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FOIA MARKER

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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 85037
Folder ID Number: 85037-010

Folder Title:
Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Report	Re: Government report (1 pp.)	9/22/92	(b)(1)	
01a. Paper	Re: Israeli Settlement Activity (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01b. Paper	Re: Peace Process: State of Play (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	S
01c. Paper	Re: Internal Political and Economic Situation (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
01d. Memo	Special Memorandum Re: Yitzhaq Rabin: A Political Profile (6 pp.)	7/29/92	(b)(1)	
02. Letter	President Bush to President Nixon Re: [How to Lose the Cold War] (1 pp.)	3/5/92	(b)(1)	
03. Letter	President Nixon to Brent Scowcroft Re: [State Department] (2 pp.)	5/13/92	(b)(1)	
04a. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush Re: [Gulf War] (3 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	
04b. Memo	President Nixon to President Bush Re: Soviet American-Relations (12 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	
05. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush Re: [Gulf War] (8 pp.)	9/6/90	(b)(1)	

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Collection:

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Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap2275
OA/ID Number: 85037-010
Date Closed: 10/4/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S[2]
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
06. Report	Re: Options in the Gulf (9 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
07. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush Re: [Gorbachev] (6 pp.)	11/16/89	(b)(1)	
08. Memo	POTUS to James A. Baker, III and Brent Scowcroft Re: [President Nixon] (1 pp.)	7/22/89	(b)(1)	
09a. Note	POTUS to James A. Baker, III, Brent Scowcroft, and John Sununu Re: [Letter from President Nixon] (1 pp.)	11/18/89	C	
09b. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush Re: [Gorbachev] (6 pp.)	11/16/89	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 2

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RICHARD NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY 07675

Save the Peace Dividend

By Richard Nixon

PWOODCLIFF LAKE, N.J. resident-elect Bill Clinton deserves high marks for aggressively addressing a number of important issues during the transition period. But as was the case during the campaign, the most important issue since the end of World War II has received minimal attention.

It may be politically shrewd to give domestic policy, as it affects an economy just beginning to recover from recession, a higher priority than foreign policy. But the collapse of Boris Yeltsin's pro-Western, democratic Russian Government would have a far greater impact on the American economy than anything the new Administration could do at home.

The Yeltsin Government is in mortal danger. The National Salvation Front, an unholy alliance of ex-Communists and ultra-nationalists, have boldly demanded Boris Yeltsin's resignation, a return to authoritarian rule and the restoration of the Soviet Union within its 1991 borders. That would be a prescription for the beginning of cold war II.

The peace dividend, which the Clinton Administration is counting on to help finance its new domestic policies, will be down the tube. Instead of cutting the defense budget, it will be necessary to increase defense spending by billions of dollars.

It has been projected that the United States over the next 10 years can save between \$250 billion and \$300 billion in defense expenditures if present trends continue. A new Russian nationalist authoritarianism government, heavily controlled by the military and shorn of the failed faith of Communism, would be a greater threat to the forces of peace and freedom in the world than the old Soviet totalitarianism.

What are the chances that the Yeltsin Government will survive? On the minus side, Russia is plagued by massive corruption and runaway inflation. Bloody ethnic conflicts are on the rise. The gridlock in Moscow between President Yeltsin's Cabinet and the heavily Communist Parliament he inherited from the Soviet era is much worse than anything ever witnessed in Washington.

On the plus side, Mr. Yeltsin has proved to be a skillful politician and

formidable statesman. His popularity, at a time when his country is suffering not just from a recession but from a deep depression, is still above 50 percent.

Russia is a rich country; we are not dealing here with a nuclear-armed Bangladesh. Ninety-five percent of the Russian people are literate, and 90 percent of the Russian work force has graduated from high school. The press is free, and Mr. Yeltsin has acted as its greatest defender against undue interference from both conser-

vatives in the Parliament and his own Government. There is considerable progress in overall judiciary reform. Most important, in foreign policy, both vis-à-vis the West and the newly independent post-Soviet states, Mr. Yeltsin has consistently acted with enlightened moderation. He needs our help and he deserves it.

It is essential that we be understanding and tolerant as he tries to find a new way of ruling the country through a compromise with the centrist forces organized under the umbrella of the Civic Union. I personally know some of the top leaders in this diverse coalition. While questioning many of the current Government tactics, they have a fundamental commitment to democracy and a free-market economy and are loyal to Mr. Yeltsin as the Russian President. If he makes a compromise with the Civic Union, there is no need to panic and to perceive it as a mortal blow to

the Russian democratic experiment.

One of the most effective ways we can help Mr. Yeltsin survive is to champion the rights of the 25 million Russian-speaking people in the Baltic and the other post-Soviet states — both bilaterally and in international forums. The Russian people should be able to feel that their human rights are a priority for American diplomacy. This will be a constructive way to respond to xenophobic Russian nationalists who are paranoid and suspicious of the West and violently opposed to President Yeltsin.

The Yeltsin Government will not survive unless it receives a major new economic assistance package. The Freedom Support Act was a positive first step, but it has been overtaken by events. Urgent action on three fronts is required.

1. The \$80 billion debt that Mr. Yeltsin inherited from Mikhail Gorbachev must be rescheduled for 15

years as Mr. Yeltsin has requested.

2. There must be a substantial bridge loan from Western governments to help the Russian people through a cruel, cold winter and to assist the transition from a command to a free-market economy that is unprecedented in a major country.

3. Russia needs massive investment from the private sector in the West. Government aid is limited by budgets. Investment from the private sector is limited only by opportunity. If Russia adopts the same legal guarantees for private property as we have in the West, it has been estimated that \$300 billion would be invested over the next five years, dwarfing the \$25 billion in Western government aid currently allotted.

4. As Senator Sam Nunn has recommended, responsibility for the aid program should be given to one high-level individual reporting directly to the President who would act as the principal coordinator of all U.S. Government efforts. This individual should be of sufficient stature so that he can talk to Mr. Yeltsin and to Western leaders as an equal.


None of these things will happen unless the President plays a direct role. Only he can persuade the Europeans to accept debt relief, force the

If we don't help Yeltsin, it will cost us plenty.

American bureaucracy to shape up and get Congress to approve foreign aid appropriations.

What's in it for us? If Mr. Yeltsin fails, we will again live in a dangerous world with the threat of nuclear war hanging over our heads. The wave of freedom sweeping the world will ebb and we could get caught in the undertow. If Mr. Yeltsin survives, and freedom and democracy succeed in Russia, we will live in a safer world.

We will also live in a richer world. A vigorous free-enterprise economy in Russia will mean billions of dollars in trade and hundreds of thousands of jobs for American workers. We will live in a freer world because the success of democracy and free markets in Russia will be an example for China and other dictatorships around the world to follow. □



Horacio Cardo

Richard Nixon, the former President, is honorary chairman of the Fund for Democracy and Development.

Received
1:18 PM

Staff
cy back up

RICHARD NIXON

January 14, 1993

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Dr. Brent

As a final request to your fine N.S.C. staff, I would greatly appreciate it if they could send me background papers on the top government officials in Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Germany, France, Poland, China, Japan, Korea, and Hong Kong. Any unclassified material on major bilateral issues would also be useful.

I hope to visit all of these countries in the next three months. Any information you provide is strictly for my own personal use and would not be disclosed to the media.

Sincerely,



General Brent Scowcroft

RICHARD NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

9-29-92

Dear Brent,

This is my confidential
assessment which as you
will note is not as bleak
as some of the internal polls.

If the campaign concentrated
on the winnable states
we can still pull this
off.

Also I would strongly
advise that there be
debates. When you
are behind you
must take risks.
Bush will do better
than expected & Clinton
may not wear well

Reggie

Reggie

September 27, 1992

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

This is my latest assessment of where they stand based on the most recent state polls.

Probable Clinton

California	54
New York	33
Oregon	7
Washington	11
Massachusetts	12
Pennsylvania	23
Rhode Island	4
Hawaii	4
Minnesota	10
Iowa	7
Maryland	10
D.C.	3
West Virginia	5
Arkansas	6
Tennessee	11
Illinois	22
New Jersey	15
Delaware	3
Vermont	3

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Probable Bush

Oklahoma	8
Kansas	6
Nebraska	5
South Dakota	3
North Dakota	3
Alabama	9
Mississippi	7
Utah	5
Nevada	4
Idaho	4
Wyoming	3
Virginia	13
Indiana	12
Alaska	3
S. Carolina	8
New Hampshire	4
Ohio	21

	118

Even

Texas	32
Florida	25
Arizona	8
Louisiana	9
Montana	3
North Carolina	14

	91

Leaning Clinton

Wisconsin	11
Missouri	11
Maine	4
Connecticut	8
Colorado	8
Kentucky	8
New Mexico	5
Georgia	13
Michigan	18

	86

Analysis

Clinton's lead seems insurmountable but he has some major problems. First, he is making the classic mistake of the front runner -- playing not to lose rather than playing to win.

Second, Perot is a wild card and may hurt Clinton more than Bush in the battleground states.

Third, Clinton's support is shallow. He has nagging personal vulnerabilities which may not show up in the polls but which could affect the undecided voters in the last two weeks of the campaign when they make up their minds.

Bush can win only if he concentrates on the key states where he has a reasonable chance to win. Among the probable Clinton states, Pennsylvania and New Jersey are Bush's best shots though both are long shots at this time. The others should not be publicly written off but should not receive major attention.

Bush can win without any of the Clinton probables provided he concentrates his efforts on the even states -- all of which he should be able to win -- and on the Clinton leaning states, where he must win enough to deny Clinton the 27 votes he needs to go over the top assuming Clinton wins all of his probable states.

It's tough, but if Clinton continues to coast, Bush can make it a nail biter by November 3rd.

UNCLASSIFIED
FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: NSC

PHONE: (202) 395-6926

FAX (202) 395-3380

TO	FAX	PHONE
PRESIDENT NIXON	201 391-3725	

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER SHEET 7

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: URGENT

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THE WHITE HOUSE


WASHINGTON

September 28, 1992

Dear Mr. President:

As you requested, the enclosed background materials update the Middle East situation for your use in discussions with Foreign Minister Peres. The three-page background paper gives a quick overview of recent developments. Also included are a background paper on US assistance over the years and a biographical sketch.

Sincerely,


Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable
Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON'S MEETING WITH ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER PERES

Introduction

Foreign Minister Peres' position within the current Israeli government is anomalous. Prime Minister Rabin has reserved for himself responsibility for both the U.S.-Israeli relationship and the bilateral Middle East peace process. Peres has been given charge of other relationships, notably the Europeans for whom he has a natural affinity, and the multilateral track. The division of labor is an uneasy one, and Rabin has been uncomfortable with recent Peres initiatives. Rabin would be equally uncomfortable with any initiative by Peres that interfered with the Prime Minister's management of U.S.-Israeli relations.

Multilaterals

Peres has been striving to expand his role and the significance of the multilaterals. He has proposed that future meetings be held at the foreign minister level which is problematic. The Syrians and Lebanese have still not engaged in any of the multilaterals, and the Israelis have yet to find a formula to permit their participation in the economic development and refugee working groups where the Palestinians have Palestinian National Council members in their delegations. The regional parties agree that the multilateral track should complement, not outstrip, the bilateral one.

We have now had two of the five multilateral working groups scheduled for this fall: Arms Control and Regional Security in Moscow and Water in Washington. Both went well, focussed on practical issues and demonstrated what could be achieved once the bilaterals pay off. The fact that Arabs, Israelis, and Palestinians got on a plane and flew to Knoxville to spend a day touring the TVA is an extraordinary testament to this process.

Bilaterals

Although there were no dramatic breakthroughs during this round of bilaterals (the first under a new Israeli government committed to making headway), progress was achieved in the two most difficult tracks.

After a week of abortive Palestinian efforts to make Resolution 242, Jerusalem and settlements the focal point of negotiations, Israelis and Palestinians finally got down to business. In a procedural fix that should make discussions easier, Palestinians agreed to an Israeli idea to form a smaller groups to sort out tough issues. For the first time, there was a meaningful dialogue on the nature of the elected authority and on the concept of interim self-government. At the same time, Palestinians pressed the Israelis for detailed responses to a number of questions relating to land and water -- the first sign that Palestinians may be looking for a serious way to engage on key issues within the terms set by the process.

Equally encouraging, Israelis and Palestinians began to address the difficult issue of the status of the Palestinian delegation as it pertains to bridge-crossing, treatment, etc.

Israel and Syria started this round with an historic exchange of documents outlining draft principles for negotiations. Israel's decision to work from the Syrian draft buoyed hopes for a breakthrough until both parties ran headlong into the issue of how to define their ultimate goals: Israel wants a peace treaty and normalization not tied to agreements reached with other Arabs; Syria wants full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Domestic politics in Israel -- a Knesset debate and demonstrations on the Golan -- have constrained Rabin's ability to even use the word "withdrawal", although with the right signals from Damascus he's clearly prepared to go further.

The other two tracks moved along this round, but at a very slow pace. Israeli-Jordanian negotiations exhibit a Jekyll and Hyde personality; on one hand, they are still bogged down in word wars trying to define an agenda. At the same time, their experts have engaged in fascinating discussions on water, banking, energy, and the environment. The Lebanese-Israeli track is moving along the right direction, i.e. focussing on security arrangements, but the problems of the Lebanese government will make this slow going.

The parties will all be back on October 21 to resume negotiations which are scheduled to last until November 19.

Qualitative Military Edge

In accordance with our ongoing commitment to the maintenance of Israel's qualitative military edge, we have just agreed on certain measures that will be initiated by the United States in the very near future. These measures include the supply of Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and the prepositioning of advanced defense equipment in Israel. They will be implemented pursuant to previously enacted legislation which authorized the transfer to Israel and prepositioning in Israel of defense articles drawn from United States stocks. It was further agreed that there will be closer ties between the two countries' armed forces, cooperations on technology upgrades and the start of discussions on Israel's participation in the Global Protection System.

F-15's for Saudi

Although the GOI formally opposes the proposed sale, Rabin has made clear to us and Israel's supporters that he is not interested in fighting a losing battle. For our part, we have made clear, as outlined above, our tangible commitment to Israel's qualitative edge although we have been careful not to link these measures directly to the F-15 sale.

UNCLASSIFIED

ISRAEL: U.S. ASSISTANCE

- o U.S. assistance to Israel is an expression of our close bilateral relationship. It is designed to maintain Israel's qualitative edge in defense and to provide general balance of payments support in the economic sphere.
- o From 1951 through fiscal year 1991, the United States has provided over \$50 billion to Israel in loans and grants for economic and security assistance.
 - Economic assistance has been all grant since FY 1981 and military assistance has been effectively all grant since FY 1985. All U.S. aid to Israel is restricted to uses within those areas administered by Israel prior to June 5, 1967.
- o Since FY 1986, regular U.S. aid to Israel has been \$3 billion annually, \$1.2 billion in economic support fund assistance (ESF) and \$1.8 billion in military assistance (FMF).
 - Israel's ESF is a cash transfer which the GOI uses primarily for U.S. debt service (e.g. repayment of old FMF loans) and secondarily for the purchase of U.S. goods.
 - Israel's FMF is deposited in an interest-bearing account from which disbursements are made to Israel's trust fund account or to reimburse the GOI for payments made for the purchase of military equipment and services in the U.S. and Israel. (For FY91, \$475 million of the \$1.8 billion in FMF was allowed to be spent in Israel.)
- o In addition, there are smaller grant programs for special purposes, such as refugee assistance, and non-appropriated aid, especially in the defense area (see attached table).
 - In FY91, as a result of the Gulf War, Israel received emergency aid, consisting of \$650 million in additional ESF, several hundred million dollars worth of additional military equipment (including Patriot fire units) and accelerated delivery of the \$100 million munitions War Reserve Stockpile.
 - The FY91 Foreign Operations and Defense Appropriations Acts authorized an additional \$1.1 billion in military assistance for Israel, including a \$700 million drawdown of DOD stocks, and a \$200 million addition to the War Reserves Stockpile.
 - The U.S. also provided Israel in FY91 housing loan guarantees to enable Israel to borrow \$400 million to provide housing for Soviet immigrants.

