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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 85033
Folder ID Number: 85033-008

Folder Title:
Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
V	0	0	0	0

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	Timothy E. Deal to Wilma G. Hall Re: International Debt (1 pp.)	5/1/89	(b)(1)	C
02. Memo	Brenda I. Hilliard to Distribution List Re: Presidential Meeting - Panama (1 pp.)	4/26/89	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft and Richard N. Haass Re: Meeting with Prince Bandar (2 pp.)	4/24/89	(b)(1)	C
04a. Memo	William W. Working to Brent Scowcroft Re: Courtesy Call (1 pp.)	3/28/89	(b)(1)	
04b. Vitae	Re: Curriculum Vitae (1 pp.)	11/5/87	(b)(1), (b)(6)	
04c. Report	Re: Role and Mandate of the Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator, Privy Council Office (3 pp.)	11/5/87	(b)(1)	
05a. Proposal	Re: Schedule Proposal (1 pp.)	4/1/89	(b)(1)	
05b. Memo	Melvyn Levitsky to Brent Scowcroft Re: Appointment Requests: NATO SYG Manfred Woerner (1 pp.)	3/24/89	(b)(1)	
05c. Report	Re: [Government Report] (2 pp.)	2/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap2246
OA/ID Number: 85033-008
Date Closed: 9/13/2010
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S[2]
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05d. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Appointment for NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (1 pp.)	3/30/89	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	Robert Blackwill to Brent Scowcroft Re: Rand Study (2 pp.)	3/30/89	(b) (1)	C
07. Report	Re: [Government Report] (1 pp.)	4/22/85	(b)(1)	C
08a. Memo	Diane L. Edwards to Arnold Kanter and Robert Blackwill Re: ABM Briefing (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S
08b. Memo	Linton Brooks to Florence E. Gantt Re: Strategic Defense Briefing (1 pp.)	4/8/89	(b)(1)	S
08c. Memo	Diane L. Edwards to Arnold Kanter and Robert Blackwill Re: ABM Briefing (1 pp.)	4/10/89	(b)(1)	S
09a. Letter	Henry F. Cooper to Brent Scowcroft Re: [United States Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union] (1 pp.)	2/14/89	(b) (1)	
09b. Report	Re: Arms Control, SDI and Next Steps by Henry F. Cooper (11 pp.)	2/14/89	(b) (1)	
10. Report	Re: Defense Issues and Budgets (20 pp.)	12/1988	(b) (1)	

Page 2 of 2

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Re-review Case #:

P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-May-1989 08:42 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wilma G. Hall
(HALL)

SUBJECT: Photo Op - Carol Paquette

Carol,

General Scowcroft would like to take you with him at 8:00 am on Friday, May 5 at the beginning of his briefing with the President for a farewell/photo op. You may wish to come to the General's office about 7:55 a.m.

For the photo op with you and your family, General Scowcroft defers to your personal preference: (1) in his office with you and your family, OR (2) at the party in the Indian Treaty Room. Please advise.

Thanks very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Carol A. Paquette	(PAQUETTE)
CC: George D. Robinson, Sr.	(ROBINSON)
CC: Brenda K. DePoortere	(DEPOORTERE)
CC: Helen Pahlke	(PAHLKE)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Brenda I. Hilliard	(HILLIARD)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4-May-1989 07:33 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Wilma G. Hall
(HALL)

SUBJECT: Soviet Amb Dubinin

Amb Dubinin is scheduled to meet with Gen Scowcroft at 5:00 pm, Friday, May 5 (30 minutes). He will be accompanied by Kuznetsov and Zolotov. Bob Gates will participate. Blackwill and Rice should plan to attend.

Pls provide Gen Scowcroft with paper for mtg -- agenda items Dubinin is likely to raise and any General Scowcroft should address on the eve of Amb Dubinin's trip back to Moscow for Baker/Shevardnadze Ministerial Meeting.

Thanks very much

Distribution:

FOR: Robert Blackwill	(BLACKWILL)
FOR: Condoleezza Rice	(RICE)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Jackie Murphy	(MURPHY)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Arnold Kanter	(KANTER)

*Per Condi Rice,
no paper required*

May 3, 1989

*Scheduled
6:15 pm.
Jai 5/5/89*

General:

Boyden Gray would like to meet with you and Nick Rostow to discuss HR-91 -- tomorrow if possible.

I asked Nick for recommendation -- he recommends doing as soon as your calendar will permit.

I checked with Ginny Lampley who said that Berman has called Boyden with some alternatives to what you and Boyden offered Berman in the meeting on the Hill. They want to reach a conclusion and Boyden wants to work it out with you. Ginny wants to be included in meeting.

☒ Okay to schedule when there's a window on my calendar

☐ I will call Boyden to discuss

Other: _____

Wilma

Respond to: Debbie x 2632

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-May-1989 19:46 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brent Scowcroft

(SCOWCROFT)

FROM:

Nicholas Rostow
(ROSTOW)

SUBJECT:

H.R. 91 -- Possible Call from Gray

Boyden likely will call you in the next day or two. As I mentioned at the staff meeting, Berman is looking for a substitute for the "vital" in the phrase "vital to the national security interests of the United States" establishing one of the conditions a proposed transaction must meet in order for the President to waive the prohibitions in H.R. 91. Berman has suggested "essential", which, according to my dictionary, is a synonym for vital. While retaining the usual Foreign Assistance Act standard would be best ("important to the national interests of the United States" or "in the national interest of the United States"), I think one might try out one of the following if Berman simply won't go along with existing language:

-- advances or substantially or materially advances our counterterrorism policy; or

-- is advantageous to our national interest; or

-- materially advances the national interest.

The first of these formulations is analogous to provisions regarding nuclear non-proliferation: the President may furnish security assistance to a non-nuclear weapons state that otherwise would be barred if he certifies that "termination of such assistance would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security."

Berman also proposed changing "30 legislative days" to "60 days" with respect to notification to Congress of the President's determination to revoke the designation of a country as having repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism. Berman would retain the two week period for notice and consultation prior to taking action on the President's determination to rescind the terrorism determination.

Boyden has visions of spinning this discussion out for some weeks. Other congressional committees are focusing on the bill and noising concerns of their own. Still, the President may have to veto the bill in the end.

CC: Virginia A. Lampley

(LAMPLEY)

CC: Nancy B. Dyke

(DYKE)

CC: Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4-May-1989 16:41 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Photo Op with the President

We have just been informed that Scheduling has placed Mrs. Violetta Chamorro, publisher of Nicaragua's La Prensa Newspaper, on the President's calendar for a brief meeting and photo op tomorrow at 2:25 p.m. for five minutes in the Oval Office.

Your meeting paper, along with a disc, is due in the Executive Secretary's office as soon as possible.

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: David Pacelli	(PACELLI)
CC: Virginia Runion	(RUNION)
CC: Marilyn E. Wilson	(WILSONM)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Michael B. Donley	(DONLEY)
CC: Daniel L. Snyder	(SNYDER)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Jackie Murphy	(MURPHY)
CC: Diane G. Ross	(ROSSDG)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

May 5, 1989

President Bush today met with Mrs. Violeta Chamorro, publisher of the Nicaraguan newspaper La Prensa. Mrs. Chamorro is in Washington at the invitation of the National Endowment for Democracy.

Mrs. Chamorro and La Prensa have become symbols of freedom of expression and the struggle against tyranny and dictatorship throughout Latin America, beginning with the struggle against the Somoza government.

During the meeting, the President expressed his deep regard for Mrs. Chamorro and of her unceasing efforts to carry on the tradition of her assassinated husband over the last ten years in the face of Sandinista harassment and intimidation.

The President told Mrs. Chamorro that he shared her disappointment and concern that the new media law promulgated by the Sandinistas does not guarantee the free functioning of the media and unrestricted political expression. The new law gives the Ministry of Interior wide latitude for prosecuting and punishing the media for such ill-defined concepts as violating "national integrity" and for publishing "injurious, defamatory and false news." Rather than relaxing existing controls and increasing freedom of expression, the law is a more systematic compilation of existing restrictions and sanctions.

The Sandinista media law, as well as the recently approved electoral law, do not comply with the letter or the spirit of the Esquipulas and El Salvador agreements signed by Central American leaders. The President and Mrs. Chamorro expressed their hope that international leaders would use their influence to persuade the Sandinistas to fulfill their commitment.

This sounds rather weak. Also, isn't the US an "international leader" or is it code for the Soviets (could be read that way).

*Thanks
JK*

(Please let me know asap if you want to alter or leave as is -- Thanks)

1. ~~Bob~~
2. ~~General~~

April 28, 1989

Bob/General --

Please advise how you want to do the Presidential Photo-op for Carol Paquette. Her last day is Friday, May 5. There is a party that morning for her at 10:00 in the Indian Treaty Room. Your participation will be at 10:30. I will have George get pertinent information over to us. NSC Staff is going to present her with a painting as her parting gift. She will also have a plaque.

Let's do it prior to PDB/NSB on Friday at 8:00 ✓

Other _____

She would also like a photo-op with you (General) to include her family. Do you want to have this done at the party or do you want something separate done in your office?

Let's do at party _____ In office whenever _____

Florence

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Apr-1989 09:59 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George D. Robinson, Sr.
(ROBINSON)

SUBJECT: Farewell Reception

FAREWELL RECEPTION AND COFFEE IN HONOR OF CAROL A. PAQUETTE

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
cordially invites you to attend
a farewell reception and coffee
in honor of
Carol A. Paquette
Director of Administration
Friday, May 5th, 10:00-11:00 A.M.
Indian Treaty Room, OEOB

Requested donations:
\$4 Professional Staff
\$3 Support Staff
(Forward to G. Robinson
NSC Admin, OEOB 397).

Refreshments:
10:00-10:30 A.M.
Ceremony:
10:30 A.M.

A favor of a reply is requested.
Please RSVP by May 2nd.

Distribution:

FOR: Brad D. Andries	(ANDRIES)
FOR: Brock Ayers	(AYERS)
FOR: Florence Bagnall	(BAGNALL)
FOR: Deborah Baker	(BAKER)
FOR: Remote Addressee	(BARRY AT A1 AT VAXE)
FOR: Pat Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
FOR: Robert R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Ralph Bellamy	(BELLAMY)
FOR: Stephen E. Benko	(BENKO)
FOR: William Blitgen	(BLITGEN)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Apr-1989 15:04 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

George D. Robinson, Sr.
(ROBINSON)

SUBJECT:

Carol Paquette

Florence, I would like to request the following photo-ops for Carol Paquette's departure.

- PRESIDENTIAL PHOTO-OP:
(President, CP)
As available, please advise date and time.
- GENERAL SCOWCROFT:
(NSA, CP, Family)
As available, please advise date and time.
- FAREWELL RECEPTION AND COFFEE:
Friday, May 5, 1989 (10:00-11:00 A.M.)
Ceremony: 10:30 A.M.
Indian Treaty Room

Many thanks, George.

CC: Robert M. Gates
CC: G. Philip Hughes

(GATES)
(HUGHES)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

25-Apr-1989 08:44 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George D. Robinson, Sr.
(ROBINSON)

SUBJECT: CP FAREWELL EVENT UPDATE

Event Update:

Reception and Coffee (ROBINSON):

- Indian Treaty Room is reserved.
- Cost is \$4 Professional Staff and \$3 Support Staff.
- Date is Friday, May 5th.
- TIME HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO 10:00-11:00 A.M.
VICE 9:30-10:30 A.M. DUE TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT'S
SCHEDULE ON THE 5TH. CEREMONY IS AT 10:30 A.M.
- Menu as published.
- Staff solicitation has started (89APR24).

NSC Plaque (ROBINSON):

- Done. Received from engraver.

Presidential Letter (DONLEY):

- Pending. Final draft will be forwarded to EXSEC
by April 26th.

Presidential Photo-Op (ROBINSON):

- Request made. Awaiting approval, date and time.

Scowcroft Letter (DONLEY):

- Pending. Final draft will be forwarded to EXSEC
by April 26th.

Scowcroft Photo-Op (ROBINSON):

- Request made for Photo-Op with Family. Awaiting
approval, date and time.
- Request made for Farewell Ceremony, May 5th,
10:30 A.M.

Staff Gift (DEPOORTERE):

- Working. Staff solicitation started 89APRIL24.
- Donation total needed is \$150.
- Gift is an oil painting or print.

Outside Complex Guests (ADMIN):

- Immediate family only, currently identified by Carol.

Next update May 1st.

Thanks, George.

Distribution:

FOR: Michael B. Donley
FOR: Brenda K. DePoortere

(DONLEY)
(DEPOORTERE)

CC: G. Philip Hughes
CC: Bill VanHorn
CC: Florence E. Gantt
CC: Cathy Millison
CC: Helen Pahlke
CC: Bronya S. Hartness
CC: Wendy E. Gray

(HUGHES)
(VANHORN)
(GANTT)
(MILLISON)
(PAHLKE)
(HARTNESS)
(GRAY)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2-May-1989 11:03 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George D. Robinson, Sr.
(ROBINSON)

SUBJECT: CAROL PAQUETTE FAREWELL CEREMONY

**** CAROL PAQUETTE FAREWELL RECEPTION AND COFFEE ****

General Scowcroft requests the pleasure of your company to attend a farewell reception and coffee for Carol Paquette, Director of Administration on Friday, May 5th at 10:00 a.m. in the Indian Treaty Room, OEOB.

Ceremony at 10:30 a.m. with Coffee, Juice and Danish refreshments served 10:00-10:30 a.m. Requested donations: Professional Staff \$4 and Support Staff \$3 (Forward to NSC Admin, Attn: G. Robinson).

Your immediate reply not later than Thursday, May 4th is greatly appreciated.

Distribution:

FOR: Brad D. Andries	(ANDRIES)
FOR: Brock Ayers	(AYERS)
FOR: Florence Bagnall	(BAGNALL)
FOR: Deborah Baker	(BAKER)
FOR: Remote Addressee	(BARRY AT A1 AT VAXE)
FOR: Pat Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
FOR: Robert R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Ralph Bellamy	(BELLAMY)
FOR: Stephen E. Benko	(BENKO)
FOR: William Blitgen	(BLITGEN)
FOR: Richard E. Boehnlein	(BOEHNLEIN)
FOR: Charlene C. Bolinski	(BOLINSKI)
FOR: Linton Brooks	(BROOKS)
FOR: Richard E. Broome	(BROOME)
FOR: Barbara Browne	(BROWNE)
FOR: Susan G. Bunch	(BUNCH)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-May-1989 09:57 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George D. Robinson, Sr.
(ROBINSON)

SUBJECT: CAROL PAQUETTE FAREWELL RECEPTION

Gang, mark your calendars for this Friday morning 10:00-11:00 A.M. for a Farewell Reception and Coffee in honor of Carol A. Paquette, Director of Administration.

Friday, May 5th, 10:00-11:00 A.M.
Indian Treaty Room, OEOB

Coffee, Fruit Juices, Danish, Rolls and Fruits
10:00-10:30 A.M.

Ceremony
10:30 A.M.

Requested donations:
\$4 Professional Staff
\$3 Support Staff
(Forward to G. Robinson)
NSC Admin, OEOB 397)

A favor of a reply is requested.

Distribution:

FOR: Brad D. Andries	(ANDRIES)
FOR: Brock Ayers	(AYERS)
FOR: Florence Bagnall	(BAGNALL)
FOR: Deborah Baker	(BAKER)
FOR: Remote Addressee	(BARRY AT A1 AT VAXE)
FOR: Pat Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
FOR: Robert R. Beers	(BEERS)
FOR: Ralph Bellamy	(BELLAMY)
FOR: Stephen E. Benko	(BENKO)
FOR: William Blitgen	(BLITGEN)
FOR: Richard E. Boehnlein	(BOEHNLEIN)
FOR: Charlene C. Bolinski	(BOLINSKI)

10:30
Fri
5/5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

17-Apr-1989 09:21 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: George D. Robinson, Sr.
(ROBINSON)

SUBJECT: CP Farewell Event Update

Event Update:

Reception and Coffee (ROBINSON):

- Indian Treaty Room is reserved.
- Cost is set at \$4 Professional Staff and \$3 Support Staff.
- Date is set at Friday, May 5th, 9:30-10:30 A.M.
- Menu is Hot Coffee, Tea, Coco, Orange Juice, Grapefruit Juice, Croissant Rolls, Muffins, Jams and Butter.
- Staff solicitation and promotion will start April 24th.

NSC Plaque (ROBINSON):

- Has been ordered from engraver with May 1st delivery.

Presidential Letter (DONLEY):

- Draft working by Mike Donley. Forward draft to EXSEC by April 21st.

Presidential Photo-Op (ROBINSON):

- Action pending.

Scowcroft Letter (DONLEY):

- Draft working by Mike Donley. Forward draft to EXSEC by April 21st.

Scowcroft Photo-Op (ROBINSON):

- Formal Photo-Op with Family. Request pending.
- Reception Photo-Op request pending.

Staff Gift (DEPOORTERE):

- Action working by Brenda Depoortere.

Outside Complex Guests (ADMIN):

- Immediate family only, currently identified by Carol.

Next update April 24th.

Thanks, George.

Distribution:

FOR: Michael B. Donley	(DONLEY)
FOR: Brenda K. DePoortere	(DEPOORTERE)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Bill VanHorn	(VANHORN)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Helen Pahlke	(PAHLKE)
CC: Bronya S. Hartness	(HARTNESS)
CC: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-May-1989 09:18 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

David Pacelli

(PACELLI)

FROM: Wilma G. Hall
(HALL)

SUBJECT: Amb Deane Hinton - Request for Appt

Reference your package # 3000 (enroute back to you)

We have the Mulroney visit on May 4th so it's not a good day for Gen S.

Gen Scowcroft could see him at 4:30 pm on Fri, May 5th. Pls confirm if that will work on his schedule. Thanks very much.

CC: Virginia Runion
CC: Dona F. Proctor

(RUNION)
(PROCTOR)

5/4/89 Lenny Runion called
to confirm - no paper.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Apr-1989 11:02 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

5/4
Jhuan
3:30

FROM:

Robert L. Hutchings
(HUTCHINGS)

x 5732

~~Walt~~

SUBJECT:

Ambassador Grunwald

Henry Grunwald, US Ambassador to Austria, has requested (via State) a meeting on May 4 or 5 with General Scowcroft, whom he has known for many years. Grunwald will be here during the visit of Austrian Chancellor Vranitzky and will be available at any time except during Vranitzky's meeting with the President at 9:30 a.m. on the 5th. The Ambassador would like to talk about general trends in Europe and East-West relations.

Could you inquire whether General Scowcroft will be able to see him? I will be glad to notify Ambassador Grunwald.

Okay to schedule?

