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OA/ID Number: 25863
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Folder Title:
Notes 1/5/72 - 11/30/72

Stack:	Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:
G	5	1	5	4

January 5, ¹72
~~1973~~

Secret

JFK
secret
personal

Bush - Mitchell 1-5 ¹⁷ 5-6

Texas Gov. race

- 1 Connally got Barnes off Tower
- 2 " put together big Texas effort for R.N.
3. Better not have strong race
4. Don't want Governor
5. Clean cut guy - to win primary then if lose come to R.C.
6. Barnes clean
7. Smith trying to get Barnes
" " " Connally
8. Tower - Nixon interests identical
9. Agree:
G.B. talk to Tower
then call Willetford.

10 AG commit = Willetford prop off vs R.N. - G.B. put Mitchell at case on this

11. Discuss Clements -

- a) Mitchell stop Beaumonts -
- b) not solve right wrong thing.
- c) asked questions about Clements finances

12. Leah - Ind - Pak -

- a) Low level - can't prosecute
- b) transfer case -

Secret

②

Rita Howard -

"CB feels bad - let them down"

AG - "Nixon feels a dual good job"

I explained to AG that
welder blame centered in NY

(Rita distorted the position -

number how should say -

"they want to get you"

Don't get me out of the

Turned fairly early in an AG
people from USSR

3 HHH found Nixon now work
for RN - Go to hotel cut to
Leon Hess - AG follow up.

Mittell + CB - like it??
ready to come back in
73 777

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: January 24, 1972

SUBJECTS: ROLE OF UNITED STATES IN THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM'S VIEWS ON
THE UNITED NATIONS

PARTICIPANTS: PRESIDENT NIXON
SECRETARY-GENERAL WALDHEIM
SECRETARY ROGERS
AMBASSADOR BUSH
AMBASSADOR MOSBACHER

The Secretary-General, after welcoming remarks from the President in which the President stated his continuing support for the United Nations, filled the President in on his major problems and what he planned to do about them. He discussed his program for streamlining the bureaucracy and talked about the needs for bailing out the funding. He stated that those who caused the deficit would have to do something about it and he had already discussed this with France and Russia; but of course he would want help from the United States. He made a pitch for advance payments and said that if that wouldn't work perhaps the United States could pay its full assessment in July thus alleviating the \$24 million crisis that would be coming up in June. The President indicated that he thought it would be difficult to get advance funds but perhaps we could pay our assessment in full. He asked Secretary Rogers to look into this.

The Secretary-General filled the President in on the Middle East situation explaining the Jarring Mission to see President Senghor and President Ould Daddah. The Secretary-General indicated that he was grateful that the information on this mission had not leaked out.

Secretary Rogers spoke up and told the President the Secretary-General had been concerned about leakages ala Jack Anderson. General discussion continued on this. The President assured the Secretary-General that he had total confidence in Ambassador Bush and that if he would call Ambassador Bush, the Ambassador could arrange for him to see the Secretary or the President if necessary. He told the Secretary-General that he was aware that too much U.S. influence would be detrimental, that the Secretary-General would have to be neutral and firm, but that we wanted to have the channels such that he could take his case directly to our top leadership.

Secretary-General Waldheim told the President that if the United States did not stay active a vacuum would develop and other new leadership would try to assert itself in the United Nations. The discussion of Peking and Moscow battles ensued.

In conclusion the President offered his continued support for the United Nations and in very positive and emphatic terms. Waldheim seemed grateful.

Additional thoughts:

The President filled the Secretary-General in on the problems we had with the Congress in terms of additional funding. The President brought up his idea about the U.N. meeting around the world from time to time (General Assembly or Security Council). A short discussion ensued about the African meeting of the Council. The President pointed out to Waldheim that when his cabinet met outside of Washington it got great attention and brought much more interest to cabinet meetings than if the meetings were held routinely. Waldheim raised the question of funds and the President pointed out that of course these would be necessary but the host country should contribute. He made sure he was not pushing this on the Secretary-General but he did think it was worth considering.

There was also a discussion of the UN role with refugees. The Secretary-General said he felt that there was a massive role for the United Nations in refugee problems. He did not make a direct pitch for funds but said he did want the support of the United States. The President indicated that this was a very useful role for the U.N. to be playing. Waldheim, at the opening, mentioned press criticism of him but he wanted to assure the President that he was going to be "active". The President brushed off the press criticism and told the Secretary-General not to worry about the columnists.

There was no discussion about filling the top post at the Secretariat.

AFRICAN TRIP - FEBRUARY, 1972

Zambia - President Kaunda - we met with him for some thirty minutes. He is a warm, amiable man. He is very black, medium size, has some nine children. He looked far older than his 45 years. He was very friendly to me, gave me a fairly long statement in very tolerant and understanding tones. They wished the United States could do more, wished we could be more helpful to the freedom fighters. He did not touch on the Crowe mission. He is not nearly as uptight as many of the ministers we met but he was very concerned. An example - he mentioned going down the river in a canoe on a continuous journey. He and many other African leaders have a question of whether the canoe can continue its journey or whether it will be upset, given its troubled waters of racism.

I told him the United States was definitely concerned, that when we talked about peaceful change, we meant both peace and change, that we were not in favor of the status quo and that our move in Portugal was in no way a condonation of racism. Rather it was a commitment to freedom that we had to make.

In the meeting with the For. Minister of Zambia, Mudenda, we had a long and much more detailed discussion. He established the point that his priorities were: Portugese colonies, Rhodesia, South West Africa. He felt if the pressure could be taken off the Portugese colonies then it would be much better. Both he and all the others I talked to in Zambia realized that South Africa is "the toughest nut to crack". One can't help but be tremendously concerned in these talks about racism and colonialism etc.

It is all around you in these governmental levels, although here is another place where I am told the people just don't care that much. Then we talked about economic cooperation. He preferred to call it that rather than aid. He is very critical of the United States for not doing more on

these political questions.

The press conference at the airport coming in was predictable - the questions raised were drone. The questions of why the United States didn't do more, Rhodesian resolution at the UN -- there had been a story printed on Nairobi down here saying that I had favored dialogue between the southern part of Africa and South Africa on the question of Namibia. What I had actually said was that we strongly support the UN resolution that set up communications between the Secretary General, the Committee of the Security Council and the government of South Africa. I made the point very clearly at the airport press conference. And lo, the next day the headlines -- distorted what I said, again emphasizing the dialogue between countries. Dialogue has become a big catch word because of Houthouet-Boigny's initiative (Pres. of Ivory Coast). In my own private view it makes a great deal of sense, but it's a trigger word here for Uncle Tom or status quo. I pointed out this inaccuracy to the Foreign Minister after our talk, and at our lunch in exchanging toasts I made this point very clear again.

The Foreign Minister requested that we have another press conference Thursday afternoon. I didn't see much point in it but he kept insisting. After the visit with the President and others we went out and had the press conference. It was nothing but a political harangue lead by the government spokesman. Most peculiar arrangement. Our ambassador told me that normally he had been friendly and certainly silent at these things, but he kept bringing up the most difficult South African problems. For example, I told him that we

avored peaceful change, and he asked the next question - if Africans are killing Africans even then would not the United States send troops. It was a very provocative questioning. Mainly done by the government spokesman. Again questioning our role in Vietnam. In everyway trying to make the United States look bad. Quite a contrast with meeting with the Foreign Minister - exceptional contrast with meeting with the President.

