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2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
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FOIA MARKER

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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-003

Folder Title:
Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01. Letter	JABIII [James A. Baker, III] to POTUS (1 pp.)	9/13/91	(b)(1)	
02. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Wednesday's Meetings in Moscow (4 pp.)	9/11/91	(b)(1)	S
03. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meetings with King Hassan and President Ben Ali [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/4/91	(b)(1)	S
04. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meetings with King Hassan and President Ben Ali [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/4/91	(b)(1)	S
05. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Friday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/2/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Friday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/2/91	(b)(1)	S
07. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Sunday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	7/22/91	(b)(1)	S
08. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Jeddah [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	7/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Page 1 of 2

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Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Pinksheet Number: cap1349
OA/ID Number: 91164-003
Date Closed: 8/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
09. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Egypt [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	7/19/91	(b)(1)	S
10. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meeting with President Assad (2 pp.)	7/18/91	(b)(1)	S
11. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Impressions from the Trip (5 pp.)	6/22/91	(b)(1)	S
12. Memo	John A. Gordon to Distribution List Re: Baker in Geneva (3 pp.)	6/7/91	(b)(1)	S
13. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Meetings in Lisbon (6 pp.)	6/1/91	(b)(1)	S
14. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Summing up the Trip and What We Do Next (4 pp.)	5/16/91	(b)(1)	S
15. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Monday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S
16. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Tuesday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/14/91	(b)(1)	S
17. Memo	James A. Baker, III to POTUS Re: Monday's Meeting (7 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 13, 1991



POTUS,

As I said in my telephone call, I thought your press conference was perfect -- just the right tone and message. The attached is from what I am told is a very responsible publication in Tel Aviv (written by its Washington correspondent). Except for the "below the belt" comment at the top, it seems to me to pretty well tell it like it is -- particularly the last two paragraphs. Hopefully this will be the way many Israeli publications will treat with what you said.

For now, my recommendation is that nothing more needs to be, nor should be, said by you or from the White House pending either my arrival in Jerusalem or some other development. The point is I think we're positioned about as well as we could be under the circumstances, although I may be too far away (Leningrad) to clearly see the picture.

JABIII


Attachment

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: James A. Baker, III 
Subject: Wednesday's Meetings in Moscow

As I mentioned to you on the phone, my first day here was an extraordinary one. I met with Gorbachev for nearly three hours and then with Yeltsin for three hours. I went from meeting with Yeltsin to the CSCE Conference where I witnessed the Lithuanian Foreign Minister giving his speech to those assembled. If two months ago, someone had told us an independent Lithuanian Foreign Minister would be making a very positive speech to a CSCE meeting in Moscow in September, we would have asked what he was smoking. That typifies the enormous changes that have taken place here.

President Gorbachev praised you privately and publicly for your personal role in this transformation. He thanked me, with some emotion, for your support during the coup. He believes your support led world opinion. He said he really learned who his friends are. At our press conference, Gorbachev asked me to give you one of the four video tapes he prepared in the Crimea during his darkest hour. Yeltsin was also highly appreciative.

This is not their only point of common agreement -- far from it, at least for now. One thing that came through very clearly in both of my meetings with them is that they are absolutely determined to cooperate with each other. They each see that as essential to managing change now. I was frankly surprised by the extent of their coordination and agreement which runs across the spectrum of issues. For example, they agreed totally on the need to preserve a new Capital Center. They agree that the Center must be in control of all nuclear weapons (strategic and tactical). They agree that there should be only one currency in a new economic union. They agree that an economic union, properly forged through an "Economic Treaty" that Yavlinskiy is now drafting with the Republics, is critical for governing what emerges in what they call "the common economic base." They agree that what is needed now is practical action, not talk -- and that what is required is a credible program for moving to a market-based economy that is worked out with the IMF and the World Bank. (And that program needs to be worked out in weeks not months). They agree also that they need help from the outside and they're worried about what will happen this winter.

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2011-0850-MR
9/24/2013 MM

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- 2 -

What comes through unmistakably is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin are convinced that they need each other -- Gorbachev because of Yeltsin's broader legitimacy, Yeltsin because of Gorbachev's experience and his help with the other Republics, who fear the Russians in general and Yeltsin in particular. Their common stake in preventing disintegration and promoting transformation of the country is a very strong bond. I don't know how long it will last, but they clearly each see that it is in their interest now, and both made a strong and very conscious pitch to me that they were cooperating with the other.

(Gorbachev emphasized Yeltsin's courage, Yeltsin spoke of Gorbachev as a changed man and said that he and Gorbachev were on the phone all the time with each other.) It's interesting that the decision on Afghanistan that I called you about came only after a meeting that I'd had with Yeltsin and he called me after that meeting to let me know that he'd talked with Gorbachev and they had agreed on it.

Both of them look to us for ideas, support, and in time, I suspect, leadership in mobilizing real assistance. I don't think it's an accident that they're each very eager to close out our old agenda -- e.g., Cuba, Afghanistan, and possibly the Northern Territories.

On Cuba, following our meeting, Gorbachev announced that there would shortly be a discussion with Cuba on removing their training brigade. But when citing a figure for those who would be affected by that discussion, he referred to a number that was the equivalent of their whole military intelligence presence in Cuba, not simply their training brigade. Later Yeltsin told me that all military and economic assistance to Cuba would be cut off by January 1, 1992, and that all Soviet military personnel in Cuba will be out of Cuba by the same date. It's clear to me that a key motivation behind this step, which will not go down well in numerous quarters here, is to clear the way for our stronger support. They have recognized your political constraints and are seeking to remove them.

I suspect, over time, we may be able to manage the question of the Northern Territories as well, particularly because I think they will look to us to help broker a process with the Japanese. They don't find it easy to deal with the Japanese, who they believe want everything up front, without a process that eases the adjustment and offers their public an explanation. In particular, the Soviets will want any movement on this issue to look like they are closing the book on World War II and the Stalinist legacy, not simply trading away Russian territory for money.

In addition, my discussions today leave little doubt that they want to be very responsive to us on the Middle East peace process and I think they are also anxious to cooperate with us on new agenda items like proliferation. In short, we're very important to them and that's all to the good.

~~SECRET~~

But as we look at what's good and helpful in the current situation, the dangers also stand out plainly to any visitor here. Their needs are immense. People are sullen. Our anecdotal talks with the average person here reveal a sense that all they hear is talk and meanwhile food and other basic goods are harder and harder to get -- much more so than five years ago. One old acquaintance of Margaret Tutwiler's said that the first person who puts vodka on the shelves will walk away with the prize.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin are trying very hard to get their political and economic act together, but it won't be easy and they have to deliver on more than merely promises. What's more, they know they do. Gorbachev said that very clearly to me. He clearly wants to move now and is worried that if he and the democrats do not deliver soon they will be discredited.

Gorbachev emphasized that in defeating the coup, the democrats had been successful in cutting off the "head" of the reactionaries behind it. Implicit in what he was saying was that there was a lot of latent support for anyone who could promise order. Others we know well have been more explicit: they say seven are gone, but thousands more are still out there. A feeling is that if they have their chance, the next round won't be an amateur act.

The simple fact is that we have a tremendous stake in the success of the democrats here. Their success will change the world in a way that reflects both our values and our hopes. What may be at stake is the equivalent of the postwar recovery of Germany and Japan as democratic allies, only this time after a long cold war rather than a short one. Their failure would produce a world that is far more threatening and dangerous, and I have little doubt that if they are unable to begin to deliver the goods, they will be supplanted by authoritarian leaders of the xenophobic right wing. (I suspect I will hear such a scenario from Shevardnadze in very explicit terms tomorrow.) Given the long odds, I think we need to be realistic in recognizing that success might amount to simply holding off a counter-reaction and giving the democrats the space and time to keep at what will be a long journey. But that in itself could be an historic legacy.

Gorbachev and Yeltsin know -- and I made it extremely clear -- that they have got to produce a credible plan for getting to a market-based economy, in league with the IMF and World Bank. They can't just talk about this; they have to do it. But if they do it, they will be looking to us, and you in particular, to mobilize a major international effort to help them through what will be a very difficult transition. Frankly, they trust and respect you -- and believe the U.S. is the only nation in the world that can pull together the West to match their efforts.

(Gorbachev clearly sees the Gulf coalition as a model here, and drew attention to that in our meeting.) This effort would start on the humanitarian side, as you have spoken of, to lead the process of securing support for a radical market reform drive.

At this point, the onus is still on them to step up to the plate and prove that they are prepared to carry out an economic revolution that matches their political revolution. But if they do that -- indeed, if they really do want both the IMF and the World Bank to shape a very credible program for moving to a market economy, the onus will be on us, especially if we hang back. Notwithstanding everything they are up against, I don't think we should assume that they are going to shy away from the task of carrying out an economic revolution. We should begin to position ourselves to deal with that possibility.

Handwritten note from Secretary Baker:

POTUS: I'd like to discuss this note with you after you and Brent have had a chance to focus on it. JAB III 9/12/91

25:31

IMMEDIATE

MODE :

PAGES 4

ADMIN FAX # _____

DTG 041943Z AUG 91

RELEASER

FROM / LOCATION: USDEL

1. GEN. SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT

2. GATES

3. _____

4. _____

5. _____

041959Z AUG 91
(TIME OF RECEIPT)

INFORMATION / LOCATION:

1. _____

2. _____

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAP NARA, Date 8/28/09

REMARKS :

(CLASSIFICATION)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines
E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B), July 21, 1997
By CAP NARA, Date 8/28/09

SENT: **CLASSIFIED** RCVD:
FAX
USDEL SECRETARY

FROM: USDEL BAGATTO: GENERAL SCROWCROFT
FOR THE PRESIDENTTHIS TRANSMISSION INCLUDES THIS COVERSHEET PLUS 3 PAGES

AUGUST 4, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE ROBERT KIMMITT'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-2471.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Meetings with King Hassan and President Ben Ali [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	8/4/91	(b)(1)	S

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Document Partially Declassified
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 By MM on 4/20/2023

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Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1172-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH KING HASSAN AND PRESIDENT BEN ALI

Summary

King Hassan told me Saturday night that Morocco has decided to go as an observer to the peace conference. He reserved judgment on participation in the regional multilateral negotiations, pending consultations with his Arab friends. For public consumption, he asked us to say that Morocco reacted positively on the observer issue and is considering its position.

