

Originally Processed With FOIA(s):
2009-0275-S

FOIA Number:
2009-0275-S

FOIA MARKER

**This is not a textual record. This is used as an
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Record Group/Collection: George H.W. Bush Presidential Records
Collection/Office of Origin: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files

OA/ID Number: 91164
Folder ID Number: 91164-001

Folder Title:
Baker, James A.

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	34	49	2	1

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet (George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
01a. Memo	From John Hanford to James Baker, Re: Request for inquiry on Noah's Ark [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/15/93	(b)(6)	
01b. Request	Re: Request for Inquiry [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	
01c. Paper	Re: Addendum: 1974 Navy Reconnaissance Mission [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	
01d. Map	Re: Buyuk Agri Dag (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(9)	
01e. Map	Re: Buyuk Agri Dag (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(9)	
01f. Map	Re: Khrebet Saray Bulag (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(9)	
02a. Note	Brent Scowcroft to Jim Baker (1 pp.)	4/17/92	(b)(1)	C
02b. Report	Re: Organizing U.S. Policy on Space Cooperation with Russia (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	C
03a. Letter	James A. Baker, III to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	
03b. Summary	Re: Summary of Key Provisions (2 pp.)	3/25/92	(b)(1)	
04a. Draft Cable	Re: James A. Baker to Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	3/10/92	(b)(1)	C

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Pinksheet Number: cap1347
OA/ID Number: 91164-001
Date Closed: 8/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #: 2009-0275-S
Re-review Case #:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
04b. Cable	From White House, Re: To Secretary Baker from General Scowcroft [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/10/92	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C
05. Draft Cable	Re: Brent Scowcroft to James A. Baker (1 pp.)	12/18/91	(b)(1)	S
06. Draft Cable	Re: James A. Baker to Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	12/18/91	(b)(1)	C
07. Note	Wilma to General [Scowcroft] Re: Secretary Baker Called with a Message (1 pp.)	10/7/91	(b)(1)	
08a. Note	JABIII [James A. Baker, III] to Brent Scowcroft Re: Note for Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	
08b. Letter	Antony Acland to James A. Baker, III (1 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	C
08c. Message	Re: Text of a Message from the Right Honourable Douglas Hurd to Honorable James A. Baker III (2 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	C
09. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Re: Message for Secretary James A. Baker, III (2 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	TS
10. Memo	Lawrence S. Eagleburger to Brent Scowcroft Re: Memorandum for Brent Scowcroft White House (1 pp.)	12/18/90	(b)(1)	
11. Handwritten Notes	Re: Baker (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

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Collection:	
Record Group:	Bush Presidential Records
Office:	Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series:	Trip Report Files
Subseries:	Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:	
File Location:	Baker, James A.
Pinksheet Number:	cap1347
OA/ID Number:	91164-001
Date Closed:	8/28/2009
FOIA/Sys Case #:	2009-0275-S
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
12. Handwritten Notes	Re: Baker (1 pp.)	3/26/90	(b)(1)	
13a. Note	JABIII [James A. Baker, III] to Brent Scowcroft Re: Note for Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	6/20/89	(b)(1)	C
13b. Memo	Dave Smith to Senator Dole Re: Jim Woolsey (1 pp.)	6/19/89	(b)(6)	
14. Draft Cable	James A. Baker to Brent Scowcroft Re: For Secretary Baker (2 pp.)	7/7/89	(b)(1)	C
15a. Note	Jim Baker to Brent Scowcroft Re: Note for Brent Scowcroft (1 pp.)	4/13/89	(b)(1)	C
15b. Summary	Re: Summary (1 pp.)	4/12-13/89	(b)(1)	S
16a. Meeting Notes	Re: Secretary Baker Meeting with the President (1 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	
16b. Handwritten Notes	Re: Baker Meeting with President (1 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	
17. Note	Re: For Secretary Baker from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	9/14/91	(b)(1)	S
18a. Note	JABIII [James A. Baker, III] to Dick [Cheney] and Brent [Scowcroft] (1 pp.)	1/19/90	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Pinksheet Number: cap1347
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P-2/P-5 Review Case #:

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Doc. No. / Type	Subject/Title	Date	Restriction	Classification
18b. Analysis	Re: Politics Takes Command (1 pp.)	1/19/90	(b)(1)	TS

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Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01a. Memo	From John Hanford to James Baker, Re: Request for inquiry on Noah's Ark [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	1/15/93	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Document Declassified
COPY OF (Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/18/2022

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1166-MR(500)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 3/2/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]



(b)(1) National security classified information
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
 C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
 C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
 PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]



*Sent to Bob
Gates
1/15/93*

MEMO

TO: James Baker

FROM: John Hanford, Office: (b)(6); Home: (b)(6)

DATE: January 15, 1993

RE: Request for Intelligence inquiry on Noah's Ark

Thank you for your continued interest in this inquiry, especially during such a hectic time of departure.

I have attempted to put the attached Memorandum in the most appropriate and useful form possible for passing on to those who would conduct the inquiry. I have spoken to several persons in the intelligence community, including two generals and a former CIA official, who have a significant interest in this project and extensive experience in imagery collection and analysis. They have advised me on what form this request should take, what language would be best understood by those carrying out orders, and what tasks are reasonable. For example, they have assured me that the request is not too burdensome. The archives on Mt. Ararat are quite limited and, therefore, will not involve too extensive a search. They have also recommended the provision for flexibility on completing loose ends at a later date and have stressed the importance of a hard copy file being established.

I include an initial deadline of 1400 hours next Tuesday, the 18th (which I am told is more than enough time for significant completion of this task), but, of course, this is entirely up to your discretion. Even if this request were not processed before Saturday or even Monday, I am told that it can be handled competently.

You may be interested to know that I have also filled in Dave Gribben, Director of Legislative Affairs at the Defense Department (and a man of strong faith), on this issue.

Thank you very much for considering this inquiry. You may reach me at any time at the numbers above. My hope is that, with your interest and your placing of a request, a meaningful inquiry may ensue which may go a long way toward resolving this important issue.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01b. Request	Re: Request for Inquiry [FOIA restrictions redacted] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Document Declassified
Copy of (Document Follows)
 By MM on 7/18/2022

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-1166-MR(500.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 3/2/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
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REQUEST FOR INTELLIGENCE INQUIRY



BASIC OBJECTIVE AND COORDINATES

Basic objective: The purpose of this inquiry is to request from the National and Tactical Intelligence Community any contribution possible in an examination of the area of the ice cap on Mt. Ararat, Turkey. The focus of such an examination would be to determine if there is information which will help to prove or disprove reported sightings of a large, rectangular artifact, of petrified wood, reputed to be Noah's Ark. According to accounts, the object is covered with ice, except during rare periods of extensive melt-back.

Coordinates of area to be studied: The coordinates of the main summit of Mt. Ararat are: 44 17' 30" East, 39 43' 00" North. (Two different maps are attached, reflecting some difference in the placement of coordinates and suggesting the need for these coordinates to be double-checked). The most promising site for the possible location of the Ark is approximately 30-50" almost due north of the summit, at an elevation of 15,000-16000 feet, near the top of the Ahora gorge. A secondary sight, which may include a portion of the Ark, is located further north, down in the Ahora Gorge. Please see attached maps, with red marks indicating these two areas.

Alleged size of artifact: 450' X 75' X 50' (Alleged original size). Some reported sightings indicate that the artifact has broken into two or three pieces, as a result of a serious earthquake in the region. The largest portion may consequently be only 200-250'.

Orientation of artifact: Some alleged sightings indicate a North-South orientation.

TIME FRAME OF REQUEST

Please seek to provide the best collection, archival analysis, and interpretation possible on available materials which can be assembled by 1400 hrs., Tuesday, January 19, 1993.

An additional hard copy of materials and images should be set aside for use by Senators with an ongoing interest. If a Senator's name or formal request for a hard copy file is required for the establishing such a file, please notify contact person: John Hanford, (b)(6)

Any work (new collection, archival, or interpretation) which cannot be completed by 1400 hours, January 18, 1993 (due to time constraints or alternative tasking requirements necessary for current national interests), should be completed within a

reasonable period of time. Please deposit such additional work in Senators' hard copy file and notify contact person that project is complete.

CURRENT COLLECTION REQUEST

A request is made for a new multi-sensor collection of information, using each of the relevant sensor technologies, both national and tactical, currently available.

Priority should be given to any ground penetrating radar capability, which would be capable of ice penetration. Surface images are likely to be less productive, as compared to other times of the year, when there is less ice covering on the mountain. If spectroscopy is possible, it may be of use.

All available aspects and angles should be utilized, to maximize coverage of the difficult terrain of the Ahora gorge region. Coverage of both sides of the gorge is needed, if possible.

ARCHIVAL SEARCH

An archival search is requested of all sensors or sources available, utilizing both national assets and tactical means. Both imagery-derived information and narrative or visual reports would be helpful.

Someone with experience in studying this area for the National Intelligence Community has informed me that there are not a large number of collections for this particular site. He therefore recommends a study accessing all available archived materials for this location, since this should not be too burdensome a project.

However, there are particular time frames in which credible sightings have been reported, and archives for these periods should receive special attention. These include: 1988, 1984, 1973-1974, 1968-1970, 1958-1963.

SPECIFIC ARCHIVAL REQUESTS

There are several credible accounts involving reports by U.S. military personnel of sightings of an object on Mt. Ararat which warrant special focused investigation.

1) 1974 Navy Reconnaissance Mission

On or about June 17, 1974, an F-4 was dispatched from the USS Independence with specific instructions to get a closer look at a structure previously sighted (by satellite or reconnaissance

flight) high up on the Soviet side of Mt. Ararat. The stated objective of this mission was to investigate whether the object was a Soviet military installation.

Al Shappell, who operated the photography equipment on this mission, reports that, as his plane flew straight up the Ahora gorge, a large, rectangular structure was sighted off the port wing on a ledge near the top of the gorge and 300-400 pictures were taken. The Independence had been delayed two days in a planned liberty call for the specific purpose of conducting this mission.

Mr. Shappell lives near Evansville, Indiana and can be reached at (b)(6). See Addendum for several sites which may be of use in searching for records and archived film on this mission.

2) Possible Photos from U-2s Based at Incirlik, Adana, Turkey

Several pilots with the 428th Tactical Flight Squadron, stationed at Incirlik Air Base in Adana, Turkey, report having sighted an object resembling the Ark during the 1958-1960 time frame. Lt. Greg Schwinghammer also reports hearing at the base club that pictures had been taken of the object by U-2 pilots based at Adana. Lt. Schwinghammer describes seeing "an enormous boxcar or rectangular barge, visible in a gully high on the mountain," as he circled Mt. Ararat in a F-100 Super Saber. He can be reached at (b)(6). See Addendum for additional details.

3) Witness of Air Force Imagery and Films of the Ark

While stationed at Fort Still, Lawton, OK, James Robert Johnson reports viewing (in 1969) 30 minutes of classified film footage of the Ark taken from an aircraft. He recalls additional details of the film involving strategic sites in the Soviet Union, which he would be willing to discuss with persons with proper security clearances. Mr. Johnson also reports having viewed, at an earlier point in time while based in Germany, still images taken of the Ark under the ice cap. Mr. Johnson lives in Broken Bow, OK, and can be reached at (b)(6).

