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NOTES ON THE UNITED NATIONS

December 15, 1970 - Comments on the White House Christmas Reception on Monday the 14th. The President stopped me going through the line and commented on the Connally appointment. He said, "I'll show you the kind of guy Connally is. He wouldn't accept a job in the Administration until you had got what you wanted." I told the President that the UN assignment was the one I really wanted. I also talked to Bob Haldeman and told him I hoped that Connally would remain hitched and not try to embarrass the President. He indicated that the matter was entirely tied down. The Connally appointment was interesting. I thought that both Finch and Haldeman showed a little embarrassment, feeling perhaps maybe I wanted the Treasury and was disappointed that Connally got it. I assured them, and it is true, that I really wanted this UN post. My feeling now is that Connally will have some real headaches. I don't think he's all that good on finance. I think it's a very shrewd political move. Tower ought to be happy. The Republican troops are most unhappy about it. They can't understand picking the guy that did more to beat me than any one else. They are up in arms, but in the long run if Connally stays hitched this will be good for Tower. I would think Barnes would be against it. Connally is a consonant politician, however, so I am not quite sure how it will all end up.

I had a good reception on the UN from people like Maury Stans, John Volpe, Red Blount and all the others. I want very much to keep the cabinet side of things going. I had a good briefing from Sam DePalma,

Assistant Secretary of State. My initial reaction is a very favorable one. He is a pro. He seems quiet and well informed. His deputy for house-keeping came up and gave me the story on the mission. I talked to Cabot Lodge and Arthur Goldberg - both were very friendly and wanted to chat. I also talked to Averill Harriman. He interestingly enough spoke frankly about his reservations. I talked to Dean Rusk, who I found sick and home with a 103 degree temperature. He also has agreed to see me. It is amazingly simple to get in touch with these people and so far each one has seemed very cooperative. Averill Harriman called my mother and father and was ecstatic. I realize his eccentricities, but he is a gentleman, and he is like anybody else - he likes to be consulted.

At the White House I was pleased with the reception of such senators as Bible, Aiken, Church etc. I am hoping I will not have trouble being confirmed.

Initial reaction is that it will be very good for me to get control of that thing up there in a hurry, not to throw my weight around but make darned sure they understand who is going to be running the place. I was very pleased when Secretary Rogers called today to talk to me about one of the ambassadors who will be under me, asking what I thought about his replacement etc. and telling me that he had written Mr. Arthur Flemming who wanted to get the job and told him that the final decision would have to be withheld until I was in the position. Arthur Flemming, incidentally, was an Eisenhower cabinet appointee. I am not sure we don't need to staff it with younger people going up rather than down, but I will be open-minded on this one.

The response of my colleagues I think has been terrific. Political people seem to feel that the State Department diplomatic people need more political people. State Department people may not agree. The editors of some of these papers may not agree. Moynihan told me that on the day of my announcement he was at the New York Times giving them the pitch that the President really wanted to emphasize the UN, wanted to build it up, wanted to get somebody in there who was going to represent him etc. But then, lo, the New York Times comes out with kind of a snide editorial - not all that bad but snide. Incidentally, Moynihan called about a NATO matter. Prime Minister Heath's right-hand man, Sir Solly Zuckerman, is going to be in Washington this week and wants to get together with me on an environmental matter. This kind of thing will be very interesting.

My theory is that we can use the UN post to emphasize the positive aspects of the UN. Today there was in the Rules Committee a bill to expand the UN building and make a \$20 million commitment. I can see where we will have some conflicts with the Congress because the UN is not that popular. I think part of my job will be building up the UN in the US, emphasizing the progressive and strong points.

December 17, 1970 - I went up to the UN headquarters for the first time. People's reaction ranged from the chauffeur to the woman at the entrance - you could see they were looking me over carefully. Ted Schottke, the administrative guy, seemed amazed when I asked him to have lunch with me and T. Divine at the Links Club, but he is a down to earth

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	CLASS.
01a. Redaction	Personal Notes - United Nations Redaction of paragraph (2 pp.)	12/18/70	C	
COLLECTION George Bush Personal Papers United Nations File				
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]


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kind of guy and I was determined to early get his confidence. The woman was waiting, holding the elevator as we were walking into the building, and I glanced back over my shoulder and noticed her looking me over carefully as we got on. When we got to the 11th floor we had a visit with Yost who was waiting to go to the ending of the General Assembly. I met Chris Phillips for the first time. I also met Glenn Olds, who apparently has some personnel problems. They all seem to feel he is not in the right job and that it might be my lot to sort him out. He goes off in all directions. I met his staff. He came on very strong. He is nice and had his wife there to say hello and all this. With Chris Phillips, I think that's going to click. I talked to the political section guy and tried to convince him that I was not going to go around him or try to have all the answers myself. I had a good visit with the press guy. I have some strong doubts about the press section. Other first impressions - I talked to Mr. Rex Realand in the political section. He is an impressive young guy, eager to help to get things on the right level.

I went through the apartment which is grand - a fantastically grand looking place. I am loaded down with things to read.

December 18, 1970 - Macomber called about the first personnel problem.





My first impression is that I can really do this job in a while. I am impressed with the general quality of the people there. Their physical setup is fantastic and at this early point in time I can't wait to get started.

Afternoon of December 18 - I met with Sir Sollie Zuckerman, Science Advisor to Prime Minister Heath. Incidentally, we had a picture taken which we can send him (sent). He is interested in seeing all of the environmental matters that are scattered through NATO and the many, many other international organizations centered in the UN and this is something that we ought to try to do.

December 28, 1970 - There aren't many developments in Houston. I got a call from an assistant to DePalma in the State Department exercised over the seabed treaty. A very "Groton" talking guy whose name escapes me. Stevenson, the solicitor, whom I have known, called later and we have agreed to meet on Tuesday. The contrast was quite something.

The first guy seemed all flustered about it and Stevenson seemed rather confident that all differences would be resolved once I understood the facts. He tells me that he is meeting with Henry Bellmon and I plan to go with him. I have read Arnold Beichman's book, The Other State Department. From that it seems that one must establish the kind of relationship he is going to have. The previous mission chiefs have been very different of course, but the most successful ones have had the most direct relationship with the White House. It seems that my goal must be to assert this relationship which does exist so that it will work toward (1) keeping me briefed - NSC etc (2) attending all cabinet meetings (3) getting the channels open so that we can get the proper appointments through on time.

In Beichman's book he talked about one of the criteria being "liberalism". In reviewing the past ambassadors, this seems to be a matrix but it will be interesting to see if this is absolutely necessary in order to be effective.

One clear message - the battle between USUN and the State Department. We'll get a better feel for this as we go along.

Note - the difference between the method of operation at the State Department and the Congress is already quite clear. The Hill seems "grass-rootsier", less formal, less regimented. Maybe this is true of other bureaus as well as the State Department but the comparison is sure noticeable.

