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FOIA MARKER

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Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-009

Folder Title:
Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Monday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Tuesday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/14/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings (7 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Sunday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Sunday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Gorbachev Message on CFE (1 pp.)	4/26/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Thursday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/25/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Thursday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/25/91	(b)(1)	S

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1355
OA/ID Number: 91164-009
Date Closed: 8/31/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Official Informal (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Official Informal (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Tuesday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/23/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Monday's Meetings (4 pp.)	4/22/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Sunday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/21/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Saturday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Secretary Baker Re: to Secretary Baker (3 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	TS

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

May 14, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/16/2022

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2013-0833-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/14/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MONDAY'S MEETINGS

Today I met with Bessmertnykh, Mubarak and Meguid, had a three-way lunch that Mubarak hosted for Bessmertnykh and me, and, finally, I met with Lebanese Foreign Minister Bouez. With Bessmertnykh, I covered a number of Middle East and non-Middle East topics. As I suspected, he's not quite as inclined to quickly send out an invitation to the conference. Nevertheless, I believe he does accept the need to move within a relatively short period of time, probably within the next two weeks. He agrees that we have to put the parties on the spot to decide and he's prepared to lean on Assad and will, in fact, stop in Damascus on his way back to Moscow.

Mubarak will do likewise. As a result of our talks, he's decided to go to Damascus next Sunday and press Assad hard to ensure that he does not miss this opportunity. Both Mubarak and Meguid emphasized that they were not surprised by Assad's behavior, but I suspect that saying that was designed at least in part to keep me in the game. The fact is, after hearing what I had to say about my meeting with Assad, Mubarak said, "we really must push Assad hard right now." And indeed, he joined with me in pressing Bessmertnykh to stop in Damascus on his way out of the region.

Finally, I saw the Lebanese Foreign Minister. Interestingly, he said Lebanon would come to the conference. I asked if he would be willing to say that publicly and he said he needed to call President Hrawi and would get back to me in the morning. Even if he won't say it publicly, I can still use this with Hussein, the Palestinians and Shamir to show how broad the support is in the Arab world to move. If he does say it publicly, it may soften the impact of Assad's inflexibility, since most observers would assume that Lebanon would never come without Syrian acquiescence or agreement.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0833-MR

MM 9/14/2015

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BESSMERTNYKH MEETING

We covered a number of topics in this meeting, focusing principally on the peace process, Iraq and BW.

Peace Process: Bessmertnykh and I discussed how we might maximize the pressure on Assad. I emphasized that I thought it was especially important to produce the right answer on the UN observer and the consent rule.

I said I was convinced that if Assad went along with these positions, we would definitely get to the conference. I told Bessmertnykh that if Assad came around on these two issues, Shamir would find it very difficult to say no to negotiations if these were the only two questions preventing the advent of direct talks. Bessmertnykh suggested that he would get Gorbachev to write Assad a letter. When I pressed him to stop in Damascus on the way out of the region, he said he didn't have the time, since he needed to be back in Moscow by Wednesday for a meeting with the Chinese. Later on, when Mubarak joined with me in pressing him -- and indeed said he would call Gorbachev because it was so important that Bessmertnykh make the stop -- Sasha changed his mind and said he would do so.

As for the timing of sending out the invitation, Bessmertnykh is inclined to want to let a little more time go by before taking this step. I suspect the reason for his caution is that he has just begun talking to everyone in the region, rather enjoys this new role and fears that this particular process might come to and end if we send the invitation out right now. I explained why I felt it was important for us to move on the invitation more quickly, rather than less so. To begin with, I said that with the two of us in the region we created much more momentum and attention on the need to move. But once we left, the pressure to move would diminish. Indeed, when coupled with stories that we had failed to produce any results, the pressure to make decisions would drop off very rapidly.

In addition, I said that both Syria and Israel were inclined to stretch this process out and neither would say no or yes if left to their own devices. We would need to put each in a position where they had to respond. Indeed, putting them on the spot might be the only way to produce the yes. On the other hand, if we put them on the spot and they said no, that might generate enough pressure after the fact -- after an obvious breakdown -- that some other possibilities might emerge. In any case, I argued we needed to have a vehicle to come to closure, lest we devalue the whole effort.

In the end, Bessmertnykh came around and agreed we would have to move quickly. He still wants to think about the exact timing, and I suspect he'll go along with our moving on the invitations in about two weeks' time.

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BW

I raised this and I told him very directly that we would have to brief the Hill and would do so on Wednesday. I said that we had hoped to have something from the Soviets -- something that we could use to show the Soviet Union was trying to rectify the problem. Unfortunately, at this moment, we had yet to receive anything from the Soviet Union even though I had raised specific concerns on Soviet BW activities over sixty days ago. In addition, though Bassmertnykh had promised at Kislovodsk two weeks ago that we would get a response and that he would be proposing our experts meet to discuss each specific problem we had raised, we still had received nothing.

