

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-004

Folder Title:
Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Sunday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S
02. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Sunday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Gorbachev Message on CFE (1 pp.)	4/26/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Thursday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/25/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Thursday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/25/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Informal (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Informal (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Tuesday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 3

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Pinksheet Number: cap1350
OA/ID Number: 91164-004
Date Closed: 8/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings (4 pp.)	4/22/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Sunday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/21/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Saturday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Secretary Baker Re: Deliver Eyes Only to Secretary Baker (3 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	TS
13a. Cable	From White House Re: Message for Secretary Baker from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/18/91	(b)(1)	S
13b. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to The Secretary of State Re: Secretary Baker from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	S
14a. Letter	President Bush to President Hafiz al-Asad (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
14b. Letter	President Bush to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
14c. Letter	President Bush to President Mohammad Hosni Mubarak (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
14d. Letter	President Bush to King Fahd bin Abdulaziz al-Saud (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	
14e. Letter	President Bush to King Hussein I (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	

Page 2 of 3

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
14f. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to POTUS Re: Letters to King Fahd, King Hussein, President Mubarak, President Asad, and Prime Minister Shamir (1 pp.)	4/16/91	(b)(1)	C
15. Cable	To Distribution List Re: Press Backgrounder on Kuwait (4 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	C

Page 3 of 3

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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

May 13, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

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Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/16/2022

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1176-MR(500)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	7/13/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
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- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: SUNDAY'S MEETINGS

I had a long meeting with Assad in which he basically back-tracked from his agreement on a UN observer and on a consent rule for reconvening the conference. I went at him hard on the importance of not missing this opportunity, particularly given the attitude and approach of this Administration. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}

^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)} all the arguments I mustered had little effect on him. I did try out one idea, and he said he would consider it. But at this point I have low expectations.

My meeting with Sasha Bessmertnykh tonight was a good deal more upbeat. He's hopeful that we can put the conference together. I previewed privately with him the kind of announcement or invitation we might send out and he agrees with the general approach. He also agrees that keeping this confidential until we actually send it out is important to making this work.

Between my meeting with Assad and the meeting with Bessmertnykh, I saw Abdel Meguid and had a chance to chat with him as we rode in from the airport in Cairo. Interestingly enough, he, too, was rather upbeat. First, he wasn't surprised by what I heard in Syria (Osama al Baz had just been to Damascus a couple of days ago and had heard much the same thing.) Meguid suggested that this is Assad's way, and in any case, the Egyptian discussions with Abu Mazin of the PLO leaves them confident that the Palestinian representation issue can be handled successfully. In Meguid's view, that's the big issue, not the two outstanding modalities questions on a conference. I'll hear more from the Egyptians when I see Mubarak tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1176-MR

MM 7/13/2015

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Assad Meeting

With Assad our six hour meeting was, as always, characterized by a lot of repetition. The first inkling of trouble came when Shara rode in with me last night from the airport and raised the need for the conference to be reconvened without the agreement of all the parties. I told him the Syrians had already given me a positive answer on the question of reconvening by consensus of the parties and on that basis I had gone to you on the issue of providing a security guarantee. Shara didn't pursue it further with me in the car, but then asked this morning to see Djerejian before my meeting with President Assad. With Djerejian, he said there was not an agreement on the issue of reconvening a conference on the basis of the consent rule. In addition, he said that Syria had modified its position on the UN's role at a conference, downgrading the UN's role from that of sponsorship to that of "full participant". Ed reminded him of the conversations that he had with Shara on the two questions we posed and the positive answer which Shara had given. The position he was now hearing had very little resemblance to what we'd heard last week. He got nowhere and I faced pretty much the same with Assad.

When I went in to see Assad, I went through and actually read him parts of the transcript of our last conversation in which I had been very explicit in posing the questions of whether Assad would accept the UN observer and whether he would agree that the conference could reconvene on the basis of an agreement by all the parties. I read him the part that not only spelled out the questions, but also the part that made it clear that I would not go to you with a proposal on a security guarantee of the Syrian-Israeli border unless I first knew that he would answer yes to both of these questions. We had received such a positive response, and now I was finding that the yes was not really a yes. (You may recall that I told you that I wasn't putting money in the bank on the Syrian response.)