On Sunday in Tunis, President Ben Ali was interested in talking, but extremely cautious about any public position. In our private meeting, he parroted a fair amount of traditional Arab rhetoric, even though he had earlier been positive about our proposals in a Le Monde interview. He said he would forward a response to us and Foreign Minister Ben Yahia was broadly positive in our joint press conference.

Morocco

I met for two hours with Hassan at his seaside palace Saturday night. He was delighted to have your handwritten letter from Moscow.

I went through in full detail where we are on the peace process and where we think all of the other players are. Hassan took it on board, asked a number of good questions, and grasped the full significance of the Israeli "yes" even if it is conditioned on the Palestinian representation question.

Hassan was particularly interested in the East Jerusalem issue (he is head of the Jerusalem Committee of the Islamic Conference). While he did not explicitly endorse the links to Jerusalem that we had outlined to the Palestinians, he seemed to believe that they are worthwhile.

He said he would speak to the Palestinians about not blocking the process.

[REDACTED]

Hassan's bottom line was that Morocco has decided to attend the peace conference as an observer, if Egypt and the GCC go (they have already said "yes"). Hassan thought that Tunisia, Algeria and even Mauritania might go as observers.

Hassan said that observer status was just fine: Morocco would say nothing in the conference plenary, but nothing would prevent them from being active in the corridors. Hassan initially said that Morocco would not participate in the multilateral negotiations on regional issues. After I explained further the significance of these talks, Hassan said he would be in touch with the Egyptians, the Saudis and the other Maghreb states on the question.

Hassan asked us to withhold publicity on his decision to attend as an observer until he announces it. This will probably be between the UMA summit in early September and Hassan's state visit with you September 26. Hassan told us to say publicly last night that Morocco reacted positively to our proposal, but is consulting its Arab friends before making a final decision.

Tunisia

I opened my meeting with Ben Ali by recalling his visit with you in May 1990. I said that we wanted to get over the period of estrangement in our relations and get back to normal. We have no real problems on our bilateral agenda and will try to resume a modest aid flow in FY 1992.

I went over in detail where we are on the peace process and what we have told the Palestinians about a potential letter of assurance. Ben Ali had seen Palestinians from Tunis the previous night, but had no clear indication of where they are heading.

Faisal Hussein was to arrive in Tunis Sunday night and Ben Ali was to meet with both Hussein and other Palestinians. I stressed to Ben Ali the absolute necessity for the Palestinians in Tunis not to block the process and said that this bus won't come by again soon.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

I asked explicitly that the Tunisians tell the press that they would participate in the multilateral negotiations and come to the conference as an observer. Ben Ali stalled and said he would forward a response.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

On balance, I believe the Tunisians will be helpful, particularly Ben Yahia, although Ben Ali is not a very stand-up guy.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MY FRIDAY MEETINGS

A thorough discussion with the Palestinians showed their continued preoccupation with the representation issue. I laid out ways that we could reassure them that their claims or negotiating position would not be in any way prejudiced. Hussein and his colleagues are concerned for their physical safety. At the end of the meeting they presented me with a letter containing some unacceptable positions. In Amman with King Hussein, I reviewed where we are with the Palestinians and on the process in general. He and his senior advisors seemed generally satisfied and he was constructive at a press conference.

Palestinian Meeting

In four hours with Feisal Hussein and his two partners, the main focus was on the question of whether residents of East Jerusalem would be on the Palestinian delegation from the outset of the talks. I outlined a package of links to Jerusalem which are reiterations of US positions which we would provide them in a letter of assurance. I told them that our position is solid, that the status of Jerusalem must be determined by negotiations. I told them we would support voting rights for East Jerusalem citizens in the election of a transitional authority and that we and the Soviets will state that regardless of the form of representation, nothing would be prejudicial or precedential with respect to their claim to negotiate on Jerusalem.

I added that Feisal and his colleagues could come to Washington and meet with you if they found that useful. I offered to hold my next meeting with them in East Jerusalem (our first five have been at the Consul General's house in West Jerusalem).

Both Hanan Ashrawi and Feisal asked for some reference to "self-determination" in our letter of assurance. I told them I was not agreeing, but I would look at the issue.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR
mm 4/7/2016

1.4(d)

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

1.4(d)

The Palestinians agonized over settlements (this came up in Jordan too). I underlined the best way to attack the issue is to get to the negotiations which will have its own impact on Israeli public opinion.

Ashrawi raised renewing the US-PLO dialogue. I said it wasn't in the cards, given the support for Saddam and the failure to act on terrorism. But I added that if the PLO blocked the peace process, it will forever forfeit any chance to renew the dialogue.

1.4(d)

At the end of the meeting, they gave me a contentious letter (clearly influenced by Tunis). It was noteworthy that they did not press most of the points in the letter during the meeting and were careful to point out that it was drafted before my presentation.

They were as positive as we could reasonably expect in their press conference after the meeting.

Jordan

In my meeting with King Hussein and his advisors, I outlined the Jerusalem discussion I had with the Palestinians. Jordan asked for, and I agreed, to give them a letter of assurances spelling out our position. The King and his Prime Minister had some reasonable questions and were generally supportive. The King echoed this in our joint press conference.

On bilateral issues he stressed their difficulties and how renewed economic and military assistance could help. I'm asking the Department, with the NSC, to work on some decision memos which would free things up for Jordan. Much will depend on the Congressional mood, but I think the time has come to try to get assistance flowing again. This means you will have to certify that Jordan is making a meaningful contribution to the peace process. We can do so in good conscience.

After our working session we continued over dinner with the King. I'll have a working breakfast with the Prime Minister Saturday morning to go over bilateral issues. Then it is a six-hour flight to Rabat where I will see King Hassan tomorrow evening. Sunday it is on to Tunisia, Monday to Algeria and back to Washington Monday night.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Friday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	8/2/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1172-MR(504)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
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- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1991



CP
8-4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MY FRIDAY MEETINGS

A thorough discussion with the Palestinians showed their continued preoccupation with the representation issue. I laid out ways that we could reassure them that their claims or negotiating position would not be in any way prejudiced. Hussein and his colleagues are concerned for their physical safety. At the end of the meeting they presented me with a letter containing some unacceptable positions. In Amman with King Hussein, I reviewed where we are with the Palestinians and on the process in general. He and his senior advisors seemed generally satisfied and he was constructive at a press conference.

Palestinian Meeting

In four hours with Faisal Hussein and his two partners, the main focus was on the question of whether residents of East Jerusalem would be on the Palestinian delegation from the outset of the talks. I outlined a package of links to Jerusalem which are reiterations of US positions which we would provide them in a letter of assurance. I told them that our position is solid, that the status of Jerusalem must be determined by negotiations. I told them we would support voting rights for East Jerusalem citizens in the election of a transitional authority and that we and the Soviets will state that regardless of the form of representation, nothing would be prejudicial or precedential with respect to their claim to negotiate on Jerusalem.

I added that Faisal and his colleagues could come to Washington and meet with you if they found that useful. I offered to hold my next meeting with them in East Jerusalem (our first five have been at the Consul General's house in West Jerusalem).

Both Hanan Ashrawi and Faisal asked for some reference to "self-determination" in our letter of assurance. I told them I was not agreeing, but I would look at the issue.


DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

~~SECRET~~


1.4(d)



The Palestinians agonized over settlements (this came up in Jordan too). I underlined the best way to attack the issue is to get to the negotiations which will have its own impact on Israeli public opinion.

Ashrawi raised renewing the US-PLO dialogue. I said it wasn't in the cards, given the support for Saddam and the failure to act on terrorism. But I added that if the PLO blocked the peace process, it will forever forfeit any chance to renew the dialogue.

1.4(d)



At the end of the meeting, they gave me a contentious letter (clearly influenced by Tunis). It was noteworthy that they did not press most of the points in the letter during the meeting and were careful to point out that it was drafted before my presentation.

They were as positive as we could reasonably expect in their press conference after the meeting.

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- 3 -

On bilateral issues he stressed their difficulties and how renewed economic and military assistance could help. I'm asking the Department, with the NSC, to work on some decision memos which would free things up for Jordan. Much will depend on the Congressional mood, but I think the time has come to try to get assistance flowing again. This means you will have to certify that Jordan is making a meaningful contribution to the peace process. We can do so in good conscience.

After our working session we continued over dinner with the King. I'll have a working breakfast with the Prime Minister Saturday morning to go over bilateral issues. Then it is a six-hour flight to Rabat where I will see King Hassan tomorrow evening. Sunday it is on to Tunisia, Monday to Algeria and back to Washington Monday night.

JULY 22, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
07. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Sunday Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (4 pp.)	7/22/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1172-MR(506)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
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- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells


Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MY SUNDAY MEETINGS


I expected a long and tough day and I got it. I started in Saudi Arabia this morning, went from there to Amman, and finished up this evening in Jerusalem where I met first with Palestinians and then with Shamir. On the whole, the meetings went about as well as I could have expected and I think it is fair to say that we're still moving forward.

Meeting with King Hussein

I succeeded in getting Hussein's commitment to come to the conference, his endorsement of the Mubarak initiative (suspending the boycott and settlements), and his assurance that the Jordanians were now working quite seriously on the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. As usual, the King was better in private than in public -- notwithstanding his assurances that he would say all this in public. Nevertheless, he said enough in public to be helpful.

I think he's moving in the right direction and the best example of that is that he is finally getting serious on the joint delegation. Not only has the Jordanian Prime Minister now invited Palestinians from the territories to come to Amman to work on the joint delegation, but we had a very detailed discussion on a number of the issues related to it: e.g., the criterion for selection, the formula for finessing the Jerusalem issue, the nature of the invitations, the character of the announcement on the joint delegation, etc.

