

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
administrative marker by the George Bush Presidential
Library Staff.**

Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-006

Folder Title:
Baker Trip Reports [1] [5]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Meetings with [Middle East] (3 pp.)	1/10/91	(b)(1)	TS
02. Memo	James A. Baker, III to General Scowcroft Re: Gulf and the Baltics (2 pp.)	1/13/91	(b)(1)	S
03a. Draft Cable	From Brent Scowcroft Re: Message for the Secretary (2 pp.)	1/12/91	(b)(1)	S
03b. Report	Re: Here is the plan: (1 pp.)	1/11/91	(b)(1)	
03c. Report	Re: Response to Soviet Proposal (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	
04. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: London Meetings (2 pp.)	1/8/91	(b)(1)	TS
05. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Tuesday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	1/9/91	(b)(1)	TS
06a. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Gulf Trip (3 pp.)	11/6/90	(b)(1)	TS
06b. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Cairo Meetings (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Page 1 of 2

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [5]

Pinksheet Number: cap1352
OA/ID Number: 91164-006
Date Closed: 8/31/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
07. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Paris Meetings (2 pp.)	11/10/90	(b)(1)	TS
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: London Meetings (2 pp.)	11/10/92	(b)(1)	TS
09. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: My Meetings with [Middle East Leaders] (2 pp.)	10/16/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Israel and Jordan [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	7/21/92	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Libson [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	5/24/92	(b)(1)	S
12. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Libson [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	5/24/92	(b)(1)	S
13. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Cairo Meetings (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	TS

Page 2 of 2

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~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX #

ADMIN FAX #

PAGES

DTG

RELEASER

FROM / LOCATION:

ACTION / LOCATION:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1.

2.

REMARKS:

TIME OF RECEIPT

110530Z

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 8/31/09

33 : 21 : 11 10 12

GS-8

Top Secret
Sensitive

File

January 10, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

IN ADDITION, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY
EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN COME OVER AND
PICK UP A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202)
647-5291.

THANKS VERY MUCH.

PAGE

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH SAUDIS

I had separate meetings with King Fahd and Foreign Minister Saud in Riyadh, including restricted sessions with each. Saud, Crown Prince Abdullah, Defense Minister Sultan, and Bandar attended the larger session with Fahd; only Bandar attended the restricted sessions.

Saud

In the restricted session, as I have at other stops, I told Saud that this visit constituted the final consultation prior to any decision to use force. I told him that you had made no decision to commence offensive operations. I did say that you were inclined to use force "sooner rather than later," but I declined his request to be more specific.

Saud proposed the following notification procedure: we would inform Bandar in Washington, who would telephone Fahd and pass a pre-arranged codeword in an otherwise personal conversation. Simultaneously, Ambassador Freeman would pass the codeword to Foreign Minister Saud. Upon receipt of this information, Fahd, Abdullah, Sultan, Saud, and Prince Naif would proceed to their command center until the operation commenced. (Bandar said this could be done without any publicity.)

I told them I would report this proposal to you as their preferred approach. We should discuss it on my return, along with the notification proposals from Mubarak and Assad.

Saud said they intended to tell Fahd that offensive operations would commence between 15 and 25 January. I reiterated that you had made no decision to commence operations.

Saud said that their commander, General Khalid, already had authority to go when General Schwarzkopf told him to do so. He asked when I thought they should instruct their people to take civil defense measures and certain of their embassies to begin drawdowns. I said I would do so now, though they could still explain these steps as defensive measures against an unpredictable Iraq.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0835-4R

MM 11/16/2016

On 1991 financial support, Saud and Bandar asked that I raise assistance only in general terms with Fahd. I agreed, but gave them the specific figures we requested. They did not flinch. Bandar reiterated what Fahd had said on an earlier trip: if we are here to fight if necessary, money is no problem. That is why they prefer monthly accounts, to avoid any impression that they are simply funding an extended US deployment presence.

Saud then leveled about Syria. He said Assad was not prepared to engage in operations against Iraqi forces unless Iraq attacked Saudi Arabia. Only in that case would his forces fight, and he would also attack Iraq from Syria. Saud said he and Bandar were pressing Fahd to push Assad to do more, and asked me to weigh in with Fahd.

In our larger meeting, Saud discussed efforts to develop their own "Arab solution" to counter Saddam's rhetoric. Their solution would embrace UN and Arab League resolutions, and they hope to get an Arab summit convened prior to the 15th to endorse their approach.

Fahd

Fahd began by telling me that they had televised my entire press conference on their English language station. I read him your letter to Saddam, which he said Aziz refused because Saddam "could not respond to it in a logical manner."

Fahd said that Saddam's public relations chief had defected and was put on Saudi television a few days ago. He said Saddam reacted "violently," by going on Iraqi television to attack Fahd personally. He said he would send the tape to you.

When I indicated our concerns about Syria being prepared to fight, Fahd said: "Rest assured. This will happen. I will work on it." He said Assad had just been on Syrian television and issued a statement that was threatening, even an ultimatum. Fahd said it was unprecedented in its tone.

On 1991 contributions -- to Desert Shield and to Turkey -- Fahd said: "We are putting the lives of our people on the line. Money is not more valuable than lives. What is money for if not to defend your country? If we have the same objectives, what does money matter? Regarding Saudi Arabia, there is no problem." I told him that we anticipated \$30-32 billion in increased Desert Shield costs through September 30th, assuming no conflict.

Fahd said that either Saddam will begin to withdraw in the next few days, or he will enter "the unknown." Saddam has been sending messages to Fahd saying "they could work things out."

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 3 -

Fahd said that if he received a signed letter from Saddam pledging full withdrawal and if Saddam called him, Fahd would invite him to talk.

In the restricted session, General Graves passed to Fahd General Schwarzkopf's suggested operational role for Syrian forces: as a reserve for the Arab forces (including Egyptians) who would be liberating Kuwait City. Fahd said he would pass this information to Assad in advance of my Saturday meeting with him.

On notification prior to possible military action, Fahd was very relaxed, saying that he had already made clear that he was with us. He said that however we wanted to notify him was acceptable to him, but that if and when you decided to go, he was with you.

Lastly, I briefed Fahd on Shamir's no-preemption pledge, Larry's trip this weekend, and our efforts to keep Israel from joining any conflict. I told Fahd I wanted to reconfirm his commitment to stick with us if Israel is attacked and joins in. He did so without hesitation.

~~TOP SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

~~IMMEDIATE~~ **FLASH**

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # Booths #3

ADMIN FAX # _____

RECORD # _____

PAGES 3DTG 131656ZRELEASER RW

FROM/LOCATION

1. SAM 974

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHSR

2. _____

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131701Z Jan 91

4. _____

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6. _____

7. _____

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. _____

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

PLS PASS TO GEN. SCOWCRAFT.

