

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-007

Folder Title:
Baker Trip Reports [2] [1]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Israel and Jordan [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	7/21/92	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Lisbon [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	5/24/92	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Lisbon [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	5/24/92	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meetings in Moscow (4 pp.)	2/17/92	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meetings in Moscow (4 pp.)	1/29/92	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings in Moscow (5 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday Meetings and Next Steps (4 pp.)	12/19/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday Meetings and Next Steps (4 pp.)	12/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

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Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [1]

Pinksheet Number: cap1353
OA/ID Number: 91164-007
Date Closed: 8/31/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Tuesday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	12/17/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings in Moscow (5 pp.)	12/16/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meetings with Kozrev and Shevardnadze (3 pp.)	12/15/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Cable	Re: UNSYG: [United Nations Secretary General] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	10/14/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Cable	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meetings with [Middle East Leaders] (2 pp.)	10/16/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Cable	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meetings with [Middle East Leaders] (2 pp.)	10/16/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Cable	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Day in [the Middle East] (2 pp.)	10/15/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Cable	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meetings in [the Middle East] (2 pp.)	10/14/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Cable	From Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., Re: My October 17 Meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze [181845Z Oct 91] [Document declassified; FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	10/18/91	(b)(1), (b)(6)	S

Page 2 of 2

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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/19/2022

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-007
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1187-MR(509)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1992



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

JAB

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN ISRAEL AND JORDAN

I have had an interesting set of meetings in the last two days. The meetings with Rabin (and Peres) highlighted the dramatic changes that have taken place in Israel. The discussion with the Palestinians indicated they recognize the changes. While they would like to see more, they understand they have a real opportunity to move quickly on interim self-government -- assuming they can get their act together and negotiate seriously.

Finally, the meeting with Hussein revealed he, too, sees an opportunity on peace, but he is worried about his internal situation and sees it being potentially explosive.

Before outlining in greater detail what was discussed in the various meetings, let me simply say that there is an opportunity now to take advantage of the negotiating process we have put together. Assuming we stay involved, I believe that real movement toward an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on a framework for interim self-government, and the elections for who will administer it, is possible by November. (Given our need to stay involved, I've explored the possibility of not moving the venue to Rome but keeping it in Washington, and the Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians all accept this.)

Meetings in Israel

I have just visited a different Israel. The mood is different and the atmosphere is one of hope. Rabin was open, direct, and very clear about his objectives. He is reordering Israel's priorities away from the territories and to revitalizing Israel's economy. And he is determined to move rapidly on peace-making.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1187-MR
MM 7/28/2015

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As he and Peres put it to me, they have not adopted these objectives because of us. They've adopted these priorities because of Israel's needs. He made it clear that he and his government simply do not want to expend money in the territories. Unlike Likud, their agenda is not to populate the West Bank/Gaza. And he has already acted to demonstrate this by freezing 7,000 contracts that had been concluded for new building in the territories. (Notwithstanding the legal problems, he told me he is going to cancel these contracts.)

In addition, he is moving to eliminate the special incentives and subsidies (low interest mortgages, tax incentives, etc.) that have encouraged people to move to the territories. The incentives and subsidies made it extremely attractive for non-ideological Israelis to move to the territories. Take away the housing and financial incentives and very few Israelis will want to go there. The settlers' movement is already up in arms over this. But Rabin is determined to persevere for, as he put it, the sake of the 3.9 million Israeli Jews and the 1 million Israeli Arabs who should not have to mortgage their future because of the 100,000 settlers in the territories.

While he is determined to redirect Israeli resources, he feels he has no choice but to complete the units under construction. The costs of cancelling them will simply be too high financially and politically. In a nutshell, our talks on the loan guarantees and what Israel will do were good and encouraging. I think we have the basis of an understanding, but there are a few questions on numbers of units, locations, and "natural growth" that I want answers to. When I leave the region, and go to the Philippines, Dennis will go back to Israel and see Rabin to go over the questions and the formulations we can use to describe our understandings. Thus, by the time Rabin comes to see you in Kennebunkport, I'm confident we will be able to finalize the deal and have you announce it.

On the peace process, Rabin was very receptive to my suggestions on Israel being ready to table a model for interim self-government arrangements. He has thought through a lot of this and I'm confident his government will put a serious proposal on the table.

He also made it clear to me that he is prepared to negotiate seriously on all fronts, though he remains dubious about Assad's intentions at this stage. I told him it was important to test those intentions and he gave me a couple of things to try with Assad. I'll have a better feel after I see Assad, but even on this issue, between the Israeli acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, the Syrian acceptance of the principle of peace, and the mutual focus on security, I think we may have something to work with.

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Meeting with Palestinians

My meeting with Faisal Husseini, Abdel Shafi, et.al., was surprisingly relaxed. While being reluctant to give Rabin too much credit yet, there was no doubt that they recognized a clear opportunity. They acknowledged the profound difference from Shamir and credited Rabin's intervention for resolving the tense situation at An Najah University in Nablus last week.

They saw the freezing of contracts, the public talk of different priorities, and the commitment to continuous negotiations as positive. At the same time, they raised a variety of human rights questions and sought other confidence-builders from the Israelis. (Rabin was willing to act on one measure, having to do with the travel of the delegation, but not others right now.)

They also raised the loan guarantees, but almost in a pro forma way. They don't want us to grant the guarantees now, but they didn't press the point very hard, especially when I said we are going to see a severe reduction in Israeli settlement activity and they should be satisfied with that. Indeed, when Hanan Ashrawi did her press conference after the meeting, she said a total freeze was not a condition for negotiating and the Palestinians would be satisfied as long as the US could monitor the Israeli activities and assure that US assistance wasn't directly or indirectly going to the settlements. We'll be able to do that.

On the peace process. I hammered hardest on the Palestinians being ready to put realistic, not pie-in-the-sky proposals on the table. I said they were going to get serious Israeli proposals now, and they had to be willing to engage on the Israeli proposals and offer some of their own.

I came away from the meeting feeling that we made some headway. We'll see when they come to the table.

Meeting with Hussein

My meeting with the King left me less upbeat than my meetings with Rabin, Peres, and the Palestinians. There was some good news. The Jordanians are making a systematic effort to enforce the sanctions now and they are willing to show us, members of Congress, and the press just what they are doing. Similarly, the King was very hopeful on the peace-making process. While he is clearly pleased by the changes in Israel, and acknowledges their significance, he's preoccupied with his internal situation. He'll support moving ahead on the negotiations, but was very somber on what's going on in Jordan.

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1.4(b); 1.4(d)

I told him if the Jordanians maintain their new effort on sanctions enforcement and publicize it, we might make some headway with the Congress on our bilateral assistance programs. But I also said this wasn't going to meet the kind of economic needs that Jordan had -- only reconciliation with the Saudis or the Gulf states could produce the resources Jordan needed. I said we've tried all we could to overcome the differences between Jordan and the Gulf states. While we'd made headway at times, incidents or speeches tended to undo our work.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

EYES ONLY

251250Z

WHITE HOUSE
COMMUNICATIONS ROOM

012 MAY 05 AM 9:00

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 01

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 5

DTG 251230Z

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: SEC STATE

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. WHSR
2. Scowcroft
3. Howe
4. Gantt
5. Eagleburger

(TIME OF RECEIPT)

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

REMARKS: _____

SECRET

(CLASSIFICATION)

EYES ONLY

May 24, 1992

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON^y
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

ATTACHMENT

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1992



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN LISBON

We have had an interesting two days in Lisbon. While we are in Lisbon for the second Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the Former Soviet Union -- and the Conference has been successful in channelling increasing efforts into technical assistance -- the attention of most of the participants has been on Yugoslavia. Many of the former republics worry that this is their future, especially when they see signs of another Yugoslavia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Many worry that if Milosevic can get away with his Greater Serbia strategy it will be a lesson to others seeking to capitalize on ethnic followings and ambitions to make cross-border appeals and dismember neighboring states.

With the growing atrocities in Bosnia and the efforts by Serbs to systematically de-populate Bosnia of Moslems through mass killings and expulsions, it becomes more and more important to press the Europeans to do something. Indeed, as we witness the Serbs pursuing a strategy of "ethnic purification" -- using terms and behaving much like the Nazis -- we and the Europeans can't stand idly by.

I spoke of a humanitarian nightmare occurring here in the heart of Europe. I spoke of all of us taking political, diplomatic, and economic steps to make it clear there was a very real price to be paid for continuing Serbian violation of fundamental human rights and the basic norms of civilized behavior. I asked each of our European friends, starting with John Major, how they could continue to let lowest common denominator policies paralyze them on Yugoslavia. ^{1.4(d)}

^{1.4(d)} my private and public comments have catalyzed the Europeans to consider a range of sanctions, and I believe they will take some action steps tomorrow. What we are seeing once again is that the Europeans want to be active but need a push from us to do so -- even when it's on an issue where they want to be in the lead and should be in the lead.

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2010-1187-MR
MM 7/28/2015

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Collective engagement works, and multilateral responses can be real but tend not to get energized unless we serve as the catalyst. This applies to the Russians as well. While Russian-Serbian ties limit the Russian enthusiasm for sanctions, Kozyrev made it very clear that our growing pressure might make it possible for him to wring some important concessions out of Milosevic, especially on the quick opening of the Sarajevo airport and the roads for humanitarian relief efforts.

We'll see, but it is interesting that Kozyrev in his press conference with me made a point of saying sanctions and other steps by the UNSC were to be expected if humanitarian assistance remain blocked from going to Sarajevo.

I believe staking out this far tougher position publicly -- one which emphasizes the importance of trying political, diplomatic and economic sanctions and simply treating possible multilateral military steps as too hypothetical to comment on -- makes sense for several reasons:

(1) It gets us on the right side of the issue. It's very hard to explain inaction in circumstances where a country is being dismembered, there's a conscious policy of de-population and people are being starved and denied necessary medicines (e.g., 35,000 diabetics can't get insulin because of the Serbian-led blockade). This isn't just morally right, it's right geopolitically. There will be no new world order if other dictators playing the ethnic card know the international community will retreat from acting on ethnic conflicts because they are seen as too messy. That will surely produce many more Yugoslavias over the next decade -- with all the human costs, the massive refugee flows, the extra burdens on fledgling democracies, and the prospect for escalation.

(2) It forces the Europeans to get far more serious. The EC wants to play a major political role on the world stage. While it's clearly not unified sufficiently to do so, our public posture will force Europeans not to hang back any longer at least on Yugoslavia. Indeed, to break out of the constraints imposed by the EC, the member states announced today that they will act unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally on Yugoslavia. That would not have happened without our more forceful public posture.

(3) It's the right thing for you politically. I say this not because of where editorial opinion is. I say it because it gets a major foreign policy issue back into the news. It intrudes on everyone's consciousness, and begins to break down the exclusive preoccupation with domestic issues in the public's mind. We need to be able to remind the public that the world is

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still dangerous, that it needs our leadership, and that our President must be competent. In other words, it makes your special turf part of the campaign.

I need to briefly discuss two of the other issues we did important business on here in Lisbon. First is START and the progress we made here on your initiative on further, far-reaching strategic reductions. The second is the headway I think we may have made on Nagorno-Karabakh.

START Follow-on. I'll save for another time (preferably over drinks) what it took to finally get the Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Byelorussians, and Russians to sign the START protocol and exchange the side-letters. Suffice it to say, the wrangling brought back some pretty vivid memories of eight trips to the Middle East and what it took to nail down the invitation for the Madrid Conference.

As for where we go from here, Kozyrev came with a proposal that went a long way to close the gap between your initiative and Yeltsin's. He hopes it makes it possible for us to close a deal on further reductions at your Summit meeting with Yeltsin.

With further work, I think it gives us a chance to do so. In a nutshell, the Russian proposal accepts your numbers -- 4500-4700 warheads. It drops their goal of 2500. It de-links the demIRVing of ICBMs from SLBMs. (The linkage was important to Yeltsin but impossible for us.) It's sub-ceiling on SLBM warhead numbers is exactly the number you originally offered in your initiative -- 2200-2300. It accepts our approach on bombers, and it promises complete demIRVing of ICBMs by 2005, without, as I said, any link to SLBMs.