In our discussion, we went over some of the names that -- based on last year's exercise -- we believe would probably be acceptable to Palestinians and Israelis. I also suggested that once the Jordanians and Palestinians had agreed on a list for the delegation, they should share it with us. ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)}



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PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR
mm 4/7/2016

Meeting with Palestinians

My meeting with Faisal Husseini, Hanan Ashrawi, and Zakaria Al-Agha was intense and emotional. I told them the train was moving and they'd better not miss it, for it was not likely to come around again soon. Unfortunately, Arafat is still holding back on giving those in the territories the green light to go to Amman and sort out a joint delegation. My interlocutors made it clear that they would like to get a letter of understandings from us in order to help push Arafat to make a decision or at least make it more difficult for him to block them from going to Amman for talks. I told them we'd be prepared to provide such a letter but only when we knew they were actually beginning to work on the joint delegation. I suspect that there is some chance that may begin to happen this week.

Most of our meeting today was devoted to my explaining in some detail our approach to the joint delegation and in particular how we intended to finesse the extraordinarily difficult and sensitive problem of Jerusalem. I explained that at this stage we were simply not in a position to have a peace process if an East Jerusalemite were on the joint delegation. Instead, to meet Palestinian needs on this issue, I could propose the following package:


- (1) On the Jordanian side of the joint delegation there could be a Palestinian from a prominent Jerusalem family, who now resides in Jordan.
- (2) We would make a statement (perhaps, in conjunction with the Soviets) that emphasizes that no decisions at this time on representation would be prejudicial, or precedential in any way on the substance of Palestinian claims to Jerusalem.
- (3) That our position on Jerusalem would remain constant, namely the city must remain unified, but its final status must be resolved by negotiations.
- (4) That we would do our best to make sure that East Jerusalemites would not be excluded from participation in negotiations on final status.
- (5) That we would also do our best to ensure that East Jerusalemites would have voting rights in the self-governing authority during the transition period.

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
- 3 -

In addition to these five points, I suggested that we might also be willing to meet with East Jerusalemites like Faisal Husseini before and during the negotiations to reinforce our policy position and to make a political gesture to Palestinians on the Jerusalem question.

I told the Palestinians that we couldn't do any better than that. In response, they argued long and hard that they had to have an East Jerusalemite on the joint delegation from the very beginning. They said the delegation would not have any credibility if there wasn't someone currently from East Jerusalem on the delegation. They said this was a red line for them. ^{1.4(d)}



^{1.4(d)}



Meeting with Shamir

I had a one-on-one meeting tonight with Shamir for about an hour and a half. It turned out to be a good meeting. He told me there was a lot of suspicion in Israel that the US was determined to force Israel out of the territories. I told him there was a lot of suspicion in the United States that he wasn't serious about negotiating peace. When we got beyond the preliminaries, he asked a lot of questions about Syria and Assad's response to us. For example:

- Why had Assad responded the way he did? Why had he changed now?
- What was he really after now, what was his goal? Was he really ready to conclude a peace treaty with Israel?
- What clarifications or promises had we made to him to elicit his response?

- Did we tell him our definition of 242 and 338 and how it applied to the Golan?
- Did we stand by President Ford's letter of 1975 on "giving weight" to Israel's security needs on the Golan?
- Would the US, Soviet Union and the UN sit in on the bilateral negotiations?

I responded to all of these questions, and I think generally reassured him. When I finished, he said he wouldn't be able to give me an answer on this trip, but he would send me an answer very shortly.

I responded that while we had made no decisions at this point, we were considering the possibility of issuing invitations to the conference at the Summit. He asked whether we would do this if the Palestinian representation issue wasn't settled? I said we might issue the invitation at the Summit and call for the convening of the conference in October. That would give us time not only to sort out the Palestinian representation issue, but also to begin to lay a stronger substantive basis for the negotiations so they'd have a better chance of succeeding once begun.

He didn't respond, but I know I got his attention. The meeting was serious and I think useful and its character and content were echoed in a meeting I asked Dennis to have with Shamir's aides. Tomorrow morning I'll meet with Shamir, Arens and Levy at 7:00am and then I plan to leave for ASEAN. We'll see where we are after that meeting.

July 21, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Jeddah [FOIA restrictions redacted] (2 pp.)	7/20/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1172-MR(507)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
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Deed of Gift Restrictions

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- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1991

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *J.A.B.*

SUBJECT: MY MEETINGS IN JEDDAH

I had dinner with Saud and Bandar early in the evening and then met with the King afterwards. We focused on the peace process and Iraq. With a little pushing and some important editing, the Saudis did issue a statement that embraced the Mubarak initiative: suspending the boycott in return for suspension of settlement activity. The Saudis have now taken the lead on this among the rest of the Arab states not at peace with Israel. We expect that others may now follow suit.

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

1.4(b); 1.4(d)

the King ^{1.4(b); 1.4(d)} went on to say that it was not enough to be passive on peace, we had to push together on it. He said, if we continued to work closely together, to coordinate together, and to push together, we'll succeed. I told him the trust and confidence that he expressed in you and me reflected the feelings that we had about him. I told him as well that the step that he took this evening justified that trust and confidence and I let him know that we were determined to keep pushing.

On Iraq, I passed on the comments that Mubarak and Assad had made to me, noting in particular their opposition to any early military strikes against Iraqi nuclear facilities. The King listened, but took a very different posture. He said Saddam Hussein had not changed one iota. He said the only thing Saddam understands was pressure, the threat of force, and the use of force. If he thinks he can get away with something, he will. Alternatively, the King said, if he thinks he is going to be hit, he will acquiesce. The King argued that the best thing to do at this point is to maintain the pressure.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

He said that for now, we could justify an extension of the July 25th deadline on the grounds that Saddam has opened up partially and provided some information on his weapons of mass destruction. The King said we should set a new deadline demanding complete disclosure. He added that we should also increase dramatically the numbers of inspectors in Iraq. Not only would that make it more difficult for the Iraqis to move things around, but, the King said, it would also further humiliate Saddam internally and hasten his overthrow.

1.4(b)

~~SECRET~~

July 19, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: CARON S. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: My Meetings in Egypt [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	7/19/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 4/20/2023

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1172-MR(508)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	4/7/2016

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: MY MEETING IN EGYPT

My meeting with President Mubarak today went very well. He was helpful once again on the peace process, making a statement which, I believe, we will be able to build on during the course of the rest of our trip. We also talked briefly about possible military strikes against Iraq -- strikes which he feels at this time would be premature and counterproductive. Finally, there was a brief discussion on Libya where he indicated once again his belief that a few "carrots" to Qadhafi would help to keep him in his box. I made clear that Libyan involvement with Pan Am 103 made it impossible for us to think about any possible improvement in relations with Libya. Let me discuss each of these in a little more detail.

Peace Process

1.4(d)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR

MM 4/7/2016

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

In short, I said if the Saudis followed up on Mubarak's statement we would succeed in building a lot of momentum as we headed into Jordan and Israel.

Obviously, we need the Saudis now to follow up on what Bandar had said they were willing to do: publicly support the Egyptian call for suspension of the boycott in return for a suspension of settlement activity. Mubarak understood perfectly the importance of a quick Saudi response and he will be talking to the Saudis before we get there tomorrow. In addition, I learned tonight from Osama al-Baz that the Egyptians are calling on the Maghreb states and others to endorse their call today for such a joint moratorium.

Besides following up on the statement, Mubarak said they will be pushing Arafat hard to stop blocking Palestinians from the territories from going to Amman to put together a joint delegation. He said they would also convey to the King that he needed to show movement on a joint delegation by the time I get to Amman.

Iraq

Mubarak echoed Assad's sentiments on the adverse consequences of a military strike against Iraq in the near future and was if anything even more concerned that such an action would backfire on us. He said there was already an undercurrent, even in Egypt, that he worries about -- i.e., that our collective objective was not to liberate Kuwait, but to destroy Iraq. He made very clear that Iraq must not be permitted to go nuclear, but he prefers for now to keep the pressure on through sanctions and intrusive inspections. A military strike he feels could strengthen Saddam's position internally.

Clearly, one factor governing Mubarak's view is that he sees no need to rush to use military force against Iraq's nuclear equipment and facilities. He just doesn't believe the threat is very real in the near term. I told him that we could not under any circumstances -- and indeed would not -- permit Iraq to acquire a nuclear capability. But I did tell him that I would convey his concerns to you. I must say hearing what I am hearing from our Arab coalition partners about this causes me concern that a strike would be counterproductive.

One other point: I asked Mubarak whether, given his reluctance to see military force used now, he might support a move to suspend Iraq from the Arab League if it did not fully comply with UNSC 687. I said this might be a way to put more pressure on Iraq, particularly as Iraqis would see Saddam guaranteeing further isolation even in the region. Mubarak said he feared such a move now because it could trigger a debate in the Arab League. Rather than isolating Iraq, such a debate might imply Iraq's Arab support was growing.

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- 3 -

Libya

Once again I heard a pitch from Mubarak on the need to send some positive signals to Qadhafi. I told him we have some hard evidence now, as well as increased suspicions that Libya was responsible for Pan Am 103. I said I couldn't yet get into the evidence, but that our view now was not just based on conjecture.

Mubarak asked if we could at least hold off putting increased pressure on Libya for a while. He said he had been able to manage Qadhafi and that this certainly served our interest throughout the Gulf crisis.

Similarly, as we're trying to put a peace process together, we don't need Qadhafi using his money and activating terrorism networks. He said we should not underestimate Qadhafi's ability to cause trouble, especially among Palestinians. What was needed at this point was to keep Qadhafi managed and in his box. Mubarak clearly believes he is capable of doing that, and I suspect he'll continue to urge us to make it easier, not harder, for him to keep Qadhafi positioned where he is.

