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2009-0275-S

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FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 85036
Folder ID Number: 85036-006

Folder Title:
Appointments Regretted, January to December 1991

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	William T. Pryce to Distribution List Re: Appointment for Bolivian Foreign Minister (1 pp.)	7/19/91	(b) 1	C
02. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Florence E. Gantt and Wilma G. Hall Re: Rocard Dinner (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 1

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Regretted, January to December 1991

Pinksheet Number: cap2265
OA/ID Number: 85036-006
Date Closed: 9/29/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S[2]
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Wed
Dec 18
4:00 pm.

December 2, 1991

General:

US Ambassador to Great Britain Ray Seitz called --

UK Shadow Opposition Leader Gerald Kaufman could be the next UK Foreign Secretary in 4 months. He is now **on verge of cancelling his trip to US because of scheduling with US officials.**

Understand there is a **request pending to meet with General Scowcroft** that is in his office but has not yet been acted upon which proposes that he see Kaufman **on 19 or 20 December.** Before we lose him, I wonder whether we might get a decision on his seeing the General.

I asked if there would be any UK sensitivity to your meeting with Kaufman. Amb Seitz said no, particularly with the Brits; not a problem. There will be an election here in the next 4-5 months, Seitz is not predicting but **Kaufman could be the next Foreign Secretary.** Seitz wanted you to know he **strongly endorses your meeting with Kaufman and would appreciate if your schedule could accommodate request.**

I checked with Tony Wayne -- he said he's not sure they have sent formal request forward but they have rec'd request for you to meet with Kaufman. **Both Wayne and Gompert endorse and recommend you meet with him.**

- ☒ Okay to schedule mtg w/Kaufman
- ☐ Tony Wayne/David Gompert to give me formal staff request w/background
- ☐ Regret

Wilma

cc: Florence

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Canceled

November 20, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROMAN POPADIUK *RP*
SUBJECT: Doug Jehl

You have a background session with Doug Jehl, of the Los Angeles Times, Friday, November 22, at 4:30 p.m. regarding Ukraine.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Cancelled

November 20, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROMAN POPADIUK *RP*

SUBJECT: Jerry Seib

You have a background session with Jerry Seib, of the Wall Street Journal, Thursday, November 21, at 4:30 p.m. regarding Ukraine.

Ukraine: Turning to America

By DAVID BROOKS

KIEV, Ukraine — Ukraine suffered a Stalin-induced famine that leading Americans denied, endured decades of subjugation that American policy ignored, and now enjoys a liberation that the American administration discourages. Love for America is palpable on Ukrainian streets, yet rarely has a love been so unrequited.

George Bush's Kiev speech of a few months ago, in which he effectively urged Ukraine to rejoin the nonexistent union, was only a recent example of American disdain. "He spoke to us like we were primitive tribesmen," recalls Ivan Drach, leader of the democratic Rukh movement. "Bush despises not only Ukraine. He is arrogant to all other nations. His arrogance is your problem, not mine."

"This really was a very stupid speech," says Dmytro Pavlychko, chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament's foreign affairs committee. "But I was happy he gave such a speech, because I knew all of America would laugh at him. He would be forced to make up for his mistake."

So far the repentance is mostly cosmetic. Mr. Bush was exceptionally charming when Ukrainian leader Leonid Kravchuk, Mr. Pavlychko and others visited the White House Sept. 21, but at the same time the administration was giving \$211 million in export credits to the Soviet center.

In late October, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles went to Capitol Hill and emphasized that the trend toward independence was reversible. The same day, U.S. Ambassador Robert Strauss echoed the theme by saying that "like teen-agers," the republics would retreat back "home" when they found out how tough the real world is.

A Foregone Conclusion

On Oct. 30, Undersecretary of State Robert Zoellick acknowledged that "power has shifted almost completely to the republics," but this was only a day after George Bush went to Madrid and said that the coup hadn't altered relations with the central Gorbachev government. On bad days, the administration has an anti-Ukrainian policy; on good days, it is wait-and-see—that is, no policy at all.

In Ukraine itself, independence is a foregone conclusion. On Dec. 1, more than 70% of Ukrainians will support an independence referendum—including a clear majority of the republic's Russian citizens—if all the polls are to be believed. Ironically, with the Soviet central government a shambles, there is nothing left to declare independence from. "I don't think about Russia anymore. Russia is like China to me, a foreign country. I think in terms of Ukraine," says Ukrainian activist Volodymir Musinko.

Starting with Lithuania, the Bush administration has always erred on the side of shabbiness, siding with the center against republican democrats. In Ukraine, the U.S. says it supports democratic principles, but it remains coolly aloof while the Ukrainians struggle to create them.

It is a struggle, because Ukraine has had few contacts with the West. The Bush policy grows out of a tradition of Western journalists who thought that covering the Soviet Union meant covering the Kremlin;

of Sovietologists who focused on the *no-menklatura*; of government officials who developed contacts with central Soviet officials who are now irrelevant to real reform; and of foundations that even now center their work on Moscow and St. Petersburg (a notable exception are George Soros's foundations).

About 40,000 foreigners are living in Moscow, but only 500 in the Ukraine—of whom only 75 are Americans. There are more than 3,000 joint ventures in the Soviet Union, of which only 120 are based among Ukraine's 52 million citizens. There are a plethora of Jewish organizations in Moscow, but up until recently only one served Kiev's 120,000 Jews.

As a result of lack of contact with the West, the level of understanding of West-

In the case of Ukraine, the U.S. says it supports democratic principles, but it remains coolly aloof while the Ukrainians struggle to create them.

ern-style institutions is abysmal. Serhij Holowaty, a parliamentarian writing the Ukrainian constitution, says: "The professional skills of our parliamentarians are very low. It is very difficult to convey the elementary notions of democracy. That's why I am very pessimistic about the future of the constitution. The lack of contacts with the West hurts our work. Western experts went to Moscow to educate the center. Those efforts were all in vain."

Earlier this month, Ukraine signed a contract to print an independent currency, but local understanding of central banking is primitive. Volodymyr Musinko is working from six in the morning until midnight to rush into print a translation of an American finance textbook, inventing Ukrainian words for concepts such as earnings per share: "None of the parliamentarians know anything about privatization, or about finance. Very few of our economics professors know anything about this."

The U.S. has had two diplomats working in Kiev from an apartment building on the far side of town. They are revered in Ukraine for their energy and understanding of the situation. But, according to Ukrainians, their dispatches were filtered through Moscow and the State Department bureaucracy. "The American bureaucracy, like mine, sees Ukraine as an annoyance," says one Western diplomat here. There is also the tendency to see things through Russian eyes.

Vladimir Averchev is a Russian democrat who has been part of Yeltsin delegations to Ukraine: "Ukrainians have no experience in building responsible government. They may have a strong inclination to follow a medieval structure, with a strong state. Russia cannot allow this. We have sent hints to the West to this effect, and they have been understood."

Mr. Averchev's evaluation of the Ukrainian situation is absurd. Ukraine has its

problems. The Ukrainians are going to try to build a paternalist welfare state that they cannot afford; no one has enough economic understanding to even evaluate the costs of the industrial subsidies they envision. But medieval authoritarianism is the opposite of their problem.

There is a haphazard Velvet Revolution atmosphere in government circles here. Mr. Pavlychko, the foreign affairs chairman, was translating Shakespearean sonnets as I entered for an interview. The leaders of Rukh sat in the back of a Kravchuk press conference earlier this month, giving a running commentary as Mr. Kravchuk held forth (on his passion for the theater, among other things). "Taras Shevchenko is our Jesus Christ," said Rukh's Mr. Drach of the Ukrainian poet.

Mr. Kravchuk himself is a politician's politician. The former ideology spokesman of the Communist Party now has usurped 90% of the Rukh platform. He almost certainly will win the presidential election, though perhaps only after a runoff. The Rukh candidate, Vyacheslav Chornovil, who served in prison for nationalist activities, would move more dramatically. But a surprising number of democratic activists admit that Mr. Kravchuk's methods—slyly, two steps forward, one step back—are best. Many voters also feel Mr. Kravchuk would be more attentive to preserving trade relations with Russia.

Mr. Chornovil would bring in a staff of poets and intellectuals. Mr. Kravchuk, a staff of ex-communist conformists. Neither would be well prepared for the tough economic reforms that lie ahead. But even the former communists show no sign of authoritarianism or crude nationalism.

The Democracy Test

"I hesitate to even call them nationalists, because that has negative connotations," says Rabbi Yaakov Bleich, an American who has spent the past two years leading Kiev's bustling synagogue. "Ukrainian nationalists are not anti-Semitic, or anti-Russian, or anti-anybody else. Whichever side wins the election, we will have good relations with them."

Shortly after the Dec. 1 vote, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Canada (which has a large Ukrainian population) will recognize independent Ukraine. But the U.S. will wait to see if the government passes James Baker's democracy test (which would be interesting if applied to Syria). The U.S. will also wait to see if Russia recognizes Ukraine, though the U.S. doesn't even recognize Russia.

In one sense, President Bush's Kiev speech was useful. "The Ukrainians learned that the West was not going to help them," says Bohdan Krawchenko, member of the advisory council to the Ukrainian Parliament. But out on the city's central square last week, an old Russified Ukrainian woman came up to an American reporter. With tears of rage streaming down her face, she described the indignities inflicted by Soviet rule. But she brightened and said she was so happy to meet her first American. No matter what we Americans do, the Ukrainians will love us.

Mr. Brooks is deputy editorial page editor of The Wall Street Journal Europe.

The items that are underlined where highlighted in the original newspaper clipping.

CAP

Bush Library Photocopy
Preservation

6 RE 7g's
cy

October 1, 1991

General --

Bill Miller, President of the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations, would like to come see you to discuss the arms control proposal and to inquire about the President giving a speech on October 29. I don't know the time, but FYI the President has a Republican Governors Association Annual Club Dinner on that evening. Shall I schedule him or do you want to see if you can do it on the telephone?

Schedule _____

Let's try to do on the telephone _____

Other _____

546-1700

Florence

*Rich will see
- He are the
off hood!
11/14*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

08-Nov-1991 15:15 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Edward A. Hewett

(HEWETT)

FROM:

Nancy H. Maxfield
(MAXFIELD)

SUBJECT:

appt request for the General

Ed,

Wilmas transferred a call from Paul Doty. He is a friend of the General's and he had an appointment request for the General to see Andre Kokoshin either the afternoon of Nov 15 or the morning of Nov 16. He can be reached at:

(H) 617-864-6679

(W) 617-495-1401

CC: Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

Ed Hewett's recommendation:

If BS schedule will allow, this is one of better Soviet visitors to see; think BS would want to see him.

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

660-0111
George
Previous editions usable

TO:

FLORENCE

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY- ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Bro Paul Doty

OF (Organization)

617/864-6679

☒ PLEASE PHONE ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*at home for next
couple of hrs.*

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

12:30 PM 11/13

Bifrost

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

617-

Ellen Fri 495
pm

Andrei 1399

Ko KOSHIN

hp ps of
Inst of USA
+ (Cannibal)
Moscow

Ope v. G
Gahr
all

Jay
Tues 11/5
5 PM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

04-Nov-1991 14:19 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Edmund J. Hull
(HULL)

SUBJECT: Mtg. with Egyptian Defense Minister

Florence:

Ambassador El Reedy continues to lobby on instructions from Mubarak for a White House meeting for visiting Minister of Defense Tantawi. He has now accepted that the President is unavailable, but wonders if the General could receive him for 10 minutes on Wednesday so the Defense Minister can present a message from President Mubarak. We recognized that General Scowcroft's schedule will be packed prior to departure for Rome, but told Reedy that we would check. Pls. let me know if it can be done.

