

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 85037
Folder ID Number: 85037-011

Folder Title:
Nixon, Richard M., President [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	President Richard Nixon to President George Bush Re: My China Trip (14 pp.)	11/5/89	(b)(1)	
01b. Paper	Re: Copy of Untitled Non-Paper Given to Jiang Zemin (3 pp.)	10/31/89	(b)(1)	C
01c. Memo	Mike Oksenberg to Karl Jackson Re: Deng Xiaoping Presentation to President Nixon about Fang Lizhi (3 pp.)	11/3/89	(b)(1)	TS
02. Paper	Re: The Crisis in Sino-American Relations (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
03. Paper	Re: Should We Help Gorbachev? (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap2276
OA/ID Number: 85037-011
Date Closed: 10/4/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S[2]
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	President Richard Nixon to President George Bush Re: My China Trip (14 pp.)	11/5/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [2]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Paper	Re: Copy of Untitled Non-Paper Given to Jiang Zemin (3 pp.)	10/31/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [2]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Memo	Mike Oksenberg to Karl Jackson Re: Deng Xiaoping Presentation to President Nixon about Fang Lizhi (3 pp.)	11/3/89	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [2]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Toast by Former President Nixon at a Banquet Hosted by
the Premier of the Peoples Republic of China

October 30, 1989

Mr. Premier:

We meet at a delicate moment in Sino-American relations. The tragedy that occurred in Beijing from June 2 to June 4 and the subsequent developments in your country and mine have cast a shadow over our relations.

My purpose in journeying to China is not to reexamine exactly what transpired in this city this past spring. The facts are clear enough. The cultural, political, and ideological differences between us, Mr. Premier -- you a Chinese communist who believes in Leninist rule, I an American conservative who believes in capitalism and democracy -- are too great to permit a common understanding of this tragedy. Let us recognize that our differences over recent events are huge and unbridgeable. But let us not become mired in endless and fruitless recriminations over the seeming impasse that has now developed between our two countries.

Both of our nations must now deal realistically with the aftermath. Both of our nations inhabit the same planet. Both of our nations possess nuclear weapons. Neither of our nations poses a military threat to the other. Neither of us wishes to return to the hostility and bitterness that characterized our relations for over 20 years, at such high cost to our peoples. Our separate national welfares demand that we continue to cooperate in many areas.

So let us return to the formula that has served us so well since my first journey to China in 1972, acknowledging our profound differences while realistically identifying and pursuing our common interests. This approach has been followed in bipartisan fashion by four successive Administrations, including those of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush.

What is the strategic basis for Sino-American relations in the 1990s? Why should our nations attach priority to our relationship? What practical steps can be taken by both sides to restore momentum to our relations?

To deal with these issues intelligently, we must first understand the new world in which we live. That world is going through a period of enormous change. International relations differ substantially from 1972, when Soviet expansionist activities were the primary factor which led to the Sino-American rapproach-

ment. Note the changes since then:

- o Some observers believe the Soviet Union is in the midst of profound change and no longer poses a significant threat to world peace.

- o Eastern European countries are asserting their independence and resuming their historic ties with Western Europe.

- o Western Europe is moving rapidly to the creation of an integrated economy, which will enhance its influence in the world.

- o Japan has become a global economic superpower and as a result is gaining increased political influence and a slowly growing military capacity.

- o China has enjoyed an extraordinary decade of economic growth by unleashing the remarkable entrepreneurial talents of its people. These days we primarily hear about the dramatic reforms in the Soviet Union. To keep things in perspective, we should bear in mind that in the ten years of the reforms Deng Xiaoping initiated in 1979, the per capita income of China has doubled. In the five years of Gorbachev's reforms, the per capita income of the Soviet Union has gone down. Events of recent months have raised doubts among some foreign observers about China's future, but a humanely governed China that is responsive to the yearnings of its people will continue its rapid ascent in world affairs.

- o Although suffering from government and trade deficits and facing numerous social problems, the United States is enjoying unprecedented prosperity and has rebuilt its defenses. Our people have gained renewed confidence in their future.

- o Throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia, small and weak governments confront problems that they lack the capacity to solve.

- o In East and Southeast Asia, the four dragons of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore have developed economies of global consequence and reach.

- o A truly international economy is emerging that transcends the capacity of individual governments to manage.

- o The telecommunications and computer transformations make it impossible for governments to halt the dissemination of ideas and information at their borders.

- o Problems that transcend national boundaries, such as

global warming, environmental degradation, population increase, communicable diseases, production of narcotics, and illegal migration of peoples demand increasing attention.

When we reflect in this fashion upon today's world and adopt a long-term, strategic perspective, the importance of Sino-American relations comes into focus. The basis of our relationship is clear. The reasons we must overcome our current difficulties are obvious. We still have common concerns that make cooperation between China and the United States an indispensable element in ensuring the welfare of our two peoples and serving the cause of peace and prosperity in the world.

o First, peace and security still depend upon nations having sufficient might to deter would-be aggressors. The United States and China continue to share an interest in maintaining a stable global balance of power.

o Second, the United States shares in China's interest to participate fully in the international economy.

o Third, the United States and China must cooperate in addressing the problems of interdependence. Our scientists, social scientists, and scholars in the humanities must be unfettered in their search for solutions to these problems.

o Fourth, it is neither in China's nor America's interest for your nation of over one billion people to return to its isolation. The certain result would be an angry and impoverished nation.

o And finally, China has an indispensable role to play in the maintenance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Peace cannot be maintained in Korea, the Taiwan issue cannot be resolved peacefully, the people of Hong Kong cannot enjoy a future as an autonomous, capitalist, and democratic entity, and tranquility cannot be found at last in Indochina unless China is constructively and responsibly engaged in regional affairs.

The choice is clear. Shall China turn away from greatness and consign itself to the backwater of oppression and stagnation? Or does it continue to venture forth on the open seas on a journey which may at times be rough but which leads to progress and peace and justice for its people?

The United States must decide whether it wishes to persist in the arduous journey begun 17 years ago. Does it wish to be involved in the development of a nation whose values and traditions differ from ours? Or does it wish to disengage itself from a

quarter of mankind who are destined to be one of the superpowers of the 21st century?

The challenges before us are enormous, but the opportunities are also great. For together, we can help create an era of unprecedented peace and prosperity for our peoples. Let us therefore rise above the acrimony of the moment and resume the progress and cooperation that are worthy of two great peoples.

May I therefore propose a toast

- o to the continued development of Sino-American relations;
- o to the Premier of the Peoples Republic of China; and
- o to the health of all our Chinese and American friends here tonight.

Toast by Former President Nixon at a Banquet Hosted by
the President of the Peoples Republic of China

November 1, 1989

Mr. President:

We meet at a critical time in the relations between our two countries. Americans will long remember the tragedy that recently occurred in this city and its continuing aftermath. And this memory will inevitably color American opinion and behavior toward China.

Lenin wrote that facts are stubborn things. The fact is that many in the United States, including many friends of China, believe the crackdown was excessive and unjustified. The events of April through June damaged the respect and confidence which most Americans previously had for the leaders of China.

On the other hand, as I have learned this week, many Chinese leaders deeply believe that the American reaction represents an intrusion in their internal affairs. The American response has included economic sanctions, cessation of high-level official contacts, and moral condemnation from a nation with inadequacies of its own. These measures have revived bitter personal memories among China's leaders. They recall bygone days, when their nation was bullied and exploited by outside powers. As a result, some Chinese now exhibit a distrust of the United States that is reminiscent of the period before 1972.

China's leaders now appear to claim that how they rule their country internally is no one else's business. Most Americans deeply believe, however, that international standards exist to guide the conduct of leaders anywhere. The age-old clash of ideas that now divides our nations is clear: The assertion of sovereignty of the state versus the universal rights of man.

But let us leave the philosophical realm. When ideology intrudes excessively into public affairs, disaster is sure to follow. I journeyed to China to explore a number of issues:

-- Our common strategic concern about Soviet adventurism was a major factor that brought us together. Today, when the conventional wisdom is that the Soviet threat has diminished -- some even proclaim that the Cold War is over -- what is the glue that can keep us together?

-- In view of its domestic problems, is China willing and able to play a major and constructive role in the maintenance

of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region?

-- Are martial law and political repression permanent features of life in China?

-- Is the door that China opened to the outside world to be closed, or can we continue and increase the exchange of people and ideas which has so enriched the lives of the people of both our countries?

-- Can the courageous and bold economic reforms that Chairman Deng Xiaoping initiated in 1979 be revitalized and continued, or will China revert to the stagnant situation that existed before?

-- In rooting out corruption and inflation, will China also root out the delicate new growth of individual enterprise that has doubled the per capita income of the Chinese people between 1979 and 1989?

My twenty hours of frank and wide-ranging discussions with China's leaders do not permit conclusive answers to these questions. But they do yield two unmistakable conclusions.

First, mutual efforts are required to restore momentum to our relations. At present, the Chinese side says the United States must take the first step. Many Americans say China must take the first step. If those attitudes had prevailed in 1971 and 1972, the Shanghai Communique would not exist. Neither normalization in 1979 nor resolution of our differences in 1982 and 1983 would have been possible. The only way to move forward is to journey together.

Second, the death of innocent people on June 2 through June 4 was a great tragedy. But another tragedy would be the death of a relationship and of policies that have served so well. We must not permit our real enemies -- misunderstanding, fruitless resentment, endless recrimination -- to close the door we opened with such high hopes 17 years ago.

American concern over the tragedy of June 2 through June 4 has as much to do with our compassion for the people of China as it does with our opposition to some policies of their government. What both sides must recognize is that this bond between our peoples is a precious thing. If we are concerned about the events of last June, it is because we want a better life for the people of China. If we worry that Chairman Deng's visionary reforms may stall, it is because we want a better life

for the people of China. If in my discussions with your leaders I have at times seemed to be alarmed at the deteriorating of Sino-American relations, it is because I want a better life for the people of China, and I know that there is much our two peoples can still do for each other.

Despite the differences that divide us today, I am more confident about the future of Sino-American relations than I was in 1972. That is because we are no longer joined together only by our fears, as was the case 17 years ago, but by our hopes -- our hope for economic progress for both our peoples, our hope to reduce the danger of war, our hope for a cleaner, safer world.

When I first came to China in 1972, a deep and abiding friendship began between our two countries that continues today. Some naive observers, of course, insisted on turning our rapprochement into a romance. In fact, we became friends because we had mutual interests. We did not look for mutual interests because we were friends. Friendship neither brought us together nor will keep us together. But without the friendship between our two peoples, no enduring relationship between our two governments would be possible.

Enemies do not have falling-outs. Enemies do not fear they are being misunderstood. Only friends do. In the years to come, I am confident that China and the United States will reach new heights together. They will find new ways to cooperate in building a better world and better lives for their people. As the bitterness of the last few months recedes, and as our common interests draw us together, our relationship will emerge stronger than ever.

Our relations will never be smooth and untroubled. We are both too proud, too different, and too great for that. China and the United States took a great risk by putting aside their differences and starting together down a common road. But think about it: Nothing great is ever accomplished without great risks. We must never be satisfied with success; we should never be discouraged by failure. As two great nations moving toward an uncertain future, we will have both successes and failures in our relations. But our relations will endure, because they must endure. It is destiny for two nations as great as ours to work together, both for ourselves and for the world.

May I therefore propose a toast

- to the continued growth of good Sino-American relations;
- to my host, the President of the Peoples Republic of China;
- And to the health of all our Chinese and American friends here this evening.


(201) 391-4404

JOHN H. TAYLOR

ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE RD.
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NJ 07675

Local News



Another beam is headed for steel skeleton of Richard Nixon Library slated to open in June of 1990 in Yorba Linda

Nixon Library shoots skyward

By CHARLES ELLIOTT
Staff writer

YORBA LINDA — "It's the 'Wonder Years' Syndrome," said Hugh Hewitt, describing the "intense public interest" in the Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace project.

That excitement is justified, the 32-year-old executive director of the project added, because Nixon "is the pivotal figure — if not in world history — in U.S. history in the post-war world."

Visitors to the museum, which is rising on a field in Yorba Linda, will "read, see and feel such episodes as the end of the Vietnam War, the opening of China, the launching of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during Nixon's presidency."

The project is "unique among the presidential libraries because

The farmhouse built by Nixon's father, Frank Nixon, in 1912 will get a new foundation next month and be refurbished.

"To the extent that it's possible, we want to recreate the house as Nixon lived in it," Hewitt said.

Many items in the house will relate to Nixon's life in Whittier from 1922 to 1940. The bed in which Nixon was born in Yorba Linda and the piano he learned to play on will return to the house, Hewitt said.

"A lot of the Whittier furniture also may have been Yorba Linda furniture," he added.

The collection will include postcards, letters, and other papers collected by Hanna Nixon, the president's mother, between 1910 and 1940, Hewitt said.

"I even have all of Nixon's childhood books back to age 2 or 3."

on library will recreate the Lincoln sitting room.

"It was his private office," Hewitt said. "It's a little-known room, off the Lincoln bedroom."

Nixon wrote his "Silent Majority" speech there, and discussed China with Henry Kissinger.

Another display, "The Leaders' Room," will feature life-size reproductions of world leaders Nixon knew, he added.

The library should open in June 1990 — if more money can be raised soon.

"We need \$3 million more," said Hewitt.

The Foundation has already gathered \$16 million, with another \$1 million in prospect this year.

"Twenty-five million dollars is the overall goal," Hewitt added. A \$5 million endowment will allow the library to be the only privately owned and operated presiden-

tial, Patricia, now live in Saddle River, N.J., where Nixon is working on a new book, Hewitt said.

Despite many invitations, Nixon has made few public appearances in recent years, Hewitt said, but is "very excited" about attending the grand opening.

At the heart of the controversy, which Nixon always stirred in American public life, Hewitt speculates, is the fact "he was always an anti-communist first."

Nixon's role in the prosecution of the Alger Hiss espionage case has confused him in many minds with "the excesses of McCarthyism," Hewitt said, but liberals never forgave Nixon for proving the case against Hiss.

"To have been right about Hiss is to have become controversial forever."

Nixon's attempt to reform the welfare system was stymied by a

NIXON

From B1

Democratic Congress whose members, Hewitt said, "could not let a Republican reform the welfare system."

But Nixon started the Environmental Protection Agency, opened a war on cancer and even imposed wage and price controls to slow inflation — uses of government power surprising to many.

"The domestic agenda needs some space," Hewitt said, "because few people know about it."

"Only an anti-communist could have opened China," he added.

The library will contain some 50,000 documents, including Nixon diaries, the papers of many Nixon cabinet members, and films, videos and photographs.

"As an historical resource it will be truly important," Hewitt said.

The library has an agreement with the National Archives allowing the library to copy Nixon's presidential papers and borrow key documents.

"We will have a complete set of the crucial papers," Hewitt said.

Nixon's presidential papers were seized by the federal government during the Watergate break-in scandal. Some 10,500 documents are still the subject of a Nixon suit seeking to keep them confidential.

Items that might be borrowed for display include the SALT I treaty, which "began the arms control process," Nixon's exchange of letters with Chinese leaders, the Vietnam peace accords and perhaps even the letter Nixon submitted when he became the only president ever to resign.

"The museum's being designed so you can spend two days there," he said. "But mostly I expect half-day visits."

The facility will include a gift shop where books and high class



Staff photos / Charles Elliott

Hugh Hewitt is director of library and birthplace project

items will be sold, Hewitt added, "no ashtrays, no T-shirts."

He is the only employee of the library now, and the staff will remain small.

"A lot of our work force will be volunteer docents."

Hewitt, an Ohio native, graduated cum laude in government from Harvard University in 1978.

When he sought a job as a researcher with Ray Price, a former Nixon speech-writer, Price introduced him to David Eisenhower instead. Hewitt worked as an editorial assistant

to Nixon's son-in-law on the book, "Eisenhower at War."

In a similar capacity, he later assisted Richard Nixon on his Vietnam book, "The Real War."


Hewitt is now an attorney with the Irvine firm of Pettis, Tester, Kruse & Krinsky and divides his time between real estate law and the increasing duties with the presidential library.

Linda for donating the land, and local Republican leaders for their help.

"There's very excellent community support," Hewitt said.



ALWAYS
USE ZIP
CODE



#1021

1800-K at Mid
20006

~~Hon. Brent Scowcroft
1875 I St. N.W.
Suite 410
Washington D.C. 20006~~

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON
577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY 07675

1740

RICHARD NIXON

January 12, 1989

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Dear Brent,

Now that I have passed 75, I am reluctant to celebrate a birthday. But when I think of the alternative of not being able to, I welcome the chance to do so.

Your call helped to make it a very special day.

Pat joins me in sending our best wishes for the New Year.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'RN' with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Hon. Brent Scowcroft

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

RICHARD NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY


1-23-'84

Dear Brent,
Your T. V. appearance
was outstanding.

Don't let the soft
heads panic the President
into a premature Summit.

And thank you for
not going along with
the conventional wisdom
(including Reagan & Thatcher)
that the Cold War is over —

Warm regards



RICHARD NIXON

January 12, 1989

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Dear Brent,

As promised, I am enclosing an advance copy of my article for Foreign Affairs. It will be published on or around February 1st.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. Nixon', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Hon. Brent Scowcroft

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

WGH, PG, LR, PH, PLD, DK, AUTHORZ,

1st proofs

JW, ME, MB, DH, RH, FILE

JAN 10 1989

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

ORIGINAL SET
PROOF-READ & RETURN

Richard Nixon

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE BUSH AGENDA

In 1945, a year before his speech in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill sent a message to the new president, Harry Truman, about the ominous developments in Soviet policy: "An Iron Curtain is being drawn down over their front. We do not know what lies behind it. It is vital, therefore, that we reach an understanding with Russia now before we have mortally reduced our armies and before we have withdrawn into our zones of occupation." Churchill's advice went unheeded, and the West lost a historic opportunity to negotiate a favorable deal with the Kremlin when the bargaining leverage of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union stood at its peak.

After almost half a century, the communist world's leader, President Mikhail Gorbachev, has undertaken dramatic changes within the Soviet bloc that give the free world's new leader, President George Bush, another historic opportunity to enhance the West's security and to effect a sea change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika have been hailed, even by some hard-line Western leaders, as heralding the end of the cold war. While his reforms give reason for a reappraisal of the West's policy toward the Soviet Union, we must bear in mind that the causes of the cold war—Moscow's domination of Eastern Europe and aggressive foreign policies around the world—still endure. Those who urge the West to "help Gorbachev" with low-interest loans and subsidized credits fail to realize that such actions are not in our interest until he makes an irrevocable break with the Kremlin's past policies.