UNCLASSIFIED

FACT SHEET: U.S. Assistance to Israel FY 89-91
(in millions)

Fiscal Year 1991

--	Foreign Military Financing	\$1,800 million
--	Economic Support Funds	1,200 million
--	Emergency ESF Supplemental	650 million
--	Other Appropriated Assistance (including SDIO projects, Haifa port refurbishing, refugee assistance, and cooperative development programs)	121 million
--	Other non-Appropriated Assistance (War reserve stockpiles -- \$100m, interest on early disbursement of FMF and ESF, Partiot fire units, excess defense equipment, and items identified for Drawdown of DOD stocks.)	338 million
--	TOTAL	\$4,109 million

-- FY91 legislation also authorized:

- o a drawdown of up to \$700 million in DOD stocks (10 F-15's valued at \$45 million were identified in FY91 for delivery to Israel and are included above);
- o \$200 million in additional war reserve stockpiles (details under negotiation);
- o and a 4.5 million barrel petroleum stockpile (efforts are underway to incorporate language in legislation saying that the size of the program is to be negotiated).

-- In addition, AID provided \$400 million in housing loan guarantees and EX-IM bank provided credit guarantees for up to \$64 million of U.S. housing exports.

Fiscal Year 1990

--	Foreign Military Financing	\$1,800 million
--	Economic Support Funds	1,200 million
--	Other Military Assistance	422 million
--	Other non-Military Assistance	213 million
--	TOTAL	\$3,635 million

Fiscal Year 1989

--	Foreign Military Financing	\$1,800 million
--	Economic Support Funds	1,200 million
--	Other (approximate)	96 million
--	TOTAL	\$3,096 million

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Disposition Date:

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RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

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C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

Records temporarily restricted in accordance with the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Interim Guidelines on Classified National Security Information Directive No. 1 (32 CFR Part 2001), Section 2001.13(e) concerning re-review of previously declassified records at the National Archives.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 5, 1992

Dear Mr. President:

Attached are some briefing materials for your use in preparing for your meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. Included are three classified papers:

Internal Political & Economic Situation;

Peace Process;

Israeli Settlement Activity.

Also included is the text of Rabin's inaugural address to the Knesset and a political profile.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable
Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INTERNAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION

Coalition Dynamics

- o Rabin's new government, a significant departure from the previous one, is a center/left coalition of Labor; left-wing, dovish Meretz bloc; and the Sephardi ultraorthodox Shas party. He also has the support of the two Arab parties, which are not part of the government.
 - Shas continues to support the government despite pressure from the religious right to split. Assuming Shas remains loyal to the government, the coalition is durable.
 - Rabin would like at least one more party to balance the coalition on the right, but so far neither the secular rightist Tsomet nor the Ashkanazi ultraorthodox UJT have been willing to join. Rabin has not yet filled several ministries, which could help him lure possible additions to the coalition.
- o The coalition's platform is focused on rapid progress toward Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories, improved relations with the United States, and economic expansion.
- o Rabin currently enjoys a high level of trust, popularity and credibility. The fast pace of his government has captured the public's imagination and generated a renewed optimism; his coalition should encounter smooth sailing in the coming months.
 - A visibly successful meeting with you will further strengthen him at home. He needs to show that he can produce results in his dealings with you.
- o Clear signs that we and he have developed a strong, productive relationship will strengthen his control over the coalition and give him a strong hand for dealing with other potential coalition members. A broader coalition would help solidify his forward approach to the bilateral relationship and further isolate Likud. At the same time, Rabin will balk at any U.S. moves that crowd him or which can be used by opponents at home to assert that he is in our pocket.

Rabin's Economic Strategy

- o Rabin's overriding economic objective is to secure U.S. loan guarantees.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015
By SS NARA, Date 3/7/24

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-2-

- Rabin needs these funds to produce sufficient economic growth (6 to 7 percent per year) to create jobs for new immigrants and at the same time maintain the standard of living for veteran Israelis.
- Key elements of Labor's political constituency -- the Histadrut, the kibbutz movement, and lower income Israelis -- will place demands on the government budget which will limit his economic options in the absence of loan guarantees.
- Government obligations to buy-back vast numbers of unwanted homes built by Ariel Sharon in outlying areas will add to economic pressures.
- o In order to secure the guarantees and maximize their usefulness, Rabin and his team are prepared to adopt new policies and structural economic reforms:
 - First, the new government will shift resources away from settlements and the construction of unwanted houses in outlying areas of Israel towards job creation and improved infrastructure in the major population centers.
 - Second, Rabin's economic team has spoken of accelerated privatization of state-controlled enterprises and a reduction of government intervention and regulation. Promoting increased exports and foreign investment in the private sector will be a key objectives of these efforts.
- o We will want to push Rabin to fill in the details of his program so that the loan guarantees will contribute to real growth. Steps he can take include:
 - Taking a committed, personal role in making an economic reform plan work: Shamir's economic advisors also had the right ideas, but without support from the Prime Minister they amounted to little.
 - Putting together a solid economic plan in time for the submission of the FY93 budget in October.
- o U.S. support will be crucial:
 - o In addition to the loan guarantees, high level support for a resumption of the economic dialogue will be necessary. The Israelis are eager to resume the long-dormant Joint Economic Development Group (JEDG).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

29 July 1992

FB SM 92-10009



Special Memorandum

Yitzhaq Rabin: A Political Profile

Shamir Turns Over Prime Ministership to Rabin

TA1407073592 Jerusalem Qol Yisra'el in Hebrew
0700 GMT 14 Jul 92

[Text] Outgoing Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir met privately with Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin this morning and handed the reigns of power to him. Afterwards, Yitzhaq Shamir said that the country is currently in better shape than it was when put in the hands of his government. Shamir expressed the hope that the new government will not do anything to undermine the outgoing government's achievements. He wished Yitzhaq Rabin success in his post and expressed the hope that his government will mark many accomplishments.

Yitzhaq Rabin said that anyone assuming the role of prime minister feels a heavy responsibility. Rabin said that Israel should aspire to achieve additional goals. He pointed out that his predecessor belonged both to the last generation to be enslaved and the first to achieve redemption. This was a generation of people who struggled and put themselves at risk to establish the country. I am sure, Rabin said, that Yitzhaq Shamir has earned his honorable place in the annals of Zionism, and I thank him for that.

Rabin Administration Approved; Cabinet Sworn In

TA1307202892 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew
2007 GMT 13 Jul 92

[Text] Rabin's government has gained the Knesset's confidence: 67 Knesset members [MK's] voted in favor while 53 voted against. Labor, Meretz, SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim], HADASH [Democratic Front for Peace and Equality], and MK Darawshah and his Arab Democratic Party colleagues supported the government, while Likud, Tzomet, Moledet, the NRP [National Religious Party], and United Torah Jewry voted against. The 17 members of the new government were sworn in immediately after the vote of confidence.

Inaugural Session of 13th Knesset Held 13 Jul

Rabin Addresses Knesset

TA1307155592 Jerusalem Israel Television Network
in Hebrew 1407 GMT 13 Jul 92

[Address by Prime Minister-Designate Yitzhaq Rabin at the inaugural session of the 13th Knesset—live]

[Text] His Excellency, Mr. President of the State; Knesset Speaker, Members of Knesset: The government that is seeking the vote of confidence of the 13th Knesset today knows very well that each and every Israeli is looking at it with a prayer and vast hope. From today onward, many people—both in Israel and outside it—will hope for a new way, for momentum, for a new chapter in the annals of the State of Israel. With their blessing and concern, we set out today on a lengthy and arduous road.

Members of the House, please take note that this government is determined to embrace every possible effort, pave every road, and do every possible and impossible thing for the sake of national and personal security, for the sake of peace and of preventing war, for the sake of eliminating unemployment, for the sake of aliyah and its absorption, for the sake of economic growth, to enhance the foundations of democracy and the rule of law, and for the sake of ensuring equality for all citizens, while upholding human rights.

We will change the national order of priorities. We know well that the road we are about to tread will be fraught with obstacles; crises will erupt, and there will be disappointment, tears, and pain. After all this is over, however, once we come to the end of this road, we will have acquired a strong country, a good country, a country in which we all share in the big efforts and are proud to be its citizens. As the poet Rahel put it: Will a concerted, stubborn, and persistent effort of a thousand arms not move mountains? The answer lies with us and is up to us.

Members of the House, on behalf of all of you, both veteran and new members, I would like to thank outgoing Knesset Speaker Dov Shilansky for his role in and contribution to the Knesset and to democratic conduct in Israel. You have the gratitude of us all.

Heartfelt blessings on behalf of all of us to the Knesset speaker who has just been elected, my friend Shevah Weiss. I see him as a symbol of the history of the Jewish people in the last generation: a survivor; a Jewish boy who survived the horrors of the Holocaust; an immigrant who was integrated into this country, who has studied and imparted knowledge, and who today deserves our appreciation. To you and to this House, I wish success.

I hope that on your behalf, members of the House, with a warm handshake that transcends parties, different opinions, and political rivalries, I greet the new Knesset members. I would like to express my gratitude to the 40 members of the outgoing Knesset. Many of them are among the founders of this country and its best warriors. I cannot mention them by name and express my gratitude and appreciation for the deeds of each and every one of them, but I am sure that all factions of the House—right and left, religious and secular—bid them farewell with gratitude.

Members of the House, on Sunday, 2 July 1992, the president of the state entrusted me with the mission of forming a government in Israel, and on Friday, 10 July 1992, I informed him that I had succeeded. The government that is seeking the vote of confidence of the Knesset today will be made up of Labor, Meretz, and SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim]. We explained the government's policy to HADASH, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, and to the Arab Democratic Party with regard to Israel's Arab citizens. The coalition's door will remain open to broaden its ranks with those parties that agree to embrace the government's basic guidelines. Aside from possible disagreements

among the coalition partners because they come from all parts of the political spectrum, the government unanimously shares the feeling currently prevalent among the people: that this is a time of goodwill, a time of big possibilities and opportunities which we will do our utmost not to miss.

Mr. Speaker, members of the House, in the last decade of the 20th Century, the atlases and the history and geography books no longer depict reality. Walls of hatred have crumbled, borders have been erased, superpowers have collapsed, ideologies have broken down, countries have been born and passed away, and the gates have opened to immigration to Israel. It is our duty, both to ourselves and to our children, to see the new world as it is today, to examine the risks and explore the chances, and to do everything so that the State of Israel becomes part of the changing world. We are no longer an isolated nation, and it is no longer true that the entire world is against us. We must rid ourselves of the feeling of isolation that has afflicted us for almost 50 years. We must join the campaign of peace, reconciliation, and international cooperation that is currently engulfing the entire globe, lest we miss the train and be left alone at the station.

This is why the new government made its main goal to promote the attainment of peace for Israel and to launch vigorous steps to bring about the termination of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We will do this on the basis of recognition by the Arab countries and the Palestinians of Israel as a sovereign state and of its right to live in peace and security. We sincerely believe that this is possible, imperative, and will come to be. As the poet Saul Tchernichowsky wrote: Believe I in the future. Though it may be far off, the day will yet come when peace shall be spoken and nation will bless nation. I would like to believe that this day is not far off.

The government will propose to the Arab countries and to the Palestinians to pursue the peace negotiations based on the format consolidated at the Madrid conference. As a first step on the way to the permanent solution, we will discuss the implementation of autonomy in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza district. It is not our intention to waste valuable time. The first directive the government will issue to the negotiating teams will be to accelerate the talks and to conduct intensive deliberations between the sides.

Within a short period of time, we will reopen the talks to dampen the flame of hatred between the Palestinians and the State of Israel. As a first step, and in order to demonstrate our integrity and goodwill, I wish to invite the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation for an informal meeting here in Jerusalem, to hear them and to let them hear us, in order to create the proper atmosphere for a good partnership.

From this podium I want to send a message to you, the Palestinians in the territories: We have been destined to live together on the same piece of land in the same

country. Our life proceeds alongside yours, with you, and against you. You have failed in the wars against us. A hundred years of bloody terror on your part only inflicted suffering, pain, and bereavement upon you. You have lost thousands of your sons and daughters, and you have constantly lost ground. For over 44 years you have been deluding yourselves, your leaders have been leading you by the nose with falsehoods and lies. They missed all the opportunities, they rejected all our proposed solutions, and they led you from one disaster to another. You, the Palestinians in the territories, living in miserable exile in Gaza and Khan Yunus and in the refugee camps in Nabulus and Hebron, you who have never in your lives known even one day of freedom and happiness: You had better listen to us, if only this time. We are offering you the most fair and realistic offer we can put forth today: autonomy, self-rule, with its advantages and limitations. You will not get all that you want. We, too, may not get everything we want. Once and for all, take your fate into your own hands. Do not once again miss the opportunity which may never recur. Take our proposal seriously, give it the seriousness it deserves to spare yourselves yet more suffering and bereavement. Enough of tears and blood!

Today the new government proposes to the Palestinians in the territories to give peace a chance and to stop all violent and terrorist activities during the autonomy negotiations. We know very well that the Palestinians are not of one mind and that some of them think differently, but the people have been suffering for years.

To the troublemakers in the territories we propose to drop the stones and the knives and await the outcome of the talks which may engender peace in the Middle East. If the Palestinians accept this proposal, we will pursue the talks. Nevertheless, we will deal with the territories as if there were no negotiations going on between us; Instead of stretching out a friendly hand, we will enforce all the measures to prevent terror and violence. The choice is in the hands of the Palestinians in the territories.

We have lost our best sons and daughters in the struggle over this land and in the wars against the Arab armies. My longtime comrades in the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and I, as a former military man who fought in Israel's wars, carry their memory in our hearts with great love. We share the grief of the families whose nights are sleepless and for whom all days of the year are one long memorial day, because only those who have lost their best friends can understand the feeling. Our heart also goes out to the disabled whose bodies are marked with the scars of war and terror. Even at this festive time, we do not forget the Israeli MIA's and POW's. We will continue to wage every possible effort to bring them back home. Our thoughts today, as always, are with their families.

Members of the House, we will continue to fight for our right to live here in peace and tranquillity. No knife, stone, firebomb, or mine will stop us. The government

being presented here today sees itself responsible for the security of each and every Israeli citizen, Jew and Arab alike, in the State of Israel, in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. We will strike hard and relentlessly at the terrorists and their henchmen. There will be no compromises in the war against terror. The IDF and the other security forces will prove to the bloodthirsty men that our lives are not expendable. We will take action to reduce hostile activities as much possible and safeguard the personal safety of the inhabitants of Israel and the inhabitants of the territories while meticulously upholding the law and individual freedoms.

Members of the House, on your behalf, too, allow me to seize this occasion to convey our gratitude to the soldiers and commanders of the IDF, to the secret warriors of the Shin Bet, to the men of the Border Police and the Israel Police for the nights spent in pursuit and lying in ambush, for the days spent on guard and on the alert. On behalf of all of us, I shake your hand.

Members of the Knesset, the plan for Palestinian self-rule in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza—the autonomy—included in the Camp David accords involves a five-year interim arrangement. No later than three years after its establishment, discussions will begin on the permanent solution. By definition, the very fact that this issue is being discussed arouses concern among those of us who chose to settle in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza district. I hereby inform you that the government, by means of the IDF and the other security forces, will be responsible for the security and welfare of the residents in Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. At the same time, the government will avoid moves and acts that would disturb the proper conduct of the peace negotiations. We would like to emphasize that the government will continue to strengthen and build up Jewish settlement along the confrontation lines, due to their security importance, and in metropolitan Jerusalem.

This government, just like all its predecessors, believes there are no differences of opinion within this House concerning the eternalness of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Jerusalem, whole and united, has been and will remain the capital of the Israeli people under Israeli sovereignty, the place every Jew yearns and dreams of. The government is resolute in its position that Jerusalem is not a negotiable issue. The coming years, too, will witness the expansion of construction in metropolitan Jerusalem. Every Jew, both religious and secular, vows: If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand wither! This vow unites all of us and certainly applies to me, being a native of Jerusalem.

The government will uphold the freedom of worship of members of all other faiths in Jerusalem. It will meticulously maintain free access to the holy sites of all faiths and sects and will make a normal and comfortable life possible for all those visiting and living in it.

Members of the Knesset, the winds of peace that have been blowing recently from Moscow to Washington,

from Berlin to Beijing; the voluntary elimination of weapons of mass destruction; and the abrogation of military pacts have decreased the risks of war in the Middle East as well. Nevertheless, this region—made up of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon—is still rife with dangers, which is why we will not make even the slightest concession on issues of security. As far as we are concerned, security comes even before peace.