Yes MD Other _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2-May-1989 17:29 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Douglas H. Paal

(PAAL)

FROM: Wilma G. Hall
(HALL)

SUBJECT: Scowcroft Request: FSX

Doug,

General Scowcroft has asked if you could give him a copy of "the exchange of letters with the Japanese on FSX; exactly what the language is on source coding and on derived technology." He needs this tonight before he goes home for the night. He is on the Hill now and will be returning to office about 9:00 pm or so to do his papers.

Sorry for short fuse. . . many thanks.

Wilma

CC: Janet M. Jeffers	(JEFFERS)
CC: Virginia A. Lampley	(LAMPLEY)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Apr-1989 14:43 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Appointment with President

We have been informed by Scheduling that you have been placed on the President's calendar to meet with him in the Oval Office May 3, at 11:45 a.m. for a five-minute photo session.

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Shirin R. Tahir_Kheli

(TAHIR_KHELI)

CC: Linda Crowell

(CROWELL)

CC: Marilyn E. Wilson

(WILSONM)

CC: G. Philip Hughes

(HUGHES)

CC: Michael B. Donley

(DONLEY)

CC: Daniel L. Snyder

(SNYDER)

CC: Cathy Millison

(MILLISON)

CC: Jackie Murphy

(MURPHY)

CC: Diane G. Ross

(ROSSDG)

CC: Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

CC: Diane L. Edwards

(EDWARDS)

CC: Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

CC: Dona F. Proctor

(PROCTOR)

1:10 pm, June, 5/2/89

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-May-1989 08:32 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

FROM:

Timothy E. Deal
(DEAL)

SUBJECT:

International Debt

I have received back the memorandum to the General regarding the PCC meeting on international debt (log# 20341). The General said, "see me" and also asked about an update of an earlier memo regarding bankers' views on the Brady debt initiative. On April 24, we sent the General the update memo (Log# 2875), which also requested a meeting for Deane to report on his discussions with Citicorp Chairman Reed. We are ready to meet the General at his convenience.

CC: Deane E. Hoffman

(HOFFMAN)

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/5/24

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-May-1989 09:47 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

FROM: Robert L. Hutchings
(HUTCHINGS)

SUBJECT: RE: Dr. Peter Wallenberg - Request for Appt

I have confirmed the time -- May 2, 5:00 p.m. -- with Dr. Wallenberg's office. He will be accompanied by former U.S. Ambassador to Sweden Franklin Forsberg.

We will have them cleared in. I will sit in as notetaker, unless General Scowcroft prefers a private meeting.

CC: Dona F. Proctor
CC: Mary Kay Stults
CC: Robert Blackwill

(PROCTOR)
(STULTS)
(BLACKWILL)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1-May-1989 09:31 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Photo Op with President

We have been informed by Scheduling that Michael Armacost, the new U.S. Ambassador to Japan, is scheduled for a photo op with the President tomorrow (Tuesday) at 9:20 a.m. for five minutes in the Oval Office.

Please forward your meeting memo (along with a disc) to the Executive Secretary's Office as soon as possible.

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Douglas H. Paal	(PAAL)
CC: Janet M. Jeffers	(JEFFERS)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Michael B. Donley	(DONLEY)
CC: Daniel L. Snyder	(SNYDER)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Jackie Murphy	(MURPHY)
CC: Diane G. Ross	(ROSSDG)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)

7250 # 3158

5/1/89
KBK

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2998

Scowcroft

MEMORANDUM

TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

EVENT: Photo Op with Ambassador Michael Armacost

DATE: May 2, 1989

TIME: 9:20 a.m.

DURATION: 5 Minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

ATTIRE: Business Suit

REMARKS REQUIRED: No

MEDIA COVERAGE: Closed

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION:

CONTACT: _____

TELEPHONE: OFFICE _____ HOME _____

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

Ed Rogers
James Cicconi
Fred McClure
Susan Porter Rose
Patty Presock
Chriss Winston
Laurie Firestone
Robert Guttman

Marlin Fitzwater
David Demarest
Jean Lamb
Steve Studdert
John Keller
Tim McBride
J. Bonnie Newman
Tony Lopez

David Bates
David Valdez
USSS - PPD
Gary Walters
WHCA Audio/Visual
WHCA Operations
Amy Louisa Buckley
C. Boyden Gray
Bruce Zanca

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/12

5/1
mon
3:00
pm.

General

Dean Maurice East would like to meet briefly with you in April before you deliver the Commencement address at the Elliott School of International Affairs on May 7.

OK to schedule (10 mins) DD

Plead busy schedule _____

Other _____

DAB
(2-21-41)

Dona

Denice
994-6241

P.S. The trip to Kennebunkport for that weekend has been cancelled. I had previously regretted the 9:00am breakfast for you, thinking you would come directly from Kennebunkport. Do you want to reconsider and accept bkfst?

Yes ✓ No

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Apr-1989 19:59 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

FROM:

Dona F. Proctor
(PROCTOR)

SUBJECT:

Reminder

Wilma, Ignore my other note re appointment - to remind you to call Dean East and move his appointment to 3:30. It should be moved to 5:30 on Monday. His number is 994-6241, or call Millie Christensen at 994-7049.

1:15 pm Lgt msg

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Apr-1989 19:45 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

FROM:

Dona F. Proctor
(PROCTOR)

SUBJECT:

aPPPOINTMENT mONDAY

Reminder: Call Dean Maurice East 994-6241 and let him know his appointment has been moved from 3 to 3:30. Thanks

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Mon
5/1
2:00 pm.
1891

April 20, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: ROBERT D. BLACKWILL *RB*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Request To Address British Business Executives

At Tab I is a letter from you from William D. Rogers in which you agree to meet with a group of prominent British executives to discuss international economic issues. Rogers' request is at Tab II. Given the high calibre of the group (list of attendees is at Tab III), we think a meeting would be a worthwhile opportunity to discuss such vital issues as U.S.-European economic relations and the Single European Act.

Q
Tim Deal concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to meet with the group on Monday, May 1 at 2:00 p.m. for thirty minutes.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

That you sign the attached letter to William Rogers at Tab I.

Approve ☒ Disapprove ☐

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to William Rogers
Tab II Incoming Letter
Tab III List of British Executives

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Bill:

Thank you for your letter inviting me to meet with a group of British executives. I agree with your assessment of the individuals participating in the program; it is indeed an impressive group. I would be happy to meet with them on May 1. My staff will be in touch with your office to make the necessary arrangements.

Sincerely,

15/

Brent Scowcroft

The Honorable William D. Rogers
Arnold and Porter
1200 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.

VISIT TO WASHINGTON DC, APRIL 30th - MAY 3rd 1989

Acceptances as of January 20, 1989

SIR TREVOR HOLDSWORTH - Group Leader
President, Confederation of British Industry

LORD REES-MOGG
Former editor of the London Times
Chairman, London Washington Associates

VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM
Chairman
Pearson Group plc

LORD BOARDMAN
Chairman & Chief Executive
National Westminster Bank plc

SIR PETER CAREY
Chief Executive
Morgan Grenfell Group plc

MR PETER DAVIS
Chairman
Reed International plc

MR RICHARD GIORDANO
Chairman & Chief Executive
BOC Group plc

SIR PAUL GIROLAMI
Chairman
Glaxo Holdings plc

THE EARL OF HARROWBY
Chairman
Dowty Group plc

SIR DAVID PLASTOW
Chairman & Chief Executive
Vickers plc

MR ROY ROBERTS
Chairman
Simon Engineering plc

LORD SAINSBURY
Chairman & Chief Executive
J. Sainsbury plc

SIR ERIC SHARP
Chairman & Chief Executive
Cable & Wireless plc

DR N. BRIAN SMITH
Chairman
Metal Box Group plc

PROFESSOR ROLAND SMITH
Chairman
British Aerospace plc

SIR ROBERT HASLAM
Chairman
British Coal Corporation

LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.

VISIT TO WASHINGTON DC, APRIL 30TH - MAY 3RD 1989
Acceptances as of January 20, 1989

Brief biographical and company descriptions.

SIR TREVOR HOLDSWORTH - Group Leader

President, the Confederation of British Industry,
Britain's leading employers organisation.

Sir Trevor is one of Britains most distinguished industrialists, he is chairman of British Satellite Broadcasting and a director of Midland Bank, the Prudential Corporation (Britain's largest life insurance company) and several other companies. Until recently he was chairman of GKN, Britains largest engineering group.

VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM

Chairman of the Pearson Group, a diversified company which includes subsidiaries involved in publishing, including The Financial Times (Viscount Blakenham is Chairman of the Financial Times), The Economist, and Viking Penguin Publishers. Pearsons is also involved in investment banking through ownership of Lazard Brothers, and oil and gas industry equipment and services.

LORD BOARDMAN

Lord Boardman has been Chairman of National Westminster Bank since May 1983, when he succeeded Mr Robin Leigh-Pemberton, who became Governor of the Bank of England. He was member of Parliament between 1967 and 1974, and held office as Minister for Industry and Chief Secretary to the Treasury (1972-1974).

National Westminster is the leading bank in the UK. It is becoming a major regional banking force in the Northeast US, and since 1987 owns First Jersey National Corporation.

LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.

SIR PETER CAREY

Chairman, Morgan Grenfell Group plc, one of the UK's leading merchant banks.

Sir Peter is a former Permanent Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, he is also a director of Cable & Wireless plc, NV Philips, Westland Group plc and non executive Chairman of Dalgety plc.

MR PETER DAVIS

Chief Executive, Reed International plc.
Reed International is one of the UK's leading international businesses with mainstream activities in publishing, packaging, paper and paint (turnover \$3.5 billion). Reed International has substantial interests in the US.

MR RICHARD GIORDANO

Chairman & Chief Executive of BOC Group, Britain's largest producer of industrial gases (turnover in excess of \$3.5 billion). The company has 27 production facilities in North America.

SIR PAUL GIROLAMI

Chairman, Glaxo Holdings plc, one of Britain's largest pharmaceutical manufacturers (turnover \$3 billion approx). Glaxo has several production facilities in the US.

THE EARL OF HARROWBY TD

Chairman, Dowty Group plc, a leading and diversified engineering group (turnover \$1 billion approx). Dowty has 8 plants in the US where it manufactures aircraft equipment, electronic controls, hydraulic systems and components and data communications equipment.

LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.

SIR ROBERT HASLAM

Chairman, British Coal Corporation, a nationalised company and Britains largest coal producer (turnover \$8 billion). Sir Robert is also a Director of the Bank of England and Unilever.

SIR DAVID PLASTOW

Chairman and Chief Executive, Vickers plc, among Britains largest engineering companies (turnover \$1.5 billion). Products include Rolls Royce automobiles and the Chieftain tank. In the US Vickers produces medical equipment, office furniture, printing machinery, marine equipment, and scientific instruments.

LORD REES-MOGG

Lord Rees-Mogg, is former editor of the London "Times". He is Chairman of the Arts Council of Great Britain and the newly formed Broadcasting Standards Council, he is also a director of a number of companies including General Electric Company.

Lord Rees-Mogg is Chairman of London Washington Associates, advisors to British industry on US trade, economic and political developments and the organisers of this visit to Washington DC

MR ROY ROBERTS

Chairman of Simon Engineering, one of the largest UK process plant and engineering companies (turnover \$1 billion). In the US, Simon supplies waste water treatment plants, the oil and gas industry, animal feed services, and the chemical industry, it has over 11 US production facilities.

LONDON WASHINGTON ASSOCIATES INC.

LORD SAINSBURY

Chairman and Chief Executive, J. Sainsbury plc, Britain's largest retail food and grocery business (turnover in excess of \$8 billion).

Lord Sainsbury is also Chairman of the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden.

SIR ERIC SHARP

Chairman & Chief Executive of Cable & Wireless plc, one of the world's leading international telecommunications groups which operates in 49 countries (turnover \$2 billion). Cable and Wireless have seven US companies.

DR N. BRIAN SMITH

Chairman, MB Group plc. The Metal Box Group is one of the world's largest manufacturer of containers, fasteners, and packaging materials (\$2 billion). In the US the group has manufacturing facilities in 16 locations.

PROFESSOR ROLAND SMITH

Chairman, British Aerospace plc, Britain's largest aircraft manufacturer (turnover \$7 billion).

ARNOLD & PORTER

1200 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

(202) 872-6700

CABLE: "ARFOPO"

TELECOPIER: (202) 872-6720

TELEX: 89-2733

PARK AVENUE TOWER

65 EAST 55TH STREET

NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022-3219

(212) 750-5050

WILLIAM D. ROGERS

DIRECT LINE: (202) 872-6915

March 14, 1989

*very soon
recommendation
& reply for BS*

Signature
1891

1700 LINCOLN STREET

DENVER, COLORADO 80203

(303) 863-1000

cy Florence

MAR 16 1989

General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

We are writing about a visit to Washington, D.C. in early May by a prominent group of British business executives. A list of the delegation is attached. It is, as you will see, nothing if not distinguished. The group proposes to meet senior members of the Bush administration and of Congress to discuss economic policy. They have set meetings with Alan Greenspan and Dan Rostenkowski. Others are in the process of being arranged.

The trip is being coordinated by London Washington Associates, which provides advice on American developments for British multinationals. London Washington Associates works with our firm. It has asked if we might be of assistance in setting up additional meetings. We agreed, in the hope that you might enjoy and benefit from such a meeting. The group has time available on May 1 and 2.

I hope you agree with me that this group is worth meeting. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Dr

William D. Rogers

Enclosure

(List of British Executives)

April 28, 1989

General --

The service arrangements for Colonel James N. Rowe on Monday, May 1 are as follows:

- 1:50 VIPs arrive at Memorial Chapel at Ft. Myer
 (this is the new chapel near the PX). You will
 be escorted to the front and seated on the left
 side with Cheney, Vuono and Marsh.
- 2:00 Memorial Service is scheduled to last 30-35
 minutes. (Cheney is planning to depart as soon
 as this service is over)
- [2:35 Motorized procession to graveside. This portion
 will last for approximately 45 minutes.]

If you wish, you may choose to exit after the memorial service.

Major Sean Byrne, the President's Army Military Aide, will accompany you throughout. Bob Gates also wants to attend.

I have moved your 2:00 appointment with the British Executives to 4:30. I am having difficulty on your 2:40 briefing for the Illinois Business Leaders (Bob Michel's group). Even if you leave the memorial service at 2:30-35, that would really squeeze you. Do you want to try to do this or would you prefer to recommend someone else on the staff do it.

If they have no problems with my being a little late, I'll do it _____

That's too squeezed, ask _____ to do it.

(Peter Rodman has suggested talking points in for your use)

Florence

Service arrangements for Colonel James N. Rowe

Monday, 1 May at 1400

Memorial Chapel at Ft. Myer followed by interment

Military Office x2150

Arlington Cemetery - Ray Castanza 695-3175

Been told that Major Sean Byrne (at this point) is attending
as the President's representative.

de/28Apr/0900

VIEW THE NOTE

E01

SUBJECT: Meeting with Minister Mitsuzaka of Japan's MITI

This is to seek Gen. Scowcroft's formal approval of a meeting with Minister of MITI Hiroshi MITSUZUKA on Monday, May 1 at 4:00 p.m., for 30 minutes.

The Japanese say that the General agreed to meet Mitsuzaka in his meeting with Vice Minister Muraoka. Karl Jackson and Deane Hoffmann do not specifically recall that agreement.

State nonetheless recommends the meeting, as do Hoffmann, Jackson and Paal. Talking points will be provided to put across the need for further Japanese action on the trade issue. The General should be aware that the 301 against Japan on telecommunications will be released on Monday as well, and we will have talking points covering that subject.

Please advise. Thanks.

PF1 Alternate PFs PF2 File NOTE PF3 Keep PF4 Erase PF5 Forward Note
PF6 Reply PF7 Resend PF8 Print PF9 Help PF10 Next PF11 Previous PF12 Return

*I already have time for
this on your calendar if
you wish to do.*

OK [Signature] Other _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

26-Apr-1989 13:56 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Douglas H. Paal
(PAAL)

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Minister Mitsuzuka of Japan's MITI

This is to seek Gen. Scowcroft's formal approval of a meeting with Minister of MITI Hiroshi MITSUZUKA on Monday, May 1 at 4:00 p.m., for 30 minutes.

The Japanese say that the General agreed to meet Mitsuzuka in his meeting with Vice Minister Muraoka. Karl Jackson and Deane Hoffmann do not specifically recall that agreement.

State nonetheless recommends the meeting, as do Hoffmann, Jackson and Paal. Talking points will be provided to put across the need for further Japanese action on the trade issue. The General should be aware that the 301 against Japan on telecommunications will be released on Monday as well, and we will have talking points covering that subject.

Please advise. Thanks.

CC: Dona F. Proctor
CC: Janet M. Jeffers

(PROCTOR)
(JEFFERS)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By cap NARA, Date 9/10/10

Ganth

2815

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

did not
attend

April 25, 1989

ACTION

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: DEANE E. HOFFMANN *D/E*

FROM: TIMOTHY DEAL *T*

SUBJECT: Briefing on Industrial Productivity

Science Adviser Graham has invited you to attend a meeting on May 1 in the OEOB to hear the results of the M.I.T. Commission on Industrial Productivity. The issue is important and the panelists are well known. But I would not recommend that you take time from your schedule to attend such a briefing.

Deane Hoffmann plans to attend.

RECOMMENDATION

That your office inform Dr. Graham that you will be unable to attend the briefing.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*I'll try to make it (but
probably
won't)*

Attachment

Tab I Incoming from Dr. Graham

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

1.65
2. Staff
2815

April 17, 1989

APR 17 1989

Dear General Scowcroft:

I invite you to join me on Monday, May 1 to receive the findings of the M.I.T. Commission on Industrial Productivity. Three authors of the Commission's report will present an informational briefing for senior members of the Administration prior to release of the report the following day to considerable public exposure, including a lead article in Fortune magazine.

The Commission, the first M.I.T. has convened on a major national issue since World War II, was charged in late 1986 "to address a decline in U.S. industrial performance perceived to be so serious as to threaten the nation's economic future." Eminent M.I.T. faculty in business, economics, and engineering collectively examined such high technology industries as steel, consumer electronics, commercial aircraft, and textiles in order to suggest possible private and government approaches to reverse declines and to avoid repeating them in other advanced industries.

Michael L. Dertouzos, Commission chairman, together with Richard K. Lester, executive director, and John M. Deutch, M.I.T. Provost, will present the Commission's conclusions in a one-half hour briefing, followed by open discussion on their findings and recommendations. Each person attending will receive a copy of the book presenting the Commission's report. The briefing will take place from 10:00 to 11:00 a.m. in 450 Old Executive Office Building. Please advise my office of your plans to attend.