Bob Finch called today from the White House, regarding the furor

over the Jews who have been sentenced to death in Russia for the alleged hijacking of an airplane. He discussed with me whether I would be available to meet with some of the Jewish leaders who planned to be in Washington on December 30. I told him I would be glad to do this but to be very careful that nothing was done to make it look like I was trying to take over for Yost. He said they would be very careful to do this and that it would be at the invitation of the President since I was already in Washington etc. It is a fascinating new development.

December 29, 1970 - I meet with Jack Stevenson of the State Department for breakfast. I'd known him a long time ago at Andover. He is a very bright, international lawyer, formerly with Sullivan and Cromwell. The more he talked the more convinced I became that the difficulty on the seabed treaty can be resolved. There are mostly semantical differences. We then went to Henry Bellmon's office where we met with the minority counsel on the Interior Committee. Henry too felt these problems could be resolved, and he suggested a lunch or dinner for the 25th of January to talk about this.

I talked to him privately after the meeting. He didn't see any problems with confirmation at all. He told me that Pell had gotten very close with Jack Abernathy, a Big Six drilling man, and all in all seemed to feel there was no problem. He said this is one nomination where I can guarantee you there will be no problem. He agreed to be on the lookout for any trouble spots. At this early outset I think it is important to keep in touch with the Congress and with the White House staff.

Finch called telling me that Len Garment was going to handle the Jewish hijacking for the White House and that probably I would be asked to sit in with Hildebrande and/or Rogers tomorrow.

Footnote - the first of the year. The friendliness of Bill Macomber, the sound advice about the administrative assistant who can communicate with the press, who is "my man". Macomber recited his and others' experience with Dulles - that they were really looking after Dulles because they believed in what he was doing. In this connection I have talked with Tom Lias who has White House and political experience. He is very interested and I will talk further with him this week. Martin Herz, Sam DePalma's deputy, came and talked to me. He seems to have a broad foreign experience. He gave me his book the Beginnings of the Cold War which I shall read.

The pressures seem to be building and I'll bet it's going to be hard to "be oneself" in this job. The suggestions for entertaining are such. I am determined that we shall not change in the sense of getting formalized by this new job.

Seabed - I had several meetings on the seabed with Stevenson, a legal advisor whom I admire, and the staff. I was amazed at the number of people who attended the conference. There is relative formality compared to the Congress. I think we must keep Congress in touch with the UN. Chairman Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee mentioned to me that he had never been to New York. I am determined to get them up there.

Two days before New Years I met with Dr. Wexler, the National President of B'nai B'rith and Mr. Bookbinder and several other Jewish

leaders. They were fair and reasonable because the Soviets had just commuted the death sentence to the alleged hijackers, but they come on pretty strong and I can see where firmness will be required. One was a friend of Reub Askanase's. They kept insisting that they, the Jews in this country, had not been responsible for the dismissal of Yost. Evans and Novak quoted the fact that Yost had been in the opinion of the Jews "soft on the Arabs" or something like that, and the Jewish leaders over and over again mentioned to me how this was not true.

Sidelight - Maybe it's the New Year season but I have been amazed at how little goes on in the outer office where I am at the State Department. No telephone ringing, no paper work, nothing. The assistant press officer had not seen any of the clippings on my nomination which seemed a little odd to me if he was to be the international press officer for IO.

January 4, 1971 - the first day in the office. I visited with Henry Catto and decided I would look in on a bunch of assistant secretaries to introduce myself and to let them know I was in the building. There was generally a favorable reaction to this. People were very pleasant. I had lunch with Justice Goldberg who made various observations.

- (1) Be sure to get the proper relationship with the White House.
- (2) Be sure that it's made clear you're working just for the President.
- (3) Be sure that you get good staff people.

He did not have a large personal staff. He used a White House Fellow. He insisted on a large office in the State Department and was shocked at the fact that we were off in this office here that I think is pretty grand. He felt you need a full-time

secretary here in Washington. The car and the driver he felt were essential not as he put it for his own prestige but for the prestige of the job. He said you must keep good relations with the President. He told about when President Johnson came to New York and he advised Johnson to go to the UN Mission and also to see U Thant. Johnson said he didn't have time. Goldberg forcefully told him he ought to do it and finally he got a phone call from Johnson who was coming over to do it. He impresses me as a somewhat talkative fellow, quite vain but very sincere and he told me that I would have difficulty with the press, that they would be hostile to me and that they were criticizing me for lack of experience. He recited that he had had no experience in this, nor had Lodge, nor had Austin etc. He repeatedly told me that he wanted me to succeed not just for me personally but for the country. He felt it was important to demonstrate for the press that I had the confidence of the President. He said the press feel the job has been downgraded by my appointment. He thinks that a ceremony by the President when I am sworn in either in New York or in Washington would be important to demonstrate that this is not true. He talked about the job. He didn't travel too much. He did have a major hand in the Cypress dispute in helping Cyrus Vance through setting up a network of phone calls to our various capitals involved. He had cordial relations with the Arab Ambassador who gave him the best party when he left. He tried to do different things with entertaining - boat trips around the island etc. He advised inviting foreigners to play tennis, golf etc. He seemed generally hostile to the State Department, generally on guard against the State Department and its influence. He made no bones about his

difference with the President on Vietnam, certain African matters, etc. He told me he went in the hole \$10,000 a year for entertainment. He thought it was better to have the Waldorf caterer than to have a housekeeper live in (a la Paula). He was very willing to help and to have Mrs. Goldberg visit with Barbara. He was generally friendly - gave some gratuitous advice like "be yourself", "don't try to be something different", "establish they won't push you around", etc. One political aside - we discussed his race with Rockefeller - inordinate political pressure brought to bear against him through the Chase Bank - he mentioned Rocky's calling the head of City Investing, letting him know that he knew that he was Goldberg's biggest fund raiser, etc.

We want to have the President tell the head of the CIA that I should have the dope and to have the President tell the people over here. He said Johnson came over with him to the communications center and got the Secretary of State and told him he wanted him to have all the traffic and the cable. I don't know if I should do that with Nixon, but I'll find out from the CIA people.

I had a good visit with Fred Flott, discussing details at the State Department and how the system works.

I had a discussion with Tom Lias about going up to be Administrative Assistant.

January 5, 1971 - I had a long CIA briefing from Dick Helms after lunch. He is a friend and I think this will prove to be helpful. He is calm and appears to have grasp. They did not feel that an NSA briefing would be useful. It mainly deals with decoding.

I am already amazed with the bureaucracy. The mail comes back with letters to Mr. Joe Jones simply to Mr. Jones - a dozen or more of them. Rose Zamaria would have a fit.

