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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-008

Folder Title:
Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Day in [Middle East] (2 pp.)	10/15/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Day in [Middle East] (2 pp.)	10/15/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Meetings in Mexico City (3 pp.)	9/9/91	(b)(1)	C
04. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday's Meetings in Moscow (4 pp.)	9/11/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Cable	Cabinet Office London to The White House Re: Message from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
06. Note	JABIII [James A. Baker, III] to POTUS Re: As I said... (1 pp.)	9/13/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Thursday and Friday in Moscow (5 pp.)	9/13/91	(b)(1)	C
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday's Meetings in Moscow (4 pp.)	9/11/91	(b)(1)	S

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
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WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1354
OA/ID Number: 91164-008
Date Closed: 8/31/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meetings with King Hassan and President Ben Ali [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/4/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meetings with King Hassan and President Ben Ali [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/4/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Friday Meetings [2 copies] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	8/2/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Sunday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	7/22/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Jeddah [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	7/20/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meeting in Egypt [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	7/19/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meeting with President Assad (2 pp.)	7/18/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Impressions from the Trip (5 pp.)	6/22/91	(b)(1)	TS
17. Note	John Gordon to General [Scowcroft] Re: We have a bar bones... (2 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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18. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Meetings in Lisbon (6 pp.)	6/1/91	(b)(1)	S
19. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Summing Up The Trip and What We Do Next (4 pp.)	5/16/91	(b)(1)	S

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

October 15, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MY DAY IN DAMASCUS

My discussions with President Assad were basically what I expected them to be: long -- they were over eight hours in two separate meetings; tedious in terms of going over fourteen points that he wanted revised in the letter of assurances; and difficult insofar as we could not resolve our differences on multilateral negotiations. That's probably our only remaining problem and I really won't know until tomorrow whether our inclusion of a watered-down phrase on "multilaterals" in the invitation will have him decide to walk away from the process. As I've said to you before, Assad likes to go to the brink and sometimes crosses it, and it seems clear there's no give in his opposition to the multilaterals. But is he willing to risk his new standing internationally, his relationship with us, and the real possibility he will let the Israelis off the hook by turning down the invitation?

That's a pretty big gamble, but one ought to be careful betting on which way he'll go. Much as with the Palestinians, the Egyptians, Saudis and Jordanians are confident Assad is hooked and has made a basic decision. I'm less sure. I'm prepared to try to find a formula that certainly doesn't obligate him to go to multilateral discussions and to highlight that it's really up to the parties to decide who wants to go and what they'll talk about.

I feel we can't simply walk away from the multilaterals because we genuinely believe they'll promote progress in the bilaterals and support the development of peace. And clearly countries like Jordan and Egypt really want there to be regional discussions on arms control, the economic plight of Palestinians in the territories and those forced to leave Kuwait and the Gulf, etc. (The Jordanians, with 300,000 Palestinians having been forced to come to Jordan from the Gulf in the last fourteen months, are especially desperate for these regional talks, as the King made clear to me last night.) Moreover, Israelis, if they're to actually make tangible concessions, will need to see that Arab attitudes have changed and that they're prepared to treat Israel as a normal part of the region by including them in regional discussions.

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12/1/2014 MM

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Assad is unswayed by some of these realities. Put simply, he wants to keep Israel isolated and make clear there are no regional rewards until the Israelis withdraw from the Golan. His weakness, not strength, drives him to oppose any multilaterals, particularly as he fears the other Arabs will get into them, start forging agreements, and reduce Israel's need and incentives in responding to him.

I'm hopeful Assad will still agree to come to the conference and go into the bilaterals and not link his participation to the absence of the multilaterals. And I think there's a chance he will, but I'm going to have to make a judgment tomorrow on whether I need to do more to keep him in the process. (As important as the multilaterals are, I don't want to lose the bilaterals.)

On the Palestinian front, there's good news and bad news. The good, they've finally gone to Amman in a very visible way. The bad, they're not going to meet my deadline on giving me the names. I think the names have been selected -- indeed, the Egyptians gave me a list they thought might be it and that same list appeared in the Jordanian press today. While having some on it who are unacceptable, out of the twenty names, we would have no problem producing fourteen who meet the agreed criteria.

I'll go to Jerusalem tomorrow afternoon and see the Palestinians, but I bet I won't get the names until after I see Shamir (if then). If I do get them by Thursday, we could still be in a position to go with the invitations by Friday or Saturday. But that depends on getting the names and being certain that Assad hasn't left the reservation.

As you can see, I've just had another day on the Middle East roller coaster. I don't intend to ride it for much longer -- and as I wrote you yesterday, letting everyone know that may be the best way to produce the outcome we seek.

*This is almost as much fun
as a Y.R. convention!*

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PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1991

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

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07

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN MEXICO CITY

I'm just departing from Mexico City, where we held our annual Binational Commission meeting. I was pleased to be joined by Bob Mosbacher, Carla Hills, Ed Madigan, Jack Kemp, Bill Barr, Bill Reilly, Bill Sessions, and Rob Bonner, among many others who contributed to a successful meeting. While it's a little difficult to coordinate all our schedules for this annual get-together, the commitment of a sizable number of your top officials counts a great deal with the Mexicans. The BNC is the only meeting of this kind that we have with a foreign partner, and it suits the top priority you have established for US-Mexican relations.

I had a very good exchange with President Salinas last night at a one-on-one dinner, and I wanted to be sure to relay some key points to you. Salinas, and his team, were greatly encouraged by the dramatic election victory by the PRI recently in mid-term congressional and gubernatorial elections.

Not surprisingly, the NAFTA was foremost on Salinas' mind. In particular, he is eager to learn your sense of timing. Salinas would like to complete the FTA by year's end in order to be sure we have time to get Congress' approval before our election. Therefore, Salinas envisages using your December 14 meeting at Camp David to resolve any of the big subjects that remain open.

Carla is understandably reluctant to suggest any target date for completion, so as to avoid the Congressional charge that we let the deadline drive the details. Nevertheless, I think Salinas would like to know, privately, whether we're working with an eye toward completion, including through Congress, as early as we can in '92. My own opinion is that we should shoot to get the FTA done in '92 for three reasons. First, I'd like to catch the ongoing momentum from the fast track victory, and it will dissipate over time, especially after the election. Second, I recall we got the Canadian FTA through Congress in the summer of '88, and I think we can effectively replicate that non-partisan approach with a focus on the merits and the importance of our ties with Mexico. Third, the NAFTA would be an excellent achievement for your first term; it would be an especially powerful example of the inextricable relationship between foreign and domestic policies in today's world, helping to spike the assertions that our foreign policy progress is unrelated to the home front.

We can discuss this issue more when I get back if you wish, but I think President Salinas would like your opinion, even if it's to be held close.

Salinas also wanted to flag two related FTA issues of concern. First, while the Mexicans hope to secure changes in our anti-dumping/countervailing duty laws (as had the Canadians), they recognize (very privately) that in the end we might not be able to bite this bullet. In that event, however, Salinas stressed they'll at least need to point to a dispute resolution process that differentiates them from everyone else in the world; he said the procedure we worked out for Canada probably would be fine, and he didn't understand why Carla believes it shouldn't be extended to Mexico. Salinas believes that Carla's reserve may be related to his second concern: the explicit inclusion of a "docking" provision designed to permit other Latin nations to sign on later. Salinas suspects we are unwilling to extend Canada's dispute settlement mechanism to Mexico because Congress will fear its extension to all of Latin America -- and the "docking" provision will heighten this worry. Salinas doesn't want us to pull back from our willingness to negotiate FTAs with other Latins; he's just concerned that a lawyerly effort to draft for contingencies might make it harder to get NAFTA done. I think this bears looking into.

When I stressed the need for Mexican liberalization in the areas of services (especially financial) and investment, I received the strong sense they were only holding back because they wanted to be able to trade these openings for items like those Salinas went over with me. I also pointed out they needed to be open on agriculture, that the auto sector had to be handled sensitively, and that we'd need a good counter for the charge that Mexico would simply be an export platform for the Japanese (e.g., we need good rules of origin).

Salinas also gave me the sense they felt a little personal distance in the formal negotiations. As you know well, Latins are sensitive to atmosphere. I'll go over this with you when I return.

I also told Salinas that Congress' attitude toward the FTA would be heavily influenced by their general feeling toward Mexico. So we need to continue to make progress on issues like the environment, labor, and narcotics. I suggested that Salinas was his own best advocate and urged him to continue to court some of these groups, including by inviting some down to see the new Mexico for themselves. (In this context, the Mexicans agreed not to press, at this October's GATT meeting, the GATT panel judgment against our dolphin protection law embargoing Mexican tuna exports. In return, we agreed to try to change our law, which is going to be difficult, even with stronger Mexican cooperation.)

President Salinas also recognizes your strong personal interest in trying to bring the guerilla war in El Salvador to an end.

Salinas said he had no love for the FMLN and also felt Cristiani had given about as much as he could. But they haven't kicked the FMLN office out of Mexico because Cristiani has to date encouraged Salinas to keep the channel open. He said if Cristiani asked, he would start to squeeze the FMLN presence in Mexico. Salinas said Castro agreed to talk to the FMLN about "easing off" and in fact Castro said he'd been impressed with Cristiani when they met at the recent Ibero-American Summit in Guadalajara. Salinas agreed with the need to keep the SYG personally involved and said he'd be pleased to request the inclusion of the "4 Friends" in the SYG's meetings with the GOES and the FMLN. It's a mark of our new relationship with a pragmatic Mexico that Salinas seems four-square behind our approach.

Speaking of Castro, Salinas said he was all ears and very interested when Salinas relayed his recent conversation with you in which Salinas understood you would consider responding to positive movement by Cuba. Castro clearly has his back against the wall, and he's looking for any sign of a way out. I warned Salinas that any Mexican receptivity to a Cuban request for subsidized oil would hurt him badly in the US. Salinas replied that he and CAP had agreed that if they get a request they'll reply that under their San Jose program for concessional oil in the region they review requests once a year and the next review point is July 1992. I believe Salinas got my strong message, but it's a point worth repeating when you meet in December.