As you can see from the last point, we don't achieve complete demIRVing of ICBMs during the START period, only afterwards. But we would get the demIRVing of 80% of their ICBMs during the START seven-year period, with the remaining 20% by 2005. Kozyrev said practical difficulties required this. Even if we can't move him further (which I hope we can) I think this proposal moves us in the direction we want to go.

I told him we'd have to study his proposal and left him with some questions: e.g., if it's only practical difficulties that prevent you from the demIRVing of ICBMs by 1999, are there steps or assistance we could offer to help overcome these difficulties? Kozyrev and I will talk after I get back to Washington, and everyone on the arms control team here clearly felt this proposal gave us something to work with.

Nagorno-Karabakh. I met with the Turks, Azeris, and Armenians and discussed some steps to contain the conflict, defuse the tensions, and launch a negotiating process. They all agreed that CSCE civilian observers (to be drawn from NACC states) could be very useful for limiting the conflict and defusing tensions, particularly because the observers would be able to pinpoint responsibility for continuing attacks. At a

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time when some are fomenting trouble and thinking they can avoid responsibility, the threat of exposure by monitors may have an inhibiting effect on the conflict.

That said, we recognize that it may not be easy to get such observers. We have conveyed our view that its best to draw the civilian observers principally from the newly independent states and Eastern and Central European countries. This will give them a sense that they have a role to play and are being fully integrated into the NACC.

As for launching a negotiating process, I proposed a preliminary meeting next week of all the parties, including the Armenians and Azeris from Karabakh. Having them come as observers with the CSCE manager of the process designating the Armenian representative from Karabakh and the Azeris designating the Azeri representative is a formula they all accepted. We are following up with the CSCE officials tonight, but since all agreed to observers and the formula for a preliminary meeting next week, we may have a chance to make headway.

I hope so. Finding a way to manage this kind of tribal-ethnic blood feud is increasingly important if we are to shape a more stable, peaceful world over the next decade. Indeed, if the democrats in the newly independent states are to succeed, they need to be insulated from the pathologies of greater ethnicity and nationalistic rivalries in politics.

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

~~SECRET~~

TIME OF RECEIPT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

*Gompert
+ Koch
Read*

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *John*DTG: 251349Z MAY 92MESSAGE NO. 109 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 4

FROM WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Secretary Baker's Memo

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

K-PORTGENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENTGENERAL SCOWCROFT

REMARKS:

Immed. Delivery

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAE NARA, Date 8/31/09

2005 NY

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With the growing atrocities in Bosnia and the efforts by Serbs to systematically de-populate Bosnia of Moslems through mass killings and expulsions, it becomes more and more important to press the Europeans to do something. Indeed, as we witness the Serbs pursuing a strategy of "ethnic purification" -- using terms and behaving much like the Nazis -- we and the Europeans can't stand idly by.

I spoke of a humanitarian nightmare occurring here in the heart of Europe. I spoke of all of us taking political, diplomatic, and economic steps to make it clear there was a very real price to be paid for continuing Serbian violation of fundamental human rights and the basic norms of civilized behavior. I asked each of our European friends, starting with John Major, how they could continue to let lowest common denominator policies paralyze them on Yugoslavia. ^{1.4(d)}

^{1.4(d)} my private and public comments have catalyzed the Europeans to consider a range of sanctions, and I believe they will take some action steps tomorrow. What we are seeing once again is that the Europeans want to be active but need a push from us to do so -- even when it's on an issue where they want to be in the lead and should be in the lead.

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Collective engagement works, and multilateral responses can be real but tend not to get energized unless we serve as the catalyst. This applies to the Russians as well. While Russian-Serbian ties limit the Russian enthusiasm for sanctions, Kozyrev made it very clear that our growing pressure might make it possible for him to wring some important concessions out of Milosevic, especially on the quick opening of the Sarajevo airport and the roads for humanitarian relief efforts.

We'll see, but it is interesting that Kozyrev in his press conference with me made a point of saying sanctions and other steps by the UNSC were to be expected if humanitarian assistance remain blocked from going to Sarajevo.

I believe staking out this far tougher position publicly -- one which emphasizes the importance of trying political, diplomatic and economic sanctions and simply treating possible multilateral military steps as too hypothetical to comment on -- makes sense for several reasons:

(1) It gets us on the right side of the issue. It's very hard to explain inaction in circumstances where a country is being dismembered, there's a conscious policy of de-population and people are being starved and denied necessary medicines (e.g., 35,000 diabetics can't get insulin because of the Serbian-led blockade). This isn't just morally right, it's right geopolitically. There will be no new world order if other dictators playing the ethnic card know the international community will retreat from acting on ethnic conflicts because they are seen as too messy. That will surely produce many more Yugoslavias over the next decade -- with all the human costs, the massive refugee flows, the extra burdens on fledgling democracies, and the prospect for escalation.

(2) It forces the Europeans to get far more serious. The EC wants to play a major political role on the world stage. While it's clearly not unified sufficiently to do so, our public posture will force Europeans not to hang back any longer at least on Yugoslavia. Indeed, to break out of the constraints imposed by the EC, the member states announced today that they will act unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally on Yugoslavia. That would not have happened without our more forceful public posture.

(3) It's the right thing for you politically. I say this not because of where editorial opinion is. I say it because it gets a major foreign policy issue back into the news. It intrudes on everyone's consciousness, and begins to break down the exclusive preoccupation with domestic issues in the public's mind. We need to be able to remind the public that the world is

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still dangerous, that it needs our leadership, and that our President must be competent. In other words, it makes your special turf part of the campaign.

I need to briefly discuss two of the other issues we did important business on here in Lisbon. First is START and the progress we made here on your initiative on further, far-reaching strategic reductions. The second is the headway I think we may have made on Nagorno-Karabakh.

START Follow-on. I'll save for another time (preferably over drinks) what it took to finally get the Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Byelorussians, and Russians to sign the START protocol and exchange the side-letters. Suffice it to say, the wrangling brought back some pretty vivid memories of eight trips to the Middle East and what it took to nail down the invitation for the Madrid Conference.

As for where we go from here, Kozyrev came with a proposal that went a long way to close the gap between your initiative and Yeltsin's. He hopes it makes it possible for us to close a deal on further reductions at your Summit meeting with Yeltsin.

With further work, I think it gives us a chance to do so. In a nutshell, the Russian proposal accepts your numbers -- 4500-4700 warheads. It drops their goal of 2500. It de-links the deMIRVing of ICBMs from SLBMs. (The linkage was important to Yeltsin but impossible for us.) It's sub-ceiling on SLBM warhead numbers is exactly the number you originally offered in your initiative -- 2200-2300. It accepts our approach on bombers, and it promises complete deMIRVing of ICBMs by 2005, without, as I said, any link to SLBMs.

As you can see from the last point, we don't achieve complete deMIRVing of ICBMs during the START period, only afterwards. But we would get the deMIRVing of 80% of their ICBMs during the START seven-year period, with the remaining 20% by 2005. Kozyrev said practical difficulties required this. Even if we can't move him further (which I hope we can) I think this proposal moves us in the direction we want to go.

I told him we'd have to study his proposal and left him with some questions: e.g., if it's only practical difficulties that prevent you from the deMIRVing of ICBMs by 1999, are there steps or assistance we could offer to help overcome these difficulties? Kozyrev and I will talk after I get back to Washington, and everyone on the arms control team here clearly felt this proposal gave us something to work with.

Nagorno-Karabakh. I met with the Turks, Azeris, and Armenians and discussed some steps to contain the conflict, defuse the tensions, and launch a negotiating process. They all agreed that CSCE civilian observers (to be drawn from NACC states) could be very useful for limiting the conflict and defusing tensions, particularly because the observers would be able to pinpoint responsibility for continuing attacks. At a

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time when some are fomenting trouble and thinking they can avoid responsibility, the threat of exposure by monitors may have an inhibiting effect on the conflict.

That said, we recognize that it may not be easy to get such observers. We have conveyed our view that its best to draw the civilian observers principally from the newly independent states and Eastern and Central European countries. This will give them a sense that they have a role to play and are being fully integrated into the NACC.

As for launching a negotiating process, I proposed a preliminary meeting next week of all the parties, including the Armenians and Azeris from Karabakh. Having them come as observers with the CSCE manager of the process designating the Armenian representative from Karabakh and the Azeris designating the Azeri representative is a formula they all accepted. We are following up with the CSCE officials tonight, but since all agreed to observers and the formula for a preliminary meeting next week, we may have a chance to make headway.

I hope so. Finding a way to manage this kind of tribal-ethnic blood feud is increasingly important if we are to shape a more stable, peaceful world over the next decade. Indeed, if the democrats in the newly independent states are to succeed, they need to be insulated from the pathologies of greater ethnicity and nationalistic rivalries in politics.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 
SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN MOSCOW

I had a good meeting with President Yeltsin today. Bob Strauss delivered your letter to Yeltsin a couple hours before I went to see him at the Kremlin. Your letter helped set the stage for the meeting because he was still clearly stung by the Hoagland piece. He said much had been made of that article and it was damaging to him.

Your letter, and our discussion today, has put things back on track, or as he put it, has permitted us to "return to the good sentiments" embodied in our last meetings. I think his reaction to Hoagland should be a reminder for us. Anything that calls into question his effectiveness or his longevity, especially if it seems to be coming from us, undercuts what he and clearly the democrats feel they most need right now: an image of confidence.

I'm more and more convinced that the psychological aspect is extremely important for the reformers right now. The closer the embrace with us, the better. In this connection, our humanitarian assistance via the airlift, and the new Science Center probably have a greater impact on the environment here than the actual number of people who are helped by these particular efforts. I suspect that's true, because these kinds of efforts signal that the people here are not alone, and that there really is a commitment from the outside to help the democrats deliver, in part, precisely because they are democrats.

One other point on psychology that is important to Yeltsin. He mentioned to me that he was very touched that I had gone to his home city Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk) and it was pretty clear to me that he hoped very much that he would have a chance during his upcoming visit to see you (which he said would be in July) to go to your home state of Texas. Here again, the psychological impact of your having him down to Texas should not be underestimated. I think a stop there is definitely worth thinking about.

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It's clearly very important to take psychology into account, particularly as it can buy Yeltsin and the democrats time. That said, psychology by itself is ultimately not going to solve their problems. Symbols can give the democrats the time to make the kinds of changes that will be productive in the longer term. But even in the nearer term, the democrats must deliver more than only symbols.

In this sense, Yeltsin made it clear that they're going to need more help. He said they would stick with their plan of tightening credit, cutting the deficit, restricting the money supply, and moving on privatization. He even said he felt they were making some headway on strengthening the ruble against the dollar. Nevertheless, he made it clear that he was very worried about the grain situation, in particular, over the next few months. He noted that our CCC credits run out on April 1, and at that point, Yeltsin said, the Russians would need additional credits. Though they had received additional credits from the British, the French and the Canadians for grain, Yeltsin said that these credits would not be sufficient. And, unfortunately, they would need about \$600 million in additional credit from us. He repeated this request publicly after our meeting and I think we'll have to take a hard look at it.

He also made clear that Russia's needs were not limited to additional grain credits. He believes now that a stabilization fund is necessary. Having heard our argument over the last few months, he understands that establishing such a fund will be far more difficult if Russia is not a member of the IMF and the World Bank. As such, he emphasized today that he would like our help in gaining membership in the Fund and the Bank just as quickly as possible and at the very least by the April meetings of those organizations.

Interestingly, he sought not only our help in pushing the Fund and the Bank to be responsive on the membership issue, but he also asked us to provide the Russians assistance in responding to the technical questions posed by the Fund and the Bank. Paul Volcker may play a pivotal role in this connection. Bob Strauss has gotten him to come over here and he's increasingly willing to play an active role. Upon hearing that Volcker could be very helpful with the Fund, the Bank, and other international financial institutions, Yeltsin asked whether Volcker would be willing to be made a special adviser to the Russian President on economic reform. If nothing else, this is one more sign of how remarkably our world has changed.

I guess the bottom line is that Yeltsin et.al. are trying very hard and it's impossible to exaggerate the stake we have in them. Yeltsin made a point of saying to me today that there are no good alternatives to the democrats and if they're going to make it, they're going to need more help. We need to maintain a mixture of ongoing symbols and substance that demonstrate that we are helping them and we aren't holding back.