David Lissy and Macomber will be allies and it is important to get our communications worked out regarding future appointments. There will be a lot of vacancies at the UN - the Security Council Ambassadorship is open, Olds seems in disrepute, Sam Harry Wright is light of weight, and Max Finger has been there a long, long time. The consensus is there are some darn good people in the mission up there. Most people I have talked to think the press section is weak.

January 6, 1971 - This was an intensive day of briefings, one on the Far East, one on the workings of IO, lunch with Bus Mosbacher, who told me he is being considered for Ambassador to the Organization of American States. I talked to Henry Kissinger who told me he was excited about the appointment and I would clearly be President Nixon's and his man up there. I told him I wanted to see him before I left. He was very friendly and cooperative. He is in San Clemente but will be back next week. The IO briefing was long and interesting. There are tremendous budget problems. I am already caught between the conflict of the UN budget and the realities of congressional life. When I look at the myriad of organizations I am wondering if we couldn't made the saving by pulling out of one or two of them and putting the money into the general operations - a radical suggestion.

The philosophical conviction of Latin American and African countries is "they have been had" for many years and apparently it is a very deep one. No amount of personal diplomacy can change this.

I talked to Harry Flemming about the appointment of his father as ECOSOC man and informed him that I didn't want to see anything firmed up here until Olds has been notified he is leaving. My conviction is Flemming is the wrong age and on the way down. I want someone on the way up. It may be hard to work this out. I am getting good cooperation from Macomber's and Lissy's office.

January 8, 1971 - I went to Beverly, Massachusetts, to visit with Cabot Lodge. That noon at the request of a letter from President Nixon to Stassen I had lunch with Stassen in New York. Stassen had some good, constructive suggestions about changes that needed to be made in the UN charter - voting, many states, etc. I had the distinct feeling throughout the meeting that Stassen visualized the 25th Anniversary Charter Revision with Stassen prominently involved. He mentioned that he was the only live member of the old charter draft. I kind of felt sorry for him, though some of his suggestions were obviously pretty good. I told him I would be back in touch with him and this will do. Chris Phillips joined us for lunch. I wanted to see how Chris reacted to the ideas. He was polite but somewhat cool about them, feeling that charter revision was impractical. The visit with Lodge was a good one. I was impressed with Lodge the politician. He was much more politician, much more "for the people" than I thought he would be. He talked about the job requiring political know how more than diplomatic language etc. He talked in detail about how he had tried to entertain people and make them feel at home and he did all this with enthusiasm and spark. He mentioned his

closeness to Eisenhower and how he ranked fourth in precedence. He whipped out a sheet showing me that the UN Representative was right behind the Chief Justice, the Secretary of State and the Vice President. He seemed perfectly willing to rely on the State Department but then he also seemed insistent that one retain his right to do things his own way in terms of execution of policy. He was friendly and warm and after a dinner with his wife, we went down and had an excellent discussion. He was much more relaxed and less pompous than Goldberg. He made one major substantive point - the UN has changed since his day when he, at Eisenhower's request, would challenge the Russians at every turn. He foresaw another such day "when the Red Chinese come in." He talked about this with an inevitability, but he felt this would again put the focus on the UN and make it much more important.

Friday - I had the unpleasant task of firing Ambassador Glenn Olds. There was unanimity of feeling against him from the State Department, the UN Mission, and the White House and yet no one had taken the bull by the horns to can him. Ambassador Yost told me that he had mentioned Olds' shortcomings to him and Sam DePalma, Assistant Secretary of State for IO, mentioned that he a time or two made reference to this for Olds' benefit. When I talked to Olds though with David Lissy, Assistant to Macomber, there he indicated total shock and surprise. I told him he could take plenty of time but I recognized an irreconcilable situation when I saw one and he ought to contemplate a change. He wanted to know what the charges were against him. I told him they were not specific but that door after door was closed and this we couldn't have. I don't know what the specific

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	CLASS.
01b. Redaction	Personal Notes - United Nations Redaction of 2 sentences (1 pp.)	01/08/71	C	
COLLECTION George Bush Personal Papers United Nations File				
FILE LOCATION Notes 12/15/70 - 2/8/71 OA/ID Number 25863 Date Closed 6/26/2002				

RESTRICTION CODES

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charges are but I did feel that in fairness to him he should be informed of this total dissatisfaction so that he could make other arrangements.

Heaven knows where it will go from here. I am convinced that we must

[REDACTED]

Friday we went

on with the briefings - IO for example, long, tedious, great detail but important to know.

January 11, 1971 - I was with President Lyndon Johnson. I flew down on an Air Force Convair with a large group, headed by General Schultz, going down to the Johnson Library. The unanimous reaction of the people at the Republican Executive Committee Meeting that was held on the 10th at the Crest was "Well, if it's what you want, it ought to be good", or "Are you sure this really makes sense?". "I never liked the UN, but maybe you can make something of it." They were all very nice but obviously very down on the UN.

I visited with the President. The main reaction was there can only be one cook. He used the example you can put in the potatoes and know all about proteins but you won't know all the rest of it. You have got to rely on the President. You cannot have two State Departments. You must have trust in the President. He suggested events - take the UN people to the Johnson Library, the Eisenhower Library or the Woodrow Wilson School or the Stock Exchange. He mentioned specifically Brown, Harriman and one other firm. He said how he brought them to the ranch. Get the President to provide certain transportation for them. It is good for the President to have a good relationship. He mentioned that he took

the UN people out on the Presidential yacht. He spoke with great reservation about U Thant. He was not very fond of him I think. He indicated that Rusk clearly didn't think much of him either. He pointed out that Goldberg always wanted his ear and so did Stevenson. They both tried to go around the Secretary of State. I had the feeling he felt they were wasting his time an awful lot of the time. He really emphasized the point that only one man can have all the facts. He specifically mentioned Tim (Townsend) Hoopes and pointed out how Tim Hoopes didn't really know what he was talking about. He said he had never even heard of Hoopes when he was in his Administration and that he then wakes up with Hoopes making statements that simply aren't true. He was very upset about Hoopes and this whole idea of second guessing the President or saying that the President acts without facts when all along he did consider all alternatives. When you do have a genuine disagreement you may have to have the President settle it, but you should not bring to the President lots of little incidents. Ambassador Wiggins happened to be with the President and I had a good long talk with him about the job. He was only at the UN three months. He felt diplomacy could make a difference. He felt that you had to have a good staff up there. He was there so short a time that I gathered there weren't many conflicts between him and the Secretary of State. He was extremely pleasant and thought it was a good job, well worth doing. He agreed with me that the UN needed a victory, needed to have a win. I am more and more convinced this is what the UN needs in this country. He felt that the UN Ambassador could do more toward answering the Communists though he did not feel we would return to the age of confrontation like Lodge had.