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

July 18, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD

Tonight was the shortest meeting that I've ever had with Hafez al-Assad. In keeping with that, I'm going to write you the shortest note I've ever done on our meetings.

When I arrived tonight, Assad had one thing on his mind and that was to say "yes" to our proposals. There is no ambiguity there; they have accepted what we have proposed. Yesterday with President Mubarak he said on three separate occasions that he had accepted our proposals. That said, Assad did create some confusion by saying that an observer would have a speaking role at the conference. What is clear after my conversation with him is that while that might be Assad's preference, it is not a condition for his participation.

I'm not sure how our press will play things, but I know that we have a "yes" and we're going to try to build on that. A measure of Assad's desire not to muddy the waters was that he chose not only to have an uncharacteristically short meeting, but he also kept our discussion on the peace process rather short. Instead, we had a discussion on Iraq. I asked Assad what he thought the consequences might be if further military action were required to deal with Saddam Hussein's continued and deliberate pursuit of his nuclear program in spite of UNSC resolutions.

Assad responded categorically that the resort to military force would backfire and would actually bolster Saddam's position. While the overwhelming majority of the Iraqi people hate Saddam, military action against him under present circumstances will diminish the hostility against him, especially on the part of the forces resisting him. According to Assad, the resistance feels betrayed because they were encouraged to move against Saddam only to be denied material support from the outside. Military strikes against Iraq as a result of the nuclear issue will reinforce the perception inside Iraq that the coalition forces care little for the people of Iraq and are only preoccupied with their own strategic interests. As for Saddam, he has nowhere to go, will cling on to power as long as he can, and doesn't care at all if there is further devastation in Iraq.

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1172-MR
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- 2 -

Some, including the U.S., are pinning hopes on the possibility that some of those around Saddam may move against him. It is difficult to determine if their hopes are well-placed. Ninety-five percent of the Iraqi people are opposed to Saddam, while the remaining four or five percent are neither for nor against him, except for the small band around him who rise or fall with him. Undoubtedly, the Iraqi opposition will prevail, but it needs a little more time and the appropriate circumstances, Assad concluded.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

21-Jun-1991 18:33 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Re Attached Note

I do hope everyone realized when I sent out the attached note yesterday that it is a revision of whatever times you may have scheduled for the President to be briefed on the upcoming Economic Summit. But, just in case you didn't, if your calendars show meeting times at 10:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m. on July 8th or 1:15 p.m.-2:15 p.m. on July 11, you should remove these times from your calendar. The President will be travelling during that time, which is the reason for rescheduling the briefing times.

Thanks very much, and have a nice weekend.

Distribution:

FOR: Timothy E. Deal	(DEAL)
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CC: Mary C. Emery	(EMERY)
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CC: Gilda Kay	(KAY)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

20-Jun-1991 16:48 EDT

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: Brenda I. Hilliard
(HILLIARD)

SUBJECT: Economic Summit Briefings

The President's calendar has been blocked (indicating Staff Time - Scowcroft) for briefing the President on the Economic Summit:

July 9, 8:45 a.m. - 9:45 a.m., Cabinet Room

July 10, 10:00 a.m. - 11:00 a.m., Cabinet Room

July 10, 2:30 p.m. - 3:30 p.m., Cabinet Room

Thank you very much.

Distribution:

FOR: Timothy E. Deal	(DEAL)
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DOWNGRADED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

to

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ES 1/28/08

June 22, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *J.A.B.*
SUBJECT: IMPRESSIONS FROM THE TRIP

I thought it might be useful to summarize some of the impressions I'm bringing back from this trip. Much like some of my Middle East trips, I return from this one having ridden an emotional roller-coaster over the last two days -- with the Yugoslav low-point more than off-set by the unbridled euphoria of the Albania people. I want to offer some perspective on these two days as well as run through some other issues that emerged from my meetings in Berlin.

My Day in Albania

It's hard to put into words what transpired in Albania. My day started with us driving into Tirana from the airport. The crowds engulfed the motorcade, literally flinging themselves against the car, and kissing it. Cheering people sought to touch us, as if this offered a way of expressing the joy, affection, and admiration they felt for us. The crowd at the Square was unlike any I had ever seen before and easily numbered several hundred thousand, chanting your name, mine, and USA. It cheered my speech and all references to Albania and its people now being free and now becoming a part of Europe. (To give you an idea of the mood, when I mentioned Albania's becoming a member of CSCE, this drew one of the biggest cheers.)

Coming here helped bring into focus how much the world we inherited in 1989 has changed. It also served as a vivid reminder of what America continues to represent to many others worldwide. We are a symbol of hope, the embodiment of freedom, and the model of what so many others want to become. It's hard to think of ourselves in these terms, but it is our legacy and I saw how we, as a country, continue to inspire other peoples in Albania today.

My meetings with the Prime Minister and his cabinet, the President, and the leaders of the Opposition followed my speech in the Square. The emotional outpouring of the Albanian people provided a remarkable backdrop to these meetings.

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2013-0833-MP
MM 5/26/2015

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- 2 -

With the Prime Minister and the President, I pressed on the need for rapid movement on political and economic reform as well as the immediate release of their 100 or so political prisoners, and the dismantling of their internal security apparatus.

The Prime Minister gave me his commitment to move rapidly on all these fronts. He did say they would need technical and economic assistance, given the economic catastrophe they had inherited. I was in a position to tell him we could offer some food assistance relatively quickly, but said our ability -- and willingness -- to consider more either bilaterally or multilaterally would depend on how rapidly they moved on reform. I got the sense that the Prime Minister and, especially his Deputy who is in charge of the economy, are committed to rapid movement.

My sense of President Alia is that he's much more of a gradualist. Because of that, and because of the clear emotional bonds that exist between the leader of the Opposition and the public, I think Alia is not likely to be around that long. The future of Albania was probably well represented in my meeting with the Opposition. Its head, Dr. Sali Berisha, is very charismatic and a disciple of reform and, frankly, of America. When I recounted my conversation with the Prime Minister and, in particular, the Deputy Prime Minister and their apparent commitment to rapid reform, he said, "well, many of the Ministers are really with us now". He, too, put a premium on getting help from the outside while they pressed for a wholesale transformation on the inside.

Assuming they move as they say they will on the inside, we probably should think about finding ways to help them. Albania is sufficiently small and backward, that small amounts of assistance might have a dramatic effect. At a minimum, we should target technical assistance and move on ideas like getting the Peace Corps into Albania. Followup here is going to be the key.

By the way, both the President and the Opposition hoped you would stop in Tirana on your swing through Turkey and Greece. I told them your schedule was tight and wouldn't permit it. (The truth is, I know it would be uplifting for you, and putting on my former hat, it might be good to have film footage showing huge, adoring and chanting crowds of free East Europeans come campaign time in 1992.)

Yugoslavia: Heading Toward Disintegration

While Albania was spiritually uplifting, Yugoslavia was downright depressing. Frankly, I think it's easier to deal with people like Shamir and Assad than it is to try to affect Milosevic and Tudjman.

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What I found in Yugoslavia was an air of unreality among the key players, and I am afraid it will be very difficult to head off a violent collision. Those who see what's coming like Markovic and Loncar, are, I believe, largely powerless to prevent it. Meanwhile, those responsible for the collision course are locked in positions as a result of public posturing (or in the case of Slovenia and Croatia, public referenda that call for independence.) To make matters worse, those locked in their positions have a false sense of security, basically believing the worst can't or won't happen. (Tudjman, the President of Croatia, told me the fears of civil war are greatly exaggerated. This, from a man who is rapidly arming a civil guard in Croatia.)

I conveyed a very stiff set of messages to Tudjman, Milosvic, et.al., explaining what their actions were setting in motion, why the international community felt so strongly about this and why the EC and others would not be providing badly needed assistance in the absence of a responsible dialogue to resolve Yugoslavia's national problems peacefully. I argued strongly against unilateral steps that would preempt a negotiating process, and basically sought to introduce a heavy dose of reality into the unreal political climate in Yugoslavia. Markovic was very pleased with this message and the thrust of the visit. Frankly, I'm dubious about the effect.

For now, I think we should press to keep international efforts alive on Yugoslavia. Starting with the EC, it's important to go forward with their offer to send a team to help discuss and perhaps help draft new constitutional arrangements on Center-Republic relations. While there wasn't great enthusiasm among the Yugoslav players for such a team, it could become a mediating mechanism in time -- one the Yugoslavs presently seem incapable of creating on their own.

In addition, we will need to maintain a collective non-recognition policy on the unilateral declarations of independence that are likely to come from Slovenia and Croatia in the next week or so. Moreover, we must keep the pressure on Slovenia and Croatia not to move beyond declarations to actual implementation of such declarations. It is the practical steps that begin to implement independence (e.g., setting up customs posts, etc.) that will quickly produce disintegration and warfare. (We'll also want to continue to persuade Markovic to exercise restraint, particularly with regard to the use of the military in response to these declarations.)

My gut feeling is that we won't produce a serious dialogue on the future of Yugoslavia until all parties have a greater sense of urgency and danger. We may not be able to impart that from the outside, but we and others should continue to push.

In addition, we should keep up the pressure on Slovenia and Croatia to commit to a dialogue on future arrangements among the Yugoslav states, and a new basis for Yugoslav unity and, at the same time, press the Serbs to permit the selection of a new Federal President.

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- 4 -

Depending on what happens after the declaration of independence, we should also consider invoking the CSCE emergency mechanism.

The Soviets and Concluding START

Bessmertnykh didn't come with any specific new ideas, but he certainly implied they would move further on downloading. To be sure, he made it clear we would have to move also in order to find some middle ground between our two positions. He argued that this was essential if we were to preserve the Houston package and to conclude an agreement.

On data denial, he again raised questions about our ability to conclude all the technical details in time for a Summit. He said at this point the physicists are the only ones who understand the issue and it will take months to work out all the details. He suggested agreeing on a framework or principles for data denial, having that as part of the treaty, and then subsequently concluding a technical protocol.