Several countries in our region have recently stepped up their efforts to develop and export nuclear weapons. According to reports, Iraq was very close to possessing nuclear arms. Fortunately, the Iraqi nuclear capability was exposed in time and, according to various testimonies, it was affected and damaged in and after the Gulf war. The possibility that nuclear weapons may make their appearance in the Middle East in the next few years is a negative and very serious development from Israel's point of view. Already in its initial steps, the government—possibly with the cooperation of other countries—will give its attention to the foiling of every possibility that any of Israel's enemies should get a hold on nuclear weapons. For a long time, Israel has been ready for the danger of the existence of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, this reality requires us to give additional thought to the urgent need to terminate the Arab-Israeli conflict and to attain peace with our neighbors.

Members of the House, from this moment on, the term peace process is no longer relevant. Starting today we will not talk of a process, but of making peace. In making peace, we would like to employ the good services of Egypt, whose late leader Anwar al-Sadat mustered the courage and had the wisdom to award his people and us the first peace treaty. The government will seek other ways to improve neighborly relations and to enhance the ties with Egypt and its president, Hosni Mubarak.

I call on the leaders of the Arab countries to follow in the footsteps of Egypt and its presidents, to make the move that will bring peace to us and them. I invite the king of Jordan and the Syrian and Lebanese presidents to come here to this podium, here in Israel's Knesset in Jerusalem, and talk peace. I am willing to travel today, tomorrow, to Amman, Damascus, Beirut on behalf of peace, because there is no greater triumph than the triumph of peace. In wars, there are victors and vanquished. In peace, all are victors.

In making peace, we will also be joined by the United States, whose friendship and special closeness we sincerely appreciate and hold dear. We will spare no effort to tighten and improve the special relations we have with the only superpower in the world. Although we will receive its advice, the decisions will be ours only—of Israel as a sovereign and independent state.

We will also foster, enhance, and reinforce our ties with the EC. Even if we have not always seen eye to eye and have had disagreements with the Europeans, we have no doubt that the road to peace will also go through Europe.

We will enhance all possible ties with Russia, the CIS republics, the PRC, and every country that would like to take our outstretched hand.

Mr. Speaker, members of the House, security does not only mean tanks, aircraft, and missile boats. Security also means—perhaps first and foremost—man. It is the education of man; it is his home and school, his street and neighborhood, the society in which he grew up. Security is the hope of man; it is the peace of mind and the livelihood of the immigrant from Leningrad and a roof over the head of the immigrant from Gondar in Ethiopia; it is the factory that gives jobs to native Israelis and to demobilized soldiers; it is integration in our way of life and culture. All these also spell security.

You ask: How will we go about it? We will change the national order of priorities in the allocation of financial resources from the state budget and from funds we will raise abroad. First and foremost, national priority will be given to fighting unemployment, to strengthening economic and social systems. Unemployment is the source of all evil. It deprives man of dignity; it ruins and crushes the life and soul of the man who cannot put bread on the table of his family, and there is no greater calamity than being hungry.

We intend to accelerate the pace of economic growth, to create jobs for hundreds of thousands of immigrants and native Israelis who will be joining the work force in the coming years. We will do this by adjusting the economy, by opening it up and freeing it of administrative restrictions and excessive government intervention. There is too much paperwork and too little productivity. We will promote the sale of government-owned enterprises and privatization. We will do this in cooperation with the workers so as not to hurt them. A free world calls for a free economy.

We will invest in vital and basic projects in order to attract entrepreneurs to build industries. We will allocate funds to infrastructure, transportation, electricity, water, and sewage; to high-tech industries; to research and development—this is the government's duty. We will reduce government intervention in the capital market, and we will open a high-risk investment market. We will encourage small businesses. We will set a social services basket comprising education, health, welfare, and housing which will be provided by law to all Israeli citizens. We want new immigrants and our sons and daughters to find employment, means of livelihood, and a future here. We do not want Israel's main export to be our children.

Members of the House, we are determined to put the citizen at the top of our priorities. I am asking all of you to remember that it is not the people who serve us, but it is we who serve the people. The education of our children will be the primary service to Israel's citizens. We will make every possible effort to institute a long school day in development towns and in low-income neighborhoods already in the upcoming school year, at

the end of the summer recess two months from now. There may be organizational difficulties, but we will try to overcome them nonetheless.

We will ensure equality between all school systems, including those in Arab and Druze locations. We will make every possible effort so that every Israeli may attend university, even if he or his parents are not wealthy. One of our main goals will be to strengthen the development towns. We will give priority to this issue by providing incentives. We will improve urban neighborhoods by guaranteeing community services that will meet the needs of education, health, and welfare.

Our concern will not only be given to the young generation. We intend to initiate a state pension law that will apply to all breadwinners, both salaried and self-employed. The pension funds will be under government control. We owe our senior citizens a dignified life, in keeping with our tradition of not neglecting our elderly.

We will make every possible effort to put a roof over the heads of new immigrants and to supply housing solutions to newly married couples, giving priority and assistance to demobilized soldiers. We send our youngsters to the hardest and most dangerous national missions and ignore them upon their safe return. The cheer: Hurrah for the IDF! also means seeing to the needs of the soldier once he completes his military service.

The government embarking on the road today considers the health of its citizens a very high priority. Comprehensive medicine does not only mean wishing good health to all but means the patient's rights by virtue of a state health law. The law will determine the public financing required to uphold a top quality, egalitarian public health system. Every Israeli citizen will qualify for health insurance that will be issued by the public sick funds. Most importantly, may we just be healthy!

It would be only fitting to admit that for years we erred in our attitude toward our Arab and Druze citizens. Today, almost 45 years after the foundation of the state, there are quite large gaps between the Jewish and the Arab sectors in many areas. On behalf of the new government, I would like to promise the Arab, Druze, and Bedouin population to make every possible effort to close those gaps. We will try to move toward ensuring the well-being of the minorities who have tied their fate to ours.

Binyamin Ze'ev Herzl said: All the deeds of man begin with a dream. We had a dream, we fought, and in the face of adversity and criticism, we established a safe haven for the Jewish people. This is the gist of Zionism; this is the realization of the dream of generations. In recent years, the gates have been opened to Jewish immigration. Hundreds of thousands have come here from all ends of the earth, especially from Russia and other CIS republics, to revive their Jewish lives. We are their home and family. We have no closer kin than them. We must be their guides; we must absorb them in our midst in the spirit of Jewish love. The number of

immigrants has decreased in recent months, and we are sorry about this. The government will take action to resume and invigorate immigration, particularly from Russia and other CIS republics, and will pursue its efforts to rescue Jews persecuted for being Jews. Without all this, we will have no return to Zion and, after all, we are all returnees to Zion.

Exiles from many countries, communities, sects, religious affiliations, and cultures have gathered in this small country. It is no easy task to integrate all these into one people. In the meantime, we must nurture tolerance and patience and cultivate solidarity. Jewish heritage sustained the Israeli people through all its wanderings and exiles, and we consider it our duty to uphold the mutual link and affinity between the Israeli Government and Israel's heritage. Maintaining the unity of the people requires the creation of conditions for coexistence based on mutual respect between religious and secular people. We will not abide polarization and offending the feelings of observant Jews. We will see to the education of all Israeli children based on Jewish values, and we will continue to impart and will not impair these values.

The government will abstain from any form of religious and antireligious coercion by any side whatsoever. It will guarantee the public religious needs of all people, regardless of political influences and affiliation. All special allocations will be abolished. The defense minister will appoint a team, which he will head, to check and determine the criteria and procedures for the deferral of military service of yeshiva students in a bid to prevent the exploitation of the arrangements to this effect.

I believe that these moves, in full cooperation with the religious and ultra-Orthodox parties, will help curb polarization in our society and will foster unity among Israel's communities.

Members of the House, a long way and hard work lies ahead. We will complete the legislation of basic laws to bring about the formulation of a state constitution. We will treat the state comptroller's reports with utmost gravity, and we will eradicate any trace of corruption. We will at long last enforce the law that has already been legislated concerning the direct election of the prime minister and changing the system of elections to the Knesset. We will give special attention to the environment, to improving transportation and roads.

I would like to say a few words to the opposition parties. We are not deluding ourselves. We know full well that huge missions lie ahead of us. The struggle is long, and our efforts may meet up with difficulty. We will concern ourselves with deeds, and there are no deeds without mistakes. We anticipate your criticism, however caustic it may be, as long as it is constructive and concerns the future and fate of this people.

This is also a good opportunity to ask you, members of the House, that we do everything in our power to elevate the stature of the Knesset, to conduct ourselves politely

and responsibly. The Israeli people watch us on television every evening, and you should not criticize them because you are a reflection of them. Your image is reflected in the national mirror, and we are treated accordingly. The government turns over a new leaf today. I suggest that all of us, members of the Knesset, turn over a new leaf in our relations with those who have sent us here.

Members of the Knesset, today we placed on the Knesset's table the basic guidelines of the new government and all the documents pertaining to the establishment of the government, including the coalition agreements. There are not and there will be no secret agreements; everything is out in the open and on the table, in keeping with the law.

Mr. Speaker, I am honored to present to the Knesset the government I have formed in keeping with the task entrusted to me by his excellency, the president of the state, according to Article 15 of the Basic Law: The Government. I am asking the Knesset to express its confidence in the following government:

Yitzhaq Rabin—prime minister, defense minister, and minister in charge of the religious affairs portfolio and the labor and welfare portfolio until the appointment of other ministers;

Shulamit Aloni—minister of education and culture;
Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer—minister of construction and housing;

'Uzi Bar'am—minister of tourism;

Arye Der'i—minister of the interior;

Mikha Harish—minister of industry and trade;

David Liba'i—minister of justice;

Ora Namir—minister of environmental affairs;

Shim'on Peres—minister of foreign affairs;

Ya'ir Tzaban—minister of immigrant absorption;

Ya'akov Tzur—minister of agriculture;

Yisra'el Qeysar—minister of transportation;

Amnon Rubinstein—minister of energy and infrastructure and of science and technology;

Hayim Ramon—minister of health;

Avraham Shohat—minister of finance;

Moshe Shahal—minister of police affairs and communications;

Shim'on Shetrit—minister of economy.

Mr. Speaker, distinguished Knesset, this is our declaration of intent, this is our identity card. These are the wishes we want to turn into reality. All I have said on behalf of the government and myself was said out of goodwill and a sincere intention to embark on a new road, to shed old attitudes, to establish here the country that every Jew, wherever he may be, will consider his home and the land of his dreams. Our entire policy can be condensed into one verse from the Bible: May the Lord give strength to his people! May the Lord bless his people with peace!

August 5, 1992

Dear Mr. Speaker:

We urge your support for the Freedom Support Act. For much of this century, the peoples of Europe and Eurasia have suffered under the tyranny of Communism. Throughout those years, America has nurtured their desire for freedom, their thirst for individual liberties, and their will to become democracies.


Our successive administrations -- and our allies -- have been united in the struggle against Communism. Our unity has proven the wisdom and strength of our democratic system and provided a stunning victory for freedom.

We now have the opportunity, so fervently pursued for generations, to guarantee a peaceful transition to democracy. America must respond to this challenge, as we have so many times before, through leadership of an international coalition to secure the success of reform in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.


The stakes could not be higher. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity now, authoritarianism could return in Moscow and elsewhere, the anticipated peace dividend could evaporate, future markets and jobs for Americans could be lost, and nuclear weapons may again threaten the lives of our children.

This may be the most important vote you cast. Aid to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and the other states of the former Soviet Union is an investment in peace and prosperity for the American people.

Sincerely,


Ronald Reagan


Gerald R. Ford


Jimmy Carter


Richard M. Nixon

NOON, June 12, 1992

Admiral Howe:

Monica Crowley in Former President Nixon's office called --

President Nixon is going to Canada in two weeks to make a speech but will also be meeting with officials there. He has asked if it might be possible to get some written materials in preparation for his Canadian visit; boiler-plate type papers.

✓ Staff thru Bill Sittmann preparation of package, to include cover note for BS/JH signature

_____ I will call Gompert to ask him to put something together

Other: _____

Wilma

POC: Monica Crowley, President Nixon's Ofc: 201/391-4404

NOTE: We can send briefing materials to via OVERNIGHT MAIL for next day delivery or if package isn't too thick we could FAX them to Monica.

NSC # 4772
SENT 6/18/92

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NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9204772
RECEIVED: 17 JUN 92 17

TO: NIXON, RICHARD M

FROM: SCOWCROFT

DOC DATE: 18 JUN 92
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: CANADA

INTL TRADE

PERSONS: NIXON, RICHARD M

SUBJECT: LTR TO NIXON RE THANKS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON CANADA

ACTION: SCOWCROFT SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 20 JUN 92 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LOWENKRON

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EMERY
GOMPERT
LOWENKRON
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY JDA DATE 6/18 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSJDA

DOC 2 OF 2

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From

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft

Ship Date 6/18/92

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
726 JACKSON PLACE NW
WASHINGTON DC 20503

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The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Wood Cliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

Release No.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 18, 1992

Dear Mr. President:

Attached is background material you may find useful for your upcoming trip to Canada. If you have any questions or need any additional material, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Wool Cliff Lake, New Jersey 07675

Enclosure

CANADIAN POLITICS/NATIONAL UNITY

- o Prime Minister Mulroney must call national elections by November 1993. Spring elections are probable.
- o His conservative Tories are recovering slightly; recent polls place them at 20%.
- o The centrist Liberals claim about 36% popularity and the socialist New Democratic Party (NDP) about 22%. Two other parties--Reform and the Bloc Quebecois--threaten to steal Tory votes, complicating Mulroney's ability to mount another comeback. A coalition government appears likely.
- o Federal-provincial Committees met for three months to hammer out a package of constitutional proposals. The government's final proposals were due in parliament at the end of May, but talks broke down over the issue of Senate reform.
- o Some provinces--particularly Alberta, Manitoba, and Newfoundland--insist the new Senate should be "elected, effective, and equal." Quebec and Ontario would oppose giving equal weight to smaller provinces.
- o Though Quebec is scheduled to hold a referendum on sovereignty by October, Premier Bourassa recently said he might hold one instead on the new federal offers if they are attractive.
- o The opposition Parti Quebecois and others have denounced this implied shift, but Bourassa probably has sensed a provincial mood swing away from outright separation.
- o Quebec wants to see what English Canada has to offer. Mulroney has threatened a national (non-binding) referendum to discourage premiers from holding up the process.
- o Canadians, including Quebecers, support the notion of a national referendum. But Quebecers insist that a Quebec majority would also be necessary.
- o The political temperature has lowered, but English Canada--even if it reaches consensus--will find it difficult to offer all concessions that Quebec demands.

QUEBEC

Quebec accounts for roughly one fourth of Canada's population and GDP. Quebec benefits from federal transfers and equalization payments, but the size of its net fiscal benefit is unclear and a subject of frequent debate.

Advocates of separation from Canada regard the federal system as wasteful and predict gains for Quebec due to more effective, market-oriented policies.

Other Canadian economists, however, predict heavy costs to Quebec from separation.

- They foresee a drop in Quebec's GDP of around 2 to 3 per cent, even assuming a peaceful and well-managed transition.
- They also see the new country's policy freedom hindered by heavy public debt and high tax rates.

The Economic Council of Canada (ECC) predicts that under Sovereignty-Association, Quebec government spending would roughly double from 24% to 47% of Quebec's output, while the tax burden on Quebecers would rise by 3.3% of GDP.

Another study (written by Ottawa economic consultant Patrick Grady and published by the Fraser Institute) estimated Quebec's net fiscal gain from confederation at C\$ 800 million to 2 billion annually, plus another 2.2 billion in benefits from federal defense and development assistance procurement.

Grady also noted that Quebec is more dependent on the other provinces' markets than vice versa. Its C\$ 3.3 billion trade surplus with TROC is concentrated in soft industries like textiles, leather, apparel, and furniture (not to mention dairy) whose lack of competitiveness has been masked by tariffs and VRAs heretofore financed by the Canadian consumer.

Grady predicts that a sovereign Quebec would face an annual fiscal deficit of at least C\$ 11.3 billion, would be heavily indebted and would pay a premium on its loans. It would have trouble servicing its external debt if it did not take steps to strengthen its current account balance and to compress real incomes of Quebecers. A rough estimate of the required transfer of resources to the external sector would be 2 to 3% of GDP.

Prof. McCallum of McGill U. predicts large transition costs and warns of a possible "unraveling process" in which a vicious cycle of tax increases and outmigration could destroy the Quebec economy.

