acceptable criteria and in addressing the broader impact of a greatly expanded trading relationship.

o Crisis of Expectations: Even with private sector involvement, we won't have the massive resources some believe are needed to restructure stagnating Eastern European economies from the ground up. To the extent that the program were perceived as a "Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe", it would raise unrealistic expectations in many Eastern European countries. When it became clear that a transfer of resources on a "Marshall Plan" scale was not envisioned, we would lose credibility, both with the Eastern Europeans and with our Western Allies. To reduce this likelihood, we must avoid both the name and any comparison to a "Marshall Plan" for Eastern Europe. Use of the name serves only to underline the differences in size and objectives of this program and create disappointment over the lack of substantial government financing which characterized the 1940s Marshall Plan.

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o Anti-Market Backlash: If short-term expectations are raised and not met, disappointed Eastern European workers could oppose the introduction of long-term austerity measures by reforming governments. The public backlash could be strong enough to undermine the fragile political consensus in countries such as Poland. To the degree that disappointment is directed at the short-term costs of reform, it could undermine support for the market experiment, playing into the hands of minority advocates of a return to Marxist central planning.

o The Fatted Calf: In Congress and elsewhere, what we do for Eastern Europe may be viewed as a "floor" for assistance to be offered to other debtor and/or developing countries, particularly those with a better record of democratic government. A U.S. program to provide concessions in trade and official financial flows will be followed closely by governments in Latin America, Africa and South East Asia as well as by less-developed members of NATO, e.g., Turkey and Portugal. All may demand equal or better treatment.

o Policy Inflexibility: An initiative driven largely by the private sector would be difficult to turn off if there were a rapid, unfavorable change either in the political climate of an Eastern country (e.g., 1960s-style unrest) or in overall East-West relations.

o Congressional Resistance: For that and other reasons, Congressional resistance to changes requiring legislation to relax quotas, extend USG programs or provide new funding for Eastern Europe is likely to be strong. ("Swapping" roughly 2 percent of U.S. official debt to Eastern Europe would require an appropriation of 50 million dollars, almost all of it going to Poland.)

o U.S. labor: Organized labor will lobby against any extension of GSP or OPIC or any change in EXIM bank programs which would remove requirements that the Bank not finance projects with the export potential to injure U.S. producers.

o Western Resistance: Unless they see a significant USG political and/or economic investment in this program, Western governments are unlikely to make concessions of their own. While some (e.g., Switzerland, Norway) are seeking a new mechanism to support reform in Eastern Europe, most seem comfortable working bilaterally or through existing institutions. Without something major to put on the table - e.g., significant U.S. trade concessions, granting of MFN to all reforming economies, funding for new indigenous private sector investment - we will have difficulty in attracting their support.

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INTERAGENCY ATTITUDES:

- o Treasury is likely to oppose any outlay for financial programs, such as Debt for Enterprise or the Eastern European Investment Bank.
- o USTR may oppose unilateral trade concessions for the Eastern Europeans on the grounds that it would undermine our negotiating leverage in the GATT. USTR will oppose expanding GATT membership to include more Eastern European countries at this time.
- o Commerce should support expanding trade with reforming Eastern European economies but may not have the resources to provide more commercial support.
- o Defense : Some elements of defense will oppose the entire approach out of hand. They will argue that the fungibility of funds means that money from Western public and private sources for Eastern Europe only serves to release funds for Warsaw Pact military purposes. In addition, some elements at Defense will argue against the buildup of long-term business relationships and investments which could over time lead to pressures for transfer of higher technology and production techniques.

ALLIED REACTION:

- o The Allies will welcome, in general terms, a U.S. decision to promote private sector development in Eastern Europe, believing that their economies stand to reap the greatest benefits from such an effort.
- o However, they will be sceptical of any US initiative that does not seem to involve a significant USG political and/or economic commitment.
- o Some will be equally sceptical over any potential undermining of existing institutions, such as the GATT and the Paris Club.
- o Many will be reluctant to swap official debt or to provide financial backing for an investment bank which could compete with their own lending institutions.
- o Most will object to efforts to change bilateral export credit criteria, arguing that it will only duplicate World Bank lending (and erode their ability to promote their own exports.)
- o All will have difficulty agreeing on common criteria to determine, e.g., whether a country's performance, as measured by CSCE compliance, makes it eligible for a common outreach program.

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APPROACH:

- o The Free Market Outreach program should be presented first as a Presidential speech.
- o We will need to lay the groundwork with our Allies, the Congress and the private sector. (The last is mandatory if we are to acquire some funding commitment, e.g., for management scholarships.)
- o The final outreach program, e.g., exact elements to be included and the institutional structure, should be shaped through these consultations, to develop a framework attractive enough to gain broad political and financial support.