Salinas the reformer seems to have more in mind. Bob Zoellick was told privately by Salinas' Chief of Staff that this November Salinas will propose two major constitutional changes: one in Mexico's antiquated agricultural land tenure system, and another to create a rapprochement with the Catholic Church. He said this means they don't intend to take on the constitutional restrictions on energy, although Mexico may do some "reclassification" so PEMEX will focus its resources on exploration and basic production. This could open up some opportunities for foreigners in other petrochemical fields.

I think all of our delegation came away again with the striking sense of change that Salinas and his team are pursuing -- change that is forging much stronger ties and common purpose with us. As the NAFTA goes forward, we need to pull out the stops to make sure this man succeeds.

I'm off to Moscow now, and I'll send you reports about my impressions.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

September 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James A. Baker, III

Subject: Wednesday's Meetings in Moscow

As I mentioned to you on the phone, my first day here was an extraordinary one. I met with Gorbachev for nearly three hours and then with Yeltsin for three hours. I went from meeting with Yeltsin to the CSCE Conference where I witnessed the Lithuanian Foreign Minister giving his speech to those assembled. If two months ago, someone had told us an independent Lithuanian Foreign Minister would be making a very positive speech to a CSCE meeting in Moscow in September, we would have asked what he was smoking. That typifies the enormous changes that have taken place here.

President Gorbachev praised you privately and publicly for your personal role in this transformation. He thanked me, with some emotion, for your support during the coup. He believes your support led world opinion. He said he really learned who his friends are. At our press conference, Gorbachev asked me to give you one of the four video tapes he prepared in the Crimea during his darkest hour. Yeltsin was also highly appreciative.

This is not their only point of common agreement -- far from it, at least for now. One thing that came through very clearly in both of my meetings with them is that they are absolutely determined to cooperate with each other. They each see that as essential to managing change now. I was frankly surprised by the extent of their coordination and agreement which runs across the spectrum of issues. For example, they agreed totally on the need to preserve a new Capital Center. They agree that the Center must be in control of all nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical). They agree that there should be only one currency in a new economic union. They agree that an economic union, properly forged through an "Economic Treaty" that Yavlinskiy is now drafting with the Republics, is critical for governing what emerges in what they call "the common economic base." They agree that what is needed now is practical action, not talk -- and that what is required is a credible program for moving to a market-based economy that is worked out with the IMF and the World Bank. (And that program needs to be worked out in weeks not months). They agree also that they need help from the outside and they're worried about what will happen this winter.

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What comes through unmistakably is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin are convinced that they need each other -- Gorbachev because of Yeltsin's broader legitimacy, Yeltsin because of Gorbachev's experience and his help with the other Republics, who fear the Russians in general and Yeltsin in particular. Their common stake in preventing disintegration and promoting transformation of the country is a very strong bond. I don't know how long it will last, but they clearly each see that it is in their interest now, and both made a strong and very conscious pitch to me that they were cooperating with the other.

(Gorbachev emphasized Yeltsin's courage, Yeltsin spoke of Gorbachev as a changed man and said that he and Gorbachev were on the phone all the time with each other.) It's interesting that the decision on Afghanistan that I called you about came only after a meeting that I'd had with Yeltsin and he called me after that meeting to let me know that he'd talked with Gorbachev and they had agreed on it.

Both of them look to us for ideas, support, and in time, I suspect, leadership in mobilizing real assistance. I don't think it's an accident that they're each very eager to close out our old agenda -- e.g., Cuba, Afghanistan, and possibly the Northern Territories.

On Cuba, following our meeting, Gorbachev announced that there would shortly be a discussion with Cuba on removing their training brigade. But when citing a figure for those who would be affected by that discussion, he referred to a number that was the equivalent of their whole military intelligence presence in Cuba, not simply their training brigade. Later Yeltsin told me that all military and economic assistance to Cuba would be cut off by January 1, 1992, and that all Soviet military personnel in Cuba will be out of Cuba by the same date. It's clear to me that a key motivation behind this step, which will not go down well in numerous quarters here, is to clear the way for our stronger support. They have recognized your political constraints and are seeking to remove them.

I suspect, over time, we may be able to manage the question of the Northern Territories as well, particularly because I think they will look to us to help broker a process with the Japanese. They don't find it easy to deal with the Japanese, who they believe want everything up front, without a process that eases the adjustment and offers their public an explanation. In particular, the Soviets will want any movement on this issue to look like they are closing the book on World War II and the Stalinist legacy, not simply trading away Russian territory for money.

In addition, my discussions today leave little doubt that they want to be very responsive to us on the Middle East peace process and I think they are also anxious to cooperate with us on new agenda items like proliferation. In short, we're very important to them and that's all to the good.

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But as we look at what's good and helpful in the current situation, the dangers also stand out plainly to any visitor here. Their needs are immense. People are sullen. Our anecdotal talks with the average person here reveal a sense that all they hear is talk and meanwhile food and other basic goods are harder and harder to get -- much more so than five years ago. One old acquaintance of Margaret Tutwiler's said that the first person who puts vodka on the shelves will walk away with the prize.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin are trying very hard to get their political and economic act together, but it won't be easy and they have to deliver on more than merely promises. What's more, they know they do. Gorbachev said that very clearly to me. He clearly wants to move now and is worried that if he and the democrats do not deliver soon they will be discredited.

Gorbachev emphasized that in defeating the coup, the democrats had been successful in cutting off the "head" of the reactionaries behind it. Implicit in what he was saying was that there was a lot of latent support for anyone who could promise order. Others we know well have been more explicit: they say seven are gone, but thousands more are still out there. A feeling is that if they have their chance, the next round won't be an amateur act.

The simple fact is that we have a tremendous stake in the success of the democrats here. Their success will change the world in a way that reflects both our values and our hopes. What may be at stake is the equivalent of the postwar recovery of Germany and Japan as democratic allies, only this time after a long cold war rather than a short one. Their failure would produce a world that is far more threatening and dangerous, and I have little doubt that if they are unable to begin to deliver the goods, they will be supplanted by authoritarian leaders of the xenophobic right wing. (I suspect I will hear such a scenario from Shevardnadze in very explicit terms tomorrow.) Given the long odds, I think we need to be realistic in recognizing that success might amount to simply holding off a counter-reaction and giving the democrats the space and time to keep at what will be a long journey. But that in itself could be an historic legacy.

How? / Gorbachev and Yeltsin know -- and I made it extremely clear -- that they have got to produce a credible plan for getting to a market-based economy, in league with the IMF and World Bank. They can't just talk about this; they have to do it. But if they do it, they will be looking to us, and you in particular, to mobilize a major international effort to help them through what will be a very difficult transition. Frankly, they trust and respect you -- and believe the U.S. is the only nation in the world that can pull together the West to match their efforts.

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(Gorbachev clearly sees the Gulf coalition as a model here, and drew attention to that in our meeting.) This effort would start on the humanitarian side, as you have spoken of, to lead the process of securing support for a radical market reform drive.

At this point, the onus is still on them to step up to the plate and prove that they are prepared to carry out an economic revolution that matches their political revolution. But if they do that -- indeed, if they really do want both the IMF and the World Bank to shape a very credible program for moving to a market economy, the onus will be on us, especially if we hang back. Notwithstanding everything they are up against, I don't think we should assume that they are going to shy away from the task of carrying out an economic revolution. We should begin to position ourselves to deal with that possibility.

Handwritten note from Secretary Baker:

POTUS: I'd like to discuss this note with you after you and Brent have had a chance to focus on it. JAB III 9/12/91

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1991



POTUS,

As I said in my telephone call, I thought your press conference was perfect -- just the right tone and message. The attached is from what I am told is a very responsible publication in Tel Aviv (written by its Washington correspondent). Except for the "below the belt" comment at the top, it seems to me to pretty well tell it like it is -- particularly the last two paragraphs. Hopefully this will be the way many Israeli publications will treat with what you said.

For now, my recommendation is that nothing more needs to be, nor should be, said by you or from the White House pending either my arrival in Jerusalem or some other development. The point is I think we're positioned about as well as we could be under the circumstances, although I may be too far away (Leningrad) to clearly see the picture.

JABIII

Attachment

September 14, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON ^{cy}
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

ATTACHMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: THURSDAY AND FRIDAY IN MOSCOW

I want to report to you on my last two days of meetings. I saw an extraordinary spectrum of people. I met with Silayev and the members of the Economic Committee. Collectively, they are responsible for shaping a new economy in the context of a new set of relations between the Center and the Republics. I saw reformers like Shevardnadze and Yakovlev and Mayors Popov and Sobchak. Sobchak, the Mayor of St. Petersburg, is a charismatic leader who we'll be hearing much from in the future. He was one of the heroes of the coup, he's extraordinarily dynamic, he's full of ideas and speaks to Russian pride and the Russian on the street. Above all else, he's absolutely committed to democratic reform.

In addition to seeing the new Soviet Foreign Minister Pankin and the Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, I also met with the new Defense Minister Shaposhnikov and Bakatin, the new head of the KGB. Finally, I had dinner with representatives from twelve republics.

Let me summarize my general impressions from all these meetings:

1. What we say matters. Our five principles (peaceful resolution of disputes, the rule of law, fulfilling international obligations, respect for human rights, etc.) were cited by everyone as being extremely significant. When I emphasized, particularly with Republic representatives, that relations with us and support or assistance from us will be dependent upon leaders at every level living up to these standards, there was strong approval. I believe that the five principles can become a very useful tool for affecting the behavior of republic leaders.

One other measure of our moral authority and the weight of our words was provided by the way your speech in Kiev was raised with me and praised for tempering separatist tendencies. Shevardnadze and Yakovlev, in particular, drew attention to it.

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2013-0834-MR

mm 7/27/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

What's significant is that our public posture will be a factor as things sort themselves out internally. I suspect that's true in part because of what you did during the coup. Every leader I met with emphasized that your posture during the coup not only led the international community, but also provided a tremendous source of inspiration to Yeltsin and those who manned the barricades. In addition, I think we have great authority now because everyone here is desperate for ideas. They're redefining who they are, they're trying to fundamentally transform their country and they look to us as a model. We embody much of what they want to be. This certainly provides us with both an opportunity to shape what evolves here, but it also imposes a very real responsibility on us as well.

2. The Soviet Union is a different country. There are several reasons that I say this. First, power and authority now very clearly derives from the Republics and not the Center. Second, the democrats are totally dominant and the conservatives are invisible, and, as a result, nothing is holding back the democrats from readying themselves to carry out the most far-reaching reforms imaginable. Third, the traditional institutions of coercion -- the military and the KGB -- are being transformed and their new leaders, Shaposhnikov and Bakatin, bear no resemblance to any of their predecessors. The fact is these institutions are simply not recognizable.

