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Tower, John, 1989

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2/15/89

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Tower

1. Budget cuts
2. Intelligence prog cuts
3. Wolfowitz
4. NSR's

COLONEL ZANE E. FINKELSTEIN
245 GLENDALE STREET
CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Tower

24 February 1989

FEB 28 1989

LTG. Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

Dear General:

It is with the utmost reluctance that I not only interrupt your day, but also involve myself in matters way above my pay grade. I do so with full knowledge both of what decision-makers rightly think of officious intermeddlers and what risk is involved. Nonetheless, I feel that I owe General George Brown at least this much and the Country a lot more.

General Brown, just prior to his death, was visibly distraught with Secretary Rumsfeld and the attack on military professionals he represented. Every issue was politicalized - nothing was professional or objective. General Brown suggested that the kind of loyalty Mr. Rumsfeld demanded approached the infamous "Hitler Oath" required of the German Officer Corps. General Brown stated that when Mr. Rumsfeld said to Secretary Weinberger, "I hope you can control these people (The JCS), I never could," he made the CJCS' job almost impossible.

I urge that you or the President discuss this issue with the then JCS (Gen Meyer? Adm. Halladay? Gen. Jones? Broughes?) prior to replacing Senator Tower with him if, as the Press indicates, the President is considering.

I wish you and those you serve the very best.

Very respectfully,

Zane



LTG. Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500



COLONEL ZANE E. FINKELSTEIN

245 GLENDALE STREET

CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

214 Massachusetts Avenue NE, Suite 360, Washington, D.C. 20002

February 13, 1989

Dear General Scowcroft,

Just wanted to let you know
that we continue to support John
Tower for Secretary of Defense.

Best regards,


John Kwapisz

John Kwapisz
Executive Director



Brent -

I could not

UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS

Fulbright Institute of International Relations

722 West Maple

Fayetteville, Arkansas 72701

(501) 575-2006

WILLIAM E. JACKSON, JR.

Senior Fellow

*William
this one. The
President & ought
to have his capital.
As ever, Bill Tuck*

February 6, 1989

RE: The Nomination of John Tower
to be Secretary of Defense

"What's a Confirmation Between Friends?"

by

William E. Jackson, Jr.

Senior Fellow

Fulbright Institute
of
International Relations

@ 1989

Phones:

(501) 575-2006
(501) 442-5434

Just as there must be no "sacred cows" in the defense budget, there must be no golden passports or "sacred nominees" to the highest appointive offices in the land. It is imperative that a confirmation hearing not be -- or perceived to be -- an "old boy" rite of passage.

Some philosophers have asserted that democracy presupposes the perfectibility of man. But the Founding Fathers had a different view: "If men were angels" said the 50th Federalist, "no government would be necessary." One might amend that to read: if men were angels, there would be no need for a Senate check on the nominees of Presidents. As Gouverneur Morris, one of the architects of the Constitution's "advice and consent" clause put it in 1787: "As the President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as the Senate was to concur, there would be security."

The Constitution Between Friends

There is a great temptation, however, to ask in a "honeymoon" period with a new President: "What's the Constitution between friends?" This question from an anecdote about President Grover Cleveland provides in capsule form the recurring conflict between constitutional principles and responsibilities, such as approving or disapproving presidential nominees, and short-run political objectives, such as rushing to help a new President get his team aboard.

Every Senator has a duty not just to make a personal

judgment about presidential nominees but he or she also has a responsibility to make an institutional judgment. So it is not desirable or acceptable to leave an impression with the public that sitting Senators are saying to former Senators nominated to Cabinet office: "What's a nomination between friends?"

Constitutional restrictions are erected to keep the actions of the executive and legislative branches within certain boundaries -- not only of legality but of propriety as well, when it comes to nominations to high office. The lifestyle of a nominee becomes relevant to confirmation if, and only if, there is a pattern of behavior or a set of habits that cast doubt on his or her ability to carry out the responsibilities of the job.

Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense together with the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor, the CIA Director, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have the heaviest responsibility for advising the President on matters relating to the national security of the United States. In contrast to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense commands an organization so thoroughly interwoven into the fabric of American social, political, and economic life that his recommendations regarding national security carry influence on not only the foreign environment but the domestic one as well.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for preparing

the annual report to Congress on the biennial fiscal year budget and the five-year projection of defense programs. He is charged with overseeing a \$300 billion-plus budget with over 3 million military and civilian personnel under his direct jurisdiction -- not to mention the nuclear and conventional arsenals of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. The Secretary of Defense alone shares with the President, in the national military command authority, the "keys" for the initiation of the use of nuclear weapons. The Secretary of Defense is privy to the most sensitive secrets of the government, including intelligence sources and methods, and has under his direction and control the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Indeed, the Department of Defense is the largest executive agency in the intelligence business, consuming some three-quarters of the federal intelligence budget.

To briefly list these awesome responsibilities is sufficient reminder that the Senate, in voting on a Secretary of Defense nominee, is not just passing on another Cabinet officer (or picking an interesting politician and defense intellectual with whom to have lunch). Knowledge of the issues and the weapons may not be as important as management skills. Certainly they are not as important as character, judgment, credibility, and discretion.

Detachment in the Job

Secretaries of Defense since 1961 -- McNamara, Clifford, Laird, Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, Brown, Weinberger, Carlucci -- all have brought different skills and experiences to the job. There is one notable common thread in their backgrounds: every single one of them represented a greater detachment from the "defense culture" or a more independent perspective than the current nominee.

Former Senator Tower has critically referred to the "culture of the building" (Pentagon) and stated that it has to be changed. The Senate should beware of conversions on the confirmation road to Damascus. His entire record over three decades indicates that he is part of the problem, and not the solution. I refer to his membership on the SASC (Senate Armed Services Committee), representing one of the largest defense contractor constituencies (Texas). It is not too much of an exaggeration to say he seldom, if ever, met a weapon system he didn't like. While chairman of the committee, he stonewalled in 1983-1984, the attempt to reorganize the Pentagon that later led to the Goldwater-Nichols legislation; he was identified with parochial service interests, especially the NAVY. It is a joke to describe him as a champion of weapon procurement reform in those years. In 1985-1986, he chaired our strategic arms delegation (START) in Geneva -- dealing with the "Trinity" from "air and land and sea" (to borrow from that great hymn, "Eternal Father, Strong to Save"); and then turned

around in 1986-1988 to advise defense contractors on the possible impact of arms control agreements on their business!

Misleading Testimony

It has been well documented that Tower lobbied -- for fees in the range of \$1 million -- for several major defense contractors: LTV Aerospace; Martin Marietta; Rockwell International; Textron. Several times during the hearing, however, he denied advocating defense programs before the Executive Branch and -- even though he had inquired about the status of certain weapon systems in conversations with well-placed government officials -- he insisted to Senator Warner (the ranking Republican) that he had not "solicited" sensitive classified information. He was not a Senator, nor was he an arms control negotiator, but a private consultant when he sought information. We have to be realistic about this "realist."

Within weeks after leaving as START chairman, in 1986 Tower had signed on with Rockwell International; and Martin Marietta later employed him in 1987. Tower told the Armed Services Committee that he or his staff analyzed for the "senior management" of Martin Marietta the implications of START talks for "future product development" (such as SDI, MX, and Midgetman). For Rockwell, he provided "senior management" with his views on the future of the B-1 strategic bomber, and his staff analyzed the implications of arms negotiation on the future of SDI and Midgetman.

While insisting to the Armed Services Committee that "I gave value" to corporate clients, Tower denied to Senator Levin giving "enlightened" advice on probable outcomes of the arms control negotiations -- arguing that he was providing no more than "academic speculation" and what his clients could have read in the newspapers!

The chairman, Senator Nunn, asked: "Would it be appropriate to advise that a system was about to be eliminated in START?" This question drew attention to the fact that a ban on all mobile ICBMs became part of the American position at START, in November 1985, when Tower chaired the delegation; indeed, he personally presented that part of the negotiating package to Victor Karpov, his Soviet counterpart. Such a ban would have aborted not only new Soviet mobile ICBMs but the American multiple-warhead MX and the single-warhead Midgetman.