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Before summarizing the remainder of our discussion on the security and arms control agenda, one point is noteworthy. Though Yeltsin knew we would spend much time on the security questions raised at Camp David, he had no representative from the military sitting with him. I suspect this was a signal to us that he will call the shots, and the decisions will be made by and at the political level. I mentioned to him three weeks ago that if we are to take bold and ambitious steps in strategic arms, we had to do so at the political level, and avoid letting the bureaucracies take over. The absence of the military today was an interesting side. They will be present tomorrow, but as Yeltsin said, the military "no longer dictates their negotiating brief." Let me summarize the key points:

BW

Following up on what he told you at Camp David, Yeltsin said he would have the programs all cleaned up and terminated within 60 days. At that point, he'll have international inspectors come in to look at the facilities. Following that, he would like inspectors to visit some of our sites. I don't see any problem in that since you've agreed to it before.

COOPERATION IN A GLOBAL DEFENSE SYSTEM

He remains very hopeful about this. Bearing in mind British sensitivities, I was able, nevertheless, to tell him that we were prepared to take certain unprecedented steps in defense cooperation. I told him these unprecedented steps involve a joint early warning center and the possible sharing of defense technologies reflecting our new relationship -- a relationship he was quick to emphasize was heralded in the Camp David Declaration. While noting our wanting to cooperate in ways that had previously been reserved only for allies, I did say that at this point we could privately explore how a global defense system might be developed but that it was premature to begin publicly talking about that. Yeltsin accepted that and was clearly taken with the idea of the joint center that others could participate in and also the possibility of our cooperating in defense technologies. I think we whetted his appetite, but we still have a ways to go here.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE CENTER

We issued our Tripartite Declaration today involving us, the Russians, and the Germans in the establishment of a Center to fund projects and employ Russian scientists. Yeltsin sees the Center idea, the public declaration, and my visit to Chelyabinsk as offering a real boost for him internally. Yeltsin sees the Center as helping the defense conversion process and, in particular, remains very hopeful that the Center will fund projects and employ scientists in converting plutonium and enriched uranium into sources of energy.

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Shevardnadze told me that the Center had had a much greater impact than we might have imagined. It had bolstered the morale of Russian scientists, giving them hope for the future and a reason to stay. Perhaps, best of all, it made Yeltsin look successful in an area of real importance.

STRATEGIC ARMS PROPOSALS

Following our meeting today, Yeltsin said some very positive things publicly about the progress we were making, but I'm not sure that he really understands at this point the differences between our two proposals. He basically thinks the two proposals have only minor differences that separate them and we need only to split the difference in numbers between our call for 4700 warheads and his for 2500 in order to have a deal. However, there still is some good news here. He is prepared to move quickly, including agreement with you in a very short statement at a July summit. Like us, he sees neither the need for extended Geneva-type negotiations nor the requirement to produce hundreds of pages of text. Similarly, I also believe he thinks that what we propose is generally fair. That said, he doesn't really seem to understand the difference in our approaches. And I believe the numbers are still paramount in his thinking. I'll see tomorrow if I can get Kozyrev to buy onto a concept of phases: The Russians agree to your proposal on ICBM deMIRVing and following that agreement, we'll then talk about an additional phase that could involve reductions below the 4700 we're suggesting.

NAZERBAYEV AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN KAZAKHSTAN

After I raised it with him, Yeltsin made a point of telling me in private that Nazerbayev had assured him again three days ago in Minsk that Kazakhstan would be a non-nuclear state. Yeltsin remains confident on this score that Nazerbayev's assurances can be counted on. At the same time, he feels it's important for the two of us to maintain the pressure to ensure that there's no retreat from the assurances that we've each been given. It's interesting to note that when I saw Shevardnadze tonight he made a point of saying that we need to maintain the pressure on both Kazakhstan and Ukraine to live up to their commitments on nuclear arms. Shevardnadze felt they will continue to respond to us particularly because we have enormous influence in the current environment.

Speaking of Shevardnadze, it seems pretty clear from my discussion with him that he is prepared to go back to Georgia and will do so if he feels that democratic reforms and free elections will be adopted. He's prepared to go on an interim basis and then run for the presidency in elections that would be held after a relatively brief transition period. If he does so, I think we should support his efforts to put Georgia on the pathway to political and economic reform. I'm going to see the Georgian Prime Minister tomorrow and make it clear that Georgia's going to have to demonstrate to the outside world its commitment to democratic principles if it wants to be accepted by us and the international community.

January 29, 1992

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY
EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY
FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

ATTACHMENT

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1992

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0834-MR

MM 7/27/2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN MOSCOW

My meeting today with Boris Yeltsin was extraordinary in many respects. More than anything else, I saw a Yeltsin different from the man I've seen before. Whereas in the past he's often seemed vague and rather glib, today he spoke at great length with no notes and about highly technical issues. He focussed almost exclusively on security questions -- on his and your strategic reduction proposals, on dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical), on his desire to see a joint US-Soviet strategic defense, on the "brain drain", and on the need to establish some understandings on conventional arms transfers.

His focus on the security questions was driven largely by his upcoming trip to New York and his meeting with you at Camp David. I suspect the reason he wants to make this a focus is that he is going to be acting on a world stage and he wants to be seen as a world leader and not someone who is coming as a supplicant. By the same token, I think he wants to demonstrate in his new capacity that there really is a new world. I think he wants to use that new world to justify a far smaller military establishment and to help rationalize the kind of help from the outside that would be needed to get Russia through its internal transition.

His desire to be seen as a major player and to demonstrate how much the world has changed has led to at least one objective for his trip: He would love to see a short, pithy joint statement emerge from Camp David. He'd like such a statement or declaration to give an historical aura to his visit and to make it clear that democratic Russia has a very different relationship with the United States.

Frankly, I think such a statement happens to be very much in our interest as well. Your first meeting with the elected leader of democratic Russia is historic and we ought to have a joint declaration of principles that will guide our relationship in a new era. I don't know if you want to go down this route, but I have asked Dennis to draft a possible statement which we might go over in New York. The simpler we make it, the better.

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In any case, I think it would bolster Yeltsin and his own stake in his approach to us. I think it would also fortify a basic premise he now seems to be operating on: namely, we're no longer adversaries; we're no longer estranged countries; instead, we should be friends, and even allies. As such, he doesn't just seek cooperation, he seeks real partnership. He wants his military posture to reflect that; that's why he favors deep cuts, that's why he wants to change targetting, and that's why he's advocating a joint global defense (perhaps based on something like GPALS).

Clearly, his view is very ambitious. And it obviously won't be so easy to translate this broad vision into concrete steps. But I think it's very important that we not be reflexively negative. On the contrary, we need to do our utmost to channel his enthusiasm and his desire to develop this kind of relationship with us. After all, even if Yeltsin proves to be a transitional leader, the more that can be done in terms of dismantling and converting the military establishment, the better.

When he comes to Camp David, he will want to discuss our respective strategic initiatives. I don't think he expects an immediate agreement, but I do think he'll want to see how we're going to react and how determined we are to find common ground between our initiatives. We may want to think about a sequence of steps that permits us to implement certain parts of our initiative and offers a broader vision for the future that moves us in the direction of at least some of the Russian proposals.

There are a number of other security issues that Yeltsin will also want to discuss at Camp David. One of particular interest to him is how to deal with plutonium, and enriched uranium that will be byproducts of the dismantling and destruction process of nuclear weapons. He mentioned today that he spent a great deal of time with Russian scientists on this issue and they have said that if plutonium and enriched uranium can be blended with a neutral element, they can be turned into a "cake" that can be used for energy purposes but cannot be transformed into weapons. He said, the Russians on their own will not be able to do this, but could as part of a joint effort with us. It occurred to him that employing Russian scientists in such an effort could be one useful way to deal with the "brain drain" problem. I have an idea on the "brain drain" issue that might involve using some of our \$400 million for this purpose and enlisting support from the Germans and other Europeans (and perhaps some private foundations) to fund efforts of Russian nuclear scientists and engineers in a number of areas. Depending upon its feasibility and utility, this might be one of them.

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Another of his ambitious ideas that he wants to discuss at Camp David is his concept of a joint system of global defense or protection. He'll make it very clear to you, as he did to me today, that it is very important to reaffirm the ABM Treaty. He was both clear and strong on this point. At the same time, he emphasized there was a value in having a defense against missile attacks, but the best way to deal with that threat was to do it jointly. I'm quite sure that his concept of a joint operating global defense isn't what we have in mind. But again, I think he sees it as a basis to demonstrate our new relations and I suspect also he's motivated by wanting to convince his military and his public that our pursuit of GPALS will come neither at their expense nor will it leave them at our mercy.

We need to remember that for all of his desire to develop and affirm a relationship of friendship with us, Yeltsin is a genuine Russian nationalist. He will be sensitive to charges that he is making unilateral concessions and he is being exploited by us. Accordingly, when we respond to this kind of idea, we need to take those particular sensitivities into account. I think the same general understanding needs to shape our response to his call for ending our targetting of each other with nuclear missiles. While he knows that this is a difficult thing to make real, he sees great value in the symbolism of it and even Shaposhnikov told me that if the political leaders mandate such a policy, we should explore ways to implement it.

Besides the nuclear question, he is also quite anxious to have a discussion on "the do's and the don't's" of conventional arms transfers. This is clearly a discussion we should also want to have, particularly at a time when the Russians have a tremendous need to earn hard currency and arms sales are one of their surest ways to get it. I've got some ideas on the kinds of guidelines or criteria we should be outlining to Yeltsin on where, what kinds, and to whom arms sales might make sense. I think we need to come at it this way, precisely because he clearly wants to have some understanding with us on this question. While understanding his own needs in selling arms, he also understands the political fallout of an indiscriminate policy and he wants to see whether there are some general parameters that might be acceptable.

Finally, he also wants to mention to you two other issues. He told me today about his decision on BW. He said that we had been deceived, and there clearly was an illegal program. He said he will have the program terminated within a month. Once it has been terminated, he will invite international inspectors to come to the sites we have the most concern about. Afterwards, he said, "he trusted" that we would permit inspection of some of our relevant facilities. Since we had been prepared to offer Gorbachev a visit by Soviet experts to our facilities even though he had made no commitment to terminating a program which he denied existed, I think we should have no problem going along with what Yeltsin is asking.

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In any case, I think he will want to explain this to you and have you see that he's finally putting an end to this egregious program.

While I told him that I thought you would want to hear about his assessment of how the economic reform was going and how things were developing in the Commonwealth, particularly on military and economic issues (and particularly in the wake of his visit to the Black Sea Fleet), I think you're going to find that he will not spend too much time on economic issues. He's bringing Gaydar with him, but says that Gaydar will stay in Washington and engage with our economic experts while we're up at Camp David. He made clear that he felt our experts needed to understand the nature of their plans, and it was important that our experts feel comfortable with all the details. That was the purpose of bringing Gaydar to Washington. I think that means he will respond to some of our general questions on the reform process, but will prefer to leave the economic issues to the experts -- at least on this go around. I might add, when I told him that the IMF was having a very difficult time getting necessary data from the Central Bank, he made it clear that the Russian Government would furnish all necessary information.

By the way, he told me Burbolis and Petrov will not be coming with him because they are needed in Moscow. Kozyrev, Marshall Shaposhnikov and Academician Velikov (a leading scientist) will accompany him to Camp David. That tells you something about what he has in mind for the trip and clearly also the image he is seeking to create for it.

To sum up, I think Yeltsin is coming as a leader determined to exude confidence and determined as well to show that he is every bit the player on the international stage that his predecessor was. From that perspective, it will also be very important to him to show that he has established the same kind of close personal relationship with you that Gorbachev had.

I will fill you in on the Middle East multilaterals when I see you. But suffice it to say, it's no mean feat to have eleven Arab countries sit down with Israel and seriously engage each other in setting up five working groups on arms control, economic development, refugees, water, and environment. (I think the Palestinians know they made a mistake.)

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December 17, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH LINEBERRY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
LARRY EAGLEBURGER AND UNDER SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S OFFICE OF
RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY AS WELL. HIS OFFICE
NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

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OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: MONDAY'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW

I had a long and rather poignant day here in Moscow. All told I spent nearly ten hours in separate meetings with Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Shaposhnikov (the Defense Minister), and Shevardnadze. Some of the meetings had a surreal quality, especially the meeting I had with Shaposhnikov. I don't know how else to describe a meeting that was very interesting, but one in which the Defense Minister talked about putting in place a common defense policy in a commonwealth where there were going to be ten separate foreign policies.