4) Photographs Viewed at Beale Air Base

Lt. Col. Walter D. Hunter (b)(6) reports having viewed photographs of what appeared to be the Ark sometime during the 1968-1970 time period at Beale Air Base in California. The photos were oblique shots, presumably taken by a U-2, and he has some remembrance that they may have been taken during the month of November. See Addendum.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
01c. Paper	Re: Addendum: 1974 Navy Reconnaissance Mission [FOIA RESTRICTIONS REDACTED] (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Document Declassified
(Document Follows)
 By MM (NLGB) on 3/10/2016

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	2010-1166-MR(500.02)
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	Released in Full
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	12/8/2014

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ADDENDUM



1974 NAVY RECONNAISSANCE MISSION

At the time of this reconnaissance mission, the USS Independence was headed toward Athens for a liberty call. When it abruptly reversed course, the crew was informed that liberty would be delayed for two days. The F-4 reconnaissance mission represented the only aircraft launched during this period. After the plane was launched, the Independence immediately set course again for liberty call in Athens.

The F-4's flight involved a refueling over Turkey and a radar-evading approach to Mt. Ararat, where it flew straight up the Ahora gorge. Upon his return to the Independence, Shappell was put through a thorough debriefing. He reported seeing what appeared to be a long, rectangular structure, with a coal-black appearance, clearly set off against the lighter rock of the mountain and partially covered by ice. During the fly-over, he had remarked to the pilot, "It looks like a carrier," and described the object as resembling a loaf of bread.

Perhaps noteworthy is the coincidence in time between this mission and an investigation conducted in 1974 by the CIA into the Ark. Director William Colby's staff-action memo to Howard Schue, which initiated this inquiry, is dated May 13, 1974, just a few weeks prior to the Navy reconnaissance flight. However, Mr. Schue had no knowledge of this mission as he conducted his study.

Several bases might be included in an effort to search for archived photos. The carrier Independence was based in Norfolk (where it returned in February 1975). Some reconnaissance photos off the Independence were processed at a photo lab at Cecil Field, near Jacksonville, Florida. The F-4s on board the Independence were affiliated with the VF33, based in Alameda, California.

POSSIBLE PHOTOS FROM U-2s BASED AT INCIRLIK, ADANA, TURKEY

Lt. Greg Schwinghammer describes his approach to the object he believes was the Ark:

We were coming down from 5000 feet. I think we were at more like 3000 feet when we sighted it. I remember that we were doing 380 knots. I estimate that I saw it at a 45 degree angle. It appeared to be hanging at 45 degrees or 30 degrees down the mountain.

When asked if he took any photographs of the object, Schwinghammer replies:

No. We were in too much of a hurry. We had two hours of fuel. It took us 45 minutes to get there in the F-100. We had time enough to make just one pass around the mountain and return. We had to be very careful. The Russians had a radar installation right on the border. A C-130 had recently been shot down. The pilot was a guy named Dick Skiddip.

At one point, Schwinghammer asked an acquaintance to help him sketch a picture of what he had seen. When later he saw, for the first time, a drawing of another eyewitness's recollection of the Ark, he was struck with the close resemblance. Both depicted the Ark with a similar shape, banked in snow, and set against a similar outcropping on the mountain. Schwinghammer's account is included in a two-hour CBS television special on Noah's Ark, which will air on February 12th.

The recollections of others stationed in Adana at the same time corroborate Schwinghammer's account. Lt. Col. Ben Bowthorp (then a 1st Lt.) remembers:

I was the deputy base commander at the time. Greg Schwinghammer was there at the same time. We took a bunch of flights around the area, looking at castles and ruins, and then on Ararat we saw something different. It was about two-thirds of the way up the mountain, made of wood, and it looked like a boat or a wooden boat-shaped wall. I don't know who first said it was Noah's Ark. We all discussed it. Most of us felt it could be, since that's where it's supposed to be.

Others report hearing about the sightings from colleagues. Col. Robert Phillips recalls:

I was rotated through Adana with another squadron. I heard rumors, talking to people at the bar, about some of the pilots having seen the outline of something looking like a big ship or a barge on the mountain. I didn't get a chance to see it because they told us to steer clear of Ararat -- not to go near it because of what happened to the U-2.

Similarly, Capt. Lloyd Hawkins remembers, "I was assistant squadron commander and heard about the incident at the time." Col. J. L. Pennington (then 1st Lt.) recalls, "I do recall that some pilots in the squadron said they had seen Noah's Ark."

PHOTOGRAPHS VIEWED AT BEALE AIR FORCE BASE IN CALIFORNIA

Lt. Col. Walter D. (Dean) Hunter describes an object which looked like a boat and was encased in a glacier.

It looked like a glacier with an object buried in it, obviously underneath ice. The photo had red caliper marks on it which were used in determining its length of 450 feet.

It [the object] was pointed on both ends. They [the photos] had no edges on them; they just had been run off on photo paper. The first photo was a "pan shot" of a large glacier.

PHOTOGRAPHS DISPLAYED AT SPECIAL MEETING IN DAYTON, OHIO

An additional account takes us further back in time to photographs reportedly taken of the Ark in 1944. While flying over Turkey, a squadron of B-24s based in Italy ran a check on a new Fairchild camera system which was being integrated with the Norden bombsight for improved monitoring of bombing accuracy. When they were later developed, some of these photos surprisingly revealed an object high up on Mt. Ararat which appeared to be the Ark. Lester Walton ^{(b)(6)} recalls a special meeting which was convened at Wright Air Base in Dayton, Ohio for the purpose of viewing these photos. He remembers that 50-100 people attended the meeting, including many affiliated with the 4000 A.A.F. Base Unit.




Abb. 2: Büyük Agri Dag oder Großer Ararat. Detaillierte der Gipfelregion mit Angabe der im Juli 1906 trigonometrisch bestimmten Punkte. Höhenangaben in Meter, bezogen auf die Höhe 5165 m des Hauptgipfels.
--

GRID SHEET OF 1927 MAP






Abb. 2: Büyük Ağır Dağı oder Großer Ararat.
 Detailkarte der Gipfelregion mit Angabe der im Juli 1928 trigonometrisch bestimmten Punkte.
 Höhenangaben in Meter, bezogen auf die Höhe 5165 m des Hauptgipfels.





7660

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 12, 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET AND AGENCY HEADS,
PAS APPOINTEES AND COMMISSIONED OFFICERS
IN THE WHITE HOUSE

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

SUBJECT: STATUS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES

I know you agree with me that it has been an extraordinary privilege to serve President Bush as a member of his team during this first term. And I am aware that many of you may wish to return to the private sector or to assume new positions in a second Bush term.

As we come to the end of a first term and begin to make plans for a second, the President has asked that I repeat a customary request. In accord with past practice, would you, immediately following the election, please submit a pro forma letter of resignation "effective at the pleasure of the President." I trust you will agree with me that this procedure will afford the President maximum flexibility in making the decisions necessary to staff his second Administration.

Please address the letter to the President and send it in care of Phillip D. Brady, Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary.

Thank you very much.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

To Baker
4/17

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 17, 1992

Jim --

We spoke last week about how best to organize to deal with U.S.-Russian space cooperation within the NSC system, while drawing upon the work being done by the Space Council. You asked to see the concept in writing -- the enclosed paper outlines that concept. Let me know what you think.



Brent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1166-AR
12/1/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Organizing U.S. Policy on Space Cooperation with Russia

U.S. cooperation in space and space-related trade with Russia (and other states of the former Soviet Union) must be closely coordinated and consistent with our policy on the full range of high-technology trade and cooperation with Russia. Such cooperation and trade is a key element of foreign policy and can serve far-reaching national security objectives. Therefore, it is important that the expertise and experience of the National Space Council be brought to bear on the critical issues of how to manage and best take advantage of both high-technology trade and cooperation, and to integrate U.S.-Russian space cooperation policy with other national security issues. The following organizational guidelines will facilitate these objectives:

The subgroups of the National Space Council should continue to function as presently organized: The basic group for developing and analyzing civil and commercial space policy options is the Interagency Working Group on U.S.-Russian Civil Space Cooperation (IWG), co-chaired by State and NASA. This interagency group has the responsibility for backstopping negotiations, coordination of U.S. initiatives, and development of policy options.

This working group reports to the Committee on International Space Activity (CISA) which meets at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. The CISA, in turn, reports to the Policy Implementation and Review Committee (PIRC), meeting at the Assistant Secretary/Undersecretary level.

While it is important that civil space issues receive attention from a broad range of agencies with interests in the matter, the three committees may meet in restricted session when issues of particular sensitivity are being considered.

After evaluation and development within the National Space Council System, the CISA or PIRC would refer issues to an NSC staff chaired Steering Group. The NSC's Steering Group will integrate these inputs into the overall U.S. space cooperation and space-related trade policies with Russia and ensure that U.S. space policy is consistent with, supportive of, and fully integrated into U.S. foreign policy and meets national security objectives.

Policy issues that require higher-level consideration will be referred to the Deputies Committee, NSC principals, or the full NSC.

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1166-MR
12/1/2014 MM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1992

Dear Brent:

We have all agreed we need to get the President ahead of the power curve on a specific, comprehensive plan to assist the former Soviet Union.

In the short run for dealing with the FSU, we need to be able to support a comprehensive legislative vehicle designed to address FSU needs.

We have drafted a forward leaning document, which is attached. I'd like to deal directly with you, Nick and Dick to discuss this and avoid a lengthy interagency review process. There is nothing in this document which can't be modified as our discussions proceed. The important thing is to present an agenda and get ahead of the curve.

I hope you will work with me to bless the document expeditiously so we can move forward quickly with Hill discussions.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Jim", with a large, sweeping flourish extending from the end of the signature.

James A. Baker, III

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs,
The White House.

March 25, 1992

Summary of Key Provisions

- The bill articulates a policy framework for assisting the independent states of the former Soviet Union by:
 - emphasizing the opportunities for lasting peace, the international community's interest in a successful transition, and the special role for the United States.
 - stating that failure to act could threaten U.S. security interests and jeopardize savings in the defense budget.
 - highlighting the "five principles" that we have been promoting -- democratic values, human rights, economic reforms, respect for international obligations, and responsible security policies.
 - describing the need for the flexible authorities that we are seeking.
- The bill authorizes appropriation of "such sums as may be necessary" for a separate account to carry out this Act.
- The bill contains several key authorities, including:
 - IMF quota increase -- authorizes the IMF quota increase.
 - Macroeconomic stabilization -- provides authority and urges President to take the lead in multilateral efforts on macroeconomic stabilization.
 - Expanded credit for FSU -- allows waiver of Stevenson and Byrd ceilings on EXIM and other credit programs, and Johnson Debt Default Act restrictions on private lending.
 - Use of other agencies' funds -- allows agency heads to use their funds for FSU programs (with exception of funds for social or economic programs directly benefitting Americans). ?
 - Imports from FSU -- allows waiver of restrictions on imports from FSU beyond those applied to other friendly countries. *
 - Nunn-Lugar funds -- broadens allowable use of the \$500 million appropriated for DOD last fall (weapons destruction/humanitarian transportation) to make these funds available for nonproliferation efforts, relocating Soviet military forces, demilitarization and defense conversion.

- America Houses/Democracy Corps -- authorizes support for programs like the "America Houses" and "Democracy Corps" programs.
- USDA programs -- provides greater flexibility in USDA programs for FSU.
- Post openings -- authorizes use of funds for State Department expenses in new posts in FSU.
- Loan/guarantee authority -- expands authority for loan and guarantee programs, including OPIC. /
- Statutory Communist Country Lists -- removes USSR and Eastern European countries from communist country lists such as those in Foreign Assistance Act and Export-Import Bank Act.
- The bill also contains additional policy language on several important aspects of a U.S. program:
 - Participation in IFIs and Related Organizations -- sense of Congress language supports FSU efforts to join GATT, OECD, IMF, World Bank and EBRD.
 - World Bank and IFC -- urges President to negotiate special capital increases in the World Bank and IFC for expanded credit programs for the FSU. ? why
 - CCC creditworthiness determination -- urges USDA, in light of historic changes in FSU, to refrain from making non-creditworthiness determinations (thus preserving eligibility of republics for CCC guarantee programs). >
 - COCOM restrictions -- commends recent reductions in items covered by COCOM restrictions, and encourages further reductions as a means of promoting trade and investment. >
 - Ukraine Science Center -- urges negotiations for a Science and Technology Center in Ukraine.
 - Trade and Investment -- emphasizes trade and investment opportunities and benefits.
- Although now drafted as an authorization bill, it could easily be transformed to include necessary appropriations language for the IMF quota increase, stabilization assistance, and any of the other assistance now covered. In a single bill.

