

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-010

Folder Title:
Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Cable	From White House Re: Message for Secretary Baker from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/18/91	(b)(1)	S
01b. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Secretary of State Re: For Secretary Baker from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	S
02a. Letter	President Bush to President Hafiz al-Asad (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
02b. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
02c. Letter	President Bush to President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
02d. Letter	President Bush to King Fahd bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
02e. Letter	President Bush to King Hussein I (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
02f. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letters to King Fahd, King Hussein, President Mubarak, President Asad, and Prime Minister Shamir (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	C
03. Memo	White House Situation Room to Distribution List Re: Press Backgrounder on Kuwait (4 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	C
04. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Tuesday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	TS

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Pinksheet Number: cap1356
OA/ID Number: 91164-010
Date Closed: 8/31/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
05. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Thursday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	4/12/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Wednesday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Meeting with President Ozal (3 pp.)	4/8/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Tuesday Meetings (4 pp.)	4/10/91	(b)(1)	S
09. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Friday Meetings (5 pp.)	3/16/91	(b)(1)	TS
10. Cable	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Thursday Meetings (5 pp.)	3/15/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday Meetings (3 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	TS
12a. Note	JABIII [James A. Baker, III] to POTUS Re: Meeting with Yeltsin (1 pp.)	3/14/91	(b)(1)	S
12b. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday Meetings (1 pp.)	3/14/91	(b)(1)	TS

Page 2 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
13. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday Meetings (1 pp.)	3/14/91	(b)(1)	TS
14. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Sunday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	TS
15. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Saturday Meetings (3 pp.)	3/10/91	(b)(1)	TS
16. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Friday Meetings (5 pp.)	3/9/91	(b)(1)	TS
17a. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Sunday Meetings (2 pp.)	1/13/91	(b)(1)	TS
17b. Report	Re: Response from Saddam Hussein (1 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	
18. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Saturday Meetings (2 pp.)	1/13/91	(b)(1)	TS
19. Memo	From Steve Hadley to Secretary of Defense, Re: Secretary Baker's Meeting in Cairo, Damascus, and Ankara (2 pp.)	1/13/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 3 of 3

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
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Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

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(George Bush Library)

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Be sure
to give
Florence
my
Outgoing
Before departure
0700

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Secretary of State Re: For Secretary Baker from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
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(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02a. Letter	President Bush to President Hafiz al-Asad (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02b. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02c. Letter	President Bush to President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02d. Letter	President Bush to King Fahd bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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02e. Letter	President Bush to King Hussein I (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

4 16 91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1991

91 APR 16 12:45

2782

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS for*
SUBJECT: Letters to King Fahd, King Hussein,
President Mubarak, President Asad, and
Prime Minister Shamir

Purpose

To convey your personal sense of urgency for Jim Baker's peace process mission.

Background

Jim Baker is heading back to the Middle East, where he will meet with Fahd, Hussein, Mubarak, Asad, and Shamir. He suggested that letters from you to each leader, stressing the urgency of making progress in the peace process, would be useful to convey your personal support for his mission. We agree.

Recommendation

That you sign the letters at Tab A to King Fahd, King Hussein, President Mubarak, President Asad, and Prime Minister Shamir.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1194-MR

SCS 1/25/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2782

April 16, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *rwf*

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *cdw*

SUBJECT: Letters to King Fahd, King Hussein, President Mubarak, President Asad, and Prime Minister Shamir

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President, forwarding brief letters to Fahd, Hussein, Mubarak, Asad, and Shamir for Jim Baker to deliver during his trip.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to President
Tab A	Letter to King Fahd
Tab B	Letter to King Hussein
Tab C	Letter to President Mubarak
Tab D	Letter to President Asad
Tab E	Letter to Prime Minister Shamir

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Apr-1991 13:41 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

(WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: PRIMA COMEXINRESS BACKGROUND ON KUWAIT

<DIST>

SIT: HAASS WHSR_IRAQ MONTGOMERY VAX

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<OSRI>

RUEHKU

<DTG>

201732Z APR 91

<ORIG>

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

<TO>

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1129

<SUBJ>

PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON KUWAIT

<TEXT>

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 01218
S/S PLEASE PASS SECDEL FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER
AND KAREN GROOMES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, KU

SUBJECT: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON KUWAIT

REF: GROOMES-GNEHM TELCONS 4/19

1. AS WE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY, I AM PROVIDING SOME
TALKING POINT BULLETS THAT MARGARET CAN USE IN HER
BACKGROUND ON THE WAY OVER HERE. THESE POINTS ARE
INTENDED TO GIVE YOU A SENSE OF WHAT HAS BEEN
ACCOMPLISHED, JUST OVER 50 DAYS AFTER WE RETURNED TO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1180-MR

MM 11/7/2016

LIBERATED KUWAIT ON MARCH 1. I HAVE ALSO CITED SOME IMPRESSIVE ACHIEVEMENTS BY U.S. BUSINESSES IN THE KUWAIT RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.

2. RECONSTRUCTION/RECOVERY

-- ELECTRICAL POWER HAS BEEN RESTORED TO 91 PERCENT OF THE CITY. WHEN HOSTILITIES ENDED, THE CITY WAS COMPLETELY BLACK. HUNDREDS OF MILES OF POWER DISTRIBUTION LINES HAVE BEEN REPAIRED OR REPLACED.

-- WATER PRODUCTION IS CURRENTLY 70 MILLION GALLONS PER DAY, UP FROM ZERO ON MARCH 1. THE RESERVOIR STORAGE SYSTEM WITH A 2 BILLION GALLON CAPACITY WAS VIRTUALLY EMPTY AND IS NOW NEARLY A THIRD FULL.

-- ALL PUBLIC HOSPITALS ARE FUNCTIONING. MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE MORE THAN ADEQUATE. CRITICAL MEDICAL MACHINERY IS BEING REPLACED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.

-- TELEPHONE SERVICE, VIRTUALLY TOTALLY OUT OF OPERATION AFTER LIBERATION, HAS BEEN RESTORED TO 88 PERCENT OF THE CUSTOMERS. INTERNATIONAL CALL CAPABILITY IS EXPANDING.

-- REPAIRS TO MAJOR ROADS ARE WELL UNDERWAY WITH THE PAVING OF 13 KILOMETERS OF THE MAJOR SUPPLY HIGHWAY BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT.

-- THE POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUES TO EXPAND WITH 5,500 MEN IN UNIFORM AND 265 PATROL CARS IN SERVICE.

-- FORTY-EIGHT OIL WELLS HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED. THIRTEEN OF THESE WERE BURNING. THE COMPANIES ARE CAPPING TWO OR THREE A DAY ON AVERAGE.

-- CITY GARBAGE IS NOW ON A REGULAR SCHEDULE. WASTE MANAGEMENT, A U.S. FIRM, HAS BEEN AWARDED ONE OF THE LARGE COLLECTION CONTRACTS.

-- PLANS ARE UNDERWAY TO RESTORE WITHIN 40 DAYS OIL PRODUCTION TO SUPPLY KUWAIT'S DOMESTIC NEEDS--ABOUT 50,000 B/D.

-- ONE THOUSAND WRECKED VEHICLES HAVE BEEN CLEARED FROM THE CITY TO DATE.

-- FOOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO EXPAND WELL ABOVE SUBSISTENCE LEVELS WITH THE IMPORTATION OF FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. MORE AND MORE MARKETS ARE OPEN AS THE PRIVATE SECTOR REPLACES THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION POINTS AS THE PEOPLE'S MAIN SOURCE OF FOOD.

-- PUBLIC COMMERCIAL TRADE IS SLOWLY EXPANDING WITH THE OPENING OF SOME SMALLER SHOPS AND RESTAURANTS.

-- THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS AND THE GOK IS ABOUT TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FROM THE COALITION MILITARY. KUWAIT AIRWAYS HAS RESUMED INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS.

-- ONE OF KUWAIT'S TWO MAJOR PORTS IS OPERATIONAL WITH MAJOR ASSISTANCE OF U.S. NAVY. SHIPPING CHANNELS TO FOUR OF KUWAIT'S PORTS HAVE BEEN SWEPT.

-- PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS IS FUNCTIONING WITH ONE T.V. STATION AND TWO RADIO STATIONS IN OPERATION.

3. U.S. BUSINESS AND KUWAIT RECONSTRUCTION

-- U.S. COMPANIES HAVE RECEIVED 135 CONTRACTS OUT OF
200 AWARDED BY THE GOK DURING THE EMERGENCY PHASE.

BT

#1218

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 KUWAIT 01218
S/S PLEASE PASS SECDEL FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER
AND KAREN GROOMES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, KU

SUBJECT: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON KUWAIT

THE TOTAL VALUE AMOUNTED TO USDOL 372.3 MILLION OR 66
PERCENT OF ALL CONTRACTS. IN ADDITION TO THE
EMERGENCY CONTRACTS, THE KUWAITI PETROLEUM COMPANY
AWARDED U.S. COMPANIES CONTRACTS FOR THE OIL WELL
FIRES WHICH IS ESTIMATED AT USDOL 51 MILLION.

-- IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AMERICAN FIRMS HAVE ALREADY
SOLD ABOUT USDOL 158 MILLION, CHIEFLY IN VEHICLES.

4. U.S. FIRMS PLAY PROMINENT ROLE

BECHTEL IS THE CHIEF SUPPORT FIRM FOR THE FIRE
FIGHTING TEAMS.

AT AND T HAS SOLD USDOL 24 MILLION IN TELEPHONE
EQUIPMENT AND IS POISED TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF KUWAIT'S TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR.

CATERPILLAR WON THE LARGEST CONTRACT UNDER THE
EMERGENCY PHASE, USDOL 19.8 MILLION. THE COMPANY IS
EXPECTING MORE BUSINESS ESTIMATED AT USDOL 56 MILLION
THIS YEAR.

U.S. CAR/VAN/TRUCKS MANUFACTURES WILL BE THE HIGHEST
EXPORT TO KUWAIT OVER THE NEXT 18 MONTHS, POSSIBLY
TOPPING USDOL 750 MILLION.

5. LARGEST U.S. EXHIBITION IN KUWAIT, JUNE 3-9, 1991

THE EMBASSY AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WILL STAGE THE
FIRST FOREIGN EXHIBITION IN KUWAIT SINCE LIBERATION.
THE EVENT WILL FEATURE OVER 60 LEADING FIRMS AND WILL
BE THE LARGEST U.S. EVENT STAGED IN KUWAIT.

GNEHM

BT

#1218

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 02

<SSN>

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<TOR>

910420133540 MSG000293463340

<SECT>

SECTION: 02 OF 02

<SSN>

1218

<TOR>

910420133553 MSG000293463353

March 13, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Tuesday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MJM on 4/21/2023

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1999-0578-F(148)	MR Case #:	2013-0831-MR(501)
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	4/15/2005	MR Disposition Date:	11/10/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~TOP SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1991

DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET

ES 10/14/04



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: TUESDAY MEETINGS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

MM 11/10/2016

Overview

I've had an interesting and productive day. It began with a two hour one-on-one meeting with Shamir, and ended with a private dinner that Susan and I had with the Prime Minister and Mrs. Shamir. In between, I met Arens, Peres, and Rabin, and I also visited Karmiel, a town where Soviet and Falasha Jews are being socialized and absorbed into Israeli society. The task is enormous, but meeting these people is uplifting.

All in all, I found Shamir serious and thoughtful. He used some new formulations (which I'll outline below). He agreed that the time to move is now, but suggested it must be done right and without too much haste (which worries me). We agreed to follow up right after I return by getting Dan Meridor to quietly work with Dennis on possible specific actions. He also said he decided to postpone his trip to Washington, preferring to come when it appears there is some chance that we really might get a process underway. I hope there is a sense in Israel that there is an opportunity that must not be lost. There is clearly some real thinking going on and based on my discussions today, I see some different ways to test Shamir on the Palestinian representative issue. So movement may be possible.

While Shamir may be prepared to move, his tendency as usual will be to proceed very slowly and carefully. We will have to keep up the heat on Shamir and probably also on the Egyptians and Saudis to move from the general to the specific in laying out the steps they might take and the mechanism to be used to launch a process more formally. Outlined below is a fuller treatment of the meetings I had today.

Shamir

I began the day with a lengthy one-on-one session with Prime Minister Shamir. As in my discussions at other stops, I did not try to pin down Shamir on specifics, but I outlined for him the full range of steps that Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians ought to consider if they're serious about getting a peace process started.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Not surprisingly, Shamir was more interested in talking about what the Arabs should do, but I also sensed that he knows he may have to engage on potential Israeli actions.