He was clearly chagrined. He told me he had been blocked by the chemical and biological specialists from being able to set up the experts meeting. They had insisted that such a meeting could not take place and they could not answer our questions until Soviet experts had been allowed to take their reciprocal visit to our facilities. He said he had been able to ensure that a report responding to our particular concerns would be sent to us shortly. On that basis, he wondered whether we could postpone the briefing on the Hill until we had had a chance to receive and analyze this report. He worried about the possibly explosive impact of a briefing on the Hill on such a sensitive topic without some Soviet explanation.

I told him we had waited as long as we could and we couldn't delay a briefing any longer. I said that if the report was done, he needed to send it to Washington immediately. He answered that he would cable Gorbachev right away, because it was Gorbachev who had not yet reviewed the report and had not yet permitted it to be sent to us.

A number of other topics were covered briefly.

CSCE Ministerial: I brought up two issues in connection with the CSCE Ministerial. First, I asked whether he thought they could allow the Baltics to attend the Berlin meeting as observers. He told me, interestingly enough, that seven or eight republics had made similar requests and they were reviewing them. I suggested that by allowing all of them to come the Baltics would be submerged, not highlighted. He told me that's what their thinking was as well. Second, I said given the turmoil in Yugoslavia, did he agree it was appropriate to raise Yugoslavia at the Ministerial. He said he thought it was appropriate, and in fact he said he worried a great deal about the consequences of instability in Yugoslavia for the Balkans as a whole.

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Afghanistan: I asked him whether he had had time to consider the proposal on Afghanistan I made to him in Kislovodsk. I reminded him that I had given him a letter at the time that had proposed that we would adopt the Soviet idea for an international conference on Afghanistan if they would adopt our strong preference for a date certain for bilateral negative symmetry. He told me that they were still considering their response, and that we would receive it shortly.

Angola: He asked me whether I would attend the ceasefire signing ceremony in Lisbon on May 31. I said that I thought it was a good idea for both of us to attend and in fact we might suggest that the Secretary General of the UN attend as well. I added that this was a significant achievement, it demonstrated the value of our cooperation, and it might still prove to be a model for settling other regional conflicts or civil wars.

MUBARAK MEETING

We spent nearly all our time talking first about Assad and then about Qadhafi. He told me that when Meguid had informed him of what we had discussed last night, he had called Assad and said he wanted to come to Damascus this weekend. Assad agreed to his coming Sunday morning. Mubarak made a point of emphasizing that I shouldn't despair when thinking about Assad. He said Assad goes up and down: "He's like a rug merchant, always probing to see what he could get." Meguid added that the Syrian press is playing the visit very positively, indicating at least to him, that Assad was leaving the door open.

I responded by saying that Assad was playing for time and was emphasizing form over substance. I recounted the understanding I had with him -- i.e., he accepts a UN observer and the consent rule for reconvening the conference, we offer a security guarantee on the border once Israel and Syria have settled their differences. Mubarak was clearly amazed that Assad would play games with such a proposal. He immediately saw the value of it from Assad's standpoint. In fact, Mubarak said this was Assad's opportunity to get the Golan back since Israel would never relinquish it without such a guarantee. He implied that Assad was conditioned to act a certain way. He said that he would go to Damascus and tell him he would be a fool if he chose not to go along with what was being proposed.

Before ending our meeting Mubarak raised Qadhafi again. He said Qadhafi had been behaving himself, and he could be contained. This was the challenge and the opportunity. He argued that keeping Qadhafi quiet, as he had succeeded in doing during the Gulf war, could be very important to us if we got the peace process going. Qadhafi was interested in building relations with us, but radicals like Jalloud were around him and pressing him to revert to his crazy, extreme ways. Mubarak argued that he was counteracting Jalloud and keeping a leash on him.

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But he needed some help. He asked whether there was some small gesture we could take toward Libya. He suggested that we at least let some of the former Libyan POWs, who had been moved from Chad to Zaire to Kenya, be visited by the Egyptians to see if they wanted to return. He added that the families of some of these had made this an issue of some embarrassment for Qadhafi.

I said I thought these men might have been or were in the process of coming to the US. If that weren't the case, I'd check into it. Beyond this, however, ^{9.3(b)(1)}

I said these reports suggested Qadhafi had not been contained or leashed. I don't think Mubarak is persuaded, believing instead that he is affecting Qadhafi and we are missing an opportunity to moderate his behavior.

BOUEZ MEETING

I had an interesting meeting with the Lebanese Foreign Minister. He started by discussing the peace process. He told me very clearly that Lebanon would come to the conference. He may be blowing smoke, especially if the Syrians oppose Lebanon's doing so, but he argued that Lebanon's frontier with Israel and its Palestinian population gave Lebanon a special stake in any process. And he added that Lebanon needed to be involved in any ongoing process.

Aside from the peace process, he had several points he wanted to raise. First, he raised the issue of Iran. He said Iran had expressed an interest in normalizing relations with Lebanon. He told me that Lebanon would never be willing to normalize relations unless the hostage question had been settled first. I told him that was good to hear, because we would take a very dim view of any such normalization so long as hostages were being held. I sensed that he might have had an interest in wanting to act as an intermediary with the Iranians, and so I told him that we had one channel to Iran and that was the Swiss. I added that we didn't see any value in having any additional channels.