When one looks at Bakatin and the KGB what one sees is a commitment to openness and the rule of law. Bakatin talks of transforming the KGB into an organization much like the CIA, emphasizing its role must be primarily one of foreign intelligence and not internal political suppression and intimidation. He emphasizes that the KGB was far too big and that the first order of business is to vastly reduce it in size. He feels there must be a legal basis for the KGB and he's been studying how our legislation underpins our intelligence community and its prerogatives. He made a point of asking whether we would be open to extensive exchanges between the KGB and the CIA -- something he sees as being beneficial at least in part for the effect it will have on transforming the KGB into the kind of professional institution he wants it to become.

Shaposhnikov is equally determined to overhaul the Soviet Defense Ministry and the military. Though he's an Air Force Marshall, he says he wants to transform the defense ministry into a civilian-based institution. In addition, he wants to carry out a fundamental reform within the Soviet military that also takes account of the changed relationship between the Center and the Republics. But he says there must be no compromise on the central command and control of nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical). On tactical nuclear weapons, he, too, says it's time to abolish them. Pressure in Europe is bound to build on this one.

As he thinks about the military in this new Soviet Union, Shaposhnikov speaks of the military in effect having a treaty relationship with each republic. The military's presence in a republic will be worked out according to a certain code that requires the military to protect the borders of the republic, while obligating it never to intervene in its internal affairs.

He speaks of the local commander being in the chain of command of the general staff, but working in concert with a local council of ten to fifteen leaders of each republic. It's fascinating to hear of his plans for reforming the military and here, too, he very much looks to us for help. He asked to see a generic Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) clearly with an eye towards shaping the relationship between the military and each of the republics. He wants to give the military in Soviet society a very different image by borrowing from us a different juridical code for prosecution of crimes committed by military personnel. He believes this will make the military more professional as well as less threatening in the eyes of the public.

In addition, it's clear that the basic assumptions about the size and shape of the military, as well as its force structure, are in the process of being reassessed. Perhaps not surprisingly, both Shaposhnikov and Lobov (Chief of the General Staff) are extremely eager to see and talk with Dick Cheney and Colin Powell, as well as lower-ranking officials in both the Pentagon and the State Department. I think we have a tremendous opportunity to help shape attitudes as Shaposhnikov overhauls the military, and, therefore, we ought to expand the scope of our contacts and discussions with Shaposhnikov, Lobov and their staffs. I'm convinced this could have not only long term implications for their behavior externally, but could also contribute to making the military more of a bulwark in defense of reform internally.

3. There's a new realism among republic leaders. After my discussions, I'm convinced that the initial euphoria over declarations of independence has been succeeded by the recognition that the republics have to figure out a way to deal with their new realities. As the President of Moldavia said at the dinner last night, independence sounds nice, but "we have to live and we have to be practical." That was really the persistent theme that I heard from every one of the republic leaders with the sole exception of the Georgian Prime Minister. (Even he spoke of the need for economic cooperation once Georgian independence was recognized internationally.) Everyone else emphasized that economic coherence was needed and that they all lived in a "single economic space." They said cooperation and coordination on assistance was essential. They all agreed with me that an economic treaty among the republics was needed very soon. They understood that the international community would find it very difficult to be helpful in the absence of arrangements (like those being developed in the economic union treaty) that defined where the authority for economic decision-making would reside.

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- 4 -

At the end of the evening I got Silayev and Fokin (the Ukrainian Prime Minister) together and Fokin agreed that the Ukraine would sign the economic union treaty, provided it received assurances that distribution of aid from the outside would be equitable. Silayev said such a commitment would be made. Based on the discussion during the dinner and its aftermath, there is reason to be hopeful that the economic treaty can be concluded in the near future.

That said, there are bound to be difficulties that may yet impede the conclusion of such a treaty. Nationalistic pressures in the new competitive politics of each of the republics may exert themselves. As one set of republics starts to raise objections, others may retreat from any agreement. In the end, the best we may be able to hope for is that the Russian republic, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan agree on the treaty and later on others follow suit.

4. Dangers are clearly coupled with the current opportunities. Everyone I spoke with talked about their hopes. They all emphasized the possibilities. But in every conversation there was also recognition of dangers. Their fears lead them to ask for our help. They want our help to head off their fears of the upcoming winter and the shortages that Yeltsin, Shevardnadze and Yakovlev all said could lead to mob violence and the emergence of a fascist demagogue.

But their fears are not limited to the winter. They're also concerned about separatist nationalist movements, especially in the Ukraine. While acknowledging there is greater realism among the republics now, many noted that there are great dangers lurking just below the surface. The great fear that Shevardnadze and Yakovlev have is that the Ukraine will end up being satisfied with nothing less than total and complete independence -- something that they say will trigger secession of a number of Russian-dominated areas from within the Ukraine (e.g. the Crimea, Donbas, Odessa and Kharkov). In their minds that would trigger grave conflict. This is another one of those areas where they want us to use our moral authority to influence the Ukraine and get them to be responsible.

Finally, there are fears that if the democrats can't deliver the goods over time they will be discredited and replaced. As a result, they look to us to mobilize the international community to help them. Leaders like Sobchak have a number of creative ideas for how they can best be helped. One such idea he emphasized tonight was that if we furnish them food or goods, they should be required to pay for these with rubles. In turn, we and others would invest those rubles in a set of enterprise funds to promote development within Russia. I don't know whether this idea would work or not, but it shows that they're trying to be very creative and they want to figure out the best way for the international community to invest in their future.

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- 5 -

In the end, they want our involvement and our support to help validate what it is they're doing on the inside. Given our stake in their success, I think we will need to focus on what we can do and not on what we can't do.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James A. Baker, III 
Subject: Wednesday's Meetings in Moscow

As I mentioned to you on the phone, my first day here was an extraordinary one. I met with Gorbachev for nearly three hours and then with Yeltsin for three hours. I went from meeting with Yeltsin to the CSCE Conference where I witnessed the Lithuanian Foreign Minister giving his speech to those assembled. If two months ago, someone had told us an independent Lithuanian Foreign Minister would be making a very positive speech to a CSCE meeting in Moscow in September, we would have asked what he was smoking. That typifies the enormous changes that have taken place here.

President Gorbachev praised you privately and publicly for your personal role in this transformation. He thanked me, with some emotion, for your support during the coup. He believes your support led world opinion. He said he really learned who his friends are. At our press conference, Gorbachev asked me to give you one of the four video tapes he prepared in the Crimea during his darkest hour. Yeltsin was also highly appreciative.

This is not their only point of common agreement -- far from it, at least for now. One thing that came through very clearly in both of my meetings with them is that they are absolutely determined to cooperate with each other. They each see that as essential to managing change now. I was frankly surprised by the extent of their coordination and agreement which runs across the spectrum of issues. For example, they agreed totally on the need to preserve a new Capital Center. They agree that the Center must be in control of all nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical). They agree that there should be only one currency in a new economic union. They agree that an economic union, properly forged through an "Economic Treaty" that Yavlinskiy is now drafting with the Republics, is critical for governing what emerges in what they call "the common economic base." They agree that what is needed now is practical action, not talk -- and that what is required is a credible program for moving to a market-based economy that is worked out with the IMF and the World Bank. (And that program needs to be worked out in weeks not months). They agree also that they need help from the outside and they're worried about what will happen this winter.

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- 2 -

What comes through unmistakably is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin are convinced that they need each other -- Gorbachev because of Yeltsin's broader legitimacy, Yeltsin because of Gorbachev's experience and his help with the other Republics, who fear the Russians in general and Yeltsin in particular. Their common stake in preventing disintegration and promoting transformation of the country is a very strong bond. I don't know how long it will last, but they clearly each see that it is in their interest now, and both made a strong and very conscious pitch to me that they were cooperating with the other.

(Gorbachev emphasized Yeltsin's courage, Yeltsin spoke of Gorbachev as a changed man and said that he and Gorbachev were on the phone all the time with each other.) It's interesting that the decision on Afghanistan that I called you about came only after a meeting that I'd had with Yeltsin and he called me after that meeting to let me know that he'd talked with Gorbachev and they had agreed on it.

Both of them look to us for ideas, support, and in time, I suspect, leadership in mobilizing real assistance. I don't think it's an accident that they're each very eager to close out our old agenda -- e.g., Cuba, Afghanistan, and possibly the Northern Territories.

On Cuba, following our meeting, Gorbachev announced that there would shortly be a discussion with Cuba on removing their training brigade. But when citing a figure for those who would be affected by that discussion, he referred to a number that was the equivalent of their whole military intelligence presence in Cuba, not simply their training brigade. Later Yeltsin told me that all military and economic assistance to Cuba would be cut off by January 1, 1992, and that all Soviet military personnel in Cuba will be out of Cuba by the same date. It's clear to me that a key motivation behind this step, which will not go down well in numerous quarters here, is to clear the way for our stronger support. They have recognized your political constraints and are seeking to remove them.

I suspect, over time, we may be able to manage the question of the Northern Territories as well, particularly because I think they will look to us to help broker a process with the Japanese. They don't find it easy to deal with the Japanese, who they believe want everything up front, without a process that eases the adjustment and offers their public an explanation. In particular, the Soviets will want any movement on this issue to look like they are closing the book on World War II and the Stalinist legacy, not simply trading away Russian territory for money.

In addition, my discussions today leave little doubt that they want to be very responsive to us on the Middle East peace process and I think they are also anxious to cooperate with us on new agenda items like proliferation. In short, we're very important to them and that's all to the good.

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- 3 -

But as we look at what's good and helpful in the current situation, the dangers also stand out plainly to any visitor here. Their needs are immense. People are sullen. Our anecdotal talks with the average person here reveal a sense that all they hear is talk and meanwhile food and other basic goods are harder and harder to get -- much more so than five years ago. One old acquaintance of Margaret Tutwiler's said that the first person who puts vodka on the shelves will walk away with the prize.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin are trying very hard to get their political and economic act together, but it won't be easy and they have to deliver on more than merely promises. What's more, they know they do. Gorbachev said that very clearly to me. He clearly wants to move now and is worried that if he and the democrats do not deliver soon they will be discredited.