Shamir made several particularly interesting comments. First, he recognized the need to find a new and more effective terminology to characterize different phases of the process. For example, he acknowledged that "autonomy" is a loaded term for Palestinians, and agreed to my suggestion to use "self-government" instead. (The Saudis liked the term "self-government" when I tried it out on them in Riyadh.)

Second, Shamir said he realized that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations had to go beyond talks on interim self-government to work out permanent status. He noted that permanent status talks should begin no later than three years after interim arrangements had been worked out. He added that permanent status negotiations on the territories could be conducted in accordance with UNSC 242 and 338. He also said that he had some "new ideas" about how to handle the sovereignty question in permanent status, but he wanted to finish thinking them through before discussing them. I'm not sure what to make of this at this point, but it is a far cry from his traditional posture of saying that nothing can be said about final status. He clearly is not at this point ready to back off of his opposition to land for peace, however.

Third, Shamir said he is willing to consider a "regional conference," including all the Arab parties. He accepted that there would have to be a Palestinian delegation, but wasn't ready to commit himself. He made a particular point of stressing the importance of keeping King Hussein on the throne; he said he knew the King's support for Saddam had left a bad taste in everybody's mouths, but hoped we'd take into account the need for a stable Jordan. Shamir added that the U.S. might host any such conference, but he doesn't want the Europeans there. Although he also said no to Soviet co-sponsorship, I had the impression that his view would change if the Soviets paid the admission price of restoring full relations.

Finally, I pressed Shamir hard on settlements, taking the same approach I used with Levy last night. Like Levy, Shamir claimed that there was no Government approval of any Housing Ministry planning for expanded settlement activity, but I think he got the message. Interestingly, Max Fisher called Dennis today to say that a \$1 billion loan that the American Jewish community had put together to help with absorption had been put on hold because of Sharon's recent statements about stepping up settlements. He acknowledged that Sharon's agenda and his don't always coincide.

~~TOP SECRET~~


- 3 -

Arens

My subsequent conversation with Misha Arens focussed on two issues: the Occupied Territories, and regional arms control.

Arens said he had hoped before the Gulf crisis to try to take a little of the weight of Israeli occupation off Palestinians. He wanted to reopen universities, but not if they would become springboards for violence. He didn't want the IDF to have to patrol all over the Occupied Territories, but again violence was the issue, especially in the wake of the stabbings in Jerusalem two days ago. I emphasized that easing restrictions and lightening the Israeli presence would give Palestinians hope, and serve to lessen violence. Arens said he'd give this some more thought. He added that it was also important to improve economic conditions in the Territories. If Saudi Arabia wanted to help, putting more money into projects in refugee camps was a good place to start, because the camps were becoming a real breeding ground for fundamentalists and extremists of all stripes.

On regional arms control, Arens agreed that a serious effort to curb military competition is needed. ^{3.3(b)(6)}



Arens made a couple of brief points at the end of our meeting. He argued that Egypt could play a helpful role in encouraging Israel-Arab state accomodation by warming up its cold peace with Israel, perhaps through high-level visits.

And he stressed that, just as we had rightly made return of POWs and remains a top priority after the war with Iraq, Israel was very interested in action on its longstanding requests for return of remains, information on MIAs, and the release of Ron Arad, an Israeli airman held captive in Lebanon. Misha asked me to raise this with the Syrians, and I said I would raise it with Assad.

Peres and Rabin

In separate meetings with Peres and Rabin this afternoon, each made the point that there is a real opportunity now for reviving the peace process, but that it won't last long. In light of that, Peres argues for skipping over elections and trying to put together a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for negotiations, as he had tried to do with Hussein in the mid-1980s.

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

Rabin, not surprisingly, took a somewhat different tack. He suggested picking up where we left off last spring, and using the increased leverage of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to hammer together a Palestinian delegation from the Occupied Territories. This could be sweetened for the Palestinians, Rabin maintained, with a package that included financial help (from the Saudis), and a commitment to final or permanent status negotiations on the basis of 242 and 338 after a three year period of interim self-government. (The latter point is what I think Shamir might be prepared to do.) Rabin also said he was concerned that elections might drag out the process, and thought the Palestinian delegation could move right to negotiations with the Israelis on arrangements for interim self-government. I must say I once again found myself impressed with Rabin's practical approach which might offer the prospect of real progress.

Palestinians

I had a very useful discussion with a group of eleven Palestinian leaders from the West Bank and Gaza. The fact of the meeting may have been our most significant accomplishment. It was important to signal our willingness to engage, and after eight months of boycotting U.S. officials following the suspension of the U.S.-PLO dialogue, the assembled West Bankers and Gazans seemed relieved to be talking to us again directly.

All the Palestinians who spoke made ritualistic statements about their loyalty to Arafat and the PLO, emphasizing that the meeting would never have happened without Tunis' approval. At the same time, the Palestinians with whom I met -- as moderate and representative group as you could put together -- were clearly unsettled by Arafat's blunder in backing Saddam to the bitter end, and worried about how to pick up the pieces. Nevertheless, the group pressed hard for some indication of what the PLO needed to do to resume the dialogue. I didn't give them any encouragement. I repeated the conditions we laid out after the Abu Abbas terrorist attack, and added that the PLO's support for Saddam had put an enormous new obstacle in the path of considering resumption of the dialogue.

I emphasized that the U.S. was prepared to work hard for peace, and that we wanted to engage Palestinians at every step of the way.

But I also drove home the message that there would be no process if they insisted on a PLO role up front, and that they would have to assume greater responsibility. After all, Palestinians under occupation have the most to gain from progress -- and the most to lose from stalemate.

Several of the Palestinians in the group voiced deep concern about Israeli settlement activity, noting that this ate away at prospects for negotiations.

TOP SECRET

- 5 -

I reaffirmed our strong opposition to settlements, and said we would continue to try to find ways to make that clear to the Israelis. I also told them I had raised with the GOI the importance of eliminating or at least easing practices like administrative detentions and deportations.

Finally, in response to a question from Mayor Freij of Bethlehem, I assured the group that I had weighed in strongly with the Amir of Kuwait to help protect innocent Palestinians in Kuwait from mistreatment. Freij was quite appreciative.

Final Note

I'm generally impressed thus far with the willingness of the players in the region to think more creatively and perhaps to be more active. There appears to be enough convergence of ideas -- for example, in the remarkably similar thinking of Rabin and Mubarak on putting together a Palestinian delegation quickly -- to give us a fair amount to work with. We'll get a better sense tomorrow of whether Assad is prepared to enter the ranks of the new thinkers too.

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

MODE

SECURE FAX #

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RECORD #

PAGES

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RELEASER

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

FROM/LOCATION

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TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/01

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

CAMP DAVID COMM CTR PASSED MSG
FROM AIRCRAFT TO WHSR

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

SECSTATE AIRCRAFTFRI 12 APR 91 02:34PG.01~~**SECRET**~~

(classification)

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Fax Number: _____

Tel Number: _____

FROM: SAM 56973 Sec State Acft

Fax Number: _____

Tel Number: _____

REMARKS: Eyes only memo to General Scowcroft
for the President**DECLASSIFIED**

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09Number of pages to follow: 6

~~SECRET~~

(classification)

April 12, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Thursday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	4/12/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/16/2022

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1183-MR(501)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 3/23/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: THURSDAY MEETINGS

I had another full day starting with Prince Saud in Cairo this morning, moving on to Ben Yahya, the Tunisian Foreign Minister in Damascus, and concluding with another marathon session with Assad. The Saud and Ben Yahya meetings highlighted the continuing impulse that countries in the area have for looking to us. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the Tunisia meeting was characterized by the Foreign Minister clearly emphasizing that they want to see our good relations restored. The Assad meeting, like my meetings on the peace process with Shamir, were detailed and involved a very extensive and serious exchange. The road ahead with Assad is likely to be difficult, but my sense is he wants to be a part of this process.

Saud Meeting

Saud was interested in two subjects: the peace process and support for Iraqi opposition. He listened carefully to my brief on the peace process, paying close attention as I described how Shamir had moved, what we were seeking to do with a regional meeting, how negotiations might proceed, and how the Saudis might be helpful. With regard to the latter, I noted that they could support Palestinians in the territories politically and economically; they could help to keep the PLO from undercutting the process; they could work to get the Syrians to come to the meeting; and they could think about issuing a general statement, perhaps with the members of the GCC, on their commitment to peace with Israel once Palestinian needs and rights were addressed and satisfied.

Saud responded

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1183-MR
mm 3/23/2015

CAMP DAVID NO.2

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
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~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

Ben Yahya

The most noteworthy point of our meeting was that the new Tunisian Foreign Minister put an absolute premium on restoring our relations. He made a point of saying that all of the things that his President had said to you in your meeting in 1989, they now stood by. They were determined to renew strong ties, even though they recognized that we had been disenchanted with their position during the Gulf crisis.

I wouldn't say that Ben Yahya was contrite, but he clearly did recognize why we had problems with some of their behavior. He tried hard to explain those behaviors, but above all else he said let's look to the future and renew the strong ties that have always served our mutual interest. I told him that we're not in the habit of holding grudges and we're prepared to look to the future and not be preoccupied with the past. But I also said that I wouldn't be honest if I didn't tell him that we really did feel deeply disappointed by the positions his government had adopted during the crisis.

I said one way Tunisia could begin to restore our good relations would be for them to use their special relationship with Arafat to convince him that the PLO needs to stay out of the peace process if there is to be a process. I said that no process is possible with the PLO, but it is increasingly clear a very credible one is possible without it. I said, how about doing what you can to keep the PLO outside the process? He responded by saying, they would use all their moral and political influence with Arafat for this purpose. They understood how important this could be for pursuing our mutual interests. We'll see if this offers any help.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

Assad

My session with Assad covered five and a half hours. We met for three hours to begin with, broke for dinner, and came back for a remaining two and a half hours. In the first part of our discussion, I spent about an hour explaining why it was very important to us from a bilateral standpoint for him to ease the harsh punishment of Syrian Jews for travel violations and restrictions on the emigration of Syrian Jews. At a minimum, I asked how about permitting unification of families with relatives in the United States. He adopted a hardline on permitting men to emigrate on the grounds that they could go to Israel and go into the army. There was no give in this position -- and there isn't likely to be as long as Syria is in a state of war with Israel -- but he did agree to look favorably on granting visas to unmarried single Jewish women. (That is an advance that will be welcomed by Steve Solarz, one of those most concerned with the Syrian Jewry issue.)

On terrorism, we agreed to Ambassador Busby's visit in early May for discussions on combatting terrorism with Syrian officials at the political and security levels. This visit may prove helpful in continuing to narrow our differences on this very key issue.

On the peace process, he listened with great interest to my description of how Shamir moved. However, rather than getting into what Shamir had done, he preferred to focus on the conference and the terms and modalities of that conference. He outlined four reservations:

First, he wanted to maintain the reference to an international conference. He didn't see the need to change it to a regional conference. After a good deal of give and take, he suggested rather than calling it a regional conference, that we simply call it a peace conference. 1.4(d)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

He asked me to work on his reservations and in return he would think about all the points I'd made. I told him he hadn't made it impossible for me, but he'd made it very difficult. To which he answered, "that's not my intent, I really want this to work."

Things went about the way I expected with Assad. There's no doubt that there's a lot of hard work to be done, and the gaps between Israelis and Syrians on getting this process started are real. But when you cut through it all, ^{1.4(d)}

Right now, I think it might not be a bad thing to let a few days go by in both Israel and Syria. Early next week, we might want to activate a little phone diplomacy to try to nail down some things before more face to face meetings take place. After a week or so, I might want to come back to the area with some things in writing to ensure that we have the necessary understandings in hand in order to proceed.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Wednesday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	4/11/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/16/2022

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1183-MR(502)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 3/23/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: WEDNESDAY MEETINGSDECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526
2010-1183-MR
mm 3/23/2015

I had another interesting day of meetings. I feel that we're making progress and that I have moved Prime Minister Shamir on a number of issues. The movement is not as much as I might have wanted, but clearly enough at this point to impress Mubarak. I know we have a long ways to go, but we're moving in the right direction. I expect some of the difficulties that we'll face over time will be highlighted in my meetings with Assad tomorrow. For now, I see a consensus developing among the Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians on a regional meeting/conference that will pursue the two-track approach, and a phased approach to negotiations.

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SHAMIR

As a follow up to my meeting yesterday, Shamir came in with a number of answers. He basically agreed to what I was asking for on 242 and 338 -- namely, that these resolutions would serve as the basis of permanent status negotiations. Shamir will say publicly that he is accepting 242 and 338 as agreed to in Camp David. The Arabs will say they accept these resolutions as the basis because they see them as meaning "territory for peace." If asked, we will state U.S. policy and point out that the parties have differing interpretations of these resolutions, and that these differing interpretations will be resolved in the talks.