If I had to draw a conclusion, perhaps President Johnson was preoccupied, but I don't believe he really felt all that great about the UN. His two analogies - you're just a slice of the apple, an important slice but just one slice - you put the potato in and you know about the proteins, but you don't know the final taste of the stew for only the President is the cook and he alone understands all that is happening. He also used the example of McNamara sending him a position paper that he then quietly sent to Rusk and asked Rusk to show it to nobody and report to him. He sent it to Clifford and did the same thing. He sent it to one other man and did the same thing. In the end after making a decision different than McNamara's, McNamara expressed surprise that Johnson had checked this out. He thought the President had made a unilateral decision when all in all the President had all the brains in the Administration check the paper, but do it in secret so it would not be spread around. The main thing I got from President Johnson was that you should entertain these people, be good to them, show them the best in America, let the President have some exposure to them which will be good for both the President and the ambassadors and that was about it. He did not seem to rely too heavily on the UN to solve the problems and he certainly had a reservation about the way Stevenson and Goldberg kept bugging him, calling him on matters that he felt were trivial. He mentioned one matter that Stevenson kept hounding him on and when he talked to Rusk about it, Rusk said Stevenson went over all that before. He, Johnson, ended up agreeing with Rusk most of the time on these things.

January 12, 1971 - My first visit with a foreign diplomat with

Joe Sisco, Middle East Affairs Assistant Secretary. I met with Dr. Ashraf Ghorbal, Minister for the Egyptian Interests in Washington. He was a very friendly little man with a nice twinkle, and I was impressed with the way Sisco discussed things with him - very informal and friendly. When it got substantive, things got a little tense. The meeting had to do with the fact that the Israelis had presented Jarring with "substantive" suggestions. We were letting the Egyptians know that we wanted them to go ahead and either counterpropose or comment, thus trying to keep the matter out of the Security Council. Sisco impresses me as strong, "take charge", and able.

I had lunch with Secretary Rogers and some of his staff in the Executive Dining Room. I'd gotten the feeling that maybe they wanted to delay my taking over at the UN but he did not indicate this at all. In fact he felt we should move forward on it. I discussed some personnel changes with him and he seemed most cooperative.

January 14, 1971 - I had more briefings on Chinese representation. I had a very good visit with Sol Linowitz who knows U Thant. It is amazing the number of people who know U Thant well, but I think Sol probably does. I had a feeling that Sol might have been interested in the UN. He did bring a flare to the OAS. He had some good suggestions like joint meetings of OAS and the UN counterparts here in the State Department. He is an energetic guy, and I think he wants to be helpful. I met with Al Otten and Bob Keatly. I hope I was not too frank with them because I don't know Keatly, but I am in good shape with Otten on this. Otten is a man of integrity and ability in my view.

I met with the Interior people and talked about the seabed. My position is like that of most Americans and, I'm convinced, like most of the people in the Senate. Senator Pell is over quite far in left field on it, and he will be asking some tough questions on it at the confirmation.

I met with Jack Stevenson who suggested that we set up a blind trust regarding the conflict of interest. This suits me.

I just got a strange call from H. L. Hunt regarding Libya. The man is old and doddering and the next thing I know two lobbyists are calling saying that H. L. Hunt told them to call - one an Arab and one a Jew. I want to stay out of getting into that crossfire. I had a talk with the Secretary who indicated it would be good to shoot to take over March 1 and I might plan a trip. He is a very thoughtful guy, who is considerate of Yost and thought this might work out better with Yost for his feelings and also so we wouldn't make a change on the Security Council in the middle of the stream.

I talked with Harry Flemming who wanted his father Arthur Flemming to be head of ECOSOC - a very embarrassing, tough situation. It has got to be handled right so we can keep the White House lines of communication open but I don't think he's the right guy for the job.

January 16, 1971 - This week I have been up to my neck in briefings. We have had the African affairs briefing. There the emphasis seems to be that personal attention by the ambassador can help considerably. Apparently the Mission has not been doing the job on personal attention. These people feel slighted etc. The African section suggested a trip to many African countries. Secretary Rogers told me he felt the trip ought to be to international organizations so we are mapping out a

trip on this basis. I had a very interesting security briefing with Ray Klein who is a friend of Charlie Bartlett and is a thorough going pro in the security field. The country by country African briefing was very interesting. The problems seem frustrating. The whole question of southwest Africa will I am sure plague me. It was interesting to see the beginning of how policy is formulated on the Chi Com question. I get the feeling that there is very little political input on these decisions, that the effect on the Administration of certain policies does not seem to be weighed particularly. Perhaps this is something I will be able to put in without "making it political". I am glad Macomber is at the State Department.

I am amazed at the amount of material one has to read but it is understandable because it covers all the Middle East and Africa - past positions etc.

I am not fully advised yet as to the feeling of the Administration and the Secretary on the UN, though I feel they view it with reasonable restraint or "benign neglect". Reading some of the debates and resolutions I can certainly understand why. I am convinced that the UN needs "a victory", needs to get a major accomplishment underway. You get to the UN and they all talk about the seabed and what a major step forward this is and yet it is nothing in the eyes of the American public. Nobody knows about it and if they did know about it, they wouldn't care about it. What the UN needs is a victory in keeping the peace or preventing war or successfully confronting and backing down the Russians or something that the American people can identify with. It can't be done through sending off a technical resolution about South Africa.

The confidence of the country can't be won through shifts in the China policy. The microstate question appears to be awesome. Little tiny outfits having the same vote we do is going to always disturb the American people.

The day before the Secretary had talked with me about taking over right away. The next day he said unless I had any special preference, which was very nice of him, that it would be better to wait until the first of March. He put it on the basis that it might be more considerate to Yost. Now that the decision is made I agree totally with it. I hope to get some of the personnel problems worked out before I leave.

January 18, 1971 - Today was my first exposure to the UN Association. They were very friendly. I am told that many of the members are liberal Democrats and very strongly opposed to Nixon. It was quite a challenge. Ambassador Yost and his wife were there and obviously he is highly regarded by most of them. He and I both had to give short speeches. Mac McCollum introduced me in his typical, friendly, outgoing style that made things a heck of a lot easier. Mr. Benjamin of United Artists introduced Mr. Yost. All in all I think it proved to be a good evening and I think we laid the groundwork for working with these people. Chris Phillips was there and seemed to think it had gone well. I spent the afternoon at the apartment, the school and the mission. At the mission I met Jack Stewart and Wally Irwin and we talked about the NGO's - Non-Government Organizations. I am beginning to get much more of a feel for the job. Glenn Olds came in again. He was heartbroken and said he simply

doesn't understand this. Yost told him he had done a good job and everything. I can't understand this. Yost and all these men told me there was universal opposition to Olds and he was not any good and then they snow him along. It doesn't seem fair.

January 19, 1971 - I have been invited to my first Cabinet meeting. Things are shaping up. It was a very interesting session. Rog Morton and I were the two new guys there. We sat at the front table and heard a presentation of the President's message. I was surprised at a couple of little things. The President graciously worked me into the conversation a time or two - "Now, George, this will be of interest to you up at the UN". He seemed to be including me in the official family which is a very helpful thing. I didn't get a chance to visit with him. I am determined this kind of meeting is going to be terribly important.