Gorbachev emphasized that in defeating the coup, the democrats had been successful in cutting off the "head" of the reactionaries behind it. Implicit in what he was saying was that there was a lot of latent support for anyone who could promise order. Others we know well have been more explicit: they say seven are gone, but thousands more are still out there. A feeling is that if they have their chance, the next round won't be an amateur act.

The simple fact is that we have a tremendous stake in the success of the democrats here. Their success will change the world in a way that reflects both our values and our hopes. What may be at stake is the equivalent of the postwar recovery of Germany and Japan as democratic allies, only this time after a long cold war rather than a short one. Their failure would produce a world that is far more threatening and dangerous, and I have little doubt that if they are unable to begin to deliver the goods, they will be supplanted by authoritarian leaders of the xenophobic right wing. (I suspect I will hear such a scenario from Shevardnadze in very explicit terms tomorrow.) Given the long odds, I think we need to be realistic in recognizing that success might amount to simply holding off a counter-reaction and giving the democrats the space and time to keep at what will be a long journey. But that in itself could be an historic legacy.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin know -- and I made it extremely clear -- that they have got to produce a credible plan for getting to a market-based economy, in league with the IMF and World Bank. They can't just talk about this; they have to do it. But if they do it, they will be looking to us, and you in particular, to mobilize a major international effort to help them through what will be a very difficult transition. Frankly, they trust and respect you -- and believe the U.S. is the only nation in the world that can pull together the West to match their efforts.

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- 4 -

(Gorbachev clearly sees the Gulf coalition as a model here, and drew attention to that in our meeting.) This effort would start on the humanitarian side, as you have spoken of, to lead the process of securing support for a radical market reform drive.

At this point, the onus is still on them to step up to the plate and prove that they are prepared to carry out an economic revolution that matches their political revolution. But if they do that -- indeed, if they really do want both the IMF and the World Bank to shape a very credible program for moving to a market economy, the onus will be on us, especially if we hang back. Notwithstanding everything they are up against, I don't think we should assume that they are going to shy away from the task of carrying out an economic revolution. We should begin to position ourselves to deal with that possibility.

Handwritten note from Secretary Baker:

POTUS: I'd like to discuss this note with you after you and Brent have had a chance to focus on it. JAB III 9/12/91

~~SECRET~~

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(CLASSIFICATION)

01 JUL 91 P5:31

FROM: ROOM

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PAGES 4

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2. GATES
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

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(TIME OF RECEIPT) *mt*

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

REMARKS: _____

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Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAF NARA, Date 8/31/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

FROM: USDEL BABATTO: GENERAL SCROWCROFT
FOR THE PRESIDENTTHIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 3 PAGES

AUGUST 4, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meetings with King Hassan and President Ben Ali [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/4/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1172-MR(502)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
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 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH KING HASSAN AND PRESIDENT BEN ALI

Summary

King Hassan told me Saturday night that Morocco has decided to go as an observer to the peace conference. He reserved judgment on participation in the regional multilateral negotiations, pending consultations with his Arab friends. For public consumption, he asked us to say that Morocco reacted positively on the observer issue and is considering its position.

On Sunday in Tunis, President Ben Ali was interested in talking, but extremely cautious about any public position. In our private meeting, he parroted a fair amount of traditional Arab rhetoric, even though he had earlier been positive about our proposals in a Le Monde interview. He said he would forward a response to us and Foreign Minister Ben Yahia was broadly positive in our joint press conference.

Morocco

I met for two hours with Hassan at his seaside palace Saturday night. He was delighted to have your handwritten letter from Moscow.

I went through in full detail where we are on the peace process and where we think all of the other players are. Hassan took it on board, asked a number of good questions, and grasped the full significance of the Israeli "yes" even if it is conditioned on the Palestinian representation question.

Hassan was particularly interested in the East Jerusalem issue (he is head of the Jerusalem Committee of the Islamic Conference). While he did not explicitly endorse the links to Jerusalem that we had outlined to the Palestinians, he seemed to believe that they are worthwhile.

He said he would speak to the Palestinians about not blocking the process.

[REDACTED]

Hassan's bottom line was that Morocco has decided to attend the peace conference as an observer, if Egypt and the GCC go (they have already said "yes"). Hassan thought that Tunisia, Algeria and even Mauritania might go as observers.

Hassan said that observer status was just fine: Morocco would say nothing in the conference plenary, but nothing would prevent them from being active in the corridors. Hassan initially said that Morocco would not participate in the multilateral negotiations on regional issues. After I explained further the significance of these talks, Hassan said he would be in touch with the Egyptians, the Saudis and the other Maghreb states on the question.

Hassan asked us to withhold publicity on his decision to attend as an observer until he announces it. This will probably be between the UMA summit in early September and Hassan's state visit with you September 26. Hassan told us to say publicly last night that Morocco reacted positively to our proposal, but is consulting its Arab friends before making a final decision.

Tunisia

I opened my meeting with Ben Ali by recalling his visit with you in May 1990. I said that we wanted to get over the period of estrangement in our relations and get back to normal. We have no real problems on our bilateral agenda and will try to resume a modest aid flow in FY 1992.

I went over in detail where we are on the peace process and what we have told the Palestinians about a potential letter of assurance. Ben Ali had seen Palestinians from Tunis the previous night, but had no clear indication of where they are heading.


Faisal Husseini was to arrive in Tunis Sunday night and Ben Ali was to meet with both Husseini and other Palestinians. I stressed to Ben Ali the absolute necessity for the Palestinians in Tunis not to block the process and said that this bus won't come by again soon.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



I asked explicitly that the Tunisians tell the press that they would participate in the multilateral negotiations and come to the conference as an observer. Ben Ali stalled and said he would forward a response.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



On balance, I believe the Tunisians will be helpful, particularly Ben Yahia, although Ben Ali is not a very stand-up guy.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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Collection:

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Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
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Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
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~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH KING HASSAN AND PRESIDENT BEN ALI

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Morocco

I met for two hours with Hassan at his seaside palace Saturday night. He was delighted to have your handwritten letter from Moscow.

I went through in full detail where we are on the peace process and where we think all of the other players are. Hassan took it on board, asked a number of good questions, and grasped the full significance of the Israeli "yes" even if it is conditioned on the Palestinian representation question.

Hassan was particularly interested in the East Jerusalem issue (he is head of the Jerusalem Committee of the Islamic Conference). While he did not explicitly endorse the links to Jerusalem that we had outlined to the Palestinians, he seemed to believe that they are worthwhile.

He said he would speak to the Palestinians about not blocking the process.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

Hassan's bottom line was that Morocco has decided to attend the peace conference as an observer, if Egypt and the GCC go (they have already said "yes"). Hassan thought that Tunisia, Algeria and even Mauritania might go as observers.

Hassan said that observer status was just fine: Morocco would say nothing in the conference plenary, but nothing would prevent them from being active in the corridors. Hassan initially said that Morocco would not participate in the multilateral negotiations on regional issues. After I explained further the significance of these talks, Hassan said he would be in touch with the Egyptians, the Saudis and the other Maghreb states on the question.

Hassan asked us to withhold publicity on his decision to attend as an observer until he announces it. This will probably be between the UMA summit in early September and Hassan's state visit with you September 26. Hassan told us to say publicly last night that Morocco reacted positively to our proposal, but is consulting its Arab friends before making a final decision.

Tunisia

I opened my meeting with Ben Ali by recalling his visit with you in May 1990. I said that we wanted to get over the period of estrangement in our relations and get back to normal. We have no real problems on our bilateral agenda and will try to resume a modest aid flow in FY 1992.

I went over in detail where we are on the peace process and what we have told the Palestinians about a potential letter of assurance. Ben Ali had seen Palestinians from Tunis the previous night, but had no clear indication of where they are heading.

Faisal Hussein was to arrive in Tunis Sunday night and Ben Ali was to meet with both Hussein and other Palestinians. I stressed to Ben Ali the absolute necessity for the Palestinians in Tunis not to block the process and said that this bus won't come by again soon.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



I asked explicitly that the Tunisians tell the press that they would participate in the multilateral negotiations and come to the conference as an observer. Ben Ali stalled and said he would forward a response.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)



On balance, I believe the Tunisians will be helpful, particularly Ben Yahia, although Ben Ali is not a very stand-up guy.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Friday Meetings [2 copies] [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	8/2/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-008
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1172-MR(504)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MY FRIDAY MEETINGS

A thorough discussion with the Palestinians showed their continued preoccupation with the representation issue. I laid out ways that we could reassure them that their claims or negotiating position would not be in any way prejudiced. Hussein and his colleagues are concerned for their physical safety. At the end of the meeting they presented me with a letter containing some unacceptable positions. In Amman with King Hussein, I reviewed where we are with the Palestinians and on the process in general. He and his senior advisors seemed generally satisfied and he was constructive at a press conference.

Palestinian Meeting

In four hours with Feisal Hussein and his two partners, the main focus was on the question of whether residents of East Jerusalem would be on the Palestinian delegation from the outset of the talks. I outlined a package of links to Jerusalem which are reiterations of US positions which we would provide them in a letter of assurance. I told them that our position is solid, that the status of Jerusalem must be determined by negotiations. I told them we would support voting rights for East Jerusalem citizens in the election of a transitional authority and that we and the Soviets will state that regardless of the form of representation, nothing would be prejudicial or precedential with respect to their claim to negotiate on Jerusalem.

I added that Feisal and his colleagues could come to Washington and meet with you if they found that useful. I offered to hold my next meeting with them in East Jerusalem (our first five have been at the Consul General's house in West Jerusalem).

Both Hanan Ashrawi and Feisal asked for some reference to "self-determination" in our letter of assurance. I told them I was not agreeing, but I would look at the issue.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR
MM 4/7/2016

1.4(d)

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

1.4(d)

The Palestinians agonized over settlements (this came up in Jordan too). I underlined the best way to attack the issue is to get to the negotiations which will have its own impact on Israeli public opinion.

Ashrawi raised renewing the US-PLO dialogue. I said it wasn't in the cards, given the support for Saddam and the failure to act on terrorism. But I added that if the PLO blocked the peace process, it will forever forfeit any chance to renew the dialogue.

1.4(d)

At the end of the meeting, they gave me a contentious letter (clearly influenced by Tunis). It was noteworthy that they did not press most of the points in the letter during the meeting and were careful to point out that it was drafted before my presentation.