LEGISLATION

March 25, 1992

SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Support for the Democratic and Economic Development of the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union Act of 1991".

SECTION 2. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that--

(1) recent developments in Russia and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union present an historic opportunity for a transition to a peaceful and stable international order and the integration of the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of democratic nations;

(2) the entire international community has a vital interest in the success of this transition, and the dimension of the problems now faced in the independent states of the former Soviet Union makes it imperative for donor countries and institutions to provide the expertise and support necessary to ensure continued progress on economic and political reforms;

(3) the United States is especially well-positioned because of its heritage and traditions to make a substantial contribution to this transition by building on current technical cooperation, medical and food assistance programs, and by fostering conditions that will encourage the United States business community to engage in trade and investment; and

(4) failure to meet the opportunities presented by these developments could threaten United States national security interests and jeopardize substantial savings in defense that these developments have made possible.

SECTION 3. DEFINITION.

As used in this Act, except where the context indicates otherwise, the term "independent states of the former Soviet Union" shall include the independent states that formerly were part of the Soviet Union. It does not include Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania.

SECTION 4. POLICY.

(a) In General.--It should be the policy of the United States to facilitate the integration of the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of democratic nations, and to make a substantial contribution to the purposes described in section 5 by building on earlier initiatives, including ongoing technical cooperation, medical and food assistance programs. In furtherance of these purposes, the United States should support economic and political reform through the provision of assistance and the promotion of United States trade and investment in those states.

(b) Provision of Assistance.--In providing assistance for the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the President should take into account the extent to which such states are taking appropriate steps toward--

(1) establishment of a democratic system based on principles of the rule of law and individual freedoms;

(2) respect for internationally recognized human rights, based on full respect for the individual and including equal treatment for persons belonging to minority groups;

(3) economic reform based on market principles, the development of a substantial private sector, and integration into the world economy;

(4) respect for international law and obligations, and adherence to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris; and

(5) adherence to responsible security policies, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and non-proliferation of destabilizing conventional weapons.

SECTION 5. PURPOSES OF ASSISTANCE.

In furtherance of the policies described in section 4, funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act may be made available for the independent states of the former Soviet Union for the purposes of promoting democracy, encouraging free market systems, meeting urgent and other humanitarian needs, fostering demilitarization of the economy and defense conversion, and promoting bilateral trade and investment, and for such other purposes as the President deems appropriate.

SECTION 6. EXTRAORDINARY NATURE OF ASSISTANCE.

The Congress recognizes that--

(1) change throughout the independent states of the former Soviet Union is occurring rapidly but unevenly, and it will remain impossible to anticipate with certainty how United States assistance would best serve to facilitate the processes of political and economic reform;

(2) the varying pace of reform and change from region to region will affect in ways that cannot now be anticipated how and where United States assistance can be provided most effectively;

(3) the effectiveness of United States assistance depends on efficient coordination of United States efforts with the similar activities of friendly and allied donor countries, and of international financial institutions;

(4) the development and implementation of United States assistance and related programs should be carried out in a manner to promote the strengthening of United States bilateral relations with the independent states of the former Soviet Union;

(5) expanded trade and investment is the best method of promoting market reforms in the independent states of the former Soviet Union while at the same time promoting the involvement of U.S. businesses in the emerging private sector in those states;

(6) such trade and investment will generate strong employment and other economic benefits for the United States as the economies of the independent states of the former Soviet Union begin in future years to realize their enormous potential as both customers and suppliers; and

(7) the pace and unprecedented nature of events requires that the President be provided with the authority to furnish United States assistance and resources expeditiously if the United States is to be able to influence events as they occur and effectively promote the purposes of this Act.

SECTION 7. ASSISTANCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

(a) Authority.--The President is authorized to furnish assistance in order to promote the purposes described in section 5, including assistance for--

(1) support for the creation and development of democratic political systems;

(2) support for the creation and development of private enterprise and free market systems, including technical assistance and training individuals in the basics of business and improving understanding of how market economies function, and including support for multilateral efforts to promote macroeconomic stabilization;

(3) creation of the conditions for expanded trade and investment which will be crucial to the development of market economies and genuine private sectors;

(4) support for demilitarization and the conversion of defense-related industry and equipment for civilian purposes and uses, including the absorption of defense-related industry personnel into the civilian sector;

(5) improvements in food distribution systems to enhance the ability of the independent states of the former Soviet Union to use their own resources to meet basic needs;

(6) promotion of investment in and increased efficiency of the energy sector, which would help the independent states of the former Soviet Union increase hard currency earnings in the medium term, as well as conservation of natural resources;

(7) support in addressing emergency and other humanitarian needs of the people of the independent states of the former Soviet Union during the period of transition to a free market economy, particularly by providing technical assistance to enhance the ability of those states to meet future needs in this area;

(8) support for activities that will facilitate efforts connected with the withdrawal and relocation of military forces of the former Soviet Union; preventing the diversion of scientific expertise of the former Soviet Union to terrorist and other third countries; and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including in appropriate circumstances having the United States purchase or otherwise receive such weapons or related material; and

(9) support for cultural exchange programs between the United States and the independent states of the former Soviet Union, including support for "America Houses" in key locations in such states designed as focal points for exchanges of people and information to and from the United States.

(b) Promoting Involvement of U.S. Private Sector.--It is the sense of the Congress that the private sector in the United States must become increasingly involved in the process of transition taking place in the independent states of the former Soviet Union if reform efforts are to succeed. Accordingly, the President should and is authorized to undertake activities designed to promote the active involvement of the United States private sector, including as appropriate through--

(1) initiatives designed to encourage small- and medium-sized businesses to become involved in the markets of those states, including as appropriate the use of trade missions, the establishment of information networks and assistance centers including one or more American Business and Management Centers, and the activities of the Trade and Development Program;

(2) support, which may include contributions to an endowment, for one or more Enterprise Funds that help promote United States investment in the private sector of those states, or for a "Eurasia Foundation" or similar organizations, as well as support through programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation;

(3) support, which may include contributions to an endowment, for a "Democracy Corps" or other appropriate organization, the purpose of which shall be to utilize United States citizens having appropriate experience to provide detailed, independent, onsite assessments of the needs at all levels within the independent states of the

former Soviet Union to build democratic institutions, free market economies, and the basic infrastructure of a civil society; to mobilize private United States citizens to help meet such needs; to establish local centers or work with the "America Houses" described in subsection (a)(9) in such countries in making available logistical and information resources for those assisting in meeting such needs; and to disseminate its assessments in appropriate circumstances to governmental and nongovernmental organizations;

(4) technical assistance designed to help increase trade between those states and the United States, including through seminars on most-favored-nation treatment of goods and services and, when appropriate, the Generalized System of Preferences; and

(5) support for efforts by those states to join or participate in international economic and financial organizations such as the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

(c) Provision of Assistance.--

(1) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be appropriated to the President for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. Funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act are authorized to remain available until expended.

(2) Assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act.--The President should and is authorized to utilize funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, for programs for the independent states of the former Soviet Union, including utilization of funds under chapter 1 of part I of that Act for development activities in the those states consistent with the purposes of that chapter, and of funds under chapter 4 of part II of that Act. Any funds made available under chapter 4 of part II of that Act may be utilized on the same basis as funds authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1).

(3) Application of Authorities under the SEED Act.--In furtherance of the purposes of this Act, and consistent with the provisions of section 8 of this Act, the President

may authorize any United States Government agency that has authority under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 to take SEED Actions for any eligible East European country under that Act to utilize such authority, and to make available any funds available to it for activities related to international affairs outside Eastern Europe, to take comparable actions with respect to any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union. For purposes of this Act, the term "United States Government agency" shall include any agency as defined in section 644(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(4) Direct Loan and Loan Guarantee Authorities.--Funds authorized to be appropriated by this section may be utilized to cover the cost, including the cost of modifying such loans, as defined in section 502 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, of direct loans and loan guarantees with respect to the independent states of the former Soviet Union, including loan guarantees provided consistent with the provisions of section 108 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended and title IV of chapter 2 of part I of that Act, and to cover the administrative expenses for such direct loans and loan guarantees.

(5) Department of Defense Activities.--In recognition of the direct contributions that such activities can make to the national defense interests of the United States, the President is authorized to make available such sums as may be necessary of funds available to the Department of Defense under sections 108 and 109 of Public Law 102-229 to carry out the provisions of subsections (a)(4) and (a)(8).

(6) Authorities.--In order to assist in meeting the administrative costs incurred in connection with carrying out functions under this Act, of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this section, such sums as may be necessary may be used for administrative expenses of United States Government agencies in connection with administering programs hereunder. Assistance may be provided and authorities may be exercised in accordance with this Act notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in making available funds authorized to be appropriated under this section the President may utilize any of the authorities applicable to the provision of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and to the provision of assistance under programs for which appropriations are made in annual foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations acts.

(7) Participation of United States Government Agencies.--

(A) In General.--Upon a determination by the head of a United States Government agency, or by the President, in accordance with subparagraph (B), any such agency may utilize funds available to it in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph.

(B) Determination Required.--The determination referred to in subparagraph (A) is a determination by the head of such agency, or by the President, that the benefits of exercising the authority described in this paragraph outweigh the benefits of proceeding without respect to this paragraph, taking into account the anticipated effect of doing so on the ability of the agency to achieve its statutory objectives and otherwise foster its programs and policies, as well as the extent to which doing so can in other ways be expected to promote the national interests of the United States. X

(C) Coordination and Use.--A United States Government agency may utilize any funds with respect to which a determination under subparagraph (B) applies for any of the purposes for which funds authorized to be appropriated under paragraph (1) may be utilized under this Act, subject to procedures for coordination of activities consistent with section 8 of this Act. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of any United States Government agency under other provisions of this Act or any other provisions of law.

(D) Exclusions.--The authority of this paragraph may not be exercised with respect to funds that have been made available in authorization and appropriations acts for social or economic programs designed to benefit directly the people of the United States.

(d) In recognition of the importance of establishing an effective official United States Government presence in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, such sums as may be necessary may be used by the Department of State for costs of personnel and other expenses for new posts in such states, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes.

SECTION 8. COORDINATION OF ACTIVITIES.

The effectiveness of United States efforts to promote a successful transition to democracy and a market-oriented economy in the former Soviet republics requires that assistance and related programs of all United States Government agencies affecting the former Soviet republics be carefully coordinated. At the same time, it is critical that all assistance and related efforts of United States Government agencies be coordinated with other aspects of our bilateral relations, with the assistance and related programs of other countries and organizations, and with United States foreign policy in general. Accordingly, it is the sense of the Congress that the President should ensure that there continues to be, within the Department of State, a program coordinator who shall be directly responsible for overseeing and coordinating all programs described in this Act and all other activities that the United States Government conducts in furtherance of the purposes of this Act. In this connection, the program coordinator should work closely with the Secretary of the Treasury and the National Advisory Committee on International Monetary and Financial Policies regarding matters for which they have responsibility relating to the activities of international financial institutions, and thereby ensure that such institutions play an important role in complementing programs carried out by United States Government agencies under this Act. [Note: This language needs to be fully checked with Treasury, and adjusted as appropriate, to ensure that the provisions are consistent with Treasury's primary responsibilities for the IFIs.]