Second, he then turned to the internal situation within Lebanon. He told me that the disarming of the militias was proceeding. He said all of Greater Beirut was now controlled by the government and the militias in this area had been completely disarmed. He said they were now working on Mount Lebanon, where 50% of the militias had been disarmed. He took great pride in noting that there had been no violent incidents either in Greater Beirut or in Mount Lebanon as this process had gone forward. He said in two months they would move into the third phase of disarming the militias and that would involve disarming them throughout the rest of the country, including in the southern part of the country. Even now, they were negotiating with Arafat, as the Palestinians were the most formidable militia in the south. There were three to four thousand fighters in the south with light and medium weaponry.

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Israel had said, if these and other militias in the south were disarmed, then they could withdraw from the security zone in southern Lebanon. The Palestinians, on the other hand, had said they would not disarm unless Israel first withdrew or at least Israeli withdrawal was guaranteed in advance of any such disarming.

He asked me how we felt about a compromise between these two positions. For example, how would we react if there was a period of calm for four months in the south (no attacks on Israel) and in return for that period of calm, either Israel or we guaranteed to implement UNSC Resolution 425 which called for total Israeli withdrawal? I told him we'd have to think about that proposal because, after all, I had previously suggested to him -- and to Shamir -- that Israel might declare its willingness to withdraw from the security zone once there were a six to twelve months period of tranquility.

As I had said to Assad, when we were talking about southern Lebanon, the best approach would be to get to a peace conference and have this as the first item on the Lebanese-Israeli bilateral agenda. Perhaps, if we don't get to such a conference, we could think about some blending of the approaches described above.

The last issue he raised was Lebanon's need for outside help in repairing its devastated infrastructure. All the years of war had taken its toll. He said the Lebanese were doing the best they could and he cited a couple of examples of what they had succeeded in doing on their own over the last couple of months. He noted that four months ago they had one day of drinking water a week in Beirut. Now, they were up to four or five days of drinking water a week. Similarly, he said, four months ago, the telephone system had been 80-85% ineffective. That number was now 40%. He said the Lebanese people were ingenious, but they need some capital investment from the outside. Though the Saudis and other Gulf states had promised a development fund prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that fund hadn't materialized. And he hoped that we might help with some of the Gulf states and the Europeans.

May 15, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *elt*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

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By MM on 5/16/2022

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AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2013-0833-MR(503)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
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RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: TUESDAY'S MEETINGS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 135262013-0833-MR
MM 5/26/2015

As I reported before, this effort to try to put together a real peacemaking process is characterized by ups and downs. Today was more of an up day than a down one. I had a very good meeting with King Hussein. As I told you on the phone, he's clearly leaning towards moving without Syria and he understands well that this will make the peace process possible. He also realizes that Jordan for its own reasons badly needs such a process. He told me that he is prepared to take risks that he has never taken before, provided he is not left alone and provided that his isolation in the region ends.

After driving from Amman to Jerusalem -- going across the Allenby Bridge and through the West Bank -- I saw three Palestinians. For at least part of my meeting with them, I felt that there was some regression in their approach. I almost felt that Bassmertnykh's meeting today with Arafat actually made two of them more reticent than in previous conversations, especially since Arafat's meeting tended to enhance his prominence. Nevertheless, as our talks today neared their conclusion, Faisal Husseini, at least, began to focus more practically on certain assurances that we might provide about America's policy positions -- not Israel's -- as we enter the negotiating process. All in all, I remain convinced that Hussein and the Palestinians in the territories are desperate for a negotiating process and that just might make one possible.

Hussein Meeting

My meeting with King Hussein was interesting as we started out alone, moved to a larger group (where for the first time some of his aides were very forward-leaning) and concluded with a small group discussion where we really got much closer to the essence of what the King is prepared to do. The upshot is that the King feels he is going to have to make some changes very soon in Jordan. He recounted for me how disastrous the economic situation has become. And he went on to say that he is on a "collision course with the Muslim brethren." He said some of

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his problems stem from his economic and political isolation in the region, but he also said that some of them stem from Saudi financial support for the Muslim brethren and Hamas -- the fundamentalists in the Occupied Territories who he said are also beginning to undermine stability in Jordan. (I think we need very quickly to talk to the Saudis about this.)

The King knows he must end his isolation. He knows he must "tie things together" in Jordan. And, as he said to me, he is convinced that his involvement in an active, productive peace process now is essential to his domestic objectives. He strongly believes that the best chance to make peace is now. And he fears that if it is lost, it will be catastrophic for Jordan and the region. Indeed, his main fear is that if we miss this opportunity, if we don't have an active peace process, the fundamentalists will be able to make a big comeback in the region.

I sense from his comments that he believes there is an historic opportunity now because of the US standing in the region; because the PLO and Arafat are too weak to block him; because the Gulf states having committed to directly participate in this process, create Arab cover for him; and perhaps, also, because he has apparently struck up an interesting, if covert, relationship with Shamir.