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09**EYES ONLY**

January 13, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

PLEASE DELIVER THE ATTACHED EYES ONLY MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

MANY THANKS.

SUN 13 JAN 91 12:02

PG.03

January 13, 1991

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: GULF AND THE BALTICS

Brent,

Thanks for your message. I agree that we need to stay in touch and coordinate closely, especially in times like this. It may not always be easy when I'm on the move out here but it is essential.

I cannot believe my message to Perez De Cuellar could present any problem. Substantively, it was basically a replay of the Aziz meeting, in which all agencies were represented. I also simply repeated what we put in the briefing cables that went to posts after the meeting. All agencies participated in the drafting and clearing of those cables.

Obviously, if I'd known there was even a hint of difference in what the President said to Perez De Cuellar and this letter, I would not have sent it. But I was never briefed on the President's conversations. (And I'm not aware that anyone was briefed to pass a message to me.) And since we thought it useful to provide a briefing of the Aziz meeting in advance of De Cuellar's trip, I didn't think there would be a problem. I still don't know what the substantive problem is, if any.

On my Shevardnadze message: again we had not received a brief on the President's phone call or the meetings with Bessmertnykh. All we knew was that Marlin's statement, "The Soviets have given us some interesting ideas on the Gulf", was triggering a lot of questions from our traveling press. I had Dennis call back to find out what had gone on so we would know how to respond to all the press queries we were getting.

Even had we known the content of the President's comments to Gorbachev and of your meeting with Bessmertnykh on the Baltics, I still would have sent the Shevardnadze message. It can't hurt to double-track messages on the Baltics. Moreover, by getting to Shevardnadze the reactions of Mitterrand, Kohl, Dumas, Genscher, and Hurd -- and the effect a crackdown would have on their willingness to provide continued assistance to the Soviet Union -- I was seeking to provide Shevardnadze an incentive and a credible basis on which to go to Gorbachev and talk to him about the consequences of his moves toward imposing Presidential rule in the Baltics.

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-0835-MR

MM 5/19/2015

- 2 -

Finally, on the President's question about our mentioning the requirement "to maintain order in Iraq," I raised that in my meetings because our Arab partners haven't thought at all about post-war Iraq. I wanted to jog their thinking and make clear we have no desire to play a role in preserving order in Iraq. At the same time, as our experiences in Grenada and Panama indicate, we do have some responsibility for the areas where our forces have been in action. Raising this issue now with the Saudis and Egyptians offers us the best chance either to avoid or minimize any role for US forces in Iraq after the conflict.

In any case, Brent, the lesson here as your message suggested, is for us to stay in close touch. That's why we always have all agencies represented on the airplane.

Warm regards,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Jim", written over the words "Warm regards,".

12 JAN

FLORENCE,

THIS WAS
FAXED TO SEC. BAKER'S
AIRCRAFT SATURDAY
EVENING.

Sat Room

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

January 12, 1991

VIA PRIVACY CHANNEL

~~SECRET~~

TO: ~~X~~

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IN A SEALED ENVELOPE/EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY:

Jim:

Several Miscellaneous Items.

1. Attached are the texts of the incoming from Gorbachev which Bessmertnyhk presented to the President and the President's reply. The President amplified his statement verbally to Bessmertnyhk, emphasizing the importance at this last hour of staying the course and not giving Saddam Hussein any indication that the resolve and solidarity of the coalition were wavering.

2. Brian Mulroney asked Derek Burney to try out on me the idea of calling a UN Security Council meeting at the Head of Government level before, on, or just after the 15th. I gave Derek a strong negative response, citing the many reasons why it would be a seriously counter-productive move. I relay this to you because Mulroney may raise it with you tomorrow.

3. The President had a question on your "Friday Meetings" report. Your report mentioned the requirement "to maintain order in Iraq" and the President worries that there may be some consideration of US troops "occupying" Baghdad or something like that. He is disquieted at any such prospect.

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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1186-ur
mm 1/9/2015

4. I think we need to be especially mindful of our coordination while you are traveling. For Example, we were unaware you were planning to send a letter to Perez de Cuellar. The thrust of your letter was rather different from the two conversations the President had with him before he left. Also, I noted your demarche to Shevardnadze on the Baltics. It was a good paper, but the President had already weighed in on that subject when he spoke with Gorbachev. He also did so in person with Bessmertnyhk, and asked me to amplify our concern to Bessmertnyhk following his meeting with the President. In addition, State last night proposed a demarche on the Baltics for Matlock to deliver to the Foreign Ministry.

5. None of this is a disaster, but it is easy for things to fall through the crack when we are so far apart.

Warm regards,

Brent

~~SECRET~~

*from Gess, meeting 1-11-91
To President*

Here is the plan:

- Saddam Hussein announces the withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait.
- The United States officially declares that the possibility of military action against Iraq is ruled out.
- The Security Council adapts a resolution under which the economic sanctions will be lifted upon the completion of the Iraqi troops withdrawal.
- After the Iraqi troops withdrawal is completed, Saudi Arabia and Egypt shall immediately begin negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait on disputed territorial and financial questions (we are prepared to agree on this with Riyadh and Cairo).
- The permanent members of the UN Security Council declare that upon the completion of the Iraqi troops withdrawal an effort will begin to prepare an international conference to establish a strategic security system for the entire Middle East, and it is in this context that the Palestinian problem will be addressed.
- After the Iraqi troops have been withdrawn the number of the US armed forces in Saudi Arabia will be reduced in a phased manner and finally will be fully withdrawn when the situation is normalized.

Presented to the Security Council 3:15 11/1/71
1. General Secy

RESPONSE TO SOVIET PROPOSAL

-- We appreciate the spirit of cooperation in which this consultation is taking place.

-- We applaud the spirit in which the Soviet plan is put forth. No one wants a war, and if it can be avoided in a manner fully consistent with the 12 UN Security Council resolutions then we will all benefit.

-- One major reason the policy has been so successful is that the two of us have acted in such close concert. We could not have reached this point had this not been the case.

-- If our efforts are to finally succeed, we must not depart even the slightest bit from what the Security Council has put forth.

-- We agree with diplomatic efforts that include a full and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. We have made it clear that Iraq and Iraqi forces would not be attacked during and after such a withdrawal. But I believe it is essential that we not go beyond that point.

-- It would be a disaster for us all if at this late date we were to do anything which allowed Saddam Hussein to claim victory. Such a move could also lead to serious difficulties within the UN coalition.

-- Thus, while I understand and appreciate the motivation for these proposals I would like to urge you not to proceed with them.

-- The best hope for peace at this point is to convince Saddam Hussein that he has nothing to gain and everything to lose by being obstinate.