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Legislative Exchanges with Eastern Europe

The Concept

Responding to the movement toward democratic pluralism in Eastern Europe, the President, speaking at the NATO Summit, should propose that the NATO countries develop a program of Western legislative exchanges with Eastern European legislative bodies. Such exchanges would help bring democratic values and processes directly to the attention of Eastern governments. Eastern legislators visiting the West would see how genuine democracies function while Western legislators would be able to see first hand and comment upon Eastern practices. Such exchanges would further understanding between East and West, perhaps impart to the East information and guidance on democratic processes at a critical time, and be a positive step toward breaking down the division of Europe, a major goal of the Alliance.

Background

Until several years ago, contacts between Western and Eastern parliamentary bodies were few. Eastern legislative bodies have generally been sham affairs. In a one-party communist system, they were not fora for open debate but mere rubber stamps for regime policy, serving a purely fictional role. Western legislative visitors to socialist countries generally had to make protocolary calls on their parliamentary counterparts, but these were not substantive meetings. Eastern regimes, anxious to be seen as legitimate democratic governments, have often pushed for legislative contacts with the West, but Western legislators have been wary of according their Eastern "counterparts" equal stature given the inherent fallacy of the Eastern claims to have genuine parliamentary systems.

Reforms in the East have, however, altered the picture. While the legislatures remain the tools of one party dictatorships, they are opening up in some Eastern countries. In Poland, the Roundtable accords mark a major advance toward a genuine parliament with members of the non-communist opposition able to hold seats and perhaps exercise real power over government programs. In Hungary, legislative changes have been less dramatic than in Poland, but the Hungarian parliament has become a scene of free and independent debate, albeit within the confines of a generally one-party system. Hungary also intends to move toward a real multi-party system by 1990. And in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev appears to be granting the Supreme Soviet actual authority and responsibility. The national assemblies in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and the GDR, however, follow the old Eastern pattern.

Contacts between Western and Eastern legislators are not

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new. The Interparliamentary Union (IPU) meets regularly (last year in Sofia, Bulgaria) at which members from Eastern and Western national assemblies attend (Rep. Claude Pepper led the U.S. delegation to Sofia). The European Parliament also sponsors contacts and meetings, however U.S. Congressional participation has been scant. Similarly the East has had initiatives of its own, the latest being a meeting of speakers of parliaments hosted by the Polish Sejm (Speaker Wright declined to attend; Congressman Lantos did represent the U.S. Congress). Overall, contacts have increased in recent years, but a regular exchange program has not surfaced. As noted, U.S. Congressional interest in contacts with the East has been limited.

Pros

The President's proposal would respond to a dramatic change in Eastern Europe--the re-emergence of genuine politics in some Eastern countries. In Poland and Hungary there is a clear need and desire of Eastern legislators now embarking on a genuine parliamentary experience to become better acquainted with Western practitioners. The help Western legislators can provide to the East as well as the knowledge the Eastern legislators could gain in the West would exert a positive influence on the development of parliamentary democracy and practices in the region. In the other, less reform minded Eastern countries, the exchange program could influence a cadre of people who might comprise the core of a future movement toward greater democracy. Since the East has long pushed for such contacts, largely for the image of legitimacy it may impart, these regimes would be hard put to reject a Western initiative.

Finally, the President's proposal would reflect positively on U.S. leadership in the West, and give substance to NATO's call for effective contacts with the East encouraged in the NATO report on Eastern Europe adopted by NATO ministers last winter. The President's proposal would also build on current developments moving in our direction in Eastern Europe.

Cons

To be effective, the President's proposal would require strong Congressional support. The Congress as a whole has not exhibited great interest in developing contacts with the East. Certain members of a conservative persuasion may recoil in horror at the idea of developing exchanges with Communist parliaments and could pose problems for the Administration. Other members may encounter difficulty supporting such an

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exchange program due to hostility from East European ethnic constituencies who would see these exchanges as a confirmation of Communist rule over their homelands. Lastly, opening this program to all Eastern countries regardless of progress toward democracy, could dilute our overall policy of differentiation in Eastern Europe.

Alternative

The President could indicate in advancing his proposal that while the program is intended to embrace all of the East, exchanges would be encouraged first with those Eastern European nations where meaningful parliamentary reforms are underway, such as in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. Exchanges would not be offered to the other Eastern countries until they gave evidence of movement toward genuine representativeness. Such an approach would be in keeping with the U.S. policy of differentiation as well as the conditional approach to contacts with the East adopted by NATO ministers last winter.