An opportunity now exists to make genuine progress toward a more stable peace. President Bush can exploit this opportunity if he takes a hard-headed look at the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and devises a policy that presents the Kremlin leaders with intractable strategic choices. We must make Gorbachev choose between a less confrontational relationship with the West and the retention of his imperial control over Eastern Europe, between a continuing race in arms technology and arms control agreements that could create a stable strategic

2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

and conventional balance, and between access to Western technology and credits and continuing Soviet adventurism in the Third World.

II

Gorbachev has sparked enormous excitement in the West because he is perceived to be a new kind of Soviet leader. Dazzled by his "star quality"—the fashionably tailored suits, the polished manners and the smooth touch in personal encounters—reporters and diplomats alike have naïvely confused changes in style and rhetoric with shifts in substance and policy. I have met with three of the Soviet Union's principal postwar leaders—Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 and 1960, Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, 1973 and 1974, and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986. Gorbachev is in a class of his own. He is their match in tenacity and forcefulness, but outstrips them in realism, quickness and intelligence. He deserves great respect for his boldness, his courage and his mastery of public relations. He is a different but, from the West's point of view, not necessarily a better type of leader. We must keep in mind that his talent and capabilities can just as easily make the world a more dangerous place as they can contribute to greater global security.

Gorbachev has launched his reforms and pursued a more conciliatory approach to the West because the communist economic system failed at home and the Soviet Union's foreign policy became counterproductive abroad. The centrally planned economy of the Brezhnev era has become a monument to corruption and inefficiency. Brezhnev's militarism and expansionism not only mobilized the West to strengthen its armed forces but also gave the Soviet Union a severe case of imperial indigestion after it gobbled up Third World countries. By the early 1980s, Moscow's clients in Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Angola and Ethiopia cost the Kremlin at least \$20 billion a year to keep in power. It is a mistake to think that only Gorbachev would have initiated a reform program, for these realities would have forced whoever came to power into rethinking Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev sees the world without ideological blinkers. He has realistically assessed the Soviet Union's enormous economic, political, imperial and geopolitical problems. First, he recognizes openly that the Soviet economy has stagnated, with negligible or even negative growth rates since the late 1970s. Without economic reform and access

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 3

to Western technology and capital, the Soviet Union will fall hopelessly behind the United States, Western Europe, Japan and—perhaps as early as the middle of the next century—China.

Second, Gorbachev initiated his economic reforms—*perestroika*—because he knows that the Soviet people can no longer be motivated with political slogans. The increased East-West contacts of the *détente* era and the revolution in mass communications have rendered futile the Stalinist strategy of isolation and ideological indoctrination. Today, the Soviet people are aware that their standard of living—cramped housing, endless food lines and empty store shelves—compares unfavorably not only with that of the West but also with those of the newly industrializing countries of the Third World. Gorbachev knows that only material incentives, not ideological exhortations, will induce the people to work harder. They will produce more only if they can actually purchase decent consumer goods with the additional rubles they earn.

Third, Gorbachev knows that economic failure and political repression have created seething unrest throughout the Soviet empire that could erupt at the slightest provocation. Time bombs lie just below the surface ready to explode, not only in virtually all his East European satellites, but also in many of the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union itself. Through *glasnost*, he has tried to create a safety valve to defuse this pent-up frustration, but by venting these angers he may have let the genie out of the bottle. He will find that demands for pluralism in Eastern Europe and greater national autonomy for the non-Russian peoples are difficult to control. Ironically, Soviet leaders used appeals to nationalism to expand their empire into the Third World. Now nationalism threatens to tear that empire apart.

Fourth, as Gorbachev surveys the global political scene, he must be struck by the fact that instead of improving the Soviet Union's position in the world, the Kremlin's foreign policy has managed to unite all the world's major powers against Moscow. The United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and China—which together account for over 60 percent of the world economy and which pose the threat of a two-front engagement in any world conflict—have cooperated actively for more than 15 years in opposing Moscow's traditional expansionist ambition. Moscow's old thinking led to a dead end, so Gorbachev has launched his "new thinking" in foreign

4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

affairs to loosen the bonds of, or break up, that anti-Soviet bloc.

Fifth, Gorbachev, as a communist, instinctively believes in the importance of the battle of ideas, but as a realist, he knows that the Soviet Union has lost that battle. Around the world—not only within the Soviet bloc, but also in Africa, Asia and Latin America—Soviet socialism is perceived as the road to stagnation, not prosperity. It still appeals to those who want to seize and hold power but not to those who want to build a better life for their people. Through his reforms, Gorbachev seeks to create a new model and image for socialism and to give the communist ideology a second wind.

III

Gorbachev's goal is to reinvigorate his country's communist system, to make the Soviet Union a superpower not just in military but also in economic and political terms. Without sweeping reforms, he will not be able to afford the costs of the Soviet military establishment and of Soviet client-states, to provide the Soviet people with a better life, to create a model that can be competitive in the global ideological battle and to keep the Soviet Union in the front rank of world powers.

Gorbachev's reforms face three massive internal roadblocks that could derail his efforts. Despite his successes at the recent special party conference (June 1988) and his tours de force at the recent Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet meetings, Gorbachev has not consolidated a firm political grip over the Soviet system. He can count only three or four of the 12 members of the Politburo as steadfast allies. While Yegor Ligachev, his apparent rival, may no longer be looking over Gorbachev's shoulder as the recognized number-two man, Ligachev's faction is waiting in the wings, ready to take over should Gorbachev falter. The last Soviet reformer—Nikita Khrushchev—met with an untimely political demise when he threatened too many entrenched interests.

Thus, we should make no concessions to Gorbachev that we would not make to the least progressive Soviet leader, for the chance still exists that the latter could come to power. While Gorbachev has been hailed as a superstar on the world stage, we must remember that the stars that shine the brightest sometimes fade away the fastest.

In Gorbachev's four years in power, there has been a lot of talk but precious little progress. He has been unable to force

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 5

the sclerotic Soviet party and state bureaucracies to abandon their Stalinist ways. He has the unenviable task of teaching old bureaucrats new tricks. It is one thing to tell a bureaucrat to do a certain task and another to order him to be creative and innovative. The former at least stirs him to action, while the latter evinces blank stares of total incomprehension.

Gorbachev's most profound problem is that he still believes in Marxism-Leninism. Even if he wins his political and bureaucratic battles, this handicap will ultimately doom his reforms to failure. Rapid, self-sustaining economic growth has occurred only in countries that respect the right of individuals to own private property and that allow unregulated prices and the laws of supply and demand to allocate economic resources. Gorbachev has expressed a willingness to grant farmers long-term leases for private farming and has stated that some prices will be decontrolled in the early 1990s, but he still wants to keep the party-state apparatus in firm command of the economy as a whole. While there have been several examples of economies moving from capitalism to communism, there are no examples of economies moving from communism to capitalism. No one has ever constructed a successful halfway house between a market-based and a command economy.

Gorbachev faces a profound philosophical dilemma: he can choose ideology or progress. If he chooses communism, he cannot have progress; if he chooses progress, he cannot have communism. Only by abandoning the ideology that is the bedrock of his power can he produce progress that will match that of the West.

Given the inefficient central planning system and the irrational pricing system, no foreign investor today has the slightest idea of how to judge which economic risks in the Soviet Union are worth taking. Making loans to the Kremlin is like laying down chips on the dice table; some bets may pay off but the odds are that in the long run the money will be wasted. In fact, it is not even in Gorbachev's interest for the West to provide economic assistance before fundamental economic reforms have been institutionalized. A banker does no favor to a borrower by making him a bad loan. We should not enable the Kremlin to borrow its way out of today's problems and thereby delay the inevitable day of addressing the causes of those problems.

Both American superhawks and superdoves overstate the impact Western policies can have on the Soviet Union. Super-

6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

hawks argue that the West's arms buildup and its opposition to Soviet aggression in places like Afghanistan were the primary factors that prompted Gorbachev to launch his reforms. Those Western actions were vital on their own merits. But even without those actions Gorbachev would have had to initiate changes because the Soviet economic system was suffering from terminal illness. As a Chinese leader told me in 1985, without reforms the Soviet Union by the middle of the next century would "disappear" as a great power. That made internal change imperative, regardless of Western policies.

Superdoves, on the other hand, believe that we should do anything within our power to help Gorbachev in order to promote peace. But we must realize that whether he succeeds or fails ultimately depends on events and forces within the Soviet Union that we cannot affect. We cannot induce Gorbachev to cast aside his Marxist-Leninist obsession with keeping the state in charge of the economy. We cannot whip the Soviet bureaucracy into shape. We can hardly even make out the patterns of Kremlin political intrigue after the fact, much less lend a helping hand to those whose views and interests seem to parallel ours.

Above all, we must keep Gorbachev's reforms in perspective. He does not want to overturn the Soviet system; he wants to strengthen it. To paraphrase Churchill from another context, Gorbachev did not become general secretary to preside over the demise of the Communist Party. We have an interest in the success of his reforms only to the extent that they change the system to make it less threatening to our security and interests. We should applaud glasnost and perestroika but not pay for them, for if his reforms do not irrevocably alter Soviet foreign policy we will be subsidizing the threat of our own destruction.

IV

Those who parrot today a fashionable slogan—"the cold war is over"—trivialize the problems of Western security. Gorbachev's public relations experts have made many Western policymakers forget that a more benign Soviet image does not mean a more benign Soviet foreign policy. As a result, the race to Moscow is already on. In recent months, Western leaders have jetted off to the Kremlin with planeloads of eager bankers and industrialists in tow, and Soviet leaders have gleefully lined up more than \$10 billion in easy credit. Unless the West steps back and designs a coherent strategy, we will squander our

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 7

leverage and lose the historic opportunity presented by events in the Soviet Union.

We should bear in mind a remark made to me in 1953 by Field Marshall Slim, then the British governor-general of Australia. In arguing for a dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, he said, "We must break the ice. If we don't break it, we will all get frozen into it so tight that it will take an atom bomb to break it." Today, the ice has broken even before the end of winter. We are witnessing the thaw that brings the promise of spring. While it is a period of great possibilities, we must tread carefully or risk falling into the icy waters.

We have to recognize that the situation we face now is infinitely more complex than the one we faced at the outset of the cold war forty years ago. At that time, the threat was as clear as Stalin's Iron Curtain and his belligerent rhetoric about the inevitability of war, all of which enabled President Truman to prevent a return to isolationism, adopt a policy of containment and win bipartisan support for entry into NATO and unprecedented levels of peacetime defense spending.

Gorbachev has brilliantly changed the game. In Europe, he has discarded the traditional Soviet tactics of diplomatic bluster and military threat and has mastered those of deceptive propaganda and political maneuver. He has substituted the wiles of diplomacy for the threat of force as his chosen instrument for foreign policy conquests. As a result, at a time when Soviet superiority in conventional military forces and in accurate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is larger than ever before, he has made more progress toward the traditional Soviet objective of dividing the NATO alliance than any of his predecessors. We cannot counter his "peace offensive" simply by loudly warning about the military threat of Moscow's Red Army. Instead, we must launch our own political offensive to achieve our strategic and geopolitical objectives.

We will be pursuing those goals in what has become a multipolar world. Japan is already an economic superpower and will inevitably use its economic clout for political effect. Western Europe will become a unified economic market by 1992 and is beginning to intensify its cooperation in political and strategic matters. China, already a major nuclear power and fast becoming a major economic player, will emerge as one of the world's superpowers in the next century.

We can work with all of these new major powers more easily

8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

than Gorbachev can. Therefore, before the new administration holds a substantive summit with Gorbachev, it should conduct intensive discussions and meetings with our major allies and friends. We should do this not to present Moscow with an antagonistic and belligerent united front but to explore our common interests and to coordinate our policies where possible.

President Bush should continue to reject the advice of those who urge that he schedule a quick summit with Gorbachev in order to have a foreign policy "victory" early in his term. Gorbachev needs a summit far more than the president. Only when the Bush Administration has agreed on a strategy with our allies and has a definite program for making significant substantive progress on major issues should President Bush schedule an American-Soviet summit.

In formulating a strategy, we should begin by estimating what Gorbachev wants, then map out what we want, what trade-offs are possible, and what we can do to put pressure on him to agree to our terms. Most important, we have to recognize that linkage—the linking of progress on one issue to progress on another—is the key to any successful negotiations with Moscow. Kremlin leaders will always explicitly reject linkage, but they always implicitly accept it.

Without linkage, Gorbachev will string together a series of easy victories at the bargaining table. Each superpower has a greater interest in progress on some issues than on others. Gorbachev, for example, will press hard for access to Western capital markets and technology. The United States, on the other hand, has a greater interest in reducing Soviet influence in the Third World through settlements of certain regional conflicts that threaten our interests. Moscow will be more than willing to negotiate solely on the former. If we fail to pursue a determined policy of linkage, Gorbachev will dominate the agenda and make one-sided progress on his top priorities.

Linkage requires subtlety. An American president should not step before the cameras and announce that he intends to hold the next arms control agreement hostage to Soviet capitulation on one or another issue. Nor should the Congress make the mistake of publicly linking U.S. foreign policy objectives to Soviet domestic policy reforms. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1973–74 was a case in point. Its purpose was to force the Soviet Union to increase Jewish emigration, but it had the opposite effect of drastically reducing it. We should vigorously

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 9

press the Soviets in world forums to eliminate their human rights abuses. But we must allow them to appear to do so of their own volition rather than by clumsily making it look as if they did so only because of direct Western intervention in their internal affairs. No great nation can appear to allow its internal policies to be dictated by a foreign power.

We should link progress toward better East-West relations to restraint in Soviet global behavior. If we enter into agreements beneficial to Moscow despite direct or indirect Soviet aggression, we will in effect be giving the Kremlin a green light to assault our interests. If we pursue a determined strategy that includes linkage, we can further our strategic interests in Europe, in arms control negotiations and in the world's key regional conflicts.

V

Europe has again become the central focus of the East-West conflict, and our strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets must change to meet these circumstances. From 1945 to the early 1960s, the European continent was the principal arena of the world ideological struggle. From the early 1960s through the mid-1980s, after the division of Europe had become a settled political reality, the primary fields of conflict—Indochina, the Middle East, southern Africa, the horn of Africa, southwest Asia and Central America—were situated in the Third World. Now Gorbachev has made the Old World the central priority and target of his new foreign policy.

The traditional goal of Kremlin leaders has been to create political fissures between the United States and Western Europe in order to erode the strength of the alliance. Moscow has pursued this objective, at various times, through a strategy of confrontation that seeks to rattle European nerves and demonstrate the unreliability of America as an ally, or through a strategy of condominium with the United States that seeks to weaken European confidence by creating the impression that the superpowers are settling Europe's fate. Gorbachev has adopted the more straightforward tactic of appealing directly to the West Europeans. He has called for the creation of a single "European home" stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals—thus implying that the United States represents an obstacle to peace—and has sought to exploit the West European fatigue after forty years of East-West conflict.

The world of 1949, when NATO was formed, differs pro-

10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

foundly from the world of 1989. We need a new strategy in Europe—one that enhances the Continent's stability not only through initiatives to revitalize the alliance in Western Europe but also through a sustained effort to foster peaceful change and positive political evolution in Eastern Europe.

The new administration should make Europe its top foreign policy priority. It should call for a major working summit—no black ties and no spouses—to hammer out a strategy for enhancing our collective security. First of all, we should articulate a common analysis of the nature of the Soviet military threat in Europe. Americans, and many Europeans, believe that the Soviet threat remains as great as or even greater than ever, especially because of Moscow's unrelenting buildup of conventional and strategic weaponry. But in recent years there has been a tendency among other West Europeans, especially but not exclusively those on the left, to view the Soviet Union as a stagnant society incapable of threatening the West or even to view Washington's calls for vigilance and readiness as a greater threat to peace than Moscow's armies.

Harold Macmillan once told me that alliances were held together by fear not love. For many in Europe and the United States, the fear of the Soviet Union has waned, and what love may exist between economic competitors in the West is a very weak glue to hold an alliance together. It is therefore imperative that Western leaders issue a joint statement, in conjunction with its arms control proposals, that educates their publics on the nature and scope of the Soviet threat.

Second, we should agree on ways to defend common Western interests outside of Europe. In 1949 the West faced the threat of a direct Soviet military thrust into central Europe. In recent years, with the East-West competition in Europe focusing on the political plane, Soviet direct and indirect aggression has principally taken place in the Third World. The United States has borne the overwhelming share of the burden in countering Moscow's subversion and proxy warfare to protect regions, such as the Persian Gulf, even though it is far more important to Western Europe than to the United States. Unless we devise a more equitable global security framework, it is inevitable that pressure will build in the United States for a significant reduction of the U.S. troop commitment to NATO.

Third, we should articulate a compelling rationale for NATO's nuclear deterrent and a joint approach for the next round of European arms control talks. At the Reykjavik summit, the

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 11

Reagan Administration undermined public support for nuclear deterrence by advocating the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. We must renounce the Reykjavik rhetoric in unequivocal terms and explain to Western publics the realities of the nuclear age. We should pursue the so-called competitive strategies on the conventional level to undercut the significance of Soviet quantitative superiority and thereby raise the nuclear threshold. But nuclear deterrence, both strategic and tactical, remains imperative. Even if conventional arms control succeeds, NATO will have to maintain a residual, even if diminished, tactical nuclear capability in Europe, though the deterrent should be reconfigured to allay West German concerns regarding the bases and targets of these weapons. More important, NATO must arrive at a joint conventional arms control proposal that makes offensive warfare futile and that mobilizes public support for the Western negotiating position. A good beginning has been made in the recent NATO proposal for major cuts in the tank armies in Europe, though a public diplomacy offensive needs to be launched to sell it to Western publics.

Fourth, we must agree on a common approach to East-West trade. We should not provide the Soviet Union with technologies that can significantly improve its military forces. We should also create a joint institution for coordinating and regulating the Soviet Union's access to Western capital markets. It is not in our interest to have Western banks competing to provide the Kremlin with loans at below-market rates. Nor is it in our interest to repeat the mistakes of bankers in the 1970s who lent East European countries tens of billions of dollars that will never be repaid.

Fifth, we should design a common approach to the problem of Eastern Europe. The cold war began in Eastern Europe, and it will not end until Moscow's satellites receive their independence. In the past, it has always been in the West's interest, but not in Moscow's, to address the issue of Eastern Europe. Today, since Gorbachev needs East-West economic links and reduced tensions for perestroika to succeed, a new settlement is in the Kremlin's interest as well.

Without a political settlement in Eastern Europe, no stable, enduring improvement in East-West relations is possible. Post-war history is the story of continual attempts by the East Europeans to wrest their freedom from Moscow. The workers' uprising in East Germany in 1953, the popular rebellion in Hungary in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, the Solidarity

12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

movement in Poland in 1980, and the scores of other smaller incidents of open opposition all testify to the popular determination to be free. All these outbursts had to be suppressed directly or indirectly by Soviet arms, and all those interventions destroyed the prospects for an immediate improvement in East-West relations.