Edmund

Distribution:

FOR: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
FOR: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Donna P. Mmoh	(MMOH)
CC: Kathy Leahy	(LEAHY)
CC: Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
CC: Bruce O. Riedel	(RIEDEL)

will not arrive until after 7 PM
Haass will do

4:40 pm, November 1, 1991

General:

Bob Gates called with message for you:

Egyptian Ambassador El-Reedy called him and asked him to arrange for the Egyptian Defense Minister to see the President next Tuesday. Bob was very discouraging; told him the President was out of town until on Monday; Tuesday was only day next week President would be in town and it was scheduled up; should not count on it.

Bob thought you might want to have Riedel or someone call him and just tell him that it would not be possible.

I think Chevey has already told him.
☒ Agree, ask Riedel to call El-Reedy and pass this message

☐ BS will call El-Reedy on Monday

Wilma

Egyptian Amb El-Reedy 939-9585/86

*6:35 pm - Passed to Bruce Riedel
he will call Amb El-Reedy to
tell him appt request was
addressed & can't be done w/
P's schedule - Wil*

Mulroney NOT
going to LA

9:30 am, October 9, 1991

General:

Neil Reeder, Canadian Embassy, called --

Amb Burney recently spoke with you about the possibility of a private breakfast or bilateral meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Mulroney when the President is in California for the dedication of the Reagan Library. Mulroney also invited & will be attending.

Amb Burney has asked Neil to check with you whether there is any chance of that working out. Burney will be in Ottawa until Friday and will meet with Mulroney -- can he tell him anything?

☒ Yes, are working on: ☒ pvt breakfast

☐ bilateral mtg

☐ Doesn't look like it's going to work out

☐ No news yet; P's schedule not yet firmed up

mon
11/4

30-40
min mtg
after
lunch

Wilma

Respond to: Neil Reeder 682-7737

3:30 pm, 10/9
PASSED to Neil Reeder

*Please
keep
on
both*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Oct-1991 15:41 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt
Wilma G. Hall
Robin A. Uhl
Dona F. Proctor

(GANTT)
(HALL)
(UHL)
(PROCTOR)

*Tony
Wayne
Advised
10/28/91*

FROM: Earl A. Wayne
(WAYNE)

SUBJECT: Two Requests for Meetings

Could you please check the following two requests with the General.

French Ambassador Andreani raised with Genreal this AM getting together late next week. He wants to discuss NATO summit, has no instructions but wants to send in a report on our views. If the General is busy, we could suggest that David meet with Andreani.

Dutch ambassador Meeseman requests a meeting to discuss the President's agenda in the Netherlands, also late next week. David just met him to discuss NATO summit and went over much of the President's agenda for the Hague. Thus, this does not seem to be a necessity.

Thanks,
Tony

CC: David C. Gompert

(GOMPERT)

12:05 pm, October 18, 1991

General:

Martha Muse, Chairman and President of Tinker Foundation, will be in Washington on November 1 and invites you to lunch with her. Indicates that she is an old friend; is a member of Council of Foreign Relations -- knew you there; has worked with you on many, many boards.

FYI: P/departs on Thurs, Oct 31 to Houston/Dallas/Los Angeles; returns on Nov 4.

Wont be here

_____ Accept

_____ Regret

Wilma

Regretted
11/1/91

RSVP: Maria 212/421-6858

MURPHY & DEMORY, LTD.

2300 N STREET, N.W.
SUITE 725
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037

*File
10/18
2:00 PM.*

ADMIRAL DANIEL J. MURPHY, USN (RET.)

TELEPHONE (202) 785-3323
TELECOPIER (202) 785-8278

September 12, 1991

3-24-22

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Cancelled

Dear Brent:

I hope your summer was enjoyable and, in light of the amazing events taking place in the Soviet Union, as relaxing as possible. This volatile situation has all U.S. businessmen reevaluating how best to adjust to all the changes. The work we are doing in modernizing air traffic control in the old USSR is at a critical point. We need a positive push from the U.S. government if we are to avoid losing all the time and money already invested.

On that note, I am writing to request a meeting to update you on the status of the Global Air Transportation Systems and Services (GATSS). GATSS, as you know, is a consortium of six international companies who have joined to plan the modernization of the Soviet air traffic control system. The final draft of the modernization plan for the Soviet air traffic management system has been completed and I would like to present a copy to you for your review as well as to discuss some issues which need your assistance.

I will be in the Soviet Union until the end of September, thus a convenient time in early October would be best. I look forward to seeing you then.

Sincerely,

Dan

Ask Nick R
about Jower
Bo.

Regretted
10-1-91

September 30, 1991

General --

General
Course
on
Jower
Bo.

Clark McFadden, an attorney with Dewey Ballantine, called to request a meeting with you and several representatives of the US lumber industry (6 or so CEOs). They would like to do this tomorrow at 4:30 or after. I talked with Tim Deal and he said he wasn't recommending it but if Mr. McFadden is a friend you may not be able to get out of it. Shall I schedule?

Okay _____

Other _____

429-2333
Available
4:30 - 5:45
or after
6:15

Florence

Lower level
group -
Same representation

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

House



YOU WERE CALLED BY-



YOU WERE VISITED BY--

Clark MacLadden

OF (Organization)

429-2333



PLEASE PHONE ►



FTS



AUTOVON



WILL CALL AGAIN



IS WAITING TO SEE YOU



RETURNED YOUR CALL



WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

RECEIVED BY

W

DATE

10/1

TIME

9:53

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

Cancelled his trip

*Monday
Oct 7
3 P.M.
15 min*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Sep-1991 07:39 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Bruce O. Riedel
(RIEDEL)

SUBJECT: Omani FM

The Omani Foreign Minister, Yusuf bin Alawi, is visiting the US for annual US-Oman bilateral talks and the UNGA. State has forwarded a request for a courtesy call on General Scowcroft. In the past there has been no consistency in our approach to this issue. In some years during the bilats Alawi has called on the General, in others he has been told the General's schedule is too tight.

Alawi will be available after 30 Sept until 10 October except for 4 October. We would recommend a short courtesy meeting if the schedule is not too tight.

Distribution:

FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
FOR: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
CC: Donna P. Mmoh	(MMOH)
CC: Kathy Leahy	(LEAHY)
CC: Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
CC: Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
CC: Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
CC: Donna P. Mmoh	(MMOH)
CC: Kathy Leahy	(LEAHY)

12:25 Rostow
Wants us
to move

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Sep-1991 11:32 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Cathy Millison

(MILLISON)

FROM:

Joan S. Hunerwadel
(HUNERWADEL)

SUBJECT:

APNSA Actions not completed

Cathy, would you please check on the following actions -- all have been with APNSA for over a month and should be completed.

5136 dated July 16, 1991 -- open date but courteous to reply after 2 months
5704 dated Aug. 6, 1991 -- reply needed
6080 dated Aug. 16, 1991 -- regret prepared as requested, letter should be sent
6097 dated Aug. 19, 1991 -- wanted APNSA to speak to them this fall at 25th
Anniversary dinner and it is getting late

Thanks for your help.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Sep-1991 13:42 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Cathy Millison
(MILLISON)

SUBJECT: Request from Rostow's Office

Nick Rostow's office has asked if we could try to get action on the actions listed in the following note. Your assistance would be appreciated. Thanks.

Distribution:

FOR: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
FOR: Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
FOR: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)
CC: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)

*File
Requeto*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Sep-1991 14:54 E

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt
Wilma G. Hall
Douglas H. Paal

(GANTT)
(HALL)
(PAAL)

FROM: Dona F. Proctor
(PROCTOR)

SUBJECT: Mr. Choong

Per Florence's conversation with Robin, I called Bill Timmons and reg
for the General Mr. Choong's request for an appointment.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-Sep-1991 18:51 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Wilma G. Hall
(HALL)

SUBJECT:

Kim Woo Choong

CC: Dona F. Proctor

(PROCTOR)

Doug Paal has come back to me re Bill Timmons phone call to BS -- requesting appt for Mr. KIM Woo Choong of Korea (see earlier note).

Doug said he believes this gentleman was invited to dinner during Roh Tae Woo visit -- perhaps BS shook his hand. There is no official reason for BS to see him. Mr. Kim is the head of a very aggressive business in Korea.

If BS knows Mr. Kim and wants to see him, Doug defers to BS.

Does BS want to return Timmons call to say "would like to do but will be at UNGA in New York"??

_____ BS will return call

_____ Ask Wilma to call Timmons office -- has checked
w/BS and BS regrets; will be at UNGA w/Pres

Thanks, Wilma

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Sep-1991 20:24 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Donna P. Mmoh	(MMOH)
Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)

FROM: Florence E. Gantt
(GANTT)

SUBJECT: Ambassador of Morocco

Richard, would you please call the Ambassador on behalf of the General. Explain that he has been travelling with the President and is now at the UN. Since he wanted to see the General before the King's visit, see if you can assist the Ambassador. Thanks.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Sep-1991 18:39 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Richard N. Haass
(HAASS)

SUBJECT:

RE: Ambassador of Morocco

if the day's a disaster, say Brent cant do it and suggest me

CC: Donna P. Mmoh

(MMOH)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Sep-1991 17:39 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Richard N. Haass
Donna P. Mmoh

(HAASS)
(MMOH)

FROM: Florence E. Gantt
(GANTT)

SUBJECT: Ambassador of Morocco

Richard, The Moroccan Ambassador, Muhammand Belkhat, wants to come see the General to talk about the visit of the King. Is this something I should go ahead and schedule or can you handle it. I have a problem because tomorrow is probably the only day it can be done and the day looks like a disaster. Please advise.

Ms. Boehm
462-8189

Thanks.

DID NOT HAPPEN

11

June 20, 1991

General:

Courtesy call

Ed Yeo called with following message:

"Argentine Defense Minister will be in Washington next week on Thursday and Friday and he was in great hope of seeing my friend.

"Please let me know if you can see him."

☒ Okay for Florence to schedule

☐ Ed Yeo to arrange

☐ Yes, but NSC Staff arrange meeting

☐ Regret, unable to do

Wilma

452-2249

May 29, 1991

DID
NOT
Ocar

General:

Dr. Omar Zawawi will be Washington for a week, June 10-16th, and would like to have a small dinner to include you.

His secretary has asked which of the following dates might be good for you:

- _____ Monday, June 10
- _____ Tuesday, June 11
- _____ Friday, June 14
- _____ Saturday, June 15
- _____ Sunday, June 16

FYI: Thurs, Jun 13 - The President's BLACK TIE Dinner

HAK has invited you to Connecticut for the Weekend!!

Do you wish to accept his invitation?

- _____ Yes (If yes, please check preferred evening)
- ☒ Regret; unable to do this week

Wilma

RSVP: Julie Ruggles 301/469-6640

6/6
forwarded to Julie

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Jul-1991 09:31 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall
Florence E. Gantt

(HALL)
(GANTT)

FROM: Betty A. Marshall
(MARSHALL)

SUBJECT: German Ambassador

The German Ambassador (Juergen Ruhfus) would like to see the General before he leaves for the Soviet Union if it is at all possible. He would only require 10 minutes and then spend the rest of the time with David Gompert.

CC: Dona F. Proctor

(PROCTOR)

OK to schedule?

If I have the time.
 YES

 NO

*No time to do ~
met w/ Gompert*

*Not sure if
you saw this
one.*

APNSA Has Seen

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

19-Jul-1991 09:14 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: William T. Pryce
(PRYCE)

SUBJECT: Appointment for Bolivian FonMin

Flo,

The Bolivian Foreign Minister and Minister of Interior will be in town monday through wednesday of next week, primarily to explain Bolivia's new policy of not extraditing narcotics kingpins who surrender voluntarily (a la Columbia.) They know we are not happy and will be seeing various and sundry high officials at State, Justice, DEA and Governor Martinez's office to try to put the best light on their action. The Bolivian Embassy has asked if it would be convenient for the General to meet with them.