Another way to describe this day is that it was one filled with contrast. Yeltsin was clearly feeling his oats and chose to make a strong political statement by meeting me in the Kremlin and having Shaposhnikov sitting in his delegation. Gorbachev, on the other hand, was subdued, but surrounded by his two original partners -- Shevardnadze and Yakovlev. Each of whom helped him launch perestroika, glasnost and new thinking, but each of whom criticized him at different times and were estranged from him at different points as well. Nevertheless, they were both at his side as his role is coming to an end. It was an interesting reminder that these are men of character and conviction and can be counted on to stand by their beliefs (and their friends) even when times are tough.

Yeltsin is much more the politician than any of these men and right now he's riding the wave of a revolution. The critical question is can he translate revolutionary enthusiasm into changed behaviors and real improvements on the ground. The odds are very long and if Shevardnadze is to be believed, things are almost certain to get worse before they get better. In addition, I continue to worry that there remains too much of a tendency to focus on broad political arrangements and to continue to ignore the importance of dealing with the real problems that people are experiencing.

Let me turn to a summary of each of the meetings.

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Meeting with Yeltsin

Yeltsin left very little doubt that he's the one in charge. Russia, he declared to me, is the successor state to the Soviet Union. He told me it would take over all embassies and foreign trade missions. He said it will assume the Soviet Union's seat on the Security Council and he asked for our support in doing so. He said it will absorb the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry and at least part of the KGB. And he implied that while the Minister of Defense would be answerable to the new Council of Presidents, in reality, when it came to nuclear questions, he would answer to the President of Russia.

To be sure, Yeltsin was reassuring on the command and control question, making it clear that there would be a single, highly unified command and control structure. Indeed, he said, such a structure was currently in place, and it would continue to be in place.

On other security questions, he agreed (with Kozyrev and Shaposhnikov nodding approvingly) to enter into discussions with us on dismantling and disabling warheads, on safe storage of weapons, on joint planning for contingencies involving nuclear accidents, and on follow-up on our deMIRVing initiative given our willingness to limit our high yield warheads on our SLBMs.

He also agreed to everything I wanted him to say publicly on issues of control of nuclear weapons; destruction and elimination of nukes; prevention of proliferation; and cooperation in strengthening Russia's export controls on weapons, technology and knowhow; and CFE and START. His public posture on each of these questions should make it more likely to be able to get similar public commitments from all of the other Republic heads that I will be seeing in the next two days.

For his part, Yeltsin wants us to recognize Russia soon. He'd like us to be first, but at a minimum, he wants us to recognize Russia within weeks. He also wants us to take Russia off the list of "communist states" and he wants the founders of the Commonwealth to be admitted to CSCE. He would also like to see the defense alliance of the Commonwealth eventually "fused" or "blended" with NATO.

When we talked about economic issues, I had the sense that he was neither particularly focused nor particularly aware of what was needed at this stage. At one point, I emphasized that for us to be able to help make humanitarian assistance meaningful (and to be able to justify it more easily at home), we needed to be assured that the assistance would be well targetted and would really get to the people who needed it. In response, he said we've put an infrastructure in place and we'll be able to take advantage of this humanitarian assistance.

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- 3 -

The only problem with that statement is that there's absolutely no evidence of such an infrastructure. As a result, I pressed him to give us a list of city and oblast level officials who could help coordinate and work with our people on the ground to help ensure assistance was distributed to the places that most needed it. It's clear to me we'll have to get many more people (largely from private voluntary organizations) on the ground to oversee and police the distribution. It is interesting that Yeltsin too reacted positively to the idea that we might want to put US military personnel into the provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Yeltsin did not raise the stabilization fund idea, perhaps because he felt he would not get a favorable response. But he did say they will need help to get through this winter and to avoid an explosion. Notwithstanding that observation, and his own acknowledgement that it might be costly to host the Middle East multilaterals here in Moscow, his desire to have Russia step out on the world stage is such that he's absolutely determined to have the talks here the end of January.

To sum up, Yeltsin is a very strong politician, who knows that relations with us are very important, he also knows how to talk to the "street", but for now I'm not sure he's listening to it.

Gorbachev Meeting

Gorbachev was somber in the meeting, but generally relaxed and very straightforward. He made it clear that the Commonwealth was not a good approach, but at this point there was no alternative to it. As such he felt an obligation to make it work and he would give his all in that direction. Doing that was more important than his views, his role, or even his career. If a Commonwealth didn't work, then the result would surely be disintegration and total chaos. That would mean that all the good in the political changes that had been brought would be swept away. He simply couldn't let that happen if it could be avoided.

He confirmed that he and Yeltsin have worked out an agreed transition timeframe to move from the union structures to those of the Commonwealth by the middle of January. Presumably that's the point at which he would step aside. In his mind the most important thing he could do is to create a process that provides for constitutional change and constitutional succession. To do that, he's inclined to have the Supreme Soviet meet and declare the end of the union and the end of the Presidency and the advent of the Commonwealth.

He worries, at this point, that none of the tough questions have really been thought through. He said his discussions with Yeltsin make clear that questions like citizenship, different interpretations of borders and the relationship between the central military and republic militaries have not been resolved. He's going to try and flesh out the Commonwealth by talking with all of the various heads of the emerging states.

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- 4 -

He said very clearly that we can help out best by not rush offer recognition to each of the states. That would buy a little time and increase the chances that details can be fully developed.

He also made it clear that the planned price liberalization made our humanitarian assistance on a large scale extremely important. As he sees it, the surge in prices is unlikely to be accompanied by any increase in supply and as a result we may see a real explosion. He thinks our conference idea is essential to produce international involvement, and the kind of food assistance that will be necessary to avert this explosion.

Shaposhnikov Meeting

Shaposhnikov also appeared quite relaxed and interestingly enough, he exuded a certain confidence that he would in fact be able to work out the details on the defense arrangements. He described a set of arrangements that sounded very much like they had been drawn directly from the NATO model. Indeed, he told me that he'd spent a lot of time studying NATO's organization in the last few days, as he proceeded to sort out the defense alliance that the members of the Commonwealth would conclude. He said he would be the commander-in-chief of the defense alliance and he would be answerable to the Council of Presidents. He said he would control all strategic forces, which included air forces, most naval forces, air defense forces, space, strategic rocket forces, reconnaissance forces, and all nuclear weapons.

He said there was a general understanding on conventional forces, except with the Ukraine. He made it clear that he was working on that issue with Kravchuk and they had agreed that steps towards creating an independent Ukrainian force should not be precipitous. That said, he said he still had work to do in this area. He said he would continue his discussions and he would be going to Alma Ata and would seek certain amendments to the Commonwealth agreement there.

Shevardnadze Meeting

Perhaps the most emotional meeting of the day was with Eduard Shevardnadze. He was matter-of-fact about the prospect of his leaving the Ministry after having so recently returned to it. His concern was much less for himself and much more about what he sees coming. He believes the combination of price liberalization, massive and new unemployment, and the exhaustion of reserves by the end of January may very well provoke an explosion in February. He believes that help from the outside is desperately needed particularly because he worries about extremists being on the rise. The only way to head off extremists and to give people a reason to believe in the democrats is to begin to get enough goods and food available so people begin to think that things can get better.

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- 5 -

Having thought about it overnight, he said he was even more strongly convinced that having joint US-Soviet military efforts on food aid could give people a reason for hope. And he said that right now they very much need such a symbol.

He concluded by saying he would do all he could to help preserve the course that we had launched in US-Soviet relations. He would work with all the leaders of the new states to keep them on the right course. He closed by saying he had no regrets about coming back or about being with Gorbachev now since, despite it all, Gorbachev was still his friend.

Concluding Thoughts

Two issues really leap out from today's discussions. First, is the issue of recognition. It's important and we need to have a considered approach. Norway has already acted to recognize Russia. I think we want at least to see how the remainder of my discussions go here and also see what emerges from Alma Ata and whether the Commonwealth agreement is any further clarified. Second, is the issue of humanitarian assistance and getting it here as soon as possible; indeed, getting it launched even before the Conference in January. That may require using US military assets and perhaps also NATO military assets. At this point, I'm inclined to suggest this in Brussels on Thursday. Clearly, humanitarian assistance is only a near-term response. We will need to work with Yeltsin and the others to get them to work with the World Bank and the IMF both to embrace the program they jointly work out and to provide a basis on which World Bank/IMF resources become available for their longer term economic needs.

December 18, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH LINEBERRY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: WEDNESDAY MEETINGS AND NEXT STEPS

07-24
12-24

My meetings with Presidents Shushkevich of Belarus and Kravchuk of Ukraine followed the basic pattern of the week. Both responded favorably in all the areas of concern that I raised. On nuclear command and control; accession to NPT as non-nuclear states; on the strict imposition of legislative controls on export of nuclear weapons, know-how, and technology; on working with our experts to disable and dismantle nuclear weapons; on inviting our legal experts to come and sort out the legal questions of adherence to and implementation of START and CFE; and on promising us points of contact at local levels to coordinate with us on provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

In all cases during the week, I found an intense desire to satisfy us. This was true from Nazarbayev, who specifically sought our advice and council on how to think about his options on the Commonwealth, to Kravchuk, who asked us to send our political, security, economic and legal experts to Kiev to satisfy ourselves that Ukraine was implementing our five principles and was worthy of recognition. Clearly, to all the Republic leaders, we represent the moral authority they seek to respond to.

That creates an extraordinary opportunity; it also creates a responsibility. Because of our standing and their desire to be accepted -- indeed almost "approved" by us -- they look to us to help them. Our willingness to do so can be used to shape what they do and can also be used by them to build their authority and buy them additional time with their internal constituencies.

Our announcement of the Coordinating Conference on Humanitarian Assistance is already having that effect. Now we need to follow through and help ensure that our allies and the private sector (commercial and voluntary groups) do likewise. More than anything else, we need to get people on the ground to give advice and help manage the distribution process.

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

I leave the former Soviet Union with a sense that some of the Republics -- Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Belarus, and maybe even the Ukraine -- have a real chance to make it, especially if they can get humanitarian and technical assistance from the outside. I'm far more dubious about Russia because I saw little evidence on this trip that there is any real understanding of how to deal with their economic problems.

Meetings with Shushkevich and Kravchuk

✓ Shushkevich was at pains to emphasize that Belarus would accept anything we wanted on nuclear weapons. The trauma of Chernobyl makes it essential to get all nukes off of Belarus territory and the sooner the better. Provision of our expertise in the nuclear area -- especially for disabling and dismantling purposes -- was eagerly sought by him.

Shushkevich was also keen to explain how Belarus was moving ahead on political and economic reform. He wanted, in his words, to correct possible misimpressions we had, noting Belarus's parliament was now discussing a draft constitution that would provide for universal, secret voting rights and for free and fair elections by the first half of next year. He also said Belarus led the way in all the Republics on privatization and saw that as its best path to economic salvation.

In the near term, Shushkevich said Belarus can feed itself and is exporting to Russia. But Belarus needed selected near term humanitarian and food assistance -- including fodder, infant formula, and medical equipment. He promised he would provide immediately the names of key officials and representatives from voluntary organizations to help with distribution of aid and to ensure it was to get to where it was most needed and not wasted or lost. As I heard from all other Republic Presidents, the assistance that the international community has given over the last few years -- and its been substantial -- has not found its way to the Republics.

That's why all the Republic leaders favor our doing business directly with them, not through Moscow, and also why all favor a US role, including a military role, in helping not just the provision of assistance but its distribution.

This was a key theme with Kravchuk as well. But my main focus was on nukes, Ukrainian military plans, and how Kravchuk approached the Commonwealth. He made it clear immediately that Ukraine was committed to becoming a non-nuclear state. It would join the NPT and had already asked the IAEA to send its representatives to Kiev to tell Ukraine what it must do to do so. It would welcome our help in telling Ukraine what it must do legally to adhere fully to START and CFE. It would seek accelerated elimination of strategic nuclear weapons on Ukraine and go beyond eliminating the 130 SS-19s in Ukraine covered potentially by START and seek to eliminate the 46 SS-25s that are not covered by START. It would welcome our assistance in safe storage, transfer, disabling and destruction.