While each of the parties may say something different internally to their own domestic audiences, they will all agree that the basis of the meeting is to launch a phased approach to direct negotiations. The initial focus will be on "interim self-government arrangements" (this is the new term I've gotten Shamir to use in place of autonomy). And then the focus will shift to permanent status negotiations which will be based on 242 and 338.

In addition to working out an understanding on 242 and 338 as the basis, Shamir also agreed to the regional meeting and accepted that Palestinians could be represented in the meeting either by a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation or by some other means, including a separate Palestinian delegation. While not yet deciding on whether the EC presidency could participate, Shamir did say I could tell Jacques Poes when I see him on Friday that Israel will consider this possibility.

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- 2 -

On the Palestinians who can come, Shamir agreed in principle to some of the names we had discussed last year. But he wanted us to run the names past the Jordanians. He implied the Jordanians would have ideas on these names and might well suggest some additional ones. He agreed as well to our criteria for determining the Palestinians who could participate -- e.g., that they accept the two-track approach, the phased approach to negotiations, and the importance of living in peace with Israel.

But it was at this point that we hit our one major area of disagreement. Shamir wanted to add to our criteria for Palestinian participation an additional element. He wanted a commitment put in writing to us by the Palestinians that they would refrain either from saying they were representatives of the PLO or were under orders from the PLO.

I turned this down flatly. I said if you force these people to put this in writing, you'd be putting them at great risk. I emphasized that they were already putting themselves at risk merely by being willing to commit themselves to this process, particularly because the principles embodied in it ran directly counter to the PLO agenda. Indeed, their willingness to accept the criteria we were establishing was itself a measure of their conviction and their commitment to negotiating peace.

I said I was willing to tell the Arabs and the Palestinians that if the Palestinians in the meeting made a big issue to the effect that they either were representatives of the PLO or under PLO instructions, Israel would probably walk out and there would be no process. If the Arabs and Palestinians were as genuinely desirous of a process as they were conveying to me, then they would not want to risk that process by behavior that would guarantee its end.

1.4(d)

We went back and forth on this and I finally said I needed to know what the bottom line was -- that I did not want to leave this issue hanging. I told Shamir that I wanted an answer before I left the region. I said that I would not agree to seek a letter from the Palestinians on this issue. I said Shamir could, if it would make it easier for him, send a letter to us explaining Israel's position and outlining the circumstances under which it would walk away from the process. However, any such letter could not contain requirements that would in effect impose an impossible condition. This may provide a way out, but that will only happen if Israel does not seek to exclude the possibility that some of the Palestinians at the table may say that they've been authorized by the PLO to be there.

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1.4(d)

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

I outlined for President Mubarak what Shamir had agreed to on the regional meeting, including the possibility of accepting an EC President's role, 242/338 as the basis for permanent status, and the criteria for Palestinian representation. To put it simply, Mubarak said he was amazed that Shamir had moved this much. (He actually told me this in private noting he didn't want to say that in front of others.)

Even Shamir's problem with Palestinians saying they were PLO, ironically, didn't seem to create a problem for Mubarak. He said the best way to proceed was for Palestinians at the meeting to say nothing about the PLO -- and that would also reduce the need for Israel to say anything about the PLO. I suspect that the PLO and Israel each fear possible embarrassment: the PLO because Israel will say openly they're not in the process, and Israel because they fear Palestinians will make it look as if the Israelis are dealing with the PLO. The net effect is that both for their own reasons may want silence on the issue, and Mubarak seems to think this is possible.

I hope Mubarak is right, but I'm not sure he is. If he is, we're likely to find that this issue is not that difficult to finesse. One other area where Mubarak shared Shamir's preference was on the issue of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He seemed to feel such a delegation might solve a lot of problems and might be the easiest way to get Palestinians to step forward. 1.4(d)

In short, on the question of peace, Mubarak was clearly optimistic. He told me he had worried about a regional conference before, but now he had a better idea of what we had in mind and he wanted us to pursue it. He directed Foreign Minister Maguid in our press conference to speak of progress, to endorse our efforts, and to say that a regional conference was an interesting idea that should be discussed and considered.

Mubarak also raised the issue of Libya. He had just returned from Libya early this morning and mentioned that he'd actually been to Rabta. I asked him why so many SAMs were needed to protect the aspirin there, and while laughing about the question, he acknowledged that he'd seen the SAMs. He also said Egypt was planning to send, with Qadhafi's approval, specialists to Rabta to help manage the plant and ensure that it was not producing -- and indeed could not produce -- chemical weapons. Mubarak once again made a point of saying that he thought he could moderate Qadhafi.

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I told him we continued to have great problems with Qadhafi and that I'd give him a list of those. In any case, Mubarak emphasized that having Qadhafi remain quiescent over the next several months would be very important to the success of our efforts on peace.

He made one request and that was that the families of five Libyan officers who had gone first to Kenya and were now in the United States be permitted to visit them there. I told him we'd have no problems with such a visit provided the officers wanted it. Similarly, I said I didn't see any problem with taking up Mubarak's offer of asylum for these men and their families in Egypt if that's what they wanted.

Mubarak said this would help him with Qadhafi and I said we would be responding to him, not to Qadhafi. I noted that his efforts with Qadhafi did seem to effect Libyan behavior during the course of the Gulf crisis, but we still had many problems with Qadhafi and had absolutely no impulse to draw closer to him. Mubarak said he understood that.

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2010-1183-MR

MM 3/23/2015

April 8, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT OZAL

My meeting with President Ozal focused understandably on the Kurdish refugee problem. It is clearly a human tragedy of massive proportions. Before getting to our discussion, I want to pass on two items of interest from Ozal.

First, Ozal told me he would be willing to meet Shamir in Europe or the US, and with a little prodding from me, said he'd be prepared to do this publicly. He wants to protect the fact of the meeting until holding it, but is willing to have it announced at that time. He understands the value of my using this with Shamir, and has encouraged me to do so. (I will, pointing out how when seeing Mubarak I got him to make a statement on an international conference that responded to Shamir's needs and now after seeing Ozal I've produced something Shamir has very much wanted; it's time he gives me something I can use with others.)

Second, Rafsanjani will be visiting Turkey the end of the month. While seeing some increasing economic benefit in increased trade, there's not a great deal of trust in Iranian behavior. One indication of Iranian dissembling: Turkish intelligence says that 50,000, not 500,000, Kurds as announced by the Iranians have fled into Iran and that has now led to a closing of the Iranian border. Ozal understands Iranian motivations and will work to improve commercial ties, but has few illusions.

The Kurdish Refugee Situation

Ozal outlined the situation to me, pointing out the rugged, mountainous terrain that Kurds are forced to traverse. He said there are now 180,000 who have fled into Turkey, and another 100,000 on the border notwithstanding the hardships. He showed me videos that graphically portrayed the numbers (one stream of refugees stretched 20 kms.), and that also vividly showed who is suffering.

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- 2 -

I'm sure I will see even more heartbreaking scenes tomorrow when I tour the area, but the video I saw tonight (and which I'm sending back so you can see it as well) shows, unfortunately, that those who are suffering are the most easy to victimize -- children, young women with babies, and old women. Ozal said 1,500 have already died from exposure and starvation. He said that Turkey is doing everything it can do, and he's eager to get our help and the help of others in coping with the new evil Saddam is perpetuating.

Ozal told me that the Iraqis are dropping leaflets on the Kurdish cities and villages warning them to leave or face bombing. It's hard not to conclude that Saddam is deliberately and forcibly seeking to expel a population that he sees as troublesome. Perhaps, he's also seeking to make Turkey pay for its position in the war by forcing a massive population on it.

Whatever the motivation, once again innocents suffer. Ozal's answer to this challenge is not merely to meet humanitarian needs, but also to ensure the return of the Kurds to Iraq. Indeed, the latter is, I suspect, his main preoccupation. He says this will only happen if Kurds feel safe enough to return and that can only happen if there is a protected zone for them in northern Iraq or if Saddam is removed from power.

He does not now expect that Saddam will fall soon, and thus prefers the creation of a zone of protection for Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. In his eyes, the zone would be more hospitable, less rugged than the mountainous area in Turkey. It should have a UN peacekeeping force, a force to which Turkey would be prepared to contribute. Clearly, the additional benefit from Ozal's perspective is the zone would be a source of pressure on the central regime, because Kurdish fighters would not have to fear for the lives of their families -- or so Ozal seems to think.

I agreed with him that more must be done by the international community to help Turkey cope with this mounting human tragedy. This is not Turkey's problem, but our collective problem. I said we do have to create the conditions that make it possible for the Kurds to return to Iraq, but the most immediate and urgent task is to meet the basic needs of the refugees -- providing food, blankets, tents, medicine, shoes (many are walking barefoot in the mountains), and doing it in some systematic way.

I told Ozal what we are doing, and I'm leaving Princeton Lyman -- the principal deputy for refugee affairs in the Department -- here to work with the Turks to coordinate international efforts to help. I also said we were working with Perez de Cuellar to have him designate a special coordinator to take hold of and organize the relief effort for the refugees fleeing Iraq. (This was important to Ozal and his colleagues, who told me they don't want multiple international organizations in Turkey working on this, they want one lead international agency to coordinate outside efforts with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Red Crescent.)

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- 3 -

I said it was very important for us to address together the best approach for getting the Kurds to return to Iraq, particularly because this was something Turkey wanted, we wanted, and the international community wanted. I didn't go beyond this, knowing there's no enthusiasm in the UNSC for creating a zone in northern Iraq for the Kurds to be policed by UN forces.

That said, we will need to do more. For now we should be focused on maximizing the international effort to respond to the humanitarian needs. Perhaps, we should take advantage of Nick's upcoming trip to solicit commitments to help the Kurds either directly, working with others, or facilitating Turkey's efforts.

Beyond this, we should take advantage of UNSC Resolution 688 to get international organizations into northern Iraq to provide relief. That presence might not only provide needed relief but also create a deterrent of sorts to Saddam. To be sure, if the Iraqis sought to block such an effort, we might want to take steps to prevent them from doing so.

I'll send you my additional thoughts or impressions tomorrow after I've actually visited the border area.

EYES ONLY
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(CLASSIFICATION)

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RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: Caron Jackson Assistant to Sen Baker

ACTION / LOCATION:

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1. General Scowcroft for the
2. President

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EYES ONLY
~~SECRET~~

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
White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8



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Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

FROM: Secretary Baker
TO: General Scowcroft

THIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 5 PAGES

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202/ 395-2000

April 10, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Tuesday Meetings (4 pp.)	4/10/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 1/30/2015

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1932-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	10/28/2013

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1991




MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: TUESDAY MEETINGS

I had an interesting and very full day of meetings with Levy, Shamir, Arens and a group of Palestinians. I don't know if we're going to get where we want to go, but there is no doubt that everyone I have been talking to has been thinking seriously. My discussions with all that I met with were very detailed, especially with Shamir.

It's clear to me that Levy is pushing very hard to try to make something happen. (b)(1)



My public response was that we had a long ways to go and much work remains -- with Arabs and Israelis.

With Shamir, I heard very detailed responses to some of the questions that we had posed after my first trip and I have to say we had a very serious exchange. There are areas of agreement and areas where we still have gaps between us on what I feel is essential if we're going to make this process work. We're going to meet tomorrow to see if we can overcome the gaps we still have on some of the key issues -- issues I will summarize below.

My meeting with Arens focused principally on what the Israelis could do to demonstrate that they are prepared to positively alter the atmosphere in the territories. Anticipating pressure from me, Arens had set the stage rather well for our meeting, because he announced, as we were landing in Israel, that Israel was going to release 1,200 Palestinian prisoners (300 of whom had been administrative detainees). He's being attacked rather harshly by some of the Likud, but he seems quite prepared to try and respond to our concerns for a wide range of confidence-building measures. For example, he told me that he's making a systematic effort to open the schools -- and that, in fact, of the 29 colleges and universities in the territories 25 are now open. Beyond this, however, he is willing to launch two other significant efforts, efforts that I think, if successful, would get at the concern that Brant had.

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10/28/2013 MM

First, he is willing to push an extensive program of economic liberalization in the territories. For the first time, the development of Palestinian economic institutions -- a necessary condition for greater independence -- will be encouraged. Onerous restrictions on investment, construction, industrial development, and even land use by Palestinians, are to be relaxed. This is a fundamentally different approach for Israel, but we will have to see how it actually develops.

Second, he is willing to push for "Emergency Municipal Councils" to be run by the Palestinians to take over the functions of the IDF in cities and towns. While seeking a formal negotiation to end the civil administration, he favors the Palestinians actually assuming governing responsibilities in the cities. And if they do, both the civil and security functions of the Israeli military could be gradually removed. He acknowledged the difficulty of doing this, because the threats to local Palestinians make few willing to assume this role. Nonetheless, he is hopeful about being able to proceed very soon in Gaza City (population 250,000), and also Nablus, one of the bigger towns on the West Bank.