They were as positive as we could reasonably expect in their press conference after the meeting.

Jordan

In my meeting with King Hussein and his advisors, I outlined the Jerusalem discussion I had with the Palestinians. Jordan asked for, and I agreed, to give them a letter of assurances spelling out our position. The King and his Prime Minister had some reasonable questions and were generally supportive. The King echoed this in our joint press conference.

On bilateral issues he stressed their difficulties and how renewed economic and military assistance could help. I'm asking the Department, with the NSC, to work on some decision memos which would free things up for Jordan. Much will depend on the Congressional mood, but I think the time has come to try to get assistance flowing again. This means you will have to certify that Jordan is making a meaningful contribution to the peace process. We can do so in good conscience.

After our working session we continued over dinner with the King. I'll have a working breakfast with the Prime Minister Saturday morning to go over bilateral issues. Then it is a six-hour flight to Rabat where I will see King Hassan tomorrow evening. Sunday it is on to Tunisia, Monday to Algeria and back to Washington Monday night.



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1991

CP
84

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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
Both Hanan Ashrawi and Feisal asked for some reference to "self-determination" in our letter of assurance. I told them I was not agreeing, but I would look at the issue.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR
MM 4/7/2016

~~SECRET~~


1.4(d)



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On bilateral issues he stressed their difficulties and how renewed economic and military assistance could help. I'm asking the Department, with the NSC, to work on some decision memos which would free things up for Jordan. Much will depend on the Congressional mood, but I think the time has come to try to get assistance flowing again. This means you will have to certify that Jordan is making a meaningful contribution to the peace process. We can do so in good conscience.

After our working session we continued over dinner with the King. I'll have a working breakfast with the Prime Minister Saturday morning to go over bilateral issues. Then it is a six-hour flight to Rabat where I will see King Hassan tomorrow evening. Sunday it is on to Tunisia, Monday to Algeria and back to Washington Monday night.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Sunday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	7/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1172-MR(506)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MY SUNDAY MEETINGS


I expected a long and tough day and I got it. I started in Saudi Arabia this morning, went from there to Amman, and finished up this evening in Jerusalem where I met first with Palestinians and then with Shamir. On the whole, the meetings went about as well as I could have expected and I think it is fair to say that we're still moving forward.

Meeting with King Hussein

I succeeded in getting Hussein's commitment to come to the conference, his endorsement of the Mubarak initiative (suspending the boycott and settlements), and his assurance that the Jordanians were now working quite seriously on the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. As usual, the King was better in private than in public -- notwithstanding his assurances that he would say all this in public. Nevertheless, he said enough in public to be helpful.

I think he's moving in the right direction and the best example of that is that he is finally getting serious on the joint delegation. Not only has the Jordanian Prime Minister now invited Palestinians from the territories to come to Amman to work on the joint delegation, but we had a very detailed discussion on a number of the issues related to it: e.g., the criterion for selection, the formula for finessing the Jerusalem issue, the nature of the invitations, the character of the announcement on the joint delegation, etc.

In our discussion, we went over some of the names that -- based on last year's exercise -- we believe would probably be acceptable to Palestinians and Israelis. I also suggested that once the Jordanians and Palestinians had agreed on a list for the delegation, they should share it with us. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}



Meeting with Palestinians

My meeting with Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, and Zakaria Al-Agha was intense and emotional. I told them the train was moving and they'd better not miss it, for it was not likely to come around again soon. Unfortunately, Arafat is still holding back on giving those in the territories the green light to go to Amman and sort out a joint delegation. My interlocutors made it clear that they would like to get a letter of understandings from us in order to help push Arafat to make a decision or at least make it more difficult for him to block them from going to Amman for talks. I told them we'd be prepared to provide such a letter but only when we knew they were actually beginning to work on the joint delegation. I suspect that there is some chance that may begin to happen this week.

Most of our meeting today was devoted to my explaining in some detail our approach to the joint delegation and in particular how we intended to finesse the extraordinarily difficult and sensitive problem of Jerusalem. I explained that at this stage we were simply not in a position to have a peace process if an East Jerusalemite were on the joint delegation. Instead, to meet Palestinian needs on this issue, I could propose the following package:


- (1) On the Jordanian side of the joint delegation there could be a Palestinian from a prominent Jerusalem family, who now resides in Jordan.
- (2) We would make a statement (perhaps, in conjunction with the Soviets) that emphasizes that no decisions at this time on representation would be prejudicial, or precedential in any way on the substance of Palestinian claims to Jerusalem.
- (3) That our position on Jerusalem would remain constant, namely the city must remain unified, but its final status must be resolved by negotiations.
- (4) That we would do our best to make sure that East Jerusalemites would not be excluded from participation in negotiations on final status.
- (5) That we would also do our best to ensure that East Jerusalemites would have voting rights in the self-governing authority during the transition period.

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
- 3 -

In addition to these five points, I suggested that we might also be willing to meet with East Jerusalemites like Faisal Husseini before and during the negotiations to reinforce our policy position and to make a political gesture to Palestinians on the Jerusalem question.

I told the Palestinians that we couldn't do any better than that. In response, they argued long and hard that they had to have an East Jerusalemite on the joint delegation from the very beginning. They said the delegation would not have any credibility if there wasn't someone currently from East Jerusalem on the delegation. They said this was a red line for them. ^{1.4(d)}



^{1.4(d)}



Meeting with Shamir

I had a one-on-one meeting tonight with Shamir for about an hour and a half. It turned out to be a good meeting. He told me there was a lot of suspicion in Israel that the US was determined to force Israel out of the territories. I told him there was a lot of suspicion in the United States that he wasn't serious about negotiating peace. When we got beyond the preliminaries, he asked a lot of questions about Syria and Assad's response to us. For example:

- Why had Assad responded the way he did? Why had he changed now?
- What was he really after now, what was his goal? Was he really ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel?
- What clarifications or promises had we made to him to elicit his response?

- Did we tell him our definition of 242 and 338 and how it applied to the Golan?
- Did we stand by President Ford's letter of 1975 on "giving weight" to Israel's security needs on the Golan?
- Would the US, Soviet Union and the UN sit in on the bilateral negotiations?

I responded to all of these questions, and I think generally reassured him. When I finished, he said he wouldn't be able to give me an answer on this trip, but he would send me an answer very shortly.

I responded that while we had made no decisions at this point, we were considering the possibility of issuing invitations to the conference at the Summit. He asked whether we would do this if the Palestinian representation issue wasn't settled? I said we might issue the invitation at the Summit and call for the convening of the conference in October. That would give us time not only to sort out the Palestinian representation issue, but also to begin to lay a stronger substantive basis for the negotiations so they'd have a better chance of succeeding once begun.

He didn't respond, but I know I got his attention. The meeting was serious and I think useful and its character and content were echoed in a meeting I asked Dennis to have with Shamir's aides. Tomorrow morning I'll meet with Shamir, Arens and Levy at 7:00am and then I plan to leave for ASEAN. We'll see where we are after that meeting.

JULY 22, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Jeddah [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	7/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**

By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1172-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN JEDDAH

I had dinner with Saud and Bandar early in the evening and then met with the King afterwards. We focused on the peace process and Iraq. With a little pushing and some important editing, the Saudis did issue a statement that embraced the Mubarak initiative: suspending the boycott in return for suspension of settlement activity. The Saudis have now taken the lead on this among the rest of the Arab states not at peace with Israel. We expect that others may now follow suit.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

the King ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)} went on to say that it was not enough to be passive on peace, we had to push together on it. He said, if we continued to work closely together, to coordinate together, and to push together, we'll succeed. I told him the trust and confidence that he expressed in you and me reflected the feelings that we had about him. I told him as well that the step that he took this evening justified that trust and confidence and I let him know that we were determined to keep pushing.

On Iraq, I passed on the comments that Mubarak and Assad had made to me, noting in particular their opposition to any early military strikes against Iraqi nuclear facilities. The King listened, but took a very different posture. He said Saddam Hussein had not changed one iota. He said the only thing Saddam understands was pressure, the threat of force, and the use of force. If he thinks he can get away with something, he will. Alternatively, the King said, if he thinks he is going to be hit, he will acquiesce. The King argued that the best thing to do at this point is to maintain the pressure.


~~SECRET~~

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- 2 -

He said that for now, we could justify an extension of the July 25th deadline on the grounds that Saddam has opened up partially and provided some information on his weapons of mass destruction. The King said we should set a new deadline demanding complete disclosure. He added that we should also increase dramatically the numbers of inspectors in Iraq. Not only would that make it more difficult for the Iraqis to move things around, but, the King said, it would also further humiliate Saddam internally and hasten his overthrow.

1.4(b)

~~SECRET~~

July 21, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meeting in Egypt [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	7/19/21	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed:	8/31/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-008
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1172-MR(508)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MY MEETING IN EGYPT

My meeting with President Mubarak today went very well. He was helpful once again on the peace process, making a statement which, I believe, we will be able to build on during the course of the rest of our trip. We also talked briefly about possible military strikes against Iraq -- strikes which he feels at this time would be premature and counterproductive. Finally, there was a brief discussion on Libya where he indicated once again his belief that a few "carrots" to Qadhafi would help to keep him in his box. I made clear that Libyan involvement with Pan Am 103 made it impossible for us to think about any possible improvement in relations with Libya. Let me discuss each of these in a little more detail.

Peace Process

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

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In short, I said if the Saudis followed up on Mubarak's statement we would succeed in building a lot of momentum as we headed into Jordan and Israel.

Obviously, we need the Saudis now to follow up on what Bandar had said they were willing to do: publicly support the Egyptian call for suspension of the boycott in return for a suspension of settlement activity. Mubarak understood perfectly the importance of a quick Saudi response and he will be talking to the Saudis before we get there tomorrow. In addition, I learned tonight from Osama al-Baz that the Egyptians are calling on the Maghreb states and others to endorse their call today for such a joint moratorium.

Besides following up on the statement, Mubarak said they will be pushing Arafat hard to stop blocking Palestinians from the territories from going to Amman to put together a joint delegation. He said they would also convey to the King that he needed to show movement on a joint delegation by the time I get to Amman.