That pattern could soon recur. Eastern Europe has become an economic and political powder keg waiting to blow up. Today, the tectonic plates of East European nationalism and Soviet expansionism have built up enormous pressure as they have pushed against each other. We have seen the first tremors in the rise of East European dissident and reform movements. But a political earthquake is inevitable in the 1990s. If Moscow responds with military force, it will mean a return to sharper tensions in East-West relations and an abortion of Gorbachev's reforms.

If we want to avoid this grim scenario, we must work on three fronts.

First, the West should press for peaceful change in Eastern Europe. We should continue to exploit modern means of mass communication to break the grip of the East European regimes over their peoples. Radio Free Europe has been one of our most effective programs in the East-West struggle. In the 1990s we should establish direct television transmissions via satellite into these countries. We should also provide material support to those behind the Iron Curtain who are pressing for peaceful change, with Western trade union support to the Solidarity movement in Poland serving as a model.

Second, the West should continue its policy of differentiating between those East European regimes which demonstrate a willingness to enact reforms that move their countries toward political pluralism and those which do not. For those leaders who liberalize their regimes, we should make available economic credits, more advanced technology and debt rescheduling, while the others should be left to fend for themselves.

Third, the United States should put Eastern Europe on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. In Yugoslavia last year, Gorbachev signed a declaration that stated that "no one has a monopoly on truth" and that foreign powers had no "claim on imposing their notions of social development on anyone." We should insist that Kremlin leaders back up their words with deeds. We could even propose the neutralization of Eastern Europe along the lines of the Austrian Peace Treaty of 1955, with an interim

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 13

agreement that leaves the military structure of the Warsaw Pact intact but that would allow the East European peoples to choose their own forms of government through genuine elections.

Eastern Europe is the natural field for political initiatives by Western Europe. Our allies' historical fatigue stems in part from the fact that for forty years their role has been defined by a negative mission—stopping further Soviet expansion. It can be cured by devoting energy to the positive mission of promoting peaceful change beyond the Iron Curtain. Holding the line against the Red Army has principally involved sacrifice and risk, but supporting the development of pluralism under the nose of the Red Army requires ingenuity and inspiration. It is a task that will not only enhance Western Europe's security but also help to restore its sense of purpose.

VI

Arms control should be treated as only one part of Western defense policy and not vice versa. Arms negotiations are a political imperative, indispensable in holding the NATO alliance together and for winning support in Congress for adequate defense budgets. For too long, however, many Western leaders have endorsed arms control as an end in itself, regardless of the impact that particular agreements would have on our strategic position. Moscow, on the other hand, has traditionally sought to use arms control to achieve political and strategic ends—to lull the West into a false sense of security, to limit developments in American weapons technology, and to preserve or increase Soviet advantages in weapons deployments. It is time for the United States to borrow a page from the Kremlin's negotiating handbook.

Since Soviet superiority in conventional arms represents the greatest threat to Western security, cuts in those forces should be the top priority of Western arms control strategy. Moscow's main goal is to reduce the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and to stifle the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) while preserving its advantage on the conventional level, because that would maximize the political importance of its conventional superiority. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States link progress in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) to progress in conventional arms control negotiations.

Western conventional arms control proposals should focus geographically on the European central front, the most mili-

14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

tarily congested territory in the world, and should seek to reduce those weapons that are most useful for offensive warfare. These should include at a minimum reductions in tanks and self-propelled artillery, even beyond those proposed by Gorbachev at the United Nations. The weapons must be destroyed rather than pulled back into the Soviet Union; otherwise Moscow could redeploy them in a matter of days. In addition, military bases and supply depots should be relocated away from the front in order to make surprise attacks more difficult. NATO governments must insist in arms control talks that Gorbachev fulfill his pledge to accept "asymmetrical reductions" on the conventional level.

Gorbachev's rhetoric about reconfiguring Warsaw Pact forces to fit a "defensive" doctrine has been all talk and no action. His pledge in his recent U.N. speech to demobilize 500,000 troops and retire 10,000 tanks represents a significant symbolic gesture. But we must not pretend that it solves the security problem posed by the Warsaw Pact's tank armada (currently about 53,000).¹ Thus, if the 5,000 tanks withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are not destroyed but simply parked on the Soviet side of the border, they can be redeployed rapidly. Even if the tanks were destroyed, the Warsaw Pact's tank advantage would drop only slightly.

In addition to linking the strategic and conventional arms control talks, the new administration should redirect the U.S. approach to the START negotiations.

Our problem on the strategic level, which began in the mid-1970s and threatens to become much worse in the 1990s, is the growing vulnerability of our land-based missiles and command-and-control systems to a first-strike attack by the most accurate and powerful Soviet missiles. The Reagan Administration's effort to cut strategic forces by 50 percent focused too much on simply reducing the total number of strategic weapons instead of reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces and thereby enhancing strategic stability. The real test is not whether the treaty reduces the number of nuclear weapons but whether it reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. We must ultimately judge the value of any START agreement by whether it increases the security of our strategic forces and

¹ *The Military Balance 1988-1989*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988, p. 237.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 15

decreases the incentives for either side to resort to nuclear weapons in a crisis.

That is where the current START formula falls short. Under its terms, both sides would reduce their arsenals to 1,600 launchers including heavy bombers, ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and to 6,000 warheads, of which only 4,900 would be permitted on ballistic missiles. While such radical reductions might be politically appealing, close scrutiny shows that they actually increase the vulnerability of U.S. forces. Moscow would retain a land-based ICBM force composed almost entirely of the newer SS-18, SS-24 and SS-25 missile launchers, all of which are first-strike weapons. At the same time, the cuts would reduce the number of targets inside the United States that would have to be destroyed for a first strike to succeed. Assuming that after reductions the United States would choose to retain its most accurate and modern weapons, the ratio of Soviet first-strike warheads to U.S. first-strike targets would grow drastically worse. In addition, the prospective reductions would restrict the deployment of our most capable and survivable force, the fleet of Trident II submarines, to no more than 17 boats. As a result, this force could well become vulnerable, for some number will always be in port or off-line, and the remainder, reduced to, say, ten boats, will be tracked by Moscow's fleet of 270 attack submarines.²

Some argue that these issues do not matter, because under the proposed START agreement we would be allowed to reconfigure our strategic forces to account for the new ceilings. They contend that we could build a new fleet of smaller submarines that would carry fewer missiles and a new generation of land-based missiles that would carry fewer warheads. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the START force reductions are to be carried out over seven years, while any programs to develop and deploy entire new strategic systems would take a decade or more. Second, it is totally unrealistic to think that Congress, which expects arms control to produce cuts in the defense budget, would vote to increase military spending by the tens of billions of dollars necessary to overhaul completely our strategic force posture.

Instead of seeking an arbitrary 50-percent reduction, the Bush Administration should consider adopting a two-part pro-

² Edward L. Warner III and David A. Ochmanek, *Next Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989, pp. 46-47.

16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

posal, with the first level designed to meet minimum U.S. requirements and to produce a quick interim agreement and the second level directed to major reductions in first-strike weapons. In formulating our proposal for the first stage, we should calculate what kind of strategic force posture our security requires and propose launcher and warhead ceilings that could involve some reductions from present levels but would not impede the necessary U.S. weapons programs, particularly the mobile Midgetman missile. In addition, since the United States observed and the Soviet Union ignored the modernization restrictions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaties, this initial agreement would permit unrestricted modernization.

After the completion of the interim agreement, the two sides would focus on the far more difficult objective of increasing strategic stability by reducing the number of warheads on both sides capable of destroying hardened military targets in a first strike. Both superpowers would be allowed to retain an equal number of counterforce warheads. But the level of these most threatening weapons would be scaled back dramatically—far more than by the current START proposal. This should involve a 75-percent cut from the present level of such Soviet weapons and should also require reductions in planned deployments of comparable U.S. weapons, such as the MX, the Midgetman and the Trident II D-5 missiles.

This second agreement would also address the issue of strategic defense. As long as the Soviet Union possesses its formidable arsenal of first-strike weapons, the United States must press forward with the SDI. Our position should be that research, development, testing and deployment of defensive systems is not negotiable. Only the *extent* of our deployments should be subject to limitation through mutual agreement and those deployments should be calibrated to the extent of the Soviet counterforce threat.

A two-stage approach along these lines offers the best prospects for successful nuclear arms control. It would enable Presidents Bush and Gorbachev to conclude quickly an interim agreement capping the number of launchers and warheads, though unlike the current START formula the accord would not inhibit U.S. weapons programs needed to redress the asymmetry in strategic vulnerability and the imbalance in counterforce weapons. It would also create a stable foundation for a treaty to enhance strategic security by reducing the number

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 17

of counterforce systems to levels that make a successful first-strike attack on the other side's strategic forces militarily infeasible.

VII

The two regional conflicts requiring immediate presidential action, Afghanistan and Central America, represent opposite poles in American policy. Our program to aid the Afghan resistance has received bipartisan support, has operated continuously for almost a decade and verges on ultimate success. Our assistance to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters has been subjected to partisan bickering, has been at best episodic and has failed so far. In distant Afghanistan, we learned that a sustained, bipartisan program of large-scale assistance to anticommunist freedom fighters can produce major geopolitical gains. We should apply the same lesson to the nearby and strategically critical conflict in Central America.

In Afghanistan, as Moscow's tanks retreat, one round of the great game closes—but yet another one begins. Our goal has been twofold, to force the Soviet Union to withdraw and to restore the Afghan people's right to self-determination. To achieve the former does not automatically accomplish the latter. First of all, the communist regime in Kabul must be displaced. The best solution would be the removal of the Soviet puppet regime through the direct talks now taking place between Moscow and the resistance leadership. But should those talks stall or fail we must continue to provide whatever kinds of weapons the resistance requires to topple the Kabul regime. Since the character of the fighting has changed from guerrilla warfare to battles for taking and holding cities, the United States must upgrade its assistance quantitatively and qualitatively, particularly in terms of antiaircraft missiles, long-range mortars, and mine-clearing devices and equipment.

It does not serve American, or Afghan, interests for the United States to disengage before a political process is in place that will establish real self-determination for the Afghan people themselves. If the country collapses into a civil war with dozens of tribal warlords ruling their separate fiefdoms, the Kremlin will seize this as a lever to regain a measure of influence by supporting one or another group in the fighting or by declaring the need to keep forces in a "security zone" in northern Afghanistan. Therefore, at a time when our weapons pipeline still gives us influence, we need to address directly the critical

18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

issue of establishing, through the traditional Afghan means of a tribal assembly and through elections, a post-communist government that truly represents the people.

Central America poses far more difficult and, from the U.S. point of view, far more critical problems. Our interests are not threatened by Nicaragua simply because its government systematically violates human rights and spouts anti-American rhetoric. A dictatorship, even a totalitarian one, does not threaten our interests per se. Rather, the Sandinista regime threatens our interests only because Managua has forged links with the Soviet Union and has become a base for indirect Soviet subversion of other Central American states such as El Salvador. The problem is not that the Nicaraguan government is communist but that the communist government of Nicaragua is inherently expansionist. As the Sandinistas freely admit, and even boast, they seek "a revolution without frontiers" in Central America and insist on the right to aid communist guerrillas in neighboring countries.

At the first opportunity, the Bush Administration must impose linkage between the issue of Soviet access to U.S. capital, credits and technology and that of Soviet military assistance to Managua. Gorbachev must be made to understand that Nicaragua is a neuralgic issue for us. While academics might debate whether the Monroe Doctrine has become obsolete, the United States cannot allow the Soviet Union or any other foreign power to provide arms to a virulently anti-American and aggressive regime in the western hemisphere. Given the Soviet economy's pathetic condition, our economic power represents tremendous leverage. If we link these issues, we should be able to profit politically, as well as economically, from our economic relationship with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, we must recognize that the Sandinista leaders have made a mockery of the Arias peace plan, despite the cutoff of U.S. assistance to the contras. Managua permits fewer civil liberties and holds more political prisoners today than it did when the so-called process of democratization began. In its direct talks with the contras, it has in effect demanded surrender, rather than opening the way to a political compromise. Moreover, the Nicaraguan-backed communist guerrillas in El Salvador have dramatically stepped up their terrorist and military attacks.

The Bush Administration must determine, once and for all, the viability of the Arias peace plan. If the Sandinista-contra

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19

talks cannot achieve their objective, they should be ended. Since endless negotiations work to the advantage of the Sandinistas, the United States should undertake a final, 90-day effort to breathe life into the peace process. If that fails to produce a concrete, workable plan for genuine democracy in Nicaragua, the president should request from Congress a major military and humanitarian aid package for the contras. Coupled with the effort to cut off Soviet aid to Managua through superpower talks, this policy would represent a pincer movement against the Sandinistas, with Moscow putting the squeeze on one end and the contras on the other.

The United States today faces a clear choice: Do we oppose communist subversion in a series of protracted wars throughout Central America or at its source in Nicaragua? Managua's leaders are avowedly committed to supporting anti-U.S. insurgencies throughout the region. If Nicaragua becomes a safe haven and an arms conduit for communist guerrillas, we will be doomed to decades of facing the messy problems of advising our friends in counterinsurgency warfare.

VIII

Revitalizing the Western alliance, redirecting the arms control process, and resolving the critical regional conflicts in Afghanistan and Nicaragua should represent America's immediate foreign policy priorities. Gorbachev's admission of Soviet economic failure and his need for a breathing spell in the East-West competition so perestroika can take root creates an excellent opportunity for the United States not only to enhance the West's security but also to promote a more stable peace through a determined strategy.

This is not to say that Moscow's economic failures will make Gorbachev a pushover. His toughness and intelligence will more than compensate for his country's economic weakness, and his consummate ability in diplomacy and political maneuver will guarantee that he seldom winds up with the short end of a deal. If Western leaders want to avoid being taken to the cleaners, they must understand what Gorbachev wants and how the West should respond.

On his first priority, strengthening the Soviet Union's economy, he will seek free access to Western capital and technology. The United States, Western Europe and Japan must coordinate their policies so that the West exploits its economic power for political effect. We should go forward with unsubsidized trade

20 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

in nonstrategic goods on a cash-and-carry basis. But until the Soviet Union overhauls its domestic economic system and discontinues its aggressive policies, it is not in our interest to bankroll reforms that will either squander our loans or bolster our adversary.

On his second priority, ending the Soviet Union's international isolation, Gorbachev will seek to separate the United States from Europe, particularly Germany, and to open a new relationship with China. We must undertake a new effort to reinvigorate the Western alliance and to infuse Western Europe with the positive purpose of fostering peaceful change in Eastern Europe. If Gorbachev satisfies China's three obstacles, we should welcome a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. We can be confident that, since China's top priority remains economic development, our relations with Beijing will continue to be closer than the Kremlin's.

On his third priority, arms control, he will seek new agreements that will reduce strategic weapons stockpiles but preserve the present Soviet advantage in counterforce capability. In order to reduce the main threat to the West—Moscow's conventional superiority—we must link progress in START to progress on conventional arms control. We must also recast our strategic arms negotiating positions so that a START treaty will enable us to restore the counterforce balance and eventually to enhance strategic stability.

On his fourth priority, prevailing in Third World conflicts, he will seek agreements that appear to settle the conflicts but that actually keep his client regimes in power. We possess the leverage necessary for the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola to prevail. We must never sign an agreement with the Soviet Union that undercuts, militarily or politically, those relying on our support, and we must exploit linkage to promote the retraction of the Soviet empire.

In the short run, we can sympathize with the thrust behind many of Gorbachev's aspirations. We both want to reduce military competition and the danger of nuclear war. We certainly should applaud those of Gorbachev's reforms that reduce, even marginally, the repression and poverty which plague the people of the Soviet Union. At the same time, we must keep in mind that in the long run the goals of the two sides diverge diametrically. Gorbachev wants reform because he wants a stronger Soviet Union and an expanding Soviet empire.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 21

We should support those reforms in the hopes of making the Soviet Union less repressive at home and less aggressive abroad.

As the outpouring of sympathy and support for the victims of the Armenian earthquake so vividly demonstrated, there is a great well of friendship for the Russian people in the United States. The people of the United States and the people of the Soviet Union can be friends. Because of our profound differences, the governments of our two nations cannot be friends—but we cannot afford to be enemies. Gorbachev's historic challenge is to implement reforms that will remove those differences.



FOREIGN AFFAIRS

58 EAST 68TH STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 | (212) 734-0400

WILLIAM G. HYLAND
EDITOR

JAN 27 1989

January 24, 1989

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Brent,

Attached is President Nixon's article, which he has probably already bombarded you with. It is embargoed but you or Bob Gates may want to look at it or send it around to the staff. It will be out February 8..

Yours truly,

William G. Hyland

enc.

FEB 03 1989

Richard Nixon

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE BUSH AGENDA

In 1945, a year before his speech in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill sent a message to the new president, Harry Truman, about the ominous developments in Soviet policy: "An Iron Curtain is being drawn down over their front. We do not know what lies behind it. It is vital, therefore, that we reach an understanding with Russia now before we have mortally reduced our armies and before we have withdrawn into our zones of occupation." Churchill's advice went unheeded, and the West lost a historic opportunity to negotiate a favorable deal with the Kremlin when the bargaining leverage of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union stood at its peak.

After almost half a century, the communist world's leader, President Mikhail Gorbachev, has undertaken dramatic changes within the Soviet bloc that give the free world's new leader, President George Bush, another historic opportunity to enhance the West's security and to effect a sea change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika have been hailed, even by some hard-line Western leaders, as heralding the end of the cold war. While his reforms give reason for a reappraisal of the West's policy toward the Soviet Union, we must bear in mind that the causes of the cold war—Moscow's domination of Eastern Europe and aggressive foreign policies around the world—still endure. Those who urge the West to "help Gorbachev" with low-interest loans and subsidized credits fail to realize that such actions are not in our interest until he makes an irrevocable break with the Kremlin's past policies.

An opportunity now exists to make genuine progress toward a more stable peace. President Bush can exploit this opportunity if he takes a hard-headed look at the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and devises a policy that presents the Kremlin leaders with intractable strategic choices. We must make Gorbachev choose between a less confrontational relationship with the West and the retention of his imperial control over Eastern Europe, between a continuing race in arms technology and arms control agreements that could create a stable strategic

200 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

and conventional balance, and between access to Western technology and credits and continuing Soviet adventurism in the Third World.

II

Gorbachev has sparked enormous excitement in the West because he is perceived to be a new kind of Soviet leader. Dazzled by his "star quality"—the fashionably tailored suits, the polished manners and the smooth touch in personal encounters—reporters and diplomats alike have naïvely confused changes in style and rhetoric with shifts in substance and policy. I have met with three of the Soviet Union's principal postwar leaders—Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 and 1960, Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, 1973 and 1974, and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986. Gorbachev is in a class of his own. He is their match in tenacity and forcefulness, but outstrips them in realism, quickness and intelligence. He deserves great respect for his boldness, his courage and his mastery of public relations. He is a different but, from the West's point of view, not necessarily a better type of leader. We must keep in mind that his talent and capabilities can just as easily make the world a more dangerous place as they can contribute to greater global security.