I encourage you to take this opportunity to review the M.I.T. work first-hand with the authors, whose conclusions furnish a highly useful and productive point of departure for public and Administration discussions of effective strategies to recover American competitiveness.

Sincerely,



William R. Graham
Director

General Brent Scowcroft.
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

April 24, 1989

General --

Doug Richardson (624-7760) called on behalf of Governor James Thompson of Illinois. Thompson is going to be in town on Friday and has asked if he can have a brief appointment to talk about being appointed to serve on an intelligence board. You are the only one he hasn't weighed in with concerning this. Shall I schedule him for 10 minutes on Friday?

Okay

Ugh

Other

Florence

4/25

April 24, 1989

General --

Prince Bandar has asked to see you before he returns to the Kingdom -- he wants to talk about the Middle East, Lebanon and Afghanistan. Understands you are busy but will do it at anytime. Sandy Charles says he is seeing Secretary Baker at 6:30 tonight. Sandy also says he will inquire about the Fahd visit. Shall I see what we can arrange?

Okay _____

Other _____

Mimi
337-4150

*P.S. The time + date
we have been given
is July 27 (10:00-12:00)*

*Letter should be
here shortly - once
you approve + if we
don't need Pres approval,
it will then go to
Ciccone for Signature.
If you want to give to
Bandar, we can have
him come here in Am.
K B*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Fahr -
State Visit

10 - 12:00

Arrival ceremony
& Mtg

(goes to State
for lunch)

BT dinner of
WH at 7:30

April 24, 1989

General --

Director Bennett and Dave Miller have asked to see you tomorrow to report on some of their findings. I have put them on the calendar for 11:30 tomorrow. FYI

William Bennett
John Walters (his Chief of Staff)
David Miller

OK

Florence

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	Brenda I. Hilliard to Distribution List Re: Presidential Meeting - Panama (1 pp.)	4/26/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	9/13/2010	OA/ID Number:	85033-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

4/18

General --

This is what the groups looks like for the WH Summit Group Meeting. Secretary Baker will have Richard McCormack at this meeting but has also asked to bring Bob Zoellick. Do you have any problems with that?

Okay  Other _____

White House Summit Group (for Paris Economic Summit)

Friday, April 21, 1989 = 3:00 p.m. - Situation Room

Governor Sununu (6797)

Secretary Baker (647-6103)

Secretary Brady (566-5500)

David Mulford (566-5363)

Michael Boskin (5042)

Richard Darman (4840)

Richard McCormack (647-7515) 3-6-41

Steve Studdert (2421)

Roger Porter (2705)

Marlin Fitzwater (2100)

Jim Cicconi (2702)

Deane Hoffmann (3622)

Eric Melby (4985)

General Scowcroft

Bob Gates

Bob Zoellick

*FYI - Sit Rm holds 10 around the
table + 12 around the room*

~~4/7 =
12:00
Lunch in
mess~~

Secretary Sam Skinner of DOT said you two had talked about getting together for lunch in the Mess.

~~lunch in the~~

Linda
366-9496

or
Abbey

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Apr-1989 16:40 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

George D. Robinson, Sr.

(ROBINSON)

FROM: Jeffrey T. Rathbun
(RATHBUN)

SUBJECT: Re-Up Ceremony

George: As requested, here is the needed info for my April 20, 11:00 a.m. reenlistment ceremony with Gen. Scowcroft:

Who: Petty Officer Jeffery T. Rathbun, U.S. Navy
Management Analyst/ Research Assistant,
Information Policy Directorate. Been at the NSC since
May 1987.

What: Reenlistment for 6 years.

Where: Will be leaving NSC for OCS in Newport, Rhode Island for 7 weeks then to NROTC, University of Arizona to finish my degree in Business Administration/Political Science.

When: Leave NSC in late May; arrive at University of Arizona and start classes in mid August.

Why: Reenlisting to meet requirements imposed upon Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) officer candidates.

From: Polson, Montana

I plan on having 10 - 12 guests. Non will be family. Rich Boehnlein will serve as my backup to Gen. Scowcroft.

P.S. I hope you have what is supposed to be said at a reenlistment!?

Jeff

11:00-11:05

RE-ENLISTMENT

RATHBUN

11:06-11:10

PLAQUE PRESENTATIONS:

- Julie Porta — 11:06
- Amy Korpeck — 11:07
- CHRIS FEATERSTONE — 11:08
- SCOT Addis (?) — 11:09

From: WILSONB --VAXC
To: NSFEG --CPUA

Date and time 03/16/89 21:30:29

From: Bret T. Wilson
Subject: MAIL

UNCLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Mar-1989 21:30 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM: Florence E. Gantt
(GANTT)

SUBJECT: MAIL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

16-Mar-1989 17:19 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt
Wilma G. Hall

(GANTT)
(HALL)

FROM: George D. Robinson, Sr.
(ROBINSON)

SUBJECT: Ceremony Requests

11:00
Thurs.
April 20

Florence/Wilma, two requests:

1. Jeff Rathbun (Nancy Menan's Office), an enlisted navy staff member, is reenlisting in April to accept orders to attend the Navy's Enlisted Commissioning Program. He is requesting to be reenlisted by General Scowcroft. Ceremony, start to finish, can be done in 5 minutes. Can we reserve 5 minutes for same on or about April 20th of next month. (We need to give navy a firm date around the first week of April. As such, we will as a back-up, plan on an alternate person if the General's schedule would change at the last minute).

2. 10 minutes, any day, any time for several backlog photo-ops for departing staff members plaque presentations and awards. Desire a date not later than the 1st of April.

Thanks, George.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	Sandra Charles to Brent Scowcroft and Richard N. Haass Re: Meeting with Prince Bandar (2 pp.)	4/24/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

March 14, 1989

4/20
Jhena
1:00

Florence/Diane:

6-15-32

Lt General Charles Brown, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, DOD, would like to meet with General Scowcroft and Bob Gates.

Please call Sue Crummetter: 695-3291.

Kanter Ship
or
Navy Base
Dyke

Wilma

Courtesy call

Gen -

Shall I schedule a
brief mtg w/ you + Bob?

OK Brief

Other _____

Dr. Henry H. Gaffney, Jr.
6-24-34

HENRY H. GAFFNEY, JR.

Dr. Henry H. Gaffney, Jr. is the Director, Plans, in the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). DSAA is the focal point in the Defense Department for all Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and military assistance to other nations. Dr. Gaffney works closely with the State Department in the development and presentation to Congress of the military assistance budget and is thus responsible for the overview of the program as an instrument of foreign policy and national security. His staff also manages major competitions for aircraft sales, worldwide security assistance personnel, the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), and the Special Defense Acquisition Fund.

Dr. Gaffney has served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense since 1962. For many years, he directed staff support for U.S. participation in the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. In that position, he devised the NPG High Level Group which proposed historic choices for NATO theater nuclear modernization. He also served as the Director of the Near East South Asia office in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in 1979-81, where he was instrumental in setting up the long-term military assistance relationship with Egypt. He has been Director of Plans in DSAA since 1981.

Dr. Gaffney graduated from Harvard College in 1956 and received his doctorate from Columbia University in 1967. His dissertation was on the civil service of Sierra Leone. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1956 to 1959. He was born in Boston, Massachusetts, on June 24, 1934.

APR 17 1989
APR 1

BIOGRAPHY
CHARLES WINSTON BROWN
Lieutenant General

Lieutenant General Charles W. Brown was born in Rushville, Nebraska on 15 June 1932. Upon graduation from the New Mexico Military Institute in 1953, he was commissioned a second lieutenant and awarded a Bachelor of Science degree.

His graduate studies include a Master's Degree from Penn State University, a research Fellowship at Northwestern University, and he has studied National and International Security at Harvard University.

During his 34 year career, his key staff assignments have been with the 21st Vietnamese Infantry Division; 82d Airborne Division; US European Command; Forces Command; Army Materiel Command; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army; Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, US Army Europe; and most recently Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for Security Assistance, Department of the Army.

His command assignments include: Commander, 143d Signal Battalion, 3d Armored Division, Germany; Deputy Commander, 1st Signal Brigade, Korea; Commander, Division Support Command, 2d Armored Division in Texas; Commander, 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center, Germany; and Commander, 2d Support Command, VII Corps, Germany.

In the 1960's he completed a one year combat tour with a Vietnamese Infantry Division in the southern delta area of Vietnam. Then, shortly after his return to the United States, he deployed with the lead assault element of the 82d Airborne Division into the Dominican Republic.

In his current assignment as Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, General Brown is responsible for all military assistance provided by the Department of Defense to allied and friendly governments.

He is a graduate of the Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army War College.

Awards and decorations which General Brown has received include:

Distinguished Service Medal
Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf Cluster
Bronze Star for Valor with Oak Leaf Cluster
Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry

He is married to the former Sherry Church. They have two children; Stephan and Christi.

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

CHARLES WINSTON BROWN, Lieutenant General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 15 June 1932, Rushville, Nebraska

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 34

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency,
Washington, DC 20301, since October 1987

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Signal School, Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

New Mexico Military Institute - BS Degree - Biology
Pennsylvania State University - MPA Degree - Public Administration

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Sep 53	Feb 54	Student, Signal Corps Officer Basic Course, The United States Army Signal School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
Mar 54	Dec 54	Platoon Leader, Company A, 16th Signal Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona
Jan 55	Apr 55	Executive Officer, Company D, 16th Signal Battalion, Fort Huachuca, Arizona
May 55	Apr 58	Executive Officer, and later Commander, Company B, 29th Signal Battalion, Europe
May 58	Jul 58	Student, Infantry Communications Officer Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia
Jul 58	Sep 59	Communications Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battle Group, 22d Infantry, Fort Lewis, Washington
Sep 59	May 60	Student, Signal Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Signal School, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
May 60	Oct 63	Assistant Professor of Military Science, Texas Technical College, Lubbock, Texas
Nov 63	Feb 65	Advisor, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
Mar 65	Oct 66	Division Staff/Battalion Executive Officer, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Oct 66	Jul 68	Staff Officer, Silk Purse Control Group, England
Jul 68	Feb 70	Commander, 143d Signal Battalion, 3d Armored Division, Germany.
Mar 70	Mar 73	Staff Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Washington, DC
Mar 73	Apr 74	Deputy Commander, 1st Signal Brigade, United States Army Communications Command, Vietnam
Aug 74	Jun 75	Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Aug 75	Nov 76	Commander, United States Army Communications Command Forces, and Chief, Communications and Electronics, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

CHARLES WINSTON BROWN, Lieutenant General

MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>ASSIGNMENT</u>
Dec 76	Jun 78	Commander, Support Command, 2d Armored Division, Fort Hood, Texas
Jul 78	Jul 80	Director of Materiel Management, United States Army Communications-Electronics Materiel Readiness Command, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey
Jul 80	May 82	Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Management Center/Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics for Materiel Readiness, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army
May 82	Dec 83	Commanding General, 2d Support Command (Corps), United States Army Europe
Jan 84	Oct 87	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for Security Assistance, United States Army, Washington, DC

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

	<u>Temporary</u>	<u>Permanent</u>
2LT		4 Sep 53
1LT	21 Mar 55	4 Sep 56
CPT	10 Dec 59	4 Sep 60
MAJ	30 Nov 64	4 Sep 67
LTC	27 Dec 67	4 Sep 74
COL	1 Jul 74	4 Sep 77
BG	1 Aug 80	22 Jan 82
MG		1 Oct 83
LTG	1 Oct 87	

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Bronze Star Medal with V Device (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Meritorious Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Air Medal
Joint Service Commendation Medal
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Parachutist Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION ROTC

SUMMARY OF JOINT EXPERIENCE

<u>Assignment</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Grade</u>
Advisor, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam	Nov 63-Feb 65	Captain/Major
Staff Officer, Silk Purse Control Group, United States European Command, England	Oct 66-Jul 68	Major/ Lieutenant Colonel
* Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics for Security Assistance, United States Army, Washington, DC	Jan 84-Oct 87	Major General

* Joint Equivalent

As of 1 October 1987

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

29-Mar-1989 13:32 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Confirmation of Visit - King Hussein

This is to confirm that the Official Working Visit of King Hussein will take place on April 19th. The meeting will be held 11:00a.m.-Noon. There will be a B dinner at 7:30 p.m. that evening.

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: C. David Welch	(WELCH)
CC: Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
CC: Linda Crowell	(CROWELL)
CC: Barbara Browne	(BROWNE)
CC: Michael B. Donley	(DONLEY)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Daniel L. Snyder	(SNYDER)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Jackie Murphy	(MURPHY)
CC: Diane G. Ross	(ROSSDG)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Mar-1989 10:22 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: King Hussein Visit - ANOTHER DATE

The date for the Official Working Visit of King Hussein has now been scheduled April 19th, rather than April 28th, as previously reported.

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: C. David Welch	(WELCH)
CC: Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
CC: Linda Crowell	(CROWELL)
CC: Barbara Browne	(BROWNE)
CC: Michael B. Donley	(DONLEY)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Jackie Murphy	(MURPHY)
CC: Diane G. Ross	(ROSSDG)
CC: Daniel L. Snyder	(SNYDER)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

23-Mar-1989 10:14 EDT

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Visit by King Hussein

The date for the Official Working Visit of King Hussein has been changed to April 28th, rather than as previously reported.

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Richard N. Haass	(HAASS)
FOR: Sandra Charles	(CHARLES)
CC: Barbara Browne	(BROWNE)
CC: Linda Crowell	(CROWELL)
CC: Robert M. Perito	(PERITO)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Jackie Murphy	(MURPHY)
CC: Diane G. Ross	(ROSSDG)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By SP NARA, Date 9/10/10

Scowcroft

March 16, 1989
KBK

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1942

MEMORANDUM

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JOSEPH W. HAGIN
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

EVENT: Meeting and Luncheon with King
Hussein of Jordan

DATE: May 2, 1989

TIME: 11:00 a.m.

Hussein Visit -- There will be no luncheon, but there will be a dinner in
Hussein's honor.

LOCATION: Oval Office/Cabinet Room/Residence

ATTIRE: Business Suit

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Pool/Open

**FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION:** No

**ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION:**

CONTACT: _____

TELEPHONE: OFFICE _____ HOME _____

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

Ed Rogers	Marlin Fitzwater	David Bates
James Cicconi	David Demarest	David Valdez
Fred McClure	Jean Lamb	USSS - PPD
Susan Porter Rose	Steve Studdert	Operations - Executive Residence
Patty Presock	John Keller	WHCA Audio/Visual
Speechwriting Office	Tim McBride	WHCA Operations
Laurie Firestone	J. Bonnie Newman	
Robert Guttman	Tony Lopez	

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

14-Apr-1989 14:16 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Visit by Mayor Walter Momper

We have been informed by Scheduling that the President will meet with Berlin Governing Mayor Walter Momper in the Oval Office April 19th, beginning at 2 p.m., for 15 minutes.

Request your meeting memo (with the disc) be received in the Executive Secretary's office by noon, Monday, April 17th.

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Robert L. Hutchings	(HUTCHINGS)
CC: Robert Blackwill	(BLACKWILL)
CC: Mary Kay Stults	(STULTS)
CC: G. Philip Hughes	(HUGHES)
CC: Michael B. Donley	(DONLEY)
CC: Daniel L. Snyder	(SNYDER)
CC: Cathy Millison	(MILLISON)
CC: Jackie Murphy	(MURPHY)
CC: Diane G. Ross	(ROSSDG)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Diane L. Edwards	(EDWARDS)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 28, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: WILLIAM W. WORKING *W*
SUBJECT: Courtesy Call by Blair Seaborn

A short (15-minute) courtesy call on you has been requested by Blair Seaborn, Canada's Intelligence and Security Coordinator. Mr. Seaborn will be accompanied by Paul Barton, Liaison Officer, Intelligence Advisory Committee, Canadian Embassy.

During his visit to Washington, Mr. Seaborn will also be meeting with Bill Webster and Judge Sessions.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve scheduling a 15-minute courtesy call with Blair Seaborn for April 18, 1989, 3:45-4:00 p.m.

Approve OK - BS Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Biographic Information

(posted)

CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: J. Blair SEABORN

TITLE: Intelligence and Security Coordinator

Born in Toronto March 18, 1924

Married, 2 children

1947 B.A. (Political Science, Economics), Trinity
College, University of Toronto

1948 M.A., Trinity College, University of Toronto

1948-70 Foreign Service Officer, DEA (postings in The Hague,
Paris, Moscow, Saigon)

1967 Head, Far Eastern Division, DEA

1970-74 Assistant Deputy Minister (Consumer Affairs),
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs

1974-82 Deputy Minister, Department of Environment

1982-85 Chairman, Canadian Section, International Joint
Commission

1985- Intelligence and Security Coordinator, Privy Council
present Office

Role and Mandate of the Intelligence and Security
Co-ordinator, Privy Council Office

As a senior official of the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Co-ordinator's primary responsibility is to provide support and advice to the Prime Minister, through the Secretary to the Cabinet, on security and intelligence policy matters. This can be done either directly or through the Cabinet Committee system, specifically the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence of which the Co-ordinator is Secretary. The Co-ordinator also supports the Secretary to the Cabinet in discharging the latter's security and intelligence responsibilities through his role as Vice-Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI), of which the Secretary to the Cabinet is Chairman.

The Co-ordinator's security and intelligence responsibilities cover four broad areas: security and intelligence policy issues; departmental (PCO/PMO/FPRO/DPMO) security services; interdepartmental intelligence assessments; and policy guidance to the Communications Security Establishment. With the support of the Security and Intelligence Secretariat, the Co-ordinator evaluates and provides advice to the Prime Minister and Secretary to the Cabinet on security and intelligence policy matters that engage the broad interests and responsibilities of the Government, and on the effectiveness of policies and programs in the security and intelligence sector. The Co-ordinator also maintains a general overview of the effectiveness of policy co-ordination between the security and foreign intelligence sectors. Secondly, the Co-ordinator is responsible for assuring the physical and personnel security of the PCO, PMO, DPMO and FPRO. Thirdly, as Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), the Co-ordinator directs the interdepartmental preparation of intelligence assessments for a senior government readership. As Chairman of the IAC, the Co-ordinator also provides general leadership to the foreign intelligence sector and consults with the IAC on policy issues related to the sector, including questions regarding the processing, analysis and dissemination of intelligence by the Canadian intelligence community. Fourthly, the Co-ordinator provides operational policy direction to the Communications Security Establishment, although the CSE remains subject to the broad direction and guidance of the ICSI in serving the Government of Canada as a whole.

November 5, 1987

Role of the Security and Intelligence Secretariat,
Privy Council Office

The Secretariat, under an Assistant Secretary, is composed of three units whose function is to support the Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator in the discharge of his security and intelligence responsibilities. The Assistant Secretary, Security and Intelligence, has administrative responsibility for all three units and direct functional responsibility for two, i.e., policy and security services. The Assistant Secretary is the Secretary of the deputy head-level Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence (ICSI), whose Chairman is the Secretary to the Cabinet and whose Vice-Chairman is the Co-ordinator.