Martin Marietta in the early 1980s had a principal role in the development of the MX ICBM; it has a continuing role in the production of components of "Peacekeeper" (MX). Rockwell International -- which was the prime contractor for the B-1 -- has a development contract for the "rail garrison" MX. Rockwell provided the guidance system for the Minuteman III ICBM; and was one of three contractors for the Poseidon SLBM. Both Martin Marietta and Rockwell are contractors working on ballistic missile defense (SDI) programs.

To sum up, John Tower as the immediate past head of the

START delegation -- where he had bargained with the Russians over the strategic "triad" -- was in a unique position to provide enlightened, time-sensitive, advice to his corporate clients on highly secret negotiations involving the nation's strategic arsenal. Major cuts in the overall aggregate of bombers and missiles were being discussed in Geneva, in addition to a ban on mobile ICBMs. Did he advise as to whether the no-mobiles proposal was just a negotiating ploy; or whether the U.S. had a fall-back position to allow one exception to the ban -- permitting a single-warhead mobile ICBM (Midgetman)? What actions did the contractors take, in regard to trying to change the negotiating position of this country back in Washington, or in regard to adjusting their future plans to focus on weapon systems likely to survive the cut in Geneva?

It defies credibility to argue that former Senator Tower did not provide enlightened advice bearing upon management decisions.

Conclusion

Senators Nunn and Warner have stated that nominees to the Defense Department must be of unquestionable integrity. Public confidence in them is absolutely essential: "It is imperative that nominees should have and should be seen to have the public interest as their only goal. Actions which call into question this commitment are unacceptable."

John Tower is not anywhere near the best man for the job of Secretary of Defense at this time in our history.

"Nixon went to China" as an answer to the concerns raised is not persuasive. A Texan rediscovers oil might be a better analogy! This in a time of budget crunch and contracting scandals.

Senator Stuart Symington warned us years ago that national security lies not just in a strong defense, but also in a sound dollar and in the confidence of the American people. I do not see the need for someone associated with a "fire hose" approach to the defense budget and someone who is mired in the "revolving door" culture. I fail to see how he will inspire reform confidence or why he will give due consideration to fiscal constraints on the national budget.

In the final analysis, the Senate will vote as a body of 100 on the Tower nomination. What example is being rewarded if he is confirmed? To be an interesting character is not sufficient reason to be Secretary of Defense.

(William E. Jackson, Jr., served as Executive Director of the U.S. General Advisory Committee on Arms Control 1978-80, and as a legislative assistant in the U.S. Senate, 1974-77. This article is adapted from his testimony on the nomination of John Tower to be Secretary of Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., January 31, 1989.)

FROM

EVENT

DATE

1. Western Regional
Council (Bruce G.
Willison, COB)

Meet w/20 CEOs during
Council's Washington Forum
(previously met with Clark
& Carlucci)

Wed, Mar 15
(morning)

Yes___ No___

Prefer_____

Western Regional Council

January 30, 1989

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General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Room G-WW
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

As Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Western Regional Council, I invite you to meet with twenty Chief Executive Officers during the Council's Washington Forum on the morning of Wednesday, March 15, 1989.


The Western Regional Council is a coalition of the chief executive officers of fifty corporations with significant business activities in the West, including financial, engineering, transportation, utility, forest products, energy, manufacturing, mining and other enterprises. Enclosed is a list of WRC member companies.

During the two and one-half day WRC Washington Forum, we traditionally meet with Cabinet Secretaries, the Western Coalition of Senators, Representatives and other high-level federal government officials. We previously met with William Clark when he served as National Security Advisor to the President. On March 11, 1987, we met with Frank Carlucci in the Roosevelt Room at the White House.

While the focus of our organization is mostly on domestic policy issues, our CEO members are currently very interested in and concerned about foreign policy issues and their implications. They are also often asked their individual views on such issues at meetings later in the Forum with western Senators and Representatives. We would be delighted to meet with you briefly to hear your views.

We look forward to hearing from you. Should you have any questions, please contact Don Leonard at 801-363-7997. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,



Bruce G. Willison
Chairman of the Board

:ckl18L8

Western Regional Council

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Southwest Gas Corporation
Union Pacific Resources Company
U S WEST Communications
Utah Power and Light Company
Valley National Corporation
Washington Water Power Company
Weyerhaeuser Company

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