I asked Assad what I should now tell President Bush. Assad said that he'd made a major concession by accepting UN full participation as opposed to sponsorship. He was less clear on the question of reconvening, but he then went on to say that he thought that we were guaranteeing Israel's total withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Here again, I read him a passage from the transcript that said the security guarantee of the border is only possible, and could only go into effect, after Israel and Syria had come to a negotiated agreement.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

He raised the extraneous issue of our opposition to the Czech tank sale to Syria. He wondered whether that opposition wasn't merely a sign of our trying to pressure Syria to make concessions on the peace process. I then went through and explained the two were entirely unrelated. I noted that the Czechs had raised the tank sale with us, we had not raised it with them. I said they had probably raised it with us because they were concerned about political fallout in the Congress and its possible effect on US-Czech relations. I made it clear we had told the Czechs in response to their inquiry, that we preferred that they not make the sale, but we in no way threatened our relationship with them if they did. We could do no less than voice our preference, particularly given our desire to restrain the sale of weaponry to the area as a whole. We were not singling Syria out, but our Congress would create a major problem for us, if we had not responded to the Czechs in the way we did. This was probably not going to prevent the Czechs from selling the tanks to the Syrians.

I made it clear to Assad that we wanted to see further improvement in our relations with Syria, but Assad would make a big mistake if he passed on this opportunity to make progress and peace because of a preoccupation with form over substance. I argued that the label the UN had at a conference ("full participant" versus "observer") would not have any effect on his ability to get the Golan back. Similarly, I said whether a conference met on a continuing basis or met only on a basis of the agreement of the parties, could also have no effect on the restoration of the Golan to Syria. The only thing that could possibly restore the Golan to Syria would be a continuing US commitment to the process and a US security guarantee to Israel that would deny Israel a security argument for holding on to the Golan Heights.

I said that by offering to guarantee the border against aggression on either side -- once there was agreement between Israel and Syria -- we were taking a step that was nearly unprecedented for us. We were in effect offering Syria a security guarantee that had really until now only been offered to US allies. Assad should not underestimate the value of this. Indeed, I said if he now preferred to focus on form and not substance, he would surely be the loser and the Golan would become even more densely settled by Israel. The more that happened, the less he'd ever have a chance of seeing the Golan Heights restored to Syria.

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- 4 -

Near the end of our conversation, I suggested a new idea on how to handle the UN role. I said rather than having an observer, it might make more sense for the co-sponsors to make clear that they would undertake to keep the Secretary General regularly informed of the progress in the bilateral and multilateral negotiations. The fact is that would surely have more weight than a simple observer. And, in reality, would mean more than having the UN as a "full participant" -- whatever that meant. Assad said, "this is a new idea, I will consider it", but he did not give me any reason to believe that he would consider it positively.

The bottom line is that Assad retreated. Maybe he thought we were getting too close. It is also possible that Assad reflected on what the guarantee was and wasn't (i.e., it wasn't a guarantee of Golan's return), he decided it wasn't worth the price of the modalities concessions. Maybe he thought I'll produce something more out of Shamir and he'll wait to see that before making any real concessions to us. Or maybe in the end he's really not interested in negotiations, merely in us delivering Israel.

Bessmertnykh

Tonight we covered only the Middle East. We'll go through non-Middle East issues tomorrow morning. I suspect that discussion will prove more interesting because of the conversation you had with President Gorbachev.

On the Middle East, Bessmertnykh was generally upbeat as he gave me a briefing on what had happened in each of his stops. He feels he saw a seriousness on the need to move towards peace in every discussion he had in the area. For example, he said he thought Assad might be prepared to move and might be more flexible on the UN issue than he was revealing at this time. He also felt Shamir genuinely understood that this was the time to move. His perception after this, his first tour of the area, was that the main issues out there were mainly the ones that I had identified for him previously: the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. (The one additional issue he identified as a possible timebomb was that of settlements.)

In part, I suspect his more upbeat assessment results from his having had rather general, not specific, discussions in each of his meetings. In part, also, I suspect it emerges from his view that these modality questions are simply not serious enough to block the process, particularly if there is a good chance to resolve the Palestinian representation issue.

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

By the way, he told me that he will be seeing Arafat in Geneva relatively soon. I said it was very important that such a meeting not have such a high profile or be given much publicity at this point. There was a real danger, I said, that Arafat would seize on such a meeting to hype his role and to give him a reason to have a more prominent role in the process. Bessmertnykh said that wasn't the purpose of the meeting. On the contrary, he would see Arafat for the express purpose of managing the PLO in a way that made this process possible -- namely, ensuring that the PLO would not seek to block this process. He told me he had mentioned to Shamir that he would be seeing Arafat and he'd drawn no response.

In general, we have no differences with the Soviets on how to proceed. Bessmertnykh told me the Soviets would now work very hard on Assad to get him to be more flexible on the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. He likes the idea of our trying to further narrow the differences on these two issues. Once we've made the effort, he agrees that we should go ahead and issue a joint US-Soviet invitation to the conference in order to put everybody on the spot to respond. Either that would produce the conference or it would bring this effort to a clear-cut conclusion.

In the meantime, I'll see Mubarak tomorrow, and I'll probe to see why the Egyptians are apparently confident that the Palestinian representation issue is close to resolution. I'll see Hussein the day after that, both to pin him down on his attendance and to go through the details on how to actually produce the Palestinian part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. At that point, I should have a better fix on the prospects for actually seeing a conference take place.