It is interesting how in private people will take one line whereas in public do something entirely different. Needless to say the Zambian government is not on very friendly terms for they have been trading with Rhodesia for years - they're not on firm ice - and have stirred up their trade last year due to a shortage of maize.

Wednesday - visit to Botswana - Chobe National Park - very interesting. Crossed over the quadra-point - near the Caprivi Strip - an area that causes us great trouble. In Botswana the Minister of the Interior came across as a most sincere and kind, articulate man. He frankly faces the problems of Botswana, dying to have the road come in from the North so they can have an exit from their country other than through South Africa and Rhodesia. All in all he was the most persuasive. Botswana is a terribly poor country.

They have no counter-part funds. They have no means to solve their own problems. They need a \$12 million loan to help them with this road that means so much to them. It is something I want to strongly recommend when I get back.

Our Ambassador Nelson was there at the border to meet us. We were observed closely by the Rhodesian and South African troops who stood only 10 yards away from us - taking pictures, looking through spyglasses as we crossed the river, etc. At one time they fired shots at the ferryboat from Botswana to Zambia.

Zambia is a land of contrast. They can eliminate dissent and political freedom of those that oppose them and yet they give us lectures on establishing freedom on racial basis in the south. We don't mention this but maybe we should publicly. It is annoying for the United States to get constantly lectured on what the United States should be doing about guaranteeing freedom by countries thousands of miles away who have yet to perfect their own political processes to guarantee even much less freedom than our country has. It is a great exercise in keeping one's temper, and yet one cannot question as one looks at apartheid and the police methods in South Africa and Rhodesian South Africa that one must be tremendously concerned. But the nasty question lingers on. What should the United States do about it?

Visit to the UN projects - I am still convinced much more can be done in the way of communication. Some of the projects we saw - fisheries, vocational schools - seem to have a good spirit, but the question is how much poverty they are solving, what are they doing, is the educational institution preparing the people for technical jobs - welding, plumbing, etc. All their people get jobs - which is certainly a step in the right direction.

Comments on the United Nations - I visited at length with Robert Gardner at the Economic Commission for Africa, then with UN Resident Representative in Sudan, Mr. Cappalletti, saw several projects in Kenya, visited with all the local UN agency heads in Zambia and visited with Mr. Renart in Zaire. The UN is apparently doing 'some good' but I have this overwhelming feeling that it needs more co-ordination.

The Economic Commission for Africa makes tremendous studies. Some of the UN people question the data it uses. When the studies are complete both the UN people and the ECA people admit that the studies are not used fully.

All the field people seem to agree that there needs to be more cooperation at the higher levels of the agencies. The agencies operate independently - like a fiefdom. The local people seem to feel they can avoid overlap and the Res. Rep. system is an attempt to avoid it, but they all say that there is definitely an overlapping of functions. The problem of development in Africa is so tremendous, particularly in countries like Somalia and Sudan, as opposed to Zaire which has made some progress, that it is almost like throwing a penny into the ocean to fill it up. I am continually appalled by the difference of standards in Zaire. There are some beautiful living sections, but of course immense poverty. Once one gets out in the countryside in the Sudan, poverty is all around you all the time. Although there is some comfortable spots there as well.

The people in the United States who worry about, who are most concerned about, poverty, simply ought to take a tour through Africa - not to lessen their desire for better conditions in the United States, but to at least get the balance that comes from realizing how very fortunate even the most impoverished people in the UN are compared to their counterparts in these African countries. The per capita income in some of the countries is \$42 per year or \$62-64 per year. There is a good ECA chart on this.

The problem, of course, is that of education. When the British left Zambia there were only 100 people in the whole country who had had a college education. I expect these figures are very much the same for some of the other countries. In Zaire they would train them up to be telegraph operators and not beyond. In retrospect I imagine the colonial powers wish they had done more for education.

Zaire - Our stay in Zaire was more restful than in others. I was kind of tired when we got here but we did have an opportunity with their Res. Rep., Mr. Renart, a Frenchman who had been in Latin America and who had just come from the Sudan. He felt that we did need more coordination. He felt the Reps. could do much to screen out the bad programs, and all in all he seemed like a competent man. Many of his program (32 percent) were in education in one way or another. (I am convinced that the people-to-people exchange programs are tremendously important in these African countries. We should try to identify young leaders and have them come to the United States. There is a vast reservoir of goodwill in Africa toward the United States itself.) We had a long visit with the Foreign Minister Mario Philippe Losembe - black, formerly Cardoso. Zaire is easily the most up-to-date. Officially they are very friendly with the United States - they are very leary of China and Russia. President Mobutu runs a tight ship and our ambassador pointed out that this is the only place where the soldiers saluted the American Ambassador's car whether his flag was flying or not.

We got to sit in the ambassador's residence and look across the Congo at Brazzaville, a Peking-dominated country where we have no influence or representation at all. A couple of good tee shots across the river and there one would be. In the Congo the citizens are allowed to come to Kinshasa. In the Zaire system people are allowed to go to Brazzaville. But that's about the only interchange.

The Congo Cargo (B) is way behind the Zaire's. They are a radical extremist organization over there and of course they give us great and loud grief at the United Nations.

In our conversation with the Foreign Minister we touched on Southern African affairs. He was very moderate. Inside the OAU none of the Africans will speak up. And certainly when African matters are being discussed with the rest of the UN none of the Africans will speak up for moderation. But privately people like the Zairian Foreign Minister and even to some degree Mudenda and Mungai, of Zambia and Kenya respectively, are much more moderate. So much of his time is spent on matters other than the matters related to South African, Portugese and Namibian items - so much so that it is hard to realize that these men spend the majority of their time on other things.

After dinner at Amb. Vance's home I had a long, roundtable discussion with the ambassadors from Tanzania, Kenya, Zambia, etc. - a very frank exchange in which I took the offense and criticized them for not criticizing other countries, while they all felt free to blast us on things like Rhodesian sanctions. It is odd how much we agreed and how much they seemed to like one's taking the offense.

I discussed the same thing with the Zairian Foreign Minister. He felt we should indeed use more rhetoric and more name-calling at the UN when people chewed us for being the old colonialist, imperialist and accuse us. I am getting sick of hearing our country so abused. He felt we should respond in kind. He said it would be well received. My own view is that we respond too little to these outrageous charges and thus it was fun to have a very frank discussion with these ambassadors, to take the offense, and to get the feeling that at least they were listening. We have got to devise a way so that we can do this better in the UN fora.

General Comments on Zaire - Driving in from the airport the contrast from the other countries is immense. Factories, industries, labor, housing being built, "a lot going on". A stark contrast particularly with the Sudan. But even with the other countries as well.

General Observations - another thing that bothers me is that each of these African countries appears to be ruled by a strong man who by the flick of a finger can turn off constitutional liberties. And yet each of these countries from time to time assails the United States. They have criticized us as supporting colonialism and racism, but they are totally willing to overlook the fact that they themselves cannot enjoy the same civil liberties that the United States is famous for. Again it is appalling to me to be lectured by people who have so little actual democracy in practice in their own country. It would not be right to say to them "get your own house in order before you criticize" because in my view the moral problem on apartheid is appalling. But again there ought to be some balance, there ought to be some way to say: "Yes, we agree apartheid, racism, subjugation of peoples is morally wrong, but at the same time you are calling on us to do something about this. Please spend some time getting your own system in shape so that your individual citizens will be accorded the right to protest, the right of freedom of speech, the right of liberty." The people in America such as the American African Committee (George Hauser group) who pride themselves on their commitment to civil rights etc. should in fairness take a look at the African system - Tanzania which is very close to Peking certainly has a dictatorial, totalitarian, ruthless system.