To be sure, the very legitimate grievances Palestinians emphasized in my meeting with them indicated there is still a long ways to go. But there is little doubt that for now Israel is willing to seek to move in the territories in a way that could have a very practical and positive effect on the lives of Palestinians. This may not be the substitute for a political process, but with the right kind of economic support from the outside, it could well underpin any political process we produce.

In my meeting with Palestinians, I was struck by the almost total absence of any polemics or of any mention of the PLO. Instead of posturing or focusing on symbols, what I heard was a specific set of practical concerns about Israeli behavior in the territories (especially on settlements and land confiscations). Questions were then posed on whether there might be a halt of such activities or a freeze on them once negotiations were underway.

In addition, questions were also posed about how the regional meeting would work, how Palestinians would be represented, and how and what might be negotiated in the self-government phase of the negotiations. More than anything else, there was a kind of poignancy in the meeting. These Palestinians, who were criticized for meeting with me again, made it clear they want to be a part of the process. When I asked them if they would agree that Palestinians who take part

should be willing to accept (1) our two-track approach, (2) the phased approach to negotiations that I had outlined, and (3) the need to make peace with Israel, they all said they would agree to each of these points. That alone is a good indicator of the change of mood and attitude among potential Palestinian leaders in the territories.

By the way, Hussein asked if Shamir would be present. I said it was possible since the President was interested in attending. It became clear at that point that he was uneasy about having heads of state attend since this would build pressure to involve Arafat. He clearly wasn't interested in that, knowing it would preempt, not begin the process.

Issues to be discussed with Shamir tomorrow

Tomorrow I'll try to nail down some understandings with Shamir. Shamir has already accepted the idea of a regional meeting co-hosted by the US and Soviet Union. Surprisingly, he even agreed to consider at least observer status of the EC President at the meeting. I don't know that he'll accept this, but I emphasized to him that it could well be in Israel's interest to go along with a role for the European countries. We'll see what his response is tomorrow, (b)(1)


Of the other key issues on which I want to get a response, I sensed varying degrees of difficulty.

First, on 242/338 being the basis for permanent status negotiations, I think that we have narrowed the gap, but we are not quite there yet. Shamir wants to be able to say that 242 and 338 is the basis as agreed at Camp David. If, as he acknowledged, the Arabs wouldn't say that, he hoped a formula taking note of different interpretations of 242 and 338 was possible. I told him (b)(1)

Second, on the issue of the form of Palestinian representation at the meeting or conference, Shamir prefers that the Palestinians be there as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He sees this as a way to diminish the PLO role and I suspect to set the basis for future permanent status discussions. The latter (b)(1)

Third, is which Palestinians are going to come. Shamir repeated to me that he had never approved the seven or eight names that we had discussed with Rabin last year. He said that there may have been a misunderstanding between he and Rabin. I told him, well let's look to the future, not the past, and let's focus instead on the principles that are to guide the participation of Palestinians. And here, I outlined the three points I'd raised in my meeting with Palestinians: that they accept the two tracks; that they accept the negotiating phases of the process (first, interim arrangements for self-government, then permanent status); and that they be committed to living in peace with Israel.

(b)(1)



Let me sum up today by saying that we clearly still have a ways to go and we may not get there. But I don't believe we have ever had Likud or the Palestinians in the territories as poised to move as they seem to be today. We'll see if that's enough to get us over the threshold.

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

SDO Please see attached Note from
Carol Jackson for instructions,

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

March 16, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE TRANSMIT A COPY OF THIS MEMO TO ROBERT ZOELICK (COUNSELOR, DEPARTMENT OF STATE) WHO IS TRAVELLING AS A MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY IN MARTINIQUE.

FINALLY, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

THANKS SO VERY MUCH. WE'RE ON OUR WAY BACK TO WASHINGTON NOW, SO THIS WILL BE THE LAST ONE OF THESE!

~~TOP SECRET~~

March 16, 1991

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

mm 11/16/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: FRIDAY MEETINGS

Friday Meetings

I had a long day of meetings that stretched until after midnight and included three and a half hours with President Gorbachev. All the meetings, including especially my discussion with Republic leaders, highlighted the broad diversity in the Soviet Union today. Pluralism has come to the Soviet Union, and that's good. Unfortunately, it has not been accompanied by coherence and consensus. To the extent that any elements are organized and coherent, you find them on the right. And the rightist forces are putting real pressure on Gorbachev, and in his own way, he's responding. He made it clear to me that he will never give up his chosen course, though he may be forced to maneuver from time to time.

The maneuvering has discredited him with the left and raised questions in our minds about him. But in my talks with him (which I'll detail below), he made a very forceful presentation on his sense of purpose and direction. During the course of our discussion, we spent considerable time on internal questions, on the importance of US-Soviet relations, and then touched on CFE, the BW issue, the Middle East, and Yeltsin.

Gorbachev

Gorbachev began the meeting by conveying his greetings to you. He said he had been looking forward to this meeting and particularly had wanted to make two points.

First, that he was absolutely committed to the course he was on. He had made the decision several years ago and there was no going back. He noted that one of our embassy officials who had been at the big demonstration in Moscow was quoted in Time Magazine as saying the Soviets were on the verge of a revolution. Gorbachev said that was wrong, "we're not on the verge of a revolution, we're in a revolution."

~~TOP SECRET~~

-2-

clearly, he noted, there was a lot of stress. The pressures were enormous. But small changes or tinkering with the system had been tried and couldn't work. An overhaul was needed, and it had to be fundamental. That was the choice he'd made. He had, along with everyone else, underestimated the difficulty. The Soviet Union, after all, was burdened with problems that went back not years or even decades, but centuries.

There would be no quick turnaround so the course would have to be maintained and some balance preserved. He said this would not be easy, particularly at a time when production was falling. Hitler, he said, exploited a drastic drop in economic production to come to power. Dictators always emerged in circumstances of total economic chaos and depression. And pressures for a dictator were building now in the Soviet Union. Others from both the left and the right might seek such a role, but he -- though he probably had the means -- would never move in that direction. That would deny everything he stood for.

At the same time, to deal with the enormous pressures on him, he had to be able to maneuver. Each maneuver was designed not to retreat from his course of perestroika, but to preserve it. He was pursuing economic reform but with reference to trying to prevent production from falling so much that it would destroy the political fabric of reform. So he would continue to press ahead with reform, emphasizing a mixed economy with different kinds of property and ownership, encouraging land reform, and creating a new pricing system.

The second point that he wanted very much to convey was the critical nature of the US-Soviet relationship. He was absolutely committed to preserving its new basis. He said we had just faced a test in US-Soviet relations and we had passed it. He believed that the relationship with the US was extremely important to the Soviet Union and that while relations with the Soviet Union might not be as critical to the US, he believed they were still important to us. (I agreed.)

He said the new US-Soviet relationship that we had shaped together was the essential underpinning of the new world order. It created new international possibilities and hopes. It had been important to the isolation and reversal of Saddam's aggression. And it was both the reflection of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy and also the proof of its validity.

In response, I told him that we, too, valued US-Soviet cooperation and agreed that our partnership in the Gulf had been essential to cementing the international coalition. I made clear we wanted to continue cooperation along these lines, and pointed out that Sasha has been the only Minister I had called to brief on my discussions in Riyadh with the eight Arab foreign ministers. Far from trying to keep the Soviets out of the post-crisis Middle East, we see continued coordination between us as one of the building blocks for the future in the area. I told the President that reflected our own new thinking.

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-3-

In addition, I told him that you and I supported perestroika and want very much for it to succeed. I even said, we might want it to succeed even more than he did. To which he laughed, and said "hardly". I said we had taken some heated criticism for being too supportive of Gorbachev, but we remain committed to the reform process he had begun.

I told him we did worry about the signs of reform going off the track, signs that economic reform in particular seemed on hold. I said it was hard to encourage foreign investment when the Prime Minister was speaking of western banks conspiring to sabotage the Soviet economy. (Gorbachev and Bessmertnykh laughed, with Gorbachev saying they were trying to clean that one up.) I also said you can't encourage investment from the outside if the KGB is acting to intimidate foreign investors or if there is total uncertainty about Union-Republic relations.

I asked why not settle the Center-Republic issues first, noting they were political and likely to be more resolvable than the problem associated with trying to reshape an economy grounded in 70 years of the traditions and psychology of a command system. In the spirit of openness that characterized our talks, I asked him why not take advantage of the March 17 referendum to declare "victory," reach out to the Republics, and consider modifying the secession law.

Gorbachev responded by saying the draft union treaty was now being circulated and did, in fact, respond to many of the Republics' interests. (Nazerbayev, the President of Kazakhstan and an increasingly credible figure nationally, told me that the new draft treaty did go a long way toward working out union-republic powers equitably, especially in the area of economic powers, but did nothing on the secession law.) On the broader issue of economic reform, Gorbachev said laws were being passed to create a basis for the mixed economy. He knew we felt he wasn't going fast enough, but he had to operate in his political context and experience, not ours. That said, he seemed to genuinely enjoy this part of the discussion, listened very attentively, and took quite a few notes. (He told me he and Prime Minister Pavlov would have a brainstorming session tomorrow with a number of economists to focus on the kind of adjustments that needed to be made on their economic course.)

While being concerned about the pace and direction of economic reform, I told him we also had a number of worries about activities by the military that seemed to be designed to vitiate new thinking. Some of these activities, especially on CFE and BW, could undercut our ability to pursue arms control with the Soviets. It was that serious.

CFE: On CFE, I said we couldn't be in a position where we sign a treaty and then the Soviet military has the right to change it after the fact. I said, "you, Mr. President, signed the treaty, not General Moiseyev," and all 21 other signatories disagree with the position the Soviet Union is taking.

~~TOP SECRET~~

-4-

Gorbachev said there were arguments on both sides and it was better not to debate the issue, but solve it. He said he had a practical suggestion and then proposed reductions on the coastal defense units; a freezing of the ground equipment of the naval infantry; and a freezing of the armored vehicles associated with the Strategic Rocket Forces, to be reduced once there is a START agreement. I told him this proposal didn't seem to meet our concerns, but said I would give it to our experts. (They said it was a step in the right direction, and I went back this morning with points our interagency team worked out here suggesting that there need not be any reference to the equipment of certain military branches -- e.g., naval infantry -- if the numbers in the overall zone fit those prescribed by treaty. Bessmertnykh said they would take a close look at this proposal, noting they had broken a lot of china to give us their proposal. He said he thought we were close.)

BW: Here I said our concerns had not been allayed by the visits but made worse. I recited a few of the reasons for our heightened concerns and that we would need the Soviets to take some concrete steps to show they were dismantling what we were now convinced was an active BW program.

Gorbachev said they did not have a BW program. He said he had responded to President Bush's very private discussion with him to check into their activities and to authorize the visits to these facilities. He now had two requests to make: (1) Give him a paper with very clear specifics; (2) Tell him when his scientists could visit our facilities.

I said we would give him a paper, but that we would put further visits on hold until the Soviets took some concrete steps to allay our concerns. This was important because the premise of our agreement on visits was that the Soviets did not have a BW program that violated the convention.

Clearly quite angry, he said he was the one who now had suspicions. Why wouldn't we permit the return visits? Did we have something to hide?

I told him no, that the terms of our agreement on the visits drew a clear distinction between our respective facilities. He said he wasn't speaking legally, but politically.

At this point, I suggested the following: we give you a paper spelling out clearly the problems; we include a list of some of the indicators that would satisfy us that the Soviets were dismantling the program; and when we receive a Soviet response to these papers we would review the status of the visits.

Gorbachev agreed. I did tell him we had a legal obligation to report to the Congress and if this leaked out it could poison the political atmosphere. He understood and hoped we would resolve this without things coming out. I said their prompt action in response to our concerns would provide an explanation that could defuse any potential problem.

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
Our last two items for discussion were the Middel East and Yeltsin. On the Middle East, we were in general agreement. Bessmertynykh had briefed Gorbachev on our discussion on the Middle East and Gorbachev said he was very pleased that there was a general convergence in our thinking. However, there is at least one area where there is a gap in our thinking, and that's on the size of our military presence in the area. While not seeking to play up the issue, Gorbachev said he expected we would restore our presence to what it had been on August 1.

I described what we had in mind, noting much had yet to be defined (e.g., what does enhanced naval presence mean), and also pointing out that the Arabs were seeking a much larger presence than we were willing to develop. Indeed, I noted since Gorbachev said the Arabs should decide in the first instance what their security required, the Soviets shouldn't have a problem with what we have in mind. I don't think this one is put to rest, and I suspect we'll revisit it later.