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THEMES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

May 26 - June 2, 1989

I. OVERALL THEMES FOR TRIP

1. The durability of the Western Alliance rests on our shared heritage and common Western values; NATO is the foundation institution, but the Atlantic Community is broader than any single institution.
2. European unity can offer the basis for a more creative transatlantic partnership; Europe's progress toward economic integration and political and defense cooperation is welcome.
3. We share a vision for the future, one of overcoming the division of Europe on the strength of Western values; we offer a community of values to which all who pursue free societies, free markets, are invited to join.
4. Together, we are prepared as an Alliance to meet the challenges and opportunities of the changing East-West context on the basis of our values and a strong defense.

II. SUB-THEMES FOR INDIVIDUAL STOPS

Rome

Constancy and commitment of GOI in Alliance tasks
(Comiso acceptance of INF missiles vital in achieving INF ban; 401st wing shows steadfastness)

Common values have guided our cooperation on modern challenges (drugs, terrorism, environment)

Value of growing economic ties; strong, open economies vital to Western security

Vatican visit can reiterate values of West and their role in overcoming division of Europe

Brussels

Strength of Alliance, relevance of strong defense for pursuing political/economic agenda with East

NAC intervention should stress all four themes
(the second -- that of European unity -- can be pegged to risks, roles, responsibilities)

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Brussels
(cont.)

President should meet Delors, stressing firm transatlantic partnership, support for Europe's economic integration/political cooperation, partnership with Europe of the future

Bonn

Overall theme should be cohesiveness and strength of bilateral relations (meeting with FRG youth can focus on future of bilateral ties, e.g.) on 40th anniversary of FRG's founding

Stress that NATO is foundation on which we stand: strong defense is the basis for political/economic dialogue with the East, as Harmel report notes

Central speech President's best public opportunity to state vision of West-West relations, including durability of transatlantic partnership, support for European unity (follow-up to Summit) and goal of ending division of Europe (including Germany and Berlin)

If decision made to go to Warsaw and/or Budapest in July, should announce intention here (the home of Ostpolitik)

London

Note shared heritage (e.g. at Messing Village) but focus also on change (hi-tech cooperation, business ties, alliance of equals)

Plug free societies, free markets

Democracies with a vision, a friendship moving forward in history to the next century

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THE PRESIDENT TAKES CHARGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA

1989 will be a crucial year for the Bush Administration: it is the year in which the President must take charge -- and be perceived as taking charge -- of the international agenda. Three interrelated events will inform this conclusion:

- the President's trip to Europe, to include a NATO Summit;
- the President's July trip to the Economic Summit; and
- his first meeting with Gorbachev.

The President must project early on his leadership and his agenda: he must establish himself not only as leader of the Alliance, but also as the source and inspiration of the full transatlantic agenda. The themes chosen for the first trip should also anticipate the President's mastery of the global economic agenda during his Paris Economic Summit trip. Based on these two successful visits, he can move forward to a meeting with Gorbachev in which he is clearly seen to set the agenda for superpower relations as well.

The following overall themes set the tone for the President's trip to Europe -- and provide a bridge to the second trip. Sub-themes are keyed to individual stops during the visit. Presidential initiatives are important insofar as they reinforce the impression of leadership; however, they should fit in with the trip's overall objectives.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *B*

SUBJECT:

Scope Paper -- Your Bilateral with Chancellor Kohl

Setting: Chancellor Kohl's preoccupation between now and December 1990 will be to get reelected. Although economically and politically, things could hardly be better for Germans, Kohl faces a tough battle with an electorate now preoccupied with the German Question. After his free fall in the polls last spring, Kohl rebounded during the summer. In recent weeks, though, criticism that he was trailing events in the GDR led him to go to Berlin, where he called much more aggressively than Genscher for "German unity."

Kohl's November 28 message to you, followed by your November 29 telephone conversation, demonstrated just how close your views and his are on the major East-West issues. His approach toward German reunification, though just as ambitious as Genscher's, is much more firmly rooted in the Western security system and a strong U.S. tie. Your meeting will be in opportunity to reaffirm your firm support for Kohl, particularly for his strongly Atlanticist approach to the German Question. Strong U.S. and Allied support, in turn, will help Kohl avoid a bidding war with Genscher on the subject.