CANADA: ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK

- o After a substantial recession lasting four quarters, the Canadian economy began to grow again in the spring of 1991. But the recovery faltered last fall, causing the economy to contract by 1.5% in 1991.
- o Growth in the first quarter of 1992 has been sluggish, around 1% (y/y). The IMF forecasts a rise in GDP of 2.3% for the year.
- o The unemployment rate was 11.0% in April. Structural factors are partly to blame for Canada's high rate of unemployment.
- o Canadian recovery will depend importantly on growth in the U.S., the market for the majority of Canadian exports. The smallest of the G-7 countries, Canada has an economy one-tenth the size of the U.S. economy. Its impact on world economic growth is marginal.
- o The Bank of Canada and the Department of Finance are pursuing a joint "zero inflation" policy designed to achieve 2% annual inflation by 1995. The goal is to promote price stability and long-run competitiveness. This policy has been successful in lowering inflation so far. However, the commitment to monetary restraint has limited the scope for lowering interest rates during the recent period of slow growth.
- o Since November 1991 the Canadian dollar has fallen against the U.S. dollar. Constitutional anxieties and concern about the weakened economy--aggravated by the recent financial problems of developer Olympia and York--have partially accounted for the decline. An increasingly buoyant U.S. dollar has also pushed the Canadian dollar downward.
- o The current account deficit rose in 1991, to 3.9% of GDP, as trade surplus declined. The high Canadian dollar made Canadian goods less marketable abroad.
- o Since 1984 the GOC has pursued a policy of reducing the federal deficit through spending cuts, and rationalizing the tax system. Nevertheless, the federal deficit remains high (5.5% of GDP in 1991). Provincial governments have also driven up public debt; they account for more than half of all government expenditures on goods and services.
- o Public dissatisfaction with the economy, as well as introduction of a VAT ("Goods and Services Tax") in January 1991, are partly responsible for the decline in Prime Minister Mulroney's popularity.

U.S./CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (CFTA)

- o Implementation has proceeded well. Both sides have enacted and put into effect necessary implementing laws and regulations.
- o Bilateral trade increased 9% in 1989, 5% in 1990, and a modest 1% in 1991, despite a slowdown in both economies. U.S. shipments to Canada are just over 20% of all U.S. merchandise exports, nearly equalling our exports to all EC countries combined.
- o The CFTA remains controversial in Canada, and polls show that two thirds of all Canadians believe it has not served Canada's interests.
- o Canada has maintained the favorable balance of trade with the U.S. that it enjoyed before the CFTA, but the Canadian press focuses instead on stories about firms and jobs moving to the U.S., Canada's lingering recession (deepest of any G-7 country) and high unemployment rate of 11%
- o The only serious study of the CFTA's macroeconomic effects shows that Canada's GNP, private consumption, business investment, and exports are all higher because of the CFTA.
- o Recent U.S./Canadian trade disputes have heightened Canadian concerns that the CFTA disadvantages them.
- o USG countervailing duty and antidumping investigations have long been flash points. Access to the U.S. market is critical; about 75% of Canadian exports go to the U.S.
 - The CFTA establishes a review mechanism (in Chapter 19) to ensure that each party applies fairly its antidumping and countervailing duty laws, but it does not repeal these laws.
 - The CFTA provides procedures to settle a wide range of other trade disputes fairly and quickly, but it does not preclude such disputes.
- o Liberal leader Chretien has said he would seek to renegotiate parts of the CFTA and might abrogate it if the U.S. refused. We do not believe he intends to abrogate.
- o Deputy USTR Katz established earlier this spring an under secretary-level interagency group to improve implementation of the CFTA.

FTA, TRADE DISPUTES, and NAFTA

The U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement remains controversial in Canada. Well over half of all Canadians believe it has not served Canada's interests. Much of this criticism is shortsighted and ill-informed. The FTA is blamed unfairly for Canada's recession and high unemployment rate. It is of course associated with the Mulroney government which has had the lowest approval ratings of any government in Canadian history.

The FTA cannot eliminate trade disputes, but it provides a means of settling them fairly and expeditiously.

- Canada has already requested a review under Chapter 19 of the FTA of the final determination by the Department of Commerce of a 6.5 % subsidy on Canadian softwood lumber exported to the U.S.
- US countervailing duty and antidumping decisions on Canadian exports to the U.S. magnesium are due in early July. They could also be subject to Chapter 19 review.
- We are also engaged in a dispute over whether Honda Civics produced in Canada meet the 50 percent North American value content required under the U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement for duty free entry into the U.S. Canada has requested a Chapter 18 dispute settlement panel in that case, although progress has been made in NAFTA toward resolving the underlying auto rules of origin problem in the existing FTA text.
- The US and Canada also have a number of differences over agricultural subsidies and their effects on trade. We have requested a Chapter 18 panel because we believe Canadian exports of durum wheat to the U.S. are subsidized in contravention of the FTA.

The US, Canada and Mexico are engaged in negotiations for a North American Free Trade Agreement that would create the world's largest market, with annual production of \$6 trillion and more than 360 million people.

The negotiations are content-driven, not calendar-driven, but President Bush has made clear that he believes we can conclude a sound, sensible deal in the coming months.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 17, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DAVID C. GOMPERT
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON
SUBJECT: Briefing Papers on Canada

SIGNED

Attached are fact sheets on Canadian political and economic issues for former President Nixon.

Attachments

Tab I	Canadian Politics/National Unity
Tab II	U.S./Canada Free Trade Agreement
Tab III	Canada: Economic Situation and Outlook
Tab IV	Canada and NAFTA
Tab V	FTA, Trade Disputes, and NAFTA

RICHARD NIXON


February 25, 1992

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Dear Brent,

Enclosed are some thoughts on a vital issue which
deserves priority attention during the 1992 campaign.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "R. Nixon", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Honorable Brent Scowcroft

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

HOW TO LOSE THE COLD WAR

While the candidates have addressed scores of significant issues in the presidential campaign, the most important issue since the end of World War II -- the fate of the political and economic reforms in Russia -- has been virtually ignored. As a result, the United States and the West risk snatching defeat in the cold war from the jaws of victory.

We have heard repeatedly that the cold war has ended and that the West won it. This is only half true. The Communists have lost the cold war, but the West has not yet won it. Communism collapsed because its ideas failed. Today, the ideas of freedom are on trial. If they fail to produce a better life in Russia and the other former Soviet republics, a new and more dangerous despotism will take power, with the people trading freedom for security and entrusting their future to old hands with new faces.

We are at a watershed moment in history. The historical significance of the democratic revolution in the Soviet Union compares only with events like the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815, the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, and the creation of NATO and the Marshall Plan in 1948. A century of stability in Europe, the drift toward World War II in the 1920s and 1930s, and a half century of successful containment of the Soviet Union were all determined by how the statesmen of the major powers responded to these critical moments. While opportunities and dangers on that same order of magnitude face us today, the West has failed so far to seize the moment to shape the history of the next half century.

Russia is the key to success. It is there that the final battle of the cold war will be won or lost. The stakes could not be higher. If freedom succeeds in Russia -- if President Yeltsin's economic reforms succeed in creating a successful free-market economy -- the future will hold the promise of reduced spending on arms, cooperation in coping with crises around the world, and economic growth through expanded international trade. More important, freedom's success will reverberate in the world's last isolated strongholds of communism -- North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam, and China. Their leaders will face irresistible pressures to take the first steps toward political reform.

If Yeltsin fails, the prospects for the next fifty years will turn grim. The Russian people will not turn back to communism. But a new, more dangerous despotism based on extremist Russian nationalism will take power. We must remember that even before communism, Russia had an expansionist tradition dating back seven centuries. The leaders of a new despotism, who have already been organizing themselves to take over in the event that Yeltsin's reforms fail, will stoke nationalist passions and

exploit the tendency of the Russian people to turn to the strong hand -- even to dictatorship -- during times of troubles.

If a new despotism prevails, everything gained in the great peaceful revolution of 1991 will be lost. War could break out in the former Soviet Union as the new despots use force to restore the "historical borders" of Russia. The new East European democracies would be imperiled. China's totalitarians would breathe a sigh of relief. The new Russian regime -- whose leaders would cozy up to the Soviet Union's former clients in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and North Korea -- would threaten our interests in hot spots around the world. It would sell conventional weapons, ballistic missiles, and nuclear technology to any buyer. A new Russian despotism inspired by imperial nationalism shorn of the baggage of the dying faith of communism would be even more dangerous than Soviet totalitarianism.

If freedom fails in Russia, we will see the tide of freedom that has been sweeping over the world begin to ebb, and dictatorship rather than democracy will be the wave of the future.

In light of the stakes involved, the West must do everything it can to help President Yeltsin succeed. Yeltsin has been maligned by friends of freedom in the West who should have known better. Some say that he is not democratic enough politically, others that he is not smart enough intellectually, and still others that he is not smooth enough socially. A few who dismissed him as a boob in the past now seem to be hoping for his failure so that they can claim to have been proved right. That thinking is not worthy of the world's only superpower.

Like all strong leaders who try to make a difference, Yeltsin is not perfect. He has made serious mistakes. But he is an extraordinary historic figure. He is the first Russian leader in history chosen through free elections. Unlike Gorbachev, he has irrevocably repudiated socialism as well as communism. He risked his life in facing down a gang of card-carrying killers in the coup attempt in August 1991. He recognized the independence of the Baltic states and the other republics of the former Soviet Union. He abandoned the Russian imperial tradition -- throwing away the keys of what Lenin called the "jailhouse of nations" -- by dissolving the Soviet Union and forging the voluntary Commonwealth of Independent States. He risked his enormous popularity by embarking on painful free-market economic reforms, including the indispensable first step of allowing astronomical price rises. He has moved decisively toward privatization of Soviet enterprises and decollectivization of Soviet agriculture, steps Gorbachev refused even to consider. He has completely cut off the \$15 billion in foreign aid and trade subsidies that Gorbachev in his 1990 budget continued to provide to Cuba and other anti-American Communist losers in the developing world. He has not

only matched but exceeded the cuts in nuclear weapons proposed by President Bush.

The bottom line is that Yeltsin is the most pro-Western leader of Russia in history. Moreover, whatever his flaws, the alternative of a new despotism would be infinitely worse.

What has the United States and the West done so far to help Russia's first democratic, free-market oriented, non-expansionist government? We have provided credits for the purchase of agricultural products. We have held a photo-opportunity international conference of fifty-seven foreign secretaries that was long on rhetoric but short on action. We are sending sixty cargo-planes of surplus food and medical supplies leftover from the Persian Gulf War. We have decided to send two hundred Peace Corps volunteers -- a generous action if the target of our aid were a small country like Upper Volta but mere tokenism if applied to Russia, a nation of almost 200 million people covering one-seventh of the world's landmass. This is a pathetically inadequate response in light of the opportunities and dangers we face in the crisis in the former Soviet Union.

What is to be done? To meet the moment, the West must step up to the task of helping President Yeltsin's government in six crucial ways:

- We must provide humanitarian food and medical aid to get Russia through the critical months until Yeltsin's reforms have a chance to start working.

- We must create a "free enterprise corps" that will send thousands of Western managers to Russia to infuse newly independent enterprises with free-market know-how.

- We must reschedule Soviet debt incurred during the Gorbachev era and defer interest payments until the new market economy begins to function.

- We must allow greater access to Western markets for Russia's exports.

- We must be ready to join with others to provide tens of billions of dollars for currency stabilization through the IMF or other means as soon as Russia reins in the growth of its money supply.

- We must create a single Western-led organization to assess Soviet needs and coordinate wide-ranging governmental and private aid projects, as the United States did when embarking on the rebuilding of Western Europe after World War II.

In light of the depth of the Russian economic crisis, there is no time to lose. Those who would put off major action on these fronts until the next international aid conference in July 1992 could find that this is too little and too late.

Can we afford these initiatives? As Herb Stein has pointed out, "The United States is a very rich nation. We are not rich enough to do everything, but we are rich enough to do everything important." Forty-three years ago, the United States alone helped its allies and enemies in Europe and Japan recover from World War II. A strong case can be made that the United States has carried the burden of foreign aid and world leadership for long enough and that it is time for Europe and Japan to assume the major financial burden in helping Russia and the other former Soviet republics. But the United States as the strongest and richest nation in the world must provide the leadership.

At the same time, we must be willing to bear our share of the burden. To play in this game, we must have a seat at the table. To get a seat at the table, we must be ready to put some chips in the pot. The stakes are high, and we are playing as if it were a penny ante game.

It is a tough call politically. Opinion polls indicate that foreign policy rates only in the single digits among issues that voters consider to be important. The American people overwhelmingly oppose all foreign aid because they want to see that money spent on solving our problems at home. But the mark of great political leadership is not simply to support what is popular but to make what is unpopular popular if that serves America's national interest. In addition, what seems politically profitable in the short term may prove costly in the long term. The hot-button issue in the 1950s was, "Who lost China?" If Yeltsin goes down, the question of "who lost Russia" will be an infinitely more devastating issue in the 1990s.

Those who oppose aid argue that charity begins at home. I agree. But aid to Russia and other reformist republics of the former Soviet Union is not charity. We must recognize that what helps us abroad helps us at home. If Yeltsin is replaced by a new aggressive Russian nationalist, we can kiss the peace dividend good-bye. Not only would the world become more dangerous, but our defense and foreign policies would also become far more expensive. Tinkering with the tax code or launching new domestic initiatives will have little economic significance if a new hostile despotism in Russia forces the West to rearm. On the positive side, if Yeltsin succeeds, a free-market Russia will provide an opportunity for billions of dollars in trade, which will create millions of jobs in the United States. Most important, a democratic Russia would be a non-expansionist Russia, freeing our children and grandchildren in the next century of the fear of armed conflict because democracies do not start wars.

President Bush is uniquely qualified to meet this challenge. The brilliant leadership he demonstrated in mobilizing the coalition abroad and the American people at home to win victory in the Persian Gulf War can ensure that the cold war will end not just with the defeat of communism but also with the victory of freedom.



March 5, 1992

To: Brent Scowcroft/Jim Baker

From: The President

Attached is a memo from Richard Nixon that I think you will find of great interest. Also attached is the letter I wrote him today.

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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WHORM Cat.:
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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At the same time, we must be willing to bear our share of the burden. To play in this game, we must have a seat at the table. To get a seat at the table, we must be ready to put some chips in the pot. The stakes are high, and we are playing as if it were a penny ante game.

It is a tough call politically. Opinion polls indicate that foreign policy rates only in the single digits among issues that voters consider to be important. The American people overwhelmingly oppose all foreign aid because they want to see that money spent on solving our problems at home. But the mark of great political leadership is not simply to support what is popular but to make what is unpopular popular if that serves America's national interest. In addition, what seems politically profitable in the short term may prove costly in the long term. The hot-button issue in the 1950s was, "Who lost China?" If Yeltsin goes down, the question of "who lost Russia" will be an infinitely more devastating issue in the 1990s.

Those who oppose aid argue that charity begins at home. I agree. But aid to Russia and other reformist republics of the former Soviet Union is not charity. We must recognize that what helps us abroad helps us at home. If Yeltsin is replaced by a new aggressive Russian nationalist, we can kiss the peace dividend good-bye. Not only would the world become more dangerous, but our defense and foreign policies would also become far more expensive. Tinkering with the tax code or launching new domestic initiatives will have little economic significance if a new hostile despotism in Russia forces the west to rearm. On the positive side, if Yeltsin succeeds, a free market Russia will provide an opportunity for billions of dollars in trade, which will create millions of jobs in the United States. Most important, a democratic Russia would be a non-expansionist Russia, freeing our children and grandchildren in the next century of the fear of armed conflict because democracies do not start wars.

President Bush is uniquely qualified to meet this challenge. The brilliant leadership he demonstrated in mobilizing the coalition abroad and the American people at home to win victory in the Persian Gulf War can ensure that the cold war will end not just with the defeat of communism but also with the victory of freedom.

National Archives



Washington, DC 20408

JUL 8 1991

General Brent Scowcroft
6114 Wynnwood Road
Bethesda, MD 20816

Dear General Scowcroft:

Enclosed is a copy of the Federal Register notice that describes materials that the National Archives intends to open for public research on August 22, 1991. These file segments include documents that contain references to you. You requested us to notify you before opening such materials.