Finally, on Yeltsin, all of Gorbachev's animus came out. He said Yeltsin was unstable and would use populist rhetoric to become a dictator if he ever had the chance. Shevardnadze said later he too was of this view. (Nazerbayev too agreed with this assessment, saying, Yeltsin's a friend of mine, but I wouldn't trust him in that position.) I'll have more to tell you about the conversation on Yeltsin when I see you.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding all his problems, Gorbachev seemed calm, if not as confident as usual. He seems to believe that what he's doing will work. Frankly, it's hard to see how it can, and, here again, I worry that his serenity is a function of increasing isolation and rationalization. I do not doubt his sincerity. But I do wonder about his ability to succeed. Maybe he'll muddle through, but as the problems worsen, I suspect he is going to look to us for increasing help and assistance.



THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

RELEASER: _____

DTG: 161740Z MAR 91MESSAGE NO. 120 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 5FROM W.H.S.R.
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)MESSAGE DESCRIPTION THURSDAY'S MEETING

TO (Agency) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. PHONE NUMBER

BERMUDA: FLO GANTT FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFTRICHARD HAASSDAVID GOMPERTREMARKS DELIVER NEXT SCHEDULED DELIVERY!

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 05

PRT: GATES HILL SCOWCROFT SITTMANN
SIT: FILE COMPERI HAASS PRES-MSGS SIT

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~SECRET~~ DTG: 151700Z MAR 91

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN SOVIET UNION

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5205

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 02047

NODIS

FOR S/S - EYES ONLY STAPE ROY. TO PASS TO NSC - SCOWCROFT
FOR THE PRESIDENT AND E. O. BOB ZOELLICK

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (BAKER, JAMES A III)

SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

MOSCOW, MARCH 14, 1991

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: THURSDAY MEETINGS, MARCH 14, 1991

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: THURSDAY MEETING

2. I HAD TWO MEETINGS TODAY, STARTING WITH FARES BOUEZ, THE
LEBANON FOREIGN MINISTER IN DAMASCUS, AND WITH SASHA
BESSMERTNYKH HERE IN MOSCOW THIS EVENING. BOUEZ WAS INTERESTING
AND CLEARLY HOPEFUL, EVEN WHILE IMPLICITLY ACKNOWLEDGING THAT
LEBANON HAS A LONG WAYS TO GO TO ACHIEVE REAL INDEPENDENCE.
BESSMERTNYKH REACTED VERY POSITIVELY TO MY REPORTS OF
FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF ALL THOSE I MET IN THE AREA, AND TO
THE SUGGESTION WE WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO FOLLOW-UP ON THE
CONCEPT I'VE JUST LAID OUT IN THE REGION. IT'S CLEAR TO ME THAT
SASHA AND HIS BOSS (WHO HE SAID WAS EAGER TO HEAR FROM ME ON MY
TRIP TO THE AREA) NEED TO BE SEEN TO BE INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE
TO SHOW THAT NEW THINKING IS PRODUCING ON THE OUTSIDE.

3. BOUEZ MEETING

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

mm 11/10/2016

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 05

BOUEZ WAS VERY HOPEFUL, SAYING THE MILITIAS HAVE BEEN DISBANDED IN GREATER BEIRUT. ARTILLERY DUELS AND FIGHTING HAVE CEASED, AND THE PROCESS OF RESTORING NORMAL LIFE IS RESUMING. HE SAID THE NEXT CRITICAL CHALLENGE WAS TO DISBAND THE REMAINING MILITIAS -- THE CHRISTIAN FORCES, THE DRUZE FORCES, AND THE PALESTINIANS. HE SUGGESTED WE SHOULD USE OUR INFLUENCE TO WORK ON JA'JA TO DISBAND HIS FORCES, AND HAVE THEM INTEGRATED INTO THE LEBANESE ARMY. HE WAS HOPEFUL JA'JA MIGHT SEE THE LIGHT. HE FELT THE SYRIANS WOULD BE CRITICAL TO GETTING DRUZE AND PALESTINIAN MILITIAS TO DISBAND. HE THOUGHT THE DRUZE WOULD DO IT PEACEFULLY, AND IMPLIED THE SYRIANS WOULD COERCE THE PALESTINIANS IF NECESSARY. (HE NOTED THE PALESTINIANS WOULD NOT BE THAT HARD FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY AND THE SYRIANS TO DEAL WITH SINCE THEY HAD NO HEAVY WEAPONS.)

4. BOUEZ WAS ALSO UPBEAT ON THE HOSTAGES. HE SAID LEBANESE ARMY AND SYRIAN FORCES ARE EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLING SOUTHERN BEIRUT. HIZBOLLAH'S VARIOUS FACTIONS WERE WEAKER, AND THE LAF AND SYRIAN PRESENCE WOULD YIELD MUCH BETTER INTELLIGENCE -- INTELLIGENCE THAT WOULD PROBABLY PRODUCE INFORMATION ON WHERE THE HOSTAGES ARE. HE PROMISED TO GIVE US WHATEVER INTELLIGENCE THEY HAVE AND NOT TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION.

5. IN ANSWER TO WHAT WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN WITH AOUN, HE SAID THERE IS THE QUESTION OF MONEY HE TOOK FROM THE LEBANESE TREASURY AND ALSO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER IF ALLOWED TO GO TO FRANCE, HE WOULD FOMENT TROUBLE FROM THERE. HE SUGGESTED A NEGOTIATION WAS POSSIBLE TO WORK THIS OUT. (IT SEEMED HE DIDN'T MEAN A SHORT NEGOTIATION.)

6. THE UPSHOT: STABILITY AND HOPE MAY BE RETURNING TO LEBANON. I'M NOT SURE IT WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY INDEPENDENCE, BUT I ENCOURAGED HIM IN THAT DIRECTION. FOR SOME TIME TO COME, SYRIA IS LIKELY TO TREAT LEBANON LIKE A PROTECTORATE. FOR NOW, THE HRAWI GOVERNMENT SEEMS CONTENT AS IT STRUGGLES FIRST AND FOREMOST TO TACKLE THE MILITIAS AND EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY.

MOSCOW, MARCH 14, 1991

7. BESSMERTNYKH MEETING

I GAVE BESSMERTNYKH AN OVERVIEW OF MY TRIP. I EMPHASIZED THAT I

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IMMEDIATE

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 05

HAD FOUND SOME FLEXIBILITY, EVEN AMONG SHAMIR AND ASSAD, AND THAT THERE WAS A GENERAL CONSENSUS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT MISSING THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY. I TOLD HIM THAT JUST AS IN THE GULF, WE WERE PREPARED TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS, RECOGNIZING THAT HERE, TOO, THERE MIGHT BE WAYS FOR US TO SHAPE AN INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON TOUGH ISSUES LIKE REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL.

8. MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, I SAID THE MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY NOW REQUIRES AVOIDING SYMBOLS, TERMS WITH A LOT OF BAGGAGE, AND IDEOLOGICAL RATHER THAN PRACTICAL STEPS. I DESCRIBED OUR TWO-TRACK APPROACH, AND TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS GENERALLY SUPPORTED BY THE PARTIES IN THE AREA.

9. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT WE ARE THINKING ABOUT DIFFERENT WAYS TO GET THE TWO TRACKS UNDERWAY, INCLUDING SOME KIND OF REGIONAL EVENT OR MEETING. I TOLD HIM I WAS SHARING THIS VERY PRELIMINARY THINKING ON THE SAME BASIS I USED TO SHARE SUCH THINKING WITH EDUARD SHEVARDNADZE. I KNEW WITH EDUARD IT WOULD BE STRICTLY PROTECTED.

10. IN ANY CASE, SUCH AN EVENT OR MEETING COULD INCLUDE ISRAEL, PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES, SYRIA, JORDAN, EGYPT, LEBANON, AND MAYBE OTHERS LIKE THE SAUDIS. IT MIGHT BE CO-HOSTED BY THE TWO OF US, ASSUMING THE SOVIETS RESTORED THEIR TIES WITH ISRAEL. I TOLD HIM I WANTED TO THINK MORE ABOUT THIS APPROACH, BUT IT WAS CERTAINLY ONE POSSIBILITY.

11. I SAID WHETHER WE SELECTED THIS MECHANISM OR SOME OTHER ONE, IT WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE ARAB STATES TO HELP PROMOTE AND SELECT A DELEGATION OF PALESTINIANS FROM THE TERRITORIES TO MAKE THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN ENGAGEMENT POSSIBLE.

12. NOT SURPRISINGLY, SASHA WAS BULLISH ON THIS IDEA. WHILE MOMENTARILY WORRYING ABOUT THE EUROPEANS BEING LEFT OUT, HE RATHER RAPIDLY SAW THE VALUE OF THIS APPROACH. HE NEVER RAISED ANY CONCERNS ABOUT HAVING TO RESTORE RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL FIRST; ACKNOWLEDGED THEY COULD HELP THE ARABS ON THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION PROBLEM (WITHIN OUR GUIDELINES); AND SAID ANY EVENT OR REGIONAL MEETING WOULDN'T CONTRADICT THE SOVIET POSITION ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 05

13. HE EMPHASIZED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW-UP WITH US AS WE DEVELOPED OUR CONCEPTS (AND PROMISED TO DESIGNATE SOMEONE WHO COULD WORK WITH DENNIS). HE ALSO PROMISED TO TREAT THIS INITIAL DISCUSSION WITH GREAT CARE. CLEARLY, THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING CUT INTO THE MAIN DIPLOMATIC GAME IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS REAL ATTRACTION TO THE SOVIETS NOW. WE SHOULD USE THAT TO GET THEM TO SUPPORT OUR CONCEPT, TO COMMIT TO HELPING MORE WHERE THEIR HELP MAY BE USEFUL (SYRIANS AND PALESTINIANS), AND TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH ISRAEL AND CUTTING THEM IN IN THIS WAY COULD OFFER REAL ADVANTAGES IN CREATING A PROCESS THAT MIGHT SUCCEED.

14. TWO AREAS WHERE I SENSED SOME DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS: (1) SIZE OF OUR PRESENCE IN THE GULF AND (2) MAINTAINING THE EMBARGO ON IRAQI OIL. WITH REGARD TO THE FIRST, SASHA SAID ANY INCREASE IN THE US MILITARY PRESENCE FROM PRE-CRISIS LEVELS IN THE REGION WOULD BE SEIZED UPON BY THOSE ALREADY ATTACKING GORBACHEV FOR PAVING THE WAY FOR A "PAX AMERICA". AS FOR THE SECOND, HIS MAIN ARGUMENT WAS WE WOULD INEVITABLY BE PUNISHING THE IRAQI PEOPLE IF WE MAINTAINED THE EMBARGO ON OIL EXPORTS, AND THAT COULD TRIGGER A COUNTERACTION IN THE ARAB WORLD. I TOLD HIM THAT REFLECTED THE SAME ARGUMENT THAT WE CONFRONTED THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS: NAMELY, THE ARAB STREET IS EXPLOSIVE, WILL TEAR APART YOUR COALITION, PREVENT YOUR ARAB PARTNERS FROM FIGHTING WITH YOU, AND DESTROY YOU IN THE ARAB WORLD FOR YEARS TO COME. THAT REALITY WAS WRONG (WITNESSED HOW WE'RE BEING WELCOMED NOW) BOTH BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE CRISIS AND WAR. IN FACT, OUR ARAB COALITION PARTNERS FAVORED MAINTENANCE OF ALL SANCTIONS SO LONG AS SADDAM WAS THERE.

15. ON THE SIZE OF OUR PRESENCE, I EMPHASIZED YOUR COMMITMENT ON NO PERMANENT GROUND FORCE PRESENCE, AND NOTED WE WERE GOING TO RETAIN A PRESENCE FOR LESS THAN OUR ARAB PARTNERS NOW SOUGHT. I SAID HE COULD CERTAINLY USE THAT ARGUMENT WITH HIS RIGHT WING CRITICS.

16. I SUSPECT THESE SOVIET POSITIONS MAY SURFACE AGAIN, REQUIRING SOME POTENTIALLY TOUGH SLEDDING WHEN WE GO BACK TO THE UNSC FOR THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. (I PREVIEWED THE RESOLUTION,

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 05 OF 05

WE HAVE IN MIND, AND HE LIKED MUCH OF WHAT WAS IN IT, BUT RESISTED ON THE IRAQI OIL EXPORT ISSUE. I'LL TRY TO WORK HIM HARD ON THIS.)

