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Chinese Representation [8]

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problem that is properly before us: how China should now
be represented in the United Nations.

-15-

Let us make this decision realistically, wisely, equitably and in a way that will strengthen the United Nations for its service to peace, now and time immemorial.

Let each of us for a moment look at what is best for the United Nations.

Many of you know very well that you don't ~~we~~ really want

the Republic of China expelled. We 19 countries who have

sponsored our resolution ask you now to act here at the ~~UN~~ ^{United Nations}

United Nations' with the ~~best~~ best interests in mind.

Let us stand up for what is fair and decent and constructive.

Let us welcome a large and dynamic ^{reality} ~~reality~~ to our midst, but let's do it not on its own terms but on the UN's terms.

Let us affirm representation for the People's Republic of China, but let us vigorously protect the principle that no smaller reality, in this case the Republic of China, which has abided by the Charter need ever fear that it will be expelled to accomodate a larger reality.

* * * * *

DRAFT

October 11, 1971

Opening Statement by Ambassador Bush on Chinese Representation
GA Plenary, about October 18, 1971

Mr. President:

For 22 years the question of the representation of the great nation of China in the United Nations has been a major international issue -- a troublesome and intractable one.

In the history of this issue the year 1971 can be, and ought to be, a year of change and decision.

For 21 years the Assembly faced, on this question, only two stark alternatives. We could either leave things as they were, with no representation here for the enormous population of the Chinese mainland, or we could agree to a formula which, in a single stroke, would make room for the People's Republic of China by expelling the Republic of China, a member in good standing. As to this latter step, the Assembly has always been aware of its drastic nature and fateful implications for the UN -- and year after year has refused to take it, even though this meant prolonging the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from this organization. So the situation remained frozen.

Now, everybody has known, all through those years, that there was a third possibility. Instead of throwing out one of these Chinese governments to make room for the other, it was

perfectly possible for the United Nations to accommodate them both. The fact that discussion of such a solution was highly distasteful to the settled policies of both was not, in itself, a conclusive argument against it, since the peaceful solution of conflict situations very often requires difficult decisions. So there was a constant undercurrent of discussion about a way to accommodate both these realities within the UN.

However, until very recently this approach did not gain much headway. This was only partly because both the parties opposed it. More fundamentally, I think, it was because the general attitude of the People's Republic of China toward the outside world, including the United Nations, during most of this period was hostile and aloof. There was strong reason to doubt whether a government in that frame of mind could usefully participate in the UN. And, hence, there was doubt that it would be worth while to laboriously hammer out a formula for achieving this. Given the cold and forbidding attitude in Peking, most members -- and the United States, frankly, was one of these -- were content to see the issue presented in the old way, and fully expected that the perennial Albanian resolution would still fail to muster the necessary majority. And it did fail, year after year, usually by wide margins.

Now that situation has changed. The People's Republic of China has in many ways moderated its attitude and its conduct toward the outside world and toward the United Nations. It has actively sought normal contact with many countries. And it has made known its positive desire to sit in the United Nations -- a marked change from its attitude of aloofness and disdain in earlier years.

Finally, this year, after more than two years of silence, the People's Republic of China has responded affirmatively to the overtures of President Nixon for better relations and for direct contact at the highest level between itself and the United States. These overtures were an important new step in American policy, a step designed as one major element in our country's basic objective of a more stable and peaceful world.

In these changed circumstances it has become increasingly clear that the past pattern of UN decision ~~amounting to an annual decision not to expel the Republic of China as the price for admitting the People's Republic~~ (is no longer sufficient. The time in history has arrived to find a way, both realistic and just -- however difficult that may be -- by which to welcome the People's Republic of China into the UN without unacceptable damage to other interests. It must be a way which would avoid the unacceptable route of expelling a law-abiding and faithful member. It should be a way that could command the assent of a

sufficient majority in the General Assembly. My Government set out to develop such a proposal, and in the process we consulted with very nearly the whole membership of the UN.

In embarking on this course my Government was well aware of the difficulties. For many years the issue had been posed in sharp black-and-white terms and positions had been frozen on each side. But we went ahead in the belief that this year ought to be, and could be, a year of decision -- and that the decision must be sound and realistic and just, and not one which this Organization would later have cause to regret.

In this spirit we proceeded to shape an alternative to the Albanian Resolution, ~~the first real alternative ever offered in this Assembly.~~ The result is embodied in a draft resolution whose text appears in document A/L.635. It is sponsored by members including the United States.

~~As a framework for this proposal, and a sign of our serious intent, we offered, and the Assembly agreed to inscribe, a new agenda item which is now before us, and which bears an appropriately non-prejudicial, noncontentious title: "The Representation of China in the United Nations."~~

Our draft resolution is short and carefully worded. I shall read it at this point:

((Read text of DR resolution.))

I need comment only briefly on this draft resolution. Its terms are simple and direct. In essence, it would recommend that the People's Republic of China take over China's place as a permanent member of the Security Council, and would provide representation both for the People's Republic of China and for the Republic of China in the General Assembly.

The sponsors of this resolution believe it is the most realistic, pragmatic and equitable solution to this problem. Under its terms,

-- the Republic of China, which governs 14 million people, would retain a place in the General Assembly instead of being summarily and unjustly ejected;

-- the People's Republic, with its enormous extent and population, would no longer be excluded from the General Assembly and, in addition, would occupy the Chinese seat in the Security Council;

-- all the people of China would thus at last be represented in the United Nations by the governments which for over 20 years have actually governed them.

Moreover, this resolution, while achieving these things, has been carefully written in order to avoid any prejudice to various related matters. It does not ask Member States to alter their recognition policies or their bilateral relations.

It does not in any way purport to divide China into two separate states or to commit those who vote for it on how they may in future regard the legal or diplomatic situation of the parties involved. It does not take either a "two Chinas" position, or a "one-China-one-Taiwan" position, or any other position on that subject. It is founded on the reality of the present situation as we all know it to be, but it does not seek to freeze that situation for the future. On the contrary, it expressly states in the preamble that a solution should be sought without prejudice to a future settlement.

I know well from our discussions with other delegations during the past two months that some would prefer more detailed and explicit language as to the legal aspects of the step we propose, since there is no exact precedent for it in UN history. I have great respect for this point of view but I do not share it. It is unavoidable that what we propose should be new and without precedent, because the situation with which it deals is new and without precedent. If we attempt now, at this stage, to state explicitly all the legal aspects and meanings of what we propose to do, then I very much fear that we might become so tied up in legal disputations that we would miss this historic opportunity to act. Therefore, the sponsors decided to leave ~~these~~ legal ^{details} ~~issues~~ to one side.

, while seeking a result compatible with the law of the Charter,

That is the nature of this proposal we have placed before you. It is ^{a fair and practical way} ~~the only realistic, equitable and viable proposal~~ to solve this historic problem of Chinese representation.

There is one other proposal, and only one, before the Assembly: the Albanian resolution. It would not only admit the People's Republic of China but would also, in the same stroke, "forthwith" expel the Republic of China from the UN and all its organs.

That act of expulsion, fellow delegates, is the issue before us. Both sides agree that the People's Republic of China should be admitted and should sit in the Security Council as a permanent member. One essential point divides us: whether to retain or to expel the Republic of China.

I submit that the course of expulsion, first, is most ill-advised and dangerous as a precedent in the UN, and, second, is an unnecessary price for the entry of the People's Republic of China into this organization. Let me give my reasons for both these points.

First, as to expulsion as a precedent.

In the 26-year history of the UN, no member has been expelled or deprived of its seat. In fact, the whole trend has been the other way -- so that the original 51-nation membership is now up to 131, including an immense variety of sizes and political systems. Yet here it is proposed that a ^{member in good standing,} ~~sitting member,~~ a

government over 14 million people, with no Charter violations against its name, ~~and in fact~~ ^{and} a most constructive record, should be expelled utterly from the UN and all its agencies -- solely because certain other governments deny its legitimacy.

And let us remember realistically that, once expelled, the likelihood of the Republic of China ever being readmitted to the UN as a separate member, under whatever name or label, would be approximately zero -- given the fact that under the Charter ^{a proposal for its} ~~such~~ admission could be vetoed by the People's Republic of China.

If the Assembly is going to travel down that road, where do we stop? Who can predict what UN member will be next? Surely there is many another member in this organization which, though fully in possession of its ~~own~~ territory and governmental powers, could one day become the target of some political combination in this very hall, aiming to throw it out of the UN solely because its right to govern is disputed by others.

If we are going to start playing with the right of members to sit in this organization, as if that right were a chip in some international poker game, we will have started the UN itself down a ~~dangerous and~~ ^{and perilous} slippery slope. Such a step would ~~exert a profoundly damaging effect on this organization~~ ^{would exert a profoundly damaging effect on this organization} ~~might or might not greatly affect the world outside these~~ ^{might or might not greatly affect the world outside these} ~~and on the attitudes of many members toward it~~ ^{and on the attitudes of many members toward it} ~~halls, but it would profoundly affect the UN itself.~~ It would lead away from universality, away from realism, and toward

factionalism, recrimination and irrelevancy. It ~~could well~~ ^{would grievously}
~~damage the fabric of this organization~~ ^{tear this organization apart.}

And it would cause many people in many countries -- including my own country, I can assure you -- to question very seriously what hopes for world peace continue to reside in this organization.