Iraq

Mubarak echoed Assad's sentiments on the adverse consequences of a military strike against Iraq in the near future and was if anything even more concerned that such an action would backfire on us. He said there was already an undercurrent, even in Egypt, that he worries about -- i.e., that our collective objective was not to liberate Kuwait, but to destroy Iraq. He made very clear that Iraq must not be permitted to go nuclear, but he prefers for now to keep the pressure on through sanctions and intrusive inspections. A military strike he feels could strengthen Saddam's position internally.

Clearly, one factor governing Mubarak's view is that he sees no need to rush to use military force against Iraq's nuclear equipment and facilities. He just doesn't believe the threat is very real in the near term. I told him that we could not under any circumstances -- and indeed would not -- permit Iraq to acquire a nuclear capability. But I did tell him that I would convey his concerns to you. I must say hearing what I am hearing from our Arab coalition partners about this causes me concern that a strike would be counterproductive.

One other point: I asked Mubarak whether, given his reluctance to see military force used now, he might support a move to suspend Iraq from the Arab League if it did not fully comply with UNSC 687. I said this might be a way to put more pressure on Iraq, particularly as Iraqis would see Saddam guaranteeing further isolation even in the region. Mubarak said he feared such a move now because it could trigger a debate in the Arab League. Rather than isolating Iraq, such a debate might imply Iraq's Arab support was growing.

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Libya

Once again I heard a pitch from Mubarak on the need to send some positive signals to Qadhafi. I told him we have some hard evidence now, as well as increased suspicions that Libya was responsible for Pan Am 103. I said I couldn't yet get into the evidence, but that our view now was not just based on conjecture.

Mubarak asked if we could at least hold off putting increased pressure on Libya for a while. He said he had been able to manage Qadhafi and that this certainly served our interest throughout the Gulf crisis.

Similarly, as we're trying to put a peace process together, we don't need Qadhafi using his money and activating terrorism networks. He said we should not underestimate Qadhafi's ability to cause trouble, especially among Palestinians. What was needed at this point was to keep Qadhafi managed and in his box. Mubarak clearly believes he is capable of doing that, and I suspect he'll continue to urge us to make it easier, not harder, for him to keep Qadhafi positioned where he is.

July 19, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD

Tonight was the shortest meeting that I've ever had with Hafez al-Assad. In keeping with that, I'm going to write you the shortest note I've ever done on our meetings.

When I arrived tonight, Assad had one thing on his mind and that was to say "yes" to our proposals. There is no ambiguity there; they have accepted what we have proposed. Yesterday with President Mubarak he said on three separate occasions that he had accepted our proposals. That said, Assad did create some confusion by saying that an observer would have a speaking role at the conference. What is clear after my conversation with him is that while that might be Assad's preference, it is not a condition for his participation.

I'm not sure how our press will play things, but I know that we have a "yes" and we're going to try to build on that. A measure of Assad's desire not to muddy the waters was that he chose not only to have an uncharacteristically short meeting, but he also kept our discussion on the peace process rather short. Instead, we had a discussion on Iraq. I asked Assad what he thought the consequences might be if further military action were required to deal with Saddam Hussein's continued and deliberate pursuit of his nuclear program in spite of UNSC resolutions.

Assad responded categorically that the resort to military force would backfire and would actually bolster Saddam's position. While the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people hate Saddam, military action against him under present circumstances will diminish the hostility against him, especially on the part of the forces resisting him. According to Assad, the resistance feels betrayed because they were encouraged to move against Saddam only to be denied material support from the outside. Military strikes against Iraq as a result of the nuclear issue will reinforce the perception inside Iraq that the coalition forces care little for the people of Iraq and are only preoccupied with their own strategic interests. As for Saddam, he has nowhere to go, will cling on to power as long as he can, and doesn't care at all if there is further devastation in Iraq.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR
MM 4/7/2016

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Some, including the U.S., are pinning hopes on the possibility that some of those around Saddam may move against him. It is difficult to determine if their hopes are well-placed. Ninety-five percent of the Iraqi people are opposed to Saddam, while the remaining four or five percent are neither for nor against him, except for the small band around him who rise or fall with him. Undoubtedly, the Iraqi opposition will prevail, but it needs a little more time and the appropriate circumstances, Assad concluded.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0833-MR

MM 5/26/2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 
SUBJECT: IMPRESSIONS FROM THE TRIP

I thought it might be useful to summarize some of the impressions I'm bringing back from this trip. Much like some of my Middle East trips, I return from this one having ridden an emotional roller-coaster over the last two days -- with the Yugoslav low-point more than off-set by the unbridled euphoria of the Albania people. I want to offer some perspective on these two days as well as run through some other issues that emerged from my meetings in Berlin.

My Day in Albania

It's hard to put into words what transpired in Albania. My day started with us driving into Tirana from the airport. The crowds engulfed the motorcade, literally flinging themselves against the car, and kissing it. Cheering people sought to touch us, as if this offered a way of expressing the joy, affection, and admiration they felt for us. The crowd at the Square was unlike any I had ever seen before and easily numbered several hundred thousand, chanting your name, mine, and USA. It cheered my speech and all references to Albania and its people now being free and now becoming a part of Europe. (To give you an idea of the mood, when I mentioned Albania's becoming a member of CSCE, this drew one of the biggest cheers.)

Coming here helped bring into focus how much the world we inherited in 1989 has changed. It also served as a vivid reminder of what America continues to represent to many others worldwide. We are a symbol of hope, the embodiment of freedom, and the model of what so many others want to become. It's hard to think of ourselves in these terms, but it is our legacy and I saw how we, as a country, continue to inspire other peoples in Albania today.

My meetings with the Prime Minister and his cabinet, the President, and the leaders of the Opposition followed my speech in the Square. The emotional outpouring of the Albanian people provided a remarkable backdrop to these meetings.

With the Prime Minister and the President, I pressed on the need for rapid movement on political and economic reform as well as the immediate release of their 100 or so political prisoners, and the dismantling of their internal security apparatus.

The Prime Minister gave me his commitment to move rapidly on all these fronts. He did say they would need technical and economic assistance, given the economic catastrophe they had inherited. I was in a position to tell him we could offer some food assistance relatively quickly, but said our ability -- and willingness -- to consider more either bilaterally or multilaterally would depend on how rapidly they moved on reform. I got the sense that the Prime Minister and, especially his Deputy who is in charge of the economy, are committed to rapid movement.

My sense of President Alia is that he's much more of a gradualist. Because of that, and because of the clear emotional bonds that exist between the leader of the Opposition and the public, I think Alia is not likely to be around that long. The future of Albania was probably well represented in my meeting with the Opposition. Its head, Dr. Sali Berisha, is very charismatic and a disciple of reform and, frankly, of America. When I recounted my conversation with the Prime Minister and, in particular, the Deputy Prime Minister and their apparent commitment to rapid reform, he said, "well, many of the Ministers are really with us now". He, too, put a premium on getting help from the outside while they pressed for a wholesale transformation on the inside.

Assuming they move as they say they will on the inside, we probably should think about finding ways to help them. Albania is sufficiently small and backward, that small amounts of assistance might have a dramatic effect. At a minimum, we should target technical assistance and move on ideas like getting the Peace Corps into Albania. Followup here is going to be the key.

By the way, both the President and the Opposition hoped you would stop in Tirana on your swing through Turkey and Greece. I told them your schedule was tight and wouldn't permit it. (The truth is, I know it would be uplifting for you, and putting on my former hat, it might be good to have film footage showing huge, adoring and chanting crowds of free East Europeans come campaign time in 1992.)

Yugoslavia: Heading Toward Disintegration

While Albania was spiritually uplifting, Yugoslavia was downright depressing. Frankly, I think it's easier to deal with people like Shamir and Assad than it is to try to affect Milosevic and Tudjman.

What I found in Yugoslavia was an air of unreality among the key players, and I am afraid it will be very difficult to head off a violent collision. Those who see what's coming like Markovic and Loncar, are, I believe, largely powerless to prevent it. Meanwhile, those responsible for the collision course are locked in positions as a result of public posturing (or in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, public referenda that call for independence.) To make matters worse, those locked in their positions have a false sense of security, basically believing the worst can't or won't happen. (Tudjman, the President of Croatia, told me the fears of civil war are greatly exaggerated. This, from a man who is rapidly arming a civil guard in Croatia.)

I conveyed a very stiff set of messages to Tudjman, Milosvic, et.al., explaining what their actions were setting in motion, why the international community felt so strongly about this and why the EC and others would not be providing badly needed assistance in the absence of a responsible dialogue to resolve Yugoslavia's national problems peacefully. I argued strongly against unilateral steps that would preempt a negotiating process, and basically sought to introduce a heavy dose of reality into the unreal political climate in Yugoslavia. Markovic was very pleased with this message and the thrust of the visit. Frankly, I'm dubious about the effect.

For now, I think we should press to keep international efforts alive on Yugoslavia. Starting with the EC, it's important to go forward with their offer to send a team to help discuss and perhaps help draft new constitutional arrangements on Center-Republic relations. While there wasn't great enthusiasm among the Yugoslav players for such a team, it could become a mediating mechanism in time -- one the Yugoslavs presently seem incapable of creating on their own.

In addition, we will need to maintain a collective non-recognition policy on the unilateral declarations of independence that are likely to come from Slovenia and Croatia in the next week or so. Moreover, we must keep the pressure on Slovenia and Croatia not to move beyond declarations to actual implementation of such declarations. It is the practical steps that begin to implement independence (e.g., setting up customs posts, etc.) that will quickly produce disintegration and warfare. (We'll also want to continue to persuade Markovic to exercise restraint, particularly with regard to the use of the military in response to these declarations.)

My gut feeling is that we won't produce a serious dialogue on the future of Yugoslavia until all parties have a greater sense of urgency and danger. We may not be able to impart that from the outside, but we and others should continue to push.

In addition, we should keep up the pressure on Slovenia and Croatia to commit to a dialogue on future arrangements among the Yugoslav states, and a new basis for Yugoslav unity and, at the same time, press the Serbs to permit the selection of a new Federal President.

Depending on what happens after the declaration of independence, we should also consider invoking the CSCE emergency mechanism.

The Soviets and Concluding START

Bessmertnykh didn't come with any specific new ideas, but he certainly implied they would move further on downloading. To be sure, he made it clear we would have to move also in order to find some middle ground between our two positions. He argued that this was essential if we were to preserve the Houston package and to conclude an agreement.