The three units of the Security and Intelligence Secretariat which support the Co-ordinator are:

A) Security and Intelligence policy unit

This group is headed by a Director of Policy, who advises the Assistant Secretary and the Co-ordinator on the policy aspects of those security and foreign intelligence issues that affect the broad interests of the Government. The unit is responsible for policy analysis and co-ordination in such areas as protection of information, personnel security, signals intelligence, communications security, security and intelligence organization and structure, counter-terrorism and issues arising from the CSIS Act. The Director of Policy also provides to the Co-ordinator an overview of security intelligence and foreign intelligence activities in the federal government, including developments pertaining to the Privacy Act and the Access to Information Act. These issues are handled either directly with the appropriate government departments or agencies, or through the interdepartmental committee system.

B) Director of Security Operations

The Director of Security Operations provides the usual departmental security services -- personnel security, physical security, protection of classified material, co-ordination of arrangements for the personal security of officials -- to the Privy Council Office, the Prime Minister's Office, the Deputy Prime Minister's Office and the Federal-Provincial Relations Office and to officials associated with those departments.

C) Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) Secretariat

Under an Executive Secretary, the IAC Secretariat co-ordinates the interdepartmental production of foreign intelligence assessments for the government. The Co-ordinator, who is responsible for ensuring that the Prime Minister and other senior readers receive such assessments as they require, is Chairman of the IAC. In addition to directing the production of intelligence assessments for the Government, the IAC provides advice to the Co-ordinator and to the ICSI on policy related to the intelligence sector, including advice regarding the processing, analysis and dissemination of intelligence by the Canadian intelligence community.

March 29, 1989

General --

JOHN V.
8-16-37

Jack Brennan (466-5544) called. He said Bill Gully told a reporter that ISI made millions of dollars on phosphates deals. The reporter now wants to talk with Jack. Jack would like to come in and talk with you.

Florence

OK

Jry
4/18
12:00

March 15, 1989

General --

General Lessey, Director of Selective Service, said he had spoken with you about a briefing. He said that he knows you are extremely busy and would be willing to talk with someone on the staff if you will refer him to someone.

Refer to _____ I'll see him later

724-0817

SAMUEL KENRIC LESSEY, JR.
10-9-23
4/14 3:00 PM.

Florence

Molley
or
Sunder

Secy
Chloe
Ginsley

Cong = come up w/ plan recruitment/regis.
for poss health care personnel
press is starting to stir



THE DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE
Washington, D.C. 20435

April 12, 1989

General Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
First Floor, West Wing
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

The enclosed statement is provided for your information and use.

In anticipation of the Washington Times running a story on our Health Care Personnel Initiative, this statement was faxed to the White House Press Office last night and also provided to the DoD Public Affairs Office.

I just returned from some powder skiing in Utah and a visit to Hill Air Force Base. Beautiful weather and scenery!

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Sam Lessey".

Samuel K. Lessey Jr.

Enclosure



Selective Service System

National Headquarters / Washington, D.C. 20435

(202) 724-0790

April 11, 1989

Mr. Bill Harlow
Assistant Press Secretary
Press Office
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Harlow:

As requested, attached is a synopsis of the "operational concept" being developed by the Selective Service System at the direction of the Congress. We do not intend to release this statement at this time unless we are placed in a position of having to respond to media inquiries.

As I mentioned, we have offered two inquiring reporters the opportunity to be thoroughly briefed on this concept a few days from now; however, a piece may be written as early as tomorrow due to a reporter's interviews with one of the organized conscientious objector groups.

Please call if you have questions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Lewis C. Brodsky", written over a horizontal line.

Lewis C. Brodsky
Assistant Director
(Public Affairs)

Enclosure



Selective Service System

National Headquarters / Washington, D.C. 20435

April 11, 1989

STATEMENT

At the direction of Congress by law, the Selective Service System is developing an operational concept designed to support the nation's military services and their medical readiness for national emergencies. It is simply a blueprint for the possible future registration and military induction of health care personnel in the event of a "worst case" crisis. Implementation of any of the concept's provisions would require Congressional and Presidential approval. The concept is not yet formally approved at any level.

ACTION

The concept is called the "Health Care Personnel Delivery System," or "HCPDS." It proposes a standby program that would be different from the previous "doctor draft," which ended in 1973. Male physicians, dentists, and other allied specialists were included then. Principal differences are the larger numbers needed by the military, the speed with which they would need to be called to duty after a mobilization, the greater variety of health care skills required, and the inclusion of women. The concept describes how the government would register and process for military induction thousands of health care personnel if they are needed in a future crisis.

HCPDS is being developed as the result of language in the Fiscal Year 1988/89 Defense Authorization Bill. The bill requires Selective Service to "develop a structure for the possible registration and classification of health care professionals to be implemented after the President declares a national emergency, and after Congress passes legislation providing specific registration and conscription authority." The House Armed Services Committee emphasized that this authority did not mean the start of a peacetime draft or registration program for medical professionals. It merely requires development of a concept. If war broke out, Department of Defense has projected there would be critical shortages of military physicians, nurses, and medical technicians, qualified in more than 60 medical specialties, although the total number of people required who are practicing those specialties represents less than two percent of all the trained and practicing health care personnel in the U.S.

In developing the concept, the Selective Service System gathered preliminary data showing that the predominance of women in nursing and technical health care specialties, and the higher percentage of female physicians graduating from medical school, make the inclusion of women essential for the DoD "worst case" requirements to be met. Nevertheless, like all other aspects of the operational concept, the possible future registration and induction of women would require Congressional approval.

LEGISLATION

#

Contact: Lew Brodsky, (202) 724-0790

11530 LeHavre Drive
Potomac, MD 20854
February 17, 1989

Ms. Florence Gantt
Office of the National
Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, DC

Dear Ms. Gantt:

In reference to our phone conversation of Monday, February 6, at 4:30 PM, I wanted to thank you in advance for your assistance in arranging an interview between General Scowcroft and myself.

As an honors student at the University of Maryland, I am excited to speak with the General concerning some of the issues of the Vietnam War. I understand that Professor Philip Straw and Ms. Maureen Minehan from Kissinger Associates have been in contact with your office. If they or I might be able to help you in any way, please do not hesitate to call. (My number is 301/294-2652.)

I look forward to hearing from you. I respect and appreciate General Scowcroft's service to our country and I shall be prepared to meet with him at his convenience.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,

Eric W. Young

Eric W. Young
Student, HONR 318
University of Maryland

11-18-66
578-94-5050

ofc 225-5131
Re 301-750-2694

*Pres. Honor
Society*

5. Univ of Maryland
(Prof Phil Straw)

Interview by Student Taking
his class: America In
Vietnam. (11/10 You
indicated you were amenable)
(Similar request was turned
down several times by Powell)

After Jan 69
Yes ☒ No ☐

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Eric Young

Univ of Maryland

228 mm

on 2h.

assignment

Home 294-2652

ofc 853-3738

begs aprie.

February 6, 1989

General Scowcroft:

Maureen, HAK's ofc, called to say that about 2 months ago you agreed to meet with Eric Young, University of Maryland student, to answer any questions he might have for a semester-long project for a particular class. Doesn't have to be this week or next week but soon. Maureen said you agreed to do this knowing you would be at White House when meeting takes place.

Okay to schedule?

_____ Yes

_____ With much regret, now unable to do

Other: _____

Wilma

Eric Young - Work: 853-3738

THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

COLLEGE PARK CAMPUS
0110 Hornbake Library
College Park, Maryland 20742

General Honors Program
(301) 454-2532/2535

2/2
Wilma - other corr.
on this went over
in previous "to be
scheduled - no
particular date"
folder.
Today

February 1, 1989

Dear friend Maureen:

I have met my students for Honors 318, and the assignments for their interviews in conjunction with the course have been made.

The young man selected for the distinct honor of discussing the Vietnam era with Lt. Gen. Scowcroft is ERIC YOUNG. Eric is a senior, very active in campus affairs, carries an excellent academic record, and is President of the Honor Society. He is preparing for his White House visit with General Scowcroft and will be in touch with you soon to nail down the logistics of that once-in-a-lifetime educational opportunity.

As I have said so often: you have been terrific in making this a reality, and we will be grateful for your assistance long after the course has ended.

With sincere thanks,



Phil Straw
Honors 318



COLLEGE PARK CAMPUS
0110 Hornbake Library
College Park, Maryland 20742

General Honors Program
(301) 454-2532/2535

still
amenable
to this?
Yes ☒
No ☐

Phil Stras
9309 Meadow Hill Road
Ellicott City, Maryland 21043

23 November 1988

Dear General Scocroft:

Maureen phoned me last week to inform us that you've graciously agreed to participate in my Issues & Interviews project with Honors 318 this spring.

As you will recall, this worthy academic project involves my assigning one student to meet with you at some point between early February and mid-April to discuss issues associated with the Vietnam war, its causes and consequences. Your conversation is a very important part of our efforts to fully, and fairly, examine the Vietnam war, and to properly prepare the young people now on campus for their roles in leadership as this nation moves into the next century.

As always, I am very appreciative of your ongoing, dedicated interest in this class. I have the highest regard for your record of public service, and your example of honesty, integrity and priority.

With thanks.

Sincerely,

Phil Stras
Honors 318

Stras's earlier
letter already
came over there
in the already
accepted, to be
scheduled older
in

PS. You have our vote for a top spot in the new Administration.

11/10

I mentioned This
was coming in my
11/9 sched. memo.
Are you amenable?

Yes —

MM
advised
11/15

No —

Jody

Date on This
Vague —

• Sometime
after late
Jan. —

STUDENT TO CALL
BS

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page



THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

COLLEGE PARK CAMPUS

0110 Hornbake Library
College Park, Maryland 20742

General Honors Program
(301) 454-2532/2535

NOV 10 1988

Phil Straw
9309 Meadow Hill Road
Ellicott City, MD. 21043

9 November 1988

BS
Dear Maureen:

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me this morning about my Honors course at Maryland.

As I noted, I consider General Scowcroft a valuable educational resource for those who must look at the past as they prepare for the future. His investment in this course, in terms of time, and sharing his views, will last long after the class, itself, has concluded.

I have enclosed a copy of my original note from 1987. I have also included a copy of my syllabus on the course. The project -- Issues & Interviews -- is outlined on page 2.

I will assign one student to research a topic (or topics) associated with the Vietnam era, after which they will contact you for a time and date for a discussion with General Scowcroft. The student will be expected to meet his schedule, and to visit his office for the interview. The course begins in late January and continues into early May. The student should be in touch shortly after the class gets underway.

As the General knows, I served in Vietnam with the Marines in 1968-69, and I continue in service to my country as the teacher of a comprehensive class which is devoted to the same values General Scowcroft has so honorably, and consistently, represented and upheld. He has my highest admiration and respect, and I value his ongoing support for my class and my students.

Again, thank you for your willingness to assist in this matter. You've been most gracious and helpful.

Sincerely,

Phil Straw
Phil Straw
Honors 318



THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

COLLEGE PARK CAMPUS
0110 Hornbake Library
College Park, Maryland 20742

General Honors Program
(301) 454-2532/2535

Philip K. Straw
4902 Cherokee Street
College Park, Maryland 20740

14 July 1987

General Brent Scowcroft
1875 I Street NW
Suite 440
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear General Scowcroft:

During the period 1968-69, I served my country as a Marine Corps infantry platoon commander in SE Asia. I returned home with a Bronze Star (w/V), a Purple Heart and a sincere desire to learn as much as possible about the causes and consequences of America's longest war. My interest took me back to college -- not as a student, but as a teacher. Much to my dismay, I found that no course was offered at the University on the Vietnam era. After noting this fact to a friend, I subsequently drafted a course and offered it to Honors. The class was approved two years ago and this fall will mark the third consecutive year that I have taught a comprehensive course devoted to the careful, objective and detailed study of the conflict that took over 58,000 American lives and taxed us so dearly at home and abroad.

One of the key elements in my presenting this course is a project I call Issues & Interviews. The project is outlined on page 2 of the enclosed syllabus. Under its process, I seek the approval of key figures who agree to a one-on-one interview with an Honors student enrolled in my course. I assign the student and they meet with the person to discuss issues tied to Vietnam and the era. To date, the project has been very, very successful. I have been blessed to have had such figures as James Webb, J. William Fulbright, Clark Clifford, David Brinkley, Steve Bell, General Westmoreland, Charles Robb, John McCain, Bobby Muller and former Ambassador Bui Diem agree to participate. It is apparent that the views each brings to the period add greatly to my students' overall understanding of, and appreciation for, the war and its warriors.

I would be honored, sir, if you would agree to participate in Issues & Interviews this fall (September-December). With your permission, I would select a student, advise you of their name and background, after which they would be responsible for contacting your office to arrange a date and time for your discussion. The student then authors a theme essay which accounts for nearly 50 percent of their final grade.

Knowing of the long standing service you have rendered this nation and the importance you place on the next generation properly appreciating and understanding the issues of the past, I am hopeful that you will see the worth in assisting us this fall. I dedicate my course to the memory of those who served in Vietnam and I can think of no more fitting tribute to them than to make certain that the lessons of the past are well learned, well applied and remembered. Thank you, in advance, for your kind consideration.


With respect

OK

(o) 861-0006

(h) 229-1986

* EVA
Brantley
MAUREEN
MINEHAN
Schedule:
Kissinger
Assoc.



AMERICA IN VIETNAM

honors 318a

PHILIP K. STRAW

FALL 1987

TUESDAYS: 6 - 9 P.M. HORNBAKE LIBRARY 0123

A. COURSE OUTLINE

Twelve years have passed since Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City) fell to advancing North Vietnamese Army troops. That particular dramatic event -- on April 30, 1975 -- marked the end of South Vietnam as a nation as well as the end of costly American efforts stretched over two decades to hold the line on Communism in Indochina. The war in Vietnam was America's longest war, taking 58,119 U.S. servicemen killed and leaving more than 280,000 wounded in a conflict that found the average age of those fighting for the United States armed forces in Vietnam to be 19 years old. The Vietnam experience calls into debate the fundamental question about America's role in the world, about the use of force, the power of diplomacy and public opinion and the process of foreign policy decision making.

What happened in Vietnam, and why? What happened at home as a result of the war in Vietnam? What have we learned? How do we apply the lessons of a lost war?

This course is designed to carefully and fairly examine the American involvement in Southeast Asia within a historical, social and political context. Special emphasis will be placed on personalizing history and making the period and its personalities as relevant as possible. The course will not seek to prove any one theory or academic observation about the war, but will rather attempt to explain the complicated and oftentimes contrasting issues and events associated with the war. The very nature of the war (it was undeclared; it was covered more intensely by television, etc.) and the American role in it demands a comprehensive examination of the causes and consequences of the period. Utilizing a wide range of resources, the course will give students the basis for judging the turbulent Vietnam era and the American presence in Southeast Asia.

B. TEXTBOOK

Vietnam: A History, by Stanley Karnow. Viking Press (1983).

In addition to the text, a series of handouts/resource packets will be distributed during the semester on issues discussed and studied. A xeroxing fee (\$6) for the resource materials will be paid by each student. The fee is due before October 1st.

C. RESOURCES ON RESERVE (Non Print Media Center, 4th Floor, Hornbake)

Students will be expected to view certain segments of

"Master fear and pain, overcome obstacles, unite your efforts, fight to the very end, annihilate the enemy."

—GENERAL GIAP
1954

"I could conceive of no greater tragedy than for the U.S. to [fight] an all-out war in Indochina."

—DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
1954

"You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one and [the last one] will go over very quickly."

—EISENHOWER
1954

"In the final analysis it is their war... We can help them... but they have to win it, the people of Viet Nam."

—KENNEDY
1963

"We are not about to send American boys 10,000 miles away to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."

—JOHNSON
1964

"Hell no, we won't go!"
—ANTIWAR CHANT
1965

"I'm not going to be the first President who loses a war."

—RICHARD NIXON
1969

"Peace is at hand."

—HENRY KISSINGER
1972

Vietnam: A Television History (PBS/WGBH) as an assignment for class. The entire 13-part videotape series is on reserve and is available for viewing.

Vietnam: A Television History (PBS)

Part 1 (Roots of a War)	AANP #137
Part 2 (The First Vietnam War 1946-54)	AANP #137
Part 3 (America's Mandarin 1954-63)	AANP #138
Part 4 (LBJ Goes to War 1964-65)	AANP #138
Part 5 (America Takes Charge 1965-67)	AANP #139
Part 6 (America's Enemy 1954-67)	AANP #139
Part 7 (Tet 1968)	AANP #140
Part 8 (Vietnamizing the War 1968-73)	AANP #141
Part 9 (Cambodia and Laos)	AANP #142
Part 10 (Peace is at hand 1968-73)	AANP #143
Part 11 (Homefront USA)	AANP #144
Part 12 (End of the tunnel 1973-75)	AANP #145
Part 13 (Legacies)	AANP #145

In addition to the PBS Vietnam series being on reserve, the 13-part series The 10,000 Day War is also on reserve in Hornbake (Non Print Media Center, 4th Floor). Students will be assigned to view selective segments of this video series as well during the semester. Ask for the series by the call letters: DS 557.73.V54

D. COURSE REQUIREMENTS and GRADING

1. Issues and Interviews (Grade value: 50 percent) (Due date: December 1, 1987)

Students will be assigned to research an issue associated with the Vietnam period to be discussed during an in depth interview off campus with a key individual from the era who has already agreed to assist in the course. The instructor has determined the list of those participating and has already gained permission for the student's interview/discussion. Each student should finalize plans for the interview and should work with the instructor to assure that the project moves along as anticipated. Upon completion of the interview, each student should be prepared to discuss the issue and interview when called upon to do so by the instructor. While the presentation is not expected to be formal, each student should nevertheless be fully prepared to discuss with the class the issues involved in their research and their respective interviews. Students will be responsible for a well composed written report as a result of the issue/interview project. The report: minimum of 12 pages, double spaced, with appropriate footnotes and references. Grammar, sentence structure, proper style and spelling will have a bearing on grading. Papers turned in after the due date will be automatically marked down and grade accordingly. No revisions or rewrite of paper will be allowed.