Under the provisions of the public access regulations governing access to the Nixon Presidential materials (36 CFR 1275.44), interested persons may file a claim of legal or constitutional right or privilege to prevent or limit public access to the Nixon materials proposed for opening. Claims concerning the opening of the materials identified on the enclosed notice must be in writing and received by the Archivist of the United States by August 12, 1991.

If you have any questions concerning these materials, or if you would like to make an appointment to review them, please write or call me or Anita Happoldt of my staff. Our telephone number is 703-756-6498.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Clarence F. Lyons, Jr.", is written over the typed name.

CLARENCE F. LYONS, JR.

Acting Director

Nixon Presidential Materials Staff

[Notice 91-61]

NASA Advisory Council, Space Science and Applications Advisory Committee, Exploration Science Working Group; Meeting

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

SUMMARY: In accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Public Law 92-463, as amended, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces a forthcoming meeting of the NASA Advisory Council, Space Science and Applications Advisory Committee, Exploration Science Working Group.

DATES: July 22, 1991, 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.

ADDRESSES: The Lunar and Planetary Institute, Berkner Room, 3303 NASA Road 1, Houston, TX 77058.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Carl B. Fitcher, Code S, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, DC 20546 (202/453-1422).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Exploration Science Working Group (EXSWG) reports to the Space Science and Applications Advisory Committee (SSAAC) and consults with and advises the NASA Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) on identifying and addressing science issues associated with human exploration missions to the Moon and Mars. The EXSWG will meet to review the development of NASA procedures regarding robotic missions to the Moon and Mars, and to review the report of the Exploration Outreach Synthesis Group and formulate conclusions. The EXSWG is chaired by Dr. David C. Black and is composed of 18 members. The meeting will be open to the public up to the seating capacity of the room (approximately 55 people including members of the EXSWG). It is imperative that the meeting be held on this date to accommodate the scheduling priorities of the key participants.

Type of Meeting: Open.

Agenda

Monday, July 22, 1991

- 8:30 a.m.—Opening Remarks.
- 8:45 a.m.—Robotic Missions Process.
- 9:45 a.m.—Presentation of Exploration Outreach Synthesis Group Report.
- 11 a.m.—Discussion of Exploration Outreach Synthesis Group Report.
- 3 p.m.—Writing and Review of EXSWG Conclusions on Exploration Outreach Synthesis Group Report.
- 5 p.m.—Adjourn.

Dated: June 27, 1991.

John W. Gaff,

*Advisory Committee Management Officer,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.*

[FR Doc. 91-15939 Filed 7-3-91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-M

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

Nixon Presidential Historical Materials; Opening of Materials

AGENCY: National Archives and Records Administration.

ACTION: Notice of opening of materials.

SUMMARY: This notice announces the opening of additional files from the Nixon Presidential materials. Notice is hereby given that, in accordance with section 104 of title I of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (88 Stat. 1695; 44 U.S.C. 2111 note) and section 1275.42(b) of the Public Access Regulations implementing the Act (36 CFR part 1275), the agency has identified, inventoried, and prepared for public access integral file segments of materials among the Nixon Presidential materials.

DATES: The National Archives intends to make the integral file segments described in this notice available to the public beginning August 22, 1991. Any person who believes it necessary to file a claim of legal right or privilege concerning access to these materials should notify the Archivist of the United States in writing of the claimed right, privilege, or defense before August 12, 1991.

ADDRESSES: The materials will be made available to the public at the National Archives' facility located at 945 South Pickett Street, Alexandria, Virginia.

Petitions concerning access must be sent to the Archivist of the United States, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC 20408.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Clarence F. Lyons, Jr., Acting Director, Nixon Presidential Materials Staff, 703-758-6496.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The integral file segments of textual materials to be opened consist of 134.7 cubic feet.

The White House Central Files Unit is a permanent organization within the White House complex that maintains a central filing and retrieval system for the records of the President and his staff. This is the sixth of a series of openings of Central Files; the previous openings were on December 1, 1988;

March 22, 1988; December 9, 1988; July 17, 1989; and December 15, 1989.

Some of the materials designated for opening on August 22, 1991, were selected from the Subject Files of the Central Files. The Subject Files are based on an alphanumeric file scheme of 61 primary subject categories. Listed below are the primary subject categories of the Subject Files that will be made available to the public on August 22, 1991.

Subject category	Volume (cubic feet)
Federal Government (FG):	
U.S. District Courts (FG53)	2.0
Medals and Awards (MA)	8.7
Reports and Statistics (RS)	5.7
Veterans Affairs (VA)	5.0
Welfare (WE)	21.3
	42.7

Seven file groups from the Staff Member and Office Files will also be made available to the public. These consist of materials that were transferred to Central Files but were not incorporated into the Subject Files. Listed below are the Staff Member and Office Files that will be made available to the public on August 22, 1991.

File group	Volume (cubic feet)
Arthur Burns	1.0
Alexander P. Butterfield	1.9
Earl Butz	1.2
Jean Eisenberg	3.8
S. Bruce Herschensohn	4.7
Vicki Kefauver	10.3
Herbert Stein	70.3
	91.8

The National Security Files, which comprise the materials of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and his staff, include one file segment to be made available to the public on August 22, 1991:

	Volume (cubic feet)
Country File: Sudan	.1

A number of documents which were previously withheld from public access have been reviewed and declassified under the Mandatory Review provisions of Executive Order 12356 and will be made available to the public on August 22, 1991:

	Volume (cubic feet)
Previously restricted material	less than .1

Public access to some of the items in the file segments will be restricted as outlined in 36 CFR 1275.50 or 1275.52 (Public Access Regulations).

Dated: June 27, 1991.

Don W. Wilson,
Archivist of the United States.

[FR Doc. 91-15922 Filed 7-3-91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510-01-M

NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES

National Endowment for the Arts

Dance Advisory Panel; Meeting

Pursuant to section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), as amended, notice is hereby given that a meeting of the Dance Advisory Panel (Dance Company Grants "B" Section) to the National Council on the Arts will be held on July 26, 1991 from 2 p.m.-7 p.m. in room M-07 of the Nancy Hanks Center, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20506.

This meeting is for the purpose of panel review, discussion, evaluation, and recommendation on applications for financial assistance under the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, as amended, including discussion of information given in confidence to the Agency by grant applicants. In accordance with the determination of the Chairman of June 5, 1991, this session will be closed to the public pursuant to subsections (c) (4), (6), and (9)(B) of section 552b of title 5, United States Code.

Further information with reference to this meeting can be obtained from Ms. Yvonne M. Sabine, Advisory Committee Management Officer, National Endowment for the Arts, Washington, DC 20506, or call (202) 682-6433.

Dated: June 25, 1991.

Yvonne M. Sabine,
Director, Council and Panel Operations,
National Endowment for the Arts.

[FR Doc. 91-15991 Filed 7-3-91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7537-01-M

Dance Advisory Panel; Meeting

Pursuant to section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463), as amended, notice is hereby

given that a meeting of the Dance Advisory Panel (Dance Company Grants "A" Section) to the National Council on the Arts will be held on July 22-23, 1991 from 9 a.m.-8 p.m. and July 26 from 10 a.m.-1 p.m. in room M-07 at the Nancy Hanks Center, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20506.

A portion of this meeting will be open to the public on July 26 from 10 a.m.-1 p.m. The topic will be policy discussion.

The remaining portions of this meeting on July 22-25 from 9 a.m.-8 p.m. are for the purpose of panel review, discussion, evaluation, and recommendation on applications for financial assistance under the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, as amended, including information given in confidence to the agency by grant applicants. In accordance with the determination of the Chairman of June 5, 1991, these sessions will be closed to the public pursuant to subsection (c) (4), (6), and (9)(B) of section 552b of title 5, United States Code.

Any interested persons may attend, as observers, meetings, or portions thereof, of advisory panels which are open to the public.

Members of the public attending an open session of a meeting will be permitted to participate in the panel's discussions at the discretion of the chairman of the panel if the chairman is a full-time Federal employee. If the chairman is not a full-time Federal employee, then public participation will be permitted at the chairman's discretion with the approval of the full-time Federal employee in attendance at the meeting, in compliance with this guidance.

If you need special accommodations due to a disability, please contact the Office of Special Constituencies, National Endowment for the Arts, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20506, 202/682-5532, TTY 202/682-5496, at least seven (7) days prior to the meeting.

Further information with reference to this meeting can be obtained from Ms. Yvonne M. Sabine, Advisory Committee Management Officer, National Endowment for the Arts, Washington, DC 20506, or call (202) 682-6433.

Dated: June 25, 1991.

Yvonne M. Sabine,
Director, Council and Panel Operations,
National Endowment for the Arts.

[FR Doc. 91-15992 Filed 7-3-91; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7537-01-M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-312]

Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact Regarding Amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-54, Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License No. DPR-54 for the Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station. Rancho Seco is licensed by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD). The amendment would revise the license to delete certain security requirements that are no longer necessary for a nuclear facility that is in a shutdown and permanently defueled condition such as Rancho Seco.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The amendment will modify security requirements to eliminate certain vital areas and equipment, systems and procedures, and reduce the number of required armed responders, which are unnecessary for a nuclear facility that is in a shutdown and permanently defueled condition such as Rancho Seco.

Rancho Seco is a 2772 megawatt (thermal) pressurized water reactor that operated commercially from April 17, 1975 to its final shutdown on June 7, 1989. Rancho Seco is located near Sacramento in Sacramento County, California. As a separate action (not addressed herein), the license (SMUD) has proposed to amend Facility Operating License No. DPR-54 to delete authority to operate the Rancho Seco reactor. A confirmatory order dated May 2, 1990, was issued to Rancho Seco that prohibits fuel from being moved into the reactor building without prior Commission approval.

Need for Proposed Action

The amendment is needed to change the Physical Security Plan that was appropriate for an operating plant but not for a facility in a shutdown and permanently defueled condition such as Rancho Seco.

Environmental Impact of the Proposed Action

The proposed action will have no environmental impact because Rancho Seco is shutdown and permanently defueled, SMUD is not allowed to put

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Letter	President Nixon to Brent Scowcroft Re: [State Department] (2 pp.)	5/13/92	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

(201) 391-4404

KATHY O'CONNOR

ASSISTANT TO PRESIDENT NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE RD.
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NJ 07675

June 2, 1991

Gorbachev's Crisis—and America's Opportunity

By Richard Nixon

THE SOVIET UNION is quickly approaching the moment of truth, when it must decide whether to transform its outmoded communist system into a democratic state with a free market economy. Many analysts are urging the West to foot the bill—to the tune of \$100 billion or more—to help Moscow make the right choice. While we have an enormous stake in the outcome, advocates of a bailout misunderstand what our interests are and how we can best advance them.

U.S. policymakers should not separate the issue of economic reform from broader political and strategic questions. Many tend to see the economic salvation of the other nuclear superpower as an end in itself, but in fact our key strategic interest does not lie in saving the Kremlin economically. Instead, it centers on the dismantling of the communist Soviet system that has oppressed its people for 75 years and that has engaged in unremitting expansionism against the free world. Our policies should promote the chance for democratic government, market economics and self-determination for the Russian and non-Russian nations.

How we advance these objectives requires an understanding of the present Soviet political scene. So far, U.S. policy debate has been preoccupied with every twist and turn in Mikhail Gorbachev's periodic maneuvers between the forces of reform and reaction. His most recent swing toward the reformers, including an offer to accommodate Boris Yeltsin's Russian government and other republics, has been uncritically accepted as an irreversible return to thoroughgoing *perestroika* after his dangerous detour toward repression last fall.

But Gorbachev is not one-dimensional. He is a troika: a product of his upbringing in the Communist Party apparatus; a patriotic Russian nationalist; a brilliant pragmatic politician who likes power, knows how to use it and will do what is necessary to keep it. He sincerely wants major reform. But his vision seeks the strengthening, not the destruction of the Soviet system. The zigzags in his policy are not accidental but rather reflect a profound split in his political personality.

Only the naively optimistic can confidently conclude that his recent agreement with Yeltsin and the leaders of eight other republics willing to sign a new union treaty will put an end once and for all to Gorbachev's vacillation. It is far more significant that opponents of re-

See NIXON, D4, Col. 1

Former president Richard Nixon met with government and opposition leaders in Moscow, Lithuania, the Ukraine and Georgia on a recent trip to the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev's Crisis

NIXON, From D1

form continue to dominate the positions of real power in his inner circle:

■ Valentin Pavlov, the prime minister, has not retracted his recent accusations that Western banks tried to destabilize the Soviet economy; nor has he withdrawn his authorization of the police and the KGB to raid the offices of Western joint ventures without search warrants.

■ Oleg Ozhereliev, a doctrinaire Marxist economist, remains Gorbachev's principal economic adviser and dominates day-to-day policy, while market-oriented thinkers, such as Grigory Yavlinsky, are simply window-dressing for the Western press.

■ Boris Pugo, the tough-minded former KGB chief in Latvia and current minister of the interior, presides over the continuing bloody attacks by Soviet military and security forces on secessionist republic governments from the Baltics to Transcaucasia.

■ Vladimir Kryuchkov, the steely head of the KGB, shows no sympathy for broader political reform. In a meeting during my recent visit to the Soviet Union, he pulled no punches. He bluntly said, "We have had as much democratization as we can stomach."

But opportunities as well as dangers exist in the divergence between Gorbachev's beliefs and actions. Over the last six years, he has repeatedly drawn lines in the sand across which he swore he would not

step, only to reverse himself when confronted by overwhelming political pressure. Today, he has declared that he cannot accept any reforms that would fragment the empire or undermine socialism. But there is a chance he will do so if the deepening crisis leaves him no alternative.

Instead of promoting political and economic reform, premature Western assistance would ease the mounting pressure on Gorbachev to expand perestroika into a comprehensive dismantlement of the Soviet system. Since the Soviet Union only reforms when under pressure, a helping hand would hinder the cause of democracy. Although they are on the ropes, the forces of reaction are not down and out. They will exploit Western aid to preserve the communist system, even if only in a modified form.

The West should therefore set three preconditions to any consideration of major economic aid to Moscow:

■ *Geopolitical accommodation:* While relations have improved, important issues still divide the superpowers. Until Gorbachev resolves satisfactorily the date disputes in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, signs a stabilizing and verifiable Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, accepts a settlement giving genuine self-determination to the Afghan people and cuts off aid to Third World client states like Cuba, aiding the Soviet economy would simply enhance Moscow's ability to challenge our interests.

■ *Market reforms:* It would require a great leap of faith to offer the Soviet Union massive assistance in exchange for a verbal promise from Gorbachev that he will adopt more radical reforms. Some have touted the pro-


posed \$100-billion aid package as a "grand bargain." But a "grand con job" sounds like a more appropriate term.

While Gorbachev has changed the world with his foreign policy and the Soviet Union with his political reforms, he has not moved off square one economically. In a speech before the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, a prestigious Moscow think tank, I observed that Gorbachev's "economic policies have been a dismal failure." My speech drew many responses, but no one disputed my assessment. To his credit, Gorbachev himself admits that his earlier economic policies were a major cause of the present Soviet crisis.

Yet he still fails to understand the iron link between prosperity and private property, free-market prices and sound monetary policy. As recently as two weeks ago, he expressed his lack of enthusiasm for private ownership. In an interview with Rupert Murdoch, he said, "People do not want to work in the factory whose owner has accumulated money in some unknown way. Small private property might be allowed in trade." This kind of old thinking would doom any new economic reforms to failure.

The West cannot save the Soviet Union. Only the Soviets can save themselves. The Soviet system is bankrupt, and its leaders must face up to this fact. This means they must adopt radical reforms that will provide the incentives for the people to work their way out of bankruptcy. While we should permit and encourage trade in non-strategic goods and even grant most-favored-nation trade status, aid to a Soviet government not committed to radical reform would be like a bank extending credit to a bankrupt corporation.

Those who patronizingly claim that nothing short of a Western bailout can save the Soviet people are wrong. The Soviet Union is no nuclear-armed



ASSOCIATED PRESS

Bangladesh. The Soviet Union's natural resources, while increasingly expensive to develop, are abundant. Its labor force, despite its poor work ethic, is highly skilled and will respond to proper incentives. Its scientists are recognized internationally. When right reforms come, the accomplishments of the Soviet people will astonish the world.