On Thursday night Henry Kissinger came out to the House for dinner with his secret service man and incidentally instead of staying outside we invited the secret service man in and he was promptly defeated in Tiddley Winks. He won four games but lost a total of twenty-four. He was heard to remark as he got into the car, "Well, the boys told me I at least have a great long shot." They indeed confirmed he had a long shot but the rest of his game was not too fantastic. This was the first time the guy ever played however, but I kind of like the concept of the secret service man down playing Tiddley Winks.

I had a long talk with Kissinger. We talked about the right relationship between the President, and he told me I had the confidence of the President, that the President wanted to work through the UN.

That day the Secretary General had just made a statement criticizing the Government of Saigon and Kissinger remarked that the President wished George Bush were up there because at least he could respond and point out that compared to Hanoi, Saigon was a pretty good government. We set up lines of communication for me to get directly to him if there was any major problem and where they would do the same thing. He said there will be times when they will want to call me and give me possible things up there that would be better initiated from my office. He said there are about four ambassadors that have this confidence of the President. I told him I am glad to know I have it, and I am determined to keep it. I also told him I did not want to "go around" Secretary Rogers, but I felt that we could keep a balance here. Kissinger has I think a rather low regard for the paperwork and bureaucratic foul-up at the State Department, but he was not critical or down on any particular individual here. I probed for the President's true feeling on the UN. I think the President feels it can do much more in the ECOSOC etc. I am determined that to do this job right we have got to have the right relationships. I told Henry this. I told him that I wanted to be an advocate for the President's positions with which I agree. If we differ I want to be in a position to tell him. He suggested that I talk to Marshall Wright some more and that the line of communication be General Hague if Kissinger is out, but take it up with him and he would always try to be available etc. The conversation could not have been more productive from delineating the ground rules standpoint. Kissinger is a very interesting guy. He told me about his visit to Harvard with the professors where he

pointed out to them in the war Nixon had done everything McCarthy had suggested in '68 and they still were down on him. He feels the war will be in good enough shape in '72. The President will not have a liability here.

January 25, 1971 - Policy matter - The question of locating the UN Headquarters in New York. I received a message from Chris Phillips urging me to lobby on this bill. This made me wonder why do we extend the UN Headquarters at \$61 dollars a foot in New York. Why not put some of the agencies abroad. The State Department argument is this will fractionate the UN. I went down and talked to Sam DePalma and told him my dilemma - I couldn't fight for something unless I really believed in it. This seems to be a decision by consensus. He is going to dig out some papers. The question transcends this little issue - it is who makes the decision and how do you get it changed if it's a bad one. I am not sure yet that it's a bad one but certainly this is worth an examination. Besides, I can't sell it if I don't really believe in it.

Little things - My office has no pictures of the President or Secretary of State. I am taking care of that. I am also going to get some White House pictures up in the New York mission. There seems to be an avoidance of President Nixon around here. Some of it may be that the people here are Democrats or maybe it's the apolitical nature of the place. I don't know which but certainly there doesn't seem to be any great enthusiasm or advocacy for the President; and yet many of his positions seem to have good loyal support which I think is probably the main thing. I am beginning to see how important it is to keep the lines

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of communication open on personnel. Fortunately Bill Macomber is a very able, forthright guy and you know where you stand with him. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

There is great suspicion in the department of the "political" influence. I have now been invited to go to the Under Secretary's and the Secretary's briefings and this I intend to do to get a good feel for the Department. I am impressed with Joe Sisco at this point. He is direct, reminds me of Johnny Walker - very straight forward, take charge, "move things" kind of guy.

The quality of the men in the building is generally impressive. Kissinger's comments about the UN still ring in my head. Apparently the President wants me to take a reasonably tough and forceful line in defending the country and this I am prepared to do. When the Secretary General made some comment that was called to the President's attention criticizing the Saigon government, he said "Well, I wish George was up there to reply." It is encouraging that I will be free to do this kind of thing. I am wondering how much the bureaucracy will resist this kind of independence.

I sat next to both Senator Cooper and Senator Symington at the Alfalfa Dinner. They both seemed very pleasant. I will be appearing

before both of them at the Foreign Relations Committee. Both have indicated they are for me. I had a nice note from Claiborne Pell, though I understand he plans to ask some tough questions on the seabed. Personal aside - I have been advised by Jack Stevenson to put my holdings in a blind trust. This suits me fine but the trouble is finding the proper blind man to run the darn thing.

I think the best policy around here is to demonstrate your willingness to "go to others", to ask advice, to be grateful, to get here earlier and leave later than the rest of the people. This will be the way I plan to do it at the Mission. Set the pace. I think we need to lower the median age up there. It needs to be revitalized. Lodge's comments about the Chi Com in there to spice things up makes some sense in terms of action. I am still unclear as to whether it makes some sense in terms of what's best for the country. Certainly review of this policy is very much in order. It's being done now.

January 26, 1971 - I attended a lovely dinner given by Secretary Rogers for the Prince and Princess of Spain. She was most attractive. I sat at a small table with Bill Rogers, his daughter, his daughter-in-law's sister, Janet Armstrong, not Neil's wife, and Bob Finch's great wife. It was relaxed and fun and I was amazed at how the Princess was with it - smiling, giggling, cute and Bill Rogers had a great touch with her. The Spanish guitar players hung in there for a long time, twanging away. Rogers obviously wanted to get the proceedings on. He gave us all a laugh by trying to figure a way to get them to to cease and desist.

January 27, 1971 - At night we entertained 8 or 9 of the black ambassadors. I am convinced that the personal touch can go with these guys. They are not formal. They were relaxed and I know I am going to get clobbered on the votes, but it is worth the try to make them feel at home, and I am now convinced from this limited experience that we can do it. I am spending quite a bit of time trying to pick a successor for Hoffman at the UN, trying to get a successor for Bunche lined up, trying to get a successor for Glenn Olds at ECOSOC - perhaps with Earnest Stern, the AID man who is very bright and able, I am impressed with many of the people in the building and yet there seems to be a restrained or "lack of charge" air.

January 28, 1971 - I sent Macomber a memo cancelling out the full-time cadillac required for the UN ambassador in Washington. Perhaps it is premature, perhaps it's a little showy but there is no reason to have a cadillac sitting down there gathering dust all the time. I was told that David Kennedy is making certain requirements for transportation. I think the thing to do is not to be shoved around but to be pliable and flexible, and to bend over backwards on things of personal adornment such as travel. The decision now comes whether to travel first class or tourist. I am not on the payroll and the government should pay my way, but normally consultants go tourist. Well, I don't think I should make special requests at all, although I am sure we could get Macomber to waive it because of Cabinet status and ambassadorial status, But I think the best thing is to tell him we will go tourist.