Gorbachev has launched his reforms and pursued a more conciliatory approach to the West because the communist economic system failed at home and the Soviet Union's foreign policy became counterproductive abroad. The centrally planned economy of the Brezhnev era has become a monument to corruption and inefficiency. Brezhnev's militarism and expansionism not only mobilized the West to strengthen its armed forces but also gave the Soviet Union a severe case of imperial indigestion after it gobbled up Third World countries. By the early 1980s, Moscow's clients in Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Angola and Ethiopia cost the Kremlin at least \$20 billion a year to keep in power. It is a mistake to think that only Gorbachev would have initiated a reform program, for these realities would have forced whoever came to power into rethinking Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev sees the world without ideological blinders. He has realistically assessed the Soviet Union's enormous economic, political, imperial and geopolitical problems. First, he recognizes openly that the Soviet economy has stagnated, with negligible or even negative growth rates since the late 1970s. Without economic reform and access

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 201

to Western technology and capital, the Soviet Union will fall hopelessly behind the United States, Western Europe, Japan and—perhaps as early as the middle of the next century—China.

Second, Gorbachev initiated his economic reforms—*perestroika*—because he knows that the Soviet people can no longer be motivated with political slogans. The increased East-West contacts of the *détente* era and the revolution in mass communications have rendered futile the Stalinist strategy of isolation and ideological indoctrination. Today, the Soviet people are aware that their standard of living—cramped housing, endless food lines and empty store shelves—compares unfavorably not only with that of the West but also with those of the newly industrializing countries of the Third World. Gorbachev knows that only material incentives, not ideological exhortations, will induce the people to work harder. They will produce more only if they can actually purchase decent consumer goods with the additional rubles they earn.

Third, Gorbachev knows that economic failure and political repression have created seething unrest throughout the Soviet empire that could erupt at the slightest provocation. Time bombs lie just below the surface ready to explode, not only in virtually all his East European satellites but also in many of the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union itself. Through *glasnost*, he has tried to create a safety valve to defuse this pent-up frustration, but by venting these angers he may have let the genie out of the bottle. He will find that demands for pluralism in Eastern Europe and greater national autonomy for the non-Russian peoples are difficult to control. Ironically, Soviet leaders used appeals to nationalism to expand their empire into the Third World. Now nationalism threatens to tear that empire apart.

Fourth, as Gorbachev surveys the global political scene, he must be struck by the fact that instead of improving the Soviet Union's position in the world, the Kremlin's foreign policy has managed to unite all the world's major powers against Moscow. The United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and China—which together account for over 60 percent of the world economy and which pose the threat of a two-front engagement in any world conflict—have cooperated actively for more than 15 years in opposing Moscow's traditional expansionist ambition. Moscow's old thinking led to a dead end, so Gorbachev has launched his "new thinking" in foreign

202 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

affairs to loosen the bonds of, or break up, that anti-Soviet bloc.

Fifth, Gorbachev, as a communist, instinctively believes in the importance of the battle of ideas, but as a realist, he knows that the Soviet Union has lost that battle. Around the world—not only within the Soviet bloc but also in Africa, Asia and Latin America—Soviet socialism is perceived as the road to stagnation, not prosperity. It still appeals to those who want to seize and hold power but not to those who want to build a better life for their people. Through his reforms, Gorbachev seeks to create a new model and image for socialism and to give the communist ideology a second wind.

III

Gorbachev's goal is to reinvigorate his country's communist system, to make the Soviet Union a superpower not just in military but also in economic and political terms. Without sweeping reforms, he will not be able to afford the costs of the Soviet military establishment and of Soviet client-states, to provide the Soviet people with a better life, to create a model that can be competitive in the global ideological battle and to keep the Soviet Union in the front rank of world powers.

Gorbachev's reforms face three massive internal roadblocks that could derail his efforts. Despite his successes at the recent special party conference (June 1988) and his tours de force at the recent Central Committee and Supreme Soviet meetings, Gorbachev has not consolidated a firm political grip over the Soviet system. He can count only three or four of the 12 members of the Politburo as steadfast allies. While Yegor Ligachev, his apparent rival, may no longer be looking over Gorbachev's shoulder as the recognized number-two man, Ligachev's faction is waiting in the wings, ready to take over should Gorbachev falter. The last Soviet reformer—Nikita Khrushchev—met with an untimely political demise when he threatened too many entrenched interests.

Thus, we should make no concessions to Gorbachev that we would not make to the least progressive Soviet leader, for the chance still exists that the latter could come to power. While Gorbachev has been hailed as a superstar on the world stage, we must remember that the stars that shine the brightest sometimes fade away the fastest.

In Gorbachev's four years in power, there has been a lot of talk but precious little progress. He has been unable to force

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 203

the sclerotic Soviet party and state bureaucracies to abandon their Stalinist ways. He has the unenviable task of teaching old bureaucrats new tricks. It is one thing to tell a bureaucrat to do a certain task and another to order him to be creative and innovative. The former at least stirs him to action, while the latter evinces blank stares of total incomprehension.

Gorbachev's most profound problem is that he still believes in Marxism-Leninism. Even if he wins his political and bureaucratic battles, this handicap will ultimately doom his reforms to failure. Rapid, self-sustaining economic growth has occurred only in countries that respect the right of individuals to own private property and that allow unregulated prices and the laws of supply and demand to allocate economic resources. Gorbachev has expressed a willingness to grant farmers long-term leases for private farming and has stated that some prices will be decontrolled in the early 1990s, but he still wants to keep the party-state apparatus in firm command of the economy as a whole. While there have been several examples of economies moving from capitalism to communism, there are no examples of economies moving from communism to capitalism. No one has ever constructed a successful halfway house between a market-based and a command economy.

Gorbachev faces a profound philosophical dilemma: he can choose ideology or progress. If he chooses communism, he cannot have progress; if he chooses progress, he cannot have communism. Only by abandoning the ideology that is the bedrock of his power can he produce progress that will match that of the West.

Given the inefficient central planning system and the irrational pricing system, no foreign investor today has the slightest idea of how to judge which economic risks in the Soviet Union are worth taking. Making loans to the Kremlin is like laying down chips on the dice table; some bets may pay off but the odds are that in the long run the money will be wasted. In fact, it is not even in Gorbachev's interest for the West to provide economic assistance before fundamental economic reforms have been institutionalized. A banker does no favor to a borrower by making him a bad loan. We should not enable the Kremlin to borrow its way out of today's problems and thereby delay the inevitable day of addressing the causes of those problems.

Both American superhawks and superdoves overstate the impact Western policies can have on the Soviet Union. Super-

204 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

hawks argue that the West's arms buildup and its opposition to Soviet aggression in places like Afghanistan were the primary factors that prompted Gorbachev to launch his reforms. Those Western actions were vital on their own merits. But even without those actions Gorbachev would have had to initiate changes because the Soviet economic system was suffering from terminal illness. As a Chinese leader told me in 1985, without reforms the Soviet Union by the middle of the next century would "disappear" as a great power. That made internal change imperative, regardless of Western policies.

Superdoves, on the other hand, believe that we should do anything within our power to help Gorbachev in order to promote peace. But we must realize that whether he succeeds or fails ultimately depends on events and forces within the Soviet Union that we cannot affect. We cannot induce Gorbachev to cast aside his Marxist-Leninist obsession with keeping the state in charge of the economy. We cannot whip the Soviet bureaucracy into shape. We can hardly even make out the patterns of Kremlin political intrigue after the fact, much less lend a helping hand to those whose views and interests seem to parallel ours.

Above all, we must keep Gorbachev's reforms in perspective. He does not want to overturn the Soviet system; he wants to strengthen it. To paraphrase Churchill from another context, Gorbachev did not become general secretary to preside over the demise of the Communist Party. We have an interest in the success of his reforms only to the extent that they change the system to make it less threatening to our security and interests. We should applaud glasnost and perestroika but not pay for them, for if his reforms do not irrevocably alter Soviet foreign policy we will be subsidizing the threat of our own destruction.

IV

Those who parrot today a fashionable slogan—"the cold war is over"—trivialize the problems of Western security. Gorbachev's public relations experts have made many Western policymakers forget that a more benign Soviet image does not mean a more benign Soviet foreign policy. As a result, the race to Moscow is already on. In recent months, Western leaders have jetted off to the Kremlin with planeloads of eager bankers and industrialists in tow, and Soviet leaders have gleefully lined up more than \$10 billion in easy credit. Unless the West steps back and designs a coherent strategy, we will squander our

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 205

leverage and lose the historic opportunity presented by events in the Soviet Union.

We should bear in mind a remark made to me in 1953 by Field Marshall Slim, then the British governor-general of Australia. In arguing for a dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, he said, "We must break the ice. If we don't break it, we will all get frozen into it so tight that it will take an atom bomb to break it." Today, the ice has broken even before the end of winter. We are witnessing the thaw that brings the promise of spring. While it is a period of great possibilities, we must tread carefully or risk falling into the icy waters.

We have to recognize that the situation we face now is infinitely more complex than the one we faced at the outset of the cold war forty years ago. At that time, the threat was as clear as Stalin's Iron Curtain and his belligerent rhetoric about the inevitability of war, all of which enabled President Truman to prevent a return to isolationism, adopt a policy of containment and win bipartisan support for entry into NATO and unprecedented levels of peacetime defense spending.

Gorbachev has brilliantly changed the game. In Europe, he has discarded the traditional Soviet tactics of diplomatic bluster and military threat and has mastered those of deceptive propaganda and political maneuver. He has substituted the wiles of diplomacy for the threat of force as his chosen instrument for foreign policy conquests. As a result, at a time when Soviet superiority in conventional military forces and in accurate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is larger than ever before, he has made more progress toward the traditional Soviet objective of dividing the NATO alliance than any of his predecessors. We cannot counter his "peace offensive" simply by loudly warning about the military threat of Moscow's Red Army. Instead, we must launch our own political offensive to achieve our strategic and geopolitical objectives.

We will be pursuing those goals in what has become a multipolar world. Japan is already an economic superpower and will inevitably use its economic clout for political effect. Western Europe will become a unified economic market by 1992 and is beginning to intensify its cooperation in political and strategic matters. China, already a major nuclear power and fast becoming a major economic player, will emerge as one of the world's superpowers in the next century.

We can work with all of these new major powers more easily

206 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

than Gorbachev can. Therefore, before the new administration holds a substantive summit with Gorbachev, it should conduct intensive discussions and meetings with our major allies and friends. We should do this not to present Moscow with an antagonistic and belligerent united front but to explore our common interests and to coordinate our policies where possible.

President Bush should continue to reject the advice of those who urge that he schedule a quick summit with Gorbachev in order to have a foreign policy "victory" early in his term. Gorbachev needs a summit far more than the president. Only when the Bush Administration has agreed on a strategy with our allies and has a definite program for making significant substantive progress on major issues should President Bush schedule an American-Soviet summit.

In formulating a strategy, we should begin by estimating what Gorbachev wants, then map out what we want, what trade-offs are possible, and what we can do to put pressure on him to agree to our terms. Most important, we have to recognize that linkage—the linking of progress on one issue to progress on another—is the key to any successful negotiations with Moscow. Kremlin leaders will always explicitly reject linkage, but they always implicitly accept it.

Without linkage, Gorbachev will string together a series of easy victories at the bargaining table. Each superpower has a greater interest in progress on some issues than on others. Gorbachev, for example, will press hard for access to Western capital markets and technology. The United States, on the other hand, has a greater interest in reducing Soviet influence in the Third World through settlements of certain regional conflicts that threaten our interests. Moscow will be more than willing to negotiate solely on the former. If we fail to pursue a determined policy of linkage, Gorbachev will dominate the agenda and make one-sided progress on his top priorities.

Linkage requires subtlety. An American president should not step before the cameras and announce that he intends to hold the next arms control agreement hostage to Soviet capitulation on one or another issue. Nor should the Congress make the mistake of publicly linking U.S. foreign policy objectives to Soviet domestic policy reforms. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1973–74 was a case in point. Its purpose was to force the Soviet Union to increase Jewish emigration, but it had the opposite effect of drastically reducing it. We should vigorously

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 207

press the Soviets in world forums to eliminate their human rights abuses. But we must allow them to appear to do so of their own volition rather than by clumsily making it look as if they did so only because of direct Western intervention in their internal affairs. No great nation can appear to allow its internal policies to be dictated by a foreign power.

We should link progress toward better East-West relations to restraint in Soviet global behavior. If we enter into agreements beneficial to Moscow despite direct or indirect Soviet aggression, we will in effect be giving the Kremlin a green light to assault our interests. If we pursue a determined strategy that includes linkage, we can further our strategic interests in Europe, in arms control negotiations and in the world's key regional conflicts.

v

Europe has again become the central focus of the East-West conflict, and our strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets must change to meet these circumstances. From 1945 to the early 1960s, the European continent was the principal arena of the world ideological struggle. From the early 1960s through the mid-1980s, after the division of Europe had become a settled political reality, the primary fields of conflict—Indochina, the Middle East, southern Africa, the horn of Africa, southwest Asia and Central America—were situated in the Third World. Now Gorbachev has made the Old World the central priority and target of his new foreign policy.

The traditional goal of Kremlin leaders has been to create political fissures between the United States and Western Europe in order to erode the strength of the alliance. Moscow has pursued this objective, at various times, through a strategy of confrontation that seeks to rattle European nerves and demonstrate the unreliability of America as an ally, or through a strategy of condominium with the United States that seeks to weaken European confidence by creating the impression that the superpowers are settling Europe's fate. Gorbachev has adopted the more straightforward tactic of appealing directly to the West Europeans. He has called for the creation of a single "European home" stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals—thus implying that the United States represents an obstacle to peace—and has sought to exploit the West European fatigue after forty years of East-West conflict.

The world of 1949, when NATO was formed, differs pro-

208 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

foundly from the world of 1989. We need a new strategy in Europe—one that enhances the Continent's stability not only through initiatives to revitalize the alliance in Western Europe but also through a sustained effort to foster peaceful change and positive political evolution in Eastern Europe.

The new administration should make Europe its top foreign policy priority. It should call for a major working summit—no black ties and no spouses—to hammer out a strategy for enhancing our collective security. First of all, we should articulate a common analysis of the nature of the Soviet military threat in Europe. Americans, and many Europeans, believe that the Soviet threat remains as great as or even greater than ever, especially because of Moscow's unrelenting buildup of conventional and strategic weaponry. But in recent years there has been a tendency among other West Europeans, especially but not exclusively those on the left, to view the Soviet Union as a stagnant society incapable of threatening the West or even to view Washington's calls for vigilance and readiness as a greater threat to peace than Moscow's armies.

Harold Macmillan once told me that alliances were held together by fear, not love. For many in Europe and the United States, the fear of the Soviet Union has waned, and what love may exist among economic competitors in the West is a very weak glue to hold an alliance together. It is therefore imperative that Western leaders issue a joint statement, in conjunction with its arms control proposals, that educates their publics on the nature and scope of the Soviet threat.

Second, we should agree on ways to defend common Western interests outside of Europe. In 1949 the West faced the threat of a direct Soviet military thrust into central Europe. In recent years, with the East-West competition in Europe focusing on the political plane, Soviet direct and indirect aggression has principally taken place in the Third World. The United States has borne the overwhelming share of the burden in countering Moscow's subversion and proxy warfare to protect regions such as the Persian Gulf, even though the Gulf is far more important to Western Europe than to the United States. Unless we devise a more equitable global security framework, it is inevitable that pressure will build in the United States for a significant reduction of the U.S. troop commitment to NATO.

Third, we should articulate a compelling rationale for NATO's nuclear deterrent and a joint approach for the next round of European arms control talks. At the Reykjavik summit, the

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 209

Reagan Administration undermined public support for nuclear deterrence by advocating the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. We must renounce the Reykjavik rhetoric in unequivocal terms and explain to Western publics the realities of the nuclear age. We should pursue the so-called competitive strategies on the conventional level to undercut the significance of Soviet quantitative superiority and thereby raise the nuclear threshold. But nuclear deterrence, both strategic and tactical, remains imperative. Even if conventional arms control succeeds, NATO will have to maintain a residual, even if diminished, tactical nuclear capability in Europe, though the deterrent should be reconfigured to allay West German concerns regarding the bases and targets of these weapons. More important, NATO must arrive at a joint conventional arms control proposal that makes offensive warfare futile and that mobilizes public support for the Western negotiating position. A good beginning has been made in the recent NATO proposal for major cuts in the tank armies in Europe, though a public diplomacy offensive needs to be launched to sell it to Western publics.

Fourth, we must agree on a common approach to East-West trade. We should not provide the Soviet Union with technologies that can significantly improve its military forces. We should also create a joint institution for coordinating and regulating the Soviet Union's access to Western capital markets. It is not in our interest to have Western banks competing to provide the Kremlin with loans at below-market rates. Nor is it in our interest to repeat the mistakes of bankers in the 1970s who lent East European countries tens of billions of dollars that will never be repaid.

Fifth, we should design a common approach to the problem of Eastern Europe. The cold war began in Eastern Europe, and it will not end until Moscow's satellites receive their independence. In the past, it has always been in the West's interest, but not in Moscow's, to address the issue of Eastern Europe. Today, since Gorbachev needs East-West economic links and reduced tensions for perestroika to succeed, a new settlement is in the Kremlin's interest as well.

Without a political settlement in Eastern Europe, no stable, enduring improvement in East-West relations is possible. Post-war history is the story of continual attempts by the East Europeans to wrest their freedom from Moscow. The workers' uprising in East Germany in 1953, the popular rebellion in Hungary in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, the Solidarity

210 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

movement in Poland in 1980, and the scores of other smaller incidents of open opposition all testify to the popular determination to be free. All these outbursts had to be suppressed directly or indirectly by Soviet arms, and all those interventions destroyed the prospects for an immediate improvement in East-West relations.

That pattern could soon recur. Eastern Europe has become an economic and political powder keg waiting to blow up. Today, the tectonic plates of East European nationalism and Soviet expansionism have built up enormous pressure as they have pushed against each other. We have seen the first tremors in the rise of East European dissident and reform movements. But a political earthquake is inevitable in the 1990s. If Moscow responds with military force, it will mean a return to sharper tensions in East-West relations and an abortion of Gorbachev's reforms.

If we want to avoid this grim scenario, we must work on three fronts.

First, the West should press for peaceful change in Eastern Europe. We should continue to exploit modern means of mass communication to break the grip of the East European regimes over their peoples. Radio Free Europe has been one of our most effective programs in the East-West struggle. In the 1990s we should establish direct television transmissions via satellite into these countries. We should also provide material support to those behind the Iron Curtain who are pressing for peaceful change, with Western trade union support to the Solidarity movement in Poland serving as a model.