■ *Democratic reforms:* Economic success requires more than radical economic reform. Only a democratically elected Soviet government will have sufficient credibility to take the tough steps and make them stick. The Marshall Plan succeeded because its resources were channeled through democratic, non-communist governments. More recently, a multi-billion-dollar Western assistance program to Poland was implemented only after Solidarity instituted the painful economic reforms needed to make the aid effective.

This means the Pavlov cabinet has to go. Neither a game of ministerial musical chairs nor even the appointment of competent technocrats would

suffice. Nothing short of a government elected by the Soviet people and fully committed to reform can do the job. The remnants of the Communist Party bureaucracy and the military-industrial complex would finally have to surrender their power to the democratic process.

In addition, Gorbachev must decide not just to share more power with those republics willing to stay within the Soviet Union, but also to accept the secession of those that are determined to leave. Promoting democratic and market-oriented reforms while simultaneously fighting a rear-guard battle to save the dying empire is impossible. For the Soviet Union, it is far better to have as neighbors friendly people living in an independent nation than hostile people living in a captive nation.

The Soviet empire was put together by force. It is being held together today by force and fear. The glue of the communist idea, which once enhanced unity, has lost its potency. Today the Soviet Union can remain intact only through the voluntary consent of the people.

These are the conditions for the successful outcome of the Soviet experiment in reform. While we cannot demand that the Soviet Union give up its territorial integrity, its system of government and its present leadership in return for aid, we should not delude ourselves into believing that aid would succeed without these far-reaching changes. Only the Soviet people themselves can make decisions of such magnitude. And they deserve to make them without artificial and, in the long-run, counterproductive Western painkillers. Only when they have irrevocably made such changes can Western aid be justified.

In coping with the volatile Soviet crisis, the U.S. policies cannot be built on the fortunes of one man—even as

outstanding a man as Gorbachev. Nor does it make sense to hold a U.S.-Soviet summit this summer for the sole purpose of bolstering him politically. Soviet citizens already know their president is a world class leader. But his foreign policy accomplishments mean nothing to average people standing in line for everything from cigarettes to Big Macs. In fact, unless they deliver tangible economic gains, vodka-toasting summits between Gorbachev and world leaders trigger rather than temper frustration among the angry and disillusioned Soviet masses.

This is not to suggest that the summit with Gorbachev this summer would be a mistake. If remaining arms control differences can be successfully resolved, a summit could improve the U.S.-Soviet relationship and lock in reductions in military forces. In this case, the decision to proceed with the summit would be based on merit.

Can Gorbachev survive? He is by far the ablest leader in the Soviet Union. He is a fighter. He has demonstrated the vision and courage to make bold decisions. He can survive temporarily in alliance with Soviet reactionaries—the hardliners in the KGB, military-industrial complex and the party. But the wave of the future is democratic reform not communist reaction.

A new revolution of free nations, free peoples, free ideas and free markets has driven the communists from power in Eastern Europe and is now sweeping across the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's only long-term hope is to set aside the ideological and imperialist baggage of the Soviet past and lead this new revolution. To do so, he must establish his legitimacy by submitting his fate to a nationwide free election. By showing the same boldness in economic and political reform that he has demonstrated in his foreign policy reforms, he could save his nation and his place in history.

RICHARD NIXON

April 12, 1991

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Dear Brent:

Talk about going into the lion's den.

I thought you would like to see a list of those who attended an off-the-record appearance I made at a Carnegie Endowment forum in Washington Wednesday.

I guess they thought that by having me they would balance the fact that Alger Hiss was once their President!

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. Nixon', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Honorable Brent Scowcroft

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

FACE-to-FACE Dinner Discussion

April 10, 1991

SPEAKER: Hon. Richard M. Nixon

TOPIC: A Fresh Look at the Soviet Union

List of Attendees

Madeleine Albright	Center for National Policy
Jodie T. Allen	Washington Post
Leon Aron	Heritage Foundation
Asta Baniones	Lithuanian-American Community of the USA
Robert Barry	Department of State (D/EEA)
Arvydas Barzdukas	Lithuanian-American Community of the USA
Anthony C. Beilenson	U.S. House of Representatives
James H. Billington	Librarian of Congress
Robert Blackwell	Central Intelligence Agency
Arnaud de Borchgrave	Washington Times
Simon Bourgin	Aspen Institute
William Colby	Donovan, Leisure, et. al.
John Despres	Senate Select Intelligence Committee
Gerd R. von Doemming	Voice of America (BRU)
John W. Douglas	Covington & Burling

Eric Edelman	Department of Defense (P/SR)
Robert Einhorn	Department of State (S/P)
Alison Brenner Fortier	Rockwell International
Joseph Fromm	International Institute for Strategic Studies
Alton Frye	Council on Foreign Relations
Anne Garrels	National Public Radio
David Gergen	U.S. News & World Report
Paul Goble	Department of State (EUR/EEY)
John Goshko	Washington Post
Rachel Guglielmo	Face-to-Face
Owen Harries	The National Interest
Peter Hauslohn	Department of State (S/P)
Hendrik Hertzberg	New Republic
Theresa Hollingsworth	Special Assistant to President Nixon
Edward Hurwitz	Department of State (INR/SEE)
Kenneth Jensen	U.S. Institute of Peace
Robert Kaiser	Washington Post
Bernard Kalb	
Spurgeon Keeny	Arms Control Association
Peter Kendall	Cable News Network, Inc.
George Kolt	Central Intelligence Agency
Morton Kondracke	New Republic

Peter Kovler	Center for National Policy
Clifford Krauss	New York Times
Charles Krauthammer	Syndicated Columnist
Gilbert Kulick	Face-to-Face
Ronald F. Lehman, II	Arms Control & Disarmament Agency
Samuel W. Lewis	U.S. Institute of Peace
I. Lewis Libby	Department of Defense (P/SR)
Josh Lincoln	Face-to-Face
Barry Lowenkron	Joint Chiefs of Staff
Mark Lowenthal	Congressional Research Service
Michael Mandelbaum	Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
C. William Maynes	Foreign Policy Magazine
Robert McFarlane	McFarlane Associates, Inc.
Donald McHenry	Georgetown University
William Green Miller	American Committee on U.S. - Soviet Relations
Michael Mosettig	MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour
Victor Nakas	Lithuanian Information Center
Lionel H. Olmer	Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison
Thomas Omestad	Foreign Policy Magazine
John Ordway	Department of State (EUR/SOV)
Walter Reich	Woodrow Wilson Center
Peter Rodman	Johns Hopkins - Foreign Policy Institute

Peter Rosenblatt	Heller, Rosenblatt, Schemann
Stephen Rosenfeld	Washington Post
Daniel Schorr	National Public Radio
Douglas Seay	Heritage Foundation
Dimitri Simes	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Helmut Sonnenfeldt	Brookings Institution
Jack Sontag	Department of State (INR/SEE/SI)
Douglas Stanglin	U.S. News & World Report
Ann Stecker	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Milan Svec	U.S. Institute of Peace
Strobe Talbott	Time Magazine
Robert Toth	Los Angeles Times
Alexander R. Vershbow	Department of State (EUR/SOV)
Ann Walker	
Ronald Walker	Korn-Ferry International
Douglas Waller	Newsweek
Edward L. Warner	RAND Corporation
Samuel G. Wise	Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe

Appointments

Visit of Former President Richard Nixon

To the Soviet Union

March/April 1991

Moscow

Mikhail Gorbachev	President of the USSR
Boris Yeltsin	Chairman of the Russian Republic Supreme Soviet
Dr. Vladlen Martynov and Directorate	Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
Aleksandr Yakovlev	Chief, Group of Consultants to the President of the USSR
Andrei Kozyrev	Foreign Minister of the Russian Republic
Yevgeny Primakov	Advisor to President Gorbachev and Member of the Security Council of the USSR
Dmitri Yazov	Minister of Defense of the USSR
Mikhail Moiseyev	Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the USSR
Gennadiy Yanayev	Vice President of the USSR
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh	Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Victor Kryuchkov	Chairman of the KGB of the USSR
Anatoly Dobrynin	Advisor to President Gorbachev, Former Ambassador to the U. S.
Eduard Shevardnadze	President of the Foreign Policy Association, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Boris Pugo	Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Boris Gromov	First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Gavriil Popov	Mayor and Chairman of the Moscow City Council, Member of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR
Leonid Abalkin	Director, Institute of Economics
Boris Zolotukhin	Chairman, Subcommittee on Legal Reform, Russian Congress of People's Deputies
Vladimir Lukin	Chairman, Committee of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies
Sergei Stankevich	Deputy Mayor of Moscow and Member of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

Republic of Lithuania

Vytautas Landsbergis	President of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania
Gediminas Vagnorius	Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania and members of the Cabinet
Halina Kobeckaite	General Director, Department for Ethnic Affairs, and 15 other representatives of ethnic minority communities in Lithuania
Algirdas Brazauskas	Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party
Eduardas Vilkas	Lithuanian Liberal Union
Kazimieras Antanavicius	Lithuanian Social Democratic Party

Note: Dimitri Simes met with OMON at President Nixon's request.

Republic of the Ukraine

Boris Paton

President of the Ukrainian Academy
of Sciences

Ivan Drach

And ten Leaders of the Rukh
Opposition Movement

Leonid Kravchuk

Chairman, Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
of the Ukraine

Republic of Georgia

Zviad Gamsakhurdiya

Chairman, Supreme Council of the
Republic of Georgia

Akaki Asatiani

Vice President, Republic of Georgia

Tedo Paatishvili

Chairman, Georgian Supreme Soviet
Committee on Foreign Relations

Iliya II

Patriarch of All Georgia

Also other senior Georgian officials as well as five top leaders
of opposition parties.

ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT NIXON PREPARED FOR DELIVERY TO
THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MOSCOW

Friday, March 22, 1991

The Moment of Truth

I am honored to appear before this distinguished group of foreign policy scholars. This is particularly true because of my great respect for your former colleague, Dimitri Simes, who is accompanying me on this trip, and also because I am aware of the important role the Institute played in developing new foreign policy thinking and the resulting shift away from tension and hostility between East and West.

Profound changes have occurred since my first trip to the Soviet Union in 1959, when Nikita Khrushchev and I met in what later became known as the Kitchen Debate at the American Exhibition in Moscow. The most significant change is that this will be the first time in seven visits that I will meet not only with government leaders but with leaders who are not in government, with leaders in newly proud and assertive republics, and even ordinary people without having to assume that chance encounters with them are a courtesy of the secret police.

Let me first put the present relationship between our two countries in historical perspective. Since 1959, both the United States and the Soviet Union have gone through the ordeal of unpopular foreign wars in Vietnam and in Afghanistan. We were on different sides in those conflicts. But it is vitally important to note that in the two centuries of our relationship there has never been an occasion when American soldiers and Soviet soldiers fought each other in war.

We have had profound differences in part because as the only two nuclear superpowers we inevitably became geopolitical competitors and at times adversaries on the world scene. Efforts to reduce those differences have been made by both sides. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson participated in meetings at the highest level with Soviet leaders. After each of these summit meetings, some naive observers predicted that we were entering a new era of good relations between our two countries. Some of you are old enough to remember the Spirit of Geneva in 1955, the Spirit of Camp David in 1960, the Spirit of Vienna in 1961, and the Spirit of Glassboro in 1967. We learned, however, that good personal relations between government leaders do not automatically produce good state relations. Spirit without substance evaporates very quickly.

In 1972, I became the first American President to visit Moscow. Since then, Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush have had productive summit meetings with Soviet leaders. Progress was made on difficult issues like arms control. But we continued to be adversaries in many areas -- military, economic, and ideological. But just as important as finding agreement on some issues was our success at developing a process for disagreeing on other issues without resorting to armed conflict.

Then came 1989 -- the year of the century for those who cherished peace and freedom in the world. The Berlin Wall, the ugly symbol of the conflict between East and West, was torn down. As a result, most foreign policy observers, both East and West, said that this marked the end of the Cold War. Since then, we have seen dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, in the Third World, and in the Soviet Union.

In the newly independent countries of Eastern Europe, we have learned that democracy and free markets do not instantly produce economic progress.

In the Persian Gulf, where our interests have traditionally clashed for over 40 years, we joined in condemning Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. But because we acted together in opposing the aggressors in Iraq does not mean, as some observers suggest, that in the future we shall be partners and allies rather than adversaries in all conflicts that may develop in the world. Iraq was a special case. Most of the nations that joined the allied coalition did so not because they liked each other but because they hated or feared Saddam Hussein. This may not happen again in a future conflict.

But assuming that the Cold War is over, we all hope that we will now be able to create a new world order that will finally operate according to the great principles of peace that brought the League of Nations into being after World War I and the United Nations after World War II. But again, we must leaven our hopes with reality. Since the end of World War II, 140 wars have been fought in the world. Eighteen million people have been killed in those wars, more than were killed in all of World War I. Most of those wars would have been fought even if there had been no Cold War. Even today, there are 20 wars being waged in the world in which thousands of people are killed every year.

We cannot shrug off our responsibilities by pointing out that because of the role the United Nations played in the Gulf War, we can now rely on the UN to produce and preserve peace whenever wars erupt, as they inevitably will. The UN at times can play a very constructive role. But one fact stands out above all others. For a really meaningful new world order to exist -- not just peace, but peace with freedom and justice -- cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States is indispensable.

The challenge for the leaders of both of our countries is to meet that awesome responsibility.

Let me now turn to a sensitive subject: the internal situation in the Soviet Union.

Like all successful politicians, President Mikhail Gorbachev is not one-dimensional. He is a troika -- a sincere, true-believing communist, a patriotic Russian nationalist, and most significant of all, a brilliant, pragmatic politician. In the six years he has been in power, he has changed the world. Even more important, he has changed the Soviet Union.

But when we look at the all-important issue of the economy, let me be undiplomatically blunt. Soviet economic policies have been a dismal failure. President Gorbachev has boldly advocated reform, but his government's policies have failed to recognize two fundamental truths. There is no halfway house between a command economy and a free economy, and there can be no successful private enterprise without private ownership. The inadequacy of President Gorbachev's reforms have led some critics in the United States to charge that he cannot cut the umbilical cord which joins him to the Marxist-Leninist communist philosophy that has nurtured him throughout his life.

I vividly recall Nikita Khrushchev telling me 32 years ago before a worldwide television audience, "We are behind you now economically, but in five years we will pass you, and I will be waving goodbye; follow us if you want to be able to compete with us." President Gorbachev has called Khrushchev's overly optimistic comments wild and totally unrealistic. He was right. The past 30 years have proved without question that when a free economy competes with a command economy, it is simply no contest.

Yet freedom is not a magic wand that creates prosperity with one flick of the wrist. There is no better proof than in the nations of eastern Europe, where reality has fallen so dramatically short of expectations. In China ten years ago, I commented that communism gives all people an equal share in poverty, while freedom gives all people the opportunity to work their way out of poverty. What many people may not realize is that an opportunity is not the same as a guarantee. They may ask, "What about free housing, free education, free health care, all of which are guaranteed by communist command economies?" The answer is that no thing is free. Only free people can produce the wealth to provide things some people cannot provide for themselves.

Americans wholeheartedly endorsed the beginning of President Gorbachev's historic reforms. But it is already a cliché to say that perestroika has run into serious roadblocks. Some of its architects have been sidelined or have left the government

altogether. And now even the "new thinking" in foreign policy is under attack. Momentum is being squandered in a climate of mutual recriminations, intolerance, and outright personal hostility.

We know that the Soviet people are discouraged, and we can easily understand why. If it is hard to live by bread alone, it is harder still to live with shortages of bread. Lines for food and other necessities are getting longer, crime is becoming more prevalent, and long-suppressed ethnic tensions are exploding across the Soviet Union. The temptation is strong to give up or even to give in to nostalgia about the way things were before perestroika, when at least basic goods were available, some rules, even if arbitrary and counterproductive, were observed, and there was some predictability and stability.

But trying to go back to the so-called "good old days" would be tragic and futile. Attempts to turn back the historical clock always fail. There is nothing more destabilizing than trying to arrest a revolution in mid-course. And yours, whether those who started it intended it or not, is by now a true revolution, one that has broken irrevocably with old Marxist-Leninist ideology, with old habits of being submissive to dictatorial government authority, and with relying on the State to take care of your material needs and even your souls.

I am confident that in this perilous moment you will triumph over your misgivings and discouragement. Great peoples show what they are made of not when the going is easy, but during times of crisis, when the going is tough. This is your greatest crisis, your moment of truth. The decisions you make today will ultimately determine the place you will hold in history and the future you will build for your children. It will also determine the course of U.S.-Soviet relations. The American people have made an emotional stake in the success of your reforms. It would be painful to them, and harmful to the spirit of cooperation we both want so strongly, if their high hopes for meaningful reform in the Soviet Union prove to be shortlived.