MOSCOW. MRCH 14. 1991

17. FINALLY, I RAISED AFGHANISTAN BRIEFLY WITH HIM. I TOLD HIM THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE TOLD BOB KIMMITT THAT IF THE "SOVIETS WOULD END LETHAL AID TO KABUL, THE SAUDIS WOULD CONSIDER TERMINATING LETHAL AID TO THE MUJAHEDIN, BUT AT A LATER DATE." I SUGGESTED THAT THIS SEEMED TO RESPOND TO THE SOVIET CONCERN THAT OUR BILATERAL CUT-OFF OF ARMS WOULD DENY KABUL ARMS, BUT NOT CUT THE MUJAHEDIN OFF FROM OTHER SOURCES. I ASKED WHETHER THIS MIGHT CHANGE THE SOVIET VIEW ON HAVING A SPECIFIC DATE IN OUR PROPOSED JOINT STATEMENT FOR A US-SOVIET CUT-OFF OF ARMS TO THE AFGHAN COMBATANTS.

18. SASHA SAID THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT. HE'D NEED TO KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT THE SAUDIS MEANT BY "AT A LATER DATE," BUT THIS WAS CLEARLY A POTENTIALLY BIG STEP. ON FIRST BLUSH, HE STILL PREFERRED NOT TO PUT A DATE CERTAIN IN, BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED WE WANTED TO THINK ABOUT POSSIBLY GOING TO THE SAUDIS AND TO KABUL ABOUT THIS DEVELOPMENT.

19. WE WON'T SIGN THE JOINT STATEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN WHILE I'M HERE, BUT I THINK THE SAUDI MOVE PUTS US CLOSE TO BEING ABLE TO END US AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE AFGHAN WAR.

BAKER

BT

#2047

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~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 44

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 05

DTG 120615Z MAR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: CARON JACKSON / DEPT OF STATE

ACTION / LOCATION:

TIME OF RECEIPT

1. SENIOR DUTY OFFICER WHSR

120627Z

2. SCOWROF

3. GATES

4. SITTMANN

5. HILL

6. _____

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____

2. _____

REMARKS: _____

DECLASSIFIED


White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006 (CLASSIFICATION)

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~TOP SECRET~~

GS-8

**DECLASSIFIED**

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAP NARA, Date 8/3/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** **RCVD:**
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

FROM: CARON JACKSON**TO:** White House Sit. RoomTHIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 4 PAGES

March 12, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

MANY THANKS.

② PLEASE SECURE FAX TO
UNDER SECRETARY BOB
KIMMITT (Attn: Alex Wolfe)

c/o USNATO

32-2-242-88-37

"EYES ONLY"

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

MM 11/10/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: MONDAY MEETINGS

President Mubarak

The most striking feature of my two-hour meeting with Mubarak this morning was his clear determination to stay right with us in postwar diplomacy. He repeatedly emphasized how much he values his relationship with you, how important it is to him to be able to pick up the phone and call you. Mubarak's impulse to use telephone diplomacy was highlighted when, in the middle of our conversation, he picked up the phone and called President Assad. Partly for my benefit, he told Assad that we were the best Administration the region had ever had, that if progress wasn't made with this Administration, it wouldn't be made, that he agreed with our approach to postwar challenges and the peace process, and that it was essential that the Arabs give us something to work with. (I'll have a better idea of Assad's reaction after I see him on Wednesday.)

In general, Mubarak was supportive of our concept of two tracks, propelled by parallel steps by Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. He agreed that we might think about using the Palestinian names that Prime Minister Shamir agreed to last year, without specifying categories like dual addressees or deportees, as a basis for solving the problem of Palestinian representation. He seemed confident that Egypt and its Arab partners could manage any disquiet that this created on the Palestinian side.

Mubarak had no great enthusiasm for an international conference. At one point in our conversation, Osama el-Baz made a spirited argument for an early conference. When Foreign Minister Meguid disagreed, Mubarak immediately sided with Meguid.

On Gulf security, Mubarak was also broadly supportive of our approach. While the details have yet to be worked out with the Gulf Arabs and the Syrians, the Egyptians are thinking in terms of a 50-60,000-man Egyptian-Syrian force to bolster defense of the Arabian Peninsula. On Libya, Mubarak pressed for greater flexibility on our part, suggesting specifically that we look for ways to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Rabta.

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- 2 -

I told him we remained deeply skeptical, but would listen to any ideas he had. We also discussed the importance of quick action on an IMF standby arrangement. I repeated that we would urge the IMF to meet Egypt halfway if the GOE moved ahead on energy price reforms.

Mayor Kollek

I had looked forward to a walking tour of the Old City with Teddy Kollek on my first day in Jerusalem -- the same tour you took with Teddy in 1986 -- but was forced to cancel because of rising tensions after the tragic stabbings of four Israeli women yesterday. Instead, Teddy came to the King David for a brief chat. He very much agrees that now is the time to move on the peace process. He added that he thought most Israelis are ready to move too, although he's not so sure about the present government.

Foreign Minister Levy

At a working dinner this evening, David Levy was very appreciative of what we had done in the Gulf. He showed interest in our approach to the postwar challenges of arms control and proliferation, stressing that we had to address both weapons of mass destruction and conventional arms if we really wanted to curb the regional arms race.

Levy reaffirmed the GOI's commitment to the May 1989 initiative, and said he supported a two track effort. He realized that meant Israel had to offer something to Palestinians. In remarks to the press after our dinner, he used an interesting formulation on the Palestinians, noting that they "have the right to participate in determining their own fate." I didn't press him on specific steps, saving the details for my one-on-one meeting tomorrow morning with Prime Minister Shamir.

I did ask Levy, however, to elaborate on public statements about the possibility of a "regional conference." Levy replied that he envisioned all regional parties participating, including Palestinians from the Occupied Territories, either in their own delegation or as part of another one. I'll also pursue this further with Shamir, particularly because if there are no traps in it, there may be some potential in this idea.

Finally, I laid down a very blunt marker with Levy on settlements. I said I was pleased that we had worked out assurances that had led to disbursement of \$400 million in Housing Investment Guarantees. But we had recently seen some disturbing reports about internal GOI planning for greatly expanded settlement activity. We sincerely hoped they had no basis.

I told Levy frankly that our response to any further Israeli requests for HIGs -- which we agreed in connection with the supplemental package would be deferred until after Labor Day -- would be shaped to a very significant extent by the course of settlement activity in the meantime. (I'll make the same point to Shamir tomorrow.) Levy said he knew nothing about these reports, said Israeli settlement activity remained quite limited (especially given the makeup of the Israeli Cabinet) and agreed to follow up discussions between our two staffs to answer any questions we might have.

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CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 02

ADMIN FAX # _____

RECORD # _____

PAGES 3DTG 14 MAR 91RELEASER CL

FROM/LOCATION

1. CARON JACKSON (OFFICE OF SECSTATE)

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. SR. DUTY OFFICER WHSR2. TOR 141252Z

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. COVER NOTE TRANSMITTING TWO SECSTATE MEMOS2. TO POTUS

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CAMP DAVID NO.2
SECSTATE AIRCRAFT

THU 14 MAR 91 12:4

PG.01

THU 14 MAR 91 12:23

PG.01

DATA COPY FROM THE SECRETARY

DATE/TIME SENT:	DATE/TIME RECEIVED:
3/14/91	

FROM: CARON JACKSON	OFFICE OF SEC STATE
Name	Office
TO: SR. DUTY OFFICER	WH SITUATION ROOM
Name	Office

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: COVER NOTE TRANSMITTING TWO
SECSTATE MEMOS TO POTUS,

Number of pages to follow: 3

REMARKS:

SECSTATE AIRCRAFT

THU 14 MAR 91 12:31

PG.01

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1991

NOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT

RE: MEETING WITH YELTSIN

After seeing Gorbachev on Friday, I plan to host a dinner at the Ambassador's residence with about 20 "new thinkers" and Republic leaders. This is part of our effort to show we are meeting with all sectors of the Soviet Union. To solve the issue of seeing Yeltsin, I thought to involve him in a social event in which he was part of a larger group. (I suspect Gorbachev would be highly sensitive to a meeting alone with Yeltsin that would be official and publicized, particularly two days before the referendum.)

Yeltsin has come in asking to see me privately for ten minutes either before or after the dinner. While I have little doubt he will dump out that I would be seeing him, my inclination is to wait, but tomorrow let him know I will see him for a few minutes after the dinner. There would be no photograph and no press coverage of the private meeting. If I do not let him know I would see him very briefly after the dinner, I don't think he will attend at all.

Given the sensitivity, however, I wanted to let you know about this before having our embassy inform him that I'd see him privately for a few minutes. Unless I hear from you to the contrary I will assume you have no problem with this approach.



JABIII

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262012-2608-MR
11/8/2013 MM

THU 14 MAR 91 12:49

CAMP DAVID NO.2

SECSTATE AIRCRAFT

THU 14 MAR 91 12:36

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: WEDNESDAY MEETINGS

It's after midnight, so this is just a brief note to tell you about the highlights of today's meetings with the Syrians.

I had a six hour and forty-five minute meeting with President Assad this evening which centered on the Arab-Israeli peace process and our two-track approach. Assad gave me the clear impression that he is serious about pursuing peace, but that he will be a tough nut to crack.

He said he had no basic problem with our first track of an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, but that on the second track of signalling of Arab state reconciliation with Israel, he had serious problems and thought that for the most part our ideas were premature. He has said before to me that the best chance for real negotiations for peace is often "while the guns are firing." With regard to the first track, Assad said that it simply cannot take off if there is no "cover" of international legitimacy. I suggested the possibility of the US and the Soviets providing the international aegis as a cover and he responded positively to that. (As I reported to you after my meeting with Shamir, I think he might accept such a mechanism, provided the Soviets restore full diplomatic relations with Israel.)

Assad has questions about the mechanism to carry out our approach and the timing. He is concerned that the whole process may be drawn out and end in a stall.

Assad said that Syria will do what it can to continue to work closely politically with the coalition. We will see. I have some ideas about how we could merge tracks one and two and I will be talking to you about them. Of course they would merge in any meeting (conference) sponsored by the US and USSR.

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CAMP DAVID NO.2

SECSTATE AIRCRAFT

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1991

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CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

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MODE:

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PAGES 4

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FROM / LOCATION: SEC. OF STATE

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. GEN. SCOWCROFT
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White House Guidelines


E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

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(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

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Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAF NARA, Date 8/31/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** **RCVD:**
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FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE**TO:** GEN. SCOWCROFTTHIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 3 PAGES

03/11/91

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P.01

March 11, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Sunday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	3/11/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [4]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/21/2023

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-010
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:	1999-0578-F(150)	MR Case #:	2013-0831-MR(507)
AR Disposition:	Released in Part	MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	4/15/2005	MR Disposition Date:	11/10/2016

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 11, 1991

DOWNGRADED FROM
TOP SECRET TO SECRET
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

MM 11/16/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: SUNDAY MEETINGS

I left Riyadh on Sunday night with the strong sense that our Arab friends are serious and cooperative about meaningful security arrangements in the Gulf which will allow us effectively to prevent another Iraq from seeking to dominate the area. On the peace process, the Arabs are ready to work with us on a two-track approach which allows me to see Shamir with something to talk about in terms of parallel moves between Arab states and Israel. While they haven't committed to the range of specific steps I outlined, they are backing the basic concept I proposed. In addition, they seem prepared to consider specific moves pending Shamir's reaction.

The basis for this improved Arab attitude is the extraordinary credibility we now have in the area. American standing has never been higher and the Arabs are impressed enough with the United States' ability to deliver on its word to grant us some room to move forward.

The centerpiece of the meetings today was the unprecedented conference of the GCC, Egyptian and Syrian foreign ministers. They met as a collective with me and endorsed our four-part agenda. As always, the serious work was in the bilaterals with each of the ministers, but as Saud al-Faisal said to me after the plenary, "the only variance" was Syrian hesitancy on the timing of the parallel steps Arabs and Israelis might take.

In security arrangements, there was near unanimity on an enhanced naval presence, exercises, prepositioned U.S. equipment, continuous air presence, and prospects for a forward CENTCOM headquarters are good.

In the bilaterals,

^{3.3(b)(6)}

As the Damascus Declaration pointed out, the eight have already agreed on a Syrian and Egyptian force presence, but want the U.S. to undergird the Arab efforts.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

All are ready to support a UN force along the Iraq-Kuwait border and support demarcation of the 1963 line by these UN troops.

All support efforts to control weapons of mass destruction. Wary of conventional arms limits because of their own defense needs, they do agree no "new Iraq" should be allowed to amass 4,000 tanks. In this sense, restraint on conventional arms and especially numerical caps and limits on destabilizing weaponry is something they're not wild about, but seem to realize should be considered.

Economic cooperation, a possible World Bank facility, or a regional development bank were discussed cautiously but there is recognition of the need to do something.

In my remarks to the plenary I echoed your themes to the Joint Session of Congress and asked for Arab help and willingness to break old taboos. The Arabs noted the new opportunity, the obsolescence of Arafat, and the need to work with -- and focus on -- elections in the occupied territories to help a new Palestinian leadership emerge. This was, in their minds, the way to bypass the PLO and produce Palestinians with which the Israelis could deal. As you'll recall, that was the essence of the Shamir election initiative.