Second, the West should continue its policy of differentiating between those East European regimes which demonstrate a willingness to enact reforms that move their countries toward political pluralism and those which do not. For those leaders who liberalize their regimes, we should make available economic credits, more advanced technology and debt rescheduling, while the others should be left to fend for themselves.

Third, the United States should put Eastern Europe on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. In Yugoslavia last year, Gorbachev signed a declaration that stated that "no one has a monopoly on truth" and that foreign powers had no "claim on imposing their notions of social development on anyone." We should insist that Kremlin leaders back up their words with deeds. We could even propose the neutralization of Eastern Europe along the lines of the Austrian Peace Treaty of 1955, with an interim

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 211

agreement that leaves the military structure of the Warsaw Pact intact but that would allow the East European peoples to choose their own forms of government through genuine elections.

Eastern Europe is the natural field for political initiatives by Western Europe. Our allies' historical fatigue stems in part from the fact that for forty years their role has been defined by a negative mission—stopping further Soviet expansion. It can be cured by devoting energy to the positive mission of promoting peaceful change beyond the Iron Curtain. Holding the line against the Red Army has principally involved sacrifice and risk, but supporting the development of pluralism under the nose of the Red Army requires ingenuity and inspiration. It is a task that will not only enhance Western Europe's security but also help to restore its sense of purpose.

VI

Arms control should be treated as only one part of Western defense policy and not vice versa. Arms negotiations are a political imperative, indispensable in holding the NATO alliance together and for winning support in Congress for adequate defense budgets. For too long, however, many Western leaders have endorsed arms control as an end in itself, regardless of the impact that particular agreements would have on our strategic position. Moscow, on the other hand, has traditionally sought to use arms control to achieve political and strategic ends—to lull the West into a false sense of security, to limit developments in American weapons technology, and to preserve or increase Soviet advantages in weapons deployments. It is time for the United States to borrow a page from the Kremlin's negotiating handbook.

Since Soviet superiority in conventional arms represents the greatest threat to Western security, cuts in those forces should be the top priority of Western arms control strategy. Moscow's main goal is to reduce the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and to stifle the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) while preserving its advantage on the conventional level, because that would maximize the political importance of its conventional superiority. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States link progress in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) to progress in conventional arms control negotiations.

Western conventional arms control proposals should focus geographically on the European central front, the most mili-

212 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

tarily congested territory in the world, and should seek to reduce those weapons that are most useful for offensive warfare. These should include at a minimum reductions in tanks and self-propelled artillery even beyond those proposed by Gorbachev at the United Nations. The weapons must be destroyed rather than pulled back into the Soviet Union; otherwise Moscow could redeploy them in a matter of days. In addition, military bases and supply depots should be relocated away from the front in order to make surprise attacks more difficult. NATO governments must insist in arms control talks that Gorbachev fulfill his pledge to accept "asymmetrical reductions" on the conventional level.

Gorbachev's rhetoric about reconfiguring Warsaw Pact forces to fit a "defensive" doctrine has been all talk and no action. His pledge in his recent U.N. speech to demobilize 500,000 troops and retire 10,000 tanks represents a significant symbolic gesture. But we must not pretend that it solves the security problem posed by the Warsaw Pact's tank armada (currently about 53,000).¹ Thus, if the 5,000 tanks withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are not destroyed but simply parked on the Soviet side of the border, they can be redeployed rapidly. Even if the tanks were destroyed, the Warsaw Pact's tank advantage would drop only slightly.

In addition to linking the strategic and conventional arms control talks, the new administration should redirect the U.S. approach to the START negotiations.

Our problem on the strategic level, which began in the mid-1970s and threatens to become much worse in the 1990s, is the growing vulnerability of our land-based missiles and command-and-control systems to a first-strike attack by the most accurate and powerful Soviet missiles. The Reagan Administration's effort to cut strategic forces by 50 percent focused too much on simply reducing the total number of strategic weapons instead of reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces and thereby enhancing strategic stability. The real test is not whether the treaty reduces the number of nuclear weapons but whether it reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. We must ultimately judge the value of any START agreement by whether it increases the security of our strategic forces and

¹ *The Military Balance 1988-1989*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988, p. 237.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 213

decreases the incentives for either side to resort to nuclear weapons in a crisis.

That is where the current START formula falls short. Under its terms, both sides would reduce their arsenals to 1,600 launchers including heavy bombers, ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and to 6,000 warheads, of which only 4,900 would be permitted on ballistic missiles. While such radical reductions might be politically appealing, close scrutiny shows that they actually increase the vulnerability of U.S. forces. Moscow would retain a land-based ICBM force composed almost entirely of the newer SS-18, SS-24 and SS-25 missile launchers, all of which are first-strike weapons. At the same time, the cuts would reduce the number of targets inside the United States that would have to be destroyed for a first strike to succeed. Assuming that after reductions the United States would choose to retain its most accurate and modern weapons, the ratio of Soviet first-strike warheads to U.S. first-strike targets would grow drastically worse. In addition, the prospective reductions would restrict the deployment of our most capable and survivable force, the fleet of Trident II submarines, to no more than 17 boats. As a result, this force could well become vulnerable, for some number will always be in port or off-line, and the remainder, reduced to, say, ten boats, will be tracked by Moscow's fleet of 270 attack submarines.²

Some argue that these issues do not matter, because under the proposed START agreement we would be allowed to reconfigure our strategic forces to account for the new ceilings. They contend that we could build a new fleet of smaller submarines that would carry fewer missiles and a new generation of land-based missiles that would carry fewer warheads. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the START force reductions are to be carried out over seven years, while any programs to develop and deploy entire new strategic systems would take a decade or more. Second, it is totally unrealistic to think that Congress, which expects arms control to produce cuts in the defense budget, would vote to increase military spending by the tens of billions of dollars necessary to overhaul completely our strategic force posture.

Instead of seeking an arbitrary 50-percent reduction, the Bush Administration should consider adopting a two-part pro-

² Edward L. Warner III and David A. Ochmanek, *Next Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989, pp. 46-47.

214 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

posals, with the first level designed to meet minimum U.S. requirements and to produce a quick interim agreement and the second level directed to major reductions in first-strike weapons. In formulating our proposal for the first stage, we should calculate what kind of strategic force posture our security requires and propose launcher and warhead ceilings that could involve some reductions from present levels but would not impede the necessary U.S. weapons programs, particularly the mobile Midgetman missile. In addition, since the United States observed and the Soviet Union ignored the modernization restrictions of the treaties negotiated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, this initial agreement would permit unrestricted modernization.

After the completion of the interim agreement, the two sides would focus on the far more difficult objective of increasing strategic stability by reducing the number of warheads on both sides capable of destroying hardened military targets in a first strike. Both superpowers would be allowed to retain an equal number of counterforce warheads. But the level of these most threatening weapons would be scaled back dramatically—far more than by the current START proposal. This should involve a 75-percent cut from the present level of such Soviet weapons and should also require reductions in planned deployments of comparable U.S. weapons, such as the MX, the Midgetman and the Trident II D-5 missiles.

This second agreement would also address the issue of strategic defense. As long as the Soviet Union possesses its formidable arsenal of first-strike weapons, the United States must press forward with SDI. Our position should be that research, development, testing and deployment of defensive systems is not negotiable. Only the *extent* of our deployments should be subject to limitation through mutual agreement, and those deployments should be calibrated to the extent of the Soviet counterforce threat.

A two-stage approach along these lines offers the best prospects for successful nuclear arms control. It would enable Presidents Bush and Gorbachev to conclude quickly an interim agreement capping the number of launchers and warheads, though unlike the current START formula the accord would not inhibit U.S. weapons programs needed to redress the asymmetry in strategic vulnerability and the imbalance in counterforce weapons. It would also create a stable foundation for a treaty to enhance strategic security by reducing the number

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 215

of counterforce systems to levels that make a successful first-strike attack on the other side's strategic forces militarily infeasible.

VII

The two regional conflicts requiring immediate presidential action, Afghanistan and Central America, represent opposite poles in American policy. Our program to aid the Afghan resistance has received bipartisan support, has operated continuously for almost a decade and verges on ultimate success. Our assistance to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters has been subjected to partisan bickering, has been at best episodic and has failed so far. In distant Afghanistan, we learned that a sustained, bipartisan program of large-scale assistance to anticommunist freedom fighters can produce major geopolitical gains. We should apply the same lesson to the nearby and strategically critical conflict in Central America.

In Afghanistan, as Moscow's tanks retreat, one round of the great game closes—but yet another begins. Our goal has been twofold, to force the Soviet Union to withdraw and to restore the Afghan people's right to self-determination. Achieving the former does not automatically accomplish the latter. First of all, the communist regime in Kabul must be replaced. The best solution would be the removal of the Soviet puppet regime through the direct talks now taking place between Moscow and the resistance leadership. But should those talks stall or fail we must continue to provide whatever kinds of weapons the resistance requires to topple the Kabul regime. Since the character of the fighting has changed from guerrilla warfare to battles for taking and holding cities, the United States must upgrade its assistance quantitatively and qualitatively, particularly in terms of antiaircraft missiles, long-range mortars, and mine-clearing devices and equipment.

It does not serve American, or Afghan, interests for the United States to disengage before a political process is in place that will establish real self-determination for the Afghan people themselves. If the country collapses into a civil war with dozens of tribal warlords ruling their separate fiefdoms, the Kremlin will seize this as a lever to regain a measure of influence by supporting one or another group in the fighting or by declaring the need to keep forces in a "security zone" in northern Afghanistan. Therefore, at a time when our weapons pipeline still gives us influence, we need to address directly the critical

216 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

issue of establishing, through the traditional Afghan means of a tribal assembly and through elections, a post-communist government that truly represents the people.

Central America poses far more difficult and, from the U.S. point of view, far more critical problems. Our interests are not threatened by Nicaragua simply because its government systematically violates human rights and spouts anti-American rhetoric. A dictatorship, even a totalitarian one, does not threaten our interests per se. Rather, the Sandinista regime threatens our interests only because Managua has forged links with the Soviet Union and has become a base for indirect Soviet subversion of other Central American states such as El Salvador. The problem is not that the Nicaraguan government is communist but that the communist government of Nicaragua is inherently expansionist. As the Sandinistas freely admit, and even boast, they seek "a revolution without frontiers" in Central America and insist on the right to aid communist guerrillas in neighboring countries.

At the first opportunity, the Bush Administration must impose linkage between the issue of Soviet access to U.S. capital, credits and technology and that of Soviet military assistance to Managua. Gorbachev must be made to understand that Nicaragua is a neuralgic issue for us. While academics might debate whether the Monroe Doctrine has become obsolete, the United States cannot allow the Soviet Union or any other foreign power to provide arms to a virulently anti-American and aggressive regime in the western hemisphere. Given the Soviet economy's pathetic condition, our economic power represents tremendous leverage. If we link these issues, we should be able to profit politically, as well as economically, from our economic relationship with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, we must recognize that the Sandinista leaders have made a mockery of the Arias peace plan, despite the cutoff of U.S. assistance to the contras. Managua permits fewer civil liberties and holds more political prisoners today than it did when the so-called process of democratization began. In its direct talks with the contras, it has in effect demanded surrender, rather than opening the way to a political compromise. Moreover, the Nicaraguan-backed communist guerrillas in El Salvador have dramatically stepped up their terrorist and military attacks.

The Bush Administration must determine, once and for all, the viability of the Arias peace plan. If the Sandinista-contra

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 217

talks cannot achieve their objective, they should be ended. Since endless negotiations work to the advantage of the Sandinistas, the United States should undertake a final, 90-day effort to breathe life into the peace process. If that fails to produce a concrete, workable plan for genuine democracy in Nicaragua, the president should request from Congress a major military and humanitarian aid package for the contras. Coupled with the effort to cut off Soviet aid to Managua through superpower talks, this policy would represent a pincer movement against the Sandinistas, with Moscow putting the squeeze on one end and the contras on the other.

The United States today faces a clear choice: Do we oppose communist subversion in a series of protracted wars throughout Central America or at its source in Nicaragua? Managua's leaders are avowedly committed to supporting anti-U.S. insurgencies throughout the region. If Nicaragua becomes a safe haven and an arms conduit for communist guerrillas, we will be doomed to decades of facing the messy problems of advising our friends in counterinsurgency warfare.

VIII

Revitalizing the Western alliance, redirecting the arms control process, and resolving the critical regional conflicts in Afghanistan and Nicaragua should represent America's immediate foreign policy priorities. Gorbachev's admission of Soviet economic failure and his need for a breathing spell in the East-West competition so perestroika can take root creates an excellent opportunity for the United States not only to enhance the West's security but also to promote a more stable peace through a determined strategy.

This is not to say that Moscow's economic failures will make Gorbachev a pushover. His toughness and intelligence will more than compensate for his country's economic weakness, and his consummate ability in diplomacy and political maneuver will guarantee that he seldom winds up with the short end of a deal. If Western leaders want to avoid being taken to the cleaners, they must understand what Gorbachev wants and how the West should respond.

On his first priority, strengthening the Soviet Union's economy, he will seek free access to Western capital and technology. The United States, Western Europe and Japan must coordinate their policies so that the West exploits its economic power for political effect. We should go forward with unsubsidized trade

218 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

in nonstrategic goods on a cash-and-carry basis. But until the Soviet Union overhauls its domestic economic system and discontinues its aggressive policies, it is not in our interest to bankroll reforms that will either squander our loans or bolster our adversary.

On his second priority, ending the Soviet Union's international isolation, Gorbachev will seek to separate the United States from Europe, particularly Germany, and to open a new relationship with China. We must undertake a new effort to reinvigorate the Western alliance and to infuse Western Europe with the positive purpose of fostering peaceful change in Eastern Europe. If Gorbachev satisfies China's "three obstacles," we should welcome a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. We can be confident that, since China's top priority remains economic development, our relations with Beijing will continue to be closer than the Kremlin's.

On his third priority, arms control, he will seek new agreements that will reduce strategic weapons stockpiles but preserve the present Soviet advantage in counterforce capability. In order to reduce the main threat to the West—Moscow's conventional superiority—we must link progress in START to progress on conventional arms control. We must also recast our strategic arms negotiating positions so that a START treaty will enable us to restore the counterforce balance and eventually to enhance strategic stability.

On his fourth priority, prevailing in Third World conflicts, he will seek agreements that appear to settle the conflicts but that actually keep his client regimes in power. We possess the leverage necessary for the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola to prevail. We must never sign an agreement with the Soviet Union that undercuts, militarily or politically, those relying on our support, and we must exploit linkage to promote the retraction of the Soviet empire.

In the short run, we can sympathize with the thrust behind many of Gorbachev's aspirations. We both want to reduce military competition and the danger of nuclear war. We certainly should applaud those of Gorbachev's reforms that reduce, even marginally, the repression and poverty which plague the people of the Soviet Union. At the same time, we must keep in mind that in the long run the goals of the two sides diverge diametrically. Gorbachev wants reform because he wants a stronger Soviet Union and an expanding Soviet empire.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 219

We should support those reforms in the hope of making the Soviet Union less repressive at home and less aggressive abroad.

As the outpouring of sympathy and support for the victims of the Armenian earthquake so vividly demonstrated, there is a great well of friendship for the Russian people in the United States. The people of the United States and the people of the Soviet Union can be friends. Because of our profound differences, the governments of our two nations cannot be friends—but we cannot afford to be enemies. Gorbachev's historic challenge is to implement reforms that will remove those differences.

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON
5777 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

JAN 30 1989

January 27, 1989

MEMORANDUM FROM JOHN H. TAYLOR

I thought you might be interested in an article TV Guide asked President Nixon to write about using television effectively. You will see that it departs from the conventional wisdom about how to get along with the media.

Together with his Foreign Affairs article, which I sent you last week, this completes RN's transition report!

Memo to President Bush: How to Use TV—and Keep from Being Abused by It

By Richard Nixon



President-elect George Bush will be inaugurated in Washington, D.C., on Friday, Jan. 20, at 11:30 A.M. (ET) at the West Front of the Capitol. See listings for details of live coverage.

Thousands of think-tank gurus, professors and former Government officials spent the holidays lining up to hand President-elect Bush fat reports full of unsolicited, frequently ignored advice about the Congress, the budget or foreign policy.

But the transition staff had no Depart-

ment of Television Strategy. It should have had. Of all the institutions arrayed with and against a President, none controls his fate more than television. Unless a President learns how to harness its power, his Administration is in trouble from the very beginning.

Ronald Reagan used TV so skillfully that he made it look effortless. It would be a mistake for any other President to assume he will do as well. Reagan was born to the breed, a performer long be-

fore he became a politician. The media are currently excoriating themselves, in a lengthy best seller and elsewhere, for giving him such an easy time. The real reason is short and simple: he was the greatest living practitioner of their own show-biz game. Now that he is leaving office, Presidents will once again have to sweat for every friendly sound bite.

The print media are also important, but only if their work is picked up and amplified by TV. A newspaper story that turns a few hundred thousand heads in the morning can turn 40-plus million that evening if the networks use it. Otherwise, it is usually gone with the wind.

No matter how many friends he may think he has in the press, especially during the honeymoon period when he is still riding high, the President must recognize that his relationship with the media is inherently adversarial. TV reporters always claim to be "speaking for the people," but they are really speaking primarily for themselves. In many ways they are political actors just like the President, mindful of their ratings, careful of preserving and building their power. A President must respect them for that power, but he can never entirely trust them.

Most TV reporters, like most politicians, are conscientious, intelligent and hard-working. The majority are liberal. But because of the media's loss of credibility in recent years, they are sensitive about appearing biased.

This makes them fair-weather friends. Except during the 1981 recession and the Iran-contra affair, President Reagan got generally favorable coverage on TV not because the reporters liked him but because the people did. Producers recognize the danger of telling people too much of what they don't want to hear. If viewers decide the networks are being too hard on the President, affiliate switchboards get angry calls, advertisers get angry letters, and channel dials get switched. TV news executives claim their professionalism makes them immune to such pressures. We should view these


George Bush addresses the press.

TV GUIDE JANUARY 14, 1989

noble testaments with the same innate skepticism with which TV reporters view every statement a President makes.

Television commentators live in an iron cage of highly competitive, cut-throat competition. Being more interesting is infinitely more important than being more responsible. Negative news is far more likely to get on the air than positive news. Discussions of serious issues are a ratings nightmare. The television reporter who always emphasizes the serious and the substantive will never go to the top.

Sometimes a President convinces himself that if he can just make his media critics understand what he is trying to do, they will stop hammering him. His aides will urge him to have them in to lunch, give them autographed pictures or invite their children to the White House Easter Egg Roll. Such tactics assume the media naturally seek compromise and harmony. In fact, they thrive only on conflict and disunity. The press views the White House not as the seat of civil government but as a constantly sim- →



Dennis Black/Black Star

Gamma-Liaison

continued

mering cauldron of potentially sensational news. Each minute irregularity in its operation, every petty staff jealousy and disagreement, will be eagerly blown into a great national event by the ambitious reporters who want to make their name on the White House beat.