Tenor and Objectives: While we, and Kohl, have been saying that we have no blueprint for German reunification, he is responding to domestic pressures to provide just that -- as in his November 28 Bundestag speech. Thus, while Bonn politicians blame others for harping on reunification, they themselves are talking about little else. It is not that the West German populace demands reunification now but that it needs -- in true Germanic fashion -- to try to create predictability out of a spontaneously evolving situation between the two Germanys. Alongside hopes for realizing the long-deferred goal of German reunification are fears of millions of refugees fleeing chaos in the GDR. So far, Genscher has been more successful than Kohl in satisfying these competing demands.

Kohl's relations with Genscher had been deteriorating for some time but took a sharp turn for the worse after the November 10 debacle in Berlin, when Kohl was booed and Genscher cheered (by a largely SPD crowd) before the Wall. Kohl's efforts to recover from this humiliation may be carrying him too far out front on the German Question. The ten-point agenda he proposed in his Bundestag speech, for example, calls for free elections in the GDR, leading "very soon" to new "confederative structures" between the two Germanys and ultimately to reunification.

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Genscher, as you saw in your meeting with him on November 21, will not be easily outflanked on the German Question. His goal is of course German reunification, but on different terms than Kohl, or the U.S., would like to see. His vision is of a "Europe for the Europeans": he seeks a diminished role for NATO and the U.S. within the context of a comprehensive arms reductions regime, which in turn will free the FRG to take the lead in promoting a new European order. As you will recall, Genscher leaves immediately after Brussels for a visit to Moscow.

Despite Genscher's personal popularity, he needs Kohl as much as Kohl needs him. His Free Democratic Party still hovers just above the five percent margin needed to remain in parliament (and hence in government), and his political advantage remains as part of the present coalition rather than with the SPD. Thus we can expect continuing divisions within the Bonn coalition, as well as criticism from the opposition, on the German Question.

The border issue is a case in point. Although the recent Bundestag resolution renouncing territorial claims against Poland "now and in the future" passed by a wide margin, some of Kohl's CDU deputies abstained (not wishing to foreclose the possibility of a future "greater Germany"). This issue is likely to intensify, with the Republikaner and others calling for reunification within the 1937 borders -- i.e., including a huge chunk of western Poland and a small part of the USSR.

For all his political difficulties, Kohl's attitude on the German issue -- his strong support for NATO and EC integration, as well as his reassurances at the EC summit in Paris -- deserves our backing. He is a bulwark of Atlanticism at a time when the heady events in the GDR cause some in the FRG to slip their Western moorings.

Your private meeting will bolster Kohl at home. He will want to demonstrate that he was consulted before and after Malta and received special treatment at Brussels. He will also project himself as an influential partner in securing progress on arms control without diminishing the U.S. security commitment, and in winning Allied confidence on the German Question. In supporting Kohl in this way, you can use your meeting to encourage him to continue defining German interests in strongly Atlanticist terms.

One disquieting note: in a November 28 briefing to the U.S., UK, and French ambassadors, Horst Teltschik said that Kohl had consulted with the Soviets beforehand on his Bundestag speech and also (quoting Ambassador Walters' reporting cable) "all possible questions, including a peace treaty, a four-power conference, and the future of NATO and the Warsaw Pact." If accurate, this report would have Kohl consulting more closely with the Soviets than with us. In a friendly way, you might ask Kohl and Teltschik about the nature of these discussions.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1989

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *(initials)*

FROM: *pc* SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Economic Assistance for Jordan

In response to our memorandum to State and Defense concerning the President's interest in extending additional U.S. economic assistance to Jordan, State has sent us a status report (Tab I) on the program as follows:

- Defense is looking into the possibility of reprogramming or transferring \$20M in foreign military sales assistance for Jordan.
- State is preparing a message to Embassy Amman reaffirming the President's commitment to provide Jordan with \$27M in grant food aid for FY 90 -- the same level as FY 89.
- We are transmitting a letter from the President to King Fahd requesting additional Saudi economic assistance for Jordan.

Attachment
Tab I Status Report

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 7, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC/S

FROM: SANDRA CHARLES *sc*

SUBJECT: Package #5899

This is an information memorandum. No further action is required. Please retain for your files.

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FY90 Food Aid and Agricultural Credits

We are preparing a joint State/A.I.D. cable for transmission to Embassy Amman, reaffirming the President's commitment to provide Jordan with \$27 million in grant food aid for FY90--the same food aid level authorized in FY89.

The cable clarifies that the \$27 million in FY89 Section 416 aid includes commodities worth \$7 million to cover the Jordanian component of ocean freight costs, and states that Section 416 commodities are again planned as the primary source of the FY90 food aid commitment. We recognize that Jordan has little capacity to absorb more sorghum in FY90, and will need other commodities for the most part. However, it is difficult to project what commodities will be on the FY90 Section 416 docket because their availability is determined by the Secretary of Agriculture in the new fiscal year.