-- If we hold out the prospect of concessions, no matter how small, he will take it as a sign of weakness and his reaction will be to see how much more he can get rather than focus on compliance with the U.N. resolutions.

January 8, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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PLEASE DELIVER EYES ONLY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

IN ADDITION, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY
EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN COME OVER AND
PICK UP A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202)
647-5291.

MANY THANKS.

~~TOP SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2011-0796-MR
SLC 7/20/12

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ✓

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: LONDON MEETINGS ✓

I had a good series of meetings Monday in London: Hurd, Kinnock, Woerner, Ordonez, and Poos.

✓ Hurd was solid, and he appreciated my reading your letter to Saddam Hussein to him. In that connection, he asked that we commit to consult with HMG before going beyond military targets in any operation; e.g., if we wanted to hit non-military targets like Takrit in the wake of chemical or biological weapons use. He also asked some questions we need to consider promptly. Specifically, how do we avoid significant civilian casualties and ecological damage if we strike BW storage facilities? Also, are we prepared to handle massive numbers of Iraqi POWs and wounded? I know our military is working hard on ~~these~~ issues, and I will discuss them with Norm Schwarzkopf in Riyadh on Thursday.

Kinnock was relatively firm, though he is getting pressed by his far left wing to give sanctions more time. His shadow foreign minister published an op-ed today, which called for full implementation of UNSC resolutions but suggested more time before force is considered. Kinnock, however, said categorically that he supported the use of force if necessary.

Woerner confirmed that Kohl and Genscher had both been furious at the Turks for the way the ACE Mobile Task Force deployment was handled -- or, he said, that was at least the reason they gave for slowing it down. Woerner said he thought the FRG would be supportive on PATRIOT deployments to Turkey, but only if it did not leak before I brief them in Bonn. Woerner also said he owed the Soviets an answer on when Gorbachev should visit NATO (Woerner is thinking March) and whether the meeting would be at the ministerial or head of state/government level. I told him we would get back to him on this issue, which we need to consider in light of current developments.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

Ordonez came from Madrid via a lunch with Dumas in Paris. I thanked him for their assistance on Gulf deployment and especially their recent decision to permit staging of B-52 flights (he said this decision must be kept quiet until hostilities). He fished a little bit for support of the French linkage idea, but he backed down when I said flatly no to the French idea. Ordonez said he had talked to Bendjedid after the latter's recent trip to Baghdad. Bendjedid said Saddam had doubts about whether we really would attack him and whether our real goal is his withdrawal or his destruction. Ordonez and I also spoke about the executions in El Salvador, which he said he and his government abhorred. I also got him to agree to have his government weigh in strongly with the FMLN to move to genuine negotiations.

Poos said the strong EC Council statement of last Friday was very tough to get. (The Dutch and British really helped us on this one.) However, that base now having been laid, Poos thinks we should stick solidly to our position, though he kept suggesting we look for diplomatic "opportunities" between January 9 and 15. Poos hopes to come to Washington in his Council Presidency role on January 28; I told him that could be a busy time, but if he came we wanted to make progress on the Uruguay Round.

I also was called by Dumas, who reported the following on the Vauzelle meeting with Saddam:

- o ✓ Vauzelle left with "some hope" for a peaceful solution.
- o ✓ Saddam did not say he would not withdraw and did not refer to Kuwait as the 19th Province. But he also did not say he would withdraw.
- o ✓ Saddam wants guarantees against attack.
- o ✓ Any solution must have an "Arab wrapping;" i.e., Saddam would want to cut a deal with the Saudis.

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY
(CLASSIFICATION)

Internal Comm
Back to
Brut Scowcroft

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 141

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES Spec Phone Call

DTG 091032Z

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: Caron Jackson/Assistant to Secy State

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. Scowcroft
2. GATES
3. COPY FOR EAGLEBURGER
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____

TIME OF RECEIPT

091040Z Ref

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

REMARKS: _____

~~TOP SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By cap NARA, Date 8/31/09

GS-8

January 9, 1991

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Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/25/2023

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2013-0835-MR(503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 11/16/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~TOP SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: TUESDAY MEETINGS

Mitterrand/Dumas

As I said on the telephone, the French will be with us when it counts. It just may be bumpy for the next week or so.

I met with Mitterrand for over an hour. Dumas, with whom I had met earlier, sat in, contrary to Mitterrand's pledge to you.

Mitterrand agreed that, in the event of hostilities, since they will not be part of the air campaign, a call from you two to three hours before initiation of the air campaign was sufficient prior notification.

After considerable hesitation, and only when I told him we needed to know where France stands, Mitterrand agreed to place his forces under our command and control for ground operations inside Iraq in the event of hostilities. Details will be worked out in military channels, perhaps between Colin and Admiral Lanxade, who is visiting the US.

The French continue to reject linkage in principle, but their various proposals and efforts within the EC are de facto linkage. Mitterrand has scheduled a press conference after my meeting with Tariq Aziz, and there is speculation he may send Dumas to Baghdad.

I have publicly welcomed any diplomatic activity that neither sends a mixed message nor walks back from the UNSC resolutions. In private, however, I have made clear that such visits only serve to make Saddam Hussein think he can play for more time.

In a one-on-one with Dumas before we met with Mitterrand, I really leveled with him about the serious problems we have in our bilateral relationship. I told him that his behavior at the NAC Ministerial was no way to treat a friend; Manfred Woerner had come up to me after the meeting to say that the French behavior was outrageous, and I agreed.

~~TOP SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0835-MR

MM 11/16/2016

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

I said we needed to deal with each other the way you and President Mitterrand did at Key Largo; Dumas agreed, and offered to come to the United States to deal with this situation. He even took the exceptional step of riding back to the airport with me to underscore his seriousness. He was genuinely concerned about, and influenced by, what I told him.

Kohl/Genscher

Not surprisingly, I met separately with Kohl and Genscher -- intentionally just missing King Hussein at both locations. The Kohl meeting was one-on-one throughout.

Kohl could not have been more pleased that I had come. His genuine affection and support for us was apparent in his demeanor and throughout the meeting.

He agreed to give serious consideration to our request for a \$335 million per month 1991 contribution to Desert Shield. He said he knew that Germany had to contribute more to this effort in a financial sense. (As I will with all contributors, I stressed that these monthly figures presumed no hostilities; if hostilities break out, the costs will increase significantly.)

3.3(b)(6)

As with other military matters, I passed this information to General Graves, who is Colin's representative on the trip. He will follow-up in military channels. I want to stress again how important the need for confidentiality is for Kohl.

Kohl raised the Uruguay Round, saying that he wanted to try to help. I used this opening to go through the talking points provided by USTR. I suggested that he could help get EC agreement because he had more flexibility than did Mitterrand.