We should frankly face the fact that this session of the UN Assembly cannot and should not try to write the last chapter in the history of China's relations with itself or with the rest of the world. We should concentrate on writing today's chapter in the history of China's relations with the UN. If we can do that, and do it right, we will have accomplished a great deal and, I believe, will have given the UN a new lease on life.

This leads me to my second point. There are those who argue that the Republic of China has to be expelled, however regrettable that is, simply because the People's Republic has announced in advance that it will not participate on any other basis. I respect the sincerity of those who make this argument, ^{but} / for several reasons, I do not agree.

In the first place, there is an implication here that for the People's Republic to be asked to reconsider its announced position on this point would be asking too much. But surely

all governments, including the People's Republic of China, must change -- and have changed -- their attitudes on some ^{important} issues in order to resolve international problems. On this particular problem of who is to speak for China in the organs of the United Nations -- including the Security Council -- surely others have made concessions and moved from long-held positions, and it is neither unrealistic nor unfair that the People's Republic of China should do its part.

Besides -- and this is a most important point -- the formula we have proposed has been most carefully written to avoid placing any unnecessary difficulties in Peking's way. The resolution neither says nor implies that there are "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan." It does not attempt to define the present status, or to prejudice the future status, of either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China, or the relations between them, or their relations with other countries. It does not say that its terms shall settle forever the Chinese representation issue in the UN, no matter what happens in the future. It simply provides that, given the existing state of affairs, the People's Republic of China, which is not in the UN, should ^{be represented} ~~come in~~ and should take over the Security Council seat; and that the Republic of China, which is in the UN, should remain in the UN. The resolution does not,

to be sure, accept the claims of Peking with respect to the Republic of China or Taiwan; but neither does it deny or reject or prejudice those claims. It is completely silent on them. Nothing, consistent with the realities of the situation, could be less prejudicial, ~~or difficult for Peking to accept.~~

The fact is that nobody can know for sure how Peking will react to the adoption of this resolution until it is adopted. Naturally, until that moment, it is perfectly legitimate and standard tactics to say "no" in the most categorical and seemingly irreversible terms to ^{any resolution which falls short of its} ~~this obviously distasteful~~ ^{maximum demands} ~~resolution~~ -- in the obvious hope of causing the resolution to be defeated. Others in this body, in similar situations, have done the same -- only to show a surprising flexibility after the fact. The adoption of the "dual representation" resolution will create a new situation in which, for the first time, it will become necessary for all concerned to look at the facts and decide how they will act. When that moment comes, and not before, ^{it will be possible to know} ~~we will find out~~ whether or not the People's Republic will accept this ^{generous} ~~entirely non-prejudicial~~ invitation to take its place in the United Nations.

For all these reasons, then, I commend to the General Assembly the ^{19-power}~~(18-power)~~ draft resolution known as the "dual representation" resolution.

-- It is a new approach responsive to a new and more hopeful situation in the relations between China and the world.

-- It provides, for the first time, effective representation in the United Nations for all the people under the two Chinese governments that exist.

-- It realistically provides that the People's Republic of China, which governs the largest population of any government on earth, should occupy the Security Council seat.

-- It avoids the expulsion of the Republic of China, ^{and} an unnecessary, unrealistic, dangerous, irreversible, ~~and unnecessary~~ step which is the distinguishing feature of the Albanian resolution.

-- It carefully avoids any attempt to prejudice or foreclose the ultimate solution of any of the disputed issues relating to China, or to affect the recognition policies or bilateral relations of any member.

Fellow delegates, the time has come for the United Nations to settle this question -- and to do so in a way that will be just to all parties, realistic in its reflection of the facts, and constructive for the United Nations and its members. I

believe that can be done, and that the Dual Representation resolution will do it. By contrast, the expulsion of a member in good standing, which would result from the Albanian resolution, is unrealistic, unnecessary, and dangerous in the highest degree for the future of the UN.

It is for this reason that the United States and its co-sponsors have also proposed a second resolution, under which a proposal to ^{deprive} ~~expel or exclude~~ the Republic of China ^{of representation in} ~~from~~ the UN is an important question within the meaning of article 18 of the Charter, thus requiring a two-thirds vote for adoption. It is only logical that this procedural point should be settled before the voting on the substantive resolutions, and accordingly my delegation will request priority in the voting for the "important question" resolution.

Mr. President and fellow delegates, the question before us is the most serious and important that will face the Assembly in this session or, possibly, for years to come. Let me assure you that the United States approaches it in a most serious and forthright spirit. Contrary to some reports, my country is not engaged in an elaborate maneuver to perpetuate the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the UN. Nor, on the other hand, are we merely going through the motions of seeking to assure the continued representation of the Republic of China. We ~~seriously~~ want to see both these entities in the UN. As all

members must know, we have devoted major diplomatic energies to this cause. We know well, and the People's Republic knows well, that our policy and theirs on this question are not the same. This need not and does not interfere with the plans for President Nixon's visit or with the mutual desire of the two sides to ~~develop better contact~~ ^{normalize their relations} with each other. The question of Chinese representation in the UN has not been bargained over or discussed ~~in any way~~ in United States contacts with the People's Republic of China and as far as my Government is concerned it will not be.

Indeed, nothing could more clearly demonstrate the seriousness with which my Government presents this proposal to the Assembly than the fact that we do so at the very moment in history in which at last we seek to develop direct and, if possible, constructive contacts with the People's Republic of China and to help end its isolation from the world ^{community}. We have said, and we mean it, that as far as the United States is concerned these contacts will not be at the expense of any other party.

Many difficult issues surround the relations of the Chinese People's Republic with the rest of the world. They cannot all be resolved overnight. We in this Assembly certainly cannot resolve them all by any amount of resolution-making. What we can do is to decide -- here, now at long last -- the vexing

problem that is properly before us: how China should now be represented in the United Nations.

Let us take that decision realistically, wisely, equitably, and in a way that will strengthen the UN for its service to peace.

#



24/12
GB -
Discusses with
Russ
Chirp

by Dr. David Nelson Rowe

the Republic of China on Taiwan stems from our 1954 treaty. The purpose of the treaty is exclusively defensive, and it controls the entire range of our military relationship with the Republic of China . . .

I am recalling the record of friendship, assistance, and alliance between the United States and the Government of the Republic of China in order to make clear both the vitality of this relationship and the nature of our defense relationship. I do not believe that this honorable and peaceful association need constitute an obstacle to the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China [Communist China]. As I have tried to make clear since the beginning of my Administration, while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the differences between Taiwan and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved by peaceful means."

This is the "two Chinas policy" in its clearest form: maintain our current political, economic and military relationships with the Republic of China on Taiwan while moving toward "normal relations" between Washington and the Communists in Peking.

The implications of this in respect to the question of Red China and the U.N. are then spelled out clearly in the President's Report (p. 108):

"In that connection, I wish to make it clear that the United States is prepared to see the Peoples Republic of China play a constructive role in the family of nations. The question of its place in the United Nations is not, however, merely a question of whether it should participate. It is also a question of whether Peking should be permitted to dictate to the world the terms of its participation. For a number years attempts have been made to deprive the Republic of China of its place as a member of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. We have opposed these attempts. We will continue to oppose them."

In other words, the President has said we are quite willing to see Peking in the United Nations but not on terms of expelling the Republic of China from that organization. He clearly wants a "two Chinas" solution in the United Nations.

Now what are the requirements for the success of any such policy as this? If such a policy is to succeed it is of course obvious that the Republic of China cannot be expelled from the U.N. Such expulsion is actually the whole purpose of the recent movements in the U.N. on the part of Algeria and the other supporters of Red China. Their resolutions have stipulated in detail the necessity of expelling the Republic of China from the United Nations.

Actually, to prevent any such expulsion of the Republic of China it is necessary only to secure the application of the relevant provision of the U.N. Charter in Chapter II, Article 6, which reads:

"A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

This gives to the Security Council the jurisdiction over the question of expelling states which are members of the United Nations, in the sense that the General Assembly cannot act on such a case without its prior recommendation. This means that the whole series of General Assembly resolutions dealing, in its words, with the so-called question of "Chinese representation," but actually providing for the expulsion from the U.N. of a Charter member, have no validity whatever under the law of the United Nations.

It will no doubt be asserted that this is merely a resort to "legalism" and a case of having recourse to a legal device in regard to a question which is primarily political. Actually, however, it is vital for the whole future of the United Nations that any action in respect to the status therein of Charter Members be taken only in full respect of the provisions of the Charter itself, the fundamental law of the Organization. This is absolutely vital to the whole question of the future of the U.N., constructed as it was and is upon the fundamental aim of eventually developing a genuine and all-encompassing world community based upon law. This is what we are working for under the United Nations. In the first instance, at the very minimum, the U.N. must comport itself in full respect for its basic Charter. It can do otherwise only at the grave risk of its basic integrity, probably leading to its ultimate death.

Ch IV
Art 18

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

September 30, 1971

The Honorable
William E. Brock, III
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill:

I have read the statement which you and your colleagues issued today on the China policy and I want to say at the outset that I understand how you feel and why you feel that way.

Your position reflects the realities of the situation today. In a very responsible way you are helping the American people know that there have been significant political changes in the world over the past decade.

In 1964 there were 115 member nations in the United Nations and only 39 of them had diplomatic relations with Mainland China. Today there are 130 member nations and some 62 UN members have recognized the Mainland Government.