What he seeks from us is help in ending his isolation and in getting political and economic support. That support is essential, he argues, if he is to make some tough decisions both at home and in the peace process. I told him that the only way we could help repair his position with the Gulf states was if we were able to say that he were truly indispensable to the peace process. And that indeed, if they were serious about making peace possible, they would need to give him economic and political support. I said rather directly, while we understood his needs, we would simply not be able to press the Gulf states successfully unless he had already committed Jordan to come to the conference even if the Syrians didn't and unless he also helped to sort out the issue of Palestinian representation in the conference and in the subsequent negotiations.

He said his own incentives for producing a process now were very great. He said if there is no hope for peace, Jordan might implode. However, if there was hope generated by a real peace process, he could overcome domestic difficulties and the fundamentalist weight in Jordan would be diminished. He noted that he had spoken to Assad on the phone yesterday, and Assad had been somewhat positive on the process. Nevertheless, he wouldn't let Assad make Jordan's decision. He couldn't say today that he would come to the conference if Syria refused to participate. But he did say that if that is what it took to produce this process, it would be time for Jordan to make an historic decision.

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On the issue of joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, he basically agreed on its need and on the importance of keeping the PLO in the background. He said he still needed Palestinians to ask him for such a joint delegation, but he felt that with Soviet and Egyptian help, such a request might be forthcoming. Significantly Taher al-Masri and Adnan Abu Odeh both indicated they are now talking to Palestinians in the territories and both have basically accepted the idea for how to handle East Jerusalem in the delegation -- e.g., have Jordanian citizens currently living in Jordan who come from well-known Jerusalem families serve on the Jordanian side of the joint delegation. I think Shamir will accept this and both Masri and Abu Odeh already had specific suggestions on names. The fact that these two are more forward-leaning than they have been is a clear-cut sign of their perception of the King's position.

Should we assume that we can count on the King? My guess is probably not yet. 1.4(d)

Perhaps one reason that things may be different this time is that his circumstances and his needs are different. He has more of a stake in acting and seems more aware of the costs to him of having no peace process. That may explain why, interestingly enough, his position seems closer to Shamir's than Assad's on both the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. On the former, he seems to feel that having 242 and 338 in the Terms of Reference for the conference, and having the Security Council bless agreements that are reached, is good enough. And, on the latter, having the conference reconvene to ratify any agreements is sufficient. Maybe he will change these positions after he sees Assad.

To push him in the right direction, I think he needs to know we will repair our relations with him if he actually moves. He should be told that we will unfreeze the assistance pipeline once he commits, regardless of Syria's position, to coming to the conference. He should understand as well that our ability and our inclination to really push the Gulf states on his behalf will depend on (1) his being at the conference; and (2) his sorting out the Palestinian representation issue along the lines that I discussed with him today. Taking those steps will demonstrate his indispensability -- and in truth the Gulf states will owe him at that point.

As I mentioned to you, I think we should move quickly to shore-up his inclination and let him know that we will help end his isolation and be there for him if he commits to the conference very soon. I think a call from you today would reinforce the meeting that I had with him. I'm even thinking of making a quick stop in Amman on my way back to the States to push him and to highlight our connection.

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In your call, I'd emphasize a number of points:

- The time to move is now. This is an historic moment. The one he has often said leaders must measure up to.
- You were personally committed to taking advantage of this moment and you're counting on him and his sense of history to help make it happen.
- You know it will not be easy for him, but we will be there for him.
- Both on our own and with others, we will be able to do much more for Jordan once we can point to the King's clear, unequivocal commitment to going to the conference and his efforts to actually pull it off.
- The key is not letting Assad determine whether or not we have a process.
- We'll stay in touch and will work to redeem our relationship, but the time for decision is measured in days, not weeks.

Palestinian Meeting

I won't go into too much detail on this meeting because there was a fair amount of repetition in it. The Palestinians probed on whether we could give them more on substance, by way of commitments on outcomes (e.g., total Israeli withdrawal) or principles (e.g., publicly acknowledging the right of Palestinian self-determination). I told them that we could not guarantee the outcome of the process, but we could guarantee that the process would be serious. I told them that self-determination was a codeword for a state, and we could not support that, though we did support the fulfillment of the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians. In this connection, I said we envision that the outcome would be more than autonomy, but less than an independent state. My guess is that there would be some kind of confederal arrangement.

Then they probed on whether there was some further flexibility on procedures, hoping to expand the role and weight of the UN in the process. I told them that the UN's presence as a sponsor or as an observer would have very little impact on whether Palestinians achieve their needs and rights. Rather than focusing on a symbol that could have little substantive impact, they should be focusing first and foremost on producing actual negotiations with the Israelis. That represents their only hope.

They also probed to see whether there was any chance to renew our dialogue with the PLO, and I suspect that this probe occurred because of the Bassmertnykh-Arafat meeting today.