I said point-blank that we had helped them when they needed us and we needed their help on this issue, which has become a major political problem. He, too, said he sees this as a major political problem. I explained to him why we thought that the Hellstrom proposal provided a good foundation for progress, and he told his interpreter to take careful notes on the points that I had made so that he could use them within the Community.

TOP SECRET

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- 3 -

Genscher and I had a thirty-minute one-on-one, ^{3.3(b)(6)}

Genscher then had Frank Elbe, his right hand man, come in and brief me on his meeting yesterday in Moscow with Shevardnadze's right hand man, Sergei Tarasenko. Tarasenko's main points included:

- 1) Shevardnadze's resignation was not a spontaneous act, but had been coming for some time. Shevardnadze was increasingly troubled by Gorbachev's accumulation of Presidential powers, powers he feared would be used to impose Presidential rule in the Baltics and other republics. Shevardnadze wouldn't be a part of that and could not in good conscience defend any such crackdowns.

He had wanted to wait to resign until after the CSCE Summit and START had been concluded, believing that each would create a structure of foreign policy hard to reverse. (I remarked that the resignation appears to have complicated closure on START, given Soviet reluctance in Geneva to follow-up on my Houston understandings with Shevardnadze.)
- 2) Shevardnadze had become increasingly disturbed by the growth of conservative, reactionary voices around Gorbachev. They were attacking Shevardnadze without any response from Gorbachev and with Lukyanov's obvious support in the Supreme Soviet. Gorbachev was in Shevardnadze's eyes becoming increasingly dependent on those who opposed the very essence of perestroika. Some would now act in Gorbachev's name, perhaps without his knowledge, and would at some point threaten Gorbachev himself.
- 3) Shevardnadze acted to send a warning signal to reformers on the inside and to the outside world about the emerging threats to the process of renewal in the Soviet Union. Actions would be needed both on the inside and the outside to save the reform process. Reformers needed to be galvanized internally, and Gorbachev needed to see that a retreat would jeopardize external support.
- 4) Shevardnadze would not accept any position in the government or state machinery. Gorbachev had sought to persuade him to stay, but had finally decided he wouldn't. Shevardnadze would set up an independent institute on foreign policy, and Tarasenko would go with him. Gorbachev agreed to support the endeavor. Tarasenko was vague about whether Shevardnadze would be active politically, and Genscher and Elbe concluded he might bide his time for awhile but look to becoming a significant political player in about six months time.

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- 4 -

I might add that Genscher was troubled by the developments in the Soviet Union, but said for the time being they would continue their food assistance. If force is used in the republics, the Germans might reconsider their assistance.

DeMichelis

I spent thirty minutes with Gianni DeMichelis, who travelled to Milan to meet with me. They had turned down an offer to meet in London, insisting on a meeting in Italy. I thought their good record of support, both in the EC Presidency and in NATO, merited this gesture. We always have to remember their sensitivity to our dealing exclusively with the British, French, and Germans.

DeMichelis expressed considerable concern about independent French diplomatic initiatives in the wake of my meeting with Aziz. He said this action would leave Italy and the rest of the EC in a very embarrassing position, and he thus concluded that the EC would take some decision on this matter in the next day or two. We have learned subsequently that the Algerians and PLO are trying to broker a meeting between the EC Troika and Tariq Aziz in Algiers sometime after my meeting.

DeMichelis said that Italy needed advance notice of any military operation, perhaps via the WEU, so that it could get legislative authority for the possible participation of their eight to ten aircraft in the air campaign. I shot down the WEU idea, and indicated that we would consider how best to inform them, noting, however, that there were already over 1,500 other aircraft committed to the air campaign.

I took him aside at the end of the meeting to ask him for a \$155 million per month 1991 contribution to Desert Shield. Having pushed so hard for this meeting, he couldn't say no, but he seemed particularly positive. He said there would be some budget issues to resolve, but that he foresaw no political obstacles and he would strongly recommend to Andreotti that the contribution be approved.

Felber

I met very briefly with the Swiss Foreign Minister, who started the meeting with a klieg-light illuminated press availability in his suite. He had been pushing to make opening remarks at my meeting with Aziz, taking an entire floor of the hotel for him and his staff. We shot that down, as well as a last-minute move on their part to delay my arrival from Milan. I am not going to be too interested in Geneva, or Switzerland, as a neutral site location in the future.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06a. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Gulf Trip (3 pp.)	11/6/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [5]

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: CAIRO MEETINGS

In Cairo, I spent two hours with Mubarak and ninety minutes with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian, who was just starting his tour of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. Both meetings were very productive and continued the good progress we made yesterday.

Mubarak

Mubarak was very upbeat, in large measure because he said Egyptian public opinion was solidly behind him. He was extraordinarily pleased by our success on Egyptian debt and your letter to him on that subject.

Mubarak was fully on board with our approach of laying a foundation for action if we decide to move forward on the military option. He strongly recommends pursuing a new UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. He said that he needs such a resolution for domestic political reasons, just as I believe we need it for US domestic political purposes. Mubarak said that he would work hard on the NAM, especially Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Zaire, as well as China and the Soviet Union.

He did not want any public discussion of command and control issues, but accepted that his forces would have to be under our operational control in the event of hostilities.

He said he would need to get back to us on our request to use the airbases at Cairo East and West for offensive strike operations. (The bases are now being used solely for deployment-related logistics activities.) He also said that our request to provide a third division might be difficult because of a lack of equipment, but he agreed on the need to bring his existing two divisions on line in a fully-supported manner. He also agreed to our request for Egypt to provide training and advice to Saudi and other GCC forces currently deployed in the Kingdom.

Qian

The tone of the Qian meeting was positive throughout, beginning with the following exchange during a brief press availability at the start of our meeting:

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED
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SS given by to Larry Saylebaugh

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: PARIS MEETINGS

This morning I spent over an hour with President Mitterrand and Foreign Secretary Dumas, then an additional hour with Dumas alone. Their position on next steps in the Gulf is remarkably similar, indeed almost identical, to our own. Mitterrand, who sent his warm regards and expressed his full confidence in you, said he will send you his views in a letter, but let me give you a quick summary.

As I did with Thatcher and Hurd, I began with a briefing on our troop augmentation and estimated casualties and duration. As in London, the starkness of these figures had a very strong impact and influenced the course of the subsequent discussion.

My basic message was that we and France had stood together and fought together before in defense of principles we hold dear, and we are now called upon again to stand shoulder-to-shoulder, politically, economically, and militarily.