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
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The first policy question regards the expansion of the UN building in New York. I can't quite see why it is so essential to build a building at \$63 a square foot. They keep talking about fractionating the UN. I am digging into the bottom of this policy and I have yet to get a real satisfactory answer on it. It seems to me that somebody made the decision and now they have got to all back it up. I am not sure it is the right decision. Before I go to battle for it I want to be sure it is right. I told Chris Phillips that I cannot convince my colleagues in the Congress of something if I don't believe in it and at this point it looks to me, given the Jackson Report, that it might be well to have these international agencies consolidated in one other area, like Geneva, Vienna or someplace. The organization of the UN appears basically inefficient.

I am going to talk to Chuck Percy about the Hoffman job, not for himself but for getting others involved. I think it is important to get Congressional advice and suggestions on these things. One embarrassment - Bob Taft suggested his brother Bill for ECOSOC and Macomber doesn't feel that that one is going to hunt.

January 27, 1971 - I went to the dinner at the Press Club with Margaret Mayer, the Jim Chambers, John and Nellie Connally, Lloyd Bentsen and B.A.



Yesterday we had talks with Dr. Hannah, the head of AID, regarding how fowled up the UNDP is. Here is a case of Mr. Hoffman, who

is a revered senior statesman, but the UNDP has been allowed to drift and wander apparently for years. The Jackson Report showed the UNDP was inefficient, ineffective and yet out of reverence and respect for Hoffman, who apparently is driven by a very aggressive wife, nothing has happened. The financial briefing I had on the UN was most discouraging. It's kind of a "finger in the dike" operation, and just by design they're going into deficit after deficit. It appears to me to be a very troubling situation.

It looks like we got Tom Lias cleared to go up there and be my aid. Tom was working at \$23,000. We're trying to get a substantial raise. I think it is going to be at \$28,000 now. He is at the White House, and I hope this will work at keeping our lines of communication open. I had lunch with Dick Gardner who is impressive. I recognize that he came in with Kennedy etc. but he seems to have spark and imagination and he is an attractive young guy. He made one suggestion that is worth implementing - using the academic community and those on the outside as advisers, as a "brain trust" to help out. I'll have to feel my way along on this one. The hearings are coming up but ours have not been scheduled. Morton's was done the first day, Connally's went up today and yet ours is not on the agenda. I will push on that today.

Ernest Stern with AID is an impressive man - young, bright, frank and I think the world of him.

The question arises whether to travel tourist or first class. I am impressed that Goldberg demanded the most, the cadillac, the big office etc. I am now told surprisingly that Secretary Kennedy who is leaving the Treasury to come to the State Department wants special transportation to Mexico plus the cadillac and all the perogatives. I feel that we should give on these things - not insist on them and be judged on performance, energy etc. After thinking about it, I called John McDonald and told him we would probably travel tourist, stimulated somewhat by the fact that I have to pay for Barbara myself and also, even though my rank etc. is entitled to first class, I just don't think we want to make a fight over these kind of things. Everyone else around here travels tourist except for ambassadors, and technically I will not be an ambassador at the time of this forthcoming trip to the inter- national organizations.

January 28, 1971 - One thing on the UN budget - I have been briefed on that and it looks almost hopeless. The thing is designed to fail. They've dipped into their reserve fund. France and Russia have withheld an inordinate amount of payments. When they backed Adlai Stevenson down on Article 19 it seemed to me to sound the death knell. One of the things we are going to have to do is to come up with some imaginative proposal although I don't know what it could possibly be. The Mission seems to be in good shape. Part of it could come from re-organization of the UNDP. Again the Thant weakness and the Hoffman problem keep cropping up in these briefings. There is a lot of hand wringing and Hoffman, with all his great service, his Marshall plan, his political power, his following, is simply out of it. I attended an Andover Trustees meeting on Saturday, and I thought to myself Andover has problems but they're nothing like these at the United Nations. There is no endowment, they're operating at a deficit, there is a tremendous pressure on the half-not countries to insist on spending more. Multilateral management is not too good to begin with.

We spent some time worrying about a Hoffman successor. Marshall Wright from Kissinger's office came over on Thursday and wanted to discuss the possible successors. He had Ambassador Martin, Tom Killifer, Franklin Murphy, and Ruddy Pederson. I vetoed Pederson on that memo that had been prepared for the President by Kissinger's staff from Kissinger. It was very much like a memo that had been circulated to me in the Department, and I am wondering if that State Department memo went over there, or was stopped from going to the President, or whether, indeed, it had ever been prepared for the President. This is

something I ought to look up just to learn how these things work.

February 1, 1971 - Yesterday I went down to watch the launch of the Apollo 6 team. It was a very interesting day. The rocket was only visible for a little while and was postponed a little bit by cloud cover and rain. I flew down on a NASA plane and had a chance to visit with Bill Anders, an astronaut who had been to the moon, and his charming wife. Fame is a fleeting thing. Nobody recognized Anders at all and yet a while back he was pretty prominent. Jack Irwin and his Under Secretary and his daughter were there. He is a quiet, nice kind of man. I met the Ambassador from Central Africa. His name I can't pronounce but he spoke only French. Chris Phillips was on the plane. Bus Mosbacher was down there with the Vice President. NASA does it well. You stand around out on the grass and see it all without wedging into seats. I was given an assigned seat but didn't want to push into it. The stands were filled and what was the point. I got to see lots of people from Texas and other places around there.

Today I attended the Under Secretary's briefing. I am impressed with Joe Sisco. He is straightforward and seems to have a good command of things. He is not a "hand wringer". I am growing increasingly concerned about a lack of forcefulness in the IO Department. Though Sam DePalma is a very nice, accommodating guy, and I am sure he is very able, I am not sure about all the people around him. I am impressed with Mr. Hannah, the head of AID. I had a visit with him and he is quite a fellow. I talked with him last week about his assistant, Ernest Stern, coming up to work for me to head ECOSOC. He is very high on Stern but

said Stern simply wouldn't do it. He also was pushing Rutherford Poats to take over Hoffman's job. Macomber does not feel that Poats is the man. Hannah feels that IO is very weak. He feels that we are going to run into serious opposition on the multilateral fund concept. He said the Congress is getting less and less inclined to go along with multilateral funds like the UNDP and it's all the more reason that they should be run firmly. He feels that Franklin Murphy is an excellent man. I told him Marshall Wright had come over from Kissinger's office and suggested Franklin Murphy along with Graham Martin, our Ambassador to Italy, and another young man, Tom Killiford. Hannah is high on Poats. He seems to be very practical. He also discussed with me Bill Draper's plea that we continue to put up 50 percent of the money for population. He feels we should not have 50 percent of the funds on these deals and though I hate to do anything that will cut back on population, I am inclined to agree with him. Particularly in population we need a multi-national approach. We can do bilateral or multilateral funding and we can continue our bilateral programs, but we must not dominate these things by 50 percent.