Neither State nor Randy Beers nor I think the General needs to see them, and I have told the Embassy that due to his absence with the President, and the upcoming summit, it would be very difficult to schedule an appointment with the General at this time. They seemed to understand. So unless I hear from you differently, we will assume that we should not try to set up an appointment.

Second item. Would appreciate your letting the General know that the Vice President's trip to Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil and Haiti has been postponed for a week because of the Soviet summit. It will now take place August 5-9. Seven of the nine original CEO's including David Rockefeller will still be going, and EPA Administrator Reilly will not be going.

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/7/24

Distribution:

FOR: Florence E. Gantt
CC: O. Ruth Stalcup
CC: Wilma G. Hall
CC: Robin A. Uhl
CC: Dona F. Proctor
CC: Robert B. Morley
CC: Robert R. Beers

(GANTT)
(STALCUP)
(HALL)
(UHL)
(PROCTOR)
(MORLEY)
(BEERS)

Can't do this
trip due to
Moscow rep

July 18, 1991

Thompson's
ofc
will call
when next
in
town

Florence:

Jim Thompson, RAND Corp, will be in Washington next week,
July 24-25.

He would like to meet with General Scowcroft for 30 minutes on
Wednesday afternoon or anytime Thursday to seek General's advice
on RAND work with U.S. government.

I told him General will have just returned from Summit trip with
the President and it might be difficult to schedule but that you
would be in touch with his secy, Sharon, on your return.

Wilma

Sharon, Jim Thompson's Ofc: 213/451-6936

NOTE: Mr. Thompson has an appt w/Senator Leahy at 4:00 pm
on Wednesday.

Lee Meyer

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

F

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Connie BRYCHEL

OF (Organization)

w/ Amy Derwinski

☒ PLEASE PHONE ► ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

535-8650

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU
☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*15 min
tomorrow
re Turkey + Greece*

RECEIVED BY

W

DATE

6/25

TIME

10:10

Wilma -
This needs to be moved

Thurs., June 20
2:30 pm
2:00 P.M.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30-May-1991 17:09 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt
William T. Pryce

(GANTT)
(PRYCE)

FROM: Donald C. Johnson
(JOHNSON)

SUBJECT: Amb. Todman Requests Mtg.

Flo: Ambassador Terry Todman will be up here on consultations June 20th and 21st. He has asked for a brief meeting with General Scowcroft. Does this look possible? If so, what time would you suggest?

Bill Pryce has cleared this note.

Don J.

Johnson #4603 ~

BS mtg w/ Todman preempted by Pres mtg ~
TODMAN understands; will try to reschedule
during his next visit to DC.

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/29/10

Here are
the
names on
the
Delegation
as you
requested

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

18-Jun-1991 15:46 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)

FROM: Cynthia M. Hindle
(HINDLE)

SUBJECT: Further Info on U.S.-China Dialogue Delegation

The following are the Chinese Participants for the U.S.-China Dialogue:

Chai Zemin - Delegation Leader, Former Ambassador to U.S.
Gao Shangquan - Vice President, Chinese Industrial Economic Society
Li Luye - Director General, China Center for International Studies; former Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Li Zewang - Vice President, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association; former Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Zhu Quizhen - Ambassador to the U.S. from PRC
Zhang Wenpu - Vice President, CPIFA; former Director, Department of American and Oceanian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Shoumao - Vice Chairman, The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade
Wu Shuqing - President, Beijing University
Zhu Manli - Deputy Secretary General, CPIFA

CC: Douglas H. Paal

(PAAL)

*BS Requested
"Will Pass in this me"
6/19 ms8 passed to Doug Paal*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

13-Jun-1991 22:22 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt
Wilma G. Hall

FROM:

Douglas H. Paal
(PAAL)

SUBJECT:

Another Chinese delegation

*who is on
the delegation?*
GANTT)
(HALL)

For General Scowcroft:

The National Committee on US-China Relations is offering you a chance to meet with "old friends" from China. June 19-20, former Amb to Washington Chai Zemin and a number of other distinguished retired diplomats and scholars will be here for the Fifth US-China Dialogue. You participated in the Dialogues in the past, precipitating this offer.

I do not see a need for you to meet the group, unless it is for old times sake. Please advise.

CC: Dona F. Proctor

(PROCTOR)

CC: Robin A. Uhl

(UHL)

memo -
check in
this

Initiation extended to ALL
COMMISSIONED SPUs - NOT
A CMO PERFORMANCE
Required

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR WHITE HOUSE COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

FROM: EDE HOLIDAY *Ede*
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND SECRETARY OF THE CABINET

CHASE UNTERMAYER *Chase*
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND DIRECTOR OF PRESIDENTIAL PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: White House Domestic Policy Briefing -- June 19

We would like to invite you to attend the third and last of the series of White House domestic policy briefings on Wednesday, June 19, 1991. The briefing has been organized for the benefit of the Administration's Presidential appointees requiring Senate confirmation (PASs) and White House commissioned officers. The first briefing was held on March 28, 1991 and a second briefing was held on May 9.

Speakers at the June 19 briefing will include Secretary of Education Lamar Alexander, Governor Sununu and the President. The format will provide time for the speakers to respond to questions from the audience.

The meeting will be held from 10:00 - 11:30 a.m. in Room 450 of the Old Executive Office Building.

Please call to confirm your attendance with Caroline Berezny or Mark Goldman on extension 2800.

HAROLD M. AGNEW

322 PUNTA BAJA DRIVE
SOLANA BEACH, CA 92075

(619) 481-8908

May 28, 1991

*Regretted
this
time*


Lt. General Brent Scowcroft (USAF Ret.)
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Brent,

There is a real message here. Wish DOE would understand it.
I'll be in town 6/11-6/13. I'll give a call when I get in to see if
you have any time to waste. I'm still very much interested in setting
up a central bank for all clearances without in any way upsetting all
the various agencies' own clearance procedures, etc. The only requirement
being that they provide input to the bank and check with it before they
reinvent the wheel on reinvestigating someone.


I haven't found any one who doesn't like the idea but no one
has any desire to do anything. Maybe if what I read about restructuring
the CIA is true, they could serve as a counterpart to TRW's financial
data bank.

Sincerely,



Enc.

Nuclear power can be safe



DURING the past decade, there has been concern worldwide with regard to Iraq's real objectives in its extensive nuclear-research program.

More and more, it became apparent that Iraq's objective was to develop a nuclear weapons capability. An attack on its early facilities by Israel set Iraq back, but did not deter it in striving for its primary objective of becoming a nuclear-weapons power in the Middle East.

As a result of the U.N. military action in

By **HAROLD M. AGNEW**

the Persian Gulf, Iraq's weapons-production facilities have been destroyed. It is fortunate that it did not have an operational nuclear-power plant. Had such an operating power plant been attacked and even if during the attack the reactor vessel and the secondary-containment vessel were not breached, an event not too dissimilar from

Harold M. Agnew is a former director of Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory and a former president of General Atomics in San Diego, where a modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor of advanced design is being developed.

the catastrophe at Chernobyl might have ensued.

A tremendous amount of energy is produced in the fuel rods of a nuclear-power reactor even for hours after the plant has been shut down. To prevent this energy from melting the fuel rods and causing what has been called a meltdown, existing light-water reactors require a continuous flow of water to remove the heat (energy) from the fuel rods.

This water must circulate to remove the heat. The circulation is achieved by electrically driven pumps. An external source of electrical power is required to drive the pumps when the reactor is shut down and not generating electricity. Emergency on-site diesel generators are normally the source of this electrical power. In peacetime, these sources are adequate. However the electrical and/or diesel fuel supply to all reactor stations is vulnerable in the event of a war. A deliberate attack as was carried out in Iraq could easily interrupt such supply. Without the power to provide circulating water, the water would evaporate, the fuel rods would overheat, melt and react with steam and water within minutes.

A tremendous steam pressure in the reac-

tor vessel would develop, which would vent to the secondary-containment vessel. Depending on the severity and speed of the energy buildup, it is conceivable that the secondary containment also would be breached and a Chernobyl-type accident would be repeated, causing a huge area of radioactive contamination.

These events could ensue independent of

The fuel cannot melt at any temperature the system can reach.

the expertise of the operators or the excellence of the design and construction of the existing water-cooled reactor systems.

The developing nations are in dire need of electrical energy. Without it, they will never develop. Most of them have no indigenous fossil-fuel sources. Many of them have been stripping their forests of wood to burn and are creating man-made deserts.

It was thought that nuclear power could

in the future be an attractive option for these developing nations. However, if these nations — in addition to all their other problems — and the rest of the world have to worry about armed conflict on their territory, a legitimate question would be: "Is nuclear power really an option that we can risk in these areas?"

The answer, strong as it might seem, is yes, but not through deployment of water-cooled reactor technology now in being.

A recent shutdown from full power of a full-scale helium-cooled graphite reactor in Germany, with no external removal of heat, clearly demonstrated that an inherently safe nuclear-power reactor can be made. The whole shutdown sequence was presented on a NOVA program on the Public Television Network.

Several unique design features provide this inherent safety, characteristic for helium-cooled graphite reactors. The fuel is refractory-clad and cannot melt at any temperature the system can achieve. The maximum temperature is determined by geometry, power and power density of the system, the large heat capacity inherent in the graphite moderator and ability of the system to conduct and radiate the heat to the surrounding environment.

Fortunately, the typical size of such a reactor system, about 400 megawatts thermal (150 megawatts electrical), would be optimum for developing nations, as they do not have the necessary infrastructure to transmit power throughout their territories.

The inherent safety features of the system do not require the high level of skilled operators or maintenance workers demanded in current existing water-cooled reactors. The reactor also is small enough to be factory-fabricated and certified, and to be sited below ground level.

Needing no external power to maintain integrity, in event of a hostile action, the safety of the public in the surrounding regions is assured. No other nuclear-reactor system has the inherent safety features of this system, known as the modular high-temperature gas-cooled reactor (MHTGR).

If nuclear power is ever to regain public confidence worldwide, it will have to be based on the inherent safety characteristics of the MHTGR. No other system can meet its safety characteristics in peace or war. □

Can't do
this time Jokes a
Raincheck

John
Raincheck

May 22, 1991

General --

Martin Feldstein is going to be in town on Tuesday, June 11 and has asked to see you sometime in the afternoon. Your calendar could accommodate a brief visit with him. Shall I go ahead and schedule?

Okay _____

Other _____

Florence

Kathy
617-868-3908

June 5, 1991



General:

President and Mrs. Bush are going to host the box at the opening of Phantom of the Opera tomorrow, Thursday, June 6, 1991. They are extending an invitation to you and Karen. Others being invited are Secretary and Mrs. Cheney and General and Mrs. Powell. Patty said the plan was to meet in the residence at 6:00, have a cup of soup at 6:15 and depart for the Kennedy Center at 6:45. The performance begins at 7:00.

Accept for me _____

I'll call Karen and let you know soonest _____

Other _____

Florence

Patty
x7400

*Regretted
for Gen & Karen
6-5-91
7.*

May 29, 1991

General:

Jacques Attali, President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, will be in Washington on June 17 and during that time he would be very glad indeed to meet with you if at all possible.

Mr. Attali said he would also very much appreciate the possibility of having a brief word with the President about the USSR and the forthcoming G-7 Summit in London. He would need only the briefest of meetings. Could you be helpful in arranging this?

I explained that looking at the calendar it appears that The President will be "on travel" most, if not all the day, on June 17th. Mr. Attali does have meetings on June 18th but said if it is not at all possible to meet with you and the President on the 17th, he would of course cancel or rearrange his meetings on the 18th.

Should Florence try to schedule?