While being reserved on this, I said he should be specific on what he had in mind. In particular, I said we needed to be able to go to the Hill in a way that demonstrated we would get all the data we needed on Soviet missile tests and encryption would no longer be a problem. In other words, I suggested that for us to go the way he was proposing, their approach would have to respond to our ratification needs on data denial. He said, he thought this was possible. We'll see.

One other point: While our warning on a move against Gorbachev proved unnecessary, I think it obviously further cemented his view that we're with him. At a time when he clearly seems bent on deepening his ties with Yeltsin and the reformers that should be helpful.

I'm dubious about irreversible grand bargains, but I do think we have a chance to strengthen the durability of the center-reformist coalition and the general reformist bent. That is significant, and it is clearly in our interest. But I believe to achieve this end will probably take some greater specificity on what we'll be prepared to do to assist the reform process over time.

Northern Iraq

Based on my discussions in Berlin, I'm afraid the French, and maybe the British, will keep up the drumfire on Northern Iraq and the importance of keeping a presence there. In many ways, it's a "freebie" for them because they can position themselves as having warned against the dangers without necessarily having to do more themselves. I suppose we could always offer to provide logistic support to their forces if they want to stay. That is an option. However, I suspect the better option is to explain our redlines on Iraqi behavior toward the Kurds -- both publicly and privately -- and make clear we have the capability to respond and we will do so.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- 5 -

That offers the best chance of deterring Saddam, permitting us to keep to our timetable, and perhaps also defusing the European need to look like they're not getting out and leaving 500 lightly armed UN guards to provide protection for the Kurds. In any case, I think you'll have to work Mitterrand along these lines.

CSCE

The Berlin Ministerial marked a point at which we began to try to move CSCE in some practical directions. My discussions in both Yugoslavia and Albania also served to remind me of the increasing value of CSCE. In Yugoslavia, it provided a natural forum for expressing the strong sentiment of the 34. That sentiment, that statement in Berlin, made my message more credible. We may find that CSCE, in the end, provides the best framework for dealing with the centrifugal forces within Yugoslavia. Indeed, if we didn't have that framework, we'd have to figure out a way to create it.

In Albania, I heard from the Opposition that the Helsinki principles were one of their main sources of hope and inspiration. Now, having joined CSCE, we suddenly are in a position to use the CSCE principles on democracy, human rights, and the rule of law to measure Albanian progress and hold them to these standards. I told the government and the Opposition that, and they clearly understand that they will be judged accordingly. Again, having the framework and the principles are likely to be very useful as the transformation of Albania unfolds.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

07-Jun-1991 15:46 EDT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW

FROM: John A. Gordon
(GORDON)

SUBJECT: Baker in Geneva

Florence

Will you please pass the attached note to the General and to Bob?

Thanks

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2010-1173-MR

MM 10/11/2016

General --

We have a bare bones debrief of Secretary Baker's meeting with Bessmertnykh in Geneva today:

The meeting lasted two hours, all but about 20 minutes of which was one-on-one.

Baker went through the President's letter in detail, stressing that we were offering new ideas and continuing senior level involvement in the process. Baker offered his personal opinion that a signed treaty was not possible in June.

Baker told Bessmertnykh that we simply couldn't take a treaty to the Hill that didn't include the data denial provisions, but that we had good new ideas to offer. (He then asked Linton Brooks if he could hand over our paper "tonight." The cable will go tonight and Brooks plans to give the Soviets the proposal as soon as possible, but no later than Monday.) U.S. and Soviet telemetry experts will meet in Geneva early in the week to work on the package.

Baker stressed how difficult the PPCM decision was for us, that some in the U.S. had wanted to reopen the matter, but we don't want the whole Houston deal to unravel.

Bessmertnykh seemed to respond positively to the new types proposal, saying that 30% was greater than the Soviets wanted but that he recognized this was a real move for the U.S.

Bessmertnykh seemed favorably inclined toward the Arnie/Reg show going to Geneva, but said that he would call Baker on Monday to confirm and to set a date. Bessmertnykh was vague about whether Moiseyev would be ready to come to Geneva early next week. If he is not, there is a real question about whether Gorbachev has, in fact, engaged personally and given the appropriate instructions to his bureaucracy to solve START. (Linton thinks a Tuesday departure from Washington is the likely timetable.)

There was some discussion of a follow-on ministers meeting following the June 20 stop in Berlin.

Baker told Linton there was no discussion of any date for a summit.

In closing, Baker emphasized that the President wants to finish and therefore we should "concentrate" to do so, that we could not complete a treaty that did not include the data denial provisions, and that a summit without START was a bust.

Later, Bessmertnykh told the press that the Soviets had new ideas as well, but he did not in fact share any with Baker.

V/R

John Gordon

Rich Davis

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
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1991



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 
SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN LISBON

I met today with Foreign Ministers Bessmertnykh and Shara.

My meeting with Bessmertnykh went well. We closed, in principle, on CFE, with an understanding that our experts will get together on Monday to record the details of our understandings. We talked of the possibility of trying to get to a Summit by the end of June and what it would take to conclude START in time for such an early Summit. We had an interesting discussion on Gorbachev's reasons for wanting to come to London, with Bessmertnykh emphasizing that he would not be coming to receive a big "check."

We also had an extremely good discussion on the Middle East, with Bessmertnykh once again thinking largely in parallel and prepared to act on our suggestions.

Finally, we also had a brief discussion on BW. I worry about this issue creating real problems for us and Bessmertnykh does as well. I don't think he is able to move on this issue in the absence of Soviet experts being able to pay a return visit to our facilities. This is one I suspect you will have to take on.

The meeting with Shara was interesting, mostly for what it revealed about the Syrian desire to get me to come back to Damascus and to seek additional US commitments on the Golan.

CFE

Bessmertnykh came with a letter from Moiseyev that effectively met us on our terms, picking up on our proposal to use the "look alike" provision in the Treaty for certain APCs. In doing so, they were able to deal with their structural problem on the flanks and still preserve the integrity of the Treaty and all of its numerical ceilings.

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2010-1173-MR

MM 10/11/2016

He said the Soviet government would make a legally binding statement explaining how they would carry out their Treaty obligations while preserving their forces in coastal defense and naval infantry units. Bessmertnykh made clear that there should be no additional agreement, particularly because the Soviet unilateral statement will be legally binding. When I pointed out it would be important for us to be able to explain that these were agreed understandings, Bessmertnykh evidenced unease. It became apparent that the real problem was that having met us on our terms, they fear having their "retreat" rubbed in their face. He had no reluctance to emphasize that what they declare would be legally binding, but did not want to be put in the position where we or the other 21 signatories were presenting a formal document to them that they had to thus sign.

In light of that, I suggested they work with us on the Soviet governmental statement and we also work out an exchange of letters that would underscore our agreement and the legally binding nature of the statement. Bessmertnykh was comfortable with this approach and also said they would be willing to present the governmental statement in Vienna.

It will take a little work, but I think it's fair to say we've overcome the CFE roadblock.

The Summit and START

Upon completing our discussion on CFE, we began discussing the possibility of an early summit and whether and how START could be completed in time for the Summit.

I outlined your schedule and said while you had made no decisions, the last week in June might be the only time you could come to Moscow before September. I wondered whether START could be completed by that time given the gaps on data denial and downloading.

He felt meeting the last week in June was important because the two Presidents had spoken of the summit taking place in the first half of the year. He also said that it was very important to be able to have the two Presidents sign START at the summit. (In effect, echoing what Shevardnadze told us about making certain the summit was substantive, not merely symbolic.)

I pointed out that what he was saying was clearly desirable, but was it feasible. Could we complete the Treaty that quickly?

Bessmertnykh said we could, provided we raised the political level of the negotiations. He suggested we give immediate instructions to our START delegations to enter a "crash program" to finish the Treaty. He said Bartholomew and Moiseyev and Obuhkov should meet, perhaps as early as this week.

I said we would need to get together to break the logjam, perhaps at the end of next week, since I would be in Copenhagen for the NAC and he would be in Sweden with President Gorbachev. Alternatively, we might get together after the CSCE Meeting in Berlin on June 19-20. In any case, we would need to get together soon, and would need the help of our two Presidents to make difficult decisions.

The simple fact is we won't get there if we can't sort out internal differences on data denial and if there is no movement on the downloading issue.

Gorbachev, Economic Reform and the G-7

I gave him our impressions of the Primakov visit, emphasizing our commitment to Gorbachev and the success of reform and our recognition of the enormous difficulties that must be overcome as they try to move to a market-based economy. While recognizing the difficulties, I noted the task wouldn't get easier over time and that a sound plan, a good plan, was essential for minimizing the pain and disruption of the transition.

In this connection, I said the latest evolution of the anti-crisis plan as presented by Primakov was a real step forward, but still, in our eyes, did not provide a credible basis on which to move to a market-based economy. I said we were looking forward to receiving Yavlinskiy's plan this week and would then be in a better position to offer some definitive comments.

Much like Primakov, Bessmertnykh said they welcomed our comments and advice as they refined their approach. He added, however, that he hoped we would recognize the scope, the magnitude, and the historic nature of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union. Given that, he said don't be overly focused on technical questions and lose sight of the political realities and constraints.

I said we were very mindful of the scope of the changes and the political realities in the Soviet Union. But I said the Soviets, too, should not lose sight of the political realities in our country and that of our G-7 partners. The notion of the grand bargain with the Soviet Union getting \$100-200 billion wasn't realistic. Indeed, we worried that all this talk might create a set of expectations that President Gorbachev would be seen as coming "hat-in-hand" to the London Summit and would be portrayed as being rebuffed when he didn't receive a big check.

Bessmertnykh said an erroneous impression had developed about Gorbachev's purpose in wanting to come to the G-7 Summit. It wasn't, he said, to come and receive a big check.