I have never understood how some of these liberal groups in the United States assail some dictators but withhold comments on others. The same people who are knocking the hell out of the United States for supporting their corrupt regime in Chiang kai-shek are perfectly willing to overlook the corruptness and ruthlessness of Toure in Guinea (President and Prime Minister), the Brazzaville crowd, or even of course Peking or Moscow. There is a certain duplicity here that troubles the heck out of me.

Not having seen racism, colonialism etc., though we have gotten an awful lot of propaganda on these things, and though I readily admit that it is hard to judge without having been to Rhodesia or South Africa, I am convinced that the United States must find ways to help solve these problems. The system of apartheid has got to go, and the United States should be helpful ~~without sending troops or resorting to violence.~~ Many Africans think when I talk about peaceful change, that we are not talking about change at all. I made this point very clear to the President, Kaunda, in Zambia and the foreign ministers in the various countries. We are talking about peaceful and change but sometimes they fail to realize this.

Portugal - I am determined to get a top-level military briefing on Portugal. On the surface I cannot see why Portugal is so important in the United States. If there would be some way to keep Portugal in NATO but to find ways that we would not have to deal with Portugal bilaterally, it would be great for our country. The Portugese colonies situation is aboring to all of Africa and the principles of the United States. The situation is so emotional that excesses prevail, but those who are battling against colonialism in the Portugese colonies are on the side of the angels - note - check out at the highest level our whole relationship with Portugal.

General - Africa is a continent of tremendous contrast. Ethiopia - high, cold at night, thin air, great climate. Zambia, Botswana - hot, sweaty. Zaire - hot but not unbearable, not as hot as Houston. And so it goes. I would expect one would have to come at different times of the year to be sure to understand the climatic problems, therefore the various customs in Africa. There is great beauty in Africa - mammoth elephant herds on the Botswana side near Chobe. Zaire river-farm between Brazzaville and Zaire. Seashore of Mogadiscio in Somalia - Kenya with its tremendous fertility and the beauty of driving down toward ^{Lake Nakuru} Nacooa (?). It is almost like a suburb. The commuter living in Kenya is almost like Greenwich or some California plush suburb. And so is the residence area in Zaire. The stars are bright and clear in Zambia and Botswana.

Trip Notes

~~Ann. Justice~~

Ethiopia

Rosemary
212 573-6564

JK
Notes
Trip
type

Feb, 1972

HIM - old - whisper
visit very formal. Amharic -
Fom Mria translated. Men of
palace sat in - Adain. G-13 enter -
bow (leave - arrive)
HIM Talked about peace - League of Nations
very unsubstantive.

Eth - candy of contrasts - Great poverty
vs. Hilton, OAU hall, palaces - one
aware of soldiers and police - maybe
some of this due to security for security
Arrangements - fantastic, red 230's,
Sec. officer in each car, on each floor,
along the way, at OAU etc.

The contrasts drummed home -
Embassy spectacular compound with
Tooth (P) - view - down into a valley with
hill beyond - but here just is at Hilton
hovels, huts, tin shacks - poverty -
Liberation movement asked to "behold" -
one wonders what future will hold

The Sudan

now Arab - then African
Egypt ambivalence - great concern on
Middle East
No US stay - stir at our plans

(2)

~~copy in~~
 President - young, great smile -
 more concerned Arab issues than
 African - long discussion of M. East
 suggest we talk to Qaddafi - suggest
 Q must move out - Communists into
 USSR's intentions - felt Q would back
 interim plan if USG assured him
 of support for 2+2 - insisted Q
 could control liberation volunteers -
 wanted USG approach Saudi, Kuwait,
 Pres. had just visited Q for 10 hrs.
 insisted we sat in felt Q wanted
 interim solution - Palmer in Libya
 just mixed whole idea

long meeting (dinner) with Khalid.

impressions: concerned Arab problem - M. Govt
 like US people (place casual
 large & favorable still)

"Go thru motions on S. African

issues -

I mean problems of development
 roads, education, employment - start from
 scratch - backwards in so many ways
 yet leaders - reasonable to talk to, articulate.
 Discussting lunch with ex. sr. officials
 ex - for him. BX 3 time amb London -
 all somewhat critical of Pres - not
 disloyal - very plitioptical - very

bright - remembered we a way long talk
with El Zayats. fatalistic in a way
"who wants to be a martyr"?

With small change the US could

help immensely

Agriculture - turn beef non-meat

"property" aspect -

Health - ugh.

Schools - beginning only

Contrast between their teacher

school and number school in Zayats

and

Exposure in Turkey.

I liked the student - the number in

with etc.

Depressed by conditions - animal

markets "ugh -

Want better relations but Mid-East want

to reform

Harid - intelligent, fair, practical

by ORK, near market, market a little fragile.

an "intellectual measurement" by them

intellectual -

Cut Moore - come on strong, a little over

eager, set up great schedule - needs a

little more control or class

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	CLASS.
01. Redaction	Personal Notes - United Nations (Africa Trip Notes) Redaction of part of paragraph (1 pp.)	02/1972	C	
COLLECTION George Bush Personal Papers United Nations File				
FILE LOCATION Notes 1/5/72 - 11/30/72				
			OA/ID Number	25863
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Kenya

For Min. Mungai -



The next day an unfavorable report in paper directly reflected his point of view on "dialogue" - other points - He smiled a lot but was clearly anti-us

Mungai - not pro U.S. -

V. Pres. Moi - a busy, busy man - not particularly substantive talker - but interesting
Petitioners stand outside office to come in.

I compared with Kenya vs. Sudan on state of development - contrast is striking.
Kenyatta was away at sea shore.

Paula McIlvann - as with Moore - felt that had excellent talents of top leaders
Both counted on to sporadically as did

Troxell in Nairobi -

Odera - Fore - gave me dinner, very warm personal friendly talk + warm introduction -

Feeling of friendship between countries
McIlvann - social friends - nice - thought for in every way -

Less detailed than Troxell - 10

Lusaka

Troxell - into zone - able strong
walking encyclopedia. Socially no McIlvaine,
very able, knows Africa well

Mission black PAO ^{Bob} Dumas - very impressive

Botswana -

The road project

"getting out"

link North + South

12 million ~~more~~

great politics for RAN -

good for relations Botswana + Zambia
determination to "help selves"

Munster Segokgo's emphasis on
development - caught by OAU - must deal
with S.A. - Rhod etc - very reasonable
man -

Strong recommendation on road
good for RAN with courses etc

May 16, 1972 - I called on Minority Leader Gerald Ford on Michigan, Speaker Carl Albert to discuss with them the 25 percent problem.

Both Ford and Albert felt it would be difficult to amend the appropriations bill on the House side. Neither of them is for legislating the 25 percent. Ford felt it would be better to have moderates on both sides preferably on the appropriations committee offer an amendment. I mentioned that maybe we could get Derwinski and Zablocki to do this, both members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Ford thought this was a good idea. Albert did not have any specific suggestions as to what we might do although he was opposed to legislating the ceiling.