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

I was negative on renewing the dialogue, and at that point they began to get more practical in their discussions. What they're most interested in are guarantees that would permit them to highlight to Palestinians what this process will actually produce. I told them I could give them guarantees that our position on territory for peace and on the need to ensure that the process doesn't stop with interim arrangements would remain constant. I could not guarantee particular outcomes in advance of negotiations. That's what negotiations were all about. They reacted to this by asking for written assurances that our policy positions will remain constant and that we will not retreat from them during the course of negotiations.

Like Shamir, and perhaps Assad, the closer we get to actually producing the process, the more their fears begin to emerge. In the Palestinian case, however, they understand well what the absence of the process would mean for them. My hope is that their fear of the consequences of no process will exceed their fear of stepping up to the plate.

May 14, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings (7 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

May 13, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
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MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Sunday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/17/2022

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1176-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/13/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON



May 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: SUNDAY'S MEETINGS

I had a long meeting with Assad in which he basically back-tracked from his agreement on a UN observer and on a consent rule for reconvening the conference. I went at him hard on the importance of not missing this opportunity, particularly given the attitude and approach of this Administration. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)} all the arguments I mustered had little effect on him. I did try out one idea, and he said he would consider it. But at this point I have low expectations.

My meeting with Sasha Bessmertnykh tonight was a good deal more upbeat. He's hopeful that we can put the conference together. I previewed privately with him the kind of announcement or invitation we might send out and he agrees with the general approach. He also agrees that keeping this confidential until we actually send it out is important to making this work.

Between my meeting with Assad and the meeting with Bessmertnykh, I saw Abdel Meguid and had a chance to chat with him as we rode in from the airport in Cairo. Interestingly enough, he, too, was rather upbeat. First, he wasn't surprised by what I heard in Syria (Osama al Baz had just been to Damascus a couple of days ago and had heard much the same thing.) Meguid suggested that this is Assad's way, and in any case, the Egyptian discussions with Abu Mazin of the PLO leaves them confident that the Palestinian representation issue can be handled successfully. In Meguid's view, that's the big issue, not the two outstanding modalities questions on a conference. I'll hear more from the Egyptians when I see Mubarak tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1176-MR

MM 7/13/2015

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- 2 -

Assad Meeting

With Assad our six hour meeting was, as always, characterized by a lot of repetition. The first inkling of trouble came when Shara rode in with me last night from the airport and raised the need for the conference to be reconvened without the agreement of all the parties. I told him the Syrians had already given me a positive answer on the question of reconvening by consensus of the parties and on that basis I had gone to you on the issue of providing a security guarantee. Shara didn't pursue it further with me in the car, but then asked this morning to see Djerejian before my meeting with President Assad. With Djerejian, he said there was not an agreement on the issue of reconvening a conference on the basis of the consent rule. In addition, he said that Syria had modified its position on the UN's role at a conference, downgrading the UN's role from that of sponsorship to that of "full participant". Ed reminded him of the conversations that he had with Shara on the two questions we posed and the positive answer which Shara had given. The position he was now hearing had very little resemblance to what we'd heard last week. He got nowhere and I faced pretty much the same with Assad.

When I went in to see Assad, I went through and actually read him parts of the transcript of our last conversation in which I had been very explicit in posing the questions of whether Assad would accept the UN observer and whether he would agree that the conference could reconvene on the basis of an agreement by all the parties. I read him the part that not only spelled out the questions, but also the part that made it clear that I would not go to you with a proposal on a security guarantee of the Syrian-Israeli border unless I first knew that he would answer yes to both of these questions. We had received such a positive response, and now I was finding that the yes was not really a yes. (You may recall that I told you that I wasn't putting money in the bank on the Syrian response.)

I asked Assad what I should now tell President Bush. Assad said that he'd made a major concession by accepting UN full participation as opposed to sponsorship. He was less clear on the question of reconvening, but he then went on to say that he thought that we were guaranteeing Israel's total withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Here again, I read him a passage from the transcript that said the security guarantee of the border is only possible, and could only go into effect, after Israel and Syria had come to a negotiated agreement.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

He raised the extraneous issue of our opposition to the Czech tank sale to Syria. He wondered whether that opposition wasn't merely a sign of our trying to pressure Syria to make concessions on the peace process. I then went through and explained the two were entirely unrelated. I noted that the Czechs had raised the tank sale with us, we had not raised it with them. I said they had probably raised it with us because they were concerned about political fallout in the Congress and its possible effect on US-Czech relations. I made it clear we had told the Czechs in response to their inquiry, that we preferred that they not make the sale, but we in no way threatened our relationship with them if they did. We could do no less than voice our preference, particularly given our desire to restrain the sale of weaponry to the area as a whole. We were not singling Syria out, but our Congress would create a major problem for us, if we had not responded to the Czechs in the way we did. This was probably not going to prevent the Czechs from selling the tanks to the Syrians.