Rather, he had several different purposes in mind:

- To outline the current situation and status of the Soviet reform efforts.
- To explain the Soviet vision of moving to a market-based economy, and invite G-7 comment.
- And, to identify how certain kinds of Western assistance fit into Soviet needs like, for example, the need for a Stabilization Fund to facilitate the task of making the ruble convertible.

I said we were discussing this with our allies and that, while no decision had been taken, it was important that there be greater specificity when the Soviets spoke of their plans and needs. I said any hesitancy on our part had to do only with not wanting his attendance to be seen to fall short of expectations and thus be counterproductive.

(On the Stabilization Fund, I asked what did they have in mind, how much did they need it, how would the money be raised, etc.) In short, we and others wanted to help, but a good deal more would be needed from the Soviets before we could do so effectively.

The Middle East

I won't go into great detail on our discussion on the Middle East, but there was an interesting level of convergence in our thinking. Indeed, when they gave us the points Gorbachev was planning to use to weigh in with Assad to try to move him, I saw so many similar phrases that I asked Dennis whether we had already coordinated our messages. (We hadn't.)

Though they hadn't yet prepared a message to Hussein, Bessmertnykh said that Gorbachev had already decided he would convey one and Bessmertnykh said they would follow our lead -- e.g., they would emphasize the importance of Hussein committing to the conference and inviting Palestinians from the territories to come to Amman to form the joint delegation.

Forming the joint delegation is the most important thing to be done now. We need the joint delegation to be in a position to send out invitations; the principle is agreed, but no one is putting it together. The mere process of putting it together will put pressure on Assad. More importantly, if we have a joint delegation, we'll probably have a conference and a process regardless of what Assad does.

I made this case to Bessmertnykh and said we both needed to lean on Hussein to invite Palestinians from the territories to go to Amman. But more than this, I said the PLO needed to signal the Palestinians in the territories that it was OK to go and begin working out the details of the joint delegation. They were holding back, awaiting such a signal.

I said the Soviets needed to go to Tunis and get them to give the signal and permit practical movement on the joint delegation now. He agreed to do so.

While being close on everything, I still sense Bessmertnykh would prefer holding off on an invitation in the near term. He doesn't mind us going public with where we are and what and who is blocking progress in the relatively near future. But it's clear he prefers a timeframe of working through the summer before forcing decisions.

Shara Meeting

I gave Shara your letter to Assad and walked him through it. I pointed out what was new in it in terms of the UN and the continuity of the cosponsors' efforts in the negotiations. I emphasized the significance of our commitments on territory for peace as it applied to the Golan and non-recognition of Israeli annexation of the Golan.

I characterized the unprecedented nature of our offer to provide a security guarantee of the Israeli-Syrian border once they agreed to it -- noting without it, Israel would never surrender the Golan Heights. I concluded by saying Syria would never have a better opportunity or Administration to work with and it shouldn't miss the boat. If it did, if it decided to block the process, there would be inevitable consequences for our bilateral relations.

Shara described the letter as important and said Assad would consider it very carefully. He spent his time alternately trying to pin down further US commitments (e.g., will the US commit to supporting "all territory for peace," to supporting "every inch of the Golan back to Syria") and trying to convince me to go to Damascus to talk with Assad about the letter.

On the former, I emphasized we would not alter our position on territory for peace, on 242/338 which speaks of withdrawal from "territories," not all or the territories. I said we wouldn't alter our position to suit the Israelis or the Arabs, but that territory for peace applied to all fronts. I repeated we did not and would not recognize Israeli annexation of the Golan. But, in the end, the exact meaning of territory for peace had to be negotiated by the parties.

As for going to Damascus, I noted in your letter you said you would send me if Assad reported back that he was leaning to saying yes to the process we were describing. I said it only made sense for me to go if you and I knew the trip would be productive -- that something would come out of it.

In the end, I think we have Assad feeling uneasy. He wants to build a relationship with us and he knows he can't if he stifles us on the peace process.

Similarly, he fears being tagged with the responsibility for blocking peace, and he knows we're serious both about movement and about putting the onus on those who prevent it.

That may not be sufficient to move Assad, but for the moment we have positioned ourselves about as well as we can.

CB
/

May 16, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *EL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONDECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 135262013-0833-MR
MM 5/26/2015

May 16, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: SUMMING UP THE TRIP AND WHAT WE DO NEXT

I come back from this trip disappointed in the attitude I encountered in Syria but still hopeful about our prospects. I have summarized below the outcome of my talks in Israel; the importance King Hussein is to putting together a process now; and a gameplan for what we now need to do. Though the path is still difficult, and the objective may yet prove unattainable, we do have a chance to put this together.

Outcome from Israel

- o Meetings in Israel were intensive, but productive. I now have Israel locked in (by agreement to a written document) on a number of important points, including:
 - A conference will launch bilateral and multilateral negotiations within a specified timeframe.
 - An agreed set of criteria on Palestinian representation, including agreement on how to manage outsiders and East Jerusalemites.
 - ✓ An agreed mechanism for how the Palestinian representatives will be worked out.
 - ✓ Agreement that the negotiations for interim self-government for Palestinians should be completed within one year. (This point is especially important for Hussein and the Palestinians.)
 - ✓ Agreement that Israel will come even if one or more of the other regional parties don't come. (This provides a basis to produce what could amount to a one track rather than two-track approach.)

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- 2 -

- o We didn't solve the UN or ~~reconvening issues~~ in Israel. But there was some movement and I don't rule out more.
- I worked out some fallback formulas on each question with Shamir which I will try out on Hussein.
- Actually, each of the fallbacks reflects what Hussein has heretofore mentioned on both the UN and the reconvening issues.
- However, I'm not certain he'll maintain these positions once he has seen Assad.

Importance of Hussein

- o Hussein is the key to the process right now. If Assad would come, Hussein would be a given. I'm not ruling out Assad categorically, but I'm very dubious.
- ✓ o We have a process with Hussein. The critical question is will he come if Assad doesn't. He told you and he told me he will be coming.
 - ✓ Indeed, today I called him from Jerusalem to tell him I thought we had a real chance. He told me he'd be the master of his destiny and that he was going to Damascus only for reasons of form.
- ✓ o This remains to be seen. If he produces, and steps forward, and acts to help work out the Palestinian representation question, we must produce for him.
- o That will require helping to end his political, and especially his economic isolation. Even before he steps up to the plate, he should get some signals of what's possible when he delivers.
- o For now, I've told him we will unfreeze the pipeline on aid when he commits to coming to the conference without reference to Syria's position.
 - ✓ I've also asked Bandar to get the King to send a message to Hussein before Hussein's visit to Damascus, encouraging him to move on the peace process and making it clear Saudi Arabia will support his commitment to attend the conference.
 - Mubarak, too, needs to call Hussein before the Saturday meeting in Damascus to buck him up, tell him what he will be doing the next day with Assad, and signal that the political isolation is beginning to erode.

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- o To produce the Mubarak phone call, I think you should call him tomorrow, tell him we'll be sending him a brief on my trip, but that we feel we did make headway in Israel.
- Given that, we have a chance to produce a process now, and Hussein is taking on added importance. He must not go to Syria and retreat or adopt Syria's positions. Mubarak needs to be told that he, more than others can, shore up Hussein in advance of his meeting with Assad. And you are counting on him to do so since we won't have a process if Assad gets Hussein to retreat.
- o The Fahd message and Mubarak phone call are important for their psychological impact and what they indicate about the possibility for the future if Hussein delivers.

What's Next?

- o We will want to send out the invitation, but not immediately. We need to see how Hussein comes back from Damascus. And also whether Assad remains dug in after seeing Bessmertnykh, Hussein, and Mubarak.
- o We'll want to follow up quickly with Hussein to see where he is and to keep the pressure on.
- o We will not want to go with the invitation until we know from him that he is actively working the Palestinian representation issue, and how he is doing it.
- That means, Palestinians are coming from the territories to Amman and the PLO is being discreetly engaged on the names. We need to know where this exercise stands before sending the invitation, otherwise, the Palestinian representation issue could come apart.
- Coordinating closely with the Soviets on this may be especially important to push the Jordanians and Palestinians to put the delegation together in a feasible way.
- Having the Soviets engaged on this and sending signals of public reassurance to Hussein, can help bolster Hussein against Syria and contain the PLO demands on the King.
- o We'll need to send Hussein some high-level messages spelling out very specifically the steps needed.

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- o If we want to pin him down, both on his participation and on the joint delegation, I may have to go back and see him. Alternatively, since we're pushing him to make one of the most historic decisions of his life, you may want to invite him to come see you. That meeting could push him over the threshold.
- o As we draw closer to this point, we will want to get the Gulf states to make clear what they'll do concretely for Hussein if he delivers.
 - If he does, he will make the process possible, and preempt the ability of the radical/fundamentalists to prey on the frustration and lack of hope that the absence of a peace process will create.
 - The Gulf states have much to fear from the absence of a peace process and, therefore, have a stake in Hussein's delivering. They will need to deliver if he delivers.
- o Bottom line: Let's consider doing the invitation in about two weeks' time.

May 14, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

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MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15. Memo	From James A. Baker, III, to POTUS, Re: Monday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (6 pp.)	5/13/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/16/2022

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-003
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2013-0833-MR(502)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	9/14/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: MONDAY'S MEETINGS

Today I met with Bessmertnykh, Mubarak and Meguid, had a three-way lunch that Mubarak hosted for Bessmertnykh and me, and, finally, I met with Lebanese Foreign Minister Bouez. With Bessmertnykh, I covered a number of Middle East and non-Middle East topics. As I suspected, he's not quite as inclined to quickly send out an invitation to the conference. Nevertheless, I believe he does accept the need to move within a relatively short period of time, probably within the next two weeks. He agrees that we have to put the parties on the spot to decide and he's prepared to lean on Assad and will, in fact, stop in Damascus on his way back to Moscow.