Abdel-Meguid in a supporting intervention quoted extensively from your speech to Congress. He also told me privately that he was very intrigued by Shamir's apparent interest in a regional conference. Syria's Farouk Shara gave an outdated speech on the need for Israeli moves and an international conference before the Arabs act -- but was gently cut off in mid-performance by Saud al-Faisal. This was symbolic of the new Saudi willingness to act. While Shara was speaking, I interrupted to note he was putting the cart before the horse, and using old thinking, not new, in trying to address the problem.

In private, Shara was better. In fact, while being more chary of making any overt moves that would signal a commitment to reconcile with Israel, he didn't reject the concept of parallel steps and even said he could see some value in them. Though I sensed he was focused principally on what Israel, not the Arabs, needed to do. Nevertheless, it is, indeed, noteworthy that the call for elections in the territories to produce Palestinian representatives came from Shara and was then backed by everyone else.

There can be no doubt that something potentially very significant is stirring among the Arabs. We can't know how long it will last or whether it will be concrete enough to move the Israelis. Even if it does, we can't be sure that it will overcome the division and turmoil among Palestinians. I suspect things will get worse and become more polarized among Palestinians in the near future. But perhaps that, particularly in this new strategic environment, will set the stage for Palestinians capable of making peace emerge.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

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SECURE FAX # 40

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PAGES 4

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FROM / LOCATION: CARON JACKSON

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. Senior Duty-Officer WHSR
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REMARKS: _____

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

Brady
Florence

March 10, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

IN ADDITION, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

THANKS VERY MUCH.

~~TOP SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

mm 11/10/2016

March 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: SATURDAY MEETINGS

I met today with the Emir in Taif and then flew to Kuwait City to see the Crown Prince and a number of the Kuwaiti Ministers. They all expressed their deep gratitude to you, the American people, and our armed forces for liberating their country. They all spoke of the need to deepen our cooperation.

Flying over Kuwait, I saw very vividly the scorched earth policy of Saddam Hussein. The endless string of fires and the oppressive smoke from them is an awesome and tremendously depressing sight. This wanton and deliberate act of destruction is hard to comprehend. You can't help but ask how could anyone do this? Why would anyone do this? It's a colossal waste and a colossal environmental disaster, and Iraq should pay for it.

While being extremely appreciative of us, and particularly of you, I found the Emir and the Crown Prince had very much the same concerns on their minds. The differences between the two were that the Crown Prince was far more focused and responsive. Perhaps, sitting in Kuwait City makes the difference, but I couldn't help thinking the Crown Prince seemed far more in touch with things. (This is the Saudi view as well.)

The Kuwaitis were concerned primarily about how to ensure their security, whether Saddam is going to stay in power, and how they confirm the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border?

How Do we Ensure our Security?

Both the Emir and the Crown Prince made clear that Arab forces could not on their own provide for Kuwaiti security. Neither saw the UN as a vehicle for providing security, though each felt it could provide useful political cover.

Neither specifically came out and asked for a US force presence, but the Crown Prince came close when he said, "all Kuwaitis fear a repetition of this trauma," and hope the US will help "secure their future status and security."

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- 2 -

I explained that you felt strongly that we should not have a permanent ground force presence on the Peninsula, believing it could be a political lightning-rod in the area. I sought to allay Kuwaiti concerns by noting that we would have a transitional military presence in Kuwait and over time would have, in the region, an enhanced naval presence; prepositioning; joint training and exercises on a continuous basis; an air presence that might not be fixed but would probably be continuous, and a Forward Headquarters for Cent Com. I said this should enhance our deterrent and greatly increase our ability to respond quickly to any threat.

I don't know whether this line of argument really persuaded either the Emir or the Crown Prince. Perhaps, the Kuwaitis will be assured over time as security returns to Kuwait and the Iraqi threat truly does recede in their eyes.

Does Saddam Hussain Stay in Power and What About the Border?

It's possible that the answers to these two questions will go a long ways toward reassuring the Kuwaitis. Both the Emir and the Crown Prince made clear that they want to see Saddam disappear from the scene. The Crown Prince's concerns focused principally on the need to ensure that Saddam could not regroup or rebuild. He said the Iraqis now were extremely anxious to get our forces out of Iraq and that gave us leverage we shouldn't give away easily. In this vein, he said Kuwaitis could not be reassured about the future if the border was not confirmed. The Iraqis from the time of the 1963 treaty refused to formally recognize the border and this issue needed to be resolved once and for all.

I responded by saying our treatment of Iraq would obviously be influenced by whether Saddam stayed in power. I said his staying power was hard to predict at this point but, in any case, we would push a Security Council resolution that would meet many of Kuwait's concerns. For example, one element would affirm that the Kuwait-Iraq border was that provided for in the 1963 treaty. Another would maintain the arms embargo on Iraq. Still another would maintain the embargo on Iraqi oil exports until Iraq destroyed or dismantled its weapons of mass destruction and the missiles for delivering them. And still another provision would provide a mechanism for addressing Iraqi reparation to Kuwait.

I think the Crown Prince was taken with the explanation of what a new Security Council resolution should embody. I mentioned by the way that some of the non-aligned on the Security Council were moving in the wrong direction, actually thinking of lifting sanctions at this point. I said the Indians were pushing such a mistaken position, but that given the Indian interest in winning business contracts in Kuwait at this time, the Kuwaitis should be able to dissuade them from this course.

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- 3 -

Peace Process

The Emir and the Crown Prince reacted differently to my pitch on the peace process. The Emir found the parallel steps I was suggesting for Arabs and Israelis possible, but said that our identification with Israel would make it hard for the Arabs to adopt such measures unless they were proposed by the UNSC. I responded that our relationship with Israel made us the only ones who could move Israel. I added that trying to use the UN would remove any chance of influencing the Israelis, would preempt the possible steps that could set this process in motion, and would lose what could well be a real strategic opportunity to make progress.

The Crown Prince had a very different and far more positive reaction. While noting we might want to get the Arab League into the act, he said the steps I outlined represented "very good ideas that reveal your interest in making a solution that saves the Palestinians." He said he agreed with me that the time to move was now and there was an opportunity to do so. (Here, too, the Crown Prince seemed a lot closer in spirit to the Saudi position.)

Concluding Thought

The Emir said he would be returning to Kuwait this week. The move is long overdue, particularly as grumbling among Kuwaitis about him has become more pronounced. For the moment, the Crown Prince seems to be running the show, and is committed to broadening the base of political participation in Kuwait. They have much to do to get the country up and running again and I sense progress on the economic front will do much to set the stage for an evolving political system.

202/395 2000

March 9, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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March 9, 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

MM 11/10/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: FRIDAY MEETINGS

My trip has gotten off to a good start. King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah are feeling very confident not only about their position in the region but about the meaning, importance, and direction of our relationship. They are looking to the future, focused on how to develop a better basis for regional security, committed to exerting a greater leadership role on security and the peace process, and strongly convinced that Saddam must go. The King clearly doesn't want us to let him off the hook or to regroup or rebuild. As Saud said, no one, including radical Shia, would be worse than Saddam

Before getting to my discussions with the King, Abdullah and Saud al Faisal, let me mention briefly the meeting I had with Norm Schwarzkopf. Norm made it clear that he would like to get his troops out of Iraq "sooner rather than later." He expected all of his military issues to be resolved next week, though the ICRC has requested a March 21 meeting prior to which they will try to document all the Kuwaiti detainees. However, he made clear that he wanted to proceed in coordination with our political approach at the UN.

As you'll see from my reporting below, we covered all four parts of our agenda, but had a particularly lengthy and interesting discussion on the peace process.

Dealing with Iraq, Regional Security, Arms Control and Economic Cooperation

With Saud al-Faisal, I outlined our overall agenda and how we would put together a new Security Council resolution once the requirements of UNSC Resolution 686 are met. Specifically, I said we were looking to include in that resolution language locking in Iraqi commitments on the political and military aspects of UNSC 686; a UN-sanctioned border force; modifying sanctions to permit food imports, but no weapons imports or oil exports; formalization of the 1963 Iraq-Kuwait border; and UN border guarantees.

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- 2 -

Saud firmly agreed that Iraq, under any leadership, should destroy its missiles and weapons of mass destruction in order to have access to oil export revenues. He indicated some hesitation at lifting even food and humanitarian assistance until Saddam leaves.

On reparations, Bandar suggested we take ten percent of the revenue from any future Iraqi oil exports and put it into a reparation fund, perhaps under UN auspices. Saud agreed, but said we needed to be flexible on reparations if Saddam is removed.

Saud's preoccupation in discussing security arrangements was Kuwait itself. His thrust was that the GCC, Egypt, Syria, and outside powers including us ought to concentrate forces in Kuwait to ensure its security. Saud argued that a UN force could not take the place of a real deterrent, which he said could not be provided by Arabs alone. Saud was genuinely receptive, but non-specific, on the explicit things we might do in Saudi Arabia, like exercises and prepositioning. Saud and Bandar both seemed open to stockpiling military supplies in Saudi Arabia under joint management. On arms control, Saud was apprehensive that any measures on conventional weapons would deny Saudi Arabia its needed increase in forces. He agreed we need to try to eliminate weapons of mass destruction from the region, and that we should explore putting quantitative caps on regional forces.

I went through the same points on security arrangements and arms control with King Fahd, who had been briefed by Saud. He declined to discuss the issues in any detail, saying he wanted to consult and would have a considered answer for us by the time I get back to Washington. He noted, however, that decisions would be made in the "spirit of cooperation" that now exists between us. I sense he needs to consult not just among the royal family, but also with the Egyptians and Syrians after my talks there.

On economic issues, I pointed out to Fahd that a facility associated with the World Bank -- or perhaps a Middle East Development Bank -- would complement the Gulf Fund they established at the GCC Summit in December. It also might provide the Saudis with some cover from the bilateral aid requests which besiege them. They saw the point, but did not get down to any specific measures.

I found the Saudis still wary of Iran. Fahd said that we need to be "tough and consistent" with Iran if we want them to behave responsibly. "We tried to be diplomatic and friendly," he said, "but they took advantage of that approach."

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Peace Process

With Fahd, I probably spent more time on the peace process than anything else. It was clear to me that this part of the discussion was most important to the King. Following my presentation, he repeated several times that the meeting was extremely important, extremely constructive. He even said at one point it might have been our best meeting ever.

I think he reacted this way because he perceived our seriousness; a seriousness conveyed not simply by the tone but by the fact that I was asking him to consider taking specific steps that would give us something to work with in Israel.

I started by emphasizing that Saudi leadership in the region had been essential to our success on the Gulf crisis and the war. That leadership would remain critical to producing broader regional peace and stability in the aftermath of the war. Nowhere would a leading Saudi role be more important than on the Arab-Israeli peace process. With Saudi help, we might break the old taboos and generate a breakthrough on peace. Without it, I said, I thought the odds were high that the Arab world might well return to old assumptions and old patterns of behavior. That wouldn't put pressure on Israel to change, and we would find that a historic opportunity to make progress would disappear.

It is interesting that Fahd (who was joined for this part of the discussion only by Abdullah) responded by saying that he understood and agreed that the Saudis must be prepared to exert leadership on this issue. (Saudi had been far more reserved on this prior to my meeting with the King, but had encouraged me to be very specific in my presentation to the King.) Interestingly enough, Abdullah not only echoed Fahd's views, but when the King had to leave the room for a moment, Abdullah said the US and the Saudis were at the peak of their credibility in the region and this credibility must now be used jointly to tackle the Arab-Israeli problem. Given his traditional pan-Arab bent and impulse always to seek comfort in the lowest common denominator Arab position on Israel, this statement suggesting a leadership role for Saudi Arabia represents a significant departure.

While it is too soon to know, the war may well be a transforming event on the Saudi leadership's view of itself and its role in the region as a whole. The King commented at one point that my description of our goals on the peace process captured exactly what he felt in his heart. He said the Arab-Israeli conflict was now the crux of all problems in the area. It gave Saddam and others like Qadhafi "material" on which to promote themselves. It should no longer linger on. He said Saudi Arabia was prepared to have fully normal relations -- economic and diplomatic -- with Israel once the problem of the Palestinians was resolved. He said the Palestinians would have to have some right to return to a homeland.

He said many Israeli intellectuals spoke of Shamir's intransigence. But the King said he believed that the Israeli leadership knew that the US would not side with the Arabs against Israel and would not go along with an outcome that would be bad for Israel.

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- 4 -

The King said he realized that he and other Arab leaders would need to give us something we could use with the Israelis, and they in turn needed to give us something on the Palestinians that the Arabs could use.