Mitterrand began his presentation by dismissing today's Figaro headline that the U.S. doubted French resolve in the Gulf. Mitterrand said that there is no question of France's firm commitment to our common effort to force Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. He explicitly ruled out any partial solutions. He noted his earlier-stated preference for an Arab or Arab-Western committee to determine Kuwait's future government (he clearly finds the lifestyle of the Gulf Arabs distasteful), but he said "that path was not chosen" and he did not press it.

Mitterrand then proceeded to state his strong support for a UNSC resolution that would clearly authorize the use of force (stated explicitly) to "carry out the law," particularly UNSC Resolution 660 demanding unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. He said it was entirely reasonable that we reject any form of UN command. Since language in the resolution explicitly mentioning force could well cause problems with the Soviets, Chinese, and others, I think the French will come around in the end to our more general formulation of "all necessary means," though we may want to include the term "force" in the initial draft resolution for tactical reasons.

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PER E.O. 12356
1998-0099-F13
ES 6/15/99

He also agreed completely with our assessment that these steps, plus the military buildup, are the only means to make Saddam realize he must either withdraw peacefully (a doubtful outcome in Mitterrand's view) or face disastrous defeat: "If Saddam Hussein does not feel threatened, he will not give up anything," he said.

Mitterrand said that he did not believe Article 51 was a sufficient basis on which to proceed. He said that lawyers may be able to make such a case, but 58 million Frenchmen and his National Assembly would require more explicit UN authority. When I told him, however, that we considered Article 51 a sufficient legal basis on which to proceed if we did not get a resolution, he responded "We'll see, we'll see," which I interpreted to mean (1) he thinks we will get the resolution and (2) he may rethink his Article 51 position if we do not.

Mitterrand made a very pointed reference to Lebanon, asserting that he has a defense agreement with Lebanon, but he doubted if anyone would have rushed to his side if he had decided to enforce the agreement by moving against the Syrian occupation force. He did not press the point after having laid the marker, and it did not detract from the forcefulness of his support on the Gulf.

Mitterrand was reluctant to discuss force augmentation beyond their existing 6,000 men plus air and naval forces. I passed the details of our request to Dumas (including a request for one or two fully supported French divisions since they are half the size of our own).

Mitterrand said they are and certainly will be doing more than "some of your [US] best friends" -- he mentioned Germany, Japan and Italy. My sense is that they will respond positively to some of our requests.

I told Mitterrand and Dumas as well that I knew you would be extraordinarily pleased by his response. I certainly am, and I think this is a major step toward our goal of obtaining UN authority as the best way of buttressing political support on the Hill, among our public, and internationally. I can see great utility in your being able (at the appropriate time) to answer Congressional critics by saying "You mean you can't support action or principles that are supported by at least nine countries on the UNSC?"

We are certainly not there yet, but I feel strongly that you made the right decision in letting me pursue this approach.

cc: Brent Scowcroft

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1990

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: James A. Baker, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: London Meetings

On Friday afternoon, I spent an hour alone with Douglas Hurd, then 90 minutes with Mrs. Thatcher and him. The British are strongly supportive of your troop augmentation decision, though they were clearly sobered by the details I gave them on overall forces and estimated casualties, and duration. Also, we have some remaining issues to work out with them.

UN Security Council Resolution: Mrs. Thatcher remains very skeptical about a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force. Her principal concerns are two: (1) we would, by setting a future date, make more likely an Iraqi chemical attack near that date; and (2) it would be difficult to avoid amendments by the NAM and others that would restrict operational freedom.

She was somewhat mollified when I told her that we were seeking a very brief resolution simply authorizing "all necessary means" to implement the earlier resolutions. She also took on board my comments about US domestic political realities, especially in the wake of the very downbeat session Douglas Hurd had this week with Lloyd Bentsen, Jack Danforth, and other senators.

At the end, she said we should start working on a draft. She also agreed we would tell the press that, while Article 51 provides adequate legal authority, we want to "maintain the international coalition" as we go forward. In short, though she disagrees, I think she will go along, but you may have to seal the deal with her. Her advisors seem to all favor trying to obtain the specific UN authority.

Operational Issues: Mrs. Thatcher has no difficulty whatever with (1) current, satisfactory command and control arrangements; (2) staying with us in case of an Iraqi attack on Israel; and (3) air and ground operations against both Kuwait and Iraq. She hesitated, however (and Hurd winced visibly), when I asked for

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1998-09-13
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additional British support: (1) a full armored division (requiring two additional British brigades); (2) transportation assets, especially tank transporters; and (3) more minesweepers and surface combatants. On troops, she noted that significant lift would be required, and that the deployment would leave Germany "denuded" because few or none of the deploying troops would return to Germany. She concluded by saying Defense Minister Tom King was leaving for the Gulf this weekend, and she would be back to us after checking with him.

Embassy Kuwait: They see January 1 as the final date for their two diplomats in Kuwait City, and Mrs. Thatcher asked if we had thought of reducing our number of diplomats so we could conserve supplies to keep a presence until then (we estimate early December for our people). She also asked that we stay closely in touch with them on evacuation of dependents from Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states, and on any other precautionary steps we might consider.

Saudi Arabia: It was brought to my attention today that my November 6 memorandum to you had a mistaken word in the paragraph describing our command and combat agreement with the Saudis. The paragraph, a copy of which I gave both Saud and Bandar in Jeddah (and to which they agreed), reads:

"Should military operations commence, a joint command as currently exists will continue; However, the commander of US forces will have final approval authority for planning and conducting all military operations."

My earlier memorandum had mistakenly used the word "coordinating" rather than "conducting." I have informed General Graves, Colin's representative traveling with me, of this correction.

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1991

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262010 - 1198 - MR
SCS 1/31/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS WITH ASSAD AND WITH THE PALESTINIANS

After coming close to the brink on at least two occasions, one with Assad and one with the Palestinians, I think our prospects are looking up. I expect a tough day tomorrow with Shamir, and his colleagues, but at this point I think we could be in position to issue the invitations on Friday, giving everyone three days to respond.

To be sure, this will depend on getting the names from the Palestinians tomorrow and I've learned one is never going to grow rich betting on them. Still, I think we made enough headway today to get very close. I may need you to call Gorbachev tomorrow to help get the Soviets to restore their relations with Israel on Friday at the time we announce the invitations. That should improve the climate in Israel and make it more difficult to say "no" to the invitation.

Based on my meeting with Assad today, I'm now convinced the Syrians will say yes. Though Shara may have obscured that fact in his press conference with me, the fact is we came out of Damascus better than I thought we would.

After another five hour meeting with Assad today, we settled our letter of assurance (LOA) and he agreed to the draft invitation. We met some of his needs in the LOA by reiterating our policies on Palestinians and Jerusalem (basically by drawing on language we already had in our Palestinian LOA) and by dropping any reference to the multilaterals in his assurance letter.