Mubarak will do likewise. As a result of our talks, he's decided to go to Damascus next Sunday and press Assad hard to ensure that he does not miss this opportunity. Both Mubarak and Meguid emphasized that they were not surprised by Assad's behavior, but I suspect that saying that was designed at least in part to keep me in the game. The fact is, after hearing what I had to say about my meeting with Assad, Mubarak said, "we really must push Assad hard right now." And indeed, he joined with me in pressing Bessmertnykh to stop in Damascus on his way out of the region.

Finally, I saw the Lebanese Foreign Minister. Interestingly, he said Lebanon would come to the conference. I asked if he would be willing to say that publicly and he said he needed to call President Hrawi and would get back to me in the morning. Even if he won't say it publicly, I can still use this with Hussein, the Palestinians and Shamir to show how broad the support is in the Arab world to move. If he does say it publicly, it may soften the impact of Assad's inflexibility, since most observers would assume that Lebanon would never come without Syrian acquiescence or agreement.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0833-MR

MM 9/14/2015

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BESSMERTNYKH MEETING

We covered a number of topics in this meeting, focusing principally on the peace process, Iraq and BW.

Peace Process: Bessmertnykh and I discussed how we might maximize the pressure on Assad. I emphasized that I thought it was especially important to produce the right answer on the UN observer and the consent rule.

I said I was convinced that if Assad went along with these positions, we would definitely get to the conference. I told Bessmertnykh that if Assad came around on these two issues, Shamir would find it very difficult to say no to negotiations if these were the only two questions preventing the advent of direct talks. Bessmertnykh suggested that he would get Gorbachev to write Assad a letter. When I pressed him to stop in Damascus on the way out of the region, he said he didn't have the time, since he needed to be back in Moscow by Wednesday for a meeting with the Chinese. Later on, when Mubarak joined with me in pressing him -- and indeed said he would call Gorbachev because it was so important that Bessmertnykh make the stop -- Sasha changed his mind and said he would do so.

As for the timing of sending out the invitation, Bessmertnykh is inclined to want to let a little more time go by before taking this step. I suspect the reason for his caution is that he has just begun talking to everyone in the region, rather enjoys this new role and fears that this particular process might come to an end if we send the invitation out right now. I explained why I felt it was important for us to move on the invitation more quickly, rather than less so. To begin with, I said that with the two of us in the region we created much more momentum and attention on the need to move. But once we left, the pressure to move would diminish. Indeed, when coupled with stories that we had failed to produce any results, the pressure to make decisions would drop off very rapidly.

In addition, I said that both Syria and Israel were inclined to stretch this process out and neither would say no or yes if left to their own devices. We would need to put each in a position where they had to respond. Indeed, putting them on the spot might be the only way to produce the yes. On the other hand, if we put them on the spot and they said no, that might generate enough pressure after the fact -- after an obvious breakdown -- that some other possibilities might emerge. In any case, I argued we needed to have a vehicle to come to closure, lest we devalue the whole effort.

In the end, Bessmertnykh came around and agreed we would have to move quickly. He still wants to think about the exact timing, and I suspect he'll go along with our moving on the invitations in about two weeks' time.

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BW

I raised this and I told him very directly that we would have to brief the Hill and would do so on Wednesday. I said that we had hoped to have something from the Soviets -- something that we could use to show the Soviet Union was trying to rectify the problem. Unfortunately, at this moment, we had yet to receive anything from the Soviet Union even though I had raised specific concerns on Soviet BW activities over sixty days ago. In addition, though Bessmertnykh had promised at Kislovodsk two weeks ago that we would get a response and that he would be proposing our experts meet to discuss each specific problem we had raised, we still had received nothing.

He was clearly chagrined. He told me he had been blocked by the chemical and biological specialists from being able to set up the experts meeting. They had insisted that such a meeting could not take place and they could not answer our questions until Soviet experts had been allowed to take their reciprocal visit to our facilities. He said he had been able to ensure that a report responding to our particular concerns would be sent to us shortly. On that basis, he wondered whether we could postpone the briefing on the Hill until we had had a chance to receive and analyze this report. He worried about the possibly explosive impact of a briefing on the Hill on such a sensitive topic without some Soviet explanation.

I told him we had waited as long as we could and we couldn't delay a briefing any longer. I said that if the report was done, he needed to send it to Washington immediately. He answered that he would cable Gorbachev right away, because it was Gorbachev who had not yet reviewed the report and had not yet permitted it to be sent to us.

A number of other topics were covered briefly.

CSCE Ministerial: I brought up two issues in connection with the CSCE Ministerial. First, I asked whether he thought they could allow the Baltics to attend the Berlin meeting as observers. He told me, interestingly enough, that seven or eight republics had made similar requests and they were reviewing them. I suggested that by allowing all of them to come the Baltics would be submerged, not highlighted. He told me that's what their thinking was as well. Second, I said given the turmoil in Yugoslavia, did he agree it was appropriate to raise Yugoslavia at the Ministerial. He said he thought it was appropriate, and in fact he said he worried a great deal about the consequences of instability in Yugoslavia for the Balkans as a whole.

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Afghanistan: I asked him whether he had had time to consider the proposal on Afghanistan I made to him in Kislovodsk. I reminded him that I had given him a letter at the time that had proposed that we would adopt the Soviet idea for an international conference on Afghanistan if they would adopt our strong preference for a date certain for bilateral negative symmetry. He told me that they were still considering their response, and that we would receive it shortly.

Angola: He asked me whether I would attend the ceasefire signing ceremony in Lisbon on May 31. I said that I thought it was a good idea for both of us to attend and in fact we might suggest that the Secretary General of the UN attend as well. I added that this was a significant achievement, it demonstrated the value of our cooperation, and it might still prove to be a model for settling other regional conflicts or civil wars.

MUBARAK MEETING

We spent nearly all our time talking first about Assad and then about Qadhafi. He told me that when Meguid had informed him of what we had discussed last night, he had called Assad and said he wanted to come to Damascus this weekend. Assad agreed to his coming Sunday morning. Mubarak made a point of emphasizing that I shouldn't despair when thinking about Assad. He said Assad goes up and down: "He's like a rug merchant, always probing to see what he could get." Meguid added that the Syrian press is playing the visit very positively, indicating at least to him, that Assad was leaving the door open.

I responded by saying that Assad was playing for time and was emphasizing form over substance. I recounted the understanding I had with him -- i.e., he accepts a UN observer and the consent rule for reconvening the conference, we offer a security guarantee on the border once Israel and Syria have settled their differences. Mubarak was clearly amazed that Assad would play games with such a proposal. He immediately saw the value of it from Assad's standpoint. In fact, Mubarak said this was Assad's opportunity to get the Golan back since Israel would never relinquish it without such a guarantee. He implied that Assad was conditioned to act a certain way. He said that he would go to Damascus and tell him he would be a fool if he chose not to go along with what was being proposed.

Before ending our meeting Mubarak raised Qadhafi again. He said Qadhafi had been behaving himself, and he could be contained. This was the challenge and the opportunity. He argued that keeping Qadhafi quiet, as he had succeeded in doing during the Gulf war, could be very important to us if we got the peace process going. Qadhafi was interested in building relations with us, but radicals like Jalloud were around him and pressing him to revert to his crazy, extreme ways. Mubarak argued that he was counteracting Jalloud and keeping a leash on him.

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But he needed some help. He asked whether there was some small gesture we could take toward Libya. He suggested that we at least let some of the former Libyan POWs, who had been moved from Chad to Zaire to Kenya, be visited by the Egyptians to see if they wanted to return. He added that the families of some of these had made this an issue of some embarrassment for Qadhafi.

I said I thought these men might have been or were in the process of coming to the US. If that weren't the case, I'd check into it. Beyond this, however, ^{3.3(b)(1)}

I said these reports suggested Qadhafi had not been contained or leashed. I don't think Mubarak is persuaded, believing instead that he is affecting Qadhafi and we are missing an opportunity to moderate his behavior.

BOUEZ MEETING

I had an interesting meeting with the Lebanese Foreign Minister. He started by discussing the peace process. He told me very clearly that Lebanon would come to the conference. He may be blowing smoke, especially if the Syrians oppose Lebanon's doing so, but he argued that Lebanon's frontier with Israel and its Palestinian population gave Lebanon a special stake in any process. And he added that Lebanon needed to be involved in any ongoing process.

Aside from the peace process, he had several points he wanted to raise. First, he raised the issue of Iran. He said Iran had expressed an interest in normalizing relations with Lebanon. He told me that Lebanon would never be willing to normalize relations unless the hostage question had been settled first. I told him that was good to hear, because we would take a very dim view of any such normalization so long as hostages were being held. I sensed that he might have had an interest in wanting to act as an intermediary with the Iranians, and so I told him that we had one channel to Iran and that was the Swiss. I added that we didn't see any value in having any additional channels.

Second, he then turned to the internal situation within Lebanon. He told me that the disarming of the militias was proceeding. He said all of Greater Beirut was now controlled by the government and the militias in this area had been completely disarmed. He said they were now working on Mount Lebanon, where 50% of the militias had been disarmed. He took great pride in noting that there had been no violent incidents either in Greater Beirut or in Mount Lebanon as this process had gone forward. He said in two months they would move into the third phase of disarming the militias and that would involve disarming them throughout the rest of the country, including in the southern part of the country. Even now, they were negotiating with Arafat, as the Palestinians were the most formidable militia in the south. There were three to four thousand fighters in the south with light and medium weaponry.

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Israel had said, if these and other militias in the south were disarmed, then they could withdraw from the security zone in southern Lebanon. The Palestinians, on the other hand, had said they would not disarm unless Israel first withdrew or at least Israeli withdrawal was guaranteed in advance of any such disarming.

He asked me how we felt about a compromise between these two positions. For example, how would we react if there was a period of calm for four months in the south (no attacks on Israel) and in return for that period of calm, either Israel or we guaranteed to implement UNSC Resolution 425 which called for total Israeli withdrawal? I told him we'd have to think about that proposal because, after all, I had previously suggested to him -- and to Shamir -- that Israel might declare its willingness to withdraw from the security zone once there were a six to twelve months period of tranquility.