In the last General Assembly the vote on the Albanian Resolution to expel the Nationalists and seat the Communists was 51 to 49 (although a 2/3rds vote was necessary for passage). Since last Fall, 12 more nations have established diplomatic relations, thus the trend has moved towards the PRC and against the ROC. Included among the nations which today maintain diplomatic relations are such friendly countries as Canada, the UK and France. This means they are not free to support us on our present policy. Because of the shift of support away from our previous position thrust upon countries who have recently established relations with PRC, we can no longer take for granted our success

in the parliamentary maneuvering to force a 2/3rds vote (the so-called "important question" procedure).

Nonetheless, I want you and the others in the Congress to know we are leaving no stone unturned here in our effort to win this issue. I have talked personally to some 65 Representatives of foreign nations. My staff is working virtually around the clock making contacts and soliciting support. In the capitals around the world our Ambassadors are contacting governments in behalf of our position.

People always ask "can we win." I feel that we have a winnable proposition - but it will be extremely close.

After living with this problem for several months, I am totally convinced that the President is correct in his approach. Given the changes in the world, our former position would not have been sustained. The votes simply aren't there to support it. The only way Nationalist China can be kept as a UN member is for the dual representation approach to succeed. They know it and so do we.

We are working desperately to keep them in the UN.

Bringing PRC in, in my view, is a move towards reality and I support it, but we must not let a big reality "muscle out" a smaller reality.

ROC is bigger than 92 countries. Expulsion sets a very dangerous precedent. It is this point I am trying so hard to get across to the other UN members.

Your statement of interest puts appropriate emphasis on this policy.

Yours very truly,

George Bush

Emb. Bush / T. L. Cas: md

cc: Embassy

H. T. Hayes / R. M. Sweeney
Reference

From the desk of

AMBASSADOR GEORGE BUSH

Chung



Telegram

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SY WA194 AP GOVT PDB WASHINGTON DC 27 942P EDT

TOM LIAS, U S MISSION

799 W N PLAZA NYK

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION HAS STATED CATEGORICALLY ITS SUPPORT FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA. WE SUPPORT THIS COMMITMENT. THAT NATION~~AL~~ MUST RETAIN ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS. FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO BE EXPELLED WHILE THE PEKING REGIME IS ADMITTED WOULD DO SUCH VIOLENCE TO THE PRINCIPLES AND SPIRIT OF THE U.N. CHARTER, THAT WE WOULD FEEL COMPELLED TO RECOMMEND A COMPLETE REASSESSMENT OF U.S. FINANCIAL AND MORAL SUPPORT OF THE U. N. WE DO NOT ISSUE THIS STATEMENT IN ANTICIPATION OF ANY ACTION RESULTING IN THE EXPLUSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA FROM THE U.N. RATHER WE BELIEVE THAT BY DRAMATIZING OR CONCERN OVER SUCH ACTION, WE MAY HELP RALLY THE GREATEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION OFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES AND

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western union

Telegram

OTHER NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
BILLA BROCK.

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MISION PERMANENTE DE COSTA RICA
ANTE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS
211 East 43rd. St.
New York, N. Y. 10017

INTERVENCION DEL MINISTRO DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE COSTA RICA,
DR. GONZALO J. FACIO, EN EL DEBATE SOBRE REPRESENTACION DE CHINA,
DURANTE EL XXVI PERIODO DE SESIONES DE LA ASAMBLEA GENERAL DE
NACIONES UNIDAS.- NEW YORK, 18 DE OCTUBRE DE 1971.-

Señor Presidente:

El Gobierno de Costa Rica asumió el año pasado una nueva tesis en cuanto a la representación de China en Naciones Unidas. A fines de 1970 hice público ese cambio de actitud de nuestro Gobierno por medio de la televisión y la prensa locales. Lo que entonces dije puede sintetizarse así:

1.- El gobierno de la República Popular de China debe estar representado en todos los organismos de Naciones Unidas.

2.- A los representantes de dicho gobierno les corresponde ocupar uno de los cinco asientos permanentes en el Consejo de Seguridad.

3.- No obstante lo anterior, el gobierno de la República de China con asiento en Taipei debe continuar participando en todos los organismos de Naciones Unidas.

Los hechos ocurridos con posterioridad a la exposición de esa tesis, han confirmado las razones que tuvimos para cambiar la posición que habíamos mantenido antes con respecto a la representación de China en Naciones Unidas. En los últimos años la República Popular de China ha dado muestras de su creciente



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interés por integrarse a la Comunidad Internacional y de colaborar a poner fin a las tensiones de la Guerra Fría. El dramático paso tomado al invitar al presidente Nixon a visitar Pekin, y el hecho de que éste aceptara la invitación, son prueba evidente del cambio favorable en la política exterior de la China continental que ya habíamos observado desde el año anterior.

INDEBIDA DESIGNACION DEL TEMA 93.-

El tema 93 que ahora ocupa la atención de la Asamblea, destinado a darle entrada al debate que estamos sosteniendo sobre la representación de China, se incluyó en la agenda con el indebido título de "Restitución de los Legítimos Derechos de la República Popular de China en las Naciones Unidas." Por eso Costa Rica, que como ya he dicho está en favor de otorgar representación a dicha República Popular en Naciones Unidas, votó en contra de su inclusión. Porque nosotros queremos que se debata y se resuelva aquí, de la mayor manera posible, el problema de la representación de China. Pero a la hora de decidir sobre la inclusión de tan importante tema, no podíamos aceptar que se prejuzgara sobre el fondo de la cuestión, dándole la denominación que inadecuadamente se le otorgó. En todo caso, pese a la estratagema de designar el tema de acuerdo con los intereses de un determinado grupo, lo que estamos debatiendo aquí, y lo que en el fondo vamos a resolver, no es la supuesta restitución de los derechos que nunca ha tenido la República Popular de China, sino la forma como debe estar representado en Naciones Unidas lo que fue el Estado



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chino miembro fundador de esta organización mundial.

LA REALIDAD DE LAS DOS CHINAS:

Porque, como todos recordamos, al fundarse las Naciones Unidas en 1945, el pueblo y el territorio chinos se hallaban bajo la jurisdicción de un solo Estado, denominado República de China. El gobierno, presidido entonces por el generalísimo Chiang Kai-shek, era el legítimo representante de ese Estado, al que, por ser uno de los "cinco grandes" se le reconoció el derecho a tener asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad.

La situación cambió a partir de 1949, cuando las fuerzas de Mao Tse-tung dominaron la China Continental, y las de Chiang Kai-shek se refugiaron en la provincia isleña de Taiwan y en otras pequeñas islas circunvecinas.

Si quisieramos encontrar una explicación jurídica al fenómeno ocurrido desde entonces, podríamos afirmar que en la China continental se creó un nuevo Estado, de estructura comunista, con un nombre nuevo: el de República Popular de China. El antiguo estado nacionalista, denominado desde los orígenes de Naciones Unidas como República de China, quedó reducido al territorio de la isla de Taiwan y de otras pequeñas islas circunvecinas. Es cierto que los gobiernos de ambos Estados reclaman jurisdicción sobre todo el pueblo y el territorio de lo que en 1945 fue la República de China. Pero en realidad, y de facto, la República Popular ejerce su jurisdicción sobre el territorio de la China continental y sobre el pueblo que allí vive, en tanto que la República de China sólo ejerce su jurisdicción sobre



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la provincia isleña de Taiwan e islas circunvecinas, y sobre quienes las habitan. La tesis de las dos Chinas, o mejor dicho, de los dos Estados chinos, tiene un fuerte asidero en la realidad vigente durante los últimos veintidós años. Sólo cerrando los ojos a esa realidad histórica pueden sostenerse las pretensiones de cada uno de los gobiernos de los dos estados en pugna, según las cuales cada uno de ellos es el legítimo representante del Estado chino que fue miembro fundador de Naciones Unidas.

PROPOSICION ALBANA:

Bajo el tema 93 quedó incluida la proposición encabezada por la delegación de Albania y secundada por otras 17 delegaciones, en la que se pide que la Asamblea "restituya a la República Popular de China todos sus derechos, que reconozca a los representantes de su gobierno como los únicos representantes de China en Naciones Unidas y que se reconozca a la República Popular de China como uno de los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad, así como que se expulse inmediatamente a los representantes de Chiang Kai-shek del puesto que --según los proponentes-- ilegítimamente ocupan en las Naciones Unidas y en todos los organismos relacionados con ella."

Costa Rica, desde luego, no puede estar de acuerdo con esta proposición.

De lo expuesto anteriormente se desprende claramente cómo, a juicio de mi delegación, la República Popular de China no ha sido nunca miembro de Naciones Unidas. Se trata, en el fondo,



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de un Estado nuevo, segregado, de facto, del estado fundador de Naciones Unidas denominado República de China. Nosotros estamos de acuerdo en que la representación del gobierno de ese nuevo Estado tome asiento en esta Asamblea y en todos los organismos de Naciones Unidas, pero mientras no se apruebe una resolución que lo permita, sostenemos que dicha República Popular carece y ha carecido por completo de derechos como miembro de nuestra Organización. En consecuencia, si la República Popular de China nunca ha tenido derechos como miembro de Naciones Unidas, es lógico concluir que ninguno se le puede restituir. Porque se restituye lo que se ha poseído, y no lo que simplemente se aspira a poseer.