2. "Where Were YOU In '68?" (Grade value: 25 percent) (Due date: November 10, 1987)

Students in Honors 318A will collectively draft a composite survey (in class) for use in an off campus poll of individuals from the surrounding community who are between the ages 34-44. The survey's first question: "Where were you in '68?" The educational intent of the project is to identify those of the Vietnam era and discuss with them their post war observations and views on issues tied to the war and America's role in the conflict. The survey will, furthermore, support one of the course objectives: personalizing the Vietnam period and its far-reaching impact on our society. Each student will be responsible for contributing to a class discussion on the survey and findings on November 17, 1987). Also due on that date will be a 4-5 page summary of survey results and each student's written

personal conclusions and observations in the wake of polling members of the Vietnam generation. Formal footnotes, etc. will not be required on the written essay. Grammar, sentence structure, proper style and spelling will have a bearing on your grade. Papers turned in after the due date (November 17, 1987) will be automatically marked down and graded accordingly. Revisions to improve work/grade will be allowed.

3. Time-to-time Testies (Grade value: 25 percent) (They can pop up anytime)

A short answer, true-false, fill in the blank quiz will be administered as the instructor sees fit and when appropriate during the semester. The quiz/essay will focus on issues, events, dates, and key individuals and items associated with the war and discussed in class, in assigned video viewing or from the text.

Example: What was the domino theory, and how did it apply to U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia? Who is first credited with using the term in discussing Vietnam?

Missing a quiz and failing to make immediate arrangements with the instructor to take the examination within the week following its administration will result in a zero for the test. No makeup quiz will be given after the grace period.

4. Vietnam Veterans Memorial

Students enrolled in Honors 318A are strongly encouraged to visit the Vietnam Veterans Memorial at any time during the semester. While there is no grade associated with this activity, it is nevertheless important to touch the Memorial, and have it, in turn, touch you.

E. ATTENDANCE and PARTICIPATION

Students are expected to be in class, on time with assignments completed by appropriate due dates. If a student can not attend a class for an unavoidable reason, please contact the instructor regarding the absence so that arrangements can be made to cover materials missed.

Discussion participation is strongly encouraged and expected. Questions are welcomed, both in and out of the classroom. Students are encouraged to discuss Issues and Interviews and the progress of the "Where Were YOU in '68?" survey as they unfold. Sharing ideas and views are essential to the overall success of the class and the attempt to examine the war fully. Certain written exercises may be shared and discussed in class.

If a class is cancelled or changed, the instructor will notify students as far in advance as possible. Students should arrange schedules for off campus visits during semester.

Several classes originate on Tuesdays in the Non-Print media rooms, 4th floor, Hornbake. Check your syllabus carefully for the proper room each week for class.

F. ACCESS TO INSTRUCTOR

Work phone: 225-5131 (9 a.m. - 5 p.m.)

Home phone: 345-5411

I have a mailbox in the Honors lounge. Use it for materials pickup and drop off as required during the semester.

Students are encouraged to contact the instructor about any aspect of the course which

needs clarifying. My objective is not to test you at every turn, but to teach you as much as possible about a crucial period of American history.

I am available for appointments on research topics if the conference can be arranged without a work or class conflict.

G. LIVING HISTORY

The course, as planned, includes the participation of several distinguished speakers and guests who will join us in class for a discussion of issues relating to Vietnam and the period. Resource packets will be distributed on guests prior to their visits and each student is expected to review the material for use in class with speakers. Questions for guests should be relevant, timely and concise, and they should be drawn from the resources used during the course. Attendance at class sessions which include speakers is absolutely essential.

H. RECOMMENDED READINGS

Friendly Fire, by C.D.B. Bryan. G.P. Putnam & Sons (1976).

Touched With Fire: The Future of the Vietnam Generation, by John Wheeler. Avon (1984).

A Soldier Reports, by (General) William C. Westmoreland. Dell Books (1976).

The Wound Within, by Alexander Kendrick. Little, Brown & Co. (1974).

10,000 Day War, by Michael Maclear. St. Martin's Press (1981).

Vietnam: The Valor and Sorrow, by Thomas Boettcher. Little, Brown & Co. (1985).

POW, by John Hubble. Reader's Digest Press (1976).

Vietnam Witness, by Bernard B. Fall. Praeger Press (1966).

No More Vietnams, by Richard Nixon. Arbor House (1985).

The War At Home, by Thomas Powers. Grossman Publishers (1973).

Why Vietnam? by Archimedes L.A. Patti. University of California Press (1980).

A Vietcong Memoir, by Truong Nhu Tang. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich. (1985).

America In Vietnam, by Guenter Lewy. Oxford University Press (1978).

Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War and the Vietnam Generation, by Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss. Vintage Books (1978).

Dispatches, by Michael Herr. Alfred A. Knopf (1977).

End of the Line: The Siege of Khe Sanh, by Robert Pisor. W.W. Norton & Co. (1982).

Fire In The Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam, by Frances FitzGerald. Little, Brown & Company (1972).

Long Time Passing: Vietnam and the Haunted Generation, by Myra McPherson. Doubleday (1984)

Planning A Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam, by Larry Berman. W.W. Norton & Company (1982)

April 7, 1989

General:

11-19-52

Paul Stevens would like to see you for 15 minutes -- not DOD or NSC-related; more personal -- sometime next week at your convenience.

☒ Okay to schedule

☐ Regret

Thurs 4/13
11:00

Refer to: _____

Wilma

Paul Stevens: 695-3341

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3/31

Brent:

President apparently can only do this on April 12. He's out of town April 13 from early morning. At this point we (NSC) only have an NSC meeting on the President's calendar that day.

Although it's not noted on the Scheduling Proposal, The President met with Woerner numerous times over the last 8 years, including a time when Woerner commandeered a W. German train to return the V.P. to Nurnberg after bad weather forced his helo down during a border inspection tour.

Philip

THE WHITE HOUSE

2019

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1989

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: JOSEPH W. HAGIN, II, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

REQUEST: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner.

PURPOSE: To discuss the May NATO Summit, Alliance's overall approach to East-West relations.

BACKGROUND: Woerner is coming to Washington with a full agenda of topics that can determine the future success of the NATO Alliance: nuclear force modernization, the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks, and a host of military and political issues that will dominate NATO's agenda.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE & TIME: Afternoon of April 12, morning of April 13
DURATION: 20 Minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Brent Scowcroft, Ambassador Blackwill; Secretary General Woerner plus one aide.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo Opportunity, 20 minute meeting in Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open Photo/Writing Pool

RECOMMENDED BY: NSC and State

OPPOSED BY: None



8906204
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2019

March 24, 1989

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Appointment Requests: NATO SYG Manfred Woerner

NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner will make an official visit to Washington April 11-13. Secretary General Woerner has requested a meeting with the President, and also with you, Secretary Baker, Secretary Cheney, and key members of both houses of Congress. The Department strongly recommends the President meet with Woerner.

With an eye on the NATO Summit in May, Woerner will want to exchange views on conventional stability, nuclear modernization, the comprehensive security concept, and NATO's approach to East-West political issues. His visit presents an opportunity to convey to the highest levels of the Alliance U.S. views on these and other important security issues. We also would exchange ideas on key themes which will be addressed at the Summit.

If the President's schedule permits, the afternoon or early evening of April 12 would be an optimal time for the Secretary General. However, he also could be available the mornings of April 12 or April 13.

Attachment:

Biographic Sheet.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

89 MAR 24 11:15

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05c. Report	Re: [Government Report] (2 pp.)	2/3/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	9/13/2010	OA/ID Number:	85033-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05d. Memo	Barry F. Lowenkron to Brent Scowcroft Re: Presidential Appointment for NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (1 pp.)	3/30/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	9/13/2010	OA/ID Number:	85033-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30-Mar-1989 14:20 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

EDWARDS

DECLASSIFIED
PER NSC WAIVER, 1500 2021-02
By SS NARA, Date 3/5/24

FROM: VMS MAIL user NSGPH
(NSGPH@CPUA.P@)

SUBJECT: NO SUBJECT

Received: From CPUA(NSGPH) by VAXC with Jnet id 6792
for EDWARDS@VAXC; Thu, 30 Mar 89 14:20 EDT

Date: Thu, 30 Mar 89 14:18:50

From: <NSGPH@CPUA.PROFS>

Subject: NO SUBJECT

To: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <GANTT@VAXC>,
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <HALL@VAXC>,
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <PROCTOR@VAXC>,
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <EDWARDS@VAXC>

NOTE FROM: G. Philip Hughes

Please print for Brent Scowcroft and Bob Gtaes.

*** Forwarding note from BLACKWIL--VAXC 03/30/89 13:42 ***

Date: Thu, 30 Mar 89 13:44 EDT

From: <BLACKWILL@VAXC>

Subject: RAND Study

To: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSGPH@CPUA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

30-Mar-1989 13:33 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brent Scowcroft

(SCOWCROFT)

FROM: Robert Blackwill
(BLACKWILL)

SUBJECT: RAND Study

From Bob Blackwill
Re - Rand Study

4/12 - Wed
5:00 PM

Arnie Kanter and I would like you to see the week of April 10 a briefing Jim Thomson is just putting together on minimum operational levels of conventional forces on the two sides in Europe and the effect of various cuts on NATO's military strategy. You will recall we are about to ask DOD to undertake the same study through the defense PCC. Can we put Thomson's briefing on your calendar?

OK

Other

CC: Arnold Lee Kanter

(KANTER)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4-12 1:30
2:00 pm.
w(working)

Anne
Armstrong
wants to see
Sen. for 15
minutes re
Iran W (INW?)
Indicators -
Warning

April 11 or 12

Green

X 2350-

OK RD

other _____

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

April 10, 1989

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *RM*

FROM: *SA* SANDRA CHARLES

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with the Chairman of the
Jewish Agency

State has forwarded a request from Simcha Dinitz, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency for a meeting with you either today, April 10 or tomorrow, April 11 (Tab I). He would like to discuss U.S.-Israeli relations. Your call on whether to see him or not. If you are unavailable, then Richard plans to meet with him.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to meet with Simcha Dinitz.

Approve *SC*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Scowcroft/Roy Memo

If this is something you wish to do, we can schedule - maybe at 5:00 - 4/11 Tues.

*10:00 4/12 Wed
4/12 2:00 PM*

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAF NARA, Date 9/13/00



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2440

April 6, 1989

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN Attachment)

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Simcha Dinitz, the Chairman of the Jewish Agency, will be in Washington and has asked to meet with you on April 10 or 11. Mr. Dinitz, who has been Chairman of the Jewish Agency since December 1987, would like to discuss U.S - Israel relations. He has also asked to meet with Deputy Secretary Eagleburger.


J. Stapleton Roy
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Biographic information.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN Attachment) 1 08:21

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Report	Re: [Government Report] (1 pp.)	4/22/85	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	9/13/2010	OA/ID Number:	85033-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08a. Memo	Diane L. Edwards to Arnold Kanter and Robert Blackwill Re: ABM Briefing (1 pp.)	4/11/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	9/13/2010	OA/ID Number:	85033-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08b. Memo	Linton Brooks to Florence E. Gantt Re: Strategic Defense Briefing (1 pp.)	4/8/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	9/13/2010	OA/ID Number:	85033-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Memo	Diane L. Edwards to Arnold Kanter and Robert Blackwill Re: ABM Briefing (1 pp.)	4/10/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Administrative Files
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Appointments Completed, January to June 1989 [2]

Date Closed:	9/13/2010	OA/ID Number:	85033-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S[2]	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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4/10 4:30

~~Wick~~ 1/30
on 2/16
3/29
Wed
10:00
w/Gates

January 27, 1989

General --

Ambassador Henry "Hank" Cooper, Chief Negotiator for Defense and Space, has asked if he can see you for 15 minutes sometime next week to discuss arms control.

Schedule ✓ Invite staffer to sit in

Request paper from Staff

Other

~~Valerie~~
~~647-5620~~

~~647-6245~~
Jean Sawyer
647-6245

Florence



**UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION**
Geneva, Switzerland

February 14, 1989

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

I am satisfied with the status quo of the Defense and Space Talks and, after almost four years, am quite content to pass the baton to my successor. At the same time, I am apprehensive of the future because I fear people generally don't understand what we have accomplished and what we are likely to lose if we don't pay attention both to overall strategy and to details of form.

Regarding overall strategy, I believe our negotiating leverage depends on SDI remaining a viable program intended to lead beyond research and development to deployment -- and, unfortunately, there is widespread doubt of the Administration's commitment to that end. Regarding tactics, I believe we must be patient, stand firm and not permit the Soviets to walk back from commitments they have made in the talks -- and I see signs that the organization being contemplated for the Nuclear and Space Talks plays right into longstanding Soviet tactics which will inevitably lead to an erosion of our position.

With these concerns in mind, I prepared the attached summary of key outstanding issues, as I see them, and recommendations for actions that might be taken as part of your planned strategic review. I would be pleased to discuss this important matter with you and your staff at your convenience.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Hank", written in a cursive style.

HENRY F. COOPER
Chief Negotiator
Defense and Space Talks

Attachment
As Stated

February 14, 1989

Arms Control, SDI and Next Steps
by
Henry F. Cooper
Chief Negotiator, Defense and Space Talks

President Reagan's March 1983 announcement of the SDI Program initiated a new era in strategic possibilities. For the first time in a decade, the U.S. technical community was challenged to see if advancing technology had made possible the development of effective defenses. The U.S. policy community was challenged to provide the basis for moving to deploy effective defenses if they proved feasible -- preferably in cooperation with the Soviet Union and in conjunction with reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. And the President consistently made clear, especially in his meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, his high priority on moving to a new strategic regime where deterrence is not based solely upon the threat of retaliation.

Great strides have been made by the technologists -- as even the skeptics must acknowledge. There is growing bipartisan support for considering how future deployments could improve deterrence -- as evidenced by recent articles and statements by Senator Nunn and Congressman Aspin. The United States has made consistent progress in the Geneva Talks with the Soviet Union -- witness the INF Treaty and progress toward treaties in START and the Defense and Space Talks (DST).

Maintaining a robust SDI and a commitment to deployment will be important in continuing to give the United States considerable negotiating leverage. If we hold firm in the negotiations, maintain a viable SDI and remain committed to deployment when effective defenses are feasible, then we can have both SDI deployments and good arms control agreements. But first we must be prepared to withstand a severe Soviet challenge.

The following sections review the anticipated Soviet challenge, discuss weaknesses in the current U.S. posture and recommend policy and administrative initiatives to shore up these weaknesses.

The Soviet Challenge

The Soviets have characterized SDI as an obstacle to arms control since the outset of the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST) in March 1985. At first, they argued that no agreement in either START or INF was possible unless there was also an agreement which would have crippled SDI. Eventually, they dropped the INF linkage, and an INF Treaty was signed and ratified. There have been informal hints, outside of the NST, that they might also drop the START linkage, but this seems unlikely -- at least any time soon. It is more likely that the Soviets will test the Bush Administration's commitment to SDI -- at least through the FY90 budget debate, and maybe for much longer.

Recent press reports encourage the Soviets to believe that the Bush Administration is less committed to SDI than the Reagan Administration. On the one hand, these reports may encourage the Soviets to take a soft line on their alleged concerns and to adopt a "wait and see" attitude regarding the future SDI program while reserving an attempted "coup de grace" linkage thrust until the START endgame. On the other hand, they may adopt a harder line in the near term in an attempt to influence the outcome of the upcoming U.S. strategic review.

In any case, whether expressed loudly or softly, the basic Soviet arguments will likely be variations of the theme that continuing a robust SDI threatens to "militarize space" and to make impossible a START Treaty on 50-percent reductions. At the same time, they will appeal to publics, Allies and Congress, by feigning a forthcoming negotiating posture, particularly in START, while seeking to limit SDI testing.

The Soviets can be expected to use form and procedure to gain tactical advantages in pressing their agenda. For example, they will continue to seek to solve the "ABM Treaty problem" as part of START rather than to negotiate seriously on a separate DST agreement. (On occasion, they have proposed that the DST agreement be a Protocol to a START Treaty -- and they continue to propose to include their linkage position as an explicit provision of the START Treaty.) They will no doubt continue to try to turn DST into a START working group -- by providing a very limited DST Delegation and seeking to work substantive DST issues in START and in a Joint Plenary format. In addition to eroding the negotiating gains made by the United States over the past several years, this would set up the best tactical conditions, from a Soviet perspective, for a "grand compromise" play to kill SDI in the START endgame.

The Soviets will likely continue to make their demands in the context of a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. They can be expected to downplay the differences between the U.S. and Soviet DST positions in an effort to walk away from the DST negotiating record of the past 3-1/2 years. For example, they may refer to a "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty reflecting what was "signed in 1972" in an attempt to deny the DST negotiating record associated with the language of the December 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement. They will likely continue to argue that their proposals would not in any way modify or amend the ABM Treaty. So far, Soviet proposals have either been ambiguous or would have led to an unverifiable regime more restrictive than the U.S. "narrow" interpretation of the ABM Treaty.

U.S. Response

The United States so far has frustrated Soviet attempts to subsume DST under START via procedural measures. Prior to the start of the NST, the United States anticipated Soviet linkage tactics.* The U.S. Head of the NST Delegation was initially the DST Chief Negotiator and he insisted that substantive issues be dealt with in the three negotiating groups where each negotiation was to proceed toward agreement on its own merits and at its own pace. Later a new Chief DST Negotiator was appointed and the Head of the NST Delegation seldom participated in the Geneva Talks.** During the past year or so, the U.S. DST and START chief negotiators alternated in the chair when the Soviets called for Joint Plenaries -- each insisted on dealing with his agenda separately in discussions of substance with the Soviet NST Negotiators. Thus, the role of the Head of NST Delegation has to this point been an administrative one in Geneva insofar as the formal negotiations went -- each U.S. Negotiating Group (START, INF, DST) worked autonomously on matters of substance.

On substance, the sides agreed at the December 1987 Washington Summit that the DST agreement is to have the legal status of the ABM Treaty and to be separate from the ABM Treaty, but the Soviets have so far refused to say that it would be called a "Treaty." It will be important to hold the Soviets to this agreement which counters their linkage arguments and supports the U.S. interest in moving to deploy effective defenses beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty when they prove feasible.

* The NST delegation, which included three separate negotiating groups dealing with START, INF and DST issues, was the result of the January 1985 Geneva Shultz-Gromyko Meeting. Each U.S. Negotiating Group was headed by an Ambassador, received independent instructions from Washington, and was fully authorized to deal with all matters under its purview. The NST "umbrella" was seen by the United States largely as a face-saving measure, permitting the Soviets to return to the table to "new" talks following their December 1983 walkout of the INF and START negotiations. But the Soviets were expected to use the organizational structure to emphasize their linkage arguments, which were already apparent from public statements by senior Soviet spokesmen.

**As the INF Treaty was nearing completion and in conjunction with his other duties as Counselor to the Secretary of State, Ambassador Kampelman's duties in Washington simply would not permit him much time in Geneva.