Senate hearings have been delayed. Senator Pell will be gone this week and thus the hearings won't be held until next week. Senator Pell feels that Yost has been hurt and that the Department ought to do something for him. I told Charlie Bartlett who inquired on this that in my view they were bending over backwards.

Population fund at UNDP - apparently we have been putting up 50 percent of the funds and now Hannah wants to move that back to 40 percent.

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I have been working with Chris Herter on the Secretary's Environmental Committee and what it has to do with the Stockholm Conference in 1972. We need a Chairman who will be appointed by the Secretary. There have been a lot of suggestions. [REDACTED]

Secretary grabbed the name of Howard Baker who is on the list. Howard is interested and Chris and I are going to go talk to him. It is funny how these appointments work. Dick Pederson is a very knowledgeable man, and I wondered as we talked about it how it might help Baker in his election etc. and how it would set with the nonpolitical types.

Hearings have been delayed and postponed. I had wanted to go ahead and get them done, but they have been set back for another week thus delaying our trip. Senator Pell insisted on asking some questions which is fine but he would be gone all of this week. He is a former foreign service officer who is regarded as kind of second rate in the building, but he is very much interested in the seabeds and has probably given more thought to it than anybody else. I think he will be very civil to me in the hearings though our politics differ.

February 2, 1971 - I had a meeting with Dick Pederson and the Secretary and Chris Herter about getting the Chairman. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I thought this would be a good thing for President Nixon because Rockefeller is extremely generous, was a good governor of Arkansas and he'd give strength in that part of the world. Maybe we will get Howard Baker as a member of the Committee. Chris and I went up and talked to Howard Baker about it. He was great. He feels it would be good to have Muskie on the Committee though we talked about not giving Muskie the giant buildup just before the election. Howard is very broad gauged and I think he could handle that well. He was thrilled to accept and now the paperwork will start on that one.

I saw Harry Flemming at lunch with Rowland Evans and Phil Jaylin. Flemming told me that he had a good man for the ECOSOC job, Dick Allen. ~~My choice is Stern who is not a Republican but is a very~~ skilled AID man. My concern here is that we don't politicize the mission too much. I'm pretty darned political and I don't want to get off on the wrong foot. I think I can help the President by doing a good enough job so that he'll get the credit but it can't get done if we make it pure politics. If I can get this fellow Stern I may have a battle at the White House, but I think that Kissinger will help me over there if we need it. Stern is highly regarded by Kissinger's people but he has no political credentials. He is in fact a neutral.

Here at the State Department you see great animosity about the political process. The strong feeling is that they are trying to ram incompetent pols down the throat of the Department. Then you see over

at the White House the feeling that the State Department is intransigent, that they won't do anything to help the Administration in terms of appointments, and the battle lines are firmly drawn. Somewhere in between lies, I think, an answer. I notice from reading Acheson's book that when the new President took over, all the assistant secretaries felt that they would "be gone". And the new President, Truman, was of the same party as the old President. That doesn't seem to be the feeling around here any more. I am still convinced that the main success or lack of success on this job is how I can walk the tight rope and keep lines of communication open with the White House and still work closely with the Secretary of State. I believe we can do it. The Secretary's comments on Claiborne Pell were interesting. He has very little regard for him. He used an example of how Pell asked him at the Cambodian closed hearings what he was going to do about a picture in Time showing a Cambodian soldier with the heads of two Viet Cong in his hand. The heads said Pell had a "very discouraged expression on their face". This apparently broke up the Committee, but Pell had made the remark with some degree of seriousness. I saw the picture and indeed the faces did appear to be discouraged but who wouldn't when their body was lying back in the weeds someplace. I had a long talk with Tom Lias who will be going up there. I had a call from Malek, the man who fired the six people at Interior. He told me that he understood that Lias would not be going to New York with me and wanted to help me find somebody else at Haldeman's suggestion. Apparently their signals had gotten crossed. Haldeman thought Lias was not going yet Lias does now plan to go.

I will be glad to get into something substantive, but in the meantime the learning process is needed.

On the First of February I had a call from Ambassador Yost talking about whether the March 1 take-over date was firm. I assured him it was as far as I knew and sure enough the Secretary confirmed it later on that day. He did ask that he be permitted to stay on in the apartment for another 10 days. I had offered this earlier when I thought we were going to take this up the first of February. I assured him it would not be a problem. He said he would be out in a week or ten days afterwards. He said they were having a lot of farewell parties and it would make it easier for them. Barbara Bush was not overly excited about this. She said I wouldn't permit her to do this, to be there 5 minutes over the time. That may be true but it is better to bend over backwards on this kind of small thing. What's a week over a span of what might be several years.

The memo that Macomber showed me from the Secretary about our Ambassador in Japan - replace this man. The Ambassador in Japan had been carrying on secret correspondence with Kissinger. The whole relationship of Kissinger with the State Department is confusing and we must do something about this. I must figure it out.

I got a call from Ed Harper at the White House who works for Ehrlichman. Harper's friend, Blanton Van Nort, with IMCO in London, told him that a Bermise source told him that Thant thinks a foreigner would be OK to head the UNDP. Of course this would be impossible as far as we are concerned. We have a lot of names floating around the building. Harper mentioned the possibility of naming somebody like

Romney. I probed to see if this was a feeler from the White House about unloading Romney. Romney actually would be great for this and if he were going to leave the White House it would be terrific. I will try to mention this to the Secretary. I have talked to DePalma and he thinks this is old dope. I told him we would hate to have Thant go ahead and announce some foreigner to head this sensitive job.

I went to the Secretary's briefing for the first time. I liked the way he made the pitch for the State Department to stop publicly criticizing in the press their not being kept informed about what the Pentagon was doing. He pointed out that in things like the present Indonesia crisis everybody felt they should know and it was not necessary that everybody know. He asked them to have faith and confidence and felt that the program would work out beneficially and urged that they not go to the press. He pointed out that all presidents lost confidence in the Department because people would be leaking this kind of story. I am 100 percent with him and thought he handled it beautifully.

I got a call from a man at the White House on Ehrlichman's staff regarding the Hoffman job. He told me that he heard that Thant was going to try to surface the name of an American. He mentioned Romney's name as a kind of guy that could do it. My devious mind started thinking, and I went in and talked to the Secretary about it. He said he would mention it to the President. I've felt they've wanted Romney out of there, but I haven't been able to figure out how urgent was the feeling. I can't imagine anybody being a good enough salesman to get him to do it, but I think he would be darn good at the job.

I talked with Bryce Harlow who is in my view a very able fellow. We talked about establishing the right lines at the White House. He suggested that we talk to General Hague. He is very high on Tom Lias and he feels that I ought to visit Haldeman, which I think is very good advice.