Por lo tanto, nuestra delegación no puede admitir con su voto la falacia de que la República Popular de China ha sido legítimo miembro de Naciones Unidas, de que ha sido ilegalmente privada de su representación y de que debe restituirsele ese y todos los derechos inherentes a una participación que nunca ha tenido. Tan contraria a la verdad es la premisa de que parte el proyecto de resolución albano, como es el sostener hoy que la República de China con asiento en Taiwan, continúa siendo el único Estado chino que debe ser reconocido como miembro de Naciones Unidas.

Porque, repito, la verdad es que, de hecho y de derecho, existen hoy día dos estados chinos: Uno nuevo, el de la República Popular que abarca todo el territorio de la China continental y la inmensa mayoría de su población, y otro que es el remanente de lo



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que fue la República de China fundadora de Naciones Unidas, que tan sólo abarca la provincia isleña de Taiwan e islas circunvecinas, y sólo 14 de los 750 millones de chinos, que viven en ese antiguo país.

No es la primera vez que un Estado pierde gran parte de su territorio, y sin embargo continúa, reducido, la vida jurídica del Estado del que se separaron porciones de territorio y población para formar otro u otros Estados. La historia reciente muestra numerosos casos que sirven de antecedente al actual. Por ello la delegación de Costa Rica sostiene que, constituyendo, como constituye la República de China con asiento en Taiwan el remanente de lo que fue el Estado chino cofundador de Naciones Unidas, dicha República de China, reducida grandemente en su territorio y población, es, sin embargo, la continuadora jurídica del Estado original y, que, en consecuencia, tal República no ha dejado, ni por un momento, de ser miembro legítimo de Naciones Unidas.

LA REPUBLICA POPULAR NO ES EL UNICO REPRESENTANTE DE LA NACION CHINA:

Por las razones que acabo de exponer, tampoco puede mi delegación aceptar la tesis contenida en el proyecto de resolución encabezado por la delegación albana, según la cual la Asamblea debe reconocer que el Gobierno de la República Popular de China es el único representante legítimo en Naciones Unidas de lo que fuera la China de 1945. Porque lo cierto es que la representación que dicho gobierno ejerce, sólo cubre el territorio y a los habi-



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tantes de la China continental, sin que jamás, ni por un sólo instante, su jurisdicción se haya extendido, ni de hecho ni de derecho, al territorio y habitantes de la isla de Taiwan.

NO SE JUSTIFICA LA EXPULSION DE CHINA NACIONALISTA:

Por esas mismas razones, jamás podría nuestra delegación aceptar la tesis de Albania y de los 17 copatrocinadores de la resolución en examen, en cuanto exige la inmediata expulsión de Naciones Unidas de los representantes del gobierno que preside el generalísimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Mi delegación sostiene que dichos representantes están bien sentados en Naciones Unidas, como enviados que son del gobierno de la República de China, que, aunque grandemente disminuida en territorio y población, es, como ya lo he dicho, la continuación jurídica del Estado chino cofundador de Naciones Unidas.

Además, son ellos delegados de un Estado que merece el respeto de la comunidad internacional por su comportamiento pacífico, por el esfuerzo de desarrollo económico y social realizado en beneficio de su propio pueblo y por la cooperación que ha prestado al desarrollo de otros pueblos. La actuación de los representantes de la República de China ha demostrado que su Estado aspira sinceramente a la paz, a las relaciones armónicas con otras naciones, y al acatamiento de los principios de respeto a la independencia, soberanía e integridad territorial de otros Estados, así como al reconocimiento del derecho de los pueblos



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a decidir por si mismos su propio destino.

Hace 22 años podría haberse discutido si el Estado chino asentado en Taiwan era una ficción. Pero al presente nadie puede negar que la República de China ostenta todos los atributos de un Estado moderno, que mantiene relaciones diplomáticas con 69 países, 56 de los cuales son miembros de Naciones Unidas; que tiene una población de 14 millones, muchas veces superior a la población de una gran mayoría de los Estados aquí representados; que posee una industria floreciente cuyas exportaciones superan las de la República Popular de China; y que ha desarrollado un sistema económico y social separado, con sus propios caracteres distintivos, bien diferentes de los de la China continental.

Como argumento de fuerza para inducir a la Asamblea a tomar la injusta determinación de expulsar a los representantes del gobierno de la República de China, los propulsores de la resolución albana han sostenido que, de lo contrario, el gobierno de Pekin no aceptaría tomar su asiento en esta Asamblea ni en el Consejo de Seguridad.

Para rebatir esta argumentación nada me parece mejor que citar las inteligentes palabras con que refutó ese punto el señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Filipinas, general don Carlos Rómulo, quien en su excelente discurso en el debate general dijo al respecto:

"La República Popular de China debe entrar a la



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Organización de acuerdo con las condiciones de Naciones Unidas, y no con las condiciones que aparentemente trata de imponer mediante sus portavoces en esta Asamblea. La República Popular de China puede ser una gran potencia, pero no es más grande que las Naciones Unidas, y no puede dictar las condiciones de su propio ingreso antes de que la cuestión sea decidida por la Asamblea General y por el Consejo de Seguridad."

EL ASIENTO PERMANENTE EN EL CONSEJO DE SEGURIDAD:

De acuerdo con la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, corresponde al Consejo de Seguridad decidir cuál de los dos Estados chinos debe tener asiento permanente en ese organismo. Sin entrar a discutir en esta ocasión la validez de los argumentos que dieron lugar a que a los cinco Estados que se consideraron como más importantes se les diera asiento permanente y derecho de veto en el Consejo de Seguridad, como hecho histórico hay que aceptar que ello obedeció a la creencia de que es necesario el concurso de las cinco mayores potencias mundiales para el mantenimiento de la paz. En consecuencia, a la hora de decidir cuál de los dos Estados chinos debe ser el que tiene su asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad, el único criterio lógico que puede aceptarse es el de que tal puesto corresponde al Estado chino que constituya una gran potencia mundial. Y, dentro de ese criterio de fuerza militar y económica que prevaleció al estructurar el Consejo de



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Seguridad, no cabe duda de que en el mismo momento en que se dé representación al nuevo estado denominado República Popular de China, a dicho estado nuevo le corresponde el asiento permanente en dicho organismo de seguridad.

CONVENIENCIA DEL INGRESO DE LA REPUBLICA POPULAR:

La delegación de Costa Rica reconoce, como queda dicho, que es "irreal" y contrario a la doctrina internacional sobre reconocimiento de gobiernos de facto, el negarle a la República Popular de China su condición de gobierno de facto firmemente arraigado en la China continental, y en pleno ejercicio de la jurisdicción sobre el territorio y la población de la mayor parte de lo que en 1945 fue la República de China. Considera igualmente que Naciones Unidas no puede realizar el principio de universalidad al que aspiraron sus fundadores, mientras un gobierno que ejerce jurisdicción sobre un vastísimo territorio y sobre más de 750 millones de habitantes, no esté debidamente representado en esta organización mundial. Ningún problema importante para la paz del mundo puede resolverse realísticamente sin la participación de un Estado que abarca casi una cuarta parte de la población del mundo. Resulta absurdo mantener una gran potencia nuclear como es la República Popular de China, al margen de las decisiones principales de Naciones Unidas, en tanto que se pretende exigirle que cumpla los acuerdos tomados sin su participación.

Por ello, Costa Rica, aunque en ninguna forma está dispuesta a votar la proposición albana, si desea, repito, que la República



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Popular de China esté representada en nuestra Organización y que ella ocupe un asiento permanente en el Consejo de Seguridad.

LA PROPOSICION QUE COPATROCINAMOS:

Por las razones expuestas, mi delegación tuvo mucho gusto en copatrocinar el proyecto de resolución preparado por la delegación de los Estados Unidos, que tiende precisamente a lograr esos objetivos. Pretendemos, mediante la aprobación de ese proyecto realista y justiciero, que la Asamblea afirme el derecho de representación que en Naciones Unidas tiene la República Popular de China y que recomiende que ocupe su lugar como uno de los cinco miembros permanentes del Consejo de Seguridad, todo ello sin perjuicio del derecho de la República de China a continuar representada en nuestra Organización.

La fórmula que hemos propuesto tiene la aparente desventaja de no ser aceptada por ninguno de los dos gobiernos chinos. Pero ello no debe ser óbice para que una mayoría de Estados miembros le otorguen su respaldo. Cabe considerar que no corresponde a los miembros de Naciones Unidas imponer soluciones que simplemente acojan el punto de vista de una de las partes en conflicto, sin tomar en cuenta la posición del otro. La tarea de la Asamblea debe ser, más bien, la de buscar fórmulas transaccionales que se acomoden a la realidad, como es la que proponemos. El hecho de que una de las dos partes en conflicto reaccione de inmediato en contra de la fórmula propuesta, no quiere decir que la fórmula sea mala. Si se



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cree que la solución es razonable --como lo es la que proponemos-- hay que ponerla en práctica y no dejarse amedrentar por las amenazas de rechazo de una o ambas partes directamente interesadas. Hay que esperar la reacción más reposada que esas partes habrán de tener una vez que la resolución haya sido aceptada. En el caso concreto, la delegación de Costa Rica considera que, a la larga, la República Popular de China no dejará de aprovechar la oportunidad de incorporarse a la Organización Mundial por el hecho de que el gobierno con asiento en Taiwan permanezca, como es debido, dentro de la organización. Ni cree, tampoco, que la República de China vaya a perder su puesto en Naciones Unidas por el hecho de que se admita la realidad de la existencia de un gobierno en la China continental y de que se le dé la representación que le corresponde en nuestra Organización mundial.