As the low ratings for public television's deadly dull public-affairs programming demonstrate, TV is an entertainment medium, not an educational one. The combative, even obnoxious, personalities are the most successful. The superficial, the colorful and the offbeat are far more likely to make the evening news than dry policy reports. The only exceptions are those rare instances when a major, dramatic news story captures intense public interest, such as the surprise 90-second announcement of the opening to China in 1971.

In contrast, a President wants to get maximum positive coverage, using TV to educate people on the issues and to develop support for his programs. A President must recognize the fact that TV is potentially his most powerful instrument for informing, educating and persuading. It enables him to go over the heads of his critics and speak directly to the American people.

In short, the media don't have to be convinced. They have to be outfoxed, outflanked and outperformed. Unless the President finds a way to use them to pursue his own agenda, they will use his failures to pursue theirs.

The most effective TV forum, the prime-time Oval Office speech, must not be used too often, and it should never be used unless the President has something important to say. These addresses should never be longer than 20 minutes, since listeners' attention spans are short. The President must also try to do everything he can to build a TV audience by building suspense in the days and hours leading up to the broadcast. Anyone who disrupts



Richard Nixon meets with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (left) and fields a question from CBS's Walter Cronkite.

Michel Laurent Gamma-Liaison

this process by leaking out a major Presidential statement in advance should be fired. If a President has big news to make, he should make it himself rather than relying on an aide who is trying to curry favor with a favorite reporter.

A President should never make a major televised speech before the easily distracted audience at the typical fund-raising dinner or rally. Such events put a premium on applause lines, which may stir an audience but do not persuade it. TV is a conversational medium. The President must talk to people, not orate at them. Except for formal events like State of the Union addresses that are spectacles in and of themselves, the quiet persuasion of an Oval Office speech is by far the President's most effective tool.

A President should also never answer questions on the run, shouting to be heard over the engine of his helicopter or car. He will inevitably look harassed and undignified, and he will also be prone to mistakes. Eisenhower was a master in avoiding such questions. I once asked him how he did it. He smiled and said, "I just act as if I am hard of hearing and walk right-on by them." Loudmouthed reporters who shout such questions won't grin, but they will bear it.

The televised Presidential press conference can be a highly effective forum, →

continued

but only if the President is skilled in using the Q-and-A format and takes the necessary time to prepare. Televised press conferences should be held monthly at most, and always during prime time. Daytime press conferences leave the decision about what makes the evening news solely in the hands of TV editors, who, unless there is a major news event, will always opt for the superficial, the entertaining, the embarrassing or the frivolous before they work their way down to the substantive. Prime-time viewers see the whole man and the complete performance.

The media have been clamoring for more news conferences, and it is certainly in their interests for the President to acquiesce. For the press these exchanges have developed into revolting spectacles where reporters vie with each other to see who can best play the game of "Gotchal" with the President of the United States. But a news conference is only in the President's interests when it achieves some purpose other than satisfying the media's insatiable thirst for confrontation. Contrary to the media's fulminations, the public does not much care how often the President has a press conference. When he does have one, he must be perfectly aware of the problems he wants to solve, the policies he wants to promote and the axes he wants to grind before he even steps into the East Room. When a President is surprised at a news conference, he and his staff have not done their homework.

The President might also consider having an additional biweekly meeting with reporters from both the press and TV, but without cameras. TV puts a premium on performing and preening, on both sides of the podium. The men get their hair blown dry, while the women dress up in ravishing red. On TV both sides lean to one-liners and quips, while a non-broadcast conference would allow for serious give-and-take in which the President could actually try to share his views with his interrogators, and they might listen.

The most important element of an effective

television strategy is having the whole Administration united behind the President's efforts. TV reporters love to follow a President's strong endorsement of some policy with statements like this one: "Privately, White House advisors admit the policy is doomed." Such tidbits usually come from aides who want either to disassociate themselves from a policy or to damage the fortunes of a competing advisor who is associated with the policy. In the Bush Administration, all such unnamed "advisors" should be ferreted out by Chief of Staff John Sununu and fired. The media call such efforts to plug leaks undemocratic. On the contrary: it is undemocratic for officials who publicly profess loyalty to a President to trash him privately, not for the sake of the country but of their own private ambitions.

Because the interests of the President and TV commentators are often opposed to each other does not mean that President Bush should not do everything possible to develop a good personal relationship with those who cover the White House. They have a job to do. He should help them do their job unless they try to do a job on him. He needs them, but they need him even more. Above all, he must not allow TV reporters to dominate the dialogue and determine what people should hear or how they should react to what they hear. He should welcome questions that allow the people to see the whole man and what he really stands for. He has every right to fend off questions that are designed to embarrass him or to misrepresent or distort what he is trying to get across.

He should also not be reluctant to freeze out those whose pervasively unfair coverage goes beyond the pale. The only leverage he has for encouraging fair coverage is control over further access to himself and others in his Government. An ostracized journalist will cry foul, but his colleagues will be too busy scooping him to pay any attention. **END**

President Nixon's book 1999: Victory Without War will be published in paperback by Pocket Books this spring.

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

January 12, 1989

MEMORANDUM FROM JOHN H. TAYLOR

I thought you might be interested in seeing an advance copy of RN's article for the upcoming special issue of Foreign Affairs.

WGH, PG, LR, PH, PLD, DK, AUTHORZ,

1st proofs

JW, ME, MB, DH, RH, FILE

JAN 10 1989

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

ORIGINAL SET
PROOF-READ & RETURN

Richard Nixon

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THE BUSH AGENDA

In 1945, a year before his speech in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill sent a message to the new president, Harry Truman, about the ominous developments in Soviet policy: "An Iron Curtain is being drawn down over their front. We do not know what lies behind it. It is vital, therefore, that we reach an understanding with Russia now before we have mortally reduced our armies and before we have withdrawn into our zones of occupation." Churchill's advice went unheeded, and the West lost a historic opportunity to negotiate a favorable deal with the Kremlin when the bargaining leverage of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union stood at its peak.

After almost half a century, the communist world's leader, President Mikhail Gorbachev, has undertaken dramatic changes within the Soviet bloc that give the free world's new leader, President George Bush, another historic opportunity to enhance the West's security and to effect a sea change in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika have been hailed, even by some hard-line Western leaders, as heralding the end of the cold war. While his reforms give reason for a reappraisal of the West's policy toward the Soviet Union, we must bear in mind that the causes of the cold war—Moscow's domination of Eastern Europe and aggressive foreign policies around the world—still endure. Those who urge the West to "help Gorbachev" with low-interest loans and subsidized credits fail to realize that such actions are not in our interest until he makes an irrevocable break with the Kremlin's past policies.

An opportunity now exists to make genuine progress toward a more stable peace. President Bush can exploit this opportunity if he takes a hard-headed look at the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and devises a policy that presents the Kremlin leaders with intractable strategic choices. We must make Gorbachev choose between a less confrontational relationship with the West and the retention of his imperial control over Eastern Europe, between a continuing race in arms technology and arms control agreements that could create a stable strategic

2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

and conventional balance, and between access to Western technology and credits and continuing Soviet adventurism in the Third World.

II

Gorbachev has sparked enormous excitement in the West because he is perceived to be a new kind of Soviet leader. Dazzled by his "star quality"—the fashionably tailored suits, the polished manners and the smooth touch in personal encounters—reporters and diplomats alike have naïvely confused changes in style and rhetoric with shifts in substance and policy. I have met with three of the Soviet Union's principal postwar leaders—Nikita Khrushchev in 1959 and 1960, Leonid Brezhnev in 1972, 1973 and 1974, and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986. Gorbachev is in a class of his own. He is their match in tenacity and forcefulness, but outstrips them in realism, quickness and intelligence. He deserves great respect for his boldness, his courage and his mastery of public relations. He is a different but, from the West's point of view, not necessarily a better type of leader. We must keep in mind that his talent and capabilities can just as easily make the world a more dangerous place as they can contribute to greater global security.

Gorbachev has launched his reforms and pursued a more conciliatory approach to the West because the communist economic system failed at home and the Soviet Union's foreign policy became counterproductive abroad. The centrally planned economy of the Brezhnev era has become a monument to corruption and inefficiency. Brezhnev's militarism and expansionism not only mobilized the West to strengthen its armed forces but also gave the Soviet Union a severe case of imperial indigestion after it gobbled up Third World countries. By the early 1980s, Moscow's clients in Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Angola and Ethiopia cost the Kremlin at least \$20 billion a year to keep in power. It is a mistake to think that only Gorbachev would have initiated a reform program, for these realities would have forced whoever came to power into rethinking Soviet domestic and foreign policy.

Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev sees the world without ideological blinkers. He has realistically assessed the Soviet Union's enormous economic, political, imperial and geopolitical problems. First, he recognizes openly that the Soviet economy has stagnated, with negligible or even negative growth rates since the late 1970s. Without economic reform and access

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 3

to Western technology and capital, the Soviet Union will fall hopelessly behind the United States, Western Europe, Japan and—perhaps as early as the middle of the next century—China.

Second, Gorbachev initiated his economic reforms—perestroika—because he knows that the Soviet people can no longer be motivated with political slogans. The increased East-West contacts of the détente era and the revolution in mass communications have rendered futile the Stalinist strategy of isolation and ideological indoctrination. Today, the Soviet people are aware that their standard of living—cramped housing, endless food lines and empty store shelves—compares unfavorably not only with that of the West but also with those of the newly industrializing countries of the Third World. Gorbachev knows that only material incentives, not ideological exhortations, will induce the people to work harder. They will produce more only if they can actually purchase decent consumer goods with the additional rubles they earn.

Third, Gorbachev knows that economic failure and political repression have created seething unrest throughout the Soviet empire that could erupt at the slightest provocation. Time bombs lie just below the surface ready to explode, not only in virtually all his East European satellites, but also in many of the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union itself. Through glasnost, he has tried to create a safety valve to defuse this pent-up frustration, but by venting these angers he may have let the genie out of the bottle. He will find that demands for pluralism in Eastern Europe and greater national autonomy for the non-Russian peoples are difficult to control. Ironically, Soviet leaders used appeals to nationalism to expand their empire into the Third World. Now nationalism threatens to tear that empire apart.

Fourth, as Gorbachev surveys the global political scene, he must be struck by the fact that instead of improving the Soviet Union's position in the world, the Kremlin's foreign policy has managed to unite all the world's major powers against Moscow. The United States, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and China—which together account for over 60 percent of the world economy and which pose the threat of a two-front engagement in any world conflict—have cooperated actively for more than 15 years in opposing Moscow's traditional expansionist ambition. Moscow's old thinking led to a dead end, so Gorbachev has launched his "new thinking" in foreign

4 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

affairs to loosen the bonds of, or break up, that anti-Soviet bloc.

Fifth, Gorbachev, as a communist, instinctively believes in the importance of the battle of ideas, but as a realist, he knows that the Soviet Union has lost that battle. Around the world—not only within the Soviet bloc, but also in Africa, Asia and Latin America—Soviet socialism is perceived as the road to stagnation, not prosperity. It still appeals to those who want to seize and hold power but not to those who want to build a better life for their people. Through his reforms, Gorbachev seeks to create a new model and image for socialism and to give the communist ideology a second wind.

III

Gorbachev's goal is to reinvigorate his country's communist system, to make the Soviet Union a superpower not just in military but also in economic and political terms. Without sweeping reforms, he will not be able to afford the costs of the Soviet military establishment and of Soviet client-states, to provide the Soviet people with a better life, to create a model that can be competitive in the global ideological battle and to keep the Soviet Union in the front rank of world powers.

Gorbachev's reforms face three massive internal roadblocks that could derail his efforts. Despite his successes at the recent special party conference (June 1988) and his tours de force at the recent Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet meetings, Gorbachev has not consolidated a firm political grip over the Soviet system. He can count only three or four of the 12 members of the Politburo as steadfast allies. While Yegor Ligachev, his apparent rival, may no longer be looking over Gorbachev's shoulder as the recognized number-two man, Ligachev's faction is waiting in the wings, ready to take over should Gorbachev falter. The last Soviet reformer—Nikita Khrushchev—met with an untimely political demise when he threatened too many entrenched interests.

Thus, we should make no concessions to Gorbachev that we would not make to the least progressive Soviet leader, for the chance still exists that the latter could come to power. While Gorbachev has been hailed as a superstar on the world stage, we must remember that the stars that shine the brightest sometimes fade away the fastest.

In Gorbachev's four years in power, there has been a lot of talk but precious little progress. He has been unable to force

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 5

the sclerotic Soviet party and state bureaucracies to abandon their Stalinist ways. He has the unenviable task of teaching old bureaucrats new tricks. It is one thing to tell a bureaucrat to do a certain task and another to order him to be creative and innovative. The former at least stirs him to action, while the latter evinces blank stares of total incomprehension.

Gorbachev's most profound problem is that he still believes in Marxism-Leninism. Even if he wins his political and bureaucratic battles, this handicap will ultimately doom his reforms to failure. Rapid, self-sustaining economic growth has occurred only in countries that respect the right of individuals to own private property and that allow unregulated prices and the laws of supply and demand to allocate economic resources. Gorbachev has expressed a willingness to grant farmers long-term leases for private farming and has stated that some prices will be decontrolled in the early 1990s, but he still wants to keep the party-state apparatus in firm command of the economy as a whole. While there have been several examples of economies moving from capitalism to communism, there are no examples of economies moving from communism to capitalism. No one has ever constructed a successful halfway house between a market-based and a command economy.

Gorbachev faces a profound philosophical dilemma: he can choose ideology or progress. If he chooses communism, he cannot have progress; if he chooses progress, he cannot have communism. Only by abandoning the ideology that is the bedrock of his power can he produce progress that will match that of the West.

Given the inefficient central planning system and the irrational pricing system, no foreign investor today has the slightest idea of how to judge which economic risks in the Soviet Union are worth taking. Making loans to the Kremlin is like laying down chips on the dice table; some bets may pay off but the odds are that in the long run the money will be wasted. In fact, it is not even in Gorbachev's interest for the West to provide economic assistance before fundamental economic reforms have been institutionalized. A banker does no favor to a borrower by making him a bad loan. We should not enable the Kremlin to borrow its way out of today's problems and thereby delay the inevitable day of addressing the causes of those problems.

Both American superhawks and superdoves overstate the impact Western policies can have on the Soviet Union. Super-

6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

hawks argue that the West's arms buildup and its opposition to Soviet aggression in places like Afghanistan were the primary factors that prompted Gorbachev to launch his reforms. Those Western actions were vital on their own merits. But even without those actions Gorbachev would have had to initiate changes because the Soviet economic system was suffering from terminal illness. As a Chinese leader told me in 1985, without reforms the Soviet Union by the middle of the next century would "disappear" as a great power. That made internal change imperative, regardless of Western policies.

Superdoves, on the other hand, believe that we should do anything within our power to help Gorbachev in order to promote peace. But we must realize that whether he succeeds or fails ultimately depends on events and forces within the Soviet Union that we cannot affect. We cannot induce Gorbachev to cast aside his Marxist-Leninist obsession with keeping the state in charge of the economy. We cannot whip the Soviet bureaucracy into shape. We can hardly even make out the patterns of Kremlin political intrigue after the fact, much less lend a helping hand to those whose views and interests seem to parallel ours.

Above all, we must keep Gorbachev's reforms in perspective. He does not want to overturn the Soviet system; he wants to strengthen it. To paraphrase Churchill from another context, Gorbachev did not become general secretary to preside over the demise of the Communist Party. We have an interest in the success of his reforms only to the extent that they change the system to make it less threatening to our security and interests. We should applaud glasnost and perestroika but not pay for them, for if his reforms do not irrevocably alter Soviet foreign policy we will be subsidizing the threat of our own destruction.

IV

Those who parrot today a fashionable slogan—"the cold war is over"—trivialize the problems of Western security. Gorbachev's public relations experts have made many Western policymakers forget that a more benign Soviet image does not mean a more benign Soviet foreign policy. As a result, the race to Moscow is already on. In recent months, Western leaders have jetted off to the Kremlin with planeloads of eager bankers and industrialists in tow, and Soviet leaders have gleefully lined up more than \$10 billion in easy credit. Unless the West steps back and designs a coherent strategy, we will squander our

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 7

leverage and lose the historic opportunity presented by events in the Soviet Union.

We should bear in mind a remark made to me in 1953 by Field Marshall Slim, then the British governor-general of Australia. In arguing for a dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, he said, "We must break the ice. If we don't break it, we will all get frozen into it so tight that it will take an atom bomb to break it." Today, the ice has broken even before the end of winter. We are witnessing the thaw that brings the promise of spring. While it is a period of great possibilities, we must tread carefully or risk falling into the icy waters.

We have to recognize that the situation we face now is infinitely more complex than the one we faced at the outset of the cold war forty years ago. At that time, the threat was as clear as Stalin's Iron Curtain and his belligerent rhetoric about the inevitability of war, all of which enabled President Truman to prevent a return to isolationism, adopt a policy of containment and win bipartisan support for entry into NATO and unprecedented levels of peacetime defense spending.

Gorbachev has brilliantly changed the game. In Europe, he has discarded the traditional Soviet tactics of diplomatic bluster and military threat and has mastered those of deceptive propaganda and political maneuver. He has substituted the wiles of diplomacy for the threat of force as his chosen instrument for foreign policy conquests. As a result, at a time when Soviet superiority in conventional military forces and in accurate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is larger than ever before, he has made more progress toward the traditional Soviet objective of dividing the NATO alliance than any of his predecessors. We cannot counter his "peace offensive" simply by loudly warning about the military threat of Moscow's Red Army. Instead, we must launch our own political offensive to achieve our strategic and geopolitical objectives.

We will be pursuing those goals in what has become a multipolar world. Japan is already an economic superpower and will inevitably use its economic clout for political effect. Western Europe will become a unified economic market by 1992 and is beginning to intensify its cooperation in political and strategic matters. China, already a major nuclear power and fast becoming a major economic player, will emerge as one of the world's superpowers in the next century.

We can work with all of these new major powers more easily

8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

than Gorbachev can. Therefore, before the new administration holds a substantive summit with Gorbachev, it should conduct intensive discussions and meetings with our major allies and friends. We should do this not to present Moscow with an antagonistic and belligerent united front but to explore our common interests and to coordinate our policies where possible.

President Bush should continue to reject the advice of those who urge that he schedule a quick summit with Gorbachev in order to have a foreign policy "victory" early in his term. Gorbachev needs a summit far more than the president. Only when the Bush Administration has agreed on a strategy with our allies and has a definite program for making significant substantive progress on major issues should President Bush schedule an American-Soviet summit.

In formulating a strategy, we should begin by estimating what Gorbachev wants, then map out what we want, what trade-offs are possible, and what we can do to put pressure on him to agree to our terms. Most important, we have to recognize that linkage—the linking of progress on one issue to progress on another—is the key to any successful negotiations with Moscow. Kremlin leaders will always explicitly reject linkage, but they always implicitly accept it.