Prior to this I talked to George Mahon, Chairman of the Appropriations Committee and Al Cederberg who was ranking at the time.

Frank Bow is out of town. I also contacted Ed Derwinski.

~~I had three talks with Clark MacGregor about this and sent over a~~ strong letter hoping that he will get the President to authorize it.

The State Department put out a good statement and Secretary Rogers sent a strong petition to Sen. Allen whom I have also written.

Macomber's office is working on this, having talked to Meyer about this matter on the 16th. I previously had discussed with Mailliard, and Morgan, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I also talked at length with Mel Levine at the National Security Council who is on the program. I talked to Sherm Lloyd, Frelinghuysen who tried to send out a letter to the colleagues trying to amend the bill.

The problem is to see that the House authorization bill is not amended to include the cut. The Committee beat back the cut 11-10 and so I have talked with Cong. Lloyd and will talk to others to see that the bill not be amended.

May 18, 1972 - Re defeat of 25 percent ceiling

9:00 a.m. - I talked to Al Haig - urged that the White House give out a statement. Haig seemed inclined to go along with this. He would talk to MacGregor. Derwinski has agreed to handle the amendment. The bill was unamended in the authorization but now we are hoping that it will get through today on the appropriations side. Haig will instruct MacGregor to get a statement up there so Derwinski can get moving on this.

There was a good editorial in the New York Times. It was written by Jim Brown and assisted by Tom Lias and Stottlemeyer.

Talked to Waldheim last night - May 17th. He agreed to make no statement until he heard from us. I discussed the matter with Johnie Burns who said he would check around - the State Department had called him.

Discussed the matter with Sonny Montgomery who told me about Bill Dickin-son's amendment to set the ceiling at 15 percent.

JK
feb

6-26-77

GB - Holiday.

GB personal
file -

no copies

no type -

SECRET

Report to Hairy & conversation
with Syg. 7PM 6-23-72.

White House - General Hairy - 6 PM

Syg handed me aside
showed letter from man,
in Internatl Agency, friend of HK,
friend of Ho Chi Minh - reliable,
same man talked to us about
before -

"Great human disaster"

Man talked to Dep. Rep in Paris.
Banking very serious.
causing earthquake affect on dams.

Man says Grop had misjudged = ~~was~~.

1. expected uprisings
 2. "poor fighting AR"
 3. "no U.S. reaction due to protest"
 4. didn't expect isolation from
P.R.C. - U.S.S.R.
- = Nixon to hit em.

Now want UN to intervene since
"Big Powers have hit em".

resumer
"Stop bombing - talks."

SECRET.

GB personal file

GB tell Syg. 2

No ~~hold~~ as in days before
 it have been balanced - offer
 good offers - they were dem-
 mure about it.

Syg says "They want statement on bombing
 from me - I will not make it."

Harry = They know all they have to do is
 blink - will be at table

They trying anyway they can to
 get pressure on us.

Al feels whole approach to
 Syg is a "stop the bombing now"

They know how to get message to
 us.

This is world-wide campaign.



UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING,
PER E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.3 (C)

June 14, 1972

TO : Ambassador Bush

FROM : John W. Koehring (JWK)

SUBJECT: Population

SECRET
NOTES
ON BACK

1. On March 22 we delivered to the SYG an aide-memoire conveying our views on certain aspects of preparations for the World Population Year and World Population Conference -- both in 1974. Ambassador Phillips spoke briefly with the SYG regarding these views and Messrs. Kitchen and Koehring briefed Muller and de Seynes.

2. Prominent among our points were:

1. The hope that the SYG would announce both the Year and Conference in a suitable-fashion at an early date -- preferably not later than June 1972; and

2. that the SYG would appoint a prominent world leader or figure to serve as a senior coordinator to the SYG for preparations for the Year and Conference (it is hoped that such an individual would lend prestige to the events and, as an important practical matter, be the outside man and persuader).

3. Since our aide-memoire the ECOSOC has passed a resolution requesting the SYG to make such an announcement; take such steps as may be desirable for the attainment of the objectives of the Conference and Year (e.g. the world leader we have suggested); appoint an ASYG for the Conference within the Department of Economic and Social Affairs; and designates the Executive Director of UNFPA as having responsibility for the preparations for the Year.

4. We continue to attach considerable importance to the two points from our aide-memoire cited above and on which the SYG has yet to pronounce himself. It would, therefore, be most helpful if you could, at your next meeting with the SYG, reiterate these two points and ask him what his intentions are.

Dual (?) ~~DD~~

- 1. friend Ho knows H.K.
- 2. Bush - dms

3. Earthquake

4. Dpy up in Paris.

Gap - wrong

- 1. uprising
- 2. Big Powers
- 3. no fight.
- 4. _____

This is Big Power deal -

indications want U.N. who look after us - (over)

For Dms
 Bush - dms
 Gap - wrong
 Earthquake
 Dpy up in Paris

Dams -

stop bombing medicine must be serious

Great human disaster

we want syg statement on bombing - he will not make it.

Reported to HAIG

They know all they have to do is block -

There will be a table -

would make campaign.

July 28, 1972 - Bush-Waldheim Visit

In addition to Telegram 2665 I want to make the following notes for my file. Waldheim was very subdued. He was not arrogant, offensive and rude as he started out to be on my Tuesday conversation. On Tuesday when I first approached him, having been instructed by Rogers to do so, Waldheim ranted and raved that he had had great trouble with the United States on money, that he was outraged that the Secretary of State would tell him, an experienced diplomat of 30 years, what was good, quiet diplomacy and what wasn't. The thing that got him was the personal pique that he felt from the last sentence in Rogers' press release. Waldheim said something about quiet diplomacy and Rogers suggested that he follow that approach.

After his anger on Tuesday he calmed down and we had a reasonable discussion. Today he invited me over and we had a long talk in the wake of the President's speech. Waldheim pointed out he had said nothing personal about the President at all, and that yet the President had attacked him as naive. This hurt his feelings deeply. He had in no way intended to take sides. He was getting great pressure from other countries. He only flared up a little bit when he told me that he was head of a world organization of 132 countries and he could mobilize world opinion against the United States if he wanted to. He then went on to say that he had no intention of doing that. He wanted to restore good relations with Nixon. He thought that he had done so by calling Rogers and Kissinger at my suggestion, and he appeared to be very hurt and disappointed. He did have a quiet and relaxed approach and agreed that the best thing to do was to say very little and to move forward.

He pointed out that philosophically he was certainly not for communists. He was a foreign minister, candidate for president on the conservative ticket, was western oriented as I well knew, and that he would not intentionally do anything to damage the United States.

I am totally, absolutely, irrevocably committed to the view that Waldheim got into the press conference over his head, that he got dragged into the mire, that he could not extricate himself, that he did not realize the full impact of his statement, particularly in the context of an election year, and that the press reaction and emphasis really did come as some sort of surprise to him. I recall when I told him on Tuesday that we only had twelve hours to wait to see whether I was right about the reaction that he almost fearfully said, "That's right", expecting that his view would prevail, namely that this would not appear to be a great one-sided comment that he made. When the press came out the other way, with a front page story in the Times etc. he was amazed.

I don't believe he was trying to shaft the United States. I don't believe he was trying to get President Nixon in any way. He is a proud man and there are tendencies to be Prussian but in my very close personal relationship with him I see him in a different light, and I am convinced that in this regrettable incident he was simply talking at the press conference when he should have been listening.