CUESTION IMPORTANTE:

Según sabemos, uno de los principales propósitos de la resolución albana es el de que la Asamblea expulse de Naciones Unidas a los representantes del Gobierno de la República de China. De aprobarse esa resolución, cosa que esperamos no ocurra, su efecto no sería otro que el de privar a un Miembro fundador de Naciones Unidas de los derechos y privilegios que le corresponden como integrante de nuestra Organización. Lo que en buenas cuentas no sería otra cosa que expulsar de Naciones Unidas a uno de sus Estados miembros.



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De acuerdo con el artículo 18, inciso 2° de la Carta de San Francisco, las resoluciones de la Asamblea General destinadas a la suspensión de los derechos y privilegios de un Estado miembro, o a su expulsión, deben catalogarse como cuestiones importantes, y por ello requieren el voto de dos tercios de los miembros presentes y votantes para ser aprobadas.

La delegación de Costa Rica sostiene que no puede caber la menor duda de que la proposición en debate, en cuanto pretende suprimir los derechos de representación del gobierno de la República de China, es una cuestión importante que, de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en el citado inciso 2 del artículo 18 de la Carta, sólo puede ser aprobada si obtiene un mínimo de votos equivalente a los dos tercios de los miembros presentes y votantes.

Se sentaría un precedente sumamente peligroso, especialmente para los estados pequeños, si en esta ocasión se hiciera caso omiso de las normas legales citadas, y se acordara, por simple mayoría, expulsar de Naciones Unidas a los representantes legítimos del Gobierno de la República de China.

Se ha arguido que la resolución albanesa no pretende expulsar a un Estado miembro, sino a los delegados de un gobierno que no representa al Estado chino. Pero esa argumentación efectista no resiste el menor análisis, porque está fundada en una premisa totalmente falsa, cual es la de que la República Popular de China ejerce, de hecho o de derecho, su jurisdicción sobre el territorio y los habitantes de Taiwan. Porque la verdad es, que, como



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reiteradamente lo he expuesto en el curso de esta intervención, la República de China con asiento en Taiwan es la continuadora jurídica del Estado chino cofundador de Naciones Unidas, y que, por lo tanto, en ningún momento ha perdido su condición de miembro de esta organización. De allí que, pese a todas las acrobacias legalistas que se quieran hacer, la expulsión de los representantes del Gobierno de Chiang Kai-shek implicaría dejar sin representación en Naciones Unidas a los delegados del gobierno de un Estado miembro, lo que definitivamente equivale a su expulsión. Y para tomar una resolución de tan grave naturaleza se requiere el voto de dos tercios de los miembros presentes y votantes de esta Asamblea, como categóricamente lo ordena el artículo 18 de la Carta.

Aun en la hipótesis --que mi delegación sólo admite por vía de argumentación,-- de que se estableciera que la resolución albana no implica la expulsión de un Estado miembro, aún en ese supuesto ilógico, la cuestión planteada tendría que considerarse como importante y por lo tanto para ser aprobada, requeriría un mínimo de dos tercios de los votos de los miembros presentes y votantes.

En efecto, una cuestión como la planteada por la proposición albana, sea cual fuera la interpretación que quiera dársele, afecta fundamentalmente la representación de un Estado miembro, y, por lo tanto, de acuerdo con la primera oración del artículo 18, de la Carta, es una cuestión de suma importancia.



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LOS PRECEDENTES:

Este problema de la representación de China, en la forma en que lo plantea la resolución albana, ha sido tratado siempre como una cuestión importante desde que se presentó por primera vez en 1961. No hay ninguna razón para que la Asamblea considere este año que el asunto tiene una importancia menor que en los anteriores. Nada ha ocurrido que disminuya la importancia de la cuestión para los delegados, para Naciones Unidas o para el Mundo.

Por el contrario, la importancia de la cuestión es mayor en el presente período de sesiones que en los anteriores, al punto de que el tema de este debate ha venido a ser el asunto central del vigésimo sexto período de sesiones de la Asamblea General. La importancia política que todas las delegaciones le han asignado al asunto planteado por la proposición de Albania y sus 17 copatrocinadores, hace imposible que, de buena fe, se arguya que la cuestión carece de importancia.

Según consta de las actas de la 191.ª sesión de la Mesa de la Asamblea General celebrada el 22 de setiembre de 1971, al discutir la inclusión del tema que hoy lleva el número 93, la mayoría de los proponentes de la resolución en debate manifestaron, uno tras otro, que la cuestión planteada por ellos era de la mayor importancia.

Así, por ejemplo, en la página 12 de la versión castellana del acta resumida correspondiente a la citada sesión, se informa que el señor Embajador Malile, de Albania, dijo que:



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"la restitución inmediata de los legítimos derechos de la República Popular de China es una cuestión de excepcional importancia para las Naciones Unidas, que afecta a su universalidad y a su funcionamiento según los principios y propósitos de la Carta."

En la página 15 de la misma acta resumida, se nos informa que el Embajador Ismail, de la República Democrática Popular del Yemén, dijo lo siguiente:

"La cuestión de China es un problema de importancia capital respecto del cual las Naciones Unidas tienen una gran responsabilidad."

En la página 17 de la misma acta resumida, leemos que otro miembro de una delegación proponente de la resolución en examen, el Embajador El-Shibib de Irak, dijo que:

"la cuestión de China es de vital importancia no sólo para su país, cuya posición al respecto es clara y bien conocida, sino para la paz mundial y el futuro de Naciones Unidas."

En la página 18 de la misma acta resumida se lee que el señor Embajador Mojsev, de Yugoslavia, dijo que:

"la restitución de los legítimos derechos de la República Popular de China en Naciones Unidas es tal vez la cuestión más importante con que se enfrentan las Naciones Unidas y la comunidad internacional."



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En términos semejantes, destinados a destacar la enorme importancia de la cuestión, se pronunciaron el señor Embajador Shahi de Paquistán, el señor Embajador Ecobescu de Rumania, y el señor Embajador Tomeh de la República Arabe Siria.

Mi delegación no atina a comprender cómo, en vista de las declaraciones de tan importantes miembros de las delegaciones proponentes, y en vista de las razones que aquí se han dado en el mismo sentido, pueda pretenderse que la Asamblea no catalogue como cuestión importante ésta que nos ha planteado el proyecto de resolución encabezado por Albania.

Por las razones expuestas sobre este punto procesal, mi delegación se ha unido a otras 19 delegaciones para solicitar de la Asamblea General que, naturalmente como acto previo a la votación sobre el proyecto albano, decida que toda proposición que diera por resultado privar a la República de China de representación en Naciones Unidas, es una cuestión importante con arreglo al Artículo 18 de la Carta.

Hago un llamado a todas las delegaciones, inclusive a las que apoyan la proposición albana, para que voten favorablemente esta resolución procesal de tanta trascendencia.

PRIORIDAD DEL PUNTO PROCESAL:

Dije que la resolución que hemos sometido calificando de cuestión importante todo asunto que, como el incluido en la resolución albanesa, tenga por resultado privar a la República de China de su legítima representación en Naciones Unidas,



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naturalmente debe votarse con prioridad, porque presumo que no se va a pretender que un proyecto que afecta la forma de votación de una cuestión de fondo, se vote con posterioridad al proyecto cuya calificación previa es indispensable para determinar el número de votos necesario para su aprobación.

Los precedentes sentados por la Asamblea General sobre este punto son definitivamente favorables a la tesis que acabo de sustentar. Siempre que sobre la votación de cualquier asunto se ha levantado la cuestión de su importancia, la Asamblea ha decidido resolver con prioridad el punto procesal. En lo que se refiere concretamente al asunto de la Representación de China y a la expulsión de los delegados del Gobierno de Chiang Kai-shek, la Asamblea ha decidido siempre, desde que en 1961 se presentó por primera vez el asunto, que debe votarse primero sobre la cuestión de procedimiento. Eso ha sido así, aun en los casos en que la resolución sobre cuestión importante fue introducida con posterioridad a la resolución denominada "Restitución de los Legítimos Derechos de la República Popular de China en Naciones Unidas."

No creo que en este caso exista razón válida alguna para modificar los precedentes establecidos durante diez años consecutivos. Las delegaciones que van a votar sobre la proposición albanesa tienen el derecho de saber cuál va a ser el efecto de su voto. Sobre todo aquéllas que hayan considerado la posibilidad de abstenerse, tienen que saber de antemano si la cuestión se



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cataloga como importante o no, porque sólo así podrán medir el efecto de su abstención comparado con un voto positivo o negativo.

Señor Presidente:

Espero confiado en que la Asamblea General no violentará en este caso principios de orden procesal tan fundamentales, y que, por tal motivo, votará en primer término, y en forma favorable, el proyecto de resolución que califica como cuestión importante cualquier proyecto de resolución que, como lo es, el sometido por Albania y otras delegaciones, pretende injustamente excluir de Naciones Unidas a los representantes legítimos de la República de China con asiento en Taiwan.

THE RISING TIDE

A bulletin of information and opinion from the
FREEDOM LEADERSHIP FOUNDATION, INC.