We maintained the language on multilateral meetings in the invitation and Assad accepted it, basically saying he wouldn't go, others shouldn't, but he'd go to the conference and the bilaterals even if the multilaterals are going on. (And he acknowledged the Egyptians and Jordanians really wanted the multilaterals and the Gulf states would go.)

It took some painstaking work to get there, and I had to throw one temper tantrum about walking away from all this, but in the end Assad came through. And having Syria committed helps with both Palestinians and Israelis.

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- 2 -

With the Palestinians, once again I was greeted with an effort to get something more on Jerusalem and settlements. I blew up, telling them I respected them and cared deeply about their plight, but I told them I was sick and tired of the PLO sitting in villas in Tunis and blocking those living under occupation from pursuing the one chance they have to end that occupation. I told them I'd gone as far as I could go, and this process was coming to an end in 48 hours.

They got the message and told me they thought they could have the names by Thursday night or Friday morning. I said I needed them by tomorrow night and I also suggested that if they have 25 candidates for the delegation -- and a meeting with all of them might make it easier to finalize the decision -- I'd meet with all of them tomorrow night. I think the symbolism of such a meeting might also be very good here in Israel.

In short, I'm hopeful but still cautious. This was a good day on the Middle East roller-coaster, but tomorrow promises to be tough and the Palestinians still must deliver -- and do so in a feasible way. We'll see if they are able to.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Israel and Jordan [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	7/21/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)

By MM on 7/19/2022

Date Closed: 8/31/2009 FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S Re-review Case #: P-2/P-5 Review Case #: AR Case #: AR Disposition: AR Disposition Date:	OA/ID Number: 91164-006 Appeal Case #: Appeal Disposition: Disposition Date: MR Case #: 2010-1187-MR(509) MR Disposition: Released in Part MR Disposition Date: 7/28/2015
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RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1992



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III

JB

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN ISRAEL AND JORDAN

I have had an interesting set of meetings in the last two days. The meetings with Rabin (and Peres) highlighted the dramatic changes that have taken place in Israel. The discussion with the Palestinians indicated they recognize the changes. While they would like to see more, they understand they have a real opportunity to move quickly on interim self-government -- assuming they can get their act together and negotiate seriously.

Finally, the meeting with Hussein revealed he, too, sees an opportunity on peace, but he is worried about his internal situation and sees it being potentially explosive.

Before outlining in greater detail what was discussed in the various meetings, let me simply say that there is an opportunity now to take advantage of the negotiating process we have put together. Assuming we stay involved, I believe that real movement toward an Israeli-Palestinian agreement on a framework for interim self-government, and the elections for who will administer it, is possible by November. (Given our need to stay involved, I've explored the possibility of not moving the venue to Rome but keeping it in Washington, and the Israelis, Palestinians and Jordanians all accept this.)

Meetings in Israel

I have just visited a different Israel. The mood is different and the atmosphere is one of hope. Rabin was open, direct, and very clear about his objectives. He is reordering Israel's priorities away from the territories and to revitalizing Israel's economy. And he is determined to move rapidly on peace-making.

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- 2 -

As he and Peres put it to me, they have not adopted these objectives because of us. They've adopted these priorities because of Israel's needs. He made it clear that he and his government simply do not want to expend money in the territories. Unlike Likud, their agenda is not to populate the West Bank/Gaza. And he has already acted to demonstrate this by freezing 7,000 contracts that had been concluded for new building in the territories. (Notwithstanding the legal problems, he told me he is going to cancel these contracts.)

In addition, he is moving to eliminate the special incentives and subsidies (low interest mortgages, tax incentives, etc.) that have encouraged people to move to the territories. The incentives and subsidies made it extremely attractive for non-ideological Israelis to move to the territories. Take away the housing and financial incentives and very few Israelis will want to go there. The settlers' movement is already up in arms over this. But Rabin is determined to persevere for, as he put it, the sake of the 3.9 million Israeli Jews and the 1 million Israeli Arabs who should not have to mortgage their future because of the 100,000 settlers in the territories.

While he is determined to redirect Israeli resources, he feels he has no choice but to complete the units under construction. The costs of cancelling them will simply be too high financially and politically. In a nutshell, our talks on the loan guarantees and what Israel will do were good and encouraging. I think we have the basis of an understanding, but there are a few questions on numbers of units, locations, and "natural growth" that I want answers to. When I leave the region, and go to the Philippines, Dennis will go back to Israel and see Rabin to go over the questions and the formulations we can use to describe our understandings. Thus, by the time Rabin comes to see you in Kennebunkport, I'm confident we will be able to finalize the deal and have you announce it.

On the peace process, Rabin was very receptive to my suggestions on Israel being ready to table a model for interim self-government arrangements. He has thought through a lot of this and I'm confident his government will put a serious proposal on the table.

He also made it clear to me that he is prepared to negotiate seriously on all fronts, though he remains dubious about Assad's intentions at this stage. I told him it was important to test those intentions and he gave me a couple of things to try with Assad. I'll have a better feel after I see Assad, but even on this issue, between the Israeli acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, the Syrian acceptance of the principle of peace, and the mutual focus on security, I think we may have something to work with.

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- 3 -

Meeting with Palestinians

My meeting with Faisal Husseini, Abdel Shafi, et.al., was surprisingly relaxed. While being reluctant to give Rabin too much credit yet, there was no doubt that they recognized a clear opportunity. They acknowledged the profound difference from Shamir and credited Rabin's intervention for resolving the tense situation at An Najah University in Nablus last week.

They saw the freezing of contracts, the public talk of different priorities, and the commitment to continuous negotiations as positive. At the same time, they raised a variety of human rights questions and sought other confidence-builders from the Israelis. (Rabin was willing to act on one measure, having to do with the travel of the delegation, but not others right now.)

They also raised the loan guarantees, but almost in a pro forma way. They don't want us to grant the guarantees now, but they didn't press the point very hard, especially when I said we are going to see a severe reduction in Israeli settlement activity and they should be satisfied with that. Indeed, when Hanan Ashrawi did her press conference after the meeting, she said a total freeze was not a condition for negotiating and the Palestinians would be satisfied as long as the US could monitor the Israeli activities and assure that US assistance wasn't directly or indirectly going to the settlements. We'll be able to do that.

On the peace process. I hammered hardest on the Palestinians being ready to put realistic, not pie-in-the-sky proposals on the table. I said they were going to get serious Israeli proposals now, and they had to be willing to engage on the Israeli proposals and offer some of their own.

I came away from the meeting feeling that we made some headway. We'll see when they come to the table.