The United States has made clear that it could accept such a separate DST Treaty including the Soviet demand for a limited period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty provided that the Soviets unambiguously agree that:

- (1) A new strategic regime will exist after the non-withdrawal period in which a side may, without further reference to the ABM Treaty, deploy defenses beyond those permitted by the ABM Treaty if it so chooses;
- (2) Certain withdrawal rights are to be retained, including the standard "supreme interests" provision which has been in all U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements since 1963; and
- (3) Treaty-compliant testing, including testing in space, may be conducted during the non-withdrawal period to evaluate the feasibility of effective defenses.

Possible Convergence?

The Soviets have on occasion displayed some willingness to meet these U.S. conditions, but their position at the end of the Reagan era did not reflect such convergence.

Gorbachev agreed to the first of the above conditions at the December 1987 Washington Summit, but the Soviet Union has since sought to circumvent that agreement by having the Defense and Space Treaty terminate at the end of the non-withdrawal period -- effectively nullifying the "right to deploy" after the non-withdrawal period. The U.S.-proposed Treaty, on the other hand, is of unlimited duration, preserving this right into the indefinite future.

At various times, the Soviets have also seemed to be forthcoming in meeting the other U.S. conditions, but they have backtracked. Most notably, at the December 1987 Washington Summit, they accepted U.S. language that they had previously rejected because they said it meant the sides could test, but not deploy, all ABM systems and components based on "other physical principles." But since then, the Soviets have publicly denied the clear meaning of the private negotiating record that these words meant the U.S. "broad interpretation."

In the face of such Soviet backtracking, the United States has insisted that there be unambiguous explicit agreement that testing to evaluate the feasibility of effective defenses will be permitted during the non-withdrawal period. Several U.S. initiatives have been tabled to move the discussion beyond a debate over ABM Treaty interpretation. For example, the United States has proposed Predictability Measures and tabled a proposal to free all space-based sensors of ABM Treaty limits.

The United States also provided a unilateral Assurance that future SDI testing in space will not constitute deployment of any significant defense capability. So far, Soviet responses to these U.S. initiatives have been mixed -- but mostly negative.

Some progress was made on a Predictability Measures Protocol*, which the United States wishes to enhance the transparency of both sides' strategic defense efforts, particularly as they lead toward eventual deployment of effective defenses. But the Soviet agenda with this Protocol is clearly to impose restrictions on SDI under the guise of assuring compliance with the ABM Treaty which prohibits any meaningful deployment.

There is reason to believe that, if the United States maintains a viable SDI program and clearly communicates an intention to deploy as soon as effective defenses are feasible, the Soviets will eventually accept the U.S. approach of a cooperative, jointly managed transition. But first, the Bush Administration must be prepared to withstand an intense anti-SDI campaign including arguments that SDI is making a START Treaty impossible and is a threat to our European Allies.

Hold That Line!

It is important that countering Soviet linkage is taken into account in matters of form and substance.

- Regarding form, the integrity of a separate DST negotiation toward a separate DST Treaty should be maintained. It is preferred to have DST negotiations entirely separate from START without the NST umbrella -- but the Soviets may not agree. If the United States accepts a continuation of the current format, the NST chief negotiator should not be the START negotiator -- otherwise the Soviets will use Joint Plenaries to turn the DST negotiation into a defacto START working group on "the ABM problem."

* Agreed Predictability Measures include annual data exchanges followed by meetings of experts to review the data and plan reciprocal visits to U.S. and Soviet facilities involved in research, development, testing, deployment, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missile defenses. They also include mutual observation of tests.

- Holding firm on substance will require attention to nuances of our negotiating record* -- both in Geneva and in preparing appropriate instructions from Washington. Unfortunately, the nuances of the negotiating record are not well understood -- even within the Washington bureaucracy; and there will be little continuity in the U.S. DST delegation.

It will be more important, and more difficult, in dealing with public diplomacy for Administration spokesmen to articulate clearly the President's commitment to "deployment as soon as feasible" and to state how such deployment will enhance deterrence -- including extended deterrence.

Even more important and more difficult, holding firm will require bipartisan Congressional support for a continuing viable, robust SDI program. That, of course, means that the SDI program itself, as advocated by the Bush Administration to the Congress, must be technically sound. While there are clear reasons for optimism on the technical front, there is a problem.

SDI Phase I Architectural Problem

Unfortunately, the current SDI Phase I architecture has been shaped more by a process of mediating between internal DOD bureaucratic interests than by solid technical direction -- and consequently it does not reflect anything like the best that current technology offers for \$69 billion, or even considerably less.** Two related key problems are:

- The success of the Phase I architecture is critically dependent on optimistic estimates of U.S. ability to solve the mid-course discrimination problem in the near term. However, senior scientific and engineering experts will shortly contradict this assumption and advise SecDef (through the Defense Science Board) that, with U.S. technology, assuring penetration will be the easier task for the indefinite future. It will be hard to avoid "mirror-imaging" assumptions that this is the case for Soviet technology as well -- although that may not be true. The obvious answer is to direct that the Phase I architecture be reworked so that it does not depend upon solving the discrimination problem in the near term. Such a system architecture is possible, but...

* See "A Recap of the Defense and Space Talks, March 1985 - November 1988," by Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, December 31, 1988.

** General Abrahamson states in his "End of Tour Report" that the Phase I goals might be met by a much more effective systems costing no more than \$25 billion.

-- The Air Force is resisting such innovative system architectures that could also solve critical survivability and testability problems. At the same time, SDI funds are being used to develop warning and space surveillance systems which will not have these necessary survivability and testability characteristics. Criticism of the vulnerabilities of the Phase I architecture (especially in upcoming Congressional hearings) could signal incorrectly* that advancing technology will not support deployment of any effective defense in the near term -- and the result would be a regrettable setback for SDI as well as significant erosion of our negotiating leverage.

If such problems are not dealt with immediately, upcoming Congressional hearings will cast doubt on the technology base and place at risk the very viability of SDI, and significantly undercut the NST negotiations. Overcoming these bureaucratic obstacles and preempting the opposition's arguments in upcoming Congressional hearings presents a formidable immediate challenge to the Bush Administration.

Defense and Deterrence

In rectifying the problems in the current SDI program and in carrying out President Bush's campaign promise to pursue a vigorous SDI program and to deploy a meaningful defense as soon as feasible, it will be important to rethink how deterrence, including extended deterrence, is affected by such defenses.

U.S. deterrence has long been based upon a strategy to deny Soviet leadership and planners confidence that they can achieve any rational objective by use of military force against the United States or a major Ally. This "countervailing" or "denial" strategy has been underwritten by "retaliatory" weapons with targeting options embodied in a static SIOP which is updated in a major way every 18 months or so. Great emphasis has been placed on the "damage" that could be inflicted upon the Soviet Union through retaliation -- even when seeking to limit damage to the United States. So, Damage Expectancy (DE) has been used as the measure of effectiveness to advocate new strategic systems and to evaluate the performance of existing ones -- with little consideration of overall strategy or distinction between delivery systems and

* The most notable advancing technology that could rectify the deficiencies of the Phase I architecture would involve the proliferation of autonomous space-based interceptors, such as the "brilliant pebbles" concept advocated by Dr. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore Laboratories, in place of the space-based interceptors and sensor systems of the current Phase I architecture.

when they could implement the expected damage.* The real possibility of effective active defenses in limiting damage to the United States and in denying Soviet arms through assuring the survivability of U.S. retaliatory capability calls for a rethinking of U.S. strategy.

Such a rethinking could enlarge U.S. strategic options considerably. Defenses can play important strategic roles not reflected by the measures of effectiveness currently employed throughout the U.S. defense community. A rethinking of the linkage between the U.S. strategic umbrella and U.S. Alliance relationship should include the impact of the conventional force balance, the role of in-theater nuclear weapons and the importance of ATBMs in an INF-free world. Without such rethinking, there will be incoherence, in and outside of the government, in the arguments of those advocating and evaluating various strategic systems, particularly in the Pentagon's battle of the budget -- and discussion of SDI deployment options will cause uneasiness among U.S. Allies.

The U.S. arms control approach (for strategic and conventional arms) must be consistent with our approach to deterrence as the deployment of active defenses is contemplated. The idea of a "jointly managed transition" pursued by the Reagan Administration is a sensible approach, from both a technical and political perspective, and should be continued. But the United States must be prepared to pursue defenses unilaterally if the Soviets are to be persuaded to negotiate seriously on such a transition. This means that SDI must demonstrate effective defenses are feasible and there must be bipartisan support for moving to deployment.

The Bush Administration must keep this bottom line in mind in planning next steps for developing overall policy, improving the SDI Phase I architecture and formulating U.S. arms control negotiating objectives.

Next Steps

The Bush Administration should take the initiative early, before Congress gets heavily into the act on the FY90 budget, to solve these bureaucratic and political problems and to get the SDI program and our overall policy strategy into shape. More specifically, it is recommended:

* A curiosity in our current approach is that active defenses to destroy Soviet mobile missiles after they are launched (without threatening their pre-launch survivability) are viewed by many as destabilizing while compromising the prelaunch survivability of such mobile missiles and attacking them with bomber delivered weapons ten hours into the war is viewed by the same people as a worthy, stabilizing objective.

(1) That President Bush issue an early NSD to direct his national security team to unite behind his pledge of August 2, 1988:*

"MY POLICY WILL BE TO DEVELOP A VIABLE STRATEGIC DEFENSE SYSTEM, AN OUTGROWTH OF THE SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM, TO PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK ... ALREADY, THE FIRST PHASE OF A SPACE-BASED SDI TECHNOLOGY IS READY TO COME OUT OF THE LAB AND BEGIN DEMONSTRATION. THE TECHNOLOGY ISN'T THE PROBLEM ... I AM COMMITTED TO DEPLOYMENT OF SDI, AS SOON AS FEASIBLE, AND WILL DETERMINE THE EXACT ARCHITECTURE OF THE SYSTEM IN MY FIRST TERM, AS THE TECHNOLOGIES ARE TESTED AND PROVEN. AS PRESIDENT, I WILL NOT LEAVE AMERICA DEFENSELESS AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES."

(2) That the President direct OSD to lead an indepth policy study to reexamine how active defenses, as well as our retaliatory forces, can contribute directly to our longstanding deterrence strategy to deny Soviet leadership and planners confidence that they can achieve any rational objective by use of military force against the United States or a major U.S. Ally. As a catalyst for developing the sea change in our thinking associated with including active defenses, OSD could build on the "Sloss Nuclear Targeting Policy Review" of the 1970's. This would create a critical mass of people, in and out of government, who thereafter would speak a common language in advocating and evaluating strategic offensive and defensive force options to implement the President's policy which would be based on the study results (just as PD-59 and NSDD-13 were based on the Sloss study).

(3) That OSD, in conducting this policy study, examine how the deployment of effective defenses could and should influence the architecture of our future strategic forces in a limited budget environment. For example:

- Defenses could solve the ICBM survivability problem.
- Soviet mobile ICBMs could be held at risk by effective defenses without threatening their prelaunch survivability (freeing up the B-1/B-2 to satisfy other targeting requirements).
- Coastal area defenses could defend against a sufficient number of submarines to assure detection by our ASW if the Soviets try to sneak in a sufficient number to attack U.S. time-sensitive strategic assets -- this would enhance confidence in tactical warning and provide limited protection for two-thirds of the U.S. population.

* Then Presidential Candidate George Bush's foreign policy views, including these statements on SDI, were presented in a speech to the Mid-America Committee in Chicago.

(4) That, in conjunction with recommendation (2), the U.S. policy of "extended deterrence" be reexamined and built upon for a world which includes U.S. and Soviet active defenses. This needs to be thought through carefully first in the U.S. Government, and then worked out in consultation with our Allies.

(5) That OSD scrub the SDI program to assure that the Phase I architecture will withstand critical scrutiny. The current architecture cannot, and exposure of this fact during Congressional hearings in the coming budget cycle would severely undercut the credibility of near-term deployment options (and our negotiating leverage). In particular, it is recommended that SecDef:

- Assign line authority and responsibility for SDI to a civilian, who should be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, with SecDef's full support to direct the program in the battles between the Services. (The DDR&E responsibilities could be assigned to the Principal Deputy USDA and the DDR&E slot converted to ASD for Defensive Programs (ASDD) -- including SDI, ADI and perhaps ASAT.)

- Direct the ASDD and the Services, through their Secretaries, to update the Phase I architecture and strip it of internal DOD "pork." SecDef should make clear at the outset his intention to reward innovation and cost reduction in developing a survivable, effective ABM system concept. The SDI budget should not be used as an alternate funding source for other mission objectives, no matter how worthy. The ASDD should incorporate more constructive competition into the management plan to challenge "business as usual" attitudes of the Services. For example, a competition could be held between one set of architectures which "finesse the discrimination problem" (no mid-course intercepts) in Phase I and another set which requires the "discrimination problem" to be solved in Phase I. Let two team efforts fight it out, exposed to much impartial technical scrutiny, and pick the winner -- or synthesize the results in time to advocate a single architecture for the 1991 budget. A critical issue will be to eliminate the BM/C3 single-point failure modes in space and elsewhere which would be an Achilles heel in any architecture. (This is a fragility of the current Phase I architecture.)

(6) That SecDef instruct his lawyers to be advocates for a reasonable and balanced standard of interpretation of the ill-defined and unverifiable provisions of the ABM Treaty. Our warning systems, as well as SDI, are in danger of being

unilaterally restrained by the imposition of such an inequitable standard. As a matter of policy, the United States should not hold itself to a standard which cannot be verified, especially in the case of a Treaty we know the Soviets are violating.

(7) That a proportionate response to the Krasnoyarsk violation of the ABM Treaty be developed by DOD and announced by the President early. This would send a strong counter signal to Soviet propaganda by emphasizing that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, that is violating the Treaty. (Such a response could include the suspension of all restrictions related to space-based sensors. Such restrictions are ambiguous, unverifiable and are causing considerable mischief among the Pentagon lawyers who may impose restraints on our warning sensors in space that have no basis under any international agreement).

(8) That the President insist upon the integrity of a separate forum for the DST negotiation to foil Soviet efforts to subsume DST issues into START and to strengthen public support for their linkage arguments. If an overall Head of the NST Delegation, is necessary to meet Soviet demands, then the U.S. should continue the precedent of not having him be the START Negotiator. This would continue to frustrate Soviet attempts to use procedural steps such as calling Joint Plenary sessions to deal with DST issues, to turn the DST Negotiating Group into a START Working Group on "The ABM Problem" -- strengthening their hand in making linkage arguments, especially in an endgame.

(9) That the President instruct the Geneva negotiators to hang tough -- there should be absolutely no give in our position regarding SDI. If we stand the test with Congress and our Allies, the Soviets will eventually see things our way regarding a stable and predictable "cooperative transition" to an offense-defense mix of strategic forces.

(10) That all of this be folded together with a coherent game plan for public affairs, legislative interaction and Alliance consultations. The Bush Administration simply must work to build a solid bipartisan base of support for SDI and a plan to deploy defenses when proven feasible -- and to address Allied concerns regarding extended deterrence. If this challenge is not met, the Geneva Talks won't go anywhere and SDI will be placed at grave risk. If it is met, we'll get defenses and eventually do well in Geneva as well.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 3, 1989

Florence,

Attached is a copy of the memo Gene sent to General Scowcroft. Gene said General Scowcroft knows the people who will visit him.

The group will consist of 6 or 7 persons, names to be furnished in a few days.

Gene would like to know if this meeting can be moved from the Sit Room to the General's office, and what additional paperwork you would like to have prior to the meeting.

Thanks,

Barb Desina

4920

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
February 23, 1989

4/11 - Tues
4:00 - 5:00
(Here in office)
1000

Ebner

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: LINTON F. BROOKS *LB*
FROM: EUGENE M. *E* EBNER
SUBJECT: Meeting with Council on Foreign Relations Study Group

The Council on Foreign Relations Study Group has prepared a paper on defense budget issues (see Tab I). The group, chaired by Phil Odeen, is requesting a meeting with you to discuss their study's findings and to share their ideas on what choices need to be made in an era of flat or no real growth defense budgets. Topics include the strategic environment and the role of arms control as well as ways to achieve a balance between readiness, force structure and modernization. A discussion of the decisionmaking process is also included.

This paper portrays a keen understanding of the role and sensitivities of the military departments in executing budget cuts. It also demonstrates well the relationship between the services, OSD, NSC and OMB. In that regard, the conclusions of the group are oriented more toward process and the exploration of budget options rather than making recommendations for specific cuts. Specifically, the council is looking for the Executive and Congress to do business in ways that will foster funding stability, imaginative approaches to force planning, increased efficiencies and greater cooperation in the planning process.

Considering the membership of the council (Congressional members, former DOD, NSC and OMB officials, retired senior military officers and others (see Tab II)), we believe that you would be well served by meeting with the group for one hour to hear their briefing. If you agree we will prepare a schedule proposal.

Don *LD* Anider and Bill *HB* Brant concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you schedule a meeting ^{with} the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group.

Approve *EB*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Paper on Defense Issues and Budgets
Tab II Incoming Odeen Correspondence

DEFENSE ISSUES AND BUDGETS

December 1988

This briefing paper reflects the discussions of a Council on Foreign Relations Study Group meeting in Washington over the last few months. The Group included current and former officials with experience in defense policy across the last six U.S. administrations. We did not intend to suggest detailed policies or programs for the new Bush Administration; nor does any member of the Group necessarily agree with all elements of this paper. Rather, we reflected on the Reagan build-up and looked to the future, seeking to frame the major choices the Administration will confront in constructing defense capabilities in support of American foreign policy.

The paper is organized into three sections:

1. The strategic environment of defense choices;
2. Lessons for the 1990s, six clusters of issues ranging from the balance among readiness and sustainability, force structure and modernization; to support and overhead savings; to the role of arms control.
3. Questions of process.

The Group's principal conclusions are simple to state but difficult to carry out. Given the budgetary realities of the next five years -- a shortfall of \$200-300 billion by comparison to current planning -- deep cuts in readiness, forces or modernization, or, more likely, all three, will be

inevitable. (See the appendix for more detail on the problem.) The impact of this budget shortfall can be ameliorated if the Executive and Congress agree to do business in new ways, abandoning patterns that have prevailed for years if not decades. This requires:

- o Reasonable stability and predictability of resources. Congress and the President must agree on the levels of defense spending for at least four years, and then adhere to those levels in the absence of major changes in the environment. We cannot emphasize too much the importance of predictability.

- o Willingness by the Pentagon to explore imaginative approaches to force planning -- varying readiness and sustainability levels, and relying more heavily on reserve and Guard forces.

- o Recognition by the military departments that the cost of many of their support activities can no longer be sustained given no-growth budgets.

- o Providing the Services with incentives to make fundamental changes in practices and programs. They now fear that any savings from efficiencies will only be lost to them. They need to be rewarded for making tough choices to reduce long-term costs.