- I will be traveling on 17th will see him briefly on 18th if he stays over. P, having just returned from trip, can't see him*
- ___ Yes, briefly with me *briefly on 18th if he stays over. P, having just returned from trip, can't see him*
- ___ w/Presidential Dropby in my office
- ___ separate meeting w/The President
- ___ Would love to see him but unable to do during his visit

Wilma

Traveling w/ Pres + unable to see

Phone Contacts for Jacques Attali in London:

Switchboard:	(44)	(71)	338-6000
Madam Perennou, Assistant:	(44)	(71)	338-6259
Mr. Olive, Assistant:	(44)	(71)	338-6260

Mrs. Jay could not tell me where Mr. Attali will be staying during his visit to Washington, D. C.

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # _____

ADMIN FAX # 170

PAGES 02

DTG 300949Z May 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: Mr Jacques Attali

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. Gen. Scowcroft
2. GATES
3. DEAL
4. BASORA
5. SITTMAN
6. HILL

TIME OF RECEIPT

301000Z May 91 10

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

REMARKS: _____

UNCLASSIFIED

(CLASSIFICATION)

(Ref: fax)

THE EUROPEAN BANK
FOR
RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

122 Leadenhall Street
London EC3V 4QL

Tel (071) 338 6000
Fax (071) 338 6105
(071) 338 6115
Tlx 8812161

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

FAX NO: 0101 202 395 5221

NO. OF PAGES: 2
(Including cover page)

TO: The White House

ATTN: General Scowcroft

FROM: Mr Jacques Attali

DATE: 30 May 1991

4
Think the
General
has seen
this.

Didn't
want it to
get buried
forever

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page



European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development

Jacques Attali
President

30 May 1991

General Scowcroft
The White House
Washington DC
USA


Dear Brent,

As Pierre Morel told you recently, I very much hope to be able to see you on 17, or perhaps 18 June, when I am in Washington and when I plan also to meet Secretaries Baker and Brady.

I hope that it will be possible, during my stay, or indeed on another day, for me to have a brief meeting with President Bush. This would be part of a series of meetings I am having with G7 leaders and President Gorbachev, before the July summit. It is particularly important that I do so, not only so that the G7 might have the views of one of the four international institutions which undertook the economic study of the Soviet Union, but of the only one to have the Soviet Union as a full member.

I should be most grateful for your help in arranging such a meeting. I also greatly look forward to the opportunity of seeing you again.

With my best wishes,



Jacques Attali

Nick Burns
to tell
Mr Koerner
that
General
cannot
see
them 5/20

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

THE KOERNER GROUP

BRUCE KOERNER

CONSULTANT TO GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS/SINO-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

F A X
T R A N S M I T T A L
C O V E R
S H E E T18563 Lemarsh Street
Northridge, California 91324
818-701-6441/FAX 818-701-6871801 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20037
202-785-2000/FAX 202-785-9485DATE MAY 17, 1991

TOTAL PAGES INCLUDING

COVER SHEET..... 35 Meiza Hutung, Wangfujing
Beijing 100005, PRC
86-1-512-8899/FAX 86-1-512-9050

TRANSMITTING FAX []

☒ 818-701-6871
☐ 202-785 9485
☐ 86-1-512-9050
☐

RESPOND TO FAX O

☒ NORTHBRIDGE, CA
☐ WASHINGTON, DC
☐ BEIJING, PRC
☐

FAX TO:

ATTENTION FLORENCE GANTT, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO GEN. SCOVERDET
ENTITY ASST TO THE PRES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
FAX 202-456-2883 TELEPHONE 202-456-2255

FAX FROM:

SENDER BRUCE KOERNER
ENTITY CONSULTANT / KOERNER GROUP (GARRY HIGGARDY, ET AL)
TELEPHONE: ☒ 818-701-6441/NORTHBRIDGE, CA
☐ 202-785-2000/WASHINGTON, DC
☐ 86-1-512-8899/BEIJING, PRC
☐

MESSAGE:

PUR TELEPHONE CALL WITH WILLIAM HALL, I AM FORMULATING
LIST OF PERSONS RELATIVE TO THE RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC
MOVEMENT (MRSCOM), LED BY GARRY HIGGARDY. THEY WILL
BE MEETING WITH NSC STAFF MONDAY, 5-20-91 AT 3:00AM
AND AT D.O.S. TUESDAY AT 11:00AM, WITH STAFF AND ROBERT
ZGELWICK, AS WELL AS A "ROUNDTABLE" WITH PERTINENT STAFFERS.
AT A PRIOR MEETING WITH THE GENERAL, GARRY WAS TOLD TO
LET HIS OFFICE KNOW OF HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON, SO THAT

HE COULD INTRODUCE HIS REPRESENTATION. GORDON IS BRINGING

BIRTHDAY GIFTS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. BUSH, AS WELL, INCLUDING
A CHESS SET OF HIS OWN DESIGN. PLEASE ADVISE. THANK YOU,

Edwin Kellogg

THE KOERNER GROUP

15 MAY 1991/REVISED 16 MAY 1991

PAGE 1 OF 2

DELEGATION AND PARTICIPANTS
"THE MUSCOVY GROUP" AND RELATED PERSONSWASHINGTON, D.C. VISIT
18 MAY 1991 THRU 22 MAY 1991

THE DATES AND PERSONS LISTED ARE BASED ON THE BEST INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME, AND MAY BE MODIFIED ACCORDINGLY AS WARRANTED. CERTAIN INFORMATION IS NOT COMPLETE, AND WILL BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS IT IS MADE AVAILABLE.

EMBARKING FROM MUNICH:

GARRY KASPAROV
D.O.B. 04-13-63
WORLD CHESS CHAMPION, POLITICAL ACTIVIST, A FOUNDER OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA POLITICAL PARTY, MAJOR SHAREHOLDER IN THE MUSCOVY GROUP.

EMBARKING FROM LONDON:

ANDREW PAGE
D.O.B. 07-18-45
CHAIRMAN, THE MUSCOVY GROUP OF COMPANIES/LONDON, MOSCOW, LOS ANGELES.

EMBARKING FROM MOSCOW:

MIKHAIL BAITIN (D.O.B. 05-16-51)
DIRECTOR, THE MUSCOVY GROUP, MOSCOW, BOARD MEMBER OF DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA POLITICAL PARTY, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL CHESS UNION.

YURI AFANASYEV
D.O.B. 09-05-34
HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT, MEMBER OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET, RECTOR OF INSTITUTE OF HISTORY AND ARCHIVES, PhD ECONOMICS. SHAREHOLDER IN THE MUSCOVY GROUP.

GRIGORY YAVLINSKY
D.O.B.
GROUP LEADER OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS EXPERTS FOR THE MUSCOVY GROUP, ECONOMIST-AUTHOR OF THE "400-DAY PLAN" AND MEMBER OF THE SHALATIN WORKING GROUP, "500-DAY PLAN".

VLADIMIR TIKHONOV
D.O.B. 09-13-27
SHAREHOLDER IN THE MUSCOVY GROUP, CHAIRMAN OF ACADEMY OF NATIONAL ECONOMY OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE UNITED COOPERATIVES, MEMBER OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET, MEMBER OF SUPREME CONSULTIVE COUNCIL OF THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET. MRS. TIKHONOV, YULIA, WILL TRAVEL WITH VLADIMIR. YULIA'S D.O.B.

THE KOERNER GROUP

15 MAY 1991/CON'T.

PAGE 2 OF 2

FROM WITHIN THE U.S:

LEON ARON

D.O.B. 07-04-54

SENIOR POLICY ANALYST IN SOVIET STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION,
EMIGRATED FROM USSR TO USA IN 1978, BIOGRAPHER OF BORIS YELTSIN
(IN PROCESS), PHD, WILL PROVIDE TRANSLATIONS AS MAY BE REQUIRED.

CHARLES JAMESON

D.O.B. 07-09-49

PRESIDENT OF THE JAMESON ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, LOS ANGELES, A
U.S. PARTNER OF THE MUSCOVY GROUP.

BRUCE KOERNER

D.O.B. 01-04-34

CONSULTANT TO U.S.-MUSCOVY GROUP PARTNERSHIP, CONSULTANT FOR
RUSSO AND SINO-AMERICAN AFFAIRS/GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS.

3:00
Fri
5/17

May 16, 1991

General --

Bob Hutchings called to say that Italian Ambassador Petrignani wants to come in today or tomorrow to pay a courtesy call to inform you of his future plans -- he will be leaving his post here soon. Shall I schedule him for tomorrow after the President departs for Camp David?

Okay ☒ _____

Other _____

Florence

May 14, 1991

Called
on
Telephone
4:35
5/16

General --

Amos Jordan has called requesting to see you for 15 minutes either this Wednesday or Thursday. He wants to talk about Carter/Nakasone Japanese Group; Korean Wisemen and something personal. How do you wish me to handle?

Beg off for now _____

Go ahead and schedule him for 15 minutes ONLY _____

Other _____

Ann Tennyson
775-3223
Wednesday, May 15 - After 10:30
Thursday, May 16 - After 12:30

Florence

May 9, 1991

3:00
5/9
Thurs.

General --

A voice from the Past -- Bill Hyland is over in the OEOB at the PFIAB office (x2352) doing some research getting ready for the PFIAB meeting tomorrow "being the conscientious person that I am." He was hoping to talk with you today if that was possible. Is there any chance that we can try to reach him at 1:30 when you return from the UNSYG meetings?

Let's try that time _____

Today's bad, see if he is available tomorrow _____

Other _____

Florence

1-18-29

Passed to Haass' ofc 5/2/91

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30-Apr-1991 14:20 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)

FROM: Donna P. Mmoh
(MMOH)

SUBJECT: Appointment Request

Ambassador Shoval of the Israeli Embassy would like to meet with the General to exchange information and discuss the peace process. Richard asked me to request a time from you.

CC: Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
CC: C. David Welch	(WELCH)

pls pass to Brent:

Brent: you should know that Shoval has been up to his old tricks and is the one who went public accusing Baker of changing his tune and toughening demands. Baker pointedly told Shamir that he did not want Shoval to join their meeting. I see no reason for you to agree to see him unless you want to.

CC: C. David Welch	(WELCH)
CC: Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)

Please advise
I will NOT see him ✓
I will see him _____
Other _____

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

Flouner

☒

YOU WERE CALLED BY—

☐

YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Frances Musgrove

OF (Organization)

586-7092

☐

PLEASE PHONE ►

☐

FTS

☐

AUTOVON

☐

WILL CALL AGAIN

☐

IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☒

RETURNED YOUR CALL

☐

WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

*Answer
Kanter
was
handled
Dept.*

*Apr 11th
Energy
Spec
Guy??*

RECEIVED BY

W

DATE

4/16

TIME

4:30

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018

★ U.S.GPO: 1985-0-461-274/20008

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)

Prescribed by GSA

FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

04-Apr-1991 17:57 ED

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Dona F. Proctor
(PROCTOR)

SUBJECT:

Q-U-E-S-T-I-O-N-S

Here are some things you might ask the General if you have some quiet

1. ADM Watkins would like to introduce Dr. Fenton Carey, Special Assi to Watkins for Space, to Gen Scowcroft during week of April 15 (Francis Mosgrove 586-7092) *Referred to Annie*
2. Gen Vessey departs for Hanoi on Apr 15 and would like to see Gener before he goes. *703-697-5118 Pentagon Gfc.*
(612-692-4488) *Pres will see for photo in*
3. Charlie Bartlett asks the General to spend 30 minutes with the Was Focus Group on Tues, Apr 16 (550 17th Street - 7 Flr) - group familiar fans. Calendar is clear in afternoon.
(234-3681) *On another list*
4. Believe you have #2231 - Invitation f/General to Address US-German Industrialists' Group here in Washington from Dennis Weatherst JP Morgan, June 16 at dinner. They called for answer.
(Julie Shea 212-648-6064)
5. You had put a hold at 1:45pm on Apr 11 for Congw Bentley's group o Supreme Soviet Deputies from Minsk, BSSR. Information arrived today - list of names (3 + Bentley + 2 more). Have you asked General? Do you want me to staff what I have? *Done on your calendar*
6. GET READY - THIS'LL GRIT YOUR TEETH ^~^^~ Chris Vick called Bill and he is out so she then called me. She had previously set u with Boyden Gray for him to host a client of theirs, Chmn of t of AMEC (engnr'g firm) Allan Cockshaw for lunch in the WH Exec She also said that Cockshaw had accompanied PM Major on his m recent trip to Kuwait. (In the conversation, she said that he Thompson offered Cockshaw a lunch in the Mess when he come town.) In the meantime, Cockshaw told Sir Dennis Thatcher abo trip and the lunch and he said he wanted to come along. Chris

is now asking if NSC would like to get involved since Thatcher coming along. She mentioned that General Scowcroft knew Thatcher. I told her we'd get back to her. I tried to call Hutchings but he is out today. Do you want me to just save this for good ole Bill?