It would eliminate through transfer or destruction all tactical nuclear weapons by the middle of 1992. It would favor a single authority for control of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union -- saying that control remain in Moscow. But Kravchuk emphasized that during the interim period while nuclear weapons remained in Ukraine, those nuclear weapons would be taken off alert status. (Indeed, he used the term, "inactivated.")

Overall, Kravchuk was determined to prove how responsible and responsive he was to our concerns. He had apparently consulted Yeltsin and Nazarbayev before seeing me, and his posture on the Alma Ata meeting changed. Though he had told others he would not go, he was quick to tell me he was going. Here again, he sensed an American position and chose to be responsive.

I don't know what will happen in Alma Ata, but I think the Commonwealth will take shape in the near term. Whether it will endure is a different matter. But if some general coordination of broad security, political, and economic questions is possible in the near term, we should do what we can to support that process.

I think that argues for not rushing to recognition certainly until we see the results of Alma Ata. Recognition can't be put off for long -- and it shouldn't be. But if offering recognition can complicate the Commonwealth process, we ought to consider its possible impact before simply going ahead.

Next Steps

Since the recognition issue should be behind us very soon, we do need to focus on how best to follow-up now both to meet our concerns, and to help the democrats make it. On the nuclear -- and militarily-related -- questions, we need to get our technical and legal experts over to each of the Republics. Each leader has given us assurances, and the willingness to have the experts come is a sign of seriousness. Now we need to get the experts there in early January to create practical mechanisms for each of the Republics to translate their verbal assurances into actual, concrete steps.

Similarly, we should move quickly to create similar mechanisms to translate their political commitments and their assurances on economic reform into actual behaviors. We might use the Prague CSCE meeting as a pretext to send over Dick Schifter or some of our representatives to CSCE to address specifically what laws, protections, or declarations on respect for borders, on human rights and treatment of minorities, will be required of these Republics as members of CSCE.

Finally, we should use the convening of the Coordinating Conference as the hook to send an economic team designated by Larry to the Republics I visited to work with them to identify priorities, needs, and projects most likely to be successful. This would provide some of the input for useful outputs from the Conference.

The Conference in this respect can be used to get others off the dime and begin to really direct assistance where it's needed. When you realize the EC set aside \$500 million for technical assistance one year ago and has yet to implement a single program, we clearly need an event to get everyone moving.

For our part, we also need to recognize that getting people on the ground may be as important as providing money. Nazarbayev says "send me advisors and investors -- not money". I'm sending Deputy Under Secretary Bob Fauver to Kazakhstan and Krygyzstan right after January 1. He'll work directly with Nazarbayev and his people to shape some of their planning but also to figure out how best to use our technical assistance funds to promote private sector investment in Kazakhstan. In addition, he'll focus on the best way to get the right private sector people to come in and stay for several months. That's what Nazarbayev wants and a few early deals are likely to produce a lot of investment in a Republic that has everything -- fertile land, water, incredible mineral and energy wealth -- but is underdeveloped and needs the technology to extract its considerable natural resources.

Beyond this, we need to be creative in terms of getting private citizens, perhaps via the Democracy Corps, to come and help train people. The large Ukrainian-American population -- which obviously has a keen interest in Ukraine -- ought to be mobilized to send volunteers in big numbers. Farm specialists could be especially useful to push the rural privatization process that is needed if Ukraine is to once again become the breadbasket of Eurasia.

Much can be done in the Republics, particularly if we can address their near-term needs. They don't need to quickly turn the corner. They need simply to show that progress is possible. And we have a big stake in their doing so.

December 18, 1991

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
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WASHINGTON

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [1]

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~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *J.A.B.*

SUBJECT: MY TUESDAY MEETINGS

I met with two Central Asian leaders today, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan and Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. Each has been identified with the reform movement and each very much looks to the United States for guidance, support and acceptance. Nazarbayev has been a pivotal player in the efforts to reshape the Soviet Union, starting first with the nine plus one agreement, then the one plus nine effort in the aftermath of the coup, and, currently, he recognizes the importance of trying to flesh out and make meaningful an agreement on a Commonwealth. After meeting each of these leaders and, especially following my discussion with Nazarbayev, it's clear that more precision is needed on the terms that are being used to describe the Commonwealth. Even when different leaders use similar terms I suspect they mean different things. While my discussions so far suggest that Kazakhstan and Russia can bridge their differences and forge an agreement on the Commonwealth, it's not clear yet whether Ukraine will go along with giving the Commonwealth meaningful coordinating function. That's clearly something that Nazarbayev seeks and Yeltsin is probably willing to accept. But once again, we face the question of whether Ukraine will go along. I'll have a better fix on that after I see Kravchuk tonight.

Meeting with Akayev

Akayev is a very appealing figure. In a region that hasn't known many democrats, he is very committed to democratization. Kyrgyzstan is a relatively small Central Asian republic and this trip is a very important symbol for Akayev and Moslems in this region. Shevardnadze mentioned to me that seeing Akayev was very important for Central Asia as a whole because it represented a clear sign that the democrats would be supported. As Shevardnadze put it, others in the region would get the message.

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Akayev remains very much committed to the Commonwealth, and I suspect that is driven in part by his desire for close relations with Russia. He told me it was very much in Kyrgyzstan's security interest to have such close relations and he gave me two reasons for that: the need to contain Islamic fundamentalism and the need also to counter potential problems with China. He said there was only one amendment that he would insist on along with other Central Asian republics and that was all the Commonwealth members should be accorded an equal status.

Along with Slavic members of the Commonwealth, Moslems must also be seen as founding members of this new community. I gathered that he was generally relaxed about some of the details of the Commonwealth, particularly as Kyrgyzstan is a non-nuclear republic. When I asked him whether he would develop a National Guard and if so how large would it be, he said, yes, and it would number about a thousand. As he put it, "Why do I need to have a military?" Instead, he said, I prefer to be "armed" with your five principles. That's what we need for our future, not a military.

His commitment to our five principles is a reminder that we have enormous moral authority with many of the republics and their leaders. ^{3.3(b)(6)}

(Interestingly enough, Nazarbayev, who is obviously much more of a significant political figure in Central Asia and in all the areas of what was the Soviet Union, also said to me that he'd hoped that Kazakhstan would be an ^{3.3(b)(6)}

Meeting with Nazarbayev

My discussion with Nazarbayev was really fascinating. He gave me an account of what happened on December 8 when Yeltsin called him and he also provided the backdrop to some of the events. He said that on December 6, Yeltsin called him and told him he was going to Minsk to sign a bilateral agreement with Byelorussia. He said Kravchuk was going to come to give a perspective on where Ukraine was after its referendum. Nazarbayev quoted Yeltsin as saying, "I want to look Kravchuk in the eye and see what he is prepared to say about the future, and I'll see you in Moscow on the 9th."

Nazarbayev pointed out that Gorbachev had invited Yeltsin, Shushkevich, Kravchuk and Nazarbayev to come to Moscow on the 9th to work out the details on the Union treaty. Nazarbayev said he arrived in Moscow on the 8th in preparation for the meeting on the 9th. When he arrived, there was a message from Yeltsin at the Moscow airport saying it was urgent that they talk. So he took a call from Yeltsin at the airport and Yeltsin, who Nazarbayev said was clearly drunk, told him what they had agreed to in Brest.

Nazarbayev told him he was shocked, particularly because of their previous conversation and the meeting planned for the next day. He said he asked Yeltsin a number of questions, none of which Yeltsin could answer very well. But Yeltsin did tell him that he had spoken to you and that you had supported the Commonwealth.

In recounting the story, Nazarbayev said he not only felt betrayed, but he had a hard time understanding why we would have so quickly supported something that was so ill-defined. I told him we had not and that you had made no such commitments or expressions of support to Yeltsin. On the contrary, we had been very careful to explain that we would not inject ourselves into this purely political process. I suspect Yeltsin must have also told Gorbachev that he had your support and that may explain Gorbachev's reaction to my comments that the Soviet Union, as we had known it no longer existed. (Language that Gorbachev himself was using, but against the backdrop of Yeltsin's claim of our support for the Commonwealth -- something that was presented as a fait accompli -- it's not difficult to see why Gorbachev reacted the way he did.)

Nazarbayev made clear that this situation had been created and one had to deal with it and not dwell on the past. As he looked at the current situation he felt he had three options: first, he could join the Commonwealth, provided it was real and meaningful; second, he could create a Central Asian confederation; or third, Kazakhstan could go it alone. He didn't prefer either option two or three, seeing option two as fueling, not containing, Islamic fundamentalism.

Option three was potentially even worse because it raised the specter of Kazakhstan as an independent nuclear power and he understood the problems that might create. (I left no doubt in this regard.) So, he said, he would work to make the Commonwealth succeed, but for him to do so there would have to be three amendments to the accord that had been worked out in Minsk. First, there could not be two classes of members. All members of the Commonwealth must be founding members. This would avoid a split between Slavs and Moslems. Second, there must be a treaty between the four nuclear states -- Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan -- that would spell out and codify the command control arrangements on nuclear weapons. He said there should be single point and location of authority and that should be Moscow, but there should be a political consultative mechanism before nuclear weapons could be used. This and related military questions should be embedded in a treaty. Third, there should be a council of heads of state and a separate council of heads of government to coordinate military and economic matters.

Yeltsin should have no problems with Nazarbayev's amendments, because they are very much in keeping with his description of what the Commonwealth should be and how it should operate.

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- 4 -

But I wonder whether Kravchuk will go along with either a treaty on the nuclear issues or with the creation of coordinating mechanisms that will give the Commonwealth an institutional underpinning. In reality, what Nazarbayev seeks should not create problems for Kravchuk, but I think that it may. One sign of emerging difficulties is that it is now being reported that Kravchuk will not come to Alma Ata on Dec. 21 to sign, along with the Central Asian republics, a Commonwealth Accord.

That's not a particularly good omen, but when I mentioned it to Nazarbayev, he seemed neither surprised nor concerned. He said, if Kravchuk doesn't come to Alma Ata on the 21st, he'll be in Minsk the next week when we conclude follow-on mechanisms. I asked him how he could be so sure, and he said, Kazakhi coal fuels all of Ukraine's electrical power plants; they get their ore from us; they can't launch their delivery vehicles except from our space center -- "I have him hooked."

We'll have to see if that's true. I don't think one should underestimate Nazarbayev. He's very impressive. He's one of the few leaders involved in this process that has both a vision of what is needed and also a feel for the nuts and bolts. At the same time, I think he's got his work cut out for him. If he doesn't succeed, he did tell me in answer to a question that Kazakhstan would sign onto the NPT as a non-nuclear state provided it's recognized internationally and becomes a member of the United Nations. Given what I think may end up happening here, that may be one of the most promising things I heard. Indeed, I believe that's a commitment we'll be able to count on because Nazarbayev sees his relationship with us as critical to Kazakhstan's long-term needs and interests.

I might add that the connection to us is important in Nazarbayev's eyes for two reasons: first, it's critical for the economic development of this resource rich republic, and second, it's needed to counter the challenge of Islamic fundamentalists, a challenge he sees growing in the years ahead.

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December 17, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH LINEBERRY
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER AND UNDER SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

~~SECRET~~
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: MONDAY'S MEETINGS IN MOSCOW

I had a long and rather poignant day here in Moscow. All told I spent nearly ten hours in separate meetings with Yeltsin, Gorbachev, Shaposhnikov (the Defense Minister), and Shevardnadze. Some of the meetings had a surreal quality, especially the meeting I had with Shaposhnikov. I don't know how else to describe a meeting that was very interesting, but one in which the Defense Minister talked about putting in place a common defense policy in a commonwealth where there were going to be ten separate foreign policies.

Another way to describe this day is that it was one filled with contrast. Yeltsin was clearly feeling his oats and chose to make a strong political statement by meeting me in the Kremlin and having Shaposhnikov sitting in his delegation. Gorbachev, on the other hand, was subdued, but surrounded by his two original partners -- Shevardnadze and Yakovlev. Each of whom helped him launch perestroika, glasnost and new thinking, but each of whom criticized him at different times and were estranged from him at different points as well. Nevertheless, they were both at his side as his role is coming to an end. It was an interesting reminder that these are men of character and conviction and can be counted on to stand by their beliefs (and their friends) even when times are tough.