May 13, 1991

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Document Partially Declassified
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FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1176-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 7/13/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

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By the way, he told me that he will be seeing Arafat in Geneva relatively soon. I said it was very important that such a meeting not have such a high profile or be given much publicity at this point. There was a real danger, I said, that Arafat would seize on such a meeting to hype his role and to give him a reason to have a more prominent role in the process. Bessmertnykh said that wasn't the purpose of the meeting. On the contrary, he would see Arafat for the express purpose of managing the PLO in a way that made this process possible -- namely, ensuring that the PLO would not seek to block this process. He told me he had mentioned to Shamir that he would be seeing Arafat and he'd drawn no response.

In general, we have no differences with the Soviets on how to proceed. Bessmertnykh told me the Soviets would now work very hard on Assad to get him to be more flexible on the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. He likes the idea of our trying to further narrow the differences on these two issues. Once we've made the effort, he agrees that we should go ahead and issue a joint US-Soviet invitation to the conference in order to put everybody on the spot to respond. Either that would produce the conference or it would bring this effort to a clear-cut conclusion.

In the meantime, I'll see Mubarak tomorrow, and I'll probe to see why the Egyptians are apparently confident that the Palestinian representation issue is close to resolution. I'll see Hussein the day after that, both to pin him down on his attendance and to go through the details on how to actually produce the Palestinian part of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. At that point, I should have a better fix on the prospects for actually seeing a conference take place.

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 26, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*
SUBJECT: Gorbachev Message on CFE

Larry,

I've seen the proposed message to Gorbachev and I agree with your views of it. I think it would be a mistake to send it. First, as you probably saw in my message to the President after meeting Bessmertnykh, the Soviets will be responding on CFE but at a level below Gorbachev. The reason is that Bessmertnykh doesn't want to lock Gorbachev into a position that reduces his flexibility at this point. If that's Bessmertnykh's judgment, a message from the President right now would probably be counterproductive. Second, the tone and character of the message is too strong. Does the President really want to jeopardize or threaten the whole US-Soviet relationship over 120 tanks, 753 APC's, and 234 artillery pieces? I wonder. One thing is for sure: the Europeans would never understand that.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0832-MR

MM 4/7/2015

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 25, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: THURSDAY'S MEETINGS

I had a very good meeting with Sasha Bessmertnykh in Kislovodsk. The City of Kislovodsk is in an area just north of the Caucasus. It's known for its mineral waters, it's extremely picturesque, very fertile, and a well-known retreat for the elite. When one sees an area like this in the Soviet Union, it's hard not to believe that this vast country doesn't have enormous potential. The question remains can that potential be unlocked?

In the meetings, we spent most of our time on the Middle East. Our discussion was extremely good on the peace process and I got the strong impression that the Soviets are looking for a way to demonstrate that they will be positive and constructive in this effort. Over lunch, we discussed CFE, BW, the Summit, START and Afghanistan very briefly, and also the domestic situation in the Soviet Union.

Peace Process

Bessmertnykh was very forthcoming on our initiative. He accepted not only our basic approach, but he also agreed with the way we were looking at the modalities. He was sensitive to the need to deal with Europe and give the Europeans a sense of inclusion. He particularly liked our idea of having the EC presidency at the conference. Like us, he feels the French will have to be managed and he too evinced some surprise at Dumas' meeting with Arafat.

On the question of whether or not the conference should be reconvened, he clearly understood Israel's concerns but felt there had to be more than one meeting. He liked the notion of there being a consensus rule for any reconvening of the conference. He suggested that we propose that the co-sponsors would convene the conference when they deem it necessary, provided all the parties agreed.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0832-MR

MM 4/7/2015

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

On the UN, he pushed for a more prominent role, but seemed to buy off on my argument that I could not get more than observer status -- and that would take a major effort with the Israelis given their allergy to the UN. He seemed persuaded that the need for UN role could be satisfied by the combination of observer status and reference to UNSC 242 and 338 in the terms of reference and our agreeing to deposit at the UN agreements worked out by the bilateral negotiating groups.

When we began to talk about the Palestinian representation issue he told me he had just seen Abu Mazin of the PLO and had worked him very hard on the need not to block this process; on the importance of not having Palestinians at the conference stand up and say they are there under instructions from the PLO; and on the value of dealing with the Palestinian representation issue through the mechanism of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. He said Abu Mazin had been flexible, but that they would continue to work the PLO.