*Greenberg cannot
make it - will
give report to
Watson for Gen.*

*5:30
Fri 4/12
brief mtg*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

10-Apr-1991 18:53 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt
Wilma G. Hall
Dona F. Proctor

(GANTT)
(HALL)
(PROCTOR)

FROM: Peter S. Watson
(WATSON)

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting by Hank Greenberg

For General Scowcroft:

Hank Greenberg (of AIG) has recently returned from a trip to Asia, and has met with a number of regional leaders. His office has placed a call to us to determine if you would be able to receive him for a few minutes this Friday afternoon (April 12) to discuss his trip. He apparently is particularly interested in addressing U.S./Malaysian relations after spending some time with P.M. Mahathir. I obviously made no commitment, other than to pass this request along.

CC: Douglas H. Paal
CC: Cynthia M. Hindle

(PAAL)
(HINDLE)

OK to schedule

✓ Briefly

April 8, 1991
10:45 a.m.

*Will call
@ 2:00*

*2:05
call
note
4/11/91*

General:

Ed Shannon, Sante Fe, is in Washington through Thursday evening this week and requests 10-minute meeting with you to talk about Kuwait. He said he spoke with you and you are expecting his call to arrange meeting.

☒ Okay to schedule

☐ Put on phone list; I will call him

Wilma

Ed Shannon, Capitol Hilton Hotel: 393-1000, Room 899

Florence: Mr. Shannon would prefer appointment in afternoon if at all possible. He is here attending conference -- evenings would be difficult for him to do.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	Adrian A. Basora to Florence E. Gantt and Wilma G. Hall Re: Rocard Dinner (1 pp.)	2/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Regretted, January to December 1991

Date Closed: 9/29/2010	OA/ID Number: 85036-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

February 25, 1991

General --

The Secret Service are going to have a briefing on the London bombing on Wednesday, February 27 at 1:00 p.m. in Room 450 -- sounds like a gaggle will attend! You have a 1:30 meeting with the President and Baker. Are you interested in attending at 1:00 and staying for 15 to 20 minutes?

Yes _____

Other *Q*

Florence

Lou Merletti
x4112

*Someone from
Beers of
attendee*

Not Done

January 10, 1991

General:

Professor Albert Wohlstetter will be in Washington next week, arriving late Monday afternoon until early Friday afternoon. He would very much like to meet with you.

Given your schedule, I suggested that he call Florence after he arrives in Washington to see what might be possible.

_____ Schedule brief appt if calendar permits

_____ Regret; let's try next time he is in Washington

Wilma

OBE - I presume?
B

FOR FLORENCE: While in DC, Prof Wohlstetter is staying at
One Washington Circle Hotel: 872-1680

January 3, 1991

General --

Professor Wohlstetter sent you a package on Monday after your conversation with him. He has now sent you a final version of the same package re Saddam Hussein/Gulf. Shall I just go ahead and staff it to Richard Haass or do you want to look at it first?

Staff to Haass _____ Let me look at it first _____

Florence

December 31, 1990

To General Brent Scowcroft

FAX 1-202-456-2883

From Albert Wohlstetter

FAX 213-654-1694 Verify 213-656-5101

Pages following: 14

Sending 10 pages, Convincing Saddam the Coalition Has the Will to Use Force
and 4 pages. extract from a longer piece on the options available,
which gives an illustrative step by step description of the option
we are proposing

27 Dec 90; REVISED 28 Dec
D:\NOTES\Coalwill
AW Note on:

Mr. Giral
Correction in with
Dec 30

Convincing Saddam the Coalition has the Will to Use Force

Leading figures in the Congress advocate our continuing to rely on the embargo to get Saddam out of Kuwait completely and unconditionally as we and the UN Security Council have demanded since the day of his invasion. So did the principal witnesses appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, most of whom appeared to be saying that it might take a year or more, and at least one of whom--Edward Luttwak--said it might take five years, "to work".

Both Senator Nunn and Senator Mitchell have argued that one of the drawbacks of using military force is that we'd never know whether the embargo would have worked without it.

That isn't the problem, however. A more relevant problem is how we'd ever know that the embargo was not working, and how we would know whether the embargo was working until and unless Saddam actually withdrew from Kuwait, completely and unconditionally.

Saddam has an almost unlimited contempt for the West's willingness to use force to oppose him. He will do anything he thinks he can get away with. He thought he could get away with seizing Kuwait, and he still thinks so. The embargo is intended to make it unacceptably costly to Saddam to continue to occupy Kuwait. However, it inflicts pain primarily on the civilian population, and Saddam has a very high tolerance for pain inflicted, whether by outsiders or by himself, on his civilian population. The embargo also reduces imports of supplies for the military forces, but Saddam will see to it that the military will feel it much less than the civil population. And the reduc-

tion in the efficiency of his military force, like the increase in the efficiency of ours, would be important only if we actually use military force against him. He doesn't believe we will.

On the other hand, members of the coalition are incurring costs. There have been huge losses most obviously to the Kuwaitis, in blood as well as treasure. There has been enormous suffering as well as monetary loss on the part of the Palestinians who had been working and living in Kuwait, on the part of the Egyptians, Indians and many other Third World nationals who work there, and on countries like Turkey that have lost large revenues from their oil pipeline and other trade. On the part of the Socialist countries moving precariously toward capitalism and democracy, dependent on oil and trade with Iraq, and with large credits they have earned in Iraq. The democracies of the West are incurring a variety of costs, not least of which is the mischief that is being done by fringe members of the coalition--such as Syria in Lebanon, China in its prosecution of Tian An Men dissidents, and the Union government in the Soviet Union in its use of the KGB and the army to suppress the movement toward independence and the genuine rule of law.

In fact, as the embargo takes its effect on the Iraqi population, Saddam will be able (with increasing persuasiveness) to demonstrate on CNN and on every network's evening news program the hardship the embargo will be inflicting on Iraqi women and children. Western and many Arab members of the coalition are likely to have a lower tolerance for inflicting pain on the Iraqis than Saddam.

In brief, the real parallel with the seemingly interminable war in Vietnam may be the embargo. The key problem in Vietnam was a lack of clarity in our objectives that assured it would drag on and make it impossible to tell, for all the statistics of "body counts" and the like, whether we were

making any genuine progress towards achieving these objectives. From the beginning we did not try to stop the flow of arms and other supplies from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. We said we would use "gradually increasing pressure" to make it "unacceptably costly" to the North Vietnamese to continue that supply. But we had no way of knowing just what costs Ho Chi Minh, Le Duc Tho et.al were willing to see inflicted on their cadres in South Vietnam who made their way through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Ho and Le Duc Tho had a very high tolerance for pain inflicted on their subjects. Much higher than our tolerance for the pain of inflicting it. We found it "unacceptably costly" to continue, long before they did. That's what they expected. That's what Saddam expects.

Even our accumulating an enormous military force in the Persian Gulf will not be enough to persuade Saddam, unless he believes that we will actually use it. The putative experts appearing before Congress and writing news analyses and op ed pieces in the daily press, or repeating their position endlessly in sound bites on CNN, emphasize the huge number of body bags they believe are likely to be sent back to the United States from Iraq, especially if we try a frontal ground attack on unweakened forces in Iraqi divisions on the Kuwaiti border. They seem only to confirm Saddam's repeated judgement that the American public won't accept the costs of using force in the Persian Gulf.

The key, then, is to present Saddam unequivocally with the fact that we will use force--to make that a fact--and that's possible only if we have a clearly visible way of doing that with rapid and decisive success and at tolerable costs in accomplishing an important, agreed-on goal. Such a goal and the demand announced on the day of the invasion by the White House and the UN Security Council and repeated ever since: the immediate, complete and

unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The kernel of the proposal we make for an immediate focus on reclaiming Kuwait, beginning by the actual use by Kuwait and its allies of its airspace, is to make it as certain as possible that we will use force if Kuwait's resuming control of its airspace is challenged. If Iraqi fighters based in Iraq or Kuwait attempt to intercept a powerful Coalition force of aircraft using Kuwait's sovereign airspace, the coalition would have to defend itself. It would pursue Iraqi fighters sent up to intercept the force and destroy them in the air or on the ground in Iraq. The use of Kuwaiti sovereign air space by Kuwait and the countries it invites is of course not an act of aggression or even, in any reasonable sense of that much-abused term, "offensive." The Coalition would use, and defend its use of, Kuwaiti airspace against Iraqi fighters. Saddam would have the option of avoiding attack on Coalition air--the choice between war and peace. Similarly, if the radars on Iraqi surface-to-air missile batteries are turned on to acquire coalition aircraft, the coalition would have no alternative but to destroy them, whether they are in Kuwait or across the border in Iraq. If the Iraqis were to prepare to use batteries of SCUD-B or Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles, the coalition would destroy any they could attack. The Coalition would have little alternative other than to destroy any military force or equipment, including sensors, filter centers, communication nodes that could offer substantial help to Saddam in an immediate challenge to the use and control of Kuwaiti airspace which the coalition had undertaken.

Our proposal is not to use the reclaiming of Kuwait as a pretext to destroy capabilities that Saddam could not possibly use in a timely way to challenge the reclaiming of Kuwait. It would not be used as a pretext for the immediate destruction of plants making solid propellants, or assembling SCUD-B

missiles, or manufacturing chemical or biological weapons. These have no genuine urgency and there may be some large drawbacks in the collateral damage we'd do in attacking some of these. In general, Saddam is likely to have located the moveable and fixed surface-to-surface missile batteries that could immediately threaten our allies and our own forces in unpopulated desert areas where they are both more secure and closer and so able to do the most damage to his adversaries. Saddam's factories for making missile components and assembling them tend to be much nearer population centers, if not embedded in them, to be close to sources of labor and supplies and rail, road, ~~and~~ water transport networks. (A year ago last August, the press reported an accidental explosion in an Iraqi plant making solid propellant for its rockets. ⁷⁰⁰ ~~the~~ ^{The Report} explosion killed over ~~700~~ people.) We would use air power to destroy any SCUD or other surface-to-surface missile battery we could locate, because Saddam could use them without warning in challenging control of Kuwait. Parts factories and assembly plants don't have the same urgency. The time urgency of these targets varies inversely with the unintended harm we might do.

We stress that we would destroy not only any Iraqi missile battery based in Kuwait that challenged our use of Kuwaiti airspace, but any Iraqi missile battery ^{we can} located in Iraq that could challenge it immediately. Iraq would be no sanctuary from which the reclaiming of Kuwait could be challenged.