Yeltsin is much more the politician than any of these men and right now he's riding the wave of a revolution. The critical question is can he translate revolutionary enthusiasm into changed behaviors and real improvements on the ground. The odds are very long and if Shevardnadze is to be believed, things are almost certain to get worse before they get better. In addition, I continue to worry that there remains too much of a tendency to focus on broad political arrangements and to continue to ignore the importance of dealing with the real problems that people are experiencing.

Let me turn to a summary of each of the meetings.

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Meeting with Yeltsin

Yeltsin left very little doubt that he's the one in charge. Russia, he declared to me, is the successor state to the Soviet Union. He told me it would take over all embassies and foreign trade missions. He said it will assume the Soviet Union's seat on the Security Council and he asked for our support in doing so. He said it will absorb the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry and at least part of the KGB. And he implied that while the Minister of Defense would be answerable to the new Council of Presidents, in reality, when it came to nuclear questions, he would answer to the President of Russia.

To be sure, Yeltsin was reassuring on the command and control question, making it clear that there would be a single, highly unified command and control structure. Indeed, he said, such a structure was currently in place, and it would continue to be in place.

On other security questions, he agreed (with Kozyrev and Shaposhnikov nodding approvingly) to enter into discussions with us on dismantling and disabling warheads, on safe storage of weapons, on joint planning for contingencies involving nuclear accidents, and on follow-up on our deMIRVing initiative given our willingness to limit our high yield warheads on our SLBMs.

He also agreed to everything I wanted him to say publicly on issues of control of nuclear weapons; destruction and elimination of nukes; prevention of proliferation; and cooperation in strengthening Russia's export controls on weapons, technology and knowhow; and CFE and START. His public posture on each of these questions should make it more likely to be able to get similar public commitments from all of the other Republic heads that I will be seeing in the next two days.

For his part, Yeltsin wants us to recognize Russia soon. He'd like us to be first, but at a minimum, he wants us to recognize Russia within weeks. He also wants us to take Russia off the list of "communist states" and he wants the founders of the Commonwealth to be admitted to CSCE. He would also like to see the defense alliance of the Commonwealth eventually "fused" or "blended" with NATO.

When we talked about economic issues, I had the sense that he was neither particularly focused nor particularly aware of what was needed at this stage. At one point, I emphasized that for us to be able to help make humanitarian assistance meaningful (and to be able to justify it more easily at home), we needed to be assured that the assistance would be well targetted and would really get to the people who needed it. In response, he said we've put an infrastructure in place and we'll be able to take advantage of this humanitarian assistance.

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The only problem with that statement is that there's absolutely no evidence of such an infrastructure. As a result, I pressed him to give us a list of city and oblast level officials who could help coordinate and work with our people on the ground to help ensure assistance was distributed to the places that most needed it. It's clear to me we'll have to get many more people (largely from private voluntary organizations) on the ground to oversee and police the distribution. It is interesting that Yeltsin too reacted positively to the idea that we might want to put US military personnel into the provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance.

Yeltsin did not raise the stabilization fund idea, perhaps because he felt he would not get a favorable response. But he did say they will need help to get through this winter and to avoid an explosion. Notwithstanding that observation, and his own acknowledgement that it might be costly to host the Middle East multilaterals here in Moscow, his desire to have Russia step out on the world stage is such that he's absolutely determined to have the talks here the end of January.

To sum up, Yeltsin is a very strong politician, who knows that relations with us are very important, he also knows how to talk to the "street", but for now I'm not sure he's listening to it.

Gorbachev Meeting

Gorbachev was somber in the meeting, but generally relaxed and very straightforward. He made it clear that the Commonwealth was not a good approach, but at this point there was no alternative to it. As such he felt an obligation to make it work and he would give his all in that direction. Doing that was more important than his views, his role, or even his career. If a Commonwealth didn't work, then the result would surely be disintegration and total chaos. That would mean that all the good in the political changes that had been brought would be swept away. He simply couldn't let that happen if it could be avoided.

He confirmed that he and Yeltsin have worked out an agreed transition timeframe to move from the union structures to those of the Commonwealth by the middle of January. Presumably that's the point at which he would step aside. In his mind the most important thing he could do is to create a process that provides for constitutional change and constitutional succession. To do that, he's inclined to have the Supreme Soviet meet and declare the end of the union and the end of the Presidency and the advent of the Commonwealth.

He worries, at this point, that none of the tough questions have really been thought through. He said his discussions with Yeltsin make clear that questions like citizenship, different interpretations of borders and the relationship between the central military and republic militaries have not been resolved. He's going to try and flesh out the Commonwealth by talking with all of the various heads of the emerging states.

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He said very clearly that we can help out best by not rushing to offer recognition to each of the states. That would buy a little time and increase the chances that details can be fully developed.

He also made it clear that the planned price liberalization made our humanitarian assistance on a large scale extremely important. As he sees it, the surge in prices is unlikely to be accompanied by any increase in supply and as a result we may see a real explosion. He thinks our conference idea is essential to produce international involvement, and the kind of food assistance that will be necessary to avert this explosion.

Shaposhnikov Meeting

Shaposhnikov also appeared quite relaxed and interestingly enough, he exuded a certain confidence that he would in fact be able to work out the details on the defense arrangements. He described a set of arrangements that sounded very much like they had been drawn directly from the NATO model. Indeed, he told me that he'd spent a lot of time studying NATO's organization in the last few days, as he proceeded to sort out the defense alliance that the members of the Commonwealth would conclude. He said he would be the commander-in-chief of the defense alliance and he would be answerable to the Council of Presidents. He said he would control all strategic forces, which included air forces, most naval forces, air defense forces, space, strategic rocket forces, reconnaissance forces, and all nuclear weapons.

He said there was a general understanding on conventional forces, except with the Ukraine. He made it clear that he was working on that issue with Kravchuk and they had agreed that steps towards creating an independent Ukrainian force should not be precipitous. That said, he said he still had work to do in this area. He said he would continue his discussions and he would be going to Alma Ata and would seek certain amendments to the Commonwealth agreement there.

Shevardnadze Meeting

Perhaps the most emotional meeting of the day was with Eduard Shevardnadze. He was matter-of-fact about the prospect of his leaving the Ministry after having so recently returned to it. His concern was much less for himself and much more about what he sees coming. He believes the combination of price liberalization, massive and new unemployment, and the exhaustion of reserves by the end of January may very well provoke an explosion in February. He believes that help from the outside is desperately needed particularly because he worries about extremists being on the rise. The only way to head off extremists and to give people a reason to believe in the democrats is to begin to get enough goods and food available so people begin to think that things can get better.

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Having thought about it overnight, he said he was even more strongly convinced that having joint US-Soviet military efforts on food aid could give people a reason for hope. And he said that right now they very much need such a symbol.

He concluded by saying he would do all he could to help preserve the course that we had launched in US-Soviet relations. He would work with all the leaders of the new states to keep them on the right course. He closed by saying he had no regrets about coming back or about being with Gorbachev now since, despite it all, Gorbachev was still his friend.

Concluding Thoughts

Two issues really leap out from today's discussions. First, is the issue of recognition. It's important and we need to have a considered approach. Norway has already acted to recognize Russia. I think we want at least to see how the remainder of my discussions go here and also see what emerges from Alma Ata and whether the Commonwealth agreement is any further clarified. Second, is the issue of humanitarian assistance and getting it here as soon as possible; indeed, getting it launched even before the Conference in January. That may require using US military assets and perhaps also NATO military assets. At this point, I'm inclined to suggest this in Brussels on Thursday. Clearly, humanitarian assistance is only a near-term response. We will need to work with Yeltsin and the others to get them to work with the World Bank and the IMF both to embrace the program they jointly work out and to provide a basis on which World Bank/IMF resources become available for their longer term economic needs.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS WITH KOZYREV AND SHEVARDNADZE

My initial meetings this evening with Kozyrev and Shevardnadze make it very clear that the transformation taking place here is far from complete. Both agree on the importance of my being here now. Indeed, they each see us as having particular leverage that needs to be used at this critical stage.

Kozyrev would like us to basically insist that the other Republics embrace our five principles, e.g., respect for borders, human rights, equal treatment of minorities, acceptance of international obligations, and a single, unified command in charge of all nuclear weapons. In Kozyrev's eyes, our insistence on these principles will help ensure that the Commonwealth gets fleshed out in a desirable and necessary way, particularly on the nuclear question.

Shevardnadze, too, sees the Commonwealth as the only reasonable way to sort out and provide for a peaceful transformation. However, he argues, that those who put the Commonwealth together didn't think it through, haven't worked out the details, and must come to an unmistakable understanding on who controls nuclear weapons and the military. Indeed, he believes our leverage is essential now to push the members of the Commonwealth to the necessary understandings on the critical command and control arrangements.

Shevardnadze's main concern is that the potential for military disintegration and for mob rule is growing very quickly. To get us to push the parties in the right direction, Shevardnadze would have us withhold our diplomatic recognition of the Republics. He argues that this is our big card, especially because this is what the Republics most desire and what they believe is necessary to give them legitimacy. If the question of command and control is not sorted out, he believes the Commonwealth will never get off the ground and we'll see disintegration within Russia itself and most likely in the other Republics as well.

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2013-0834-MR

MM 7/27/2015

Kozyrev, too, fears possible disintegration. But he argues that immediate recognition of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia (and maybe Kazakhstan) is necessary if we are to produce a meaningful Commonwealth. He wants us to use the five principles as a criteria to determine whether we would recognize the remaining Republics. While he would like us to withhold recognition of the non-Slavic Republics until they very clearly embrace and implement our five principles, he seeks immediate recognition of the Slavic Republics for two very different reasons.

On the one hand, he feels it would give a boost to the Commonwealth because Ukraine in particular will only adhere to a coordinating mechanism on the military and other key issues if its need to acquire international standing and legitimacy is fully recognized. On the other hand, he feels immediate recognition of Russia is in order to overcome the confusion of authority between Russia and the center that currently makes it difficult for anyone to be held accountable.

In essence, Kozyrev's Commonwealth argument is driven by his perception of Ukraine's great psychological need to have its independent identity recognized and legitimized. Only once this psychological need is satisfied, Ukraine will be confident enough and politically able to go along with coordinating arrangements on nuclear, military, economic and border issues. If the Ukrainian need for identity is not so recognized, Kozyrev is convinced, the Ukrainians will pull away and oppose any of the elements that would make the Commonwealth meaningful.

Kozyrev's argument for immediate recognition of Russia is driven largely by his concern that there is no decision-making process within Russia right now. Only when Russia knows that it is being treated as an independent state will it be ready to sort out its own decision-making rules and assume the responsibilities of a real state. In the meantime, the existence of two Presidents in Moscow -- one for the center and one for Russia -- has created confusion and ambiguity on where authority resides. This was the reason he said he could not respond to my questions dealing with who is the appropriate address on a host of issues:

- nuclear command and control;
- proliferation and the development of export controls;
- Russian payment on US agricultural credit guarantees; and
- perhaps most importantly, getting humanitarian assistance to those in Moscow and other Russian cities who are in the greatest need.

I don't raise his use of the recognition issue in this way to diminish what may be the value of early recognition of Russia.

I think the desire now for such recognition may be understandable, but it is certainly not going to be a panacea. The Russian inability to tell us who in the Russian Republic or in Moscow can help us work out the logistics, the distribution and the monitoring of food assistance, suggests the Russians have yet to get serious on basic questions of governing. Recognition, alone, isn't going to solve that problem. If the Russians want us to help them, they're going to have to make it possible for us to do so and I will make this point very clear to Yeltsin tomorrow. (Indeed, knowing that they have worked out the nuclear and military control questions and that they can give us the "addresses" -- the individuals who can solve problems -- may be the appropriate criteria for us to use in recognizing Russia.)

To sum up, at this stage there are many more questions than there are answers. At one level the Russians (and even the center in the person of someone like Shevardnadze) believe we must play a pivotal role in helping to flesh out the Commonwealth agreement. At another level, there continues to be a preoccupation with sorting out very general political arrangements, while unfortunately, very little focus is given to addressing public needs at the grass roots.