February 4, 1971 - The hearings have now been scheduled for Monday. People are coming up from Congressional Affairs to do more briefing. I can't imagine what else I need to talk about. I saw in the hall Ambassador Bunker who is back from Vietnam and he looks fantastic in spite of the whirl of the new Laos and Cambodia goings on all around him. I had lunch with Janus Stanovnik, Economical Commission for Europe man, and a most impressive Yugoslavian who talks beautifully in English, and I am told he is just as persuasive in Russian.

I visited with Tom Lias and Chris Phillips about personnel and style. I had a good briefing by Frank Shakespeare on the USIA Agency and the support we can get up there. Shakespeare feels that my appointment is being interpreted as the President's man going there and is a good thing. I think this is true but I don't think most of the establishment in New York is viewing it that way yet. I was briefed on the Russian nationals at the UN and their sometimes devious dealings. I had a long visit with Bryce Harlow at lunch yesterday. He had sound advice about visiting with Haldeman and keeping the President's interest paramount and helping him by having the lines of communication open. I am confident we can do a lot for the President and his policies there.

Personnel problems - it just seems so hard to get things done.

The UN Association people here need a UN Day Chairman. They got a list. This is the day it starts, and I want to see how long it is going to take to get one of them approved. On the whole this looks pretty good to me.

We have changed our trip. Phillips had the good suggestion that I be back in New York for the last three days of February before taking over March 1 because of the change in the Middle East situation. I think two or three days on the ground there will be very helpful.

February 5, 1971 - I had a long briefing on the Senate hearings. Everyone says that the Senate committee gives very perfunctory questions and that the hearings should be over fast - 30 or 45 minutes at the most. The questions are pretty general. I must confess I feel a certain uneasiness although the pros all say you're a Member of Congress, don't worry, etc. They all know Pell plans to ask tough questions on the seabed. I've done enough briefing and Pell is not a real gut fighter so it all ought to go well, but even at 46 years old one gets a little nervous about encounters of this sort.

At the Secretary's briefing today I talked to Joe Sisco who felt strongly that I ought to come back from the trip. Of course he is vitally interested in the Middle East and that's to him the one thing. Dave Newsome seemed disappointed I was not going to Africa, but I assured him that Barbara and I will do everything within our power to make up for it by energetic concern over the Africans at the UN.

Paul Hoffman's secretary called today. It was funny. He said Hoffman was on the phone but then the secretary or assistant was there. It is an old trick which works but once. Hoffman wants to see

me Monday, and I plan of course to visit with him. My curiosity has been peaked.

I went to a going away party for the Harlows given by the Whytes on the night of the 4th. I was very much impressed by the fantastic turn out of top-level people in the Administration - three or four Cabinet people, a lot of the key people including Laird, Blount, Shultz, Rumsfeld etc. plus many of the Senators and Congressmen. Bryce has certainly been highly regarded.

February 8, 1971 - Hearings are over with. Yesterday I played tennis with Spiro Agnew and Bryce Harlow for about two hours. I get a kick out of playing with the Vice President. He wants to be good. In fact he is a heck of a lot better this time than he has been the other times I have played with him. He is very serious, likes to run and does it rather gracefully.

I studied yesterday for the hearings and today they happened. They all went very well indeed. Senator Fulbright was very gracious. Most of the members mentioned my dad - Sen. Sparkman, Sen. Aiken, Sen. Symington, Sen. Pell. Pell, knowing we had a difference on the seabed, worded his questions in the most gentlemanly manner and all in all was very gracious about what he felt were major differences. Frankly, I don't think the differences are so much. The hearing lasted for one hour. There was some representation from my old Congressional office - Mary Lou, Mary Matthews, etc. - all of which made me feel real good. Some of the questions were pretty tough but none too difficult to handle. I have a feeling the Congressional people sighed with relief about it all.

I have just had an input back from Marshall Wright at the White House on the memo regarding the Hoffman job. The President has numbered them 1, 2, 3, 4. He put Pederson first, the one guy I felt should be stricken from the list because of age. I don't know Pederson. Perhaps he's the best of all, but the feeling in the Department was that he was too old. I mentioned this to everyone including Marshall and said that Rogers felt that way too. The main thing though is to get on with it.

I met with Macomber on Sunday at my house to go over the personnel for the Mission. He thinks Tap Bennett, former ambassador to the Dominican Republic, would be our best choice for the number three spot. We are still up in the air on the ECOSOC job. Glen Olds' resignation was accepted by the President effective March 1 so he'll probably be gone when I get there. I was prepared to have him stay on but he felt that this was a slight or that he would be damaged in his dealings if he was not the official representative at ECOSOC. I will be glad when all these deadly changes are out of the way.

Hearings were held today. They went well. Senator Fulbright was very courteous, mentioning particularly my father - "Where's your father living now, George? How is his health?" He set the tone and all the other senators, including Sen. Sparkman, Symington, Cooper, Aiken, inquired very courteously about dad. They asked some tough questions. Symington dug in on the relationship between Kissinger and Rogers. Pell most courteously asked about the seabed. There were several questions on peace-keeping but for the most part the hearings went well indeed.

Today I interviewed Tap Bennett for the possibility of number three up there. He seems very good. Apparently he can afford to do it and I hope he accepts.

I had a visit with General Al Hague, Kissinger's Assistant at the White House. I talked to him and Henry about what we plan to do and how we plan to do it. I felt it was useful to meet him face to face so that we will be able to cooperate well together in the future. Hague is a most impressive guy.

Tonight I attended the Ambassadorial Reception. The President joked with me. I told him we got by the Senate hearings and Fulbright's committee. He said, "Well, if you did that, maybe I don't want you." He also mentioned that he was sorry I was not able to come to the small dinner for twelve that he was having for Alice Longworth on Wednesday, the tenth. Rose Woods had called and invited us to this. The President was in excellent form. I had a very interesting visit with Ambassador Dobrynin who turned on the charm. I was impressed that most of the ambassadors there seemed to recognize the name Bush, but I guess they are looking closely from time to time at what we are doing at the UN. The White House diplomatic reception was a spectacular thing. All the diplomats are assigned to their places (name places on the floor). They went through to meet the President and Secretary of State. The Cabinet people were off on the side. The President again reiterated he wanted me to come to all the Cabinet meetings. I said I certainly will come if I am invited and he said you're invited to all of them so I am determined to follow up on that properly. It is fundamental. It came up in the Senate hearing and apparently people put great stock in this. I must be sure to attend

these and get the schedules as well in advance as possible.

I had a long visit on the night of the eighth with Tap Bennett. The Ambassador from Austria was extremely friendly. I am particularly impressed by the Swiss Ambassador, our good friend Felix Schnyder. He and his wife Ziggy stand out as the friendliest and the most outgoing of all. I am amazed at how many ambassadors there had been at the UN. I made a special effort at the White House reception with the black ambassadors.