He agreed with me that the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was the way to handle delicate issues like East Jerusalem and Palestinians from outside the territories. (Indeed, the concept of having Jordanian citizens who happen to fit those categories was one which he felt provided a very strong argument for having a joint delegation.) He went so far as to suggest the following idea for working out the actual Palestinians who are coming to the conference: have Jordan work out the joint delegation with Palestinians, present the list to the co-sponsors, and have the co-sponsors circulate the list to all the parties starting with Israel. As he put it, in these circumstances Israel would not be selecting the Palestinians who came to the conference and subsequent negotiations, but Israel would be put in a position where it would not have to sit with anyone that it felt unable to meet with. I told him I thought the idea was a good one, but it would be very important that Arafat not show up in Amman, be embraced by the King, and have the list emerge immediately after that. He said he understood that very well and that the whole issue would have to be handled delicately.

In addition to talk about the modalities of the conference and of Palestinian representation, Bessmertnykh also raised the question of restoring relations with Israel. He left little doubt that the Soviets would restore this relationship, but he did not want the restoration to look like a precondition for Soviet co-sponsorship of the conference. He was planning to go to the Middle East the week after next and he made it clear there was a good chance that he would stop in Israel. No final decision had been made, but he would be talking this over with Gorbachev shortly.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Lastly, he raised the question of location of the conference. He was uneasy about having the conference in Washington because he felt it might create problems for Gorbachev, particularly if you were opening the conference. As a co-sponsor, he would want to be there as well, but it created problems for Gorbachev politically if he had to come back to Washington before you had made a visit to Moscow. Bessmertnykh preferred the idea of Cairo, but wondered out loud whether Gorbachev would break away to go to Cairo. I told him I thought if you came to Cairo that that might well provide Gorbachev an incentive to do likewise. What we've been thinking of is a ministerial-level conference which you and Gorbachev might open as the co-sponsors.

All in all, I believe Bessmertnykh is prepared to take steps to contribute to our effort. And the reality is, that the Soviets can in fact be quite helpful to us on Palestinian and also Syrian participation. Their help may prove essential in these two cases.

Other Issues

(1) CFE: Bessmertnykh told me that the response to your letter on CFE would be coming very soon. He said your response to Gorbachev's earlier letter had been very helpful and that with the exception of naval infantry, all your proposals had been accepted. For example, they agreed to your suggestions on equipment east of the Urals, on destruction rules, and verification procedures. He added that it had not been easy to get this done. He said he had taken on the military, but had gone as far as he could go. On the issue of naval infantry, the military was absolutely united; he said that preserving the principle of the naval infantry was very important to the military. Notwithstanding the fact that the numbers now involved were small -- 120 tanks, 753 APC's, and 234 artillery pieces.

I said that if the numbers were indeed small, why couldn't the Soviets respond to your proposal of keeping the naval infantry intact, but reducing the equivalent number of tanks, APC's, and artillery pieces from regular army units. His answer to this was that their drawdown from regular units to meet the problem on coastal defense forces had reduced the numbers available in their regular units, especially on the flanks. He said the military just was not prepared to go further. And he repeated what Gorbachev had proposed in his letter to you, "couldn't all the signatories to the treaty simply exclude their naval infantry or marine units from the treaty?" I told him I thought this would be a very hard thing to do.

Echoing what we had been saying for some time, he said it was very important for us to get this issue behind us if we were to put arms control back on the right track and get to a summit. I told him I couldn't agree more, and that you had presented a proposal which we felt went a long ways towards meeting their needs.

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

He concluded by saying that he thought it might help at this point to bring Moiseyev together with our experts, putting him in a position where he would have to explain his position and defend it. I suspect that the response we will be receiving will be a proposal where the experts at the Moiseyev level get together. Having boosted this issue up to you and Gorbachev, I'm not sure we can solve this problem below that level. But it is clear that Bessmertnykh believes that getting the experts together may strengthen his hand.

(2) BW: I reminded Bessmertnykh that we would have to go to the Congress very soon and brief them on this very sensitive issue. I told him that it was very important if we were going to manage what could be a very explosive issue for us to have a Soviet response to the concerns we had raised. Indeed, we needed a Soviet response that addressed these concerns concretely and with a number of corrective steps. He said that we would be getting a response to the specific points we had raised very soon and he hoped we would defer going to the Congress at least until we'd received his response and our experts had gotten together. He emphasized that it was especially important for our experts to meet because no one at the political level on either side really understood the issues. He felt that if our experts got together, we could raise each of the specific points that were a source of real concern to us and their experts could provide a full explanation on each point. He said that should satisfy the concerns we had. Indeed, if their explanations under these circumstances were not sufficient, he implied there might well be a problem on their side.

So, I presume, the response that we will receive will propose that our experts meet.

I told him I could only support such a meeting if I knew it would take place within the next several days. I said we really were in a position where we had to go to the Congress very soon, so we did not have the luxury of letting much more time go by. If such a meeting of experts could take place within the next several days, I'd be prepared to recommend our going ahead with it.