I was curious as to how he would react today, but it was all sweetness and light, a serious attempt to make matters better, to have good relations with the US etc. He was indeed chasten and he saw in full perspective the

seriousness of what had gone before. I did everything I could to point out President Nixon's 'side' of the matter. I showed him a press clipping from a left wing paper in Vienna heralding this as a 'victory' for McGovern. I told him how these left wing groups in the country were trying to use this against Nixon and so were many of the newspapers. Waldheim pointed out that many of the newspapers had editorialized on the position that was attributed to him and that he regretted this very much. He didn't like to see the New York Times editorial for example for he knew this would make matters a good deal worse. I pointed out that that was exactly right, that the Times flayed Nixon for his remarks yet they praised Waldheim for his comments on the bombing. It would do nothing but make matters worse. I strongly urged that he not judge the Times as a heartbeat of America. I am convinced that he realizes that he shouldn't do that. He repeated a couple of times that as the editorials came out favorable to those calling for a cessation of bombing, it would damage his relations with Nixon. All in all I remain convinced that I must do everything I can to keep our personal relationship in a sound way. He thanked me for what I had done. I told him that I was sorry that there had been this public furor, but that he must understand that I support my government and the President of the United States and that I was sure he knew this. He shook his head in acknowledgement and said, "Certainly I understand this fully." I felt very good after our conversation was over and I think possibly we can salvage the situation.

September 5, 1972 - On learning about the killing of the Israeli athletes, I immediately called the Deputy Mayor Hailton. He had not heard the information. I told him about it and urged him to immediately notify the New York Police. He assured me that he would. He called me back later and asked me what the President planned to do about a day of mourning. (Lindsay was thinking of one for 24 hours - the next day.) I told him that I would check the White House and call him back. I called Mr. Newland at State Operations and asked him if he had any information on this and to start checking it for me. I called Leonard Garment at the White House. Garment suggested that we go back to Hamilton and tell him that it was too early to make a decision and to urge him to hold off until the President had an opportunity to decide. The President had been back in touch with Golda Meir, having talked with her once before. He was on the phone to her very recently on this matter. I called Hamilton back. He agreed it would be best to hold off, to coordinate activities with the White House. I reported this to State Department operations. Hamilton also asked whether the President planned to send representatives to the funeral in Israel on Thursday. I told him I knew nothing about this but would check. Leonard Garment called at 12:00. I reported this latest inquiry to him and that Hamilton had agreed to hold off until we got back in touch with him the next day. He told me that Kissinger was back and that he and Rogers were going to meet on the matter in the morning. Leonard Garment called back at 12:15 to say that Kissinger, Rogers and the President were meeting at 8:15 and that there would be a high-level statement before noon, that they were thinking of a delegation to send to the funeral, that they would immediately notify me so that I could call Lindsay and Hamilton. If I hadn't heard by 9:30, I should contact them.

very Personal
file

J-N

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library



With the Compliments of
Ambassador George Bush
Representative
of the United States of America
to the United Nations

9-19-22

Wh. House

RN, HK, WPK

To discuss GA

terrorism - protection of diplomats
African terrorism etc

Burundi -
Uganda

RN quotes Churchill - urge Guinean Ghana
more than they can digest

Jewish tax

- a) wrong on M.F. Naton protection
- b) what to do - Tants, etc.

"Pressure"

Martin Bangladesh - "embarrass China" - "GB
HK - French - down or in -

GB

person -

stayed behind -

same person matter - My Dad
has cancer - can I call Rose Ash here
& write note for you - He doesn't know -
it would cheer him.

No note needed - walked to phone
Phone - get former Sen. Prescott Bush
(any time today) prefer to get him but if
I can't I'll talk to Mrs. Bush - He's
in Memorial -

Warm, concerned, decent reaction
I thanked him - and started to walk
out - He called me back

George about the future - you must
be an important part of the next
administration. I have told all
people this

All reports from N.Y. have been
excellent.

Revised question of Conn.

"It is feared that, Kevin,
Mushell etc - I have reservations"
If its not right forget it -
how about Texas?

2 - I don't want to hinder you
now - after election want your advice -
I like For. Affairs

RN - Maybe answer is to stay
there - " " " " care
here -

flexible, open, supportive
credible -

~~More specifics~~ - Foreign policy etc

27th General Assembly - September, 1972: General Background

First day back in the office - we had our staff meeting, discussed the kidnapping of the Israeli Olympic athletes. This story permeated the whole first day culminating in a couple of talks with Leonard Garment late Monday night after the terrorists and hostages had been killed. The first day was mainly spent digging out from under mail, going over what appears to be a very hectic complicated, predictable UN social calendar for the fall. We discussed in detail the Puerto Rican issue which had been mis-reported in the press. It came out in the press that the Cubans won a big victory in the UN where the UN had declared Puerto Rico a territory, and thus subject to UN jurisdiction. This is not what happened. What happened was that a working group was appointed to look into the applicability of this. In my own view we did not take a tough enough line on Puerto Rico. To have Cuba, which doesn't enjoy one ounce of freedom to stand up and talk about tyranny and subjugation of people and be taken seriously at all is tremendously offensive to me. Tomorrow we are having a reception for Governor Ferre. I want a good strong statement. I had a long hour and a half visit with Waldheim. He went over his Peking visit. One comment that was interesting was Chou En Lai told him about Mel Laird - "At least we understand Laird. We know he does not intend to disarm. He talks about more armaments being necessary whereas the Russians are more tricky." He was impressed with Chou En Lai.

Waldheim appeared tense and irritable, when we made reference to Taiwan and these statistical yearbooks and removing the gifts from the Republic of China. He said, "It is only the U.S. Government, it was the only one, that raises these issues with me."

The same irritability and tenseness showed in Waldheim that showed at the time of the bombing of the dikes. For the most part the visit was very pleasant. I get along much better with Waldheim when I can talk to him alone and in person rather than having other people there. I whispered to him that I would like to see him at the end of the week and he agreed that he would do this. We had an approach from Dick Cavett about going on the Cavett Show with Jane Fonda. I talked to Chuck Colson on this who reacted, "Yes, we should do it but certainly not in the presence of Fonda."

I reviewed with Waldheim the SIS item (Strengthening International Security), the Middle East in which we find him compatible, and the question of reference to Taiwan in the Statistical Yearbook, and the removal of the plaque and other art objects given by the Republic of China. I am convinced that Waldheim knows that we are right philosophically, but he tried to position us on the Chinese issue as being victims of the Chinese lobby.

Dinner with Bill Buckley and the National Review people. The dinner was interrupted by many calls from the deputy mayor, Washington etc. on the death of the Israeli hostages. Buckley is a good man. He is less severe, less harsh than some think. He is a friend. Rusher is very hard line on the UN - not unpleasant about it but very strong and very unyielding. The Buckley sisters were great. Obviously there's great respect for Bill. Barbara liked Bill's wife Pat. I think the fact that Bill has a sense of humor is awful important.