Meeting with Hussein

My meeting with the King left me less upbeat than my meetings with Rabin, Peres, and the Palestinians. There was some good news. The Jordanians are making a systematic effort to enforce the sanctions now and they are willing to show us, members of Congress, and the press just what they are doing. Similarly, the King was very hopeful on the peace-making process. While he is clearly pleased by the changes in Israel, and acknowledges their significance, he's preoccupied with his internal situation. He'll support moving ahead on the negotiations, but was very somber on what's going on in Jordan.

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- 4 -

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

I told him if the Jordanians maintain their new effort on sanctions enforcement and publicize it, we might make some headway with the Congress on our bilateral assistance programs. But I also said this wasn't going to meet the kind of economic needs that Jordan had -- only reconciliation with the Saudis and the Gulf states could produce the resources Jordan needed. I said we've tried all we could to overcome the differences between Jordan and the Gulf states. While we'd made headway at times, incidents or speeches tended to undo our work.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

EYES ONLY

251250Z

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2. Scowcroft
3. Howe
4. Gantt
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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09

REMARKS: _____

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

EYES ONLY

May 24, 1992

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

ATTACHMENT

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Libson [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	5/24/92	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [5]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/19/2022

Date Closed: 8/31/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-006
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1187-MR(510)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/28/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1992



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN LISBON

We have had an interesting two days in Lisbon. While we are in Lisbon for the second Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the Former Soviet Union -- and the Conference has been successful in channelling increasing efforts into technical assistance -- the attention of most of the participants has been on Yugoslavia. Many of the former republics worry that this is their future, especially when they see signs of another Yugoslavia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Many worry that if Milosevic can get away with his Greater Serbia strategy it will be a lesson to others seeking to capitalize on ethnic followings and ambitions to make cross-border appeals and dismember neighboring states.

With the growing atrocities in Bosnia and the efforts by Serbs to systematically de-populate Bosnia of Moslems through mass killings and expulsions, it becomes more and more important to press the Europeans to do something. Indeed, as we witness the Serbs pursuing a strategy of "ethnic purification" -- using terms and behaving much like the Nazis -- we and the Europeans can't stand idly by.

I spoke of a humanitarian nightmare occurring here in the heart of Europe. I spoke of all of us taking political, diplomatic, and economic steps to make it clear there was a very real price to be paid for continuing Serbian violation of fundamental human rights and the basic norms of civilized behavior. I asked each of our European friends, starting with John Major, how they could continue to let lowest common denominator policies paralyze them on Yugoslavia. ^{1.4(d)}

^{1.4(d)} my private and public comments have catalyzed the Europeans to consider a range of sanctions, and I believe they will take some action steps tomorrow. What we are seeing once again is that the Europeans want to be active but need a push from us to do so -- even when it's on an issue where they want to be in the lead and should be in the lead.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1187-MA
MM 7/28/2015

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Collective engagement works, and multilateral responses can be real but tend not to get energized unless we serve as the catalyst. This applies to the Russians as well. While Russian-Serbian ties limit the Russian enthusiasm for sanctions, Kozyrev made it very clear that our growing pressure might make it possible for him to wring some important concessions out of Milosevic, especially on the quick opening of the Sarajevo airport and the roads for humanitarian relief efforts.

We'll see, but it is interesting that Kozyrev in his press conference with me made a point of saying sanctions and other steps by the UNSC were to be expected if humanitarian assistance remain blocked from going to Sarajevo.

I believe staking out this far tougher position publicly -- one which emphasizes the importance of trying political, diplomatic and economic sanctions and simply treating possible multilateral military steps as too hypothetical to comment on -- makes sense for several reasons:

(1) It gets us on the right side of the issue. It's very hard to explain inaction in circumstances where a country is being dismembered, there's a conscious policy of de-population and people are being starved and denied necessary medicines (e.g., 35,000 diabetics can't get insulin because of the Serbian-led blockade). This isn't just morally right, it's right geopolitically. There will be no new world order if other dictators playing the ethnic card know the international community will retreat from acting on ethnic conflicts because they are seen as too messy. That will surely produce many more Yugoslavias over the next decade -- with all the human costs, the massive refugee flows, the extra burdens on fledgling democracies, and the prospect for escalation.

(2) It forces the Europeans to get far more serious. The EC wants to play a major political role on the world stage. While it's clearly not unified sufficiently to do so, our public posture will force Europeans not to hang back any longer at least on Yugoslavia. Indeed, to break out of the constraints imposed by the EC, the member states announced today that they will act unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally on Yugoslavia. That would not have happened without our more forceful public posture.

(3) It's the right thing for you politically. I say this not because of where editorial opinion is. I say it because it gets a major foreign policy issue back into the news. It intrudes on everyone's consciousness, and begins to break down the exclusive preoccupation with domestic issues in the public's mind. We need to be able to remind the public that the world is

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- 3 -

still dangerous, that it needs our leadership, and that our President must be competent. In other words, it makes your special turf part of the campaign.

I need to briefly discuss two of the other issues we did important business on here in Lisbon. First is START and the progress we made here on your initiative on further, far-reaching strategic reductions. The second is the headway I think we may have made on Nagorno-Karabakh.

START Follow-on. I'll save for another time (preferably over drinks) what it took to finally get the Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Byelorussians, and Russians to sign the START protocol and exchange the side-letters. Suffice it to say, the wrangling brought back some pretty vivid memories of eight trips to the Middle East and what it took to nail down the invitation for the Madrid Conference.

As for where we go from here, Kozyrev came with a proposal that went a long way to close the gap between your initiative and Yeltsin's. He hopes it makes it possible for us to close a deal on further reductions at your Summit meeting with Yeltsin.

With further work, I think it gives us a chance to do so. In a nutshell, the Russian proposal accepts your numbers -- 4500-4700 warheads. It drops their goal of 2500. It de-links the demIRVing of ICBMs from SLBMs. (The linkage was important to Yeltsin but impossible for us.) It's sub-ceiling on SLBM warhead numbers is exactly the number you originally offered in your initiative -- 2200-2300. It accepts our approach on bombers, and it promises complete demIRVing of ICBMs by 2005, without, as I said, any link to SLBMs.

As you can see from the last point, we don't achieve complete demIRVing of ICBMs during the START period, only afterwards. But we would get the demIRVing of 80% of their ICBMs during the START seven-year period, with the remaining 20% by 2005. Kozyrev said practical difficulties required this. Even if we can't move him further (which I hope we can) I think this proposal moves us in the direction we want to go.

I told him we'd have to study his proposal and left him with some questions: e.g., if it's only practical difficulties that prevent you from the demIRVing of ICBMs by 1999, are there steps or assistance we could offer to help overcome these difficulties? Kozyrev and I will talk after I get back to Washington, and everyone on the arms control team here clearly felt this proposal gave us something to work with.