Let me turn now to another sensitive subject, the future of the relationship between the central government of the Soviet Union and the republics. The general rule is that this is an internal problem, that it is your business, not ours. But when internal problems affect foreign policy, then it is everyone's business. The Baltics are a case in point. The Baltics did not join the Soviet Union voluntarily. They were incorporated into the Soviet Union by the infamous Hitler-Stalin pact, which has been condemned by the Soviet Parliament and by President Gorbachev. The United States has never recognized the legality of Soviet domination over these nations. This issue poisons our relationship. It would serve the interests of the Soviet Union at home and abroad to move expeditiously to respect the wishes of

the people of the Baltics, which were overwhelmingly clear when they voted for independence.

There is little doubt that the stormy process of change unleashed by reform threatens the very fabric of your nation. It is easy to understand the temptation to restore stability at almost any cost. But can the legitimate need to restore stability justify brutal repression? Can coercion and violence keep reluctant populations together? Can you, in the great departure from a centrally planned economy, encourage free market forces one day and the next day harass new entrepreneurs, essentially punishing anyone who takes literally your own new emphasis on individual economic initiative? Will any of these measures allow your great country to integrate itself into the international community and the international economic system? The answer to all these questions is an unequivocal no. The trouble with your reactionaries is that they have a number of legitimate complaints but no adequate solutions to either repairing your structural economic problems or keeping the republics from leaving the union.

I do not suggest that America has all the answers. Yours is a country with a long and great history and a unique tradition. You have to sort things out for yourselves. That does not mean measuring success by blindly adopting foreign models, including those of the United States. Your tradition emphasizes spirit, great art, inner growth. Perhaps these things seem less important to millions of Soviet citizens currently deprived of basic necessities, yet they are great accomplishments, not just for your country but for civilization as a whole. By Marxist-Leninist materialistic criteria, the whole history of Russia prior to 1918, in comparison with the much more prosperous West, was one great failure. But I am convinced that while you paid an enormous price for your preoccupation with spiritual values, you enriched all mankind.

The United States and the Soviet Union are different, and our solutions may not be applicable to your situation. But there are certain truths that have been borne out over and over again throughout history. In the long run, freedom works, releasing people's creative energy works, allowing people to exercise their right of self-determination works. These ideas may sound almost like cliches. But unless your country is prepared to embrace them, there is a danger.

The accomplishments since my last visit in 1986 have been extraordinary -- glasnost, allowing free elections, allowing the eastern Europeans to determine their own destiny, accepting the unification of Germany, and beginning to disengage from the collection of international outlaws Moscow used to support in the Third World. But if after all this you turn back to the dark days of reaction and do not stay the course of enlightened

reform, you may find yourselves on the sidelines of history, isolated from the mainstream of international developments. Your spectacular reforms at home and all of your statesmanlike initiatives abroad will be neither appreciated nor rewarded. You will then find yourselves in an even weaker position than when you originally started. I cannot believe your talented, creative people would settle for such a fate. The Soviet people are not emerging from 70 years of repression in order to become irrelevant. Instead they should be preparing to play the major role on the world stage that is worthy of a great and free people.

I know enough about the great resources of your land and the resourcefulness of your people to be optimistic about your long-term future. But only you can be the architects of your own destiny. Our interests are in a stable and peaceful transition of the Soviet Union from what it is today, the sick man of Europe, into a modern and democratic nation. We wish that for the sake of your people. We also wish it for the sake of the world, because democratic nations are less threatening to their neighbors and more reliable as partners.

Some now say that the time has come to sacrifice the democratic reforms you have begun in the interests of stability. But now that you have begun the process, it will be impossible to stop. It is possible to have stability without reform in the short run, but in the long run there can be no stability without reform. I am not saying it will be a smooth and simple process. Democracy cannot be perfect because democracy is government by people, and people are not perfect. But unlike dictatorship, democracy unleashes the power of people and produces the progress that everyone desires.

You are entitled to expect us not to interfere in your internal affairs. But we cannot be indifferent to what is happening on the territory of another nuclear superpower. You have won the admiration of the civilized world by telling the shocking truth about your recent history. Now, when we see attempts to stifle this truth again, shouldn't we pass the same moral judgement that led us to applaud Soviet reforms to start with, even if this time a moral judgement may have to go against you? To paraphrase Andre Sakharov, how can one trust the foreign policy of a government that persecutes its own people?

For too many years, both of our great nations had to subordinate our foreign policies, indeed very often our domestic policies, to the confrontation between East and West. The Cold War was enormously expensive, both in energy and other kinds of resources that we hope can now be expended more productively. We will continue to disagree on some issues. But because we are the two major powers in the world, we also have many areas where we can work together: the environment, antiterrorism, the war

against drugs, the proliferation of new weapons technologies, and, as we were reminded in the Gulf, making sure the world is safe from brutal aggressors like Saddam Hussein. I am not talking about bringing the world into a new age of perpetual harmony. Instead I am thinking about our historic responsibility to exploit the opportunity provided by the winding down of the Cold War to build a more stable and mutually beneficial relationship between the two most powerful nations in the world.

Americans respect and admire the Soviet people. Our governments will continue to have differences, but differences between governments should not mean that our people cannot be friends. And the friendship we cultivate will inevitably be reflected in the policies of our governments.

I came to the Soviet Union as a friend 32 years ago. I return today as an even better friend. That is not because I believe there are no longer any differences between our governments. It is based on the profound recognition that working together our two peoples have so much to offer each other and the world.

Looking at the situation in the Soviet Union today, it is easy to despair, to give up, to try to recapture the certainties of the past, to resist the dawn of an uncertain and dramatically different future. But if you turn away from the path of economic and political reform, you will not only let down your own country. You will let down the world.

The people of the United States have watched the events of the last six years with hope and mounting anticipation. If the promise of reform is not soon followed by the reality of reform, they will lose faith in our new relationship. If that happens, the consequences for peace and freedom everywhere in the world will be catastrophic.

In the life of a nation, moments like this come once in ten generations. You have begun a process that if successfully completed will guide the course of the Soviet Union for many more generations to come. But if you fail to live up to the challenge of the process you have begun, what started in triumph could end in tragedy.

Your moment of truth has arrived. You hold the future in your hands.

END

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Americans respect and admire the Soviet people. Our governments will continue to have differences, but differences between governments should not mean that our people cannot be friends. And the friendship we cultivate will inevitably be reflected in the policies of our governments.

I came to the Soviet Union as a friend 32 years ago. I return today as an even better friend. That is not because I believe there are no longer any differences between our governments. It is based on the profound recognition that working together our two peoples have so much to offer each other and the world.

Looking at the situation in the Soviet Union today, it is easy to despair, to give up, to try to recapture the certainties of the past, to resist the dawn of an uncertain and dramatically different future. But if you turn away from the path of economic and political reform, you will not only let down your own country. You will let down the world.

The people of the United States have watched the events of the last six years with hope and mounting anticipation. If the promise of reform is not soon followed by the reality of reform, they will lose faith in our new relationship. If that happens, the consequences for peace and freedom everywhere in the world will be catastrophic.

In the life of a nation, moments like this come once in ten generations. You have begun a process that if successfully completed will guide the course of the Soviet Union for many more generations to come. But if you fail to live up to the challenge of the process you have begun, what started in triumph could end in tragedy.

Your moment of truth has arrived. You hold the future in your hands.

END

4/19

General,

The President asked that you
NOT share this with anyone.
He told President Nixon that
we wouldn't make any copies.

Many thanks!

Patty Presock

*Ed Hewitt has
seen*

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04a. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush Re: [Gulf War] (3 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Date Closed: 10/4/2010	OA/ID Number: 85037-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Memo	President Nixon to President Bush Re: Soviet American-Relations (12 pp.)	4/19/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

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*(Accompanied Pres
Nixon)*

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VIA TELECOPIER

April 17, 1991

General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

To round out my conclusion, while I am not a Sovietologist, I do believe that we are nearing the time when we will have to make some serious strategic choices.

Whether we like it or not, whether we are ready or not, whether we will be comfortable dealing with it or not, the historic transformation in the Soviet Union from Communism toward freedom confronts President Bush with some serious strategic choices:


- Should the United States view a breakup of the Soviet Union with benign neglect or even satisfaction? This is a serious and viable option. We have enough influence to assist a breakup, and in some ways it would serve some of our interests. RN's view is that this option is too full of uncertainties, too loaded with unforeseeable consequences. There are too many unknowns.
- Should the United States buy fully into the proposition that there is no alternative to Gorbachev and that therefore we should support him more or less wherever he decides to go, including his current moderate law-and-order regime and his strong resistance to a looser, voluntary Union? This may appear the safest and most comfortable course, and it certainly is consistent with the U.S. government's policy of recent years. But we are not dealing with the "old" Gorbachev; and this option puts us too much in the "new" Gorbachev's hands. In doing so it risks betrayal of our own interests, both moral and practical.

General Brent Scowcroft
April 17, 1991
Page 2

- Should we press Gorbachev for a looser, more voluntary Union -- even some secessions like Lithuania and Georgia -- and an entirely new political-military relationship of collaboration with the U.S. and NATO for a "New World Order?" This policy -- while marking a shift from our present position and requiring a full explanation to the American people and then a new, more energetic role for the State and Defense and Commerce Departments -- clearly serves U.S. strategic interests, with less risk and less uncertainty than the other possible choices.

Warm personal regards.

Sincerely,



Robert F. Ellsworth

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6.

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TO:

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FROM:

Mr. John Taylor

CC:

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March 8, 1991

John H. Taylor
DirectorHonorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Attention: Mrs. Wilma Hall

Dear General Scowcroft,

I attach letters I've sent to Marlin and to Margaret Tutwiler in the hope of influencing official reaction to any press inquiries about RN's upcoming trip.

Please let me know if you have any concerns or thoughts.

With great respect,

Sincerely,

John H. Taylor



THE RICHARD NIXON LIBRARY & BIRTHPLACE

March 8, 1991

John H. Taylor
Director

Ms. Margaret Tutwiler
Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Attention: Mr. Richard Boucher or
Ms. Marie Jones

Dear Margaret,

I am writing to fill you in on some travel plans President Nixon has and to propose (at the risk of being presumptuous!) the kind of response you or your colleagues might consider making if asked about the trip by the press.

He has been invited to Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and he has accepted the invitation. His visit will begin on March 20th. We have made no public announcement. Bob Ellsworth talked to General Scowcroft and Secretary Cheney about it, and we understand Secretary Baker has also been informed. None expressed any reservations. We hope that if asked you might consider saying that President Nixon is on a private fact-finding trip, that he is paying his own way and that of his staff, and that as has always been his practice will make a report of his findings to President Bush upon his return.

I'll have the honor of traveling with him. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


John H. Taylor



THE RICHARD NIXON LIBRARY & BIRTHPLACE

March 8, 1991

John H. Taylor
Director

Mr. Marlin Fitzwater
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Marlin,

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He has been invited to Moscow by the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and he has accepted the invitation. His visit will begin on March 20th. We have made no public announcement. Bob Ellsworth talked to General Scowcroft and Secretary Cheney about it, and Secretary Baker has also been informed. None expressed any reservations. We hope that if asked you might consider saying that President Nixon is on a private fact-finding trip, that he is paying his own way and that of his staff, and that as has always been his practice will make a report of his findings to President Bush upon his return.

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I'll have the honor of traveling with him. Please let me know if you have any questions or concerns.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

John H. Taylor

I don't think this
requires a response,
but when was the
last letter to former
Presidents?

Question
Answered

Document Originally
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Following Page

☐ Routine Matter
☐ Fairly Important
☒ The future of Western Civilization
hangs in the balance

Brent

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George Bush Handwriting

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush Re: [Gulf War] (8 pp.)	9/6/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

RICHARD NIXON

December 27, 1990

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Dear George,

Because I know you must be deluged by unsolicited advice on how to handle the crisis in the Gulf, I hesitate to add to your voluminous reading material. Nevertheless, I am enclosing a memorandum I wrote on Christmas Day. I hope you might find it useful. But in any event, whether you follow my advice or not, you can be sure that I will unqualifiably support whatever decision you make.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Rich -

The Honorable
George Bush

*I apologize for not
keeping it to two pages -! -*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Report	Re: Options in the Gulf (9 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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**Remarks by President Nixon at the Nixon Library and
Birthplace Dedication, July 19, 1990**

Mr. President may I express my deep appreciation for your very gracious introduction. I have been introduced to thousands of audiences over the past 44 years. This is the first time I have been introduced by the President of the United States.

I know I speak for all of the people gathered here today in expressing our deep appreciation to you, to President Reagan, and to President Ford for honoring us with your presence. To have four men who have served as President here makes this a very special occasion. What makes it even more special is to have for the first time in history four First Ladies on such an occasion.

I know from experience that there could be no more important career for a woman than to be First Lady -- the wife of the President of the United States. Or as First Lady Barbara Bush might put it, there could be no more important career for a man than to be the husband of the President of the United States.

May I also express appreciation to all who made this occasion possible today. Over the past 44 years Pat and I have visited Westminster, Versailles, the Vatican, the Kremlin, the Great Wall of China, the Imperial Palace in Japan, the Taj Mahal in India, the Valley of the Kings in Egypt, and Angkor Wat in Cambodia. Each was a memorable experience but nothing we have ever seen could match this moment to be welcomed home so warmly by our friends and neighbors in California.

May I share with you what you will see here.

You will see a personal life -- the influence of a strong family, of inspirational ministers, of great teachers.

You will see a political life covering 44 years with campaigns for Congress, the Senate, Vice President, Governor and President. Some winning, some losing -- all interesting.

You will see 77 years in the life of a great nation -- a period of unprecedented progress.

You will see how great leaders changed the world in which we live.

But interesting as the past may be, I hope that all who visit this Library and Birthplace will always bear in mind that the past is important only as it points the way to a better future.

My friend Paul McCracken of the University of Michigan sent me a little poem which graphically makes that point:

"The lightning bug is brilliant,
But it doesn't have a mind.
It travels through creation,
With its headlight on behind."

Let us learn from the past but let us always keep our headlight on the road ahead.

Seventy years ago as I laid in bed in the little house over there in which I was born, I would hear the train whistle in the middle of the night and dream of places far away I hoped to visit some day. I never dreamed I would visit over 80 countries in my lifetime.

We hear today that America is in decline, that our best days are behind us, that we no longer have the means or the will to play a leading role in the world.

Don't you believe it. In my travels I have found some who like us, some who envy us, some who hate us. But in their hearts most people of the world know what every American should know: that unless America continues to play a leading role on the world stage, peace and freedom will not survive in the world. That is why President Bush deserves our whole-hearted support as he provides that leadership.

This is not a burden to be grimly borne. It is a challenge worthy of a great people.

What is that challenge? I was born a year before World War I. Since that time more people have lost their lives in war than in all the wars in the history of civilization before this century began.

The 20th century will be remembered as a century of war. Our challenge is to help make the 21st century a century of peace.

Peace is not our only goal. Let us be remembered not just for saving the world from communism, but for helping to make the world safe for freedom.

Let our legacy be a new world in which all people can enjoy the blessings of peace, freedom, justice, and progress. In times past, we could only dream of such goals. Today, because of recent breathtaking changes in the world, we can make those dreams come true.

In 1971 after a State dinner in the White House, we were entertained by a superb musical group from California. At the conclusion of the program, the leader of the group expressed appreciation for the invitation to perform in the White House. He concluded his remarks by saying, "It's a long way from Watts to the White House." He was right.

I would add today that it's a long way from Yorba Linda to the White House. I have made that journey. Let our goal be that every American will have the opportunity to make that journey. We can't all be Congressmen or Senators. We can't all be Governors. I found that out. But let us make sure that the road is open for all Americans to go as far as their talents can take them, and that the road ahead is never blocked by prejudice poverty or ignorance.

To the young people listening to me today, may I add a personal note.

I believe in the American dream because I have seen it come true in my own life. As you travel through life you may sometimes suffer the disappointment of defeat. Losing is sad. But the greatest sadness is to travel through life without knowing either victory or defeat.

Whatever happens always remember that only by participating in a cause bigger than yourself can you be true to yourself. Above all, know in your hearts that there was never a better time to be alive than now, and never a better country in which to live than in America. Because you hold the future in your hands.