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COMMUNISM: A Social Science Perspective

By Dan Graydon Fefferman

It is obvious to any objective observer that communism is no longer a monolithic political movement with a unified direction. Some analysts believe that the fragmentation of the world Communist revolution invalidates some of the fundamental assumptions of American foreign policy regarding the "threat" of communism.

The Communist movement has changed, and our response to it must be flexible. Nevertheless, despite significant internal

contradictions and a degree of "liberalization," the Communist pattern of assumption of power, elimination of political competition, complete control of the mass media, forced mobilization of its population and subversion of other systems continues to repeat itself; communism remains today the greatest single threat to the growth of world freedom.

In analyzing the Communist movement, therefore, it may be helpful to develop a typology of Communist systems for the purpose of comparison, explanation and prediction of events, past, present and future.

WFI Opens!

The first World Freedom Institute (WFI) Fall workshop and conference drew delegates from across the nation to Washington, D.C. over Labor Day weekend. The first of its kind, the conference marked the beginning of a new level of FLF participation and commitment, as well as the launching of FLF's Leadership Training program through the WFI.

Highlighting the conference were seminars on Marxist theory and its historical development, area studies by the FLF research staff, strategy and goal-setting sessions, films, regional reports and workshops in techniques of organization.

On Labor Day afternoon, many conference delegates participated in a demonstration sponsored by the Christian Political Union (CPU) urging President Nixon to clarify his position on China and warning him that his trip to Peking is likely to do more harm than good unless he makes it clear that he plans to do more than pay tribute to Mao.

Culminating the conference were two scholarly and inspirational orators, Prof. Justus van der Kroef and journalist Allen Brownfeld, who spoke on Communist China and the crisis of the American spirit, respectively.

Conferees returned to their home cities with a renewed commitment and broadened perspective, confident that something *can* be done to reopen channels for rational dialogue on the campus, expose the wrong ideas resulting from the permeation of Marxist thinking in our society, and eventually win the intellectual and ideological victory over the despairing attitudes which threaten our country's survival as a responsible world leader and champion of freedom.

The WFI staff looks forward to more such successful conferences, provided that the necessary funds can be raised. That's where you come in. FLF needs to raise \$50,000 by the end of the year for the WFI program to continue. All contributions are tax-exempt, so please give as generously as you can—**TODAY—We need your help now.**

MORE NAMES

FLF wants to expand the circulation of *THE RISING TIDE*. If you know anyone (or several people) who might like to receive a complimentary copy, please send us his or her address as soon as possible.

TYPOLOGIES WITHIN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM*

CLASSICAL: The classical Communist system is based upon an advanced industrial society in which the socio-economic revolution has projected the working class into power as a result of natural dialectical processes culminating in the dictatorship of the proletariat (including large elements of the rural and urban bourgeoisie). Privilege and parasitism are gotten rid of by the leveling of wealth and inheritance through a state-controlled economy in accord with the will of the vast majority of the people. No existing system fits or even approximates this model, nor is there any substantial evidence to suggest that such goals are even being approached in existing Communist systems.

In **THE BOLSHEVIK MODEL** an elite revolutionary "vanguard" inherits an existing national state structure through violent rebellion. Power remains in the hands of the educated urban elite, which seeks to conduct a one-generation socialist industrial revolution to establish the necessary pre-conditions for the transition to communism. A one-party structure, the government develops along technical-bureaucratic lines, resulting in a static rather than dynamic governmental sector. This model is, of course, relevant to the Soviet Union, but also to some East European systems.

The mainstream **EAST EUROPEAN MODEL** is characterized by the influence of external (Soviet) power to gain or maintain control; united front politics manipulated legally,

(continued on page 4)

Economic Progress in Taiwan

By Edwin K. Ang

Chin-fan

The current radical line on Nationalist China considers Taiwan a corrupt puppet regime and a decadent outpost of American imperialism fighting against the benevolent rule and Great Thought of the beloved leader Chairman Mao. Taiwan, say the radicals, only survived because it is propped up by American dollars. It will eventually collapse, and the "people" (as represented by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party) will triumph. We hope this article offers a more substantial and objective perspective.

The remarkable success of Taiwan's economic development is currently drawing the thoughtful attention of public administration officials, economists, and businessmen from the developed and developing countries in both the Communist and non-Communist world. Three major reasons may be cited. First, from a condition of economic backwardness characterized by rampant inflation, critical shortage of basic necessities, rapid population increase, a heavy defense burden, war-crippled industries and infrastructure, and social and political instability, Taiwan has emerged in the early 1960's with a healthy and vigorous economy maintaining a yearly growth rate of over 9% in real terms. Secondly, Taiwan has the distinction of being one of the few developing countries to have terminated U.S. concessional aid on account of a successful transition to sustained development. Thirdly, the success is generally attributable to the government's policy of taking a pragmatic and ideologically non-dogmatic approach to development, and of fostering individual initiative in agriculture and industry. The response of private enterprise to the market mechanism and its incentives has contributed much to Taiwan's growth.

Because of its small size, the island is necessarily limited in the quantity and variety of natural resource endowments as well as in the domestic market. Resources consist mainly of agricultural land, timber land, fisheries, coal, dolomite and natural gas; and efforts are constantly under way to further develop these resources at economic cost. Taiwan will increasingly continue to import raw materials, and minerals. The disproportionately large number of technical, professional, and administrative personnel from the mainland have been able, with the cooperation of a well-disciplined and adaptable labor force, to use these resources effectively. In contrast to most developing countries, which seek to solve their trade problems through import substitution, Taiwan has made export promotion a cardinal principle of its trade and development policy. No effort could have been so richly rewarded, however, without the powerful effect of U.S. aid that was injected into the economy at a crucial junction in a highly fluctuating economic, military, and political milieu.¹

The Taiwan economy has in the post-aid period maintained a very high rate of growth, despite adverse effects from typhoons in 1967 and 1969. Real Gross National Product rose by 10.14% in 1967, 10.10% in 1968, and 8.66% in 1969. These high growth rates were again sustained by increased investment, rapid expansion of agriculture, industry, and foreign trade.

Long-term positive economic trends have continued while U.S. AID funds are being displaced by funds from the U.S.



An FLF associate in Berkeley, Mr. Ang is currently completing his doctoral studies at the University of California. This article was excerpted from his Ph.D. thesis: *An Econometric Evaluation of the Economy of Taiwan*.

Export-Import Bank, World Bank and Japanese yen credit agreements.

In 1969, Taiwan's national product is estimated at NT (New Taiwan dollars) \$164.1 billion in 1964 prices, representing an annual growth rate, measured in constant prices, of more than 8% over the past 15 years. The engines for this remarkable expansion have been investment and exports. During 1960-1969 exports and gross domestic investment have increased in real terms at an annual rate of 19.0% and 16.2% respectively. Gross National Product by 1979 is expected to exceed NT \$415.9 billion, in 1964's prices, for an average annual growth rate of more than 9%. This exceeds the 7% growth rate projected in the Chinese fifth four-year plan, (1969-1972) and may be somewhat optimistic. Much depends on the size of the military burden and also upon the investment in urgently needed housing, both of which subtract from capital available for agricultural and industrial expansion.

The next ten years will see Taiwan progressing toward a higher level of industrialization. The government's fifth four-year plan emphasizes the advanced industries requiring heavy capital equipment and modern technology, such as petrochemicals, shipbuilding, automobiles and tractors, machinery and metals. Continued attention will be directed toward the future development of labor-intensive manufactures, such as electronics, building materials, and canned goods. With this economic resource and activity base, Taiwan will be able to expand its international market as advanced countries such as Switzerland, Belgium, Israel, and Japan have done in a comparable stage of development.

¹ For a comprehensive analysis of U.S. aid in Taiwan, see Neil H. Jacoby, *U.S. Aid to Taiwan: A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-help and Economic Development*, 1967)

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FISHING

Dale Frayer, FLF Research Intern

While the United States softens its commitments to its allies and reorders priorities to alleviate the tense situation at home, the Soviet Union continues to build toward military superiority and has gained significant advantages in many areas (see TIDE last issue). This article examines one aspect of this phenomenon: Soviet fishing policy and its relationship to international naval power.

What's that, Fidel?

The August 16 edition of the *Washington Post* reported on a recent speech by Fidel Castro chiding the U.S. about its relatively poor showing at the recent Pan American Games in Cali, Colombia.

Castro, the *Post* reported, said that in the past the United States earned more medals at the Pan American Games than all Latin American countries combined. But this year, due to the Cuban victories (Cuba finished second to the U.S.) the total Latin American medals topped the American medals. "Castro added that Cuba had made no secret of the fact that the country had received aid in sports as well as many other things from 'brother Socialist countries.' And he said he hoped in the future that other Latin American countries would develop the same conditions for sports that Cuba now has."

Wrote the *Post*, "Sports in Cuba, like most of life in Cuba, is often depicted as one unending struggle against the United States. And Castro reflected this approach in his speech. 'In spite of all the efforts of imperialists, in spite of all their crimes against our country to try to frustrate her efforts in favor of man, our country is prospering and advancing.' The spirit of the Cuban team reflects the spirit of the Cubans who staved off the Bay of Pigs attack and the spirit of the Cuban revolution, Castro said."

On August 18, another (much shorter) *Post* story gave a slightly different perspective. The lead paragraph of that story: "Bogota, Colombia, Aug. 17 (UPI). Four Cubans who defected from their country's team at the Pan American Games in Cali have asked for political asylum in Panama, it was reported today."