In this connection, there was one other interesting point of convergence between Kozyrev and Shevardnadze. Both responded positively when I asked what their reaction would be to the US military flying in food assistance and helping the distribution on the ground using US military trucks. Each felt that such US military engagement would be acceptable if it was a joint US-Soviet military effort. They each thought this would be good for the Soviet military. And, in fact, each felt this might be the only way to make sure that those who really need food and medical assistance in such critical cities as Moscow and St. Petersburg actually get it.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1991

NOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III



Sending this along in case you haven't seen it.

Secret Attachment

2 pages only

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Cable	Re: UNSYG: [United Nations Secretary General] [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (1 pp.)	10/14/91	(b)(1)	S

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Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [2] [1]

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 By MM on 3/10/2016

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
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AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/31/2014

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 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PER E.O. 135262010-1118-MR
SCS 11/31/13THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS WITH ASSAD AND WITH THE PALESTINIANS

After coming close to the brink on at least two occasions, one with Assad and one with the Palestinians, I think our prospects are looking up. I expect a tough day tomorrow with Shamir, and his colleagues, but at this point I think we could be in position to issue the invitations on Friday, giving everyone three days to respond.

To be sure, this will depend on getting the names from the Palestinians tomorrow and I've learned one is never going to grow rich betting on them. Still, I think we made enough headway today to get very close. I may need you to call Gorbachev tomorrow to help get the Soviets to restore their relations with Israel on Friday at the time we announce the invitations. That should improve the climate in Israel and make it more difficult to say "no" to the invitation.

Based on my meeting with Assad today, I'm now convinced the Syrians will say yes. Though Shara may have obscured that fact in his press conference with me, the fact is we came out of Damascus better than I thought we would.

After another five hour meeting with Assad today, we settled our letter of assurance (LOA) and he agreed to the draft invitation. We met some of his needs in the LOA by reiterating our policies on Palestinians and Jerusalem (basically by drawing on language we already had in our Palestinian LOA) and by dropping any reference to the multilaterals in his assurance letter.

We maintained the language on multilateral meetings in the invitation and Assad accepted it, basically saying he wouldn't go, others shouldn't, but he'd go to the conference and the bilaterals even if the multilaterals are going on. (And he acknowledged the Egyptians and Jordanians really wanted the multilaterals and the Gulf states would go.)

It took some painstaking work to get there, and I had to throw one temper tantrum about walking away from all this, but in the end Assad came through. And having Syria committed helps with both Palestinians and Israelis.

Bush Library Photocopy
George Bush Handwriting

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With the Palestinians, once again I was greeted with an effort to get something more on Jerusalem and settlements. I blew up, telling them I respected them and cared deeply about their plight, but I told them I was sick and tired of the PLO sitting in villas in Tunis and blocking those living under occupation from pursuing the one chance they have to end that occupation. I told them I'd gone as far as I could go, and this process was coming to an end in 48 hours.

They got the message and told me they thought they could have the names by Thursday night or Friday morning. I said I needed them by tomorrow night and I also suggested that if they have 25 candidates for the delegation -- and a meeting with all of them might make it easier to finalize the decision -- I'd meet with all of them tomorrow night. I think the symbolism of such a meeting might also be very good here in Israel.

In short, I'm hopeful but still cautious. This was a good day on the Middle East roller-coaster, but tomorrow promises to be tough and the Palestinians still must deliver -- and do so in a feasible way. We'll see if they are able to.

OCTOBER 16, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON *oj*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1991

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SCS 11/31/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS WITH ASSAD AND WITH THE PALESTINIANS

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In short, I'm hopeful but still cautious. This was a good day on the Middle East roller-coaster, but tomorrow promises to be tough and the Palestinians still must deliver -- and do so in a feasible way. We'll see if they are able to.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1991

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MY DAY IN DAMASCUS

My discussions with President Assad were basically what I expected them to be: long -- they were over eight hours in two separate meetings; tedious in terms of going over fourteen points that he wanted revised in the letter of assurances; and difficult insofar as we could not resolve our differences on multilateral negotiations. That's probably our only remaining problem and I really won't know until tomorrow whether our inclusion of a watered-down phrase on "multilaterals" in the invitation will have him decide to walk away from the process. As I've said to you before, Assad likes to go to the brink and sometimes crosses it, and it seems clear there's no give in his opposition to the multilaterals. But is he willing to risk his new standing internationally, his relationship with us, and the real possibility he will let the Israelis off the hook by turning down the invitation?

That's a pretty big gamble, but one ought to be careful betting on which way he'll go. Much as with the Palestinians, the Egyptians, Saudis and Jordanians are confident Assad is hooked and has made a basic decision. I'm less sure. I'm prepared to try to find a formula that certainly doesn't obligate him to go to multilateral discussions and to highlight that it's really up to the parties to decide who wants to go and what they'll talk about.

I feel we can't simply walk away from the multilaterals because we genuinely believe they'll promote progress in the bilaterals and support the development of peace. And clearly countries like Jordan and Egypt really want there to be regional discussions on arms control, the economic plight of Palestinians in the territories and those forced to leave Kuwait and the Gulf, etc. (The Jordanians, with 300,000 Palestinians having been forced to come to Jordan from the Gulf in the last fourteen months, are especially desperate for these regional talks, as the King made clear to me last night.) Moreover, Israelis, if they're to actually make tangible concessions, will need to see that Arab attitudes have changed and that they're prepared to treat Israel as a normal part of the region by including them in regional discussions.

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Assad is unswayed by some of these realities. Put simply, he wants to keep Israel isolated and make clear there are no regional rewards until the Israelis withdraw from the Golan. His weakness, not strength, drives him to oppose any multilaterals, particularly as he fears the other Arabs will get into them, start forging agreements, and reduce Israel's need and incentives in responding to him.

I'm hopeful Assad will still agree to come to the conference and go into the bilaterals and not link his participation to the absence of the multilaterals. And I think there's a chance he will, but I'm going to have to make a judgment tomorrow on whether I need to do more to keep him in the process. (As important as the multilaterals are, I don't want to lose the bilaterals.)

On the Palestinian front, there's good news and bad news. The good, they've finally gone to Amman in a very visible way. The bad, they're not going to meet my deadline on giving me the names. I think the names have been selected -- indeed, the Egyptians gave me a list they thought might be it and that same list appeared in the Jordanian press today. While having some on it who are unacceptable, out of the twenty names, we would have no problem producing fourteen who meet the agreed criteria.

I'll go to Jerusalem tomorrow afternoon and see the Palestinians, but I bet I won't get the names until after I see Shamir (if then). If I do get them by Thursday, we could still be in a position to go with the invitations by Friday or Saturday. But that depends on getting the names and being certain that Assad hasn't left the reservation.

As you can see, I've just had another day on the Middle East roller coaster. I don't intend to ride it for much longer -- and as I wrote you yesterday, letting everyone know that may be the best way to produce the outcome we seek.

*This is almost as much fun
as a Y.R. convention!*

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN CAIRO AND JORDAN

Peace Process

My meetings with President Mubarak and King Hussein today went very well. Each in his own way is working very hard to produce a conference. They both think we're going to get there and they're both making every effort to cajole, to pressure, and to threaten the Palestinians to do what they must do. Once again, what I have seen today indicates that the PLO is blocking the necessary steps to put together a joint delegation in the timeframe that we need.

Mubarak and Hussein each made great efforts to ensure that we would get Palestinian names that fit our criteria by tonight, or certainly, not later than tomorrow. The Egyptians told us they had a promise to get these names by 7:00 pm tonight. But as is so often the case with "Tunis," promises are rarely kept and conditions are nearly always added. Not only did the Egyptians not get the answer by 7:00 pm (much less this evening), but the Jordanians were told that the answer could only be forthcoming if we made a further concession on Jerusalem representation. I told the Jordanian Prime Minister to tell them "absolutely not" and to say that I was getting pretty close to blowing the whistle on the PLO and its efforts to block a peace process that in the first instance will help Palestinians under occupation.

Notwithstanding the events of the day, both the Jordanians and Egyptians are confident that we will get the names, they will reflect the criteria we will need, and we will receive them before I get to Israel. We'll see. I'd told both Mubarak and Hussein that I wanted the names in advance of getting to Israel so I could credibly tell Shamir (without revealing the names) that we knew who was going to be on the Palestinian part of the joint delegation and having checked out these people, we were in a position to say, with confidence, that they met the agreed criteria. Unfortunately, the way diplomacy works in the Middle East, one always has to go to the brink before anything becomes resolvable. I'm sure that's what we will find here and I have little doubt that's what I'm going to find when I head to Damascus tomorrow.

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While I don't share the confidence of Mubarak and Hussein, I do think we remain very well positioned and I know that Palestinians not only want this process, but are scared to death for being blamed for its failure. So I'm going to press ahead and I'm going to make it clear that I'm near the end of the road and either we're going to make this thing work now or I'm going to walk away from it and I'm going to point the finger at who's responsible.

Other Issues

Egypt and Libya: Mubarak again made a run at me on Libya. Noting the value of not having them as troublemakers during the Gulf war, he also emphasized how important it is now to ensure that they won't disrupt our efforts to promote peace. The Egyptians worry, in particular, about Libyan ties to extreme Palestinian groups and how Libyan support for those groups now might be far more threatening and dangerous (especially for moderate Palestinians taking part in the negotiations). That's their main argument, but I think their position is also informed by an increasing stake economically in Libya. Libya serves as a safety valve for excess Egyptian population and it is clear at this point that Qadhafi is quite fearful of what we may do to him and is using every channel he has to try to convince us that he's changed his stripes. Egyptians are conveying this, but I suspect also because they believe he really can be kept quiet for some time to come.

One other issue that Mubarak raised was Saudi funding of fundamentalists within Egypt. I said I would look into it and would do something about it, if were true.

Jordan and Saudi Arabia: I had some good news on this front that I think has added to King Hussein's decisiveness on the peace question. He had explained last time how bad the economic situation was here and how it threatened to destabilize the Kingdom. He asked if there was anything we could do to begin opening things up with the Saudis. When Zaid Bin Shaker saw me last week he said what would really help the Jordanians would be to have the Saudis open their borders and their markets again to Jordanian produce. I sent a personal message to Saud asking if they could open their borders by the time I got to Jordan, saying I thought this would help the King do some difficult things at a difficult time in Jordan. During my meeting with the King tonight I got an answer from the Saudis that King Fahd had approved the request to open the borders. King Hussein and his colleagues were extremely pleased, noting that this would have an immediate benefit for Jordanian farmers and truckers. They want to build on this and I told them the potential exists, but they're going to also have to help themselves with the Saudis and the Gulf states by making it clear that he understood that these states had the right to defend themselves against Iraq.

One last point: I think the King was really touched by your personal note. I think it helped with some sensitive things I've asked him to do and I'll report to you when I get back.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

General,

This was sent by driver to
Camp David per Patty Presock's
instructions.

WHSR

APNSA Has Seen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ // NODIS //

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FOLLOWING MOSCOW 29838 DATED OCT 18 SENT ACTION SECSTATE.
REPEATED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 29838

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL PARM ECON, UR
SUBJECT: MY OCTOBER 17 MEETING WITH EDUARD SHEVARNADZE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. JIM, I KNOW YOU HAVE OTHER THINGS ON YOUR MIND, BUT I HAD A VERY GOOD TALK WITH EDUARD SHEVARNADZE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON (OCTOBER 17) AND THOUGHT YOU MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN SOME OF HIS REMARKS. THERE IS LITTLE NEW TO REPORT AND NOTHING EARTHSHAKING, BUT I THOUGHT THAT KNOWING HIS THINKING AT THIS STAGE WOULD BE USEFUL TO YOU. HE WAS RELAXED AND IN GOOD HUMOR. HIS GREAT FEAR IS NOT OF ANOTHER COUP, BUT OF A SPONTANEOUS POPULAR UPRISING THAT COULD LEAD TO VERY UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS TAKING POWER

3. STRANGELY, HE WAS RATHER OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE POLITICAL SITUATION HERE. HE BELIEVES THERE WILL BE AN ECONOMIC TREATY THAT EVEN THE UKRAINIANS WILL EVENTUALLY SIGN, AND IN THE END SOME KIND OF POLITICAL AGREEMENT AS WELL. HE SAID THAT GORBACHEV AND YELTSIN ARE GETTING ALONG WELL ENOUGH TO WORK TOGETHER. HE STATED THAT THERE'S NO LOVE LOST BETWEEN THEM, OF COURSE, BUT THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THEY HAVE COMMON INTERESTS. YELTSIN, MEANWHILE, SEEMS TO HAVE HIS OWN PROBLEMS WITH INDEPENDENCE-MINDED GROUPS WITHIN RUSSIA. (I ASKED ABOUT YELTSIN'S HEALTH, AND EDUARD DISMISSED THE QUESTION AS IF

10/19 - (En Route home from Jerusalem)

POTUS:

I hope you will
have a chance
to read this.