Wednesday, September 6 - great time spent on security arrangements, EPS, dealing with the White House, Alex Butterfield, Joe Donelan talked to John Lindsay. Most of the day was spent trying to figure out what the UN

should do in the Munich massacre. A soft resolution could probably get through, a resolution deploring if not condemning and calling on people not to do this in the future. Israel at first didn't have instructions, but then they called back to say they did not want to have any Security Council action. Obviously the Arab countries didn't want it. I am troubled because the UN will once again appear impotent. I gave a lot of thought as to whether we should recommend to the President and Secretary that we go into the council ourselves just to express our concern even if we lost. Britain would have liked to have had an anti-terrorist statement raising the question of Ireland. I had a long talk with Colin Crowe. I saw the problem clearly because to him terrorism means Munich, but it also means Ireland. To Arabs terrorism means border acts. To Israel of course it means Munich or Lud Airport.

McGovern and Shriver called for UN Security Council action. I am curious about the politics. I mentioned this to the Secretary of State. He had not known about it. Rogers felt from the beginning that it would be difficult to get Security Council action. Apparently there were some positive noises from the White House. Fred Rendon of NSC was calling several times during the day quietly to see where we stood in our deliberations. I dealt closely with the White House, Alex Butterfield, State Department, Joe Donelan, about shaping up the EPS to protect the missions. The city put on a big public announcement about how they were protecting the missions. They responded with 26 additional posts inside and outside, and then appealed in a letter to the President, with copy to me, for 40 EPS coverage. I recommend strongly that we do something about it because it was my worry that the tip

of the iceberg is just upon us.

The problem is a difficult one because the cities have fundamental responsibilities but clearly here you have an unusual potential for emergency and I strongly recommended that EPS be sent. There is still White House-NYC hostility. Until we get it straightened out, it appears that there will be a gimmicky attempt to jump ahead of Lindsay on this issue by acting like the letter had not been received.

Had a reception for Governor Ferre of Puerto Rico and his bipartisan committee. The Puerto Rican matter really infuriates me in that there is a pondering on the part of the Committee of 24 to Cuba, a country that knows no freedom at all. Ferre brought a very distinguished group with him and later we took Ferre to the Palm, an act that had considerable significance because the Palm is a symbol of his party, evoking a large laugh from the bipartisan group. I was impressed with John Hova, our OAS ambassador, who was along.

On the social side, it is building to a tremendous, back-breaking crescendo. The appointments and schedule are unbelievable.

I got a little preview at our reception for Ferre of difficulty with Aquilino Boyd of Panama. He is a most discouraged man, melancholy, blaming the U.S. for everything on Panama, pointing out the difference between economy of Puerto Rico and the economy of Panama, an irrelevant point to make if one is commonwealth status and the other is independent and does not have the benefit of the close ties with the United States. Boyd is terribly emotional. I like him, I talk frankly to him, but he is so hooked on this Panama Canal thing. When we get in the Security Council to meet on Panama we are going to have difficulties in the future.

He expressed grave concern over Frank Bow saying that Bow had taken some very right wing stands on the Canal. I told him "judge a man by what he does, not by what he said sometime ago." It appears to me that if Bow goes along with the Administration policy we can indeed work out a difficult negotiation on the canal, because it will need people of Frank Bow's stripe in Congress to support any new treaty. Boyd was not looking at it this way however.

At the same time we had the Munich crisis, there was a high-level meeting in Tap Bennett's office on Korea. I was embarrassed to see Colin Crowe and others attending and not being able to be present myself.

Phil Habib, our ambassador in Korea, called to tell me he was most appreciative of what we are trying to do and was most pleased at how it appeared to be working out. I cautioned him against over-optimism.

There was a good deal of discussion on the 25 percent issue. I am convinced that Pete Nelson and Harrington Waterford Boe are spreading the word that we shouldn't intervene on the Hill, that they're upset because we worked hard at it. Same is true for a guy in Macomber's office I am told by Stottelmyer. This issue troubles me deeply. And if the Congress legislates 25 percent and it doesn't give us time to negotiate it, we have no chance at all to get agreed action here. I know Sam DePalma, a thoroughly decent man, is doing the best he can on this, and welcomes my support and intervention on the Hill. The story goes that there is a Waterford-Rooney appointee that is kept in there to spy etc. I am not sure it is true. He is the most negative guy I have ever met.

September 7, Thursday - Today we got approval of the EPS, attended the service of the American Jewish organizations. It is interesting how the Israeli Council talked far too long, and tried to politicize the service of mourning - a long, political speech on the problems of the Middle East. He did the same thing yesterday, and then again he did the same thing at the City Hall. It seems unfair to whip up the masses given the state of play on this very sensitive subject. The Arab Caucus had a meeting today and one of the Arabs, Amb. Abdullah, talked to me about security. I had an off the record talk with Victor Israelian of the USSR. I asked him off the record if there wasn't some way that they could express their concern about what had happened. He in his very tactful way indicated that it would be extremely difficult. Most of the diplomats will concede that the incident was terrible. None of them seem to have any view as to what can be done about it.

I saw Waldheim at the UNITAR reception and he expressed nervousness about the security in the city. He told me how Willy Brandt had called Sidke in Egypt and he hung up in his ear when Brandt asked him if he could guarantee the safety of the hostages once they got to Egypt. Sidke said, "I don't want to talk about this subject" or "This is not our problem" and hung up. Sidke is the same guy who made the very inflammatory statement at the time of the Lud Airport incident -- outrageous.

Made a demarche to Rossides on the Korean subject and also got into 25 percent. It is interesting how Cyprus represented by this older man has a very idealistic and quite impractical view of the United Nations, but it is

refreshing because it is altruistic. He talked about how the US could not cut down its support. Yes the principle of 25 percent was smart, but that we ought to then say but we will give 35 percent. It's a piddling amount of money and we ourselves had to be the ones to uphold the principle of the UN. The problem is that practical failures to the UN sully the principles, dull the image and it's not bad enough to give up, but it's not good enough to even begin to get the kind of idealistic support that Rossides understandably was appealing for.

Our briefing of the Puerto Ricans and the luncheon went well. I agreed to go to Puerto Rico to present the UN case at a press conference. As soon as I left the conference the two factions in the Puerto Rican delegation began to fight with each other about whether I should call on Mr. Colon who is running for Governor or whether I should simply be received by Gov. Ferre, the constituted governor. I obviously don't want to do anything to hurt Ferre, and I obviously don't want to get into Puerto Rican politics. When I got back to the office John Howison and Bob Immerman agreed that I not go down there. I will see what happens but I do think we have done a lousy job of explaining the U.S. position in Puerto Rico and what the UN actually did.

I am happy that General Haig was appointed to four-star general. I called him and he was in with somebody. For the first time I said interrupt him, it's not that important but it's a happy thing and I want to have something happy too.

I attended a dinner by Okla, former foreign minister of Turkey given for Ambassador Aren who was about to be posted to Peking. At the dinner was Huang Hua, Chin the deputy ambassador, Tang the UN top ranking Chinese and

Mrs. She, the ever attractive translator. The Chinese were very relaxed. Huang listened, opening with no embarrassment my discussion with Aren of the Munich incident. He did deplore it. I agonized with Tang over the fact that the UN hadn't done anything about it, and he concurred that it couldn't given the different interests. Tang gave me a good indoctrination course in how people should go out and work. He pointed out that Amb. Huang Hua, just before he went to Ottawa had spent a year working on a farm because "one can learn a lot from the people." When one goes and asks the people questions, the people are not always willing to speak up, but when you live with them for a year you can learn a great deal from them. His own daughter at 16 and 17 spent two years on a farm after she finished middle school, before attending Peking University this year at the age of 18. Madame Huang Hua was very forthcoming. Olcha gave a very long and rather detailed toast that touched on politics, such as that he was pleased that he had been responsible for establishing diplomatic relations with China, that Aren was now going to China and was sitting at the same table with the United States whose interests had not always been parallel. I will say that he also pointed out that they had friendly relations with both but they had special relations with the United States because we had protected their freedom. He made several references to the Great Wall of China and the reason it had been put up. He talked about NATO indicating that he realized the Chinese did not like it but that it was necessary to their freedom, the message about Russia got through loud and clear to the Chinese. They would laugh frequently and openly. And I have never seen Huang Hua more cordial.