- o Commitment by Congress not to undermine Defense Department actions in these areas if we are to minimize reductions in U.S. military power. This implies efforts by the Administration to bring Congress into the process in some way.

I. THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The Soviet factor has driven postwar American defense planning:

- o Soviet forces heavily influence strategic nuclear programs.

- o the need for large, heavy conventional units also responds to the Soviet presence in Europe, especially now that China is no longer regarded as a near-term threat.

- o the emphases on high technology and high states of readiness primarily reflect concern with the Soviet Union.

- o even the larger mobility forces and the Army's new light divisions have been planned to meet the Soviet threat in southwest Asia.

Perhaps what is most evident thus far about the Soviet Union under Gorbachev is that its course is uncertain; Gorbachev's predecessors, even if menacing, were reasonably predictable. Skeptics argue that so far the most hopeful of Gorbachev's words have not been matched by deeds. In planning U.S. defenses, the Group feels that for now, the safest bet about the future is continuity:

- o Gorbachev will more adroitly pursue familiar Soviet policies. This "Gorbachev factor" will undercut support for defense in Europe even more than the United States. Actions with limited military significance will have big political effects -- for instance, the promised unilateral Soviet troop withdrawals from eastern Europe and overall reduction in

military manpower.

- o if Soviet forces and programs are about to change, that change will become visible only slowly, given Soviet secrecy and emphasis on adjusting doctrine before forces. This complicates U.S. and NATO reaction to recent Soviet initiatives.

- o the withdrawal from Afghanistan suggests that a retrenching Soviet Union may diminish the short-run challenge to the U.S. in other areas -- for instance, Afghanistan/Pakistan or Angola.

- o whatever American arguments, and however successful, the United States should not expect its allies to make up for major decreases in U.S. defense effort. "Burden-sharing" has a long history, and patterns of effort will not change quickly or dramatically. Indeed, given the promise of Soviet troop reductions, our allies are likely to reduce their forces, especially if we do.

However, fixation with the Soviet Union and Gorbachev should not obscure the fact that the United States continues to confront challenges outside the traditional focal points of Soviet-American competition in Europe and northeast Asia, challenges unconnected or loosely connected to the Soviet Union.

Throughout the postwar period, the U.S. has treated these Third World contingencies as lesser included cases of the Soviet threat. That practice, if ever tenable, seems less and less so despite the possession by minor powers of a few very sophisticated and lethal weapons. Will tight budgets provide

an incentive to rethink old assumptions? We hope so, for experiences suggests that limited conflict in some region will erupt at some point in President Bush's tenure, and we must be prepared.

The changes in the Soviet Union and the prospect of limited U.S. resources for defense: these and other developments indicate it is time for a careful re-evaluation of military contingencies that might threaten American security interests, the range of forces required for those missions, and the costs of those forces. This assessment should be the first order of business for President-elect Bush's national security team. It should be done before any long-term decisions are made about budgets or Defense programs. We make some suggestions about how to do it in this paper's conclusion.

II. DEFENSE LESSONS FOR THE 1990S

This Group cannot hope to define a coherent strategy, nor choose some weapons while rejecting others. We do hope to sharpen some issues, suggest how to think about them, and lay out options we believe should be addressed.

Fiscal stringency risks undermining American defense capabilities, but it also provides a stimulus for fresh thought. Merely muddling through year by year will not work; long-term savings require attention now if they are to have impact by the end of the President's first term. Moreover, postponing hard choices will only create a larger "bow-wave," making the problem harder in the future, forcing sharp cuts in

military capability.

The real challenge is achieving a reasonable balance among readiness, force structure and modernization (both immediate procurement and longer-term research and development).

Dramatic deterioration in readiness during the 1970s created a "hollow army," and Congress, often conceived as the villain, became instead an advocate for sustaining readiness. Now, the conventional wisdom, embraced in last year's budget by Secretary Carlucci, holds that structure should be cut, preserving readiness. But the question of balance will continue to loom:

- o all three areas will probably have to be cut to achieve flat or declining budgets.

- o the biggest near-term savings would result from deferring modernization -- tactical aircraft (the ATF and ATA), B-2 (Stealth), the new Army helicopter (LHX), C-17 transport, SDI, for instance.

- o when structure is cut, the key question to consider is recovery time. As a hedge against an uncertain future, sustaining some "hollowed out" structure makes sense.

- o selective cuts in readiness can be made, in forces and missions less time-sensitive or judged less necessary.

A. Readiness and Sustainability

Readiness calls for full manning, frequent training and realistic exercises, while sustainability requires stocks of ammunition and spares, plus a responsive industrial base. The

latter is usually easier to cut, with larger savings; and so it gets cut first. (It also did not benefit proportionately during the recent build-up.)

- o under a policy of deliberately unbalanced readiness, the readiness of units for some missions would be reduced while others would be maintained were held at a high state. Decisions should be based on (a) the likelihood of the contingent threat; (b) the recovery time; and (c) the cost of a bad judgment. Possible changes include:

- selective reductions in manning and training of U.S.-based Army and Air Force units destined for use in Europe.

- cutting readiness and activity levels of Pacific naval forces to free resources for naval units in the Mediterranean and southwest Asia.

- reducing training for the nuclear role of tactical fighters in northeast Asia to enable those units to maintain conventional readiness.

- o the United States should not lower the quality standards of military recruits. The potential savings are too small, the recovery time too large.

B. Force Structure

Cuts in structure produce large, long-term savings. The same criteria as for readiness apply, with special attention to taking cuts in ways that will be least risky in the early 1990s. Areas for possible reduction include:

- o East Asia, given the relatively low likelihood of

conflict.

- the 25th Army division in Hawaii.

- ground forces in Korea as political conditions improve.

- tactical air, relying more on crisis deployments of U.S.-based forces.

- o the fifteen-carrier Navy.

- block obsolescence in the 1990s means that sustaining fifteen will require building six expensive, new carriers (\$3-4 billion each) if older carriers are retired after 45 years.

- the Navy has too few tactical aircraft to sustain the needed carrier air wings.

- given these factors, Defense should consider cutting back to thirteen, with one or more assigned to the Naval Reserve.

- o substituting Guard/Reserve forces for some U.S.-based forces committed to NATO. In particular, more use of round-out units would make it possible to bring active units to full strength quickly in a crisis. History suggests that smaller, readier components to be rounded out are preferable to larger units at low readiness and low morale.

- o smaller forces may dictate moving to more specialized, less costly units in order to sustain essential missions. More effective planning to mobilize the civilian sector will also be called for.

C. Major Weapons

The string of costly weapons about to enter full production makes these a tempting target for near-term savings while longer-term changes take effect. The money involved is enormous -- B-2 (Stealth) bomber is a \$50 billion program -- and since many of the new systems are strategic nuclear (including rail-mobile MX and Midgetman), the connections to strategy and arms control are inescapable. Issues to examine include:

- o determining which programs face major management or technical problems; these should be candidates for deferral until problems are resolved.

- o delaying B-2 production until the complex technologies involved are thoroughly proven by testing prototypes.

- o deferring one or both of ATA and ATF, procuring instead more current generation aircraft (e.g. F-16, F-18). The counter argument is that the modern technology, especially stealth, is so vital that the U.S. must move ahead, yet both programs are reported to be encountering technical problems.

- o assessing the implications of advances in naval technology -- satellite means of locating surface ships, ways of detecting submarines, and the availability of quieter propulsion systems. Does greater vulnerability suggest more, cheaper surface ships? more reliance on submarines?

Cancelling or postponing production of new weapons alone will not solve the budget problem. But they could generate

savings of \$20-40 billion in 1992, freeing money to buy larger quantities of current weapons or fund investments that will pay off with larger savings down the road. It may also be time to consider again the issue of high-low mix, in light of today's threats and strategies.

D. Support and Overhead

A range of support functions consumes a full third of the defense budget -- \$100 billion. For instance:

- o major headquarters -- the Pentagon, military systems commands, major service commands such as SAC, TAC, Army Forces Command, and the Navy's Atlantic and Pacific fleets, plus the Unified and Specific Commands (annual cost, \$5 billion).

- o service shipyards, arsenals and aircraft maintenance facilities (annual cost, \$25 billion).

- o military laboratories for basic research, new equipment and engineering (annual cost, \$12 billion).

- o integrated Defense agencies for intelligence, logistics and communications, such as DIA, DLA and DCAA (annual cost, \$2 billion).

- o medical services (annual cost, \$12 billion).

- o training, from basic recruits to the war colleges (annual cost, \$18 billion).

These huge, far-flung activities are seldom subjected to sustained scrutiny from anywhere -- OSD, OMB or the services. If they are cut, it is usually in specific, narrow areas. Serious attention from the top is necessary if tough issues are

to be raised and resolved. The scrutiny will be time-consuming, but private sector experience in the 1980s suggests that it will be amply repaid. Savings on the order of ten to twenty percent are possible.

However, it is important not to overestimate one specific issue, closing bases, often cited as the source of billions of dollars in cuts. The Group fully supports the recent Base Closure Commission but cautions that the savings are not likely to be more than several hundred million dollars:

- o politics may intrude, as it has in the past.
- o even if it does not, major savings will only ensue if the closures are accompanied by cuts in personnel, units, functions, and support.

E. Procuring Weapons

The Defense acquisition process is in trouble; recent scandals are only a part of the problem. The process is overly complex, burdened by obsolete organizations, rules, procedures and measurement systems. It takes too long and costs too much, and in many cases the technology is obsolete by the time the equipment reaches the field.

We spend some \$100 billion acquiring weapons and equipment, and unquestionably, much of that is poorly spent -- Secretary Carlucci estimated that \$15 billion per year could be saved. But the impediments to reform are also legend, all the more so when the political backlash from scandal argues for more, not less oversight -- and thus more paperwork and less

efficiency.

Achieving real savings will require unprecedented common effort by the Pentagon, Congress and defense industry. For instance:

- o stabilizing funding through two-year budgets and multi-year procurement contracts.

- o dramatically simplifying the process to reduce time and paperwork; over the past two decades the time required to develop and produce a new weapon has increased significantly, now taking 8-12 years.

- o introducing much more modern manufacturing technology into defense industry; in the current system the investment is risky, there is little incentive to cut costs, and industry has been slow to move on its own.

- o using cost competition more judiciously, for the Pentagon needs quality suppliers with proven track records, not those who are skillful at "buying in" or who provide shoddy products cheaply.

It is tempting to dismiss real reform of procurement as "too hard." In many ways, the current process is seriously obsolete; the needed reforms are basic and sweeping, and they run to the very culture of our systems. However, we think the possible savings, not to mention the increased confidence of citizens in the process, demand early, priority attention by the new Administration.

F. The Role of Arms Control

With Gorbachev in the Kremlin, hopes for arms control are high. Yet history cautions that arms control will not necessarily save money and indeed often raises costs -- technically, if new systems must compensate for those withdrawn, and politically, if increased spending is the price of ratification. The real goals are enhancing deterrence and promoting stability, not cost reduction. It is hard to see how arms control will be important in solving the budget problem over the near term, but, cost savings or not, future arms control will raise much more serious questions about American strategy and purposes than in the past. Here we offer only guidelines:

- o arms control and defense policy must be more closely connected than in the past. Then, it did not much matter; the arms control proposals on the table had limited effect on U.S. defense planning. Now, it will -- or may -- matter more.

- o thus, choices about goals will be central -- whether to seek stability, reductions in particular weapons, constraints on technological change, or some combination.

- o even if saving money is not a primary objective, there can be significant longer-term benefits. A fifty percent reduction START agreement has been estimated to save \$2 billion in short run, much more over time. At a minimum, agreements can be used to reinforce directions we wish to take as part of broader defense planning: for instance, it would make no sense

to protect the right to deploy systems we cannot afford.

- o the next focus is conventional forces, a more complicated subject than previous negotiations and one for which the United States lacks clear objectives. We and our allies need to regain the initiative we have lost to Gorbachev, who is bound to use arms control to entice western Europe, improving relations and securing credits.

- o verification also deserves priority attention, lest the new Administration lose the political debate about it. No arms control agreement is perfectly verifiable, but building a constituency for good agreements that are less-than-perfectly verifiable has not been easy.

III. QUESTIONS OF PROCESS

Any new administration has its hands too full coping with specific choices that must be made; that will be all the more true in this period of rapid change. Yet we believe it worth taking time to think explicitly about process -- both how the administration wants to structure itself to make those specific choices and how it wants to shape defense policy-making over the course of an administration. In the short run:

- o a broad agreement on budget levels over two to five years is imperative, first within the new Administration and then with Congress. Some version of last year's "budget summit" may be the best means to do this.

- o the Pentagon must take its own out-year planning seriously; the numbers should be real, not wishes based on rosy

funding levels or cost and inflation assumptions. For example, the out-year programs should recognize the fact of flat budgets, not hopes for two percent real spending increases.

There is no "right" approach; too much depends on the personalities of the president and the secretary of defense. But we believe President Bush would be well-advised to follow the Packard Commission's suggestion for greater attention to strategy and planning in the process of defense resource allocation. Before we launch a series of major changes in the defense program, we must first focus on our goals, strategies and priorities. What is it these forces need to be able to do?

A degree of centralization of the process in the White House will help ensure that:

- o projected budgets are "real" -- that is, attainable within the administration's overall fiscal policy;
- o Defense plans and strategy reflect the Administration's own priorities.
- o there is a focal point for broader budget negotiations with the Congress.

A variety of process instruments can achieve these goals. Within the Pentagon, a number of people -- the CINCs, the Chairman, OSD and others -- should participate in raising and assessing options, in order to make sure that the result is not simply the preferred program of the military services. We think it useful to construct an inter-agency process around the NSC, with the active cooperation of OMB, to evaluate options

and insure that major choices are sharply framed for decision by the president. Those decisions must also include approximate funding levels for four years, which means that involving Congress in the process could have a major pay-off.

Managing the defense budget must be seen as a multi-year effort, involving decisions for the long term. We understand that participants will want to avoid tough choices, hoping for better times. Yet we believe wishful thinking has run its course. Barring some dramatic change in the international landscape, the best the Defense Department can hope for is no-growth budgets, and real declines in available resources are distinctly possible.

Coping with this reality will entail unpopular choices. But they must be made. Perhaps over the longer-term we will see changes in the Soviet Union that permit us to spend less on defense; or, given historical precedents, changes in the international climate might again elicit popular support in the United States for spending more. But we are not near either point today. We must manage our way through the next few years, preserving as much capability as possible, by making choices that have been neglected simply because they were too hard. They can no longer be ignored, and we should seize the opportunity for fresh thought and innovative approaches to the basic problems that have been ignored for too long.

APPENDIX

Defining the Problem

There was consensus within the Group and, we believe, in the country as a whole, that the recent defense build-up, unprecedented in peacetime, has come to an end. Real spending is about half again larger now than in 1978 and about equal to the peak of Vietnam spending in 1968. Defense as a percentage of GNP rose from under five in 1978 to seven-plus in 1985, and is nearly six now, but never neared the postwar peaks in the mid-1950s and the late 1960s.

There is broad agreement that American military forces have improved over the last decade. For instance, in 1980, 49 percent of Army recruits were high school graduates, but by 1987, 91 percent held diplomas. On the other hand, (1) force structure, the Navy excepted, did not grow much during the build-up; and (2) the United States has about the same number of weapons systems as a decade ago but of much higher technology and more expensive per unit.

Table 1 illustrates those features; while there were some increases in the number of major weapons bought, spending rose much more dramatically:

Numbers and Cost, 1974-80 Versus 1981-87

<u>Weapons Type</u>	Increase (+) or Decrease (-) in Numbers purchased <u>1981-87 vs. 1974-80</u>	Increase (+) or Decrease (-) in Total spending <u>1981-87 vs. 1974-80</u>
Fixed-wing combat aircraft	+8 percent	+59 percent
Rotary-wing aircraft	+79	+305

<u>Weapons Type</u>	<u>Increase (+) or Decrease (-) in Numbers purchased 1981-87 vs. 1974-80</u>	<u>Increase (+) or Decrease (-) in Total spending 1981-87 vs. 1974-80</u>
Strategic/theater missiles	+162	+97
Tactical missiles	-21	+110
Combatant ships	0	+46
Tanks and heavy combat vehicles	+99	+198
Other combat vehicles	+131	+250

Source: Congressional Budget Office

It also is apparent that the U.S. cannot maintain is present level of forces without real growth in budget. Indeed, it cannot come close unless it changes the way it does business. New weapons, maintenance, and missiles and other ordinance are all more expensive than those they replace. And the cost of personnel almost certainly will increase in real terms. If the military is to attract and retain its present high caliber of people, it will have to be competitive with civilian salary levels.

Despite this need for growth, it is plain, too, that the large budget increases have ended. Indeed, the bulk of the build-up was in the first Reagan term, peaking in 1985; since then spending has been declining in real terms at about two percent annually. The safest projection of the immediate future is flat budgets -- flat in real terms to flat in nominal terms, thus declining as eroded by inflation.

The impact of this judgment is significant, especially by the end of the current five-year planning period. As shown below, Defense will have much less money than is currently

planned, and those plans already have been dramatically scaled back from the figures the Pentagon was using as recently as a year ago:

Table 2: Defense Budget Authority
(billions of then-year dollars)

	1989					
	<u>Base</u>	<u>1990</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1993</u>	<u>1994</u>
Two-percent real growth (current planning)	300	318	338	359	382	406
Flat in real terms	300	312	325	339	355	367
Flat in nominal terms	300	300	300	300	300	300
Cumulative shortfall (from current planning)						
Flat in real terms	7	20	40	67	106	
Flat in nominal terms	19	57	116	198	304	

Source: Congressional Budget Office

This outlook clearly is challenging, and there are more grounds for pessimism than optimism:

- o the U.S. budget deficit seems politically intractable: health and social security cuts seem impossible and tax increases of any magnitude are all-but ruled out politically.

- o astute Soviet diplomacy may undercut short-run support for defense spending (witness the initial reaction to Gorbachev's troop reduction announcement).

- o recent procurement scandals have reinforced the widely-held view of the public that whatever the level of defense spending, much of it is wasteful.

Hence, tight budgets are not likely to be temporary, and

it is painfully clear that hard choices lie ahead. Not every part of the budget can go up, and most will have to go down. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci has begun the process of strategic choice, and in this paper we make a number of suggestions regarding the decisions that lie ahead.

13. Phil Odeen

Meet w/you to re his chair
manship of Council on
Foreign Relations study grp
looking at Def budget issues
f/next 4 years. He wrote on
12/19 and you indicated you'd
meet w/him. Are you still
interested? Don't know if
he still is.