There are several key differences, then, between what we propose and ^{US} ~~our~~ persistently misunderstood experience in Vietnam. One is the fact that our proposal sets forth a clear political-military objective defined in territorial terms, namely, the rapid reclaiming of all Kuwait. Not to make it "unacceptably costly" for Saddam to challenge our reclaiming of Kuwait, but to retake Kuwait and defend it by destroying any challenge to its sovereignty. We differ here not only from US policy in Vietnam, but from those who advocate

sole reliance on an embargo to impose "unacceptable costs" on Saddam.

Second, there would be no sanctuary. In Vietnam, the Communist Party of North Vietnam located its Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) a few kilometers across the border in Cambodia. North Vietnamese forces conducted raids on our forces in South Vietnam and on ARVN, and then ducked back into Cambodia or Laos. For many years we accepted the fiction that Cambodia and Laos were neutral territory. But if Saddam attacked our forces, we should respond by disabling anything any place that could offer an immediate challenge to our continuing control of Kuwait, and we should destroy such time-urgent targets on an urgent basis.

A third related difference is that with the overwhelming force available to us we could complete the job of controlling airspace in a very short time, very likely in days. (The Israelis in 1982 in their war with Syria took 10 minutes to destroy more SA-6s than Saddam has in and near Kuwait, without the loss of one aircraft.) We would then continue to use air power to isolate Iraqi forces in and near Kuwait, to cut off their supplies especially of water and other items that would take immediate effect, and to attack ~~them~~ ^{Iraqi divisions deployed} directly--and so to weaken them that it would be feasible to introduce armored and other ground forces at reasonable cost. To take ground. And with Arab members of the coalition in the lead, to take prisoners. To destroy the Iraqi armed forces in and near Kuwait as an organized force. And be prepared if necessary to continue the embargo and enforce other demands for Iraqi compensation for the immense damage its invasion has done, for war crime trials, for the termination of their programs for getting the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction over long and short range.

*along the
Saudi
border
to the tactical
reserves
in Kuwait*

Why the Immediate Focus on Kuwait
Rather than Saddam's Long-Term Military Power.

We have a strong interest in reducing Iraq's ability and disposition to use weapons of mass destruction and other military power to disturb the peace in the future and gain control. Why not take a strategic bombing offensive aimed at destroying his military power as the immediate focus of Coalition action against Saddam?

The first reason is that such an offensive would divert resources from the urgent objective of getting Saddam out of Kuwait swiftly and totally. It would delay us. And it would have large opportunity costs, both for speedily reclaiming Kuwait and for the ultimate reduction in Iraq's ability and disposition to use military power in the Gulf. First things first.

A second reason associated with the first is that the job is much harder, especially if it's undertaken at the outset, than the task of reclaiming Kuwait. It involves deeper penetrations through air defenses in Iraq as well as Kuwait, including active defenses of strategic targets that are both denser and harder to suppress because they are likely to be more uncertain as to their precise location. The surface-to-air missile batteries like the advanced Soviet SA-6 or the French and German Roland can be moved more frequently than periodic satellite observations that we must depend on principally for observation of the Iraqi heartland in Baghdad Province. Look at a map: Kuwait is only 6200 square miles, compared to over 172,000 square miles for Iraq. The maximum distance in Kuwait from international waters or Saudi sovereign territory is about 100 miles. Kuwait is largely open to surveillance by optics, radar and electromagnetic and other sensors on AWACS or on TR-1 photo reconnaissance and other tactical aircraft flying in Saudi or international air space. Even short-range unmanned air vehicles with a variety of sensors, and

Stealth aircraft with powerful IR imaging sensors could use Kuwaiti's sovereign air space to obtain essentially continuous surveillance before as well as during combat.

We are better able to locate targets in Kuwait than in Iraq, where Saddam has had many years to harden and hide underground key materials and facilities. Hardened, poorly located targets that have an uncertain amount of moveable, active defense can present formidable problems for reliable destruction even by large nuclear weapons, not to say conventional explosives. The job of finding and attacking selected targets deep in Iraq will be made somewhat easier when our reconnaissance and attack aircraft can be based nearer by in Kuwait and air-refueled over it.

Third, there are better options for cutting off the 600,000 or so troops that Saddam will have in Kuwait from national command than by trying to find and destroy the national command authority in Baghdad. Saddam boasts of his elusiveness and probably compares favorably with Castro in this respect, who is reputed to have at least 28 alternate places to stay. Saddam almost surely would be someplace else at the time of attack, in an alternate command post hardened and concealed. Advocates of an initial decapitating strike ignore the lesson taught by COSVN in Cambodia, Qaddafi in Libya, Noriega in Panama. Even prisoners of war, we learned at Son Tay, can be moved more frequently than our recurrent means of observing them.

Fourth. This point applies in particular to the problem of finding and destroying key materials for making nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Uranium is extremely dense. Saddam's small lumps of highly enriched uranium (HEU) are not likely to be found at any known places, nor are the extremely expensive and few grams of tritium gas which could be of great use not only in making fusion weapons but in increasing the effectiveness of

fission bombs. The HEU and other critical materials and facilities can be reliably found only after the defection of a large part of Saddam's army makes a change of government and an international inquiry on the spot feasible.

Fifth, the objective of destroying Saddam's military power sounds clear enough, but actually is troublingly vague. Does it mean that we should destroy at the outset of this war any facility that could support Iraqi military power now and in the future, even if they have a double function to support Iraqi civil society? That would cover a very large proportion of the facilities and resources needed to support Iraqi civil society, especially if it includes the oil reserves which have enable Saddam to buy military power. It's very doubtful that it can be done at all, but in any case it's a bad idea. Arab members of the Coalition who support the retaking of Kuwait have been reluctant to take part in the invasion of Iraq, much less its total destruction. Those who oppose the military option in the United States frequently assume that it would mean the destruction of Iraq, and say they oppose it on that ground, among others. And members of the Administration have indicated, with good reason, that destroying Iraqi power completely--if it could be done--would only make it more difficult to contain the power of Syria or a resurgent Iran.

Finally, there is the problem of destroying Iraq's civil society unintentionally. We want to neutralize Saddam's military force. Saddam would prefer us to kill Iraqi civilians. If, as some in the public debate seem to propose, we were to try simply to use non-nuclear weapons to mimic the major nuclear SIOP against the Soviet Union in the familiar scenario for Mutual Assured Destruction, we would run down a bombing encyclopedia of targets, many of them embedded in population centers. We'd be unlikely to get the national command authority but we would very likely get Baghdad. If we attacked a

biological weapons facility like Salman Paq (some 50 kilometers southeast of Baghdad and near the Tigris River and the population there), we might do a great deal of unintended harm--and not only to the local population. A dispersed cloud of anthrax might harm distant as well as local population, depending on how the winds blew.

An opening attack of that sort might do immediate damage not only to our ability to complete the immediate task of reclaiming Kuwait and the longer-term goals of reducing Iraq's ability and disposition to use weapons of mass destruction and other military force, ^{since} there would be worldwide protests. It would also do grievous harm to our ability to use force in the future in a turbulent world where a temperate use of American military force will have a critical role in keeping a modicum of stability.

To achieve our short-term objective of getting Saddam out of Kuwait rapidly, completely and unconditionally, we should focus our attention on targets that serve that task. It's also essential for our longer-term goals.

EXTRACT pp 7-10

It is highly probable that we will be able to locate the lumps of highly enriched uranium, grams of tritium gas and all the stocks of anthrax and other biological or chemical weapons and laboratories in which they might be made as the result of a change in government and an international commission of inquiry based in Baghdad, supported by a credible threat of the selective use of military force if there is no compliance.

The option we have suggested bears some comparisons in some of its parts to past military options, such as the air phase in the Bekaa Valley in the Israeli War in Lebanon in 1982, as well as the envelopment of the Egyptian Third Army in the Yom Kippur War. It contrasts, however, with Israeli attempts to lay siege to Beirut in the 1982 War and has an even larger contrast with the 14 years of indecisive US operations in Vietnam, gradually increasing pressure on Hanoi by making its resupply of the Viet Cong through sanctuaries ^{unacceptably costly}.

However, it would be useful to first describe some of the details and uncertainties in a step-by-step outline of a possible scenario implementing an option that places its immediate focus on the immediate retaking of Kuwait.

As a first step, use short-slant-range manned tactical reconnaissance aircraft, AWACS and short-range unmanned air vehicles as well as NTM to identify, locate and keep under surveillance key targets in and near Kuwait, especially movable targets.

The Kuwaitis ^{would} tell Saddam that: In accordance with UN Article 51 and Resolution 660, aircraft invited by Kuwait and only such aircraft will be allowed to use their sovereign air space. Saddam would be warned to keep his fighters out of Kuwaiti airspace or Kuwaiti bases and not to turn on the radars of his SAMs. (The coalition might even use ^{as} harassment drones ~~such as~~ like the British "Alarm" or the US "Tacit Rainbow" ^{these} ~~which~~ ^{or cruise} could hover in the range

be able to adapt quickly some existing unmanned air vehicles for

of the radars so long as they were not radiating, and would home on the radars only if they were turned on.)

If faced with overwhelming air power Saddam nonetheless stays and challenges the reclaiming of Kuwaiti airspace, Iraqi aircraft, SAMs, SSMS, sensors, communications, filter centers, etc. directly involved in the challenge to control of Kuwait--whether in Kuwait or Iraq--would be disabled, jammed, or destroyed.

After establishing control of Kuwaiti air space by default if Saddam doesn't resist, or by destruction of countervailing Iraqi air power if he does, the coalition could give Saddam the opportunity to pull out his troops completely, leaving behind the weapons systems which he introduced illegally into Kuwait. If he did not comply, the coalition would begin the process of air attack on Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait and their lines of resupply. Such attacks would avoid Kuwait City and minimize damage to US, Kuwaiti and other foreign and Iraqi civilians by concentrating on those targets, such as drinking water for Iraqi troops, that can have immediate effect when disrupted. Air power could also be used to permit the introduction of resistance and other special ground forces to monitor and report Iraqi military movements, to cut lines of supply, to harass troops, and, where feasible, to infiltrate population centers and to join other Kuwaiti resistance fighters in protecting Kuwaiti and Third Country civilians.

In particular to deter Saddam's threat to set fires to the Kuwaiti oil fields, which would be very difficult to extinguish, the coalition would: (a) make clear that if Saddam severely injured the Kuwaiti oil fields he might have to compensate the Kuwaitis by yielding an oil field of his own; and (b) airdrop special forces to protect these oil fields which are in any case distant from the Kuwaiti metropolitan area.

At the same time, the coalition would beam voice broadcasts by free Kuwaitis and free Iraqis, as well as other Arabs, directly at the Iraqi military forces in Kuwait. The purpose of such broadcasts should be to encourage defection and honorable surrender to ~~brother~~ other Arabs, i.e., Kuwaitis, Saudis, Egyptians, etc. Preparation by Arab members of the coalition to handle such large-scale defections would require a substantial but essential effort. (During Iraq's previous invasion of a neighbor, Iran, three times as many Iraqis surrendered as Iranians, especially when on land they had invaded.) This process would continue until front line divisions and reserves had been weakened enough to permit the breakthrough (at reasonable cost) and introduction of coalition armor and other ground forces in order to reclaim and reoccupy Kuwaiti territory.

Kuwait City would be by-passed and isolated to avoid door-to-door fighting which is costly both to civilians and to coalition military forces.

The encirclement and surrender of the huge force Iraq has put into Kuwait would be an enormous military disaster for Saddam. One doesn't have to kill every soldier to destroy a military force. Moreover, the retaking of Kuwait and the destruction of a good part of Iraqi combat aircraft, SAMs, etc., would facilitate further action against Iraq, including selective air strikes if necessary. This ~~enormous~~ military disaster to Iraqi military forces would very likely bring change in the Iraqi government.