SECTION 9. QUOTA INCREASE FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.

In recognition of the critical contribution that the activities of the International Monetary Fund can make to the purposes of this Act, the Bretton Woods Agreement Act is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sections:

"SEC. 56. QUOTA INCREASE.

"The United States Governor of the Fund is authorized to consent to an increase in the quota of the United States in the Fund equivalent to 8,608,500,000 Special Drawing Rights, limited to such amounts as are appropriated in advance in appropriation Acts.

"SEC. 57. ACCEPTANCE OF AMENDMENTS TO THE ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT OF THE FUND.

"The United States Governor of the Fund is authorized to consent to the amendments to the Articles of Agreement of the

Fund approved in resolution numbered 45-3 of the Board of Governors of the Fund.".

SECTION 10. SUPPORT FOR MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION.

In order to promote macroeconomic stabilization and the integration of the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the international financial system, the United States should in appropriate circumstances utilize the authority described in section 7(a)(2) of this Act and take a leading role in organizing and supporting multilateral efforts at macroeconomic stabilization and debt reduction, conditioned as appropriate on the development and implementation of comprehensive economic reform programs.

SECTION 11. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION.

It is the sense of the Congress that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation can each play an important role in supporting the economic restructuring in the independent states of the former Soviet Union necessary to move toward market economies. By leveraging the contributions of other donors and the access of those institutions to international capital markets, the United States contribution to special capital increases could play a critical in promoting the purposes of this Act. Accordingly, it is the sense of Congress that the President should seek to negotiate special capital increases with respect to both of these institutions to provide additional capital for an expanded lending program for the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

SECTION 12. COCOM RESTRICTIONS.

The Congress commends recent efforts that have resulted in a substantial reduction of the number of items the export of which is restricted under COCOM procedures. It is the sense of the Congress that efforts to reduce the number of items the export of which is restricted under COCOM procedures should be continued as an important step in further facilitating expanded trade and investment between the United States and the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

SECTION 13. ESTABLISHMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER IN UKRAINE.

It is the sense of the Congress that the President should initiate negotiations for the establishment in Ukraine of a center, comparable to the center presently contemplated for Russia, for the purpose of promoting science and technology projects for nonmilitary purposes. Such a center would minimize incentives for weapons scientists and engineers of the former Soviet Union, and particularly scientists and engineers previously involved in the design and production of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction, to engage in activities that could contribute to proliferation of such weapons by supporting the activities for peaceful purposes of such scientists and engineers. It is the further sense of the Congress that the President should utilize the authorities described in sections 7(a)(4) and 7(a)(8) of this Act to make available appropriate support for such a center.

SECTION 14. STATUTORY LISTS OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND SOVIET-SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS.

(a) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.--Section 620(f)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking from the list at the end thereof "Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.", "Estonia.", "German Democratic Republic.", "Hungarian People's Republic.", "Latvia.", "Lithuania.", "People's Republic of Albania.", "People's Republic of Bulgaria.", "Polish People's Republic.", "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.", "Socialist Republic of Romania.", and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (including its captive constituent republics).".

(b) Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.--The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 is amended in section 2(b)(2)(B)(ii), by striking from the list at the end thereof "Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.", "Estonia.", "German Democratic Republic.", "Hungarian People's Republic.", "Latvia.", "Lithuania.", "People's Republic of Albania.", "People's Republic of Bulgaria.", "Polish People's Republic.", "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.", "Socialist Republic of Romania.", and "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (including its captive constituent republics).".

(c) Special Restrictions on Persons Involved in Legal Commercial Transactions.--Section 951(e)(2) of Title 18, United States Code, is amended by striking out "the Soviet Union, the

German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, or".

(d) Other Obsolete Provisions.--Upon concluding that doing so is in the national interest of the United States, the President may waive the application with respect to any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union of any provision of law that would have restricted the eligibility of the Soviet Union, by name, or by virtue of actions or obligations of the Soviet Union as it existed prior to December 25, 1991, and that might otherwise be construed to apply to such republic or republics, with respect to any program, benefit or other treatment. This subsection shall not be construed as authorizing waivers of the provisions of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended.

SECTION 15. ADDITIONAL STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

(a) Overseas Private Investment Corporation.--Section 234(g)(2) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended--

(1) by striking out "or" and inserting a comma in lieu thereof"; and

(2) inserting ", and the independent countries of the former Soviet Union" after the word "Act".

(b) Amendments to Food Security Act of 1985.--Section 1110 of the Food Security Act of 1985 is amended--

(1) in subsection (b) by--

(A) by striking out "or cooperatives" and inserting in lieu thereof "cooperatives, or other private entities"; and

(B) by inserting after "such countries" the phrase "including the independent states that formerly constituted the Soviet Union"; and

(2) by amending subsection (f)(1) to read as follows:

"(f)(1) The Commodity Credit Corporation may provide for grants, or sales on credit terms, of commodities made available under section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 for use in carrying out this section."

(c) Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990.--Section 1542 of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 is amended--

(1) in subsection (b), by inserting "and services" after the word "facilities" each place it occurs;

(2) in subsection (d)(1)(B)(i), by inserting ", farmers, other persons from the private sector," after "agricultural consultants"; and

(3) by amending subsection (d)(1)(D) to read as follows:

"(4) Technical assistance.--The President is authorized to provide, or pay the necessary costs for, technical assistance to enable individuals or other entities to implement the recommendations, or to carry out the opportunities and projects identified under, paragraph (1)(A).".

(d) Other Provisions Applicable to Agriculture Programs.--

(1) Food Security Act of 1985.--(A) The ceiling limitation contained in section 1110(f)(4) of the Food Security Act of 1985 shall not apply with respect to funds used during fiscal years 1992 and 1993 with respect to commodities made available for the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

(B) The ceiling limitation contained in section 1110(g) of the Food Security Act of 1985 shall not apply with respect to commodities furnished during fiscal years 1992 and 1993 to the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

(2) Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990.--For fiscal years 1992 and 1993, the ceiling limitation contained in section 1542(d)(1)(I) of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 shall not apply with respect to assistance made available for the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

(3) Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954.--For fiscal years 1992 and 1993, the ceiling limitation contained in section 202(e)(1) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, shall not apply with respect to programs for the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Any funds made available under that Act may be made available

under section 202(e)(1) to assist private voluntary organizations and cooperatives in establishing new food assistance programs for those states under provisions of law other than title II of that Act, as well as for the purposes described in paragraphs (A) and (B) of that section.

(4) Agricultural Trade Act of 1978.--It is the sense of the Congress that in view of the historic transformation taking place in the independent states of the former Soviet Union, and the contribution that guarantee programs of the Commodity Credit Corporation for those states can make in these circumstances to the purposes described in sections 202(c) and 202(d) of the Agriculture Trade Act of 1978, the Secretary of Agriculture should refrain from making a determination under section 202(f) of that Act regarding those states, and should maintain a substantial guarantee program to promote the export of United States agricultural commodities in those states.

(e) Restrictions on Imports From the Soviet Union.--To the extent consistent with Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, the President is authorized and encouraged to exempt any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union from any statutory or regulatory restrictions on the importation of goods and services into the United States, to the extent that such restrictions are more stringent with respect to goods and services of such states than restrictions applicable to like goods and services of other friendly countries.

SECTION-BY-SECTION

March 25, 1992

SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE SUPPORT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE
FORMER SOVIET UNION ACT OF 1991

The Support for the Democratic and Economic Development of the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union Act of 1991 would authorize the President to provide critical support for the economic and political transformation taking place in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Section 1.--Title

This section entitles the bill "The Support for the Democratic and Economic Development of the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union Act of 1991".

Section 2.--Findings.

This section states a series of findings that emphasize the opportunities created by recent events in the independent states of the former Soviet Union for a transition to a peaceful and stable international order and the integration of those states into the community of democratic nations, the international community's interest in a successful transition, and the special role that the United States can play because of its heritage and traditions in contributing to this transition. The findings also state that failure to meet these opportunities could threaten U.S. national security interests and jeopardize substantial savings in defense that these developments have made possible.

Section 3.--Definition.

This section defines the phrase "independent states of the former Soviet Union" as used in this Act. It would include any state established on the territory of the former Soviet Union, but does not include Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania.

Section 4.--Policy.

Subsection (a) sets forth that United States policy should, among other things, facilitate integration of the independent

states into the community of democratic nations and support economic and political reform through the provision of assistance and the promotion of United States trade and investment in the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Subsection (b) sets forth several considerations which the President should take into account in providing assistance, based on the "five principles" that the United States has emphasized: establishment of a democratic system; respect for internationally recognized human rights; economic reform; respect for international law and obligations, and adherence to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris; and adherence to responsible security policies.

Section 5.--Purposes of Assistance.

This section states that funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act may be made available for the independent states of the former Soviet Union, in furtherance of the policies described in section 4, for the purposes of promoting democracy, encouraging free market systems, meeting urgent and other humanitarian needs, fostering demilitarization of the economy and defense conversion, and promoting bilateral trade and investment, and for such other purposes as the President deems appropriate.

Section 6.--Extraordinary Nature of Assistance.

This section highlights the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the need for assistance under this Act, including the rapid and uneven change throughout the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the need for efficient coordination of U.S. assistance with the similar activities of other donors, the need to develop and implement U.S. programs in a manner to promote the strengthening of U.S. bilateral relations with the independent states of the former Soviet Union, the importance of expanded trade and investment as the best method to promote market reforms in the independent states of the former Soviet Union while at the same time promoting the involvement of U.S. businesses in the emerging private sectors of those states, the fact that trade and investment will generate strong employment and other economic benefits for the United States as the economies of the independent states of the former Soviet Union begin in future years to realize their enormous potential as both customers and suppliers, and the need in light of these

circumstances to ensure that the President has authority to furnish United States assistance and resources expeditiously if the United States is to be able to influence events as they occur and effectively promote the purposes of this Act.

Section 7.--Assistance and Related Activities.

Subsection (a) authorizes the President to furnish assistance in order to promote the objectives described in section 5, including assistance for support for the creation and development of democratic political systems, and of private enterprise and free market systems (including support for multilateral efforts to promote macroeconomic stabilization), creation of the conditions for expanded trade and investment, support for demilitarization and defense conversion, improvements in food distribution systems, for promotion of investment in and increased efficiency of the energy sector and conservation of natural resources, support in addressing emergency and other humanitarian needs, support for activities that will facilitate efforts connected with withdrawal and relocation of military forces of the former Soviet Union, preventing the diversion of scientific expertise, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (including in appropriate circumstances having the United States purchase or receive without cost such weapons or related material), and support for cultural exchange programs.

Subsection (b) sets forth the sense of the Congress concerning promoting involvement of the U.S. private sector in the process of transition taking place in the independent states of the former Soviet Union and authorizes the President to undertake activities designed to promote the active involvement of the private sector. These activities include initiatives designed to encourage involvement of small- and medium-sized businesses in the markets of those states; support for one or more Enterprise Funds that serve to promote United States investment in the private sector or a Eurasia Foundation or similar organizations -- which it is contemplated may be established to provide assistance to promote and strengthen market economies and institutions concerned with representative government, effective legal systems, human rights and responsible media -- as well as support through programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation); support for a "Democracy Corps" or other similar organization as described in the provision; technical assistance designed to help increase trade between those states and the United States; and support for efforts by those states

to participate in certain international economic and financial organizations.