I told him that was the precise logic of our two-track approach. The Arabs wanted to be able to explain any moves toward Israel by highlighting what was now being done for Palestinians. The Israelis wanted to be able to put moves toward Palestinians in the context of a larger reconciliation with Arab states. Each needed something to point to.

Our task, being uniquely situated with credibility with both sides, was to see if we could set in motion a process that would provide explanations each side needed. We felt a pragmatic approach geared toward real steps was the best way to proceed.

The King agreed, saying we need to "pre-cook" this process carefully before we go for big public events. Indeed, he agreed with our view that this is not the right time for an international conference. He noted, in particular, that if you try to start the process with an international conference you will create complications, not clear the way for progress.

I pointed out that we thought the process could be initiated by setting in motion steps that Arab states might take to signal their willingness to reconcile with Israel, and parallel steps that Israel might take vis-a-vis Palestinians and the broader peace process. To induce the Israelis to take certain steps, I needed to know what the Saudis and others might be willing to do in this regard and what I might be able to report very privately to Shamir on possible Arab steps.

With that in mind, I outlined a range of steps, some tacit and low visibility and others much more open and political, that the Saudis and other Arab states might consider taking:

- Signal the Israelis that you will work to promote Palestinian representatives they can work with.
- Consider possible CBMs on security in the Red Sea area and elsewhere.
- Consider public meetings with unofficial Israelis or possibly a covert exchange of intelligence on terrorism with Israel.
- Drop the economic boycott openly, or at least convey to countries like Japan that there will no longer be secondary or tertiary boycotts of companies doing business with Israel.
- Reject zionism is racism, or at least drop the fight against Israel's credentials at the UN.
- Renounce the state of belligerency or at least declare that you don't consider yourself in a state of war with Israel and would normalize relations fully when a peace treaty is concluded.

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- 5 -

In turn, I told the King, that I would press the Israelis to take steps that might involve:

- Easing conditions on Palestinians in the territories (stopping deportations, administrative detentions, withdrawing the IDF and the civil administration from certain villages and towns, permitting free and fair municipal elections.)
- Declaring a willingness to meet with Palestinians from the territories, without elections, to discuss transitional arrangements for local self-government.
- Expressing a willingness to withdraw from Southern Lebanon after a six to twelve month period of tranquility on Israel's border. (Meaning an end to terror attacks.)
- Expressing a commitment to a comprehensive settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338, stating a willingness to negotiate on the Golan and to negotiate on the basis of a confederal solution for the West Bank/Gaza.

Upon hearing this, the King said many of these Israeli steps would be very useful. I said the more the King could do on steps toward Israel, the more I could press for in return. I also said that while I wasn't asking for a specific Saudi response tonight, it would be very helpful for me to have something before I went to Israel.

The King said he understood. He wanted to think about everything I had said. He knew it was important to respond quickly, but these ideas deserved very serious consideration. He added that having this kind of a discussion was testimony to our relationship of trust and friendship. He said he would try to give us a response before we arrived in Israel, and Bandar (who served as the translator) told Dennis afterward that he would get together with him to go over the steps in greater detail before we left Saudi Arabia.

The proof is in the pudding, and we're a long ways from being able to eat it, but I think it's fair to say that we've peaked their interest.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1991

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: SUNDAY MEETINGS

Ankara

On the thirty-minute ride from the airport, I outlined our Gulf approach in general terms to Foreign Minister Alptemocin. Even with all that is going on in the Gulf and the Baltics, it took him very little time to raise Cyprus. He passed me a paper that I am having reviewed.

I then met with Prime Minister Akbulut for about an hour, trying unsuccessfully to get out after thirty minutes. That left me with only twenty-five minutes with President Ozal before the airport fog rolled in. The meeting with Akbulut, though not substantively productive, was important to Ozal because it helps keep him from being isolated on his Gulf policy.

Ozal was as solid as ever. He sincerely appreciated your letter to him on his CNN interview, which I gave him at the outset of the meeting.

I told Ozal he had no better friends than George Bush, Jim Baker, and the U.S. Government. I said he had been a real stand-up guy for us during this crisis, and we would be there for him in the future.

After a brief readout of the Aziz meeting, I laid out the assistance package you approved for Turkey. Ozal listened carefully, asked a few good questions, and seemed to be pleased.

I then made our one operational request following up on your conversation in Paris: that Ozal let us increase our air forces in Turkey above the DECA 48 combat aircraft limit. I told him we sought his authority now for the deployment of an additional 48 combat aircraft and associated logistical support. We would come back to him for separate authorization in the event we wished to use the forces for offensive operations. I reminded Ozal that he had told you this would be possible after the NATO ACE Mobile Force deployment, and I told him the deployment could help save American and other lives by concluding any combat operations more quickly.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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2013-0831-MR
mm 11/16/2016

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Ozal said he agreed in principle, but that he might have to go to the Parliament for approval. (Mort Abramowitz subsequently called to say that the Cabinet could probably approve the deployment, while Parliament would likely have to approve operations.) Since we would be exceeding DECA limits, Ozal asked that we conclude a written bilateral agreement that he could present for approval. Mort is working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on what will now be an exchange of letters.

Ozal said he thought there was a high likelihood that Saddam Hussein would announce or start a pullout in the next day or so. However, the new Iraqi ambassador, who had presented his credentials on January 11 and received a stiff message from Ozal, had brought him a message from Saddam Hussein on January 12: basically, that their view on the crisis is what they told me in Geneva and that Turkey should not stand by George Bush. Ozal's and Saddam's messages are attached.

Major

John Major and I met for over an hour at Alconbury Air Force Base, and discussed both the Gulf and the Baltics. We are at one on these issues, with one exception: Major's personal language on the Baltics ("deplores") was stronger than ours, but not as strong as the EC's ("condemns").

The other items Major raised were operational ones, which I will discuss with you when I get back.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

12 January 1991
Response from Saddam Hussein

1. President of Iraq (Mr. Saddam Hussein) has the honour to convey to you his compliments and that of the Iraqi people.
2. Iraq has already expressed her position to the Foreign Minister of the United States during the negotiations held in Geneva and we have nothing to add in this respect.
3. Iraq hopes that Turkey would not stand by President Bush's position and Iraq always favours good relations with Turkey.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

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PAGES 3DTG 136250Z JAN 91RELEASER RW

FROM/LOCATION

1. SAM 974

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHITE SITUATION ROOM

2. _____

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

VIA CAMP DAVIDBest Copy11
136250Z
JAN 91
07:59~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

January 13, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

IN ADDITION, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN COME OVER AND PICK UP A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-5291.

THANKS VERY MUCH.

SUN 13 JAN 31 07:50

PG.03

~~TOP SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0831-MR

mm 11/16/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: SATURDAY MEETINGS

Mubarak

As I reported to you when we spoke, Mubarak is solid. I met with him two-on-two, with Foreign Minister Meguid and Frank Wisner, and I will pass Wisner's notes to you after I get back.

The Egyptians are ready to participate in the ground campaign if hostilities occur, including in the event Israel responds to an attack on it (but not if Israel preempts). Since Egypt is not in the air campaign, Mubarak agreed that notification can be made at or just before commencement of any operations.

As I mentioned, I spoke to Yemeni Foreign Minister Iryani, and sent Bob Kimmitt and John Kelly to see him at his Cairo hotel. There he laid out a six-point peace proposal, which he said he had discussed with Iraqi officials. We commented on the proposal consistent with our positions on full implementation, no partial solutions, and no linkage. Whether he goes to Baghdad remains to be seen, but Kimmitt told him that if he goes, he should go very soon -- and be out by midnight January 15, which is a real deadline. Iryani flinched and quickly said: "I only plan to stay a few hours!" If he goes, he clearly has the message.

Assad

I also met with President Assad two-on-two, joined by Foreign Minister Shara and Ed Djerejian. He made clear that he very much appreciated meeting you in Geneva.

I will also pass you the detailed notes from Ed after I get back. On two key issues, however:

- Assad is wrestling with the question of whether his forces in Saudi Arabia will participate in any possible offensive operations. Before making a decision, I think he will talk again with Fahd and Mubarak, both of whom want his forces to participate. He said being part of the coalition is already politically difficult for him, and operational involvement would cause real problems.

~~TOP SECRET~~

- It is quite clear that if Israel is attacked and responds (and even more certain if Israel preempts) that Syria will have a tough time remaining even politically in the coalition, much less militarily.

Nevertheless, in my view, it was worth the effort to go to Damascus. Assuming a timely and favorable resolution of the Gulf crisis, we may have some real opportunities in the peace process working with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

EYES ONLY

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CAMP DAVID

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PAGES 3 excluding
Header Sheet

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

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RECORD #

FROM/LOCATION

1. Carol Jackson / Special Asst. to Sec. Baker aboard Sam 974

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Department of Defense Command Center

2.

3.

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6.

7.

for: Secretary Cheney Sec Def
Dep. Sec. Def**SCOWCROFT
GATES**

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Department
of Defense
Command CenterPlease call the Camp David
Communications Center (301) 824-1350
and provide confirmation of receipt.**EYES ONLY**

January 13, 1991

NOTE FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMMAND CENTER

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM TO THE
SECRETARY AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

THANKS VERY MUCH.

703/697-8151

~~SECRET~~

January 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM

EYES ONLY FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1184-MR

mm 1/4/2016

INFO EYES ONLY: PAUL WOLFOWITZ
HENRY S. ROWEN

FROM: STEVE HADLEY

SUBJECT: SECRETARY BAKER'S MEETINGS IN CAIRO, DAMASCUS,
AND ANKARA

Secretary Baker spent Saturday, January 12, 1991, in meetings with President Mubarak in Cairo, Egypt, and President Asad, in Damascus, Syria. Neither Howard nor I sat in on the meetings, so our reports are second-hand. As I advised SecDef by telephone, the talks went well. On Sunday, January 13, Secretary Baker was in Ankara, Turkey.

Cairo, Egypt

Mubarak is sound and ready to go. Since the Egyptians have no part in the air war, Mubarak said they need notification only of the commencement of the attack.

Damascus, Syria

Asad would like to assume a military role for Syria, but politically he may not be able to do so. He will talk to President Mubarak and King Fahd. The Foreign Minister said at a joint press conference with Secretary Baker that if Israel became involved in the conflict in any way -- even by retaliating in response to an Iraqi attack -- this would "shuffle the cards" in the Gulf crisis. Secretary Baker responded by emphasizing that Syria still fully supports the UN Security Council Resolutions and the coalition.

Ankara, Turkey

The meeting with Turkish officials was rushed by the need to depart Ankara for London before we got socked in by fog. Howard and I sat in on the meeting with the Prime Minister, but not with President Ozal. Secretary Baker's central thrust was to:

- (1) Lay out the package of military and economic assistance developed by the USG over the last two weeks; and
- (2) Press hard for Turkish approval of the deployment of additional US aircraft to Turkey.

The latter point is a priority. The US/Turkish Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) limits us to 48 combat aircraft deployed in the country. The key CINCs would like 48 more combat aircraft plus another 30 or so SOF and support aircraft for a total of about 130.

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- 2 -

We got no real reaction from the Turks on the aid package we offered, but time was also very short. Ozal emphasized economic help, and raised again the issue of a higher textile quota. Our Ambassador will have to follow up.

As to the deployment of additional US aircraft in Turkey, the Prime Minister laid down a marker down that on some decisions the Turkish parliament would have to be consulted. We then went to see President Ozal.

- Ozal did not say "yes" but was clearly leaning our way.
- During the meeting, the Foreign Minister said that a separate agreement had to be drafted to cover this additional deployment. He also said that this agreement would be presented to the Turkish Parliament.
- Our Ambassador, Mort Abramowitz, will work with the Foreign Ministry to prepare a draft ASAP. It will be faxed to Secretary Baker on the airplane.
- Howard and I will be asked to clear for our agencies. I will check with Terry O'Donnell and Bruce Weinrod, then run it by you.

NOTE: While the inference from the Turks is that parliamentary review is not a problem, the country is badly split both on Turkey's role in the Gulf crisis and on Ozal's concentration of power in the Presidency at the expense of the parliament.

The Turks seem solid. Ozal wrote to Saddam Hussein two days before Secretary Baker's arrival soliciting a commitment to withdraw. Saddam responded with a three sentence letter saying that Iraq had nothing to say beyond what Foreign Minister Aziz said to Baker in Geneva. Saddam urged Ozal not to stand with George Bush.

Ozal said he believes there is a high possibility of an Iraqi pull-out tomorrow.

Our plans have changed somewhat due to the delay associated with the Ankara stop. We meet with the British in London tonight, leave for Ottawa, and meet with the Canadians Monday morning. ETA Washington is shortly after noon on Monday. I will report orally to you on the London and Ottawa stops once I get to the office.

~~SECRET~~