(3) Summit: Bessmertnykh asked about timing for a possible summit. And I told him that at this point it was very hard to see you going to Moscow for a full-fledged summit without there being a START agreement. I said that did not necessarily have to rule out a meeting in a third country if a START agreement weren't going to be available for some time to come. Clearly, if we were able to put together the Middle East peace conference, that could provide an opportunity for a meeting.

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- 5 -

(4) START: Perhaps because he would like to get to a summit soon, Bessmertnykh proposed that we revive the negotiations in Geneva. He said he would be willing to raise the level of his negotiators to spur movement, noting that it would be good to put ourselves in the position to resolve START quickly in the event that we put CFE behind us. I told him I'd think about whether there was any value in trying to give the START negotiations in Geneva a push at this point.

(5) Afghanistan: I raised Afghanistan very briefly with him. I gave him a letter in which I proposed that we'd consider taking part in an international conference on Afghanistan, something the Soviets had long wanted, if they in turn agreed to set a date for the implementation of bilateral negative symmetry. Bessmertnykh said this was an interesting idea, and he'd think about it. However, he also noted that the task from his end had become a little more difficult because of the fall of the city of Khost. That had made some in Moscow less willing now to cut off arms to Kabul than before. Having said that, he nonetheless added that he would think about this proposal and get back to me.

(6) Domestic Situation: When I raised questions about the Plenum Bessmertnykh suggested that Gorbachev would face a challenge, but he evidenced little concern about that challenge. He didn't say it was insignificant, but the clear impression was that Gorbachev would be able to handle this. Interestingly enough, Bessmertnykh observed that Soyuz (the right wing group of deputies) was actually helping Gorbachev right now in calling for his resignation and announcing an intention to form a party. The fear of Soyuz was creating a potential for coalescence of other groups and had contributed very directly to a productive meeting that Gorbachev had had the other day with nine republic leaders, including Yeltsin. I asked whether this increased the prospect for a coalition with Yeltsin, reformers, and some from the center right on the political spectrum. He noted that "personalities" prevented that at this point, but he felt there was a growing degree of realism about the need to work together. Those words sound good, but I'm afraid the drift continues. That said, I do think we may be seeing the first stirrings of a possible new coalition: one that might join conservatives who realize there must be some change with reformers who realize they need a better program to thwart the threat from the right. This may be another argument for us to expand not only our contacts with the republics, but also with some of the key players in the center.

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(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 109

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 6

DTG 260450ZAPR91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: E. LINDBERRY / USDEL SECRETARY

ACTION / LOCATION:

TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHSR - SDO
2. SCOWCROFT
3. GATES
4. SITMAN
5. HILL O'HEARY
6. SDU SIGLER

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

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2. _____

REMARKS: _____

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By CAF NARA, Date 8/28/09

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April 25, 1

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ELL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

April 25, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: THURSDAY'S MEETINGS

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0832-MR

MM 4/7/2015

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- 2 -

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~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

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~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 08

ADMIN FAX # _____

RECORD # _____

PAGES 3

DTG 241310Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM/LOCATION

1. SAM 974 / SECSTATE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHSR / SCOWCROFT

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SCOWCROFT (2)

TOR: 241314Z

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INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Best Copy Avail

2. _____

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By CAF NARA, Date 8/28/09

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

April 24, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *EL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL
SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER
OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS
Well, his office number is (202) 647-9640.
MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Informal (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX # 08

ADMIN FAX # _____

RECORD # _____

PAGES 3

DTG 241310Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM/LOCATION

1. SAM 974 / SECSTATE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. WHSR / SCOWCROFT

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SCOWCROFT (2)

TOR: 241314Z

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1. Best Copy Avail

2. _____

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By CAF NARA, Date 8/28/09

~~SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

CLASSIFICATION

April 24, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ef*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER
OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS

Well, his office number is (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Official Informal (1 pp.)	4/24/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX #

98

ADMIN FAX #

PAGES

5

DTG 240739Z APR 91

RELEASER

FROM / LOCATION:

LINESBERRY

AJ
ACTION / LOCATION:

1.

WHSR D.O.

Scowcroft

2.

GATES

3.

4.

5.

6.

TIME OF RECEIPT

240749Z

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1.

2.

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAP NARA, Date 8/28/09

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAP NARA, Date 8/28/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

FROM: ELIZABETH LINESBERRY
SPECIAL ASST. TO SECRETARY BAKER

TO: WHITE HOUSE SITROOM
SENIOR DUTY OFFICER

THIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 4 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

April 23, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ELL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Tuesday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/23/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 95

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 6

DTG 230911Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: SECSTATE

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. WHSR D.O. Scowcroft
2. GATES
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____

TIME OF RECEIPT

230934Z

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

REMARKS: _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/28/09

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997

By CAP NARA, Date 8/28/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

ELIZABETH LINDBERRY
FROM: SPECIAL ASST. TO SEC. BAKER

TO: White House SIT. RM, SENIOR D.O.

THIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 5 PAGES

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *EL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meetings (4 pp.)	4/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 92

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 5

DTG 221945Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: USDEL SEC OF STATE, DAMASCUS

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. W.H.SR. D.O.
2. Scowcroft (2)
3. Gates
4. Kimmitt
5. _____
6. _____

TIME OF RECEIPT

221953Z NR

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____
2. _____

REMARKS: _____

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 8/28/09

~~SECRET~~

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

April 21, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
10. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Sunday's Meetings (3 pp.)	4/21/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

~~SECRET~~ / EYES ONLY

(CLASSIFICATION)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW:

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE:

SECURE FAX # 85

ADMIN FAX # _____

PAGES 6

DTG 210730Z APR 91

RELEASER _____

FROM / LOCATION: E.R. LINEBERRY / USDEL CIARO

ACTION / LOCATION:

1. WHSR - SDO

2. SCOWCROFT

3. GATES

4. KIMMITT

5. _____

6. _____

TIME OF RECEIPT

210739Z

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____

2. _____

REMARKS: MEMO FM SEC BAKER TO GEN SCOWCROFT
FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By CA NARA, Date 8/20/01

~~SECRET~~ / EYES ONLY

(CLASSIFICATION)

GS-8

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ert*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Saturday's Meetings (5 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
12. Memo	Brent Scowcroft to Secretary Baker Re: Deliver Eyes Only to Secretary Baker (3 pp.)	4/20/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13a. Cable	From White House Re: Message for Secretary Baker from Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	4/18/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
13b. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to The Secretary of State Re: Secretary Baker from Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/17/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [3]

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-004
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1991

Dear Mr. President,

On the holy occasion of Id al-Fitr, I am pleased that Secretary Baker can convey my warmest wishes to you and all the people of Syria. Secretary Baker has returned to the region at a crucial moment. I am convinced that we have a real and historic opportunity to make a breakthrough toward enduring peace in the Middle East.

Syria's role right now is going to be critical. On the basis of our exchanges so far, I am confident that we can work together for regional peace. I hope that you will be able to work closely with Jim Baker in making a breakthrough now possible. We have accomplished great things together in recent months, and together we can do much more. I look forward to hearing Secretary Baker's report of his discussions with you and to the continued improvement of U.S. - Syrian relations and our dialogue.

With best wishes,



His Excellency
Hafiz al-Asad
President of the Syrian Arab Republic
Damascus

Thank you for the courtesies shown to my friend Jim Baker. He fills me in on every detail

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1991

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am pleased that Secretary Baker can convey my warmest wishes to you and all the people of Israel. Jim has returned to the region at a crucial moment. I am convinced that we have a real and historic opportunity to make a breakthrough toward enduring peace in the Middle East.

Your help right now is going to be critical to turn opportunity into reality. I know that I can count on it, and I hope also that you will be able to work closely with Secretary Baker in making a breakthrough now possible. While compromises from everyone will be necessary, the fundamental basis for progress toward the dream of a lasting, comprehensive peace is the U.S. commitment to Israel's security. I look forward to hearing Secretary Baker's report of his discussions with you and to continued U.S.-Israeli cooperation and friendship.

With best wishes, *and*

high regard,

A. Bush

His Excellency
Yitzhak Shamir
Prime Minister of Israel

*P.S. Thanks for your generous
allocation of time to my
friend Jim Baker.*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


April 16, 1991

Dear Hosni,

On the holy occasion of Id al-Fitr, I am pleased that Secretary Baker can convey my warmest wishes to you and all the people of Egypt. Jim has returned to the region at a crucial moment. I am convinced that we have a real and historic opportunity to make a breakthrough toward enduring peace in the Middle East.

Egypt's help right now is going to be critical. I am confident that I can count on it, and I hope also that you'll be able to work closely with Jim Baker in making a breakthrough now possible. We have accomplished great things together in recent months, and together we can do much more. I look forward to hearing Jim's report of his discussions with you and to our continued close cooperation and friendship.

With best wishes,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "G. Bush", written in a cursive style.

His Excellency
Mohammad Hosni Mubarak
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Cairo

My warmest personal regards.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1991

Your Majesty,

On the holy occasion of Id al-Fitr, I am pleased that Secretary Baker can convey my warmest wishes to you and all the people of Saudi Arabia. Secretary Baker has returned to the region at a crucial moment. I am convinced that we have a real and historic opportunity to make a breakthrough toward enduring peace in the Middle East.

Your help right now is going to be critical. I hope that I can count on it, and I hope also that you will be able to work closely with Secretary Baker in making a breakthrough now possible. We have accomplished great things together in recent months, and together we can do much more. I look forward to hearing Secretary Baker's report of his discussions with you and to our continued cooperation.