Subsection (c)(1) authorizes to be appropriated to the President, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act, and specifies that such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

Subsection (c)(2) authorizes the President to utilize funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, for programs for the independent states of the former Soviet Union, and specifies that any such funds that are made available under chapter 4 of part II of that Act may be utilized on the same basis as funds appropriated under paragraph (1).

Subsection (c)(3) authorizes any United States Government agency that has authority under the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989 to take SEED Actions for any eligible East European country under that Act to utilize such authority, and to make available any funds available to it for activities related to international affairs outside of Eastern Europe, to carry out comparable programs or take comparable actions for any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Subsection (c)(4) authorizes utilization of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act to cover the subsidy cost and administrative expenses for any direct loans or loan guarantees. Loans or guarantees could be provided either directly under the authority of this paragraph, in connection with the general authority under the Foreign Assistance Act to provide assistance on such terms as may be best suited to the achievement of the purposes of that Act, or in connection with the authority to furnish assistance under chapter 4 of part II of that Act "on such terms and conditions as [the President] may determine, in order to promote economic stability." Alternatively, funds could be utilized in the same manner as under ongoing programs such as those conducted by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Subsection (c)(5) supplements the authority of the President to utilize funds made available to the Department of Defense under sections 108 and 109 of Public 102-229 by making them available to carry out the provisions of section 7(a)(4) and section 7(a)(8), relating to efforts described above in such areas as nonproliferation, withdrawal and relocation of

military forces of the former Soviet Union, demilitarization and defense conversion.

Subsection (c)(6) contains a series of general authorities. First, it authorizes use of funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act for administrative expenses of United States Government agencies in connection with administering programs under this Act. Second, it provides that assistance may be provided and authorities may be exercised in accordance with this Act notwithstanding any other provision of law. It thus for instance would permit the use of funds appropriated under subsection (c)(1) or economic support funds made available under subsection (c)(2) notwithstanding any other provision of law; would permit the use of funds for OPIC guarantee programs under subsection (c)(4) notwithstanding otherwise applicable program ceilings on OPIC activities; and would permit the taking of actions authorized under this or other sections of the Act notwithstanding such provisions. Finally, it provides that in making available funds appropriated to carry out the Act, the President may utilize any of the authorities applicable to the provision of assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and to the provision of assistance under programs for which appropriations are made in annual foreign operations, export financing, and related programs appropriations acts (including as an example Peace Corps programs).

Subsection (c)(7) would authorize any agency the head of which makes the determination described in subparagraph (B) to utilize funds available to it for any of the purposes for which funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be utilized, subject to any procedures for coordination of activities consistent with section 8 of this Act. The required determination is a determination that the benefits of exercising the authority of this paragraph outweigh the benefits of not doing so, taking into account the anticipated effect of doing so on the ability of the agency to achieve its statutory objectives and otherwise foster its programs and policies, as well as the extent to which doing so can in other ways be expected to promote the national interests of the United States. There is a specific exemption for funds that have been made available in authorization and appropriations acts for social or economic programs designed to benefit directly the people of the United States. Finally, the last sentence of subparagraph (C) confirms that nothing in this provision shall be construed as limiting the authority of any United States Government agency under other provisions of this Act or other provisions of law.

Subsection (d) contains a statement regarding the importance of establishing an effective official United States Government presence in the independent states of the former Soviet Union. It provides that of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act, such sums as may be necessary may be used by the Department of State for costs of personnel and other expenses for new posts in such states, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes. ?

Section 8.--Coordination of Activities.

The section stresses the need for careful coordination of all U.S. assistance for the independent states of the former Soviet Union among United States Government agencies and with the efforts of other countries and organizations. It expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should ensure that there continues to be, within the Department of State, a program coordinator who shall be directly responsible for overseeing and coordinating all programs described in this Act and all other activities that the United States Government conducts in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, and indicates that the program coordinator should work closely with the Secretary of the Treasury and the National Advisory Committee on International Monetary and Financial Policies regarding matters for which they have responsibility relating to the activities of international financial institutions.

Section 9.--Quota Increase for International Monetary Fund.

This section amends the Bretton Woods Agreements Act in two respects in recognition of the critical contribution that the activities of the International Monetary Fund can make to the purposes of this Act. First, it authorizes subject to appropriations an increase in the quota of the United States in the International Monetary Fund, as previously requested by the Administration. Second, it authorizes acceptance of certain amendments to the Fund's Articles of Agreement that would allow the Fund to suspend a member's voting rights if that member, having been declared ineligible to use the Funds's general resources because it failed to fulfill obligations under the Articles, persists in its failure to fulfill its obligations. The quota increase resolution that was approved by the Fund's Board of Governor's provides that the quota increase cannot become effective without approval of these amendments to the Articles of Agreement.

Section 10.--Support for Macroeconomic Stabilization.

This section states that the United States should take a leading role in organizing and supporting multilateral efforts at macroeconomic stabilization and debt reduction, conditioned as appropriate on the development and implementation of comprehensive economic reform programs.

Section 11.--Role of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation.

This section expresses the sense of the Congress with regard to the role of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation, and urges the President to seek to negotiate special capital increases with respect to both of these institutions to provide additional capital for an expanded lending program for the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Section 12.--COCOM Restrictions.

This section commends recent efforts that have resulted in a substantial reduction of the number of items the export of which is restricted under COCOM procedures, and states the sense of the Congress that efforts to reduce the number of items the export of which is restricted under COCOM procedures should be continued as an important step in further facilitating expanded trade and investment between the United States and the independent states of the former Soviet Union.

Section 13.--Establishment of Science and Technology Center in Ukraine.

This section states the sense of the Congress that the President should initiate negotiations for the establishment of a Science and Technology Center in Ukraine, comparable to that presently contemplated for Russia.

Section 14.--Statutory lists of communist countries and Soviet-specific restrictions.

Subsections (a), (b) and (c) delete the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries from the statutory communist country

lists contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, as well as the provisions governing registration of foreign agents representing these countries in certain commercial matters. Subsection (d) authorizes the President, upon concluding that doing so is in the national interest, to waive the application with respect to any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union of any provision of law that would have restricted the eligibility of the Soviet Union, by name, or by virtue of actions or obligations of the Soviet Union as it existed prior to December 25, 1991, and that might otherwise be construed to apply to such republic or republics, with respect to any program, benefit or other treatment. Thus, the provision would apply to provisions such as the Byrd and Stevenson Amendments, each of which specifically names the Soviet Union, and the Johnson Debt Default Act, which applied by virtue of actions or obligations in connection with the renunciation of debt by the former Soviet Union. A specific exception provides that the authority of this provision cannot be used to waive the provisions of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974, which includes the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.

Section 15.--Additional statutory provisions.

Subsection (a) amends section 234 of the Foreign Assistance Act to make the independent states of the former Soviet Union eligible for the pilot equity program of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Subsections (b), (c), and (d) contain a series of provisions allowing greater flexibility in USDA programs for the independent states of the former Soviet Union. Subsection (d)(4) contains sense of the Congress language urging the Secretary of Agriculture, in light of the historic transformation taking place in these states, to exercise his discretion to refrain making determinations described in section 202(f) of the Agricultural Trade Act of 1978, and urges that a substantial guarantee program to promote the export of United States agricultural commodities in those states be maintained. Finally, subsection (e) authorizes and encourages the President to exempt the independent states of the former Soviet Union from certain statutory or regulatory restrictions on the importation of goods and services into the United States, though not from the provisions of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.

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*
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EYES ONLY/~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VIA BACK CHANNEL

March 10, 1992

FROM: Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FOR: James A. Baker
Secretary of State

Dear Jim:

The President noticed the article in THE NEW YORK TIMES which reported that you said we may recognize Slovenia and Croatia soon. In view of the political sensitivity of this issue, the President asked me to insure that any statement on U. S. recognition of the Yugoslav republics comes from him.

Warm regards,

Brent

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0560-MR
MM 5/14/2015

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
04b. Cable	From White House, Re: To Secretary Baker from General Scowcroft [FOIA restrictions redacted] (1 pp.)	3/10/92	(b)(1), (b)(3)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

**Document Partially Declassified
(Copy of Document Follows)**
By MM on 5/31/2022

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #: 2010-0560-MR(501.01)
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition: Released in Part
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date: 5/14/2015

RESTRICTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- (b)(1) National security classified information
- (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency
- (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute
- (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information
- (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy
- (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes
- (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions
- (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells

Deed of Gift Restrictions

- C(1) Closed by Executive Order 13526, governing access to national security information
- C(2) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the information
- C(3) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift [formerly listed as only C]
- PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

PRT: GANTT HOWE COMM OLEARY SIGLER SCOWCROFT
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FM WHITE HOUSE

1.4(c); (b)(3)

NIACT



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1.4(c); (b)(3)

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

0000

PLEASE PASS EYES ONLY TO SECRETARY BAKER FROM GENERAL SCOWCROFT
AT EARLIEST WAKING HOUR.

BEGIN TEXT:

10 MARCH 1992

DEAR JIM:

THE PRESIDENT NOTICED THE ARTICLE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES WHICH
REPORTED THAT YOU SAID WE MAY RECOGNIZE SLOVENIA AND CROATIA
SOON. IN VIEW OF THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THIS ISSUE, THE
PRESIDENT ASKED ME TO INSURE THAT ANY STATEMENT ON U.S.
RECOGNITION OF THE YUGOSLAV REPUBLICS COMES FROM HIM.

WARM REGARDS,

BRENT

END TEXT

DECLAS: OADR

#0059

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E.O. 13526

2010-0560-MR

MM 5/14/2015

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1992

Dear Brent:

As you know, the President will host an international Coordinating Conference on emergency assistance to the former Soviet republics in Washington January 22-23. This represents an effort by the President to lead internationally on the critical issues facing the world posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union. We want to build a broad coalition to provide support for reformers and the peoples of these republics as they move toward market democracy.

Roughly 50 countries will send representatives to the Conference, most of them led by their foreign ministers. Many delegations will also include senior officials from other government ministries. Most are travelling great distances to attend this Conference, in part at least out of respect for the President and his leadership effort on this issue.

While I know all of us are very busy, I would very much appreciate it if you could please try to make time available for those senior foreign officials who ask to meet with you either directly or through the State Department. Many will want to take advantage of their time in Washington to conduct other important business. I believe our common interests will be served if they feel they will have a productive visit on those matters as well as on the humanitarian assistance issues in the former Soviet Union that bring us together.

Sincerely,

James A. Baker, III

The Honorable
Brent Scowcroft,
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs,
The White House.

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

TIME OF RECEIPT



12 FEB 16 030
10 FEB 16 030 8

THE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: 35/10/12

DTG: 2001/10/12

MESSAGE NO. 27 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES 1
FROM GEN. SCOWCROFT VIA SIT Room 6313
(Name) (Phone Number) (Room No.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (Agency) LIE LINE DELIVER TO: BERRY DEPT/ROOM NO. FOR SECRETARY PHONE NUMBER BAKER

011-871-150-56-37 #

STU-III VAX

REMARKS

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.4 (B) September 11, 2006

By CAF NARA, Date 8/28/09

~~SECRET~~

December 18, 1991

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE WHITE HOUSE

TO: THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Jim:

Dick Cheney and I discussed at breakfast this morning the issue of U.S. military participation on the ground in the Soviet Union helping to distribute humanitarian supplies. Neither of us is clear on the kind of participation you have in mind, so we hesitate to comment. However, we both see some potential problems, depending on how the troops might be employed. At this point, may I just urge you not get overly committed to specifics at the NAC before we have had a chance for a more enlightened discussion with you back here.