Chin commented that I looked fit and very strong holding his muscles, speaking through his interpreter. I asked him if he and Huang Hua were getting any exercise. They both commented no. I indicated that I would like them to get out in the country. All in all there seemed to be at that dinner at least much more warmth than I have ever experienced from the Chinese before.

I came home to find Paula sick. She looks so little when she's sick and asks nothing. She's unselfish. Fantastic. Mother called to say that Dad is sick, that there is a pain by his heart. I have a deep worry about him. He seems instantly old, unlike his old self in many ways.

A woman from UNICEF stopped me at a reception. She was from UNICEF and was appealing to me to be for the UN University. I asked her why and she wanted to come talk about it. I said couldn't she put it in writing and she was so idealistic and so determined about it. Then I thought to myself what can it do, what will it accomplish, and it's just one more idea that sounds great but doesn't do much.

I was at a dinner last night where the guest of honor didn't get up to leave and finally at 11:15 p.m. I got restless, looked over at him, yawned, stretched, made somewhat of a fool of myself, but it broke up the party.

Friday, September 8 - another hectic day - working with Ramphul of Mauritius. He showed me some of the problems the small countries have. I approached him on Korea, they having relations with both North and South. They clearly don't want to antagonize either one of them. They are on the spot. They have supported the US in the past but it is not easy - the dilemma they are in. I think he will abstain at worst.

Israelis retaliated today on Munich and for a fleeting moment it appeared that we would have an instant Security Council meeting. We might be able to get away without a meeting. However, not likely due to the closeness to Munich and due to the fact that the Israelis concentrated on the guerrilla camps in retaliation. Most of the day was spent cleaning up an unbelievably cluttered desk, securing the schedule for the fall, dealing with the Chinese on Secretary Rogers' schedule, etc. etc.

Wednesday, September 27, 1972 - A tough day. Dad had his prostate operation, unconnected with his cancer. It was supposed to be routine, but it became that he was having complications. There was some infection, constant fever, an irregular heartbeat, blood pressure was bad. They stabilized the condition in the afternoon and Pres and I went up to talk to the doctor at length at 4:30. Doctor Beattie made clear that it was very serious. He was a very reassuring, confident and inspiring man. He pointed out that they were concerned about the lesion in the arm which could be an extension of the cancer, that they weren't sure about that. He pointed out that the tumor in the lung could possibly be extending to rub on the heart. All in all, it sounded quite serious. Beattie was very reassuring. He pointed out it could be a question of weeks or months. He said he would watch it very closely. I gave him my home phone number and the number at the Peruvian Embassy where I would be at 8:15 before going to the SYG's dinner.

I got a phone call that they said was a matter of some urgency. I got Beattie who reported that there were quite a few complications. He suggested that we be at the hospital at 11:00 with Mother. She was already in bed, but I woke her up. I told her that I would meet her there and that I loved her. I met Dr. Beattie there, and went up to see him. He was full of tubes. He was conscious though very sleepy with drugs.

He kept asking what time it was. I told him about the dinner with the Russians. His answer was, "Who picked up the tab?"

At the UN, we are off to a good start. We won the Korea vote. We won the terrorism vote. We were not embarrassed much on Bangladesh. We are off to a reasonable start on the 25%.

MEMO FOR THE RECORD - September 28, 1972 - On Thursday, September 28, 1972, Security Officer Joe Glennon, accompanied by Tom Lias, talked with Ambassador Bush concerning the personal security of the Ambassador and his family.

(Glennon had mentioned the evening before to Lias that there was some intelligence coming in which indicated that the Ambassador should take certain additional precautions.)

Glennon advised the Ambassador that intelligence sources indicated that the Black September organization was planning some new move, possible in New York, and possibly against Israelis or Americans. It was felt that because of the veto which the Ambassador cast in the Security Council, he might very well be the target of Arab extremists. Glennon pointed out that most of the intelligence was not "hard" and could not be fully evaluated. Glennon recommended that steps be taken to arrange for Dorothy Bush to be driven to school instead of using public transportation as she has been doing.

There was some discussion of the handling of this proposal and the Ambassador agreed that beginning Friday morning, he and Dorothy would leave the Waldorf together and Jerry would drive the Ambassador to the Mission and Dorothy to school. Because Dorothy has been reluctant to arrive at school in a chauffeured limousine, it was further agreed that the car Jerry would use would be one of the sedans and not one of the black Cadillac limousines.

Glennon further suggested that the Ambassador consider the possibility of utilizing personal security guards for himself throughout the day and possibly to some extent at 42-A. At this point, the Ambassador said he would like to get the advice of his friend, Richard Helms at CIA, and a call was placed to Director Helms. The Ambassador and Helms discussed the situation and Helms advised the Ambassador the the intelligence on this matter was not at all "soft" and that he was most concerned about some aspects of this and was following

one situation very closely.

The Director indicated that the Black September Organization was not as well organized in this country now as it might be, but this would get better.

The Ambassador said that he was asking Helms as a friend to give his counsel as to the appropriateness of personal security. The Ambassador also called General Haig to seek his advice on whether this was necessary.

It was also decided that the Ambassador's schedule which had been quite freely circulated around the Mission would be classified as "Limited Official Use" so that his whereabouts would not be advertised.



THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

November 21, 1972

Honorable Richard M. Nixon
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Attached is the analysis of USUN plus a few comments on State. I put them on plain paper in the event you wanted to send them anywhere.

Now, I want to thank you for yesterday.

Frankly, your first choice for me came as quite a surprise particularly to Barbara. The rarified atmosphere of international affairs plus the friendships in New York and the Cabinet seem threatened to her. She is convinced that all our friends in Congress, in public life, in God knows where -- will say, "George screwed it up at the UN and the President has loyally found a suitable spot". Candidly, there will be some of this.

But -- here's my answer --

Your first choice was the Republican National Committee. I will do it!

The treasury slot - #2 there - is an interesting job but I wouldn't really be running something -- the stamp, the imprint would and should be George Shultz'. I have deep respect for George, but that slot is not for me.

I mentioned to you "visibility" and "staying in the game". This slot does not do that -- fascinating though the work would be.

Our finance section is soon getting a new head -- Dave Stottlemyer. This will be an improvement as far as imagination goes. He should remain.

Our security chief Joe Glennon is excellent.

I will be glad to discuss, with whoever succeeds me, the whole range of personnel at USUN.

How about Anne Armstrong for this job. She's articulate, loyal, good with people, can afford it and you'd have a woman in this most visible diplomatic job. There's a lot of politics involved and she could handle that well. The administration is not a big headache in this job since the State Dept. handles so much of it.

Another suggestion for the UN Ambassador - Bill Macomber (more later).