As I had said to Assad, when we were talking about southern Lebanon, the best approach would be to get to a peace conference and have this as the first item on the Lebanese-Israeli bilateral agenda. Perhaps, if we don't get to such a conference, we could think about some blending of the approaches described above.

The last issue he raised was Lebanon's need for outside help in repairing its devastated infrastructure. All the years of war had taken its toll. He said the Lebanese were doing the best they could and he cited a couple of examples of what they had succeeded in doing on their own over the last couple of months. He noted that four months ago they had one day of drinking water a week in Beirut. Now, they were up to four or five days of drinking water a week. Similarly, he said, four months ago, the telephone system had been 80-85% ineffective. That number was now 40%. He said the Lebanese people were ingenious, but they need some capital investment from the outside. Though the Saudis and other Gulf states had promised a development fund prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, that fund hadn't materialized. And he hoped that we might help with some of the Gulf states and the Europeans.

May 15, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *elt*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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MANY THANKS.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16. Memo	From James A. Baker, III to POTUS, Re: Tuesday's Meetings [FOIA restrictions redacted] (5 pp.)	5/14/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker Trip Reports [1] [2]

Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)
 By MM on 5/16/2022

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-003
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2013-0833-MR(503)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/26/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*
SUBJECT: TUESDAY'S MEETINGSDECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0833-MR

MM 5/26/2015

As I reported before, this effort to try to put together a real peacemaking process is characterized by ups and downs. Today was more of an up day than a down one. I had a very good meeting with King Hussein. As I told you on the phone, he's clearly leaning towards moving without Syria and he understands well that this will make the peace process possible. He also realizes that Jordan for its own reasons badly needs such a process. He told me that he is prepared to take risks that he has never taken before, provided he is not left alone and provided that his isolation in the region ends.

After driving from Amman to Jerusalem -- going across the Allenby Bridge and through the West Bank -- I saw three Palestinians. For at least part of my meeting with them, I felt that there was some regression in their approach. I almost felt that Bessmertnykh's meeting today with Arafat actually made two of them more reticent than in previous conversations, especially since Arafat's meeting tended to enhance his prominence. Nevertheless, as our talks today neared their conclusion, Faisal Husseini, at least, began to focus more practically on certain assurances that we might provide about America's policy positions -- not Israel's -- as we enter the negotiating process. All in all, I remain convinced that Hussein and the Palestinians in the territories are desperate for a negotiating process and that just might make one possible.

Hussein Meeting

My meeting with King Hussein was interesting as we started out alone, moved to a larger group (where for the first time some of his aides were very forward-leaning) and concluded with a small group discussion where we really got much closer to the essence of what the King is prepared to do. The upshot is that the King feels he is going to have to make some changes very soon in Jordan. He recounted for me how disastrous the economic situation has become. And he went on to say that he is on a "collision course with the Muslim brethren." He said some of

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his problems stem from his economic and political isolation in the region, but he also said that some of them stem from Saudi financial support for the Muslim brethren and Hamas -- the fundamentalists in the Occupied Territories who he said are also beginning to undermine stability in Jordan. (I think we need very quickly to talk to the Saudis about this.)

The King knows he must end his isolation. He knows he must "tie things together" in Jordan. And, as he said to me, he is convinced that his involvement in an active, productive peace process now is essential to his domestic objectives. He strongly believes that the best chance to make peace is now. And he fears that if it is lost, it will be catastrophic for Jordan and the region. Indeed, his main fear is that if we miss this opportunity, if we don't have an active peace process, the fundamentalists will be able to make a big comeback in the region.

I sense from his comments that he believes there is an historic opportunity now because of the US standing in the region; because the PLO and Arafat are too weak to block him; because the Gulf states having committed to directly participate in this process, create Arab cover for him; and perhaps, also, because he has apparently struck up an interesting, if covert, relationship with Shamir.

What he seeks from us is help in ending his isolation and in getting political and economic support. That support is essential, he argues, if he is to make some tough decisions both at home and in the peace process. I told him that the only way we could help repair his position with the Gulf states was if we were able to say that he were truly indispensable to the peace process. And that indeed, if they were serious about making peace possible, they would need to give him economic and political support. I said rather directly, while we understood his needs, we would simply not be able to press the Gulf states successfully unless he had already committed Jordan to come to the conference even if the Syrians didn't and unless he also helped to sort out the issue of Palestinian representation in the conference and in the subsequent negotiations.

He said his own incentives for producing a process now were very great. He said if there is no hope for peace, Jordan might implode. However, if there was hope generated by a real peace process, he could overcome domestic difficulties and the fundamentalist weight in Jordan would be diminished. He noted that he had spoken to Assad on the phone yesterday, and Assad had been somewhat positive on the process. Nevertheless, he wouldn't let Assad make Jordan's decision. He couldn't say today that he would come to the conference if Syria refused to participate. But he did say that if that is what it took to produce this process, it would be time for Jordan to make an historic decision.

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On the issue of joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, he basically agreed on its need and on the importance of keeping the PLO in the background. He said he still needed Palestinians to ask him for such a joint delegation, but he felt that with Soviet and Egyptian help, such a request might be forthcoming. Significantly Taher al-Masri and Adnan Abu Odeh both indicated they are now talking to Palestinians in the territories and both have basically accepted the idea for how to handle East Jerusalem in the delegation -- e.g., have Jordanian citizens currently living in Jordan who come from well-known Jerusalem families serve on the Jordanian side of the joint delegation. I think Shamir will accept this and both Masri and Abu Odeh already had specific suggestions on names. The fact that these two are more forward-leaning than they have been is a clear-cut sign of their perception of the King's position.

Should we assume that we can count on the King? My guess is probably not yet. ^{1.4(d)}

Perhaps one reason that things may be different this time is that his circumstances and his needs are different. He has more of a stake in acting and seems more aware of the costs to him of having no peace process. That may explain why, interestingly enough, his position seems closer to Shamir's than Assad's on both the UN role and the reconvening of the conference. On the former, he seems to feel that having 242 and 338 in the Terms of Reference for the conference, and having the Security Council bless agreements that are reached, is good enough. And, on the latter, having the conference reconvene to ratify any agreements is sufficient. Maybe he will change these positions after he sees Assad.

To push him in the right direction, I think he needs to know we will repair our relations with him if he actually moves. He should be told that we will unfreeze the assistance pipeline once he commits, regardless of Syria's position, to coming to the conference. He should understand as well that our ability and our inclination to really push the Gulf states on his behalf will depend on (1) his being at the conference; and (2) his sorting out the Palestinian representation issue along the lines that I discussed with him today. Taking those steps will demonstrate his indispensability -- and in truth the Gulf states will owe him at that point.

As I mentioned to you, I think we should move quickly to shore-up his inclination and let him know that we will help end his isolation and be there for him if he commits to the conference very soon. I think a call from you today would reinforce the meeting that I had with him. I'm even thinking of making a quick stop in Amman on my way back to the States to push him and to highlight our connection.

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In your call, I'd emphasize a number of points:

- The time to move is now. This is an historic moment. The one he has often said leaders must measure up to.
- You were personally committed to taking advantage of this moment and you're counting on him and his sense of history to help make it happen.
- You know it will not be easy for him, but we will be there for him.
- Both on our own and with others, we will be able to do much more for Jordan once we can point to the King's clear, unequivocal commitment to going to the conference and his efforts to actually pull it off.
- The key is not letting Assad determine whether or not we have a process.
- We'll stay in touch and will work to redeem our relationship, but the time for decision is measured in days, not weeks.

Palestinian Meeting

I won't go into too much detail on this meeting because there was a fair amount of repetition in it. The Palestinians probed on whether we could give them more on substance, by way of commitments on outcomes (e.g., total Israeli withdrawal) or principles (e.g., publicly acknowledging the right of Palestinian self-determination). I told them that we could not guarantee the outcome of the process, but we could guarantee that the process would be serious. I told them that self-determination was a codeword for a state, and we could not support that, though we did support the fulfillment of the legitimate political rights of the Palestinians. In this connection, I said we envision that the outcome would be more than autonomy, but less than an independent state. My guess is that there would be some kind of confederal arrangement.

Then they probed on whether there was some further flexibility on procedures, hoping to expand the role and weight of the UN in the process. I told them that the UN's presence as a sponsor or as an observer would have very little impact on whether Palestinians achieve their needs and rights. Rather than focusing on a symbol that could have little substantive impact, they should be focusing first and foremost on producing actual negotiations with the Israelis. That represents their only hope.

They also probed to see whether there was any chance to renew our dialogue with the PLO, and I suspect that this probe occurred because of the Bessmertnykh-Arafat meeting today.

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I was negative on renewing the dialogue, and at that point they began to get more practical in their discussions. What they're most interested in are guarantees that would permit them to highlight to Palestinians what this process will actually produce. I told them I could give them guarantees that our position on territory for peace and on the need to ensure that the process doesn't stop with interim arrangements would remain constant. I could not guarantee particular outcomes in advance of negotiations. That's what negotiations were all about. They reacted to this by asking for written assurances that our policy positions will remain constant and that we will not retreat from them during the course of negotiations.

Like Shamir, and perhaps Assad, the closer we get to actually producing the process, the more their fears begin to emerge. In the Palestinian case, however, they understand well what the absence of the process would mean for them. My hope is that their fear of the consequences of no process will exceed their fear of stepping up to the plate.

May 14, 1991

NOTE FOR SENIOR DUTY OFFICER
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: ELIZABETH R. LINEBERRY *ERL*
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO SECRETARY BAKER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED "EYES ONLY" MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ALSO, PLEASE NOTIFY ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE LARRY EAGLEBURGER OFFICE OF RECEIPT SO THAT THEY CAN OBTAIN A COPY FOR HIM AS WELL. HIS OFFICE NUMBER IS (202) 647-9640.

MANY THANKS.

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