Nagorno-Karabakh. I met with the Turks, Azeris, and Armenians and discussed some steps to contain the conflict, defuse the tensions, and launch a negotiating process. They all agreed that CSCE civilian observers (to be drawn from NACC states) could be very useful for limiting the conflict and defusing tensions, particularly because the observers would be able to pinpoint responsibility for continuing attacks. At a

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That said, we recognize that it may not be easy to get such observers. We have conveyed our view that its best to draw the civilian observers principally from the newly independent states and Eastern and Central European countries. This will give them a sense that they have a role to play and are being fully integrated into the NACC.

As for launching a negotiating process, I proposed a preliminary meeting next week of all the parties, including the Armenians and Azeris from Karabakh. Having them come as observers with the CSCE manager of the process designating the Armenian representative from Karabakh and the Azeris designating the Azeri representative is a formula they all accepted. We are following up with the CSCE officials tonight, but since all agreed to observers and the formula for a preliminary meeting next week, we may have a chance to make headway.

I hope so. Finding a way to manage this kind of tribal-ethnic blood feud is increasingly important if we are to shape a more stable, peaceful world over the next decade. Indeed, if the democrats in the newly independent states are to succeed, they need to be insulated from the pathologies of greater ethnicity and nationalistic rivalries in politics.

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMPRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
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(Name)

(Phone Number)

(Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

Secretary Baker's Memo

TO (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

DEPT/ROOM NO.

PHONE NUMBER

K-PORT

GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENTGENERAL SCOWCROFT

REMARKS:

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White House Guidelines

2025 11

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/09~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1992



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SPECIAL CIRCUIT MESSAGE

GEN Scowcroft,

copy to David Welch

The attached message has been disseminated only to you. Please indicate any additional distribution below.

copy to JP

Situation Room

Cheney also sent copy 11/6

Don't forget to call 90 CE

Caron Jackson, Sec Baker's Assistant, called to tell us the cable should be close hold. Asked us to make a copy for Eagleburger, you, and the President. I did not fax a copy to Mr. Gates or the President. Do you want that done?
Donna Cheney, SDO

~~TOP SECRET~~ *Eyes Only*
(CLASSIFICATION)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ *Eyes Only*
(CLASSIFICATION)

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White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/31/69

*Copies provided
(Cheney
Eagleburger
Webster)*

070843Z Nov 90
(TIME OF RECEIPT)

*7
A2:46*

~~TOP SECRET~~ - EYES ONLY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: CAIRO MEETINGS

In Cairo, I spent two hours with Mubarak and ninety minutes with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian, who was just starting his tour of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iraq. Both meetings were very productive and continued the good progress we made yesterday.

Mubarak

He was very upbeat, in large measure because he said that public opinion was solidly behind him. He was particularly pleased by our success on Egyptian debt and your position on that subject.

He was fully on board with our approach of laying a basis for action if we decide to move forward on the military option. He strongly recommends pursuing a new UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force. He said that he needs such a resolution for domestic political reasons, just as I believe we need it for US domestic political purposes. Mubarak said that he would work hard on the NAM, especially Ethiopia, Malaysia, and Zaire, as well as China and the Soviet Union.

He did not want any public discussion of command and control issues, but accepted that his forces would have to be under our operational control in the event of hostilities.

He said he would get back to us on our request to use the airbases in East and West for offensive strike operations. (The bases are now being used solely for deployment-logistics activities.) He also said that our request to provide a third division might be difficult because of a lack of equipment, but he agreed on the need to bring his existing two divisions on line in a fully-supported manner. He also agreed to our request for Egypt to provide training and advice to Saudi and other GCC forces currently deployed in the region.

Qian

The tone of the Qian meeting was positive throughout, beginning with the following exchange during a brief press availability at the start of our meeting:

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12356
1998-0099-F/3
ES 6/15/99

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

-2-

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, is your government willing to consider a United Nations resolution that would authorize force in the Persian Gulf?

FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN: I think all the resolutions adopted by the United Nations are intended to increase the pressure on Iraq so as to achieve a peaceful settlement.

Q: And would authorizing the use of force increase the pressure for a peaceful settlement?

FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN: We'll still have to wait and see. Because all of the armed forces have two roles to play. One is to fight a war. The other is to seek peace. Do you agree with me?

SECRETARY BAKER: I do, indeed.

During our discussion, I emphasized to Qian that augmentation of the multinational force and passage of a UNSC resolution authorizing the use of force are two essential steps in the search for a peaceful resolution, since they would send an unequivocal signal to Saddam that we would not permit him to remain in Kuwait. I told Qian that we could accept a decision on their part not to contribute forces to the multinational effort, but we would not understand if they stood in the way of our pursuing an appropriate resolution at the UN. Although I did not press him either for a response or commitment on the resolution, Qian clearly got the point. I told him to consider carefully my presentation, as well as those of the Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Egyptians. My sense is that following Qian's return to China, they will conclude it is in their interests to either support a resolution or at worst abstain.

I told Qian that Saddam would push him while in Baghdad to accept a partial solution, a path that had to be rejected lest Saddam and the world conclude that aggression pays. Qian responded that he was taking no proposal to Baghdad, nor did he have the authority to mediate or consider any Iraqi proposal. His purpose was to emphasize China's commitment to full implementation of the UNSC resolutions, and to make clear to Saddam the political, economic, and military strength of the international coalition arrayed against him. He would tell Saddam directly that the only way to avoid further bloodshed was for him to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait.

On bilateral issues, Qian expressed his leadership's appreciation for your strong stance on MFN. He also pressed for me to commit to come to China and for his previously proposed 1989 visit to the US to be rescheduled.

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

-3-

I told him that I wanted to come to China, and that you wanted me to do so. But I told him that it was important for my visit to be carried out in a way that advanced rather than complicated the bilateral relationship, and that would require more effort on both our parts to establish the requisite domestic political foundation. He seemed to accept this point, and then asked when Bob Kimmitt could come to China to resume the Under Secretary level discussions begun in the previous Administration. (These discussions were begun when Ambassador Zhu was the Chinese interlocutor in Beijing, and it was he who first suggested resumption of the discussions.)

I told Qian that Bob might be able to come in late November or early December, but that I wanted to confirm that decision with you before agreeing formally. As indicated above, I do not think we need a visit by me to obtain their support or acquiescence on the UN resolution. If obtaining that support or acquiescence depended upon my going, of course, I'd be ready to go.

If I do go, however, we need to recognize that a visit at this time will rekindle the domestic debate, which could cause real problems for the Chinese as well as us. For now, then, I recommend that you authorize me to tell Qian that we accept their proposal for Bob to visit before the end of this year, and that one of his agenda items will be preparing the way for a possible visit by me in 1991.

cc: Brent Scowcroft

~~TOP SECRET~~
EYES ONLY