With best wishes,



His Majesty Fahd bin Abdulaziz al-Saud
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Riyadh

*My personal respects
a friendship comes with
this letter*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1991

Your Majesty,

On the holy occasion of Id al-Fitr, I am pleased that Secretary Baker can convey my warm wishes to you and all the people of Jordan. Secretary Baker has returned to the region at a crucial moment. I am convinced that we have a real and historic opportunity to make a breakthrough toward enduring peace in the Middle East.

Your help right now could be critical. I hope that I can count on renewed cooperation in the peace process, and I hope also that you will be able to work closely with Secretary Baker in making a breakthrough now possible. I look forward to hearing Secretary Baker's report of his discussions with you and to our continued dialogue.

With best wishes,



His Majesty
Hussein I
King of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan
Amman

*I am very pleased
that Tim will be
visiting. We have a long
way to go, but working
together we can get
there.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4 16 91

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 16, 1991

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2782

91 APR 16 12:15

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS for*
SUBJECT: Letters to King Fahd, King Hussein,
President Mubarak, President Asad, and
Prime Minister Shamir

Purpose

To convey your personal sense of urgency for Jim Baker's peace process mission.

Background

Jim Baker is heading back to the Middle East, where he will meet with Fahd, Hussein, Mubarak, Asad, and Shamir. He suggested that letters from you to each leader, stressing the urgency of making progress in the peace process, would be useful to convey your personal support for his mission. We agree.

Recommendation

That you sign the letters at Tab A to King Fahd, King Hussein, President Mubarak, President Asad, and Prime Minister Shamir.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0379-MR

SCS 1/25/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2782

April 16, 1991

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

THROUGH: RICHARD N. HAASS *mw*

FROM: C. DAVID WELCH *mw*

SUBJECT: Letters to King Fahd, King Hussein, President
Mubarak, President Asad, and Prime Minister Shamir

Attached at Tab I is a memo to the President, forwarding brief letters to Fahd, Hussein, Mubarak, Asad, and Shamir for Jim Baker to deliver during his trip.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached memo to the President.

Attachments

Tab I	Memorandum to President
Tab A	Letter to King Fahd
Tab B	Letter to King Hussein
Tab C	Letter to President Mubarak
Tab D	Letter to President Asad
Tab E	Letter to Prime Minister Shamir

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/28/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Apr-1991 13:41 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

(WHSR_ROUTER@WHSR)

SUBJECT: PRIMA COMEXINBESS BACKGROUNDER ON KUWAIT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1180-MR

MM 11/17/2016

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FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1129

<SUBJ>

PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON KUWAIT

<TEXT>

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 01218

S/S PLEASE PASS SECDEL FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER
AND KAREN GROOMES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, KU

SUBJECT: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON KUWAIT

REF: GROOMES-GNEHM TELCONS 4/19

1. AS WE DISCUSSED YESTERDAY, I AM PROVIDING SOME
TALKING POINT BULLETS THAT MARGARET CAN USE IN HER
BACKGROUNDER ON THE WAY OVER HERE. THESE POINTS ARE
INTENDED TO GIVE YOU A SENSE OF WHAT HAS BEEN
ACCOMPLISHED, JUST OVER 50 DAYS AFTER WE RETURNED TO

LIBERATED KUWAIT ON MARCH 1. I HAVE ALSO CITED SOME IMPRESSIVE ACHIEVEMENTS BY U.S. BUSINESSES IN THE KUWAIT RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM.