I made it clear to Assad that we wanted to see further improvement in our relations with Syria, but Assad would make a big mistake if he passed on this opportunity to make progress and peace because of a preoccupation with form over substance. I argued that the label the UN had at a conference ("full participant" versus "observer") would not have any effect on his ability to get the Golan back. Similarly, I said whether a conference met on a continuing basis or met only on a basis of the agreement of the parties, could also have no effect on the restoration of the Golan to Syria. The only thing that could possibly restore the Golan to Syria would be a continuing US commitment to the process and a US security guarantee to Israel that would deny Israel a security argument for holding on to the Golan Heights.

I said that by offering to guarantee the border against aggression on either side -- once there was agreement between Israel and Syria -- we were taking a step that was nearly unprecedented for us. We were in effect offering Syria a security guarantee that had really until now only been offered to US allies. Assad should not underestimate the value of this. Indeed, I said if he now preferred to focus on form and not substance, he would surely be the loser and the Golan would become even more densely settled by Israel. The more that happened, the less he'd ever have a chance of seeing the Golan Heights restored to Syria.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

Near the end of our conversation, I suggested a new idea on how to handle the UN role. I said rather than having an observer, it might make more sense for the co-sponsors to make clear that they would undertake to keep the Secretary General regularly informed of the progress in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The fact is that would surely have more weight than a simple observer. And, in reality, would mean more than having the UN as a "full participant" -- whatever that meant. Assad said, "this is a new idea, I will consider it", but he did not give me any reason to believe that he would consider it positively.

The bottom line is that Assad retreated. Maybe he thought we were getting too close. It is also possible that Assad reflected on what the guarantee was and wasn't (i.e., it wasn't a guarantee of Golan's return), he decided it wasn't worth the price of the modalities concessions. Maybe he thought I'll produce something more out of Shamir and he'll wait to see that before making any real concessions to us. Or maybe in the end he's really not interested in negotiations, merely in us delivering Israel.

Bessmertnykh

Tonight we covered only the Middle East. We'll go through non-Middle East issues tomorrow morning. I suspect that discussion will prove more interesting because of the conversation you had with President Gorbachev.

On the Middle East, Bessmertnykh was generally upbeat as he gave me a briefing on what had happened in each of his stops. He feels he saw a seriousness on the need to move towards peace in every discussion he had in the area. For example, he said he thought Assad might be prepared to move and might be more flexible on the UN issue than he was revealing at this time. He also felt Shamir genuinely understood that this was the time to move. His perception after this, his first tour of the area, was that the main issues out there were mainly the ones that I had identified for him previously: the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. (The one additional issue he identified as a possible timebomb was that of settlements.)

In part, I suspect his more upbeat assessment results from his having had rather general, not specific, discussions in each of his meetings. In part, also, I suspect it emerges from his view that these modality questions are simply not serious enough to block the process, particularly if there is a good chance to resolve the Palestinian representation issue.

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

By the way, he told me that he will be seeing Arafat in Geneva relatively soon. I said it was very important that such a meeting not have such a high profile or be given much publicity at this point. There was a real danger, I said, that Arafat would seize on such a meeting to hype his role and to give him a reason to have a more prominent role in the process. Bessmertnykh said that wasn't the purpose of the meeting. On the contrary, he would see Arafat for the express purpose of managing the PLO in a way that made this process possible -- namely, ensuring that the PLO would not seek to block this process. He told me he had mentioned to Shamir that he would be seeing Arafat and he'd drawn no response.

In general, we have no differences with the Soviets on how to proceed. Bessmertnykh told me the Soviets would now work very hard on Assad to get him to be more flexible on the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. He likes the idea of our trying to further narrow the differences on these two issues. Once we've made the effort, he agrees that we should go ahead and issue a joint US-Soviet invitation to the conference in order to put everybody on the spot to respond. Either that would produce the conference or it would bring this effort to a clear-cut conclusion.

In the meantime, I'll see Mubarak tomorrow, and I'll probe to see why the Egyptians are apparently confident that the Palestinian representation issue is close to resolution. I'll see Hussein the day after that, both to pin him down on his attendance and to go through the details on how to actually produce the Palestinian part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. At that point, I should have a better fix on the prospects for actually seeing a conference take place.

May 13, 1991

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MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
05. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Sunday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
 (Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/17/2022

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1176-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/13/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1176-MR

MM 7/13/2015

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- 2 -

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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: Gorbachev Message on CFE

Larry,

I've seen the proposed message to Gorbachev and I agree with your views of it. I think it would be a mistake to send it. First, as you probably saw in my message to the President after meeting Bessmertnykh, the Soviets will be responding on CFE but at a level below Gorbachev. The reason is that Bessmertnykh doesn't want to lock Gorbachev into a position that reduces his flexibility at this point. If that's Bessmertnykh's judgment, a message from the President right now would probably be counterproductive. Second, the tone and character of the message is too strong. Does the President really want to jeopardize or threaten the whole US-Soviet relationship over 120 tanks, 753 APC's, and 234 artillery pieces? I wonder. One thing is for sure: the Europeans would never understand that.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 25, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: THURSDAY'S MEETINGS

I had a very good meeting with Sasha Bessmertnykh in Kislovodsk. The City of Kislovodsk is in an area just north of the Caucasus. It's known for its mineral waters, it's extremely picturesque, very fertile, and a well-known retreat for the elite. When one sees an area like this in the Soviet Union, it's hard not to believe that this vast country doesn't have enormous potential. The question remains can that potential be unlocked?