In any case, whether or not it does bring down the government, the coalition could continue the economic embargo and would have a largely intact force in place and in a better position than before the exercise of this option to press other demands. ~~many of which have been~~ made by the US and endorsed by the UN.

The coalition could press Iraq to compensate for some of the harm its

invasion had done not only to Kuwait but to many other countries in the First World, the Third World and in socialist countries moving to democracy and free markets. It could do this not out of vengeance or out of any desire to reduce Iraq's ability to return to the world community and to develop its economy peacefully in the future, but, among other things, as a way of reducing its military power.

A reduction of Iraqi military force, a stop to its efforts to acquire nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and the use of the ^{Iraqi} "peace dividend" to make up for some of the harm done by Iraq's invasion.

TELEFAX TRANSMISSION

2 January 1991

To: General Brent Scowcroft
202-456-2883

From: Albert Wohlstetter
FAX: 213-654-1694
PHONE: 213-656-6101

Dear Brent,

Attached is the final version, tightened and sharpened, of the short unclassified paper I faxed to you on Monday. I hope it will help.

I can provide further unclassified and classified detail and hope we can discuss it on the STU III.

Best regards,



16 pages follow.

SHAPING PRECISE MEANS TO CLEAR-CUT ENDS IN THE GULF
Albert Wohlstetter
Fred Hoffman

Summary

To break the deadlock in the Gulf, we've proposed that Kuwait and its allies resume the use of its sovereign air space with an air patrol powerful enough to make evident that it can and will defend its sovereignty against any challenge by Saddam, whether it originates in Iraq or in occupied Kuwait. It would be for Saddam, then, to choose war or peace. If he chose war, the Coalition would use air supremacy quickly to isolate, attack, and encourage large-scale surrender of Iraqi equipment and ground forces (especially to Arab members of the Coalition); and to pave the way for Coalition ground forces to reclaim the rest of Kuwait.

With this most widely agreed on immediate objective clearly achieved, supported by the continuing embargo, and a now plainly credible threat to use additional force if Iraq doesn't comply, the Coalition would press its broader and longer term demands: among others, compensation for the damage done by invading Kuwait, a drastic reduction in Iraq's military power, and especially an end to its program for getting the ability to deliver, at short and long range, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

This option has clear advantages for the short and long run over other alternatives in the public debate: (a) continuing to rely solely on an embargo of indeterminate--and perhaps forever indeterminable--length, (b) an immediate ground assault on unweakened Iraqi divisions in and near Kuwait, (c) an immediate use of strategic bombing to destroy all of Iraq's military power deep in its heartland.

(a) The embargo is unlikely to convince Saddam that the Coalition has the will to use force to get him out of Kuwait completely and unconditionally. He is likely to tolerate the pain the embargo will inflict primarily on his civil society longer than the domestic and international Coalition would bear the high political and economic costs of insisting on his getting out without compromise.

(b) Starting with a head-on ground assault would involve large and unnecessary costs in US lives.

(c) An immediate bombing offensive to destroy the entire base of Saddam's military power would focus on the least time-urgent and some of the most elusive Iraqi targets to accomplish a vaguely defined and very likely infeasible and undesirable goal. It would do great damage to Iraqi civil society and could significantly harm some of its neighbors. It would delay and might even prevent the quick retaking of Kuwait.

All three of these alternatives, including an embargo that ended by rewarding Iraqi aggression in a region that engages key US and allied interests, would make it still harder for us credibly to threaten or to use military force to protect our interests in the future. They would weaken our ability to contribute to keeping the peace in a world where our contribution will be essential.

Convincing Saddam the Coalition Has the Will to Use Force

Leading figures in the Congress advocate our continuing to rely on the embargo to get Saddam out of Kuwait completely and unconditionally as we and the UN Security Council have demanded since the day of his invasion. So did the principal witnesses appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearings, most of whom appeared to be saying that it might take a year or more, and at least one of whom--Edward Luttwak--said it might take five years,

"to work".

Both Senator Nunn and Senator Mitchell have argued that one of the drawbacks of using military force is that we'd never know whether the embargo would have worked without it.

That isn't the problem, however. A more relevant problem is how we'd ever know that the embargo was not working, and how we would know whether the embargo was working until and unless Saddam actually withdrew from Kuwait, completely and unconditionally.

Saddam has an almost unlimited contempt for the West's willingness to use force to oppose him. He will do anything he thinks he can get away with. He thought he could get away with seizing Kuwait, and he still thinks so. The embargo is intended to make it unacceptably costly to Saddam to continue to occupy Kuwait. However, it inflicts pain primarily on the civilian population, and Saddam has a very high tolerance for pain inflicted, whether by outsiders or by himself, on his civilian population. The embargo also reduces imports of supplies for the military forces, but Saddam will see to it that the military will feel it much less than the civil population. And the reduction in the efficiency of his military force, like the increase in the efficiency of ours, would be important only if we actually use military force against him. He doesn't believe we will.

On the other hand, members of the Coalition are incurring costs. There have been huge losses most obviously to the Kuwaitis, in blood as well as treasure. There has been enormous suffering as well as monetary loss on the part of the Palestinians who had been working and living in Kuwait, on the part of the Egyptians, Indians and many other Third World nationals who work there, and on countries like Turkey that have lost large revenues from their oil pipeline and other trade. Also on the part of the Socialist countries

moving precariously toward capitalism and democracy, dependent on oil and trade with Iraq, and with large credits they have earned in Iraq. The democracies of the West will continue to incur a variety of costs, not least of which is the mischief done by fringe members of the Coalition—such as Syria in Lebanon, China in its prosecution of Tian An Men dissidents, and the Union government in the Soviet Union in its use of the KGB and the army to suppress the movement toward independence and the genuine rule of law.

In fact, as the embargo takes its effect on the Iraqi population, Saddam will be able (with increasing persuasiveness) to demonstrate on CNN and on every network's evening news program the hardship the embargo will be inflicting on Iraqi women and children. Western and many Arab members of the coalition are likely to have a lower tolerance for inflicting pain on the Iraqis than Saddam.

In brief, the real parallel with the seemingly interminable war in Vietnam may be the embargo. The key problem in Vietnam was a lack of clarity in our objectives that assured it would drag on and make it impossible to tell, for all the statistics of "body counts" and the like, whether we were making any genuine progress towards achieving these objectives. From the beginning we did not try to stop the flow of arms and other supplies from North Vietnam to the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. We said we would use "gradually increasing pressure" to make it "unacceptably costly" to the North Vietnamese to continue that supply. But we had no way of knowing just what costs Ho Chi Minh, Le Duc Tho et.al. were willing to see inflicted on their cadres in South Vietnam who made their way through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Ho and Le Duc Tho had a very high tolerance for pain inflicted on their subjects. Much higher than our tolerance for the pain of inflicting it. We found it "unacceptably costly" to continue, long before

they did. That's what they expected. That's what Saddam expects.

Even our accumulating an enormous military force in the Persian Gulf will not be enough to persuade Saddam, unless he believes that we will actually use it. The putative experts appearing before Congress and writing news analyses and op ed pieces in the daily press, or repeating their position endlessly in sound bites on CNN, emphasize the huge number of body bags they believe are likely to be sent back to the United States from Iraq, especially if we try a frontal ground attack on unweakened forces in Iraqi divisions on the Kuwaiti border. They seem only to confirm Saddam's repeated judgement that the American public won't accept the costs of using force in the Persian Gulf.

The key, then, is to present Saddam unequivocally with the fact that we will use force—to make that a fact--and that's possible only if we have a clearly visible way of doing that with rapid and decisive success and at tolerable costs in accomplishing an important, agreed-on goal. Such a goal is the demand announced on the day of the invasion by the White House and the UN Security Council and repeated ever since: the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

The Kernel of the Proposal

The kernel of the proposal we make for an immediate focus on reclaiming Kuwait, beginning by the actual use by Kuwait and its allies of its airspace, is to make it as certain as possible that we will use force if Kuwait's resuming control of its airspace is challenged. If Iraqi fighters based in Iraq or Kuwait attempt to intercept a powerful Coalition force of aircraft using Kuwait's sovereign airspace, the Coalition would have to defend itself. It would pursue Iraqi fighters sent up to intercept the force and destroy them in

the air or on the ground in Iraq. The use of Kuwaiti sovereign air space by Kuwait and the countries it invites is of course not an act of aggression. Nor even, in any reasonable sense of that term much-abused in the current debate, "offensive." The Coalition would use, and defend its use of, Kuwaiti airspace against Iraqi fighters. Saddam would have the option of avoiding attack on Coalition air--the choice between war and peace. Similarly, if the radars on Iraqi surface-to-air missile batteries are turned on to acquire Coalition aircraft, the coalition would have no alternative but to destroy them, whether they are in Kuwait or across the border in Iraq. If the Iraqis were to prepare to use batteries of SCUD-B or Silkworm surface-to-surface missiles, the Coalition would destroy any they could attack. The Coalition would have little alternative other than to destroy any military force or equipment, including sensors, filter centers, communication nodes that could offer substantial help to Saddam in an immediate challenge to the use and control of Kuwaiti airspace which the Coalition had undertaken.

Our proposal is not to use the reclaiming of Kuwait as a pretext to destroy capabilities that Saddam could not possibly use in a timely way to challenge the reclaiming of Kuwait. It would not be used as a pretext for the immediate destruction of plants making solid propellants, or assembling SCUD-B missiles, or manufacturing chemical or biological weapons. These have no genuine urgency and there may be some large drawbacks in the collateral damage we'd do in attacking some of these. In general, Saddam is likely to have located the moveable and fixed surface-to-surface missile batteries that could immediately threaten our allies and our own forces in unpopulated desert areas where they are both more secure and closer and so able to do the most damage to his adversaries. Saddam's factories for making missile components and assembling them tend to be much nearer population centers, if not embedded in

them, to be close to sources of labor and supplies and rail, road or water transport networks. (A year ago last August, the press reported an accidental explosion in an Iraqi plant at Al Hillah making solid propellant for its rockets. The reports said that the explosion killed up to 700 people.) We would use air power to destroy any SCUD or other surface-to-surface missile battery we could locate, because Saddam could use them without warning in challenging control of Kuwait. Parts factories and assembly plants don't have the same urgency. The time urgency of these targets varies inversely with the unintended harm we might do.

We stress that we would destroy not only any Iraqi missile battery based in Kuwait that challenged our use of Kuwaiti airspace, but any Iraqi missile battery we can locate in Iraq that could challenge it immediately. Iraq would be no sanctuary from which the reclaiming of Kuwait could be challenged.

There are several key differences, then, between what we propose and the persistently misunderstood US experience in Vietnam. One is the fact that our proposal sets forth a clear political-military objective defined in territorial terms, namely, the rapid reclaiming of all Kuwait. Not to make it "unacceptably costly" for Saddam to challenge our reclaiming of Kuwait, but to retake Kuwait and defend it by destroying any challenge to its sovereignty. We differ here not only from US policy in Vietnam, but from those who advocate sole reliance on an embargo to impose "unacceptable costs" on Saddam.

Second, there would be no sanctuary. In Vietnam, the Communist Party of North Vietnam located its Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) a few kilometers across the border in Cambodia. North Vietnamese forces conducted raids on our forces in South Vietnam and on ARVN, and then ducked back into Cambodia or Laos. For many years we accepted the fiction that Cambodia and Laos were neutral territory. But if Saddam attacked our forces, we should

respond by disabling anything any place that could offer an immediate challenge to our continuing control of Kuwait, and we should destroy such time-urgent targets on an urgent basis.