On data denial, he again raised questions about our ability to conclude all the technical details in time for a Summit. He said at this point the physicists are the only ones who understand the issue and it will take months to work out all the details. He suggested agreeing on a framework or principles for data denial, having that as part of the treaty, and then subsequently concluding a technical protocol.

While being reserved on this, I said he should be specific on what he had in mind. In particular, I said we needed to be able to go to the Hill in a way that demonstrated we would get all the data we needed on Soviet missile tests and encryption would no longer be a problem. In other words, I suggested that for us to go the way he was proposing, their approach would have to respond to our ratification needs on data denial. He said, he thought this was possible. We'll see.

One other point: While our warning on a move against Gorbachev proved unnecessary, I think it obviously further cemented his view that we're with him. At a time when he clearly seems bent on deepening his ties with Yeltsin and the reformers that should be helpful.

I'm dubious about irreversible grand bargains, but I do think we have a chance to strengthen the durability of the center-reformist coalition and the general reformist bent. That is significant, and it is clearly in our interest. But I believe to achieve this end will probably take some greater specificity on what we'll be prepared to do to assist the reform process over time.

Northern Iraq

Based on my discussions in Berlin, I'm afraid the French, and maybe the British, will keep up the drumfire on Northern Iraq and the importance of keeping a presence there. In many ways, it's a "freebie" for them because they can position themselves as having warned against the dangers without necessarily having to do more themselves. I suppose we could always offer to provide logistic support to their forces if they want to stay. That is an option. However, I suspect the better option is to explain our redlines on Iraqi behavior toward the Kurds -- both publicly and privately -- and make clear we have the capability to respond and we will do so.

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- 5 -

That offers the best chance of deterring Saddam, permitting us to keep to our timetable, and perhaps also defusing the European need to look like they're not getting out and leaving 500 lightly armed UN guards to provide protection for the Kurds. In any case, I think you'll have to work Mitterrand along these lines.

CSCE

The Berlin Ministerial marked a point at which we began to try to move CSCE in some practical directions. My discussions in both Yugoslavia and Albania also served to remind me of the increasing value of CSCE. In Yugoslavia, it provided a natural forum for expressing the strong sentiment of the 34. That sentiment, that statement in Berlin, made my message more credible. We may find that CSCE, in the end, provides the best framework for dealing with the centrifugal forces within Yugoslavia. Indeed, if we didn't have that framework, we'd have to figure out a way to create it.

In Albania, I heard from the Opposition that the Helsinki principles were one of their main sources of hope and inspiration. Now, having joined CSCE, we suddenly are in a position to use the CSCE principles on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law to measure Albanian progress and hold them to these standards. I told the government and the Opposition that, and they clearly understand that they will be judged accordingly. Again, having the framework and the principles are likely to be very useful as the transformation of Albania unfolds.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Jun-1991 18:33 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Re Attached Note

I do hope everyone realized when I sent out the attached note yesterday that it is a revision of whatever times you may have scheduled for the President to be briefed on the upcoming Economic Summit. But, just in case you didn't, if your calendars show meeting times at 10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. on July 8th or 1:15 p.m.-2:15 p.m. on July 11, you should remove these times from your calendar. The President will be travelling during that time, which is the reason for rescheduling the briefing times.

Thanks very much, and have a nice weekend.

Distribution:

FOR: Timothy E. Deal	(DEAL)
FOR: Eric D. K. Melby	(MELBY)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
CC: Kenneth J. Hill	(HILL)
CC: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
CC: William F. Sittmann	(SITTMANN)
CC: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
CC: Diane G. Limo	(LIMO)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Mary M. Wadsworth	(WADSWORTH)
CC: Gilda Kay	(KAY)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Jun-1991 16:48 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Economic Summit Briefings

The President's calendar has been blocked (indicating Staff Time - Scowcroft) for briefing the President on the Economic Summit:

July 9, 8:45 a.m. - 9:45 a.m., Cabinet Room

July 10, 10:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m., Cabinet Room

July 10, 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m., Cabinet Room

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Timothy E. Deal	(DEAL)
FOR: Eric D. K. Melby	(MELBY)
CC: Pat A. Battenfield	(BATTENFIELD)
CC: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
CC: Dona F. Proctor	(PROCTOR)
CC: Robin A. Uhl	(UHL)
CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
CC: Wendy E. Gray	(GRAY)
CC: Diane G. Limo	(LIMO)

General --

We have a bare bones debrief of Secretary Baker's meeting with Bessmertnykh in Geneva today:

The meeting lasted two hours, all but about 20 minutes of which was one-on-one.

Baker went through the President's letter in detail, stressing that we were offering new ideas and continuing senior level involvement in the process. Baker offered his personal opinion that a signed treaty was not possible in June.

Baker told Bessmertnykh that we simply couldn't take a treaty to the Hill that didn't include the data denial provisions, but that we had good new ideas to offer. (He then asked Linton Brooks if he could hand over our paper "tonight." The cable will go tonight and Brooks plans to give the Soviets the proposal as soon as possible, but no later than Monday.) U.S. and Soviet telemetry experts will meet in Geneva early in the week to work on the package.

Baker stressed how difficult the PPCM decision was for us, that some in the U.S. had wanted to reopen the matter, but we don't want the whole Houston deal to unravel.

Bessmertnykh seemed to respond positively to the new types proposal, saying that 30% was greater than the Soviets wanted but that he recognized this was a real move for the U.S.

Bessmertnykh seemed favorably inclined toward the Arnie/Reg show going to Geneva, but said that he would call Baker on Monday to confirm and to set a date. Bessmertnykh was vague about whether Moiseyev would be ready to come to Geneva early next week. If he is not, there is a real question about whether Gorbachev has, in fact, engaged personally and given the appropriate instructions to his bureaucracy to solve START. (Linton thinks a Tuesday departure from Washington is the likely timetable.)

There was some discussion of a follow-on ministers meeting following the June 20 stop in Berlin.

Baker told Linton there was no discussion of any date for a summit.

In closing, Baker emphasized that the President wants to finish and therefore we should "concentrate" to do so, that we could not complete a treaty that did not include the data denial provisions, and that a summit without START was a bust.

Later, Bessmertnykh told the press that the Soviets had new ideas as well, but he did not in fact share any with Baker.

V/R

John Gordon

Rich Davis

Distribution:

FOR: Florence E. Gantt	(GANTT)
FOR: Wilma G. Hall	(HALL)
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CC: Arthur P. Kuehne	(KUEHNE)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-Jun-1991 15:46 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: John A. Gordon
(GORDON)

SUBJECT: Baker in Geneva

Florence

Will you please pass the attached note to the General and to Bob?

Thanks

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 8/31/09

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN LISBON

I met today with Foreign Ministers Bessmertnykh and Shara.

My meeting with Bessmertnykh went well. We closed, in principle, on CFE, with an understanding that our experts will get together on Monday to record the details of our understandings. We talked of the possibility of trying to get to a Summit by the end of June and what it would take to conclude START in time for such an early Summit. We had an interesting discussion on Gorbachev's reasons for wanting to come to London, with Bessmertnykh emphasizing that he would not be coming to receive a big "check."

We also had an extremely good discussion on the Middle East, with Bessmertnykh once again thinking largely in parallel and prepared to act on our suggestions.

Finally, we also had a brief discussion on BW. I worry about this issue creating real problems for us and Bessmertnykh does as well. I don't think he is able to move on this issue in the absence of Soviet experts being able to pay a return visit to our facilities. This is one I suspect you will have to take on.

The meeting with Shara was interesting, mostly for what it revealed about the Syrian desire to get me to come back to Damascus and to seek additional US commitments on the Golan.

CFE

Bessmertnykh came with a letter from Moiseyev that effectively met us on our terms, picking up on our proposal to use the "look alike" provision in the Treaty for certain APCs. In doing so, they were able to deal with their structural problem on the flanks and still preserve the integrity of the Treaty and all of its numerical ceilings.

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PER E.O. 13526

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MM 10/11/2016

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

He said the Soviet government would make a legally binding statement explaining how they would carry out their Treaty obligations while preserving their forces in coastal defense and naval infantry units. Bessmertnykh made clear that there should be no additional agreement, particularly because the Soviet unilateral statement will be legally binding. When I pointed out it would be important for us to be able to explain that these were agreed understandings, Bessmertnykh evidenced unease. It became apparent that the real problem was that having met us on our terms, they fear having their "retreat" rubbed in their face. He had no reluctance to emphasize that what they declare would be legally binding, but did not want to be put in the position where we or the other 21 signatories were presenting a formal document to them that they had to thus sign.

In light of that, I suggested they work with us on the Soviet governmental statement and we also work out an exchange of letters that would underscore our agreement and the legally binding nature of the statement. Bessmertnykh was comfortable with this approach and also said they would be willing to present the governmental statement in Vienna.

It will take a little work, but I think it's fair to say we've overcome the CFE roadblock.

The Summit and START

Upon completing our discussion on CFE, we began discussing the possibility of an early summit and whether and how START could be completed in time for the Summit.

I outlined your schedule and said while you had made no decisions, the last week in June might be the only time you could come to Moscow before September. I wondered whether START could be completed by that time given the gaps on data denial and downloading.

He felt meeting the last week in June was important because the two Presidents had spoken of the summit taking place in the first half of the year. He also said that it was very important to be able to have the two Presidents sign START at the summit. (In effect, echoing what Shevardnadze told us about making certain the summit was substantive, not merely symbolic.)

I pointed out that what he was saying was clearly desirable, but was it feasible. Could we complete the Treaty that quickly?

Bessmertnykh said we could, provided we raised the political level of the negotiations. He suggested we give immediate instructions to our START delegations to enter a "crash program" to finish the Treaty. He said Bartholomew and Moiseyev and Obuhkov should meet, perhaps as early as this week.

I said we would need to get together to break the logjam, perhaps at the end of next week, since I would be in Copenhagen for the NAC and he would be in Sweden with President Gorbachev. Alternatively, we might get together after the CSCE Meeting in Berlin on June 19-20. In any case, we would need to get together soon, and would need the help of our two Presidents to make difficult decisions.

The simple fact is we won't get there if we can't sort out internal differences on data denial and if there is no movement on the downloading issue.

Gorbachev, Economic Reform and the G-7

I gave him our impressions of the Primakov visit, emphasizing our commitment to Gorbachev and the success of reform and our recognition of the enormous difficulties that must be overcome as they try to move to a market-based economy. While recognizing the difficulties, I noted the task wouldn't get easier over time and that a sound plan, a good plan, was essential for minimizing the pain and disruption of the transition.