New subject. We have now completed development of an economic package to discuss with the Japanese. Skinner and I have just gone over potential candidates for Chief Negotiator. Remembering your recommendation, we would like Zoellick to do it, accompanied by Paal and somebody from STR. The problem is that in order to get the job done and get back by Christmas, they just about have to leave tomorrow (December 19). Larry is trying to get in touch with Zoellick but you may see him before that connection is made.

Warm regards, Brent

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-11-67-UNA
MM 1/30/2015

Sent to
Baker via
State
(per LSE)
12-18-91

Document Originally
Attached to
Following Page

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
06. Draft Cable	Re: James A. Baker to Brent Scowcroft (2 pp.)	12/18/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

APNSA Has Seen

5:52 p.m., October 7, 1991

General:

Secy Baker called with message:

"Tell Brent, I am adding to the list of potential UN Secretary General candidates the name of Owada, the Japanese gentleman who is such a good friend of the United States and speaks perfect English.

"I am doing that unless you call me and ask me not to do so -- just to the list of candidates."

Wilma



United States Department of State

The Secretary of State

1/24/91

APNSA Has Seen

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JABIII

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "JABIII" followed by a stylized flourish.

Great minds think along the same lines. This was just received from Douglas Hurd.

I'm writing to tell him that we had already discussed this among ourselves and we agree with the inadvisability of enlarging our goals and purposes by including this as a definitive objective.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "JD" or similar, with a large loop.

Attachment

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08b. Letter	Antony Acland to James A. Baker, III (1 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
08c. Message	Re: Text of a Message from the Right Honourable Douglas Hurd to Honorable James A. Baker III (2 pp.)	1/24/91	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
09. Draft Cable	Brent Scowcroft to Re: Message for Secretary James A. Baker, III (2 pp.)	3/13/91	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]


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Department of State
Executive Secretariat

To _____

NODIS

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Executive Secretary

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

William Coleman, Tom Plaskett and Ken Duberstein called on me today with respect to the problem of United's replacement of Pan Am at Heathrow. This same issue just surfaced with American's bid to take over TWA's routes although the TWA-American deal is on a slower track and should not be tied to the Pan Am-United arrangement.

The Pan Am problem is coming to a head. Pan Am's financial situation is very difficult, as the attached letter attests. Its liquidity is going to run out in January unless the airline gets help from United. Meanwhile, United is reluctant to advance money to Pan Am when the outcome of USG and U.K. approval procedures for the route transfer is in doubt.

Negotiations to obtain the U.K. approval are going slowly. We are seeking a generic solution to the problem of route designation in our bilateral agreement. The Brits tell us that they cannot come to an agreement until they have completed revision of their internal airport traffic distribution rules, which at the earliest will come in the second half of January.

Prime Minister Major needs to be aware that if the problem of Heathrow route rights is not solved satisfactorily and promptly, preferably by mid-January, it could become a real thorn in the bilateral relationship.

I am attaching a copy of a letter Pan Am sent to me which provides further details, including Pan Am's request for Presidential intervention. We have forwarded through normal channels talking points for the President's meeting with Prime Minister Major taking Pan Am's letter into account.


Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Acting Secretary

Attachment:
As stated.

*Brent: It really is important
that the Pres. let Major know he is
personally concerned about this issue.*

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
11. Handwritten Notes	Re: Baker (1 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

3:30 PM
June 20, 1990

General:

Bob Bell called --

Sent you a letter asking if you might be available for breakfast on Saturday morning, August 4. He is bringing a business group to Washington -- arrive on August 2, stay over August 3/4. Saturday breakfast would be preferable for our group. Would like to include Condi Rice if possible.

You are in Washington for the weekend. . .

_____ Okay to schedule breakfast

_____ here if group not too large

_____ will go to their location (e.g. hotel)

_____ Prefer brief meeting with group (serve coffee)

How about none of the above?

Wilma

Gen said to see him he will be OOT.

POC:

Bob Bell - ofc: 402/346-5297

Wilma

Leonno
Passed to Leonno that Brent can't see this group.

Office of
The President

June 15, 1990

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Brent:

You cannot be more pleased with the way the Summit turned out and the way other things are happening throughout the world, with respect to America. I think the President did an absolutely spectacular job with the Gorbachev visit. He really came out the winner. The only time I observed Gorbachev capture the highlight was after he left Washington and stopped in Minneapolis and San Francisco. Congratulations! I know that you were the cornerstone of this whole event.

You recall we discussed, earlier, my bringing back a group of our Nebraska business leaders to Washington, and my request to bring them in for a short exposure and discussion with you. We now have a date - 2, 3 & 4 August. I am excited with the potential.

If you could identify a half hour or 45 minutes for us to visit with you late afternoon of the 2nd, or on the 3rd or 4th, it would be deeply appreciated. The best of all worlds would be for you to join us for breakfast on Saturday morning, 4 August. Of interest, Mike Walsh, Union Pacific CEO, Stanford graduate, and friend of Condi Rice's, is heading our business group. Perhaps Condi could join us as well.

Thanks, Brent. I look forward to seeing you in August. You are doing a great job. Warm wishes for continued success.

Most sincerely,



C. R. "Bob" Bell
President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1990

B. Scowcroft
Dear Mr. Bell:

Thank you for your January 30 letter requesting a meeting with several key business leaders from the Greater Omaha area.

I have long been impressed with the quality of local business leadership in Omaha and their commitment to contributing to the community. You are quite correct in stating that the critical first step in meeting the challenges of drugs and housing begins with the local community. Let me also say that the Air Force greatly appreciates the generous contributions of the Strategic Air Command Consultation Committee and looks forward to continued cooperation.

I would be delighted to meet with your group. As you know, my schedule can sometimes be unpredictable as it depends on the President's schedule and unforeseen world events. Nonetheless, I would like to make every effort to meet personally with your group. If I am unable for some reason to do so, perhaps my Senior Directors for International Programs and for Defense and Arms Control Policy, David Miller and Arnold Kanter, could pinch-hit. Please stay in close touch with my Personal Assistant, Florence Gantt, who will gladly work with you to make the arrangements.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft

Brent Scowcroft

Mr. C. R. Bell
Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce
Omaha, Nebraska 68102

GREATER OMAHA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68102

OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT

January 30, 1990

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Brent:

Thanks for your note and, again, my hat is off to you for the wonderful job you are doing for our country.

We in Omaha, although on a much smaller scale, are trying to do our part to add to the strength of our country by solving local problems. Unifying the business community and focusing their resources is a critical first step in meeting these challenges. We have some good, solid "heavy hitters" here, many of them Fortune 500, and many of whom serve on the Strategic Air Command Consultation Committee which supports Jack Chain at Offutt.

My idea is to find an opportunity to get these leaders back to Washington to meet with appropriate Cabinet and Administration leaders in the areas of drugs and gangs, low-cost housing and education - all issues of critical concern to Omaha. Hopefully, we could come away with valuable information that could help us become a model city in those particular categories.

I believe that the real "hook" on attracting our key people would be an opportunity to have a short (half-hour or 45-minute) session with you. Mike Walsh, CEO of Union Pacific Railroad and Mike Harper, CEO of ConAgra, are the current and past chairmen of our Chamber of Commerce. I don't want to impose on you, but if you would consider a short visit with you as a personal favor, I would be appreciative and deeply indebted.

We would gear our trip to your availability, sometime in the month of May or June.

ST of the Pres's
OLAND team

original white House
Falmers Class

The Honorable Brent Scowcroft
January 30, 1990
Page 2

Brent, thanks for your understanding. I hope we can make this work. Best wishes for continued success.

Most sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'C. R. Bell', written in a cursive style.

C. R. Bell

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United States Department of State
Policy Planning Staff

October 17, 1989

NOTE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Brent,

Here is a newer, more concise version of the speech draft the Secretary gave you today. We would appreciate your comments.

Dennis

10/23 ~ 8:00 AM

Copy of Gen Scowcroft's comms
hand carried direct to
Pres Baker's Df.

DRAFT

DRAFT:ACarpendale
Tuesday, October 17
7:00 p.m.
SPSPEECH 1380

Prerequisites and Principles for Arms Control

Address by

The Honorable James A. Baker, III

The Commonwealth Club
San Francisco, California

October 19, 1989

Ladies and Gentlemen:

A euphoric speech.

DRAFT

It is indeed a pleasure to be here in San Francisco. The Bay Area is always beautiful, but especially in October as the warmth of a fading Indian summer heats the Bay until the fog rolls back in to cool things off. This October has undoubtedly been especially beautiful for all of you. While my flight from the nation's capital landed only a short time ago, already -- here in the nation's sports capital -- I can feel the excitement of the Bay Bridge World Series. Wanting to be bipartisan, I wish both the A's and Giants well. Realizing I am speaking in the City, as we all know it, I wish the Giants especially well. Twenty-seven years is a long time to wait.

1962 was a long time ago in baseball -- and in superpower diplomacy.

The contrast between October 1962 and October 1989 could not be greater, especially in relations between Moscow and Washington. In October 1962, we faced a blustering Soviet Union; its leader talked of burying us. Today, we face a sobered Soviet Union; its leader talks of restructuring his society. In October 1962, the Soviet economy was growing and ready to feed an unrelenting arms buildup. Today, the Soviet economy is virtually bankrupt. In October 1962, the Soviet space program raised fears we would lose the race to the moon. Today, the Soviet Union is racing to avoid being left behind as much of the world moves from the Industrial Age.[?] And

*arms
buildup?*

twenty-seven years ago this month, we stood -- as you all no doubt recall -- eyeball-to-eyeball on the brink of war. Today, by contrast, superpower relations are as peaceful as we have ever found them since the Second World War. Looking back, the Cuban missile crisis posed the clearest possibility for nuclear war in the post-war era. Looking forward, we face the clearest opportunity to reduce the risk of war since the dawn of the nuclear age.

The President has described our purpose as moving beyond the peace of armed camps to the peace of shared optimism. Earlier this week, I described our strategy for achieving this goal through a prudent search for points of mutual advantage. Today, I want to talk in more detail about one of those points: arms control.

Arms control can lend a strong hand in building an enduring peace, but arms control does not proceed in a political vacuum. Let me be clear: We compete militarily because we differ politically. Political disputes are fuel for the fire of arms competitions. Only by resolving political differences can we dampen the arms competition associated with them. To follow Clausewitz, if war is the continuation of politics by violent, military means, arms control is the search for a stable, predictable strategic relationship by peaceful, political means.

That is why our times are now so full of promise. Over the last forty years, arms control played only a marginal role in shaping the U.S.-Soviet security relationship because our political differences were simply too wide to allow sustained progress. Western strength and Western unity sustained deterrence throughout this period when we all lived in the shadow of opposed values and conflicting purpose. Now *could conceivably* perestroika in Soviet domestic and foreign policy [promises to] lift the shadow. The political prerequisite for sustained and strategically significant arms control may finally be materializing. Surely the President was right when he wrote President Gorbachev in June, "We bear enormous -- and mutual -- responsibility to take advantage of the promise of these extraordinary times to improve international security."

It now appears possible to achieve goals that would have been unthinkable a decade ago, such as deep stabilizing cuts in strategic forces and parity in conventional arms in Europe. It would be folly indeed to miss this opportunity. The President and I have both said we want perestroika to succeed. But perestroika's success is far from assured. Reform could conceivably fail, and the "new thinking" in defense and foreign policy could be replaced by the old. We do not wish this to happen and are working for perestroika's success, but we must be realistic. Changes can be reversed, no matter how hard we try to see them made permanent. For this reason, we must proceed prudently.