In the meetings, we spent most of our time on the Middle East. Our discussion was extremely good on the peace process and I got the strong impression that the Soviets are looking for a way to demonstrate that they will be positive and constructive in this effort. Over lunch, we discussed CFE, BW, the Summit, START and Afghanistan very briefly, and also the domestic situation in the Soviet Union.

Peace Process

Bessmertnykh was very forthcoming on our initiative. He accepted not only our basic approach, but he also agreed with the way we were looking at the modalities. He was sensitive to the need to deal with Europe and give the Europeans a sense of inclusion. He particularly liked our idea of having the EC presidency at the conference. Like us, he feels the French will have to be managed and he too evinced some surprise at Dumas' meeting with Arafat.

On the question of whether or not the conference should be reconvened, he clearly understood Israel's concerns but felt there had to be more than one meeting. He liked the notion of there being a consensus rule for any reconvening of the conference. He suggested that we propose that the co-sponsors would convene the conference when they deem it necessary, provided all the parties agreed.

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- 2 -

On the UN, he pushed for a more prominent role, but seemed to buy off on my argument that I could not get more than observer status -- and that would take a major effort with the Israelis given their allergy to the UN. He seemed persuaded that the need for UN role could be satisfied by the combination of observer status and reference to UNSC 242 and 338 in the terms of reference and our agreeing to deposit at the UN agreements worked out by the bilateral negotiating groups.

When we began to talk about the Palestinian representation issue he told me he had just seen Abu Mazin of the PLO and had worked him very hard on the need not to block this process; on the importance of not having Palestinians at the conference stand up and say they are there under instructions from the PLO; and on the value of dealing with the Palestinian representation issue through the mechanism of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He said Abu Mazin had been flexible, but that they would continue to work the PLO.

He agreed with me that the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was the way to handle delicate issues like East Jerusalem and Palestinians from outside the territories. (Indeed, the concept of having Jordanian citizens who happen to fit those categories was one which he felt provided a very strong argument for having a joint delegation.) He went so far as to suggest the following idea for working out the actual Palestinians who are coming to the conference: have Jordan work out the joint delegation with Palestinians, present the list to the co-sponsors, and have the co-sponsors circulate the list to all the parties starting with Israel. As he put it, in these circumstances Israel would not be selecting the Palestinians who came to the conference and subsequent negotiations, but Israel would be put in a position where it would not have to sit with anyone that it felt unable to meet with. I told him I thought the idea was a good one, but it would be very important that Arafat not show up in Amman, be embraced by the King, and have the list emerge immediately after that. He said he understood that very well and that the whole issue would have to be handled delicately.

In addition to talk about the modalities of the conference and of Palestinian representation, Bessmertnykh also raised the question of restoring relations with Israel. He left little doubt that the Soviets would restore this relationship, but he did not want the restoration to look like a precondition for Soviet co-sponsorship of the conference. He was planning to go to the Middle East the week after next and he made it clear there was a good chance that he would stop in Israel. No final decision had been made, but he would be talking this over with Gorbachev shortly.

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- 3 -

Lastly, he raised the question of location of the conference. He was uneasy about having the conference in Washington because he felt it might create problems for Gorbachev, particularly if you were opening the conference. As a co-sponsor, he would want to be there as well, but it created problems for Gorbachev politically if he had to come back to Washington before you had made a visit to Moscow. Bessmertnykh preferred the idea of Cairo, but wondered out loud whether Gorbachev would break away to go to Cairo. I told him I thought if you came to Cairo that that might well provide Gorbachev an incentive to do likewise. What we've been thinking of is a ministerial-level conference which you and Gorbachev might open as the co-sponsors.

All in all, I believe Bessmertnykh is prepared to take steps to contribute to our effort. And the reality is, that the Soviets can in fact be quite helpful to us on Palestinian and also Syrian participation. Their help may prove essential in these two cases.

Other Issues

(1) CFE: Bessmertnykh told me that the response to your letter on CFE would be coming very soon. He said your response to Gorbachev's earlier letter had been very helpful and that with the exception of naval infantry, all your proposals had been accepted. For example, they agreed to your suggestions on equipment east of the Urals, on destruction rules, and verification procedures. He added that it had not been easy to get this done. He said he had taken on the military, but had gone as far as he could go. On the issue of naval infantry, the military was absolutely united; he said that preserving the principle of the naval infantry was very important to the military. Notwithstanding the fact that the numbers now involved were small -- 120 tanks, 753 APC's, and 234 artillery pieces.