State Dept. - some random comments:

The Middle East will be critical - Joe Sisco should be replaced. He knows the subject but at this point in time he does not have the in-depth support or confidence of the Arabs. An Assistant Secretary for the Mid-East must be considered "fair" by both Israel and Egypt. This is regrettably not the case with Sisco. I know this for a fact certain. It's not his fault, but to effectively negotiate in 1973 a change is needed there.

The Assistant Secretary for IO, Sam DePalma, is loyal, able, decent. He should be given an embassy but not stay in IO.

The Dep. Under Secretary, Bill Macomber, went to bat for the Administration on the Pentagon Papers. He is a Republican who came in under Eisenhower. He would be good as UN Ambassador. He should be given a foreign post. He's loyal.

I'll be glad to go into more detail with anyone you designate.

I believe we can fully develop this relationship on the "inside" political advisor basis that you spelled out at Camp David. I must have the personal access to you and Bob that we talked about.

To build the GOP we'll need to build it on your record; but, too, we'll need to have tie pins, endless tours through the Rose Garden, some folks to dinner, the candidate photo, etc. etc. I'll not overpress my welcome, but when Ehrlichman told me you understood all this, I felt much relieved.

John reiterated the part about "after two years -- the Cabinet". This, Mr. President, is reassuring and I must confess had some bearing (not overriding) on my decision. The main thing is I want to do a first-class job for you -- and I believe I can.

My thanks to you for your friendship and loyalty. I will repay it with hard work and loyalty in return.

My wife's initial reaction is understandable, for she is but a mirror of how the real world regrettably views politics. Most people feel it is not the noble calling it should be -- not the noble calling like affairs of state. One real challenge lies in enchanting the disenchanted young who view partisan politics with a worrisome cynicism.

But with your help maybe I can be a part of changing some of that. And in the final analysis that's one hell of a challenge.

So my initial "no" has changed after a sleepless night to a happy "yes". The shock has worn off, and Barbara will see that it makes sense. And besides, she's your biggest fan.

So I'm ready.

Respectfully,



George Bush

Herewith the comments that you asked me to submit to you personally on organization.

At the U.S. Mission to the U.N.:

The #2 man, Amb. Phillips is a seasoned diplomat, a political appointee -- first President Eisenhower's, more recently yours. In terms of complete pro-President Nixon sentiment he is not what you want. He is a Massachusetts Republican, well respected in UN circles but he is not dedicated totally to your concepts. Recommendation -- that he be reassigned abroad (he wants Geneva and would be good at it - all U.N. related) or retired.

The #3 man, Amb. Tap Bennett is a seasoned foreign service officer from Georgia. He has been here about a year. He was in Portugal and the Dominican as Ambassador. He could well run the U.S. Mission to the U.N. -- certainly he's be a skilled #2. He is attuned to the Nixon view on foreign affairs. Recommendation -- that Amb. Bennett be promoted to Deputy Permanent Representative. If you have a new Permanent Representative, he or she will need an experienced #2. Bennett would be good.

The #4 man, Amb. Zagorin -- a presidential appointee. He is our Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council. He is knowledgeable in his job, a veteran of multilateral diplomacy mainly in the economic end, but is not a strong Nixon partisan.

Our political section, headed by John Howison and Harry Thayer, is in my view a competent operation staffed mainly by FSO's. I have found them to be strongly supportive after policy has been set.

Our administrative section is acquiring a new head. The present head has been here too long.

Number 2 at State, which I realize is all but committed, would be different. I have been dealing happily, and I hope effectively, with the top international leadership. I could continue this -- arrogantly tucking into the back of my mind the thought that a) if I performed and b) if all the other panting candidates for Secretary of State dropped by the wayside -- I might get that -- a slot which in my current thinking would be tops.

The Under Secretary for Finance at State is like #2 at Treasury -- a fascinating job but not really up to the offered Treasury post. My love affair is not with State, it's with high-level policy dealings on international matters -- this UN job has that -- Deputy Secretary has it -- the Under Secretary for Economics does not.

As to the Republican National Committee -- access to you is all important, trying to gear up for the '74 elections is important, the "imprint" or "image" I can bring to the job is important. You visualize a very different role -- getting all politics out of the White House and into the Republican National Committee through its chairman. This I find really challenging. With Ehrlichman's approval I talked to John Mitchell today, and he was really re-assuring on this.

John Ehrlichman told me he raised a ticklish point with you -- I can and will of course take orders, but I'd like to retain options on the style in which to carry them out. I can be plenty tough when needed, but each person has his own style, his own methods, and if I get too far out of character -- I'll be unconvincing and incredible and this will not serve you well.

Our Chinese friends here at the United Nations are proud but not vain -- maybe I'm the same way -- proud but hopefully not to the point of vanity. To the degree you can launch this thing with some "newness", "change", etc. it would help offset the cynic's inevitable charge that we Bushes are going backwards. After talking to you and to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Ehrlichman I am intrigued with the concept of helping you on a wide spectrum of political matters.

Bob H - 11-30-72 8¹⁰ AM

Hang up! on deal

Must get on track - best way we can
Pres set Tues - Mitchell to fore
this - strong feeling not be change
"Full time, penit" etc - shld be done
now on peak of victory etc.

Pres strong pitch - "time for
execution" assume "last words"
D - argue "full time" shattered

Bushlen a few times - kept
raising it -

D "shld stay - May or June" look
like kicked out - damaging in
Kansas for credit and for funds.
H - "No interest in party or comm" -

Financial problem - rent, live,
charities - ~~case~~ goes thru May
Pres want thru Kansas deal
with Dole - "Come, now, Pres
delighted to non step down"

(2)

Robt

Dde to stay on as comm head.

Dole says "give us a little time"

Dde - Month

RM. - week or two

come back - work it out.

week thing in Post today -

agreement stay on as long as want'

Has to come from Dole (La Cannon)

only Pres, me, Dole & room

Pres renewed G-13 in meeting -

Dole "what we need"

HRT - "called Dole yesterday -

- Pres talked to G-13 - look

like it could be worked out -

- delicate thing - UN

situation - our point - in UN etc -

- can't love duck - Bush

- ME etc

- "Pres wants you back next

Wednesday - mention talk to

G-13"

③

Dole met with Mitchell
yes' day - afternoon.

Dole said talk to Bush -

Problem - from Pres. viewpoint -

Best story might help - "can
it be as it like to" -

'D be better

Pres. feels very strongly - change -
comm. meets on Jan. 18. Preside
over inaugural -

Ash see Pres - Next week

Done some checking -

Changed mind

Wants to come to agreement -

Both agreed C-13 is the man -

Needed the "attack position"

Polit. spokesman - this was existing

Pres - talked to earlier
discuss other possibilities -
entirely really as now.

RN

OB more interested in ^{UN} ~~the~~ ~~com~~
 back to other Cab. posts.

HRT - told Dole "to get"

that's what he wants

new analysis - his wrong.

to say as is bad

terrible time to make change.

a) new exec. com

b) budget

c) returns -

all need be done

HRT - not heard of Rich Ford

"who's he - who would for"

OB - Inaug. Com

OB

Try to get Mitchell - on

way to D.C.

OB

Shift gears - now - stay
 in touch HRT

Amb. Alva
 please
 talk directly
 in
 Amb. Alva
 Madrid

- special assignment
- ① Handicapped
 - ② Veterans
 - a) "still work in the pros."

RMG
 re-
 Comm
 Not
 Date - appearance
 amount toward

① Frithman
- sure -
① did it go down
②