And a week later Castro announced that the U.S.-sponsored air lift transporting refugees from Cuba to the United States (which has a waiting list of tens of thousands) would be discontinued: No more Cubans will be allowed to leave the island for the United States.

What's that he said about the spirit of the Cuban revolution?

Man has always been a predator of the sea who affects the natural biological balance. Today, however, the oceanic ecological question has become an issue which demands immediate international attention. Thus, the United Nations has proposed a conference on the Law of the Sea, to be held in Geneva in 1973. However, if Soviet merchant fishing policies do not change substantially, that conference is not likely to produce the necessary agreements to deal with the impending ecological crisis.

The evidence for such a statement is substantial, particularly in the case of Soviet fishing policy off the coast of the United States. Fisheries Institute reports and recent Senate testimony indicate an alarming exploitation of red herring in the Chesapeake Bay area. Russian ships have swept up in their nets such a great percentage of this anadromous species that insufficient numbers were able to return up river to spawn. Result: present supply of red herring depleted; likelihood of replenishment remote. Haddock, flounder, mackerel and others have nearly reached extinction in some areas near the American coast, largely because of Soviet fishing policies. All of our northern coastal areas are depleted and the South Atlantic is being heavily fished right now, as are the waters off the Pacific coast and Alaska.

Despite its vast coastline, the United States has slipped as a world fishing power. Our fleets are incapable of traveling the high seas, and their equipment is geared to yielding only one type of fish. When the supply of fish of that type is depleted in their area, our boats must return to the docks. As the boats sit idle at dockside the repercussions extend beyond the fisherman's family to many facets of the marine industry. Moreover, American dealers, seemingly unconcerned with the long range results of exploitative fishing techniques, have brought into the American market an increasing number of the cheaper foreign catches.

What are the techniques which give the Soviet fleets such an advantage? The Russians use large ocean-going vessels under the direction of a mother ship. One group of these ships does the research, going ahead of the rest of the fleet to determine what areas are ripe for fishing. Each fleet includes complete processing, packing and refrigeration facilities, enabling the fleets to span the oceans without returning to port. Unmolested by net size restrictions, the Russians use nets with so small a mesh that they can literally "vacuum" the ocean floor.

Modern sonar equipment further enhances production and creates a valuable by-product. The fleets are capable of charting the ocean depths to discover Polaris and other U.S. submarine locations, as well as keeping track of their own submarines. Complementing this activity the Russian fleets perform the role of surface surveillance, often with sophisticated electronic equipment.

Thus it is clear that Soviet fishing techniques bear more than simply economic significance, extending into the area of military strategy as well. However unprincipled Soviet maritime policy may seem, one should consider that within the context of Russian Marxist-Leninist theory (which still sees human history as building toward world communization under Soviet direction), such policies are not without "justification."

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COMMUNISM: A Social Science Perspective

(continued from page 1)

quasi-legally and illegally to produce pro-Soviet ascendancy; a relatively high initial reliance on terror as a means of gaining both submission and mobilization; and a command economy imposed usually unsuccessfully on the population (especially the peasants). This model is particularly relevant to Rumania, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia but many of its characteristics may be applied to other East European systems.

The typical *ASIAN COMMUNIST SYSTEM* emerges from a guerrilla movement and maintains guerrilla characteristics for at least its first few decades. It inherits societies with lengthy and deep-rooted social traditions but little foundation as nation-states. The Asian Communist regime must deal with a strong family-centrist tradition and consequently relies heavily on small group techniques for ideological indoctrination and political mobilization in order to replace the family with the state as the primary social unit and frame of reference. It therefore allows a lower degree of privatism and less looseness.

We are indebted to Dr. Robert A. Scalapino of the University of California at Berkeley, whose graduate seminar on comparative Communist systems produced the above typology.

Of course such categorizations have their limitations. There is considerable overlapping, and each "model" is relevant to a given society only to a certain degree and not always in every characteristic outlined. Moreover, additional categories may be necessary for "quasi-Communist" systems such as Cuba or contemporary Yugoslavia, and the newly emerging regimes such as in Chile may or may not develop within the scope of the models here presented. Nevertheless, such typologies are useful in that they offer an overall perspective which can serve as a framework in dealing with many questions relating to communism.

It should become clear through the use of such models—now accepted as valid analytical tools by most western social scientists—that communism remains a great hindrance to the growth of creativity and freedom in the societies which it has overtaken.

Freedom may be a philosophical concept and its definition depends largely on psychological, moral and religio-ideological factors; but to fail to recognize communism as an immediate if not permanent stifler of freedom—and as a system whose long-range goal is the complete elimination of alternative views of the universe by any means feasible—is to be unscientific at the very least.



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Mr. George Bush
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Herb - This is same copy
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I transferred all your changes
to copy 2. gave Mike (who I
DRAFT father gave it to Bush).

M. Reiss

October 11, 1971

Opening Statement by Ambassador Bush on Chinese Representation
GA Plenary, about October 18, 1971

Mr. President:

For 22 years the question of the representation of the great nation of China in the United Nations has been a major international issue -- a troublesome and intractable one.

In the history of this issue the year 1971 can be, and ought to be, a year of change and decision.

For 21 years the Assembly faced, on this question, only two stark alternatives. We could either leave things as they were, with no representation here for the enormous population of the Chinese mainland, or we could agree to a formula which, in a single stroke, would make room for the People's Republic of China by expelling the Republic of China, a member in good standing. [As to this latter step, the Assembly has always been aware of its drastic nature and fateful implications for the UN -- and year after year has refused to take it, even though this meant prolonging the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from this organization. So the situation remained frozen.

Now, everybody has known, all through those years, that there was a third possibility. Instead of throwing out one of these Chinese governments to make room for the other, it was

perfectly possible for the United Nations to accommodate them both. The fact that discussion of such a solution was highly distasteful to the settled policies of both was not, in itself, a conclusive argument against it, since the peaceful solution of conflict situations very often requires difficult decisions. So there was a constant undercurrent of discussion about a way to accommodate both these realities within the UN.

However, until very recently this approach did not gain much headway. This was only partly because both the parties opposed it. More fundamentally, I think, it was because the general attitude of the People's Republic of China toward the outside world, including the United Nations, during most of this period was hostile and aloof. There was strong reason to doubt whether a government in that frame of mind could usefully participate in the UN. And, hence, there was doubt that it would be worth while to laboriously hammer out a formula for achieving this. Given the cold and forbidding attitude in Peking, most members -- and the United States, frankly, was one of these -- were content to see the issue presented in the old way, and fully expected that the perennial Albanian resolution would still fail to muster the necessary majority. And it did fail, year after year, usually by wide margins.

Now that situation has changed. The People's Republic of China has in many ways moderated its attitude and its conduct toward the outside world and toward the United Nations. It has actively sought normal contact with many countries. And it has ~~made~~ known its positive desire to sit in the United Nations -- a marked change from its attitude of aloofness and disdain in earlier years.

Finally, this year, after more than two years of silence, the People's Republic of China has responded affirmatively to the overtures of President Nixon for better relations and for direct contact at the highest level between itself and the United States. These overtures were an important new step in American policy, a step designed as one major element in our country's basic objective of a more stable and peaceful world.

In these changed circumstances it has become increasingly clear that the past pattern of UN decision [-- amounting to an annual decision not to expel the Republic of China as the price for admitting the People's Republic --] is no longer sufficient. The time in history has arrived to find a way, both realistic and just -- however difficult that may be -- by which to welcome the People's Republic of China into the UN without unacceptable damage to other interests. It must be a way which would avoid the unacceptable route of expelling a law-abiding and faithful member. It should be a way that could command the assent of a

sufficient majority in the General Assembly. My Government set out to develop such a proposal, and in the process we consulted with very nearly the whole membership of the UN.

In embarking on this course my Government was well aware of the difficulties. For many years the issue had been posed in sharp black-and-white terms and positions had been frozen on each side. But we went ahead in the belief that this year ought to be, and could be, a year of decision -- and that the decision must be sound and realistic and just, and not one which this Organization would later have cause to regret.

In this spirit we proceeded to shape an alternative to the Albanian Resolution. ~~[the first real alternative ever offered in this Assembly.]~~ The result is embodied in a draft resolution whose text appears in document A/L.63³. It is sponsored by ^{nineteen} members including the United States.

~~[As a framework for this proposal, and a sign of our serious intent, we offered, and the Assembly agreed to inscribe, a new agenda item which is now before us, and which bears an appropriately non-prejudicial, noncontentious title: "The Representation of China in the United Nations."]~~

Our draft resolution is short and carefully worded. I shall read it at this point:

((Read text of DR resolution.))

I need comment only briefly on this draft resolution. Its terms are simple and direct. In essence, it would recommend that the People's Republic of China take over China's place as a permanent member of the Security Council, and would provide representation both for the People's Republic of China and for the Republic of China in the General Assembly.

The sponsors of this resolution believe it is the most realistic, pragmatic and equitable solution to this problem. Under its terms,

-- the Republic of China, which governs 14 million people, would retain a place in the General Assembly instead of being summarily and unjustly ejected;

-- the People's Republic, with its enormous extent and population, would no longer be excluded from the General Assembly and, in addition, would occupy the Chinese seat in the Security Council;

-- all the people of China would thus at last be represented in the United Nations by the governments which for over 20 years have actually governed them.