Yet uncertainty about the fate of reform in the Soviet Union is all the more reason, not less, for us to seize the present opportunity to negotiate drastic reductions in the current threat and to constrain the military options available to future Kremlin leaders. For the works of our labor -- a diminished Soviet threat and verifiable agreements -- can endure even if perestroika does not. If the Soviets have already destroyed weapons, it will be ^{more} difficult and costly for them to try ^{to} ~~and~~ assert military superiority. And with agreements in place, any attempt to break out of treaties will serve as ^{a select} [one] indicator of ^{a reversion to} [an outbreak of] old thinking.

We must take advantage of the new political climate to consolidate deterrence at lower levels of risk. Through sound and verifiable agreements, we can institutionalize a more stable, predictable strategic relationship. ^{an improved political} [The changed] relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States should be reflected in force structures and strategic concepts. In this way, we can help to codify political progress in military reality and by doing so, underpin that progress and strengthen it.

Strategy and the Changing Strategic Environment

Before outlining the tenets of this Administration's arms control policy, I would like to say a few more words about the broader strategic environment in which arms control policy must operate. Politically, the Soviet Union is in the midst of this

revolution of perestroika, ^{and} glasnost, [and democratization.] The new thinkers understand that Stalin's system must ^{undergo substantial} change

[fundamentally] if the Soviet Union is -- as Mr. Gorbachev has said -- to enter the twenty-First Century in the manner worthy of a Great Power. To this end, the Soviet leader has done much and promised even more for political, economic, and legal reform. While ^{the problems facing him are incredibly difficult} [his reforms need to be codified, institutionalized, and made habitual,] the political face of Soviet power is being changed already.

The prospects for reform are [just as great,] even greater, in Poland, ^{and Eastern} Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and the other countries of Eastern Europe, ^{as well,} While the trends should not be overstated, the political foundations of a Europe divided by force since 1945 are crumbling away.

These great political changes are set in a time of vast technological change. Our military tools are being reshaped by emerging technologies that promise greater security. ^{or greater danger,} Advances in sensor technology, communications processing capabilities, and precision-guided munitions offer novel ways to strengthen deterrence [with fewer forces.]

Let us be careful, also, to see the darker side of changing technological realities. More nations are acquiring the capacity to make chemical weapons and to manufacture missiles.

With many of these regimes locked in continuing regional conflicts, the explosive escalation potential of their disputes is obvious.

I would add, too, that these technological changes are taking place in a time of changing defense economics. Everyone has noted the Soviet Union's compelling need to convert some of its vast expenditures for the military into domestic reconstruction. The era of rapidly rising defense budgets is over in the West, too. From the new technologies, we are going to have to pick very carefully those weapons that strengthen deterrence the most cost-effectively.

What do these political, economic, and technological changes add up to? Strategically, the world we've planned for since the Cuban Missile Crisis is increasingly distinct from the world we actually encounter. Threats to our interests are changing politically and multiplying technologically. Our capabilities are being improved technologically but constrained economically.

As our strategic environment is transformed, we will need to look anew at some of our guiding concepts and approaches. Many long-held assumptions may need to be rethought. Strategy aligns ends and means. As both shift, strategy will have to shift, too.

For example, we need to think about the future of both European security relations and the central superpower strategic relationship. Today's historic political transformations in Eastern Europe -- if suitably institutionalized -- make such reassessments doubly important. In light of the growing threat to our power projection forces and global interests posed by the proliferation of new technologies, we will also need to reconsider our strategy for Third World conflicts. *[Over the longer term]* we need to *begin* *reexamining the possibility that* consider if deep reductions in nuclear and conventional weapons, strategic defense options, increasingly powerful conventional munitions, and shifts in Soviet strategy *may* *[will]* alter our requirements for deterrence.

To cope with this changing environment, defense programs and arms control must work together. This is a prerequisite for a coherent, integrated strategy that reduces the risk of war while promoting American values. Both defense programs and arms control can serve the common goals of enhancing stability, ensuring predictability, and bolstering deterrence. As our strategy responds to changes in the strategic environment, so, too, will our defense programs and arms control positions. Together, security will be maintained.

Clearly, neither defense programs nor arms control can do the job alone. *[No remotely achievable START agreement, for* *not so* *example, can restore the survivability of our silo-based ICBMs.]* To maintain the integrity of the Triad, we will need to

rely upon the deployment of mobile missiles as a key component of our nuclear modernization program. START can reduce the Soviet threat to our forces and thereby make survivability through mobility more feasible. Without START to bound the Soviet threat, the job of ensuring reliable deterrence would be less predictable and affordable. Without the START negotiations, the domestic consensus needed to support essential modernization programs would be difficult to sustain. Thus, our force modernization and arms control efforts are reinforcing one another.

In September, I announced the President's decision to ^{left the hands} allow mobile missiles in START. Clearly, permitting mobile missiles only makes sense if the United States is willing to deploy them. For this reason, this decision is contingent on Congressional funding of our mobile missile program. Congress needs now to support START, not undercut it, by funding this program. Senator Nunn said recently that "the START negotiations face a very bleak and a very long future indeed" if the ICBM modernization program is not put back on track. This observation is quite realistic.

Another prerequisite for a successful strategy -- for defense programs and arms control that work together -- is the need for unity as a nation and as an Alliance. This follows from a simple truism: united we stand, divided we fall. We

should not tempt the Soviets with exploitable differences between the Administration and Congress, or between the United States and its allies. That does not exempt us, of course, from the need for informed debate. It is imperative that we maintain open and honest discussions about strategy and arms control matters within the strategic community and with the public at large. As we deter possible aggression, we must -- as the noted military historian Michael Howard has put it -- reassure our peoples that their defense dollars are efficiently and effectively supporting the cause of peace. An open, frank debate is the surest formula for unity. But such a debate must begin before treaties are signed if we are to bring home treaties in the national interest.

The Goal of Arms Control and the Path To It

In the interest of contributing to such a debate, I would like to move now from the prerequisites of arms control to the basic goal of our arms control policy and the principles for achieving it.

The main goal of arms control must be to reduce the risk of war -- any war. We hope to prevent war by working toward a stable, predictable strategic relationship. What do I mean by a "stable, predictable strategic relationship?" ^{Crisis} Stability requires military forces and policies such that no one can gain

by striking first. Even in the worst crisis imaginable, a crisis far more horrifying than the missiles of October, no Soviet leader must ever be allowed to believe that beginning any war, especially a nuclear war, could be a realistic option or be even his least-worst option, as a noted strategist once put it. Predictability requires that sufficient openness and transparency prevails to prevent misperception, miscalculation, and an inadvertent war -- a war no one wanted but no one could stop. The more open and transparent Soviet military affairs, the greater trust and confidence we can have in Soviet intentions.

Four principles guide our search for a stable, predictable strategic relationship. First, we seek stability through proposals to reduce those capabilities most suited for offensive, blitzkrieg-style actions and preemptive first-strikes. In CFE, we've sought to eliminate Soviet advantages in those weapons most suited to seizing and holding territory: tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. In START, we've focused on reducing the most destabilizing weapons: vulnerable, silo-based heavy ICBMs, such as Soviet SS-18s, which are suited principally for preemptive first-strikes and not for retaliatory missions. In Wyoming, we proposed banning short-time-of-flight SLBM tests, seeking in this way to reduce the capability for a Soviet decapitating first-strike. Our START proposals emphasize the relative merits of slow-flying weapons -- such as cruise missiles and bombers which are not suitable for a first-strike.

Our SDI program as presently structured also supports our emphasis on stability. Strategic defenses may be able to provide survivable, cost-effective barriers to a successful first-strike. That's why we look favorably on the decision made by the Soviets in Wyoming to de-link the Defense and Space Talks from START. This removes a key obstacle to a START Treaty while enabling us to proceed with our SDI plans. We remain committed to preserving our right to conduct SDI activities consistent with the ABM Treaty. And we will use the Defense and Space talks to explore a cooperative and stable transition to a greater reliance on stability-enhancing, cost-effective strategic defenses.

Every war has its own unique causes, but surely Thucydides had an important general point when he wrote, "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." Traditionally, arms control has tended to cope only with the first part of this equation: constraining or reducing destabilizing military power or capabilities. Now, in the second principle of our approach to arms control, we are broadening the traditional arms control agenda to deal with the other aspect of Thucydides equation: assuaging fears of aggressive intent. We are pushing to make Soviet military activities more open and transparent. The more we know and understand, the less likely our fears will be the result of misperception or miscalculation. Greater openness is the surest path to greater predictability and a lower risk of war, especially inadvertent war.

The President's Open Skies initiative is the clearest example of this new focus in arms control. Openness about military forces and activities is at the heart of the talks on confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) in Europe. In those negotiations, we are proposing an all-European military exchange of data about our military forces and weapons programs. In keeping with the spirit of openness we found at the Wyoming Ministerial, we signed an agreement on notifying strategic exercises and invited the Soviets to visit our SDI facilities. And the chemical weapons data exchange will help us move toward a verifiable global ban. Defense Minister Yazov's visit earlier this month is just one of a series of exchanges that provide face-to-face opportunities to understand the Soviet military. And we've pushed the Soviets to publish a real defense budget that presents the inputs into and outputs from their defense production process.

Openness in military affairs is just part of our overall emphasis on creating open, pluralistic institutions in our dealings with the Soviets. Anyone who could hear Soviet Defense Minister Yazov talk of the increasing influence of Supreme Soviet committees over the Soviet defense complex has to be heartened by the prospect that Soviet military power may be exposed to the salutary effects of detailed and searching public debate.

Greater openness combined with force reductions will support political change as well. In CFE, our proposals will

reduce the potential not only for a Soviet invasion but for Soviet intimidation of Western Europe as well. The weight of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe will be reduced as well. Freed from the cold shadow of Soviet military domination, political pluralism and free markets should flourish more easily in Eastern Europe.

And a more predictable strategic relationship should also be less expensive. Arms control can, as the President wrote Mr. Gorbachev, "introduce predictability into military planning so that we can slow the pace of military competition." A slower competition is a cheaper and safer competition. But our desire to save money must not come into conflict with the necessity for ^{adequate strength} strategic stability and predictability.

The third principle of our policy is to broaden arms control beyond its traditional East-West nuclear focus. That's why we have broadened our agenda with the Soviets, both in terms of dealing with pressing, global arms control problems, like chemical and missile proliferation, as well as focusing on regional conflicts. In an increasingly intertwined world, a stable, predictable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship depends in part on regional stability and vice versa. Earlier, I noted the tendency for advanced technologies to proliferate to the Third World. Advanced fighters have gone to Libya, Syria, and North Korea. Over twenty states possess the capability to

produce chemical weapons. And ^{The danger of} nuclear proliferation, notably North Korea's reactor program, remains ^{very real} dangerous.

The President's United Nations initiative can lead us toward a verifiable global ban on chemical weapons. The President's proposal represents a realistic road map for progress. We will move bilaterally with the Soviets to reduce eighty percent of our chemical weapons stockpiles. We will further reduce ninety eight percent of current stockpiles eight years after the multilateral convention goes into effect. Then, we will move to zero within two years of adherence to the ban by all chemical weapons-capable states.

We realize it may be difficult to persuade ^{certain} problem states such as Libya [and Iraq] to join. But we are creating an environment where everyone will have incentives to join and costs to pay for remaining an outlaw. Export control on precursor chemicals will be strengthened, building on progress made at the recent Canberra Conference. The President has also ordered a study on sanctions to deter chemical weapons use and to punish violators of a convention. States that use or produce these weapons of horror must know that they will pay a price for their inhumanity.