~~Speech -
writer?~~

Document Originally
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Following Page

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

APR 20 1989

DATE: 4/17/89

TO: Brent/Chase

FROM: ANDY CARD Andy

Did you ever hear from
President Nixon regarding
Marvin Stumecki who is
looking for a job?

Please get back to me.

see attached

Resume

RICHARD NIXON

November 30, 1988

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

Dear Brent,

As you can imagine, I have been inundated by requests from friends who want to continue to be or become ambassadors, as well as others who would settle for being Cabinet officers, for me to recommend their appointments to the President-elect. Having been in the position between 1968 and 1974 of being the recipient of hundreds of such recommendations, I have followed a policy of making none whatever and in commenting on potential appointees only if requested by the President-elect.

I was amused, incidentally, to see a piece in the New York Times last week to the effect that the Bush transition team had received a number of recommendations from former Presidents as to the staffing of the new Administration. The plural puzzles me. I assume that Carter is not forwarding recommendations, and I know that I have not.

Not surprisingly, the one and only recommendation I will be making to the new Administration is to you. I know that you will be searching for the brightest and the best to serve on what I trust will be a much leaner and stronger NSC staff. My only advice is: Don't make the mistake Henry did when what he considered to be the brightest and the best -- the Lakes, the Halperins, the Ellsbergs, the Morrisises -- turned out to be disloyal to him and to the President.

The enclosed biographical memorandum sets forth Marin Strmecki's distinguished record. What I want to emphasize to you is that he has been my one and only foreign policy advisor during the period when I wrote Leaders, Real Peace, No More Vietnams, and 1999. He is tough, fast, and brilliantly intelligent. While he is a careful

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

Hon. Brent Scowcroft
November 30, 1988
Page 2

and analytical thinker, he is also a clear, cogent writer whose memoranda and analyses would be a pleasure to read compared to most of the pseudo-academic mush the bureaucracy churns out. Most important, he is discreet and passionately loyal.


He is more conservative than some of the establishment types you will probably inherit from your predecessor. But above all, he is a company man. For example, in the past two years, as you will note, he has been Brzezinski's top assistant. In that entire period, he has never revealed any of Brzezinski's views to me unless Brzezinski asked him to do so, and I am confident that the same is true as far as revealing my views to Brzezinski was concerned.

I believe he would be an enormous asset to your staff. In fact, rather than pigeonholing him as an Afghan or Central American expert, I would strongly advise you to use him as a top editor. He is a first-class strategic thinker, but unlike some in that category he writes in simple, powerful, lean prose.

I hope you will act favorably on this recommendation. I shall not be making any others, to you or to the President-elect. In Marin's case, you will be doing a favor not primarily to me or to him, but to the Administration and to yourself.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



Hon. Brent Scowcroft

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

To Gen. Scowcroft

Brent,

Marin Strmecki is very close to Nixon and also works downstairs at CSIS for ZB.

He has apparently spoken to Nixon of his interest in a job on the NSC (Afghanistan is his bag) and I gather Nixon may write you a note in support thereof.

I've known Marin for several years - he strikes me as a solid fellow. He wondered if I might pass along his resume in advance of anything you might get from RN.

Rosemary

ru
12/1

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
1800 K STREET, N. W., SUITE 400
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 833-2408

December 30, 1988

Dear Brent:

This is just a word to let you know that I have seen a copy of the letter that President Nixon wrote you regarding my current associate, Marin Strmecki. Sadly -- because I do not wish to lose him -- but truthfully, I confirm every word that Nixon wrote. I think he would make an excellent member of your staff for Afghan affairs, and I would be happy to provide more detail or answer any questions regarding him when we are all back from our New Year's vacation.

I will call you during the week of January 9, and perhaps your office in the meantime could tell me when and where you would be easiest to reach.

Best regards,

W. Br.

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Suite 440
1875 I Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006

MARIN STRMECKI

Center for Strategic and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 775-3122

EXPERIENCE:

- 9/88 - FELLOW IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES: Analyzed, lectured on, and wrote about U.S.-Soviet issues in general and the war in Afghanistan in particular. Edited an anthology of Zbigniew Brzezinski's essays and speeches, In Quest of National Security (1988). Provided Dr. Brzezinski with research and editorial assistance on his forthcoming book, Grand Failure: Communism's Terminal Crisis (1989).
- 9/85 - RESEARCH AND EDITORIAL CONSULTANT TO RICHARD NIXON: Assisted the former President as his principal research and editorial coordinator in the writing of his recent book, 1999: Victory Without War (1988), and served as an editorial consultant in the preparation of speeches and articles.
- 7/85 - 6/88 RESEARCH ASSOCIATE TO ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI: Assisted Zbigniew Brzezinski with his book, Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest (1986), as well as with his academic lectures at Columbia University and other writings and speeches. Served as co-editor with Dr. Brzezinski of Promise or Peril: The Strategic Defense Initiative (1986).
- 2/85 - 6/85 FREE-LANCE JOURNALIST: Reported on the war in Afghanistan and travelled with the resistance inside Afghanistan for several weeks. Published articles in The Washington Times, The American Spectator, National Review, and Harvard Magazine.
- 9/79 - 2/85 ASSISTANT TO RICHARD NIXON: Served as head research and editorial coordinator for his recent book, No More Vietnams (1985). Worked as research and editorial assistant on his two previous books, Real Peace: A Strategy for the West (1984) and Leaders (1982). Also prepared briefing books for media interviews and foreign travels and assisted with speeches, statements, and articles.

EDUCATION:

- 9/86 - GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY: Doctoral candidate in Government specializing in international relations, with completion of academic work expected in late 1989; awarded a Fellowship from the Earhart Foundation in 1987.
- 9/83 - 6/86 COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY: M.A. in International Affairs, with a regional specialization in the Soviet Union; selected for the International Fellows Program.
- 9/77 - 6/81 HARVARD COLLEGE: B.A. in General Studies with a concentration in Government; placed on the dean's list every semester; co-founded and later served as editor-in-chief of the Harvard International Review; selected as a news editor of The Harvard Crimson.

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

RICHARD NIXON

June 8, 1990


577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY



To write a book is an ordeal. To hear
positive comments from an expert is consequently
enormously appreciated.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,



The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft

Bush Library Photocopy
Miscellaneous Handwriting

Bush Presidential Library Photocopy

RICHARD NIXON

November 16, 1989

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

*Don't
Discuss
China P.5*

Dear George

You will be getting reams of advice before your meeting with Gorbachev -- some bad, some redundant, and most of it useless. I would like to emphasize what are probably obvious points, but ones which I believe it is in the country's interest and your interest for people to remember when they think of the Malta meeting.

The Atmospherics

Some will urge that what is important is that Gorbachev and you hit it off well and that you like each other personally. I disagree. I don't mean that you should leave the impression that you did not get along. But at all costs avoid any impression that you believe that good personal relations will make Gorbachev more reasonable in negotiations. It was a mistake for Reagan to put his arm around Gorbachev physically and rhetorically in Red Square. For you to leave a similar impression after your meetings in Malta would only add credence to the mistaken idea so emotionally being propounded by the prestigious Beltway media that because the wall is coming down, we have no differences with Gorbachev that can't be settled by a few friendly meetings and warm handshakes.

Everyone knows you are a gentleman. Everyone knows that unlike Reagan, you will be in complete command of the issues which may be raised. Sophisticated observers know that the U.S. and Soviet Union still have some irreconcilable differences that no personal relations will resolve. It is necessary for the general public to understand this. In fact, it would be helpful if White House spokesmen indicate in the briefing sessions that there were some subjects on which you sharply disagreed as well as some on which you agreed. People want you to treat Gorbachev with respect, but at arm's length -- arguing as strongly for your interests as he does for his.

Everyone knows that you are a fine, decent human being. Not enough know what I know and what you know -- that you are also a strong leader with no illusions as to how the real world works. In sum, after the meeting, I would hope that the media would report that in contrast to Reagan, you were well prepared, that you treated Gorbachev with respect but avoided sentimental guff, and above all that you were strong and superbly qualified to more than hold your own with a world-class heavyweight.

What Gorbachev Wants

I don't want to be the skunk at the lawn party, but I do not share the views of those who believe that because Gorbachev is tearing down a wall that should never have been built when he had no other choice, and because he often speaks of his devotion to freedom and human rights, that he is deep down a closet democrat. This is similar to the ludicrous idea that because he sometimes mentions God in his conversations and refers to the fact that his mother always had an icon that he deep down is a closet Christian. There is no question but that he is a remarkable new kind of leader of the Soviet Union, and we welcome the initiatives at home and abroad that he had already taken. But when you examine the evidence, it is clear that what he is doing is making a virtue out of necessity. This does not make him a virtuous leader. He can tolerate dissent in Eastern Europe and not implement the Brezhnev Doctrine because he has a much bigger target -- Western Europe and the United States.

No one can predict what this unpredictable man will do at Malta. But based on his past record, I would not be surprised if, as Sam Nunn recently observed in London, he tries to get you to agree to adopt a goal of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Western and Eastern Europe. This is, of course, simply the son of Reykjavik, when he got Reagan to agree to the elimination of all nuclear weapons within ten years.

His long-term goal is to get the United States out of Europe. Even suggesting that we could consider that as a goal would have a devastating effect, particularly at a time when the Germans are emerging again as the dominant economic and also military power in Europe. The reason we have troops in Europe is because of the Soviets' overwhelming superiority in conventional weapons. Simply equalizing the numbers in NATO and the Warsaw Pact by some bean-counting process is not enough. As Helmut Schmidt pointed out to me recently, Soviet tanks are only ninety miles from Hamburg. American tanks would be three thousand miles away. You are absolutely correct in insisting that we have an orderly process for dealing with this problem and that not until that process is completed and fully implemented can we even discuss what might happen thereafter.

A second long-time Soviet goal is to de-nuclearize Europe. As you know, I had reservations about the INF Treaty. But putting that aside, the reason we need nuclear weapons in Europe is because of the Soviets' superiority in conventional weapons. Until that superiority is totally removed, any further reduction in short-range or battlefield nuclear weapons is simply not negotiable. Some of your advisors may contend that your saying no to such popular ideas as bringing the boys home from Europe and de-nuclearizing Europe puts you in an impossible public relations stance. I disagree. As you will recall, Reagan's popularity after Reykjavik ironically arose not from the fact that he agreed to the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons but that he said no to Gorbachev's insistence that he eliminate or abandon SDI. Saying no to bad proposals that are not in our interests may contribute to the unfair image that you are too timid and cautious and are not "seizing the moment" as Gorbachev is. On the other hand, saying no to such proposals can in the long run prove to be a major political asset, because it will demonstrate that you are a strong man of principle and not just another politician seeking popularity by waxing eloquent about what you have properly derided as the "vision thing."

What You Want

It would be presumptuous for me to suggest what your agenda should be. In advance of your meeting in Malta, I would strongly urge that you indicate that you are not going to negotiate German reunification or the future of NATO with Gorbachev. Only after conferring with our allies do we negotiate with our adversaries. The recent loose talk about the "inevitability" of German unification is irresponsible. In addition to the front burner items of Eastern Europe and arms control, I would strongly urge that you hit hard on Soviet supply of arms to Cuba. I know that some of Gorbachev's apologists are applauding his apparent decision to quit shipping arms to ✓ Nicaragua. But shipping them to Cuba on their way to Nicaragua and to the rebels in El Salvador is just as bad.

I think you might consider telling him bluntly that Central America is to us what Eastern Europe is to him. Let us suppose that Poland opted to get out of the Warsaw Pact and that an anti-Soviet government came to power. If the United States were to sell arms to that government, the Soviet leaders would justifiably climb the wall. I think you should update the Monroe Doctrine and insist that any sale of arms to a government in the Western Hemisphere which is unfriendly to the United States is simply unacceptable. Gorbachev will not agree, but the fact that you raised it, as Reagan did not in his stroll with Gorbachev around the South Lawn, will be enormously important strategically and of course politically at home. In the arms control area, I feel you should continue to insist that since Soviet superiority in conventional arms is the primary reason we have nuclear arms, an agreement on eliminating that superiority must take precedence over START.

Finally, although there is probably not enough time to do anything before December 2 on the China issue, it would be very useful if before your meeting with Gorbachev an announcement could

be made that you are going to resume high-level contacts with the PRC. This is not a top burner item at the moment, but Gorbachev must not feel that he has a free hand in Asia and therefore can concentrate all of his diplomatic efforts on Western Europe.

A Possible PR Ploy

Every summit should be remembered for something positive. While I know that this meeting has been publicized as one where no substantive agreements will be considered or reached, the fact that it is your first formal meeting with Gorbachev makes it essential that something positive come out of it. I am sure that Brent and his team have some excellent ideas in this area and I would simply suggest the following for consideration.

Everyone remembers FDR's and Churchill's Atlantic Charter, although few can tell you what was in it. Why not consider the possibility of a Bush-Gorbachev Mediterranean Charter? You and he might agree on a statement of principles in which you would include free elections, free speech, self-determination, and any other concepts of this type that he and Shevardnadze have so glibly talked about over the past few months. He won't abide by such an agreement, just as Stalin did not abide by his agreement at Yalta for elections in Poland. But it would be very useful to nail him down and might be marginally helpful on making a breakthrough in Czechoslovakia, which is certainly ripe for a Polish-Hungarian-type uprising. The prestige media, as smart as they consider themselves to be, would be ecstatic about such an agreement in principle between the two major world leaders.

The greatest PR danger is that the nuts on the right will try to make the case that Malta was simply a second Yalta. The answer to that is that Yalta divided Europe. Malta laid the groundwork for uniting it through agreement on and adherence to the great values which the United States and our Western European allies have always cherished.

If you have gotten this far in reading this letter, you will probably conclude that I have gone a little ga-ga for even raising such way-out ideas. My major concern is that you be in a position to say no to popular but wrong-headed proposals Gorbachev may advance while saying yes on general principles which have enormous public appeal.

In any event, one thing I am sure of -- America's interests will be in good hands at Malta.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Paul", followed by a short horizontal line.

The Honorable
George Bush

THE WHITE HOUSE

DATE:

7-22-89

Camp David

FROM THE PRESIDENT

To:

JAB III / Brent

cc: J.S.

I talked to Pres. Nixon today, calling him to give him a fill on our trip. He was very upbeat about the trip etc.

He mentioned that long before June 4th the Chinese had invited him to come to PRC. He is thinking about a trip after Mid-September. He was interested in my views. I told him "on the one hand good, on the other we don't want to give impression to world that all's well. He agreed it was tough call/

We should get together on a recommendation for him.

BRENT: Please discuss with JAB or set up meeting with three of us.

RN mentioned in passing "I would like to talk to Brent on this".....

GB

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09a. Note	POTUS to James A. Baker, III, Brent Scowcroft, and John Sununu Re: [Letter from President Nixon] (1 pp.)	11/18/89	PRM	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09b. Letter	President Nixon to President Bush Re: [Gorbachev] (6 pp.)	11/16/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Nixon, Richard M., President [1]

Date Closed:	10/4/2010	OA/ID Number:	85037-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information



THE PRESIDENT

PERSONAL

Sununu

Scowcroft

11-16-89

Dear Dick -

Thanks re: Mawry
Stans. It's a good man -
always has been -

Brief, Brief, Brief for
Malta I await your memo -
Thanks. *Cy*

THE WHITE HOUSE

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

RICHARD NIXON

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

11-15-89

Dear George,

Your approving Maury's
appointment as Chairman of the
Minority Enterprise Advising Council
was courageous + correct.

He received a bad rap in
the Watergate era + deserved
to be recognized for his
outstanding work for Minority
Business in our Administration.
All of his friends are in your
debt for biting the bullet
on this tough call.

I shall be sending
you a brief memo on
MEL to this weekend.

I will try to cover
points you may not
have received from the
Chairman.

Sincerely

1 Dick -

No
Not to Schedule,
he is sending
report

November 16, 1989

General --

In setting up the various meetings/briefings pre-Malta, Joe Hagin asked Condi to check on the availability of President Nixon coming to the White House for breakfast with the President on Tuesday, November 28, at 7:15 a.m. Nixon will be in country.

Who should do the inviting?

Who will participate?

Will it be in President's Office?

Do we need to work on transportation?

Florence

P.S.
See attached
note I just
received. It
appears Nixon
is sending a
memo.