It may prove impossible to fulfill the entire FY90 commitment of \$27 million from Section 416 stocks, in which case grant corn, rice or other commodities under PL-480 title II would be sought to fill the gap. However, the ultimate availability of PL-480 resources depends on both the FY90 appropriations bill and U.S. agricultural harvest conditions, which have been adversely affected this year by the continuing drought. With regard to possible PL-480 aid to Jordan, no per-capita income waiver is required but a waiver will be needed if UMR requirements (commercial grain purchases) cannot be met.

Continuing FY90 GSM credits at the FY89 levels--\$78 million in GSM-102 and 103--should not pose a problem. However, limitations on new debt under Jordan's recent standby agreement with the IMF may preclude or sharply reduce the country's capacity to utilize USG-credit guarantees under the GSM-103 program. Funding adjustment between the GSM-102 and 103 categories may therefore be required to fulfill the President's credit-guaranty commitment to Jordan.

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July 26, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Assistance for Jordan

The July 14 memo from Philip Hughes to the Executive Secretaries in State and Defense expressed the President's strong interest in examining opportunities for the U.S. to extend additional assistance to Jordan. We have taken the following actions with regard to the three areas outlined in that memo:

-- In view of the postponement of King Fahd's visit, we are preparing a letter from the President to King Fahd which asks the Saudis to provide additional assistance to Jordan and help in enlisting others to do the same.

-- The question of the reprogramming/transfer of \$20 million in FMS assistance for Jordan from Defense to State was discussed at the Baker-Cheney-Scowcroft working breakfast on Wednesday, July 26. We will be following up with DOD and can then proceed to talk with Congress on the issue.

-- At Tab 1 is a report on the status of FY90 food aid and agricultural credits for Jordan.

J. Stapleton Roy
J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - FY90 Food Aid and Agricultural Credits (Jordan)

Tab 2 - July 14 NSC Memorandum re Assistance to Jordan

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 14, 1989

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MEMORANDUM FOR J. STAPLETON ROY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL GEORGE P. COLE, JR.
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

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2010-1255-MR
SCS 8/26/13

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SUBJECT: Assistance for Jordan

The President has expressed a strong interest in examining the opportunities for the U.S. to extend additional assistance to Jordan. Accordingly, please undertake the following steps:

- the talking points for the visit of King Fahd should include an inquiry about the possibility of further Saudi assistance for Jordan in view of its pressing needs; (e)
- a report should be prepared for the NSC as as soon as possible on the status of the reprogramming/transfer of \$20 million in FMS assistance for Jordan, as discussed during the visit of King Hussein in April. (e)
- and, a report should be forwarded to the NSC on the status of the President's commitments to King Hussein in April to continue FY 90 food aid and agricultural credits at FY 89 levels, i.e., food aid grants at \$27 million and GSM-103 credits at \$65 million. (e)


G. Philip Hughes
Executive Secretary

cc: Executive Secretary
Department of Treasury

Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Agriculture

Chief of Staff
Agency for International Development

Executive Associate Director
Office of Management and Budget

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DRAFT REPLY

Dear King Fahd:

I regret that you had to delay your visit to the United States, but I look forward to your visit in September. I understand your great concern about the seriousness of the situation in Lebanon. As I said on the phone, we wish you and the committee every success in finding a workable solution.

There was one subject I had intended to raise with you during your visit which is a matter of particular concern and urgency to me. As you know, an economic crisis of major proportions is building in Jordan; its potential consequences threaten the interests of both our countries.

Under the leadership of King Hussein, Jordan has taken steps to correct its economic problems. Unfortunately, none of these actions provide any immediate relief, or help avert the potential for economic upheaval. Until these measures have had time to take effect, Jordan has a substantial need for short-term financial assistance.

The United States is helping Jordan to relieve the pressure with our \$180 million program of grants, credits, and guarantees. Unfortunately, our tight budget constraints prevent me from doing all that is needed to help Jordan through this difficult period. I therefore would appreciate it if Saudi Arabia would consider providing additional extraordinary financial assistance to Jordan. Recognizing your generosity in

the past, I also would appreciate your help in marshalling additional aid from other potential benefactors.

I believe we share the view that the stability of Jordan under King Hussein's rule is crucial to regional security and to our mutual interests. I hope you will agree that this extraordinary situation merits our special attention and efforts.

I hope to hear from you on this matter and on the results of your efforts in Lebanon.

Barbara and I look forward to your visit in September.
With warm regards,

Sincerely,

George Bush