Our fourth principle is that verifiable, ratifiable treaties can help institutionalize a safer world. The President wants to reduce the risk of war permanently, not

temporarily. We want to see weapons destroyed, not merely removed. We want to negotiate agreements that can endure.

Verification can ensure the treaties we sign are doing their job to institutionalize a safer world. Because of the primacy of verification in this Administration's approach to arms control, our negotiators have already proposed data exchanges and trial verification measures that would be implemented even before the agreements themselves are concluded. Such measures in START and in chemical weapons will help us build confidence and gain practical experience that will facilitate the conclusion of sound, verifiable agreements. [A sustainable and enduring arms control process also means avoiding limits, for example on sea-launched cruise missiles, that would create unmanageable verification and compliance problems.] *we are on chemical*

Neither have we stood still in pressing the Soviets to comply fully with agreements already signed. In September, President Gorbachev informed the President that the Krasnoyarsk radar would finally be destroyed. We welcome Moscow's step to come into compliance with the ABM Treaty.

A Realistic Path to Risk-Reduction

These four principles of a more stable, open, broader and less reversible strategic relationship offer a realistic path to a lasting reduction of risk. In April, I said that unlike

the last forty years, the task before us today is more complex and nuanced. It has become less susceptible to the grand gesture, the single solution or the over-arching doctrine. It is a path best travelled by steady steps that build on one another, rather than grand leaps that are often as not undone. ^{reference} In START, in CFE, in all our negotiations -- we have made fair, responsible proposals designed to find enduring points of mutual advantage. The Soviets have said yes to much of what we have proposed. Now, we have rolled up our shirt sleeves and set to work together to put principle into practice. The President wants real progress made permanent, not just propaganda points.

We should be clear about the task ahead. We are not on the verge of a Perpetual Peace in which war is no longer possible. We cannot dis-invent nuclear weapons nor the need for continued deterrence. Nor can we [completely] eliminate Soviet-American rivalry. But that rivalry does not require that we stand ^{constantly} on the brink of Armageddon [as we did twenty-seven years ago this month.] Peace need no longer hang solely on Winston Churchill's "process of sublime irony...where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."

Deterrence need not rest only on a delicate, technical balance of terror replete with recurrent crises. Opportunity invites us, instead, to move beyond containment, beyond the

Cold War, to a new strategic relationship based on a sound political footing.

A new relationship in which the capabilities and incentives to attack first are removed. A new relationship in which Soviet military power is open to the naked eye, not just satellites in the sky. A new relationship in which all the peoples of Europe are free of military intimidation. A new relationship in which verifiable treaties lock-in a lower risk of war. And a new relationship in which arms control aids our people in turning the seeds of war into the fruits of peace.

This is the superpower relationship we seek.

Thank you.

ESSAY | William Safire

Baker's Four Blunders

WASHINGTON
At Karl Marx U. in Hungary, President Bush displayed his competence in enunciating a policy of daring prudence; meantime in the Middle East, the Bush State Department has displayed a depth of professional ineptitude not seen in seven years.

The foreign policy of the United States is to bring about the free election of Palestinian leaders to negotiate peace in the disputed lands. But Secretary James Baker and his ham-handed aides have undermined that goal.

Blunder 1: After Israel's coalition Government put forward the free-elections plan, Arabs refused to cooperate; the P.L.O. in Tunis does not want to share power with the Palestinians on the West Bank-Gaza scene, and King Hussein does not want Palestinians getting in the election habit.

Rather than put public pressure on Arab dictators, Secretary Baker gave the slippery Hussein license to obstruct; rather than set a deadline for decision on the P.L.O., Mr. Baker rewarded P.L.O. intransigence with higher-level contacts.

Blunder 2: To establish tough-guy credentials, the Secretary made his classic "no Greater Israel" speech, which signaled an outcome of negotiations patently unacceptable to the majority of Israel's strongest party.

The result of this unhelpful harangue (in diplomingo, unhelpful means "foolish" and counterproductive means "really stupid") was easy to predict: a revolt by the Sharon-Levy-Modai right against the centrists led by Prime Minister Shamir.

The only people who did not see what such posturing would cause were Baker acolytes too young to remember Hitler's "Greater Germany" claims. Sure enough, Arik Sharon seized on Secretary Baker's "no Greater Israel" provocation to confront Mr. Shamir in the Likud party conclave. To remain in power, the Prime Minister was forced to swallow party guidance that would deny the withdrawal Mr. Baker would impose.

This delighted Arab rejectionists, who promptly used the hard line to justify their refusal to submit themselves to the will of the Palestinian people. The toughening also delighted Labor's Shimon Peres, who wants to bring down the coalition Government and start all over.

With extremists happy and centrists glum, it finally dawned on our Secretary of State that he had bombed his own troops. This realization that he had undermined the middle should have caused him to reassess his approach, but instead led to:

Blunder 3: Irritated and puzzled at

this consequence of his speech, Mr. Baker, traveling in the Arab Persian Gulf states, brandished this stick at the Israelis: "Does this drive us to the international conference formulation now? The answer is no... we are not at that point yet."

The key word was "yet"; the spin-control expert knew the headline would read "U.S. May Back International Talks If Israel Stymies Vote Plan."

This blustering was counterproductive, and you know what that means. Threatening Israelis with a gang-up conference, especially with its only ally already pledged to strip it of defensive depth, will stiffen already stiff necks.

Worse, this ill-considered threat provides the P.L.O. with a huge disincentive: Why should Mr. Arafat go

The meaning of 'counter-productive.'

along with any election plan that might produce Palestinian rivals, when Mr. Baker hints the P.L.O. can get an international conference to put the Arafat crowd in power?

Blunder 4: In the agonized aftermath of the terrorist attack — publicly approved by the P.L.O. — on a bus, killing 14 civilians and injuring 7 Americans among others, the State Department categorized this as "a tragic incident" and refused to condemn it for what it was — a terrorist attack. Grudgingly, days later, still worried about upsetting Mr. Arafat's followers, State acknowledged that this indeed came under the heading of terror.

Excuses exist for all these blunders: State hoped the P.L.O. would be shamed into elections; Mr. Baker's speechwriters were naive; it was a hot day in Oman and the traveling Secretary blurted the wrong thing; he was overseas and the State spokesman in Washington was devoid of guidance. Alibis abound.

Mr. Baker is now thinking of sending his deputy, the ailing Lawrence Eagleburger, to Jerusalem to try to talk Mr. Peres and Mr. Sharon out of bringing down the Shamir Government. Mr. Eagleburger may be chosen partly because he was recently denounced by Yasir Arafat, which makes him our only diplomat with Israeli credibility.

If the Bush Administration cannot offer more competence in carrying out its own policy, perhaps it should step back and let Israelis sort out their leadership by themselves. □

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/23

Brunt

Any letter that
goes out I hope will
include ~~a~~ a statement of
full support for my speech.

J.P.M.

Save
B



United States Department of State

The Secretary of State

June 20, 1989

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: JABIII *JAB III*

Bob Dole came up to me after this morning's meeting and said "Why don't you appoint a Republican?" We probably made a mistake inquiring, but with this reaction are you still interested in going forward with Woolsey?

Alternatively, do you want to consider him for the CW job since Cheney has a problem with Harrison?

Please call me about this at your convenience.

DECLASSIFIED

PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 3/5/24

MEMORANDUM

JUNE 19, 1989

TO: SENATOR DOLE

FROM: DAVE SMITH

SUBJECT: JIM WOOLSEY

Jade West of the Steering Committee has polled about ten offices and gotten comments ranging from "Who is he?" (which, I guess, means he's not a big name, if that is what the President wants), to "not another Democrat" to "bad news."

That said, Jade found no one who was going to fight over it. Woolsey brings a lot of snarls, little action. The administration can have Woolsey if they want him, but it won't do them any good with Republicans up here.

Some alternatives: General Edward (Shy) Meyer, former Chief of Staff of the Army; and senator Mack Mattingly, Deputy Secretary-General of NATO.

Beyond that, they could appoint an expert deputy like Phil Karber or Lynn Hansen and turn to someone like Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Chuck Lichenstein, or Alan Keyes for the top job.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
14. Draft Cable	James A. Baker to Brent Scowcroft Re: For Secretary Baker (2 pp.)	7/7/89	(b)(1)	C

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
 (b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
 (b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
 (b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

mtg w/ P
occurred
on 6-14-89
5:15-6:35
in gone

APNSA Has Seen

June 9, 1989

General --

I talked with Joe Hagan about an hour meeting w/Baker, Cheney, Herres and Gates sometime early next week w/a follow-on or preceding 15 minute meeting w/Cheney et al to present his Defense Management Report.

If we schedule it for Wednesday, June 14 -- it will be at 5:00 but it will mean we bring the President back to the office after he has been at the Residence (he has a reception at 4:30 for 30 minutes). It will also mean we keep the President late. Normally they do not schedule anything for him after 5:00.

OR

We can wait until Friday, June 16 and do it in the afternoon before the President goes to Camp David.

We need to do it earlier in the week so let's ask for Wednesday. I will advise the President so he will know we are having the meeting.

Let's do the Defense Management Review portion

Before _____ After ☒ _____ } *whichever is easier.*
It can wait until Friday ☒ _____

Florence

Re Bob Gates in
scowage PUT mtg w/ President
5:15 PM Wed. 6/14/89
in Residence



United States Department of State

The Secretary of State

4/13/89

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- EYES ONLY

NOTE FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM:

JIM BAKER

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J.B.M.", written over the printed name "JIM BAKER".

I thought you and the President would be interested in seeing these summaries of two cables which have just come in indicating that Egypt and Jordan will work with us to convert the proposal for elections into a political dialogue that might make progress toward peace.

APNSA Has Seen

DECLASSIFIED

PER DOS WAIVER, November 6, 2015

By SS NARA, Date 3/5/24

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
15b. Summary	Re: Summary (1 pp.)	4/12-13/89	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

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 (b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
 (b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

SECRETARY BAKER MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

January 25, 1989

* Korean stop - okay to go to Blue House

-- HAK trip report - Saturday meeting

-- Taiwan Meeting

* Bill Draper

Fitzwater - FMLN
- Trade Sanctions
- Shultz

Taiwan - raise in Chinese bilateral

WPA - Rostow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
16b. Handwritten Notes	Re: Baker Meeting with President (1 pp.)	1/25/89	(b)(1)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed: 8/28/2009	OA/ID Number: 91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #: 2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #:	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
17. Note	Re: For Secretary Baker from General Scowcroft (1 pp.)	9/14/91	(b)(1)	S

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1990

Dick and Brent,

The attached from a morning intelligence summary makes the point that I raised at our last breakfast -- basically that unless the U.S. can lead, through a U.S. initiative or otherwise, we run the risk of substantial deterioration of support for COCOM. Thus, we should try very hard to get a U.S. position without having to await the completion of a long, drawn-out study.

The greatest threat to rebuilding a consensus for an effective COCOM regime could be a gridlock or stalemate in developing our own position.



JABIII

Attachment -- ~~Top Secret~~/Exdis/Codeword

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2010-1169-MP
MM 12/12/2016

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
18b. Analysis	Re: Politics Takes Command (1 pp.)	1/19/90	(b)(1)	TS

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Scowcroft, Brent, Collection
Series: Trip Report Files
Subseries: Baker, James A. III Trip Report Files
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Baker, James A.

Date Closed:	8/28/2009	OA/ID Number:	91164-001
FOIA/SYS Case #:	2009-0275-S	Appeal Case #:	
Re-review Case #:		Appeal Disposition:	
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:		Disposition Date:	
AR Case #:		MR Case #:	
AR Disposition:		MR Disposition:	
AR Disposition Date:		MR Disposition Date:	

RESTRICTION CODES

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 (b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
 (b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information