Without linkage, Gorbachev will string together a series of easy victories at the bargaining table. Each superpower has a greater interest in progress on some issues than on others. Gorbachev, for example, will press hard for access to Western capital markets and technology. The United States, on the other hand, has a greater interest in reducing Soviet influence in the Third World through settlements of certain regional conflicts that threaten our interests. Moscow will be more than willing to negotiate solely on the former. If we fail to pursue a determined policy of linkage, Gorbachev will dominate the agenda and make one-sided progress on his top priorities.

Linkage requires subtlety. An American president should not step before the cameras and announce that he intends to hold the next arms control agreement hostage to Soviet capitulation on one or another issue. Nor should the Congress make the mistake of publicly linking U.S. foreign policy objectives to Soviet domestic policy reforms. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment in 1973–74 was a case in point. Its purpose was to force the Soviet Union to increase Jewish emigration, but it had the opposite effect of drastically reducing it. We should vigorously

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 9

press the Soviets in world forums to eliminate their human rights abuses. But we must allow them to appear to do so of their own volition rather than by clumsily making it look as if they did so only because of direct Western intervention in their internal affairs. No great nation can appear to allow its internal policies to be dictated by a foreign power.

We should link progress toward better East-West relations to restraint in Soviet global behavior. If we enter into agreements beneficial to Moscow despite direct or indirect Soviet aggression, we will in effect be giving the Kremlin a green light to assault our interests. If we pursue a determined strategy that includes linkage, we can further our strategic interests in Europe, in arms control negotiations and in the world's key regional conflicts.

V

Europe has again become the central focus of the East-West conflict, and our strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets must change to meet these circumstances. From 1945 to the early 1960s, the European continent was the principal arena of the world ideological struggle. From the early 1960s through the mid-1980s, after the division of Europe had become a settled political reality, the primary fields of conflict—Indochina, the Middle East, southern Africa, the horn of Africa, southwest Asia and Central America—were situated in the Third World. Now Gorbachev has made the Old World the central priority and target of his new foreign policy.

The traditional goal of Kremlin leaders has been to create political fissures between the United States and Western Europe in order to erode the strength of the alliance. Moscow has pursued this objective, at various times, through a strategy of confrontation that seeks to rattle European nerves and demonstrate the unreliability of America as an ally, or through a strategy of condominium with the United States that seeks to weaken European confidence by creating the impression that the superpowers are settling Europe's fate. Gorbachev has adopted the more straightforward tactic of appealing directly to the West Europeans. He has called for the creation of a single "European home" stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals—thus implying that the United States represents an obstacle to peace—and has sought to exploit the West European fatigue after forty years of East-West conflict.

The world of 1949, when NATO was formed, differs pro-

10 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

foundly from the world of 1989. We need a new strategy in Europe—one that enhances the Continent's stability not only through initiatives to revitalize the alliance in Western Europe but also through a sustained effort to foster peaceful change and positive political evolution in Eastern Europe.

The new administration should make Europe its top foreign policy priority. It should call for a major working summit—no black ties and no spouses—to hammer out a strategy for enhancing our collective security. First of all, we should articulate a common analysis of the nature of the Soviet military threat in Europe. Americans, and many Europeans, believe that the Soviet threat remains as great as or even greater than ever, especially because of Moscow's unrelenting buildup of conventional and strategic weaponry. But in recent years there has been a tendency among other West Europeans, especially but not exclusively those on the left, to view the Soviet Union as a stagnant society incapable of threatening the West or even to view Washington's calls for vigilance and readiness as a greater threat to peace than Moscow's armies.

Harold Macmillan once told me that alliances were held together by fear not love. For many in Europe and the United States, the fear of the Soviet Union has waned, and what love may exist between economic competitors in the West is a very weak glue to hold an alliance together. It is therefore imperative that Western leaders issue a joint statement, in conjunction with its arms control proposals, that educates their publics on the nature and scope of the Soviet threat.

Second, we should agree on ways to defend common Western interests outside of Europe. In 1949 the West faced the threat of a direct Soviet military thrust into central Europe. In recent years, with the East-West competition in Europe focusing on the political plane, Soviet direct and indirect aggression has principally taken place in the Third World. The United States has borne the overwhelming share of the burden in countering Moscow's subversion and proxy warfare to protect regions, such as the Persian Gulf, even though it is far more important to Western Europe than to the United States. Unless we devise a more equitable global security framework, it is inevitable that pressure will build in the United States for a significant reduction of the U.S. troop commitment to NATO.

Third, we should articulate a compelling rationale for NATO's nuclear deterrent and a joint approach for the next round of European arms control talks. At the Reykjavik summit, the

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 11

Reagan Administration undermined public support for nuclear deterrence by advocating the idea of eliminating all nuclear weapons. We must renounce the Reykjavik rhetoric in unequivocal terms and explain to Western publics the realities of the nuclear age. We should pursue the so-called competitive strategies on the conventional level to undercut the significance of Soviet quantitative superiority and thereby raise the nuclear threshold. But nuclear deterrence, both strategic and tactical, remains imperative. Even if conventional arms control succeeds, NATO will have to maintain a residual, even if diminished, tactical nuclear capability in Europe, though the deterrent should be reconfigured to allay West German concerns regarding the bases and targets of these weapons. More important, NATO must arrive at a joint conventional arms control proposal that makes offensive warfare futile and that mobilizes public support for the Western negotiating position. A good beginning has been made in the recent NATO proposal for major cuts in the tank armies in Europe, though a public diplomacy offensive needs to be launched to sell it to Western publics.

Fourth, we must agree on a common approach to East-West trade. We should not provide the Soviet Union with technologies that can significantly improve its military forces. We should also create a joint institution for coordinating and regulating the Soviet Union's access to Western capital markets. It is not in our interest to have Western banks competing to provide the Kremlin with loans at below-market rates. Nor is it in our interest to repeat the mistakes of bankers in the 1970s who lent East European countries tens of billions of dollars that will never be repaid.

Fifth, we should design a common approach to the problem of Eastern Europe. The cold war began in Eastern Europe, and it will not end until Moscow's satellites receive their independence. In the past, it has always been in the West's interest, but not in Moscow's, to address the issue of Eastern Europe. Today, since Gorbachev needs East-West economic links and reduced tensions for perestroika to succeed, a new settlement is in the Kremlin's interest as well.

Without a political settlement in Eastern Europe, no stable, enduring improvement in East-West relations is possible. Post-war history is the story of continual attempts by the East Europeans to wrest their freedom from Moscow. The workers' uprising in East Germany in 1953, the popular rebellion in Hungary in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, the Solidarity

12 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

movement in Poland in 1980, and the scores of other smaller incidents of open opposition all testify to the popular determination to be free. All these outbursts had to be suppressed directly or indirectly by Soviet arms, and all those interventions destroyed the prospects for an immediate improvement in East-West relations.

That pattern could soon recur. Eastern Europe has become an economic and political powder keg waiting to blow up. Today, the tectonic plates of East European nationalism and Soviet expansionism have built up enormous pressure as they have pushed against each other. We have seen the first tremors in the rise of East European dissident and reform movements. But a political earthquake is inevitable in the 1990s. If Moscow responds with military force, it will mean a return to sharper tensions in East-West relations and an abortion of Gorbachev's reforms.

If we want to avoid this grim scenario, we must work on three fronts.

First, the West should press for peaceful change in Eastern Europe. We should continue to exploit modern means of mass communication to break the grip of the East European regimes over their peoples. Radio Free Europe has been one of our most effective programs in the East-West struggle. In the 1990s we should establish direct television transmissions via satellite into these countries. We should also provide material support to those behind the Iron Curtain who are pressing for peaceful change, with Western trade union support to the Solidarity movement in Poland serving as a model.

Second, the West should continue its policy of differentiating between those East European regimes which demonstrate a willingness to enact reforms that move their countries toward political pluralism and those which do not. For those leaders who liberalize their regimes, we should make available economic credits, more advanced technology and debt rescheduling, while the others should be left to fend for themselves.

Third, the United States should put Eastern Europe on the U.S.-Soviet agenda. In Yugoslavia last year, Gorbachev signed a declaration that stated that "no one has a monopoly on truth" and that foreign powers had no "claim on imposing their notions of social development on anyone." We should insist that Kremlin leaders back up their words with deeds. We could even propose the neutralization of Eastern Europe along the lines of the Austrian Peace Treaty of 1955, with an interim

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 13

agreement that leaves the military structure of the Warsaw Pact intact but that would allow the East European peoples to choose their own forms of government through genuine elections.

Eastern Europe is the natural field for political initiatives by Western Europe. Our allies' historical fatigue stems in part from the fact that for forty years their role has been defined by a negative mission—stopping further Soviet expansion. It can be cured by devoting energy to the positive mission of promoting peaceful change beyond the Iron Curtain. Holding the line against the Red Army has principally involved sacrifice and risk, but supporting the development of pluralism under the nose of the Red Army requires ingenuity and inspiration. It is a task that will not only enhance Western Europe's security but also help to restore its sense of purpose.

VI

Arms control should be treated as only one part of Western defense policy and not vice versa. Arms negotiations are a political imperative, indispensable in holding the NATO alliance together and for winning support in Congress for adequate defense budgets. For too long, however, many Western leaders have endorsed arms control as an end in itself, regardless of the impact that particular agreements would have on our strategic position. Moscow, on the other hand, has traditionally sought to use arms control to achieve political and strategic ends—to lull the West into a false sense of security, to limit developments in American weapons technology, and to preserve or increase Soviet advantages in weapons deployments. It is time for the United States to borrow a page from the Kremlin's negotiating handbook.

Since Soviet superiority in conventional arms represents the greatest threat to Western security, cuts in those forces should be the top priority of Western arms control strategy. Moscow's main goal is to reduce the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons and to stifle the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) while preserving its advantage on the conventional level, because that would maximize the political importance of its conventional superiority. Therefore, it is imperative that the United States link progress in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) to progress in conventional arms control negotiations.

Western conventional arms control proposals should focus geographically on the European central front, the most mili-

14 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

tarily congested territory in the world, and should seek to reduce those weapons that are most useful for offensive warfare. These should include at a minimum reductions in tanks and self-propelled artillery, even beyond those proposed by Gorbachev at the United Nations. The weapons must be destroyed rather than pulled back into the Soviet Union; otherwise Moscow could redeploy them in a matter of days. In addition, military bases and supply depots should be relocated away from the front in order to make surprise attacks more difficult. NATO governments must insist in arms control talks that Gorbachev fulfill his pledge to accept "asymmetrical reductions" on the conventional level.

Gorbachev's rhetoric about reconfiguring Warsaw Pact forces to fit a "defensive" doctrine has been all talk and no action. His pledge in his recent U.N. speech to demobilize 500,000 troops and retire 10,000 tanks represents a significant symbolic gesture. But we must not pretend that it solves the security problem posed by the Warsaw Pact's tank armada (currently about 53,000).¹ Thus, if the 5,000 tanks withdrawn from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are not destroyed but simply parked on the Soviet side of the border, they can be redeployed rapidly. Even if the tanks were destroyed, the Warsaw Pact's tank advantage would drop only slightly.

In addition to linking the strategic and conventional arms control talks, the new administration should redirect the U.S. approach to the START negotiations.

Our problem on the strategic level, which began in the mid-1970s and threatens to become much worse in the 1990s, is the growing vulnerability of our land-based missiles and command-and-control systems to a first-strike attack by the most accurate and powerful Soviet missiles. The Reagan Administration's effort to cut strategic forces by 50 percent focused too much on simply reducing the total number of strategic weapons instead of reducing the vulnerability of U.S. strategic forces and thereby enhancing strategic stability. The real test is not whether the treaty reduces the number of nuclear weapons but whether it reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. We must ultimately judge the value of any START agreement by whether it increases the security of our strategic forces and

¹ *The Military Balance 1988-1989*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988, p. 237.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 15

decreases the incentives for either side to resort to nuclear weapons in a crisis.

That is where the current START formula falls short. Under its terms, both sides would reduce their arsenals to 1,600 launchers including heavy bombers, ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and to 6,000 warheads, of which only 4,900 would be permitted on ballistic missiles. While such radical reductions might be politically appealing, close scrutiny shows that they actually increase the vulnerability of U.S. forces. Moscow would retain a land-based ICBM force composed almost entirely of the newer SS-18, SS-24 and SS-25 missile launchers, all of which are first-strike weapons. At the same time, the cuts would reduce the number of targets inside the United States that would have to be destroyed for a first strike to succeed. Assuming that after reductions the United States would choose to retain its most accurate and modern weapons, the ratio of Soviet first-strike warheads to U.S. first-strike targets would grow drastically worse. In addition, the prospective reductions would restrict the deployment of our most capable and survivable force, the fleet of Trident II submarines, to no more than 17 boats. As a result, this force could well become vulnerable, for some number will always be in port or off-line, and the remainder, reduced to, say, ten boats, will be tracked by Moscow's fleet of 270 attack submarines.²

Some argue that these issues do not matter, because under the proposed START agreement we would be allowed to reconfigure our strategic forces to account for the new ceilings. They contend that we could build a new fleet of smaller submarines that would carry fewer missiles and a new generation of land-based missiles that would carry fewer warheads. This argument is flawed for two reasons. First, the START force reductions are to be carried out over seven years, while any programs to develop and deploy entire new strategic systems would take a decade or more. Second, it is totally unrealistic to think that Congress, which expects arms control to produce cuts in the defense budget, would vote to increase military spending by the tens of billions of dollars necessary to overhaul completely our strategic force posture.

Instead of seeking an arbitrary 50-percent reduction, the Bush Administration should consider adopting a two-part pro-

² Edward L. Warner III and David A. Ochmanek, *Next Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989, pp. 46-47.

16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

posal, with the first level designed to meet minimum U.S. requirements and to produce a quick interim agreement and the second level directed to major reductions in first-strike weapons. In formulating our proposal for the first stage, we should calculate what kind of strategic force posture our security requires and propose launcher and warhead ceilings that could involve some reductions from present levels but would not impede the necessary U.S. weapons programs, particularly the mobile Midgetman missile. In addition, since the United States observed and the Soviet Union ignored the modernization restrictions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaties, this initial agreement would permit unrestricted modernization.

After the completion of the interim agreement, the two sides would focus on the far more difficult objective of increasing strategic stability by reducing the number of warheads on both sides capable of destroying hardened military targets in a first strike. Both superpowers would be allowed to retain an equal number of counterforce warheads. But the level of these most threatening weapons would be scaled back dramatically—far more than by the current START proposal. This should involve a 75-percent cut from the present level of such Soviet weapons and should also require reductions in planned deployments of comparable U.S. weapons, such as the MX, the Midgetman and the Trident II D-5 missiles.

This second agreement would also address the issue of strategic defense. As long as the Soviet Union possesses its formidable arsenal of first-strike weapons, the United States must press forward with the SDI. Our position should be that research, development, testing and deployment of defensive systems is not negotiable. Only the *extent* of our deployments should be subject to limitation through mutual agreement and those deployments should be calibrated to the extent of the Soviet counterforce threat.

A two-stage approach along these lines offers the best prospects for successful nuclear arms control. It would enable Presidents Bush and Gorbachev to conclude quickly an interim agreement capping the number of launchers and warheads, though unlike the current START formula the accord would not inhibit U.S. weapons programs needed to redress the asymmetry in strategic vulnerability and the imbalance in counterforce weapons. It would also create a stable foundation for a treaty to enhance strategic security by reducing the number

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 17

of counterforce systems to levels that make a successful first-strike attack on the other side's strategic forces militarily infeasible.

VII

The two regional conflicts requiring immediate presidential action, Afghanistan and Central America, represent opposite poles in American policy. Our program to aid the Afghan resistance has received bipartisan support, has operated continuously for almost a decade and verges on ultimate success. Our assistance to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters has been subjected to partisan bickering, has been at best episodic and has failed so far. In distant Afghanistan, we learned that a sustained, bipartisan program of large-scale assistance to anticommunist freedom fighters can produce major geopolitical gains. We should apply the same lesson to the nearby and strategically critical conflict in Central America.

In Afghanistan, as Moscow's tanks retreat, one round of the great game closes—but yet another one begins. Our goal has been twofold, to force the Soviet Union to withdraw and to restore the Afghan people's right to self-determination. To achieve the former does not automatically accomplish the latter. First of all, the communist regime in Kabul must be displaced. The best solution would be the removal of the Soviet puppet regime through the direct talks now taking place between Moscow and the resistance leadership. But should those talks stall or fail we must continue to provide whatever kinds of weapons the resistance requires to topple the Kabul regime. Since the character of the fighting has changed from guerrilla warfare to battles for taking and holding cities, the United States must upgrade its assistance quantitatively and qualitatively, particularly in terms of antiaircraft missiles, long-range mortars, and mine-clearing devices and equipment.

It does not serve American, or Afghan, interests for the United States to disengage before a political process is in place that will establish real self-determination for the Afghan people themselves. If the country collapses into a civil war with dozens of tribal warlords ruling their separate fiefdoms, the Kremlin will seize this as a lever to regain a measure of influence by supporting one or another group in the fighting or by declaring the need to keep forces in a "security zone" in northern Afghanistan. Therefore, at a time when our weapons pipeline still gives us influence, we need to address directly the critical

18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

issue of establishing, through the traditional Afghan means of a tribal assembly and through elections, a post-communist government that truly represents the people.

Central America poses far more difficult and, from the U.S. point of view, far more critical problems. Our interests are not threatened by Nicaragua simply because its government systematically violates human rights and spouts anti-American rhetoric. A dictatorship, even a totalitarian one, does not threaten our interests per se. Rather, the Sandinista regime threatens our interests only because Managua has forged links with the Soviet Union and has become a base for indirect Soviet subversion of other Central American states such as El Salvador. The problem is not that the Nicaraguan government is communist but that the communist government of Nicaragua is inherently expansionist. As the Sandinistas freely admit, and even boast, they seek "a revolution without frontiers" in Central America and insist on the right to aid communist guerrillas in neighboring countries.

At the first opportunity, the Bush Administration must impose linkage between the issue of Soviet access to U.S. capital, credits and technology and that of Soviet military assistance to Managua. Gorbachev must be made to understand that Nicaragua is a neuralgic issue for us. While academics might debate whether the Monroe Doctrine has become obsolete, the United States cannot allow the Soviet Union or any other foreign power to provide arms to a virulently anti-American and aggressive regime in the western hemisphere. Given the Soviet economy's pathetic condition, our economic power represents tremendous leverage. If we link these issues, we should be able to profit politically, as well as economically, from our economic relationship with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, we must recognize that the Sandinista leaders have made a mockery of the Arias peace plan, despite the cutoff of U.S. assistance to the contras. Managua permits fewer civil liberties and holds more political prisoners today than it did when the so-called process of democratization began. In its direct talks with the contras, it has in effect demanded surrender, rather than opening the way to a political compromise. Moreover, the Nicaraguan-backed communist guerrillas in El Salvador have dramatically stepped up their terrorist and military attacks.