Moreover, this resolution, while achieving these things, has been carefully written in order to avoid any prejudice to various related matters. ^{TP} It does not ask Member States to alter their recognition policies or their bilateral relations.

It does not in any way purport to divide China into two separate states or to commit those who vote for it on how they may in future regard the legal or diplomatic situation of the parties involved. It does not take either a "two Chinas" position, or a "one-China-one-Taiwan" position, or any other position on that subject. It is ^{simply} founded on the reality of the present situation as we all know it to be, but it does not seek to freeze that situation for the future. On the contrary, it expressly states in the preamble that a solution should be sought without prejudice to a future settlement.

I know well from our discussions with other delegations during the past ~~two~~ months that some would prefer more detailed and explicit language as to the legal aspects of the step we propose, since there is no exact precedent for it in UN history. I have great respect for this point of view but I do not share it. It is unavoidable that what we propose should be new and without precedent, because the situation with which it deals is new and without precedent. If we attempt now, at this stage, to state explicitly all the legal aspects and meanings of what we propose to do, then I very much fear that we might become so tied up in legal disputations that we would miss this historic opportunity to act. ^{while seeking a result compatible} Therefore the sponsors decided to ^{details} leave [^] (these) legal (issues) to one side.

with the Law of the Charter

[That is the nature of this proposal we have placed before you. It is the ~~only~~ realistic, equitable and viable proposal to solve this historic problem of Chinese representation.]

There is one other proposal, and only one, before the Assembly: the Albanian resolution. It would not only admit the People's Republic of China but would also, in the same stroke, "forthwith" expel the Republic of China from the UN and all its organs.

That act of expulsion, fellow delegates, is the issue before us. Both sides agree that the People's Republic of China should be admitted and should sit in the Security Council as a permanent member. One essential point divides us: whether to retain or to expel the Republic of China.

I submit that the course of expulsion, first, is most ill-advised and dangerous as a precedent in the UN, and, second, is an unnecessary price for the entry of the People's Republic of China into this organization. Let me give my reasons for both these points.

First, as to expulsion as a precedent.

In the 26-year history of the UN, no member has been expelled or deprived of its seat. In fact, the whole trend has been the other way -- so that the original 51-nation membership is now ~~(up to)~~ 131, including an immense variety of sizes and political systems. Yet here it is proposed that a ~~sitting member~~ ^{member in good standing} ~~a~~

government over 14 million people, with no Charter violations against its name and in fact a most constructive record, ^{and} should be expelled utterly from the UN and all its agencies -- solely because certain ^{other} governments deny its legitimacy.

And let us remember realistically that, once expelled, the likelihood of the Republic of China ever being readmitted to the UN as a separate member, under whatever name or label, would be approximately zero -- given the fact that under the Charter ^{a proposal for its} ~~(such)~~ admission could be vetoed by the People's Republic of China.

If the Assembly is going to travel down that road, where do we stop? Who can predict what UN member will be next? Surely there is many another member in this organization which, though fully in possession of (its own) territory and governmental powers, could one day become the target of some political combination in this very hall, aiming to throw it out of the UN solely because its right to govern is disputed by others.

If we are going to start playing with the right of members to sit in this organization, as if that right were a chip in some international poker game, we will have started the UN itself down a ^{perilous} ~~(dangerous)~~ and slippery slope. ^{We think} Such a step ~~would~~ ^{might or might not greatly} affect the world outside these ^{no instantly} halls, ~~(but it would)~~ profoundly affect the UN itself. It would lead away from universality, away from realism, and toward

factionalism, recrimination and irrelevancy. It could well tear this organization apart.

And it would cause many people in many countries -- including my own country, I can assure you -- to question very seriously what hopes for world peace continue to reside in this organization.

We should frankly face the fact that this session of the UN Assembly cannot and should not try to write the last chapter in the history of China's relations with itself or with the rest of the world. We should concentrate on writing today's chapter in the history of China's relations with the UN. If we can do that, and do it right, we will have accomplished a great deal and, I believe, will have given the UN a new lease on life.

This leads me to my second point. There are those who argue that the Republic of China has to be expelled, however regrettable that is, simply because the People's Republic has announced in advance that it will not participate on any other basis. I respect the sincerity of those who make this argument, ^{but} / for several reasons, I do not agree.

In the first place, there is an implication here that for the People's Republic to be asked to reconsider its announced position on this point would be asking too much. But surely

all governments, including the People's Republic of China, must change -- and have changed -- their attitudes on some issues in order to resolve international problems. On this particular problem of who is to speak for China in the organs of the United Nations -- including the Security Council -- surely others have made concessions and moved from long-held positions, and it is neither unrealistic nor unfair that the People's Republic of China should do its part.

Besides -- and this is a most important point -- the formula we have proposed has been most carefully written to avoid placing any unnecessary difficulties in Peking's way. The resolution neither says nor implies that there are "two Chinas" or "one China and one Taiwan." It does not attempt to define the present status, or to prejudice the future status, of either the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China, or the relations between them, or their relations with other countries. It does not say that its terms shall settle forever the Chinese representation issue in the UN, no matter what happens in the future. It simply provides that, given the existing state of affairs, the People's Republic of China, which is not in the UN, should come in and should take over the Security Council seat; and that the Republic of China, which is in the UN, should remain in the UN. The resolution does not,

to be sure, accept the claims of Peking with respect to the Republic of China or Taiwan; but neither does it deny or reject or prejudice those claims. It is completely silent on them. Nothing, consistent with the realities of the situation, could be less prejudicial ~~(or difficult for Peking to accept.)~~

The fact is that nobody can know for sure how Peking will react to the adoption of this resolution until it is adopted. Naturally, until that moment, it is perfectly legitimate and standard tactics to say "no" in the most categorical and seemingly irreversible terms to this obviously distasteful resolution -- in the obvious hope of causing the resolution to be defeated. Others in this body, in similar situations, have done the same -- only to show a surprising flexibility after the fact. The adoption of the "dual representation" resolution will create a new situation in which, for the first time, it will become necessary for all concerned to look at the facts and decide how they will act. When that moment comes, and not before, ^{it will be possible to know} ~~we will find out~~ whether or not the People's Republic will accept this ^{fair} ~~(entirely non-prejudicial)~~ invitation to take its place in the United Nations.

For all these reasons, then, I commend to the General Assembly the ^{19-power} [(18-power?)] draft resolution known as the "dual representation" resolution.

-- It is a new approach responsive to a new and more hopeful situation in the relations between China and the world.

-- It provides, for the first time, effective representation in the United Nations for all the people under the two Chinese governments that exist.

-- It realistically provides that the People's Republic of China, which governs the largest population of any government on earth, should occupy the Security Council seat.

-- It avoids the expulsion of the Republic of China, ^{and} an ~~unnecessary~~ unrealistic, dangerous, irreversible ~~and unnecessary~~ step which is the distinguishing feature of the Albanian resolution.

-- It carefully avoids any attempt to prejudice or foreclose the ultimate solution of any of the disputed issues relating to China, or to affect the recognition policies or bilateral relations of any member.

Fellow delegates, the time has come for the United Nations to settle this question -- and to do so in a way that will be just to all parties, realistic in its reflection of the facts, and constructive for the United Nations and its members. I

believe that can be done, and that the Dual Representation resolution will do it. By contrast, the expulsion of a member in good standing, which would result from the Albanian resolution, is unrealistic, unnecessary, and dangerous in the highest degree for the future of the UN.

It is for this reason that the United States and its co-sponsors have also proposed a second resolution, under which a proposal to ^{expel or exclude} ~~expel or exclude~~ the Republic of China ^{of} ~~representation in the UN~~ ~~from the UN~~ is an important question within the meaning of article 18 of the Charter, thus requiring a two-thirds vote for adoption. It is only logical that this procedural point should be settled before the voting on the substantive resolutions, and accordingly my delegation will request priority in the voting for the ^{this "non-expulsion"} ~~"important question"~~ resolution. WJH

Mr. President and fellow delegates, the question before us is the most serious and important that will face the Assembly in this session or, possibly, for years to come. Let me assure you that the United States approaches it in a most serious and forthright spirit. Contrary to some reports, my country is not engaged in an elaborate maneuver to perpetuate the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the UN. ^{TP} Nor, on the other hand, are we merely going through the motions of seeking to assure the continued representation of the Republic of China. We seriously want to see both these entities in the UN. As all

members must know, we have devoted major diplomatic energies to this cause. We know well, and the People's Republic knows well, that our policy and theirs on this question are not the same. This need not and does not interfere with the plans for President Nixon's visit or with the mutual desire of the two sides to develop better contact with each other. The question of Chinese representation in the UN ^{has not been bargained over or discussed} ~~in any way~~ in United States contacts with the People's Republic of China and as far as my Government is concerned it will not be.

Indeed, nothing could more clearly demonstrate the seriousness with which my Government presents this proposal to the Assembly than the fact that we do so at the very moment in history in which at last we seek to develop direct and, if possible, constructive contacts with the People's Republic of China and to help end its isolation from the world. We have said, and we mean it, that as far as the United States is concerned these contacts will not be at the expense of any other party.

Many difficult issues surround the relations of the Chinese People's Republic with the rest of the world. They cannot all be resolved overnight. We in this Assembly certainly cannot resolve them all by any amount of resolution-making. What we can do is to decide -- here, now at long last -- the vexing

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