I said that if the numbers were indeed small, why couldn't the Soviets respond to your proposal of keeping the naval infantry intact, but reducing the equivalent number of tanks, APC's, and artillery pieces from regular army units. His answer to this was that their drawdown from regular units to meet the problem on coastal defense forces had reduced the numbers available in their regular units, especially on the flanks. He said the military just was not prepared to go further. And he repeated what Gorbachev had proposed in his letter to you, "couldn't all the signatories to the treaty simply exclude their naval infantry or marine units from the treaty?" I told him I thought this would be a very hard thing to do.

Echoing what we had been saying for some time, he said it was very important for us to get this issue behind us if we were to put arms control back on the right track and get to a summit. I told him I couldn't agree more, and that you had presented a proposal which we felt went a long ways towards meeting their needs.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

He concluded by saying that he thought it might help at this point to bring Moiseyev together with our experts, putting him in a position where he would have to explain his position and defend it. I suspect that the response we will be receiving will be a proposal where the experts at the Moiseyev level get together. Having boosted this issue up to you and Gorbachev, I'm not sure we can solve this problem below that level. But it is clear that Bessmertnykh believes that getting the experts together may strengthen his hand.

(2) BW: I reminded Bessmertnykh that we would have to go to the Congress very soon and brief them on this very sensitive issue. I told him that it was very important if we were going to manage what could be a very explosive issue for us to have a Soviet response to the concerns we had raised. Indeed, we needed a Soviet response that addressed these concerns concretely and with a number of corrective steps. He said that we would be getting a response to the specific points we had raised very soon and he hoped we would defer going to the Congress at least until we'd received his response and our experts had gotten together. He emphasized that it was especially important for our experts to meet because no one at the political level on either side really understood the issues. He felt that if our experts got together, we could raise each of the specific points that were a source of real concern to us and their experts could provide a full explanation on each point. He said that should satisfy the concerns we had. Indeed, if their explanations under these circumstances were not sufficient, he implied there might well be a problem on their side.

So, I presume, the response that we will receive will propose that our experts meet.

I told him I could only support such a meeting if I knew it would take place within the next several days. I said we really were in a position where we had to go to the Congress very soon, so we did not have the luxury of letting much more time go by. If such a meeting of experts could take place within the next several days, I'd be prepared to recommend our going ahead with it.

(3) Summit: Bessmertnykh asked about timing for a possible summit. And I told him that at this point it was very hard to see you going to Moscow for a full-fledged summit without there being a START agreement. I said that did not necessarily have to rule out a meeting in a third country if a START agreement weren't going to be available for some time to come. Clearly, if we were able to put together the Middle East peace conference, that could provide an opportunity for a meeting.

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CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

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MODE:

SECURE FAX #

ADMIN FAX #

PAGES

DTG

RELEASER

FROM / LOCATION:

ACTION / LOCATION:

TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHSR - SDO
2. SCOWCROFT
3. GATES
4. SITTMANN
5. HILL O'HEARY
6. SDO SIGLER

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REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

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(CLASSIFICATION)

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Following Page

April 25, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ELL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER
OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS
WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

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CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

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SCOWCROFT (2)

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

April 24, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ef*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER
OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS

Well, his office number is (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Official Informal (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

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SECURE FAX # 08

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By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 98

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 5

DTG 240739Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION:

LINESBERRY

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. WHSPR D.O. Scowcroft

2. GATES

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

6. _____

TIME OF RECEIPT

240749Z

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____

2. _____

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

FROM: ELIZABETH LINEBERRY
SPECIAL ASST. TO SECRETARY BAKER

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITROOM
SENIOR DUTY OFFICER

THIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

April 23, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ELX*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Tuesday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 95

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 6

DTG 230911Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: SECSTATE

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. WHSR D.O. Scowcroft
2. GATES
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____

TIME OF RECEIPT

230934Z

[Signature]

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

REMARKS: _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006 (CLASSIFICATION)

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~SECRET~~

GS-8

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAF NARA, Date 8/31/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

ELIZABETH LINDBERRY
FROM: SPECIAL ASST. TO SEC. BAKER

TO: White House SIT. RM, SENIOR D.O.

THIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *EL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Monday's Meetings (4 pp.)	4/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

11-22 24:16

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 92

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 5

DTG 221945Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: USDEL SEC OF STATE, DAMASCUS

ACTION / LOCATION:

TIME OF RECEIPT

1. W.H.SR. D.O.

221953Z nm

2. Scowcroft (2)

3. Gates

4. Kimmit

5. _____

6. _____

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____

2. _____

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

April 21, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Sunday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

/EYES ONLY

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 85

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 6

DTG 210730Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: E.R. LINEBERRY / USDEL CIARO

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. WHSR - SDO
2. SCOWCROFT
3. GATES
4. KIMMITT
5. _____
6. _____

TIME OF RECEIPT

210739Z

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

REMARKS: MEMO FM SEC BAKER TO GEN SCOWCROFT
FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

~~SECRET~~

/EYES ONLY

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ert*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Memo	James A. Baker, III to The Acting Secretary Re: Saturday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Secretary Baker Re: to Secretary Baker (3 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [3]

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-009
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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