The Bush Administration must determine, once and for all, the viability of the Arias peace plan. If the Sandinista-contra

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 19

talks cannot achieve their objective, they should be ended. Since endless negotiations work to the advantage of the Sandinistas, the United States should undertake a final, 90-day effort to breathe life into the peace process. If that fails to produce a concrete, workable plan for genuine democracy in Nicaragua, the president should request from Congress a major military and humanitarian aid package for the contras. Coupled with the effort to cut off Soviet aid to Managua through superpower talks, this policy would represent a pincer movement against the Sandinistas, with Moscow putting the squeeze on one end and the contras on the other.

The United States today faces a clear choice: Do we oppose communist subversion in a series of protracted wars throughout Central America or at its source in Nicaragua? Managua's leaders are avowedly committed to supporting anti-U.S. insurgencies throughout the region. If Nicaragua becomes a safe haven and an arms conduit for communist guerrillas, we will be doomed to decades of facing the messy problems of advising our friends in counterinsurgency warfare.

VIII

Revitalizing the Western alliance, redirecting the arms control process, and resolving the critical regional conflicts in Afghanistan and Nicaragua should represent America's immediate foreign policy priorities. Gorbachev's admission of Soviet economic failure and his need for a breathing spell in the East-West competition so perestroika can take root creates an excellent opportunity for the United States not only to enhance the West's security but also to promote a more stable peace through a determined strategy.

This is not to say that Moscow's economic failures will make Gorbachev a pushover. His toughness and intelligence will more than compensate for his country's economic weakness, and his consummate ability in diplomacy and political maneuver will guarantee that he seldom winds up with the short end of a deal. If Western leaders want to avoid being taken to the cleaners, they must understand what Gorbachev wants and how the West should respond.

On his first priority, strengthening the Soviet Union's economy, he will seek free access to Western capital and technology. The United States, Western Europe and Japan must coordinate their policies so that the West exploits its economic power for political effect. We should go forward with unsubsidized trade

20 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

in nonstrategic goods on a cash-and-carry basis. But until the Soviet Union overhauls its domestic economic system and discontinues its aggressive policies, it is not in our interest to bankroll reforms that will either squander our loans or bolster our adversary.

On his second priority, ending the Soviet Union's international isolation, Gorbachev will seek to separate the United States from Europe, particularly Germany, and to open a new relationship with China. We must undertake a new effort to reinvigorate the Western alliance and to infuse Western Europe with the positive purpose of fostering peaceful change in Eastern Europe. If Gorbachev satisfies China's three obstacles, we should welcome a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations. We can be confident that, since China's top priority remains economic development, our relations with Beijing will continue to be closer than the Kremlin's.

On his third priority, arms control, he will seek new agreements that will reduce strategic weapons stockpiles but preserve the present Soviet advantage in counterforce capability. In order to reduce the main threat to the West—Moscow's conventional superiority—we must link progress in START to progress on conventional arms control. We must also recast our strategic arms negotiating positions so that a START treaty will enable us to restore the counterforce balance and eventually to enhance strategic stability.

On his fourth priority, prevailing in Third World conflicts, he will seek agreements that appear to settle the conflicts but that actually keep his client regimes in power. We possess the leverage necessary for the freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Nicaragua and Angola to prevail. We must never sign an agreement with the Soviet Union that undercuts, militarily or politically, those relying on our support, and we must exploit linkage to promote the retraction of the Soviet empire.

In the short run, we can sympathize with the thrust behind many of Gorbachev's aspirations. We both want to reduce military competition and the danger of nuclear war. We certainly should applaud those of Gorbachev's reforms that reduce, even marginally, the repression and poverty which plague the people of the Soviet Union. At the same time, we must keep in mind that in the long run the goals of the two sides diverge diametrically. Gorbachev wants reform because he wants a stronger Soviet Union and an expanding Soviet empire.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 21

We should support those reforms in the hopes of making the Soviet Union less repressive at home and less aggressive abroad.

As the outpouring of sympathy and support for the victims of the Armenian earthquake so vividly demonstrated, there is a great well of friendship for the Russian people in the United States. The people of the United States and the people of the Soviet Union can be friends. Because of our profound differences, the governments of our two nations cannot be friends—but we cannot afford to be enemies. Gorbachev's historic challenge is to implement reforms that will remove those differences.

(201) 391-4404

JOHN H. TAYLOR

ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT NIXON

**577 CHESTNUT RIDGE RD.
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NJ 07675**

11/6/89

ESSAY | William Safire

Nixon in China

He did not tastelessly sell his celebrity for two million bucks; he did not charge the American taxpayer for bodyguards; he did not toady to his foreign hosts.

In sharp contrast to a far more beloved former President, Richard Nixon used his foreign affairs acumen and his personal relationship with China's leaders to carry out a vital mission for his country.

He struck exactly the right note. Only Nixon (two words that so often go together) had the credentials of an old friend that enabled him to express our outrage at the Tiananmen massacre and our concern at the wrong turn off the democratic road, without causing his hosts to freeze.

By traveling as a private citizen, he could be the most special envoy: unofficial, above politics, even above diplomacy. In that role, he could talk turkey to the Chinese gerontocracy — showing in pragmatic terms the dire consequences of Beijing's leap backward — and bring back a realistic assessment of possible openings to President Bush, the man he sent to China as U.S. Ambassador a few political lifetimes ago.

Even the dwindling legion of Nixon-haters who consider him good for nothing admit he's good at openings to China. The New York Times noted with approval Mr. Nixon's words warning China against sinking into "a backwater of oppression and stagnation," credited him for "putting his reputation to good use" and concluded: "The tough-minded Mr. Nixon has told them the hard truth."

Was this the same guy we saw last week in a TV docudrama, bawling like a baby and beating his fists on the carpet?

No. The sobbing character of "The Final Daze" was a caricature. Its central scene's central moment, of Nixon cracking after a prayer with Henry Kissinger into an hysterical, rug-diving crybaby, was fiction — all drama, no docu — unsourced, and roundly denied by the only two people present.

In a perverse way, I was glad to see the burst of sensationalist excess; it cast into doubt some of the distastefully true parts of the half-fiction account.

Let me testify that this has been some roller-coaster week for old Nixon hands. The television version of the late-hit book reminded us of the bad old days, with so many of our friends going to jail or into disgrace. The news of Nixon in China ("Nixon in China" was also the title of a respectful, critically acclaimed opera with music that was beyond me) gave us a lift.

In between came what we hoped would be a serious revisionist book by

Stephen Ambrose, a respectable Eisenhower biographer. But he produced a disappointment: a book that draws its foreign-policy judgments from an aide to Gerard Smith, an arms controlnik embittered at having been jilted by Nixon in Moscow, and accepts as historic gospel unattributed quotes from the works of Kissinger-despising Seymour Hersh.

Documented details are bad enough. How can we explain to historians and fair-minded reporters that so many of the terrible things Nixon said on tape, or mean-spiritedly jotted down in the margins of news summaries, were moody expostulations not reflecting considered views or intended to be orders?

At an airport campaign rally attended by fewer than a dozen sup-

Ovation at the next G.O.P. Convention.

porters, I heard an infuriated Nixon give an "order" to H. R. Haldeman: "There will be no more landings at airports."

What did that mean? Parachute in? Cancel all TV arrival events? As he was expected to do, his aide watered that down to: "There had better be no more unsuccessful airport rallies." Yet there stands that weird Nixon command, to be examined by uncomprehending historians: "There will be no more landings at airports."

Here we are then, thee and me, nearly a generation after his fall, reacting to Nixon being misportrayed on the tube, Nixon in China again making his valuable contribution to human rights, Nixon being savaged in books, Nixon again operating behind the scenes to further U.S. policy.

Anguished Nixon haters will ask: Didn't we bury him at a crossroads, with a stake through his heart, never to stalk the earth by daylight?

All those who had been his admirers, including so many dismayed by his tapping and taping and Watergate wrongdoing, will say: He's done it again. He's come back. After letting down the side, he is now lifting up the side.

There will be reputational redemption. There will be official assignments. There will be a terrific new memoir. As with the re-examined Herbert Hoover, there will be an ovation at a Republican Convention. There will be no landing at airports. □

World



Former President Nixon shakes hands yesterday with passersby in Beijing, where he is conducting a five-day fact-finding mission. AP PHOTO

Beijing bows to a Nixon hard line

For a US Embassy visit, he wants the AK-47s gone – and he gets his wish

By Colin Nickerson
GLOBE STAFF

BEIJING – With a few sharp words to Prime Minister Li Peng, Richard M. Nixon succeeded yesterday where months of diplomatic protests had failed.

Nixon, who is visiting Beijing on a five-day fact-finding mission, complained to Li this week about the squads of police armed with AK-47 assault rifles who have stood menacing guard outside the US Embassy for five months.

The embassy has officially and repeatedly objected to the large police presence and especially to the combat weapons. According to embassy sources, the guards have pointed the automatic rifles at visitors to the compound and even at children of embassy staff.

All other embassies in the capital are unobtrusively guarded by one or two sentries equipped with small, holstered pistols.

When Nixon raised the issue at a state banquet on Monday, Li testily retorted that the guards were necessary to prevent the escape of the dissident Fang Lizhi and his wife, Li Shuxian, who took refuge in the embassy shortly after the June 4 massacre of hundreds of antigovernment demonstrators in downtown Beijing.

Nixon's response was blunt:

"I don't like guns, and when I go to the embassy this visit I don't want to see any guards with AK-47s."

Yesterday, the intimidating gunmen were gone, replaced by ordinary police with sidearms only. Their numbers, too, were somewhat reduced – although the police presence outside the three US compounds and the ambassador's residence remains substantial.

It was a small but significant victory for the United States, which has come under intense verbal attack from Li and other Communist Party hard-liners.

"Thank you, Mr. President, for doing what we were unable to accomplish ... for getting rid of the gun-toters out there," Lynn Pascoe, an embassy official, told Nixon while introducing him to an informal gathering of Foreign Service officers and their families.

Ever since the Bush administration imposed sanctions against China after the June slaughter, the Chinese leadership has sought to whip up anti-American sentiment, using the kind of "capitalist dog" propaganda that has hardly been heard since the days of the Cultural Revolution.

Beijing has said, without offering evidence, that last spring's peaceful

protest movement was masterminded by "American agents" seeking to undermine the government and transform China into a "bourgeois republic," as Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader, recently put it.

Nixon yesterday characterized the tensions between Beijing and Washington as "the greatest crisis of Chinese-American relations" since diplomatic ties were resumed.

The government's surprising decision to strip the guards of their formidable firepower, a move that may prove to be temporary, may be less a sign of improving relations between the two countries than a gesture of respect for Nixon.

There is irony in this because during the course of his unofficial visit Nixon has criticized the Deng regime for its brutal suppression of the antigovernment protests.

At another state banquet held in his honor last night, Nixon delivered a toast to the Chinese president, Yang Shangkun, that plainly embarrassed his hosts.

"China's leaders now appear to claim that how they rule their country internally is nobody's business," Nixon said. "Most Americans deeply believe, however, that international standards exist to guide the conduct of leaders anywhere."

He asked rhetorically: "Are mar-

tial law and political repression permanent features of life in China?"

However, speaking of the events in June, he added: "The death of innocent people was a great tragedy. But an even greater tragedy would be the death of a relationship" between China and the United States "and of policies that have served so well. We must not permit our real enemies – misunderstanding, fruitless resentment, endless recrimination – to close the door we opened with such hope 17 years ago."

Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 led to the reestablishment of diplomatic and commercial ties, which had been sundered soon after the communists came to power in 1949.

For his championing of rapprochement, Nixon is widely admired here, not only among the internationally minded elite but also among ordinary citizens.

The warm feelings Chinese hold toward Nixon were obvious yesterday when the former president, displaying an uncharacteristically populist touch, spent 45 minutes strolling through Xidan market in western Beijing. There, amid the stink of rotting cabbages and the clamor of fruit sellers, he shook hands and chatted with the throngs that gathered about.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Paper	Re: The Crisis in Sino-American Relations (7 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [2]

Date Closed: 10/4/2010	OA/ID Number: 85037-011
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

January 17, 1990

JAN 24 1990

MEMORANDUM FROM JOHN H. TAYLOR

Jch-

In view of the heightened interest in U.S.-China relations in the wake of the Chinese government's decision to lift martial law, I thought you might be interested in seeing the attached vignette from RN's trip to China last fall.

"I DON'T WANT TO SEE ANY AK-47s"

Soon after President Nixon arrived in Beijing in late October, Lynn Pascoe, the #2 man at the Embassy, told him of the war of nerves the Chinese had been waging against American diplomats by having their armed guards, both in and out of uniform, harass people as they went through the main gate. Normally these guards wear only sidearms, but in recent weeks, as Sino-U.S. relations continued to deteriorate, they had begun carrying automatic weapons. One soldier had pointed his rifle at the daughter of an American official and pretended to pull the trigger. President Nixon promised to raise the matter with the Chinese; we assumed he would do so in a private meeting. Instead he chose a more public forum, and the way he raised it came as a complete surprise to everyone in his party.

After a meeting with Premier Li Peng on the afternoon of Monday, October 30 that lasted seventy minutes beyond the scheduled time of one hour, we all went in to a banquet hosted by Li (both the meeting and dinner were in one of the government guest houses). There were about 25 people present at a single long table, with RN and Li facing each other in the middle.

Following an exchange of toasts and a few minutes of small talk, President Nixon raised his voice and said, "Mr. Premier, as you know, I support President Bush down the line on foreign policy. But there is one domestic issue I don't agree with him on, and that's gun control. I don't like guns. So when I visit the American Embassy on Wednesday, I do not want to see your soldiers waving AK-47s standing outside."

The room was absolutely, expectantly still. As at any large dinner, at these banquets all the guest do not normally hang on every word of the principals. People feel free to conduct their own conversations with people seated nearby. At the welcoming banquet the foreign minister had hosted for the former President two nights before, I remember listening with one ear as RN and the FM, seated behind me at the next table, had a forceful, no-holds-barred exchange about the tragedy of June 2-4 at the same time I was talking to the host of our table about how some of the dishes we were eating had been prepared. But after RN's demand to Li Peng, every eye in the room seemed to be on the premier.

He was leaning forward with his elbows on the edge of the table and his arms crossed, looking down at the bowl of soup in front of him and smiling faintly. After a moment he said that the guards were necessary because there had been rumors that Fang Lizhi and his wife might try to escape.

In his reply, rather than argue with Li on the points, RN, having put the man on the spot, just as deftly gave him some wiggle room. He said, "I remember that on my first visit to China in 1972, I told Chairman Mao that his writings had moved a nation and changed the world. He replied that he had only been able to change a few things in the vicinity of Beijing. Mr. Premier, you too are a very powerful man. I am certain this is one of the small things in the vicinity of Beijing that you will be able to change."

By the following afternoon, the soldiers were still there, but the AK-47s were gone. So far as I know, they have never come back. When RN arrived at noontime on Wednesday, November 1, the last full day of his visit, to make some impromptu remarks to the Embassy staff, he stepped to the microphone and said, "I checked my gun at the gate!"

In his reply to RN's remarks, Lynn Pascoe said, "Thank you, Mr. President, for doing what we were unable to do: for getting rid of those gun-toters out there." A number of other Embassy people also told me how appreciative they were, both personally and professionally, for what RN had done and also of how gracefully he had done it. While we were still in China there was also a modification in the enforcement of martial law in the city as Peoples Liberation Army soldiers at the various posts were replaced by municipal police officers.

(201) 391-4404

JOHN H. TAYLOR

ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE RD.
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NJ 07675

LOOK WHO WON OUR MOST ADMIRED WOMEN AND MEN POLLS

Chosen by our readers, here are the top ten winners of America's most-talked-about polls—our Twenty-First Annual Most Admired Women Poll, and Ninth Annual Most Admired Men Poll



1. BARBARA BUSH
(An overwhelming first-time favorite)



2. MOTHER TERESA
(13th year in top 10; was #1 last year)



3. MARGARET THATCHER
(Up from #4 last year)



4. OPRAH WINFREY
(3rd year in top 10; was #2 last year)



5. ANN JILLIAN
(Dramatic first appearance on our list)



6. PAT NIXON
(20th year in top 10; was #5 last year)



7. KATHARINE HEPBURN
(9th year in top 10)



8. PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY
(Was #10 last year)



9. NANCY REAGAN
(9th year in top 10; was #3 last year)



10. DIANA, PRINCESS OF WALES
(Reappears after 2 years)



1. GEORGE BUSH
(2nd year in top 10; up from #7 last year)



2. BILLY GRAHAM
(9th year in top 10; 3rd year as #2)



3. LECH WALESA
(5th year in top 10; up from #10 last year)



4. POPE JOHN PAUL II
(9th year in top 10; 3rd year as #4)




5. OLIVER NORTH
(2nd year in top 10 and in #5 spot)



6. RONALD REAGAN
(9th year in top 10; was #1 for past 8 years)



7. BOB HOPE
(9th year in top 10; was #3 last year)



8. C. EVERETT KOOP, M.D.
(First time in the top 10)




9. JIMMY CARTER
(Returns to top 10 after one year absence)



10. BILL COSBY
(5th year in top 10; was #8 last year)

For some runners-up, turn to page 133

RICHARD NIXON



IN THE ARENA

A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal

In his most outspoken book, the former President shares his thoughts and feelings as few political figures ever have. Filled with dramatic revelations certain to make headlines, *IN THE ARENA* is Richard Nixon's inside story of his resignation, pardon, and the aftermath, and much more, including his candid opinions of world leaders, from Mao and Gorbachev to Eisenhower and Bush.

- 200,000-copy first printing
- \$200,000 advertising/promotion campaign
- National author publicity to include an unprecedented 5-part "Today Show" appearance; 90-minute PBS interview special; Larry King Radio and TV

- National radio and print advertising campaign
- First serial to *Time* magazine
- Tie-in to the opening of the Richard Nixon Library in Yorba Linda, California
- Simultaneous Touchstone publication of Richard Nixon's six previous books in a uniform library edition

May • \$21.95 • 0-671-70096-0
24 pages of photographs

IN THE ARENA will also be available in a signed limited edition, slipcased, leather-bound and gold embossed.
Net price, \$75.00 • 0-671-72318-9



**SIMON AND
SCHUSTER**
A PARAMOUNT
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY

RICHARD NIXON

December 8, 1989

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY


DEC 10 1989

Dear Brent:

I thought you might be interested in an analysis of Gorbachev and his reforms that I prepared after Malta.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. Nixon', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Paper	Re: Should We Help Gorbachev? (8 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [2]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-011
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information