In this connection, I said the latest evolution of the anti-crisis plan as presented by Primakov was a real step forward, but still, in our eyes, did not provide a credible basis on which to move to a market-based economy. I said we were looking forward to receiving Yavlinskiy's plan this week and would then be in a better position to offer some definitive comments.

Much like Primakov, Bessmertnykh said they welcomed our comments and advice as they refined their approach. He added, however, that he hoped we would recognize the scope, the magnitude, and the historic nature of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. Given that, he said don't be overly focused on technical questions and lose sight of the political realities and constraints.

I said we were very mindful of the scope of the changes and the political realities in the Soviet Union. But I said the Soviets, too, should not lose sight of the political realities in our country and that of our G-7 partners. The notion of the grand bargain with the Soviet Union getting \$100-200 billion wasn't realistic. Indeed, we worried that all this talk might create a set of expectations that President Gorbachev would be seen as coming "hat-in-hand" to the London Summit and would be portrayed as being rebuffed when he didn't receive a big check.

Bessmertnykh said an erroneous impression had developed about Gorbachev's purpose in wanting to come to the G-7 Summit. It wasn't, he said, to come and receive a big check.

Rather, he had several different purposes in mind:

- To outline the current situation and status of the Soviet reform efforts.
- To explain the Soviet vision of moving to a market-based economy, and invite G-7 comment.
- And, to identify how certain kinds of Western assistance fit into Soviet needs like, for example, the need for a Stabilization Fund to facilitate the task of making the ruble convertible.

I said we were discussing this with our allies and that, while no decision had been taken, it was important that there be greater specificity when the Soviets spoke of their plans and needs. I said any hesitancy on our part had to do only with not wanting his attendance to be seen to fall short of expectations and thus be counterproductive.

(On the Stabilization Fund, I asked what did they have in mind, how much did they need it, how would the money be raised, etc.) In short, we and others wanted to help, but a good deal more would be needed from the Soviets before we could do so effectively.

The Middle East

I won't go into great detail on our discussion on the Middle East, but there was an interesting level of convergence in our thinking. Indeed, when they gave us the points Gorbachev was planning to use to weigh in with Assad to try to move him, I saw so many similar phrases that I asked Dennis whether we had already coordinated our messages. (We hadn't.)

Though they hadn't yet prepared a message to Hussein, Bessmertnykh said that Gorbachev had already decided he would convey one and Bessmertnykh said they would follow our lead -- e.g., they would emphasize the importance of Hussein committing to the conference and inviting Palestinians from the territories to come to Amman to form the joint delegation.

Forming the joint delegation is the most important thing to be done now. We need the joint delegation to be in a position to send out invitations; the principle is agreed, but no one is putting it together. The mere process of putting it together will put pressure on Assad. More importantly, if we have a joint delegation, we'll probably have a conference and a process regardless of what Assad does.

I made this case to Bessmertnykh and said we both needed to lean on Hussein to invite Palestinians from the territories to go to Amman. But more than this, I said the PLO needed to signal the Palestinians in the territories that it was OK to go and begin working out the details of the joint delegation. They were holding back, awaiting such a signal.

I said the Soviets needed to go to Tunis and get them to give the signal and permit practical movement on the joint delegation now. He agreed to do so.

While being close on everything, I still sense Bessmertnykh would prefer holding off on an invitation in the near term. He doesn't mind us going public with where we are and what and who is blocking progress in the relatively near future. But it's clear he prefers a timeframe of working through the summer before forcing decisions.

Shara Meeting

I gave Shara your letter to Assad and walked him through it. I pointed out what was new in it in terms of the UN and the continuity of the cosponsors' efforts in the negotiations. I emphasized the significance of our commitments on territory for peace as it applied to the Golan and non-recognition of Israeli annexation of the Golan.

I characterized the unprecedented nature of our offer to provide a security guarantee of the Israeli-Syrian border once they agreed to it -- noting without it, Israel would never surrender the Golan Heights. I concluded by saying Syria would never have a better opportunity or Administration to work with and it shouldn't miss the boat. If it did, if it decided to block the process, there would be inevitable consequences for our bilateral relations.

Shara described the letter as important and said Assad would consider it very carefully. He spent his time alternately trying to pin down further US commitments (e.g., will the US commit to supporting "all territory for peace," to supporting "every inch of the Golan back to Syria") and trying to convince me to go to Damascus to talk with Assad about the letter.

On the former, I emphasized we would not alter our position on territory for peace, on 242/338 which speaks of withdrawal from "territories," not all or the territories. I said we wouldn't alter our position to suit the Israelis or the Arabs, but that territory for peace applied to all fronts. I repeated we did not and would not recognize Israeli annexation of the Golan. But, in the end, the exact meaning of territory for peace had to be negotiated by the parties.

As for going to Damascus, I noted in your letter you said you would send me if Assad reported back that he was leaning to saying yes to the process we were describing. I said it only made sense for me to go if you and I knew the trip would be productive -- that something would come out of it.

In the end, I think we have Assad feeling uneasy. He wants to build a relationship with us and he knows he can't if he stifles us on the peace process.

Similarly, he fears being tagged with the responsibility for blocking peace, and he knows we're serious both about movement and about putting the onus on those who prevent it.

That may not be sufficient to move Assad, but for the moment we have positioned ourselves about as well as we can.

CB
✓

May 16, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *cd*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0833-MR

MM 5/26/2015

May 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: SUMMING UP THE TRIP AND WHAT WE DO NEXT

I come back from this trip disappointed in the attitude I encountered in Syria but still hopeful about our prospects. I have summarized below the outcome of my talks in Israel; the importance King Hussein is to putting together a process now; and a gameplan for what we now need to do. Though the path is still difficult, and the objective may yet prove unattainable, we do have a chance to put this together.

Outcome from Israel

- o Meetings in Israel were intensive, but productive. I now have Israel locked in (by agreement to a written document) on a number of important points, including:
 - A conference will launch bilateral and multilateral negotiations within a specified timeframe.
 - An agreed set of criteria on Palestinian representation, including agreement on how to manage outsiders and East Jerusalemites.
 - ✓ An agreed mechanism for how the Palestinian representatives will be worked out.
 - ✓ Agreement that the negotiations for interim self-government for Palestinians should be completed within one year. (This point is especially important for Hussein and the Palestinians.)
 - ✓ Agreement that Israel will come even if one or more of the other regional parties don't come. (This provides a basis to produce what could amount to a one track rather than two-track approach.)

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- o We didn't solve the UN or ~~reconvening issues~~ in Israel. But there was some movement and I don't rule out more.
- I worked out some fallback formulas on each question with Shamir which I will try out on Hussein.
- Actually, each of the fallbacks reflects what Hussein has heretofore mentioned on both the UN and the reconvening issues.
- However, I'm not certain he'll maintain these positions once he has seen Assad.

Importance of Hussein

- o Hussein is the key to the process right now. If Assad would come, Hussein would be a given. I'm not ruling out Assad categorically, but I'm very dubious.
- ✓ o We have a process with Hussein. The critical question is will he come if Assad doesn't. He told you and he told me he will be coming.
- Indeed, today I called him from Jerusalem to tell him I thought we had a real chance. He told me he'd be the master of his destiny and that he was going to Damascus only for reasons of form.
- ✓ o This remains to be seen. If he produces, and steps forward, and acts to help work out the Palestinian representation question, we must produce for him.
- o That will require helping to end his political, and especially his economic isolation. Even before he steps up to the plate, he should get some signals of what's possible when he delivers.
- o For now, I've told him we will unfreeze the pipeline on aid when he commits to coming to the conference without reference to Syria's position.
- ✓ I've also asked Bandar to get the King to send a message to Hussein before Hussein's visit to Damascus, encouraging him to move on the peace process and making it clear Saudi Arabia will support his commitment to attend the conference.
- Mubarak, too, needs to call Hussein before the Saturday meeting in Damascus to buck him up, tell him what he will be doing the next day with Assad, and signal that the political isolation is beginning to erode.

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- o To produce the Mubarak phone call, I think you should call him tomorrow, tell him we'll be sending him a brief on my trip, but that we feel we did make headway in Israel.
- Given that, we have a chance to produce a process now, and Hussein is taking on added importance. He must not go to Syria and retreat or adopt Syria's positions. Mubarak needs to be told that he, more than others can, shore up Hussein in advance of his meeting with Assad. And you are counting on him to do so since we won't have a process if Assad gets Hussein to retreat.
- o The Fahd message and Mubarak phone call are important for their psychological impact and what they indicate about the possibility for the future if Hussein delivers.

What's Next?

- o We will want to send out the invitation, but not immediately. We need to see how Hussein comes back from Damascus. And also whether Assad remains dug in after seeing Bessmertnykh, Hussein, and Mubarak.
- o We'll want to follow up quickly with Hussein to see where he is and to keep the pressure on.
- o We will not want to go with the invitation until we know from him that he is actively working the Palestinian representation issue, and how he is doing it.
- That means, Palestinians are coming from the territories to Amman and the PLO is being discreetly engaged on the names. We need to know where this exercise stands before sending the invitation, otherwise, the Palestinian representation issue could come apart.
- Coordinating closely with the Soviets on this may be especially important to push the Jordanians and Palestinians to put the delegation together in a feasible way.
- Having the Soviets engaged on this and sending signals of public reassurance to Hussein, can help bolster Hussein against Syria and contain the PLO demands on the King.
- o We'll need to send Hussein some high-level messages spelling out very specifically the steps needed.

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- o If we want to pin him down, both on his participation and on the joint delegation, I may have to go back and see him. Alternatively, since we're pushing him to make one of the most historic decisions of his life, you may want to invite him to come see you. That meeting could push him over the threshold.
- o As we draw closer to this point, we will want to get the Gulf states to make clear what they'll do concretely for Hussein if he delivers.
 - If he does, he will make the process possible, and preempt the ability of the radical/fundamentalists to prey on the frustration and lack of hope that the absence of a peace process will create.
 - The Gulf states have much to fear from the absence of a peace process and, therefore, have a stake in Hussein's delivering. They will need to deliver if he delivers.
- o Bottom line: Let's consider doing the invitation in about two weeks' time.