2. RECONSTRUCTION/RECOVERY

- ELECTRICAL POWER HAS BEEN RESTORED TO 91 PERCENT OF THE CITY. WHEN HOSTILITIES ENDED, THE CITY WAS COMPLETELY BLACK. HUNDREDS OF MILES OF POWER DISTRIBUTION LINES HAVE BEEN REPAIRED OR REPLACED.
 - WATER PRODUCTION IS CURRENTLY 70 MILLION GALLONS PER DAY, UP FROM ZERO ON MARCH 1. THE RESERVOIR STORAGE SYSTEM WITH A 2 BILLION GALLON CAPACITY WAS VIRTUALLY EMPTY AND IS NOW NEARLY A THIRD FULL.
 - ALL PUBLIC HOSPITALS ARE FUNCTIONING. MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE MORE THAN ADEQUATE. CRITICAL MEDICAL MACHINERY IS BEING REPLACED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE.
 - TELEPHONE SERVICE, VIRTUALLY TOTALLY OUT OF OPERATION AFTER LIBERATION, HAS BEEN RESTORED TO 88 PERCENT OF THE CUSTOMERS. INTERNATIONAL CALL CAPABILITY IS EXPANDING.
 - REPAIRS TO MAJOR ROADS ARE WELL UNDERWAY WITH THE PAVING OF 13 KILOMETERS OF THE MAJOR SUPPLY HIGHWAY BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND KUWAIT.
 - THE POLICE DEPARTMENT CONTINUES TO EXPAND WITH 5,500 MEN IN UNIFORM AND 265 PATROL CARS IN SERVICE.
 - FORTY-EIGHT OIL WELLS HAVE BEEN CONTROLLED. THIRTEEN OF THESE WERE BURNING. THE COMPANIES ARE CAPPING TWO OR THREE A DAY ON AVERAGE.
 - CITY GARBAGE IS NOW ON A REGULAR SCHEDULE. WASTE MANAGEMENT, A U.S. FIRM, HAS BEEN AWARDED ONE OF THE LARGE COLLECTION CONTRACTS.
 - PLANS ARE UNDERWAY TO RESTORE WITHIN 40 DAYS OIL PRODUCTION TO SUPPLY KUWAIT'S DOMESTIC NEEDS--ABOUT 50,000 B/D.
 - ONE THOUSAND WRECKED VEHICLES HAVE BEEN CLEARED FROM THE CITY TO DATE.
 - FOOD SUPPLY CONTINUES TO EXPAND WELL ABOVE SUBSISTENCE LEVELS WITH THE IMPORTATION OF FRESH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. MORE AND MORE MARKETS ARE OPEN AS THE PRIVATE SECTOR REPLACES THE PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION POINTS AS THE PEOPLE'S MAIN SOURCE OF FOOD.
 - PUBLIC COMMERCIAL TRADE IS SLOWLY EXPANDING WITH THE OPENING OF SOME SMALLER SHOPS AND RESTAURANTS.
 - THE KUWAIT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IS OPEN FOR BUSINESS AND THE GOK IS ABOUT TO TAKE CONTROL OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FROM THE COALITION MILITARY KUWAIT AIRWAYS HAS RESUMED INTERNATIONAL FLIGHTS.
 - ONE OF KUWAIT'S TWO MAJOR PORTS IS OPERATIONAL WITH MAJOR ASSISTANCE OF U.S. NAVY. SHIPPING CHANNELS TO FOUR OF KUWAIT'S PORTS HAVE BEEN SWEPT.
 - PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS IS FUNCTIONING WITH ONE T.V. STATION AND TWO RADIO STATIONS IN OPERATION.
- ## 3. U.S. BUSINESS AND KUWAIT RECONSTRUCTION

-- U.S. COMPANIES HAVE RECEIVED 135 CONTRACTS OUT OF
200 AWARDED BY THE GOK DURING THE EMERGENCY PHASE.

BT

#1218

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 KUWAIT 01218
S/S PLEASE PASS SECDEL FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY TUTWILER
AND KAREN GROOMES

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, KU

SUBJECT: PRESS BACKGROUNDER ON KUWAIT
THE TOTAL VALUE AMOUNTED TO USDOL 372.3 MILLION OR 66
PERCENT OF ALL CONTRACTS. IN ADDITION TO THE
EMERGENCY CONTRACTS, THE KUWAITI PETROLEUM COMPANY
AWARDED U.S. COMPANIES CONTRACTS FOR THE OIL WELL
FIRES WHICH IS ESTIMATED AT USDOL 51 MILLION.

-- IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR AMERICAN FIRMS HAVE ALREADY
SOLD ABOUT USDOL 158 MILLION, CHIEFLY IN VEHICLES.

4. U.S. FIRMS PLAY PROMINENT ROLE

- - - - -

BECHTEL IS THE CHIEF SUPPORT FIRM FOR THE FIRE
FIGHTING TEAMS.

AT AND T HAS SOLD USDOL 24 MILLION IN TELEPHONE
EQUIPMENT AND IS POISED TO PLAY A LEADING ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF KUWAIT'S TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR.
CATERPILLAR WON THE LARGEST CONTRACT UNDER THE
EMERGENCY PHASE, USDOL 19.8 MILLION. THE COMPANY IS
EXPECTING MORE BUSINESS ESTIMATED AT USDOL 56 MILLION
THIS YEAR.

U.S. CAR/VAN/TRUCKS MANUFACTURES WILL BE THE HIGHEST
EXPORT TO KUWAIT OVER THE NEXT 18 MONTHS, POSSIBLY
TOPPING USDOL 750 MILLION.

5. LARGEST U.S. EXHIBITION IN KUWAIT, JUNE 3-9, 1991

- - - - -

THE EMBASSY AND DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WILL STAGE THE
FIRST FOREIGN EXHIBITION IN KUWAIT SINCE LIBERATION.
THE EVENT WILL FEATURE OVER 60 LEADING FIRMS AND WILL
BE THE LARGEST U.S. EVENT STAGED IN KUWAIT.

GNEHM

BT

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SECTION: 01 OF 02

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SECTION: 02 OF 02

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