JMB III

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YELTSIN WERE FINE.)

4. THE REAL PROBLEM, EDUARD SAID, IS THAT THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AGREEMENTS WON'T MEAN ANYTHING FOR FOLKS ON THE GROUND. HE SAID, RIGHTLY, OF COURSE, THAT IN THE PERIOD SINCE THE PUTSCH, THE GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN WORKING ON A "PARALLEL TRACK" -- I.E., BESIDES SEEKING POLITICAL AGREEMENT THROUGH VARIOUS TREATIES, THEY SHOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN MOVING FORWARD WITH CONCRETE REFORM.

5. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID THEY HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT THE PRIVATIZATION OF HOUSING FOR NEARLY FOUR YEARS NOW, YET BARELY A HANDFUL OF RESIDENCES HAVE ACTUALLY BEEN HANDED OVER. HE WAS ABSOLUTELY DESPONDENT OVER THE MONEY SUPPLY SITUATION. INFLATION IS SERIOUS AND RISING, BUT THERE'S NO SIGN OF ANY LETUP IN THE PRINTING OF NEW CURRENCY. NOR DID HE THINK MUCH OF THE IDEA OF SEPARATE REPUBLIC CURRENCIES: IT JUST MEANT THE LIKELIHOOD OF TEN PRINTING PRESSES OUT OF CONTROL, INSTEAD OF ONE. HE SAID THEY HAVE GOT TO FIND SOME WAY SOON OF RESTORING SOME VALUE TO THE CURRENCY, AND HE APPEALED TO US FOR HELP. HE ALSO STRESSED THE NEED TO GET ON WITH THE PRIVATIZATION OF LAND AND TO ACCELERATE CUTS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE -- STEPS, HE SAID, WHICH COULD HAVE A REAL, IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON PEOPLE. I ADVISED HIM THAT THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM WAS NOT ONLY ESSENTIAL BUT WOULD BE A VERY CREDIBLE ACTION IN THE U.S. THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN THE SHORT RUN AND STRENGTHEN OUR HAND TO MOVE POLITICALLY IN THE U.S. -- THAT PRESIDENT BUSH HAS HIS OWN PROBLEMS TO DEAL WITH.

6. THE FAILURE OF THE PUTSCH HAD RAISED PEOPLE'S EXPECTATIONS THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES WERE FINALLY GOING TO HAPPEN, HE SAID. YET, SINCE THE PUTSCH, WE AGREED, LITTLE OR NOTHING HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, AND HE FELT THERE HAS EVEN BEEN REGRESSION. WHEN I ASKED IF HE DIDN'T THINK THAT AN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT COULD MOVE US TO THE NEXT PLATEAU, HE AGREED. BUT, LIKE US, HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION.

7. EDUARD DOESN'T FORSEE ANOTHER COUP. BUT HE SAID HE CAN IMAGINE -- EVEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE -- SOME KIND OF SPONTANEOUS, POPULAR UPRISING THAT WOULD BRING OUT THE DEMOGOGUES AND THAT COULD LEAD TO VERY UNDESIRABLE ELEMENTS TAKING POWER.

8. WE TOUCHED ON A NUMBER OF OTHER POINTS OF INTEREST. HE TOLD ME IT WAS VERY GOOD THAT WE HAD GONE TO ALMA-ATA AND WERE GIVING NAZARBAYEV SOME ATTENTION. HE APPLAUDED YOUR PHONE CALL THAT HE HAD READ ABOUT IN THE PRESS HERE

AND URGED ME TO GO BACK THERE. NAZARBAYEV, HE SAID, IS "THE THIRD MOST IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THIS GAME."

9. HE WAS ALSO VERY HIGH ON THE YOUNG PRESIDENT OF KIRGIZIA, MR. AKAYEV, WHOM I MET WITH LAST WEEKEND. EDUARD SAID THAT AKAYEV IS A REAL DEMOCRAT, THAT HE'S AGAINST BOTH COMMUNIST AND ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, AND THAT HE'S GOT TREMENDOUS POPULAR SUPPORT. AKAYEV, AS YOU KNOW, IS GOING TO THE UNITED STATES NEXT WEEK. I DON'T THINK HIS TRIP IS BEING ADVANCED VERY WELL, AND I TOLD HIM (AND EDUARD) THAT WE WOULD DO WHAT WE COULD TO HELP. EDUARD SAID THAT IT WOULD BE VERY GOOD IF THE PRESIDENT WOULD SEE HIM FOR A FEW MINUTES, THAT IT WOULD REALLY HELP SOMEONE WHO HAS ACCOMPLISHED A LOT. AKAYEV, HE SAID, IS ONE OF THE "PUREST REFORM-MINDED DEMOCRATS WE HAVE." HE URGED ME TO CONTINUE TO DO ALL I CAN TO ENCOURAGE HIM AND OTHER LIBERAL REPUBLIC LEADERS, AND HE REPEATED TO ME THAT A PHOTO OP WITH THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE MORE THAN WORTH THE TROUBLE. (NOTE: I WAS PLEASED TO LEARN THIS MORNING THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL SEE MR. AKAYEV.)

10. WE TALKED BRIEFLY ABOUT DON ATWOOD'S DEFENSE CONVERSION TRIP. EDUARD PROMISED THAT HE WOULD SEE DON AND HIS GROUP AND GIVE THE TRIP HIS FULL SUPPORT. HE HAD VERY HIGH PRAISE FOR ARKADIIY VOL'SKIY, THE MAIN GUY WE'VE BEEN DEALING WITH ON THIS QUESTION. VOL'SKIY, HE SAID, IS "ONE OF THE MOST RESPONSIBLE MEN IN THIS COUNTRY."

11. THAT LED EDUARD TO SOME COMMENTS ON THE PRESIDENT'S ARMS INITIATIVE, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS VERY SIGNIFICANT AND TIMELY. BUT HE ALSO INSISTED THAT WE COULD DO EVEN MORE, THAT FAR MORE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS ARE WITHIN OUR GRASP AND THAT PRECISELY NOW IS THE TIME TO MOVE. HE SAID THAT A TOP PRIORITY IS GETTING ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE. AND HE SAID HE HAD BEEN TALKING REGULARLY ABOUT THIS TO PRESIDENT GORBACHEV WHO AGREED THAT SOME FURTHER INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA IS NECESSARY. EDUARD SAID THAT HE WOULD DO ANYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD PASS ON HIS REMARKS TO YOU AND PRESIDENT BUSH.

12. EDUARD ALSO MADE ONE OTHER REQUEST. TALKS ARE TO BEGIN SOON WITH THE THREE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS, AND HE IS GOING TO LEAD ONE OF THE THREE SOVIET DELEGATIONS. (WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE THE DELEGATION TO LITHUANIA.) YAKOVLEV WILL ALSO LEAD ONE, AND SOBCHAK WILL HEAD THE THIRD. EDUARD SAID THAT IT MIGHT HELP MATTERS A GREAT DEAL IF WE COULD SAY SOMETHING TO THE BALTIC GOVERNMENTS AT THE "RIGHT MOMENT," I.E. GET THEM TO BE FLEXIBLE, PARTICULARLY ON THE QUESTION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET

TROOPS. HE ASSURED ME THERE IS NO QUESTION OF SOVIET TROOPS LEAVING. BUT GIVEN THE HUGE SOCIAL PROBLEMS ALREADY FACING THE ARMY, WITH JOBS, HOUSING AND THE LIKE, THE ISSUES OF TIMING AND PACE WERE CRUCIAL AND, IF NOT HANDLED WELL, COULD LEAD TO NASTY CONFRONTATIONS. THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE NEED FOR US TO DO ANYTHING, HE WENT ON, THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVEN'T BEGUN YET. BUT COULD WE THINK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF TRYING TO USE OUR INFLUENCE AT AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT IN THE FUTURE? I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD SPEND SOME TIME THINKING ABOUT THIS AND WOULD LET WASHINGTON KNOW HIS THOUGHTS SO THAT THEY MIGHT BE READY.

13. FINALLY, I WANT TO TELL YOU, PERHAPS IMMODESTLY BUT NOT WITHOUT SOME PERSONAL SATISFACTION, THAT EDUARD BEGAN OUR LONG CONVERSATION WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE HAD BEEN WANTING TO SEE ME TO LET ME KNOW THAT THE WORD WAS OUT, THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET AND RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, THAT WE HAD BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN ASSISTING THEM AS THEY GRAPPLE WITH THEIR VARIOUS PROBLEMS, AND PARTICULARLY WITH THEIR POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES IN REACHING THESE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL AGREEMENTS. HE TOLD ME THAT OUR ACTIVITY AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAD BEEN NOTED AND THAT PEOPLE ARE PLEASED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE HAD SENT SOMEONE WHO KNOWS HOW TO MOVE AROUND AND DEAL WITH PEOPLE, AND WHO CAN COMBINE THAT WITH THE ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE TO AND ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE. HE SAID HE HOPED IT WOULD CONTINUE. ON A VERY PERSONAL NOTE, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I CONTINUE TO MARVEL AT YOUR GOOD JUDGMENT, MR. SECRETARY, FOR HAVING ESTABLISHED A RELATIONSHIP WITH ME MANY YEARS AGO THAT HAS PROVED SO BENEFICIAL TO YOU AND THAT I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE WILL EVENTUALLY PROVE TO BE OF SOME SMALL BENEFIT TO ME (BEFORE WORKING FOR YOU HAS KILLED ME ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY AND SOCIALLY).

14. ONE OTHER NOTE. LAST NIGHT I SPENT TIME WITH ANATOLIY DOBRYNIN WHO SAID THE BEST THING AND A VERY IMPORTANT THING THAT BUSH AND BAKER COULD DO RIGHT NOW WOULD BE TO MAKE SOME UNSOLICITED GESTURE IN THE ECONOMIC AREA THAT WOULD SHOW THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. IS NOT LETTING THE EUROPEANS TAKE THE LEAD. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH DELEGATIONS AND VISITS ARE CRUCIAL, THE SOVIET PEOPLE DON'T UNDERSTAND ALL OF THIS, WHILE THE LEADERSHIP HERE HAS LITTLE TO SHOW TO GIVE THEM CONFIDENCE THAT THE U.S. IS GENUINELY CONCERNED.

15. THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER, JIM, IS THAT WE'RE WEARING PEOPLE OUT HERE, AT ALL LEVELS, WITH OUR NONSTOP MISSIONS AND FACTFINDING TRIPS. MORE AND MORE PEOPLE ARE BEGINNING TO WONDER IF WE'RE EVER GOING TO DO MORE THAN JUST TALK. I UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN

COORDINATING THINGS AND MOVING THE BUREAUCRACY. BUT I DO THINK THE TIME HAS COME FOR US TO DO SOME THINGS, AND TO STOP WAITING FOR THE SOVIETS TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER -- WHICH IS GOING TO BE A LONG TIME COMING, AND WHICH MAY NEVER HAPPEN. (THEY DON'T HAVE TO BE BIG THINGS, SOME LITTLE PROJECTS WILL DO. BUT THEY HAVE TO BE REAL.) I THINK THIS IS WHAT ANATOLIY WAS TRYING TO TELL ME IN HIS USUAL DIPLOMATIC WAY. AND I MIGHT ADD THAT THE PEOPLE IN THIS EMBASSY PROBABLY GENERALLY SHARE HIS VIEW. I'D BE INTERESTED IN HEARING FROM ZOELICK, ROSS, AND HEWETT ON THIS SUBJECT. STRAUSS UNQUOTE EAGLEBURGER

BT

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