OPEN ✓

Yes ☒ No ☐ *Why is this a*
Prefer speaking
engagement:

1000

Philip A. Odeen
Managing Partner
Management Consulting Services

December 19, 1988

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft
1875 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 440
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Brent:

I mentioned in a recent letter that I am ~~chairing~~
a Council on Foreign Relations study group looking at
Defense budget issues for the next four years. As I
promised, a copy of our paper is enclosed.

We kept the paper short in order to increase the
likelihood that people will read it. As a result, it
misses of the nuances and supporting arguments we would
like to have presented. The study group was excellent
and if you have time, I believe a meeting with us might
be of considerable value to you. I am enclosing a list
of members. As you will note, it is a good cross
section of experienced Congressional and Executive
Branch veterans, senior military officers, and outside
observers.

I will be ~~pleased to call the group together to~~
meet with you at your convenience.

Please let me know if we can be of any assistance.
Good luck in your new endeavor.

Regards,

PLD

PAO:mr
Enclosure

Coopers
& Lybrand

1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Philip A. Odeen
Managing Partner
Management Consulting Services

December 5, 1988

General Brent Scowcroft
1875 Eye Street, N.W.
Suite 440
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Brent:

First, let me congratulate you on your new position. I can't think of anyone better suited for the job or the very demanding challenge you will face. President Bush is most fortunate you are willing to return to government and the NSC.

I am chairing a CFR Study Group on the Defense budget which is just completing its work. We hope to have a final report in a week or so. Given that you will undoubtedly be involved in the Defense budget debate, I will send you a copy when it is finished.

If it would be helpful, the group would be pleased to meet with you to discuss the issues we raise. One of the purposes in forming the group was to be of help with the new Administration in addressing the Defense budget problem. A list of the members of the group is attached.

Best of luck in your new position. If I can be of help in any way please call on me.

Regards,



PAO:mr
Enclosure

STUDY GROUP ON DEFENSE BUDGETS AND ISSUES

Philip A. Odeen, Chairman - Coopers & Lybrand (former OSD & NSC)
Gregory F. Treverton, Group Director - Council on Foreign Relations
Barbara Bicksler, Rapporteur - Institute for Defense Analyses

David L. Aaron - D.L. Aaron & Company (former NSC)
Les Aspin - U.S. Congress
W. Bowman Cutter - Coopers & Lybrand (former OMB)
John M. Deutch - MIT
Alton Frye - Council on Foreign Relations
Michael R. Gordon - The New York Times
Fred Haynes - LTV Aerospace & Defense Co. (Retired Military General)
Robert Hale - Congressional Budget Office
David C. Jones - USAF (Ret.)
P.X. Kelley - USMC (Ret.)
Robert W. Komer - RAND Corporation (former NSC and OSD)
Lawrence J. Korb - University of Pittsburgh (former OSD)
Robert Murray - Harvard University (former OSD and Navy)
Robert E. Pursley - United Services Automobile Association (Retired AF General and OSD)
Ivan Selin - American Management Systems, Inc. (former OSD)
Walter B. Slocombe - Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered (former OSD & NSC)
W.Y. Smith - Institute for Defense Analyses (Retired AF General)
Harry D. Train - Strategic Research & Management Services, Inc. (retired Navy Admiral)
Mitzi M. Wertheim - IBM Corporation (former Navy)
R. James Woolsey - Shea & Gardner (former Navy & OSD)
Dov S. Zakheim - System Planning Corporation (former OSD)

4-11-89
11:00 AM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7-Apr-1989 17:06 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

Robert L. Hutchings
(HUTCHINGS)

SUBJECT:

visit of Amb. Keel

OK

AKTON G.

9-8-43

Florence: Ambassador Keel, US PermRep at NATO, will be here next week in connection with the Woerner visit and would like to see General Scowcroft, preferably Tuesday (4/11) morning in time for Keel to make an 11:00 appointment at the Pentagon. Friday the 14th would also be a possibility. Thanks.

William B. Taylor
9-14-47

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 9/13/10

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11:15 am, April 4th

Florence:

Doug Paal called -- *5746*

Would like to work with you to
schedule two significant Japanese
visitors with Gen Scowcroft on
Mon, Tues or Wed of next week - 30 min.

Would be Vice Minister of MITI,
runs Japanese Trade & Industry --
which is very important to US.

Wilma

*Karl Jackson
+ Doug Paal
Recommend*

*Doug recommends
if you agree to see
these people that
I call Timmons &
say I had previously
received a call from the*

*11:30
4/11
Jules*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*OK
B*

William Timmons
representing visiting Japanese dignitaries

-- Shaigeo Muraoka, Vice Minister of the
Ministries of International Trade
and Industry

-- Naomichi Suzuki, Director, Trade
Policy Bureau

10 April

11 April

afternoon of 13th

*(out
10+3)*

14 April

POC: Jane 331-1760

*ask
Staff*

de/30Mar

Embassy + we have set it up

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

0392

February 2, 1989

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

Bring in
4/3 - now
2:45 pm

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: NICHOLAS ROSTOW *NL*

SUBJECT: Your White House Fellow

On September 1, 1988, a White House Fellow, Mitchell Reiss, was assigned as Special Assistant to the National Security Advisor. Reiss is not formally an NSC staff member; he is on the payroll of the Department of Energy.

The intent of the one-year White House Fellowship, according to David Miller (who, as you know, is a former White House Fellow as well as a former Commissioner of the Fellows program), is to provide a broad overview of a government department or agency by having the Fellow work closely with a Cabinet or senior government official.

As General Powell's Special Assistant, Reiss has attended the morning meetings of the senior NSC staff. (Reiss has SCI clearances, and should be receiving his Q clearance shortly.) He has provided support for my office on a variety of legal matters. In addition, he has been actively involved with a wide range of issues that have carried over from the Reagan administration, including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the problem of ballistic missile proliferation. Of particular interest, Reiss has spent considerable time during the past two months in the Arms Control Directorate, attending the Arms Control Support Group meetings, reading through the Directorate's files, and reviewing the arms control policies of the Reagan administration in the INF and START negotiations.

Reiss has a Master's degree from the Fletcher School, a Ph.D. in International Relations from Oxford, and a law degree from Columbia University. He has published a book on nuclear nonproliferation (Without the Bomb, The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)), has contributed to a forthcoming volume on Soviet policy toward the Third World, and has also written widely on arms control issues. While previously working at the IISS, he served as Special Assistant to the Director, Robert O'Neill.

Reiss has continued to provide support for the Legal Adviser's office, and David Miller has also requested his assistance on African affairs. However, Reiss is eager to discover what duties you might have in mind for him.

I would like to bring Reiss around to your office to introduce him whenever it would be convenient.

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8900878
RECEIVED: 15 FEB 89 18

TO: SCOWCROFT

FROM: HEAD, MARCY L

DOC DATE: 09 FEB 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES COMMIS ON WH FELLOWSHIP REQUEST MTG W/ SCOWCROFT
NO DATE GIVEN

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 18 FEB 89 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: POPADIUK

LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
POPADIUK

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
GANTT
PERITO

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON WHITE HOUSE FELLOWSHIPS
THE WHITE HOUSE

February 9, 1989

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear General Scowcroft:

On behalf of the President's Commission on White House Fellowships, I would like to invite you to meet with the 1988-89 White House Fellows.


Throughout the year the Fellows meet with guests to explore the issues and problems facing the Nation. The Fellows would like to meet with you in order to benefit from your insights. We would appreciate it if you could meet with them during March or April.

We are very grateful that Mitchell Reiss is working for you during his Fellowship year. He is truly enjoying his work.

I am enclosing a brochure about the White House Fellowships which includes brief biographies on the Fellows.

The White House Fellows look forward to meeting with you. I will have Willie Bledsoe contact your office next week.

Sincerely,



Marcy E. Head
Director

*Please
Staff 0818*

*Gen
Scowcroft
will do
a brief
mtg.*

*4/3-
3:00
712 Jackson Pl*

American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

0601



815 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 637-5000

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

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Jay Mazur
John J. Barry
William J. McCarthy

FEB 3 1989

January 30, 1989

*Staff
for
BS.
Response
7.*

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

First, allow me to extend to you my warm congratulations on your new post. The President could choose no other better suited for the job than you.

The AFL-CIO Committee on Defense, with whom you have met on two previous occasions, remains active. I am writing to impose upon you once again.

I would like to invite you to meet with the Committee sometime in March to discuss your plans for the review of American national security and strategic policy. Aware as we are of your views on systems such as the Midgetman and SDI, and cognizant of the situation our country faces in Western Europe, Asia and the Pacific, and in conventional forces as well as military spending, the Committee feels that significant changes are taking place.

I would like you to share with us what your plans are, and to tell us if there is any particular area where the AFL-CIO might be of assistance.

Again, my best wishes to you, and good luck.

Sincerely,

Lane Kirkland

President

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 14, 1989

Nat Sec Advisor
has seen

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: LINTON F. BROOKS *lit*

FROM: DON M. SNIDER *AS*

SUBJECT: Invitation to Meet with AFL-CIO Committee on
Defense

Attached at Tab I is correspondence from Lane Kirkland inviting you to meet the AFL-CIO Committee on Defense. He requests a discussion of your plans for the review of national strategy.

Ginny Lampley checked with White House Legislative Affairs -- they recommend that you meet with the Committee if possible, noting "we need all the help we can get." We agree, but suggest that the meeting occur sometime in March or April when the strategy review is well along and you can provide better insights into areas that the AFL-CIO might be of assistance.

Ginny *Ad* Lampley concurs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you agree to meet with AFL-CIO Committee on Defense.

Approve *B*

Disapprove _____

That you provide guidance as to when you prefer the meeting.

____ February

late
____ March

Early
____ April

Attachment


Tab I

Incoming Correspondence

*now
4-10
may be
1:00*

*Room
208*

4/6



General:

Gen Walters would like "5 mins" with you on Saturday to discuss his upcoming trip to FRG and some of the things he has been asked to do before he departs.

Okay to schedule Saturday

Blackwill to sit in

Dona

H-522-2455*
O-647-3972

WH Passholder

(T) 3:30 Gen Walters

1:00 pm Having
Lunch at Madison Hotel
w/ an "old friend"

March 14, 1989

June
4/4

General Scowcroft:

CHARLES McCURDY M. JR
7-24-22

Senator McC. Mathias has written you a letter re the American Committee on the French Revolution and their invitation to both President Bush and President Mitterrand to attend a dinner sometime between August 25 and September 25. He called to see if he can meet with you to discuss the above and other things.

Schedule meeting ✓ Other

Amelia
879-7669

Florence

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8901632
RECEIVED: 13 MAR 89 14

TO: SCOWCROFT

SUSPENSE

FROM: MCC MATHIAS, CHARLES

DOC DATE: 06 MAR 89
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: FRANCE
AP

ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: REQUEST MTG W/ SCOWCROFT RE JOINT BICENTENNIAL OF US BILL OF RIGHTS
& FRENCH DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF MAN / 26 AUG - 25 SEP

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT DUE DATE: 16 MAR 89 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ZELIKOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
ZELIKOW

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BLACKWILL
GANTT
PERITO
RODMAN

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJWD

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 2

UNCLASSIFIED

Staff recommendation for
wty
TELEPHONE: 202-879-3939
TELEX: DOMESTIC 892410
TELEX: INTERNATIONAL 64363
CABLE: ATTORNEYS WASHINGTON
TELECOPIER: 202-737-2832
WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER
1632

JONES, DAY, REAVIS & POGUE

METROPOLITAN SQUARE

1450 G STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-2088

AUSTIN HONG KONG
CHICAGO LONDON
CLEVELAND LOS ANGELES
COLUMBUS NEW YORK
DALLAS PARIS
GENEVA RIYADH

March 6, 1989

General Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

A dinner at Mount Vernon to celebrate the joint bicentennial of the United States Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man has been discussed with the White House and personally with President Mitterrand. Marvin Traub and I wanted you to have copies of the letters of invitation that we have sent to President Bush and President Mitterrand.

I had been hoping to bring them to you myself, but I read the newspapers and know how busy you are. It would still be useful to see you briefly to discuss this project and I understand that your office is arranging an appointment. I look forward to seeing you at that time.

In the meantime, the French Desk at the Department of State is informed about this proposal as is the United States Embassy in Paris.

Sincerely,

Mac

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

10:41:30



American Committee on the French Revolution

A non-profit corporation

H.E. EMMANUEL de MARGERIE

Ambassador of France
Honorary

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Chairman

ARTHUR A. HARTMAN, Secretary

LEONARD L. SILVERSTEIN, Treasurer

JOAN R. CHALLINOR, Director

EDWARD HALLAM TUCK, Director

February 13, 1989

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As part of the American Committee to celebrate the two-hundredth anniversary of the French Republic, we believe there will be enormous interest in this event in 1989 in both the United States and France. If it can be achieved, the single most important event in America would be a dinner for the Presidents of France and the United States. This would bring world attention to the event.

The dinner would be held at Mount Vernon under the sponsorship of the American Committee on the French Revolution and would be limited to about 350 guests prominent in the United States and France. We believe the evening is a most appropriate way to celebrate the close, warm and historic ties between our two countries.

We would like to set the date of the dinner between August 26th, when France adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and September 25th, when our Congress adopted the Bill of Rights. These two events have created a unique bond between the French and American people which would be spotlighted by this event.


We would be delighted to review the specifics of the event with your staff and the Department of State.

Very truly yours,

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

Marvin S. Traub

France & America: Partners in Liberty



American Committee on the French Revolution

A non-profit corporation

H.E. EMMANUEL de MARGERIE
Ambassador of France
Honorary

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Chairman
ARTHUR A. HARTMAN, Secretary
LEONARD L. SILVERSTEIN, Treasurer
JOAN R. CHALLINOR, Director
EDWARD HALLAM TUCK, Director

February 13, 1989

Monsieur François Mitterrand
Président de la République
Palais de l'Elysée
55, rue du Faubourg St. Honoré
75008 Paris, France

Your Excellency:

As part of the American Committee to celebrate the two-hundredth anniversary of the French Republic, we believe there will be enormous interest in this event in 1989 in both the United States and France. If it can be achieved, the single most important event in America would be a dinner for the Presidents of France and the United States. This would bring world attention to the event.

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We would be delighted to review the specifics of the event with your staff and the French Embassy. I, Marvin Traub, will be in France, February 16th through 18th, and would be pleased to follow up at that time.

Very truly yours,

Marvin S. Traub

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr.

France & America: Partners in Liberty

Schedule ?
SK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1. RG
2. BS

24-Mar-1989 10:16 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

EDWARDS

FROM: VMS MAIL user NSRMP
(NSRMP@CPUA.P@)

SUBJECT: NO SUBJECT

Received: From CPUA(NSRMP) by VAXC with Jnet id 8505
for EDWARDS@VAXC; Fri, 24 Mar 89 10:16 EDT
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 89 10:14:59
From: Robert M. Perito <NSRMP@CPUA.PROFS>
Subject: NO SUBJECT
To: <PROCTOR@VAXC>,
<GANTT@VAXC>,
<EDWARDS@VAXC>,
<HALL@VAXC>

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/13/10

for gates and scowcroft
*** Forwarding note from CABELLY --VAXC 03/24/89 09:45 ***
Date: Fri, 24 Mar 89 09:46 EDT
From: <CABELLY@VAXC>
Subject: Scheduling a Meeting with Ambassador William Harrop
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
To: NSRMP@CPUA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

24-Mar-1989 09:37 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Brent Scowcroft
Robert M. Gates

Wed 4/5
1:00 PM w/ Gates
(SCOWCROFT)
(GATES)

FROM: Robert Cabelly
(CABELLY)

SUBJECT: Scheduling a Meeting with Ambassador William Harrop

Ambassador William Harrop, our representative in Zaire, will be in Washington

for consultations from March 28 to April 7. He has asked to meet with Gen. Scowcroft and/or Mr. Gates to discuss the situation in Zaire and US policy toward that country. Since you are both quite busy I thought it would be prudent to informally ask if you would like to schedule a meeting with the ambassador. Given our interests in Zaire and Angola I would suggest that you meet with him, but I will await your response before proceeding.

CC: Karen S. Ogle

(OGLE)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines
E.O. 13526, SEC 3.4 (b), September 11, 2006
By CAP NARA, Date 9/13/10

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Feb-1989 12:18 EDT

or 3

MEMORANDUM FOR:

EDWARDS

FROM: VMS MAIL user NSMLC
(NSMLC@CPUA.P@)

SUBJECT: Proposed Intl Technology Transfer Policy on Apr 5, 4

Received: From CPUA(NSMLC) by VAXC with Jnet id 7562
for EDWARDS@VAXC; Tue, 21 Feb 89 12:18 EDT

Date: Tue, 21 Feb 89 12:16:13

From: <NSMLC@CPUA.PROFS>

Subject: Proposed Intl Technology Transfer Policy on Apr 5, 4 or 3

To: -UNCLASSIFIED- <GANTT@VAXC>

Cc: -UNCLASSIFIED- <HALL@VAXC>,

-UNCLASSIFIED- <EDWARDS@VAXC>,

-UNCLASSIFIED- <NSCES@CPUA>

NOTE FROM: Mary L. Cooper

Jerry Leach is writing a memo recommending Gen Scowcroft meet with some people for about one hour in the afternoon on (in order of preference) Wed, 5 Apr; Tue, 4 Apr or Mon, 3 Apr, to discuss "International Technology Transfer Policy." Please let me know when/if Gen Scowcroft is available. Thanks.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4-Apr-1989 10:52 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM: Christina L. Funches
(FUNCHES)

SUBJECT: Scowcroft's ASAT Briefing 4:30 4/5

I will clear DOD visitors who include:

Gen. John L. Piotrowski
Douglas R. Graham
Kent G. Stansberry

CC: Wilma G. Hall

(HALL)

L/100
4/5
Indoor
gover
Rm

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

28-Feb-1989 15:01 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Florence E. Gantt

(GANTT)

FROM:

NANCY BEARR DYKE
~~Richard M. Saunders~~ x5694
(SAUNDERS)

SUBJECT:

Speaking Request for Gen Scowcroft

I need your guidance.

The American League for Exports and Security Assistance has written General Scowcroft asking him to meet with their executive board on Wednesday, April 5 (preferably between 1000 and 1100 here in the OEOB). Mr Carlucci and General Powell both met with the group. Also, the group's president (Howard Fish) is a retired Air Force LTG and contemporary of Brent. The session could be held to as little as 30 minutes, if time is a serious problem.

I see no compelling reason for Brent to accept, unless you think he's want to. ALESA is a very supportive group, but arms export issues probably aren't near the top of the General's agenda right now. Should I go ahead and prepare a package regretting the invitation? Do you want to check with him first?

Thanks.

Is this something you want to do?

Yes, but only for 30 min ugh

Other.

Florence