A third related difference is that with the overwhelming force available to us we could complete the job of controlling airspace in a very short time, very likely in days. (The Israelis in 1982 in their war with Syria took 10 minutes to destroy more SA-6s than Saddam has in and near Kuwait, without the loss of one aircraft.) We would then continue to use air power to isolate Iraqi forces in and near Kuwait, to cut off their supplies especially of water and other items that would take immediate effect, and to attack Iraqi divisions deployed along the Saudi borders and its tactical reserve divisions in Kuwait directly--and so to weaken them that it would be feasible to introduce armored and other ground forces at reasonable cost. To take ground. And, with Arab members of the coalition in the lead, to take prisoners. To destroy the Iraqi armed forces in and near Kuwait as an organized force. To be prepared if necessary to continue the embargo and enforce other demands for Iraqi compensation for the immense damage its invasion has done, for war crime trials, and for the termination of their programs for getting the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction over long and short range.

Why the Immediate Focus on Kuwait Rather than Saddam's Long-Term Military Power?

We have a strong interest in reducing Iraq's ability and disposition to use weapons of mass destruction and other military power to disturb the peace in the future and gain control. Why not take a strategic bombing offensive aimed at destroying his military power as the immediate focus of Coalition action against Saddam?

The first reason is that such an offensive would divert resources from

the urgent objective of getting Saddam out of Kuwait swiftly and totally. It would delay us. And it would have large opportunity costs, both for speedily reclaiming Kuwait and for the ultimate reduction in Iraq's ability and disposition to use military power in the Gulf. First things first.

A second reason associated with the first is that the job is much harder, especially if it's undertaken at the outset, than the task of reclaiming Kuwait. It involves deeper penetrations through air defenses in Iraq as well as Kuwait, including active defenses of strategic targets that are both denser and harder to suppress because they are likely to be more uncertain as to their precise location. The surface-to-air missile batteries like the advanced Soviet SA-6 or the French and German Roland can be moved more frequently than periodic satellite observations that we must depend on principally for observation of the Iraqi heartland in Baghdad Province. Look at a map: Kuwait is only 6200 square miles, compared to over 172,000 square miles for Iraq. The maximum distance in Kuwait from international waters or Saudi sovereign territory is about 100 miles. Kuwait is largely open to surveillance by optics, radar and electromagnetic and other sensors on AWACS or on TR-1 photo reconnaissance and other tactical aircraft flying in Saudi or international air space. Even short-range unmanned air vehicles with a variety of sensors, and Stealth aircraft with powerful IR imaging sensors could use Kuwaiti's sovereign air space to obtain essentially continuous surveillance before as well as during combat.

We are better able to locate targets in Kuwait than in Iraq, where Saddam has had many years to harden and hide underground key materials and facilities. Hardened, poorly located targets that have an uncertain amount of moveable, active defense can present formidable problems for reliable destruction even by large nuclear weapons, not to say conventional explosives. The

job of finding and attacking selected targets deep in Iraq will be made somewhat easier when our reconnaissance and attack aircraft can be based nearer by in Kuwait and air-refueled over it.

Third, there are better options for cutting off the 600,000 or so troops that Saddam will have in Kuwait from national command than by trying to find and destroy the National Command Authority in Baghdad. Saddam boasts of his elusiveness and probably compares favorably with Castro in this respect, who is reputed to have at least 28 alternate places to stay. Saddam almost surely would be someplace else at the time of attack, in an alternate command post hardened and concealed. Advocates of an initial decapitating strike ignore the lesson taught by COSVN in Cambodia, Qaddafi in Libya, Noriega in Panama. Even prisoners of war, we learned at Son Tay, can be moved more frequently than our recurrent means of observing them.

Fourth. This point applies in particular to the problem of finding and destroying key materials for making nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Uranium is extremely dense. Saddam's small lumps of highly enriched uranium (HEU) are not likely to be found at any known places, nor are the extremely expensive and few grams of tritium gas which could be of great use not only in making fusion weapons but in increasing the effectiveness of fission bombs. The HEU and other critical materials and facilities can be reliably found only after the defection of a large part of Saddam's army makes a change of government and an international inquiry on the spot feasible.

Fifth, the objective of destroying Saddam's military power sounds clear enough, but actually is troublingly vague. Does it mean that we should destroy at the outset of this war any facility that could support Iraqi military power now and in the future, even if they have a double function to support Iraqi civil society? That would cover a very large proportion of the facili-

ties and resources needed to support Iraqi civil society. Especially if it includes the oil reserves which have enable Saddam to buy military power, it's very doubtful that it can be done at all, but in any case it's a bad idea. Arab members of the Coalition who support the retaking of Kuwait have been reluctant to take part in the invasion of Iraq, much less its total destruction. Those who oppose the military option in the United States frequently assume that it would mean the destruction of Iraq, and say they oppose it on that ground, among others. And members of the Administration have indicated, with good reason, that destroying Iraqi power completely--if it could be done--would only make it more difficult to contain the power of Syria or a resurgent Iran.

Finally, there is the problem of destroying Iraq's civil society unintentionally. We want to neutralize Saddam's military force. Saddam would prefer us to kill Iraqi civilians. If, as some in the public debate seem to propose, we were to try simply to use non-nuclear weapons to mimic the major nuclear SIOP against the Soviet Union in the familiar scenario for Mutual Assured Destruction, we would run down a bombing encyclopedia of targets, many of them embedded in population centers. We'd be unlikely to get the National Command Authority but very likely to get Baghdad. If we attacked a biological weapons facility like Salman Paq (some 53 kilometers southeast of Baghdad and near the Tigris River and the population there), we might do a great deal of unintended harm--and not only to the local population. A dispersed cloud of anthrax might harm distant as well as local population, depending on how the winds blew.

An opening attack of that sort might do immediate damage not only to our ability to complete the immediate task of reclaiming Kuwait and the longer-term goals of reducing Iraq's ability and disposition to use weapons of mass

destruction and other military force since there would be worldwide protests. It would also do grievous harm to our ability to use force in the future in a turbulent world where a temperate use of American military force will have a critical role in keeping a modicum of stability.

The unpopulated featureless desert where Saddam has deployed his divisions in and near Kuwait contrasts both with the tropical jungles of Vietnam and with the cloud-covered forests and farms of Northern Europe. It presents a nearly ideal environment for the use of air power in near interdiction. It is also ideal for rapid, enveloping maneuvers of armored ground forces, in contrast to the head-on charge through dug-in, unweakened divisions presumed in much of the public debate. And it is ideal for focusing both air and ground attack on military forces rather than on innocent bystanders.

* * * *

To achieve our short-term objective of getting Saddam out of Kuwait rapidly, completely and unconditionally, we should focus our attention on targets that serve that task. Finishing that task will mean compelling the surrender or destruction as an organized force of the huge armies Saddam has assembled in and near Kuwait. That, in turn, can serve the larger and longer-term goal not only of ending Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical programs and its preponderance in the Gulf, but also the broader purpose of preventing any other power from gaining such a preponderance.

APPENDIX BRIEFLY ILLUSTRATING A STEP-BY-STEP EXECUTION
OF THE RECOMMENDED OPTION
Stressing the Role of Arab Members of the Coalition

Further details and some of the uncertainties in the option focusing immediately on the retaking of Kuwait may be shown in the form of a step-by-step outline:

As a first step, use short-slant-range manned tactical reconnaissance aircraft, AWACS and short-range unmanned air vehicles as well as NIM to identify, locate and keep under surveillance key targets in and near Kuwait, especially movable targets.

The Kuwaitis would tell Saddam that: In accordance with UN Article 51 and Resolution 660, aircraft invited by Kuwait and only such aircraft will be allowed to use their sovereign air space. Saddam would be warned to keep his fighters out of Kuwaiti airspace or Kuwaiti bases and not to turn on the radars of his SAMS. (The Coalition might even be able to adapt quickly some unmanned air vehicles currently in US and allied forces for use as harrassment drones, in the manner of the British "Alarm" or the US "Tacit Rainbow." These don't have to meet all the "mil specs" demanded for use in a variety of other circumstances. They could hover or cruise in the range of the radars so long as they were not radiating, and would home on the radars only if they were turned on.)

If, faced with overwhelming air power, Saddam nonetheless stays and challenges the reclaiming of Kuwaiti airspace, then Iraqi aircraft, SAMS, SSMS, sensors, communications, filter centers, etc. directly involved in the challenge to control of Kuwait--whether in Kuwait or Iraq--would be disabled, jammed, or destroyed.

After establishing control of Kuwaiti airspace--by default if Saddam doesn't resist, or by destruction of countervailing Iraqi air power if he does--the Coalition would give Saddam the opportunity to pull out his troops completely, leaving behind the tanks, armored personnel carriers, SAMs and other weapons systems which he has introduced illegally into Kuwait. If he did not comply, the Coalition would begin the process of air attack on Iraqi ground forces in Kuwait and their lines of resupply. Such attacks would avoid Kuwait City and minimize damage to US, Kuwaiti and other foreign and Iraqi civilians by concentrating on those targets, such as drinking water for Iraqi troops, that can have immediate effect when disrupted. Shortages of drinking water for the troops have been reported by defectors continually from near the start of the invasion to the present time. (They show that even marginal further disruption to the inadequate and vulnerable system of distributing water to the divisions in deserts in or near Kuwait can encourage defection.) Air power could also be used to permit the introduction of resistance and other special ground forces to monitor and report Iraqi military movements, to cut lines of supply, to harass troops, and, where feasible, to infiltrate population centers and to join other Kuwaiti resistance fighters in protecting Kuwaiti and Third Country civilians.

In particular to deter Saddam's threat to set fires to the Kuwaiti oil fields, which would be very difficult to extinguish, the Coalition would: (a) make clear that if Saddam severely injured the Kuwaiti oil fields he might have to compensate the Kuwaitis by yielding an oil field of his own; and (b) air drop special forces to protect these oil fields which are in any case distant from the Kuwaiti metropolitan area.

At the same time, the Coalition would beam voice broadcasts by free Kuwaitis and free Iraqis, as well as other Arabs, directly at the Iraqi

military forces in Kuwait. The purpose of such broadcasts should be to encourage defection and honorable surrender to brother Arabs, i.e., Kuwaitis, Saudis, Egyptians, etc. Preparation by Arab members of the Coalition to handle such large-scale defections would require a substantial but essential effort. (During Iraq's previous invasion of a neighbor, Iran, three times as many Iraqis surrendered as Iranians, especially when on land they had invaded.) This process would continue until front line divisions and reserves had been weakened enough to permit the breakthrough (at reasonable cost) and introduction of Coalition armor and other ground forces in order to reclaim and reoccupy Kuwaiti territory.

Kuwait City would be by-passed and isolated to avoid door-to-door fighting which is costly both to civilians and to Coalition military forces. Drinking water for Kuwait City would not be cut off. Neither would the water from Turkey or Syria to Iraq.

The encirclement and surrender of the huge force Iraq has put into Kuwait would be an enormous military disaster for Saddam. One doesn't have to kill every soldier to destroy a military force. Moreover, the retaking of Kuwait and the destruction of a good part of Iraqi combat aircraft, SAMs, etc., would facilitate further action against Iraq, including selective air strikes if necessary. This military disaster to Iraqi military forces would very likely bring change in the Iraqi government.

In any case, whether or not it does bring down the government, the Coalition could continue the economic embargo and would have a largely intact force in place and in a better position than before the exercise of this option to press other demands made by the US and endorsed by the UN.

The Coalition could press Iraq to compensate for some of the harm its invasion had done not only to Kuwait but to many other countries in the First

World, the Third World and in socialist countries moving to democracy and free markets. It could do this not out of vengeance or out of any desire to reduce Iraq's ability to return to the world community and to develop its economy peacefully in the future, but, among other things, as a way of reducing its military power--the sustained reduction of Iraqi military forces, a stop in particular to its efforts to acquire nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and the use of this Iraqi "peace dividend" to make up for some of the harm done by Iraq's invasion.